LARSvS

Finite-time Average Consensus in a Byzantine TÉCNICO **Environment Using Stochastic Set-Valued Observers** LISBOA LISBOA Daniel Silvestre, Paulo Rosa*, João Hespanha[#], Carlos Silvestre {dsilvestre,cjs}@isr.ist.utl.pt, *paulo.rosa@deimos.com.pt, # hespanha@ece.ucsb.edu

Objectives:

- · Compute the average of the initial states in finite-time
- · Guarantee fault detection and bounds on the maximum possible deviation from an attack
- · Incorporate the transmissions stochastic information in the fault detection mechanism.

1. Motivation

Nodes need to distributedly agree on a common value: ·Smart Grids when deciding the needed power •Robot swarms to find rendezvous points ·Social Networks making a pool about a subject.



In all these examples a single node can drift the entire network to any desired value!

3. Proposed Solution

Each node runs a Stochastic Set-Valued Observer (SSVO). The estimates are intersected as to produce less conservative polytopes.

1) Compute the next set-valued estimates



Example of a SSVO update where low probability events are



discarded

Compute X(k+1)with SVO

 $(z_j(k))$

New Iteration

X(k) to get $z_i(k)$

Intersect with (8)

Consensus with (9)

Flowchart of the proposed algorithm

- 2) Overbound using a hyper-parallelepiped to transmit estimates to neighbors X(k)
- 3) Intersect estimates by performing
- $z_i(k) = z_j(k) = \max(z_i(k), z_j(k))$

4) Perform a consensus update on the estimates interval

$$z_i(k+1) = \left[\left(\frac{1}{2} (e_i - e_j)(e_j - e_i)^{\mathsf{T}} + I_{n_x} \right) \otimes I_2 \right] z_i(k)$$

Remark:

Fault detection consists in checking if the result of the intersection in step 3) is the empty set

[1] Silvestre, D.; Rosa, P.; Cunha, R.; Hespanha, J.P.; Silvestre, C., "Gossip average consensus in a Byzantine environment Description of the second s

2. Problem Statement

The objective is to compute the average of some quantity of interest. If faulty, any node *i* must detect the fault using only local information communicated from their neighbors.

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$$\begin{aligned} & \mathcal{G} = (V, E) \\ & \mathcal{G} \subseteq V \times V \\ & \mathcal{F} \subseteq V \times V \\ & \mathcal{F} & \mathcal{F} \\ \end{aligned} \\ & \mathcal{F} = (k, k) \\ & \mathcal{F} \\ & \mathcal{F}$$

System Model

 n_{Δ} number of uncertainties Each S^i is a Linear Parameter-Varying (LPV) system $\Delta_{\ell}(k)$ are scalar uncertainties

Byzantine Consensus Problem:

Either detect non-zero signals u(k) using y(k) without the knowledge of B(k) or compute the final consensus value.

4. Results

- fault signal is bounded.
- The magnitude of an attacker Faults are more likely to be detected as time increases.



· Less conservative set-valued

estimates.

· Finite-time consensus is achieved.





Main result:

The algorithm can either detect and intruder or compute the average consensus in finite-time.

[2] Silvestre, D.; Rosa, P.; Hespanha, J.P.; Silvestre, C., "Finite-time Average Consensus in a Byzantine Environment Using Set-Valued Observers," American Control Conference (ACC), pp.3023.3028, 4-6 Jun, 2014

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X(k + 1)from $z_4(k \rightarrow 1)$