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ELITE MIGRATION FROM THE LIBERAL TO THE LABOUR PARTY, 1917-1924,
AND THE INTERACTION WITH POPULAR POLITICS THROUGH
THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL.

BY

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VOLUME 1 OF 3.

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Elite Migration from the Liberal to the Labour Party, 1917 - 1924, and the interaction with Popular Politics through the Union of Democratic Control.

Abstract of Thesis

Following a preface indicating aims, Chapter 1 outlines the general situation of European elites in 1914 and the particular problem of an elite attempting to re-direct British public opinion in war-time through the agency of a pressure group. In Chapter 2 the aims and organisation of the U.D.C. are outlined. Chapter 3 indicates the nature of the U.D.C.'s involvement in popular politics: the membership; connections with organised labour; branch proliferation; structure of communication flow; commitment to special effort in popular education; reactionary response to the U.D.C.; the stimulus of 1917; the Union's change of policy after the Versailles settlement and retreat from immediate popular involvement. Chapter 4 is concerned with the factors involved in the Liberal U.D.C. elite's migration to Labour: the nature of the migration from 1917 to 1924; 'rejective' pressures and reformulatory forces; the dilemma of Radical allegiance illustrated in the correspondence of E.D. Morel; the common background and diverse pathways of nine prominent Liberal U.D.C. migrants to Labour. In Chapter 5 the factors connected with the U.D.C.'s interaction with popular politics and the Liberal elite's migration to Labour are reviewed and reinforced. The place of the U.D.C. within the background of pressure groups is outlined and the Union's connections with the women's movement and pacifist groups are indicated. Some wider ideological implications of Liberal-Labour definitions are discussed and the U.D.C.'s intervention in Labour Party politics is considered, with special reference to its influence upon the construction of a more sophisticated foreign policy. Chapter 5 concludes that the U.D.C. provided a pathway for Liberal elite migration to Labour after 1917 and that the Union's intervention in popular politics was significant. The appendices include a review of the ideological background and a brief consideration of the U.D.C. elite's 'pro-German involvement'.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- BIHR "Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research".
- B.L.P.E.S. British Library of Political and Economic Science, London.
- B.S.P. British Socialist Party.
- CMH Cambridge Modern History.
- CR "The Contemporary Review".
- Cttee. Committee.
- CW (followed by volume number) Collected Works.
- CX Publication banned by censor.
- D.N.B.Supp. Dictionary of National Biography and Supplements to 1970.
- D.N.B. Sup. 61-70. Dictionary of National Biography 1961-1970.
- D.O.R.A. Defence of the Realm Act.
- ESR "European Studies Review".
- Exec. Executive.
- Fedn. Federation.
- F.O.R. Fellowship of Reconciliation.
- Gen. General.
- H,DDC (followed by locatory reference) Brynmor Jones University
Library, Hull, U.D.C. Archive.
- HEI "History of European Ideas".
- HY "History".
- I.L.P. Independent Labour Party.
- Inaug. Inaugural.
- IR "The Independent Review".
- JMH "Journal of Modern History".
- Lab. Pty. or LP Labour Party.
- L.R.C. Labour Representation Committee.
- M473 (followed by locatory reference) Morel Collection, British
Library of Political and Economic Science, London.

Min. Minute or Minutes.

Mtg. Meeting.

N.C.C.L. National Council for Civil Liberties.

N.C.F. No-Conscription Fellowship.

NL Freedon, M., The New Liberalism, an ideology of social reform,

Oxford, 1978.

NR "Nineteenth-Century Review".

NUR National Union of Railwaymen.

Parl. Parliamentary.

PP "Past and Present".

Rpt. Report.

Sec. Secretary or Secretary's.

TC Trades Council.

TLC Trades and Labour Council.

Treas. or Hon. Treas. Henerary Treasurer.

U.D.C. Union of Democratic Control.

Preface

The following propositions involve a number of interlocking factors. The Liberal leadership of the Union of Democratic Control (U.D.C.) constituted an identifiable group of the Radical elite which entered the ranks of Labour between 1917 and 1924. The cause which linked this group in collaboration with some of the I.L.P. leaders was the effort to persuade public opinion that democratic control of foreign policy was of essential importance to every citizen. The formation of the U.D.C. in 1914, as a pressure group which aimed at widespread support, entailed the interaction of the elite with popular politics during a period of acute social and political stress. Intervention in popular politics from 1914 until 1919 brought to the Union's Liberal leadership a sharpened perception of the nature of mass society, which contributed to the reformulation of their political adherence in the years 1917 to 1924. However, there were factors in the Radical leaders' personal political outlook before 1914 which adumbrated a potential change of allegiance. Their close association as colleagues in the management of a highly controversial organisation was conducive to a strong feeling of group identity and formed a focus which helped to precipitate an awareness that Radical hopes for the future now lay with the Labour Party.

The fundamental background to these linked developments is provided by the ideological setting which had evolved during the previous century. This complex phenomenon has been reserved for review in an appendix in order to avoid a discordant juxtaposition of highly general and theoretical considerations with the analysis of the very particular and practical political concerns of the U.D.C.

Twentieth century history presents enormous problems in the multi-faceted availability of large quantities of sources in a profusion of media. The selection of even that material which is

most directly concerned with any subject of investigation is fraught with the apprehension that it is often extremely difficult to demonstrate the ultimate irrelevance of matter which has been excluded. The arguments adduced to support the propositions above, which concern the U.D.C. elite migration and interaction with popular politics are overwhelmingly based on personal research in manuscript and other primary sources.

CHAPTER 1.

Introduction

In August 1914, the position of members of European elites who were at variance with their nation's official enthusiasm for the war was one of hazardous exposure and isolation. The initial response of many amounted to an acceptance of fate with silent despair.

The shock of war sharply increased a general pressure upon elites towards self-definition which had been a persistent, if variable, factor, concomitant with the emergence of mass society during the nineteenth century. Command of technological developments, such as the railway and telegraph had generally assisted the governing classes to maintain their control, as had their access to improved educational facilities, once the potential of these had been realised. Command of the public platform and the press had often been used to sustain older elite groups by way of a demagogic manipulation of the media of communication. The ruled had by no means always been able to improve their position as a result of popular education, which was often provided by those who were thus enabled to place thoughts more compellingly into the minds of the newly literate.

The need for elites to re-shape their methodology of control in conditions of mass society had been considered seriously by several theorists in the generation before 1914. Gaetano Mosca¹ believed that the political elite would be obliged to maintain its ascendancy through the imposition of 'political formulae' upon the consciousness of the less educated mass of society. However, Mosca recognised that such formulae must be in tune with the general psychological and cultural background of the society to which they were applied. Mosca's ideas represent an early articulation of a strategy to by-pass the

1. See Mosca, G. The Ruling Class, London, 1896.

conscious awareness of material conditions by appealing to the non-rational depths of the less educated masses, who were ultra-responsive to intuitive stimuli.

Robert Michels¹ noted the process of professionalization among European elites, exemplified by the reinforcement and agglomeration of the British elite through the Public School system. He considered that this development represented a safe path by which order could be maintained in the threatened chaos of mass society. In sociological terms he named his concept "the iron law of oligarchy".

Vilfredo Pareto² complemented the conservative rationale of Mosca and the liberal-bourgeois buttress provided by Michels with a consideration of elites in conditions of revolutionary socialism. He began by accepting Marx's view of the triumph of the proletariat, but prophesied that one elite would simply be supplanted by another after a period of chaos. Pareto believed that innate differences in human beings would re-assert themselves under socialism in the form of a "circulation of elites". However, Pareto's later work reflects a growing awareness of the influence of the non-rational within mass society and the need of elites to devise a method to harness it to their mechanisms of control. Pareto designated as 'Sentiments' the permanent and directly observable characteristics of the mind. Behaviour which could be related wholly or partially to causes irrational to the 'Sentiments' he called 'Residues'. He believed that the skilled implantation by elites of rhetorical structures that provided a pseudo-rationale to interact with the residue was the prime criterion of elite success in conditions of mass society. Pareto

1. See Michels, R., Political Parties, a Social Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies in Modern Democracy, London, 1911.

2. See Pareto, V., Socialist Systems, London, 1902
and Pareto, V., The Mind and Society, London, 1916.

called such structures 'derivations'. His work during the First World War adumbrated the emergence of groups armed with the new power of psychological insight, able to impose their thoughts upon the multitude with the help of communications then in the process of accelerated technological improvement.

The situation of European elites by 1914 was such that in each society the search was on to propound a corpus of political ideas in terms which were sufficiently familiar to be recognised by the generality as parallel to the terms in which everyday problems were debated. In Britain before the First World War the narrowly-based socialist elite was out-performed in the effort to promote the general recognition of political principle by the reformulatory debate carried on through public means by the New Liberals. However, the highly personal solution of charismatic leadership in the championship of a "cause", definable by slogan, was an element, divisive within the elite, which was clearly in evidence before 1914. The catholic folds of the established political parties were partly transcended before the war by the followings of the neo-caesars, first Chamberlain, then Lloyd George, with Churchill also entering the personality contest to win control of the public's political ear.

The political question which faced British elites in 1914, the problem of how to influence the direction of mass society, was further complicated by the very slow development of class consciousness in the world's first mass proletariat. British workers often remained obdurately attached to their general local communities rather than to the larger proletarian world. Trades union activity bespoke a growing class awareness, but Lichtheim¹ emphasises the important distinction

1. See Lichtheim, G., A Short History of Socialism, New York, 1970. Ch. 8 - 9.

that British working class consciousness was predominantly 'corporate' in nature. British working people generally looked towards reform of a society whose basic assumptions they tacitly or overtly accepted. They did not, in the large majority of non-Celtic Britain, constitute a Marxist proletarian class willing and able to undertake the radical re-formation of a society whose present assumptions they rejected.

Lichtheim considers that the absence in Britain of a radical intelligentsia, detached from adherence to the existing order during the crucial formation period of class consciousness in the nineteenth century, to be of decisive importance in the general absence of Marxist class consciousness in Britain. Part of the great interest in the results of the energising of the social and political scene by the outbreak of war in 1914 lies in the precipitation of the detachment of allegiance of a section of the British intelligentsia - part of the Radical Liberal elite.

Some members of this small group, in collaboration with Ramsay MacDonald, who had renounced his leadership of Labour in opposition to the war frenzy, set themselves the daunting task of influencing a mass society to change its direction and abandon the excitement and release of war, with all the personal opportunities for expression which were suddenly available. In spite of a growing sensitivity to uncertainties in intellectual circles the idea which dominated popular thought in 1914 was still that of simple optimistic positivism. The developing rational ideologies of both socialism and liberalism were thrown into confused disorder by the impact of the war. Socialism, in particular, was an early casualty. The war disrupted the precarious balance which still just linked reformist and revolutionary socialism in 1914. The international world-transforming ideals of European socialism were sundered by the preemptive demands of service to a nation at war. The storm-force of the emotion released by the onset

of hostilities is well-known - no section of society seemed immune. The rational liberal German historian, Meinecke, wrote of the "exaltation of spirit experienced during the days of 1914" as "one of the most precious, unforgettable memories of the highest sort".¹ However, beneath the surface of outward-directed action the war helped to accelerate the disintegration of patterns of thought and to deepen the questionings of assumptions which were incipient before 1914.

The members of the elite group associated with the foundation of the Union of Democratic Control were among the very few who immediately perceived that a fundamental pattern of European society had been violated by the war. Their purpose was to provide the people of Britain at large with a view which would persuade them that international affairs touched each member of society intimately and that to be unaware of the consequences of secret diplomacy and to be unable to exercise a direct democratic influence upon foreign policy was to consign themselves to the mercy of undemocratic, non-accountable interest groups.

In this undertaking the founders of the U.D.C. were obliged to create an organisation capable of functioning in the field of popular politics. They were entering the arena under peculiarly difficult circumstances. The nature and method of this intervention provides an interesting example of the manner in which an elite could make grass-roots contact in this period. Association within the Union worked as a catalyst upon the individual members of its Liberal leadership to accelerate the process by which they changed their political allegiance, to Labour - a change which was thus partially consequent upon the interaction with popular politics.

1. Meinecke, F., The German Catastrophe: Reflections and Recollections.
Boston, 1963, p. 25.

CHAPTER 2

The U.D.C. : Aims and Structure

In the words of one of its founders, Charles Trevelyan, the Union of Democratic Control was "an organisation created to secure the control over their Foreign Policy by the British People, and for the promotion of International understanding".¹ The specific aims of this audacious undertaking were first published as an annexe to a public letter to the Press of September, 1914:

1. No Province shall be transferred from one Government to another without the consent by plebiscite of the population of such province.
2. No treaty, arrangement or undertaking shall be entered upon in the name of Great Britain without the sanction of Parliament. Adequate machinery for ensuring democratic control of foreign policy shall be created.
3. The foreign policy of Great Britain shall not be aimed at creating Alliances for the purpose of maintaining the "Balance of Power"; but shall be directed to the establishment of a Concert of Europe and the setting up of an International Council whose deliberations and decisions shall be public.
4. Great Britain shall propose as part of the Peace settlement a plan for the drastic reduction of armaments by the consent of all

1. Trevelyan, Charles, The Union of Democratic Control, its history and its policy, London, 1921, p.1.

the belligerent Powers, and to facilitate that policy shall attempt to secure the general nationalisation of the manufacture of armaments, and the prohibition of the export of armaments by one country to another. 1.

The fourth point represents the early influence of Ramsay MacDonald on the embryonic organisation. The acceptance by the Liberal co-founders of nationalisation of the private sector of the armaments industry touched an Achilles' heel. Liberal moral principles had felt the pinch of the private enterprise shoe for many years on the armaments issue. But once a single case of special pleading for nationalisation had been accepted the way was open for other industries to be taken into state ownership on moral grounds.

Following the foundation meeting of the Union, in November, 1914, the four aims were proclaimed as the "Four Cardinal Points" of policy. A number of modifications had been accepted in the aims as originally published. Item 2. was retained in precisely similar words, while Item 1. weakened the mandatory nature of plebiscite by requiring ... "the consent by plebiscite or otherwise, of the population ... 2.

Item 3. was altered and enlarged at the November meeting, "the establishment of a Concert of Europe" was changed to "concerted action between the Powers". 3. It is possible here to detect the professional intervention of Arthur Ponsonby, who had become the fifth co-founder by November, in the elimination of a potentially embarrassing phrase so redolent of the secret cabinets of Talleyrand and Metternich. The

1. H, DDC/1/1.

2. Min. Inaug. Mtg. H. DDC/1/1.

3. Ibid.

final sentence of Item 3. was also strengthened by the addition of a clause stating that the International Council should be provided "with such machinery for securing International agreement as shall be the guarantee of an abiding peace".^{1.} This arrangement reflected the sentiments of Norman Angell, as an attempt to bring the principles of The Great Illusion^{2.} into practical politics. The final section of Item 4. was toned down by a membership still dominated by the ideal of free trade. The "prohibition" of armament exports was replaced by "the control of export of armaments from one country to another".^{3.}

The aims of the Union as resolved in the Four Cardinal Points at the Inaugural General Meeting in November, 1914, remained the basis of policy until 1917, when it was found necessary to add an additional point following the government's clear decision, at the Paris Economic Conference, to prosecute economic war after the end of hostilities:

Point 5. The European conflict shall not be continued by economic war after military operations have ceased. British policy shall be directed towards promoting free commercial intercourse between all nations, and the preservation and extension of the principle of the Open Door.^{4.}

Individual members joining the Union between November, 1914, and September, 1919, signed a declaration endorsing the Cardinal Points.

Once the peace treaties had been signed, the direct assault of the Union upon mass opinion was discontinued in favour of political

1. Ibid.

2. Angell, N., The Great Illusion, London, 1910. An individual statement of a rational pacificism which gained an international following.

3. Min. Inaug. Mtg. H.DDC/1/1.

4. Gen. Council Min. Oct. 1917. H. DDC/1/1.

pressure through the Labour Party. The Declaration and Points of Policy of the Union were changed after they had been "discussed at considerable length" at the General Council Meeting of October, 1919:

Declaration: The object of the Union shall be to formulate and organise support for such a policy as shall lead to the establishment and maintenance of an enduring Peace. For this purpose, the Union will endeavour to create and maintain among the peoples an interest in Foreign Affairs and to enter into the widest possible international relations of friendship and co-operation.

The objects and policy of the Union shall be as follows:

1. Democratic Control. No treaty, arrangement or undertaking shall be entered upon without the sanction of Parliament. Adequate machinery for ensuring democratic control of foreign policy shall be created.
 2. Armaments and Conscription. The abolition of industrial and military conscription; the drastic reduction, by consent, of the armaments of all the Powers as a preliminary to eventual abolition; the general nationalisation of the manufacture of armaments and the control by the League of Nations of the export of armaments by one country to another.
 3. Reciprocity and Trade. The promotion of free commercial intercourse between all nations and the preservation and extension of the open door.
-

4. Self determination. The Governments under which the peoples are placed should be determined by the will of the populations concerned.
5. Development of the League of Nations. The constitution of the League of Nations shall be made more flexible, inclusive and democratic, so as to ensure among other improvements, admission into its membership of all nations, and the prohibition of partial military alliances; and to ensure, further, full regard for the wishes, rights and interests of all peoples placed under its mandatory system.
6. Revision of the Peace Treaties of 1919. Provision shall be made for the revision of the Peace Treaties of 1919 so as to remove those obvious and manifold injustices therein, which contain the seeds of further and future wars. ^{1.}

The points of policy thus adopted are obviously more suited to the complex compromises inevitable to the internal evolution of party policy than the trenchant points advocated during the war, which were simple to articulate but immensely difficult of practical realisation. The revised policy of 1919 shows a clear commitment to the internationalization of society through a strengthened League of Nations. The clause concerning the rights of peoples transferred under the device of League mandate, reflects Morel's continuing mistrust of Belgian attitudes - he was concerned that Ruanda-Burundi

1. Gen. Council. Min., Oct., 1919. H,DDC/1/2.

had been severed from the Former German East Africa and joined with the Belgian Congo. The adoption of Point 4 illustrates the conversion of the leading members to the cause of self-determination - slightly ironic in view of the member who had written in the "Cambridge Magazine" of 2nd December, 1916, to defend German dominance of Mitteleuropa, ^{1.} referring to the Yugoslavs as "the latest novelty from Ruritania". ^{2.}

The main immediate thrust of the revised Union policy was contained in the final clause, the question of the consequences of German humiliation, which was to achieve such serious significance in the following decades.

At the Inaugural General Meeting of the U.D.C. in November, 1914, the Honorary Secretary, E.D. Morel, gained acceptance for the centralised democratic organisation, which he had elaborated in the light of his experience with the very effective Congo Reform Association. ^{3.}

The structure provided an Executive Committee of not more than ten members, with day-to-day authority, controlled by a General Council, composed of the Executive Committee, up to twenty-five additional members elected by the Inaugural Meeting and up to two representatives of each of the provincial branches. The Union would be served by two officers, a Secretary and Treasurer, elected by the meeting, who would be ex-officio members of the Executive Committee. It was decided at the Inaugural Meeting that members of the Executive would be nominated and elected annually by the General Council from its own membership. The General Council was to be elected each year at subsequent Annual General Meetings. The General Council, with a quorum set at ten members, was to meet at least thrice yearly, and the policy of the Union was its primary responsibility.

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1. The 'pro-German' issue is discussed in Appendix B.
 2. Cambridge Magazine, Vol.vi, No.8. 2nd Dec., 1916.
 3. Min. Inaug. Mtg. 17th Nov., 1914, H,DDC/1/1.

Affiliated membership of institutions and societies was accepted on the understanding that, in common with individual members, the condition for membership was an acceptance of the Cardinal Points of policy.

The policy of creating as many local branches as possible was accepted at the Inaugural Meeting, but the terms of branch function were carefully drawn. After declaring that every branch was free to frame its own constitution and was entirely liable for its own finances, the meeting decided that:

Every Branch shall be required:

- (a) To accept the four cardinal points in the Union's policy.
- (b) To abide by the decision of the General Council affecting the policy and procedure of the Union and generally to act in harmony with the Executive Committee of the Union.
- (c) To consult the Executive Committee before taking action on any new point of policy which may from time to time arise.
- (d) To keep the Honorary Secretary and Treasurer informed of its financial position and to allot periodically as great a proportion of its income to the Parent Body as it can afford, bearing in mind that the expenses of the movement will fall chiefly on the latter whose sources of income are narrowed in proportion to the establishment of Branches.^{1.}

1. Min. Inaug. Mtg., H.DDC/1/1.

Morel was clearly determined that the impact of the campaign he intended to wage should not be blunted by the diffusion of authority within the Union. ^{1.}

The meeting confirmed him as Secretary to the Union and also endorsed the other members of the ad-hoc committee of founders as members of the Executive: Ramsay MacDonald, Charles Trevelyan, Norman Angell, and Arthur Ponsonby. J.A. Hobson and a Mrs Barbara Mackenzie were also elected to the Executive for the ensuing year. ^{2.}

1. Detailed changes in the Structure and Organisation which concern the interaction with popular politics are discussed in Chapter 3.

2. Min. Inaug. Mtg. , H,DDC/1/1.

CHAPTER 3.

Interaction with Popular Politics.

(i) Emergence and Growth of a Popular Movement.

As an organisation designed to influence popular opinion the U.D.C. came into existence in November, 1914 after a gestation period which began very early in the previous August. The day following the British declaration of war Charles Trevelyan was conceding mass support might be necessary to counter war fever. After referring to like-minded Liberals on the need for common action with Labour, Trevelyan wrote to Morel:

I think it more than likely that it may be
(necessary to form) an organisation which
could connect with outside efforts and groups.

We may decide to want a Secretary. If so, I
shall think first of you.^{1.}

Trevelyan well knew that to engage E.D. Morel in any cause was to plunge irrevocably into the maelstrom of controversy. Morel's greatest achievement before 1914 was the marshalling of public opinion in the Western world to expose the systematically cruel exploitation inherent in the Belgian king's vast private realm known as the Congo Free State. Morel's knowledge of Africa combined with a crusading drive, effectively channelled into the Congo Reform Association, led to the Belgian government taking authority in the Congo - a reform which ameliorated the worst aspects of European rule.

Charles Trevelyan quickly decided that vigorous action was needed, and Morel was asked to become the Honorary Secretary and Treasurer (pro tem) of the yet unborn organisation which was to fight in the cause

1. M 473, F6.

of democratic control of foreign policy. In early September, 1914, a letter signed by Trevelyan, Morel, Norman Angell and Ramsay MacDonald was circulated to potentially influential sympathizers:

Dear Sir,

There are very many thousands of people in the country, who are profoundly dissatisfied with the general course of policy which preceded the war. They are feeling that a dividing point has come in National history, that the old traditions of secret and class diplomacy, the old control of foreign policy by a narrow clique, and the power of the armament organisations have got henceforth to be combated by a great and conscious and directed effort of the democracy.^{1.}

However urgent this matter, caution was seen to place a curb on immediate action. The public believed the country to be in imminent peril. To set oneself against the war openly could lead to a counter-productive and frenzied opposition: "When the time is ripe for it, but not before the country is secure from danger, meetings will be organised and speakers provided".^{2.} Meanwhile the writers promised the preparation of books, pamphlets and leaflets to explain the background of the recent dramatic events.

In late September, 1914 the writers of the first circular despatched a follow-up message of encouragement:

From all parts of the country and from men and women of widely divergent interests there come expressions of approval and offers of

1. H,DDC/1/1.

2. Ibid.

assistance.

A definite Organisation, provisionally known as "The Union of Democratic Control" is now in process of formation, with an Executive Committee, of which the signatories of this letter are members. Local groups are also being organised in many important centres. ^{1.}

The confidence required to proceed to the point of decision to create an organised pressure group largely resulted from the stimulus provided by Morel. Writing to Trevelyan and MacDonal on 22nd. August he displayed a characteristically vigorous approach:

We should take systematically city by city and town by town, and use any existing organisations which we can capture for distribution work and for the subsequent organisation of public meetings. ^{2.}

He goes on to illustrate, through the example of York, the organisations he has in mind: all existing Labour organisations, the National Peace Society, the Brotherhood Union, the Adult School Union, Free Church Council bodies, the Angell organisation and the Womens Suffrage Societies "other than militant". ^{3.} The dedication of the militant suffrage organisations to the war effort and their declared truce during hostilities was thus early identified by Morel as impermeable ground for anti-war activity.

Morel received many letters of support in reply to the first circular, but some responses reinforced the need for a very broadly

1. H,DDC/1/1.

3. Ibid.

2. M473.F6.

based constituency. In a letter dated 24th. August, C.P. Scott opted out: "I had rather not give my name to any Committee ... I have my own way", ^{1.} while on the 20th. September the Irish historian Alice Green was a little too enthusiastic: "The Lord put an end to the politicians that made Parliament". ^{2.} Previous experience warned Morel that cranks were quite as dangerous as backsliders. Confiding this concern to H.M. Swanwick, Morel received down-to-earth reassurance:

I understand your anxiety to get the right people together first. Don't I know the cranks! Anyone really inside the women's movement has had illuminating experience of them. But ... the anxiety to escape cranks must not be allowed to result in precisely the undemocratic methods under which European war is made possible. Sir Edward Grey doubtless regards you as a crank! ^{3.}

During September and October Charles Trevelyan toured northern Britain to test grass-roots reactions at first hand. He found Manchester encouraging territory and, following a private gathering, wrote to Morel on 23rd. September in terms of measured enthusiasm:

Our policy is all right ... At the end we definitely formed a branch with Reynol as secretary. Reynol and Benson had been prepared to leave it in the air today. But the meeting would have it. They were as

1. M 473, F6.

2. M 473, F6

3. M 473, F6

keen as would be ...^{1.}

In Edinburgh Trevelyan found "tremendous loyalty to Asquith and Liberalism",^{2.} but he found that in private meetings it was, as in Manchester, I.L.P. members who were most actively interested.

Considering how to canvass wider support he decided that "it will be a case for sending up L-D^{3.} for a turn around the town, if we are to get other than I.L.P".^{4.}

Confidence generated by the gathering enthusiasm of such early contacts led to a third circular in early November, 1914 which stated that: "An Organisation known as the Union of Democratic Control is in process of formation ...^{5.} The letter listed a Grand Committee of public figures committed to the democratic control of foreign policy in addition to the Executive Committee of signatories, now joined by Arthur Ponsonby. The letter explains that, "local branches are also being organised in many important centres", but still stops short of a definitive public organisation until "the crisis of war is passed".^{6.}

In the event the "Morning Post" precipitated the committee into direct action. Its subtle attack^{7.} on the motives of the group, by making public one of their private circulars, made a totally open organisation unavoidable and immediately necessary. At the Union's Inaugural Meeting Morel was able to report that 5000 supporters were already committed to individual membership.^{8.} Additionally Morel cited the affiliated membership of over twenty I.L.P. branches, one local Liberal Association, twelve National Adult Schools and six branches of the National Union of Railwaymen.^{9.} Thus the founders of

1. M 473,F6

5. H,DDC/1/1

9. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

3. B.N. Langdon Davies

7. "Morning Post" 10th September 1914.

4. M 473,F6

8. Meeting held on 17th Nov. 1914. H,DDC/1/1.

the U.D.C. discovered that they had articulated a profound problem at a moment when a wide audience was susceptible of response. Even before its official birth the U.D.C. showed the potential for a popular movement in protest at the major war which, to vast numbers of people, appeared as a totally unexpected obligation.

During 1915 U.D.C. membership grew rapidly, and further bodies affiliated. In February, Morel reported the adherence of three London branches of the British Socialist Party, the Women's Labour League and the Leeds Branch of the Amalgamated Association of Tramway and Vehicle Workers.¹ On 19th. November the Executive Committee Minutes record 46 organisations affiliated to the Central U.D.C. and 58 attached to local branches. The combined individual and affiliate membership was claimed to be over 258000.² At this juncture Morel sent a private and confidential memo to the Executive Committee which pointed out that "The Union of Democratic Control is becoming a very big thing indeed"³ and proceeded to detail the constitutional and functional arrangements which he considered appropriate to a large scale organisation with many local branches. In March, 1916 the estimated aggregate U.D.C. membership was 400,000 and included further affiliations of Labour bodies.⁴ The Executive was always alert to the possibility of engaging the sympathy of powerful interest groups. For example, during the stimulating year of 1917, Ponsonby suggested that the Rev. Hewlett Johnson of Stockport be asked to write a pamphlet on U.D.C. principles to make a special appeal to Churchmen.⁵ Trevelyan had spotted Johnson as seeming "to have more go than most holy men"⁶ during his visit to Manchester in

1. Gen. Council Mtg. held 9th Feb. 1915.
H,DDC/1/1.

2. H,DDC/1/4.

3. M 473, F6.

4. Gen. Council Mtg. held
9th March 1916. H,DDC/1/1.

5. H,DDC/1/4.

6. M 473, F6.

1914.

In terms of numbers the union continued to grow throughout the war years and into the uncertain aftermath. Total membership in April 1920 was claimed to be 825,215 ^{1.} and by November the number passed the million mark. ^{2.} Between November 1920 and November 1921 the growth in nominal membership continued, but with diminished momentum: 1,132,352 in November 1920; ^{3.} 1,362,205 in May, 1921 ^{4.} and 1,378,845 in November 1921. ^{5.} Those years marked the apogee of the U.D.C. as a voice in popular politics on behalf of the open diplomacy enshrined in the new League of Nations. However, the aggregate figures mask the decline in individual membership. In September, 1921 Trevelyan wrote that "over 350 Bodies of organised Labour are now affiliated to the Union". ^{6.} Just one of these bodies, the Glasgow Trades and Labour Council, accounted for 90,000 members. ^{7.} Since the end of the war the loss of unrecorded numbers of individual members is revealed only by the disappearance of many local branches. ^{8.}

1. H,DDC/1/2.

2. H,DDC/1/2.

3. Ibid

4. H,DDC/1/2.

5. H,DDC/1/2.

6. Trevelyan, C.P., The Union of Democratic Control, its history and its policy. London 1921. p.14.

7. Op. Cit. pp 15-16.

8. See Maps 1 - 9.

(ii) Relations with Labour and Other Movements.

The adherence of numerous organisations as affiliate U.D.C. members illuminates certain factors present in the mesh of popular politics. Every organisation which affiliated to the U.D.C. did so on the basis of its own decision-making structure. This might merely involve an Executive Committee, converted to the U.D.C. cause, passing a resolution in favour of membership which was later endorsed at a general meeting. In 1914 the local branches of Labour organisations were often autonomous of central direction, especially in peripheral matters such as joining the U.D.C. Therefore the jump in affiliations from 39 in November 1914 ^{1.} to 107 in October, 1916 ^{2.} (of which 48 were Trades Councils or local Labour Parties) indicates the result of successful persuasion at a local level.

The Liberal Langdon-Davies was initially responsible for touring the country, but in May, 1915, he was effectively replaced by E.P.Wake, who was appointed the special Commissioner "to place the principles and propaganda of the U.D.C. before the Trades and Labour Councils and local Labour Parties." ^{3.} A month later Morel would report:

Mr Wake's reception has everywhere been excellent.

The response from the Trades Councils all over the country is really astonishing ... When you consider the general state of the public mind, the overtime which is being worked in many trades - it is extraordinarily encouraging to find what a universal interest in our movement exists among the organised working classes of this country, ... ^{4.}

1. Min. Inaug, Mtg. H,DDC/1/1.

3. Ibid.

2. First Annual Mtg. Sec. Rpt. H,DDC/1/1.

4. Gen. Council Min. H,DDC/1/1.

Wake's local impact is testified in a letter from the Luton Branch secretary in October, 1915:

Another branch of the work which is greatly appreciated here is that which has been carried on by Councillor (sic) E.P. Wake. He made a great impression on those who were able to get to hear him ... We feel confident that the Luton Branch will co-operate with the Parent Body ... to a far greater extent than it has been able to do during the past. ¹.

Wake ranged very widely over the country to knit together the potentially big battalions of Labour. He reported in December, 1915 that, immediately following the election of the Merthyr Tydvil Trades and Labour Council, over 10,000 members were affiliated to the U.D.C.². Morel responded by earmarking him for work in London "to arouse working class opinion",³ but the resolution of the Executive Committee modified this to "consult the London Federation (of the U.D.C.) with a view to his working in London in February".⁴ London already possessed a federated structure of branches, much influenced by the I.L.P. and presided over by its own U.D.C. organiser, Seymour Cocks. However, the London Labour project was abandoned because of difficulties encountered with the Miners' Federation in South Wales, which remain unspecified in the minutes of the committee.⁵ The Executive sent Wake in February

1. First Annual Mtg. Sec. Rpt. Appendix H, DDC/1/1.

3. Ibid.

2. Exec. Cttee. Mtg. H, DDC/1/4.

4. Ibid.

5. The U.D.C. probably faced three problems in South Wales: socialism of a more doctrinaire type than elsewhere in England and Wales, unusually good wartime employment prospects, and South Wales particularism.

to South Wales to "carry on a campaign there on U.D.C. lines"^{1.} and also to perform an intelligence function for which he was eminently qualified: to ascertain "whether the South Wales miners were doing anything to affect the attitude of the Miners' Federation in other parts, especially Yorkshire and Durham".^{2.} Wake's early influence upon the Executive Committee was demonstrated the following month, when his strong recommendation to postpone the despatch of the U.D.C. Memorandum on Economic War to non-affiliated Trades Councils was accepted.^{3.} Wake was well aware that the menace of continuing German economic growth was likely to override the U.D.C.'s appeal to international fraternalism in the mind of many working-class people.

In October, 1916 and March, 1917 the Executive Committee sent Wake to support the Peace-by-Negotiation movement's parliamentary candidates in the North Ayrshire and Stockton-on-Tees by-elections.^{4.} The U.D.C. Executive wished to support this movement without becoming too closely identified with a programme which was narrowly limited to the speedy achievement of peace in the current war, but did not address the question of future reform of the international community on the broad front of the U.D.C.'s approach. Pethick-Lawrence was the member most dedicated to the Peace-by-Negotiation cause. He stood as a parliamentary candidate on their behalf in 1917.^{5.}

Thus Wake provided the U.D.C. with excellent links with Labour organisations and access to a range of popular political activities which might otherwise have remained unpenetrated. His expenses were

1. Exec. Cttee. Min. H, DDC/1/4
2. Ibid.
3. Exec. Cttee. Min. H, DDC/1/4.
4. Exec. Cttee. Min. H, DDC/1/4.
5. D.N.B. Sup. 61 - 70.

raised to ten shillings a day in September, 1915¹. and his salary increased by £50 per annum to 17 guineas a month in June, 1916.²

The energies of Morel and Wake formed an effective complementary partnership. Morel inspired the union and carried through strategic planning while Wake employed his tactical skills and knowledge of the Labour movement to such effect that, as early as October, 1915, Morel could say of him, "His ability in putting our case in the way most likely to appeal to working class opinion, his enthusiasm and his energy are beyond praise, ..." ³.

As a salaried official of the U.D.C. Wake showed skill in preserving a low profile. Just before the implementation of the planned onslaught on Labour organisations Morel wrote to the Executive Committee of Wake that, "preliminary negotiations putting him in touch with various centres are proceeding. I am giving the matter my close personal attention ..." ⁴. These monitored arrangements must have appeared naive to Wake, the confidant of Arthur Henderson and whose career to date included being Chairman and Secretary of Chatham Labour Party until 1908, after which he was Secretary of Barrow-in-Furness Labour Party. In 1913 he began work personally assisting Henderson as a voluntary 'national organiser' in the task of Trade Union relations (extra to the two salaried officials). In 1915 he was a member of both the national executive and the national administrative council of the I.L.P., but remained "Henderson's man".⁵ Henderson had joined the U.D.C. in 1914, but soon detached himself when opportunities for ministerial office

1. Exec. Cttee. Min. H,DDC/1/4.

2. Exec. Cttee. Min. H,DDC/1/4.

3. First Annual Mtg. Sec. Rpt. H,DDC/1/1.

4. M.473.F6.

5. Exec. Cttee. Min. H,DDC/1/4. and McKibbin, R. The Evolution of the Labour Party 1910 - 1924, London, 1974. p.94.

appeared likely.^{1.} As U.D.C. Commissioner Wake found himself in a position to proliferate his already widespread web of contacts. Morel had indeed engaged an able subordinate, someone who understood how to manipulate both the officers of mass organisations and persuade members at local level. His multifarious activities place Wake in an influential position intermediary between the leaders and the led. His travelling commissions provided the most effective single channel available to the U.D.C. for communication between the elite and the masses. As an anti-doctrinaire Labour man, a proponent of centralism in the Labour Party and as National Agent from September, 1918 no-one was in a stronger position than Wake to assist the transfer of the U.D.C. elite through party-approved parliamentary candidature.

In September, 1917, his widely ranging activities, together with the increased pace of political activity stimulated by events in Russia, resulted in Wake's resignation from the service of the U.D.C. for six months' rest.^{2.} The Executive Committee found considerable difficulty in replacing him. A proposal to appoint Alderman Kneeshaw of the Birmingham I.L.P. was postponed.^{3.} Kneeshaw, who was not highly regarded by Morel, was in many ways the opposite of Wake. Kneeshaw believed in the power of public oratory and mass demonstration where Wake proved effective in personal contact and organisational detail.

It was eventually decided that the increasing popular political activity demanded the services of five organisers.^{4.} Miss Chambers, who had been temporarily appointed to canvass the Nottingham workers in April, 1917,^{5.} was appointed with a broader remit. She shared the

1. He resigned from the General Council in June, 1915.

2. Exec. Cttee. Min. H,DDC/1/4.

3. Exec. Cttee. Min. 27th November, 1917. H,DDC/1/4.

4. Exec. Cttee. Min. 3rd January 1918. H,DDC/1/4.

5. Exec. Cttee. Min. 24th April, 1917. H,DDC/1/4.

responsibility for extending the U.D.C.'s grass roots influence with a Miss Royds, Alderman Kneeshaw, a Mr. Fox and a Mr. Hayward who had recently been discharged after active service as a private in France.

The appointment, in 1918, of two women to the group of five organisers emphasized the General Council's commitment to the decision of February, 1915 to declare its belief in the equal citizenship of men and women and to invite "the co-operation of women".¹ At that time Mrs Swanwick, who had supported the Union since its inception, was elected to the General Council and the Executive Committee. Morel then informed the General Council that arrangements were in hand to hold a "general Conference of Women, which will be composed of delegates sent by Committees and Branches of a large variety of Women's Associations connected with Co-operative, Suffrage and other movements".² This meeting became a Conference and was held on 14th April, 1915. It was managed by a Women's Committee nominated by the Executive Committee and succeeded in mobilising support for the "main lines of U.D.C. policy".³ The connections thus created became even more valuable once women's suffrage became a reality in 1918.

The Executive Committee was very careful not to endanger its wider popular support, especially among labour organisations, by embracing the cause of minorities seen as extremist in the context of the times. Three particular groups considered themselves within the orbit of U.D.C. ideals, but the committee adopted a very cautious response to them. On the 21st September, 1915 it was decided that the Fellowship of Reconciliation or any other anti-war organisation was not to be affiliated.⁴ The wisdom of this decision in its effect on popular

1. Gen. Council Rpt. 9th Feb. 1915. H, DDC/1/1.

2. Ibid.

3. General Council Rpt. 22nd June 1915. H, DDC/L/L.

4. Exec. Cttee. Min. H, DDC/1/4.

support was reflected in a resolution of the Bristol Branch, which objected strongly to any suggestion that the U.D.C. should try "to press on the Government and the nation any directly pacifist policy ..." ^{1.}

The committee felt much greater sympathy for the No-Conscription League, which was working within a clearly parliamentary and constitutional framework. However, it preferred to give backdoor support in January, 1916, releasing Langdon-Davies for three weeks and Wake "as needed" to assist the League's organisation and propaganda. ^{2.}

The question of Irish Nationalism, a notorious quagmire for British politicians, was treated very delicately by the committee during the World War, especially following the events of 1916 in Dublin. There were Irish U.D.C. branches and these felt entitled to Wake's support. However, the committee decided on 23rd January, 1917 not to send Wake to Ireland. ^{3.} The committee could hardly be ignorant of the violent opposition in many sections of the urban working-class population to the making of any common cause with the Irish, especially in the volatile context of London's popular politics.

Nevertheless the Irish branches pressed the committee to send Wake and on 30th January, 1917 it was agreed "that arrangements should be made to send him over, and that he should be given instructions as to how to deal with the question of Irish autonomy". ^{4.}

However, once the war was over, the leaders of the U.D.C. resumed the Liberal tradition of loyalty to the cause of Irish Home Rule. They supported Irish Nationalist aspirations and made violent attacks upon Lloyd George's repressive policy. In May, 1921 Morel and Trevelyan

1. Exec. Cttee. Min. 22nd Dec. 1915. H,DDC/1/4.


2. Exec. Cttee. Min. H,DDC/1/4.

3. Exec. Cttee. Min. H,DDC/1/4.


4. Exec. Cttee. Min. H,DDC/1/4.

gave the press the General Council's resolution protesting "against the reign of terror in Ireland introduced by the Government and still maintained in unabated ferocity ... and declares that the application of self-determination alone can solve the Irish problem ...".¹


1. Gen. Council Min. H, DDC/1/2.



Source: Inaugural Mtg. of U.D.C., Secretary's Report, H,DDC/1/1.



Source: Gen. Council Rpt. 9th. Feb., 1915, Statement of E.D. Morel, pp. 3, 4 and 7. H, DDC/1/1.



Source: First Annual Gen. Mtg. of U.D.C., 29th. Oct., 1915, Secretary's Report, p. 8. H, DDC/1/1.

UNION OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL

OCTOBER, 1917.

I IRISH FEDERATION

S SCOTTISH FEDERATION

○ YORKSHIRE FEDERATION

⊙ LONDON FEDERATION

● BRANCHES CONTINUING
OCT. 1915 - OCT. 1917.

⊙ BRANCHES FORMED
OCT. 1915 - OCT. 1917.

X CLOSURES OCT. 1915-OCT. 1917.






FIGURE SHOWS LONDON BRANCHES OCT. 1917.

MAP 4.


Source: Gen. Council Min., Oct. 1917, Amended Rules and Constitution, p. 11. H, DDC/1/1.




Source: Gen. Council Min., Oct. 1919, Revised Rules and Constitution, p. 11. H, DDC/1/2.




MAP 6. GREATER LONDON U.D.C. BRANCHES FORMED OR FORMING, FEB. 1915.
Source: Gen. Council, 9th. Feb. 1915, Statement of E.D. Morel, p. 7. H.DDC/1/1.



MAP 7. LONDON FEDERATION OF U.D.C. BRANCHES: OCTOBER, 1915.
Source: First Annual Gen. Mtg. of U.D.C., 29th. Oct., 1915, Secretary's Report p. 8. H.DDC/1/1.



MAP 8. LONDON FEDERATION OF U.D.C. BRANCHES: OCTOBER, 1917.
 Source: Gen. Council Min., Oct., 1917, Amended Rules and Constitution, p. 11.
 H, DDC/1/1.



MAP 9. LONDON FEDERATION OF U.D.C. BRANCHES: OCTOBER, 1919.
 Source: Gen. Council Min., Oct., 1919, Revised Rules and Constitution, p. 11.
 H, DDC/1/2.

Notes on maps 1 to 9 showing the distribution of U.D.C. branches.

Map 1. November 1914.

The embryonic U.D.C. network is established. The pioneer journeys of C.P. Trevelyan and B.N. Langdon-Davies resulted in the establishment of the first branches in major centres beyond London. The Carlisle, Birmingham and Letchworth branches reflect the local influence of prominent U.D.C. members - Charles Denman, Alderman J.W. Kneeshaw and E.D. Morel respectively,

Map 2. February 1915.

Branches had increased in number from 7 to 31, of which 8 were in London. The other 23, in provincial centres and industrial towns of England, Wales and Scotland, reflect the first fruits of the co-ordinating work of Langdon-Davies.

Map 3. October, 1915.

The total number of branches had risen to 81. The London Federation, organised by F. Seymour-Cocks, had 19 branches, the rest of Britain 59 and Ireland 3 (Belfast, Dublin and Cork.) The expansion partly represents the opening up of new areas, such as Nottingham and Exeter, as a result of Wake's efforts, and also the establishment of separate offshoot branches once an original branch developed an extended catchment area. The latter process is strongly indicated in West Yorkshire and on Tyneside.

Map 4. October, 1917.

This map shows the branch proliferation near its climax. There are 100 branches, 50 unfederated branches in England and Wales, 21 in the London Federation, and the new federations of

Yorkshire, Scotland and Ireland containing 16, 10 and 3 branches respectively. The Yorkshire Federation included Rochdale within its area. 9 branches had closed in provincial England and Wales since October, 1915. Some of these, such as Ipswich and Malton, were in exposed peripheral locations, while others were casualties of local controversy, especially in South Wales, where the S.W.M.F. obstructed the Union (probably on the dual grounds of non-socialist ideology and the need to protect the safe wartime employment prospects of its members.) The extension of branches in northern industrial towns is marked, especially in West Yorkshire and the Scottish Lowlands. The Scottish Federation closely parallels the areas of greatest strength of the I.L.P.

Map 5. October, 1919.

This map reflects the collapse of individual membership support following the end of hostilities and the failure of direct efforts to influence the peace settlement through popular pressure. Closures dominate the map, with the exception of Scotland, where a sustained hope for radical change through popular action was maintained. The four provincial branches in England opened since October, 1917 and still in operation in 1919, are located in unlikely places, Settle, Gainsborough, Hereford and Guildford. The appearance of these branches at the close of the war, they were opened near the end of 1918, possibly indicates the enhanced political awareness of soldiers returning to these country towns. Only 41 branches remained.

The Irish Federation had disappeared, the Yorkshire Federation was dissolved and the London Federation reduced to only 6 constituent member branches. The Scottish Federation retained 9 member branches, and provincial England and Wales contained 26. In Wales only Cardiff retained a branch.

Maps 6 to 9. Greater London Branches, February 1915 to October 1919.

Greater London proved a much more volatile arena than the rest of the country for U.D.C. involvement in popular politics (with the possible exception of South Wales.) Map 6 shows the first eight branches established, as opposed to the earlier discussion groups based on Angell's Civil Union sub-structure. The West-Central, Hampstead, Willesden triangle encompasses the core of intellectual middle-class London. The Brixton, Mitcham and Kingston branches suggest a definite clerical class interest. Support at Hoxton and Walthamstow probably indicates some working class support, although Hoxton was a locale for many very small businesses.

Map 7 shows branch proliferation in Greater London by October, 1915. The branches had increased in number from 8 to 19, but two of the original branches had already closed (Hoxton and Mitcham.) The general pattern of February was sustained in greater detail. Golders Green and Finchley branches extended the prosperous middle class representation in north west London, while the appearance of the Watford and Croydon branches may imply similar support in the outer suburbs. Areas dominated

by the clerical and small business class include Penge and Beckenham, Wimbledon and Merton, Putney and Paddington. The establishment of a branch at Hackney may also reflect clerical class interest, but both Hackney and Stepney contained a substantial immigrant Jewish minority active in a wide spectrum of popular politics. Only the new branches at New Cross, Chelsea, Hammersmith and Shepherds Bush suggest the possibility of real working class support.

Map 8 shows the London Federation in October, 1917 with 21 branches, a net increase of only two branches since October, 1915. In the rest of Great Britain during this period the number of branches had risen from 59 to 76. The new branches at North Kensington, Islington, Bow, Nunhead and Greenwich continue to suggest that the greatest interest in London in the U.D.C's policy was coming from the large clerical class, which lived in large numbers at a short train journey's distance from the City. The pattern of closures is very difficult to understand in any but the most local terms. However, the disappearance of the New Cross and Walthamstow branches removed two outposts in predominantly working class neighbourhoods. The appearance of Nunhead and Greenwich branches, in apparent replacement of the defunct New Cross branch, is particularly suggestive in view of the social balance towards clerical and small business occupations in Nunhead, compared with the growing dominance of Surrey dockworkers in New Cross.

In map 9 the collapse of individual membership by

October, 1919, is revealed to be more serious in London than elsewhere. London's decline in branch numbers from 21 to 6 compares badly with the decrease in the rest of Great Britain from 76 to 35. The pattern of surviving branches closely resembles that of February, 1915, except that the hold of areas of intellectual middle class strength is even more remarkable.

The general pattern of individual membership as reflected in the establishment and closure of branches indicates a more sustained interest in the industrial, predominantly working class areas of central and northern Britain compared with London and southern Britain. The pattern in Greater London appears to contradict the rest of the country, in that individual support was greatest in areas dominated by the large clerical class. The peak in London support before 1917 may reflect the issue of conscription, which was felt especially keenly by the non-exempt mass of clerical workers. The London working class areas proved less amenable to Wake's power of persuasion. It is possible that his style was insufficiently adapted to the demands of the highly particular and very various attitudes of the rather corporately-minded London workers. South Wales was also to prove rather impervious to the inspiration which Wake communicated so effectively elsewhere. Lowland Scotland, West Yorkshire and Tyneside were areas of outstanding individual commitment to the U.D.C.

Scotland insisted on maintaining its Federation, closely linked with the I.L.P., after the falling away of the rest of the country in 1919.

(iii) Branch Proliferation and Structure of Internal Relations.

The maintenance of the U.D.C.'s momentum as a popular organisation depended very greatly on the establishment of local branches spread widely over the country, each with its core of active propagandists. The maps ^{1.} chart both the Union's progress in branch proliferation from 1914 to 1918, and the shrinkage of 1919 which marked the acceleration of a profound change in Union policy.

Once a network of branches was created, the nature of the interactions between the body of supporters and the elite which had inspired the movement was partially determined by the overall organisational structure. As outlined in Chapter 2, the General Council controlled the shape of the structure, its Executive Committee maintaining regular communications with the branches. The inclusion of 25 members in the General Council, extra to the Executive Committee and branch members, was clearly designed to ensure the position of prominent national members. Unknown local figures would be very unlikely to command sufficient support at General Council elections.

The General Council meeting of 9th March, 1916 amended the constitution slightly in those matters affecting the relations between branch and headquarters. The Executive Committee was limited to ten members plus officers, while the number of elected non-branch members of the General Council was increased from 25 to 35. The London branches had formed a Federation and this was limited to six members. The London Federation objected to this proportional discrimination and also to the increase in non-Branch members, but was not supported by the provincial branches. However, representatives of affiliated bodies were accepted as non-elected Council members. Special meetings of the General Council were to be allowed only at the request of at least five Branches. ^{2.} Thus, on balance, the central

1. See pp. 30-36. 2. Gen. Council Min. H, DDC/1/1.

authority of the elite was strengthened and the scope of branches kept in guided channels. Morel had originally proposed to increase to 35 the elected nominated members at the General Council meeting of 22nd June, 1915 with the openly stated motive of attracting "men and women of influence and standing, whose presence on our Council would, I am quite sure, commend itself to all those present ... 1.

Branches were encouraged to form Federations, a device which also tended to strengthen the power of headquarters, in that an intermediate tier of organisation provided distributive economies of communication and made the impact of branch comment less immediate. The London Federation had formed, quite voluntarily, as a natural consequence of its atypical background of branch formation. It was built on the core of the pre-existing Civil Union, which had merged itself, at Norman Angell's behest, with the U.D.C. 2. Most provincial branches declined to consider federating, but local patriotism later played its part in the creation of Irish, Scottish and Yorkshire federations.

However, at the General Council of October, 1917 it was a successful proposal by the London Federation's secretary, F. Seymour Cocks, which sought to alter the balance in the Council in favour of the rank-and-file. It was agreed that "each Branch should have one vote for every 100 members or part thereof, and may appoint delegates to a number not exceeding its voting strength". 3. It was also decided that each Federation might have one vote apart from the votes of its incorporated Branches and that the affiliated membership would be

1. Gen. Council Rpt. H,DDC/1/1.

2. Gen. Council Rpt. 9th Feb. 1915. H,DDC/1/1.

3. Gen. Council Min. H,DDC/1/1.

limited to one delegate from each organisation "that is of a national character".^{1.} The branches also succeeded in amending the quorum number to 25.^{2.} It was entirely congruent with the spirit of the year that 1917 should witness a victory for local activists. However, the Executive succeeded in increasing the requisite number of requests from Branches for special meetings from five to ten. The Branches were also required to revise their membership roll at least once a year, and to furnish a full list of members to the Secretary before the General Council election meeting, which was now fixed in October. The Executive Committee was also given power to define the boundaries of any Federation of Branches.^{3.}

However, 1917 proved to be the apogee of popular voting power in the Union. The General Council of October, 1919 argued at length over the Executive Committee's proposals, finally deciding that the Branch voting ratios would remain unchanged, but accepting an increase from 35 to 60 members elected from the list of nominees.^{4.} This victory for centralizing forces was even greater in view of the fall in numbers of Branches from 100 in 1917 to 41 in 1919.^{5.} The Branch delegates succeeded in modifying this balance slightly through the additional item, at the end of the Constitution, which ruled that it would be necessary for future changes to be endorsed by a majority of two-thirds of the delegates present at the Council meeting, in place of the simple majority which applied previously.^{6.}

Other factors bearing upon the question of popular representation at General Council level involve the social status of Branch

1. Ibid.

4. Gen. Council Min. H,DDC/1/2.

2. Ibid.

5. See Maps 4,5,8,9.

3. Ibid.

6. Gen. Council Min. H,DDC/1/2.

representatives and the absence of Branch representatives from council meetings. It is almost impossible to identify positively delegates of working-class status. However, an idea of the participation of delegates unconnected with elite horizons may be gathered from a brief analysis of those attending the General Council meeting of 22nd June, 1915¹. (that is, before the voting reform of 1917.) 62 delegates attended. 27 Branches were represented out of a possible 58, under 47 per cent. Only 14 Branches sent the maximum of two delegates and the London area was represented by a single delegate. Oxford University was represented by three delegates and the remaining 18 were elected nominees, including members of the Executive Committee. There was a natural tendency for Branches to send prestigious delegates, or simply those who could afford to attend. Glasgow was represented by Sir Daniel Stevenson and Carlisle by the Hon. R.D. Denman, M.P. The elected nominees were overwhelmingly composed of public figures and others of high social status, such as Arthur Ponsonby, Charles Trevelyan, Hon. Bertrand Russell, Hon. Mrs Franklin and Lady Barlow. Nevertheless, it was at this meeting that Morel declared himself dissatisfied with the number of prominent people then eligible for the Council.

Morel's concern that the tail might begin to wag the dog had been expressed at the previous General Council Meeting.² His worry centred on the possibility of independent action arising at local level, which, in his opinion, might tarnish the image of the Union. He persuaded the Council to pass a resolution "That the question of further publicity of the Union's aims should be left in the hands of the Executive ..."³.

1. Misc. Detached Min. H, DDC/1/3.

2. 9th Feb. 1915.

3. Gen. Council Rpt. 9th Feb. 1915. H, DDC/1/1.

The power of the Executive was further asserted on 11th January, 1916, when it was resolved not to allow U.D.C. Branches to affiliate to Trades Councils. ^{1.} This resolution indicates a determination not to be engulfed in the Labour movement but to inspire it, and contrasts sharply with the mission entrusted to Wake to marshal mass support.

The same executive meeting agreed to appoint Seymour Cocks as the salaried official organiser of the London Federation. ^{2.} At this time Morel believed strongly that federation was the best method of organising the branches into a more structured network. On 1st February, 1916 he reported to the Executive that Branches had been "slack about suggesting their views about Federation". ^{3.} Ramsay MacDonald had suggested a form of federation, more loosely structured than the London organisation, which might appeal to the Scots and others. ^{4.} This Executive push to federate had been stimulated by discord in the Bristol Branch. Morel reported that the branch was in "an unsatisfactory condition" and the committee resolved that members of the Executive "should enquire privately of persons known to them in Bristol with a view to ascertaining whether the Branch could be reconstituted so as to become more homogeneous and work more smoothly". ^{5.} The use of "homogeneous" in this resolution appears to indicate a certain structuring attitude by the Executive towards Branch behaviour. This suggestion is further reinforced by the periphrastics of Wake as a Head Office man, independent of Branch control.

The role of Branches as auxiliary aids in the work of the U.D.C.

1. Exec. Cttee. Min. H, DDC/1/4.

2. Ibid.

3. Exec. Cttee. Min. H, DDC/1/4.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

is strongly reinforced in remarks made by Morel to a meeting of branch representatives held on the evening following the General Council Meeting of 22nd June, 1915. Speaking of Wake's mission he said:

The Trades Council then, or the Local Labour Party are approached by us direct. They are told about the Union, literature is sent them and they are asked if they will receive a deputation from us in the person of Mr Wake, who will lay before them the aims and objects of the Union ... We have had very few refusals. The Council Hears Mr Wake and decides either to affiliate or not to affiliate ... So much for Mr. Wake. He passes on to another district. He has opened the door for us. ^{1.}

Morel continues by advising the Branch representatives how to extend the work begun by Wake:

... the next step open to the Branch would be ... by way of direct approach to the several Trade Unions represented on the Trades Council, asking for an opportunity of addressing a meeting of the Union, getting into personal touch with the Secretary, asking for permission to distribute leaflets ... the local U.D.C. might then begin to organise a group of interested members within the Union itself, which would work in the shops to distribute leaflets, and obtain ... subscribers. Could

1. Gen. Council Rpt. H,DDC/1/1.

a system of that kind be pursued and systematised, the U.D.C. would begin to feel that it was really permeating the Labour World with its principles, and building up a great silent force throughout the country in favour of them. ^{1.}

Morel's use of "silent" seems to preclude the notion of a vigorous two-way channel of communication, his structures appear to tend to mono-directional modes. Branches, composed of full members, rather than the affiliated mass, were first formed following local visits by Charles Trevelyan or Langdon Davies, the Head Office Branch Secretary. Both men represented the Liberal elite and would tend to appeal, in the first instance, to those who were well informed and like-minded. Morel had elaborated, at the General Council Meeting of 9th February, 1915, on the work he considered suitable for Branches. He set out nine types of activity: ^{2.}

1. The local printing and despatch of appeals for individual membership.
2. Circularisation and personal canvass of ministers of religion and schoolmasters.
3. Frequent Branch meetings to discuss the Union's policy and to consider fresh means of local propaganda.
4. In large Branches, the formation of sectional Study Circles.
5. Securing the services of competent local speakers.
6. "Getting into personal touch with the Editors of the local newspapers, and reporters thereof, with a view to quiet discussion, to the removal of any misapprehension which may exist in regard to the Union ..."

1. Ibid.

2. Gen. Council Rpt. H, DDC/1/1.

7. Approaching and addressing such local bodies as Political Clubs, Co-operative Guilds, Suffrage Societies, Church Guilds and Teachers' Organisations.
8. Arranging outlets for U.D.C. literature through sympathetic book-sellers.
9. Inspiring the writing of individual signed letters to the local press on U.D.C. aims and policy.

These activities were illustrated by allusion to the detailed work of the London branches, whose individual membership then numbered only 687, but increased to 1572 by midsummer 1915.¹ In spite of the Executive's discipline some local branches persisted in making initiatives tangential to general U.D.C. policy. Following the 'heterogeneous' wranglings reported at the Bristol Branch in February, 1916, the Chopwell Branch succeeded in pressuring the Executive to commission Pethick-Lawrence to draft a discussion document outlining a scheme for the use of proportional representation within the U.D.C.²

In 1917 the catalyst of the Russian Revolutions precipitated the question among Liberals of making a change of political allegiance. In the Cambridge Branch, in which Lowes Dickinson was a prominent member, over-hasty assumptions appear to have misfired, as serious dissension between branch members was reported to the Executive. The committee resolved to ask the branch to take no ill-considered action which could prejudice the entire Union.³

Strains within the branches continued into 1918. On March 19th. Morel reported to the Executive that the secretary of the Carlisle

1. Gen. Council Rpt. 22nd June, 1915. H,DDC/1/1.

2. Exec. Cttee. Min. 1st February, 1916. H,DDC/1/4.

3. Exec. Cttee. Min. 27th November, 1917. H,DDC/1/4.

Branch had suggested that the Branch be dissolved.¹ Whether this arose from discussion concerning Liberal connections with the active Carlisle Labour Party or simply through collapse of support is not indicated. Although this was a time when branch membership was still increasing, new branches being created at Lincoln and Gainsborough in April, 1918,² it is possible that the Carlisle Branch had remained something of a 'one-man-band', in that it was originally the personal creation of R.D. Denman, the local M.P.³

In March, 1918, an early indication of the political change in direction, which the elite were actively contemplating, is revealed in the Executive's response to a Gloucester Branch initiative. The local secretary sent a letter to Morel asking whether the Executive had any objection to the branch affiliating to the local Labour Party. Although this was entirely opposite to the earlier instructions, the Executive gave recognition to the changed situation by resolving that a reply be sent "stating that there was no objection, but suggesting that if there was a considerable minority opposed to such affiliation, it would be wise not to press the matter".⁴

In a large and strongly-structured organisation, aiming at mass support, it was probably inevitable that some friction would occur between the branches and the Executive. Nevertheless the overwhelming impression of the Executive Committee Minutes and the records of General Council deliberations is one of positive acceptance of the informed leadership which the elite provided. As Liberals, the leaders naturally valued the contributions made by individual members and

1. Exec. Cttee. Min. H, DDC/1/4.

2. Exec. Cttee. Min. 9th April, 1918. H, DDC/1/4.

3. Min. Inaug. Mtg. 17th Nov. 1914. H, DDC/1/1.

4. Min. Exec. Cttee. 26th Mar. 1918. H, DDC/1/4.

branches. The support expressed by branches was of great value in sustaining a General Council whose members were frequently vilified in the press and Parliament. The report of the First Annual General Council Meeting on 29th October, 1915, records a resolution moved by the Bradford Branch expressing confidence in the leadership in the light of "unscrupulous and bitter attacks appearing in so much of the Press ... and more especially upon Messrs. MacDonald, Morel and Ponsonby, ...".¹ The report of this meeting's deliberations has, as an appendix, a selection of messages of support from branches unable to be represented. Typical of these are expressions such as, "We in the Provinces feel that the men at the head of things can be relied on to go straight forward and work towards a better and higher democracy for which we are all striving".² The Prudhoe-on-Tyne Branch wished "to place on record our high appreciation of ... the leaders who, in spite of a conscienceless Press, have never drawn back from the principles that they have set out to work for".³ The message from the Luton Branch included an appreciation of the printed literature, which developed into a vital feature of the U.D.C.'s impact upon the population at large: "The literature produced by the Executive Committee has been widely read in Luton and district. Many have testified to the value of the pamphlets and leaflets, stating that these have been among the best things written during the period of the war. We are confident that a good work is going on in this way which must bear fruit in the near future".⁴ In the autumn of 1915 these were heady sentiments, but they do contain something of the flavour of the purpose which the U.D.C. had already inspired.

1. H,DDC/1/1.

3. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

(iv.) Popular Education.

The production and large-scale distribution of literature in the furtherance of its cause was a very significant function of the U.D.C. in its popular aspect. Before the Union existed as a public body its founders had released to the press a public statement, later reprinted in leaflet form, headed "Conditions of a Stable Peace".¹ Such a peace was declared to be an aim unlikely of realisation,

unless behind the statement there is a push for a well-defined public opinion, insisting that certain well-defined ideas shall shape the final settlement.²

The generally unforeseen and catastrophic event of a general European war naturally produced an immense appetite for accurate information on foreign affairs. In addition to several leaflets, the U.D.C. had published the first seven of a distinguished series of pamphlets by the end of 1914.³ It thus embarked on a sustained enterprise in popular education in public and foreign affairs which had no precedent in its scale and variety. The local Branches acted as a network of distributive agencies, remaining enthusiastic throughout the war and its immediate aftermath. On 9th November, 1915 the Executive Committee meeting had to respond to the Bradford Branch's urgent representations for fresh material. At this meeting one suggestion articulated the frightening danger which was becoming more apparent as war fever interacted with rabid nationalism. The minutes record that Langdon-Davies proposed the production of a leaflet "emphasising the dangers of control by an unintelligent and uneducated democracy".⁴

1. Copy included with Misc. Detached Min. H,DDC/1/3.

2. Ibid.

3. See Sources and Bibliography.

4. Exec. Cttee Min. 9th Nov. 1915. H,DDC/1/4.

The size of demand may be gauged through the sales and printing runs of penny pamphlets reported by Morel to the General Council on 9th February, 1915.¹ A stock of 35000 copies of "The Morrow of the War" was exhausted and a further 20,000 were being printed. 32,000 copies of Norman Angell's "Shall this War End German Militarism?" had been disposed of and 3,000 more were about to be issued. Bertrand Russell's "War - the Offspring of Fear" had sold 14,000 copies and 7,000 more were being made available. Brailsford's "The Origins of the Great War" and Ponsonby's "Parliament and Foreign Policy" jointly accounted for more than 24,000 sales with a further 16,000 in hand for distribution. Several booksellers had ordered, including a request for nearly 2,000 copies from the W.H. Smith chain.

Four months later, on 22nd June, 1915,² Morel reported to the General Council that there was "an enormous demand" for leaflets and that a total of 330,500 penny pamphlets had been printed. He also adumbrated the publication of more substantial books to consolidate the information contained in the pamphlets, the latter usually being restricted to about twenty sides of octavo. In November, 1915, the First Annual Meeting of the General Council was informed that nearly half a million copies of the penny pamphlets had been printed, together with 280,000 leaflets.³ Volume of demand was sustained at this level until the end of 1918, necessitating a staffed Literature Department at head office.

The printed publications of the U.D.C. may be divided into four classes: leaflets,⁴ pamphlets,⁵ journals and periodicals, and books.⁶

1. Gen. Council Rpt.
H,DDC/1/1.

2. H,DDC/1/1.

3. First Annual Mtg. Sec. Rpt.
H,DDC/1/1.

4. See Sources and Bibliography.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

Leaflets usually consisted of one or two sheets and were normally available free of charge. After the initial leaflet mentioned earlier,^{1.} a new series of numbered leaflets began to be issued following the inaugural public meeting in November, 1914. Twenty-three leaflets in this new numbered series had been issued by January, 1916,^{2.} after which the rate of issue decreased, so that it took until 1919 for a second group of twenty-three titles to appear.^{3.} Typical of the first group of leaflets were titles such as "Why should Democracy control Foreign Policy?" "Why you should join the Union of Democratic Control", "What is the Balance of Power?", "What is a Treaty?" and E.D. Morel's "Secret Diplomacy: a Menace to the Security of the State".

Intended for the widest possible distribution, these leaflets explained the *raison d'etre* of the Union and began the most elementary attempt to educate the public in foreign affairs. Most of the early leaflets and the more substantial penny pamphlets included a form inviting a commitment to individual membership. Intending members were asked to send a list of names of possible sympathisers together with a subscription, originally unprescribed, but later set at one shilling per annum for full membership.

The second group of twenty-three leaflet titles often focused attention on particular matters which the Union wished to pursue. For example, "British Working Men - Observe! French Workers Support Wilson", reinforced the crusade to have the 14 Points adopted as official government policy, while Numbers 40, 41 and 43, forming a series on "Secret Diplomacy", aimed to harden working class attitudes to the

1. See P.53.

2. See Sources and Bibliography and Calendar of U.D.C. Archive, Univ. of Hull Library.

3. Ibid.

continuing dangers of covert negotiations.

In addition to the numbered series, a scattering of occasional, unnumbered leaflets was issued. One of the most interesting of these was produced at the end of 1917 and took its direct inspiration from the Russian revolutions. Entitled "The Basis for a Peoples' Peace",^{1.} this two page leaflet sets out to show the remarkably convergent policies, on central questions in current foreign affairs, of the U.D.C., the British Labour Party, the French Socialist Party, the German Socialist Majority, the German Socialist Minority, the Austrian Socialist Party and the Hungarian Socialist Party. In tabular form the views of these seven organisations are matched with the questions of General Principles, Territorial Questions (issue by issue in detail), Cultural Freedom, Reparations, and the Guarantees possible under a World Organisation.

The series of numbered pamphlets,^{2.} varying from six to thirty-two pages in length, represents a sustained and serious effort to utilize the improved standards of literacy achieved by universal elementary schooling. It has an impressive catalogue of titles by authors who included such scholars as Bertrand Russell, Lowes Dickinson, G.P. Gooch, J.A. Hobson and R.C. Lambert (the future librarian of the Athenaeum Club). These, together with active politicians such as Ramsay MacDonald and professional experts such as H.N. Brailsford and Arthur Ponsonby, united in a conscientious effort to educate the uninitiated in the mysteries of foreign affairs and the mechanisms of those bodies which influenced it.

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1. Printed leaflet in private collection.
 2. See Sources and Bibliography and Calendar of U.D.C. Archive, Univ. of Hull Library.

Fifteen titles, price one penny each, had been published by December, 1915.¹ They covered a wide range of topics, including "Parliament and Foreign Policy", "The International Industry of War", "War and the Workers. A Plea for Democratic Control", "Women and War", "The Balance of Power" and a very early plea for "A League of Nations". Five more titles were added in 1916,² including Lowes Dickinson's Liberal warning against "Economic War after the War". The four titles issued in 1917³ included "The War to End Wars, A Plea to Soldiers" by an anonymous soldier. In the last year of the war and its aftermath the issues of the Russian Revolution, peace overtures, the peace settlement and its betrayal of Liberal and humanitarian principles, reparations, war guilt and the League of Nations dominated the scene. In total, forty-five had been issued by the end of 1922.⁴

In addition to the planned series of numbered pamphlets, a few unnumbered titles were produced. The Imperial Russian regime had been a consistent object of hatred among the leadership of the U.D.C. The events of 1917 in Russia were seized upon joyfully and exploited fully. In August, E.D. Morel produced an unscheduled pamphlet entitled, "Tsardom's Part in the War",⁵ designed to show that war guilt was not an exclusively German prerogative. He speaks of the difficulty in breaking through the official image, supported as it was by "the passions and prejudices of the mob-mind, mostly, but not wholly composed of that great body of unintelligent middle-class opinion which is still in the stage of believing what it reads in the newspapers". (p.5). Morel here gives expression to his acute awareness of the

1. Ibid. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid.

5. Ibid, and printed pamphlet in private collection.

dangerous limitations created by a mass-circulation Press in circumstances of mass basic literacy, with very limited public provision for further education. This pamphlet advertises that its first edition of 10,000 copies was sold in five days and that it immediately went through second and third editions of 10,000 copies each. Something of the excitement of 1917 is conveyed by the heavily printed notice on the cover: "After reading, please pass on to someone else. Sow the seeds of truth".

The Union produced two monthly journals, "The U.D.C."¹ which appeared from November, 1915 to June, 1919, and its successor, "Foreign Affairs",² which began in July, 1919 and continued monthly until 1929. Before his death in 1924, both journals were edited by Morel. "Foreign Affairs" was designed to educate those "active" politically in the issues of the day. It began at the level of the numbered pamphlets and gradually acquired a professional political-consultant status. Its predecessor, "The U.D.C.", was designed to encourage the mass membership of wartime and the aftermath. "The U.D.C"'s general level was somewhere between the leaflet for labour organisations and the numbered pamphlet. For example, the issue for September, 1917 (Vol.2, No.11), price one penny, contained a three page main article "Russia, the Real - and the Misrepresented (Interview with a British Expert on Russian Affairs.)" The interviewee is described as "a friend of the Union's whose peculiar knowledge of Russia ..." enabled him to "read the Russian soul aright". In view of the date and the editor's question "What about Lenin and the extremists? ... we hear so many conflicting stories", the opinion that Lenin's activities represented "a passing phase" has a

1. See Sources and Bibliography, and Calendar of U.D.C. Archive, Univ. of Hull Library.

2. Ibid.

certain retrospective irony. The issue contained a two page editorial, followed by a page devoted to Mrs Philip Snowden's article on "The Women's Peace Crusade". The seventh page was divided between a regular feature listing the numbers and casualties of all the belligerent armies as at 1st July, 1917 and an anonymous correspondent's article "Future for 1917 and After". The next four pages are devoted to three articles: "First Class Lies", by Arthur Ponsonby, "Militarism and the Future of Democracy" by Charles Trevelyan and "Treaties of Peace" by J.A. Farrer. The twelfth and final page, entitled "Work of the Union", also a regular feature, lists the detailed activities in August of the Federations and several of the individual Branches.

The U.D.C. also supported a quite different type of periodical from 1915 to the end of the war. Entitled "Notes from the Foreign Press" it was issued at approximately monthly intervals and distributed to the U.D.C. branches by Mrs. Dorothea Buxton (nee Jebb). The "Notes" were prepared in Cambridge by a dedicated group of monitors convened by Lowes Dickinson. Originally they were published weekly as an insert in the "Cambridge Review" and intended for a scholarly readership.^{1.} However, the Executive was quick to see that the "Notes" provided an important window on to the view of events taken by other allies, neutrals and the enemy. The scope of this periodical enabled large numbers of interested people to gain an insight which transcended the blinkering screens of the national press and the official view of the war. The "Notes" contained verbatim extracts and summaries of foreign press articles, All editorial comment was scrupulously square bracketed.

1. Hanak, H., 'The Union of Democratic Control During the First World War' in B I H R Vol.xxxvi, No. 94, Nov. 1963, p.178.

Issue No.9, dated October 5th, 1915¹. included material from two French, two Swedish, one Dutch, two Russian, one Italian, two Austrian, six German and one Swiss newspaper. Wherever appropriate, the political standpoint of the paper was indicated. A certain "underground" flavour was added to the "Notes" by the total lack of attribution of the origin of its publication, other than that the printers were the National Labour Press and that copies might be obtained from Mrs. Buxton at her private address. The "Notes" could well claim a unique place in the contemporary literature of either world war.

The U.D.C. had issued over a dozen books before the end of the war.² Mostly written by the same group of experts responsible for the numbered pamphlets, some of the books were intended to reinforce and extend topics introduced to the membership earlier. In this category were such titles as Towards International Government by J.A. Hobson, The Future of Constantinople by Leonard Woolf and A League of Nations by H.N. Brailsford. In 1918 Seymour Cocks contributed The Secret Treaties, while Arthur Ponsonby produced Wars and Treaties.³ Ponsonby's short book was an admirable demonstration of a professional Foreign Office man's skill in clearly presented precis writing. Each international and major colonial war is allowed two printed pages. In order to facilitate clarity and comparison each war is subjected to a similar treatment under the headings: Date, Belligerents, Cause, Occasion, Course of the war, Political results (including treaty details) and Remarks (on the political consequences.)

However, the bible of the movement was provided by Morel with his Truth and the War. This book of over 300 pages was bought on a large

1. Private collection. 2. See Sources and Bibliography.

3. Ponsonby, A., Wars and Treaties 1815-1914, London, 1918.

scale at the price of two shillings a copy. Published in 1916, over 15,000 copies had been issued by August, 1917.¹ In the first part Morel deals with the causal chains involved in the outbreak of the war, the growth since 1900 of militarism, the naval race, European conscription, secret diplomacy, the mutual perceptions of the French and German governments and people, Tsarist machinations, the hope invested in President Wilson and, finally, the growing "Spectre of Fear" (Ch. XVIII.) In Part Two he begins with a rationale of the U.D.C.'s views of the need for democratic control of foreign policy, and proceeds to expound on the Belgian Problem, jingoistic reactionaries in Britain and Germany and the dangers of aggressive nationalism, imperialism and economic war. He details the steps which led Britain to a war unanticipated by the majority of the population and ends with offering a stark choice for the future in Chapter XXXV, "The Two Roads". He predicts ruin if an attempt is made to fight a conclusive war, as it will prove impossible to achieve a "conclusive peace". He depicts the consequence of a jingoistic, imperialist peace as future war made more unbearable by technological advance, including sophisticated air attack on the heretofore unassailable home island. He offers an alternative road of international co-operation in both the political and economic fields. Although largely untried and fraught with manifold difficulty, it represents, in Morel's view, the only sane alternative.

Truth and the War is a fluently written skilful polemic by an author who had succeeded better than most in penetrating the smoke-screen of international diplomacy. After the war Morel produced two more very popular books, both of which are characterised by a masterly handling of primary diplomatic sources. Diplomacy Revealed was

1. Advertisement on back cover of unnumbered printed pamphlet by E.D. Morel, 'Tsardom's Part in the War, Aug. 1917., in private collection.

published in 1921 and dedicated "To the Young Men in the Labour and Socialist Movement who are acting as the intellectual torch-bearers to their fellows". (p.iii) In line with the U.D.C.'s change of direction after the peace treaties he is overtly appealing to a narrowed constituency. Each year from 1905 to 1914 is shown through the observations made in despatches from the Belgian Ministers in London, Paris and Berlin. Morel demonstrates that his belief in the need for democratic control of foreign policy does not proceed from ignorance of the real difficulties involved in popular perception. On pages 174 to 176 he records the Berlin Minister, Greindl's, appreciation of Sir Edward Grey's speech in March, 1911, during the House of Commons' debate on the naval budget. Grey had eased away from confrontation over the Berlin-Baghdad Railway issue. Greindl's report indicates a jumble of governmental mistrust and popular misconception, resulting in a mismatch of understandings:

I beg to draw your attention to the fact, sir, that the present report does not mean that I consider an Anglo-German reconciliation as already accomplished or imminent ... the German papers have not taken Sir Edward Grey's speech with sufficient seriousness ... The disappointment shown by "Le Temps" proves that public opinion in Paris attaches much more importance to it than in Berlin. To judge by the manner in which the French paper expresses itself, one would say that it no longer considers the Triple Entente as anything but an empty formula devoid of significance. ¹.

1. Diplomacy Revealed, London, 1921, p. 176.
Morel, E.D.

Morel was certainly providing the Labour intellectual torch-bearers with a strengthening diet.

His other post-war work using diplomatic sources is of extended pamphlet length. Almost his last work, "The Secret History of a Great Betrayal" (1924) resulted from his use of two archives of secret Imperial Russian Foreign Office documents, the collection made public by "Pravda" in 1918 and a second group, known as the De Siebert Collection, made public in 1922. His subject is once more the consequences of secret diplomacy and he again sustains his appeal "to men and women of all parties - and of no party - to study dispassionately the facts herein set forth" (p.9)

Throughout the period from 1914 to 1924 Morel and his U.D.C. associates had not wavered from the daunting task of attempting to place before a wide public the specialist knowledge of foreign affairs necessarily familiar to very few. In their view such education was an inevitable necessity if progress was to be made in the direction of informed popular influence upon the conduct of international relations.

(v.) The Popular Campaign, Reactions, and the Stimulus of 1917.

The leaders of the U.D.C. had been well aware from the outset that face-to-face meetings, discussions and, if unavoidable, confrontations, would be a necessary component in the welding together of an organisation claiming mass appeal. If this was the age of the popular printed word it was still very much the age of the orator - as Lloyd George was effectively demonstrating.

The Union had no lack of practised and powerful speakers, and many branches included figures at ease on the platform or in the debating chamber. As early as February, 1915,¹ Morel was able to report to the General Council a long list of lectures and meetings held during the previous three months in the London area. He mentioned lectures to 30 Brotherhoods, 14 Adult Schools, 9 I.L.P. Meetings, 3 British Socialist Party Meetings, several Liberal organisations and more than ten other meetings. He announced that "An important course of three lectures is being given to the North, South, East and West (London) Federations of the I.L.P. by Mr. Arthur Ponsonby, Mr Ramsay MacDonald, Mr. C.P. Trevelyan Mr E.D. Morel, and the Hon. Bertrand Russell."² "The London U.D.C. Branch was commended for its careful organisation and selection of a group of 45 lecturers.

It was, however, necessary to take on the challenge of open public meetings. At the General Council Meeting of 9th. February, 1915 the Executive had claimed to control the further publicity of the Union's aims, a claim which the Council supported by resolution.³ Therefore, in the following Spring, Morel, having sounded out the branches,

1. Gen. Council Rpt. 9th Feb., 1915. H,DDC/1/1.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

members of the Council inaugurated a series of public meetings.

Cambridge, Bradford, Manchester, Glasgow and Luton were the first branches to arrange large meetings. At the General Council Meeting of 22nd. June, 1915, Morel reported that "These public meetings have been in every way successful"¹. adding that the interruptions were "trifling".

However, at the General Council Meeting of 9th March, 1916 Morel was forced to concede that one or two provincial meetings had been cancelled as a result of violent interruptions. He emphasised that actual violence had been confined to London meetings.² This factor may be related to the slight aura of left-wing middle class intellectualism which was much more evident in the London branches, based as they were on the old Angell Civil-Union groups, than in the provinces, where a wider spectrum of popular participation had followed in the trail of Wake's activities. Morel indicated something of this when he followed his remarks about contaminating violence at meetings with the information that "Mr. Wake ... is now undertaking, in concert with the London Federation, and with the co-operation of the officials of the I.L.P., a month's campaign among the Labour Organisations in London ... We hope greatly to strengthen our hold over the London area on the result of this effort".³

In addition to Morel, the speakers who took on the greatest burden of public meetings in 1915 and 1916 were Charles Trevelyan, C.R. Burton, Arthur Ponsonby and Helena Swanwick.⁴ The training of local speakers had been urged on the branches by Morel⁵ and he commissioned Langdon-Davies to write a handbook to guide the uninitiated

1. Gen. Council Rpt. H,DDC/1/1. 2. Gen. Council Rpt. Sec. Rpt.
H,DDC/1/1.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. First Annual Mtg. 29th. October, 1915, Sec. Rpt. H,DDC/1/1.

and warn of pitfalls. This book appeared in 1916 and was several times reprinted. Entitled The ABC of the U.D.C., Davies advises the beginner how to put over the cardinal points of the U.D.C. programme concerning the need for democratic control of foreign policy. Referring to the Union's fourth point, the drastic reduction of armaments by all the belligerent powers as part of the eventual peace settlement, he suggests various tactics.¹ Speakers are advised not to attack individuals or armaments as a cause of war, but to inveigh against the system of private international arms manufacturers. Davies suggests that the description of armaments expenditure as an "economic evil" could be effective and that armaments manufacture being a private concern tends to increase the evil, by increasing the probability of war. International influence should be shown to be exerted by private individuals devoid of public accountability. He invites speakers to consider the advocacy of nationalisation as a remedy, but to take care to show that no adverse effects would be likely to fall on the employees of armaments firms, the public at large or even the quality of armaments. He reminds speakers that a degree of public ownership of the armaments industry already existed, but to concentrate on the remaining danger inherent in the profit motive and the influence of big business.

The effectiveness of the drive to train local speakers was well in evidence by 1917. The work of the Union reported in "The U.D.C.", for September (vol. 2, No.11) shows a combination of General Council speakers, Wake and local speakers working to busy purpose. On July 29th. Charles Trevelyan addressed two large open-air meetings at Bradford. Keen audiences were reported with plenty of "fair critics".

1. Langdon-Davies, B.N., The ABC of the U.D.C., London, 1916.
Ch. 6. p.149.

One of the audiences was estimated at 1500 and support was described as unanimous. Literature sold well at the meetings, which were held under the joint auspices of the U.D.C., I.L.P. and Bradford Trades Council. At this time Wake was in the middle of a fortnight's tour of Durham and had already spoken at thirteen public meetings, under the auspices of the I.L.P. Purely local initiative was reported from the Leicester Branch. On July 27th. its members held a symposium on Peace Terms in the form of a mock Stockholm Conference. On August 5th. the Stanningley and Farsley Branch held two open-air meetings addressed by local speaker, Mr. Hoggins. A good sale of literature was reported and "Three new members made".^{1.}

However, in the midst of all the branch activities reported in "The U.D.C." for December, 1918 (Vol.4. No.2), when election fever was at a high pitch and Councillor Kneeshaw was campaigning energetically across the Scottish Lowlands and into Yorkshire,^{2.} an item of news from the Halifax Branch revealed that the U.D.C. leadership had not lost sight of the channels of communication traditional in an era of more restricted franchise. Mr. and Mrs. Trevelyan were reported to be present at a Drawing Room Meeting held by the branch, "by the kind permission of Mr. Joseph Smithson, at which Lady Margaret Sackville (attended)" and Mr. Trevelyan's short speech "was warmly received".^{3.}

1. 'The U.D.C.', Vol. 2, No. 11, p. 136, Col. 2.

2. Dundee, Oct. 24: "A stirring address ... was delivered by Councillor J.W. Kneeshaw." 'The U.D.C.' Vol.4., No.2, p.288. Col.2.

3. 'The U.D.C.', Vol.4, No.2., p. 288, Col.3.

The pages of "The U.D.C." issues for December, 1918 and January, 1919¹. continue to depict a many-faceted organisation with widespread popular support. The Union, having consistently maintained a well-orchestrated chorus of opposition to the official view of German responsibility for the war, thereafter mobilized the organisation for action to secure parliamentary seats and to enlist popular support for a non-punitive peace settlement and the establishment of a strong League of Nations.² The Scottish Federation's preparations in November, 1918 to fight the imminent General Election were indicated in the "Work of the Union" section of "The U.D.C." issue for December:

The Federation Executive has held several meetings at which Election policy has been fully discussed and a questionnaire to candidates prepared. Some twenty Parliamentary candidates in Scotland are active members of the U.D.C. and the large amount of propaganda work done by the Federation during the past two years may be expected to bear fruit at the present time.³

The growth of local interest in the proposed League of Nations is indicated in the same issue:

Pontefract. Miss Chambers⁴ met a number of sympathisers at 10 Carlton Terrace, by kind invitation of Mr. D. Evans, the result of which is the formation of a Group in the District, with Miss Mary Evans as Secretary.

Two public lectures on "A League of Nations"

1. 'The U.D.C., Vol.4, Nos. 2 - 3.

3. Ibid. col.2.

2. 'The U.D.C., Vol.4, No. 2.
p.288.

4. The U.D.C. area organiser.

are being arranged and a study circle is in
process of formation. ^{1.}

1. 'The U.D.C.', Vol.4., No.2., p.288, col.2.

The attainment of a firm foundation of popular support represented a considerable achievement in the context of near-hysteria induced during the war by the official attitude, avidly seconded by the popular press. In the early days of the Union, Morel had to endure the vitriolic opposition of such right-wing newspapers as "The Morning Post", together with slanderous suggestions in Parliament. Rumours were spread of German gold supporting the U.D.C. and in the Summer of 1915 the "Daily Express" attacked the U.D.C. as a pro-German organisation.¹ The Executive Committee was forced to decide that special care must be taken over the admission of naturalised German members. At the Executive meeting of 10th. August, 1915 Ponsonby felt that it would be safer to exclude this category of members.² Following a report to the Executive concerning a police raid, inspired by Carson, on the Labour Press, Manchester, to seize U.D.C. publications, the Executive decided that its independent position could only be safeguarded by the distasteful decision to exclude from U.D.C. membership any German or Austrian nationals, together with Germans naturalized since the outbreak of war.³

The worst period of violent public intimidation of the U.D.C. followed the press attacks of the Summer of 1915 and recurred sporadically until the Spring of 1916. Morel was in no doubt about the deliberate nature of the opposition. Speaking to the General Council on 29th. October, 1915, concerning the brutal attack on Arthur Ponsonby at a Kingston-upon-Thames meeting, he was clear that "The outrage was carefully organised and was in no sense spontaneous".⁴ As mentioned earlier, the incitement of mob-style opposition, largely confined to

1. Exec. Cttee. Min. June and July, 1915.
H,DDC/1/4.

3. Exec. Cttee. Min. 24th Aug. 1915.,
H,DDC/1/4.

2. Exec. Cttee. Min.
10th Aug., 1915. H,DDC/1/4.

4. First Annual Mtg.
Sec. Rpt., H,DDC/1/1.

the London area, and the lesson of a too narrowly-based membership led to Wake's corrective campaign among London Labour organisations.¹ However, even Wake was sometimes faced with mob opposition. In his report to the Executive Committee, considered on 14th. December, 1915, he had mentioned that three meetings arranged in Liverpool had been disturbed following a press campaign carried on by the "Liverpool Courier and Express" and the "Liverpool Echo". The police had advised the chairman that the force was not sufficiently strong to keep order.²

Morel had been very well aware of the power of the press since his campaign with the Congo Reform Association. Realising that the popular national press was very largely employed in the incitement and gratification of jingoistic nationalism, he advised Branches to make friendly contact with the local press.³ At the same General Council meeting to which he reported the London violence he suggested that branches, particularly in the north, might be as successful as Mr. Wilson, Secretary of the Kendal branch, who managed to place several columns on the Union's work in every issue of the "Westmorland Mercury and Times".⁴

Nevertheless, the U.D.C. had still to contend with very vindictive opposition determined, if possible, to deny it a popular audience. Early in 1916 the "Morning Post" and the "Daily Express" threw their support behind a counter-organisation known as the Anti-German Union. Morel referred, in his report to the General Council of 9th. March, 1916, to the advertisement which the Anti-German Union had placed in "The Times" of 21st. February, in which it described itself as "the driving force behind the Government".⁵ The Anti-German Union was

1. See P. 65.

2. Exec. Cttee. Min. H,DDC/1/4.

3. See P. 49.

4. First Annual Mtg. Sec. Rpt. H,DDC/1/1.

5. Gen. Council Rpt. H,DDC/1/1.

particularly anxious to enlist working-class support, perhaps in acknowledgement of Wake's skill in penetrating Labour organisations. Morel remarked that although headed by an Earl and twenty-two Peers and Peeresses, "it also has its hooligan side, as the break-up of the Memorial Hall meeting and the disgraceful incidents which have marked Mr. Buxton's addresses at Devonshire House¹, bear witness".² Thus the non-rational forces arraigned against a critical rational opposition had advanced beyond the refusal of papers such as the "Daily News", "Daily Chronicle" and "Glasgow Herald" to accept U.D.C. advertisements³, towards a gradually more structured violent antagonism. Even as late as May, 1918 the Earl of Denbigh infuriated Morel by referring to him as "a very dubious Frenchman".⁴

In 1921, reflecting on the violent opposition to the U.D.C., Charles Trevelyan wrote:

During the whole period of the war we were continually addressing large public meetings of working men all over the country. Left to themselves, the common people would, so our experience taught us, have been ready to discuss politics during the war almost as usual. But the governing classes took care they should not. In some cases riots were promoted by officers and recruiting authorities; soldiers were invited to break the heads of "pro-Germans", and the proceedings defended by the Government

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1. The seat of the Standing Labour Committee, and a line of communication to government.
 2. Gen. Council Rpt. 9th March, 1916, Sec. Rpt. H, DDC/1/1.
 3. Exec. Cttee. Min., 7th Dec., 1915. H, DDC/1/4.
 4. Letter to the Earl of Denbigh from E.D. Morel, dated 9th May, 1918.
M473. F2.

as spontaneous outbreaks of popular indignation.^{1.}

This view of events from a distance of three years defuses the impact of the raw feelings of the time, and Trevelyan's reference to the "common people" is cast in terms which reveal an elitist now withdrawn from contact too close for comfort. In this respect Bertrand Russell conveys the hazards run by those who opposed the war much more vividly. At a meeting in a North London church to support the Russian Revolution of March, 1917, Russell found himself in trouble:

Patriotic newspapers distributed leaflets in all the neighbouring public houses ... saying that we were in communication with the Germans ... a mob presently besieged the church ... The mob burst in led by a few officers ... the fiercest were viragos who used wooden boards full of rusty nails ... two of (these) began to attack me with their boards ... I owe my life to a young woman whom I did not know, who interposed herself between me and the viragos long enough for me to make my escape ... quite a number of people, including several women, had their clothes torn off their backs as they left the building.^{2.}

Charles Trevelyan was concerned that the prevalence of war fever might erode the public expression of private conviction. On 16th. November, 1915 he had persuaded the Executive to ask Branches to report any

1. Trevelyan, Charles, The Union of Democratic Control, its history and its policy, London, 1921, p.6.

2. Russell, B., Portraits from Memory, London, 1956, pp. 28 - 29.

suppression of freedom of speech in their neighbourhoods.^{1.} On the 17th. October, 1916 the Executive was again worried about freedom of thought. Reports of teaching in elementary schools which fostered aggressive imperialism and glorification of war received apprehensive attention.^{2.} The wide range of powers exerted under the war-emergency Defence of the Realm Act (D.O.R.A.) became a continuing concern. The authorities had always expressed suspicion of the Union's publications. The action by the Rochdale police on 9th. May, 1916 of prohibiting the sale of U.D.C. literature by local newsagents was typical of sporadic harassment.^{3.} On 4th. December, 1917 the Executive were discussing the trouble caused in previous weeks by Censorship Regulation 27c, under which all the Union's publications were ordered to be submitted.^{4.} After this date every item of the Union's literature displayed a notice on the front cover indicating the date on which the material had been sent for the censor's approval.

However, much the greatest single blow dealt to the Union occurred on the last day of August, 1917 when Morel was arrested for a technical infringement of a section of D.O.R.A. which prohibited the unlicensed transmission of literature to non-allied countries. Morel had sent a copy of his pamphlet "Tsardom's Part in the War" to the French pacifist Rolland, then living in Switzerland. The authorities seized the opportunity for which they had long been waiting and Morel was sentenced to six months in jail.

Thus the Union was deprived of its single greatest source of inspiration at elite level over the same period that Wake was too

1. Exec. Cttee. Min. H,DDC/1/4.

3. Exec. Cttee. Min., H,DDC/1/4.

2. Exec. Cttee. Min. H,DDC/1/4.

4. Exec. Cttee. Min. H,DDC/1/4.

worn out to enthuse the local supporters nationwide. Nevertheless, Charles Treveyan took on the secretaryship during this period, when the hold of the war upon the minds of millions had at last been disturbed by the events in Russia.

The Russian Revolutions made possible a legitimate expression of internationalism, in the shape of labour solidarity, for the first time since 1914. At the end of 1917 the slow sea-change discernible in popular sentiment, combined with growing war weariness, soldierly discontents, and unremitting casualty lists, made legitimate a rational appeal such as the Union championed.

Before his imprisonment Morel had realised the potentialities of the radically altered situation. On 24th. April the Executive resolved to issue a leaflet "quoting the latest manifesto of the Russian Committee of Soldiers' and Workmens' Delegates and showing that it was in accordance with U.D.C. principles".¹.

This leaflet was the harbinger of a flood of enthusiastic literature issuing from a wide spectrum of radical Liberal and Labour organisations. Some Liberals hesitated after the Bolshevik coup, but many discovered that the Rubicon was behind them. The greatest publishing sensation connected with the events in Russia involved the publication in Labour's "The Herald" of May 11th., 1918 of the texts of the Secret Conventions to several international treaties. The Bolsheviks had released documents from the Imperial Russian Foreign Office which mapped the division of spoils agreed upon by the powers in advance of the end of hostilities. "The Herald" used the services of the U.D.C.'s Seymour Cocks to write one of the explanatory articles.

Following Wake's resignation and the great expansion of

1. Exec. Cttee. Min. H, DDC/1/4.

interest in foreign affairs during 1917, the appointment of five regional organisers to replace Wake was confirmed by the Executive on 3rd. January, 1918.¹ J.W. Kneeshaw's enthusiasm had already been channelled with difficulty. On the 18th. December, 1917 a letter from him to the Executive suggested that he led a great demonstration in the Union's cause in South Wales. The Executive resolved that Kneeshaw be told that "what South Wales needed was organisation rather than demonstration."²

Returning from prison in January, 1918, Morel decided that an extra organiser could be taken on in advance of the expected termination of Kneeshaw's engagement in March. On 19th. February, 1918 the Executive arranged an Organiser's Committee meeting to plan the best division of effort.³ Kneeshaw was to continue as temporary organiser of affiliated Labour organisations. Miss Chambers was sent to work in the Yorkshire Federation. Miss Royds was based at the Birmingham Branch (where the secretary had fallen foul of D.O.R.A. and was subsequently imprisoned.) Mr. Bertram Fox was to serve in Northumberland, with some time devoted to the isolated branch at Hull. Mr. Heywood was to continue in the London area, but his services were earmarked for Lancashire subject to Executive agreement. Finally, a Miss Ashby was allotted Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire and Leicestershire. The committee emphasized that the organisers should be reassigned flexibly, to meet the contingencies of the newly volatile political situation.

As the end of the war drew closer, political allegiances came to demand firm definition. The row between Liberal and Labour supporters

1. Exec. Cttee. Min. H, DDC/1/4.

2. Exec. Cttee. Min. H, DDC/1/4.

3. Exec. Cttee. Min. Misplaced in H, DDC/1/5.

in the Cambridge Branch ^{1.} and the Executive's decision to reverse the old rules and permit the Gloucester Branch to affiliate to the Labour Party ^{2.} illuminate, at popular level, the political watershed of which the elite had long been aware.

Nevertheless, Morel was in no hurry to make a complete association of the U.D.C. with Labour before the end of hostilities. On 16th. April, 1918 he was once again in the position of restraining Kneeshaw, who had the mandate of a joint U.D.C.- Labour conference to forward "several recommendations as to the best methods of extending the work of the U.D.C. in the trade union world". ^{3.} The recommendation that a joint U.D.C. - Trades Union Committee be formed was stalled. The Executive was clearly in a dilemma. It was first decided that "a better course would be to approach one or two leading Trade Unionists with a view to getting them to sign a letter which could then be sent to Trades Councils and Labour Bodies asking them to receive a U.D.C. speaker". ^{4.} This caution may reflect an expression of trade union mistrust of the role of intellectuals in the Labour Movement. Finally the Executive resolved that their decision on this matter be held over until F.W. Jowett had been sent "to 'sound' certain people on this point and report to the Executives". ^{5.} The go-betweens in the contemplated arranged marriage needed to tread softly, but the stage of incipient institutionalisation of relationships was under way.

1. See P. 50.

4. Ibid.

2. See P. 51.

5. Ibid.

3. Exec. Cttee. Min. H, DDC/1/4.

(vi) Shrinkage and the Retreat from Popular Involvement.

The end of the war precipitated changes in the interaction of the Union with popular politics. On the one hand was the need to mobilize as large a body of opinion as possible to lobby for a non-vindictive peace settlement and to make use of the network of branch contacts to canvass support for parliamentary candidates of U.D.C. persuasion. On the other hand was the realisation that the cessation of fighting inevitably involved loss of urgency in the personal commitment of individual branch members at a time when political party loyalty was becoming an unavoidable issue. The growing alignment of many of its members with Labour party politics made a reconsideration of the Union's policies more urgent.

On 7th. January, 1919 the Executive Committee asked Morel "to consult with the organisers to obtain their views on the future role of the U.D.C."¹. Morel was already busy reshaping the strategic programme. He formulated a basis of five points which laid considerable stress on the futility of a retributive settlement.² His first point emphasised that ignorance of economics leads to futile nationalistic policies likely to engender war. Secondly, he asserted that economic international interdependence was a primary need. Thirdly, he reasoned that "patriotic" programmes were against the interests of the people in whose name they were promulgated. Fourthly, he argued that the forced lowering of economic standards in one country is contagious in a capitalist context. Finally, he warned that the infliction of injustice upon any race or nation would generate artificial antagonisms leading to future conflicts. This liberal, internationalist

1. Exec. Cttee. Min. H, DDC/1/4.

2. Manuscript draft, M473. F7.

outlook which had found some expression in the aftermath of the peace settlement of the South African War, contrasted starkly with the prolongation of popular war hysteria with such slogans as "Squeeze the Germans until the pips squeak!"

However, after a last effort to bring effective popular pressure to bear on the Peace Conference, particularly during the General Election of 1918, a process of disengagement from grass-roots involvement became discernible in the U.D.C. leadership. This incipient change of commitment seems to have been felt in the branches. Despite a long letter from the Scottish Federation's local executive read to the Executive Committee on 28th. January, 1919, which expressed "confidence in the future of the Union, ... assuring the members of the Executive of their support",^{1.} the gradual withdrawal from the popular fray continued. On 4th. February, 1919 the Executive decided to dispense with the services of all the organisers "for the time being".^{2.}

On 8th. August, 1919 the Executive decided that the journal "The U.D.C." should be replaced by "Foreign Affairs, a Journal of International Understanding".^{3.} The first issue of this journal is dated July, 1919, implying that articles were ready in advance of the Executive's formal decision. The appeal of the new journal was towards intellectual development, providing information needed by the potential future leaders, rather than the mixture with local activities provided by "The U.D.C."

The membership's perception of changes in the leadership's attitude, together with the change of emphasis in the Union's work, had

1. Exec. Cttee. Min. H,DDC/1/5.

2. Exec. Cttee. Min.3. H,DDC/1/5.

3. Exec. Cttee. Min. H,DDC/1/5.

repercussions at the popular level. On 4th. February, 1919 the Executive was told that the London Federation was in some straits because of "changed circumstances".^{1.} At the Executive meeting of 27th. January, 1920 the London Federation was reported as dissenting from the diminished role of branches which it asserted had resulted from the now undemocratic U.D.C. which meant that Branches were simply handling outlets for "Foreign Affairs".^{2.} Continuing friction led in February to the Executive's dissolution of the London Federation and its replacement by a London Committee. On 24th. February the Executive discussed London area affairs at length.^{3.} The new committee was to co-ordinate the work of just four full Branches and the residual 23 local unattached "Groups". The Executive decided that the London Committee should have 36 members, one third of whom would be nominated, half by local groups and half directly by the Executive. The six Executive nominees proposed to the meeting included Mr. Palme Dutt, together with Norman Angell, Commander Grenfell, a Mr. Francis Birrell, a Miss M.E. Durham and a T.R. Bridgewater.

The General Council of 24th. April, 1920 was told of these arrangements and was also informed that a Mr. E.E. Hunter had been appointed by the Executive as Organiser for London and the Home Counties.^{4.} Branch problems were not confined to London. The Scottish Federation continued to encourage Branch activities similar to the wartime pattern.^{5.} The General Council of 24th. April, 1920 was also told that, in disputation Cambridge, "a strong branch had been reorganised". The Executive appear to have decided that, in the Post War and Post Peace Settlement era, the time had come to assert the direction of the lines

1. Exec. Cttee. Min. H,DDC/1/5.

2. Exec. Cttee. Min. H,DDC/1/5.

3. Exec. Cttee. Min. H,DDC/1/5.

4. Gen. Council Min. H,DDC/1/2.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

of communication to the membership. Following the General Council of April, Wake's old title of head office Commissioner was revived, E.E. Hunter was upgraded to commissioner for the London area, Kneeshaw remained useful in the role of labour and trade union commissioner, while J.H. Hudson was made commissioner for Yorkshire.¹ Thus the leadership of the U.D.C. appeared to have acquiesced willingly in the widespread dissolution of local Branches after July, 1919. This situation avoided the need to make any specific decision to abandon the branch network, which would have aroused violent opposition in certain areas, especially Scotland. The new commissioners were intended as instruments to implement the Executive's policy among the now largely affiliated membership. In the post-Versailles environment local discussion groups, such as that set up by Miss Chambers at Pontefract,² were much more directly serviceable to the Executive's policies than the old pattern of direct intervention by activists of organised local branches to induce a popular pressure in favour of democratic control of foreign policy.

1. Gen. Council Mtg., 12th Nov., 1920. Gen. Council Min. H, DDC/1/2.

2. See p.68.

Charles Trevelyan provided the apologia for the modified pattern of the Union's activity. Writing in 1921 he explained:

While the possibility existed of securing a Peace Settlement inspired by the cardinal principles of the Union, the policy was adopted of maintaining and creating a large number of specific Branches all over the country to make a direct assault upon local opinion. With the defeat of justice and reason at Versailles, the situation had to be examined afresh and the conclusion arrived at, with the full consent of the majority of the English Branches, was that the solid educational work of a general character as distinct from the political agitation in specific centres, to which the Union then of necessity became committed, made any further effort to create new branches inadvisable.¹

The "consent of the majority of English Branches" masks the friction in London and Cambridge, while making no pretence that the Scottish Federation concurred. However, Trevelyan did concede that:

At the same time it was made clear that any Branch of the Union which considered that there was specific local educational work which could be usefully done to supplement the general effort from Headquarters, should

1. Trevelyan, Charles, The Union of Democratic Control, its history and its policy, London, 1921. p.13.

continue ... Several branches have decided to do so as in Birmingham, Cambridge, and other centres.^{1.}

Nevertheless, the clear message is that education rather than public action was the keynote for the Union's future work. The General Council Meeting of 22nd. November, 1921 was informed of foreign policy conferences convened by the Union at Newcastle, Bristol, Leeds, Birmingham and Hull during the previous three months. The meeting was also informed of the nomination of the Union for the Nobel Peace Prize of 1922 and its warm reception in Norway.^{2.} Following the war a number of organisations based on the U.D.C. had been set up in several European countries. The General Council of November, 1921 heard a good report of the Austrian U.D.C. and was informed that a French U.D.C. had been inaugurated.^{3.}

The focus of attention was decisively switched to national and international affairs within an institutional framework nourished by education rather than by personal or local commitment at public meetings. Some indication that the Executive was well pleased with the popular forces at its disposal, represented by the affiliated mass membership and the impact of its efforts in popular education, may be gained from Morel's report to the General Council on 9th. March, 1923,^{4.} in which he stated that thirty successful parliamentary candidates at the recent General Election had stood as committed U.D.C. advocates within the larger cause of Labour. These M.P.s included five members of the Executive, thirteen other members of the General Council and

1. Op. Cit. pp 13 - 14.

2. Gen. Council Min. H,DDC/1/2.

3. Ibid.

4. Gen Council Min.H,DDC/1/2.

twelve members of the Scottish Federation. The U.D.C. candidates had polled a total of 426,866 votes, and their success placed the U.D.C. leadership in a strong position to influence any future Labour government.

UNRESTRICTED

ELITE MIGRATION FROM THE LIBERAL TO THE LABOUR PARTY, 1917-1924,
AND THE INTERACTION WITH POPULAR POLITICS THROUGH
THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL.

BY

BRIAN CHARLES WOODWARD, B.A. (Hons.)

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CHAPTER 4.

The Migration of U.D.C. Liberal Elites to Labour, 1917 to 1924.

(i) Rejective and Reformulatory Forces.

In 1914 the Labour Party's following was overwhelmingly working-class and its leaders were identified as "men of the people". The I.L.P. commanded a somewhat wider spectrum of support, particularly in London. But, apart from the Fabian intellectuals, both parties were largely devoid of support from the elite mainstream of British life. During the war a process of change in sentiment resulted in the definite emergence by 1918 of a significant group of defectors, most of whom were previously adherents of the Liberal Party, hence nicknamed "The 1918 Liberals". This process of defection from Liberal to Labour continued through the 1920s and beyond, but the pioneer phase was over by 1924.

The personal motives which led to this decisive change of allegiance by a significant group of the British political elite were various, but those who had previously made a commitment to the Liberal Party were clearly signalling, inter alia, their belief that Liberal ideals and practice had been violated irreparably during the war.

Pre-war Liberal foreign policy was seen by many as a covert conspiracy yielding disastrous consequences. The programme of the U.D.C. was predicated upon this belief and was originally drawn up by five people: two Liberal M.P.s (Trevelyan and Ponsonby), an official Liberal parliamentary candidate (Morel), a liberal pacifist (Angell) and a Labour M.P. (MacDonald). The U.D.C. thus offered a non-party programme in the cause of democratic control of foreign policy, which had been compiled by committed supporters of both Liberal and Labour Parties. This mix of Liberal and Labour support characterised the U.D.C. at both elite and popular levels.

Personal motivations are not particularly susceptible to quantitative considerations, but a rough measure of the significance of the U.D.C. in the movement of elites to Labour during and after the First World War may be gathered by noting the proportion of U.D.C. members in a selected group of new adherents to Labour. Catherine Cline has compiled 68 brief biographies of public figures who joined the Labour Parties between 1914 and 1931.¹ 49 of these became Labour recruits between 1914 and 1924 and included 22 prominent members of the U.D.C. Thus nearly half of Cline's group of notable Labour recruits before 1925 were well known as active U.D.C. workers. 20 of the 22 who were U.D.C. members transferred allegiance to Labour between 1917 and 1924. In 1914 sixteen of this twenty were actively committed members of the Liberal Party, one was a Conservative, one the advocate of a pacifist cause, one came from the highest echelons of the women's suffrage movement and the other was a professional soldier of staff rank. (The non-U.D.C. converts in Cline's group were similarly of predominately Liberal origin.)

Thus U.D.C. membership was a factor which was common to a considerable proportion of one group of elites involved in a transfer of allegiance to the Labour parties following the Russian Revolutions and the end of the world war. A transfer which continued well into the post-war period.

The most superficial examination of the membership of the U.D.C. Executive Committee and General Council proclaims the presence of a sizeable elite contingent.² For example, those elected in October, 1917³ included a range of members clearly identifiable as belonging

1. Cline, C.A. Recruits to Labour, The British Labour Party, 1914-1931, Syracuse, N.Y., 1963. Appendix, pp. 149-178.

2. See Appendix D. 3. Gen. Council Min., H,DDC/1/1.

to one or more of the privileged sections of society. The political elite, both professional and non-professional, was represented by Norman Angell, C.R. Buxton, B.N. Langdon-Davies, Hon.R.D. Denman, E.D. Morel, F.W. Pethick-Lawrence, Arthur Ponsonby, Sir Daniel Stevenson, H.M. Swanwick and Charles Trevelyan. The intellectual elite contributed J.A. Hobson, Vernon Lee and Bertrand Russell. Social and cultural elites provided the Hon. Lady Barlow, Lady Courtney of Penwith, K.D. Courtney and Lady Margaret Sackville. The armed services were represented on the Council only by Major Maitland Hardiman in 1917.

Following the end of hostilities, the Council elected in October, 1920¹ included General Birdwood-Thomson, Colonel Wedgwood and Commander Grenfell, who had been enthusiastic members for several years while on active service. Other elite U.D.C. members who came on to the Council in 1919 included Noel Buxton, R.B. Lambert, R.L. Outhwaite, H.B. Lees-Smith, Professor Goode, Jerome K. Jerome, F.E. Pollard, the Rev. Harold Buxton, the Rev. de Cetto, the Rev. R. Sheppard and Sir George Paish.

Thus the high echelons of the U.D.C. included a comparatively numerous elite group, drawn mainly from the Liberal establishment. This group was of sufficient size to preclude the mere propinquity on the General Council and Executive of leading Labour men, such as Ramsey MacDonald, Philip Snowden, H.N. Brailsford, C.G. Ammon and W.C. Anderson,² from providing sufficient explanation of the migration from Liberal to Labour allegiance.

1. Trevelyan, Charles, The Union of Democratic Control, its history and its policy. London, 1921. pp. 11-12.

2. All elected to the U.D.C. Executive Committee or General Council, October, 1917.

Public figures who associated themselves with the U.D.C. became isolated from the mainstream of national activity, which was directed towards fighting and winning the war. In this isolation they were, however strong-minded, vulnerable to pressures conducive to a radical change of allegiance.

The war had disrupted the patterns of personal ambition and party preoccupation. If only temporarily, the national mould had been broken and replaced with the sharply focused objectives of war. In this situation the profession of pacifist views was a dangerously isolating undertaking. The U.D.C. was careful never to class itself as a pacifist organisation,¹ but many of its members had pacifist sympathies and one of its founders, Norman Angell, was the proponent of a peculiarly rational form of pacifist belief. Consequently the members of the U.D.C. could not hope to escape from the popular derision and violent persecution to which many pacifists were subjected in the First World War.²

The somewhat anguished toleration which prominent Liberals accorded their colleagues who had joined the U.D.C. was not necessarily reflected in the local Liberal Associations. The Liberals entered the war as the party of government, a party commanding a massive popular vote, launched upon a war which became an hysterically popular cause. It is hardly surprising that U.D.C. Liberal M.P.s were asked to resign, as was Charles Trevelyan by the Elland Liberal Association.³ U.D.C. members who were official Liberal candidates were even more vulnerable to party dissociation. C.R. Buxton suffered a complete withdrawal of

1. See pp.27-8.

2. See pp.71-3.

3. Anonymous pamphlet, 'The Union of Democratic Control, notes on the careers of the members of the Executive Committee', pub. U.D.C., London, n.d. (1916), p.3. H,DDC/5/335.

support in the Central Hackney constituency,¹ while E.D. Morel's vigorous prosecution of the U.D.C. cause stunned the Birkenhead Liberal Association into a unanimous request for his resignation of candidature.² As a sitting M.P., with no General Election likely during hostilities, Trevelyan could afford to defy the Elland Association, but Morel felt obliged to accede to the Birkenhead Association's request, backed as it was by local friend and foe alike.

As the war proceeded it became clear that the Liberal Party had more troubles than the irritation of a few eminent eccentrics arguing over the disastrous results of secret diplomacy. The rift between the Asquith camp and the followers of Lloyd George opened the way for the emergence of another party to challenge for the adherence of the popular vote. In spite of Labour's stumbling reaction to the war and its ambivalent attitude during the hostilities, in which the international brotherhood of man was obscured by patriotism and working-class self-interest, the Labour Parties were better placed than any other organisation to capture the mass support of a split and faltering Liberal Party.

Overseas observers sometimes thought themselves better placed to forecast post-war developments than home politicians, engulfed as they were, in a great conflict. In October, 1915, Morel received a letter from F.E. Chadwick of Newport, Rhode Island, which expatiated on the possible consequences of the war:

... I think the outcome of this is going to do England good. It is going to reconstruct her economy and probably her social system.

1. Loc. Cit., p.12.

2. Manuscript letter from J. Anderson to E.D. Morel, dated 21st. October, 1914, M473. F2.

Certainly the economy has to go ... a country with 30 percent of its population on the border line of starvation, that is, with 21/6 for the weekly support of a family of five cannot so continue and not go to pieces. How the vast change is to be brought about is hard to say ... it is going to be revolutionary in character and will take all your best thought to control.^{1.}

Even the naive confidence of such a prognostication helped to contribute to an early realisation that the exigencies of wartime social and economic changes might be expected to exert a dynamic effect upon post-war Britain. Trevelyan expressed some aspects of the development of the sentiment that the Liberal Party had faltered over fundamentals:

As the war proceeded ... Liberalism became absolutely dumb ... They (the Liberals) decried Lord Lansdowne and everyone else who wished to end the war by negotiations. They never protested against the annexionist policy of the Allies ...^{2.}

He believed that a new political force was needed which would embody Liberal principles. Speaking of foreign policy he proclaimed that:

Our (U.D.C.) Principles ... state the leading factors of the policy eventually adopted by the British Labour Party ... The Liberals knew that we were preaching the doctrines which they ought to have been practising.^{3.}

1. Manuscript letter, M473. F2.

2. Trevelyan, Charles, The Union of Democratic Control, its history and its policy, London, 1921. p.8.

3. Op.Cit. p.5.

The processes of reformulation which led to the decisive action of a change of allegiance were influenced by several factors, one of which was the implication involved in the concentration of the pressure created by the U.D.C. to effect changes by Parliamentary action. In the early days Morel had warned that the members of the Union should prepare themselves for the moment when "the country will be faced with a clear-cut issue, with definite alternate policies upon which it will have to pronounce judgement ... When that moment arrives we shall have ... to put pressure upon every Member of Parliament and upon every candidate for Parliament".^{1.}

The aggregate membership figures for the U.D.C., which approached one million by the end of the war,^{2.} were largely composed of affiliated members, particularly of those belonging to Labour organisations.^{3.} At its very beginning as an organisation with popular appeal, Morel had spoken of "5000 names on our register, over 20 I.L.P. Branches have affiliated ... and 6 (Branches of the National) Union of Railwaymen ..."^{4.} Three months later the affiliates included three branches of the Bristol Socialist Party, the Leeds Branch of the Amalgamated Association of Tramway and Vehicle Workers and the entire Women's Labour League.^{5.} This process of affiliation proceeded steadily. By October, 1915 Morel could report that "107 organisations, of which 48 consist of Trades Councils and local Labour Parties have affiliated to the Union, representing an aggregate membership of well over 300,000".^{6.} In 1921 Trevelyan wrote that "over 350 Bodies of organised Labour are now

1. Gen. Council Min., 27th June, 1915, H,DDC/1/1. 2. See P.21.

3. See Appendix C. 4. Min. of Inaugural Mtg. 17th. Nov., 1914. H,DDC/1/1.

5. Gen. Council Min. 9th. Feb., 1915. H, DDC/1/1.

6. First Annual Gen. Council Mtg., 29th Oct., 1915. Secretary's Report. H,DDC/1/1.

affiliated to the Union.^{1.} He proceeded to list the 51 bodies in England and Wales - "numerically most important"; without exception these were local Trades Councils, Trades and Labour Councils, local Labour Party branches, Labour Associations or Co-operative Societies. The situation was similar for the ten most numerous affiliated bodies in Scotland.^{2.}

Many I.L.P. members were either affiliated or individual members of the U.D.C. In spite of the tardy commitment of Philip Snowden, who was abroad at the outbreak of war, and his efforts to withdraw his name from the U.D.C.s General Council on 9th. November, 1915 as having been added without his permission,^{3.} links between the I.L.P. and the U.D.C. became close as the war proceeded. At the U.D.C. General Council Meeting of 9th. February, 1915 Morel read a telegram received during that day - "Birmingham I.L.P. supports U.D.C."^{4.} The wooing process was marked on 8th. July, 1915 by a letter to Morel from Hubert Bryan, the Secretary of the City of London Branch of the I.L.P., which urged Morel to join the party and mentioned that H.N. Brailsford, a prominent U.D.C. Liberal, had already committed himself.^{5.} Morel replied in the negative on the same day.^{6.} But Bryan felt confident that Morel would eventually change his political allegiance. He wrote again on 19th. July, taking a very understanding view of Morel's position, but making clear that the I.L.P. offer was left open and mentioning another recent Liberal U.D.C. recruit, Langdon-Davies.^{7.} The I.L.P. pathway to a new political orientation was thus in operation by the Summer of 1915.

1. Trevelyan, Charles, The Union of Democratic Control, its history and its policy, London, 1921, p.14.

2. Op. Cit. pp. 15-16. 3. Exec. Cttee. Min., H,DDC/1/4.

4. Signed "Kneeshaw", Gen. Council Rpt. H,DDC/1/1. 5. Manuscript letter. M473. F2.

6. Typescript letter, M473. F2. 7. Manuscript letter, M473. F2.

It proved to be a significant factor in practical terms once a large number of Liberal U.D.C. elites changed to the Labour position from 1917 onwards. The I.L.P. was able to call on financial support from commercial sources such as Henry Markwald and Co., Importers of Cape Town, whose interests coincided with the ideal of free trade in the cause of international brotherhood.^{1.}

The lack of an ideological barrier between Liberals and the British Labour Parties was another factor assisting the reformulation of Liberal U.D.C. allegiance.^{2.} Ramsay MacDonald was one of the founders of the U.D.C. and his progress to party leadership made the Liberal transition less traumatic. In 1916, U.D.C. members had been advised that "Mr. MacDonald's motto is 'opinions and parties are made on platforms'."^{3.} This non-ideological stance, coming from a dedicated non-revolutionary parliamentarian, must have been very reassuring to hesitating Liberals fearful of mob-style extremism. Tactical considerations, involved with the Union's attack on reparations and government proposals to continue an economic war following the end of hostilities, brought about an ideological shift which adumbrated the later change of political allegiance. On 14th. March, 1916 the U.D.C. Executive discussed Morel's memorandum on the proposed continuing economic war. The question arose as to whether the memorandum would be interpreted by the majority of members as "merely a party move of Free Trade versus Protection".^{4.}

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1. Manuscript letter from Henry H. Markwald to E.D. Morel, sent from Montreux, Switz., dated 14th. Feb., 1921, offering to support Morel in fight for Dundee.
 2. See Appendix A.
 3. Anonymous pamphlet, 'The Union of Democratic Control, notes on the careers of the members of the Executive Committee', pub. U.D.C., London, n.d. (1916) p.6. H,DDC/5/335.
 4. Exec. Cttee. Min. H,DDC/1/4.

It was resolved that MacDonald should draft a letter to be sent to all Trades Councils refuting this factional interpretation and emphasising "the need of attacking the whole capitalist system".¹ In this way the partial U.D.C. assault upon the capitalism of international arms dealers was radically extended to a general principle clearly beyond the scope of any Liberal Party programme.

Thus elements of isolation and the rejection of many main-stream Liberals combined with reformulatory forces to encourage the decision of elite Liberal U.D.C. members to change their political adherence. Through the interaction within the U.D.C. of likeminded elite members of mixed political origin, welded in the service of a common cause, there emerged, with gathering conviction from 1917 onwards, a consensus of sentiment that, in some measure, Labour had inherited the soul of the Liberal Party.

1. Ibid.

(ii.) Gradual Institutionalisation of U.D.C. - Labour Links.

Friendly relations and common membership of the U.D.C., the I.L.P and other Labour organisations gradually developed into a pattern of co-operation, intrinsically susceptible of institutionalisation. In these circumstances, initiatives from either partner could be received in the positive spirit of common cause.

In February, 1916 Morel suggested to the U.D.C. Executive a scheme for getting Labour organisations to pass resolutions to call upon the government to make a definite statement of war aims, to disavow military conquests, and, providing the Germans evacuated Belgium and North France, to accept the good offices of neutral intermediaries.¹ Morel had already sounded out the reactions of a few members of the Labour movement. He reported that a Mr. Spencer and a Mr. Hill of the Leicester Trades Council were keen supporters of such a move and he suggested asking the I.L.P. to arrange matters. The Executive accepted this scheme, together with the possibility that the I.L.P. might provide the Labour front for it. It was recorded that Morel "should write to Mr. Johnson of the I.L.P. and consult him privately as to the chances and the advisability of the I.L.P. organising such a movement".²

Relations between the U.D.C. and the I.L.P. were drawn closer during 1916 through the consultations and arrangements connected with co-operation at by-elections. On 21st. March Ramsay MacDonald considered that, in the circumstances of the parliamentary Liberal discord, a General Election might be in the offing. In any event by-elections would continue to occur periodically and MacDonald argued that relations with the I.L.P. required immediate consideration. The Executive

1. Exec. Cttee. Min. 1st Feb. 1916. H,DDC/1/4.

2. Ibid.

resolved that this matter would be raised by Jowett and MacDonald as the first question on the agenda of the forthcoming I.L.P. meeting of 28th. March.^{1.}

The result of this action was reported to the U.D.C. Executive on 11th. April and it was resolved that Ponsonby, Morel, Pethick-Lawrence and C.R. Buxton should "meet representatives of the I.L.P. Parliamentary Committee on Wednesday to discuss relations with the I.L.P."^{2.} The intimate nature of the U.D.C./I.L.P. relations is apparent in this discussion where, of the three I.L.P. representatives, MacDonald, Jowett and Richardson, two were among the most active of U.D.C. members. This discussion with the I.L.P. centred upon the I.L.P.'s constitution forbidding support for any political party. However, as the U.D.C. was not a "party", the I.L.P. was not prevented from supporting U.D.C. parliamentary candidates. As the I.L.P. was about to consider which constituences it would be contesting, MacDonald promised to report further. Following the report on these discussions, the U.D.C. Executive drew up a Memorandum of relations with the I.L.P:

We agree to recommend to the Committee that in cases where the I.L.P. run Candidates our Organisation should be run to support them. We stated that it was our personal view that if money were raised by us for the purpose of fighting elections it should be used for giving assistance to I.L.P. candidates as well as U.D.C. or Independent candidates. It was stated that the I.L.P. would not be precluded from supporting candidates run as U.D.C. or Independent candidates.

1. Exec. Cttee. Min. H, DDC/1/4.

2. Exec. Cttee. Min., H, DDC/1/4.

They would not be able to support any candidate who was recognised as the official Liberal or Tory candidate.^{1.}

Thus common cause with the I.L.P. meant not only the positive decision to use U.D.C. energies and funds to assist that party, but also to concede that reciprocal aid was unavailable to any U.D.C. candidate who might yet command a Liberal nomination. In the situation of 1916 it was very unlikely that any U.D.C. member could achieve Liberal nomination, though such an agreement could not but add to the psychological pressure upon those who had yet to decide their political adherence.

In July, 1916 the U.D.C. Executive decided upon further action over pending by-elections. The committee decided to send a U.D.C. representative to meet, not only I.L.P. representatives, but also members of the National Council Against Conscription, the No-Conscription Fellowship and the Women's International League to discuss the question of parliamentary candidature. The U.D.C. representative was empowered by the Executive to offer "in cases which appear suitable", up to £100 as preliminary backing.^{2.} The money was to be raised from individuals and not given in the name of the U.D.C. Arthur Ponsonby was entrusted with these arrangements.^{3.} Although many U.D.C. members were sympathetic towards the anti-conscription organisations so active in 1916, the Executive remained wary of becoming too closely associated with a point of view which appeared to the majority of citizens as dangerously eccentric.

However, on 21st. November, 1916 the U.D.C. Executive resolved to convene an immediate preliminary meeting of a By-Election Committee

1. Exec. Cttee. Min., 18th. April, 1916. H,DDC/1/4.

2. Exec. Cttee. Min., 18th. July, 1916. H,DDC/1/4.

3. Ibid.

composed of Johnson of the I.L.P., Inkpen of the British Socialist Party, Chalmers of the No-Conscription Fellowship, Mrs. Snowden of the Women's International League, Langdon-Davies now of the National Council for Civil Liberties and Arthur Ponsonby of the U.D.C.¹. Apart from the N.C.F. and the N.C.C.L., the U.D.C. had officially aligned itself with three specifically Labour or socialist organisations. Thus, even before the stimulus of the Russian Revolutions, the elite membership of the U.D.C. had placed itself in a position from which return to the mainstream Liberal fold would become increasingly problematic.

During the winter of 1916/17 Liberal U.D.C. members attempted to apply some restraint to the drift towards Labour which they perceived. The Executive decided on 12th. December, 1916 "that it would be unwise to attempt to hold a U.D.C. meeting" in connection with the Labour Conference at Manchester.² Morel's articles in the "Labour Leader" were over-committed politically as far as Sir Daniel Stevenson was concerned. The Executive appeared to be in some disarray over Stevenson's objections. The original minute of the committee read:

A letter to the chairman from Sir Daniel Stevenson was read urging the Executive of the Union to intervene in order to prevent the publication in the Labour Leader of the second article of the series of two articles now being contributed to the paper by Mr. Morel. It was decided not to give effect to the letter, and the chairman undertook to write to Sir Daniel Stevenson.³

However, the following day parts of this minute were crossed out and

1. Exec. Cttee. Min., H,DDC/1/4.

2. Exec. Cttee. Min., H,DDC/1/4.

3. Exec. Cttee. Min., 6th. Feb., 1917, H,DDC/1/4.

it was reformulated as:

A letter to the Chairman from Sir Daniel Stevenson was read objecting to an article by Mr. Morel in the Labour Leader. It was decided that no action should be taken except that the chairman undertook to write to Sir Daniel Stevenson.^{1.}

The "corrected" minute was signed by Charles Trevelyan at the next Executive Meeting. Feelings which resulted in a suggestion of censorship illustrate both the strength of opinion and the growing lack of confidence among leading Liberals even before the dramatic events of 1917.

The Executive was quick to take advantage of developments in Russia. Tsardom had always been a priority target in the fight against secret diplomacy; in return, U.D.C. literature had always been banned at the port of entry by the Imperial censors. Thus the committee showed understandable enthusiasm when it resolved to publish quotations from the manifesto of the Russian Committee of Soldiers' and Workmen's Delegates to show "that it was in accordance with U.D.C. principles".^{2.} However, enthusiasm was tempered with caution when the Executive considered the question of active co-operation with the Council of Soldiers and Workers on 26th. June, 1917. It was resolved that the matter needed reference to a forthcoming General Council Meeting.^{3.}

During 1917, reports of local Labour Party meetings, particularly on aspects of foreign policy, were routinely entered in the journal "The U.D.C." under the heading "Work of the Union". For example, it was reported that on July 26th. there was a special meeting of Coventry

1. Ibid.

2. Exec. Cttee. Min. 24th. April, 1917. H, DDC/1/4.

3. Exec. Cttee. Min., H, DDC/1/4.

Labour Party "at which the following resolution was passed with only two dissentients: 'We demand of the Government to state its aims and objects for the continuation of the war, and to immediately open up negotiations for Peace'." ¹. No meetings connected with any local Liberal Association were reported during July. ².

Morel's imprisonment, following his prosecution under D.O.R.A. on August 31st., was represented as a martyrdom at the hands of reactionary forces, which made him eligible as a hero of Labour. The Executive asked the "Labour Leader" to emphasise this by enclosing the U.D.C. leaflet, explaining the circumstances of Morel's trial, in the next edition following 6th. November. ³.

Throughout 1918, the gradual process continued of institutionalising the intermesh of U.D.C. activities and those of the Labour parties. In January, the U.D.C. foreign affairs experts were preparing something of a coup. Ponsonby told the Executive that the Soviet Government's representative, Litvinoff, was ready to come to a meeting in London, at which it was proposed that the U.D.C.'s W.C.Anderson should take the chair. ⁴.

During 1918, the Executive permitted U.D.C. branches to affiliate to Labour parties ⁵ and, in April, the prominent ex-Liberal U.D.C. member Pethick-Lawrence was adopted as the official parliamentary candidate for Hastings. ⁶ On June 18th., the Executive reversed their previous policy of non-association with the Labour Party Conference, by resolving to offer their journal for sale on the Literature Stall at the following conference. ⁷.

1. 'The U.D.C.', Vol.2, No.11, Sept.1917, p.136.

2. Ibid.

3. Exec. Cttee. Min., 6th. Nov. 1917. H,DDC/1/4.

4. Exec. Cttee. Min., 17th. Jan 1918. H,DDC/1/4.

5. See P.51.

6. Exec. Cttee. Min. 23rd. Apl. 1918. H,DDC/1/4.

7. Exec. Cttee. Min., H,DDC/1/4.

At the end of 1918, the "Work of the Union" section of "The U.D.C." had been extended to two pages of a three-column format and was crowded with reports of meetings of local Labour parties. For example, on 25th. November, Seymour Cocks, although not yet personally committed to the Labour Party,^{1.} was reported addressing the Hackney I.L.P. on "The Issues of the Election".^{2.}

Seymour Cocks was not the only prominent U.D.C. Liberal still hesitating over change of allegiance, even after the barbarous campaign associated with the General Election. Gilbert Murray and Morel exchanged letters in August, 1919,^{3.} Murray urging upon Morel the view that he and MacDonald had been guilty of exaggerated misrepresentation of Liberal shortcomings by associating all the Liberal leaders with such back-slidings as Grey's mistakes in foreign policy. Morel was already irrevocably committed to Labour at the time of his correspondence with Murray, but his liberal mistrust of extremism now suggested caution when dealing with the extreme Left. His report to the Executive on the French Clarté Group, led by Henri Barbusse and Madeleine Marx, which affiliated to the U.D.C. in August, 1919, regretted that the "usefulness of Clarté, which might have been very great, suffered an eclipse when it allied itself openly with one particular party in France - the Communist Party".^{4.}

1. He joined in 1923.

2. 'The U.D.C.', Vol.4., No.2, Dec. 1918.

3. Manuscript letters, M473. F2.

4. Typescript report by E.D. Morel to Executive Committee of U.D.C., n.d., (late Summer or early Autumn, 1919.) M473. F6.

(iii) U.D.C. in Labour Politics.

The developing web of interaction between the U.D.C. and the Labour parties resulted fundamentally from perceived common interests in the area of foreign affairs. As one of the founding fathers of the U.D.C., Ramsay MacDonald was as profoundly shocked as his Liberal co-signatories of the first circular letter of September, 1914, when they wrote of the catastrophic results of "the old control of foreign policy by a narrow elite".¹ The authors of this letter and their associates might be accused of unrealistic idealism in their fight for some form of democratic control of foreign policy, but they were not innocent or uninformed idealists. Morel, with his intimate knowledge of Central African affairs, was probably more knowledgeable than anyone outside the diplomatic circle of the modes of thought and action of the professionals. Ponsonby was experienced as an insider who had worked in the Foreign Office, while C.R. Buxton and his brother, Noel, were experienced in the secret pathways of Balkan affairs.² Nevertheless, the shock-force of the events of July and early August, 1914, was described by such cognoscenti in terms of "Event succeeded event with bewildering rapidity".³ In full awareness of the practical difficulties they became convinced that a democratic political counter-force must somehow be brought to bear on those activities of diplomats and military planners which appeared non-accountable to the nation at large.

As the war proceeded, the hardened attitudes of the majority of Liberals intent on winning the struggle, the gathering impotence of the Asquith wing and Lloyd George's subsequent appetite for diplomatic

1. Typescript letter, H,DDC/1/1.

2. The brothers were seriously injured by Turkish agents in September, 1914, during a confidential mission to try to prevent the adherence of Bulgaria to the Central Powers.

3. Annexe to letter to the Press of Sept., 1914, H,DDC/1/1.

intrigue at Versailles reinforced the U.D.C. Liberals' isolation from spheres of influence in the Liberal Party. Popular support for the U.D.C. had largely been Labour support. The I.L.P. had been steadfast in foreign policy aims identical with those of the U.D.C. It was therefore natural that, increasingly from 1917, the U.D.C. Liberals should recognise that the future of their political policy rested with the Labour parties rather than the divided and discredited Liberal Party.

The post-war reorganisation of the U.D.C. was designed to make effective, at government level, the wartime excursion into popular education, by means of giving expert instruction to a newly emerging Labour elite. After the 1918 General Election, Liberal U.D.C. adherence to the I.L.P. was enlarged and the attempt to impose the elite U.D.C. view of international affairs upon the Labour Party was greatly strengthened. At the U.D.C. General Council Meeting of 26th. May, 1921 there was much attention to the approach of the Labour Party to foreign policy. The Council was pleased that there was a resolution before the Labour Party Conference of June, 1921 that constitutional changes should be introduced "which shall establish complete democratic control of foreign policy".¹ The Council expressed the hope that "the Labour movement will unflinchingly persevere in a policy upon which depend the safety of the State and the welfare of the workers".² Thus by 1921 the de facto status of the U.D.C. seemed in transition from a public pressure group to that of a special interest body within the Labour movement.

This transition was given its rationale and apologia by Charles Trevelyan, writing in 1921:

1. Gen. Council Min. H, DDC/1/2.

2. Ibid.

There are now only two parties in the world. On one side are the reactionaries, and militarists who have made the war and the false peace - against them are the repudiators of force, and the believers in internationalism, gathered chiefly in the Socialist and Labour Parties of all lands. The middle people, the President Wilsons and the Liberals, the doctrinaires of the peace-out-of-war policy have pitifully failed,¹.

Trevelyan, the prominent ex-Liberal, speaks with the ardour of a proselyte, as Trevelyan the man now prominent in Labour affairs. Liberal greys have become socialist reds and blacks. He already begins to use an extreme tone suited to the post-war political order. Such internationalist sentiments as Trevelyan's, in reaction to extreme nationalism, sounded powerful, sympathetic chords among the multitudes aghast at the horrors of a war equipped with the resources of industrial technology. In 1921 the leaders of the U.D.C. could be forgiven their attachment to the noble aim of ordered international co-operation, however impossible of realisation.

The U.D.C. leaders claimed a right to influence Labour affairs based on their war-time efforts. When Clynes spoke on behalf of Morel at the Caird Hall, Dundee, during the electoral contest with Churchill in 1922, he extolled the advantages to the electors of returning such a prominent expert in International Affairs who had worked to instruct the people so that they could have a more informed vote in such matters:

1. Trevelyan, Charles, The Union of Democratic Control, its history and its policy, London, 1921, p.9.

No single man has done so much as Mr. Morel to educate the Labour Party and the mass of the people on International questions. Some of you may think that you will be doing Mr. Morel an honour by returning him to Parliament: but really you will be doing an honour and service to yourselves.^{1.}

Clyne's approach to the voters of Dundee cleverly suggests that the acquisition of an elite M.P. by a working-class constituency will reflect the newly educated judgment for which the candidate himself is given public credit. Clyne's recommendation to the Dundee voters was reinforced by Jowett's endorsement which proclaimed that "There is not, in my opinion, in all Europe a more deadly enemy of capitalist imperialism than he. His knowledge of international questions, and the fearless use he has made of it, has for many years been a great asset to the Labour and Socialist Movement".^{2.} Jowett concludes that Morel should be elected in order to "give the Parliamentary Labour Party the advantage of his knowledge and experience".^{3.} Such expositions of Labour's need for the expert services of a member of an elite group encapsulate the process of mutual interest which, inter alia, promotes the survival of the elite concerned. Once elected, the Dundee Labour Party could justify the confidence of the voters during the subsequent election campaign of December, 1923. The local party's "Pass-on-Pamphlet" quotes the opinion of Jack Mills, M.P., that Morel is:

a man who has ... by his fearless exposition

1. Offprint entitled "E.D. Morel, M.P. What he has done! Why he is hated!" from the "Jute and Flax Workers' Guide", n.d. (first issue subsequent to 20th. June, 1922) M473. F2.

2. 'Pass-on-Pamphlet' entitled "Labour's Champion for Dundee, some opinions of eminent men and women on E.D. Morel", Dundee Labour Party, n.d. (Nov. 1923) M473. F2.

3. Ibid.

of the demand for open diplomacy, his exposure of the sinister forces behind the wars of the past, and his splendid work for international peace, honoured Dundee by becoming their standard-bearer. He has helped to raise the Labour Movement out of its parochial outlook and to take its place in international affairs ...^{1.}

Mills thus appears to share the opinion that a non-revolutionary party of mass appeal must recognise that it requires the services of professional politicians, whose elite expertise in the mechanisms of public affairs at government level is necessary, once there is a credible chance of forming an administration.

Thus when, in January 1924, the formation of a Labour government was precipitated by the stalemate in the House of Commons and Ramsay MacDonald rather unexpectedly found himself the first Labour prime minister, his government included nine prominent U.D.C. members, in addition to himself, of whom six originated from the higher and middle ranks of the Liberal Party of 1914,^{2.} though without Morel.

Perhaps Morel ought not to have been surprised to find himself excluded from a Labour government without a Commons' majority. However, to be left in a personal wilderness, when all of his immediate circle of U.D.C. comrades were given government posts, was a bitter experience. Writing to Lord Parmoor on 2nd. February, 1924 Morel noted that a "Times" leader had named him as impossible of inclusion in a Labour government because of his ill-standing in the country, as opposed to his reputation in the Labour Party. He complained that his old enemy the "Morning Post"

1. Ibid.

2. Philip Snowden, J. Wedgwood, Noel Buxton, Charles Trevelyan, F.W. Jowett, C.R. Attlee, Arthur Ponsonby, C.G. Ammon, P.Hastings. Snowden and Jowett were committed to Labour and Attlee had not definitely decided upon a political career in 1914.

had complacently recorded that Ponsonby and Trevelyan came to the new government from the Union of Democratic Control, "while I who did more than anyone of them (They would generously admit it) ... am unclean".¹ Morel's letter to Parmoor continues with a quotation from a recent letter sent to MacDonald in which he complains that throughout the war "a subtle distinction (by enemies) was always drawn between you, Trevelyan and Ponsonby on the one hand - and myself on the other. It has persisted. It will be intensified ...".² MacDonald, who had taken on the post of Foreign Secretary in addition to the premiership, seemed unable to refrain from adding insult to injury. In a reply to a letter from Morel, concerning the U.D.C.'s fears over developments in the Rhineland Palatinate, MacDonald observed that "I really cannot straighten up the mess of Europe in six or seven weeks".³ The new prime minister and foreign secretary managed to combine insensitivity with delusions of grandeur.

However, MacDonald and Ponsonby did attempt to implement a fundamental U.D.C. tenet through their introduction of the practice of the submission of all treaties to Parliament before they were ratified. They also published details of all agreements and commitments with foreign countries - a practice which the next government discontinued in December, 1924.⁴

The U.D.C.'s influence towards the evolution of an internationally inclusive non-parochial Labour foreign policy, helped Labour to achieve a measure of recognition abroad. For example, some appreciation of the anti-interventionist stand on the Soviet Union is reflected in a letter

1. Typescript letter. M473. F2. 3. Manuscript letter, M473. F2.

2. Ibid. 4. Gen. Council Min., 17th. Dec., 1924. H,DDC/1/2.

to Morel, from A.Wallace, the secretary of the Dundee Labour Party, concerning his prospects for re-election in 1924. He mentioned the rumour that the Communists would not put up a candidate against Morel even if Gallacher were not selected to be his running-mate as the Dundee candidate. Wallace believed that there was no doubt that the rumour was true "because so far as I can understand it, the emphatic instructions from Moscow are, that Labour Party candidates are not to be opposed under any circumstances, as it is only by having Labour in power, that Russia will get any chance to recover".^{1.}

By late March, 1924 Morel had recovered his spirits and felt that the time had arrived for a more emphatic assertion of the U.D.C.'s role in Labour policy. Writing to the Chairman of the U.D.C. Executive, concerning a meeting which he would be unable to attend, he urged his opinion that "We ought really to be moving forward now actively and taking our proper place as the expert wing of the Labour movement, in all international affairs".^{2.}

However, Morel's health was failing and he died suddenly on 16th. November, 1924. His fierce advocacy of the U.D.C.'s cause had been sustained for more than ten years. Although the idea for the Union had sprung into being in the mind of Charles Trevelyan,^{3.} it was Morel whose driving energy had sustained the Union through all its adversities. A skilful propagandist and efficient administrator, Morel's secretaryship had provided the vehicle through which Liberal values could legitimately be transmuted to Labour convictions. Disappointed in the first Labour prime-minister, it might have consoled Morel if he had known that he had officiated at the Meeting which elected the

1. Manuscript letter, dated 22nd. Feb., 1924, M473. F2.

2. Manuscript letter, dated 27th. Mar., 1924, M473. F6.

3. See P.15.

future premier, Clement Attlee, to the U.D.C. Executive on 9th. March, 1923.^{1.}

The Union continued after Morel's death, lasting in attenuated form until 1966. However, it never attained quite such a peak of influence within the Labour Party as during the years 1920 to 1924. At a meeting of the General Council on 17th. December, 1924, after Morel's death, Lees-Smith, the Chairman, remarked that:

The Union was the only organisation which had attempted to concentrate upon an expert study of foreign policy, and that work is as much needed now as at any time. Its disappearance would be a profound loss to our national life.^{2.}

However, there is a certain sense that, even as he spoke, Lees-Smith was beginning to concede that the moment when the democratic control of foreign policy might become an international reality had already passed when he added, "For these reasons the Executive propose to carry on the Union on a strictly economic scale".^{3.}

1. Gen. Council Min., H,DDC/1/2.

2. Gen. Council Min., H,DDC/1/2.

3. Ibid.

(iv.) The Dilemma of Allegiance: A Case Study.

The impact of political pressures upon the elite Liberal U.D.C. membership varied according to individual motives and circumstances. The pressures included factors involving rejection by the majority of Liberals and the forces of reformulation conducive to a change of political allegiance. The correspondence of E.D. Morel reveals some of the processes involved.

First came the blow of rejection. Morel had been the official Liberal candidate for Birkenhead since 1912. The local Liberal Association was proud to have captured such a lion to represent them and they were confident that the man who had organised the pressure group which had destroyed the Leopoldian system would help to win Birkenhead from the Tories. On 16th. October, 1912 the local Liberal Chairman, John Ziegler, wrote that the "great work in connection with the Congo atrocities (sic) would win you much support".^{1.}

On the 20th. October, 1914 the Executive Committee of the Birkenhead Liberal Association met to discuss their alarms at Morel's anti-war stance. They decided to dismiss him as the Liberal candidate. Morel accepted their decision but noted that it resulted from the exigent forces to which the Association's officers were responding, rather than the feelings of the "Liberal Four Hundred".^{2.}

Morel received a long letter from the local Secretary, J. Anderson, which reveals part of the decision making process. Anderson opens with some remarks which reflect the abrasive situation created by the war:

I am writing this by hand for greater privacy.

I have so many callers just now (thanks largely to your "doctrinaire" views!) that it is difficult

1. Manuscript letter to E.D. Morel., M473. F2.

2. Typescript letter to the Secretary of Birkenhead Liberal Association, n.d. (late Oct. 1914) The "Liberal Four Hundred" in this context refers to the organised local party workers and canvassers.

to conceal the contents of a sheet of paper
 exposed to the public gaze on the platen of
 a typewriter.^{1.}

Morel is assured of the accuracy of Anderson's remarks, which are drawn from shorthand notes made at the meeting. He makes it clear that the general tone of the meeting was against Morel, and that about forty members of the Executive were present. The Chairman, Ziegler, opened the meeting by referring to locally published correspondence, in which Morel had attacked the government's method of conducting foreign policy. Willing to excuse Morel's individual reaction as "the impulse of the moment",^{2.} Ziegler explained that it was impossible to ignore the "Morning Post's" revelation of the first private circular of the U.D.C.'s founders.^{3.} Ziegler said that "the officers as custodians of the interests of Liberalism"^{4.} in Birkenhead, felt bound to act. Personally, he very much regretted ...^{5.}

It appears that Morel had increased the vulnerability of his position in his private letter of 4th. August, in which he was said to have placed himself "in the hands of the Officers". This letter was referred to by Councillor Frame, he and others having insisted that it was read to the meeting. Thus the pathway was quickly cleared for the forces antagonistic to Morel's retention of the candidature.

The comments of Mr.T.L. Dodds reflect a reorientation of perceptions caused by the outbreak of war. The process of isolation begins by the suggestion that Morel suffered a personal lapse, but perhaps the Association had been deceived by his charm:

1. Manuscript letter, M473. F2.

2. Ibid.

3. "Morning Post", 10 th. Sept., 1914.

4. 'Liberalism' is heavily underscored by Morel. Several later passages in the letter are subjected to underscoring and Morel's ironic comments.

5. Manuscript letter from J. Anderson to E.D.Morel, dated 21st Oct.1914.

The letter of August 4th. did not do credit to the Mr. Morel they all knew so intimately. After the war, this was the greatest blow they had suffered. Mr. Morel had endeared himself to everybody by his charming personality, and by the clearness and decisiveness of the Liberal opinions expressed by him, and in which they all had shared ... Mr. Morel, as a private individual, was at liberty to take any course he thought fit, but as the candidate for Birkenhead, he ought not to have expressed the opinions he did in the private circular before consulting the officers.^{1.}

Morel's falling away from the path of solidarity with the Liberal Government is seen by Dodds to have been revealed in the letter of 4th. August:

there could be no doubt that letter displayed an undue bias against Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Minister had acted openly, and he represented the whole Liberal Cabinet. The whole issue between Sir E. Grey and Germany was the neutrality of Belgium. Our honour was at stake and England had taken the right course.^{2.}

Morel had thus, in Dodd's view, failed to maintain common cause with his local Liberal Association, the Liberal Government and the nation at large. Dodds continued by expressing naive confidence in the Russian promise of Home Rule to Poland and that Morel had shown "undue hostility to Russia". Dodds concludes by linking the personal

1. Ibid

2. Ibid.

issue before the meeting with the need to consolidate all activity in the service of the nation, in the spirit of 'My country! Right or wrong!':

The Executive ... should ... first express its approval of the action of the Officers, (in publishing Morel's letter) and its confidence in the Government, associating with the latter the opposition, who had put country before party and assisted the Government in every way in the prosecution of the war. We are in the war now, and even if I were satisfied that Mr. Morel was right in every line, so grave are the issues that I would subordinate them all until the war was concluded.^{1.}

Following this, Councillor Rowlands moved that "Mr. Morel be informed that he is no longer prospective candidate for Birkenhead".^{2.} The motion was seconded, but before a vote could be taken Morel's defenders tried to fend off precipitate action. Mr. Cuthbert severely criticised the Officers for publishing Morel's letter of 4th. August without consulting the Executive. Councillor Wilson tried, unsuccessfully, to have the meeting adjourned for six months on the grounds that "people were not in a proper frame of mind for arriving at a fair and unbiased conclusion on such a matter".^{3.} Mr. Tattersall felt "it was a mistake to throw over such a splendid candidate on the impulse of the moment".^{4.} Alderman Russell defended Morel's action in deciding to make the U.D.C. a public organisation immediately following the attack by the "Morning Post", and felt that any decision by the Committee would penalise Morel

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

"because the 'Morning Post' told them to do so".¹

However, after further speakers had supported the resolution to dismiss Morel a vote was taken and carried "quite unanimously". The forces of solidarity were strong enough to override the private sympathies of a minority and to claim that minority's support.

Anderson proceeds to comment on the situation at Birkenhead, remarking that "You have - or, shall I say we have - the hearts and the brains on our side, while the other side have the lungs and the spleen".² Birkenhead was thus typical of the nation as a whole in the Autumn of 1914. Speaking of Morel's sympathisers in the Liberal Association, Anderson confirms the pressure for closing ranks, "The whole argument ... is: 'We agree in principle with Mr. Morel, but we must put Party before Principle'." ³ In some sense the Liberal Party was already adrift from its ideological moorings thus early in the war.

Reporting a conversation with Mr. Campbell of the Executive Committee, Anderson convinced Campbell that Asquith and Grey were revealed as the liars Morel had named them, through their public denials of any agreement with France in certain contingencies. Nevertheless, Campbell expressed the prevailing flight from reason "by declaring that any action on the part of Asquith or Grey was justified in the circumstances. He concluded in quite a friendly way, by saying 'I stand by the Old Country yet, I'm afraid, Anderson, you're a bit of a pro-German!'" ⁴ Anderson's reaction understates the tenor of the times when he says "when a man like Campbell will talk like that, I am bound to confess you have no chance here at present". ⁵

Making no compromise on principle had eroded Morel's local power base. As yet not an established member of the Liberal elite, he was

1. Ibid. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid.

thus, by October, 1914, already somewhat alienated from the political Liberal Party. Always sensitive to a slight, Morel must have experienced pain at the Birkenhead dismissal.

As established professional politicians, Charles Trevelyan and Arthur Ponsonby were well aware of the strength of their personal positions as Members of Parliament, unlikely to need the electorate's vote until after the war. When Elland Liberal Association made a specific demand that he should resign his seat Trevelyan recalled that his ground for refusal was that "a representative is bound to exercise his discretion when once elected, and not to act as a delegate only".^{1.}

During 1915, both Morel and Trevelyan avoided the question of a change of allegiance. Pressed by Bryan to join the I.L.P.,^{2.} Morel wrote to Trevelyan in July about the matter:

I have said that I thought I should be most useful to the U.D.C. in not being identified at the present moment with any political party, but as to the personal aspect of the matter I really have not had time to think about the future.^{3.}

Trevelyan was anxious that Morel's zeal should not be channelled too narrowly too soon into the paths of Labour politics. The Liberal Party was comparatively intact in 1915 and not yet a lost cause in Trevelyan's view. His reply to Morel emphasised that:

I am clear that it would be fatal to any progress with the Liberals for anyone to take a definite step towards a political change of allegiance

1. Anonymous pamphlet 'The Union of Democratic Control, notes on the careers of the members of the Executive Committee', pub. U.D.C., London, n.d. (1916), p.3.

2. See p.92. 3. Typescript letter dated 9th. July, 1915, M473. F2.

who is in a prominent position among us. We cannot yet tell how the political situation will develop. There is no hurry.^{1.}

Challenged on 9th. August, 1916, in a letter from E.H. Driffield, of Bradford I.L.P., as to whether he would subscribe to the view that the basic cause of the war was rooted in "imperialistic capitalism",^{2.} Morel avoided the question by replying at length in general support of nationalisation, but emphasising that he was a "non-party" socialist on this issue.^{3.} Morel was setting out his position in a political No-Man's Land. As a non-party socialist he could still be considered part of the broader Liberal church, so a political retreat was still possible. He made it very clear that he was not a member of the Labour Party.

Arthur Ponsonby was transmitting somewhat similar political signals in 1916 when he published his view that the policies of reduction of armaments and a change from Balance of Power diplomacy to some form of democratic control of foreign policy was "supported by the more extreme Radical and Labour Parties".^{4.} Ponsonby concedes more distinctly than Morel that Liberalism through its radical wing might yet recover its moral strength.

Issues avoided in 1915, and circumvented in 1916, became vital and unavoidable questions in 1917. In early July, Morel wrote a long letter to Ponsonby marked "Private", in which he opened his mind on the political future, beginning: "My dear Arthur, I find myself in a very

1. Manuscript letter in reply to Morel's letter of 9th. July, 1915, n.d. (mid-July, 1915) M473. F2.

2. Manuscript letter, M473. F2.

3. Manuscript letter from E.D. Morel to E.H. Driffield dated 10th. Aug. 1916, M473. F2.

4. Anonymous pamphlet 'The Union of Democratic Control, notes on the careers of the members of the Executive Committee', pub. U.D.C. London, n.d. (1916), p.10.

undecided frame of mind about Parliament".¹ Morel mentioned Ponsonby's encouragement of his future candidature and balanced the advantages or otherwise of having a platform in the Commons for his views. He referred to the asset of his knowledge of French in the light of the opinion he shared with Ponsonby that the future will include:

a great development in ... inter-communication
and inter-action between the progressive forces
in Europe - what de Marmande calls 'L'Union des
Gauches'.²

Morel indicated his belief that supra-national links and institutions must be created to serve the European community. Continuing to vacillate upon his effectiveness as an M.P. he spoke of the House of Commons as "a rather corrupt and very time-serving Assembly".³

Morel proceeded to a statement of belief about Liberalism which presents an unambiguous picture of disenchantment. Speaking of his Liberal candidature at Birkenhead, he says:

Then I genuinely believed Liberalism was a force
a real tangible force making for righteousness in
public affairs. Since then I have discovered
that it was a fraud - that my interpretation of
"Liberalism" was the interpretation of a tender-
foot, a green horn, an immature, inexperienced
mind.⁴

The letter next reaches the sticking point,

If I stood again - what should I stand as?

If along (sic) of you - it would seem useless

1. Carbon copy of typescript letter, M473. F2. 2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

otherwise - where do you stand you and Charles?

Do you know? ^{1.}

Ponsonby and Trevelyan were not yet committed and had revealed no fundamental change from their political allegiance to radical Liberalism. But Morel could not bring himself to countenance re-entry to the Liberal fold:

Nothing would induce me to stand in with any members of the gang which have brought the country to its present pass. I would never recognise Asquith or Lloyd George, or Grey, or Churchill as my chiefs to whom I owed allegiance. ^{2.}

Now Morel hints at some future allegiances other than Liberal, but not in the form of consolidated opinion:

I am more and more convinced, without having yet attained the grip and grasp which make my convictions properly articulate, that the existing foundations of society are utterly rotten, and that only profound and revolutionary changes (I do not mean necessarily brought about by violence) can alter things and give the bulk of humanity the opportunities to which it is entitled; and apply the caustic to our suppurating wounds. ^{3.}

Morel almost articulates the urgent pressure of mass society upon the discredited Liberal vision. His outrage at the machinations of Liberal politicians is boundless:

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

the hunt for place and power - exemplified once more in these scandalous . . . (recent) . . . appointments induce in me a feeling of despair. What role is there for honest men when the country is run by such creatures of ambition? Is there a chance for really honest men to play a part in determining the destinies of a country which allows itself to be run by such fifth rate minds . . . ^{1.}

As some Labour leaders were taking an active part in the regime thus castigated, Morel clearly indicates that he was not content to drift into an undifferentiated allegiance with Labour at this time.

Morel ended with a long postscript in which he continued to agonise over the political choice before him. His disgust was scarcely contained; he typically used violently hyperbolic phrases, as when writing of his impulse "to tear off the mask of hypocrisy and fling the naked truth in the faces of those who are content that the youth of Europe should be swallowed up while they think of their own miserable reputations". ^{2.}

Ponsonby's reply to Morel was dated 19th. July, 1917. ^{3.} He chose his words very carefully and was obviously very familiar with the problems posed by Morel's explosive energy and his tendency to alternate between exaggerated elation and disgusted despair. He began by expressing confidence in Morel's potential capabilities and extended influence as an M.P., but much of the remainder of his letter was devoted to an articulation of his contemplation of the political

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Manuscript letter, M473. F2.

watershed of which he was acutely aware.

Ponsonby approached the matter of party allegiance by general agreement with Morel's violent sentiments, but Ponsonby did not hesitate to lash himself and likeminded Liberal colleagues for their own shortcomings. Ponsonby's reflective comments are in marked contrast to Morel's sometimes perfervid expressions:

But now I come to your very pertinent remarks as to how you should stand ... and to what party you should belong and I quite agree that there is no real live parliamentary party to join. I agree with all you say about the old parties and so far as our little gang is concerned which I think ... may have been of some use I frankly confess we have been deplorably ineffective impotent useless lacking in force without method and cohesion and often losing good opportunities.¹

Ponsonby proceeded to give expression to a certain guarded optimism that a newly vitalised political force might be about to emerge. His words convey a suppressed excitement, at one point almost suggestive of informed anticipation:

But events are thrower us closer together and a certain force has been engendered which may strengthen us and make us effective. I have been impatient about this for some time past. I have hoped for developments which have not come off. But I am rather more hopeful

1. Ibid.

today. Things are moving - You must not ask me for details but later on there may be some results we can talk over. All I ask now is that you should not make up your mind definitely against joining with those with whom you have been working, in parliamentary life.¹

Ponsonby's measured terms indicate clearly the unfocused frustrations of the early years of the war and reflect the more purposeful spirit released by the collapse of the Russian Tsardom.

The possibility of a remoulded party worthy of the allegiance of the U.D.C. Liberals was presented to Morel for his consideration:

Later on I am not without hope that the prospect of definite co-operation with a real live party working for what you believe in both in domestic and foreign affairs may present itself to you in a far more attractive form than it does now. If that time comes and all your present colleagues range themselves in the parliamentary fighting line I think you would yourself feel that you wanted to be with them at whatever cost.²

Ponsonby expresses the cohesive quality which common purpose in the U.D.C. had generated and assumed that the group would wish to make a common move in any change of political adherence.

The final parts of Ponsonby's letter are concerned with timing and the need to recognise when the moment has come to take action.

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

He showed a deep awareness of the subtleties of the limitations imposed by circumstances on the scope of individual participation or intervention:

... though I am often inclined to be a fatalist I believe too that it rests with each of us who are alive to the incomprehensible spiritual influences that surround us to exercise a distinct initiation at some unexpected moment, and unless before that moment comes you frame in your mind a resolute determination in a definite direction, if it should find you weakened by misgiving and doubt, the moment will pass and your chance may be lost and you will be carried away by the wave and become the slave of circumstances.¹

In the morass of heightened superficial emotion so characteristic of First World War politics such thinking by a man immersed in the immediate political business of the U.D.C. is impressive. Ponsonby was sensitive to the feeling that a moment of decision was very near. Nevertheless, he was careful not to trigger Morel's vehement enthusiasms:

The decision has not got to be made yet.

But be ready for it.

I am pretty sure that if you decide now against parliamentary candidature you will be forced to change your mind in a few years time.²

In a short postscript Ponsonby reveals his alertness for straws in the wind of political change:

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

I passed a large blank notice board this evening on Marley common. It was covered with soldiers names scribbled in pencil.

In the middle in big capital letters were the words "STOP THE WAR AT ONCE".^{1.}

Morel had already confided his political dilemma to George Leach of the Bradford I.L.P., mentioning his letter to Ponsonby.^{2.} Leach replied to Morel on 19th. July at considerable length.^{3.} Section (7) of this letter made the deepest impression on Morel. Leach wrote of the U.D.C. Liberals' political position:

Under what auspices? ... I have left this purposely to the last. It is a problem which baffles. What indeed is to become of Ponsonby and Trevelyan and Outhwaite and a good many others? ^{4.}

As a committed Socialist Leach indicated the psychological difficulty of approaching the radical Liberals' problem:

We must set our minds to solve it. None of my friends have clear views. I dont see how they can have. The Socialist basis of our political views has given us a platform. I think in the end you may have to come on it.^{5.}

Leach approached the problem as a matter of practical politics. He did not envisage particular ideological difficulty, especially as:

1. Ibid. An interesting comment suggestive of the impact of the March Revolution in Russia and the widespread disaffection among British and French troops in 1917.

2. Carbon copy of typescript letter from E.D. Morel to George Leach, n.d. (early July, 1917) M473. F2.

3. Manuscript letter, M473. F2.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

Socialism is not going to be the same after the war as it was before. I would like to see a conference between the Council of the I.L.P. and all of you to find out how you are viewing things.^{1.}

At the end of this section Leach expressed unambiguously the influence exerted by practical co-operation in a common cause:

I find more and more my U.D.C. and I.L.P. tend to merge inextricably with one another.^{2.}

In his reply to Leach,^{3.} Morel mentioned that Leach was the only person to see his letter to Ponsonby of early July, but he assumed that Ponsonby would show it to Trevelyan. Morel saw no serious ideological barrier between himself and the I.L.P.

Personally I should have no difficulty myself in supporting a broadly constructive Socialist programme - none at all. The present system is rotten to the core. I dont believe - although I cant speak for them - that Pons or T would either.^{4.}

Morel, however, felt considerable doubt as to the I.L.P.'s capacity to command a voice in government:

But is the I.L.P. sufficiently strong and broad in itself, to command a political force powerful enough to construct, strong

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Carbon copy of typescript letter of 23rd. July 1917, M473. F2.

4. Ibid.

enough to compel legislation, to take in hand the execution of policies. Its name is very much against it in my opinion. It is a name which does not correspond sufficiently with the needs of the hour. Of itself, unless it can capture the great bulk of the Labour Party (of which I see no sign) it cannot hope to become a politically effective party.^{1.}

Morel's experience in the U.D.C. seems to have strengthened his awareness of the need to engage popular support in order to achieve the mass vote necessary to form a government.

Morel demonstrated his knowledge of some of the I.L.P.'s domestic problems:

Its efficacy is complicated by personal questions - the rivalry between Snowden and MacDonald. Internally it has the reputation - possibly quite unjustly held - of being narrow and autocritic (sic) towards its supporters, very suspicious of "middle class" men, fearful of being captured, rooted in a rather fierce isolation - yet intrinsically impotent as a Party to get things done.^{2.}

Following this skilful appraisal of the I.L.P., Morel approached the concept of a new synthesis of radical and Labour forces:

I can imagine a political force in which the enthusiasm and spiritual driving power of the ILP followers would be the chief stimulus.^{3.}

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

Morel proceeded to doubt that the I.L.P.'s financial resources were adequate to fight every constituency and to decry its compact with the unreformed Labour Party of the "men who misrepresent Labour in the House,"¹ about whom he expressed the most stringent reservations. He then outlined the programme of a Socialist Democratic Party which would promote his political aims "based upon a constructive Socialism and a sane Internationalism".² Morel suggested a domestic programme which included the nationalisation of all public services, railways, mines and "of land above all".³ He envisaged "sweeping concessions to womanhood - qua womanhood",⁴ including the abolition of the existing divorce laws and legal discrimination against illegitimate children. Children would be "a recognised responsibility of the state".⁵ Education would be radically reorganised and the "scandal" of the Church of England and Church of Scotland's position as State institutions removed by legislation. All industries "connected with the vital necessities of life"⁶ would be systematically withdrawn from private ownership. The ownership of the rest of industry would be gradually adjusted to make the workers partners in enterprise.

The external programme seen necessary by Morel would be "so far as its relations with foreign states are concerned (conducted) on U.D.C. lines".⁷ His imperial policy would include the definition of Britain's ultimate ideal for the evolution of the dependent territories, "India first of all".⁸

But, in 1917, Morel could still see many pitfalls. The political programme he outlined indicated that he had already discarded Liberalism as well as the discredited men of the Liberal Party. He

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

appreciated that "every one must make sacrifices, and conferences and discussions are essential",^{1.} but of the emergence of the new political combination:

How is it to evolve? Is there any dawning perception in the minds of progressives of the absolute essentiality of drawing together? Is there likelihood that the passion for clinging to old sectional labels will lose its force in the face of the new needs; that personal ambitions will consent to merge themselves in the common purpose, for the common weal?^{2.}

Although Morel was now ideologically committed to some form of Labour party he was aware that there existed a sentiment in some sections of the working class which might perhaps find his adherence unacceptable. Might British Labour:

remain as a whole rooted in the fatuous tradition which insists that its political representatives must not be men of education, but men who have actually served their time in factory or workshop, mine or mill?^{3.}

Morel appreciated the power of mass popular support, but he also seemed to realise, earlier than the majority of his erstwhile Liberal colleagues, that support for political parties was likely to be more nearly divided along class lines than in the past. Even as a quasi-professional member of the old political elite, Morel sensed the difficulties of acceptance in the popular world of Labour.

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

One factor which made a successful political transfer much easier than Morel conceived in 1917 was the expertise of the elite in conducting local electoral campaigns. Once elected, a Member of Parliament commanded the local power base of a community which placed him in some measure beyond the reach of the power of class antagonism. As a result some Labour opinion felt that the U.D.C. politicians and others of elite origin had imposed themselves upon the movement.¹ Looking back to the wartime politics of the Labour movement, an anonymous contributor to The Book of the Labour Party wrote, in 1925, that:

New recruits to the movement will find it hard to believe that a message to Congress from Mr. Ramsay MacDonald could be publicly destroyed. Nevertheless it actually happened when Mr. David Gilmour of the Lanarkshire Miners, to the accompaniment of loud cheers, publicly tore to shreds a manifesto from the Union of Democratic Control of which Mr. MacDonald was chairman.²

The symbiosis which occurred after 1917, in so far as the U.D.C. was concerned, was expressed by Charles Trevelyan:

The Union (U.D.C.) was in effect a link between the large volume of Radical opinion which no longer found guidance from the Liberal leaders, and the Independent Labour Party, which was the only party organisation which challenged the policy of the war.

1. See P. 169.

2. Tracey, H. (Ed.), The Book of the Labour Party, London, n.d. (1926) Vol. I, ch. XV, p. 233.

Here was laid the foundation of the coalition
between Radicalism and Labour which is now
(1921) rapidly becoming a complete amalgamation.^{1.}

1. Trevelyan, Charles, The Union of Democratic Control, its history
and its policy., London, 1921, p.7.

(v.) Nine Prominent Migrants 1917-1924: Common and Diverse Pathways.¹

The sticking point of party affiliation was reached by Morel in January, 1918, who joined the I.L.P. immediately following his taste of imprisonment as a result of the discriminatory use of D.O.R.A. by the Lloyd George Government. During the next six years most of his close associates in the U.D.C., who had previously adhered to the Liberal Party, had become members of one or both Labour parties. Morel's colleagues were widely referred to as the "U.D.C. Group", a term which was not uncommonly employed abusively by less privileged members of the Labour Party. However, seen from the inside, the members of the group reveal a range of different attitudes and life-styles which were submerged in their common cause as active members of the U.D.C. and in their gradual migration from the Liberal to the Labour Party.

Aside from Morel, one-time U.D.C. Liberals who had transferred their allegiance to Labour by 1924 included the Buxton brothers, F.W. Pethick-Lawrence, Josiah Wedgwood, Lowes Dickinson, J.A. Hobson, Norman Angell, Charles Trevelyan and Arthur Ponsonby.

Except for Lowes Dickinson, the other eight U.D.C. Liberals were long-serving members of the U.D.C. Council, or the Executive Committee. All of them, except Noel Buxton and Wedgwood were authors of at least one item of the U.D.C.'s published literature, while the Buxton brothers were very generous financial underwriters of the Union's activities.

1. Except where otherwise indicated or exactly specified, biographical details in this section are compiled from the following sources:

DNB and Supplements to 1970; Bellamy, J.M. and Saville, J. (ed.), Dictionary of Labour Biography, London, in progress (6 vols. published by Nov. 1983); Tracey, H. (ed.), The Book of the Labour Party, 3 vols., London, n.d. (1926); Labour Who's Who, 1924; anonymous pamphlet, 'The Union of Democratic Control, notes on the careers of the members of the Executive Committee', pub. U.D.C., London, n.d. (1916); together with the autobiographies and biographies detailed in sections A (iii.) and B (i.)(b.) of the Sources and Bibliography.

Noel Buxton did not approve every particular of the Union's popular activity. His experience of the confidential intercommunications of government over Balkan affairs led him to agree with the U.D.C.'s main point concerning the need for institutionalised democratic control of foreign policy, but to be sceptical about the popular programme to abolish secret diplomacy.

The elite attributes of the members of this group combine various elements of birth, education or achievement. The Buxtons and Trevelyan were the sons of baronets. Ponsonby's father, Sir Henry Ponsonby, had been Queen Victoria's private secretary and Arthur was for a time a Page of Honour at Court. Pethick-Lawrence, Wedgwood and Angell belonged to families whose social position depended on trade or industry. Josiah Wedgwood was a direct descendant of the founder of the famous pottery. Hobson's father was a Midland newspaper proprietor, while Dickinson's family was connected with artistic and publishing circles (his father was a portrait painter).

Every member of the group belonged to the educational elite. The Buxtons and Trevelyan went to Harrow School, Pethick-Lawrence to Eton and Dickinson to Charterhouse. Five of them went to Cambridge, the Buxtons, Pethick-Lawrence and Trevelyan were at Trinity, and Dickinson's entire career was spent at King's College. Ponsonby went to Balliol College, Oxford and Hobson to Lincoln College. Angell's education was as eccentric as his future career. He attended the Lycée St.Omer and thereafter, while still in his early teens, the University of Geneva, where he had something of the reputation of a child prodigy. After leaving Clifton School, Wedgwood's higher education was provided by the Royal Naval College, Greenwich.

Thus, unlike Morel, whose family circumstances forced him to leave school comparatively early to earn his living, the rest of the leading

group of the U.D.C. Liberals who became Labour recruits from 1918 to 1924 were unequivocally members of one or more elite groups. Several members of this group would be expected to follow the political flag of Liberalism as a matter of course. Gladstone had arranged Ponsonby's father's appointment as Queen Victoria's private secretary. The Buxtons' father was for a time the Liberal nominated Governor of South Australia, while Trevelyan's father was a member of several Liberal governments. However, each individual within the group, either gradually or at one bound, moved to a political position eccentric to the prevailing sentiment within the Liberal Party.

Charles Buxton had been, since 1902, a member of the Liberal Balkan Committee set up by the historian, Bryce. Charles and his brother Noel were frequent visitors to the Balkans and had decided views on the Macedonian problem. They wished to see a final settlement broadly in line with the Bulgarian ethnic claim. On home affairs Charles had strong views in favour of the introduction of old age pensions and he worked with his brother on behalf of the welfare of agricultural workers. The Buxton brothers produced a scheme to help smallholders market their produce more successfully. Charles Buxton was active teaching and administering the W.E.A. in South London. He failed to make a sustained impact in the pre-war parliaments because of his poor electoral appeal, election meetings rarely responding to an expert lecture in seemingly obscure foreign affairs. He failed to gain East Hertfordshire in 1906 and Mid-Devon in 1908. However, he did capture the Mid-Devon seat after the January, 1910, election, only to lose it again in December. In 1912 he was adopted as Liberal candidate for Central Hackney.

Charles Buxton admired Ramsay MacDonald before the outbreak of war and was drawn closer to him through the frequent contact of their common efforts in the U.D.C. In spite of his patriotic mission to

Bulgaria, in an effort to dissuade the Bulgarian tsar's government from adherence to the Central Powers, he was too widely known as a very active publicist for the U.D.C. to escape censure. In February, 1916 the Central Hackney Liberal Association disowned him as its candidate. Buxton thereafter distanced himself from Liberal Party affairs. He fought the Rossendale by-election of 1917 to no avail, as a Peace-by-Negotiation candidate, with the active support of his U.D.C. colleagues. He also took an active part with U.D.C. friends in the function and activities of the 1917 Club, thereby signalling his adherence to a political alliance, at least, of Radical Liberals and Labour, forged in the spirit of the year from which they took their name.

Noel Buxton fully shared his brother Charles' interest in Balkan Affairs and was chairman of the Bryce Balkan Committee from 1902. His interests in home affairs centred on philanthropic work in the East End of London associated with Toynbee Hall, also, again in collaboration with Charles, he advocated improved conditions for agricultural workers and smallholders. He collaborated with the Radical Liberal group organised by C.F.G. Masterman to produce "The Heart of the Empire", which drew attention to appalling conditions at home which needed relief. This group hoped to deflect the Liberal Imperialists, who gained a predominant position in the party hierarchy after 1906, from ambitions abroad towards domestic reform issues. In 1907 his schemes for agricultural reform were given a practical outlet when he collaborated in the creation of a co-operative capitalisation and marketing organisation for the East Bedfordshire smallholders. Noel Buxton was a quietly persuasive speaker and he was far more attractive to an election meeting than his brother, Charles. He captured the Whitby parliamentary seat at a by-

election in 1905, only to lose it at the following General Election of 1906. However, his reputation as an ultra-Radical, which contributed to his defeat at Whitby, worked as a decisive asset in his candidacy for North Norfolk. The local agricultural workers insisted that they would throw all their support behind Buxton, whether or not he was the official Liberal candidate. The local Liberal Association acquiesced in this situation and Buxton was elected in 1910 to the North Norfolk seat.

Just as Charles was coming under the spell of MacDonald so Noel Buxton increasingly admired the Webbs. He was a very well organised and methodical man himself and he responded to the stark efficiency which the Webbs exuded. The relationship was consolidated through their co-operation in the work of the Central Body, an organisation created with both Radical and Labour support, to bring practical assistance to the unemployed. Although a restraining influence on the most extreme U.D.C. position on the conduct of foreign affairs, Noel Buxton was a dedicated anti-imperialist. His view that the Liberal Party had fallen irretrievably into the control of the imperialist faction led to his rejection of the Liberal Party machine and his stand in North Norfolk in 1918 as a Lib-Lab candidate. He was only narrowly defeated following a ferocious campaign in which he was derided as an associate of treacherous pacifists.

Frederick Lawrence's career followed a more turbulent course than the Buxtons'. He was deeply interested in the economic and social problems rampant in the East End of London during late Victorian and Edwardian times. He worked in the Mansfield House Community Settlement in Canning Town with Percy Alden and William Beveridge. He qualified as a barrister and practised as a "poor man's lawyer" at no fee. He believed that effective trades union organisation was the best long-term hope for the poorest sections of the working classes. Early in

1901 his views in favour of the firm prosecution of the South African War led to an acceptance of nomination as the Liberal-Unionist parliamentary candidate for North Lambeth. However, he completely reversed his views about the Boers, largely under the influence of his fiancée, Emmeline Pethick. Upon marriage he took the surname of Pethick-Lawrence as a symbol of the equal union of the sexes to which he had become committed.

Pethick-Lawrence re-cemented his connection with Radical Liberalism in late 1901 by joining the League of Liberals Against Militarism, which hoped to harness influence in favour of a conciliatory settlement in South Africa and restrain aggressive nationalism. He was active in the League's first objective which was to publicise and ensure the moral condemnation of the consequences of the concentration camp system in the Transvaal and Orange Free State.

However, Pethick-Lawrence again strayed from the mainstream of Liberal activity through his close identification, from 1906, with Mrs. Pankhurst's Women's Social and Political Union which was established to co-ordinate the activities of women's suffrage supporters. Both he and his wife suffered greatly in the cause of the W.S.P.U., but this did not prevent his perfunctory expulsion from the organisation when he decided to support the U.D.C. in opposition to the "patriotic" forces.

In the U.D.C. Ramsay MacDonald's influence took a greater hold on Pethick-Lawrence. The two had already collaborated for a number of years in the cause of Labour improvement. Dissatisfied with Labour's poor representation in the press, Pethick-Lawrence had bought the "Echo" as early as 1902 to provide MacDonald with a regular platform. In 1917 he signalled his final separation from the Liberal Party by standing unsuccessfully at the South Aberdeen by-election as a Peace-by-Negotiation candidate.

Josiah Wedgwood was characterised by a highly individualistic radicalism. His family retained a powerful influence in the Potteries

and were of good repute among a people renowned for a certain crusty freedom of speech. Wedgwood presented himself to the voters of Newcastle-under-Lyme in 1906, as the official Liberal candidate, on the firm understanding that he would not allow his conscience to be fettered by any consideration of party interests.

Once returned to Parliament he attempted to force the attention of the House and government upon his peculiar preoccupations. He was an uncompromising advocate of Henry George's system of Taxation of Land Values and was frustrated at what he interpreted as the Liberal government's hesitation towards a great moral commitment. In addition to being an ardent single-taxer, Wedgwood was always ready to take up the cudgels in defence of personal freedoms. He maintained a one-man filibustering address in opposition to certain provisions of the 1913 Mental Deficiency Bill, which he considered a tyrannous restriction of basic individual rights.

When the war came he entered the conflict with characteristic elan. His remarkable record of war service included both naval and military operations in France and the Near and Middle East. Following serious wounds he became Deputy Director of Trench Warfare, a post suited both to his experience and his naval engineering training.

Wedgwood was not the only senior service officer to join the U.D.C. during the war and to actively participate in its counsels. General Birdwood-Thomson was another, who, like Wedgwood, was drawn to the U.D.C. by the sincere gallantry of its leaders, who were the object of such vituperative abuse at the hands of the popular press. Wedgwood had criticised Charles Trevelyan in 1914 for the actions of the U.D.C., but in less than a year he admitted that Trevelyan's rational, practical advocacy had convinced him that the U.D.C. was fighting its own righteous cause. His view that the Liberal Party had succumbed to the popular forces of aggressive nationalism resulted in his candidacy as an

Independent Radical for Newcastle-under-Lyme in the 1918 General Election. Unlike Noel Buxton, Ponsonby and Trevelyan, Wedgwood retained the affection of his voters and was returned unopposed.

Arthur Ponsonby was ideally nurtured for a distinguished career. He entered the Diplomatic Service in 1894 and, after several appointments abroad, was posted to the Foreign Office. However, he proved of too independent mind for his colleagues and, having failed to persuade his superiors of his view of necessary reforms from within, he resigned in 1902 and devoted himself to work for diplomatic reform through the Liberal Party.

He was appointed to the Liberal Central Association, where he became intimately familiar with the party's mechanisms. Although Ponsonby had just failed to secure the Taunton seat in 1905, Campbell-Bannerman appointed him as his principal private secretary. Thus by 1908 when the prime minister died, Ponsonby possessed an enormous first-hand knowledge of the workings of government in general and the Foreign Service in particular.

The voters of the Stirling Burghs accepted Ponsonby as the successor of Campbell-Bannerman and he was returned in the Liberal cause at the by-election of 1908. He rapidly convinced himself that the new administration was covertly following dangerous policies likely to end in general war. In order to oppose the ascendant Liberal Imperialists, led by Asquith and Grey, Ponsonby took the lead in the formation of the parliamentary Liberal Foreign Affairs Committee, composed of seventy backbenchers who respected his inside knowledge and were uneasy at the conduct of foreign affairs.

Never given to precipitate action, Ponsonby acted with characteristic reflection while Trevelyan, MacDonald, Angell and Morel made the first private moves in the formation of the U.D.C. Having considered, he

committed himself without reserve and became the fifth founding father of the Union. Ponsonby's assimilation to the Labour political position was not arrived at lightly. He appreciated that the political variables during the war, which he assumed so prudently would probably resolve themselves into the proposition that Radicals were no longer a natural section of the Liberal Party, combined with the question of political adherence to Labour, could resolve themselves in such a way that, by over-hesitation, a critical opportunity would be lost.

As early as 1907, as an ideologically legitimate Liberal, Ponsonby had said that he had "virtually decided to accept the truth of Socialism as an ideal".¹ The events of 1917 promoted the growing conviction that Labour would be the radical political force of the future. He was intensely antagonistic to the government's growing hostility to the Bolshevik Revolution and worked with the U.D.C. Labour left-winger, W.C. Anderson to support the Soviet cause. However, the war ended before Ponsonby had made a definite decision to join the Labour Party. He was rejected by the Liberal Association at his Stirling Burghs constituency and made a forlorn stand as an Independent candidate at Dunfermline in the 1918 General Election.

Like Ponsonby, it was almost a matter of course that Charles Trevelyan should continue the family tradition of political service in the elite levels of the Liberal Party. His active political life began in 1892 when he went to Ireland for two years as secretary to Lord Houghton, the Liberal Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. Returning to England, he worked in 1896 and 97 as a member of the London School Board, to extend the scope of the elementary schools' curricula beyond the basis of immediately applicable practical skills.

He had been unsuccessful as the Liberal candidate for North

1. John Gore in DNB Supp.

Lambeth in 1895, but in 1899 he was elected M.P. for Elland, a seat he held until 1918. In Parliament he spoke as a convinced Free Trader and advocated the enrichment and extension of the state education system. He was also concerned that the urban population was often denied access to the wild areas of the countryside by landowners protecting their game reserves, and proposed consolidation of legislation guaranteeing public rights of way. In later life he set an example by opening up, for the public recreation, his own extensive family lands at Wallington in Northumberland.

In 1908 Trevelyan became Parliamentary Secretary of the Board of Education. He was an efficient minister, who proved capable of understanding and using the administrative machine. He sought to further secularise the education system and used his influence to promote the spirit of undenominational teaching, previously enacted through the Cowper-Temple Clause.

However, his tenure of ministerial office from 1908 to 1914 permitted first-hand knowledge of the manner by which the Liberal Government "stage-managed its following from one disillusionment to another".¹ Trevelyan rejected Grey's dedication to Balance of Power politics, which he regarded as likely to demand a violation of Liberal principles, and the consequent adherence to secret commitments with potentially incalculable consequences.

The surging train of events of July and early August, 1914 convinced Trevelyan that he must make a public stand against the predominantly Liberal/Imperialist government. He resigned his ministry upon the outbreak of war and made common cause with MacDonald, who resigned as leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party on 7th. August.

1. Tracey, H., (Ed.) The Book of the Labour Party, London, n.d. (1926).
vol. III. p.248

Trevelyan, Angell and the Liberal M.P. Philip Morell persuaded the wary MacDonald that only through an organised pressure group could effective opposition to the war be attempted. E.D. Morel was asked to become the pro tem secretary and treasurer of the yet unconstituted Union of Democratic Control. MacDonald continued to insist that the group must remain private and unknown to the public, at least until the initial war frenzy had died down and the country was seen to be safe from external threat. Trevelyan's view that complete openness was the essence of what the group intended to campaign for was strongly reinforced by Ponsonby, who came in as the fifth founder of the U.D.C. in late September, 1914.

The extreme caution which MacDonald propounded was almost responsible for the extinction of the nascent U.D.C. in a morass of popular denigration. The publication by the "Morning Post" of the group's confidential circular¹ to selected sympathisers led to a rabid reaction only headed off through Morel's skill and energy in rapidly creating an embryonic popular organisation.

Trevelyan, with the support of Ponsonby and Morel, remained steadfast through the war in maintaining the focus of the U.D.C. clearly upon the main tenet proclaimed in the Union's title - the furtherance of the extension of democratic control over foreign policy. Closely connected were the aims to abolish secret diplomacy, particularly in the form of secret conventions and "closed" clauses, and to establish some form of international institution to reinforce the brotherhood of nations. This trio successfully prevented the Union from falling under the influence of any popularly perceived minority. Pacifism as such was rejected and the membership of military men actively

1. "Morning Post", 10th. Sept., 1914.

prosecuting the war was encouraged. The embrace of the I.L.P. was subtly contained, until the events of 1917 accelerated the moment when the U.D.C. Liberals accepted that the time for decision was upon them.

By 1916 the Elland Liberal Association had asked Trevelyan to resign his seat and he knew that there was no possibility of Liberal support for his candidacy there in 1918. Accordingly he ran at Elland as an Independent, expressing his concurrence with Socialist principles, but stopping just short of full allegiance to a Labour party. He came bottom of the poll and was slightly aggrieved that an official Labour Party candidate had been numbered among his opponents.

Three other prominent Liberal U.D.C. members who migrated to the I.L.P. or to the Labour Party during the period 1917 to 1924, differ from the previous six, in that their careers were not centred on parliamentary activity. Lowes Dickinson remained a Cambridge academic throughout his life. Hobson's influential career had no regular professional basis, but combined academic work with the higher reaches of journalism. Norman Angell became an early twentieth century cult-figure. His journalistic work was transcended by the following of enthusiasts, which took up the ideas propounded in The Great Illusion^{1.} with such zeal.

Lowes Dickinson, originally a Conservative, was, with Hobson, one of the three leading members of the Bryce Committee which, during 1914 and 1915, elaborated a scheme for an international organisation to be called the League of Nations. Dickinson may have been the originator of the proposed organisation's title, but Hobson, through his U.D.C. Pamphlet 15A "A League of Nations", was, in 1915, the first to attempt the presentation of the idea to a popular audience such as the Union

1. Angell, N., The Great Illusion, London, 1910.

already commanded. The respect which influential opinion in the pre-war United States accorded Bryce, ensured that the League of Nations scheme would there receive the close attention of active politicians. Thus Dickinson and Hobson provided the U.D.C. with a dual level assault in the propagation of a major aim.

Dickinson shared with Hobson the belief that the Liberal Party had abandoned its moral basis in the interests of expediency and the pursuit of the politics of power. Such a dedicated Platonist as Dickinson could hardly be expected to continue his adherence to the Liberal Party. But the shift in Hobson's allegiance, though of negligible immediate political consequence, constituted a major signal that the Liberals had jumped their ideological tracks.

Through the columns of such journals as the Nineteenth (later, Twentieth) Century Review, the Fortnightly Review and the Nation, Hobson and Hobhouse had worked brilliantly to hammer out, in discussion with many correspondents, the moral, economic and social ideology of the New Liberalism. Only Ritchie¹ could claim an equal place with these two. Thus Hobson's identification with Liberalism was total and fundamental.

His academic work placed him in the first rank of sociologists and economists in the early twentieth century. The influence of his pioneer analysis of the connection between restrictive capital conservation and the extreme unevenness of the distribution of income levels was acknowledged both by his fellow-Liberal, Keynes, and by Lenin.

Hobson fought against the policy of the Liberal Imperialists, which he characterised as aberrant to true Liberalism. Amid the pre-

1. See Appendix A.

1914 controversies he remained a convinced internationalist and free trader. Hobson developed the acceptance of the collective aspect recognised in the New Liberalism. During the war he supported the proposed introduction of proportional representation and recourse to referenda as necessary for the application of democratic methods in mass society. He also remained a firm advocate of women's suffrage.

Hobson was a frequent speaker at the South Place Ethical Society, and his persuasive humanitarianism made a deep impression on many who heard him there. His rejection of the Liberal Party during the war, on the grounds that its position was now unethical could not but influence many for whom ethical soundness was a fundamental requirement in public life, to reconsider their allegiance to a party condemned by one of its own foremost ideologues.

Norman Angell was, politically, the most eccentric of the five eventual founders of the U.D.C. His journalistic abilities were of great service to the new organisation, and his influence in merging the Civil Union with the U.D.C. gave the movement an important nucleus from which to expand the network of local branches. The Garton Foundation, created as an institution to foster the principles of rational moral pacifism formulated in "The Great Illusion", provided the U.D.C. with the experienced Langdon-Davies as its first salaried branch organiser.

Angell, although a declared Radical, was the non-Labour U.D.C. leader with least commitment to the Liberal Party. He declared that he had been bred in a local radical tradition. Speaking of himself in his autobiography, After All, he remarks that quiet discussions of the kind common among the workers in a shoe factory near his home "quite early helped to indoctrinate him with political radicalism".^{1.}

1. Angell, N., After All, London, 1951, p.26.

Angell's international reputation provided the U.D.C. with a second line of communication to the United States in promotion of the League of Nations concept, a pathway distinct from that of the Cambridge Bryce Committee group. Angell had been active before the war in promoting the American-founded League of Free Nations Association and the Foreign Policy Association. President Taft had consulted Angell before launching his League to Enforce Peace.

As a radical, a secularist and an internationalist Angell regarded the Asquith-Grey imperialist policies as an unmitigated disaster. He, too, gradually moved to a position from which the logical progression, for those wishing to promote a political programme based on moral foundations, was in the Labour direction.

Thus the radical Liberal U.D.C. membership, of which Morel and these nine were leaders of opinion, had reached, by various individual pathways, a common disillusionment with the Liberal Party. This feeling began as a reaction to the ascendancy of the protagonists of "enlightened" imperialism and was further exacerbated in the ruthless compromisings of the neo-Caesar Lloyd George. The events of 1917 showed that it was possible to break the mould in which international affairs seemed to have reached a bloody impasse. If such a traditional paternalistic autocracy as the Tsarist regime could be brought down in a country as under-developed politically as Russia, then anything was possible for those ready to seize the opportunity generated by the contagious spirit of change. In the foundation of the 1917 Club, Trevelyan, Morel and MacDonald were giving a nominal expression to the unlimited expectations of future political change. The logical chain from Liberal to Labour, implicit since the formation of the U.D.C. in

1914, and reinforced by bonds of three years' common effort and suffering, was complete. From 1917 onwards it was mostly a matter of individual acceptance of the rationale and finding the appropriate moment.

Morel joined the I.L.P. in January, 1918, immediately following his release from jail. He was adopted as Labour candidate for Dundee in 1920 and had the great pleasure of defeating Winston Churchill, whom he regarded as a renegade of Liberal values, in the election of 1922. Morel represented Dundee in the Commons until his death in 1924.

Charles Buxton had anticipated Morel's decision by several months, having joined the I.L.P. in 1917, because of their peace and general foreign political programme. In 1918 he unsuccessfully contested Accrington for Labour. His candidature was upheld and he became active in expounding the short-sighted vindictiveness of the Versailles Settlement and the morally impossible position of the British intervention forces in North Russia and the Caucasus. He was successful at his second attempt at Accrington, being elected Labour member in 1922.

Noel Buxton made his decision to join Labour two years after his brother. Like Charles, Noel was appalled at the harshness of the peace settlement. He came to accept that the future place for the Radicals was inside the Labour Party. He recognised that one logical extension of the New Liberal welfare provision involved a quantum increase in state intervention. This solution was never unequivocally accepted by the Liberal ideologues. Buxton's evangelical family background may possibly have contributed towards the formulation of his supreme belief in moral progress through State action. In 1919 he joined the I.L.P. and was accepted back into the fold of the Norfolk agricultural workers. He was restored as M.P. for North Norfolk in 1922.

Pethick-Lawrence abandoned his Peace-by-Negotiation position in early 1918 and was adopted as Labour candidate for Hastings in April.¹ Unsuccessful there, he stood at South Islington in 1922, but was again defeated. He finally entered Parliament in 1923 as M.P. for West Leicester, having repeated Morel's electoral triumph over Winston Churchill.

Josiah Wedgwood joined the I.L.P. in April and the Labour Party in August, 1919. His position as M.P. for Newcastle-under-Lyme continued to be unassailable at election after election. He was almost immediately very influential in opposing the elaboration of forms of party discipline within Labour, which struck him as offensive to individual freedom. He was vice-chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party from 1921 to 1924.

Arthur Ponsonby also joined the I.L.P. in 1919, and, by 1921, he was a member of the Labour Party. Recognising that the time for decisive action, to which he had alerted Morel, had arrived, Ponsonby presented a very advanced socialist programme to the Sheffield electorate. He was returned as Labour member for the Brightside division in 1922.

Charles Trevelyan joined the I.L.P. immediately following his defeat at Elland in 1918 and became a Labour Party member in the following year. Trevelyan diagnosed the Liberal Party as infected by jingoism and also felt that it had allowed itself "to be left behind because it does not recognise the intellectual changes brought about by the war".²

Trevelyan was another successful migrant to parliamentary labour, securing the seat for Newcastle Central in 1922.

1. U.D.C. Exec. Cttee. Min. 23rd. April, 1918, H,DDC/1/4.

2. Quoted in Morris, A.J.A., C.P. Trevelyan, 1870 - 1958, Portrait of a Radical, Belfast, 1977, p.141.

The remaining three elite ex-Liberal U.D.C. migrants were not dedicated to Parliamentary work. Dickinson, who joined Labour after the war, was not interested in candidature. Hobson and Angell remained unsuccessful and occasional candidates between 1918 and 1924. Hobson failed as an Independent in 1918, recognised the isolation of a non-party stance and joined the I.L.P. in 1919. Hobson accepted that the promotion of measures to relieve the poverty and unemployment he judged to result from under-consumption of wealth would require drastic legislative intervention. In those post-war years he agitated for the adoption of his schemes for the taxation of surplus wealth.

Norman Angell accepted that the post-war political environment exerted a pressure towards greater adherence to party in pursuit of personal aims. His rational secularising approach to domestic issues and his dedicated devotion to a moral internationalism in foreign affairs seemed to place him in the Labour Party. Having joined in 1920 he remarked that this decision had come about "by a series of steps, the final outcome of which I did not clearly foresee".¹ He failed to take Rushcliffe for Labour in 1922 and again in 1924, but his work for the League of Nations Union enhanced his already considerable reputation.

Norman Angell's standing in the larger international community was by no means the only gift put at Labour's disposal by its attraction of migrant Liberal elites. The small group of ten U.D.C. ex-Liberals alone supplied an impressive range of expertise to their new party. Naturally foreign affairs was the department in which their knowledge was pre-eminent. Morel, Ponsonby, Angell, Dickinson and Noel Buxton became members of the Labour Party Advisory Committee on International Questions. Charles Buxton was appointed official adviser to the Labour

1. Angell, N., After All, London, 1951, pp. 230 - 1.

Party on Foreign Affairs and was given the unusual honour of a private room in the House of Commons at all times, whether or not he was currently an M.P. Ponsonby's inside knowledge of the Foreign Office and the Court circle was valuable to a party which had emerged as a new alternative provider of government.

In economics Hobson continued to advise and promote his ideas for positive measures. He suggested that the drastic programme of nationalisation, which had emerged as official Labour policy, should be ameliorated along lines which discriminated between standardised industries of mass production and non-standardised ones in which the individual worker possessed a higher status. Hobson felt that the spirit of non-standardised enterprises might be quenched by the grip of necessarily bureaucratic nationalisation.

In addition to his knowledge of law, Pethick-Lawrence was active in the construction of schemes for financial management. His book, A Levy on Capital, produced for the U.D.C., was very influential in the post-war Labour world. Noel Buxton continued to advocate schemes for the improvement of agricultural workers' conditions. His suggestions for various marketing boards were accepted as Party policy and he succeeded, during the short-lived Labour government of 1924, in enacting an Agricultural Wages Bill. Trevelyan also was a successful administrator. His return in 1924 to the Department of Education as Minister was marked by an effective effort to prevent local authorities making damaging cuts to educational provision in the name of economy. Josiah Wedgwood's travels while on active war service had engendered an enduring interest in two pressing Imperial problems: the future of India and the aspirations of Zionism.

Norman Angell entered upon Labour Party work with such gusto that he might well have quickly gained the reputation of a left-winger had

he not become wary of the zeal he found which expressed itself in terms of hatreds. He therefore chose a role which attempted conciliatory mediation to seal rifts, whose dangerous potential he recognised very early.

The ex-Liberal "U.D.C. Group" thus contributed towards a new breadth in a Labour Party with a mass vote at its command. The ability of these men to communicate with an audience wider than the registered party membership ensured their attraction as parliamentary candidates. Such operational skills constituted a form of entrance stake, giving them direct access to the top table of the Labour Party decision-making system. Their elite facility was resented by a vocal fraction for whom a respectable working class background was the only acceptable passport to Labour leadership. However, the international respect which the U.D.C. Liberal migrants brought to the tenderfoot Labour Party was too valuable to be rejected on the grounds that they failed the test of the older, parochial values.

CHAPTER 5.

Conclusion.

The intervention of the U.D.C. in the arena of popular politics constituted a very courageous endeavour to deflect public opinion from a myopic and near hysterical pre-occupation with the emergency of war, towards a rational understanding of the processes which led to disaster, and how the case might be altered. In an atmosphere in which trans-national minorities and foreign residents were viewed as dangerous Trojan horses capable of eruption to assault the British state from within, and in which even German-sounding breeds of dog were at risk from the roving mob, any rational appeal which cast the enemy as a fellow human being appeared an almost foolhardy undertaking.

The popular national press seized upon the U.D.C. as a subject fit for scarification. "John Bull" of 14th. November, 1914, ran a typical article entitled "The Treason-mongers: how the Berlin lie-factory is fed". The writer condemned the U.D.C. for advocating a non-humiliating peace settlement and suggested that pro-German money backed the Union: "We fancy that, without much assistance, we could furnish the Hon. Treasurer with a useful list of likely patrons".¹ The article concludes by making much play with a favourable report quoted from the "Vossische Zeitung" (sic)² which described the U.D.C., rather prematurely as the "new Radical Party of the Left". The "Daily Express" of 2nd. April, 1915, typically questions the loyalty of E.D. Morel in its article, "Who is Mr. E.D. Morel? and who pays for his pro-German union?".³ Beginning "Mr. E.D. Morel, who is more famous as a pro-German than anything else", the writer proceeds to characterise the U.D.C. as

1. "John Bull", 14th. Nov., 1914, p.6.

2. Presumably "Volkische Zeitung" is meant.

3. For a discussion of certain ambiguities in the 'pro-German' question see Appendix B.

"essentially a pro-German organisation" and continues "It would be interesting to know the names of the principle subscribers to the Union of Democratic Control ... These things cost money. Who pays? ^{1.} The superficial impression, conveyed by the media controlling the commanding heights of popular communication, was designed to make the U.D.C.'s intended progress as a popular organisation all but incredible.

Nevertheless, Morel had already insisted, against the inclination of the cautious MacDonald (whom Morel suspected of time-serving in the interests of personal ambition,) that the U.D.C. must enter the fray as a popular organisation and become, if possible, a mass movement. Quite typically, Morel revelled in the commotion aroused by the popular press and sought to show this as a reflection of the U.D.C.'s potential in popular politics:

... we have made the U.D.C. a live thing, not a mere academic debating society. It is known and felt - and in some quarters dreaded, as a live thing. Those magic initials are familiar, from the controversies which rage round them in the Press, from Land's End to John O'Groats. There is hardly a country in the world which has the fortune, or misfortune, according to the point of view, to possess newspapers in which our existence is not the theme of public discussion.^{2.}

The potential of the U.D.C. as a popular force exceeded even Morel's expectations. While conceding in March, 1916, that the U.D.C.

1. "Daily Express", 2nd April, 1915, p.5.

2. First Annual Gen. Council Mtg., 29th. Oct., 1915, Sec's Rpt., p.1.

"is not popular ... with the mass of the public, and is not likely to be while the war fever lasts at its present height",¹ the peregrinations of Egerton Wake on behalf, inter alia, of the Union, had revealed the existence of a mass sentiment within Labour which the events of 1914 had stifled. The ideals of international socialism had been submerged by rampant war nationalism, but Wake revealed that in Britain they had been preserved at local level in the trade union and Labour groups. The growing number of group affiliations² secured by Wake, and his successors as U.D.C. Labour Commissioners, helped to lead the Liberal U.D.C. leaders towards the tardy recognition of their "rational constituency" in Labour. The internal tension which sometimes surfaced between local U.D.C. groups or branches and the Head Office Executive revealed a somewhat ambiguous attitude of the elite towards the interaction with popular politics which they had initiated. Some members of the Executive were not completely adjusted to the implications of two-way communication, but the intervention at grass-roots ultimately resulted in politically constructive contact.

The recognition by the U.D.C. leaders of the importance of improving popular education, combined with their object of informing the public of the inner nature of international affairs, resulted in a publishing enterprise of remarkable scope and outstanding success. Speaking at the Fourth Annual General Meeting of the U.D.C., just twelve days before the Armistice, Morel concluded his address by referring to the educative work of the Union:

Looking back on our work of the past four years,
we are entitled to say that the policy and principles

1. Fifth Gen. Council Mtg., 9th. March, 1916, Sec's Rpt., p.1.

2. See Appendix C.

we put forward four years ago amid general derision and denunciation ... are the policy and principles President Wilson is urging to-day, in the momentous conferences now being held ... And we are entitled to say that it is mainly due to this Union, that for hundreds of thousands of our countrymen, problems vital to their well-being, but ignored by them to their detriment, now possess a living force of actuality which can never be wholly removed. The policy and principles we have upheld and made familiar to masses of men may prevail in the Terms of Settlement, or they may be in considerable measure put aside. In either event our line of usefulness is broadly indicated.^{1.}

Writing in 1921 of the U.D.C.'s role in making public the provisions of secret treaties, Charles Trevelyan declared that:

the whole political Labour world was enabled through our instrumentality to know the full details of that disgraceful betrayal. And from that time forwards we were always sure of a hearing from working class audiences, as men who had given sound warning against the secret intrigues of war.^{2.}

Wishing to justify himself to a post-war audience, Trevelyan showed himself still somewhat unaware of the nature of the class support tapped by Wake from 1915 onwards. Trevelyan's view is noticeably event-

1. Fourth Annual Gen. Council Mtg., Sec's Address, reported in "The U.D.C." Vol. iv, No. 2.

2. Trevelyan, Charles, The Union of Democratic Control, its history and its policy, London, 1921, pp. 5 - 6.

centred.

Just as Wake aroused the Labour movement in the cause of public influence upon international policy, the work of the local U.D.C. branches helped to re-call a broader section of the community to a state of mind receptive to rational argument. The vitriol of the popular national dailies was represented, but not uncritically endorsed, in the correspondence columns of papers such as the "Westmorland Mercury and Times". On 6th. August, 1915, D. Paterson, replying to an earlier letter from Mrs. V. Price, critical of the U.D.C.'s programme and suggesting the internment of its members, pointed out that the "terrible Moloch of War" to which she referred "will not be destroyed by the persecution of those who denounce it".¹ Mr. Paterson's long letter is followed in the same issue by one from Mr. R. Chorley, who presses the charges made by the national newspapers. Chorley wrote that "the acknowledged leader of the movement (U.D.C.) Mr. Ramsay MacDonald is sufficiently a 'pro-German' to damn any cause" and "As for Mr. Morel, his indecent attacks on Sir Edward Grey last Autumn have sufficiently discredited any praise he deserved for his exaggerations of Congo atrocities".² Paterson was given ample space to reply to Chorley in the issue of 17th. August. He defended Morel's reputation over the Congo issue and refuted the suggestion made by Chorley and Mrs. Price that the U.D.C. advocated extra-Parliamentary action in the field of foreign policy: "It is because our great representative institution, the House of Commons, is not consulted, to any practical extent, in matters of foreign policy, that the U.D.C. has been formed".³ Mrs. Price's follow-up letter to Paterson's earlier rebuttal is also printed at length in the same

1. "Westmorland Mercury and Times", 6th.Aug., 1915, p.7. col.1.

2. Ibid.

3. "Westmorland Mercury and Times", 13th. Aug., 1915, p.3. col.3.

edition. Her arguments are perhaps of less interest than the tone of her ending, thanking the editor for the space granted: "Being inexperienced in newspaper correspondence I am perhaps more wordy than is absolutely necessary, but ... I am fortunate in having so courteous an editor and opponent".¹ Exchanges of this kind reveal the reassertion of the rational world amidst the confused emotions of war and the persuasive potential made available by the network of the local U.D.C. branches.

The U.D.C. was well-placed to harness the popular feelings unchained by the 1917 Russian revolutions. In particular the March Revolution was viewed by the elite as the ideal Liberal-political revolution. Liberals were perhaps vulnerable to over-enthusiasm in this cause, because of their particular hatred of the old enemy - Tsardom. Although an Allied country, the Imperial Russian censors had invariably refused to admit U.D.C. material, and the downfall of the regime was viewed with a certain degree of exultant satisfaction.

It was the stimulus given by the events of 1917 to popular agitation against the prolongation of the war which helped to bring about the greatest extension of the U.D.C.'s branch and affiliated membership.² In a situation where the pressure of popular support was growing much more quickly than anticipated, the Liberal U.D.C. leaders appeared, for the first time, to be uncertain of their direction. It became clear that events were outpacing their private deliberations over political allegiance. However, by the Armistice of 1918, they were well aware that many members and even whole branches were forcing the pace of commitment to Labour. The rapid disbandment of many branches subsequent to the Versailles Settlement, combined with the continued

1. Ibid.

2. See Maps and Appendix C.

support of organised labour in affiliate membership, helped to precipitate the Liberal elite into Labour adherence. The U.D.C., as an organisation with widespread popular support, provided its leaders with an entry stake to sit down at Labour's table with the other players, such as the trade unions, who wished to chart the political future.

The First World War had revealed Liberalism to be moving too slowly along the path of social reform. Possibly because their ethical position demanded a certain moral restraint, the hold of Liberalism upon the whole body-politic was shown to be fundamentally out of tune with the faster pace set by the development of certain socio-economic factors, such as class interest. Thus the aftermath of the war saw the emergence of growing mass loyalty to a Labour Party, which had albeit failed spectacularly to respond to the war, combined with the growing rejection of a Liberal Party, which, though split, had a highly creditable record of social reform. After 1918 "we will" gradually gained the ascendancy over "we have and intend to" - the efficacy of the uncompromising over the more purely rational was emerging as a powerful attitude.

It has been shown¹ that a number of factors combined to produce reformulatory pressures which led to the eventual migration of the greater part of the elite Liberal U.D.C. leadership to the Labour parties. The negative forces of rejection by the main Liberal body, together with public misrepresentation, were very powerful. The government leading the nation at war commanded the loyalty of the national press, and the effects of the vindictiveness of the less scrupulous sections have been noted. In the realisation that repetition of lies or distorted truths by the "big voices" would gradually create an acceptance of the Union's stance as quasi-treasonable, its leadership made strenuous efforts to counter the popular blast. In so doing they naturally

1. See Ch.4.

accreted a species of counter-myth around their personalities, which they, and the U.D.C. membership generally, could use to erode the vulgar view set forth by such papers as Horatio Bottomley's "John Bull", and the "Daily Express". In 1916 the U.D.C. published a pamphlet entitled "Notes on the Careers of the Members of the Executive Committee", defensive of their personal reputations in public life. The book cover carried a prominent label:

The only safe rule in war-time is to believe no statement about anybody's opinion until it is given by themselves. This is particularly true of the views of people who are not shouting with the crowd.^{1.}

The pamphlet begins by stating that the notes were produced in response to many enquiries from members and others: "Many fictions have been spread abroad as to who the leaders of the Union are and what they have done".^{2.}

Throughout the war years until August, 1917, the control of the U.D.C. Executive over the organisation was firm, and the General Council could usually be relied upon to support the Executive. Consequently, given the presence of MacDonald, Snowden, W.C. Anderson and other Labour politicians as Executive or General Committee members, the gradual institutionalization of the U.D.C.'s links with the Labour parties, especially the I.L.P., was an almost imperceptible, steady process.

The personal pathways by which the U.D.C. Liberal elite approached the destination of Labour adherence have been shown to vary according to the history and interests of each individual.^{3.} However, a leading role in the U.D.C. was one of the strongest connections linking the individuals as a group. Idealism and opportunism were very subtly

1. Anon. 'The Union of Democratic Control, notes on the careers of the members of the Executive Committee', pub. U.D.C., London, n.d.(1916)

2. Loc. cit. p.1.

3. See Ch.4.

mixed in a group which expressed an ethical position in politics. Attitudes to party affiliation differed between Liberal U.D.C. politicians and statesmen on the one hand and the professionals and intellectuals on the other. Hence there was a more intense urgency in the agonizings shown in the correspondence between Morel, Ponsonby and Leach than in the almost casual falling in towards Labour which Norman Angell describes in his autobiography.¹

There is more than a hint that some of the U.D.C. Liberal elite viewed the Labour Party as a beautiful body lacking a head - Morel and his colleagues almost took on the part of political Frankensteins. Morel's remarks about the U.D.C. providing "Labour's brain in Foreign Affairs"² clearly reveal the assumption that the U.D.C. group had earned the right to a position of leadership in Labour politics.

Influence in the Labour Party was the target of other members of the Liberal elite separate from the U.D.C., as Catherine Cline has demonstrated.³ Some of these reveal very hard-headed, practical motives, which set them apart from the ethical and internationalist position of the leaders of the U.D.C. For example, Christopher Addison made his mark in war-time government as a protegee of Lloyd George. He served in the Ministry of Munitions to great effect, although his patron relegated him to the Ministry of Reconstruction in 1917 in order to benefit Winston Churchill. After the war, Lloyd George finally threw him to the Conservatives as a scapegoat for the collapse of the "homes fit for heroes" scheme, for which he was given responsibility as President of the Local Government Board, but without the power of implementation.

1. Angell, N., After All, London, 1951, Pt. 111.

2. Manuscript letter from E.D. Morel to the Chairman of the U.D.C. Exec. Cttee., 27th. March, 1924, M473., F2.

3. Cline, C.A. Recruits to Labour, the British Labour Party 1914 - 1931, Syracuse, N.Y., 1963, Ch. 11, 111, V and Conclusion.

Finally turning against Lloyd George, Addison, after electoral defeat in 1922, remembered his Radical roots and discovered that "the Labour Party offered the sole hope of achieving the social reforms on which his heart was set and ... he became convinced that socialist forms of control were not only socially desirable but could also be considerably more efficient than the methods of traditional capitalism".¹ The ex-Liberal Radical Addison represents a very different thread, drawn from the disintegrating catholicism of Liberal politics, from the pattern shown by the U.D.C. Liberals. His emphasis on efficiency and bureaucratic control strongly suggest a practical descent from the nineteenth century utilitarians. His war diaries, Politics from Within,² reveal a man intent upon enforcing order and one who is proud of his achievements. He appears to have been too busy during the war even to note the existence of the U.D.C. or to mention its leaders by name.

The gifts which the U.D.C. elite brought to the Labour Party have been shown to be formidable.³ These gifts were manifold, but Foreign Affairs was the area of policy in which they clearly commanded an unrivalled expertise. The experience which such men as Ponsonby, the Buxtons and Morel could mobilize brought a new dimension to the international aspect of Labour politics.

Even though the absolute number involved was probably little over one hundred, the migration of Liberal public figures who were active U.D.C. members represented a significant movement in terms of elites. The elite's experience within the U.D.C. during the First World War is expressed remarkably clearly in the correspondence of Morel and his

1. Maurice Shock in DNB Supp.

2. Addison, C., Politics from Within 1911 - 1918 ..., 2 vols, London, 1924.

3. See Ch.4.

colleagues and in the records of the U.D.C. Executive Committee and the General Council. The "view from above" which the sources provide depicts a coming to terms with the growing problems of mass society during a period of acute crisis. Mayer has argued cogently for the notable elite adjustments in Europe which are represented by the dynastic or conservative adoption of nationalism in the late nineteenth century.¹ Using Mayer's perspective it is arguable that the New Liberalism represented an Anglo-Saxon elite response to a similar general range of challenges presented by mass society. The implications of the New Liberal acceptance of accelerated social mobility and the eventual enlargement of the elite to engross the "like-minded", led the U.D.C. Liberals to perceive that their path had converged ideologically with Labour, once the Liberal Party had surrendered its moral authority to aggressive nationalism and imperialism.

In spite of the vituperation it drew upon itself from the government and popular press, the U.D.C. as a pressure group may be seen, when placed in the longer perspective of popular protest movements, as a radical, non-militant, elite controlled organisation. In post Commonwealth England feeling, expressed in the spontaneous food riot, and in the complex or more contrived riot, was gradually directed, in the eighteenth century, into a petition movement which threatened the authority of Parliament. However, following the disastrous Gordon Riots of 1780, and the French Revolution, the elite supporters of petitioning felt obliged to channel radical protest into movements directed towards reform in or through Parliament. The Anti-Corn Law League, and even Chartism, the most popular mass movements of the nineteenth century were primarily focused upon Parliamentary reform. However, in the

1. See Mayer, A.J. The Persistence of the Old Regime, Europe to the Great War, London, 1981.

decade before 1914 an increasing tendency towards violent protest was apparent, not only among Irish organisations but also in English trade union militancy and within the women's movements. Tensions in the British social, economic and political situation were in a state of uneasy equilibrium at the outbreak of war in 1914, just at the moment when the perennial problem of Ireland had reached a new crisis, with the emergence of Unionism as an exponent of militant extra-Parliamentary action contingent upon Home Rule.

Anxiety about the internal stability of the nation now at war was sufficient to attract alarmed concern at the suggested de-stabilizing potential of even such a rational and Parliament-centred movement as the U.D.C. The misrepresentations of the national press caused Mr. Chorley in remote Kendal to write to his local paper warning that the U.D.C. was insidiously "propagandising ... very dangerous political aims: to put it shortly the overthrow of the most valuable political institutions of this country ... The attempt of the democracy directly to control its own foreign policy would ... strike at the very fundamentals of representative government".¹ Although this criticism was completely miscast, it exposes the dilemma which confronts all political pressure groups: with what degree of militancy should the process of persuasion be undertaken and by what authority is the status quo undermined? In any form of democracy the second part of the conundrum is more difficult to answer. However, the U.D.C. took particular pains to attempt to persuade a change of attitude through established channels and through non-militant means, which would, if successful, add to the strength of the established parliamentary institutions, rather than subvert them.

1. "Westmorland Mercury and Times", 6th. August, 1915, p.7. col. 1.

The Union was put into some difficulty in its relations with two movements with which it partially interlocked: the women's movement and the pacifist cause. The question of the women's movement was largely solved by the decision of the majority militant faction of the W.S.P.U. to support the war effort in return for an understanding about post-war franchise extension. H.M. Swanwick, a leader of the non-militant women's faction, was an early, enthusiastic member of the U.D.C. Her influence secured the membership of many politically-active women, especially those of a socialist persuasion. Mrs. Snowden (the wife of the I.L.P. leader) was another prominent woman member and she arranged for the co-operation of the U.D.C. with the Women's International League, which, although rather nebulous in policy, succeeded in maintaining international contacts during the war through its Hague conference. Thus the leaders of the U.D.C. contrived to avoid a potentially destructive confrontation over an issue which was nearing a crisis when the war intervened.

Relations with pacifists, pacifist organisations and the U.D.C.'s presumed adherence to pacifism form a very complex network. The Executive had to strive hard to avoid a practical identity between pacifism and the ideals of the U.D.C. Formal ties with overtly pacifist organisations, such as the No-Conscription League and the Peace-by-Negotiation movement were circumvented by the extension of covert support and the device of secondment. However, the prominence of Norman Angell as a member of the Executive helped to perpetuate a confused identity between U.D.C. policy, pacifism and pacificism. Martin Ceadel's study Pacifism in Britain 1914 - 1945: the defining of a faith, describes the U.D.C. as "the leading pacificist society from 1914 - 24".¹ This statement,

1. Ceadel, M., Pacifism in Britain 1914 - 1945: The Defining of a Faith, Oxford, 1980, p.319.

while defining Angell's position quite closely, seems a rather negative over-simplification of the Union's position - which was to promote active international co-operation. Ceadel further describes the U.D.C. as the creation of "neutrality campaigners" and having "an isolationist attitude"¹ in foreign policy. Both these opinions seem misleading, the latter assertion appearing totally at variance with the very definite attitude towards initiative in a setting of international community which pervades the Union's records and publications. Ceadel notes² that H.M. Swanwick refers to the U.D.C. as a "pacifist" organisation in her book, Builders of Peace: Being Ten Years' History of the Union of Democratic Control,³ a work described by A.J.P. Taylor as "inadequate".⁴ In practical terms the U.D.C. advocated pacifist action. As Martin Swartz shows, Morel did not hesitate to proclaim that he was trying to inspire an active voice, "We British pacifists, as a body are lacking in the sacred fire".⁵ But Morel's "pacifism" was that of the practical politician forced to react to the monstrosity of the political and social 'normalization' of catastrophically terrible warfare, from which the civilian home population were insulated even in their private grief.

Thus the "pacifism" which Morel was proud to advocate was not an ideology based on a priori principles of moral rectitude, but a rational assault upon the nonsensical frenzy of the Western Front. If the U.D.C. had possessed the interior nature of an ideologically pacifist organisation it would hardly have won the enthusiastic support of such

1. Ibid.

2. Op.cit. p.75, n.3.

3. Swanwick, H.M., Builders of Peace: Being Ten Years' History of the Union of Democratic Control, London, 1924.4. Taylor, A.J.P., English History 1914-1945, London, 1965, p.626.5. In 'Combine!', article by E.D. Morel in "Labour Leader", 23rd. Nov. 1916, quoted in Swartz, M., The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics during the First World War, Oxford, 1971, p.151.

men as Major Attlee, General Thomson and Colonel Wedgwood, who remained unashamed of the profession of arms.

The Morel-Ponsonby correspondence¹ confirms the lack of a profound ideological obstruction preventing the migration of Liberal minded people to the ranks of the Labour parties. In part this permeable membrane resulted from the widespread acceptance among Liberals since the end of the nineteenth century that, in some sense, "we are all socialists now".² Thus, socialists could believe that their ideas had penetrated the Liberal Party, while liberals considered that the socialist phenomenon had been successfully encysted. Transfer from Liberal adherence was much easier in Britain than on the Continent because the lines of ideologically-based socialist policy were less clearly drawn in the Labour Party than in socialist parties elsewhere.

The Liberals brought a well-tried discipline of ideological consensus as a tool which the Labour Party could employ. The New Liberal ideology had a respectable pedigree, having been hammered out in discussions set before a comparatively wide audience, in such journals as the 'Fortnightly Review' and the 'Nineteenth (later Twentieth) Century Review'. The Liberals who joined either the I.L.P. or the Labour Party found themselves in an ideological setting with a comparatively narrow constituency of support for outright socialist doctrine. The Fabians possessed the most sophisticated socialist ideology in Britain, but their base in 1914 was tiny compared with that of Liberalism - the Fabians were linked with a middle-class, intellectual, London image.

However, it may be argued that Liberalism before the First World War placed too much stress upon the external motives and drives of

1. See Ch.4.

2. See Appendix A for a review of the re-formulating forces in pre-war Liberalism.

individual members of society. The Liberals' apparent slight regard for psychological factors may have been one cause of their catastrophic moral collapse in the face of the challenge of the war. There was little evidence that Liberals were prepared for manifestations in public life of phenomena susceptible to explanation in terms of Jung's collective unconscious. The rational minded, both Liberals and others, were revealed as dangerously unreceptive to non-rational concepts in 1914.

The New Liberal emphasis upon the ethically responsible individual represents an effort to replace the explicitly Christian component of European individuality. But secularism claimed a heavy price in terms of personal confidence. The erosion of Church-centred faith, partly occasioned by the interpretation of Darwinism, had occurred at a critical point in the expansive momentum of European societies. A mass society created a situation which demanded individual reassurance. The Church was perceived by many to have feet of clay, and the loss of spiritual direction added to the impression of drifting normlessness generated in an environment of ugly urbanization.

Thus, by 1914, all political parties were under pressure to provide mass society with comprehensible guidelines. The situation suggested the need for more closely structured ideologies - mass society seemed to require the mobilization of particular directive ideas in order to find a new foundation.

The outbreak of war provided an energizing agency which demanded either an intensified ideological response or, more simply, a more extreme expression of belief, as in jingoism, patriotism or pacifism. The Liberals were perhaps more vulnerable in this intense atmosphere than other parties. Liberals were unable to be "more liberal" in a setting apparently requiring an extremely "un-liberal" response.

Conservatives were not so constrained, they could employ patriotism, and even take advantage of their avoidance of secularism by promoting a "Christian" foundation for the war.

It is arguable that the great achievements of the New Liberal ideology proved dangerous to the Liberals in the unforeseen exigencies of the First World War. Once the ethical edifice had been violated the Liberal ideology made the political party vulnerable to fracture. Conversely, the comparatively non-ideological stance of the Labour parties, made Labour the most available receptacle for ex-Liberals who had already, like Ponsonby, declared that the moral and ethical truth of socialism was an inclusive part of their Liberalism.¹

The political crisis created by the war certainly provided a point of departure for those, like MacDonald, who believed that "platforms make parties". MacDonald was to show that, at least for the time being, tight ideological formulations appeared to be atypically British. The Labour political process, to which the U.D.C. Liberals ultimately contributed, involved a reconciliation of platform building and ideological reasoning which was to prove politically effective from 1945 to the 1970s.

The political situation which the Asquith government presented to the Radical Liberals is expressed pithily in the Book of the Labour Party:

With the death of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Liberal imperialists obtained complete control of affairs, and disposed of the offices of government.²

1. See Ch. 4.

2. Tracey, H. (Ed), The Book of the Labour Party, 3 vols., London, n.d. (1926), pseudonymous article by 'Onlooker' in Vol. III, p. 228.

Although some Radicals, such as Charles Trevelyan, could still find a ministerial place, others realised that the ascendancy of the imperial faction forced them to choose between harnessing their career to the emerging neo-caesars, Lloyd George and Churchill, or the acceptance of a diminishing role within the Liberal Party.

The tendency among the less established Radical figures, such as Christopher Addison, was to join the court of a "great man". However, those who could not make this type of compromise must have become increasingly aware that the pattern of party loyalty among the bulk of the voting population was becoming subject to the increasing pressures of mass society and could result in changes which would leave "non-attached" Radical Liberals in a rather isolated political position.

The Liberal base in popular voting strength was threatened by the movement towards class-based parties. In Britain this process was slow and uncertain before 1914, but as the war proceeded a new pattern began to emerge. The war produced a collectivising effect, partly by sheer physical proximity in the armed forces, and also partly by the more efficiently mobilized power of association in industries - a process which the war cabinet actively encouraged. A new work force became subject to proletarian pressures - workers drawn from the servant classes and women released from home toil were prominent sections. The immediate post-war problems of military and civilian demobilization, cancelled war orders and trade depression produced a counter current, but all these factors tended to enhance class solidarity and produce a crisis for the popular power base of the Liberal Party. The bad feeling between the Asquith and Lloyd George Liberals seems ultimately only a symptom of the sudden Liberal malaise. The New Liberal ideology, however rigorously formulated, appeared to have flowered too late in

the circumstances of consolidating class solidarity - Liberal catholicism in post-1918 Britain soon appeared strangely old-fashioned and provincial.

Thus the Radical Liberals found themselves in a position of double-jeopardy - exclusion from central influence in the mainstream of the Liberal Party and lack of acceptable credentials for the Labour Party. The Morel-Ponsonby correspondence reveals some of the inherent pressures. The unresolved problem in British twentieth century politics of a Radical alternative party is exposed. At one point Morel specifically mentions a hypothetical new social democratic party.¹ Ponsonby showed an awareness of the need for solidarity in his remarks about wishing to stand with his friends in Parliament and his appreciation that, by 1917, a critical moment of choice was at hand.

MacDonald was in an excellent position to manipulate his Liberal U.D.C. colleagues in order to further his personal ambitions. Morel was sharply alert to MacDonald's manoeuvrings. Catherine Cline quotes an undated letter from Morel to Trevelyan:

... MacDonald may run away with the U.D.C. ...
 I never feel clear as to what MacD's real game is. He has a hundred little subtleties which keep me in an uncertain state of vigilance ...
 It is not that I want to be suspicious. It is that I would like to know what M's real ideas as to the future are.²

Another key figure in the political bridge-crossing of the U.D.C. Liberals was Egerton Wake. His role in Labour politics in the years

1. See p. 126.

2. Undated letter from E.D. Morel to C.P. Trevelyan, TP, quoted in Cline, C.A., E.D. Morel 1873 - 1924, the strategies of protest, Belfast, 1980, p.102.

after 1917 was unique. His personal history involved confidential service with both Henderson and the U.D.C. leadership.¹ He was Morel's right hand in the Labour movement and helped to ensure the central hold of the Executive upon the U.D.C. organisation, just as later he helped Henderson to reshape the Labour Party to a centralist mould.² He was equally familiar with MacDonald, and perhaps one of the few Labour men with the ability to obstruct his deviousness.

The goodwill of Wake, as National Agent, was an enormous asset for those of the Liberal U.D.C. elite with parliamentary ambitions. Official adoption was the only serious obstacle to their penetration of the Labour Party. Once elected, these experienced politicians could appeal to an electoral rather than a party base. The ex-Liberal U.D.C. Members of Parliament were recognised as a new element and loudly resented by some of the Labour rank and file, because of their seemingly easy assumption of an influential role. As early as the Labour Party Conference in London of June, 1918, the suspicions of J.Sexton of the Dock Labourers were reported:

He (Sexton) happened to be one of the pilgrims who would go forth into the political wilderness at the next General Election, and he was particular as to the company he would be in, rumour saying that a few most undesirable persons would be among the candidates - It was reported that ... the Labour Party ... had Outhwaites, Ponsonbys and Morels to whom he decidedly objected. It had been their experience that these men would

1. See Ch.3.

2. See McKibbin, R., The Evolution of the Labour Party 1910-1924, London, 1974, p.125.

not subscribe to the Labour Party and carry out its mandates.^{1.}

Sexton makes obvious the fear of new men of politically independent means. He would probably have felt justified by the entry in the Book of the Labour Party of 1926 which refers to Josiah Wedgwood's adherence to Labour in these terms:

Labour, a young growing party with highly synthesised ideals, is pre-eminently "open to the talents".^{2.}

However, opinions such as Sexton voiced were eventually overruled in the interest of the rapid establishment of Labour as a credible party of opposition, capable of forming a government. In spite of the personal issue between Morel and MacDonald, the ex-Liberal U.D.C. elite was well represented in the 1924 Labour government. That the men and women from the U.D.C. had plenty to offer Labour was apparent.^{3.} Their particular strength was in the field of international affairs and foreign policy.

The contribution of Arthur Ponsonby alone was of considerable importance to the political education of the Labour Party in foreign affairs. Ponsonby followed up his wartime contributions to the literature of the U.D.C. with a programme of expert guidance, made available to a broad section of society through the journal "Foreign Affairs". In 1919 he used all the channels available to the U.D.C. to campaign for a conciliatory peace settlement, and, when the Versailles diktat proved inevitable, he ensured that Labour supporters had the

1. 'Report of the Labour Party Conference', London, 26th June, 1918, p.28, col.2.

2. Tracey, H., (ed.) The Book of the Labour Party, 3 vols, London, n.d. (1926), anonymous article, Vol. III, p.245.

3. See Ch. 3.

opportunity to assess the several possible consequences in international affairs.

The U.D.C. recruits to Labour also brought a fundamental appreciation of the background of the new League of Nations organisation to the service of the party. Two separate pathways linked ex-Liberal U.D.C. leaders with the League. Hobson and Dickinson had been leading members of the Bryce Committee at Cambridge, which could claim the privilege of early formulation of the League's possible mediating roles. It was the Cambridge group who first advocated the title "League of Nations", and Hobson produced a U.D.C. pamphlet to further the cause.¹ As former ambassador to Washington, Bryce had access to the highest governmental circles in America, while Norman Angell had independent channels deriving from the organisations spawned by The Great Illusion.

The resentment of men of Sexton's stamp in the traditional Labour establishment was reflected in a certain reluctance to develop foreign policy beyond the old vague notions of an international brotherhood of workers. Swartz has clearly demonstrated the significant role played by Ponsonby and the other U.D.C. converts in persuading the Labour Party to accept a more sophisticated stance.² In Winkler's view the general U.D.C. influence on Labour and its effect upon the evolution of foreign policy in particular "would be difficult to exaggerate".³ Catherine Cline completes the consensus of the most eminent students of the U.D.C., with her view that the ex-Liberal elite U.D.C. converts gave Labour a new international standing.⁴

1. Pamphlet 15A, Hobson, J.A., 'A League of Nations', pub. U.D.C. London, 1915.

2. Swartz, M., *The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics during the First World War*, Oxford, 1971, Ch.10 and Conclusion.

3. Winkler, H.R., 'The Emergence of Labour Foreign Policy', in *JMH*, 28, p.249.

4. Cline, C. Recruits to Labour, the British Labour Party 1914-1931, Syracuse, N.Y., 1963, Ch. IV.

Concerning the work of the U.D.C. among Labour organisations and the impact of the migration of the ex-Liberal U.D.C. leaders, the estimate of Charles Trevelyan, written in 1921, appears to be substantiated:

There can now be no doubt, and I think thousands of the most active workers and leaders in the Labour movement would admit it fully and cordially, that the continuous work of the U.D.C. among leaders of organised Labour up and down the country for the past six years has done much to internationalise the mind and outlook of British Labour.¹.

The First World War tended to confirm some of LeBon's darker apprehensions of mass society.² The rulers of all the belligerent countries discovered that, once set in directed motion, a large urbanised population was also more difficult to restrain. Each country faced the problem of the violent flux of aggressive nationalism, and a dangerous re-flux, should national ambitions appear thwarted. Each ruling elite had to devise means to ride the tiger of released sentiment.

The British social situation, although made very volatile by the great changes made necessary by the demands of war, ultimately proved remarkably susceptible to the forces of continuity. The response to the fundamental exacerbating factor of the creation of an industrial society may, contrary to Marx' belief, prove to have been conditional acceptance derived from familiarity. The difference between British and Continental social and political thinking may, in part, have arisen from the very presence in Britain of the Industrial Revolution, which

1. Trevelyan, Charles, The Union of Democratic Control, its history and its policy, London, 1921., p.7.

2. See LeBon, G., The Psychology of the Crowd, New York, 1895, and Widener, A., Gustave LeBon, The Man and His Works, Indianapolis, 1979,

remained such an intrusive phenomenon to foreign observers, but which, though completely revolutionary in its effects on human life, could be viewed by British people as an accelerated evolutionary development within the norms of British social acceptability. Whereas, on the Continent, the attempt to snuff out of the French Revolution by the Vienna Settlement left the ideal of a revolution intact, as illustrated in Stendhal's novels, but without the instruction of the presence of an established European result. In the absence of empirical example, Jacobin theory was free to run away in the direction of the increasingly revolutionary Left.

In the confusion of thoughts and feelings generated by the First World War the U.D.C. provided a forum within which one Radical view of the general background of events and the framework of current ideas could become re-directed. The U.D.C. could also help to generate "events", a vitally necessary function if its leaders hoped to achieve a constitutional reform in the management of foreign affairs. The Union was supremely fortunate in its most active functionaries: Morel, the Secretary, proved to be a dynamo of organisational activity, Charles Trevelyan and Arthur Ponsonby balanced Morel with their reflective constraints, while, as their chief agent in the mobilization of popular support, the work of Egerton Wake was of the greatest significance.

After 1917, the U.D.C. Liberals set about the transplantation of the old idea of the European commonwealth from the polluted Liberal garden to the new soil being broken by Labour. In this effort they not only succeeded remarkably well but, in the process, established themselves as an elite section within the Labour Party. In the particulars of inter-war politics, the U.D.C. entrants made support for the League of Nations a part of Labour's programme, but their

devotion to the internationalist cause could also be viewed as dangerous to their new party. The slow recognition by Labour of the non-rational menace of Nazism may in part be ascribed to the over-rational and pro-German elements present among the ex-Liberal U.D.C. converts. The U.D.C. connections with pacifism and pacificism were also contributive to a major distracting phenomenon in the 1930s.

The migration of U.D.C. Liberal elites to Labour from 1917 to 1924 was not simply a matter of expediency by practical politicians who found themselves in a parliamentary no-man's-land. Their experience in the remoter reaches of popular politics during the war helped them to realise that their natural constituency now lay in Labour. But the writings of Ponsonby, Trevelyan and Morel echo with the moral shortcomings of the Liberal Party. Cline¹ detects in the Liberal migrants a consistent view that the moral collapse of the Liberal Party was the primary cause of the change of allegiance. She lists dissatisfaction with foreign policy as an important secondary reason for the defection. As far as the U.D.C. Liberals were concerned the evidence strongly supports Cline's estimate, with the important difference that, by virtue of their special concerns, the U.D.C. Liberals adduced degenerate foreign policy as the primary factor illustrative of Liberal moral decline.

In a series of interlocking rings of interest and association the U.D.C. occupied a central place during the First World War for those who held to the Radical tradition in international co-operation. It provided a refuge wherein they could re-affirm their ethical position, while re-evaluating their ideological stance in the light of new insights gained through direct experience in popular politics. The

1. Cline, C.A., Recruits to Labour, the British Labour Party 1914-1931., Syracuse, N.Y., 1963, Ch.4 and Conclusion.

evidence endorses Charles Trevelyan's decided opinion that the re-combination which brought this group of Radical Liberals into the Labour Party was in no small measure the result of "The cordiality and intimacy of meetings of the U.D.C."¹.

1. Trevelyan, Charles, The Union of Democratic Control, its history and its policy, London, 1921. p.7.

UNRESTRICTED

ELITE MIGRATION FROM THE LIBERAL TO THE LABOUR PARTY, 1917-1924,
AND THE INTERACTION WITH POPULAR POLITICS THROUGH
THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL.

BY

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APPENDIX A

THE IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND, A REVIEW, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE EVOLUTION OF THE NEW LIBERALISM.

Note

In attempting to discern factors in the wider background which resulted in the obtrusion of ideology into the area of practical politics, this review is inevitably different in kind from the main parts of this study. Whereas the affairs of the Union of Democratic Control may be appreciated properly only from the immediacy of the primary sources, the constraints of the multi-faceted nature of the ideological background demand recourse, not only to original writings, but also to a range of secondary sources. The extent of secondary reference is indicated in the footnotes and bibliography,. The general guidance provided by the works of Biddiss, Kedward, Lichtheim, Bentley, Clarke and Freedon has been especially appreciated. While not accepting all the implications of general political Liberal coincidence with the New Liberal ideology, Freedon's evaluation of the work of Ritchie, Hobhouse and Hobson has been of particular guidance in tracing the evolution of the creed which inspired, among others, the Radical Liberal leadership of the U.D.C.

The outbreak of general war in Europe in 1914 was seen by those who were sufficiently well informed and psychologically prepared to attempt an overview of the situation, as the inauguration, not merely of "more and worse" by way of military destruction, but "different" by reason of the character of the climate of thought which had been building up as the previous century progressed. Various factors in the external environment had united to exert great pressure on political thinkers. A point of departure was provided by the combined effect of the Industrial and French revolutions, which had promoted the liberal bourgeoisie in Western Europe to a position of great economic, social and political influence. This group's basic beliefs centred on libertarianism, individualism, utilitarianism and the dynamic of positive progress. Thus Europe in general, and the industrialised and industrialising countries in particular, faced a number of factors involving accelerated change in the social environment as the nineteenth century progressed.

Population growth and extensive urbanization resulted in the emergence of mass society, which gradually produced its own culture after 1870. In this situation and on this scale, unparalleled not only in Western Civilization but in any other, a new extremism soon became apparent. Living in herd form limits reason but extends the scope of dynamic passion. In Tonnies' ^{1.} characterization the results of the replacement of a *gemeinschaft* ^{2.} society of mutual obligation by a

1. See Tonnies, F., Community and Association, London, 1887.

2. *Gemeinschaft*. This term is used to indicate the varieties of traditional or established society, existing in Europe during the nineteenth century, which were more or less disrupted by the emergence of mass society. The term expressly refers to societies which actually existed and does not allude to the Nazi "*volkgemeinschaft*", which included many ideal or invented features. Here, as in many other areas, the Nazi distorting mirror makes difficult an impartial approach to those aspects which it appropriated to itself, especially in the realm of the non-rational.

gesellschaft¹. society of contractual relation included the widespread occurrence of normlessness - the anomie of Durkheim. Mass society may have appeared superficially more egalitarian than traditional society, but industrial production methods with very large outputs encouraged quantification and the vulgarization of 'more rather than better', which became particularly associated with the raw industrial society of North America.

Material progress was viewed as a fact rather than a faith at the apogee of European influence before 1914, and material growth was often equated with advance in civilization. The coincidence of industrial production and the market economy was seen as essential in spite of the emergence of dramatic boom and bust lurches of the trade cycle. The insidious nature of the revolutionary change, which characterized products as commodities rather than goods, was only fully appreciated as labour itself gradually became a commodity - just another element of the free market.

In the century and a quarter prior to 1914 European society was embroiled in an unprecedented flux. As traditional society began to crumble, secularization advanced and anti-clericalism became vehement. In efforts to re-emphasize social or religious discipline, rulers embarked on various styles of more or less informed indoctrination. The erosion of the organic family under economic stress led in a gesellschaft setting, to a market value being placed upon human attributes. Meritocracy grew apace with materialism. Once the market economy dominated a society, bourgeois values tended to become ascendant over aristocratic standards, while the swelling proletariat, often largely

1. Gesellschaft. This term is used to indicate the varieties of society which more or less completely replaced traditional societies, with their completely unlimited ties of obligation, by societies dominated by the more limited relations of implied or expressed contractual stipulation. A number of writers refer to gesellschaft society as "ordinary" or "normal" society, compared with the older gemeinschaft or "traditional" society.

formed of uprooted peasants, tended to divide between the aspiring assimilators and the totally unreconciled. In such a situation urgent social thinking was unavoidable. In the setting of the last thirty years of the nineteenth century the synthetic feats of Darwin and Marx were readily invoked in a variety of interpretations. The need for social thinking was made more urgent by the dichotomy between social and economic aims produced in the more advanced industrial economies, such as Britain, where a clear-cut distinction between social and economic aims had become commonplace as early as 1840.¹ Indeed it was the escape of the British economy from social control which electrified the whole of thinking Europe, with the grim consequences so starkly depicted by such creative observers as Dickens, Mayhew and Doré.

Lichtheim characterizes four principles enshrined in the newly emergent industrialized societies of the early nineteenth century. Firstly, the 'laws' of market economy were considered analagous to physical laws, being objectively valid.² Secondly, the operation of the economy ought not to be judged by its success or failure in serving social or moral ends. Thirdly, if untrammelled, the new economic mechanism would make all richer, and finally, the self-interest of millions of private individuals was seen as the best guarantee of the general welfare.³

The nineteenth century witnessed a prodigious growth in popular education at many levels. The new industrial society made some specific demands of education to provide the basic skills of its artisans, and to fulfil more general requirements such as the more informed awareness of the need for public health provision - notably in the matter of water

1. Lichtheim, G. A Short History of Socialism, London, 1970, p.16.

2. In some quarters the workings of the market economy were sanctified as part of the natural order, ordained by Providence.

3. Lichtheim, G., A Short History of Socialism, London, 1970, p.19.

supply. However, as the century progressed, the danger that a degree of popular education could be closely linked with new and alarming forms of mass gullibility provided a stimulus to concern over social stability. Liberal press freedom in some countries, and a mechanized newspaper industry in all European communities, played a large role in the complex interaction of ideas within a great range of levels of sophistication. Such interaction was reinforced by the widespread extension of physical mobility created by the demands of industry and by pressure of population, and which was most notably served by the proliferation of railways. It is scarcely surprising that, in the circumstances, popular writers were provided with unprecedented scope for the propagation of travesties of themes of political, economic or religious thought, a fate which befell both Marx and Darwin in a great variety of partial and unbalanced interpretations.

Amidst the burgeoning complexities of industrialising mass society it was science which provided one of the greatest stimuli to serious political thought. Science influenced nineteenth century Europe at two particular levels. At the lower level, the practical interaction of science and technology resulted in a dynamic increase in the momentum of each. Science and technology combined to produce absolutely new products in gathering profusion, while such developments as disease protection through immunisation, together with water and air filtration, produced renewed confidence in the ultimate possibilities of environmental control - Prometheus unchained as a healthy, vigorous and sapient being.

The higher level of scientific impact on nineteenth-century thought resulted from the discovered power of theoretical ideas in science and social science. Respect for scientific method credited economics and sociology in particular with an authority of seemingly unassailable absoluteness. The new 'science' of economics was elaborated in response to the stimulus of the new market-centred industrial economies. Under unprecedented social pressures, partly occasioned by the emergence of mechanized industry, the sociological thought of first Comte and, later, Durkheim and Weber commanded widespread respect as generative of practical insight in the solution of large-scale social problems. In his most characteristic work Comte¹ divided sociology into a main study of social statics, which sought to clarify the organizing principles of social interaction, and the subsidiary study of social dynamics, which analysed the processes through which the organizing principles became realised. Comte was a positivist, conceiving the modern state as a positive entity institutionalizing the industrial society of capitalism with its sharply defined class stratifications. The masters of scientific method in various fields are the characteristic elite of this new society. In his later work the scientific managers seem almost to assume the role of priests in a positivistic, non-theistic religious morality - a creed for the industrial mass society which had made irrelevant the God known through personal, individual perceptions, not susceptible to scientific generalization.

The long-term importance of Comte is rather in the narrow field of sociology than in the wider concerns tracked by political thinkers. His view of society tended to discount historical dynamics as incidental detail, a view convenient to those managing the established bourgeois,

1. See Comte, A., The Positive Philosophy, (tr. Martineau, H.)
2 vols., London, 1853.

and Comte, A., Positive Polity, (tr. Harrison, F. et al),
London, 1875.

capitalist states of Western Europe, who hoped, against reason, that the surging tides of historical change might perhaps be stilled indefinitely.

The scientific ideas which shook society with earthquake force were generated in the pure science of biology. Darwin and Wallace took up the challenge presented by Lyell and other early pioneers of geology, and interpreted the accumulated observational evidence on plants and animals to erect a new framework which proclaimed the processes of evolution and natural selection. Darwin,¹ in particular, directed scientific thought along courses which unavoidably collided with long-cherished social and religious assumptions. Darwin triggered the upheaval which had been latent in Western minds since the Renaissance, but which had never before been driven on by the force of arguments derived from disciplined scientific observation. After Darwin there seemed no long-term future for any body of political ideas which did not come to terms with Social Darwinism. Darwin's work posed an ideological conundrum to which a credible answer had to be presented before a system of thought could be seen to be well founded.

Both Comte and Darwin worked in the age of established positivist certainty and both appealed to the strongly rational element dominant in utilitarian, liberal circles. However, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the problems of mass society had prepared many people for the light thrown by the radical developments in psychology resulting from the studies of Freud and Jung upon the workings of the non-rational and unconscious personality. In science generally a paradigm of doubt was in process of creation by 1914, but at a popular level uncritical positivism still dominated a society in which

1. See Darwin, C., Origin of Species, London, 1859,
and Darwin, C., The Descent of Man, London, 1871.

frustrated, suppressed, non-rational forces were allowed insufficient outlets of escape.

A characteristic feature of political activity, which proliferated as the nineteenth century passed into the twentieth, was the enlargement of the scope of local and central government activity in response to the pressures of urbanization and technological elaboration. The state steadily grew more powerful and more closely interwoven with everyday life. Ideals stimulated by the French Revolution and fuelled by the pervasive popular press created a firm pressure for enfranchisement. At first, liberal democrats hailed this everywhere as a symbol of "progress" - the magic wand of the nineteenth century - but by 1900 it was clear to many that the release of popular political passions could promote very illiberal political regimes indeed.

Mass interest in politics required the establishment of political parties on a more systematic basis than in pre-industrial times, parties which sometimes paralleled the emerging strata of class structure in *gesellschaft* society. Mass society, with its excellent communications, also stimulated the growth of voluntary groups, such as the trade unions and other pressure groups. The early example of the British Anti-Corn Law League came to typify the new power of pressure groups in the environment of mass society.

On the macroscopic scale the nineteenth century witnessed the rise of both ethnic nationalism and the intra-cultural internationalism of European or Western perceptions of common civilization. However, the potentially unifying forces of such organizations as the Socialist Internationals were obscured by 1900 by the emergence of a vigorous, divisive and combative nationalism. The focus of struggle in the

early twentieth century was set at Nation versus Nation, not class versus class or particularism versus internationalism. Nationalism offered a reformulated statement of a vertical pattern of security at the moment when the traditional patterns appeared out-moded by the horizontal patterns of industrialised society. However, within the general ambience of national aspirations, the increasing reaction to the anomie of mass society fostered a breeding ground for festering new forms of ancient racialisms, now buttressed in widespread popular literature by the fancied authority of oversimplified, highly-selective or downright charlatan forms of science.

A final complicating factor in the early twentieth century scene was provided by imperialism in both its overseas- colonial and traditional forms. External global power rivalries and the internal complexities of imperialist motivation contributed to the formation of a bewildering array of ideological attitudes found within the varied components of European civilization in 1914.

One response to the multifarious pressures of the emerging Western mass societies was to search for a new vision of political, economic and social order. Thus mass society had a greater need for ideology than traditional society.

"Ideology is", says Lichtheim, "after all, action - oriented, geared to the comprehension of a specific political system and, with that as a springboard, to its assessment, critique, and possible transformation".^{1.}

In Western Europe and the United States the loose ideology of classical liberalism was in the ascendant from the mid-nineteenth

1. Lichtheim, G., A Short History of Socialism, London, 1970, p.247.

century onwards. The assertions of classical liberalism included some six basic tenets, thus presented by Lichtheim in an unsympathetic light:

1. Private individuals are anterior to society and states are founded on contract.
2. Human needs are measurable, as are the felicities available to consumers by purchasing goods in the market.
3. Good and evil are synonymous with pleasure and pain.
4. Individuals are invariably animated by self-regard and the pursuit of self-interest is the surest way to happiness.
5. Human nature is unalterable and the same throughout all epochs.
6. The private enterpriser's activity is essential for the public good and no other system is workable. 1.

The evolution of such a body of ideas by about 1850 is indication enough of the radical transformation of Western society - the ravages wrought upon the traditional Christian ethic of "love thy neighbour as thyself" are self-evident. No wonder that the triumphant individualism of the successful private entrepreneur trailed social devastation throughout old, organic Europe - and thereby engendered a slow but fundamental ideological reaction. Industrial urbanization fostered standardization - people must fit the mechanism - and thereby accentuated an already growing anomie. In such a setting the growth of state power, the rise of nationalism, racism and popular socialism all presented a challenge to liberal individualism. The liberal attachment to progress by way of the development of free, secular institutions never assumed the systematic character of a true ideology and this made it vulnerable to organized ideological assault.

1. Op.cit. p.23.

Bentham and the later utilitarians, although highly doctrinaire in their approach, were really providing a rationale of practical method, convenient to those in the economic driving seat. That an achievement of positive progress could be enshrined in the "reformed" Poor Laws of nineteenth century Britain must have appeared an enormity to many members of society, especially to those whose labour had become a mere commodity - an item in production cost.

The ideological reaction to the challenge of rampant liberal individualism resulted in a variety of new or re-structured formulations. The inspirations which fired political thinkers from the mid-nineteenth century to 1914 derived from a variety of sources, some traditional and some entirely new. Four particular concepts played a very significant role, interacting both with each other and with the ideological forms which gradually emerged. These concepts might be personified as Ethical or Religious Man, Ideal Man, Economic or Mechanistic Man and Scientific Man.

The ethical and religious inspiration had profound roots in European society. The Middle Ages witnessed the emergence of a new form of Western Civilization - European Christendom - itself both partly based upon, and in continuing association with, the religious ideas of Judaism and the ideals of Greek philosophy. The challenge of liberal individualism was bound to call forth a response from these traditions.

A more immediate ideological inspiration was provided by Hegel and the German school of idealist philosophy. The idealists represented a modern formulation of European thought, rooted in Renaissance and Enlightenment attitudes and created before 'the dark satanic mills' had altered the mental landscape. Hegel's vision of the state as the

divine idea, in which the individual finds complete freedom and spiritual fulfilment, was later dangerous in the hands of unprincipled propagandists, but which in the earlier nineteenth century, suggested that a state dedicated to the good of all would be strong enough to restrain the rampaging entrepreneur.

The idea of economic man had roots in the mercantilist era which preceded the industrial age. It is not surprising that Britain was the home of Adam Smith, Malthus and Ricardo - those most prominent in attempting to rationalize the course and consequences of unprecedented economic change.

Science, emancipated from its ancient ancillary subservience to philosophy, achieved an entirely new stature in the nineteenth century. The new rigour of observation, experiment, hypothesis and theory was thought an appropriate force to bear upon a great range of problems. In the social sciences Comte seemed to sanctify the ideals of industrial bourgeois society, but Durkheim and Weber later expounded sociologies divergent from Comte's over-positivist creed. In the decades prior to 1914 Freud and Jung demonstrated the power of inner personal characteristics, the force perhaps least susceptible to positivist rationale. But it was Darwinian theory which proved the most radical ideological inspiration from the 1860s onwards. Darwin's ideas appeared to transcend both the traditional order and its industrialized successor, releasing long pent secret fears on to the floor of an open debate which spread far beyond the compass of mere biology. Darwin provided the supreme inspirational focus derived from the new sciences just as Marx provided the supreme challenge derived from other sources of inspiration, by means of his brilliant intellectual synthesis.

The environmental and intellectual challenges with which mass society was unavoidably confronted produced a range of ideological elements which developed, as they interacted, into variously elaborated forms. Six particular elements dominated the ideological arena: conservatism, nationalism, imperialism, non-rationality (including racism), socialism and a redefined liberalism.

Conservative attempts to assimilate industrial society centred on doctrinal buttressing of the traditional virtues of family, Church or State. Attitudes ranged from the Tory Democrats in Britain resolving to "educate our masters" to the reconciliation of dynastic and national state in Germany. The rulers of authoritarian states discovered that technological change was a benefit as well as a threat to their regimes. The telegraph was a useful tool of police control, and railways could be used to mobilise the forces of order effectively. Many continental conservatives emphasised the need for imposed discipline in mass society to replace the more informal traditional controls. Imposed discipline in the attempt to ensure security amid potential chaos could lead to outright indoctrination. The role of a reactionary Church is well revealed in Stendhal's Scarlet and Black. The significance of such efforts towards indoctrination is set in perspective by Biddiss:

The battle was for nothing less than a sphere of fundamental influence over the moral values of mass society.¹

Nationalism, which erupted as a revolutionary force in late eighteenth century Europe and America, was reformulated after 1848 into a conservative mould. In its later, narrower form nationalism and internationalism became protagonists rather than complementary ideals.

1. Biddiss, M.D., The Age of the Masses ..., London, 1977, p.36.

The extraordinary potency of the ethnic-nation concept was early exemplified in the astonishing popularity of Mazzini and Garibaldi in London, when they were received as heroes in both street and drawing-room. Durkheim,¹ as the ideologue of the Third Republic, only made explicit the belief held by elite groups of many kinds that the nation-state could be elaborated into the central psychological comfort, source of inspiration and object of mass loyalty which would relieve the pressure for radical social adjustments. The progress of Tory democracy in Britain during the 1880s shows the emotional power of national consciousness capable of penetrating formidable barriers of social and economic separation. British workers showed an attachment to traditional values and harmonies strikingly at variance with the strife of class interests. Natural national diversity, together with the growing power of centralised nation-states, proved very potent in the short-run, during the decades leading to 1914. Ideas such as workers' solidarity often appeared insubstantial celebrations when set against ethnic national aspirations, which rose unconsciously from the very springs of a people's language.

The complex eddies of ideological reaction to liberal-democratic capitalism were further confused from the later nineteenth-century onwards by the cross-currents caused by more closely focused forms of imperialism. Merely to list the major imperial powers of 1914 is sufficient to indicate the range of diversity of outlook - Russia, Germany, Austria, Turkey, France and Britain had imperial systems in common. The dynastic-based traditional empires had, in common with

1. See Durkheim, E., The Division of Labour in Society, (1893), (tr. Simpson, G.), New York, 1947; Durkheim, E., The Rules of Sociological Method, (1895), (tr. Solvay, S.A. and Mueller, J.H.), Chicago, 1950; and Durkheim, E., The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, (1912), (tr. Swain, J.W.), Glencoe, 1948.

other conservative regimes, attempted to use new technology to preserve often-fossilized systems against the divisive attack of awakened ethnic nationalisms. But even the simple division between the traditional, dynastic empire and the colonial trading system typified by the British Empire, collapses immediately in the face of German imperialism which appeared to negate all generalizations, in that a traditional dynastic state set up a European dynastic empire in response to nationalist feeling and thereafter acquired the elements of an overseas colonial empire. The colonial trading empires themselves were modified by the pressure of over-peopled Europe for settlement in "empty" regions of the colonial world. Settlers, whose illiberal views were rejected in their homelands, were often applauded from afar as adventurous flagbearers of "civilization". Such reactions were in the mainstream of the uncritical, optimistic positivism typical both of classical, secular liberal views in mid-nineteenth century Europe and of a reinvigorated, traditional Christian missionary fervour. The later liberal rationale of "trusteeship" of under-developed peoples, that is, peoples without sufficient applied technology or social cohesion to resist Western intrusion, was an example of a belief sincerely held, but underpinned both by economic convenience and the social desirability of allowing disruptive forces to expend themselves safely in colonial settlements. Crude policies, such as the transportation of convicts to Australia in the early nineteenth century, were gradually refined and sanctified by confidence in the European view of positive progress and the European vision of an extended Christendom. The intrusion of more or less moderate formulations of pseudo-scientific European racialism gave a more heightened tension to the overseas colonial scene by 1914.

The suppression of non-rational aspects of human life in the dominant secular views of classical liberalism, together with the strong tendency to normlessness in mass society and the sheer ugliness of the physical environment of industrial society, provoked powerful surges of reaction which sometimes found creative outlets, but were often channelled into destructive forms of irrationality or racism.

The dominant creed of the Enlightenment, that Humanity was inherently rational, capable of directing self-interest for individual good and social benefit was incorporated in the uncritical rationale of inevitable positive progress which characterized many expressions of industrialized Europe and America. In the rigorous mode of Hegel's sophisticated "Philosophy of History" (1832)¹. Reason is enthroned as the supreme and sole revelation of the Eternal, yet the State is advocated as the ideal controlling social institution worthy of absolute loyalty. Hegel's harmonious synthesis of apparently contradictory elements, an achievement later overtaken in ideological scope by Marx, was of immense appeal to many people trying to escape the frightening normless swamp of "anonymous" mass society. But the dilution of Idealist concepts and their admixture with non-rational elements in popular literature and journalism led to some lethal distillations.

Non-rational slants to simple nationalism were developed by way of skewed selections from Idealist philosophy. The notion of duty to the State as the highest moral command led on to the veneration of the Nation in pseudo-religious terms. As established leaders of the Nation were rarely capable of fulfilling the role of priest-substitute, the notion was advanced that natural leaders existed, presently submerged in the masses, who would subdue all social obstacles and establish themselves as an elite worthy of the Nation. Legitimate national

1. Hegel, G.W.F., Philosophy of History, (1832), (tr.Sibree, J.), New York, 1956.

aspirations commonly found violent expression in the struggle for the establishment of nation-states, thus there was no psychological barrier in the path of the new natural rulers whenever they might choose to emerge. Indeed sanctioned violence was encouraged both in the Promethean aspect of Romanticism and the later adulation of the barbaric hero, typified in Wagner's "The Ring". The tenor of these artistic developments helped to suggest that the world of heroes and gods ought to become the real world. Kedward¹ suggests that the flaunting destructiveness of artistic figures, such as Rimbaud, provided a source of inspiration showing the radical clearance of old forms as a necessary prerequisite for new creation.

Although eccentric to the European world, Dostoevsky reinforced warnings of the dangers of violence springing from the suppressed forces of human non-rationality. The later work of the classical scientific psychologists formalized concepts of the subconscious suggested earlier by Dostoevsky's artistic perceptions. Living in Russia, Dostoevsky was immediately aware of the nihilistic force of an anarchism based ultimately on widespread disenchantment with social stagnation in a deeply rooted setting of religious formulation. Parallel reactions of destructive anarchic non-rationality were nurtured both in rural Spain and urban Italy, where Roman Catholicism sanctified the traditional order. Except for Darwin probably no-one more than Nietzsche² was so ill-used by popular traducers. Perhaps 'superman's paradoxical combination of the passionate Dionysian with the self-disciplined Appolarian directly appealed to the non-rational mind. Certainly

1. Kedward, H.R., Fascism in Western Europe 1900-45, New York 1971, p.14.

2. See Nietzsche, F., The Gay Science, London, 1882.
 Nietzsche, F., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, (1885), (tr.Hollingdale, R.J.)
 London, 1961.
 Nietzsche, F., Beyond Good and Evil, London, 1886.

Nietzsche's call to accept that "God is Dead!" expressed a widespread apprehension within a collapsing traditional Christendom. Nietzsche's vision that it was necessary to abandon the appeal to an external Deity in order that mankind might turn inward for personal fulfilment, although a central part of his philosophy, was ignored by popularisers. Those who wrote debased tracts and articles to inspire the perverse, carefully avoided the pitfalls supplied by Nietzsche's abomination of anti-semitism, worship of the state and interpretations of 'superman' which made personality a subservient characteristic.

The unsatisfied non-rational needs of Western mankind were offered an outlet from the early nineteenth century onward in the re-discovery of the real or imaginary folk-world. Artistic echoes of Romantic Arcadian fantasy and scholarly works, such as those of the Brothers Grimm and Max Muller in linguistics, alike supplied popular food to nourish the concept of a larger entity within which the beleaguered individual could find security. The folkish-movement provided a powerful concept into which a dangerously potent "false consciousness" might be insinuated. The 'healthy' outdoor life which came into vogue, associated with such beneficial technological developments as the bicycle, had the potential of transposition from the benefits of Universal humanity to that of vigorous, aggressive National or Racial Man. Closely connected with healthy-living in popular publications was the portrayal of powerful symbols. H.G.Wells was not alone in his fears of the destructive consequences of mass identification with the like of John Bull and Cathleen ni Houlihan.

Between 1870 and 1914 sociologists made attempts to get on terms with the elements, so undervalued in the secular world, of myth, violence, emotion and unreason. A notable contribution to these

efforts was provided by Gustave Le Bon's ¹. 'Crowd Studies' in which he analysed the descent to a condition conducive to 'mental contagion' in which irrational ideas and symbols may easily lash multitudes into a credulous unanimity, available as a weapon in the service of the organized, unprincipled demagogue. Part of Weber's ². great body of work focuses upon the "is"/"ought" identification in positivistic industrial society and the real feeling it engenders of the loss of the magical in the characteristically Western processes of rationalisation.

Certain aspects of European artistic development in the half-century before 1914 suggest some directions in which submerged social currents were moving. World trade and exploration included the incidental dissemination of alien and 'primitive' cultural products. Japanese prints and African and Oceanic sculpture made a vivid impression on European senses. Western primitivists produced work which assaulted the mechanistic dulness of mass society. Expressionism and Cubism both influenced Futurism in art. At Trieste in 1909 the Italian artist F.T. Marinetti proclaimed the political aspect reflected in Futurism:

We are as far removed from international and antipatriotic socialism ... that ignoble exaltation of the rights of the belly ... as we are from timid clerical conservatism, symbolized by the bedroom slippers and the hot water bottle. We sing of war, the only cure for the world ...³.

Darwin's scientific work provided an inspiration for the pseudo-

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1. Le Bon, G., The Psychology of the Crowd, New York, 1895.
 2. See Weber, M., The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, (1904-6), New York, 1958.
 3. Quoted in Joll, J., Intellectuals in Politics, London, 1960, p.177.

scientific predilections of Gobineau,^{1.} who was originally pessimistic concerning modern mass society, but whose attitude was transformed by an approach through folk ideas. His pre-Darwinian, "Essay on the Inequality of Human Races" emphasized the strength of blood purity and the dangers of congenital weakness consequent upon racial inter-marriage. Subsequent to Darwin's work, Gobineau added the factor of "drives" in the survival of human groups.

Georges Sorel^{2.} was more aggressive in his advocacy of the spur of 'myth' in the form of a dominating ideal of "The Future" which would become established in the popular mind. Sorel hoped for a mass movement by which established society would be overthrown, creating a new world on the ashes of the disgusting, corrupt parliamentary democracy thus destroyed. Biddiss quotes Sorel on the role of violence:

Violence is an intellectual doctrine, the will
of powerful minds who know what they are doing.^{3.}

In the decade before 1914 Bergson^{4.} set about attacking the 'God of Reason' rather differently. He conceived a triple alliance of the forces of instinct, intelligence and intuition, which would bring new life to the spirit of man as well as to his body. Bergson's attack on enthroned rationality is of a much more constructive nature than that of the intemperate Sorel.

1. Gobineau, A.de, Essai sur l'inegalite des races, Paris, 1853-5.

See also, Dawidowicz, L., The War against the Jews 1933-45, New York, 1975, Pt.1. Ch.2.

2. See Sorel, G.E., Reflections on Violence, (1908), (tr.Hulme, T.E.) New York, 1914.

3. Unlocated quotation in Biddiss, M.D., The Age of the Masses..., London, 1977, p.130.

4. See the consolidation of the lectures of this period in Bergson, H.L., The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, (1932), (tr.Audra, R.A. and Brereton, C.), London, 1935; and Hanna, T., (Ed.), The Bergsonian Heritage, New York, 1962.

The full importance of the scientific work of the classical psychologists Freud and Jung was only just beginning to reach a wide audience by 1914. Freud's ^{1.} pioneering work showed the fundamental significance of deeply repressed instinctual drives in human behaviour. But it was the generalized theory of Jung which most helped to explain the upwelling of non-rational thought and its expression in group aggression, conformity and subservience. Jung^{2.} sought to demonstrate, through scientific method, that all men are joined together in a collective unconscious which contains dark forces of primitive memory as well as creative urges. Jung sought to show that, first during the Enlightenment, and thereafter under liberal capitalism, the forces in the collective unconscious had been severely repressed, not only by rational thought but also by social orthodoxy and religious respectability. These superficial powers had moulded a General Respectability or 'Persona' creating a "mask of society". Jung saw Nietzsche's appeal to the non-rational element as a response to a perceived attack on the persona. Jung concluded that pressure from the submerged, dark, collective forces was mounting to the point where the mind of Western society, now denatured by extreme positive reason, would be incapable of controlling the eruptive expression of the unconscious in both astonishing acts of creation and an unbridled lust for destruction.

Jung's work helps to clarify the vast emotional appeal of folkish intuition and the intense, unhealthy interest in such non-rational,

1. See, especially, Freud, S., The Interpretation of Dreams, (1900), London, 1913.

and Freud, S., Three Contributions to the Sexual Theory, (1905), New York, 1910.

2. See, especially, Jung, C.G., Studies in Word Association, (1906-9), (CW2), New York, 1953.

and Jung, C.G., Symbols of Transformation, (1912), (CW5), New York, 1955.

pseudo-scientific ideas as the proof of inequality among human societies by "reason of difference" and the popular crazes for craniometry and physiognomy. All these curiosities may be explained by a need to find secure identity in atavistic roots.

The ideological factors influencing the non-rational element of Western man, though revealing a need for some more deeply rooted society, had not achieved any systematic mode of expression as a third way, alternative both to liberal capitalism and collective socialism, by 1914. Certain ugly, destructive forces had emerged in the previous sixty years, often concentrating on long-established foci of resentment. Nihilistic anarchism was linked with a popular anti-clericalism widespread in Catholic Europe. There was both a general, and a specifically German, revival of antisemitism. H.S. Chamberlain's racist work was published in Munich in 1912 in a popular edition under the title Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts. Chamberlain exalted Germanic man, identifiable as a superior being by virtue of his differences from others. Chamberlain appealed both to the traditional Christian antisemitism and to the more recent anti-Christian antisemitism, both of which were widely popular in Wilhelmine Germany. Tal says of Chamberlain's views on the value of scientific reality:

The rules of logic or the rational axioms of science cannot determine the reality or assess the value of phenomena. "I need not bother about definitions; race is in my bosom".

In Chamberlain's system subjective intuition took the place of "teaching" (Lehre), nature took the place of "learning" (Schulweisheit), and

non-rational unmediated experience took the place of critical objective cognition.^{1.}

Thus, by 1914, non-rational ideas had surfaced in frighteningly ugly forms just at the moment when the positive certainty of progress, still entrenched in the popular consciousness, was thrown into confusion at well-informed levels by the awareness that the new sciences' revelations of conditioning, in biological, economic, social and psychological aspects, constituted an intellectual assault on the perception of freedom of choice. A growing number of people in 1914 felt the duress of a claustrophobic captivity in European society. Writing of his early impressions, the anarchist Victor Serge found himself

... living in a world without any possible escape. I felt repugnance, mingled with wrath and indignation, towards people whom I saw settled comfortably in this world. How could they not be conscious of their captivity ...?^{2.}

The most carefully formulated body of ideological response to the environment of mass society dominated by successful capitalism was provided by the various expressions of socialism. Socialism became a vibrant ideological core, putting itself forward as an alternative both to liberal-democratic and conservative-authoritarian societies. Socialism, whether evolutionary or revolutionary, appeared essentially internationalist in its scope and appeal. But it was perhaps inevitable that, in nationalist nineteenth-century Europe, distinctly national

1. Tal, U., Christians and Jews in Germany, religion, politics and ideology in the Second Reich, 1870-1914, Ithaca, N.Y., 1975, p.282.

2. Serge, V., Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 1904-41, London, 1963, unlocated quotation in Kedward, H.R., Fascism in Western Europe 1900-45., New York, 1971, p.v.

varieties of socialism would appear. Socialism, as the great collective answer, emerged from the furnaces of private thought to be tempered in the deluge of public debate.

Late eighteenth-century Revolutionary France supplied several powerful stimuli to socialist thought and politics. Rousseau's concepts of Natural Law, General Will and Social Contract continued to provide inspiration, as did Jacobin egalitarianism. Post-Napoleonic, bourgeois France was so obviously non-egalitarian that Rousseau was abandoned by liberal democrats, while *Egalité!* became a communist slogan.

Apart from the authoritarian, state-centred ideology of small groups of primitive French communists, the first phase of socialist development was dominated by the utopian ideas of Owen and St. Simon. However, these passive forms of socialism tended to encourage retreat from the vile capitalist world, either psychologically or physically to the islands of a New Society. Nevertheless the patriarchal utopians left one ideological landmark on the mainland of European thought - their advocacy of economic planning.

The classical formulation of socialist ideology was the particular achievement of Karl Marx.¹ His collectivist response to the problems of mass society in the confidently expanding industrial economy of Europe, while archetypal of the newly characterised element of socialism, was nevertheless expressed as the product of somewhat earlier inspirations.

Marx was nurtured within the sphere of influence of classical German philosophy. The line of thought leading from Kant through Hegel,

1. See, especially, Marx, K., Capital, London, 1887. Also see McLellan, D., Karl Marx: his Life and Thought, London, 1973; and Marx, K. and Engels, F., Selected Works, London, 1968.

Fichte and Feuerbach, amplified the older Renaissance echo that man was a 'universal being' capable of unlimited development. Modern European society's tendency to mutilate man spiritually was a strong theme in Enlightenment writing. Marx's direct contact with this vigorous modern, rationalist tradition placed him in a strong position to change a philosophical critique of European society into a new, radical and practical form.

The immediate influence of the new sociology was to direct Marx towards an assessment of the nature of emerging class stratifications. The newly dominant bourgeois capitalist class comprised a mere fraction of mass society, inviting comparison with the position of the aristocracy in the French ancien regime. Marx considered alienation of the working classes to be characteristic of mass society and looked to the class solidarity of the new industrial proletariat as the harbinger of a more general social emancipation. If control of the means of production and exchange was transferred to the collective body of society as a whole, Marx foresaw the emergence of a communist 'classless society' following on the heels of a socialist state.

Marx's organic view of human society contains elements ultimately derived from the Stoics and Epicureans, Spinoza, Vico, Montesquieu and Hume. Marxist ideology is founded in earlier views of natural cause and deterministic causal chains, combined with the anti-fatalistic assertion that "Man Makes Himself". Marx recognised the importance of environmental impact, whether physical, economic or intellectual:

Men make their own history, but they do not make
it just as they please, under circumstances
chosen by themselves, but (rather) under

conditions immediately encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.¹

In developing a comprehensive ideological alternative to a liberalism which promoted capitalism, sanctified by utilitarian principles, Marx characteristically rejected even the ground rules of the new order. Marxist thinking reverses the direction of utilitarianism by proceeding from primary concepts of society to secondary doctrines of economics. Marx set a high value on a perception of empirical social reality, clear of the powerful but irrelevant influence of such "false consciousnesses" as the vision of renewed Israelite piety created in Commonwealth England and the identification with an idealised Republican Rome, common in the culture of eighteenth-century Europe.

Lichtheim sees Marx's colossal intellectual achievement as rooted in the synthesis of German idealist philosophy, French sociology and socialist politics and English theoretical economics. The original setting for this work was the intellectual ferment of mid-nineteenth century Germany.

German idealism inspired Marx's faith in autonomous human potential and engendered an acquiescence in the enhancement of state powers during the socialist transition to a communist society. French political party organisation and the St.Simonian emphasis on planning were of practical help to Marx. He recognised that lack of overall planning was a flaw potentially fatal to capitalist society. The pioneer French

1. Marx, K. and Engels, F., Selected Works, London, 1968, pp.97-8.

2. Lichtheim, G., A Short History of Socialism, London, 1970, Ch.5.

sociologists provided insights of social structure, particularly the significance of the evolution of class. Marx combined French sociological ideas with French revolutionary example in politics when he looked to the proletarian working class as the catalyst of future social change. Marx was sharply critical both of Comte's failure to grasp the concept of class conflict and his intimate connexion of industrial management with the historical accident of bourgeois ownership.

The analyses of the classical English economists combined with the tragic theatre of English social upheaval to stimulate Marx's economic ideas. In England "the state" had become an entity almost separate from "society" - politics concerned affairs apart from ordinary social life. These attitudes, fostered by Hobbes¹ and advanced by Locke,² were already established in England before their use in the interests of the new market-centred capitalist economy, in which the highest respect was accorded to contractual relations. Ricardo's³ exposition of how capital was produced out of living labour, a labour now debased into a commodity, a mere item of costs, deeply influenced the socially-minded Marx. The growth of capital by appropriation of the profits founded on the creation, by labour, of an 'above-subsistence' value helped to form, in Marx's view, a whole civilization in which the labourer felt an alien. The Labour Theory of Value occupied a central position in Marx's economic thought. While recognising the validity of Ricardo's 'Iron Law' of Wages, Marx used a characteristically dialectic approach by opposing the proposition that profits rise in proportion as labour's share of the total profit declines, with the argument that the rapid growth of capital thus engendered is the most

1. See Hobbes, T., Leviathan, (1651), (Macpherson, C.B., Ed.), London 1968.

2. See Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government, (1690-1704), (Laslett, P., Ed) Cambridge, 1963.

3. See, especially, Ricardo, D., The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, London, 1817.

favourable condition for the wage-labour force to sell its 'creative' labour-power. Marx advocated common ownership of the means of production and looked forward with positivistic optimism to the abolition of 'work', resulting from increasing mechanisation and the rise of the general level of societal wealth. Marx was very conscious of the violent social convulsions likely to result from the worsening oscillations of a trade cycle uncompensated by effective state economic intervention. Capitalism would both promote the immediate interests of the proletarian class and lacerate it into revolutionary action. Marx's perception of the consequences of capitalism apparently failed in only one important particular. He did not recognise that technological development could cause a rise in 'real wages' by lowering unit cost and increasing unit production per man hour, providing the labour force did not grow faster than the gross domestic product.

In the ideological melange of later nineteenth century Europe it was probably impossible that Marxism should entirely escape distortion in the arena of mass communication and popular debate. Engels¹ was the most influential agent of reduction of Marxist ideas. By the mid-nineties he had imparted to Marxism an emphatic materialism, a rigid determinism and an extremely ingenuous attachment to scientific certainty. In spite of Marx's personal detestation of uncritical Social Darwinism, it was a happy convenience that his conception of historical progress could be assimilated readily with the Theory of Evolution, particularly in the aspect of environmental constraints.

Another and somewhat idiosyncratic form of socialist theory was formulated by Pierre Proudhon.² In the French environment of a free

1. See Marx, K., and Engels, F., Selected Works, London, 1968.

2. See Hampden-Jackson, J., Marx, Proudhon and European Socialism, London, 1957.

peasantry and many artisan entrepreneurs, Proudhon interpreted Rousseau's dictum 'Property is Theft' as referring only to large-scale capitalist property. He scorned as renegades those socialists who compromised with liberal parliamentary processes. He advocated Mutualism - a decentralised society based on inter-related forms of co-operative association. He proposed the establishment of a National Bank which would make unlimited credit available to millions of small producers, all owning their tools individually. Proudhon's thought is far-removed from the collective control of production stressed by Marx.

In economics Proudhon put forward the notion of 'use' values rather than 'exchange' values. He developed this concept through the idea of 'constituted values', based on the amount of labour embodied in a product or service. He sought to by-pass the ordinary market process by setting up 'labour exchanges', in which independent craftsmen and members of workingmen's co-operatives could exchange their products according to agreed prices based on labour units.

Proudhon's social thought stressed a populist egalitarianism, in which a reformed legal system would make justice accessible to every citizen. Society would become totally secularized following a violent revolution which would countenance both anti-Christian and anti-Jewish sentiment. Proudhon combined with his socialism curious elements of the non-rational and the traditional. His unemancipated attitude towards women and the family reinforces the impression that he was consciously tailoring principle to fit the prejudices of the artisan and peasant communities of rural France. However, some of Proudhon's ideas were incorporated in the later developments of Anarcho-syndicalism and British Guild Socialism.

Socialist thought in Germany was also influenced by interpretations arising from the peculiarly German social environment. Ferdinand Lassalle¹ combined socialism with Hegelian philosophy. He stressed that socialism represented the interest of the entire community by placing the common good above the selfish interests of any individual. In order to protect the common interest, supreme political authority should be vested in the institutions of the state.

Johann Rodbertus² brought the viewpoint of a Prussian conservative monarchist to bear upon socialist ideology. He constructed a complex economic rationale which featured a theory of exploitation derived from Ricardo. Rodbertus had some influence beyond purely socialist circles, his work influencing the nationalist Bismarck in the direction of state intervention in economic affairs. However, by 1869 the emergent German proletariat, guided by Liebknecht and Bebel, had chosen Marxism as the official ideology of the Social Democratic Party, a Marxist organisation which eventually decided to seek power for the proletariat through evolution rather than revolution.

Eccentric to the main body of European thought, but producing figures which often obtruded, comet-like, as exiles, were the founders of Russian socialism. Herzen³ modified his simple populist ideas, through the influence of Lassalle, to accommodate the state as a necessary evil. Herzen modelled his vision of a renewed organic society on the mir - the Russian peasant commune. Bakunin⁴ translated his socialist ideas into a specifically anarchist form. In the libertarian cause all authority was designated dangerous, the nation-states were to be broken

1. See Lichtheim, G., A Short History of Socialism, London, 1970. Ch.8.

2. Ibid.

3. Op. cit. Ch.7.

4. Ibid.

up into autonomous regions and an 'anti-authoritarian collectivism' would arise through the 'wisdom which resides in the people'.¹ However, Bakunin's predilection for secret societies helped to promote the impression that anarchists were essentially nihilistic terrorists rather than representatives of a genuine popular movement. However, Kropotkin's² anti-authoritarianism was sincere. He believed in a decentralised collectivism, subsequent to the overthrow of the state as a result of a spontaneous uprising nurtured at village commune level. Kropotkin advocated the common possession of wealth in an absolutely egalitarian society. He regarded co-operation as a natural law, the true alternative to the unnatural system of competitive capitalism, which was responsible for the creation of a corruptly perverse social environment. Kropotkin's adherents established the Russian Social Revolutionary Party in the first years of the twentieth century. Chernyshevsky's³ populist socialism was based on a mistrust of positivistic progress. He foresaw the dangerous descent to barbarism implicit in boneheaded interpretations of Darwinism. His thought is humanistic, giving prominence to scientific materialism. But his most influential contribution to Russian socialist thought was his belief in the self-constituting elite of the revolutionaries.

The first specifically Marxist Russian thinker, Plekhanov⁴ was strongly against an elite direction of the proletariat. He considered the populists' divorce of politics from economics as a fundamental mistake. Plekhanov was a social democrat who advocated the Westernization of Russia, through internal proletarian advancement following the extension of popular education. Plekhanov opposed the external intervention of an exiled revolutionary intelligentsia and advocated

1. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

a social reconciliation to be achieved by socialists swimming with the "historical current".

In total contrast with Plekhanov, Lenin forged an action-orientated Marxist ideology which relied on a revolutionary elite. In Lenin's view the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' would prove an empty phrase in the absence of that Jacobin violence necessary to achieve the utter destruction of the old order. In What is to be done?¹ in 1902 he stressed the urgent need for revolutionary action in the face of the twin dangers of a pacified, complacent proletariat and the emergence of reforming ideologies within the capitalist system.

The British environment also encouraged particular forms of socialism. Following the patriarchal era of Owen and the Utopian socialists and those who based their ideas on Ricardo's economics, the mid-nineteenth century saw a diffusion of socialist ideas at the popular level of the industrial trades union. Proudhon's anti-parliamentary Mutualism was antagonistic to socialist organisers such as Odger, who was in favour of a reformed parliamentary social democracy.

In the late nineteenth century the founders of the Fabian Society managed to construct a socialist ideology which was clearly differentiated from either of the main alternatives - Marxism or anarchism. Pease, Webb, Olivier, Shaw and Wallas presented their ideas in the "Fabian Essays", first published in 1889,² which expounded a socialism which was essentially conciliatory and evolutionary. Sydney Webb saw socialism as a moral issue to be made effective by a popular change of opinion. The Fabians sought to promote the gradual introduction of

1. Lenin, V.I., What Is To Be Done?, (1902), London, 1947.

2. Shaw, G.B. (Ed), Fabian Essays in Socialism, London, 1889.

socialism through democratic welfare legislation, administered by the civil service. As new members of the Society were admitted by co-option, the Fabians closely approximated to Chernyshevsky's self-constituted elite, but of a reforming rather than a revolutionary character.

Nevertheless, Fabian socialism included a strong authoritarian element.

The Fabian bureaucratic collectivists aimed at the forcible reorganisation of society by the state. Fabian attitudes to international affairs contained an element of realpolitik, while Shaw went so far as to support British imperialism with arguments, derived from Social Darwinism, about the fitness of the rule of the strong as protectors of the weak.

Philip Wicksteed¹ provided the Fabians with an economic rationale. Influenced by the liberal search to reconcile capital and labour, Wicksteed emphasized the theme of anti-exploitation. His 'Theory of Rent' was independent of any kind of value theory, in that it could stand whether the values were based on labour, cost of production or marginal utility. Wicksteed argued that all surplus value becomes rent - a concept at once familiar and radically new. Wicksteed had contrived to place the capitalist on the same plane of moral criticism as the landlord with unearned income.

Wicksteed's 'Theory of Rent' was not easy to adjust in the face of fluctuations in the trade cycle, but Sydney and Beatrice Webb regarded it as the "cornerstone of collectivist economy". The Webbs' Fabian programme set out a 'four-fold path of socialism', which included state administration of public services, regulation of private industry, the taxation of unearned income and welfare provision for the dependent sections of the community.²

1. See Hutchison, T.W., A Review of Economic Doctrines, 1870-1929, New York, 1962.

2. Webb, S., 'Modern Socialist Movements'; in CMH, 1910, Vol. XII, p. 760.

The natural tendencies of socialism to encourage active debate and to establish political parties helped to protect its various ideologies from perverse dilution. The rationale of socialism presented a potential solution to the problems of mass society which may have been more attractive to the conscious than to the unconscious mind. By 1914, there existed four main branches of socialist response. The two evolutionary limbs were typified by Fabianism in Britain and by the Marxist Social Democrats in Germany. The revolutionary limbs of socialism were expressed destructively in anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism and constructively in Marxist revolutionary parties, such as Lenin's Bolsheviks and the Jewish Bund. The critical issue which divided socialists was sharply focused by their answer to the question "Will the establishment of socialism be more than a broadening of the area of freedom already achieved under liberal democracy?" The unequivocally affirmative answer given by the revolutionary socialists to this question was the factor most divisive of the internationalism shared by all socialists since the early nineteenth century. The war of 1914 completed the rupture between socialist movements, internationalist ideals being desolated in the maelstrom of nationalist sentiment.

Constructive critics of established liberalism were in something of a dilemma by the late nineteenth century. Uncritical positivism was an enshrined popular belief at the level of conscious thought, while suppressed beneath were the gathering forces of non-rationality. In order to meet the need for a non-authoritarian ideology, the liberal riposte took two main forms - the sociological reaction of

continental thinkers and the Anglo-Saxon development of the New Liberalism.

Durkheim and Weber stand out as the sociologists whose work attempted to provide a rationale favouring a reconciliation of problems rather than a revolutionary renewal.

Durkheim¹ kept some of Comte's uncritical positivist assertion that sociology could furnish genuinely scientific authority in the search for a political and social morality in harmony with the environment of mass society. Durkheim viewed the emergence of extreme ideologies as symptomatic of growing anomie. In a mass setting, the absence or confusion of traditional norms first disrupts the organic unity of society and then threatens the exposed and confused individual members.

Durkheim, who rejected the notion that violent revolution was inevitable, became very influential within the liberal and traditional circles which sought to stabilise the Third French Republic, following the twin shocks of war and 'communist' revolution. He proved to be able to protect the French educational system from the infiltration of extremist influences - except for the anti-clericalism in which he was personally involved.

Durkheim rejected the belief that the growing separation and specialisation of economic and social function was necessarily disruptive of a sense of community. He promoted the idea that 'reciprocity' and 'genuinely mutual interdependence' could foster an 'organic' solidarity which would replace the traditional 'mechanical' solidarity.

1. See Durkheim, E., The Division of Labour in Society, 1893, (tr. Simpson, G.), New York, 1947.

Durkheim, E., The Rules of Sociological Method, (1895), (tr. Solvay, S.A. and Mueller, J.H.) Chicago, 1950;

and Durkheim E., The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, (1912), (tr. Swain, J.W.), Glencoe, 1948.

Durkheim tended to re-invent religion in the form of a secular authority, which would act as the supreme social control whose pronouncements were reinforced by symbolization. He recognised that 'myth' was a powerful instrument of peaceful social stabilisation. He aimed to replace traditional moral coercion by an illusion that acceptance of pronounced norms was a matter of free choice.

Weber's¹ sociological work, by contrast with Durkheim's, produced a more reflective and speculative ideological expression. Weber sought to reconcile the whole body of idealist philosophy with positivism's uncritical pre-occupation with the supposedly hard facts of objective reality. He particularly strove to disengage "is" and "ought". He emphasised the relativity of value judgements and rejected the possession, by any quality, of the property of absoluteness or universality.

Weber was very aware of the unique character of social texture. He recognised both industrial capitalism and Calvinist Christianity as characteristically Western forms of discipline and rationalisation, which bore upon both social and economic development. He stressed that Western rationalisation also stimulated a process of Entzauberung ('disenchantment') in which the progressive development of rational explanation, which brings liberation from the magical, leaves a feeling of real loss. He suggested that a mass society, thus disenchanted, might seek security under the direction of charismatic leaders.

Classical liberalism had reached its peak in Western Europe about 1870, but remained rather nebulous ideologically. A handful of components provided the essentials common to true liberalism. Man was regarded as a rational individual, whose rationality was reflected

1. See Weber, M., The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, (1904-6), New York, 1958.

in his social organisation, a tenet which reflected the powerful influence of utilitarianism among liberals. Liberalism expressed a faith in the perfectability of a mankind which was gradually developing itself and expressing this development through social reforms. The achievement of the empirical freedom of the individual within society was one of the foremost elements in every liberal programme. This notion was usually in intimate association with ideals of rational behaviour and justice. Liberals were concerned with the particular interests of the individual and the general interests of society. They sought, by means of constitutional reform and institutional development, to ensure the unfettered expression of the individual, within a framework of law. Liberalism confined the *égalité* of the French Revolution within the concept of equality in law. Access to political power was normally reserved by liberals for those with some tangible stake in society. Thus liberal ideals and bourgeois values became connected symbiotically. In the later nineteenth century the concept of progress tended to dominate the liberal attitude of mind, but liberals were becoming more sharply aware that the scarifying effects of their emphasis on rationality, and the secularization of society, had made essential the quest for an ethical political system. This quest was made more urgent because of some of the individual features common in liberal-dominated society in the late nineteenth century. The proliferation of *gesellschaft* values led to society and its political institutions being viewed as artefacts based on contractual relationships. Successful liberal-bourgeois capitalism extolled private property as the measure of a man's worth. Moreover, the *laissez-faire* entrepreneurial outlook sometimes resulted in a sharply anti-social, atomistic individualism - the "buccaneer" mentality.

The growing awareness in the later nineteenth century of the interdependence of fields of knowledge led to a mutual reinforcement of ethical and scientific trends, sometimes expressed through an interaction between a systematic positivism, such as that developed by Comte, and forms of critical positivism, often elaborated through a specialised scientific field. Critical positivism, appealing by way of a particular scientific discipline, could provide apparent bedrock anchorage for ethical ideas derived from earlier positivist systems. Liberals used such newly secured positivist ideas in attempts to place values in a context of "unassailable" scientific facts. These early attempts to consolidate liberal philosophy were characteristically illustrated in the optimistic writings of the socialist H.G.Wells, and represent an indication of the possibility of open communication between liberal and socialist political ideas.

The utilitarian aspect of classical liberalism was re-interpreted in the late nineteenth century in three particular areas. Firstly, education was believed to provide the possibility of the sudden and total transformation of the human character by direct assault on the mind. Thus, the rational remedying of social ills could be reformulated as a structured programme of social reform, to meet the expected demand created by the educated minds of the newly enlightened.

Secondly, the classical belief in the autonomy of the individual was transformed by the extension of the classical goal to achieve the greatest happiness of the greatest number. It became accepted that such happiness might sometimes require the complete subordination of individual rights to social claims. The new approach adopted the dual goals of personal liberty linked with social welfare. The 'social' was now perceived as a factor both additional to and qualitatively different

from the 'individual', a perception which promoted the concept of social utility.

Thirdly, the Benthamite view of social activity as the sum of free choices of rational individuals, which formed a prominent part of the social rationale of mid-nineteenth century laissez-faire, was modified in the light of the growing perception of collective welfare. The classical liberal hostility to the state was replaced by a recognition of its right to a degree of protective interference. D.G.Ritchie wrote, in 1891, that, "We have come to recognise, with Aristotle, the moral function of the State".^{1.}

The absorption into the New Liberalism of these re-interpretations, and the growing appreciation of the potential of universal education, led to the position that concerted social action was necessary in order to restrain the impingement of adverse economic circumstances which restricted the individual's horizons. The Liberal sense of social service grew stronger with the New Liberalism's emphatic assertion of "the importance of material environment for the formation of character".^{2.}

The Liberals were in an intrinsically strong position to review the state of their economic thought in the late nineteenth century. Capitalism, with all its faults, was an eminently successful, established system. Therefore, much could stand. The New Liberal approach shifted the emphasis from problems of production to those of distribution. The economic interest in mass society centred on the individual as a consumer. The individual consumer came to be seen as the end-beneficiary of economic competition informed by rational humanitarianism. However, the adverse effects of recurrent trade depressions since 1870 forced the

1. Ritchie, D.G., The Principles of State Interference, London, n.d., (1891), p.169.

2. NL. p.16.

acknowledgement that the system possessed at least one serious defect. Nevertheless, by the 1890s, Malthusian pessimism was a diminished ideological force. Stress was now placed on the possible validity of Malthus' later belief in the ability of the masses to exercise demographic self-control, or "moral restraint", thus modifying the original perception of the incompatibility of social welfare and natural laws.

In common with both the theorists of socialism and of conservative nationalism, the Liberal ideologues felt the need to come to terms with idealism. Just as English socialism was wary of dogmatic stultification, so idealism was viewed with some caution as a rather un-English enthusiasm.

The creative aspect of the liberals' interaction with the idealists centred on T.H.Green's ¹ concept of the 'Common Good', which tallied with the classless appeal nurtured by liberals, and the convergence of liberalism with the idealist stress on non-materialist values. The liberal accommodation with this thrust provided a powerful force towards the clear differentiation of mainstream liberalism from all socialist ideologies. Non-materialism provided a base of self-criticism, by which the bourgeois-encumbered classical liberals could generate an impressive intellectual synthesis.

Liberals were also in accord with the Idealist concept of reform as the removal of hindrances to self-realization. However, J.A.Hobson ² extended the views of Hegel and Green that private property was a requisite for individual self-realization, to include the need for the community, conceived as an 'individual' with its own moral ends, to be recognised as a legitimate property owner. Hobson regarded both private

1. See Green, T.H., (Nettleship, R.L., Ed.), Collected Works, London, 1885-8; and Barker, E., Political Thought in England 1848 to 1914, London, 1947. Ch.2.

2. Hobson, J.A., 'The Ethics of Industrialism', in Coit, S. (Ed), Ethical Democracy: Essays in Social Dynamics, London, 1900, p.104.

and public property as jointly essential to social well-being.

However, the New Liberals were unable to accept the Idealist view of the state as the supreme ethical framework. L.T. Hobhouse differed^{1.} from Green's view of society as the manifestation of a metaphysical principle alone. Society, for Hobhouse, also represented an empirical truth.^{2.} Social life, for Hobhouse, was essentially social interaction and relationships, whereas Green viewed society as already implicit in the consciousness of others as ends.

The New Liberalism's interactions with Idealism were comparatively clear-cut compared with the interactions with Socialism. English Socialism was as peculiarly English as English Idealism was peculiarly continental. The elusive, non-doctrinaire character of English forms of socialism provided insidious forms of challenge to the New Liberalism. Ramsay MacDonald described socialism in England as "a tendency, a mode of thought, a guiding idea",^{3.} while Lenin characterised Fabianism as "an extremely opportunist trend".^{4.}

J. Rae stated that from the 1880s onwards attitudes to the 'social question' were of growing importance.^{5.} Some dubbed all those who accepted an intervening role for the state as 'socialists'. Lenin would doubtless have accepted the Liberal M.P. L.A. Atherley-Jones' judgment that English socialism could more properly be termed Social Reform.^{6.}

1. NL, P.67.

2. Hobhouse, L.T., Liberalism, London, 1911, pp. 71-3.

3. MacDonald, J.R., 'The Labour Party and Its Policy' in IR. 1906, p.264.

4. Lenin, V.I., Collected Works, London, 1947, Vol.13, p.358.

5. Rae, J., Contemporary Socialism, London, 1884, pp. 10-11.

6. Atherley-Jones, L.A., 'Liberalism and Social Reform; A Warning', in NR, Vol.9, (1893), p.631.

Liberals attempted to encyst Socialism as consisting merely of a recognition of the fact of Man's 'social being', which did not require the advocacy of any ideological scheme. L.Chiozza Money equated mutual help with Socialism.¹ Hobhouse described Mill's view of socialism, defined in his Autobiography in terms of a combination of individual liberty, common ownership and equal participation in the benefits of combined labour, as "the best summary statement of Liberal Socialism that we possess".² Thus the New Liberals attempted to meet the challenge of Socialism by adaptive absorption.

However, Hobhouse proceeded to outline two types of Socialism which liberals rejected: the mechanical, or economic, and the official, or political. He criticised Mechanical Socialism for constructing a system based on a single factor which led to the substitution of artificial ideas for living principles. Official Socialism was classed as beaurocratic and elitist in its aspiration to dictate to every individual the organisation of his life. Hobhouse regarded both these types of Socialism as undemocratic and anti-libertarian.³

The New Liberal attitude that the rights of individuality were not necessarily directly in conflict with collectivism and the organic view of society was reinforced by the Idealist Henry Jones. In 1910 Jones proclaimed the ultimate identity of private and public wills as arising from the essentially social nature of the individual and the essentially individual nature of society.⁴ Thus individualism and socialism differed only in point of view, being twin aspects of the same phenomenon.

1. Chiozza Money, L.G., 'Liberalism, Socialism and the Master of Elibank', in IR. Vol.11, (1906), p.10.

2. Hobhouse, L.T., Liberalism, London, 1911, p.62.

3. Op. cit. pp. 88-90.

4. NL, p.31, quotes Jones, H., The Working Faith of the Social Reformer and Other Essays, London, 1910, pp. 233-4.

The New Liberals sought to split the collectivist-socialist identity. Collectivism was viewed as "a method of social organisation involving concerted action",¹ whereas socialism was "an ideological system - a comprehensive set of beliefs which interprets and induces political action".² Thus the New Liberals might be termed "liberal collectivists" without the implicit acceptance of socialist ideology.

Nevertheless Freeden believes that the need for an ethically based political system, which formed such a fundamental part of liberal tradition, in the circumstances of the enormous problem of mass society, obvious to all by 1900, forced the New Liberals to acquiesce with the view that the social situation required a transition from unconscious to conscious socialism.³

The Liberal acceptance that certain consciously socialist policies were the inevitable consequence of their search for an ethical base became most clearly articulated in their attitudes to poverty and the unequal distribution of wealth. The New Liberals extended the classical liberal concept of unearned increment, Mill's 'wealth created by circumstances', to the advocacy of the use of profit for public benefit. J.A. Hobson led the way:

When it is said that we are all socialists to-day, what is meant is, that we are all engaged in the active promotion or approval of legislation which can only be explained as a gradual unconscious recognition of the existence of a social property in capital which it is held politic to secure for the public use.⁴

1. NL, p.31.

2. Ibid.

3. NL, Pt. II, Ch. 1.

4. Hobson, J.A., Problems of Poverty, London, 1891, p.199.

The Liberals continued to support the individual's right to achieve wealth in a capitalist economy, but emphasized the state's right to tax accumulated wealth on behalf of the community at large. In general, the Liberals continued to advocate taxation rather than the nationalization so typical of most socialist programmes.

Hobhouse enlarged upon Hobson's more specific convergences with socialist policies. He perceived a general concordance between Liberalism and Socialism in the shared ethical ideal of "what is just".¹ He stressed the empirical parallels:

The ideas of Socialism, when translated into practical terms, coincide with the ideas to which Liberals are led when they seek to apply their principles of Liberty, Equality and the Common Good to the industrial life of our time.²

However, the New Liberal recognition of convergence with certain practical aims of Socialism was tempered by the classical Liberal mistrust of the over-powerful state. The revolutionary Socialist advocacy of state controls was contrary to the Liberal view of human nature. Liberal social reform was not to be equated with State Socialism. The "Speaker" of 13th. May, 1893, posed the question 'Are We All Socialists Now?' The article ruled out the road to social reform through the paternal state. Such a state, serving the 'root idea' of socialism, would impress a stereotype upon its working population as a dependent caste reliant upon public largesse.³ In a leader in the "Daily Chronicle" of 2nd. April, 1897, the average Socialist was

1. Hobhouse, L.T., Democracy and Reaction, London, 1904, p.118.

2. Hobhouse, L.T., 'The Prospects of Liberalism', in CR, Vol. 93, (1908), p.353.

3. "Speaker" article, quoted in NL, p.62.

called upon to renounce his false ethics, hedonism and nationalism "and see that personality is the highest aim of the world effort".¹ Liberals were exhorted to abandon the belief that "there is no real economic problem".² Such popular calls to recognise the primacy of personality as a fundamental driving force sought authority not only in the re-affirmation of individuality, stimulated in the period of the Renaissance and Reformation, but also in both the Classical heroic career and the primitive European warrior ideal. The popular press of the late Victorian and Edwardian periods was thus sharply differentiated from the rational world of the reviews, in its use of persuasion based on appeal to non-rational, intuitive awareness.

However, the ideological development of the New Liberalism shared with Socialism fundamentally rational foundations. The New Liberals saw themselves as essentially constructive and evolutionary, rather than revolutionary. J.A. Hobson discriminated between the most advanced Social Liberalism advocating 'practicable socialism' and the mildest evolutionary Socialism:

(Advanced Liberalism) aims primarily not to abolish the competitive system, to socialise all instruments of production, distribution, and exchange, and to convert all workers into public employees - but rather to supply all workers at cost price with all the economic conditions requisite to the education and employment of their personal powers for their personal advantage and employment.³

The New Liberalism was much exercised with the interactions of the state, personal liberty and social welfare. The tension between the

1. Quoted in NL, p.64.

2. Ibid.

3. Hobson, J.A., The Crisis of Liberalism: New Issues of Democracy, London, 1909, pp.172-3.

notion of individuals subsumed by a larger social entity and the concept of individual will was apparent by the end of the nineteenth century. The New Liberals clung to several traditional attitudes, such as the admiration of self-help and the horror of confiscation, mismanagement and bureaucratic corruption. Even the more collectivist Liberalism of the turn of the century was sharply aware of the need to limit state intervention. The New Liberals emphasized the need for a moral and just communal life, especially in the light of the State's greatly augmented technological competence. However, C.R.Buxton believed that social progress would demand:

an extension of state activity, far wider than any we have yet experienced ... the power behind all this machinery is enormous. Here at least is an organisation which can grip and grapple with social evils.^{1.}

Thus Buxton viewed the State as a vehicle for social progress, provided that it was not divorced from "the vital influence of individual contact".^{2.}

Hobhouse viewed the State as the intelligent regulator of forces essential to communal welfare. He denied the Idealist derivation of state personality and rejected the existence of unitary social mind or will. Hobhouse characterised the social entity in terms which excluded both the Idealist interpretations and the new psychological perceptions being pioneered by Jung. Hobhouse maintained that an advanced society developed a corporate mind with a unified, self-directing force of its own.^{3.}

1. An interesting statement of belief by a future Liberal U.D.C. Migrant to Labour. Buxton, C.R., 'A Vision of England', in IR, Vol.17, (1905), pp.151-6.

2. Ibid.

3. NL. Pt.11, Ch. 4, Sect.A.

The New Liberals viewed freedom and mutual aid as dual aspects of social life. Reform was to be directed to the enhancement of the free development of personality. Hobson accepted that Sydney Webb's 'four-fold path of socialism' constituted an empirical extension of liberalism. However, provided that individuality was expressed in forms which did not violate Liberal precepts of justice, Hobson was ready to uphold the value of competition in society. Freedman sums up the conception of social life reached by Hobson and other advanced liberals:

(It) entailed an ethical transformation of society towards a rational humanitarianism in which each man would be treated as an end.¹

Thus the New Liberals had accepted the ambitious idea of extending the participatory concept of community to the periphery. Their tenet that society is an ethical entity was capable of very wide appeal in the growing normlessness of industrial society.

The decisively dynamic element in the reformulation of Liberal ideology involved coming to terms with the new biology and evolutionary theory. The ideological effort strove to create an independent authority for liberal philosophy by grafting biological and evolutionary theories on to the liberal tradition. In an attempt to enrol critical positivism in the ideological cause the Liberals sought to establish a scientific underpinning of their ethical arguments. Moral values were to be demonstrated by reference to empirical 'facts'.

Respect for scientific rationality had grown exponentially throughout the nineteenth century. Malthus had applied a yardstick to society, while Darwin's work was enormously influential in inspiring

1. NL, p.74.

efforts to develop natural laws of social life. Spencer¹. although originally inspired by pre-Darwinian environmental evolution, provided both a stimulus to discussion and a reference frame for later critics of the scientific assessment of society. The Liberals were caught up in the quest for general laws by which society could be reconstructed on rational lines. J.M.Robertson's The Evolution of States². is typical of the Liberal social scientific approach to historical evolution.

The development of Social Darwinism in the later nineteenth century centred on three foci of emphasis: internal conflict, external struggle and co-operation. The New Liberals by the turn of the century recognised only the co-operative version as ethically valid. It was argued that in the more developed species co-operation evolved towards altruism. It was a short step from this position to argue the evolutionary respectability of ethical values.

The New Liberals had to contend with the tangential and reactionary implication of Kidd's³. formulations of "Social Efficiency". Kidd's utilitarian approach to Social Darwinism argued the need for state intervention to provide basic needs in order to ensure equal opportunity in future competition. The New Liberals rejected this harsh concept in favour of the belief that welfare was needed to relieve existing distress, regardless of future prospects. The ethical importance of "regardless" could scarcely be over-stressed.

1. See Spencer, H., Social Statics, London, 1851; Spencer, H., First Principles, London, 1862; and Spencer H., The Man versus The State, London, 1884.

Also see Barker, E., Political Thought in England 1848 to 1914, London, 1947, Ch. IV.

2. Robertson J.M. The Evolution of States, an introduction to English politics, London, 1912, deals with 'English history till the Constitutional Period' only in Part VI, the previous five parts being a sociological interpretation of political, economic and cultural 'forces' in Classical Antiquity. 'The Case of the Italian Republics' and 'The Fortunes of the Lesser European States'.

3. See Kidd, B., Social Evolution, London, 1894.

Hobhouse, ultimately an anti-Idealist, was the Liberal ideologue most prominent in attacking evolutionary extrapolations which suggested any form of biological determinism. He viewed the establishments of beliefs based on unrelieved biology as tending to supplant social justice with a morbid faith in doubtful formularies concerning race and inheritance.¹ Such beliefs seemed to Hobhouse to neglect social and institutional improvement in which rights are based on social recognition rather than being simply 'natural'. Hobhouse also considered that the biologists had failed to appreciate the position of Mind as a factor included in evolution. Mind enabled "the individual to grasp that he was acting within the framework of human society".² Although Hobhouse's concept of mind approximated to the Idealist position, he rejected the connection by way of appeal to historical and empirical, rather than logical, development.

D.G. Ritchie elaborated the significance of the evolution of Mind which Hobhouse had suggested. He stressed that the appearance of consciousness had added rational choice as an extra element in Darwinian selection. Ritchie regarded consciousness as an essentially dynamic force in contrast to the Idealist's conservative and static concept:

The process by which we accept and reject opinion is not merely analagous to natural selection. It is the same process in a higher sphere, though we may prefer to call it 'the dialectic movement of thought' or by some other term which is free from biological associations. The element of consciousness differentiates intellectual selection from biological natural selection ...³

1.NL, pp.85-6.

2. NL, p.86.

3. Ritchie, D.G., 'Evolution and Democracy', in Coit, S., (Ed.), Ethical Democracy: Essays in Social Dynamics, London, 1900, p.7.

Thus Ritchie squared the central Liberal tenet of freedom of choice with the Darwinian discovery of natural selection.

Ritchie's ideas reinforced the traditional Liberal belief in the liberating potential of education, particularly through the activities of the social reformer. He believed that although Universal Reason worked unconsciously, it was sometimes immediate, in the form of Inspiration. In this light, the social reformer became the propagator of the true consciousness in a process by which the evolution of mind became a catalyst of social progress.

The appearance of Weismann's theory of the continuity of germ plasma created divergent reactions. Weismann produced evidence that the life-history of parent organisms produced no inherent effects in their germ plasma. His theory discredited the residual Lamarckian ideas, supported by Herbert Spencer, that human characteristics were acquired and could be inherited. The biologist, G.A.Paley, rejected the view that Weismann had thereby rendered all reform useless in favour of the concept that:

the social reformer is perfectly justified
in hoping that there are ... many refined
natives at the bottom of the social scale
who would develop in (a) more fortunate
environment.¹

In general the New Liberalism responded successfully to the ideological challenge represented by the supercession of political economic preoccupations by those of biology. The New Liberal re-formulation of social reform provided an enlarged concept, not merely palliative or restorative of natural balance, but an outlook which

1. Paley, G.A., 'Biology and Politics', in "New Quarterly", Vol.1, (1907), pp.122-31, quoted in NL, p.89.

regarded the operation of Mind as continuous and dynamic in an endless quest to satisfy the ethical and rational needs of humankind.^{1.}

Hobhouse's view of collectivism reinforced the idea that human behaviour could be increasingly directed by the consciousness of the individual that he was part of society.

Social science was viewed throughout the nineteenth century as a hard discipline, close to the pure sciences in its theoretical and methodological authority. The New Liberals were thus forced to confront social science in its own terms. The idea of Social Organism was particularly influential. Liberals recognised its utility, but sensed its totalitarian implications.

The concept of social organism was given a double stimulus in the earlier nineteenth century through its adoption by the Idealists and its re-emphasis in the work of Comte. Two basic premisses are involved. Firstly, the existence of mutual dependence between the parts of an autonomous entity was perceived as contrary to the separate existence of each part to the others. Secondly, the relation between the whole and the parts was seen to be not such that the whole was identical with the sum of the parts, but rather that the whole possessed a will separate from and superior to the particular wills. The second premiss provided both the Conservative Idealistic interpretation of social continuity and the Liberal interpretation of social change.

Positivist Spencer rejected the idea of corporate consciousness, but Hobson and Ritchie^{2.} asserted its validity in the New Liberal rationale of state interference. They saw the need for purposive, directed interdependent growth as a necessary consequence of the nature

1. NL., p.92.

2. See especially, Ritchie, D.G., The Principles of State Interference, London, n.d. (1891), p.17.

of social organism. Ritchie extended the concept of corporate consciousness to engross morality as being "adequately determined as the health of the social organism".¹ Ritchie saw a social goal in the Aristotelian good life, rather than the promotion of mere life. He achieved a synthesis of Idealism and the new biology by combining the concepts of consciousness and competition.

Hobson approached social organism by way of economic thought. He suggested the notion of social utility, involving the use of 'organic welfare' as a vital standard of value. Hobson replaced the earlier economic man of classical liberalism by an individual at once conscious, rational and emotional. Hobson's idea was firmly founded in an acceptance that the roots of human industrial effort were physical. He provided a comprehensive concept which evaluated economic activity in the light of its total effect on human life. He also succeeded in elaborating an adequate description of the essence of social life. Society as an organic structure was to be understood "as a group-life with a collective body, a collective consciousness and will, and capable of realising a collective vital end".² Hobson's reconciliation of Idealism and the new biology was more comprehensive than Ritchie's. Both agreed that reason and order were common characteristics of the two modes of thought. Hobson's engagement of economic forms in the service of social ends was a serious effort to create a "collective psycho-physics".³

The New Liberals experienced considerable difficulty in their attempts to achieve a common position on the question of whether community constitutes 'an autonomously functional 'entity'. Was the

1. Ritchie, D.G., Philosophical Studies, London, 1905, p.267.

2. Hobson, J.A., Work and Wealth, New York, 1914, p.15.

3. Op.cit., p.16.

General Will to be conceptualized as the nucleus of community? What is the nature of the central significance of the concept of community? Hobson and Hobhouse represented opposing poles of emphasis in this aspect of the great debate from which the New Liberalism was emerging.

Hobhouse regarded the concept of General or Social Will as burdened with implications of state authoritarianism. He reacted to the organicists' demands by denying that society was a species of physical organism, but rather an interdependent whole. He expressed his belief in unmistakable terms that "there is no thought except in the mind of an individual thinker".¹

Hobson differed widely from Hobhouse. Hobson considered that the Social Will was other than an aggregate of feeling for public good. He saw it rather as an esprit de corps transcending any individual vision or purpose. The Social Will was thus an aspect of the psychical relationship between the members of a society.²

The New Liberal reformulation of Liberalism represented a considerable ideological achievement. A way had been created by which, through political action, Western society could be transformed without revolution. The reconciliation of the General Will of mass society with the needs of the autonomous individual personality was a central problem. Hobson mediated the urgent tension between individual and social claims by combining the new perception of the priority of social aims and interests with the traditional Liberal aim of creating circumstances conducive to the highest and most harmonious development of the individual. Hobson rejected the paternalist posture of both conservative reformers and those socialists for whom H.G. Wells was

1. NL, p.105, quotes Hobson's review of Hobhouse, L.T., Social Evolution and Political Theory, in the "Manchester Guardian" of 22nd.Feb., 1912.

2. NL, pp.106-9.

propagandist and spokesman. Hobson's view of the state was that of a harmonising force, rather than a directing agency. He thought the state best suited to co-ordinate the co-operative action of its individual citizens, and was antagonistic to its promotion as an agent of class interest.

Hobson summarised the new direction of Liberal thought:

(It appears) as a fuller appreciation and realisation of individual liberty contained in the provision of equal opportunities for self-development. But to this individual standpoint must be joined a just apprehension of the social, viz., the insistence that the claims or rights of self-development be adjusted to the sovereignty of social welfare. ¹.

In an age becoming ever more demanding of ideological justification, the New Liberalism emerged as a new consensus by thinkers, many of whom were active in practical politics. The political journals provided a forum which, through a wider circle of involvement, helped to temper the new policies. The practical interplay of social philosophy and political measures, in a setting of open printed communication, contributed to the viability of the New Liberalism as a political force. The Liberals' impressment of Social Darwinism, as a vehicle for the ethical power discerned in the evolution of mind, released the blockage created by deterministic biology. Thus, by the first decade of the twentieth century, the Liberal intellectual strivings had put social reform into the active mode. Freedman deplors the attribution of ideological achievement to "Great Thinkers". ². Nevertheless, his

1. NL, p.259, quotes Hobson, J.A., The Crisis of Liberalism: New Issues of Democracy, London, 1909, p.xii.

2. NL, p.246.

whole argument is an impressive tribute to a number of individuals whose gifts and personalities were in tune with the demands of the time. Most notably, Freedman clarifies the crucial role in transmuting philosophical discussion to practical ideology played by Ritchie, Hobson and Hobhouse. Their development of the tenet that society was an ethical entity was the keystone in the New Liberal creation of a powerful ideological statement, relevant to the acute problems of the age. Such concepts as the extension of active society to the periphery and the enlargement of leadership opportunities, through education, to embrace an elite of the like-minded, provided exciting confirmation that social progress could be sustained and enlarged. The New Liberals cogently asserted the need for the action upon the problems of humankind of an optimistic, rational spirituality, with a firm ethical basis. Thus the New Liberal ideological achievement created a rationale by which Western society, at least, might continue without violent disruption. This largely Anglo-Saxon contribution to political thought offered an alternative to both rational socialism and conservative nationalism. Its stress upon ethical justification also offered a potential bastion against the destructive forces of non-rational belief, whose potential extension was difficult to comprehend in the first decade of the twentieth century.

Appendix B

The U.D.C. and the 'pro-German issue'.

Somewhat different from the perceived identification of the Union with pacifism, but often lumped with it in the blunderbuss-style press attack, was the label "pro-German". The lurid suggestion of "German gold" behind the U.D.C. was easily disposed of when the Executive offered the accounts for official inspection. However, a more rational line of criticism could note that Noel Buxton had joined the Anglo-German Friendship Committee in 1911, an organisation with which MacDonalld had connections and to which Morel was nominated by Buxton. The essential nature of these connections, and the whole spirit of the U.D.C. movement, was the recognition of the basic unity of European civilization. Buxton, MacDonalld and Morel recognised that the German people had made very significant contributions to the European outlook and achievement. Such manifestations as the Anglo-German Friendship Committee represented efforts to reinforce the European commonwealth in the prevailing disruptive climate of aggressive nationalism. The essential distinction between pro-European culture and pro-German nationalism was inevitably scorned amidst the passions of war. Norman Angell made a brave attempt in 1915, in the U.D.C. Pamphlet 13, 'The Prussian in our Midst' to show that the danger of growing military-mindedness in Britain was an internal enemy as great as the external foe, and that both were, equally, the common enemies of European civilization.

However, the "pro-German" issue does reveal the U.D.C. Liberals to be trapped within certain cultural assumptions to a degree parallel with their overtly Imperialist opponents. Hanak¹ quotes a letter by Morel, included in Wuliger's unpublished thesis:

How can any Englishman contemplate with anything
but horror the shattering of German civilization,

1. Hanak, H., 'The Union of Democratic Control during the First World War', in BIHR, Vol. xxxv1, No.94, Nov.1963, p.172.

so akin to our own, towards which the world stands so immeasurably indebted, and the overrunning of the plains of Europe by the vast hordes of a semi-Asiatic power, uncomprehending, irresponsible, driven in blind unreasoning acquiescence at the behests of a military autocracy whose ambitions are as limitless as its hatred of democracy is inveterate. ^{1.}

The Nazis pleaded a very similar cause when the Russians re-entered Eastern Europe in 1944 and 45. Hanak remarks that, "Many of the members of the U.D.C. had fallen under German cultural influence. In this way they were typical of intellectuals before the war", ^{2.} Brailsford provided a rationale for a Teutonic protection of 'Mitteleurope' which permitted German cultural diffusion to influence the "primitive unschooled races, not indeed without their own charm and emotional genius", ^{3.} but obviously completely unfitted to rule themselves.

The spell of German achievement was not confined to the highest echelons of the British political and intellectual elites. The private letter to E.D.Morel of 13th. October, 1914, by J.Anderson, the Liberal Secretary at Birkenhead, concluded with a verse from Schiller,

1. Wuliger, R., 'The idea of economic imperialism, with special reference to the life and work of E.D. Morel', unpub. Ph.D. thesis, London, 1953, p.328.

2. Hanak, H., 'The Union of Democratic Control during the First World War', in BIHR, Vol. XXXVI, No.94, Nov. 1963, p.177.

3. Brailsford, H.N., After the Peace, London, n.d. (1917), pp.22-3.

which the local press had recently refused to include in its correspondence columns, on the grounds that it was too pro-German:

German majesty and Honour
 Fall not with the princes' crown:
 When amid the flames of war
 German Empire crashes down,
 German greatness stands unscathed. ^{1.}

In the U.D.C.'s popular literature, propagandists occasionally reveal a solidarity with a racialism which went beyond that of simple overweening patronage. The back cover of the special pamphlet 'Tsardom's Part in the War' contains a prominent advertisement:

TWENTY - FIVE MILLION ARMED NEGROES
 FOR EUROPE

That is what the folly of European statesmen is preparing for us and our children - to conscript Africa's teeming millions for war in Europe!

Do you realise that tens of thousands of conscripted negroes have already been imported upon the European battlefields?

Do you realise it is only the beginning?

There is only one way in which Europe can be saved from this hideous danger.

That way is indicated in

MOREL'S NEW BOOK ...

"Africa and the Peace of Europe". ^{2.}

The direct association of Morel's name with the hard edge of the

1. M.473, F2.

2. Back cover of E.D. Morel, 'Tsardom's Part in the War', Aug.1917,
 (non-series pamphlet).

advertisement's sentiment is an unfair juxtaposition. Morel had rendered altruistic and real assistance to a large number of Africans and he disdained conscious racism as a narrow-minded and uninformed attitude towards "the races whom Europe, in her arrogance, calls 'coloured'. The fundamental interests of all ... people are common. Injustice to (one) is injustice to all".¹

1. E.D.Morel, Truth and the War, London, 1916, p.312.

APPENDIX C

Details of Affiliated Organisations.

1. November, 1914.

20 Branches of the I.L.P.

12 National Adult Schools

6 Branches of the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR)

St. George's, Hanover Square Liberal Association.

Source: Min, Inaug. Mtg., 17th. Nov., 1914, Sec. Rpt., H,DDC/1/1.

2. February 1915.

Branches of the I.L.P.

Alfreton,

Birmingham,

West Bromwich,

Normanton,

Pontnewydd

Merthyr Tydvil,

West Ham (South),

Barnsley,

Sheffield,

Douglas Water,

Edinburgh (North).

Branches of the NUR:

Birkenhead No.1,

Birmingham No.9,

Bermondsey,

Cardiff No.5,

Cardiff No.7,

Brockholes,

Newton Heath,

King's Norton,

Manchester No.12,

Grimesthorpe.

Branches of the British Socialist Party:

Walthamstow,

Hampstead,

Kilburn,

Branches of the Norman Angell Study Circle:

Farsley,

Leeds.

Branch of the Amalgamated Association of Tramway and Vehicle
Workers: Leeds.

Women's Labour League (en bloc).

The discrepancies between List 1 and 2 appear to arise over the matter of non-renewal of affiliation fee.

Source: Gen. Council Rpt., 9th.Feb.,1915, Sec's Statement,H,DDC/1/1.

3. June, 1915.

"The Central Body and the Branches between them have now secured the affiliation of over 50 Public Bodies, of which 21 are Trades and Labour Councils. These bodies have an aggregate membership of between 130,000 and 150,000."

Source: Gen.Council Rpt., 22nd. Jun.,1915, Sec's Statement,H,DDC/1/1.

4. October, 1915.

"107 organisations, of which 48 consist of Trades Councils and local Labour Parties, have affiliated to the Union, representing an aggregate membership of well over 300,000. Of these organisations, 60 have affiliated to the Branches, and 47 to the Central Body. Leicester, Manchester, Bradford, Leeds and Portsmouth are the Branches which have succeeded so far in obtaining the greatest number of affiliations".

Source: First Annual Gen.Council Mtg., 29th.Oct., 1915,
Sec's Rpt., p.2, H,DDC/1/1.

5. March 1916.

The total number of affiliated organisations was 123, with an aggregate membership of about 400,000.

Recent affiliations included:

Jarrow Labour Party (about 5,000 members)

Fulham Trades and Labour Council (TLC) (2,000 members)

*Woolwich TLC (10,000 members)

*Coventry TLC (15,000 members)

Merthyr Tydvil TLC (10,000 members)

Bargoed TLC (5,000) members)

Swindon TLC (5,000 members)

Leicester Branch of the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives (4,000 members)

* Morel considered these adherences "of Particular significance in view of the fact that the areas concerned are areas in which the wages of labour are high".

Source: Gen.Council Rpt., 9th.March, 1916, Sec's Rpt.H,DDC/1/1.

6. 1919 - 1921.

In The Union of Democratic Control, its history and its policy, Charles Trevelyan listed the Numerically most important affiliated organisations in England and Wales, followed by a complete list of the "Bodies and Organisations affiliated through the Scottish Federation":

Aberdare T.L.C.	Kettering Div. Lab. Pty.
Birmingham Central Lab. Pty.	Leicester Lab. Pty.
Bolton and District United T.C.	Leicester T.C.
Bradford T.C.	Liverpool Lab. Pty. and T.C.
Bristol L.R.C.	Manchester and Salford Lab.Pty.
Camberwell Lab. Pty.	Manchester T.C.
Cardiff T.C.	Morpeth Borough L.R.C.
Chorley T.L.C.	Normanton Div. Lab. Pty.
Colchester T.C. and Lab.Pty.	Northampton T.C.
Coventry T.L.C.	Norwich Lab.Pty. and Industrial Council.
Darlington Co-operative Indust. Socy.	Peterborough T.L.C.
Darwen and Dist. Div. T.L.C.	Pontypool T.L.C.
Dewsbury T.C.	Portsmouth T.C.
East Ham T.L.C.	Rushden and Dist. T.L.C.
Edmonton Lab. Pty.	Stafford T.C. and Lab. Pty.
Enfield Co-op. Soc.	Stepney T.C. and Central Lab.Pty.

Enfield T.C. and Lab. Pty.

Gateshead Lab. Pty.

Gorton Trades and Lab. Pty.

Grays and Dist. Lab. Pty.
and T.C.

Hampshire and I.O.W. Lab. Fedn.

Hoyland T.L.C.

Ipswich T.C. and Lab. Pty.

Islington Lab. Pty.

Jarrow T.L.C.

Stockport Lab. Pty.

Sunderland T.C. and Lab. Pty.

Swansea Labour Association.

Swindon Div. Lab. Pty.

Walsall T.L.C.

Willesden Lab. Pty.

Woolwich Arsenal Co-op Soc. .

Woolwich T.C.

Worcester Lab. Pty.

York and Dist. T.L.C.

Glasgow T.L.C.	90,000	Camelon I.L.P.	50
Aberdeen T.L.C.	12,000	Coaltown I.L.P.	50
Paisley T.L.C.	9,000	Dalry I.L.P.	50
Greenock T.L.C.	8,000	Inverurie I.L.P.	50
Leith T.C.	8,000	Chryston I.L.P.	40
Galashiels United Co-op Soc. Ltd.	2,273	Glasgow Cathcart I.L.P.	40
Glasgow Progress Co-op Soc.	2,225	Glenbuck I.L.P.	30
Hurlford Co-op Soc. Ltd.	874	Harthill I.L.P.	20
Bo'ness T.C.	800	Rutherglen T.L.C.	5,000
Tranent L.R.C.	300	Lochwinnoch I.L.P.	50
Aberdeen I.L.P.	250	Wishaw Co-op Parly. Comm.	2,630
Paisley I.L.P.	250	Drongan I.L.P.	30
Greenock I.L.P.	200	Douglas Water Lab. Pty. Women's Section	50
Johnstone I.L.P.	150	Kirkintilloch I.L.P.	100
Motherwell I.L.P.	150	Falkirk I.L.P.	150
Brechin I.L.P.	100	Stirling I.L.P.	100
Glasgow Govanhill I.L.P.	80	Kingseat Co-op Soc., Ltd.	200
Galashiels I.L.P.	60	Camelon Co-op.Soc. Ltd. Educational Comm.	1,400

Sources: Trevelyan, Charles, The Union of Democratic Control, its history and its policy, London, 1919; revised edition, Sept., 1921, pp 14 - 16.

APPENDIX D

Details of the Composition of the U.D.C. General Council and Executive.A. Names of Members of General Council and Representatives of Branches
present at General Council Meetings: 1914 - 1916:

1. 1914	B.N.Langdon Davies	Carl Heath
Nov.17.	R.D.Denman	Charles Trevelyan
	D.M.Stevenson	J.Ramsay MacDonald
	Arthur Ponsonby	C.M.Gordon (Newcastle)
	E.M.M.Williams (Newcastle)	Marian Phillips
	R.C.Trevelyan	Bertrand Russell
	Harrison Barrow	J.W.Kneeshaw (Birmingham)
	Barry Parker (Letchworth)	W.C.Anderson
	J.A.Hobson	H.N.Brailsford
	F.Seymour Cocks (Civil Union)	Barbara Mackenzie
	Norman Angell	Israel Zangwill
	Miss Sturge	Anna Barlow
	M.Philips Price	V. Paget
	S.W.Palmer (Letchworth)	J.H.Hudson (Manchester)
	C.G.Renold (Manchester)	E.D.Morel

2. 1915

Feb.9.

C.G.Renold (Manchester)	R.C.Trevelyan
H.T.Phillips(Wolverhampton)	Dr. Marion Phillips (Women's Labour League)
Sydney W.Palmer (Letchworth)	Helen Blake-Howell (Portsmouth)
Hon.Mrs.H. Franklin	J.Ramsay MacDonald, M.P.
Rev.J.J.Darmody (Wolverhampton)	Charles Trevelyan, M.P.
W.Leach (Bradford)	Norman Angell
F.Mactavish (Portsmouth)	Barry Parker (Letchworth)
H.N.Brailsford	F.W.Jowett, M.P.
R.D.Denman, M.P.	Arthur Ponsonby, M.P.
Rev. Percy Blundell (Luton)	I.Pickthall (Halifax)
Robert Shanks (Glasgow)	Enid F.Brailsford (Bradford)
I. Zangwill	J.W.Kneeshaw (Birmingham)
W.L.Edwards (Gloucester)	George Gordon (Bristol)
M.L.Edwards (Gloucester)	B.N.Langdon Davies
Miss V.Paget (Vernon Lee)	Hon. Bertrand Russell
M.M.B.Longbourne (London)	F.Seymour Cocks (London)

3. 1915

June 22. Sir D.M.Stevenson (Glasgow)	Hon. Mrs. Franklin
S.E.Keeble (Portsmouth)	Miss E. Reynolds
G.W. Thompson (Portsmouth)	H.C.Harwood (Oxford University)
Roland Muirhead (Bridge of Weir)	H.W.Lemon (Birmingham)
J.Ramsay MacDonald, M.P.	Rev. Herbert Dunnico (Liverpool)
T.Richardson (Whitehaven)	Barry Parker (Letchworth)
Llewellyn Williams (Darlington)	Charles Trevelyan
Mrs.Jane E. Strickland	Mrs. Adelaide Baly (Exeter)
Miss Sophia Sturge	R.C. Trevelyan
J.A.Hobson	Lady Barlow
H.N.Brailsford	E.D.Morel
H.E.Williams (Bath)	William Leach (Bradford)
J.E.Hodgkin (Darlington)	B.N.Langdon-Davies
J.Robinson (Leeds)	S.Spencer (Leicester)
F.J.Holdstock (Luton)	J.T.Rodes (Leicester)
Sydney Palmer (Letchworth)	R.H.Soltau (Bristol)
Hon.Bertrand Russell	J.T.Tanner (Bath)
Mrs. Margaret H. Renold (Manchester)	Charles W. Hayward (Liverpool)
Carl Heath	H.T.Phillips (Wolverhampton)
Miss M.B.Longbourne (London)	E.Ratcliffe (Kendal)
Rev. W.Charter Piggott	Charles B. Wilson (Kendal)
R.Barritt (Belfast)	F.R.Berrell (Bristol)
Harrison Barrow (Birmingham)	Miss Rose Sidgwick (Birmingham)
Miss Isabella O. Ford (Leeds)	E.A.Walton (Edinburgh)
Hon. R.D.Denman, M.P. (Carlisle)	H.F. Runacres (Oxford University)

W.J.Pope (Newport)

R.S.Lambert (Oxford
University)

Robert Shanks (Glasgow)

W.L.Edwards (Gloucester)

Herbert Corder (Sunderland)

Mrs. M.Lilian Edwards
(Gloucester)

W.H.Parker (Derby)

Arthur A. Beale
(Stanningley)

Dr. Marion Phillips

Arthur Ponsonby

Jas. H. Hudson (Manchester)

Miss V.Paget.

4. 1915

Oct. 29. Rev. Herbert Dunnico (Liverpool)	Sir Daniel Stevenson (Glasgow)
Dr. Ethel Williams (Newcastle)	Miss Edith L. Pickworth (Brighton and Hove)
J.Ramsay MacDonald, M.P.	Carl Heath
Arthur Ponsonby, M.P.	George Rose (Liverpool)
William Leach (Bradford)	Wm. E.Dickinson (Farsley)
Rev. C.T.Campion (Bristol)	Roland E. Muirhead (Bridge of Weir)
William H. Martin (Glasgow)	Harrison Barrow
Charles Trevelyan, M.P.	J.W.Kneeshaw (Birmingham)
R.C.Trevelyan	H.F.Runacres (Oxford University)
A.W.Wishart (Greenock)	Stanley W.Davies (Oxford University)
Councillor James Alston (Glasgow)	Hubert W.Lemon (Birmingham)
T.T.Jenkins (Merthyr Tydvil)	Rev. W.J.Piggott (London)
Rev. S.E.Keeble (Portsmouth)	The Hon. Lady Barlow
James H.Hudson (Manchester)	F. Seymour Cocks (London)
Miss E.B.Burnley (Bradford)	Rev. S.Spencer (Leicester)
Charles B.Wilson (Kendal)	Mrs. S.Spencer (Leicester)
Miss N. O'Shea (Portsmouth)	B.N. Langdon Davies
Rev. V.D.Davis (Bournemouth)	F.B.Simpson (Leeds)
Miss C.E. Playne (London)	Rev. C.V.Engvall (Sunderland)
The Hon. R.D.Denman, M.P. (Carlisle)	G.H.Hardy (Cambridge University)
J.E.Hodgkin (Darlington)	Miss V.Paget (Leeds)
A.B.Pollard (Ulverston)	The Hon. Bertrand Russell
H.J. Phillips (Wolverhampton)	H.C.Williams (Bath)
Mrs. H.M.Swanwick	T.B.Matchett (Bath)
J.A.Hobson	W.J.Pope (Newport)

Geo. Benson (Manchester)

I. Zangwill

S.W.Palmer (Letchworth)

Mrs. Sproson (Wolverhampton)

James G.Douglas (Ireland)

F.W.Jowett, M.P. (Bradford)

Miss M.M.B. Longbourne
(London)

F.J.Shaw (London)

Miss Sturge

W.C.Anderson, M.P.

H.N.Brailsford

W.L.Edwards (Gloucester)

Mrs M.L.Edwards
(Gloucester)

E.D.Morel

Miss E. Reynolds

Mrs Rayment (Bournemouth)

5. 1916

March 9.	E.D.Morel	Charles Roden Buxton
	Arthur Ponsonby	F.Seymour Cocks
	H.M. Swanwick	D.M. Stevenson
	H.N.Brailsford	Robert Shanks
	F.W.Pethick Lawrence	S.Spencer (Leicester)
	Kate Courtney	Edward Grubb
	J.E.Strickland	B.Russell
	Margaret Sackville	F.W.Jowett
	Charles Trevelyan	Margaret Hills
	W.C.Anderson	Ada Salter
	J.A.Hobson	J.Ramsay Macdonald
	V.Paget	Wm. J. Piggott
	Edith L. Pickworth	H.W.Lemon
	J.W.Kneeshaw	J. Arnott
	E.M.Lockett (Leicester)	Sydney W. Palmer
	E.W.Collinson (Halifax)	Carl Heath
	Anna Barlow	R.C. Trevelyan
	George Tweedy	Harrison Barrow
	Israel Zangwill	Johnstone Barnes (Chopwell)
	M.M.B.Longbourne	Henry Bolton do.
	William Leach (Bradford)	C.H.Dodd (Oxford)
	L.A. Hogg (Glasgow)	Miss I. Salt (Harrogate)
	J.E.Hodgkin (Darlington)	S.E.Keeble (Portsmouth)
	F.J.Holdstock (Luton)	E.A.Jones (Portsmouth)
	A.H.Blgey (sic) (Bradford)	C.E.Playne (London)
	George Benson (Manchester)	F.J.Shaw (London)
	Edith Ratcliffe (Kendal)	Mr. & Mrs. W.L.Edwards (Gloucester)
	Barry Parker (Letchworth)	Egerton P.Wake (Labour Commissioner for U.D.C. representing Barrow Branch)

6. n.d.

(June 1916)

Jane E.Strickland (Hastings)	Edith Ratcliffe (Kendal)
Charles Roden Buxton	Charles B.Wilson (Kendal)
Lady Courtney	Roland Muirhead (B.of Weir)
J.A.Hobson	Barry Parker (Letchworth)
Margaret Hills	C.E.Playne (Hampstead)
Anna Barlow	F.J.Shaw (London)
Arthur Ponsonby	Tom Mellor (Carlisle)
F.W.Jowett	J.E.Hodgkin (Darlington)
H.M.Swanwick	L.A.Hogg (Glasgow)
R.C.Trevelyan	H.T.Phillips (Wolverhampton)
G.H.Hardy	Sophia Sturge (Birmingham)
Carl Heath	Harrison Barrow (Birmingham)
Philip Snowden	F.Perriman (Southampton)
I. Zangwill	N. O'Shea (Portsmouth)
Ada Salter	G.W.Thompson (Portsmouth)
Charles Trevelyan	Herbert Dunnico (Liverpool)
B.N.Langdon-Davies	Egerton P.Wake (Barrow-in- F.)
Margaret Sackville	J.Ramsay Macdonald
William Leach (Bradford)	Wilfrid Fox (Farsley)

Sources: H,DDC/1/3, and Gen. Council Min. H,DDC/1/1.

B. Elected Members of the General Council, Executive Committee and
Officers, 1915 - 1921:

1. 1915 - 16

Executive:

Norman Angell	J.Ramsey MacDonald, M.P.
C.R.Buxton	E.D.Morel
Mrs Hills	A. Ponsonby, M.P.
J.A.Hobson	Mrs. H.M.Swanwick
F.W.Jowett, M.P.	C.P. Trevelyan, M.P.

General Committee:

W.C.Anderson, M.P.	W.Leach
The Hon. Lady Barlow	Vernon Lee (Miss Paget)
Harrison Barrow	Miss Muriel Matters
H.N.Brailsford	M.Philips Price
The Lady Courtney of Penrith (sic)	The Hon. B. Russell
Miss K.D. Courtney	Lady Margaret Sackville
B.N.Langdon-Davies	Mrs.Salter
Miss Llewellyn Davies	Robert Shanks
The Hon. R.D.Denman, M.P.	Philip Snowden, M.P.
Miss I.O.Ford	Sir Daniel Stevenson
Edward Grubb	W. Straker
Mrs. Hamilton	Mrs. Strickland
G.H.Hardy	R.C.Trevelyan
Carl Heath	George Tweedy
J.H.Hudson	Dr. Ethel Williams
F.W.Pethick Lawrence	Israel Zangwill

Source: First Annual Gen. Council Mtg. Rpt. and Min.,
H,DDC/1/1.

2. 1916-17

Executive:

Norman Angell

Chas. Roden Buxton

J.A.Hobson

F.W.Jowett, M.P.

J.Ramsay MacDonald, M.P.

E.D.Morel (Sec.)

F.W.Pethick-Lawrence (Treas.)

Arthur Ponsonby, M.P.

Philip Snowden, M.P.

Mrs. H.M.Swanwick

Charles Trevelyan, M.P.

Miss Irene Cooper Willis

General Council:

W.C.Anderson, M.P.

Hon. Lady Barlow

Harrison Barrow

Harry Bolton

H.N.Brailsford

Gilbert Cannan

Edward Carpenter

Lady Courtney of Penwith

Miss Kathleen Courtney

Miss M. Llewellyn Davies

B.N.Langdon Davies

Hon. R.D.Denman, M.P.

Miss I.Ford

Edward Grubb

Carl Heath

Alfred Hicks

Mrs. Hills

J.H.Hudson

William Leach

Vernon Lee

Miss Muriel Matters

R.E.Muirhead

M.Philips Price

A.Wallace Rimington

Hon. B.Russell

Lady Margaret Sackville

Mrs. Salter

Mrs. John Scurr

Robert Shanks

Mrs. Philip Snowden

Sir Danl. Stevenson

R.C.Trevelyan

George Tweedy

Miss M.P.Willcocks

Ethel Williams

Israel Zangwill

Source: Gen. Council Min., 10th. Oct., 1916, H,DDC/1/1

3. 1917 - 18.

Executive:

H.N. Brailsford

C. Roden Buxton

J.A.Hobson

F.W.Jowett, M.P.

J.R.MacDonald, M.P.

E.D. Morel (Sec.)

F.W.Pethick Lawrence (Treas.)

Arthur Ponsonby, M.P.

The Hon. B. Russell

Philip Snowden, M.P.

Mrs. Swanwick

Charles Trevelyan, M.P.

General Council:

C.G.Ammon

W.C.Anderson, M.P.

Norman Angell

The Hon. Lady Barlow

Harrison Barrow

Gilbert Cannan

Lady Courtney of Penwith

Miss K.D.Courtney

B.N. Langdon-Davies

Miss M. Llewelyn Davies

The Hon. R.D.Denman, M.P.

Miss J.O. Ford

Alexander Gossip

Principal Graham

Edward Grubb

Major Maitland Hardyman, M.C.

Carl Heath

J.H.Hudson

William Leach

Miss M. Matters

Mrs Morel

Roland E. Muirhead

Miss Paget (Vernon Lee)

M. Philips Price

Lady Margaret Sackville

Mrs Salter

Mrs. John Scurr

Robert Shanks

Mrs. Philip Snowden

Sir Daniel Stevenson

R.C. Trevelyan

George Tweedy

Dr. Ethel Williams

Miss Cooper Willis

Israel Zangwill

4. 1918 - 19

Executive:

Fred Bramley	J. Ramsay MacDonald, M.P.
C. Roden Buxton	E.D. Morel (Sec.)
F.Seymour Cocks	Arthur Ponsonby, M.P.
J.A. Hobson	Mrs. Philip Snowden
F.W.Jowett, M.P.	Mrs. Swanwick
F.W.Pethick Lawrence	Charles Trevelyan, M.P. (Hon.Treas.)

General Council:

C.G. Ammon	Mrs Morel
W.C.Anderson, M.P.	R.L.Outhwaite, M.P.
Norman Angell	Miss Paget
Lady Barlow	M.Philips Price
Harrison Barrow	Capt. E.C. Raper
H.N. Brailsford	Tom Richardson, M.P.
The Rev. Harold Buxton	The Hon. Bertrand Russell
The Rev. A. de Cetto	Lady Margaret Sackville
Lady Courtney of Penwith	Robert Shanks
B.N.Langdon-Davis (sic)	F.J. Shaw
Miss I.O. Ford	Philip Snowden, M.P.
Principal J.W. Graham	Sir Daniel Stevenson
Edward Grubb	Mrs Charles Trevelyan
Carl Heath	Ben Turner
J.H.Hudson	J.H.Whitehouse, M.P.
Joseph King, M.P.	Dr. Ethel Williams
R.C. Lambert, M.P.	Israel Zangwill

5. 1919 - 20

Executive:

Charles Roden Buxton

Carl Heath

J.A.Hobson

R.C.Lambert

J.Ramsay MacDonald

E.D.Morel (Sec)

Arthur Ponsonby

F.J.Shaw

Mrs. H.M. Swanwick

Mrs Snowden

H.B.Lees Smith

Charles Trevelyan (Hon.Treas.)

General Council:

C.G.Ammon

Norman Angell

The Hon. Lady Barlow

Harrison Barrow

Herbert A. Berens

Francis Birrell

H.N.Brailsford

The Lady Courtney of Penwith

H.N.Langdon-Davies

Robert Dell

Miss M.E.Durham

Miss I.O.Ford

William Graham, M.P.

Edward Grubb

Mrs. M.A. Hamilton

The Rev. R.V.Holt

J.H.Hudson

Joseph King

F.W.Pethick Lawrence

William Leach

R.L.Outhwaite

Miss C.E.Playne

M.Philips Price

Miss Royds

The Hon. Bertrand Russell

Philip Snowden

Sir Daniel Stevenson

Mrs Charles Trevelyan

R.C.Trevelyan

Ben Turner

George Tweedy

J.H. Whitehouse

Dr. Ethel Williams

Miss Irene Cooper-Willis

Israel Zangwill

Source: Gen. Council Min., Oct., 1919, H,DDC/1/2.

6. 1920 - 21.

Executive:

Mrs Hamilton

Carl Heath

J.A.Hobson

R.C. Lambert

J.Ramsay MacDonald

E.D.Morel (Sec.)

Arthur Ponsonby

F.J.Shaw

Mrs.H.M. Swanwick

Mrs Snowden

H.B. Lees Smith

Charles Trevelyan (Hon.Treas.)

General Council:

C.G. Ammon

Norman Angell

Major C.R.Attlee, M.A.

The Hon. Lady Barlow

Harrison Barrow

Mrs. Barton

Herbert A. Berens

Francis Birrell

H.N.Brailsford

J. Bromley

Charles Roden Buxton

The Rev. Harold Buxton

Noel Buxton

The Rev. de Cetto

Lady Courtney of Penwith

Robert Dell

Miss M.E.Durham

Miss I.O. Ford

W. Leach

Vernon Lee

Alex. McLaren, J.P.

W.H.Martin

Miss M.B. Mylne

R.L. Outhwaite

Sir George Paish

Miss Playne

F.E.Pollard, M.A.

M.Philips Price

Miss Royds

The Hon. Bertrand Russell

Robert Shanks

The Rev. R.Sheppard

Phillip Snowden

Sir Daniel Stevenson, Bart.

The Right Hon. J.H.Thomas, M.P.

Brig.-Gen. C.B.Thomson, C.B.E.,
D.S.O.

Arnold Forster	Mrs. C.P.Trevelyan
Douglas Goldring	R.C.Trevelyan
Professor Goode	Ben Turner
William Graham, M.P.	George Tweedy
Com.H. Grenfell, R.N.	E.F. Wallis
Edward Grubb	Mrs Wallis
The Rev. R.V.Holt	Col. J. Wedgwood, M.P.
J.H. Hudson	J.H. Whitehouse
Jerome K. Jerome	Dr. Ethel Williams
Joseph King	Miss I. Cooper Willis
Councillor J.W.Kneeshaw	Alex. W. Wishart
F.W. Pethick Lawrence	Israel Zangwill

Source: Trevelyan, Charles, The Union of Democratic Control, its history and its policy, London, 1921, pp.11-12.

(Note. The date of election given on p.11 is incorrect. The corrected date given here has been established by reference to the sources for B4 and B5 above.)

Sources and Bibliography

A. Primary Sources.

(i.) Collections of Documents.

- (a.) Records of the Union of Democratic Control deposited in the Brynmor Jones Library, University of Hull.

This collection consists of all the manuscript, typescript and printed documents selected for survival when the U.D.C. was wound up in 1966. The material is divided into six sections:

DDC/1 Minutes, DDC/2 Finance, DDC/3 Files, DDC/4 Numbered Parcels, DDC/5 Printed Material (mainly publications), DDC/6 Miscellaneous.

This source is indispensable to the investigation of the internal organisation of the U.D.C. The minutes, in particular, provide scope for the elucidation of much unwitting testimony.

- (b.) The Papers of E.D. Morel. This collection, deposited in the British Library of Political and Economic Science, London, (B.L.P.E.S.), mainly consists of Morel's manuscript and typescript letters, speeches and draft reports concerning those organisations with which he was connected. Morel's exchanges of correspondence with several prominent members of the U.D.C. are well represented, (particularly his dealings with Ponsonby and Trevelyan.) The collection is located under the B.L.P.E.S. Accession Number M473. The most rewarding boxes for the U.D.C. and related research are: F2 Parliamentary activity and candidature, F6 U.D.C. affairs. The boxes are sub-divided into folders which relate to particular periods or to designated groups of correspondents. Even Morel's private correspondence tends to convey the atmosphere of a public meeting - he seems always to write with the consciousness of the hand of fate upon him. He is thus usually careful to avoid the informal asides which often illuminate private correspondence. Nevertheless, aside from its immense intrinsic interest, the Morel Collection does provide some considerable unwitting

testimony, especially in the area of assumed common assumptions among the correspondents.

- (c.) The Papers of Arthur Ponsonby, First Baron Shulbrede. The collection of Ponsonby's papers is housed at the Bodleian Library, Oxford, in the Department of Western Manuscripts, Modern Papers Reading Room 132. This correspondence, which is treated chronologically rather than thematically, contrasts sharply with Morel's. Ponsonby's writings combine the delightfully informal and confident manner common to many members of the British governing class with a deeply reflective attitude to life. His honesty is almost of the kind which is painful to read. Ponsonby's handwriting can be difficult to decipher and he frequently uses obscure contractions which perhaps reflect habits derived from his diplomatic work.
- (d.) The Passfield Papers. This collection of the papers of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, housed in the B.L.P.E.S., is of only very marginal use to research concerning the U.D.C. and its leaders. The Webbs convey, mainly by omission, a certain lack of response and appreciation of the significance of the migration of the U.D.C. Radicals. They sustain a single-minded attitude to the primacy of their own views of affairs.
- (e.) The Labour Party Archive at the party's headquarters in Walworth Road, London. Documents held include two boxes of correspondence relating to the U.D.C., which mainly concern matters peripheral to this study, such as the letters of recommendation relating to the advocacy of the U.D.C.'s candidature for a Nobel Peace Prize. However, the collection of Reports of the Annual Conferences contains much material illustrating rank-and-file attitudes towards the membership of the U.D.C. Liberals, and other elite migrants to the party in the period 1917 to 1924, and the powerful influence of Egerton Wake.

(f.) T.U.C. Records. The collections stored in Congress House, Great Russell Street, London, provide useful evidence for the debate between unionists who appreciated the status in foreign affairs brought to Labour by the U.D.C. migrants and those who remained suspicious that the movement was passing out of the control of working people. This issue is most specifically expressed in the Reports of Proceedings ... of the annual Trades Union Congresses.

(ii.) Newspapers and Popular Periodicals.

The collections held by the British Library provide an enormous resource for twentieth century historical research. Newspapers and popular periodicals are stored at the Newspaper Library, Colindale, London. More substantial periodicals are available at the Bloomsbury Reading Rooms, Great Russell Street, London.

Papers which strongly reflected the violent opposition to the U.D.C. included: "The Morning Post", "Daily Express", "Daily Chronicle", "John Bull" and "The Investors' Review". Papers consistently favourable to the U.D.C. were restricted to the Labour press led by "The Herald" and the "Labour Leader". After 1916 a number of papers treated the Union more even-handedly, often according at least a "right of reply". This group included the "Daily News", "Westminster Gazette", "Manchester Guardian" and the "Nation".

Many local newspapers contain casual references to the U.D.C., some reflecting the opposition of the popular dailies, while others were trying to preserve a more balanced presentation. The latter group includes "The Hackney and Kingsland Gazette" which was faced with the problem of reporting the local Liberal Party's disavowal of a much lauded candidate - C.R. Buxton. Although hostile to overt opposition to the government's war policy, this paper continued to report Buxton's local involvement and the developing activities of the local U.D.C. Branch. The

"Westmorland Mercury and Times" was an outstanding example of a newspaper whose editor kept his head in the popular reaction to the war and maintained a calm-headed and courteous style of reportage and correspondence, apparently in the interests of local harmony and civilized continuity.

(iii.) Published Autobiographies and Diaries:

Addison, C., Politics From Within 1911-1918, 2 vols., London, 1924.

Angell, N., After All, London, 1951.

Gooch, G.P., Under Six Reigns, London, 1958.

Hamilton, Mary A., Remembering My Good Friends, London, 1944.

Hobson, J.A., Confessions of an Economic Heretic, New York, 1938.

Pethick-Lawrence, F.W., Fate Has Been Kind, London, 1942.

Proctor, Sir D. (ed.), The Autobiography of Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, Cambridge, 1973.

Russell, B., Portraits From Memory, and other essays, London, 1956.

The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell 1914-1944,
New York, 1968.

Snowden, Philip, An Autobiography, (2 vols.), London, 1934.

Swanwick, H.M., I Have Been Young, London, 1935.

Trevelyan, C.P., From Liberalism to Labour, London, 1921.

Woolf, L., Beginning Again: An Autobiography of the Years 1911-1918, New York, 1964.

(iv.) Works of Reference:

The Dictionary of National Biography.

The most useful edition for cross-referencing purposes is the Compact Edition of 1975. The whole of the original D.N.B. and Supplement is printed in two micrographic volumes. Volume Two includes all the Twentieth-Century D.N.B. entries up to 1960 in a continuous alphabetic sequence. Further useful information

about U.D.C. leaders is to be found in the latest supplement: Williams, E.T. and Nicholls, C.S. (ed.), The Dictionary of National Biography, 1961-1970, Oxford, 1981.

Bellamy, J.M. and Saville, J. (ed.), Dictionary of Labour Biography, 6 vols. issued, London, 1972 onwards.

This work provides a contrast to the "semi-official" authority of the D.N.B. It provides information about many figures absent from the D.N.B. and a different perspective of those whom the works cover in common. A recent additional feature has been the introduction of special subject entries. The article on the 1917 Club was particularly useful in helping to establish an overall view of activities alluded to rather cryptically in the U.D.C. Minutes.

Two works, which are totally partial and very uneven, are useful in their reflection of the immediate preoccupations of the period:

Labour Who's Who 1924, and

Tracey, H. (ed.), The Book of the Labour Party, its history, growth, policy, and leaders, 3 vols., London, n.d. (1926.)

(v.) Printed Publications of the U.D.C:

The following list of publications for the period 1914-1924 is not definitive. The nature of the U.D.C.'s activities and the very poor quality of much wartime newsprint and book paper have combined to create lacunae in the lists and render the decipherment of some material difficult. CX indicates a publication whose distribution was banned by the censor.

(a.) Leaflets.

Numbered Series:

1914-15.

1. 'Why Should Democracy Control Foreign Policy?'
2. 'Why You Should Join the Union of Democratic Control'
3. 'Why Have the People Taken No Interest in Foreign Affairs?'

4. 'What Is the Balance of Power?'
5. 'Crushing Germany'
6. 'What Is a Treaty?'
7. 'Some People Are Asking: Is This The Time to Talk about
Terms of Settlement?'
8. 'Our Soldiers and the Union of Democratic Control'
9. 'Do Nations Want to Fight?'
10. Arthur Ponsonby, 'Why We Should Think about Peace'
11. E.D.Morel, 'War and Diplomacy'
12. 'A Patched-up Peace'
13. E.D.Morel, 'The Union of Democratic Control'
14. 'The Union of Democratic Control: What It Is and What It Is Not'
15. 'Mr. Ponsonby and Mr. Trevelyan in the House of Commons'
(November 11th, 1915)
16. 'Lord Loreburn and Lord Courtney of Penwith in the House
of Lords' (November 8th, 1915)
17. 'What the Press Now Say: More Support for the U.D.C.'
18. Anon. 'Terms of Peace'
19. E.D.Morel, 'Secret Diplomacy a Menace to the Security of the
State'
20. 'The Attack upon Freedom of Speech' (Broken-up meeting at the
Memorial Hall, November 29th, 1915)
21. 'The Attack upon Freedom of Speech' (House of Commons sequel
to the broken-up meeting at the Memorial Hall)
22. E.D.Morel, 'Our Ultimate Objects in This War'
1916-18.
23. 'The Union of Democratic Control: Its Motives, Objects and
Policy'
24. 'Labour and a Permanent Peace'
25. E.D.Morel, 'Whither?' CX
26. 'The Prime Minister's Declaration' (February 23rd 1916)

27. Charles Trevelyan, 'The Case for Negotiations' CX
28. 'What Our Allies Think about Economic War'
29. Arthur Ponsonby, 'Why Must the War Go on?' CX
30. 'Resolutions Passed at the Second Annual Meeting of the
General Council of the Union of Democratic Control'
(October 10th 1916)
31. 'America and a Permanent Peace'
32. 'Must the War Go on till Russia Gets Constantinople?' CX
33. 'President Wilson's Message to the World'
34. 'British Working-men - Observe! French Workers support Wilson'
35. 'French Members of Parliament and the "Knock-out Blow"'
36. 'Manifesto of Russian Workers and Soldiers'
37. 'Free Russia and the Union of Democratic Control'
38. 'Then Why Go On?' CX
39. 'Russia's Real Aims'
40. 'Secret Diplomacy, No. 1'
41. 'Secret Diplomacy, No. 2'
42. 'Vindication of Mr. Morel in the House of Commons'
43. 'Secret Diplomacy, No. 3'
44. 'How to Get a Permanent Peace'
45. 'General Smuts on Victory'
46. 'How to Obtain Popular Control over Foreign Policy'
47. 'President Wilson's Peace Terms'

Occasional unnumbered leaflets were issued, for example, 'The Basis for a Peoples' Peace', 'Suggestions for Terms of a Peace Settlement' and Corporal Lees Smith's 'A Soldier's View' were all current in 1917.

(b.) Pamphlets.

Numbered Series:

1914:

1. Anon., 'The Morrow of the War', 14 pp.

2. Angell, N., 'Shall this War End German Militarism?', 22 pp.
 3. Russell, B., 'War - the Offspring of Fear'.
 4. Brailsford, H.N., 'The Origins of the Great War', 20 pp.
(reprinted from the 'Contemporary Review', Sept., 1914)
 5. Ponsonby, A., 'Parliament and Foreign Policy', 13 pp.
(later reprinted as 'The Control of Foreign Policy'.)
 6. Anon., 'The National Policy', 14 pp.
 7. Anon., 'The International Industry of War', 14 pp.
- 1915:
8. MacDonald, J.R., 'War and the Workers. A Plea for Democratic Control', 16 pp.
 9. Anon., 'Why we should state Terms of Peace', 6 pp.
 10. Anon., 'Towards an International Understanding: Being the Opinions of Some Allied and Neutral Writers', 26 pp.
 11. Swanwick, H.M., 'Women and War', 14 pp.
 12. "A. Pole", 'The Polish Problem', 20 pp.
 13. Angell, N., 'The Prussian in our Midst', 27 pp.
 14. Anon., 'The Balance of Power', 24 pp.
 15. Hobson, J.A., 'A League of Nations', 20 pp.
- 1916:
16. Hobson, J.A., 'Labour and the Costs of War', 16 pp.
 17. Anon., 'The Peace Debate in the House of Commons (May 23rd, 1916)', 21 pp.
 18. Brailsford, H.N., 'Turkey and the Roads of the East', 24 pp.
 19. Dickinson, G.L., 'Economic War after the War', 20 pp.
 20. Angell, N., 'America and the Cause of the Allies'.
- 1917:
21. "A. Soldier" (R.M. Tawney), 'The War to End Wars, A Plea to Soldiers', 20 pp.
 22. Morel, E.D., 'The African Peoples and the Peace Settlement', 31 pp.

23. Gooch, G.P., 'The Races of Austria-Hungary', 24 pp.

24. Anon., 'Rex v. Morel: Trial at Bow Street'.

1918:

25. Lambert, R.C., 'Alsace and Lorraine, a short historical sketch', 16 pp.

26. King, J., 'The Russian Revolution: The First Year', 32 pp.

27. Anon., 'Peace Overtures and their Rejection', 22 pp.

28. Anon., 'A Misrepresentation Exposed'.

29. (Not traced)

1919:

30. Pethick-Lawrence, F.W., 'Making Germany Pay'.

31. (Not traced)

32. Dell, R., 'The Left Bank of the Rhine'.

33. King, J., 'Our Policy Towards Russia'.

34. Hobson, J.A., 'The New Holy Alliance'.

35. Rickman, J., 'Common Sense and Our Russian Policy'.

36. (Not traced)

37. (Executive Committee), 'The Betrayal of the Peoples', 15 pp.

38. (Not traced)

1920:

39. Morel, E.D., 'The Fruits of Victory'.

40. Hertz, Dr. F., 'The Political and Economic Murder of the German-Austrian People'.

41. Ponsonby, A., 'The Covenant of the League of Nations. An Analysis with Full Text', 19 pp.

1921:

42. Demartial, G., 'Patriotism, Truth and War Guilt', 30 pp.

43. Dell, R. and Birrell, F., 'Anglo-French Relations'.

44. Morel, E.D., 'The Horror on the Rhine'.

1922:

45. Arnold-Forster, W., 'France, Ourselves and the Future', 20 pp.

Occasional pamphlets included the regular 'Notes from the Foreign Press' compiled by the Cambridge Group, and some unnumbered pamphlets, sometimes published privately or by sympathizers, which included:

Morel, E.D., 'The Outbreak of War', 18 pp., 1914.

Lee, V., 'Peace with Honour. Controversial Notes on the Settlement', 64 pp., 1915.

Anon., 'The Union of Democratic Control. Notes on Careers of the Members of the Executive Committee', n.d. (1916).

Anon., 'The Community of Nations', 16 pp., 1917.

Morel, E.D., 'Tsardom's Part in the War', 31 pp., 1917.

Anon., 'The Secret Agreements', 22 pp., 1918.

Anon., 'The Persecution of E.D. Morel', 11 pp., 1918.

Morel, E.D., 'Pre-War Diplomacy - Fresh Revelations', 54 pp. n.d. (1918).

Morel, E.D., 'The Poison that Destroys', 29 pp., (8th. edn., 1924).

Kneeshaw, J.W., 'The Peace that Failed', 13 pp., 1920.

(c.) Journals.

"The U.D.C.", Monthly, November, 1915-June, 1919.

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(d.) Books.

Books officially sponsored or commissioned by the U.D.C. were often brought out by commercial publishers. The name of the publishing house follows the title in the list below:

Brailsford, H.N., The War of Steel and Gold, Bell, London, 1914.

A League of Nations, Headley, London, 1917.

Buxton, C.R. (ed.), Towards a Lasting Settlement, Allen and Unwin, London, 1915.

Cocks, F. Seymour, The Secret Treaties and Understandings, (U.D.C.), London, 1918.

- Dickinson, G.Loves, The European Anarchy, Allen and Unwin,
London, 1916.
- Hobson, J.A., Towards International Government, Allen and Unwin,
London, 1915.
The New Protectionism, (Cobden Club), Manchester,
1916.
Democracy after the War, Allen and Unwin, London,
1917.
- Langdon Davies, B.N., The ABC of the U.D.C., (U.D.C.), London,
1916.
- MacDonald, J.R., National Defence: A Study in Militarism,
Allen and Unwin, London, 1917.
- Morel, E.D., Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy, National Labour Press
(N.L.P.), London, 1915.
Truth and the War, N.L.P., London, 1916.
Africa and the Peace of Europe, N.L.P., London, 1917.
Diplomacy Revealed, N.L.P., London, n.d. (1921).
The Secret History of a Great Betrayal, (U.D.C.),
London, n.d. (1924).
- Pethick-Lawrence, F.W., A Levy on Capital, Allen and Unwin,
London, 1918.
- Ponsonby, A., Democracy and Diplomacy, Methuen, London, 1915.
The Crank, a discussion, Headley, London, n.d.
(c. 1917).
Wars and Treaties, 1815-1914, Allen and Unwin,
London, 1918.
- Trevelyan, C.P., The Union of Democratic Control, its history
and its policy, (U.D.C.), London, 1919, 1921.
- Woolf, L.S., The Future of Constantinople, Allen and Unwin,
London, 1917.

(vi.) Other published works.

Cocks, F. Seymour, E.D. Morel: The Man and His Work, London, 1920.

This book, written by the U.D.C.'s London organiser, was hastily thrown together on the basis of notes supplied by Morel. The result is totally unbalanced and lacking in a sense of perspective.

Swanwick, H.M., Builders of Peace: Being Ten Years' History of the Union of Democratic Control, London, 1924.

This book is also disappointing. The author's deep involvement in both the women's suffrage movement and pacifism makes for a slanted and over-selective work.

B. Secondary Sources.

(i.) Books.

(a.) The U.D.C. and Elite Migration.

Cline, C.A., Recruits to Labour, the British Labour Party, 1914-1931, Syracuse, N.Y., 1963.

A very clear analysis full of illuminating opinions, the factors involved with elite migration are convincingly established. The author gives considerable emphasis to the suggested catalytic role of Morel and the U.D.C.

Swartz, M., The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics during the First World War, Oxford, 1971.

This is the first substantial general history of the U.D.C. The factors influencing the dynamics of the movement are thoroughly explored. The relationships of the U.D.C. with the Liberal and Labour parties are skilfully clarified. The main concern of the author is the inter-relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy.

(b.) Biography.

Anderson, M., Noel Buxton: a Life, London, 1952.

Brailsford, H.N., The Life and Work of J.A. Hobson, London, 1948.

- Cline, C.A., E.D. Morel, 1873-1924, the Strategies of Protest,
Belfast, 1980.
- deBunsen, V., Charles Roden Buxton: A Memoir, London, 1947.
- Forster, E.M., Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, London, 1934, 1962.
- Morgan, K. and J., Portrait of a Progressive, the political
career of Christopher, Viscount Addison,
Oxford, 1980.
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London, 1951.

(ii.) Articles.

- Hanak, H., 'The Union of Democratic Control during the First
World War', in BIHR, Vol. xxxvi, No. 94, Nov. 1963.
- This pioneering article opened up the U.D.C. as a subject worthy
of historical investigation. It is a clear analysis and provides
many leads to further enquiry.
- Winkler, H.R., 'The Emergence of Labour Foreign Policy in Great
Britain, 1918-1929' in JMH, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1956.
- This article is very useful for the detailed exposition of the
process whereby the U.D.C. became the major contributor to the
reappraisal of Labour's foreign policy.

C. General Bibliography.

Note. Details refer to standard editions of books. Where reference has
been made in the text to paperbacked or other editions in which
the pagination may differ from the standard version, the
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- Cook, C., et al, Sources in British Political History, 1900-1951,
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(H.M.S.O.), Record Repositories in Great Britain, London, 7th. edn.
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Present, London, 1969.

(iii.) General Social and Ideological Background.

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