Party Institutionalization as Multilevel Concept: Base- versus Elite-level Routinization

Nicole Bolleyer (University of Exeter)

&

Saskia P. Ruth-Lovell (GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies)

Abstract:

This article adds to the refinement of the concept of party institutionalization by focusing on its multilevel character, capturing possible variation between the institutionalization of the *party elite* and a *party's base*. Hence, we argue that debates around party institutionalization as an analytical concept can profit from clarifying *whose behavior* we actually theorize when specifying and operationalizing the concept's various dimensions. We illustrate this by focusing on different configurations of the internal property of routinization, more specifically, the presence or absence of *elite-level* and of *base-level* routinization. We hypothesize that distinct combinations influence whether and to which extent a party's overall organization can be considered routinized or not, which, in turn, affects intra-organizational dynamics. We illustrate the usefulness of our conceptual distinctions using comparative case studies of parties characterized by either elite-level or base-level routinization – from both established and new democracies – to illustrate each dimension's distinct implications for patterns of intra-party conflict and stability.

Keywords: party institutionalization, routinization, party organization, Latin America

1. Introduction

From its inception onwards, party institutionalization as a concept was crucially shaped by the mass party model of party organization initially developed in Western Europe (Panebianco 1988). By now the concept has successfully travelled to different world regions like Central Eastern Europe or Latin America (e.g. Tavits 2013; Mainwaring and Scully 1995) and in the course of doing so has been increasingly refined. Important clarifications have been made regarding its multidimensionality. According to Levitsky (1998) as well as Randall and Svåsand (2002), party institutionalization – a party's development towards consolidation – becomes manifest in two qualitatively distinct internal properties: *routinization*, a structural dimension which refers to rule-guided processes within the organization and *value infusion*, an attitudinal dimension which refers to party actors' emotional attachment to their party.[1] Importantly, these two qualitatively distinct phenomena neither necessarily coincide, nor are driven by the same systemic or party level characteristics (Bolleyer and Ruth 2018).

We would like to add to the refinement of this concept by focusing on its *multilevel character* by arguing that debates around the concept of party institutionalization can profit from clarifying *whose behavior* – of party elite or membership base – we actually theorize when specifying and operationalizing the concept's various dimensions. We will illustrate this by focusing on the intra-organizational property of routinization. While routinization can be generally defined as rule-guided behavior of party actors within a party organization, we *conceptually distinguish the routinization on the level of the party elite from the routinization of the party base,* both of which affect to which extent and how a party organization will routinize overall.[2] A focus on routinization has several advantages. Routinization as rule-guided behavior is not equivalent but closely associated with the nature of organizational structures. A conceptualization in terms of how some types of rules are central to the routinization of elites, while others shape the routinization of the party base allows for an empirical mapping of party organizations representing different constellations of multilevel routinization distinguished in the following. Hence, while party institutionalization "is not identical with the party's development in purely organisational terms" (Randall and Svåsand 2002, 12), structures and practices party elites decide to invest

---

[1] A party's autonomy from its environment, a third dimension Panebianco (1988) considered as important – which Randall and Svåsand (2002, 13) classified as the 'external dimension' of party institutionalization (see also the "external" or "perceptual institutionalization" Harmel et al 2018) – is not considered here, due to the focus on *internal* party dynamics (Casal Bértoa 2017).

[2] Conceptualizing party institutionalization from a *multilevel* perspective builds on the growing literature on multilevel party organization and party organization in multilevel systems that stress the need to distinguish and assess the relationship between different layers within a party organization that operate on different levels (e.g. Thorlakson 2009; Swenden and Toubeau 2013; Bolleyer et al 2014).

in can be either conducive or detrimental to institutionalized relationships between party actors and their party (Panebianco 1988, 53-65; Bolleyer and Ruth 2018). While conceptually discrepancies between elite- and base-level value infusion can be specified in the same fashion as they can regarding to routinization, lacking comparable measures of elite and party base orientations and attachments within and across parties, cross-regional comparisons are seriously curtailed.[3] At the same time, patterns of routinization are bound to have important repercussions for party organizational stability – elite-level routinization particularly within and base-level routinization particularly outside public institutions.

After developing the distinction between elite- and base-level routinization, we identify four analytical configurations of multi-level routinization, each of which has implications for a party organization's overall routinization and intra-organizational patterns of conflict and stability. To illustrate this, we present case studies for the two configurations of parties that are *either* elite- *or* base-level routinized, covering both parties in old and new democracies. Based on this assessment we aim at showing the usefulness of disentangling the routinization of party elites from the routinization of the party base when studying similarities and differences of party organization within and across regions.

2. Conceptualizing Multi-level Routinization

To conceive of party institutionalization as a multilevel concept sheds light on whose behavior we focus on when we theorize particular dimensions of the concept (here: routinization). Therefore, we distinguish between two groups of actors within political parties that constitute two fundamental layers of a party organization: the *central party elites* defined as those actors that make up a party's national leadership, both in central office and (national) public office and the *party base* defined as a party's formal members as well as active supporters (Michels 1962; Katz and Mair 1993) that depending on the nature of the organization (that can have more or less fluid boundaries) and the political system (that can be unitary or federal) can take on roles on subnational levels or not, thereby embracing rank-and-

---

[3] Some authors have used different types of survey data on party identification or brands to approximate this dimension of party institutionalization on the base-level (e.g. Bolleyer and Ruth 2018; Lupu 2013). Cross-regionally comparable measures on elite-level value infusion are even harder to find. Especially in new democracies this dimension of party institutionalization is still an understudied topic. Therefore, for the purpose of this study we focus on the dimension of routinization, exclusively, to introduce our multilevel conceptualization of party institutionalization, and leave the expansion of this conceptualization to the dimension of value infusion as a task for the future.

file, on the one hand, and activists and lower-level officials, on the other (Ponce and Scarrow 2016; Scarrow and Gezgor 2010).[4]

Since the concept of party institutionalization has been developed using the mass party model as a template, traditional research on party institutionalization tends to assume that the routinization of the party base goes hand in hand with the routinization of party elites (Panebianco 1988). More specifically, base-level routinization is assumed to have implications for elite routinization, as elites are recruited from or by the same party base (Panebianco 1988; Katz and Mair 1995). Yet various studies have indicated that outsider recruitment can co-exist with a routinized party base (Kitschelt 1994; Levitsky 1998; Wills-Otero 2009), suggesting that traditional party models need to be systematically 'disaggregated'.

Once doing so it becomes clear that the routinization of the *party base* – or base-level routinization – does not necessarily impose constraints on leadership behavior (Wills-Otero 2009; Scarrow, Webb, and Farrell 2001). This might be the case, for instance, because the party elite renews itself through outsider recruitment for high party positions, putting people in charge who are not socialized into the organization as followers (hence do not form part of the party base) and who therefore might willingly bypass party rules (Levitsky 1998, 82-83; Burgess and Levitsky 2003). At the same time, whether central elites are themselves routinized or not is not necessarily a determinant of whether they invest in a routinized party base, incentivized, for instance, by the availability of public resources or the presence of ties to societal groups (Bolleyer and Ruth 2018). This highlights the need to keep elite-level and base-level routinization separate to capture the nature of parties as complex organizations (Wills-Otero 2014, 2; Panebianco 1988), which applies to party development not only in new democracies but also in old democracies where institutionalization patterns have been found much more complex than suggested by the mass party model (e.g. de Lange and Art 2011; Bolleyer 2013; Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck 2016).

---

[4] Our distinction coincides to some extent with the three faces of party as specified by Katz and Mair - the party in central office, in public office and the party membership base (1993: 594-5). However, this 'trias' was less concerned by the 'vertical' dimension of party organization. For instance, the position of regional office-holders is not explicitly specified (they are not part of the 'national leadership' (central office) but they are not 'members' and 'activitists' either). At the same time, as the party in public and central office tend to overlap on the national level, in our conceptualization of party elite vs. party base these two units are considered as forming part of the national party elite.

2.1 Defining Base-Level and Elite-level Routinization

We distinguish base-level routinization from elite level routinization in the following way: *Base-level routinization* takes place when the behavior of rank-and-file, subnational activists and subnational party officials and representatives – actors constitutive of the party base – becomes more rule-guided and regularized. This becomes visible in an increasingly elaborate and stable infrastructure (Panebianco 1988, 49, 53), conducive to organizational rules becoming "perceived as permanent structures" (Levitsky 1998, 81) and to parties as structures being increasingly dense, regularized and thus able to guide party actors' behavior (Janda 1980). Importantly, the presence of permanent structures as a factor conducive to base-level routinization is not equivalent to the creation of formal party branches in the traditional (Western European) sense. It equally can be assured by networks of local intermediaries (Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006; Kitschelt and Kselman 2010). In this sense, permanence does not presuppose one particular 'organizational form' but refers to structures (be those formal *or* informal) which guide party actors' behavior who interact within them and thereby create continuity between elections. These structures support base-level routinization because formal party branches as well as informal networks incorporate members and followers into the party (Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006; Kitschelt and Kselman 2010, 13-14). They provide channels for communication between the national party elites and grassroots (Levitsky 2001, 54-56; Tavits 2012, 85-86), with party officials forming part of these structures who "establish routines and standard operating procedures" (Kitschelt 1994, 222), familiarizing followers with rules and procedures that govern the internal life of a party.[5]

Elite-level routinization, in contrast, is defined as rule constraints on the 'upper layer' of the organization, the national party elite, in the area of leadership renewal, which is fundamental to a party's ability to outlive its founders and to a party's ability to assure organizational continuity in the face of changing personnel (Janda 1980; Burgess and Levitsky 2003). Which national leaders are selected and how, whether this process is rule-guided or not, has important implications for whether those selected as leaders are likely to follow party rules also in other domains once exercising their role (Cross and Blais 2012; Scarrow, Webb, and Farrell 2001; Bolleyer 2013). To bind national elites to leadership selection rules these constraints need to be exercised by parts of the organization *other than* the central elite itself. This can be rank-and-file party members, activists or subnational officials (all forming part of the party base) that are *external to* the central circles of power.

---

[5] Some new parties such as the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands deliberately did not build up a membership base (e.g. de Lange and Art 2011), base-level routinization in such cases is, by definition, absent.

Importantly, elite-level routinization thus does *not* presuppose particular types of 'democratic' party rules (see on these distinctions Wills-Otero 2009, 2014) or constraints on leaders through the 'formal institutionalization of internal participation and contestation at all levels of the party' constituting mechanisms for rank-and-file to hold leaders accountable (Samuels 2004, 1010; see on this distinction Wills-Otero 2009, 132-133). Constraints assuring elite routinization *can* be imposed by such structures, but they can be equally generated through vertical networks between central and subnational officials and representatives that assure the involvement of the latter in processes of central leadership renewal but *exclude* the wider membership (hence can be the result of negotiation rather than of 'democratic' one-man-one-vote procedures). Both are modes that *integrate different actors forming part of the party base and the central leadership by making the former dependent on the latter.* This prevents leadership renewal from being a matter of *self-selection among central elites themselves.* Such self-selection indicates the absence of elite-level routinization, as it allows leaders to choose their own successors (including outsiders) freely and unbound by party rules, without interference from other parts of the party organization.[6] Operationally, then, elite-level routinization is present when we find intra-organizational integration, defined as the presence of structural connections between different layers of the party organization (Thorlakson 2009, 159), in our case a stable vertical connection as defined by (formal or informal) party rules between central elite level and (some) actors constitutive for the party base.

2.2. Mapping Different Combinations of Elite-Level and Base-Level Routinization

Building on these definitions, the following Table 1 presents four possible configurations defined by the presence/absence of elite-level routinization on one axis and the presence/absence of base-level routinization on the other. Their distinct combinations influence whether and to which extent a party's overall organization can be considered routinized or not. We expect the four different configurations to have different implications for a party's internal patterns of conflict and, with that, relative intra-organizational stability defined as the ability to cope with destabilizing events within the organization (e.g. the departure of a popular party founder or severe internal conflicts). This is because, as suggested earlier, elite-level and base-level routinization ideal-typically reinforce each other,

---

[6] Party research in long-lived democracies has particularly associated this feature with populist and charismatic right-wing parties (e.g. Harmel and Svasand 1993; Pedahzur and Brichta 2002) but as our case studies will show, this organizational characteristic is more wide-spread.

which is not given in the 'mixed' configurations that lack one of the two components (see shaded quadrants).

Table 1: Configurations of Elite and Base-Level Routinization

	Base-level routinization (rule-guided party base)	NO base-level routinization (no rule-guided party base)
Elite-level routinization (central leadership selection involving party base)	**TYPE I** Integrated party with a clearly defined party-base → low levels of internal conflict → high levels of overall organizational routinization and of intra-organizational stability	**TYPE II** Integrated party with an inclusive and fluid support base → vulnerable due to diversity/ instability of support base; limited ability of national party to assure coherence; limited leadership predictability → medium levels of overall organizational routinization and of intra-organizational stability
NO elite-level routinization (self-selected central leadership)	**TYPE III** Autonomous central party elite with clearly defined support base → vulnerable to defections; vertical conflicts and base-level resistance against leadership → medium levels of overall organizational routinization and of intra-organizational stability	**TYPE IV** Party with fluid organization composed of autonomous central party elite and volatile support base → high levels of internal conflict → low levels of overall organizational routinization and of intra-organizational stability

Discussing the implications of the four categories, an organization characterized by both elite- and base-level routinization (Type I) resembles the mass party model (upper left-hand corner) (e.g. Katz and Mair 1995; Michels 1962) in that there is a structural connection between central elites and the party base through the ability of actors constituting that base (e.g. members, activists or subnational party office-holders) to influence who runs the party. This assures the integration of the overall organization. The presence of a routinized party base indicates that the boundaries of the organization (who belongs to it and who does not) are clearly demarcated (Katz and Mair 1995; Bolleyer 2009).

As in Type I, in Type II the elite level and the party base are integrated, in that the party base is involved in central leadership selection. However, that the party base in Type II is not routinized (which suggests a much more open, and thus heterogeneous subnational layer) has important implications for how elite-level routinization can feed into the overall routinization of the organization. The model combining elite- and base-level routinization (Type I) can be expected the most internally stable, as the party base being socialized and guided in the same party rules is able to act collectively in an effective fashion, selecting a leadership with broad support and unifying behind it. In Type II the consequences of the presence of a (central) leadership selection mechanism involving the party base are likely to be different. Consider such selection mechanism involves the broader membership: Sartori (1973: 20) has stressed that democratization denotes the 'massification' of politics, which is distinct from the meaningful participation of the same masses. More specifically, Lipset et al (1956: 12-15) argued that if union members have very little in common and the membership is atomized, then the likelihood that groups of members act collectively decreases. More recent work on intra-party democracy has stressed that an atomized membership (invited by highly inclusive and fluid, hence, non-routinized membership) is more volatile and election outcomes can be more easily manipulated by the current leadership (Hazan and Rahat 2010; Aylott and Bolin 2017). Vice versa, whatever support signaled by a leaders' election, this support is less stable if the membership is less homogenous and more fluid, lacking a shared socialization in party rules and practices. The logic of the argument equally applies to parties in which elite-level routinization is assured through dependencies between national and lower-level office-holders or a small circle of activists, hence, leaders are selected through closed negotiations between the two tiers. The ability of the latter groups to act as a collective and the likelihood to agree on a strongly supported leader will be weaker than if the party base was routinized. Finally, as argued earlier, even if leaders are selected from the party base (hence outside recruitment is avoided), as far as this base is not routinized, the new leaders are not socialized into following party rules either, which should make their behavior less predictable in the range of organizational domains that they will be operating in. Naturally, an extreme case of this configuration is a party that has no party base at all and only consists of a central leadership and an altogether undefined following.

Moving to the second 'mixed configuration', Type III defined by only base-level routinization, the latter can be actively cultivated by leaders who are highly autonomous (hence, not routinized) as (new) party evolution in old and new democracies suggest (e.g. de Lange and Art 2011; Bolleyer 2013; Bolleyer and Ruth 2018). While these parties are not

vertically integrated, if a routinized party base is incentivized and cultivated by the central elite, even though this elite is not routinized itself, the rules in which the party base is socialized into is embraced by that elite, assuring – if not structural integration –basic coherence between the two levels. The party base can alternatively be routinized bottom-up as the cases with movements that transform into parties and start to establish a formal or informal party infrastructure on the ground. If those movement parties do not have (yet) a clearly identifiable central leadership, the central elite level, by default, cannot be routinized. Alternatively, when selection procedures are still weakly defined, prominent figures in the movement might, in effect, declare themselves as de facto leaders without the effective formal or informal involvement of actors constitutive for the party base. The two scenarios falling in Type III are likely to share the following vulnerabilities: top down configurations, depending on a party's ideological orientation, might face problems of resistance coming from the party base (whose ability to act collectively is supported by its routinization) when actors are dissatisfied with the line the leadership takes for the party and demand stronger involvement in who runs the party. Similar discrepancies can occur in bottom-up routinized formations. As in both scenarios the elite level (if it exists) is detached from the party base, this makes defections likely and the ability of such parties to deal with a leadership vacuum should be limited.

Type IV organizations have neither elite-level nor base-level routinization. This model without any routinization captures personal and electoral vehicles that are often 'flash parties' (Pedersen 1982; Mustillo 2009; Rose and Mackie 1988), as they combine a party base that is not socialized into any party rules, is fluid and volatile, with central elite being organizationally detached from it. This configuration is most likely to be suffering from intense internal conflict and be short-lived as a consequence.

3. Operationalizing Base-level and Elite-level Routinization and Rationale for Case Selection

We capture the routinization of the different types of party actors focusing on the presence and relevance of particular types of structures and party rules. As highlighted earlier, we consider a *party base as routinized* if we find formal local branches and, alternatively, networks of informal local intermediaries which regulate party life on the regional or local level between elections. Levitsky (1998) has stressed the need to distinguish formal from informal routinization when studying institutionalization of party organizations in new democracies, highlighting that routinization is not equivalent to the creation of formal party

branches in the traditional (Western European) sense but can be assured by networks of local intermediaries instead (e.g. Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006). Hence, we argue that regular exchanges which establish informal links between leaders and followers can be considered as rule-based as well. *Elite-level routinization* becomes manifest in formal or informal leadership selection and turnover rules that cannot be changed ad hoc by the current national leadership and that do not grant the decision of leader selection predominantly or solely to current national office-holders themselves but involve broader membership or non-national officials, activists or representatives (see Cross and Blais 2012; Scarrow, Webb, and Farrell 2001).

Based on these operationalizations, we selected four case studies representing the two 'mixed configurations' (Type II & III in our typology) from Latin America and Western Europe respectively. These cases display only one dimension and not the other which means they illustrate with most clarity the implication of each, thereby highlighting the usefulness of disaggregating the concept along the lines proposed. Meanwhile, to cover for each of these mixed configurations parties operating in old and new democracies allowing us to show that the implications of the respective party organizational property 'travel' these two types of regimes, thereby illustrating its cross-regional applicability

4. Comparing mixed types of party routinization in Latin America and Europe

4.1 Elite-Level Routinization without Base-Level Routinization (Type II)

4.1.1 Chilean Radical Social Democratic Party

The *Radical Social Democratic Party* (PRSD) in Chile is one of the smaller political parties in the Chilean party system and the smallest coalition partner within the *Concertación* – the centre-left coalition. Its roots trace back to the Radical Party (*Partido Radical*) that was founded in 1863. To avoid extinction under the binomial electoral system, installed by the military government during the democratic transition in the end of the 1980s, the Radical Party fused with the Social Democratic Party (PSD) in 1994 into the PRSD (Gayoso 2011, 126-130; Müller 2008; Siavelis and Field 2015, 44-45). Since then the party held on average six delegates in the Chamber of Deputies and one Senator.

In 2017, the PRSD officially listed approximately 30000 party members.[7] Its active membership base between elections, however, should be considered by far lower.[8] Among the

---

requirements to retain their legal status as a political party in Chile the Servicio Electoral de Chile (*Servel*) demands parties to meet a certain number of confirmed inscriptions of party members at each legislative election (*refichaje*) (see Ley No. 18603, Art. 56; Ribera Neumann 2008). The PRSD usually engages in active membership recruitment along the electoral calendar and regularly struggled to meet the criteria to retain its legal status as a political party in the past. For example, to meet the required membership ceiling to retain its party status in Chile the PRSD used a telephone campaign to attract citizens to register with the party as a way of supporting the presidential candidate Alejandro Guillier.[9] Hence, the party base of the PRSD can be considered rather inclusive and fluid and heavily dependent on the electoral cycle – in line with our conceptualization discussed above (see Hazan and Rahat 2010; Aylott and Bolin 2017).

Despite the low routinization of its party base, elite level routinization is indicated by the vertical integration of local, regional, and national party organisms of the PRSD in both the internal processes of central leadership selection and national candidate selection. Concerning the former, according to the party statues the main organism of the central party elite is the National Executive Committee (CEN) which consists of 22 members – with the party leader at the top (*presidente*). All of these central elite posts are directly elected every three years through the party base, i.e. all active members (see §5, Art. 40-59, *Estatutos del Partido Radical Socialdemocrata*, 2009). Since 1994, the party regularly enabled the party base to directly elect its party leaders. Although these internal leadership elections have been criticized to be manipulated during the leadership phase of its founder Anselmo Sule (1994-2002)[10], after Sule's death internal elections have been more regularized, fairly competitive and secured the selection of non-outsiders into the central party elite. All party leaders of the PRSD since 2002 were either representatives of the PRSD in the Chilean Congress (e.g. José Antonio Gómez) or held an extra-parliamentary leadership position within the PRSD party organization at the time of their election (e.g. Ernesto Velasco). Although some (acting) party leaders have been appointed by the CEN during the lifespan of the party (e.g. Orlando Cantuarias), these replacements followed the formal rules of leadership succession set out in

---

[8] For example, the internal election of the party leader Jose Antonio Gómez in 2005 registered the participation of 9356 votes, in total, of which Gómez obtained 4424, i.e. 53 per cent (see http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2005/01/23/170717/jose-antonio-gomez-fue-proclamado-como-presidente-del-prsd.html, accessed December 1, 2017.

[9] See https://www.df.cl/noticias/economia-y-politica/actualidad/la-desesperada-campana-del-partido-radical-para-fichar-militantes/2017-03-09/161055.html, accessed December 1, 2017..

[10] See http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2000/08/31/31238/corte-suprema-no-acoge-peticion-de-prsd.html, accessed December 1, 2017; http://www.emol.com/noticias/todas/2001/04/16/52250/consejeros-nacionales-del-prsd-denuncian-falta-de-democracia-interna.html, accessed December 1, 2017.

the party statutes in case a former party leader resigns, dies or is incapable of fulfilling his/ her duties (see party statutes §5, Art. 55; as well as Müller 2008).

With respect to the vertical integration within the process of candidate selection a more informal logic applies. The behaviour of political party actors and their organizational development in post-authoritarian Chile are highly influenced by the binomial electoral system instated by the outgoing dictatorship (see Siavelis and Field 2015; Navia 2008). This makes incumbent party candidates fairly powerful, due to their personalized ties to voters and local networks of activists. Despite the general weakness of base-level routinization, as described above, "municipal decentralization and state reforms … limited the capacity of partisan organizations to centralize power by maintaining in place hierarchical networks tying local, district, and national-level activists" (Luna and Altman 2011, 16). In the case of candidate selection within the PRSD the party base is less formally included and candidates are not selected via intra-party democratic procedures but rather through a 'consultative process' of power-sharing between local, regional and national party officials (Siavelis and Field 2015, 44-45; Navia 2008). In this respect, different party levels consult and negotiate with the party leader, who then takes the final decision (Siavelis and Field 2015, 44-45).

These two types of vertical integration patterns may, however, generate friction between different layers of the party elites, i.e. party candidates/ representatives and the party leadership, especially when career prospects of the former clash with party strategic decisions made by the party leadership during coalition negotiations. For example, in 2001 internal struggles in the PRSD between a group of national representatives and party leader Sule were made public, revolving around the bad electoral performance of the PRSD in municipal elections and a proposal of fusion with the *Partido Por la Democracia* (PPD) – another member of the *Concertación*.[11] The episode resulted in the suspension of these representatives and the party leader and his supporter within the party prevailed.[12] In a similar way, a dissident group of PRSD representatives publicly questioned the coalition pact supported by the party leadership with the *Concertación* in 2005 and opted for an ideological shift towards

---

[11] See http://www.emol.com/noticias/todas/2001/04/11/51865/consejeros-nacionales-del-prsd-impulsan-fusion-con-ppd.html, accessed December 1, 2017.

[12] See http://www.emol.com/noticias/todas/2001/02/06/45404/dirigentes-del-prsd-revelan-crisis-al-interior-del-partido.html, accessed December 1, 2017; http://www.emol.com/noticias/todas/2001/04/17/52393/consejeros-del-prsd-califican-de-poco-seria-suspension-del-partido.html, accessed December 1, 2017.

the centre through supporting the presidential candidate of the *Alianza* – Sebastian Piñera – instead.[13] As in 2001, the party leadership – this time under Gómez – prevailed.

To sum up, the existence of formal and informal institutions of intra- and inter-party cooperation, vertically integrating the party overall, secured the survival of the PRSD until the present day. The formal procedures of leadership selection legitimize the central elite vis-à-vis the party base, providing them with ample autonomy with respect to party strategy. Moreover, the informal procedures of candidate selection and the negotiation of coalition pacts secure the vertical integration of lower level party officials within an elaborate power-sharing context (Siavelis and Field 2015). Nevertheless, the PRSD regularly struggled to retain its status as a registered party in Chile and the candidate-centred logic of its electoral survival threatens both the stability of the party's support base as well as decreases the incentives and capabilities of central party elites to invest in the development of a routinized party base which could contribute to more intra-organizational stability (e.g. Navia 2008; Siavelis and Field 2015).

4.1.2 *Australian Greens*

The Australian Greens are a vertically integrated party yet – unlike elite-level routinization – base-level routinization has remained limited. The set-up of the party is linked to two main factors: first, the party's social movement roots stressing the importance of permeable, participatory organizational structures invite a highly inclusive membership base, keeping base-level routinization low. Second, its inception as a bottom-up federation of Green state parties[14] (some of which had existed on the state level for over 20 years), determined to defend their autonomy in the context of the national party organization that led to a strong representation of territorial representatives in the national party structure. While the latter assures elite integration, this kept the national party (as a layer separate from the state parties) until today without effective enforcement capacity and financial autonomy, and with it, unable to standardize decision-making procedures or policies across the party organization as a whole, in turn, feeding into low base-level routinization. Still today, the majority of state

---

[13] See http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2005/12/19/205313/miembros-del-partido-radical-declaran-su-apoyo-a-sebastian-pinera.html, accessed December 1, 2017; as well as http://www.estrellaarica.cl/prontus4_nots/site/artic/20060105/pags/20060105050617.html, accessed December 1, 2017.

[14] In Tasmania, New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia state parties existed prior to the foundation of the national party (Miragliotta 2012, 103).

parties have maintained traditional structures, hence inclusive and open grass root structures with multiple entry points (Miragliotta 2012, 107).[15]

Since its formation in 1992, the Greens have strengthened their electoral performance and institutional representation and influence significantly.[16]. After the 2016 federal election, however, the party has struggled with various internal tensions related to its structural set-up, illustrating the implications of the way the party links elite-level routinization with weak base-level routinization, a configuration which makes the organization vulnerable to the internal diversity of its party base. Before illustrating the resulting patterns of conflict, the nature of the integration between the party's layers deserves a closer look. 'National' elites and the party base are integrated not through involving the membership base as a whole but through the party's confederate structure, assuring regional representatives' direct involvement in or consultation by the party's main national organs. The party's preference for consensus decision-making reinforces their position, as it prevents territorial representatives from being outvoted. The privileged position of state parties within the national organization also finds reflection in their equal representation[17] in the party's main national governance body, the National Council, in authority second only to the national party conference. This body is in charge of coordinating and organizing policies and operations of the national party and of assuring the compliance of state parties (Miragliotta and Jackson 2015, 556-60). Though the Parliamentary Party Leader is – as typical in Westminster democracies – selected by members of the parliamentary party (Jackson 2011, 192-3), as this 'parliamentary party' has been and still is predominantly composed of territorial representatives (i.e. state Senators) assures that this leader still needs the support of major state officials. Only in 2003, following a structural review in 2001, a national Coordinating Group was established (AGCG) – 11 years after the party's foundation – creating an intermediate governing body elected by the national party conference rather than being predominantly composed by state delegates. While this group is by now a key decision-making organ of the party, decisions are still made in consultation with state convenors and state Senators (Jackson 2011, 192). Hence, most of the Greens' other national governance structures are still composed on the basis of state representation (Miragliotta and Jackson 2015, 561), maintaining its highly decentralized, confederate character.

---

[15] For instance, while the national constitution only recognizes individual party membership, the Victorian branch allows for organizational members as well (Miragliotta 2012, 104-5).

[16] In 2010 the party allowed for the formation of a Labour minority government led by Gilard. In 2016 it supported the Conservative Turnbull government.

[17] Each state party has two representatives, except their membership exceed 2000 members is case of which the state gets one additional delegate (Miragliotta and Jackson 2015, 557).

The link between a diverse membership base recruited through distinct state party organizations (restricting base-level routinization) and the dominance of territorial representation within national party structures (assuring elite-level routinization) reflects in the nature of internal conflicts the party had to deal with. Not only has the party suffered from the formation of factions. After a disappointing 2016 federal election, a group called "Left Renewal" formed within the New South Wales branch around NSW Senator Lee Rhiannon, promising to "fight to bring about the end of capitalism", a development criticized by di Natale, the current parliamentary party leader. While the latter invited the group to start their own party, Rhiannon stressed the importance of accepting diversity within the party and framed the formation of the group as an expression of internal democracy that needs to be defended[18], reflecting centrifugal tendencies within the organization composed of highly autonomous state parties, and national leaders' limited ability to assure party coherence[19]. This became even clearer in summer 2017 when the national leadership, headed by Di Natale, excluded Rhiannon from the party room and demanded an overhaul of the New South Wales (NSW) Greens' constitution, which mandates that its federal representatives adhere to state-based policy decisions. This move was a response to the public opposition of Rhiannon and the NSW Greens to legislation proposed by the federal Liberal-National minority government, over which the Greens' national leadership tried to negotiate a support agreement, which was prevented by Rhiannon's refusal to support the party line. Rather than expelling the senator for good, the parliamentary party eventually contained internal conflict in the organization by readmitting Rhiannon[20], taking the conflict as expression of a "structural issue that needs to be addressed". To be able to handle the tension between the need for group coherence in law-making and the toleration of diversity in the future, they created a "balance of power subcommittee" (BPS) to consider legislation in situations in which the party finds itself in the balance of power in the Senate and group members have been instructed by state branches to take a conflicting position against national party line. Hence, whenever group members such as Rhiannon have the power to block or pass legislation, they can be excluded from the

18 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jan/27/the-emergence-of-left-renewal-is-unsurprising-but-does-it-belong-in-the-greens-party, accessed December 1, 2017; https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/jan/27/greens-version-of-tony-abbott-lee-rhiannon-fends-off-bob-brown-attack, accessed December 1, 2017.

19 http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/australian-greens-national-council-says-factions-incompatible-with-its-principles-20170129-gu0y7p.html, accessed December 1, 2017; http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/first-cracks-appear-in-greens-left-renewal-faction/news-story/9352ade488e7b897fcdbe07dac37a681, accessed December 1 2017.

20 https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/jul/09/nsw-greens-demand-lee-rhiannon-be-fully-reinstated-to-party-room, accessed December 1, 2017.

subcommittee, allowing them to stay loyal to their state parties without preventing the national party to negotiate deals with the government.[21]

While the Australian Greens as integrated party (elite-level routinization) with a fluid support base (weak base-level routinization) has consolidated and become increasingly successful and influential over the last decades, this party organization has not only to cope with the tensions between more moderate and more radical currents that co-exist within a party. Given its set-up, state parties have the constitutionally protected right to choose their own strategies of member recruitment and of holding 'their' national office-holders to account, allowing the latter to oppose the national party line, which the national party had to accept as visible in the creation of the "balance of power subcommittee". Given that state constitutions only have to be 'compatible' with national rules (Miragliotta 2012, 104), the tendencies to such conflict is in-built into the Greens' basic set-up.

4.2 Base-Level Routinization without Elite-Level Routinization (Type III)

4.2.1 Partido Justicialista (i.e. Peronist Party)

The *Peronist Party* in Argentina (Partido Justicialista, PJ) is one of the oldest parties in the Argentine party system. It evolved from its origins as a charismatic party in the 1940s – led by Juan Perón – to a decentralized and segmented party with mainly informal roots in Argentine society today (Levitsky 2001). Since the beginning of the 1990s the party holds a nearly hegemonic position within the party system and different factions of the party held the presidency from 1989-1999 (Mememism) and 2003-2015 (Kirchnerism).

The PJ serves as an ideal example of the Type III routinization pattern, and distinguishing between base- and elite-level routinization helps to solve the puzzle the PJ posed to party scholars with respect to its level of institutionalization (e.g. Lupu 2015; McGuire 1997; Levitsky 2001). Highlighting the difficulties to characterize the degree of institutionalization of this party Levitsky, on the one hand, points out that in the PJ "intra-party rules are widely circumvented, manipulated or contested by Peronist leaders" (1998, 82-83) suggesting low routinization, which is a characterization that many have taken to describe the PJ's organization overall (e.g. McGuire 1997; De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002). However, on the other hand, Levitsky's analysis of the PJ also highlights the routinization of *base-level* processes in the party's decentral and informally organized grassroots infrastructure (Levitsky 1998; see also Levitsky 2001). These Peronist base units engage in activities such as

---

distribution of food, clothing, and organization of youth activities which serve clientelistic ends yet: "these activities entail more than the simple exchange of goods for political support. Rather, they are embedded in established and widely shared traditions, roles, language and symbols" (Auyero 2000). Consequently, Levitsky characterizes base-level Peronist activity "to an important degree" as routinized, with activity in local units being "rooted in widely shared norms" and Peronist practices "widely known and remarkably similar across territorial units" (1998, 87). Although the Peronist base units are relatively autonomous entities and the membership boundaries of the PJ are rather permeable, they nevertheless provide for informal regularized interactions between the party and its affiliates and supporters beyond elections (Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006, 182-92; Scherlis 2012, 54).

However, regularized interaction between the party and its base does not impose constraints on leadership behavior (Burgess and Levitsky 2003). Although the PJ is organized in a decentralized way with powerful local party officials within their subnational territory, the party never developed a bureaucratized structure integrating the local party elites into national-level decision-making or leadership selection (Wills-Otero 2014; Levitsky 2003). Moreover, the party frequently resorted to outside recruitments for high political positions, putting people in charge who are not socialized into the organization as followers are and who therefore might willingly bypass party rules (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002).

While the main organism of the central party elite is the National Council (according to the party statutes), this council lacks the authority to influence decision-making both in and outside public institutions (Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006, 187). Instead, decision-making usually takes place outside formal party structures and is highly dominated by public officeholders (mainly presidents and governors) due to their access to public resources necessary to uphold clientelistic networks (e.g. through the use of patronage) (De Luca 2008; Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006). Influenced by both the countries federal and presidential institutions, in the same way as governors control their Peronist party branches on the provincial level, in times when the PJ holds the presidency, the president *de facto* dominates the central party elite and controls the party strategy.[22] This explains why "Peronist leaders mostly discard the importance of party office and prefer to occupy public office" (Malamud

---

[22] Moreover, presidents have ample gate keeping power with respect to the distribution of public funds (to buy off the support of governors) and extensive appointment powers (Scherlis 2012). A systematic analysis of the appointment practice during Néstor Kirchner's presidential term (2003-2007) shows that a PJ party affiliation was no relevant criterion in about 55 percent of appointments at the highest political level (Scherlis 2012, 67). Moreover, if party affiliation played a role in selecting appointees this was mainly to strategically forge political coalitions – a practice Carlos Menem resorted to as well to assure extensive market reforms that even went against the core principles of Peronism (i.e. statism and party-union linkages) (see Corrales 2002; Levitsky 2003).

2005, 16). Hence, the selection procedures regulating the election of governors and presidents highly influences which actors dominate the provincial or central party elite, respectively. With respect to the selection of its presidential candidate, the PJ has never developed an intra-party routine to select a joint candidate. This lack of intra-party coordination frequently led to the open confrontation of different Peronist candidates (each backed by their own clientelistic networks) and encouraged the persistence of party factions (De Luca 2008, 197). To resolve internal tensions the PJ in several instances allowed opposing factions to run under a split ticket with different factions each appealing to their Peronist tradition. The most visible instance of this practice took place in the 2003 election when three Peronist factions competed against each other in the first-round of the presidential race. Unable to resolve internal conflict, a Menemnist faction (with ex-president Carlos Menem as its candidate) ran against a faction supporting the candidacy of Adolfo Rodríguez Saá (an ex-interim president) and a faction supporting the candidacy of Néstor Kirchner (which later turned into the powerful Kirchnerist faction) (De Luca 2008; Levitsky and Murillo 2003). Although this practice externalized internal tensions within the party organization it led to a triple split of the Peronist vote.[23]

To sum up, the leadership selection processes within the PJ follows a patronage-based logic, where the success of party elites on the national level depends more on their ability to mobilize voters (i.e. control clientelistic networks) and to forge strategic coalitions than to serve the party organization (De Luca 2008). This explains why the "party hierarchy is extremely porous. It lacks recruitment filters or a central bureaucracy with stable career paths" (Burgess and Levitsky 2003, 900; see also De Luca 2008). Moreover, although the PJ disposes of a highly routinized party base this party base is not vertically integrated with the central party elite – which has considerable discretion with respect to decision-making and to modify rules unilaterally (Burgess and Levitsky 2003). Despite the low routinization of the central party elite, the PJ has been successful in defending and even expanding is electoral advantage within the Argentinean party system. Its highly routinized party base provides the decentralized party branches with a powerful tool to mobilize electoral support and although different party factions sometimes compete among each other for the presidency, the party managed to control the government over 20 years since the return to democracy in 1983.

---

[23] Although the three candidates of the PJ combined gained over 60% of the vote, the election resulted in a scheduled runoff election between Carlos Menem (24.5%) and Néstor Kirchner (22,2%). Due to the decision of Menem to drop out of the second-round race, Néstor Kirchner finally assumed the presidency with less than a quarter of the Argentine voters behind his ticket (Levitsky and Murillo 2003).

4.2.2 Danish Peoples Party

The *Danish Peoples Party* (DPP) was founded in October 1995 by four dissident Progress Party MPs – one of them the first party leader Pia Kjærsgaard and at that point lacked a working organization. The newly formed party entered the Folketing, the Danish parliament, in 1998 with 7.4 per cent of the national vote, and successively increased its electoral support. By now it has served repeatedly as support party of Conservative–Liberal minority governments. The consolidation of the DPP support base was accompanied by a process of organizational institutionalization involving the routinization of its party base. In 1997, the DPP had about 1,500 members, in 1998 2,500 and in 2000 over 5,000. In 2009 the party membership was reported at about 10,000 (Meret 2010, 98), in 2014 at 14,500 (Christiansen 2016). To routinize recruitment was a central part of the party's organization-building efforts, especially since the DPP in 1998 had still experienced a shortage of candidates (as is often the case with new parties). Looking at the process of member recruitment and candidate nomination more closely, from the start the leadership directly controlled the inflow of members to assure a basic homogeneity of the party on the ground, establishing – in 1999 – a national membership record of all fee-paying members (Zalewski 2005; Pedersen 2006; Pedersen and Ringsmose 2004). This was during its first years as support party, when internal processes were increasingly guided by organizational procedures – a core indication of growing routinization (Panebianco 1988, 49, 53). Initially, the regional and local levels were in charge, formally speaking, yet the leadership interfered in selection processes irrespective of formal rules (Pedersen and Ringsmose 2004). Nowadays, the centre's involvement is formally recognized which suggests that party processes are more in line with formal rules. Every potential candidate has to apply to the national leadership and undergoes a strict screening process and the actual lists are put together by the leaders of local branches and one member of the national party executive. A complete centralization of decision-making has become less essential in face of growing base-level routinization, and the membership organization's ability to filter the pool of possible office aspirants more effectively nowadays compared to 1998 when structures were still rudimentary (see for details Bolleyer 2013).

However, and most importantly for our classification of the DPP as a mixed case (although candidate selection processes are inclusive and incorporate the party base in some aspects of central leadership decision-making), the main criterion to consider the party elite level to be routinized refers to the vertical integration of the party base into (central) *leadership renewal*, which is not given. In this very respect, the DPP remains highly leadership dominated as the recent "self-selected" leadership turnover indicates. After

building up the party and controlling it since its foundation, in 2012 a DPP press announcement of Pia Kjærsgaard's resignation and Kristian Thulesen Dahl succession was released. This succession was a clear case of a 'coronation' from within the core central elite controlled by the outgoing leader. Kristian Thulesen Dahl has 'de facto' been for a long time the daily leader of the party and worked closely with Kjærsgaard since the party was founded. Indeed Dahl was one of the co-founders of the party. When Kjærsgaard stepped back voluntarily after having informed the parliamentary party of her decision earlier on, she designated Dahl, one of the party's leading figures, to succeed her. Following this, while Kjærsgaard stayed on in parliament, becoming Speaker of Parliament after the 2015 elections (Christiansen 2016). The replacement of a long-reigning and uncontested founding leader tends to be a major challenge but the party coped well, as visible in significant gains in the following local elections as well as the 2015 national election (Meret, Siim, and Pingaud 2017; Christiansen 2017).

To date, thanks to its considerable success and the skills of its leadership, the party has not shown actual vulnerability as associated with an only base-level routinized party. Until her recent succession, Kjærsgaard has effectively dominated the party with the help of a few trusted politicians and party bureaucrats, tightly controlling the organization, complemented by long-term strategy to build a stable (routinized) support base reducing diversity and increasing predictability of the support base and the officials recruited from it. Right from the start, Kjærsgaard's leadership has been hierarchical and strictly sanctioned any public critique by followers. An internal rebellion in 2000 is indicative. Complaints in the parliamentary group regarding the leadership's hierarchical decision-making style were answered by the expulsion of three MPs and the announcement that publicly articulated critique by any other MP or party member would have the same consequences in the future (Pedersen and Ringsmose 2004). A Danish newspaper provided estimates that between 1996 and 2006 the DPP expelled 30–40 members who spoke out against the party line. This contrasts with the Liberals with 3–4 expulsions, the Conservatives with 3–4, the Social Democrats with 2–3, and the Unity List with 2 in the same period (Bolleyer 2013). Kjærsgaard's success in installing a capable successor overcame the other major hurdle, to assure leadership continuity within a 'self-selected' elite.

These focussed comparative case studies show us that we can clearly identify political parties in both regions which do not conform to the pattern of simultaneous elite- and base-level (non)routinization (Type I or Type IV), sketched out in Table 1 above. Instead we are able to

identify examples for both mixed configurations in each region. With respect to Type II (elite-level routinization only), the PRSD in Chile combines a fluctuating and fluid support base – activated only at election times for the purpose of retaining the legal party status – dependent on highly personalized and candidate-centred local and regional networks, with both formal and informal decision-making structures which vertically integrate local party activists and party elites into the process of national party leadership selection. The Australian Greens, as the second case discussed in this type, combine a very inclusive membership base with powerful local party branches which are vertically integrated into the procedures of national leadership selection – following a logic of consensus building and elite cooperation across different layers of the party. Although both parties are partially routinized, they are prone to internal party struggles, often triggered in the context of unpredictable electoral mobilization patterns due to either the fluidity or diversity of their party base.

Turning to the two cases discussed for Type III (base-level routinization only), the discussion of the Peronist party in Argentina – according to Levitsky (1998), the case to unpack the party institutionalization concept – highlights the feasibility of combining regularized albeit informal local party structures, integrating the party base into the organization beyond elections with highly centralized and personalized decision-making patterns and outside leadership recruitment by national party elites. The Danish Peoples Party, on the other hand, combines a formally and exclusively recruited party base with a highly dominant national party layer, focussed on the party founder and her cronies. Both parties in this type fared far better in electoral competition than the two previously discussed Type II cases. However, interestingly the two cases differ with respect to the degree of domination national elites' exercise over other layers within their respective party organization. While the PJ is characterized by a high level of elite competition for national public office (including the presidency) among different party factions, the DPP is characterized by a high degree of vertical domination of the central leadership over its local party branches. In how far this mixed-pattern of routinization stabilizes the party organization over time, however, remains to be seen. Until recently, both parties benefited from stable electoral support in their respective countries, which probably decreased the potential for severe internal conflicts that might challenge the national party leadership's position within the party organization.

5. Conclusion

A considerable body of literature has stressed the importance of party institutionalization.[24] More specifically, it has been argued that institutionalization can contribute to organizational stability and party survival and thereby help to stabilize party systems as a whole. Yet as its translations into measures has proved challenging, most empirical studies have been either qualitative small N studies or, alternatively, have in the context of large-N designs used relatively crude proxies such as party age (e.g. Luna 2014; Randall and Svåsand 2002; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Panebianco 1988). Most fundamentally, this article argues that before being able to examine the consequences of party institutionalization on a large-scale basis, it is essential to arrive at more nuanced measures of the concept.

Hence, we aim at contributing to the extensive debate about the refinement of the concept of party institutionalization.

We do so by focusing on the multi-level nature of the concept of party institutionalization: more specifically, we distinguish the routinization of central party elites and the party base. While traditional party models implicitly assume that the routinization of central and local party actors develop uniformly, we argue that distinguishing whose behavior we actually theorize when we specify and operationalize party routinization helps to reconcile contradictions found in the study of party organizations in both old and new democracies (Panebianco 1988; Katz and Mair 1995).

Base-level routinization is defined as the rule-guidedness of the party base (rank-and-file, subnational activists and party officials), while *elite-level routinization* is defined as rule constraints on current core elites in the area of leadership renewal. We operationalize these two aspects through, on the one hand, the presence of permanent local party structures that integrate the party base into the party organization (base-level routinization), and on the other, the structural involvement of local party actors into the selection of the (central) party leadership as one central indication of vertical party integration (elite-level routinization). Based on these distinctions, party structures can be conceptualized in four configurations – two 'pure types' (weak or strong routinization on both dimensions respectively) and two 'mixed types' characterized by either elite-level routinization without the integration of the party base into permanent local party structures (Type II), or base-level routinization without the vertical integration between this routinized base and central party elites (Type III).

---

[24] See, for instance, Huntington 1968, Dix 1992, Diamond and Gunther 2001, Randall and Svåsand 2002, Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006, Payne 2006, Casal Bértoa 2017.

To illustrate the usefulness of this conceptualization and specifically the usefulness of 'separating out' base-level and elite-level routinization, we discussed two examples corresponding to each mixed type: Both the *Chilean Radical Social Democratic Party* and the *Australian Greens* dispose of elite-level routinization – due to the vertical integration of the party base in central leadership selection processes – but either deliberately or unwillingly failed to build permanent local party structures that integrate the base-level into the party organization. In the case of the PRSD formal as well as informal institutions of vertical integration help to legitimize the central elite vis-à-vis the party base, the decentralization of local and regional activist networks increases the potential of conflict between electorally strong party candidates and the central party elite. In the case of the *Australian Greens* its set-up as a federation of state party organizations, made the party electorally successful but at the same time explains the in-built tensions between different parts of the party and the central party elite. In contrast, both the *Peronist Party in Argentina* and the *Danish Peoples Party* dispose of a routinized party base without structures that vertically integrate this party base into leadership selection processes. While in the former, leadership selection remains fluid and flexible which allows also for outsider recruitment into the highest ranks of the party elite, the latter is characterized (until now) by leadership-dominated self-selection processes.

Three out of the four discussed cases remain remarkably successful electorally over time and in organizational terms. Comparing the four cases, hence, highlights that mixed configurations of routinization may to some extent can contribute to intra-party organizational stability, but less so than we would expect from highly routinized parties that invest in building both a routinized party base and a routinized party elite. As the two cases of elite-routinized parties imply, these parties seem more prone to defections and party-splits as a way to resolve intra-party conflicts than parties with a routinized party base providing stronger organizational incentives to stick with the party. Moreover, the two cases of base-level routinization indicate that integrating the party base into the local organization, and thereby, establishing regularized interactions between followers and the party itself, helps to stabilize electoral support over time even in the absence of vertical organizational integration between party base and elite level. These parties might, over time, may develop into fully routinized parties. But as the trajectory of the PJ in Latin America shows, this does not have to be the case, which stresses the importance of developing concepts considering the growing complexity of party organization in both old and new democracies.

A nuanced conceptualization and operationalization of party institutionalization as multidimensional concept is especially important if we want to derive causal implications for the stability of party support or party systems. Different dimension of this multifaceted concept may have different consequences as does the behavior of different party layers. Furthermore, focusing on different party actors within party organizations and clarifying whose behavior we theorize, enables us to avoid theoretical pitfalls and ambiguities in the operationalization of the concept. As indicated in this article, the implications theorized for fully routinized political parties may partly also apply to the two newly identified subtypes of base-level or elite-level routinization, i.e. the routinization of different party layers. Future research on the development and the consequences of party structures will need to factor these different layers of party institutionalization into their theories, clarify the level of analysis on which they are measured (whose behavior is captured) and aim at testing their impact in large-N studies as well. Finally, while we focused only on the dimension of routinization in this article, the same exercise needs to be done for other dimensions of the concept, like value infusion.

7. References

Auyero, Javier. 2000. The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account. *Latin American Research Review* 35 (3):55-81.

Aylott, Nicholas , and Niklas Bolin. 2017. Managed Intra-party democracy. *Party Politics* 23 (1):55-65.

Bolleyer, Nicole. 2009. Inside the Cartel Party: Party Organisation in Government and Opposition. *Political Studies* 57 (3):559-579.

--- 2013. *New Parties in Old Party Systems: Persistence and Decline in 17 Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bolleyer, Nicole, and Saskia P. Ruth. 2018. Elite Investments in Party Institutionalization in New Democracies: A Two-Dimensional Approach. *The Journal of Politics* 80 (1).

Bolleyer, Nicole, Wilfried Swenden and Nicola McEwen (eds.) (2014): 'The Dynamics of Multilevel Systems in Europe: Constitutional Power and Partisan Conflict', Special Issue of *Comparative European Politics*.

Burgess, Katrina, and Steve Levitsky. 2003. Explaining Populist Party Adaptation in Latin America. *Comparative Political Studies* 36 (8):881-911.

Casal Bértoa, Fernando. 2017. "Political Parties or Party Systems? Assessing the 'Myth' of Institutionalization and Democracy." West European Politics 40 (2): 402–29.

Christiansen, Flemming Juul. 2017. Conflict and co-operation among the Danish mainstream as a condition for adaptation to the populist radical right. In *The European Mainstream and the Populist Radical Right*, edited by P. Odmalm and E. Hepburn. London and New York: Routledge.

Christiansen, Flemming Juul 2016. The Danish People's Party: combining coopration and radical positions. In *Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe. Into the Mainstream?*, edited by T. Akkerman, S. L. De Lange and M. Rooduijn. New York: Routledge.

Corrales, Javier. 2002. *Presidents Without Parties. The Politics of Economic Reform in Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990s*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Cross, William , and André Blais. 2012. Who selects the party leader? *Party Politics* 18 (2):127-150.

de Lange, Sarah L., and David Art. 2011. Fortuyn versus Wilders: An Agency-Based Approach to Radical Right Party Building. *West European Politics* 34 (6):1229-1249.

De Luca, Miguel. 2008. Political recruitment and candidate selection in Argentina: presidents and governors, 1983 to 2006. In *Pathways to Power. Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America*, edited by P. Siavelis and S. Morgenstern. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

De Luca, Miguel, Mark P. Jones, and María Inés Tula. 2002. Back Rooms or Ballot Boxes? *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (4):413-436.

Diamond, Larry, and Richard Gunther. 2001. *Political Parties and Democracy*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Dix, Robert H. 1992. "Democratization and the Institutionalization of Latin American Political Parties." *Comparative Political Studies* 24 (4):488-511.

Freidenberg, Flavia, and Steven Levitsky. 2006. Informal Institutions and Party Organization in Latin America. In *Informal Institutions and Democracy. Lessons from Latin America*, edited by G. Helmke and S. Levitsky. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Gayoso, Christian. 2011. *Konflikt und Kooperation in der chilenischen Concertación. Ursachen und Formen der langjährigen Stabilität des Mehrparteienbündnisses*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Harmel, Robert and Svåsand, Lars (1993). Party Leadership and Party Institutionalisation: Three phases of development. *West European Politics* 16: 67–88.

Harmel, Robert; Svåsand, Lars and Mjelde, Hilmar (2018): Institutionalization (and De-Institutionalisation) of Right-Wing Protest Parties. The Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway. Colchester: ECPR Press.

Hazan, Reuven Y., and Gideon Rahat. 2010. *Democracy within Parties. Candidate Selection Methods and Their Political Consequences*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. *Political order in changing societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Jackson, Stewart. 2011. The Australian Greens: From Movement to Electoral Professional Party. Sydney: University of Sydney.

Janda, Kenneth. 1980. *Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey*. New York: The Free Press.

Katz, Richard, and Peter Mair. 1993. The Evolution of Party Organizations in Europe: The Three Faces of Party Organiaztion. *The American Review of Politics* 14:593-617.

Katz, Richard S., and Peter Mair. 1995. Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy. The Emergence of the Cartel Party. *Party Politics* 1 (1):5-28.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert, and Daniel M. Kselman. 2010. The Organizational Foundations of Democratic Accountability: Organizational Form and the Choice of Electoral Linkage Strategy. In *Annual Meeting of the APSA*. Washington, D.C.

Levitsky, Steven. 1998. Institutionalization and Peronism: The Case, the Concept, and the Case for Unpacking the Concept. *Party Politics* 4 (1):77-92.

--- 2001. An 'Organised Disorganisation': Informal Organisation and the Persistence of Local Party Structures in Argentine Peronism. *Journal of Latin American Studies* 33 (1):29-66.

--- 2003. *Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Levitsky, Steven, James Loxton, and Brandon Van Dyck. 2016. Introduction: Challenges of Party-Building in Latin America. In *Challenges of Party-Building in Latin America*, edited by S. Levitsky, J. Loxton, B. Van Dyck and J. I. Domínguez. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Levitsky, Steven, and María Victoria Murillo. 2003. Argentina Weathers the Storm. *Journal of Democracy* 14 (4):152-166.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, Martin Trow, and James Coleman, J. S. 1956. *Union Democracy: The Internal Politics of the International Typographical Union*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Luna, Juan Pablo. 2014. Party System Institutionalization: Do We Need a New Concept? *Studies in Comparative International Development* 49 (4):403-425.

Luna, Juan Pablo, and David Altman. 2011. Uprooted but Stable: Chilean Parties and the Concept of Party System Institutionalization. *Latin American Politics and Society* 53 (2):1-28.

Lupu, Noam. 2015. Nacionalización e institutcionalización de partidos en la Argentina del siglo XX. In *Sistemas de partidos en América Latina: causas y consequencias de su equilibrio inestable*, edited by M. Torcal. Buenos Aires: Anthropos/SigloXXI.

Mainwaring, Scott , and Timothy R. Scully. 1995. *Building Democratic Institutions. Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

--- 1995. Introduction. Party Systems in Latin America. In *Building Democratic Institutions. Party Systems in Latin America*, edited by S. Mainwaring and T. R. Scully. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Malamud, Andrés. 2005. Winning Elections versus Governing: A Two-Tier Approach to Party Adaptation in Argentina, 1983-2003/ 2007. Lisboa.

McGuire, James W. 1997. *Peronism without Perón. Unions, Parties, and Democracy in Argentina*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Meret, Susi. 2010. *The Danish People's Party, the Italian Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party in a Comparative Perspective: Party Ideology and Electoral Support*, *Ph.D. Series 25*. Aalborg: SPIRIT.

Meret, Susi, Birte Siim, and Etienne Pingaud. 2017. Men's parties with women leaders: A comparative study of the rightwing populist leaders Pia Kjærsgaard, Marine Le Pen and Siv Jensen. In *Understanding the Populist shift. Othering in a Europe in Crisis*, edited by G. Lazaridis and G. Campani. New York: Routledge.

Michels, Robert. 1962. *Political Parties: a Sociological Study of the Oligarchial Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. New York: Free Press.

Miragliotta, Narelle. 2012. Federalism, Party Organization and Australia's Green Parties. *Journal of Politics and History* 52 (1):97-110.

Miragliotta, Narelle, and Stewart Jackson. 2015. Green Parties in Federal Systems: Resistant or Compliant to Centralizing Pressures? *Government and Opposition* 50 (4):549-577.

Müller, Gonzalo. 2008. Democracia interna y selección de autoridades. In *Reforma de los partidos políticos en Chile*, edited by A. Fontaine, C. Larroulet, J. Navarrete and I. Walker. Santiago de Chile: Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD).

Mustillo, Thomas J. 2009. Modeling New Party Performance: A Conceptual and Methodological Approach for Volatile Party Systems. *Political Analysis* 17 (3):311-332.

Navia, Patricio. 2008. Legislative Candidate Selection in Chile. In *Pathways to Power. Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America*, edited by P. Siavelis and S. Morgenstern. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Panebianco, Angelo. 1988. *Political Parties: Organization and Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Payne, J. Mark. 2006. "Sistemas de partidos y gobernabilidad democrática." In *La política importa. Democracia y desarrollo en América Latina*, edited by J. Mark Payne, Daniel Zovatto G. and Mercedes Mateo Díaz, 165-196. Washington, D.C.: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo.

Pedahzur, A and Brichta, A. (2002). The Institutionalization of Extreme Right-wing Charismatic Parties: A paradox? *Party Politics* 8: 31–49.

Pedersen, Karina. 2006. Driving a Populist Party: the Danish People's Party. edited by I. f. S. University of Copengagen. Copenhagen, Denmark.

Pedersen, Karina, and Jens Ringsmose. 2004. From the Progress Party to the Danish People's Party - from protest party to government supporting party. In *ECPR Joint Session of Workshops*. Uppsala.

Pedersen, Mogens N. 1982. Towards a New Typology of Party Lifespans and Minor Parties. *Scandinavian Political Studies* 5 (1):1-16.

Ponce, Aldo F , and Susan E Scarrow. 2016. Which members? Using cross-national surveys to study party membership. *Party Politics* 22 (6):679-690.

Randall, Vicky, and Lars Svåsand. 2002. Party Institutionalization in New Democracies. *Party Politics* 8 (1):5-29.

Ribera Neumann, Teodoro. 2008. Estatuto jurídico de los partidos políticos en Chile. Veinte años de la Ley Orgánica Constitutcional de los Partidos Políticos. In *Reforma de los partidos políticos en Chile*, edited by A. Fontaine, C. Larroulet, J. Navarrete and I. Walker. Santiago de Chile: Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD).

Rose, Richard, and Thomas T. Mackie. 1988. Do Parties Persist or Fail? The Big Trade-off Facing Organizations. In *When Parties Fail*: Princeton University Press.

Samuels, David. 2004. From Socialism to Social Democracy: Party Organization and the Transformation of the Workers' Party in Brazil. *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (9):999-1024.

Sartori, Giovanni. 1973. What is "Politics". *Political Theory* 1 (1): 5-26.

Scarrow, Susan E, Paul Webb, and David Farrell. 2001. From Social Integration to Electoral Contestation: The Changing Distribution of Power within Political Parties. In *Parteis without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, edited by R. Dalton and M. P. Wattenberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Scarrow, Susan E., and Burcu Gezgor. 2010. Declining memberships, changing members? European political party members in a new era. *Party Politics* 16 (6):823-843.

Scherlis, Gerardo. 2012. Designaciones y organización partidaria: el partido de redes gubernamentales en el Peronismo Kirchnerista. *América Latina Hoy* 62:47-77.

Siavelis, Peter, and Bonnie N. Field. 2015. The Presidentialization of Parties in Chile. In *The Presidentialization of Political Parties. Organizations, Institutions and Leaders*, edited by G. Passarelli. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Swenden, Wilfried and Simon Toubeau (2013) Mainstream Parties and Territorial Dynamics in the UK, Spain and India. In Benz, A and Broschek, J (eds) *Federal Dynamics. Continuity, Change and the Varieties of Federalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 249-76.

Tavits, Margit. 2012. Organizing for Success: Party Organizational Strength and Electoral Performance in Postcommunist Europe. *The Journal of Politics* 74 (01):83-97.

--- 2013. *Post-Communist Democracies and Party Organization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thorlakson, Lori. 2009. Patterns of Party Integration, Influence and Autonomy in Seven Federations. *Party Politics* 15 (2): 157-77.

Wills-Otero, Laura. 2009. From Party Systems to Party Organizations: The Adaptation of Latin American Parties to Changing Environments. *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 1 (1):123-141.

--- 2014. The electoral performance of Latin American traditional parties, 1978–2006: Does the internal structure matter? *Party Politics*.

Zalewski, Frédéric. 2005. La professionalisation des partis "populistes" en Europé: une comparaison entre le mouvement polonais Samoobrona et le Dansk Folkeparti. *Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée* 12 (4):487-501.