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## **Material abstract**

### **Coaches' dehumanisation in sport: exploring antecedents and relationships with wellbeing.**

**Michael John Slater**

**Overview:** Dehumanisation is the denial of humanness, in which humanness is considered as attributes that characterise what it means to be human. To the author's knowledge, this study was the first to specifically explore dehumanisation in a sporting context. The context used was team-selection decisions, widely conceptualised as a stressor for coaches. This study sought to explore whether dehumanisation was employed by coaches when making team selection decisions, what personal or contextual factors may predict this, and to examine whether dehumanisation may be protective for mental well-being.

**Methodology:** A combination of sampling methods were used alongside gatekeepers to recruit participants. Coaches completed a two part questionnaire, one before (n=193) and one after a team selection decision (n=104). Questionnaires contained demographic information, and measures of dehumanisation, Personal Sense of Power (PSP), Emotional Intelligence (EI), Resilience, Relatedness and Mental well-being.

**Results:** Coaches' change in use of dehumanisation from pre to post selection was found to be negligible. This indicated that personal factors instead of contextual factors were of greater prominence when predicting coaches' engagement with dehumanisation. Specifically, coaches' levels of PSP, EI Relatedness and Resilience negatively predicted use of all three forms of dehumanisation. Moreover, it was found that all three forms of dehumanisation were negatively related to mental well-being, suggesting that engagement with dehumanisation is unlikely to be functional for coaches in relieving stress.

**Conclusion:** Findings suggest that dehumanisation does not significantly change following a team selection decision, yet personal factors do influence coaches' engagement with dehumanisation. Thus, the key implication of this study is that coach education programmes seek to integrate training of EI, Resilience and Relatedness, due to the negatively correlations with dehumanisation, and dehumanisation's negatively relationship with mental well-being. It is recommended future research focuses on practical manifestations of, and sport-specific measures for, dehumanisation.



# Coaches' dehumanisation in sport: exploring antecedents and relationships with wellbeing.

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Michael John Slater

A thesis submitted for the degree of MSC by Research within the Department of Sport and Exercise Sciences.

Research undertaken in the Department of Sport and Exercise Sciences, Durham University.

2019



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## **Chapter 1: General Introduction**

### **Part 1 - Overview and Rationalisation of Research Area**

Sport can be defined as activities that are structured, goal-oriented, competitive, ludic and culturally situated (Giulianotti, 2005) and the reasons for studying sport are grounded in the psychological, social, physiological and economic benefits for those that take part. Benefits to the individual of participating in sport as a form of physical activity include a positive association with wellbeing (Fox, 1999; Downward & Rascuite, 2011), reduced risk of negative health states such as coronary heart disease and diabetes (Fentem, 1994) and the potential to alleviate symptoms of depression (Craft & Perna, 2004). Participating in sport also enables the learning of social and moral skills, how to cope with social differences, how to manage the experience of winning and losing, and how to develop healthy habits (Jacobs et al., 2016).

Furthermore, sport has numerous societal benefits. Economically, sport and sport-related activity in England is estimated to support over 400,000 full-time equivalent jobs, with the value of sport in terms of volunteering estimated to be £2.7 billion (Sport England, 2013). Moreover, taking part in regular sport can save between £1,750 and £6,900 in healthcare costs per person (Sport England, 2019a). Socially, returns on investment in sports programmes for at-risk youth are estimated at £7.35 of social benefit for every £1 spent - achieved through financial savings to the police, the criminal justice system and the community (Sport England, 2019b). Unfortunately, achieving these benefits is not as straightforward as listing them. Given sport's inherent interpersonal nature, there are a number of sociological and psychological processes that can either facilitate or prevent these benefits from occurring.

One key figure in the sporting experiences of those who engage is the sports coach. Indeed, Jacobs et al. (2016) contend that the coach is the catalyst for promoting the positive effects of sport participation. The coaching climate is one factor that influences people's sports experiences (Smith & Smoll, 1996). The coaching climate refers to the

psychosocial environment a coach creates for the athletes they work with, specifically; this refers to the characteristics of interactions between coach and athlete (Cronin & Allen, 2015). As such, from youth sport participation to competing at world championships, coaches strongly influence the nature and quality of the sport experience for athletes. This is through the goal priorities they promote, the attitudes and values they transmit, and the nature of their interactions with athletes (Smith et al., 2007; Pensgaard & Roberts, 2002).

Yet, Jones and Wallace (2005) argue that “coaching is a tough job” (p. 120) as it is not something which is merely delivered, but is instead a dynamic social activity that engages both the coach and athlete (Cushion et al., 2006). Given this inherently social nature, coaching practice not only includes explicit practices (e.g. language, roles, documents) but also the implicit practices (e.g. relationships, tacit conversations, underlying assumptions), with the latter largely impossible to articulate, yet crucial to coaching’s effectiveness (Wenger, 1998). Bowes and Jones (2006) note that given coaching is comprised of endless dilemmas and decision making, requiring constant planning, observation, evaluation and reaction, its nature defies predominant rationalistic explanations. This is compounded by a coaching environment characterised by ambiguity and obscurity (Bowes & Jones, 2006). Every coach or athlete brings personal interests to the coaching setting, and each is empowered to follow them to some extent according to personal rationality (Jones & Wallace, 2005). The coaching process is therefore characterised by a deep-rooted element of ambiguity over what everyone involved is trying to do, why they are trying to do it and whether they can achieve it (Jones & Wallace, 2005). This complexity and multidimensionality by which coaching can be characterised, coupled with the influence the coach has on the sport experience for the athlete, underpins the argument as to why researching sport coaching as a process, and sports coaches as a population, is a worthwhile area of study.

By researching coaching and coaches as a population, it is hoped that clarity will be developed on how best to support coaches to be effective. Coaching effectiveness (in sport)



has been defined by Côté and Gilbert (2009) as “the consistent application of integrated professional, interpersonal, and intrapersonal knowledge to improve athletes’ competence, confidence, connection and character in specific coaching contexts” (p. 316). However, this definition can be contested as it adopts a unidirectional assessment of coaching outcomes, whilst simultaneously neglecting any impact upon the coach’s wellbeing. Given that on-going research suggest rates of mental illness in coaches exceed that reported in general population samples, at up to 44% of coaches (Edge Hill University, 2018), the under-exploration in the literature of factors that influence coaches’ wellbeing is a real concern. There is not yet evidence to establish a causal relationship between the stress of sports coaching and mental illness, yet characteristics of the role (e.g., the aforementioned ambiguity and uncertainty) have been linked with negative mental health outcomes in other employment contexts (e.g., Pollard, 2001). Unhealthy coaches, much like unhealthy athletes, cannot perform to the best of their abilities. Therefore supporting coach wellbeing should be considered an important component of supporting effective coaching.

The long-term negative outcomes of reduced wellbeing is supported by research from organisational psychology, as work by Wright and Bonett (2007) reported that individuals with low levels of psychological wellbeing were more likely to leave their employers as a result of low job satisfaction. Similarly, the Department for Work and Pensions (2006) stated that healthy and fit employees are essential to ensuring a company remains efficient and profitable. Therefore, the definition of coaching effectiveness to be used in this study is one which involves a consideration for the coach’s psychological and social wellbeing too, with coaching effectiveness defined as “the consistent application of integrated professional, interpersonal, and intrapersonal knowledge to improve athletes’ competence, confidence, connection and character in specific coaching contexts whilst not negatively impacting the coach’s psychological wellbeing.” As Giges et al. (2004) note, “coaches are performers, educators, administrators, leaders, planners, motivators, negotiators, managers and listeners, but they are also people” (p. 431) and it is this last

characteristic that must be considered of equal importance to the rest when considering how to define coaching effectiveness.

In sum, therefore, sport is an important context for research when considering the benefits it offers to an individual's physical and mental wellbeing, the economy and society more broadly. Coaches are a vital part of the sporting experience, and understudied with respect to factors that influence their own performance and wellbeing. The scale at which sport and sports coaching takes place further justifies research on sports coaches as a population. The most recent coaching workforce analysis, carried out by Sport England in 2016, reported that 3.1 million adults in England have coached sport or physical activity in the past 12 months and that there are 7.6 million coach-led participation experiences per week (UK Coaching, 2017). This highlights the size of the impact studying sports coaches may have, further warranting research on sports coaches as a population. Finally, there are of course overlaps between coaching in sport and processes involved in management, leadership, and the development of others in additional elite performance domains (e.g. business, the military). Findings from the present study are likely to have applications to these contexts also. Given the above, this study will present an in-depth exploration of coaches' wellbeing around one critical job role component: team selection decisions. The next section will explain how team selection decisions can be considered a stressful context for coaches.

## **Part 2 - The context: Team selection decisions as a source of stress**

*“Selection is the most difficult ... matchday minus one when I name the team is the only day of the week that I dread.”*

Phil Neville, England Women’s Football Team Head Coach.

(Sky Sports, 2019)

In elite sport, team selection decisions sit in the public consciousness whilst also providing a constant source of fan debate, discussion and scrutiny of professional coaches. The responsibility, or rather the ‘headache’ and ‘dilemma’, of such selection decisions lies with the coach and is experienced beyond just the high-profile coaches (Neely et al., 2016; Capstick & Trudel, 2010). Within this section, first, the concept of stress will be explored, providing examples of potential stressors coaches experience and associated outcomes. Second, I will present an argument for conceptualising team selection decisions as stressors for coaches, in addition to the importance of studying them.

### ***Stress***

Lazarus (1993) defines stressors as “environmental demands (i.e. stimuli) encountered by an individual” (p. 329) with “an individual’s negative psychological, physical and behavioural responses” (p. 329) considered as ‘strain.’ The distinction here is that stressors refer to events, situations or conditions, whereas strain refers to a person’s reaction. The overall process incorporating stressors, strains, appraisals and coping responses can be described by the term ‘stress’ (Fletcher & Scott, 2010). Stress has been explored in various professional contexts, which Norris et al. (2017) list as including; law enforcement (Kaiseler et al., 2014), nursing (Woodhead et al., 2016), public services (Liu et al., 2015) and teaching (McCarthy et al., 2015). Research on stress within a coaching context has emphasised the dualistic nature of stress exchanges, finding that the coach can be a stressor

for athletes (Thelwell et al., 2017), athletes are influenced by coaches' stress experiences (Thelwell et al., 2017) and that coaches' stress experiences are influenced by athletes (Nicholls and Perry, 2016).

Full time coaches make up only 12% of the coaching population, with 74% of the workforce being comprised of volunteers (UK Coaching, 2017). However, regardless of employment status, there is literature to suggest that coaches experience multiple stressors when fulfilling the role. Research focused on elite coaches has reported conflict, pressure, athlete concerns, isolation and organisational management to be sources of stress (Olusoga et al., 2009) in addition to poor performance, poor training and officials (Thelwell et al., 2010). Similarly, work involving part-time and voluntary coaches has reported stressors to include managing other coaches, decision making, building relationships, funding, managing athletes' expectations and organisational duties (Potts et al., 2019). As such, it can be argued with confidence that coaches across all levels experience stressors in some form.

### ***Team selection decisions as a stressor***

One key stressor that coaches experience is that of team selection decisions (Didymus, 2017; Thelwell et al., 2008; Olusoga et al., 2009; Couturier, 2009 & Lundkvist et al., 2012). According to Taylor and Ogilvie (1994), deselection is the elimination of an athlete from a competitive sport team, based on the decisions of the coach. Using this definition as a guide, for the purposes of this study, a team selection will be defined as the process of the coach/coaches picking the athletes who are going to start for a team in a specific fixture, deselecting other athletes as substitutes or not participating at all. Previous research on team selection decisions can broadly be split into three categories; work on coaches (selectors), athletes (selectees) and selection itself (process).

Work on coaches has included: coaches' views on deselecting athletes (Neely et al., 2016), recommendations from coaches on deselecting players (Seifreid & Casey, 2012)

and coaches' perceptions of the challenges when working with substitute players (Wang et al., 2001). Collectively, this body of work has reported that coaches use different approaches to deselect players depending on the age of the athletes and level of the team (Seifreid & Casey, 2012; Capstick & Trudel, 2010) and that there are different phases involved in a selection decision; evaluation and decision making, communication and post decision reflections (Neely et al., 2016). Research focused on the athletes within team selection decisions has explored: the psychological symptoms of deselected elite student athletes (Brand et al., 2013), exploration of young elite athletes' deselection experiences (Brown & Potrac, 2009) and self-protection by athletes when involved in a team selection decision (Grove et al., 2004). The findings of this work state that the emotional and psychological disturbances experienced upon deselection are contributed to by the strength of one's athletic identity (Brown & Potrac, 2009), whilst athletic identity can also decrease following deselection (Grove et al., 2004). Studies exploring the selection process itself have investigated the communication of non-selection in youth sport (Capstick & Trudel, 2010) and the employment of Human Resource Management (HRM) when selecting athletes (Bradbury & Forsyth, 2012). This work found firstly, that coaches learn primarily about the process of communicating decisions through experience, and secondly (Capstick & Trudel, 2010), that coaches supported the use of HRM during the process of selection, but rarely implemented HRM-style practices (Bradbury & Forsyth, 2012).

The contention that team selection decisions are stressful for coaches has a credible base in the literature. For example, Didymus' (2017) study explored fifteen Olympic and international sports coaches' experiences of stressors and found that they experienced stressors related to the following key themes: athlete concerns, coaching responsibilities, expectations, finance, governance, interference, organisational management, performance, preparation and selection. Within the selection theme, coaches cited both 'choosing the best athletes for the team' and 'leaving athletes out of the team' as stressors. Moreover,

Olusoga et al.'s (2009) work on stress in elite sports coaching identified selection decisions as a stressor for coaches working with world-class athletes.

Further support for team selection decisions being a stressor for coaches comes from Lundkvist et al.'s (2012) study on burnout in elite football coaches. Lundkvist et al. (2012) reported how one coach described that team selection was an extremely worrying issue for them: "It's the part surrounding team selection or telling a player they're not good enough ... it takes as much energy as holding a practice session or the actual match" (p. 406). This can be interpreted as an example of emotional labour for the coach, whereby employees regulate their emotional display in an attempt to meet organisationally-based expectations specific to their roles (Brotheridge & Lee, 2003). Lundkvist et al.'s (2012) work is supported by Thelwell et al.'s (2010) study exploring coaches' experiences of coping with stressors in sport. Two of three coaches interviewed in Thelwell et al.'s (2010) research cited team selection as a stressor, although specifically one of the coaches in the study stated that "there are times when I have to escape ... I suppose I can't think of who I will pick and what the team will be ... I need to think about other stuff" (p. 248). This primarily highlights how selection decisions can be considered a stressor for sport coaches. However, to the authors' knowledge, acute experiences of, and reactions to, team selection decisions are yet to be explored either in isolation (i.e. not a whole season or for a competition) or in detail from the perspective of the coach.

### ***Outcomes of stress***

It is generally accepted that one possible outcome of chronic exposure to stress, caused by stressors like those listed above, is burnout (Olusoga & Kenttä, 2017; Tashman et al., 2010). Freudenberger (1989) defined burnout as "a state of fatigue or frustration brought about by devotion to a cause, way of life, or relationship that failed to produce the expected reward" (p. 13). Burnout is characterised as a syndrome involving symptoms such as the psychological impairments of emotional exhaustion, depersonalisation and reduced

personal accomplishment (Maslach & Jackson, 1981). Work by Bentzen and colleagues (2016) reported 24.4% of high-performance coaches across different sports were characterised as high in exhaustion at the end of the season, increasing the possibility of burnout. Burnout often presents with reduced satisfaction and diminishing commitment, which in turn increases turnover intentions (Raedeke et al., 2002). The outcome of this is that a coach's inability to effectively cope with stressors may lead to burnout and threaten long-term coach retention, thus limiting the extent to which the previously outlined benefits of sport can be enjoyed by the population as a whole. Moreover, as Kilo and Hassmén (2016) note, from an organisational viewpoint helping coaches avoid stress build-up may pay off in reduced turnover, saving organisations from regularly recruiting and replacing their coaches.

In addition to avoiding burnout's association with coach turnover/dropout, work in other domains has found that occupational stress has negative outcomes beyond burnout. For example, mental illness, particularly depression, anxiety and work-related stress, are now the leading causes of sickness, absence and long-term work incapacity (Harvey et al., 2017). This is reinforced by Goswami's (2015) study on employees in the banking sector who reported occupational stress to bring about negative psychological effects such as fear, anger and anxiety. Similarly, research on health workers has indicated that job stress is negatively correlated to job performance (AbuAlRab, 2004; Motowidlo et al., 1986; Imtiaz & Ahmad, 2009). As such, in order to alleviate these harmful health and performance outcomes related to occupational stress, effective coping methods should be explored.

### ***Summary***

Given that the psychological stress experienced by sports coaches can have both performance and potential health costs (Fletcher & Scott, 2010), there is a moral imperative to carry out research exploring how best to alleviate such negative outcomes. Linking this to the focus of the present study, failing to cope effectively with the process of

a selection decision may have negative psychological impacts for the mental wellbeing of the coach, an example of the health costs Fletcher and Scott (2010) allude to. These are likely to be the acute reactions that occur during the process of a selection decision, which when accumulated over the course of a season, may be exacerbated. As such, given team selection decisions can be considered as a stressor for coaches and the extent to which coaches are able to cope with stressors is important for their health and performance, the context of team selection decisions is a worthwhile area of study.



### **Part 3 - Conceptual Frameworks: Dehumanisation and ostracism**

Understanding how team selection decisions are stressful, and how best to mitigate this, requires application of appropriate theoretical frameworks. Here, I make an argument for the application of conceptual frameworks relating to dehumanisation and ostracism; first defining them, second explaining them and third noting how they link to sport and the context of the current study.

Ostracism is defined as “ignoring and excluding individuals or groups, by individuals or groups” (Williams, 2007, p. 427). The process of ostracism is dyadic, with one person being ostracised, the *target*, and at least one person doing the ostracism, the *source* (Wirth & Wesselman, 2018). Research focused on ostracism has found it to have multiple negative outcomes for both sides. For example, the experience of being ostracised has been associated with reduced self-esteem (Wirth *et al.*, 2010) and reduced meaning in life (Stillman *et al.*, 2009). Similarly, the experience of ostracising others has been found to be emotionally and cognitively depleting (Williams *et al.*, 2001; Zadro *et al.*, 2004). Linking this to the current study, team selection decisions may be conceptualised as a form of ostracism, given that athletes may have to be excluded from the group by the coach. It is this, I contend, that contributes to team selection decisions being stressful for coaches.

One method to avoid, or cope with, the negative outcomes and stressful experience of ostracising another, which may be present following a team selection decision, is that of dehumanisation. Dehumanisation has broadly been defined as the denial of humanness, in which humanness is considered as attributes that characterise what it means to be human (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). Dehumanisation can take three forms: animalistic, mechanistic and self. Simplistically put, animalistic involves the likening of humans to animals, mechanistic the likening of humans to machines and self-dehumanisation seeing oneself as less human. The majority of literature on dehumanisation has focused on negative contexts such as the harmful treatment of refugees (Esses *et al.*, 2008), experiences of violence (White, 2010) and sexism (Cowan & Campbell, 1994).

To date, limited literature exists considering dehumanisation in everyday use, and whether it may have adaptive or functional outcomes. The literature that does exist includes that by Haque and Waytz (2012) who explored dehumanisation in medical settings, broadly considering dehumanisation from a negative perspective but concluding with an evaluation of its potentially functional properties. The authors noted that empathy reduction may benefit physicians when working with patients. Similarly, Lammers and Stapel (2011) explored how dehumanisation could be used to justify making a tough decision, presumably therefore reducing feelings of dissonance for the individual making the decision. It is on this premise of using dehumanisation to justify tough decisions that we propose dehumanisation may be functionally employed when making team selection decisions in sport. To put it crudely; coaches may be able protect themselves from the negative outcomes of a team selection decision (underpinned by ostracism) by engaging in forms of dehumanisation.

Furthermore, these frameworks provide a useful grounding for the present research because there is some previous work linking a denial of humanness and sport within sociological research on sport, although not explicitly stated as dehumanisation. For example, Marxist theories of capitalism have been employed to articulate how athletes, and most specifically elite athletes, are considered to be parts of a machine that contribute to an output (e.g. Ingham, 2004; Brohm, 1978; Connor, 2009; Rigauer, 2000; Giulianotti, 2005). Through employing this Marxist sport structure, Brohm (1978) contends that in essence, sport is a mechanisation of the body whereby the body is treated as automaton and governed by the principle of maximising output. The competitive nature of sport implies that the maximum possible productivity is to be extracted from the labour-power of sportsmen and women, in order to reach their capacity for high performance (Brohm, 1978). This concept of productivity is reinforced by Connor (2009) who states that in elite sport, an athlete forms part of a machine “and like pieces in a machine they are just another

widget that can be replaced when worn out” (p. 1375). Despite this predominant focus on elite sport, as a result of the capitalist nature of sport that focuses on maximising productivity, it is possible that the principles still apply to those participating in non-elite levels of sport. Consequently, athletes can become tied up in a network of standardised repressive techniques and through the practice of obsessive repetition, sport can lead to the alienation of the individual (Brohm, 1978). As such, athletes are denied humanness as a result of the over-arching ‘system’ in which sport operates.

Additionally, there are plentiful examples of dehumanising terminology used within sports media. For example, Nico Portal, cycling team Team Ineos’ sporting director, described cyclist Chris Froome as “...just an animal, a beast” (BBC Sport, 2019) and Premier League Footballer, Kelechi Iheanacho, described his two former team-mates Raheem Sterling and Leroy Sane as “machines.” These descriptions characterise dehumanisation but are both used in positive contexts, which is conflicting with the majority of previous research on dehumanisation. This highlights another reason as to why dehumanisation is worthy of further consideration in this context, because it is possible that dehumanisation is employed positively within sport settings and thus, any findings related to this would be a useful addition to broader literature on dehumanisation.

#### **Part 4 - Study overview: Core Proposal**

This study will explore the prevalence, nature, and associated outcomes of dehumanisation within the sporting context surrounding team selection decisions in particular. Specifically, the extent to which a coach engages with all three forms of dehumanisation (animalistic, mechanistic and self) overall and following a team selection decision will be measured. Alongside this, individual and context-level factors hypothesised to predict a coach's use of dehumanisation will be explored.

In doing so, this study will also seek to integrate ideas from cognitive psychology, health psychology, social psychology and sociology. Specifically, we will use this focus on dehumanisation to consider how the behaviours of individuals are influenced by broader social structures and systems that exist in sport. The benefit of this integrated approach is that it will provide an understanding of the relationship between the two different disciplines (Balagué et al., 2017) and deliver additional information that would not normally be obtainable should a monodisciplinary approach be employed (Burwitz et al., 1994). As Maguire (1991) argues, in sport, people act the way they do because of the way the society in which they train and compete is constructed. This suggests that both psychology and sociology co-exist in practice and therefore builds an argument for the integration of ideas from both disciplines. Thus, by employing ideas from both psychology and sociology, it is hoped that a clearer understanding of human behaviour, both individually and during interactions, will be developed.

Moreover, by measuring factors hypothesised to predict individual differences in dehumanisation amongst coaches, insight will be provided into whether contextual or personal factors are dominant in predicting the likelihood of a coach engaging in dehumanisation. This has the potential to challenge the way in which previous research has primarily explored dehumanisation as a socially-developed phenomenon, should personal factors be central in predicting the extent to which a coach engages with dehumanisation. Collectively, the findings should enable identification of individuals or situations where

dehumanisation is likely, which in turn can facilitate early prevention, intervention, or promotion as appropriate (depending on associated wellbeing outcomes).

To summarise, novel elements of the study include: the application of psychological theory on dehumanisation to sport, the integration of individual-focused stress and coping models with a broader sociological understanding of sporting environments, and adding to the nascent research exploring sporting environments and experiences from the perspective of the coach. This study will primarily produce applied recommendations for coach education programmes, whilst also shedding light on new areas within human behaviour. Specifically, these will include the extent to which dehumanisation occurs within a sporting setting and if this potentially has adaptive outcomes for coaches. These findings may then have potential applications within contexts beyond sport, specifically leadership settings and environments centred on interpersonal relationships.



## **Chapter 2: Literature Review**

### **Part 1 - Introduction to Literature Review**

Part 1 of this literature review will conceptualise team selection decisions as a source of coach stress. In doing so, a review of the literature surrounding coach stress and coping mechanisms employed by coaches will be provided.

Following this, Part 2 will explain what dehumanisation is and provide a theoretical link between ostracism and dehumanisation, whilst considering previous research in both areas. An explanation will then be provided as to how the research on coaching, ostracism and dehumanisation suggests that dehumanisation may be employed as a coping mechanism by coaches within the context of team selection decisions.

Part 3 of this literature review will review factors hypothesised to predict the extent to which coaches engage with dehumanisation.

## **Part 2 – Coping**

### *Coping with stress*

The literature surrounding stress and coping consists of an abundance of definitions and descriptions for coping, with the trait and process perspectives being the most prominent according to Nicholls and Polman (2007). The trait approach classifies each individual according to their stable coping styles (Penley et al., 2002) and assumes individuals hold a preferred set of coping strategies which are applied to each coping context as required (Carver et al., 1989). Conversely, the process or transactional approach states that coping with stress is a dynamic and recursive process that involves interactions between a person's internal (i.e. beliefs about self, goals and values) and external (i.e. situational) environments (Lazarus, 1999). From this perspective, coping has been defined as “constantly changing cognitive and behavioural efforts to manage specific external and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the person” (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p. 141).

Lazarus (1999) and Lazarus and Folkman (1984) identified primary and secondary appraisal as crucial constructs in the stress appraisal and coping relationship. Primary appraisal concerns whether what is happening is perceived to be relevant to goal commitments, values, belief about self and situational intentions (Nicholls & Polman, 2007). Goal commitment has been viewed as a crucial factor here (Nicholls & Polman, 2007), as without goal commitment, Lazarus (1999) notes “there is nothing of adaptational importance at stake in an encounter to arouse a stress reaction” (Lazarus, 1999, p. 76). Secondary appraisal is the cognitive-evaluative process of the coping options available to the person (Nicholls & Polman, 2007). Hereby, secondary appraisal is not actual coping, but the instance where the individual decides what they are going to do to cope (Lazarus, 1999).

Furthermore, Fletcher and Fletcher (2005) developed a meta-model of stress, emotions and performance. The model illustrates the interactions between stressors,



perceptions, appraisals and coping, and the resultant positive or negative responses, feeling states and outcomes (Fletcher et al., 2006). The model comprises of three stages and the first stage identifies that all individuals' encounter environmental demands but the consequences of encountering those demands depend upon an individual's perception and initial cognitive appraisals of the demands in relation to their personal resources (Potts et al., 2019). Fletcher and Fletcher (2005) state that an individual will experience strain when the demands (stressors) they experience and their resources do not match. The second stage of the model illustrates the role of an individual's appraisal of their emotions in relation to their performance, resulting in a positive or negative feeling state (Potts et al., 2019). The final stage is focused upon how an individual copes with the feeling states that arise, leading to positive or negative outcomes (Potts et al., 2019). Thus, Fletcher and Fletcher (2005) suggest that sub-optimal performance or wellbeing is seen to result from an inability to cope or the use of ineffective coping strategies.

### *Coping in sport*

How an individual copes with a stressor is a complex phenomenon that will influence their wellbeing (Malik & Noreen, 2015). In Frey's (2007) study exploring stressors experienced by college sport coaches, it was reported that coaches who felt they were unable to manage stress effectively believed it would have a negative impact on their coaching performance, as stress would impede their focus and decision making. In addition to impacting the coach themselves, Thelwell et al. (2017) found that coaches considered their stress to impact the athletes they work with, a view supported by McCann's (1997) earlier work which suggested that when coaches experience strain, it may have a detrimental impact on athletes' confidence. Thelwell et al. (2017) argued that these findings can be explained insofar as the athletes are likely to experience stressors due to their perception that the coach has a number of deficiencies and is not able to manage their responses to the demands being placed on them. This is reinforced by Olusoga et al.'s (2010) work, in

which coaches reported that as part of their own responses to stress, their standard of work dropped, they would fail to get the best of their athletes and that generally, the quality of communication between themselves and their athletes would suffer. This therefore demonstrates the importance of coaches knowing how to effectively cope with stressors, such as team selection decisions.

### *Coping in coaches*

Research on coping within coaches has found, in support of Fletcher and Fletcher's (2005) model, that an inability to cope with stress impeded coaches' level and direction of focus, reduced their decision-making and contributed to emotional outbursts (Frey, 2007). Olusoga et al. (2010) highlighted a range of strategies (e.g. approach-focused, avoidance tactics, confrontation, distraction, structure and planning, social support) that were used to cope with stressors by a sample of world class coaches. The notion of social support being used to cope with stressors has been reinforced further by Judge et al. (2015), Knights and Ruddock-Hudson (2016) and Potts et al. (2019). Additional research on how coaches cope with stress found that, similarly to the research on athlete coping, coaches employed a variety of cognitive, emotional and behavioural strategies to cope with stressors (Frey, 2007). Moreover, Levy et al. (2009) reported how the coping strategies that the coach in their study employed to manage organisational stressors included; communication, preparation, planning, social support and self-talk. Furthermore, a variety of problem-focused, emotion-focused and avoidance strategies were reported to be effective in managing the varying organisational stressors (Levy et al., 2009).

Building on this body of work, Thelwell et al. (2010) examined specific associations between stressors and the use of coping strategies in three elite-level coaches, reporting that problem-focused and emotion-focused strategies were the most frequently deployed. Thelwell et al. (2010) suggested that these results partially reflected some of the emotional-control (e.g. social support), cognitive (e.g. being rational and keeping things in

perspective) and behavioural (e.g. exercise at the gym) strategies reported by Frey (2007) to manage performance-related stressors as well as the problem-focused (e.g. engage in communication), emotion-focused (e.g. use of self-talk) and avoidance coping (e.g. escaping from the situation) strategies reported by Levy et al. (2009). In reference to coping with team selection decisions specifically, in Thelwell et al.'s (2010) study, one of the coaches employed avoidance coping, citing going to the gym as his method of coping with a team selection decision.

These findings indicate that team selection decisions can be considered a stressor for sport coaches, with stressors known to have a range of negative impacts on coaches, such as being detrimental to coach performance and/or athlete confidence. However, this research is not without its limitations. The majority of these studies are descriptive and carried out retrospectively (e.g. Frey, 2007; Olusoga et al., 2009; Olusoga et al., 2010; Thelwell et al., 2017), have a limited sample and do not consider coping strategies for specific stressors. Retrospective studies may be considered problematic as research employing this methodology can lead to participants recollecting their most salient or intense experiences without necessarily considering the minutiae of these stress experiences (Thelwell et al., 2017). Moreover, asking individuals to outline their own stress experience requires a level of self-awareness which, given that such an ability may be impeded at a time of heightened stress, may limit the dependability of the responses in these studies (Thelwell et al., 2017).

Furthermore, the sample of coaches used in these studies limits the generalisability of these findings to the wider coaching population. For example, the work of Olusoga et al. (2009), Olusoga et al. (2010), Thelwell et al. (2017) and Didymus et al. (2017) all exclusively focus on elite coaches, with a sample size no greater than fifteen. Despite there being clear benefits to studying this population, it is not reflective of the UK coaching population. This is because of active coaches coaching in the UK, 57% do so in a voluntary capacity, 24% in a paid capacity and 18% in both a paid and volunteer capacity (UK

Coaching, 2017). Potts et al. (2018) contended that a literature base exclusively focused on the experienced of full-time coaches has contributed to a biased evidence base inaccurately reflecting the UK coaching workforce. As such, this research will support Potts et al.'s (2018) contention that an explicit focus on male and female coaches who are working at all levels is required in order to fully understand the nuances of coaches experiences. This is especially important when intending to work towards developing stress management interventions that are relevant to a range of coaches and sport organisations (Potts et al., 2018).

Moreover, only Thelwell et al.'s (2010) study examined coping strategies linked with specific stressors, with the other studies providing an insight into the ways in which coaches generally respond and attempt to cope with stressors. However, Olusoga et al. (2010) state that an exploration into the specific responses and precise impacts of stressors would be a fruitful area for future research. This is because the specific responses may vary in their effectiveness for specific stressors. Therefore, exploring the most effective way of coping for an individual stressor would be beneficial for coaches as it may reduce the negative impacts of that stressor on performance or wellbeing.

This study will suggest that one of the areas in which coaches cope with stress, consciously or non-consciously, is by engaging in forms of dehumanisation as a cognitive coping strategy. Cognitive coping strategies employed by coaches to deal with stressors include self-talk (Thelwell et al., 2010; Levy et al., 2009), relaxation (Thelwell et al., 2010), maintaining a positive outlook, remaining in emotional control and acceptance (Levy et al., 2009). A key benefit of using cognitive coping strategies, as opposed to behavioural coping strategies for example, is that coaches can utilise them with their own thinking and thus, they can be executed quickly and as a result, may be effective in preventing the negative impacts of coach stress.

### *Coping and dehumanisation*

Such adaptive properties have also been reported in literature on dehumanisation. For example, dehumanisation has been reported to assist in making tough decisions (Lammers & Stapel, 2011; Haque & Waytz, 2012). There are also maladaptive properties associated with dehumanisation, such as dehumanisation in the form of likening people to animals being used to convey negative information (Haslam et al., 2011). However, to the author's knowledge, dehumanisation is yet to be explored in within a sport setting. This is despite descriptions of dehumanisation being present in sociological research on sport. For example, Connor (2009) contends that in elite sport, an athlete forms part of a machine "and like pieces in a machine they are just another widget that can be replaced when worn out" (p. 1375). Furthermore, a professional footballer in Roderick and Schumaker's (2017) research is quoted as saying they felt they were "just a commodity" (p. 171) within their profession.

This sociological research, however, does not necessarily consider these dehumanising aspects of sport in a positive light. The commodification of athletes leads to an unquestioning adoption of behavioural codes and messages within sporting environments that have a large influence upon the athlete's identity (Brown & Potrac, 2009; Parker, 2000). On a similar note, utilising dehumanisation may be deemed contentious when compared to other sports coaching and sports psychology literature. Given research on the coach-athlete relationship emphasises closeness between a coach and the athletes they work with (Jowett, 2009) coupled with an emphasis on creating autonomy supporting environments (Adie et al., 2012), dehumanisation may be perceived as contentious as, by its nature, it contradicts these ideas.

Taken together, this work highlights how dehumanisation is yet to explicitly be explored in sport, may be perceived as contentious given wider sports sociological, psychological and coaching research but yet may have adaptive properties which could contribute to it being an effective cognitive coping strategy for coaches when managing the

individual stressor of team selection decisions. The next section will explore theories of dehumanisation in detail.

### **Part 3 – An overview and exploration of the theoretical links between Team Selection Decisions in Sport, Dehumanisation and Ostracism.**

#### *An overview of Dehumanisation.*

Dehumanisation has been explored in research focused on: cultural groups (Bain et al., 2009; Martinez et al., 2012; Goff et al., 2014), experiences of violence (White, 2010; Kelman, 1973; Bastian et al., 2012), social connection (Waytz and Epley, 2012; Waytz et al., 2013), Self-Determination Theory (SDT) (Moller and Deci, 2009), ingroups and outgroups (Haslam & Bain, 2007; Demoulin et al., 2009; Leyens et al., 2001; Čehajić et al., 2009; Vaes et al., 2012), conceptions of the self (Haslam et al., 2005; Legate et al., 2013; Bastian et al., 2013), moral status (Bastian et al., 2011; Haslam et al., 2012), social ostracism (Bastian & Haslam, 2010; Bastian et al., 2013), power (Lammers & Stapel, 2010; Gwinn et al., 2013), medicine (Haque and Waytz, 2012) and refugees (Esses et al., 2008). Despite this wide body of research, to the author's knowledge, dehumanisation has not yet been explored in a sporting context.

Dehumanisation has broadly been defined as the denial of humanness, in which humanness is considered as attributes that characterise what it means to be human (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). For example, Waytz and Epley (2011) define dehumanisation as representing a failure to attribute basic human qualities to others. Such qualities may include: civility, moral sensibility, maturity, individuality and interpersonal warmth (Haslam, 2006). Yet for Bandura et al. (1996), dehumanisation is a process that divests people of these human qualities such that they are no longer viewed as persons with feelings, hopes and concerns, but instead, as subhuman objects. Similarly for Kelman (1976), dehumanisation focuses on the denial of 'identity' and 'community'. 'Identity' is whereby the person is considered as an "individual, independent and distinguishable from others, capable of making choices" (p. 301) and 'community' centres on a perception of the other as "part of an interconnected network of individuals who care for each other"

(Kelman, 1976, p. 301). Therefore, considering all of these definitions, for this study dehumanisation will be considered as the denial of attributes, qualities and processes that define what it means to be human.

### *Operationalising dehumanisation*


Dehumanisation has been operationalised in different ways, one of which being the concept of 'infrahumanisation.' Within infrahumanisation, the essence of humanity lies in our ability to experience secondary emotions (e.g. nostalgia, humiliation; (Martinez et al., 2012)). To deny others these emotions, is to infrahumanise them. Primary emotions, such as sadness, joy and anger, are shared with animals whereas secondary emotions, like happiness, rancour and bitterness are considered to be exclusive to humans (Martinez et al., 2012). This idea draws from some of Demoulin et al.'s (2004) earlier research involving a series of cross-cultural studies demonstrating that people were able to establish differences between primary and secondary emotions, and that they considered primary emotions to be shared with animals and the secondary emotions to be exclusive to humans. Compared to primary emotions, participants within Demoulin et al.'s (2004) study considered secondary emotions to be less intense, more lasting, less visible, require more cognitive resources, provide more information on the sensitivity and moral nature of those who experience them, and to be a result of internal causes.

Martinez et al. (2012) note that studies on infrahumanisation first, cannot be understood purely as a phenomenon of in-group favouritism and second, that infrahumanisation is treated as an implicit phenomenon. This is a result of the participants in Leyens et al.'s (2001) seminal study not being explicitly aware that attributing more secondary emotions to the ingroup implies perceiving them to be more human than the outgroup. According to Haslam (2006), infrahumanisation as proposed by Leyens et al. (2003) involves denying others uniquely human attributes. Within Haslam's (2006) model,



the denial of uniquely human attributes leads to animalistic dehumanisation, one of two forms of dehumanisation, the other being mechanistic.

To explain Haslam's (2006) model in more detail, he suggested that human qualities can be divided into two dimensions; uniquely human (UH) characteristics and human nature (HN) characteristics. The human qualities that an individual or group are denied influence the form of dehumanisation that takes place. This composition of two senses of humanness is underpinned by Haslam et al.'s (2005) work, in which participants were required to rate the extent to which personality traits were UH or HN. The findings from the study showed HN traits as judged to be high in prevalence, universality, and emotionality, and to emerge early in development. In contrast, UH traits were judged to be low in prevalence and universality, to appear to be late in development and to be unrelated to emotionality. Similar findings were also reported in an earlier study by Haslam et al. (2004), whereby HN traits were judged to be deeply rooted, immutable, discrete, biologically based and consistently expressed across situations. Haslam (2006) contends that this well replicated evidence supports the distinction between the two proposed senses of humanness. Figure 1 shows the proposed links between conceptions of humanness and corresponding forms of dehumanisation as reported by Haslam (2006).



**Figure 1:** Proposed links between conceptions of humanness and corresponding forms of dehumanisation (Haslam, 2006).

UH characteristics are attributes that are seen as distinguishing humans from other animals and involve refinement, civility, morality and higher cognition (Bastian & Haslam, 2011). Haslam (2006) notes that there is limited research on the attributes that people see as UH. However, proposals centring on UH attributes have focused on cognitive sophistication, culture, refinement, socialisation and internalised moral sensibility (Leyens et al., 2001; Gosling, 2001; Demoulin et al., 2004; Schwartz & Struch, 1989). On the other hand, HN refers to attributes that are seen as shared and fundamental features of humanity (Haslam, 2006). Haslam (2006) contends that attributes of HN are the “core properties that people share ‘deep down’ despite their superficial variation” (p. 256). Therefore, for Haslam (2006), if an individual is denied UH attributes, animalistic dehumanisation

occurs, whereas if an individual is denied HN attributes, mechanistic dehumanisation occurs (Haslam, 2006). Although different conceptualisations of dehumanisation may vary in their specifics, the central feature of all accounts of dehumanisation is a diminished attribution and consideration of others' mental states (Haque & Waytz, 2012).

Haslam's theoretical model will be used within this study, with animalistic dehumanisation being used to describe 'infracumanisation' (similar to the concept applied by Martinez et al. (2012) and Demoulin et al. (2008)). This avoids any potential overlap and confusion between the two conceptions of dehumanisation and allows for clarity in the form of dehumanisation is taking place. Furthermore, Haslam's model has been widely employed in previous dehumanisation research (e.g. Bastian et al., 2012; Bastian & Haslam, 2010; Martinez et al., 2012), enabling findings to be critiqued with reference to this existent body of literature.

### ***Stereotypes and Animalistic Dehumanisation***

Research focusing on the denial of human uniqueness has included a focus on the relationship between stereotypes and animalistic dehumanisation in particular. The work of Fiske (Fiske, 2013; Harris & Fiske, 2006) has demonstrated the strong relevance of stereotyping to dehumanisation, as groups that are stereotyped in a particular way are especially prone to being dehumanised. Harris and Fiske (2006), for example, showed that individuals stereotyped as lacking both warmth and competence, two dimensions of the stereotype content model (SCM), were most likely to fail to activate the social cognition regions in the brains of the perceivers. These individuals included drug addicts and homeless people, who tended to elicit disgust, which is the emotion linked to the low-low quadrant of the SCM. Moreover, in a neuroimaging study, these groups evoked less activation of defined mind attributed areas than social targets from other quadrants. Given that Harris and Fiske's (2006) work assessed dehumanisation as an absence of mind

attribution, this would suggest that by the nature of these groups being denied mind attribution, they were dehumanised.

However, Haslam et al. (2013) have taken the view that stereotyping groups as more animalistic than others may be seen as dehumanising in its own right, may not be completely accounted for by the SCM, and may tend to occur only for particular kinds of groups. As such, Haslam et al. (2013) argue that the findings on dehumanisation and stereotypes imply that certain groups are stereotyped as less developed or refined than others, which is represented by a greater closeness to animals. If this is the case, Haslam et al. (2013) argue, then animalistic perceptions of groups may be closely linked to ideas of evolutionary, individual and societal development.

A target may also be dehumanised when it is non-consciously associated with animals, as well as being ascribed few uniquely human characteristics (Haslam et al., 2013). Such non-conscious association can take the form of animalistic metaphors. Haslam et al. (2011) carried out the first systematic study of the psychological content of animalistic metaphors. In exploring forty common metaphors, Haslam et al. (2011) found that a varied range of traits were implied; with the most common themes being stupidity, lack of self-control and moral depravity. In addition to judging these implied traits, the participants assessed the offensiveness of the metaphor and its possible determinants. A strong association was reported with two metaphor properties: the taboo nature of the animal and the inferred dehumanising intention of the speaker. Some of the most offensive metaphors invoked disgusting animals (e.g. rats and pigs) whereas others invoked animals that suggested demeaning comparisons with humans (e.g. apes). Haslam et al.'s (2011) study concluded first, that different animal metaphors convey different meanings, and these meanings are associated with their offensiveness and second, that contextual factors also influence offensiveness.

A second experimental study by the same authors showed that variations in metaphor offensiveness were mediated by the extent to which uniquely human attributes

were seen to be denied to the metaphor's target. By implication, and as noted by Haslam et al. (2013), animal metaphors vary widely but most commonly tend to convey negative information and are offensive due to their tendency to dehumanise the target. However, Haslam et al. (2013) contended that although animalistic dehumanisation has generally been understood as a singular phenomenon, it may take two forms based on revulsion and degradation. Likening people to disgusting animals, illustrated by Nazi representations of Jews as 'filthy' vermin, exemplifies revulsion, whereas likening them to demeaning animals, illustrated by the colonial representations of Africans as apes, exemplifies degradation (Haslam et al., 2013).

Generally, animalistic dehumanisation tends to be negative in its application or interpretation. Animalistic metaphors and stereotypes themselves however, aren't exclusively negative; they depend on content and context. For example, if the content of an animalistic metaphor implies a view of the target as less human in a context which is offensive, this would be negative in its application and interpretation. Yet animalistic dehumanisation is generally negative because of why people use it. For example, if an individual wishes to elicit disgust, they may use an animalistic metaphor and choose offensive content and context in order to express themselves. This is different to how animalistic dehumanisation may be used in sporting scenarios. Again, this is due to the content and context in which the language is used. For example, an athlete may be described as "working like a dog" in relation to their effort levels, which would not be interpreted as negative, given that traits centring on work-ethic and effort are commonly seen as positive in a sporting context. As such, animalistic dehumanisation is generally perceived to be negative in its application because of why it is used, however, this is heavily influenced by the content and context in the language used.

*Delimiting Dehumanisation: how it relates to objectification, deindividuation and ostracism.*

Having provided a detailed overview of Haslam's model and prior to reviewing wider research on dehumanisation, in the interests of theoretical clarity, it is important to consider how dehumanisation differentiates from related concepts, notably; deindividuation, objectification and ostracism. Deindividuation occurs whereby an individual becomes immersed in a group or otherwise anonymised (Kelman, 1976). Haque and Waytz (2012) suggest that deindividuation can lead to dehumanisation in two ways; either through the deindividuation of the person being perceived (the dehumanised) or through the deindividuation of the perceiver (the dehumaniser). Haque and Waytz (2012) contend that deindividuation can lead people (i.e. perceivers) toward antisocial behaviour (Zimbardo, 1969) such as interpersonal aggression (Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1980) through diminishing feelings of personal responsibility for these actions (Bandura et al., 1975). Likewise, deindividuation of the target being perceived facilitates antisocial behaviour toward this target (Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997) because the target becomes less identifiable. Given how Kelman (1976) notes that part of dehumanisation involves denying a person 'identity', if an individual is deindividuated, they are denied such an identity, and thus, may be dehumanised.

Objectification, on the other hand, is described as a process that involves viewing people in ways that facilitate them for personal gain (Bartky, 1990; Frederickson & Roberts, 1997; Nussbaum, 1999). Nussbaum (1995; 1999) contended that objectification is essentially defined by the assumption of instrumentality, whereby the target is treated as a means to one's ends. As Wang and Krumbhuber (2017) note, within social relationships, people typically value and are likely to approach targets who display traits that facilitate interaction and bonding. These include interpersonal warmth, kindness and similarity (Berscheid & Reis, 1998). However, when a target is objectified, these personal attributes move into the background in favour of the target's usefulness (Wang & Krumbhuber, 2017).

During this process, the person is figuratively split into parts, with only those traits being seen as valuable that can serve a perceiver's current goal (Gruenfeld et al., 2008). In a similar way to that in which the process applies to objects, the person then becomes a means to one's ends and is reduced to the status of a tool for goal achievement (Wang & Krumhuber, 2017).

Despite objectification being theoretically different from dehumanisation, there are a number of assumptions associated with it that make it similar to mechanistic dehumanisation. For instance, Gruenfeld et al. (2008) note that objectification assumes a denial of autonomy, inertness, fungibility and subjectivity which, I argue, are very similar to Haslam's (2006) characteristics of mechanistic dehumanisation that include; inertness, coldness, rigidity, fungibility and superficiality. Haque and Waytz (2012) suggest that objectification is a form of dehumanisation, a proposal which is supported to an extent. However, it can be argued with greater strength that objectification occurs as 'mechanistic dehumanisation' given the theoretical similarities and the notion of humans being used as a 'means to an end', which is compatible with the denial of human nature.

On balance, both deindividuation and objectification are inherently linked to dehumanisation, yet slightly different. Deindividuation is the anonymization of an individual, which can lead to dehumanisation from the dehumanised or the dehumaniser. The key difference between mechanistic dehumanisation and objectification is that mechanistic dehumanisation does not necessarily mean you are using someone for a means to an end, whereas this is the central to the definition of objectification. As such, it can be purported with confidence that one may engage fully with mechanistic dehumanisation in order to objectify an individual, yet can only engage to an extent with objectification in order to mechanistically dehumanise an individual.

Lastly, dehumanising could be aligned with ostracism because ostracism is defined as "ignoring and excluding individuals or groups, by individuals or groups" (Williams, 2007, p. 427). Ostracism is a two-sided experience, involving at least one person being

ostracised, the *target*, and at least one person doing the ostracism, the *source* (Wirth & Wesselman, 2018). The experience of being ostracised for the target has been reported to cause decreased meaning in life (Stillman et al., 2009), less relational evaluation (Wirth et al., 2010), detriments to both explicit and implicit self-esteem (Wirth et al., 2010) and social pain that triggers the same neural activation as physical pain (Eisenberger et al., 2003). Furthermore, ostracism is relatively immune to individual differences and occurs even when the source is a hated out-group (Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007). The source of ostracism varies in why, when, whom, how and for how long they ostracise and these dimensions can lead to different consequences for the source(s) (Williams, 2001). Some studies, such as that of Zadro and Gonsalkorale's (2014), report how ostracism can be a positive and empowering experience. This is because it is effective at terminating unwanted relationships and can be used to increase the source's sense of power over the target by dictating the type of interaction when the conflict is resolved (Zadro and Gonsalkorale, 2014). However, other work (e.g. Williams, 2001; Zadro, 2004; Zadro, Godwin & Gonsalkorale, 2013) suggests that ostracising can have negative psychological consequences for the source. When carried out for a prolonged period of time, ostracism can be both emotionally and cognitively depleting for the source (Williams et al., 2001; Zadro et al., 2004; Zadro, Godwin & Gonsalkorale, 2013) whilst also threatening belonging, self-esteem and meaningful existence needs (Williams, Shore & Grahe, 1998).

Ostracism is a unique form of interpersonal conflict because it affects four primary needs (Williams, 2007). These primary needs, articulated in Williams' (2009) model, are; belonging (the need for social acceptance and connection to others), control (the need for a sense of mastery over oneself and one's environment), self-esteem (the need to have a positive feeling of self-worth) and meaningful existence (the need to have a sense of purpose and acknowledgement from others). For Wirth and Wesselmann (2018), the model is conceptually similar to Self-Determination Theory (SDT) (Ryan & Deci, 2000). SDT asserts that people have basic needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness (Ryan &



Deci, 2000). Autonomy is the need to feel that one's behaviour is volitional and self-endorsed, relatedness concerns the need to feel connected and cared for by others and competence concerns the need to feel efficacious (Legate et al., 2013). Having these needs satisfied promotes people's natural propensity toward psychological growth and wellbeing, whereas having them thwarted contributes to ill-being and psychopathology (Ryan et al., 2006). Comparing Williams' (2009) model to SDT, autonomy is similar to control and relatedness similar to belonging (Wirth & Wesselmann, 2018).

Legate et al. (2013) hypothesised that complying with ostracism may undermine the source's psychological needs; particularly the need for autonomy given that ostracising is not something that most people would typically choose to do. Furthermore, Legate et al. (2013) proposed that ostracising should also thwart relatedness because it prevents people from connecting with others. Across three studies, Legate et al.'s (2013) results consistently demonstrated how the effect of ostracising others on affect was fully mediated by the thwarting of psychological needs (Legate et al., 2013). As such, these findings suggest that the process of ostracising threatens a source's feelings of agency and social connection (Legate et al., 2013), both of which influence an individual's sense of self. Such an influence on an individual's sense of self may promote self-dehumanisation.

### ***Self-dehumanisation***

Bastian et al. (2013) hypothesised that perpetrators of unjustified ostracism are more likely to see their behaviour as immoral, which in turn will affect their perceptions of their own human qualities, resulting in self-dehumanisation. From four studies carried out by Bastian et al. (2013), including a recall task and ostracism manipulation, empirical evidence was provided to show that the sources of ostracism see themselves as less human, explained in part by the view that one's behaviour was immoral. Therefore, as well as within intergroup and social relationships, Bastian et al.'s (2013) work suggests humanness can also be

ascribed/denied to the self, with self-humanisation and self-dehumanisation being the respective terms used.

In establishing the ‘self-humanising’ phenomenon, Haslam et al. (2005) highlighted how people attribute traits representing human nature to themselves more than to the average person. Haslam and Bain (2007) later demonstrated that self-humanisation occurs in part by egocentrism and the tendency to mentally represent others in a more abstract way than the self. On the contrary, self-dehumanisation has been defined as “an adaptive response to cope with one’s own transgressions and the immoral treatment of others” (Bastian et al., 2013, p. 157).

Bastian et al. (2013) contend that self-dehumanisation arises from the recognition that one’s actions have caused harm to others. However, for self-dehumanisation to occur, the harm-doer must not be able to justify their actions (Bastian et al., 2013). This is because harmful behaviour viewed as legitimate would not be expected to have self-dehumanising implications as it would be viewed as warranted and therefore, moral (Bastian et al., 2013). Moral judgement typically underpins the process of dehumanisation (Bastian et al., 2013) and conceptions of morality and humanness are tightly bound (Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam & Koval, 2011; Brandt & Reyna, 2011). As such, Bastian et al. (2013) purport that recognising how one’s actions have caused unjustified harm to another person is likely to lead to a perception of the self as possessing fewer human attributes. Specifically, this occurs because the act of causing unjustified harm to others is immoral and acting in immoral ways diminishes the extent to which a person feels they possess human qualities (Bastian et al., 2013). Relating this to team selection decisions, on a surface level, if a coach does not select an athlete in a team and is unable to justify that decision, they may engage with self-dehumanisation. This is because the ostracising act of leaving someone out of the team, coupled with the coach’s inability to justify the decision, suggests the coach would view it as a transgression, and thus, dehumanise the self.

This perspective is not universally supported, however, and is challenged by Bastian and Haslam's (2010) earlier work which examined whether the experience of being socially rejected or ostracised (i.e. the feelings of the target) can lead people to perceiving themselves as having lost their humanity. Regardless of if they were simply recalling an experience of social exclusion or being ostracised in an experimental game, participants rated themselves as lacking human nature traits relative to a social exclusion condition, which may assist in explaining the already noted finding that ostracised individuals typically feel numb, affectless and disconnected rather than distressed. As such, Bastian and Haslam (2010) argued that mechanistic dehumanisation may be especially relevant to ostracism, given that Haslam (2006) theorised that mechanistic dehumanisation has a relational component and commonly occurs in the context of 'asocial' or 'null' interactions (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) where people "disregard the existence of other people as social partners" (p. 19).

Further work in this area includes Bastian and Haslam's (2011) examination of the sorts of interpersonal encounters that produce the experience of being dehumanised. The authors reported that encounters which provoked feelings of dehumanisation included those in which the target felt betrayed, exploited, humiliated, invalidated and condescended to. Participants then rated the extent to which they would have a variety of thoughts and feelings, and the degree to which they would have felt dehumanised on either human uniqueness or human nature traits by the other person. When participants felt that they had been denied uniquely human qualities, they tended to imagine feeling ashamed, debased and a loss of status. When they felt they had been denied human nature qualities, they reported feelings of numbness, confusion, anger and sadness. Haslam et al. (2013) note how this work is valuable in showing that dehumanisation is not only pertinent in intergroup relations, but also highlights how people may feel that their humanness has been denied or has gone unrecognised within their social relationships. Although not the focus of this study, this work would suggest that athletes would perceive themselves as less

human when they are ostracised in some way, for example, by not being selected in the team.

### **Summary of Parts 2 and 3**

Firstly, team selection decisions have been shown to be a stressor for sports coaches. Amongst other stressors, coaches need to be able to effectively cope with making team selection decisions such that they do not have a negative impact on their own, and their athletes', performance and wellbeing. If, as argued here, the act of leaving an athlete out of a team, either as a substitute or non-participant, can be considered as a form of ostracism and ostracism can be painful for the source, this may be a contributing factor as to why coaches find team selection decisions to be a source of stress.

Secondly, there are multiple ways in which coaches have been reported to cope with stressors. However, this research intends to combine two different fields of research in order to explore a new way in which coaches may cope with selection decisions. Given the links between ostracism and dehumanisation, we suggest that coaches may engage in forms of dehumanisation as a method of coping with making team selection decisions. More accurately, dehumanisation may be employed by coaches as a form of self-protection from the negative effect of the stress of a team selection decision. Kelman (1976) noted that denying others membership in a community of interconnected individuals is a central aspect of treating them as less human, and as such, the initial non-selection of an athlete may be perceived by both coaches and their athletes as dehumanising. As dehumanisation may have some protective, albeit temporary, qualities, the first hypothesis of this study is that coaches will engage with forms of dehumanisation; animalistic, mechanistic or self, in order to cope with making team selection decisions.

***Hypothesis 1: All three forms of dehumanisation will be significantly higher following a selection decision than on a non-selection day.***

Additionally, if coaches do not engage with dehumanisation of the athletes they work, they may perceive the act of ostracism to be a transgression. This perception of a

transgression will lead to greater self-dehumanisation because self-dehumanisation is characterised as feeling less human a result of committing an unjustified transgression. This underpins the second hypothesis:

***Hypothesis 2: Following a selection decision, the more a coach engages with dehumanisation of the athletes, the less they will engage in self-dehumanisation.***

The remaining hypotheses, as explored in Part 3, regard the extent to which coaches engage with forms of dehumanisation. As discussed in this section, there is likely to be individual variation the extent to which coaches engage with forms of dehumanisation, and as such, there is need to understand why this is the case. Seven candidate variables were proposed; a coach's personal sense of power, their level emotional intelligence, level of resilience, sense of relatedness with the athletes they work with, the concordance of the coach/athlete gender and their previous playing experience of the coach. The following sections of this literature review seek to justify the inclusion of these seven variables and explain how they are predicted to influence the extent to which a coach engages with dehumanisation.

## **Part 4 - Predictors of dehumanisation**

### *Personal Sense of Power*

This section will explain how a coach's personal sense of power is hypothesised to predict the extent to which they engage in dehumanisation. Power will be defined from a psychological and sociological perspective, the latter also being used to provide context as to how coaches may obtain power, consequently influencing their personal sense of power. Following this, research on power and dehumanisation, and power and objectification will be reviewed, with an explanation of how a coach's personal sense of power may influence the extent to which they engage with dehumanisation.

### *Understanding power*

From a psychological perspective, conceptual and operational definitions of power have focused on the control over valued resources; such as money, information or decision-making (Anderson et al., 2012; Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003). Such resources can belong to both the individual/group in power themselves and the individuals/groups 'under control' (Galinsky et al., 2003). For Galinsky et al. (2003), the concept of control distinguishes power from status, in which status refers to a person's standing in social hierarchy (Anderson et al., 2001). Taking a more applied view, research on sports coaching from a sociological perspective has seen power to be inherently linked to manipulation and strategy (Potrac & Jones, 2010). This perspective is related to the Machiavellian or Weberian perception of power as the ability of an actor to realise his or her will in a social action against the resistance of others (Potrac & Jones, 2010). Linked to this, theorists such as Foucault (1978) believe power is relational and always present, even in day-to-day interactions. As such, from a sociological perspective, power cannot be deemed to be not located in one place, institution or person, but constantly reinvented and renegotiated through social actions (Westwood, 2002). In addition to other occasions in daily life, these social actions may occur between a coach and the athletes they work with

as “in their professional lives, people are often in a position which they would have to make a judgement or a decision that affects other people” (Lammers & Stapel, 2009, p. 279).

Combining both the psychological and applied sociological perspectives, for the purposes of this study, power will be defined using Galinsky et al.’s (2003) definition which describes power as the ability to control resources, one’s own and others’. This is because within the social action in this context, the coach has control of the resource, which is the decision making process as to who is to be selected in the starting team. The extent to which an individual believes they have power can be measured by their personal sense of power, which Anderson et al. (2012, p. 316) define as “the perception of one’s ability to influence another person or other people.”

How a coach obtains power, measured either through their own or others’ perceptions, can in part be contextualised by Bourdieu’s notion of capital (Potrac & Jones, 2010). Capital is described by Bourdieu as being the capacity to exercise control over one’s own future and the future of others (Potrac & Jones, 2010), suggesting it is, in effect, a form of power. The many different forms of capital, including social, cultural, symbolic and physical, can all contribute to social hierarchy, structuring the context for both coaches and athletes (Cushion & Jones, 2006). Potrac and Jones (2010) suggest that the capital afforded to coaches gives them a sense of legitimate power within the context and that such power is normalised within coaching, whereby coaches behave like individuals in power. It can be argued that such capital, or power, is assumed through the process of organisational socialisation (Sage, 1989); coaches not only learn the technical elements of the coaching role, but also the norms and values associated with the position within a particular sporting culture (Potrac & Jones, 2010). Such learning, Potrac and Jones (2010) contend, is inclusive of the power relationships that exist between coach and athlete, and specifically, how these relationships should be structured and enacted. This explains how a coach can obtain power in a context that involves working with athletes.



### *Power and dehumanisation*

The key research underpinning the prediction that power may mediate the extent to which coaches engage with dehumanisation comes from Lammers and Stapel's (2010) study focusing on the relationship between power and dehumanisation. Lammers and Stapel (2010) argued that without the ability to dehumanise, people would see their targets as humans like themselves, possessing similar qualities. As a result, when making decisions that are painful for others, people may dehumanise their targets to avoid pain and suffering themselves. Lammers and Stapel (2010) suggest that this dehumanisation is 'functional' and found in many mundane and daily situations.

The results from Lammers and Stapel's (2010) work found that dehumanisation can act as a justification for making a tough decision and that high power participants were more inclined to make a tough decision, which subsequently led to a more dehumanised view of the target. Lammers and Stapel's (2010) study suggests that dehumanisation allows powerful people to downplay the potential suffering of others by treating them as objects or tools and by doing so, the emotional consequences of the powerful people's actions are downplayed and become irrelevant. It is for this reason that I predict that the more powerful coaches perceive themselves to be, the more likely they will be to dehumanise the athletes work with. Given how coaches suffer emotionally when making team selection decisions, we predict that in order to reduce this emotional suffering and stress for the coaches, they may dehumanise their athletes as a form of self-protection.

Specifically, we predict the strongest relationship to emerge between power and the use of mechanistic dehumanisation. The support for this argument comes from work focusing on power and the objectification of social targets. As discussed, objectification is described as a process that involves viewing people in ways that facilitate them for personal gain (Bartky, 1990; Frederickson & Roberts, 1997; Nussbaum, 1999). Given the similarities between objectification and mechanistic dehumanisation, we contend that the research on power and objectification can be used to support the hypothesis that high-

power individuals are more likely to mechanistically dehumanise their targets. For example, Gruenfeld et al.'s (2008) work focused on the extent to which high-power individuals approached social targets on the basis of the target's instrumentality. Six studies supported their prediction that high-power perceivers were more attracted to the target's usefulness, which was defined in terms of the perceiver's goals, than perceivers in low-power and baseline conditions (Gruenfeld et al., 2008). Consequently, it may be suggested that high-power coaches will mechanistically dehumanise the athletes they work with as they view them as tools that assist in achieving a goal.

This said, Gruenfeld et al. (2008) state that "to know whether a powerful person will approach a target, one needs to know the power holder's goals and the targets talents" (p. 125) which suggests the extent to which power affects the coach's engagement with mechanistic dehumanisation is influenced by the coach's goal(s). Elite coaches working with adult athletes, for example, may adopt result-focused goals and this may be manifest itself in reduced care for the athlete as they are viewed in more instrumental terms, thus leading to greater dehumanisation. On the contrary, for a grassroots coach who works with children, their goals may be centred on the participants' enjoyment levels and thus, the athletes/children are of less 'use' to the coach, and therefore may be dehumanised less. Therefore, dependent on the coach's goals, we argue that coaches who perceive themselves to have high amounts of power are more likely to mechanistically dehumanise their athletes.

To summarise, when faced with a difficult decision, and dependent on their goals, it can be hypothesised that coaches perceiving themselves to be high in power would be more likely to mechanistically dehumanise their athletes in a team selection decision in order to protect themselves against suffering and negative emotion. However, should the decision not be difficult for the coach, it can be argued that the probability of them dehumanising their athletes is far lower. This is because the fundamental premise of mechanistically dehumanising the athletes is based on how it allows the coach to manage a

difficult decision and should the selection decision not be difficult, there is not a requirement for the coach to dehumanise the athletes they work with as they do not perceive the act to be a transgression.

*Hypothesis 3: Coaches' personal sense of power will positively predict overall level of, and increases in following a team selection decision, athlete dehumanisation.*

### *Emotional intelligence*

This section will start with a definition of emotional intelligence, progressing to review literature exploring emotional intelligence within sporting domains and broader context. Within this, work studying a relationship between emotional intelligence and stress will be discussed. This will build towards an explanation as to how emotional intelligence may predict the extent to which coaches engage with dehumanisation.

### *Understanding Emotional Intelligence*

Definitions of emotional intelligence vary widely and have previously included constructs as diverse as self-awareness, motivation, optimism, assertiveness and happiness (Gohm et al., 2005). For the purposes of this study, emotional intelligence will refer to the individual responses to intrapersonal or interpersonal emotional information, and encompass the identification, expression, understanding and regulation of one's own or others' emotions (Mayer & Salovey, 1990; Petrides & Furnham, 2003). Essentially, emotional intelligence describes the ability to effectively join emotions and reasoning, using emotions to facilitate reasoning about emotions (Mayer & Salovey, 1990). Mayer and Salovey's (1990) model of emotional intelligence will be used in this paper because it is theory-based, well-articulated and more narrowly defined than other models (Gohm et al., 2005). The model contends there are four strands to emotional intelligence; the appraisal and expression of emotion, the use of emotion to enhance cognitive processes and decision making, knowledge about emotions and management of emotions.

To ensure clear theoretical understanding, it is important to conceptually delimit emotions, specifically in relation to the link between emotions and moods. According to George (2000), emotions can be distinguished from moods by their intensity, as moods are pervasive and generalised feeling states that are not tied to the events or circumstances which may have caused the mood in the first place (Morris, 1989). Moreover, moods are relatively low intensity feelings which do not interrupt ongoing activities (Forgas, 1992).

On the contrary, emotions are high intensity feelings triggered by specific stimuli (either internal or external to the individual; Forgas, 1992). Emotions demand attention and have the capacity to interrupt cognitive processes and behaviours (Morris, 1989). The link between emotions and moods arrives because emotions often feed into moods such that once the intensity of an emotion is reduced as a result of the individual cognitively or behaviourally dealing with its cause, the emotion lingers on in the form of less intense feelings (George, 2000).

### *Literature exploring emotional intelligence*

There is ample research exploring emotional intelligence in sport, the findings from which are wide ranging in their application. For example, Lane et al. (2009) explored the relationship between athletes' emotional intelligence and their use of psychological skills, reporting that self-talk, imagery and activation in both practice and competition were associated with perceptions of the appraisal of others' emotions and the ability to regulate emotions. Moreover, Crombie et al. (2009) found that emotional intelligence was positively correlated with team performance in a study involving national-level cricketers. Emotional intelligence has also been linked to self-determination theory; Arribas-Galarrage (2017) explored this relationship and found emotional intelligence to be a mediating factor for autonomous motivation in canoeists.

However, there is also a growing body of work exploring emotional intelligence in sport coaching, which is complemented by research on leadership. Emotional intelligence has received attention in mainstream leadership literature due to its association with leadership emergence, leadership style, and leadership effectiveness (Lee & Chelladurai, 2018). For example, George (2000) contended that leaders who are high in emotional intelligence are more knowledgeable of, and adept at managing, emotions in the subtle ways required for enhanced functioning in achievement and close relationships. This is supported by work from Goleman (2003) who reported how leaders in a business

environment with high emotional intelligence are more likely to be successful and effective. The application of these findings to sport is reinforced by Thelwell et al.'s (2008) work indicating successful individuals in both sport and business environments possess similar forms of attributes.

With specific regard to sport coaches, Chan and Mallett (2011) suggest that for a coach to help their athletes achieve optimal performance and foster adaptive coach-athlete relationships, he/she requires effective leadership skills. Such leadership skills may be contingent on understanding and adapting to the emotional needs of the athlete (Chan & Mallett, 2011). In addition to understanding and adapting to the emotional needs of the athletes, coaches must also seek to effectively understand and appraise their own emotions, in conjunction with one of the four strands of Salovey and Mayer's (1997) conceptual model. This is important because, as Wagstaff et al. (2012a, 2012b) note, sport coaching is an emotion-laden context which evokes a variety of strong pleasant and unpleasant emotions and which requires individuals to regulate those felt emotions. The experience of unpleasant emotions, along with the stress and strain of coaching, can result in negative outcomes for coaches (Fletcher & Scott, 2010) as well as for athletes (Laborde et al., 2016). Given the detrimental consequences of unpleasant emotions, it is important for coaches to identify how to cope with them effectively (Wagstaff et al., 2012b). Crucially, such coping may be supported by high levels of emotional intelligence.

In addition, previous literature on emotional labour has noted that longer duration and higher frequency of interactions between service providers and clients entail higher levels of emotional labour (Grandey, 2000). These findings were applied to sport coaching by Lee and Chelladurai (2018), who noted that given how coaches spend significant amount of time with their athletes on- and off-the-field (Lee et al., 2015) and as they need to display a wide range of types of emotions (Fletcher & Arnold, 2015), coaches will have a requirement to manage the process of emotional labour to be effective in their jobs. Hence, emotional intelligence is important within the domain of sport coaching.

## *Emotional intelligence and stress*

In addition to work on sport, sports coaching and leadership, emotional intelligence has also been explored with regard to its relationship with stress. Predictions on the relationship between emotional intelligence and stress are likely to depend on the model of emotional intelligence being used, due to the range in proposed definitions (Matthews et al., 2004). However, the link between emotional intelligence and stress is founded on the notion that negative emotions and stress are the result of some dysfunctional relationship between aspects of the self and the environment, and that the ability to 'read' and manage emotions in the self and others is a moderator in this process (Slaski & Cartwright, 2003). In theory, emotionally intelligent individuals should be more tolerant of stressful environments because of their greater ability to adapt to circumstances (Bar-On, 1997) and/or because of their ability to manage negative emotions and cognitions successfully (Salovey et al., 1999) which, in turn, prevents them from becoming 'immersed in' and 'carried away' by their emotional reaction (Slaski & Cartwright, 2003).

Yet, despite there being a general pattern pointing towards emotional intelligence being protective against stress, research exploring this link has been inconclusive. For example, work exploring the relationship in student populations found that emotional intelligence was protective against stress for some of the participants, but not all (Gohm et al., 2005). Additionally, Matthews et al.'s (2006) work, also in students, found that prior to task performance, higher emotional intelligence was related to lower distress and worry, but failed to confirm the prediction that emotional intelligence should reduce the magnitude of task-induced stress responses.

In addition to these findings, work on the relationship between emotional intelligence and stress within healthcare practitioners has been slightly more conclusive. For example, Pau and Croucher (2003) investigated the relationship within dental undergraduate students and reported that low emotional intelligence scorers reported more perceived stress. Moreover, Birks et al. (2009) explored the relationship within healthcare

students, and found emotional intelligence to moderate against stress, but to be more effective for smaller stressors as opposed to major stressors. Finally, Gerits et al. (2005) reported that fewer symptoms of burnout were reported by female nurses with higher emotional intelligence profiles. Taken together, these findings imply that emotional intelligence may go some way to protecting against stress, although not under all circumstances.

### *Emotional intelligence predicting dehumanisation*

Considering emotional intelligence's importance to coaching and its relationship with stress, it is worthwhile considering its association with dehumanisation. Overall, and based on the emotional intelligence literature discussed, it is predicted that coaches with higher emotional intelligence will be less likely to engage with all three forms of dehumanisation when making a team selection decision and on a 'normal day', and there are three key reasons for this.

First, given that team selection decisions have been conceptualised as a stressor for coaches and emotional intelligence may be protective against the impacts of stressors, emotional intelligence may influence the extent to which coaches engage with dehumanisation as a coping method. This is because the protective nature of emotional intelligence would mean that coping methods like dehumanisation would not necessarily be required as a form of self-protection. Second, higher emotional intelligence may be characterised by strong coach-athlete relationships, meaning that to dehumanise the athletes a coach works with may feel unnatural, resulting in lower dehumanisation. Third, given that high emotional intelligence partly constitutes being adept at reading, understanding and managing one's own emotions, a coach is less likely to engage in self-dehumanisation as self-dehumanisation has undesirable outcomes, such as feelings of guilt and sadness.



## *Summary*

This section has provided a detailed overview of emotional intelligence as a concept and explored work on emotional intelligence in a range of domains including sport, leadership, sport coaching and stress. In doing so, the importance of emotional intelligence in coaching has been discussed, as has its theorised relationship with stress. Building from this exploration, it is predicted that emotional intelligence will predict the extent to which a coach engages with dehumanisation, specifically that coaches who are higher in emotional intelligence are less likely to engage with all three forms of dehumanisation.

***Hypothesis 6: Emotional intelligence will be negatively related to all three forms of dehumanisation.***

## *Resilience*

This section will define resilience, note the differences between resilience and coping, highlight current research on resilience within the sporting domain and progress to explain how resilience can predict the extent to which a coach may engage with forms of dehumanisation. According to Fletcher and Sarkar (2013), the study of psychological resilience seeks to understand why some individuals are able to withstand, or even thrive on, the pressure they experience in their lives. Psychological resilience, from here on just termed ‘resilience’, is defined as the role of mental processes and behaviour in promoting personal assets and protecting an individual from the potential negative effect of stressors (Fletcher and Sarkar, 2013).

### *Understanding resilience*

Resilience has previously been conceptualised as both a personality trait and a process. Work conceptualising it as a personality trait has suggested resilience represents a constellation of characteristics that enable individuals to adapt to the circumstances they encounter (Connor & Davidson, 2003). Such characteristics have been said to include; resourcefulness, strength of character, flexibility of functioning in response to varying environmental demands (Block & Block, 1980), hope (Horton & Wallander, 2001), social support (Brown, 2008) and self-efficacy (Gu & Day, 2007). These characteristics have been referred to as ‘protective factors’ which Rutter (1985) defined as “influences that modify, ameliorate, or alter a person’s response to some environmental hazard that predisposes to a maladaptive outcome” (p. 600). Work considering resilience as a process suggests that the effects of these protective factors will vary contextually (from situation to situation) and temporally (throughout a situation and across an individual’s lifespan; Fletcher & Sarkar, 2013). For example, if a person reacts positively to a stressor at one point in their life, this does not guarantee a positive reaction in the future. For the purposes of this study, resilience will be considered as the application of these personality traits.

This is based on the premise that an individual may have such traits, but simply possessing these traits does not necessarily mean one is resilient. Yet to effectively apply these traits would be to demonstrate resilience.

In the interests of clarity, it is important to note the conceptual differences between resilience and coping. Fletcher and Sarkar (2013) summarise this by stating that resilience is a positive response to a potential stressful situation, whereas the nature of reactionary coping strategies may be positive (e.g. encouraging) or negative (e.g. substance abuse). Essentially, this suggests that resilience is being equipped to effectively deal with stress before it arrives, whereas coping is dealing with the stress, either effectively or ineffectively, once it has arrived.

#### *Research on resilience applied to this study*

Within sport, resilience has been explored across a range of different contexts. Work on athletes has explored the importance of resilience for sporting success and what may characterise resilience individually or in a team setting. For example, Holt and Dunn (2004) examined the psychosocial competencies among elite male adolescent soccer players and resilience emerged as one of the four major themes regarded as central to an individual's success. Moreover, Gucciardi et al. (2011) examined individual resilient qualities in a sport context and found examples of such qualities to include; adaptability, staying focused under pressure and an ability to handle unpleasant feelings. Morgan and colleagues' (2013) work sought to define team resilience, concluding that it is a "dynamic, psychosocial process which protects a group of individuals from the potential negative effect of stressors they collectively encounter" (p. 552). Morgan et al. (2013) went on to note that resilient characteristics of elite sport teams include; group structure, mastery approaches, social capital and collective efficacy.

Research on resilience within the sport setting has also included work on coaches. Specifically, Wagstaff et al. (2018) explored how resilience moderated the relationship

between the frequency of stressors and burnout in both athletes and coaches. The findings of this work provided evidence of a positive relationship between the frequency of organisational stressors and burnout, as well as the moderating effect of resilience in coaches, whereby as psychological resilience increased, there was a significantly weaker relationship between organisational stressors and burnout. These findings are supported by research beyond sport in other employment settings. Work exploring resilience within social workers found a significant negative relationship between resilience and psychological distress (Kinman & Grant, 2010), suggesting that workers with higher resilience experienced lower amounts of psychological distress. Moreover, a study by Arnetz et al. (2009) explored the effect of resilience training on stress and performance in policing. Resilience training resulted in significantly less negative mood, less heart rate reactivity and better police performance compared to control. Both of these studies therefore support Howard's (2008) contention that resilience might buffer the negative impacts of work stress.

When directly applied to the present study, the implication of this body of work is that coaches higher in resilience are less likely to suffer negative effects of a stressor, like that of a team selection decision. As such, this study hypothesises that coaches high in resilience are less likely to increase in their levels of dehumanisation of the athletes following a team selection decision, if they are to see any change. Similarly, it is also hypothesised that coaches high in resilience are less likely to engage in, or witness a very small increase in, self-dehumanisation following a selection decision. Contrarily, coaches low in resilience would be more likely to increase all three forms of dehumanisation. Individuals high in resilience should be sufficiently equipped to deal with the stressors such that they do not need to functionally employ dehumanisation in order to cope with the stress of a team selection decision.

*Hypothesis 5: Coaches' resilience will negatively predict both overall use, and increases when making a team selection, of all forms of dehumanisation.*

### ***Relatedness***

This section will define relatedness within the context of SDT, explore relatedness' links with ostracism and dehumanisation, whilst also reviewing work on relatedness in sports coaching. Moreover, this section will explain how relatedness may predict the extent to which a coach will engage with forms of dehumanisation when making a team selection decision.

### ***Understanding relatedness***

SDT suggests that humans have three innate psychological needs that are essential for ongoing psychological growth, integrity and wellbeing (Ryan & Deci, 2000). These three needs are; autonomy, competence and relatedness. Autonomy is the extent to which decisions and actions emanate from a person's integrated self rather than being the product of external influence or coercion, competence is the extent to which a person feels capable of achieving their goals and relatedness is the extent to which a person feels connected to the people around him or her (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Ryan and Deci (2000) suggest that satisfaction of autonomy, competence and relatedness lead people to value continued satisfaction, implying that if these needs are met then an individual will appreciate them and seek to continually achieve them. This is contrary to thwarted need satisfaction, which prompts a process of accommodation in which individuals who have experienced long periods of need deprivation defend against the discomfort by placing less value on the satisfaction of need (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Research on SDT is wide ranging in its scope and includes, yet is not limited to, work on leadership (Kouzes & Posner, 2006), happiness (Ryan & Deci, 2001), self-talk (Oliver et al., 2008), physical activity (Teixeira et al., 2012) and education (Sheldon et al., 2007).

Here, I focus on relatedness because of its interpersonal dimension and clear relevance to the present study given its definition as “a psychological necessity that

involves having positive interpersonal interactions and trusting relationships” (Moller et al., 2010, p. 754). Relatedness has previously been explored in sports coaching literature, with the work of Jowett and colleagues on relational sports coaching dominating the landscape. Central to relational coaching is the concept of the coach-athlete relationship, which is defined as the situation in which coaches and athletes’ feelings, thoughts and behaviours are causally interconnected (Jowett, 2007). There are four key properties that correspond with the definition; closeness, commitment, complementarity and co-orientation (Jowett & Shanmugam, 2016). It is the extent to which these four factors are satisfied that underpin the effectiveness of the coach-athlete relationship.

Using Jowett et al.’s models, the quality of the coach-athlete relationship has been positively associated with basic need satisfaction and that need satisfaction has, in turn, been positively associated with motivation (Riley & Smith, 2011). Similarly, research on the coach-athlete relationships suggests that the better the quality of the coach-athlete relationship (in terms of greater closeness, commitment, complementarity and co-orientation), the more satisfied athletes and coaches are with the coaching relationship (Davis, Jowett & Lafraniere, 2013; Jowett & Ntoumanis, 2004; Lorimer, 2009) as well as with performance, training and coach treatment (Jowett, 2009; Jowett, Shanmugam & Caccoulis, 2012). One of the mechanisms explaining this link, Jowett and Shanmugam (2016) suggest, is the fulfilment of the basic psychological needs; autonomy, competence and relatedness. Therefore, we suggest that coaches exhibiting strong coach-athlete relationships are most likely to experience high levels of relatedness, a positive predictor of wellbeing.

#### *Aligning relatedness with ostracism and dehumanisation*

As stated previously in this paper, team selection decisions can be conceptualised as a form of ostracism, given that decisions require a coach to exclude at least one individual from the selected group. Research on ostracism highlights how it can impact the target’s self-

perception, with respect to their self-esteem and mood (Gerber & Wheeler, 2009; Twenge et al., 2003). Moreover, several studies including meta-analyses suggest that being ostracised leads to an increase in negative affect (Gerber & Wheeler, 2009; Poulsen, 2006; Twenge et al., 2003).

Studies focusing on the source of ostracism (in this case, the coach) have also reported negative impacts on affect, which is mediated by the thwarting of psychological needs. For example, the work of Williams et al. (1998) reported that ostracism can lead to a loss in the source's sense of belongingness. Moreover, Poulsen and Kashy (2012) examined the experiences of both sources and targets of ostracism. Their study reported that sources experienced greater feelings of guilt than did targets. The general belief guiding these findings is that being the source of ostracism is painful because people depend heavily on social connections for their psychological wellbeing, as underpinned by SDT (Williams, 2009). This has been supported in a study by Legate et al. (2013) who found that the effect of ostracising others on affect was fully mediated by the thwarting of psychological needs, specifically relatedness. Applying this to the context of a team selection decision, here we predict different roles for relatedness. Instead of an outcome of ostracism, we predicted that relatedness would be a marker of the quality of the coach-athlete relationship, and would therefore influence the extent to which coaches engage in both (i) dehumanisation of the athletes they work with, and (ii) self-dehumanisation following a team selection decision.

Specifically, this paper suggests that coaches high in relatedness would increase their level of self-dehumanisation following a selection decision. This is anticipated as key factors when engaging in self-dehumanisation are feelings linked to transgression and immorality (Bastian et al., 2012a; Bastian et al., 2012b). We argue that as relatedness increases, coaches will perceive the act of ostracising another to be 'worse' (i.e. more of a transgression and more immoral). This would therefore predict that coaches with high levels of relatedness would engage in more self-dehumanisation following a team selection



decision. Conversely, coaches with high relatedness satisfaction would be expected to engage less with animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation following a team selection decision. This is because individuals are less likely to dehumanise those close to them (Leyens et al., 2003), and high relatedness satisfaction would be characterised in part by closeness.

### *Summary*

In summary, relatedness is one of three basic psychological needs, proposed by SDT to contribute to wellbeing. The act of ostracising another, be it an individual or group, has been found to thwart relatedness. In sport coaching, relatedness is exemplified through the coach-athlete relationship which has been found to be central to effective coaching. Therefore, it is predicted that as relatedness within coaches increases, there will be an increase in self-dehumanisation and a decrease in both animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation.

***Hypothesis 4: As coaches' relatedness increases, there will be an increase in self-dehumanisation and a decrease in animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation***

## ***Gender***

### *Introduction*

This section will explore how the internalisation of gender stereotypes may influence the extent to which a coach engages with forms of dehumanisation. In doing so, the concept of hegemony will be explained, with examples given to how it may manifest itself in sporting settings. Furthermore, the notion of gender stereotypes and ‘doing gender’ will be discussed, closing with an explanation of how the internalisation of such stereotypes may influence the extent to which a coach engages with forms of dehumanisation. Despite psychological literature and theory being central to this study, some sociological concepts will be drawn upon here in order to further understand coach-athlete relationships.

To start, it is important to define the concepts of sex and gender so to ensure theoretical clarity and this can be achieved primarily using the work of West and Zimmerman (1987). West and Zimmerman (1987) state that “sex is a determination made through the application of socially agreed upon biological criteria for classifying persons as females or males” (p. 127). The criteria for such classification, West and Zimmerman (1987) continue, can be at birth or chromosomal typing before birth, in which the classifications do not necessarily agree with one another. Placement in a *sex category* is achieved through application of the sex criteria, but in everyday life, categorisation is established and sustained by the socially required identificatory displays that proclaim one’s membership in one or the other category (West & Zimmerman, 1987). In contrast, gender is the activity of managing situated conduct in light of the normative connections of attitudes and activities appropriate for one’s sex category (West & Zimmerman, 1987). Therefore, for West and Zimmerman (1987), gender “is not a set of traits, nor a variable, nor a role, but the product of social doings of some sort” (p. 129).

### *Gender and dehumanisation*

One of the ways in which I propose gender to influence coach engagement with dehumanisation can first be explained through the concept of hegemony (Gramsci et al., 1971). Hegemony describes a form of control which is persuasive, rather than coercive and is understood to be the result of people's positive reactions to values and beliefs, which, in specific social and historical situations, support established social relations and structures of power (Gramsci et al., 1971). Hargreaves (1994) argues that specifically in sport, the concept of male hegemony is present, an idea originally developed by Connell (2005). For example, Hargreaves (1994) claims it is possible to apply the concept of hegemony to specifically male leadership and domination of sports.

A further way in which male hegemony may manifest itself within sport is through gender stereotypes, which in turn, may influence coaches' engagement with dehumanisation. Bakan (1966) summarises gender stereotypes to be how men and women are thought to differ in terms of achievement-oriented traits. Within this, men are characterised as aggressive, forceful, independent and decisive, whereas women are characterised as kind, helpful, sympathetic and concerned about others (Heilman, 2001). Avolio (2009) adds that men are generally evaluated as being more agentic in terms of displaying attributes like aggressiveness, ambitiousness, self-confidence and dominance. Women, on the other hand, have generally been evaluated as being more communal using attributes such as friendly, kind, sympathetic and affectionate (Eagly & Carli, 2007). Furthermore, Heilman (2001) contends that gender stereotypes are not only descriptive, but also prescriptive. That is, they denote not only differences in how women and men actually are, but also norms and behaviours that are suitable for each. Specifically, this includes norms about how women and men *should* be (Burgess & Borgida, 1999; Eagly, 1987; Terborg, 1977, as cited in Heilman, 2001).

Essentially, what this refers to is Butler's (1990, 2004) notion of 'doing gender.' Butler (1990) developed the often-debated notion of performativity, which can be

summarised as the process through which gendered subjects are constituted by regulatory notions within a heterosexual matrix (Kelan, 2010). To 'do gender', therefore, involves a combination of socially guided perceptual, interactional, and micro-political activities that cast particular pursuits as expressions of masculine and feminine "natures" (West & Zimmerman, 1987) i.e. stereotypical feminine nature is to be kind, helpful and sympathetic towards others, as Heilman (2001) notes. In explaining the concept of 'doing gender', Butler also utilises Althusser's notion of interpellation; the process through which ideology addresses and calls upon individuals.

More simplistically, this is how, in response to being hailed in a certain way, people identify with an ideology and become subjects (Butler, 1997). An illustration of this process, as cited by Kelan (2010), is what Butler calls 'girling the girl' (Butler, 1993, pp.7-8). Within this process, a girl is named a girl at birth, or in the ultrasound procedure before. This naming serves as a performative act, thus creating the girl as a social reality. However, this process is not complete until the girl responds to the label 'girl' by citing subject positions that are deemed appropriate for girls. Doing so involves the girl creating herself constantly as a girl through citing gendered positions. This 'doing' gender, therefore, is not a matter of free will, yet compulsory and enforced (Butler, 1993). To link this work back to the present study, male and female coaches, and male and female athletes may be socially expected to behave, speak or dress in a certain way and this may influence the extent to which dehumanisation occurs in a sport setting.

Building towards a direct application of this theory to a sport coaching context, Schein's (2001) research on sex stereotypes associated with managerial or leadership roles showed that when individuals thought about managerial roles, they thought more about men and stereotypical male attributes, than they thought about women and stereotypical female attributes. This demonstrates an 'upward' consideration of gender, i.e. how those lower on the management hierarchy perceive those higher on a hierarchy. However, what I am proposing to explore in this study is the 'downward' influence of gender, in which how

those in higher positions in the management hierarchy perceive those lower down is explored.

Thus, considering the characteristics associated with both men and women, either by stereotype, evaluation or by 'doing gender', I contend that these will influence how a coach engages with dehumanisation of the athletes they work with. Specifically, the coaches who are a concordant gender with the athletes they work with will be likely to animalistically and mechanistically dehumanise more than coaches who are discordant with the gender of the athletes they work with. With reference to Heilman's (2001) contention that gender stereotypes can be prescriptive, we suggest here that gender stereotypes will dictate the extent to which a coach engages with forms of dehumanisation.

For example, as Eagly and Carli (2007) observe, women are generally evaluated in regard to attributes such as friendliness, affection and sympathy. I argue that male coaches working with female athletes, for example, will internalise this stereotype and thus, dehumanise less than male coaches working with male athletes. Furthermore, coaches of a discordant gender to the athletes they work with are likely to self-dehumanise more, also as a result of internalisation of gender stereotypes. It has been hypothesised that the act of a team selection decision itself is a transgression and if this contradicts gender stereotypes, the sense of transgression and immorality surrounding the team selection decision will be exacerbated, thus leading to greater self-dehumanisation.

## *Summary*

To summarise, it is predicted that the internalisation of gender stereotypes will influence the extent to which coaches engage with dehumanisation. Specifically, coaches of a concordant gender to their athletes will dehumanise more than coaches who are a discordant gender, as a result of gender stereotype internalisation. Moreover, given how self-dehumanisation may occur as a response to a transgression, any contradictory behaviour to internalised gender stereotypes will result in greater self-dehumanisation.

***Hypothesis 7: Coaches who are a concordant gender with the athletes they work with will be likely to animalistically and mechanistically dehumanise more than coaches who are discordant with the gender of the athletes they work with. Coaches of a discordant gender are predicted to self-dehumanise more than those of a concordant gender for their athletes.***

*Coaches' previous level of participation and its influence on engagement with dehumanisation.*

*Introduction*

This section will discuss how the commodification and professionalization of elite sport may deny athletes autonomy, specifically through the mechanisation of the athletic body. In doing so, sporting sociological theory and literature will be utilised, in order to seek a clear understanding of the explicit and implicit interactions that take place between coaches and athletes. Following this, the possibility of a coach internalising this lack of autonomy they experienced as an athlete will be examined. To close, the impact these factors have on the extent to which a coach engages with dehumanisation will be explored.

*The mechanisation of athletes, its impact on coach autonomy and how this may influence coaches' engagement with dehumanisation*

There is an abundance of sociological sport literature considering the commodification and/or mechanisation of the human body in elite sport (e.g. Brohm, 1978; Connor, 2009; Walsh & Giulianotti, 2001; Sewart, 1987). For example, the professionalization of elite sport, Walsh and Giulianotti (2001) argue, has contributed to sport organisations perceiving athletes as commodities who fluctuate in value and can be bought or sold at any time based on prevailing market conditions. This leads to the mechanisation of the sporting body, which in itself is governed by the principle of maximising output, as posited by Brohm (1978). This view is supported by Connor (2009, p.1369), who contends that in elite sport; “athletes have become a business input and as such, managers, coaches and administrators seeks to exploit that input as much as possible.” These Marxist ideologies surrounding the mechanisation and commodification of athletes at a high level of sport, Manley et al. (2016) argue, contribute to the removal of employee voice. Put differently,



the removal of employee voice can also be interpreted as the denial of an athlete's autonomy.

Sewart (1987) was one of the first authors to discuss how the commodification of sport can work to reduce autonomy in the sporting context, not least on behalf of the athletes. Specifically, Sewart (1987, p. 184) suggested that "when confronted with the reality of sensationalism, spectacle and the predominance of a market mentality in sport, critical theory highlights the extent to which sport has lost its previous autonomy." The implication here is that throughout the growth of commodity exchange within sport and instrumental rationalisation, sport loses its autonomy.

There are two examples from modern sport which show how the commodification of elite sport can lead to a reduction in autonomy specifically for athletes. The first, highlighted by Sanderson (2009), is the draft system that currently operates in many American sports. Throughout the process of amateur drafts, players are subjected to constant news about their draft 'stock' rising or falling. These practices position players as commodities who see their values increase or decrease on the open markets. Moreover, when athletes are drafted, they complete a routine of walking up to a podium and posing for photographs in their new team's kit (Oates & Durham, 2004). Thus, Sanderson (2009) argues, as players are brought before the audience, sports, consumers and the sports organisation have the opportunity to inspect the merchandise they have just selected. Taken together, these processes deny an athlete any aspect of choice, progressively making them like pawns, and as such, work to deny the athlete autonomy.

The second example surrounds how athlete exploitation co-exists with athlete commodification. When combined, these factors further contribute to a lack of autonomy for the athlete. In professional sport, athletes often generate large revenue streams for the organisation by whom they are employed (Sanderson, 2009), yet in many cases their compensation is highly disproportionate to the amount of income they generate. As a result, sporting organisations have a vested interest in preserving the athletes' health and

wellbeing (Sanderson, 2009). However, this concern is not so much grounded in a genuine regard for the athletes, but rather, stems from commodification – the athletes must be ‘protected’ so that their performance will generate maximum revenues.

Equally, this concern does not necessarily always manifest itself with preservation of athletes’ wellbeing. Work exploring injury within professional football has found that there is a culture of athletes ‘playing hurt’ (Roderick et al., 2000). For example, in the professional game there is a perception that players who play through injury are perceived to have a ‘good attitude’ (Roderick et al., 2000). In Roderick et al.’s (2000) research on managing injuries in English professional football, players felt that due to their circumstances, they were made to feel, and did feel, like they were of no use to their managers when they were injured. This complies with Brohm’s (1978) assertion that the sole aim of the manager or coach is to maximise his/her athlete’s output. In this situation, with the athletes unable to ‘produce’, they are of no use to their coach and such treatment from managers occurs as a result.

However, Murphy and Waddington (2007) contend that elite sportspeople, such as professional footballers, are willing participants in their own exploitation. Such willingness occurs as a result of a desire to display the ‘good attitude’ Roderick et al. (2000) describe, to coaches and managers (Murphy & Waddington, 2007). Connor (2009) refutes this contention however, suggesting that the entire sporting complex is geared to requiring athletes to play at all times, regardless of injury. Returning to the case in point, these examples firstly highlight the complexity for athletes unwillingly involved in the commodification, or even commodified nature, of sport, and secondly suggest that the athlete is not necessarily at the forefront of consideration in elite sport. Thus, this poses the question of how athletes are able to achieve autonomy within these environments.

Given this literature (Murphy & Waddington, 2007; Roderick et al., 2000; Sanderson, 2009; Manley et al., 2016) pointing towards a lack of autonomy for athletes, this study contends that the previous playing experience of the coach will influence the

extent to which they engage with forms of dehumanisation. To be precise, if a coach has participated at an elite level, they may internalise this lack of autonomy experienced and thus, this may influence the extent to which they dehumanise the athletes they work with. It is proposed that this will be exemplified through increased dehumanisation of the athletes, most likely to be mechanistic dehumanisation. This is because the denial of autonomy is similar to the traits that are denied when mechanistic dehumanisation occurs, for example, cognitive openness and individual agency (Haslam, 2006). Therefore, it is hypothesised that coaches who have participated in their sport at an elite level (international or national) may internalise a lack of autonomy they experienced, and thus, be more likely to dehumanise the athletes they work with.

### *Summary*

This section has discussed how the professionalization and commodification of elite sport can progressively lead to the denial of an athlete's autonomy. Following this, it has been argued that a coach who has participated in elite sport as an athlete may internalise this lack of autonomy. This, in turn, leads them to be more likely to engage in the dehumanisation of the athletes they work with. As such, it is hypothesised that coaches who have participated at a high level of the sport they coach in are more likely to dehumanise the athletes they work with.

***Hypothesis 8: The higher level of sport the coach has coach has participated in as an athlete, the more likely they are to dehumanise the athletes they work with and the less likely they will be to self-dehumanise.***

## *Mental wellbeing*

### *Introduction*

This section will discuss the hypothesised relationship between three forms of dehumanisation and coaches' mental wellbeing. In doing so, this section ties together various elements already discussed in the introduction and literature review to highlight this hypothesised relationship. First, mental wellbeing is defined alongside an outline of different perspectives taken on it as a concept. Second, how dehumanisation of others is related to mental wellbeing will be discussed and to finish, a hypothesis on how self-dehumanisation is related to mental wellbeing will be explained.

### *Defining mental wellbeing*

According to Lundqvist (2011), sport psychological research on wellbeing, specifically among competitive athletes, suffers from ambiguous and inconsistent definitions of wellbeing as many studies do not provide a definition, or use diverse wellbeings seemingly interchangeably. Thus, in seeking to overcome this ambiguity, in this study mental wellbeing will be clearly defined with a rationale provided for the definition. For the purposes of this study, the World Health Organisation's (2004) definition of mental health will be used, as both mental health and mental wellbeing are used interchangeably (Tenant et al., 2007). This definition declared positive mental health to be the 'foundation for wellbeing and effective functioning for both the individual and the community' and defined it as a state 'which allows individuals to realise their abilities, cope with the normal stressors of life, work productively and fruitfully, and make a contribution to their community' (WHO, 2004: 12).

Importantly, this definition includes elements of the definition used in Norris et al.'s (2017) study exploring stressors coping and mental wellbeing in coaches. Specifically, Norris et al. (2017) defined mental wellbeing as "a broad category of phenomena that

includes people's emotional responses, domain satisfactions, and global judgements of life satisfaction" (Diener et al. 1999: 277). This definition was adopted because it complements the basic premises of transactional stress theory that have dominated the sport psychology literature on psychological stress which is important for this study, given the conceptualisation of dehumanisation as a potential coping method for stress.

There are two main perspectives to mental wellbeing, the hedonic perspective and the eudaimonic perspective (Ryan & Deci, 2001; Ryff et al., 2004). The hedonic perspective is founded on the general idea that happiness and pleasures form the essential goal of human life (Lundqvist, 2011). Thus, according to this perspective wellbeing is achieved by increasing happiness through striving for pleasurable moments, moving toward rewarding goals in line with individual values, and approaching stimuli that increase positive affect. In contrast, eudaimonic tradition considers wellbeing to be separated from pleasure and happiness. Instead, the eudaimonic perspective does not view human goals and values that increase positive affect necessarily helpful the individuals' growth and development (Lundqvist, 2011). Rather than defining wellbeing as primarily obtaining happiness, the eudaimonic tradition is concerned with activities and challenges people engage in to develop and reach individual potential that is in line with important values and engagements rooted in the self.

### *Mental wellbeing and dehumanisation*

This literature review has already outlined how team selection decisions can be deemed a stressor for coaches, with ample supporting literature e.g. Didymus (2017), Thelwell et al. (2008), Olusoga et al. (2009), Coutrier (2009) and Lundkvist et al. (2012). Moreover, the range of current coping methods employed by coaches has also been discussed, as these included a range of cognitive, behavioural and emotional strategies to cope with stressors (Olusoga et al., 2010; Frey, 2007). The relevance of wellbeing here however, is that how

an individual copes with a stressor is a complex phenomenon that will influence their mental wellbeing (Malik & Noreen, 2015).

Therefore, given that this study is going to explore if dehumanisation may be employed by coaches when making a team selection decision, the effectiveness of dehumanisation as a coping method will also be explored, yet through the prism of mental wellbeing. The 'effectiveness' or extent to which dehumanisation is adaptive can, to an extent, be measured through the correlation between coaches' engagement with dehumanisation and mental wellbeing. Previous literature has pointed towards adaptive properties of dehumanisation, particularly when making tough decisions (Lammers & Stapel, 2011; Haque & Waytz, 2012). Therefore, this study proposes that if dehumanisation does have adaptive properties in protecting against the stress of team selection decisions, one of the ways in which this will manifest itself is through a greater wellbeing. However, this is only predicted for the dehumanisation of athletes, not self-dehumanisation.

With regard to self-dehumanisation, it is hypothesised that coaches who self-dehumanise more will have a lower mental wellbeing. This is based upon one's perception of self, in that self-dehumanisation is in part a response to cope with one's own transgressions and the immoral treatment of others (Bastian et al., 2013). Now, using Taylor and Brown's (1988) theory suggesting that positive illusions of oneself are linked to greater mental wellbeing, we are predicting an opposite effect whereby if a coach perceives themselves to have committed a transgression, they may have a negative illusion of themselves and therefore a lower mental wellbeing

### *Summary*

To summarise, if dehumanisation does have adaptive properties in relieving the stress of a team selection decision, this will be manifested in a positive relationship between other-dehumanisation and mental wellbeing. However, given that self-dehumanisation is centred

on the perception of oneself as being 'less' human, it is hypothesised that self-dehumanisation and mental wellbeing will be negatively related.

*Hypothesis 9: For both overall and change in dehumanisation, mechanistic and or animalistic dehumanisation will positively predict mental wellbeing, whereas self-dehumanisation will negatively predict lower mental wellbeing.*

## **Part 5 - Literature Review Summary: Research questions and hypotheses**

In sum, this literature review has explored coping with stress broadly, and also specifically within sporting contexts, continuing to examine previous work which enabled a link between coping and dehumanisation. Further, an overview, operationalisation and delimitation of three forms of dehumanisation has been provided. This work built upon the conceptualisation of team selection decision as a stressor for coaches already made in the introduction to this study. Doing so facilitated the first research question of this study:

**Research Question 1:** To what extent do coaches engage with dehumanisation when making a team selection decision?

Following the development of this first research question, it was observed that there was likely to be individual variation in the extent to which coaches engage with forms of dehumanisation, and as such, a need to understand why this is the case was recognised. This formulated the second research question of the study:

**Research Question 2:** What factors predict coaches' engagement with dehumanisation?

With respect to the factors that predicted coaches' engagement with dehumanisation, Part 3 of this literature review has explored the personal and contextual factors hypothesised to predict the extent to extent to which coaches dehumanise others and/or themselves.



Taken together, there were nine hypotheses developed for this study:

**Hypothesis 1:** *All three forms of dehumanisation will be significantly higher following a selection decision than on a non-selection day.*

**Hypothesis 2:** *Following a selection decision, the more a coach engages with dehumanisation of the athletes, the less they will engage in self-dehumanisation.*

**Hypothesis 3:** *Coaches' personal sense of power will positively predict overall level of, and increases in following a team selection decision, athlete dehumanisation.*

**Hypothesis 4:** *As coaches' relatedness increases, there will be an increase in self-dehumanisation and a decrease in animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation.*

**Hypothesis 5:** *Coaches' resilience will negatively predict both overall use, and increases when making a team selection, of all forms of dehumanisation.*

**Hypothesis 6:** *Emotional intelligence will be negatively related to all three forms of dehumanisation.*


**Hypothesis 7:** *Coaches who are a concordant gender with the athletes they work with will be likely to animalistically and mechanistically dehumanise more than coaches who are discordant with the gender of the athletes they work with. Coaches of a discordant gender are predicted to self-dehumanise more than those of a concordant gender for their athletes.*

**Hypothesis 8:** The higher level of sport the coach has participated in as an athlete, the more likely they are to dehumanise the athletes they work with and the less likely they will be to self-dehumanise.

*Hypothesis 9: For both overall and change in dehumanisation, mechanistic and or animalistic dehumanisation will positively predict mental wellbeing, whereas self-dehumanisation will negatively predict lower mental wellbeing.*

Hypotheses 3-6 and their predicted relationships with mental wellbeing are most clearly explained through Figure 2.

**Figure 2:** A hypothesised model of the relationships between predictive factors, three forms of dehumanisation and mental wellbeing.



### **Chapter 3: Methods**

This section provides an overview of the methods employed throughout this study. This will include a summary of the study design and epistemological stance taken, sampling methods and participant recruitment, the study procedure and measures and the data analysis techniques used.

#### **Study Design and Epistemology**

With regard to the epistemological standpoint taken in this study, a positivist approach was adopted. As such, this study was grounded in a belief that the nature of reality is ultimately knowable through the application of the right methods of observation (Atkinson, 2011). The strengths of adopting a positivist approach lie in the precision, control and objectivity facilitated by the associated methods employed (Gratton & Jones, 2001). Moreover, the straightforward nature of data analysis provides for more clear-cut interpretation of results (Gratton & Jones, 2001). However, the key argument of those who reject using a positivist approach for sport-based research is centred upon the social nature of sport (Gratton & Jones, 2001). For example, those who engage in sport, by either playing, coaching or watching, are theorised to be acted upon by a number of external forces, but these individuals also have free will to respond to such force in an active way and thus, their behaviour should be understood in terms of causal relationships. Despite these criticisms, a positivist approach was used for this study as it allows for the objective measurement and analysis of particular behaviour(s), which in the case of this study was that of dehumanisation.

Closely aligned with a positivist approach are quantitative research methods (Gratton & Jones, 2001). In seeking objective measurement and analysis of dehumanisation and other indicators of human behaviour (e.g. emotional intelligence, personal sense of power, resilience), a quantitative approach was adopted. This refers to the characteristics of the data collected, as they constituted numerical measurement and statistical analysis.

More specifically, the quantitative data used within the research was gathered by a repeated measures design, in which participants completed a series of self-report questionnaires at two different time points. Collecting data at two different time points facilitated a comparison before and after a team selection decision, enabling observation of any changes in engagement with dehumanisation. Self-report measures have been criticised for potential prevalence of social desirability bias (Conroy et al., 2008) in addition to an increased likeliness of them yielding an individual's perception of ability as opposed to their actual ability (Meyer & Fletcher, 2007). Despite this, due to a large target sample size and the ease of employing self-report measures, they were used in this study, whilst remaining cognisant of their potential limitations.

### **Sampling and participant recruitment**

A combination of three different sampling methods were used in this study; snowball sampling, the key informant technique and convenience sampling. Snowball sampling involves locating initial participants who assist in identifying further potential participants themselves, the key informant technique involves selecting individuals on the basis of specific knowledge they possess and convenience sampling concerns recruiting participants who are easily accessible (Sadler et al., 2010). These were utilised in order to achieve a large sample size across wide range of sports coaches.

Snowball sampling was characterised in this study by contacting 'gatekeepers' who facilitated access to large numbers of coaches, Specifically, these individuals were course

tutors within local county football associations, often already known to the researcher, who were approached with regard to asking the ‘learners’ on the course to participate in the research. This involved attending one day of the coaching course, being introduced to the cohort by the course tutor and providing a brief description of the research. Following this, the learners on the course were given the opportunity to take part in the study. With regard to the key informant technique and convenience sampling, coaches already known to the researcher were asked if they would be willing to take part in the study. Additionally, links to online versions of the questionnaires were shared on the researcher’s social media platforms, notably Twitter and LinkedIn (Gelinias et al., 2017).

The inclusion criterion for the study was that coaches must be “aged over 18, currently be responsible (solely or jointly) for team selection decisions and coach within the UK.” Participants were aged over 18 to avoid ethical issues in storing the personal data of minors and had to coach within the UK so to fit with the standardised national coaching qualifications. Notable by its absence, there was no specific coaching level required. The reasons for this are twofold. First, by not limiting the participants to a specific coaching level, any potential differences across coaching levels within the data can be observed, and recommendations from the study can be tailored to the appropriate level.

Second, Potts et al. (2019) contended that empirical sports coaching literature has focused almost exclusively on the experiences of full-time paid male coaches, which has contributed to a biased evidence base. They argue that this does not accurately reflect the UK coaching workforce. Such a contention can be underpinned by the gender split of coaches in the UK, which currently lies at 46:54 for females-to-males (UK Coaching 2017), moreover, full-time coaches only make up 12% of the coaching population (Sport England, 2016). Finally, in their exploration of stressors, coping and wellbeing amongst sport coaches, Norris et al. (2017) stated that to maintain and enhance sport participation, retain coaches and develop higher quality high-performance coaches, more attention should be dedicated to coaches working at sub-elite levels. Thus, a wider remit with

regards to paid/part-time/voluntary, male/female/non-binary and elite/sub-elite/non-elite coaches would provide a more accurate reflection of the behaviour of the UK coaching workforce as a whole. This study has sought to achieve this by setting wider inclusion criteria.

With respect to sample size, a combination of Green's (1991) and Harris' (1985) recommendations were used to develop a target sample size that ensured 80% power, the minimum suggested power for an ordinary study (Van Voorhis & Morgan, 2007). Green (1991) suggested that for testing multiple correlations the formula  $N > 50 + 8m$  (where  $m$  is the number of independent variables) should be used. Given that there are seven independent variables, this would put the recommended sample size at a minimum of 106. However, Harris (1985) suggests that for regression using six or more predictors requires a minimum of 10 participants per predictor which would total a minimum of 70 participants. However, Harris (1985) further notes that better power to detect a small effect size would be gained at 30 participants per predictor. Taken together, this suggested a target range of participants of between 106 and 240 to ensure 80% power.

### **Ethical considerations**

Consistent with university ethical requirements, ethical approval was obtained from the Department's ethics committee prior to data collection commencing. All participants were presented with a participant information sheet (Appendix A) and provided informed consent prior to taking part in the study (Appendix B). The responses submitted via questionnaires were entered into a database for analysis. From the point of entry into the database (which was one week after the participant completed all four parts of the questionnaire), the data was anonymised. Each participant was allocated an anonymous number for data collection not connected to their name or identity. All personal data in electronic form was stored on a password protected computer, and any hardcopies kept in

locked storage. Data was not available to anyone outside the research team. These procedures were outlined in the privacy notice which given to all participants prior to them giving consent to take part (Appendix C) and followed APA guidelines (APA, 2017)

### **Procedure and measures**

Having provided their informed consent, taking part in the study required participants to complete a two-part questionnaire. Part 1 (Appendix D) was completed at a time convenient to the participant and was filled out either via a paper or online version. On completing Part 1 of the questionnaire, participants were e-mailed a link to Part 2 (Appendix E), which could only be completed online. Participants were instructed to complete Part 2 within 24 hours of making a team selection decision. For participants that did not complete Part 2 of the questionnaire within two weeks, two e-mail reminders were sent at two-week intervals requesting they do so at their earliest convenience.

#### ***Part 1***

Part 1 was split into three sections. The first section contained questions regarding the participant's demographic information (e.g. age, gender, ethnic background) and sport experience (e.g. sport coached, years spent coaching, coaching qualification). The second section contained measures hypothesised to influence the extent to which a coach engaged with forms of dehumanisation.

#### ***Personal Sense of Power***

As in Lammers and Stapel's (2010) study assessing the relationship between power and dehumanisation, the Sense of Power Scale (Anderson et al., 2012) was used to measure coaches' personal sense of power in this study. Participants were asked to what extent they agreed with eight different statements, having been given the stem of "In my relationships with the athletes I coach..." Responses were given on a 7-point scale, with



items including “I can get them to listen to what I say” and “I think I have a great deal of power.” With regard to the internal consistency of the measure, previous work reported Cronbach’s alpha for a relationship with a friend was 0.78 and for a relationship with a parent was 0.87 (Anderson et al., 2012), demonstrating an acceptable level of internal consistency (George & Mallery, 2003).

### *Emotional Intelligence*

Emotional Intelligence within coaches was measured using Schutte et al.’s (1998) Emotional Intelligence Scale (EIS), as it was in Thelwell et al.’s (2008) study exploring the relationship between emotional intelligence and coaching efficacy. The EIS totals 33 items (where items are rated on a 5-point scale anchored by 1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree and is made up from six factors. These factors include; appraisal of own emotions (five items), appraisal of others’ emotions (seven items), optimism (five items), regulation (four items), social skills (five items) and utilisation of emotions (seven items). Examples of items include “I am aware of my emotions as I experience them” (appraisal of own emotions) and “I have control over my emotions” (regulation). Schutte et al. (1998) reported two-week test-retest reliability of .78 for the scale, with a cross-check of internal consistency reporting a Cronbach’s alpha of .87.

### *Resilience*

Campbell-Sills and Stein’s (2007) 10-item CD-RISC, an adapted measure of Connor and Davidsons’s (2003) 25-item scale, was used to measure resilience. The scale assesses the respondent’s ability to cope with adversity and requires them to rate items on a scale from 0 (*not true at all*) to 4 (*true nearly all the time*). The CD-RISC 10 highly correlated with scores on the original instrument ( $r = .92$ ) and had a Cronbach’s alpha value of .85 (Campbell-Sills & Stein, 2007). Supporting evidence for the CD-RISC-10 has

been provided by Gucciardi et al. (2011), with a Cronbach's alpha reported as  $\geq .70$ , suggesting it is a reliable instrument to assess resilient qualities in sport.

### *Relatedness*

Relatedness was measured using an adaptation of the relatedness items from the Basic Needs Satisfaction in Sport Scale (BNSSS) (Ng et al., 2011). The BNSSS has been used in sport settings in by Stenling and Tafvelin (2014) for work which focused on leadership and wellbeing in sport, but it has also been used by Jowett et al. (2016) in a study exploring perfectionism in youth sport. The relatedness items in the BNSSS include questions such as "In my sport, I feel close to other people" and "I show concern for others in my sport." However, for this study, the questions were adapted such that they measured the coach's relatedness specifically with their athletes. As such, the items included read "In my sport, I feel close to the athletes I work with", "I show concern for the athletes I work with", "The athletes I work with care about me", "I trust the athletes I work with" and "I have close relationships with the athletes I work with." Respondents rated the extent to which they felt the statements were true on a 7-point scale from 1 (*Not true at all*) to 7 (*Very true*). The alpha coefficient for relatedness as a subscale of the BNSSS was 0.80, suggesting strong internal consistency (Ng et al., 2011).

### *Mental Wellbeing*

The Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Wellbeing Scale (WEMWBS) (Tennant et al., 2007) measured participants' mental wellbeing. The WEMWBS uses 14 items, such as "I've been feeling confident", measured on a five-point Likert type scale from 1 (*none of the time*) to 5 (*all of the time*). High correlations with wellbeing measures such as the PANAS-PA ( $r = .71$ ) and the Scale of Psychological Wellbeing ( $r = .74$ ) have demonstrated criterion validity (Tennant et al., 2007). In addition, internal consistency based on Cronbach's alpha was .91 for this measure (Stewart-Brown et al., 2009) and test-

retest reliability after one week was .83 (Tennant et al., 2007). Previous work that has employed the WEMWBS in a sport setting includes Appelqvist-Schmidlechner et al. (2018) (youth sport participation and mental health), Zhou *et al.* (2016) (association with sports-related identities and wellbeing) and Shaikh et al. (2016) (mental health among sports participants and non-participants).

The third section of the questionnaire measured the extent to which coaches engaged in forms of dehumanisation.

### *Mechanistic dehumanisation*

Aron and colleagues (Aron *et al.*, 1992) utilised the Inclusion of Other in Self (IOS) measure, first employed by Pipp et al. (1985), to assess closeness between two individuals. This was done so by asking about the degree to which individuals feel that another person is a part of their conceptualisation of self. The IOS consists of seven pairs of circles labelled *Self* and *Other*, that overlap to various degrees, creating a 7-point interval scale. Moller and Deci (2009) adapted the IOS to measure mechanistic dehumanisation, with participants in their study selecting circles representing the degree of overlap between “human beings” and “machines.” For this study, the mechanistic dehumanisation of athletes was measured by participants selecting circles representing the degree of overlap between “athletes” and “machines.”

Using Haslam’s (2006) proposed links between conceptions of humanness and corresponding forms of dehumanisation, a questionnaire to measure mechanistic dehumanisation was developed. Participants were asked about the extent to which they attributed Human Nature characteristics to their athletes. For example, given the prefix of “When thinking about the athletes I work with...” participants responded to statements such as “I consider the athletes as a means to an end” and “I consider the athletes to be replaceable.” Participants gave their answers to five statements on a seven-point Likert type scale from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*very much so*).

### *Animalistic dehumanisation*

IOS scales were adapted to measure animalistic dehumanisation, like with mechanistic dehumanisation. Participants selected circles representing the degree of overlap between “athletes” and “animals.” Participants were asked about the extent they attributed Human Uniqueness characteristics to their athletes in the same fashion that mechanistic dehumanisation was measured. Using the same scoring method as for mechanistic dehumanisation, participants responded to five statements like “I see the athletes as refined individuals” and “I feel that the athletes act morally.”

### *Self-dehumanisation*

IOS scales were again adapted to measure self-dehumanisation, in which participants selected circles representing the degree of overlap between “me” and “animals”, and “me” and “machines.” A measure of self-humanity was also used, specifically the measure used by Bastian et al. (2012) which itself was adapted from Bastian and Haslam (2010). This measure assessed the attribution of Human Nature (4-items; e.g., “I felt like I was open minded, like I could think clearly about things”, “I felt that I was emotional, like I was responsive and warm”, “I felt superficial like I had no depth” (reversed), “I felt like I was mechanical and cold, like a robot” (reversed)) and Human Uniqueness (4-items; e.g., “I felt like I was refined and cultured”, “I felt like I was rational and logical, like I was intelligent”, “I felt like I lacked self-restraint, like an animal” (reversed), “I felt like I was unsophisticated” (reversed)). Responses were made from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*very much so*). Specifically, participants were asked to answer each question in relation to how they feel when working with their athletes.

With regards to scoring self-dehumanisation on the measured used by Bastian et al. (2012) and Bastian and Haslam (2010), Bastian et al. (2012) calculated a mean score for overall self-humanity, whilst Bastian and Haslam (2010) calculated two mean scores for

self-humanity, one for human nature and one for human uniqueness. However, in order to account for outliers, this study used a total self-dehumanisation score, calculated by adding each the scores from each of the answers (noting reversed scores), as opposed to a mean score. This provided one total score for self-humanity/self-dehumanisation.

## ***Part 2***

Part 2 of the questionnaire repeated all the dehumanisation measures used in the third section of Part 1. However, when completing the dehumanisation measures, participants were reminded to respond having made their selection decision. This was done so by inserting “Having made your selection decision...” and “Right now, having made my selection decision...” in bold before each question.

## **Participants**

In total, 192 coaches completed Part 1 of the questionnaire, with 104 coaches completing both Part 1 and Part 2. Of the 192, 166 coaches were male, 24 were female and two respondents chose not to declare their gender. The average age of the participants was 33.18 years old ( $SD = 10.42$ ). Table 1 provides an overview of the experience of the coaches who completed Part 1 of the questionnaire.

Table 1: Participant overview for coaches who completed Part 1 of the questionnaire.

| Sports.     | <i>N</i> | Level of competition (all sports). | <i>N</i> | Coaching Qualification (or equivalent) | <i>N</i> |
|-------------|----------|------------------------------------|----------|--|----------|
| Football    | 180      | International                      | 1        | Level 5                                | 1        |
| Hockey      | 3        | National                           | 15       | Level 4                                | 7        |
| Rugby Union | 3        | Regional                           | 39       | Level 3                                | 29       |
| Basketball  | 1        | University                         | 11       | Level 2                                | 70       |
| Rowing      | 1        | Local                              | 126      | Level 1                                | 56       |
| Netball     | 2        |                                    |          | No current qualification               | 29       |
| Volleyball  | 2        |                                    |          |  |          |

## Data analysis

Data analysis was carried out using SPSS (IBM SPSS for Windows, Version 22.0, Armonk, NY: IBM Corp.), with raw data from both paper and electronic questionnaires being entered into the programme. The first stage of data analysis was the data screening which involved analysis of the reliability of the measures, analysis of the normality of the data and recognition and subsequent action for any outliers.

Table 2: Tests used for each specific hypothesis.

| <i>Hypothesis number</i> | <i>Focus of hypothesis</i>                               | <i>Test used</i>                   |
|--------------------------|--|------------------------------------|
| 1                        | Change in dehumanisation following a selection decision. | Paired samples t-test.             |
| 2                        | Relationship between forms of dehumanisation.            | Pearson's correlation coefficient. |
| 3                        | Dehumanisation and personal sense of power.              | Pearson's correlation coefficient. |
| 4                        | Dehumanisation and relatedness.                          | Pearson's correlation coefficient. |
| 5                        | Dehumanisation and resilience.                           | Pearson's correlation coefficient. |
| 6                        | Dehumanisation and emotional intelligence.               | Pearson's correlation coefficient. |
| 7                        | Dehumanisation and gender.                               | Independent samples t-test.        |
| 8                        | Dehumanisation and previous level of participation.      | Descriptive statistics.            |
| 9                        | Dehumanisation and Mental Wellbeing                      | Pearson's correlation coefficient. |

Table 2 shows the specific tests used for each hypothesis in the study. A paired samples t-test was used to examine the change in dehumanisation following a selection decision, as this measures whether the mean of a single group is different when measured

at different times (Jones, 2014). This was required for hypothesis 1 because it assessed a change in the amount of dehumanisation before and after a selection decision.



Hypotheses 2-6 and 9 used Pearson's correlation coefficients to measure correlations between dehumanisation and its predictors. A correlation provides one with the ability to quantify the strength of a relationship between two variables (Williams & Wragg, 2004). Strong correlations are often interpreted as indicating the existence of a link between two variables, or even an influence of one variable on the other (Williams & Wragg, 2004). However, there is scope for misconception within the interpretation of a correlation, as correlations are unable to determine causality (Jones, 2014). Pearson's correlation coefficient was used specifically in this study as it analyses two variables collected at interval/ratio level of measurement, where the data is parametric (referring to a normal distribution) (Jones, 2014). Pearson's correlation coefficient provides a value between -1 and +1. A value of -1 denotes a perfect relationship, while a value of +1 signifies a perfect positive relationship, and a value of 0 indicates the complete absence of any relationships between the two variables.

Hypothesis 7 required an independent samples t-test which examines the mean scores of different groups and their significance (Jones, 2014). This was used for hypothesis 7 to assess the mean scores for coaches working with concordant or discordant genders. Finally, descriptive statistics, specifically means, were used to analyse the findings in relation to Hypothesis 8. More accurately, the mean was used as a measure of central tendency, which is a value that describes a particular characteristic of a set of scores, with the mean being the average score of all observations of a variable (Jones, 2014).

Moreover, it is important to have a measurement of statistical difference/significance for the above measures. In this study the threshold for significance (also referred to as the p-value) was set at .05 because, as Jones (2014) and Williams and Wragg (2004) note, this is a generally accepted level of significance in sport-based studies.

## **Chapter 4: Results**

The results of this study are preceded by a ‘Data Screening’ section, discussing the reliability and normality of the measures used alongside an analysis of how the outliers within the study were treated. Following this, the results relating to each hypothesis are outlined. To aid the reader, a brief reminder of the rationale for each hypothesis is provided, prior the results for that specific hypothesis.

## **Part 1 - Data screening**

### ***Reliability***

Table 3 shows the Cronbach Alpha coefficients for the measures used in the study. Every measure except for mechanistic dehumanisation shows a Cronbach Alpha coefficient above .7, indicating acceptable internal consistency (George & Mallery, 2003). The measure used for mechanistic dehumanisation had a Cronbach alpha coefficient of .599 pre-selection and a score of .493 post selection, suggesting poor internal consistency. One possible reason for this is that the wording of the statements used in the measure may be perceived as extreme when considered in a coaching context. For example, items included 'I consider the athletes to be replaceable' and 'I consider the athletes as a means to an end.' These directly contrast to 'closeness', which reflects the bond between coaches and athletes, and 'commitment', which reflects the intent to maintain such a bond, previously identified as components of effective coaching (Jowett, 2007). Considering athletes to be replaceable and/or as an instrument may not be deemed socially acceptable by some, leading to the inconsistent responses to the item set as a whole. As such, readers should interpret analyses involving the mechanistic dehumanisation scale with caution, it should also be noted that internal reliability issues are most likely to impact on Type II rather than Type I errors. A more detailed item-wise breakdown of variance and range for this scale is shown in Appendix F.

Table 3: Cronbach Alpha coefficients for measures.

| <b>Measure</b>                                | <b>Cronbach Alpha coefficient</b> |
|---|-----------------------------------|
| <i>Predictors of dehumanisation</i>           |                                   |
| Personal Sense of Power                       | .702                              |
| EIS   | .822                              |
| Resilience Scale                              | .837                              |
| MWB Scale                                     | .918                              |
| Relatedness                                   | .855                              |
| <i>Pre-selection dehumanisation measures</i>  |                                   |
| Pre IOS Scales                                | .758                              |
| Pre Self-dehumanisation                       | .783                              |
| Pre Animalistic dehumanisation                | .884                              |
| Pre Mechanistic dehumanisation                | .599                              |
| <i>Post-selection dehumanisation measures</i> |                                   |
| Post IOS Scales                               | .881                              |
| Post self-dehumanisation                      | .794                              |
| Post animalistic dehumanisation               | .839                              |
| Post mechanistic dehumanisation               | .493                              |

## *Normality*

Table 4 shows the Skewness and Kurtosis of the measures used in the study. The values for asymmetry and kurtosis relative to their normal error of between -2 and +2 are considered acceptable for assuming normal univariate distribution (George & Mallery, 2010). Using this as a guide, the data indicated acceptable distribution which facilitated progression to the next stage of data screening.

Table 4: Skewness and Kurtosis for measures used.

| <b>Measure</b>                                | <b>Skewness (SE)</b> | <b>Kurtosis (SE)</b> |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|
| <i>Predictors of dehumanisation</i>           |                      |                      |
| Personal Sense of Power                       | -.174 (.175)         | -.089 (.349)         |
| EIS   | .284 (.176)          | .746 (.351)          |
| Resilience Scale                              | -.345 (.176)         | .261 (.351)          |
| MWB Scale                                     | .018 (.176)          | -.020 (.350)         |
| Relatedness                                   | -.321 (.176)         | -.208 (.351)         |
| <i>Pre-selection dehumanisation measures</i>  |                      |                      |
| Pre Self-dehumanisation                       | -.741 (.176)         | 1.048 (.350)         |
| Pre Animalistic dehumanisation                | .025 (.176)          | .182 (.350)          |
| Pre Mechanistic dehumanisation                | .214 (.178)          | -.696 (.354)         |
| <i>Post-selection dehumanisation measures</i> |                      |                      |
| Post Self-dehumanisation                      | -.786 (.235)         | .248 (.465)          |
| Post Animalistic dehumanisation               | .450 (.233)          | .068 (.461)          |
| Post Mechanistic dehumanisation               | .164 (.233)          | -.761 (.461)         |

## *Outliers*

Following the analysis of skewness and kurtosis, boxplots were used to identify outliers in the sample. Cases more than three standard deviations away from the mean were marked as an outlier and removed from the sample by changing the value to 'missing.' One case was deleted from the sample due to presentation as an outlier on multiple ( $n = 4$ ) variables.

## Part 2 - Hypotheses and results

**Research Question 1: What are the effects of selection decisions on coaches' use of dehumanisation?**

*Hypothesis 1: All three forms of dehumanisation will be significantly higher following a selection decision than on a non-selection day.*

### *Rationale*

Literature evidences that team selection decisions are stressful for coaches. Given this, we hypothesised that coaches would need to cope with this stress and that one way to do this would be to engage in forms of dehumanisation. Specifically, it was predicted that coaches would dehumanise the athletes they work with, either animalistically or mechanistically, to help justify their selection decision and to act as a form of self-protection.

Furthermore, it was predicted that coaches would also self-dehumanise as a response to feelings of guilt for not selecting an athlete, given that team selection decisions can be conceptualised as a form of ostracism.

### *Findings*

Table 5: Change in dehumanisation following a selection decision.

| <b>Change in dehumanisation from pre to post selection</b> |          |                  |            |
|--|----------|------------------|------------|
|  | <b>N</b> | <b>Mean (SD)</b> | <b>Sig</b> |
| Animalistic DH   | 105      | -.819 (4.81)     | .084       |
| Mechanistic DH   | 105      | -.057 (3.43)     | .865       |
| Self DH***   | 104      | .894 (4.11)      | .029       |

\*\*\*Higher scores = less self-dehumanisation.



Table 5 shows a decrease in all three forms of dehumanisation following a selection decision, however, only the change in self-dehumanisation was significant. This therefore contradicts the hypothesis which predicted an increase in all three forms of dehumanisation following a selection decision.

*Hypothesis 2: Following a selection decision, the more a coach engages with dehumanisation of the athletes, the less they will engage in self-dehumanisation.*

*Rationale*

This hypothesis centres upon examining the relationship between the mechanistic/animalistic dehumanisation of athletes and self-dehumanisation. For the purposes of this study, dehumanisation has been explored as a potential coping method for the stressor of a team selection decision and as such, was hypothesised to increase following a team selection decision (Hypothesis 1). However, within this, it is hypothesised that coaches who engage more with the dehumanisation of the athletes (animalistic or mechanistic) are less likely to need to engage in self-dehumanisation. If a team selection decision can be conceptualised as a form of ostracism, which is known to be painful for the source (e.g. Williams, 2001; Zadro, 2004; Zadro, Godwin & Gonsalkorale, 2013), coaches who engages less with dehumanisation of the athletes are hypothesised to self-dehumanise more to cope with the pain of this transgression.

## Findings

Table 6: Relationships between self and other dehumanisation following a selection decision.

|                | Correlation (Pearson's r) |                       |
|----------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|
|                | Animalistic DH<br>(n)     | Mechanistic DH<br>(n) |
| Animalistic DH | -                         | -                     |
| Mechanistic DH | -.211*<br>(104)           | -                     |
| Self DH***     | -.278**<br>(102)          | -.221*<br>(102)       |

\* $p$  values  $\leq 0.05$ .

\*\* $p$  values  $\leq 0.01$ .

\*\*\*Higher scores = less self-dehumanisation.

Table 6 shows a small, negative and statistically significant relationship ( $r = -.278$ ,  $p = \leq 0.01$ ) between a change in animalistic dehumanisation and a change in self-dehumanisation. Given that higher self-dehumanisation scores indicate less self-dehumanisation, this suggests that following a team selection decision, as animalistic dehumanisation of the athletes increases, so does self-dehumanisation. This contradicts the hypothesis.

Similarly, table 6 shows a small, negative and statistically significant relationship ( $r = -.221$ ,  $p = \leq 0.05$ ) between a change in mechanistic dehumanisation and a change in self-dehumanisation. This suggests that following a team selection decision, as mechanistic dehumanisation of athletes increases, so does self-dehumanisation, again contradicting the hypothesis.

Finally, table 6 highlights a small, negative and statistically significant relationship ( $r = -.211$ ,  $p = \leq 0.05$ ) between a change in mechanistic dehumanisation and a change in animalistic dehumanisation. This suggests that following a selection decision, as animalistic dehumanisation of athletes increases, mechanistic dehumanisation decreases

and vice versa. Taken together, these findings imply that following a team selecting decision, coaches can either mechanistically or animalistically dehumanise an athlete whilst also self-dehumanising, but coaches do not simultaneously mechanistically and animalistically dehumanise athletes.

### ***Types of dehumanisation results used***

Pre-selection dehumanisation measures were used to test the remaining hypotheses not specific to a change in dehumanisation. For hypotheses specific to a change in dehumanisation, both post-selection dehumanisation and change in dehumanisation are shown. There are two reasons for this. First, pre selection dehumanisation has a larger sample size than post selection dehumanisation ( $n = 177-187$  compared to  $n = 101-104$ ) facilitating greater statistical strength for analyses. Second, the change from pre to post selection dehumanisation was nonsignificant, suggesting dehumanisation may be influenced by individual traits more strongly as opposed to the specific context. Therefore, it is appropriate to use the pre-selection data.

With regards to the terminology used, from here onwards, pre selection dehumanisation is termed 'overall dehumanisation' whilst the change in dehumanisation will continue to be termed 'change in dehumanisation.'

## ***Research Question 2: What factors predict coaches' use of dehumanisation?***

### ***Personal factors predicting coaches' use of dehumanisation.***

*Hypothesis 3: Coaches' personal sense of power will positively predict overall level of, and increases in following a team selection decision, athlete dehumanisation.*

#### *Rationale*

Lammers and Stapel (2011) identified that dehumanisation can act as a form of justification when making tough decision, but that the use of this varied depending on the position of the decision maker. Specifically, when making tough decisions, high power participants were more inclined to adopt a dehumanised view of the target. As such, in this study it was hypothesised that personal sense of power (PSP) would be positively related to increases in athlete dehumanisation following a selection decision. This would be because power is intricately linked with feeling different to and above others, and may also be linked to greater perceived 'ownership' over athletes.

#### *Findings*

Table 7 demonstrates that there is a small, negative and significant correlation between PSP and overall animalistic dehumanisation ( $r = -.144, p = \leq 0.05$ ). This indicates that as PSP increases, animalistic dehumanisation decreases. There is a small, negative and significant correlation between PSP and overall mechanistic dehumanisation ( $r = -.182, p = \leq 0.05$ ). This suggests as PSP increases, mechanistic dehumanisation decreases. Table 7 also highlights a small, positive and significant correlation between PSP and overall self-dehumanisation ( $r = .426, p = \leq 0.01$ ). This suggests that as PSP increases, self-dehumanisation decreases.

There is a small, positive and significant correlation between PSP and change in animalistic dehumanisation ( $r = .292, p = \leq 0.05$ ) as highlighted in table 7. This indicates

that as PSP increases, so does the likelihood of coaches increasing their animalistic dehumanisation of athletes following a selection decision. PSP was non-significantly related to changes in both mechanistic dehumanisation ( $r = -.061$ ) and self-dehumanisation ( $r = .051$ ).

*Hypothesis 4: As coaches' relatedness increases, there will be an increase in self-dehumanisation and a decrease in animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation.*

#### *Rationale*

Moller, Deci and Elliott (2010) defined relatedness as “a psychological necessity that involves having positive interpersonal interactions and trusting relationships” (p. 754). This study hypothesised that as coaches relatedness, characterised by positive interpersonal interactions and trusting relationships, increased, there would be an increase in self-dehumanisation and a decrease in animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation. The increase in self-dehumanisation was predicted to occur as coaches would perceive the act of ostracising another to be more of a transgression. Moreover, the decrease in animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation was predicted to arise from individuals being less likely to dehumanise those with whom they are close to (Leyens et al., 2003), which can be characterised by higher relatedness.

#### *Findings*

There is a medium, positive and significant correlation between a coach's sense of relatedness and self-dehumanisation ( $r = .423$ ,  $p = \leq 0.01$ ). This suggests that the greater a coach's relatedness is, the less they self-dehumanise. There is a medium, negative and significant correlation between relatedness and animalistic dehumanisation ( $r = -.419$ ,  $p = \leq 0.01$ ). This suggests that the greater a coach's sense of relatedness is with the athletes, the less they animalistically dehumanise the athletes. There is a small, negative and significant correlation between relatedness and mechanistic dehumanisation ( $r = -.254$ ,  $p = \leq 0.01$ ). This suggests that the greater a coach's sense of relatedness is, the less mechanistically dehumanise the athletes. Taken together, these findings support hypothesis 4 in relation to animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation, but lead to the rejection of hypothesis 4 in relation to self-dehumanisation.

*Hypothesis 5: Coaches' resilience will negatively predict both overall use, and increases when making a team selection, of all forms of dehumanisation.*

### *Rationale*

Resilience has previously been defined as the role of mental processes and behaviour in promoting personal assets and protecting an individual from the potential negative effect of stressors (Fletcher & Sarkar, 2013). However, the current study adapted this definition and conceptualised resilience as *the effective application of personality traits* that promote personal assets and protect an individual from the potential negative effect of stressors. Given there is a considerable amount of literature suggests that team selection decisions are a stressor for coaches (e.g. Didymus, 2017; Thelwell et al., 2008; Olusoga et al., 2009; Coutrier, 2009 & Lundkvist et al., 2012), that resilience's definition is linked to one's ability to cope with stressors and here I conceptualise dehumanisation as a coping method, it was hypothesised that resilience may predict the extent to which coaches engage with dehumanisation overall and when making a selection decision.

Specifically, it was predicted that as coaches' resilience increased, overall use of dehumanisation would decrease and the likelihood of an increase in change in dehumanisation would decrease, with respect to all three forms of dehumanisation. This is because coaches high in resilience would be able to effectively employ protective factors to deal with the stressors involved in a team selection decision, thus there being no need for them to engage in dehumanisation, explaining why it is predicted that there will be little, if any, change.

### *Findings*

In respect of the relationship between resilience and overall dehumanisation, table 7 shows a small, negative and significant relationship between resilience and animalistic dehumanisation ( $r = -.171, p = \leq 0.05$ ). This indicates that as coaches' resilience increases, animalistic dehumanisation decreases. Moreover, table 7 shows a small, negative and



significant relationship between resilience and mechanistic dehumanisation ( $r = -.305$ ,  $p = \leq 0.01$ ) which suggests that as coaches' resilience increases, mechanistic dehumanisation decreases. Finally, table 7 shows a small, positive and significant relationship between resilience and self-dehumanisation ( $r = .330$ ,  $p = \leq 0.01$ ). This implies that as coaches' resilience increases, self-dehumanisation decreases.

With regard to a change in dehumanisation following a selection decision, table 8 shows a small, positive but non-significant correlation between resilience and animalistic dehumanisation ( $r = .068$ ). In addition, table 8 indicates resilience was unrelated to both mechanistic dehumanisation ( $r = -.171$ ) and self-dehumanisation ( $r = -0.22$ ).

Taken together, the findings on a change in dehumanisation support our hypothesis of little or no change in dehumanisation following a selection decision. In addition, it can be suggested that resilience decreases coaches' dehumanisation.

*Hypothesis 6: Emotional intelligence will be negatively related to all there forms of dehumanisation.*

### *Rationale*

Emotional intelligence is defined as “the ability to monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one’s thinking and actions” (Salovey & Mayer, 1989, p. 189). Chan and Mallet (2011) contend that emotional intelligence is an important skill within coaching that can facilitate improved interpersonal relationships, leading to enhanced interpersonal function and performance outcomes. Thus, this study hypothesised that the more emotional intelligence a coach has, the less likely they are to engage in all forms of dehumanisation; animalistic, mechanistic and self. First, they are less likely to dehumanise the athletes they work with because they would be aware of the emotional detachment this would cause between them and the athlete, and the negative outcomes this may have on relationships and performance. Second, coaches high in emotional intelligence are hypothesised not to engage in self-dehumanisation due to the characteristics of emotional intelligence being the ability to guide one’s own thinking and emotions, and thus, an emotionally intelligent coach would not engage in self-dehumanisation as it is associated with negative thoughts and feelings (e.g. guilt and sadness).

### *Findings*

Table 7 shows the results for the relationship between overall dehumanisation and emotional intelligence. First, there is a small, negative and significant correlation between emotional intelligence and animalistic dehumanisation ( $r = -.353$ ,  $p = \leq 0.01$ ). This suggests that as emotional intelligence increases, animalistic dehumanisation decreases. Second, there is a small, negative and significant correlation between emotional intelligence and mechanistic dehumanisation ( $r = -.190$ ,  $p = \leq 0.05$ ). This suggests that as emotional intelligence increases, mechanistic dehumanisation decreases. Third, there is a

medium, positive and significant correlation between emotional intelligence and self-dehumanisation ( $r = .466, p = \leq 0.01$ ). This suggests that as emotional intelligence increases, self-dehumanisation decreases. Collectively, these findings support the hypothesis.

Table 7: Relationship between overall dehumanisation and four predictors: personal sense of power, relatedness, resilience and emotional intelligence.

| <b>OVERALL DEHUMANISATION</b> |                                   |                    |                   |                                  |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------------------|
| Correlation (Pearson's r)     |                                   |                    |                   |                                  |
|                               | Personal Sense<br>of Power<br>(n) | Relatedness<br>(n) | Resilience<br>(n) | Emotional<br>Intelligence<br>(n) |
| Animalistic DH                | -.144*<br>(187)                   | -.419**<br>(185)   | -.171*<br>(183)   | -.353**<br>(181)                 |
| Mechanistic DH                | -.182*<br>(184)                   | -.254**<br>(182)   | -.305**<br>(180)  | -.190*<br>(177)                  |
| Self DH***                    | .426**<br>(184)                   | .423**<br>(181)    | .330**<br>(182)   | .466**<br>(178)                  |

\* $p$  values  $\leq 0.05$ .

\*\* $p$  values  $\leq 0.01$ .

\*\*\*Higher scores = less self-dehumanisation.

Table 8: Relationship between change in dehumanisation following a selection decision, personal sense of power and resilience.

| <b>CHANGE IN DEHUMANISATION FOLLOWING SELECTION</b> |                                |                   |
|---|--------------------------------|-------------------|
| Correlation (Pearson's r)                           |                                |                   |
|   | Personal Sense of Power<br>(n) | Resilience<br>(n) |
| Animalistic DH                                      | .292*<br>(104)                 | .068<br>(102)     |
| Mechanistic DH                                      | -.061<br>(104)                 | -.171<br>(102)    |
| Self DH***  | .051<br>(103)                  | -.022<br>(102)    |

\**p values* ≤ 0.05.

\*\**p values* ≤ 0.01.

\*\*\**Higher scores = less self-dehumanisation.*

### *Situational factors predicting coaches' use of dehumanisation.*

*Hypothesis 7: Coaches who are a concordant gender with the athletes they work with will be likely to animalistically and mechanistically dehumanise more than coaches who are discordant with the gender of the athletes they work with. Coaches of a discordant gender self-dehumanise more than those of a concordant gender for their athletes.*

#### *Rationale*

The reasoning for this hypothesis is grounded in the social and cultural norms about how one should treat the opposite gender, and whether or not coaches are compliant with this when engaging with dehumanisation in the context of a team selection decision. Such social and cultural norms dictate that individuals should be 'softer' around the opposite gender, specifically from males to females. In the context of team selection decisions, this study predicted that this may manifest itself with a lower form of dehumanisation. More accurately, it was hypothesised that male coaches working with female athletes will dehumanise the athletes less than male coaches working with male athletes.

#### *Findings*

Table 9: The relationship between coach and athlete gender and the extent to which they engage with overall dehumanisation.

| Coach<br>Gender/Athlete<br>Gender**** | Animalistic DH |                 | Mechanistic DH |                 | Self DH**** |                 |
|---------------------------------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|-------------|-----------------|
|                                       | N              | Mean<br>(SD)    | N              | Mean<br>(SD)    | N           | Mean<br>(SD)    |
| Male/Male                             | 118            | 18.81<br>(4.85) | 118            | 12.53<br>(4.35) | 117         | 45.31<br>(5.54) |
| Male/Female                           | 25             | 18.1<br>(6.12)  | 24             | 14.17<br>(2.83) | 24          | 43.75<br>(5.02) |
| Male/Mixed                            | 19             | 18.37<br>(5.19) | 19             | 12.31<br>(4.36) | 19          | 46.11<br>(3.46) |

\*\*\*\*Higher scores = less self-dehumanisation.

*\*\*\*\*Only male coaches presented due to small sample size of female coaches not working with female athletes ( $n = \leq 3$ ).*

Table 9 shows the mean dehumanisation scores for male coaches working with male athletes, male coaches working with female athletes and male coaches working with a mixed group of athletes. An ANOVA demonstrated no significant differences between the three groups in Table 9 (see Appendix G; p ranged from .192 to .787).

*Hypothesis 8: The higher level of sport the coach has coach has participated in as an athlete, the more likely they are to dehumanise the athletes they work with and the less likely they will be to self-dehumanise.*

#### *Rationale*

Sociological literature on sport suggests that athletes are considered to be parts of a machine that contribute to an output (e.g. Ingham, 2004; Brohm, 1978; Connor, 2009; Rigauer, 2000; Giulianotti, 2005). As such, this hypothesis contends the identity-stripping and robotic-like nature of elite sport may be internalised by coaches who have competed at this level themselves and therefore be reflected in the extent to which they engage in dehumanisation. Explicitly, it is hypothesised that this will be demonstrated by coaches who have competed at a higher level of sport mechanistically dehumanising the athletes more than coaches who have competed at a lower level of sport. In addition, this internalisation may be demonstrated by coaches who have participated at a high level self-dehumanising less than coaches who have participated at a lower level.

#### *Findings*

The exploratory and descriptive analyses displayed in Table 10 suggest no clear relationship between the coach's previous highest level of participation and the extent to which they engage with dehumanisation of the athletes, both mechanistically and animalistically. Despite this, for animalistic dehumanisation, coaches who had participated at an international level dehumanised the athletes least when compared with other coaches who had not participated at such a high level. This is contradicted by the findings for mechanistic dehumanisation, in which the coaches who had participated at university level dehumanised the least. Together, the data lead us to reject the proposed hypothesis.

With regards to self-dehumanisation, there is a clearer pattern in respect to the coach's highest previous participation level and the tendency to self-dehumanise. Apart

from university level coaches, the higher the level of sport the coach has participated in, the less they engage in self-dehumanisation, which supports the hypothesis.

Table 10: Overall dehumanisation across different levels of coach participation.

|                             | <b>Animalistic DH</b> |                 | <b>Mechanistic DH</b> |                 | <b>Self DH***</b> |                 |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-------------------|-----------------|
|                             | N                     | Mean (SD)       | N                     | Mean (SD)       | N                 | Mean (SD)       |
| International               | 10                    | 16.8<br>(4.52)  | 10                    | 11.3<br>(2.63)  | 9                 | 46.56<br>(1.56) |
| National                    | 17                    | 18.35<br>(5.68) | 17                    | 12.94<br>(3.07) | 16                | 45.75<br>(3.84) |
| Regional                    | 59                    | 18.81<br>(5.26) | 58                    | 13.4<br>(4.23)  | 58                | 45.21<br>(5.17) |
| University                  | 17                    | 17.71<br>(5.92) | 17                    | 10.65<br>(3.72) | 82                | 47.24<br>(5.12) |
| Local                       | 80                    | 18.23<br>(4.93) | 78                    | 13<br>(4.4)     | 17                | 44.4<br>(5.86)  |
| Have never played the sport | 4                     | 18.25<br>(5.19) | 4                     | 11.5<br>(6.35)  | 2                 | 41<br>(8.49)    |

\*\*\**Higher scores = less self-dehumanisation.*



***Research Question 3: Is there a relationship between the extent to which coaches engage with dehumanisation and their mental wellbeing?***

*Hypothesis 9: For both overall and change in dehumanisation, mechanistic and or animalistic dehumanisation will positively predict mental wellbeing, whereas self-dehumanisation will negatively predict lower mental wellbeing.*

*Rationale*

Within this study, the premise behind a coach engaging with dehumanisation was that it may potentially have adaptive elements for the coach. Specifically, it was hypothesised that dehumanising athletes may protect the coach from the stress of a team selection decision. One of the ways in which this stress may manifest itself within the coach could potentially be a lower mental wellbeing. Therefore, if dehumanisation was to have adaptive elements, one of the ways to demonstrate this would be that coaches who dehumanise the athletes more have a greater mental wellbeing than coaches who dehumanise the athletes less, as indicated in the hypothesis.

However, it was also predicted that coaches who self-dehumanise more will have a lower mental wellbeing. This is because self-dehumanisation is associated with negative emotions, such as that of sadness and guilt. Therefore, a greater prevalence of these emotions may lead to a lower mental wellbeing.

### *Findings*

Table 11 indicates that animalistic dehumanisation has a small, negative and significant correlation with mental wellbeing ( $r = -.169$ ). This suggests that as animalistic dehumanisation decreases, mental wellbeing increases. Moreover, as shown in table 11, mechanistic dehumanisation has a small, negative and significant correlation with mental wellbeing ( $r = -.170$ ). This suggests that as mechanistic dehumanisation decreases, mental wellbeing increases. Finally, within table 11, self-dehumanisation is shown to have a small, positive and significant correlation with mental wellbeing ( $r = .316$ ). This suggests that as self-dehumanisation decreases, mental wellbeing increases. Taken together, all the findings stated in this section are contrary to hypothesis 9. Potential reasons for this will be explored in the discussion section.

Table 11: Correlations between mental wellbeing, individual difference predictors and overall dehumanisation.

| <b>Correlations with Mental Wellbeing</b> |     |                           |
|---|-----|---------------------------|
|   | n   | Correlation (Pearson's r) |
| <i>Dehumanisation predictors</i>          |     |                           |
| Personal Sense of Power                   | 182 | .148*                     |
| Relatedness                               | 179 | .257**                    |
| Resilience                                | 178 | .468**                    |
| Emotional Intelligence                    | 178 | .446**                    |
| <i>Overall Dehumanisation</i>             |     |                           |
| Animalistic DH                            | 181 | -.169*                    |
| Mechanistic DH                            | 178 | -.170*                    |
| Self DH***                                | 180 | .316**                    |

\**p* values  $\leq 0.05$ .

\*\**p* values  $\leq 0.01$ .

\*\*\*Higher scores = less self-dehumanisation.

## **Chapter 5: Discussion**

The overall aim of this study was to examine the extent of, and factors affecting, coaches' use of dehumanisation when making team selection decisions. This section will outline the key findings and contributions of the study, in light of these aims. To start, three key findings will be discussed with acknowledgement of relevant literature. These relate to: (i) coaches' use of dehumanisation generally and following a selection decision, (ii) predictors of dehumanisation, and (iii) dehumanisation's relationship with wellbeing. Following this, the theoretical and methodological contributions made by this study will be discussed along with strengths, limitations and recommended directions for future research. To close, in the tradition of reflective learning (Rogers, 2001; Ryan, 2011) there is a brief autobiographical reflection on the process and experiences of completing this thesis

## **Part 1 - Key findings: Summary**

Overall, findings demonstrated that other-dehumanisation (animalistic and mechanistic) did not change following a team selection decision, whereas self-dehumanisation decreased. Dehumanisation was negatively associated with wellbeing. Together, these findings lead us to reject our conceptualisation of dehumanisation as a potentially adaptive response to a team selection stressor. In addition, personal sense of power, resilience, relatedness and emotional intelligence all negatively predicted use of dehumanisation, suggesting individual differences in coaches are more strongly related to dehumanisation use than context.

## **Part 2 - Key findings: Coaches' use of dehumanisation**

Hypothesis 1 predicted that following a team selection decision, coaches would significantly increase animalistic, mechanistic and self-dehumanisation relative to a non-selection day. This was based upon the theorising that dehumanisation may have adaptive qualities for the coach, potentially protecting them from the stress surrounding team selection decisions. However, the results from Hypothesis 1 demonstrated that following a team selection decision there was no significant change in animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation (here termed 'other-dehumanisation') whilst self-dehumanisation decreased, thus rejecting the hypothesis. This would indicate that the context of a team selection decision does not influence coaches' dehumanisation of athletes, instead implying that coaches' tendency to dehumanise may be influenced by individual traits as opposed to contextual factors.

With regard to the findings of reduced self-dehumanisation, one proposed explanation for this is that the situation may arouse empathy and subsequently a coach's consideration of their own humanness. Empathy can be defined as an other-oriented emotional response elicited by, and congruent with, the perceived welfare of a person in need (Eklund et al., 2009). According to Riess (2017), empathy plays a critical interpersonal and societal role in the enabling of experiences, needs and desires between individuals. An individual's capacity to demonstrate empathy enables them to perceive the emotions of others, resonate with them emotionally and cognitively, to adopt the perspective of others and to distinguish between emotions (Riess, 2017). The relevance of the empathiser's previous similar experiences when it comes to displaying empathy has been widely acknowledged in psychological literature (e.g. Batson et al., 1996; Houston, 1990; Ickes, 1997 and Stotland, 1969). For example in this study, the coach's own previous experiences of selection decisions, in sport or more broadly, may influence their display of empathy.

Moreover, Hume (1957), as cited in Eklund et al. (2009), argued that because people have similar constitutions and experiences, they are able to vicariously experience the same feelings as another person when they imagine being in the person's situation. Coaches would have been involved in some way in a form of selection decision in their lives to varying degrees. For example, as Eklund et al. (2009) observe, the coach may have had precisely the same experience as the athlete, at the same level they are coaching and in the same sport. So linking it to this study, this may be a national level football coach who has played national level football. Or alternatively, the experience may be more abstract, in that the coach has experienced an invitation (or lack of) to a social event, in which they were (or weren't) selected to attend. Thus, they would have an experience of (de)selection at a higher level of generality. For example, in this study this may be a coach who never played the sport but has yet experienced selection in their workplace or social settings. Moreover, empathy can be aligned with emotional responsiveness and interpersonal warmth, two characteristics of human nature as a sense of humanness (Haslam, 2006) and included in the measure of self-dehumanisation we used. Taken together, given how previous experiences are an important situational antecedent for feeling empathy, if a coach has experienced something close to what the athletes they work with are going through, they are likely to feel more human themselves, as a result of this sense of empathy and its similarities to human nature as a sense of humanness. This would then explain the finding of decreased self-dehumanisation following a team selection decision.

Despite findings related to other-dehumanisation not being significant, a pattern was observed in which use of all three forms of dehumanisation decreased following a team selection decision. This implies there may be some form of a self and other 'humanising' effect associated with making a team selection decision. If this pattern could be replicated, one potential explanation is that, for the coach, a selection decision triggers greater consideration of the athlete as an individual, and therefore also their humanness, when a selection has to be made. This could involve, for example, consideration of

players' athletic identity, the quality of the coach-athlete relationship, and concern for athletes' reactions.

Athletic identity is the degree to which an individual identifies with the athlete role - a person with a strong athletic identity is more likely to interpret a given event in terms of its implications for their athletic function than a person who weakly identifies with the role (Brewer et al., 1993). Within the context of a team selection decision, a coach may consider the strength of each individual athlete's athletic identity, as this may be perceived as contributing to who they are as a person. In turn, the consideration of how the athlete may react to a team selection decision (e.g. the implications for those with high athletic identity compared to low athletic identity), is evidence of thinking about the athlete on more human terms, thus leading to reduced athlete dehumanisation.

This consideration of who an athlete is as a person can be linked to the coach-athlete relationship, which is defined as the situation in which coaches and athletes' feelings, thoughts and behaviours are causally interconnected (Jowett, 2007). Closeness contributes to the coach-athlete relationship (Jowett & Shanmugam, 2016) and reflects the affective bond developed between coaches and athletes. As such, when making a team selection decision, it is possible that a coach considers the relationship they have with the athletes as individuals, further contributing to humanising the athletes. In addition, if said relationship is strong, closeness is likely to be higher and therefore, the coach will consider the athlete to be more human than on a non-selection day, as a result of this consideration.

This can be linked to dehumanisation literature on ingroups and outgroups which states that individuals seen as 'ingroup' members are dehumanised less than those seen as 'outgroup' members (Leyens et al., 2003). It can then be argued that if an athlete has a close relationship with the coach, they are more likely to be defined upon ingroup terms, as Leyens et al. (2003) found that individuals attribute more uniquely human emotions to their ingroup than outgroup, thus leading to less dehumanisation. In essence, this suggests that the quality of the coach-athlete relationship may moderate the extent to which the



coach engages with dehumanisation of the athletes. Thus, one reason as to why no effect of selection upon dehumanisation was observed is because, based on this theory, it would depend upon the athlete as an individual and this study measured athlete dehumanisation as a whole group, and not individually.

Building on this, Blakelock et al.'s (2016) research highlighted how deselected elite adolescent soccer players experienced symptoms of anxiety, depression, loss of confidence and social dysfunction in the first month of deselection. Blakelock et al. (2016) explored deselection from an elite programme and not just one match day; yet, the findings are still relevant to the current study because it may be argued that the psychological distress still occurs after deselection for one game, although the effects may be short-lived and not as strong. If a coach is aware or fears the risk of causing psychological distress to the athletes, individually or as a group, regardless of the extent to which it occurs, it can be argued that they are likely to show more care for the athletes, which may manifest itself in seeing them as 'more human.'

### ***Summary***

Collectively, the findings suggest that coaches' use of other-dehumanisation is not altered by selection context, however, self-dehumanisation negligibly decreased following a selection decision perhaps indicating deeper awareness of one's own 'humanness' at that point. One mechanism to explain this may be empathy, in that previous selection-related experiences influence the coach's experience of, and awareness of, their own emotions at that time.

### **Part 3 - Key findings: Predictors of dehumanisation**

#### ***Personal sense of power***

The results from this study suggest that as coaches' personal sense of power increases, all three forms of dehumanisation decrease. In addition, personal sense of power positively predicted increases in animalistic dehumanisation from a normal to a selection day. One of the possible reasons for the finding that as coaches' personal sense of power increases, all three forms of dehumanisation decrease, is that power has been shown to increase social distance (Lammers et al., 2012). By virtue of being distant, powerful individuals can be perceived as not being close to others. If this can be extrapolated to the extent that low power individuals are closer to others, when they need to separate themselves from others, they may dehumanise in order to do this. However, given that high power individuals are more socially distant, dehumanisation is not needed to facilitate this separation. This contention can partially be supported by Waytz and Epley's (2012) work which found that social connection enables dehumanisation, although this was specifically when considering distant others in the presence of a close other.

This does pose the question of why a coach would need to separate themselves from others, and thus how social distance may be relevant here. This can be answered by referencing the way in which the data was gathered, in that by asking coaches to consider their own sense of humanness and the humanness of the athletes, they are seen being considered as separate entities.

Interestingly however, the present study also found that the influence of personal sense of power on dehumanisation may be influenced by the context in which coaches are having to consider the athletes. Specifically, the findings from this study suggest that as coaches' personal sense of power increased, they would be more likely to increase their animalistic dehumanisation on a selection day but the probability of engaging in dehumanisation on a normal day decreased. This implies that the greater a coach's personal sense power is, the more selective they are as to when this power influences the extent to

which they dehumanise others. This can be explained by one of the processes in which power affects behaviour, in that power leads people to adopt a greater focus on the self and their own needs and goals (Fiske, 1993; Overbeck et al., 2006). The coach's own needs and goals here may be a form of self-protection from the stress of the selection decision.

Thus, the positive relationship between coaches' power and the likelihood of an increase in animalistic dehumanisation on a selection day may arise from coaches' desire to protect themselves from the potential stress of a selection decision incurred. This would then imply that dehumanisation may have a protective function for the coach. This supports the work of Fiske (1993), Overbeck et al. (2006) and Rucker et al. (2011) which implies that high power individuals focus on their own needs and goals, and perceive themselves as having greater value to society than others. If this is the case then, interestingly, coaches with a higher personal sense of power are only more likely to engage with dehumanisation on a selection day where they stand to benefit (i.e. from theorised protection against stress) and not on a normal day, where there is no obvious benefit.

With respect to the form of dehumanisation likely to increase on a selection day, animalistic dehumanisation was the only form more likely to do so. This partly contradicts the hypothesis because it was predicted that mechanistic dehumanisation would be more likely to increase, given that power can lead to objectification (Gruenfeld et al., 2008) and that objectification is closely aligned with mechanistic dehumanisation. However, these findings related to the form of dehumanisation taking place support Gwinn et al.'s (2013) work in which powerful perceivers animalistically dehumanised low-power targets in two experiments. The authors attributed this to mechanistic dehumanisation usually involving a denial of the target's emotionality and given the context of the study (making job offers), the high-power individuals still had good reason to consider the low-power individual's emotional state (participants had to make more than one job offer) (Gwinn et al., 2013).

This can be applied to the coaching context as coaches must also consider the athlete's emotional state, as emotions and emotional control can impact sport performance

(Vallerand & Blanchard, 2000; Botterill & Brown, 2002; Vast et al., 2010; Wagstaff, 2014 and Campo et al., 2016). Given how the selection decisions were only for one game, it is possible that a coach may select the athlete for the next game and thus, would require the athlete to perform at their highest level for the next game. If a coach is cognisant of this, then denying athlete's humanness in an emotional sense may impact the coach's own goals with regard to the performance of the team. Thus if a coach is to dehumanise, animalistic dehumanisation is appropriate as it, in theory, goes some way to protect against possible negative performance impacts. This can also be linked back to literature suggesting high-power individuals adopt a self-focus and prioritise their own needs (Fiske, 1993; Overbeck et al., 2006 and Rucker et al., 2011), as a coach may be viewed as considering how their treatment of the athletes will impact the athletes performance, and how this, in turn, may influence their success as a coach.

### ***Relatedness***

Hypothesis 4 suggested that as relatedness within coaches increased, there would be an increase in overall self-dehumanisation and a decrease in animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation. However, the findings of the study only partially supported this hypothesis in that higher relatedness was linked to a decrease in self-, animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation. Thus, the hypothesis was supported with regard to animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation but rejected in regard to self-dehumanisation.

The implication of this is that if a coach has close relationships with their athletes, there may be a corresponding self-humanising effect. As noted, this rejects the hypothesis, but is also conflicting with Bastian et al.'s (2012) work which found self-dehumanisation occurs as a result of one's mistreatment of others, the work on which hypothesis 4 was based. However, given that a key component of self-dehumanisation is the inability to justify one's actions (Bastian et al., 2013), it is possible that the coaches did not self-

dehumanise as a result of this. If coaches were able to justify their treatment of the athletes, on a selection day or on a normal day, they would be less likely to self-dehumanise.

These findings also reinforce importance of relatedness as a fundamental human need (e.g. Ryan & Deci, 2000; Legate et al., 2013; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Reis et al., 2018). For example, work by Baumeister and Leary (1995) suggested that self-dehumanisation emerges among people who have been denied fundamental human needs, such as a connection with others, a defining characteristic of relatedness. Therefore, for coaches higher in relatedness, they haven't been denied the need of a social connection, and thus have no requirement to self-dehumanise.

### ***Resilience***

Hypothesis 5 stated that coaches' resilience would negatively predict both overall use, and increases when making a team selection, of all forms of dehumanisation. As noted, the changes in level of dehumanisation from a normal day to a selection day were negligible, however, the findings from the study broadly supported hypothesis 5, in that coaches high in resilience were less likely to engage in all three forms of overall dehumanisation.

The theory behind this hypothesis regarding a change in dehumanisation on a selection day was centred on how resilient individuals were likely to possess qualities (e.g. adaptability, staying focused under pressure and an ability to handle unpleasant feelings; Gucciardi et al., 2011) that would buffer the negative impacts of stress, like that caused by a team selection decision. However, it is possible that resilience influences overall use of dehumanisation through the same mechanism.

An additional explanation for this is linked to the observed negative relationship between dehumanisation and mental wellbeing. This implies that the act of dehumanisation may have maladaptive outcomes given lower mental wellbeing is associated with boredom, fatigue, dejection, dissatisfaction and sadness (Warr, 1990). Resilience may support

wellbeing (positive relationship in this study), reducing the need for protective engagement in dehumanisation.

### ***Emotional Intelligence***

Hypothesis 6 stated that emotional intelligence would be negatively related to all three forms of dehumanisation. This was based upon research that indicated emotional intelligence may be protective against the negative impacts of stress (e.g. Slaski & Cartwright, 2003; Bar-On, 1997), and that the act of a team selection decision would be stressful for a coach. The results from the study supported this hypothesis (three negative correlations between emotional intelligence and forms of dehumanisation (see Table 8) when reversals are accounted for), however, given the results surrounding a change in dehumanisation following a selection decision indicated negligible change, different explanations are plausible.

In wider research on dehumanisation, those that have been dehumanised have reported feelings of shame, loss of status, numbness, confusion, anger and sadness (Haslam et al., 2013). This indicates that the experience of being dehumanised is a negative one. Considering that a characteristic of emotional intelligence is the ability to identify and understand others' emotions (Mayer & Salovey, 1990), if dehumanisation is a negative emotional experience for another individual, emotionally intelligent coaches may be more likely to recognise its potential harmful effects and therefore less likely to use it. They might also be more cognisant of others' emotions generally, making it more difficult to dehumanise individuals. This would explain why, as coaches' emotional intelligence increased, dehumanisation decreased.

Additionally, and similarly to resilience, these results may also be explained in light of the findings on mental wellbeing. Within this study, emotional intelligence had a significant positive relationship with mental wellbeing – as coaches' emotional intelligence increased, so did mental wellbeing. Furthermore, increased overall dehumanisation (all

three forms) was negatively related to mental wellbeing. As a result, it can be argued that coaches with a higher emotional intelligence may, consciously or subconsciously, have a greater awareness of this relationship given that a key characteristic of emotional intelligence is the ability to identify, understand and regulate one's own emotions (Mayer & Salovey, 1990). Therefore, they are less likely to engage in dehumanisation due to its negative outcomes for their own mental wellbeing, explaining the negative relationship between emotional intelligence and dehumanisation found in this study.

Overall, emotional intelligence can be considered as another significant negative predictor of dehumanisation.

#### **Part 4 - Key findings: Dehumanisation and mental wellbeing**

Hypothesis 9 stated that mechanistic and or animalistic dehumanisation would positively predict mental wellbeing, whereas self-dehumanisation would negatively predict mental wellbeing. The rationale was that dehumanising athletes may be adaptive in its function, protecting the coach from the stress of a team selection decision, with this protection against stress being demonstrated by better state wellbeing. However, the findings from this study found that all three forms of dehumanisation negatively predicted mental wellbeing.

To start, the “adaptive” element of Bastian et al.’s (2013) definition of self-dehumanisation can be rejected by this study on the basis that if self-dehumanisation negatively predicts mental wellbeing, it may not be adaptive. This is because a lower mental wellbeing can be considered undesirable given the aforementioned negative associations with boredom, fatigue, dejection, dissatisfaction and sadness (Warr, 1990). Thus, this indicates a requirement for an adapted definition of self-dehumanisation as this study suggests that self-dehumanisation is not universally adaptive in its function.

With respect to the relationship between mental wellbeing and dehumanisation, causality was not tested within the study, therefore the direction of this relationship is currently unknown. Yet, it is predicted that the relationship between all three forms of dehumanisation and mental wellbeing is bi-directional, in that coaches with a lower mental wellbeing have an increased tendency to dehumanise, and that coaches who engage with dehumanisation are likely to have a lower mental wellbeing. So, in the knowledge that the results from this study indicated that as all three forms of dehumanisation increased, mental wellbeing decreased, one way to explain this finding is through how different forms of dehumanisation interact.

However, this was not supported by the findings from the study. Instead, the results were complex: following a team selection decision (table 6), *change in all* forms of dehumanisation were negatively related. For overall dehumanisation (Appendix H), self-



dehumanisation was significantly negatively related to both animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation. Overall animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation were positively related, although this was not a significant finding. Now, considering Bastian et al. (2013) defined self-dehumanisation to be an “adaptive response to cope with one’s own transgressions and the immoral treatment of others” (p. 157), these findings suggest that, in itself, the act of dehumanising athletes may be perceived as a transgression, or to be immoral. At this point, it is appropriate to digress somewhat, in order to explain how immoral acts can influence mental wellbeing. Without wishing to enter a debate over the definitions of, and what constitutes, moral actions, literature exploring a quintessential immoral act will be used; that of bullying, and specifically, cyberbullying.

Research exploring the mental health of students who engaged in cyberbullying found that they reported higher scores on stress, depression and anxiety scales than those who were not involved in any bullying (Campbell et al., 2013). Moreover, research by Ybarra and Mitchell (2004) found that 16% of students who harassed others online were severely depressed. In addition, cyberbullying perpetration has been related to adolescents’ decreased levels of self-esteem (Patchin & Hinduja, 2010), decreased self-efficacy, a reduction in prosocial behaviour, a reduced perceived sense of belonging (Wong et al., 2014), negative emotions such as anger, sadness, frustration, fear and embarrassment (Ybarra & Mitchell, 2007; Ybarra & Mitchell, 2004). It should be noted that the associations cited may be a reason as to why cyberbullies engage in cyberbullying, and not necessarily an outcome of it, yet the point is still valid given the breadth of evidence available.

Returning to the case in point, research on cyberbullying suggests that perpetrators of cyberbullying suffer from concepts related to negative mental wellbeing. Conceptualising cyberbullying as an immoral act, or a transgression, in the same way as dehumanisation, may assist in explaining why coaches who engage in more dehumanisation of the athletes are more likely to have lower levels of mental wellbeing.

This is because immoral acts have been shown to negatively predict mental wellbeing, the acts of dehumanisation are immoral or a transgression, thus, explaining why all three forms of dehumanisation negatively predict mental wellbeing.

An alternative explanation for the relationships between dehumanisation and mental wellbeing is in part explained, and underpinned, by the four personal factors predicting dehumanisation; resilience, relatedness, emotional intelligence and personal sense of power. The relationship between each of these factors, dehumanisation and wellbeing will be explored in turn. Following this, the interactions between different forms of dehumanisation will be provided.

### ***Power and mental wellbeing***

Power's relationship with mental wellbeing can be explained by considering work that examines individuals' autonomy. For the purposes of this study, power was defined as the ability to control resources, one's own and others' (Galinsky et al., 2003). Lammers et al. (2016) note that within this definition, power over others and power over oneself, are combined. Lammers et al. (2016) further explain that power over others' outcomes can be considered a form of influence (Emerson, 1962; Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2003) and power over one's own outcomes can be conceptualised as autonomy (Heider, 1958; Ng, 1980; Overbeck and Park, 2001). Using Lammers et al.'s (2016) work further, they also note how Dépret and Fiske's (1993) definition of power supports this influence-autonomy distinction. Dépret and Fiske (1993) defined power as asymmetrical control over others' outcomes. The word asymmetrical suggests that power consists of a capacity to control others (influence) and a capacity to remain uncontrolled by others (autonomy). Moreover, Lammers et al. (2016) cite how Keltner and colleagues (2003) defined power as the relative capacity to modify others' states, earning that power consists of a capacity to remain unmodified by others (autonomy). Taken together, this

implies that those who have a higher personal sense of power are more likely to have a higher sense of autonomy.

This, therefore, links to autonomy's relationship with mental wellbeing. Autonomy is the extent to which decisions and actions emanate from a person's integrated self rather than being the product of external influence or coercion (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Multiple studies have found that autonomy is positively correlated to mental wellbeing (e.g. Reis et al., 2018; Sheldon et al., 1996; Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski 1982). This is because a lack of sense of being the author of one's own behaviour, that is, having autonomy, may lead people to experience less satisfaction and more frustration with their lives (Deci & Ryan, 1991; Ryan, 1995; Sheldon & Kasser, 1995). Therefore, the findings of a coaches' personal sense of power positively predicting mental wellbeing can be explained as a result of power constituting autonomy, and autonomy itself being evidenced to positively predict mental wellbeing.

### ***Relatedness and mental wellbeing***

Relatedness was found to positively predict mental wellbeing in this study, a finding which corroborates ample previous research in, and beyond, sport. For example, Reis (2016) found that relatedness was significantly associated with wellbeing in a group of university students, King (2015) reported how school students' sense of relatedness with parents, teachers and peers positively predicted wellbeing whilst Lopez-Walle et al. (2012) found relatedness to mediate the path from perceived coach autonomy support to psychological wellbeing in adolescent athletes. Supporting theory for these findings suggests that positive affect is greater when individuals are socialising (Watson & Clark, 1994) and connected with others (intimacy theory; Reis & Shaver, 1988). Thus, when coaches have a greater sense of relatedness, this may occur due to their connections with their athletes, or other members of support staff, and the ongoing social interaction within the sporting environment. In sum, this suggests that coaches' relatedness predicts positive

mental wellbeing as a result of the social connections coaches obtain with others in their sporting environment.

### *Emotional intelligence, resilience, and mental wellbeing*

Both emotional intelligence and resilience's relationship with mental wellbeing can be explained through their relationship with stress. As noted by Por et al. (2011) in a study exploring nurses' experience of managing stress, the author noted that those with greater emotional intelligence were more likely to be better at managing their emotions, thus experiencing lower amounts of perceived stress, lead to better overall mental wellbeing. Similarly for resilience, it has been reported that those with higher resilience reported less stress (Friborg et al., 2006) whilst increased job stress has been shown to increase the risk of depression symptoms (Clays et al., 2007). Taken together, this suggests that resilient individuals are better at dealing with stress, which, in turn, avoids symptoms of negative mental wellbeing, thus leading to greater mental wellbeing, as indicated in this study.


### ***The role of situational factors in coaches' engagement in dehumanisation***

Hypotheses 7 and 8 concerned two situational factors that may predict coaches' use of dehumanisation. Specifically, hypothesis 7 stated that coaches who were a concordant gender with the athletes they work with will animalistically and mechanistically dehumanise more, and self-dehumanise less, than coaches who are discordant with the gender of the athletes they work with. Hypothesis 8 predicted that the higher the level the coach had previously participated as an athlete, the more likely they would be to engage in animalistic and mechanistic forms of dehumanisation, and the less likely they would be to self-dehumanise. However, neither of these hypotheses were supported by the data, with no difference between concordant and non-concordant coach:athlete groups, or coaches with different level the highest previous participation level and dehumanisation. As such, gendered partnerships do not seem to be a predictive factor for dehumanisation's use. Yet, as discussed, there were significant relationships between coaches' relatedness, resilience, personal sense of power, emotional intelligence and dehumanisation. Therefore, based on the data from this study, this would suggest that personal factors predict dehumanisation and situational factors do not, meaning that dehumanisation occurs on an individual basis.

### **Part 5 - Summary of Findings: An adapted model predicting dehumanisation in coaches**

Figure 2 (in literature review) showed the hypothesised relationships between the factors expected to predict coaches' engagement with all three forms of dehumanisation, and dehumanisation's subsequent relationship with mental wellbeing. Considering the findings from this study and the explanations provided for them, Figure 3 demonstrates an adapted model of the antecedents of dehumanisation and mental wellbeing. Given the negligible change in dehumanisation following a team selection decision, only overall dehumanisation is displayed on the model.

**Figure 3:** Updated model of the relationships between predictive factors, three forms of dehumanisation and mental wellbeing.



**Red** arrows indicate negative relationships.  
**Black** arrows indicate positive relationships.  
*(The direction of the relationships has been adjusted for reverse scoring for ease of reading e.g. higher scores = less self-dehumanisation)*

## **Part 6 – Summary: main theoretical contributions**

The first key theoretical contribution is support for a trait-like model of dehumanisation, as opposed to a context-specific one. Individual differences have been shown to differentiate dehumanisation use, specifically resilience, personal sense of power, relatedness and emotional intelligence. Second, the hypothesis regarding the adaptive use of dehumanisation is not supported – instead, findings reiterate the negative wellbeing associations of dehumanisation previously advocated in the literature. One way to explain this finding is through the perceived immorality of dehumanisation.



### *Methodological contributions*

This study represents, as far as we are aware, the first application of validated dehumanisation measures to a sporting population (i.e., Measure of Self-Humanity, Bastian et al., 2012, and a newly developed dehumanisation measure based on Haslam's (2006) conceptualisations of humanness). In doing so, this study has provided some initial evidence of their validation with for this population. Specifically, evidence is provided for face validity (as indicated by the coaches' ability to complete the measures) and predictive validity (in that the measures were related to other important concepts e.g. mental wellbeing). Support for the measures' reliability was provided (see table 1). Furthermore, minor modifications to the wording of key measures in adaptations of previously validated scales which can be used in the future with the populations similar to that in this study.

Moreover, the data makes a contribution to debates concerning whether self-dehumanisation is a uni-dimensional or multi-dimensional concept. Previous work (e.g. Bastian et al., 2012) has calculated scores for overall self-humanity, indicating uni-dimensionality, whereas other work (e.g. Bastian & Haslam, 2010) has calculated self-humanity with respect to human nature and human uniqueness, indicating multi-dimensionality. Additionally, both Bastian et al.'s (2012) and Bastian and Haslam's (2010) work calculated mean scores for self-humanity, irrespective of uni- or multi-dimensionality. However, this study totalled self-dehumanisation scores in order to account for outliers and did so with acceptable reliability. Thus, this indicates that self-dehumanisation can be measured as a uni-dimensional concept.

Lastly, with respect to data collection, this study reinforces the utility of snowball and convenience sampling in studies focusing on specific sub-populations. Additionally, the importance and effectiveness of gatekeepers to access sporting populations is highlighted, due to the sizeable contribution to recruiting participants within this study.

### *Applied contributions*

The key applied recommendation to be taken from this study is for coach education programmes to develop an awareness of, and integrate training of, resilience, emotional intelligence and relatedness. The reason for this is twofold. First, these three factors are negatively correlated with dehumanisation and dehumanisation has been shown to negatively predict mental wellbeing. Second, these three factors were shown to positively predict mental wellbeing across a sample of sport coaches. Therefore, if there is a way of increasing the levels of these within coaches, these should be explored in order to protect against negative mental wellbeing.

As outlined in the introduction to this study, coaches across all levels of sport, from participation to Olympic level, experience a range of stressors (Thelwell et al., 2010; Lundkvist et al., 2012; Didymus, 2017; Potts et al., 2019). An inability to cope with stressors has previously been shown to lead to burnout (Olusoga & Kenttä, 2017), whilst it can also be suggested that a lack of effective coping with stressors may contribute to the emergent findings of poor mental health amongst coaches (Edge Hill University, 2019; Fletcher & Scott, 2010). As such, this highlights the need for coach educators to formally understand these three factors, how they influence mental wellbeing and how they can be ‘improved’ within coaches. This process in itself may require future research, as to contextually define, operationalise and develop effective training programmes for these factors may be challenging.

However, the more experienced and qualified a coach becomes, the less likely they are to attend the same amount of formal coach training. As such, it is important to develop an understanding of why and how these factors may also be effectively integrated in settings beyond coach education programmes. For example, there is ample research supporting the contention that social support contributes to resilience (e.g. Brown, 2008; Galli & Vealey, 2008; Fletcher & Sarkar, 2012, Morgan et al., 2013). Therefore, to take one example of a different sport setting by using that of an elite academy, resilience in

coaches may be fostered through encouraging a social support network. In turn, this may assist in building a sense of belonging amongst coaches such they feel a greater sense of relatedness. This social support network does not have to be exclusive to coaches and may include support staff (e.g. psychologists, strength and conditioning coaches etc.) or administrators in the environment. Moreover, additional work with a focus on the components of an effective social support network for sports coaches in order to develop resilience and relatedness may be a fruitful area for further research.

Another applied recommendation to be made from this study is that dehumanisation should not be proposed as a potential coping method to deal with the stress of a team selection decision. Previous research has highlighted how coaches found the experience of a team selection decision stressful (Didymus, 2017; Thelwell et al., 2008; Olusoga et al., 2009; Coutrier, 2009 & Lundkvist et al., 2012) and the focus of this study was to explore whether or not dehumanisation could be a potential coping method used in order to relieve this stress. However, overall dehumanisation was found to be negatively correlated to mental wellbeing, and therefore indicates maladaptive outcomes of engaging with dehumanisation. As a result, this suggests dehumanisation is not an effective coping method for dealing with the stress of a team selection decision.

## **Part 7 - Strengths, Limitations and Future Directions**

### ***Strengths***

The first strength of this study is the applied context in which dehumanisation was measured. Many previous studies exploring dehumanisation have not sought to explore it within applied settings, and instead examined it within experimental-based studies, without specific inclusion criteria for participants (e.g. Lammers & Stapel, 2010; Bastian & Haslam, 2010; Bastian et al., 2012; Bastian & Haslam, 2011; Haslam & Bain, 2007; Moller & Deci, 2009). As a result of specifically exploring sports coaches as a sample, a clearer understanding of how this population engage with forms of dehumanisation has been developed.

Moreover, by setting broad inclusion criteria for coaches in the study, the findings attempt to achieve some level of generalisability for sports coaches. This responds to Potts et al.'s (2019) contention that empirical sports coaching literature has focused almost exclusively on the experiences of full-time paid male coaches, thus leading to a biased evidence base. Therefore, with wider inclusion criteria in respect to the sport, level, gender and experience of coaches that participated in the study, the generalisability of the findings was enhanced.

The findings of the study are also a key strength. In part, this is because they contradict previous research and thus, as suggested, highlight a need for further research, but also because they may make a contribution to informing how we can potentially improve the mental health of sports coaches.

### ***Limitations and future research directions***

To start, despite broad inclusion criteria, the homogeneity within the sample of coaches highlights one limitation of this study. 86% of the sample were male, 93% were white British and 94% were football coaches, indicating a need for more diversity in future research, if greater generalizability within the findings is desirable.

One additional limitation of this study is that within Part 2 of the questionnaire (completed after a selection decision), the perceived stress of the selection decision was not measured. Dehumanisation was conceptualised as a potential coping method for this theorised stress, and without measuring how stressful the selection decision was for each coach, the ‘need to cope’ and thus, the ‘need to dehumanise’ could not be reported. As such, relationships between stress and dehumanisation, which may have been indicative of dehumanisation’s employment as a coping mechanism, were not explored. Therefore, it would be recommended that future research exploring dehumanisation as a potential coping method for the stress of a team selection decision includes a measure for this. Such research may also provide quantitative data on specific stressors experienced by coaches.

With respect to the potential effectiveness of dehumanisation as a coping method, within Part 2 of the questionnaire it would have also been beneficial to measure coaches’ mental wellbeing. This would have provided greater insight into whether or not coaches’ mental wellbeing changed in accordance with their engagement with dehumanisation. Moreover, this would have facilitated a more detailed understanding of whether or not dehumanisation has adaptive properties, and could therefore be classed as an effective coping technique. As such, another future research direction includes the recommendation of assessing mental wellbeing pre and post events involving dehumanisation, as one way to assess the effectiveness of coping methods more broadly could be through changes in mental wellbeing.

Concerning the measures used in this study, the measure for mechanistic dehumanisation was unreliable, limiting the interpretations from the findings relating to it. One of the reasons attributed to this lack of reliability was the wording of the questions included, for example “I consider the athletes as a means to an end.” Wording of questions like this was theorised to be socially undesirable, in that coaches completing questionnaires would not want to ‘admit’ to perceive athletes in this way, or even, coaches may not have been aware that they perceived athletes like this. Thus, it would be beneficial for future

research to adapt, or develop a new measure tailored to the subtleties of dehumanisation in sport, cognisant of the range of ways in which dehumanisation occur and the ways in which coaches feel they ‘should’ behave.

Moreover, coaches were requested to fill out Part 2 of the questionnaire “within 24 hours of making a team selection decision”, yet, there was not a procedure put in place to ensure this was done. As such, there is no guarantee that coaches responded with respect to how they felt within 24 hours of making a team selection decision. Therefore, future research exploring similar concepts may employ methods to ensure that participants complete questionnaires within a direct timeframe.

One further limitation from this study concerns the lack of methods implemented to assess a causal relationship between dehumanisation, resilience, emotional intelligence, personal sense of power, relatedness and mental wellbeing. This study reported that there is a relationship between them and noted the strength and directions of the correlations, yet, to have stronger applied findings, knowledge of a causal relationship would have been beneficial. Thus, an additional area recommended for future research is an exploration into the cause and effect within the relationship between these concepts. However, it should be noted that an ethical challenge would be presented in trying to manipulate this experimentally, given the knowledge that there are negative outcomes. An investigation on this would provide stronger applied recommendations than this current study, as it would offer information on where coach education programmes should direct their focus. Specifically, knowledge surrounding how to increase relatedness, resilience and emotional intelligence would facilitate a greater understanding of how mental wellbeing can be enhanced.

Linked to this is the recommendation that a review of current psychological content taught on coach education programmes would be beneficial. To be precise, knowledge of currently what and how psychological content, specifically to protect coach mental wellbeing, is delivered on coach education programmes would be fruitful to explore. This

is because it would facilitate more explicit knowledge on where the gaps may currently lie within these programmes and thus, how new information may be effectively integrated.

Finally, investigations into who is dehumanised and how this dehumanisation takes place would be a recommended area for further research. This study explored *what types* of dehumanisation take place (e.g. animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation of a group of athletes and self-dehumanisation from a coach). However, there is potential that individual athletes are dehumanised in different ways and therefore, why and how this occurs and what the associated impacts are, would be a potential area for future research. Here, we presented provisional data exploring gender effects. Other key areas, especially those linked with other-dehumanisation might include race, for example, alongside the contextual aspects that have been shown to constitute humanness from coaches' perspectives, as outlined in this study. It is also recommended that exploration of how dehumanisation occurs in practice should not be exclusive to what aspects of humanness are denied, but also what this looks like in practice (e.g. specific uses of language and/or ostracising behaviour). Thus, given dehumanisation's negative relationship with mental wellbeing, knowledge of how dehumanisation occurs in practice, specifically within sporting settings, could support coach education programmes in providing behavioural advice for coaches. This would enable coaches to ensure their coaching remains effective, in line with the adapted definition of coaching effectiveness outlined in the introduction to this study.

### *Concluding remarks*

This study set out to explore whether dehumanisation could be employed as an effective coping mechanism for sport coaches, in relieving the stress associated with a team selection decision. In doing so, factors predicted to influence a coach's engagement with forms of dehumanisation were measured. The outcome of the hypotheses and associated findings indicated that dehumanisation does not significantly change following a team selection decision, yet personal factors did significantly influence coaches' engagement with dehumanisation. The personal factors found to predict coaches' engagement with dehumanisation included a coach's personal sense of power, relatedness, resilience and emotional intelligence. Crucially, however, dehumanisation was found to negatively predict mental wellbeing, implying that it may not be an effective coping method and all three forms may not have adaptive properties. Moreover, this study also suggested one's tendency to engage with dehumanisation is trait-driven rather than context-driven. Taken together, these findings offer implications beyond sport as the context in which dehumanisation occurs appears to have minimal influence, so given information about individuals specific traits, one would be able to predict their engagement with dehumanisation, and potentially their mental wellbeing.



## Part 8 - Autobiographical reflections

Prior to the Easter break of 2018, the trio that is the Slater family sat in a small restaurant in Vienna, discussing plans for what graduating from Durham University may entail. Upon consumption of a delightful meal served by said restaurant, it was decided that the best option would be to remain in Durham a further year, for in my head, doing so would enable me one year's additional coaching experience "*and* I get a masters."

To provide some context, at the time, to remain in Durham would afford me the opportunity to work with the Men's Football Club 2<sup>nd</sup> XI, whilst keeping my fingers crossed for the chance to coach in the academy of a professional club in the same season. In an ideal world, this would then assist me in securing a job in the football industry when I'd finished my masters, preferably in a coaching capacity. But from my experiences, not much in football seemed to work out ideally, so my hopes weren't exceedingly high.

Therefore, upon completion of this thesis, it is time to admit that, disappointingly, and what has transpired to be somewhat embarrassingly, my reasons for starting were not entrenched in a quest for enhanced academic knowledge, or a desire to pursue an academic career. Doing a masters was a side note to further pursuing my dream of being a professional football coach.

However, what a bloody side note it was. The intellectual challenge writing, and at times presenting, this thesis has provided me with has been a thoroughly enjoyable one to take on. My rate of learning with respect to my academic knowledge has far surpassed my rate of learning as a football coach this year, and has prompted an awareness of the extent to which I yearn for intellectual challenges. To enjoy 'thinking' and to get so much pleasure from writing has been a rewarding experience.

The highlight of completing this masters was my presentation at the 7<sup>th</sup> International SDT Conference, in Amsterdam. Much to my amazement, an application to present a poster of my then data-less research, ended in doing a presentation in front of

sixty people. This is an experience I am extremely proud of, and will continue to subtly brag about for years to come.

More seriously however, this additional year in Durham has asked me the question of where do I fit? In coaching environments, I feel, and have anecdotal evidence to suggest that, I'm perceived as the southern spoken PhD student on course to be a lab-coat-donning professor. Yet in academic environments, I feel I'm the football coach who is "*actually quite clever*", yet this is more of my own doing and the high regard with which I hold other academics' intelligence.

So why not embrace the difference between the two? Fully aware that I'm not the archetypal football coach with a playing career dotted around non-league clubs and contacts ranging up and down the football ladder, I requested advice from a well-regarded mentor. I was told not to be concerned and instead, to "have my niche." To say that now I have "found" that niche would be disingenuous, but "stumbled closer to" is certainly more accurate. Within said coaching environments, being the bespectacled coach studying for a masters, at times perceived as the "intelligent one", has provided me with this niche, and one that makes acceptance within an environment far easier – I definitely play on it at times, but who cares and also, who probably knows other than me?

This is not in any sense a request for pity, I needed something to make me slightly different, to make me stand out from a crowd in the most networked industry of all. Undertaking this masters has provided me with a point of difference, not to mention far more than the additional line on a CV I was anticipating. It's only a difference though, and I'm aware that more is needed to work my way up.

But for now, I'll miss the meetings with my supervisory team, and in a masochistic way, their incessant desire to constantly prod and provoke my thought process. As such, I'll also miss the team effort it was to complete this study in tandem with my supervisors. I'll miss the lightbulb moments when I've had an idea that could work well. And I'll miss the challenge of it all.

But I won't miss all of that too much, because as I make the final edits to this thesis, I am grateful, and feel privileged, to be employed full-time as Durham University's Head Football Coach and part-time as Sunderland Academy's U11s coach.

Somehow, this has worked out pretty close to ideal.



## **Appendices**

**Appendix A** – Participant Information Sheet

**Appendix B** – Consent Form

**Appendix C** – Privacy Notice

**Appendix D** – Questionnaire Part 1

**Appendix E** – Questionnaire Part 2

**Appendix F** - Item-wise breakdown of variance and range for mechanistic dehumanisation scale.

**Appendix G** – Differences in dehumanisation between three gender groups.

**Appendix H** – Correlations between forms of dehumanisation.

## Appendix A – Participant Information Sheet



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### Participant Information Sheet – 20<sup>th</sup> November 2018

You are invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide if you would like to take part, please read this information sheet carefully. You can also ask the lead researcher, Mike Slater, if you have any questions (please see contact details at the end of this sheet).

**Title of Project:** The psychology behind selecting a team.

#### **What is the purpose of the research?**

The purpose of the research is to assess the psychological processes involved in a coach's team selection decisions. This will involve gathering information about the coach's personal sporting experience in addition to examining a range of factors to see if they affect how coaches feel and act when making difficult decisions.

#### **Why have I been invited to take part?**

You have been invited to take part in this study because you are aged 18 and over and a sport coach currently working with a team.

#### **Do I have to take part?**

The decision to take part is entirely at your discretion. If you decide to take part, you are free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason. If you wish to do so, please contact the researcher using the contact details provided on this sheet.

#### **What will be involved if I decide to take part in the research?**

Taking part in this research will involve the completion of a series of questionnaires. The questionnaires will focus on your playing and coaching experience, how you perceive your athletes and assess the psychological impacts of making a selection decision. Three parts of the questionnaire can be completed at any time, and one part of the questionnaire must be completed within 24 hours of making a team selection decision.

#### **How will confidentiality be assured?**

All data submitted will be anonymous and will be stored in a password protected computer file. Should you require further information on confidentiality, please refer to the 'Privacy Notice'.

#### **What will happen to the results of the research?**

The results from the research will be used as part of a Masters by Research thesis, which may go on to be presented at a conference or published in an academic journal. We hope that the results will also inform the development of improved training and support for coaches and managers.

Should you wish to see a summary of the project's findings, please contact the lead researcher and you will be sent, via e-mail, a summary document.

**If you have any questions related to the project, please contact the lead researcher:**

Name: Mike Slater

Email address: michael.j.slater@durham.ac.uk

**Please only take part in the research project if you are aged over 18 and are currently responsible for team selection decisions (solely or jointly).**

**If you would like to take part, please complete and sign the enclosed Informed Consent Form.**

## Appendix B – Consent Form



Department of Sport and  
Exercise Sciences

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### Consent Form

**Project title:** The psychology behind selecting a team.

**Researcher(s):** Mike Slater

**Department:** Department of Sport and Exercise Sciences

**Contact details:** michael.j.slater@durham.ac.uk

**Supervisor name:** Dr Emily Oliver

**Supervisor contact details:** emily.oliver@durham.ac.uk

This form is to confirm that you understand what the purposes of the project are, what is involved and that you are happy to take part. Please initial each box to indicate your agreement:

|  |  |
|--|--|
| I confirm that I have read and understand the Information Sheet dated [20/11/2018] and the Privacy Notice for the above project.                     |  |
| I have had sufficient time to consider the information and ask any questions I might have, and I am satisfied with the answers I have been given.    |  |
| I understand who will have access to personal data provided, how the data will be stored and what will happen to the data at the end of the project. |  |
| I agree to take part in the above project.   |  |
| I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason.                         |  |

|  |
|--|
| Participant's Signature_____ Date_____ |
| (NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS)_____           |
| Researcher's Signature_____ Date_____  |
| (NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS)_____           |

**Please now refer to the questionnaire instruction sheet.**





### **Privacy Notice**

This notice provides you with the privacy information that you need to know before you give any personal data for the particular purpose(s) stated below. Additional information about the University's responsibilities for data protection and your rights in relation to personal data can be found in the University's generic privacy notice, available at <https://www.dur.ac.uk/research.innovation/governance/privacynotice/generic/>.

**Title of Project:** The psychology behind selecting a team.

### **Type(s) of personal data collected and held by the Researcher and method of collection:**

Your e-mail address will be collected as the research requires you to complete one questionnaire at a different point in time to the other three. As such, your e-mail address may be used to send you a reminder to complete the final part of the questionnaire. This will be the only use for your e-mail address.

The only other form of personal data collected will be your answers to a series of questionnaires. These questionnaires include information on your coaching experience, psychological well-being and relationships with your athletes. Your personal data will be anonymised exactly one week after you have completed and submitted all four parts of the study. This information will be gathered by either paper or online questionnaires.

### **Lawful Basis:**

Your data will be processed in accordance with the consent you give for the use of your data, should you agree to participate in the project.

### **How personal data is stored:**

You will be allocated an anonymous number for data collection which will not be connected to your name or identity. All personal data in electronic form will be stored on a password protected computer, and any hardcopies will be kept in locked storage. Data will not be available to anyone outside the research team.

### **How personal data is processed:**

The responses submitted via questionnaires will be entered into a database for analysis. From the point of entry into the database (which will be one week after you complete all four parts of the questionnaire), the data will be anonymous.

### Withdrawal of data

You can request withdrawal of your data until it has been fully anonymised (one week from completion and submission). Once this has happened it will not be possible to identify you from any of the data we hold.

### **Who the Researcher shares personal data with:**

The personal data will be shared only amongst the research team. Once the data has been made anonymous, the data may be used within the project output submitted to third parties.

### **How long personal data is held for:**

The personal data will be held for one week before being put into a database, after which it be anonymised. The anonymised data and the signed consent form will be held for up to two years.

### **How to object to the processing of your personal data:**

If you have any concerns regarding the processing of your personal data, or you wish to withdraw your data from the project, please contact Mike Slater using the information below.

### **If you require further information please contact:**

Researcher: Mike Slater

Email: michael.j.slater@durham.ac.uk

Supervisor: Dr Emily Oliver

Address: 42 Old Elvet, Durham, DH1 3HN

Email: emily.oliver@durham.ac.uk

## Questionnaire instruction sheet: The psychology behind selecting a team.

### Instructions:

To take part in this research, you must:

- Be aged over 18,
- currently be responsible (solely or jointly) for team selection decisions
- and coach within the UK.

Part 1 of the questionnaire takes approximately 15 minutes to complete.

Please answer **all the questions**, and please note the pages are **double-sided**.

Once you have completed Part 1, you will be e-mailed Part 2 of the questionnaire. This must be completed up to 24 hours after you have made a selection decision for your team. Part 2 takes less than 5 minutes.

Please refer to the participant information sheet should you require any further information, or have any questions about what to do.

Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research.

**PART A – GENERAL INFORMATION AND SPORT EXPERIENCE**

This section contains some basic questions about your experiences as a coach.

E-mail address\*:

\*As stated in the privacy notice, your e-mail address will **only** be used to send you Part 2 of the questionnaire.

**Section 1: General Information.**

1. Age:

2. Gender (please circle):

Male

Female

Non-binary

3. Please choose one option that best describes your ethnic group or background.

|   | Tick (✓) |
|---|----------|
| English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British |          |
| Irish   |          |
| Gypsy or Irish Traveller                      |          |
| White and Black Caribbean                     |          |
| White and Black African                       |          |
| White and Asian                               |          |
| Pakistani                                     |          |
| Indian  |          |
| Bangladeshi                                   |          |
| Chinese                                       |          |
| African                                       |          |
| Caribbean                                     |          |
| Arab  |          |
| Other   |          |

**Section 2: Playing Experience.**

4. Please select the sport that you currently coach. Following this, please answer all the questions in relation to this sport.

|              | Tick (✓) |
|--------------|----------|
| Football     |          |
| Hockey       |          |
| Rugby Union  |          |
| Rugby League |          |
| Basketball   |          |
| Cricket      |          |
| Rowing       |          |
| Netball      |          |
| Other        |          |

5. For how many years have you/did you play this sport?

|  |       |
|--|-------|
|  | years |
|--|-------|

6. What is the highest level at which you have played the sport you selected in question 4?  
(Select one)

| Level of league/competition | Tick (✓) |
|-----------------------------|----------|
| International               |          |
| National                    |          |
| Regional                    |          |
| Local                       |          |
| University                  |          |
| Have never played the sport |          |

7. For how many years did you play at this level?  
(Enter '0' if you answered 'Have never played the sport' to the previous question)

|  |       |
|--|-------|
|  | years |
|--|-------|

**Section 3: Coaching Experience.**

8. Please select your highest coaching qualification to date. (Please select equivalent if your sport does not adopt these levels)

| Qualification (or equivalent)      | Tick (✓) |
|------------------------------------|----------|
| Level 5                            |          |
| Level 4                            |          |
| Level 3                            |          |
| Level 2                            |          |
| Level 1                            |          |
| No current coaching qualifications |          |

9. Throughout your career, what is the highest level of competition in which you have coached a team? (Select one)

| Level of league/competition | Tick (✓) |
|-----------------------------|----------|
| International               |          |
| National                    |          |
| Regional                    |          |
| Local                       |          |
| University                  |          |

We recognise that some coaches may currently work with more than one team, so please answer questions 8, 9 and 10 in relation to the team you predominantly work with. Then, when completing the remaining parts of the questionnaire, please do so in relation to the same team.

10. Do you currently coach a men's, women's or mixed team? (Please tick one)

|       | Tick (✓) |
|-------|----------|
| Men   |          |
| Women |          |
| Mixed |          |

11. What is the age range of the team you currently coach? (Please tick one)

|                           | Tick (✓) |
|---------------------------|----------|
| Adult (19+)               |          |
| Youth (12-18)             |          |
| Children (11 and younger) |          |

12. At what level of competition does the team you currently coach participate? (Please tick one)

| Level of league/competition | Tick (✓) |
|-----------------------------|----------|
| International               |          |
| National                    |          |
| Regional                    |          |
| Local                       |          |
| University                  |          |

**PART B – Coach relationships and behaviour.**

This part of the questionnaire contains four different sections focusing on your relationship with your athletes and specific behaviours you exhibit as a coach.

**Section 1.**

Please circle your response for each item below.

In my relationship with the athletes I coach...

|    |  | Disagree strongly | Disagree | Disagree a little | Neither agree nor disagree | Agree a little | Agree | Agree strongly |
|----|--|-------------------|----------|-------------------|----------------------------|----------------|-------|----------------|
| 1. | I can get them to listen to what I say.          | 1                 | 2        | 3                 | 4                          | 5              | 6     | 7              |
| 2. | My wishes do not carry much weight.              | 1                 | 2        | 3                 | 4                          | 5              | 6     | 7              |
| 3. | I can get them to do what I want.                | 1                 | 2        | 3                 | 4                          | 5              | 6     | 7              |
| 4. | Even if I voice them, my views have little sway. | 1                 | 2        | 3                 | 4                          | 5              | 6     | 7              |
| 5. | I think I have a great deal of power.            | 1                 | 2        | 3                 | 4                          | 5              | 6     | 7              |
| 6. | My ideas and opinions are often ignored.         | 1                 | 2        | 3                 | 4                          | 5              | 6     | 7              |
| 7. | Even when I try, I am not able to get my way.    | 1                 | 2        | 3                 | 4                          | 5              | 6     | 7              |
| 8. | If I want to, I get to make the decisions.       | 1                 | 2        | 3                 | 4                          | 5              | 6     | 7              |

## Section 2.

Each of the following items asks you about how you manage emotions.

After deciding whether a statement is generally true for you, use the 5-point scale to respond to the statement.

There are no right or wrong answers. Please give the response that best describes you.

|    |   | Strongly disagree | Somewhat disagree | Neither agree nor disagree | Somewhat agree | Strongly agree |
|----|---|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| 1  | I know when to speak about my personal problems to others.  | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 2  | When I am faced with obstacles, I remember times I faced similar obstacles and overcame them.       | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 3  | I expect that I will do well on most things I try.  | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 4  | Other people find it easy to confide in me.   | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 5  | I find it hard to understand the non-verbal messages of other people.                               | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 6  | Some of the major events of my life have led me to re-evaluate what is important and not important. | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 7  | When my mood changes, I see new possibilities.  | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 8  | Emotions are one of the things that make my life worth living.                                      | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 9  | I am aware of my emotions as I experience them.   | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 10 | I expect good things to happen.   | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 11 | I like to share my emotions with others.  | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 12 | When I experience a positive emotion, I know how to make it last.                                   | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |



|    |  | Strongly disagree | Somewhat disagree | Neither agree nor disagree | Somewhat agree | Strongly agree |
|----|--|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| 13 | I arrange events others enjoy.   | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 14 | I seek out activities that make me happy.  | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 15 | I am aware of the non-verbal messages I send to others.  | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 16 | I present myself in a way that makes a good impression on others.  | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 17 | When I am in a positive mood, solving problems is easy for me.   | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 18 | By looking at their facial expressions, I recognize the emotions people are experiencing.  | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 19 | I know why my emotions change.   | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 20 | When I am in a positive mood, I am able to come up with new ideas.   | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 21 | I have control over my emotions.   | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 22 | I easily recognize my emotions as I experience them.   | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 23 | I motivate myself by imagining a good outcome to tasks I take on.  | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 24 | I compliment others when they have done something well.  | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 25 | I am aware of the non-verbal messages other people send.   | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 26 | When another person tells me about an important event in his or her life, I almost feel as though I experienced this event myself. | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 27 | When I feel a change in emotions, I tend to come up with new ideas.  | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |

|    |  | Strongly disagree | Somewhat disagree | Neither agree nor disagree | Somewhat agree | Strongly agree |
|----|--|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| 28 | When I am faced with a challenge, I give up because I believe I will fail. | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 29 | I know what other people are feeling just by looking at them.              | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 30 | I help other people feel better when they are down.                        | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 31 | I use good moods to help myself keep trying in the face of obstacles.      | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 32 | I can tell how people are feeling by listening to the tone of their voice. | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |
| 33 | It is difficult for me to understand why people feel the way they do.      | 1                 | 2                 | 3                          | 4              | 5              |

**Section 3.**

For each item, please place a tick in the box that best indicates how much you agree with the following statements as they apply to you over the last month.

If a particular situation has not occurred recently, answer according to how you think you would have felt.

|    |   | Not true at all (0) | Rarely true (1) | Sometimes true (2) | Often true (3) | True nearly all the time (4) |
|----|---|---------------------|-----------------|--------------------|----------------|------------------------------|
| 1  | I am able to adapt when changes occur   |                     |                 |                    |                |                              |
| 2  | I can deal with whatever comes my way   |                     |                 |                    |                |                              |
| 3  | I try to see the humorous side of things when I am faced with problems                    |                     |                 |                    |                |                              |
| 4  | Having to cope with stress can make me stronger   |                     |                 |                    |                |                              |
| 5  | I tend to bounce back after illness, injury or other hardships                            |                     |                 |                    |                |                              |
| 6  | I believe I can achieve my goals, even if there are obstacles                             |                     |                 |                    |                |                              |
| 7  | Under pressure, I stay focused and think clearly  |                     |                 |                    |                |                              |
| 8  | I am not easily discouraged by failure  |                     |                 |                    |                |                              |
| 9  | I think of myself as a strong person when dealing with life's challenges and difficulties |                     |                 |                    |                |                              |
| 10 | I am able to handle unpleasant or painful feelings like sadness, fear and anger           |                     |                 |                    |                |                              |

**Section 4.**

Below are some statements about how you think and feel.

Please circle the box that best describes your experience of each **over the last 2 weeks**.

|    | Statements   | None of the time | Rarely | Some of the time | Often | All of the time |
|----|--|------------------|--------|------------------|-------|-----------------|
| 1  | I've been feeling optimistic about the future      | 1                | 2      | 3                | 4     | 5               |
| 2  | I've been feeling useful                           | 1                | 2      | 3                | 4     | 5               |
| 3  | I've been feeling relaxed                          | 1                | 2      | 3                | 4     | 5               |
| 4  | I've been feeling interested in other people       | 1                | 2      | 3                | 4     | 5               |
| 5  | I've had energy to spare                           | 1                | 2      | 3                | 4     | 5               |
| 6  | I've been dealing with problems well               | 1                | 2      | 3                | 4     | 5               |
| 7  | I've been thinking clearly                         | 1                | 2      | 3                | 4     | 5               |
| 8  | I've been feeling good about myself                | 1                | 2      | 3                | 4     | 5               |
| 9  | I've been feeling close to other people            | 1                | 2      | 3                | 4     | 5               |
| 10 | I've been feeling confident                        | 1                | 2      | 3                | 4     | 5               |
| 11 | I've been able to make up my own mind about things | 1                | 2      | 3                | 4     | 5               |
| 12 | I've been feeling loved                            | 1                | 2      | 3                | 4     | 5               |
| 13 | I've been interested in new things                 | 1                | 2      | 3                | 4     | 5               |
| 14 | I've been feeling cheerful                         | 1                | 2      | 3                | 4     | 5               |

**Section 5.**

Please respond to the items below with regard to your feelings and experiences in the sport you predominantly coach.

1. In my sport, I feel close to the athletes I work with.

*Not true at all* *Very true*  
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7

2. I show concern for the athletes I work with.

*Not true at all* *Very true*  
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7

3. The athletes I work with care about me.

*Not true at all* *Very true*  
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7

4. I trust the athletes I work with.

*Not true at all* *Very true*  
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7

5. I have close relationships with the athletes I work with.








*Not true at all* *Very true*  
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7

**PART C – Coach’s perception of their athletes and themselves.**

This section contains a series of questionnaires as to how a coach perceives their athletes and their ‘self.’








**Section 1.**

Please tick **one** box which you think most accurately represents the degree of overlap between ‘athletes’ and ‘machines’:

|  | Tick (✓)                 |
|--|--------------------------|
| <br>Athletes Machines   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <br>Athletes Machines   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <br>Athletes Machines   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <br>Athletes Machines   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <br>Athletes Machines   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <br>Athletes Machines  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <br>Athletes Machines | <input type="checkbox"/> |








**Section 2.**

Please tick **one** box which you think most accurately represents the degree of overlap between ‘athletes’ and ‘animals’:

|   | Tick (✓)                 |
|---|--------------------------|
| <br>Athletes Animals | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <br>Athletes Animals | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <br>Athletes Animals | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <br>Athletes Animals | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <br>Athletes Animals | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <br>Athletes Animals | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <br>Athletes Animals | <input type="checkbox"/> |








### Section 3.

Please tick **one** box which you think most accurately represents the degree of overlap between your view of **'yourself'** and **'animals'**:

|  |  | Tick (✓)                 |
|--|--|--------------------------|
|   |  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Animals  |  |                          |
| <hr/>  |  |                          |
|   |  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Animals  |  |                          |
| <hr/>  |  |                          |
|   |  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Animals  |  |                          |
| <hr/>  |  |                          |
|   |  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Animals  |  |                          |
| <hr/>  |  |                          |
|   |  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Animals  |  |                          |
| <hr/>  |  |                          |
|   |  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Animals  |  |                          |
| <hr/>  |  |                          |
|  |  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Animals  |  |                          |

### Section 4.

Please tick **one** box which you think most accurately represents the degree of overlap between your view of **'yourself'** and **'machines'**:

|   |  | Tick (✓)                 |
|---|--|--------------------------|
|  |  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Machines  |  |                          |
| <hr/>   |  |                          |
|  |  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Machines  |  |                          |
| <hr/>   |  |                          |
|  |  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Machines  |  |                          |
| <hr/>   |  |                          |
|  |  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Machines  |  |                          |
| <hr/>   |  |                          |
|  |  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Machines  |  |                          |
| <hr/>   |  |                          |
|  |  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Machines  |  |                          |
| <hr/>   |  |                          |
|  |  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Machines  |  |                          |

**Section 5.**

Please circle the number you think is most appropriate to you.

When thinking about the athletes I work with...

1. I deem the athletes to be mature for their age.

*Not at all  
much so*

*Very*

1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7

2. I consider the athletes to be able to think logically.

*Not at all  
much so*

*Very*

1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7

3. I feel that the athletes act morally.

*Not at all  
much so*

*Very*

1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7

4. I see the athletes as refined individuals.

*Not at all  
much so*

*Very*

1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7

5. I consider the athletes to be cultured.

*Not at all  
much so*

*Very*

1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6  
7

6. I consider the athletes to be replaceable.

*Not at all  
much so*

*Very*

1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6  
7

7. I ignore the emotional responses of the athletes.

*Not at all  
much so*

*Very*

1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6  
7

8. The thoughts of the athletes are at the forefront of my mind.

*Not at all  
much so*

*Very*





**Section 6.**

Please circle the number you think is most appropriate to you.

When thinking about **how I feel** when working with the athletes I coach...

1. I feel like I am open minded, like I can think clearly about things.

*Not at all*

*Very*

*much so*

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

2. I feel like I am emotional, responsive and warm.

*Not at all*

*Very*

*much so*

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

3. I feel superficial, like I have no depth.

*Not at all*

*Very*

*much so*

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

4. I feel like I am mechanical and cold, like a robot.

*Not at all*

*Very*

*much so*

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

5. I feel like I am refined and cultured.

*Not at all*

*Very*

*much so*

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

6. I feel like I am rational and logical, like I am intelligent.

*Not at all*

*Very*

*much so*

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

7. I feel like I lack self-restraint, like an animal.

*Not at all*

*Very*

*much so*

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

8. I feel like I am unsophisticated.

*Not at all*

*Very much so*

1                      2                      3                      4                      5                      6                      7

## Appendix E – Questionnaire Part 2








### **PART 2 – Coach’s perception of their athletes and themselves following a selection decision.**

This section **must be completed within 24 hours of making a team selection decision.**

Please answer these questions with respect to how you feel **right now**.








#### **Section 1.**

**Having made your selection decision**, please tick **one** box which you think most accurately represents the degree of overlap between ‘athletes’ and ‘machines’.

|   |                          |
|---|--------------------------|
|    | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Athletes Machines   |                          |
| <hr/>   |                          |
|    | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Athletes Machines   |                          |
| <hr/>   |                          |
|    | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Athletes Machines   |                          |
| <hr/>   |                          |
|    | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Athletes Machines   |                          |
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|    | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Athletes Machines   |                          |
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|  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Athletes Machines   |                          |
| <hr/>   |                          |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Athletes Machines   |                          |








#### **Section 2.**

**Having made your selection decision**, please tick **one** box which you think most accurately represents the degree of overlap between ‘athletes’ and ‘animals’:

|   |                          |
|---|--------------------------|
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Athletes Animals  |                          |
| <hr/>   |                          |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Athletes Animals  |                          |
| <hr/>   |                          |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Athletes Animals  |                          |
| <hr/>   |                          |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Athletes Animals  |                          |
| <hr/>   |                          |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Athletes Animals  |                          |
| <hr/>   |                          |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Athletes Animals  |                          |
| <hr/>   |                          |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Athletes Animals  |                          |








#### **Section 3.**

Having made your selection decision, please tick **one** box which you think most accurately represents the degree of overlap between your view of **'yourself'** and **'animals'**:

|   |                          |
|---|--------------------------|
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Animals   |                          |
| <hr/>   |                          |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Animals   |                          |
| <hr/>   |                          |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Animals   |                          |
| <hr/>   |                          |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Animals   |                          |
| <hr/>   |                          |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Animals   |                          |
| <hr/>   |                          |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Animals   |                          |
| <hr/>   |                          |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Animals   |                          |

**Section 4.**

Having made your selection decision, please tick **one** box which you think most accurately represents the degree of overlap between your view of **'yourself'** and **'machines'**:

|   |                          |
|---|--------------------------|
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Machines  |                          |
| <hr/>   |                          |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Machines  |                          |
| <hr/>   |                          |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Machines  |                          |
| <hr/>   |                          |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Machines  |                          |
| <hr/>   |                          |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Machines  |                          |
| <hr/>   |                          |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Machines  |                          |
| <hr/>   |                          |
|  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Me    Machines  |                          |

**Section 5.**

**Right now**, having made my selection decision...

1. I deem the athletes to be mature for their age.  
*Not at all* *Very much so*  
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7
  
2. I consider the athletes to be able to think logically.  
*Not at all* *Very much so*  
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7
  
3. I feel that the athletes act morally.  
*Not at all* *Very much so*  
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7
  
4. I see the athletes as refined individuals.  
*Not at all* *Very much so*  
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7
  
5. I consider the athletes to be cultured.  
*Not at all* *Very much so*  
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7
  
6. I consider the athletes to be replaceable.  
*Not at all* *Very much so*  
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7
  
7. I ignore the emotional responses of the athletes.  
*Not at all* *Very much so*  
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7
  
8. The thoughts of the athletes are at the forefront of my mind.  
*Not at all* *Very much so*  
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7
  
9. I consider the athletes as a means to an end.  
*Not at all* *Very much so*  
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7
  
10. The way in which the athlete treats other people is important to me.  
*Not at all* *Very much so*  
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7

**Section 6.**

**Right now**, having made my selection decision...

9. I feel like I am open minded, like I can think clearly about things.  
*Not at all* 1 2 3 4 5 *Very much so* 6 7
10. I feel like I am emotional, responsive and warm.  
*Not at all* 1 2 3 4 5 *Very much so* 6 7
11. I feel superficial, like I have no depth.  
*Not at all* 1 2 3 4 5 *Very much so* 6 7
12. I feel like I am mechanical and cold, like a robot.  
*Not at all* 2 2 3 4 5 *Very much so* 6 7
13. I feel like I am refined and cultured.  
*Not at all* 1 2 3 4 5 *Very much so* 6 7
14. I feel like I am rational and logical, like I am intelligent.  
*Not at all* 1 2 3 4 5 *Very much so* 6 7
15. I feel like I lack self-restraint, like an animal.  
*Not at all* 1 2 3 4 5 *Very much so* 6 7
16. I feel like I am unsophisticated.  
*Not at all* 1 2 3 4 5 *Very much so* 6 7

**Appendix F - Item-wise breakdown of variance and range for mechanistic dehumanisation scale.**

| Item         | Item wording   | Pre-selection  |       |          | Post-selection |       |          |
|--------------|--|----------------|-------|----------|----------------|-------|----------|
|              |  | Mean**<br>(SD) | Range | Variance | Mean**<br>(SD) | Range | Variance |
| <b>DH6</b>   | I consider the athletes to be replaceable.                           | 3.67<br>(1.57) | 6     | 2.46     | 3.63<br>(1.66) | 6     | 2.75     |
| <b>DH7</b>   | I ignore the emotional responses of the athletes.                    | 2.05<br>(1.18) | 6     | 1.39     | 1.98<br>(1.30) | 5     | 1.7      |
| <b>DH8*</b>  | The thoughts of the athletes are at the forefront of my mind.        | 2.86<br>(1.33) | 5     | 1.78     | 2.82<br>(1.57) | 6     | 2.47     |
| <b>DH9</b>   | I consider the athletes as a means to an end.                        | 2.34<br>(1.6)  | 6     | 2.56     | 2.02<br>(1.37) | 5     | 1.89     |
| <b>DH10*</b> | The way in which the athlete treats other people is important to me. | 1.86<br>(1)    | 6     | 0.99     | 1.74<br>(1.10) | 6     | 1.21     |



**Appendix G – Differences in dehumanisation between three gender groups.**

---

|                                      | <b>Sig</b> |
|--------------------------------------|------------|
| Change in Animalistic dehumanisation | .745       |
| Change in Mechanistic Dehumanisation | .446       |
| Change in Self-Dehumanisation        | .620       |
| Overall Animalistic Dehumanisation   | .787       |
| Overall Mechanistic Dehumanisation   | .192       |
| Overall Self-Dehumanisation          | .300       |

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## Appendix H - Correlations between forms of dehumanisation.

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Correlation (Pearson's r)

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|                | Animalistic DH<br>(n) | Mechanistic DH<br>(n) |
|----------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Animalistic DH | -                     | -                     |
| Mechanistic DH | .089<br>(185)         | -                     |
| Self DH***     | -.208**<br>(184)      | -.530**<br>(181)      |

---

\* $p$  values  $\leq 0.05$ .

\*\* $p$  values  $\leq 0.01$ .

\*\*\*Higher scores = less self-dehumanisation.

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