

University of Nevada, Reno

**Two Tales of a Region: Japan, the Philippines, and the Economic Theory of
Alliances**

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in
Political Science

By

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Abstract

In Asia, there is an argument among the literature that the rise of China is causing a split in the region's security and economic hierarchy. China is a growing potential superpower, and it is providing economic incentives towards states traditionally allied with the United States. This paper's research focus is aimed at looking at the alliance maintenance of the non-major powers in Asia, and how they react to two contesting great powers that provide different incentives. The hypothesis of this paper is that the economic condition of a state affects with whom these non-major powers strengthen their relationship with. A formal model was constructed to portray how economic conditions affect the choice of alliance maintenance when paired with the perception of external threat. A critical case comparison was used to test this hypothesis using the cases of Japan and the Philippines. The analysis supported the hypothesis. A state's economic condition, coupled with perception of external threat, affects its alliance maintenance in a condition where security and economy are oppositional to each other.

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Introduction

The United States became the lone superpower when the Soviet Union imploded. However, this position as the single dominant power in the global system is now being challenged. China has experienced an explosive economic growth that has caused speculation on its potential superpower status. Stuck in the middle of these two giants are the middle and minor powers of the Asia Pacific, most of whom are military allies with the United States. Eyes are now upon these states to see how they act, when they are faced with a choice between their military ally, and the new rising economic power. Maintaining an alliance with the United States will ensure their Security; however, strengthening their alliance with China will produce more economic benefits at the cost of lower security. The first question becomes: “how do middle and minor powers react towards the shift of great powers in East Asia?” The literature maintains that alliance management and threat perception cause alliances to be maintained, but certain states within Asia that are affected by these variables still seek to strengthen relationships with China. The question is: why?

Two cases within the region represent opposite spectrums. Japan has remained a steadfast ally of the United States from the end of the Cold war. The Philippines continuously flips between strengthening their relationship with China and strengthening their relationship with the United States. This inconsistency presents a puzzle. The literature argues that states will strengthen their alliance relationships in the presence of increasing external threat, yet the Philippines has chosen to weaken its alliance with America in the context of China routinely using its force to threaten the Philippines in the

South China Sea. What explains the Philippines' actions? Why would a minor power that is routinely threatened by a more powerful state choose to weaken its alliance in lieu of strengthening its relationship with the threatening power? The literature is lacking in useful explanations for this occurrence, and thus this paper seeks to fill that gap of knowledge. The research question being asked is: what determines how these non-great powers in Asia decide between strengthening their relationship with the United States or with China?

Using the Philippines and Japan as two cases, the biggest difference between these two powers which might explain the difference in behavior is their economic strength. Japan is a major economic power, and the Philippines is a poor developing state. When looking at preliminary information, it seems that economic conditions correlate with these countries choices in relationships. Japan is a dominant economic power in the system, and has been steadfast with the United States in its alliance. The Philippines routinely experiences threat from China, and yet episodically works to improve its relationship with the growing power even with the history of aggression. The hypothesized reason for this anomaly is the economic conditions of the state. Those poor states will be more willing to gain economic benefits at the expense of security. Rich states will prefer security benefits at the expense of economic benefits.

This paper will be broken up into four parts. The first part will be a discussion of the concepts being discussed in the literature. Part two will be the presentation of a formal model to portray the importance of the economic conditions within the relationship. Part three will discuss the mixed methods approach that the research paper applies to the research question. Part four reviews the two case studies used, and applies

the critical case analysis to highlight how economics may affect how these states act in between two great powers.

Theory/Literature Review

Alliances

The research question deals with alliance commitments of non-great powers to the current super power, and how those alliance commitments stand in the test of oppositional incentives. To answer the research question requires a thorough understanding on the literature of alliances, “middle powers,” and the geo-political condition of Asia. This literature will then be applied to the context of the two cases showing the variables that affect Japan and the Philippines’ alliance commitments, while also highlighting the shortfalls currently in the literature.

Military alliances require insecurity. There must be some measure of insecurity for a state to consider sharing the burden of protection for another state. Alliances can help to ameliorate those insecurities. A military alliance is defined as “a formal (or informal) commitment for security cooperation between two or more states, intended to augment each member’s power, security, and or influence” (Walt 2009). States seek their security and their safety, and thus act to assure it. There are two ways a state can work to strengthen its own power. The first is internal strengthening through increasing both defense spending and military capability; the second, more immediate way of increasing security is through an alliance (Morrow 1993). The method of alliance formation to increase security is a quicker method of security strengthening as opposed to the slow and potentially uncertain internal strengthening. Classically, Balance of Power theory (BOP)

and the neo-realist literature argues that states form alliances as counters to the threat of great powers (Mearsheimer 2001). Alliances exist long enough to serve their purpose of checking expanding great powers and providing for the security of its members. When the great power no longer represents a threat, the alliance dissolves and reforms based on the next power relationship of the international system. At their most basic function, alliances are pure military defense commitments. A threat is produced, and the members come forward to provide military support. Walt (1987) altered this theory to show that alliances ally against the biggest threat, not the biggest power, as those two are not one in the same. This theory of threat is helpful in answering part of the research question, but is insufficient in whole to explain the actions of the Philippines.

This paradigm of alliance formation and dissolution has proven to be inaccurate in the real world. Alliances are military institutions, and the literature on institutions has shown that they have an ability to survive the original reason of their formation. The survival of NATO for a quarter of a century after the fall of the Soviet Union provides a counterexample to the dissolution theory. Explanations for this phenomenon range across the literature. There are institutionalists who argue that institutions naturally outlive their original purpose (Boettke et al. 2008). Constructivists argue that alliances provide more value than just a military commitment in the form of socializing states to be more cooperative within the system, and are thus valuable to keep in place (Finnemore 1993). Oppositely, Bennett (1997) finds a host of causal variables for alliance longevity, but finds no support for institutional perpetuity. McCalla (1996) Further supports the lack of evidence for institutional perpetuity, but he does provide support for alliances existing for longer periods of time when they experience high levels of organization with a strong

central leader. Alliances can be extended, but eventually they will all dissolve. De Castro (2001) finds that alliance management – the active upkeep of relations between both partners through continued talks, exercises, and agreements – contributes to the long-lasting nature of alliances. Both arguments employ models that find support for their assertions, and ultimately, a greater number of explanatory variables are needed to provide a more realistic picture.

Alliance formation is not 100 percent efficient. Snyder (1984) presents a game theory model that analyzes security dilemma induced alliance formation. States that are insecure decide to form alliances, and then decide how much they are willing to commit to those alliances. This continued commitment is based on four criteria: the state's need for assistance in a war, the partner's capacity to supply assistance, the state's degree of conflict and tension, and the state's realignment alternatives. States form alliances that they believe they will commit to, and thus add weight to the threat of the security regime's capability. A change in any of these variables will alter the likelihood of success for alliance formation. States with a smaller need for assistance, or a lower ability to supply assistance will be less successful in alliance formation. Further, states in less tense situations, with higher realignment alternatives will form less successful alliances. Alliances are further complicated as the purpose for the formation of the alliance is different among the different members (Sandler 1977). Some states may join because without the alliance their survival is at stake, while others do so as a matter of convenience.

The setting of alliances affects the formation and aboration of alliances. In multipolar setting, states are more likely to abandon their alliances in favor of a different,

more beneficial arrangement (Leeds & Savun 2007). In a bipolar system, the two competing major powers are the two main suppliers of security, and thus there are two main sides that are competing against each other for the supply and demand of security. A unipolar system results in a greater demand than supply for security; therefore, minor powers must work harder to court the major power to gain any tangible benefit (Kim 2016). This effect necessitates an understanding of the current international system. Brooks & Wohlforth (2016) argues that today's world fails to fit in the nice conforms of Unipolarity or Bipolarity. Instead, America is classified as the lone superpower, China is a new, potentially rising superpower, and there is a combination of regional powers around the globe. This combines into a quasi-unipolarity in certain regions with qualities of bipolarity in others with Asia being classified as pseudo-bipolar.

The classic point of view for alliances is that they are defensive coalitions that signal strength to deter potential enemies (Morrow 1993; Fuhrmann & Sechser 2014). There is a counter to this argument which shows that alliances can both defensive and offensive in nature - they can both "deter and assure" (Leeds 2003b). In other words, alliances that promise intervention in the case of defensive disputes reduces the probability that a military action will occur; however, those same alliances will also increase the likelihood of a military crisis if the alliance promises offensive support. These two types of alliances are not usually concurrent which implies that each individual alliance needs to be analyzed on the reasons for its formation. For both cases being researched in this study, the alliances were formed for defensive purposes and thus should follow the classic assumption of alliances through the literature.

States must work through the medium of the international arena, and their bureaucracy, to transfer the message of alliances. Fearon (1997) creates the idea of states signaling commitments to force themselves to act in the manner that the signals call for. A state does so to make its threats credible. There is a subtext in this argument that shows a level of uncertainty in a state's action. That signaling requires a level of sunk cost commitment to be deemed as credible. This has a problem of producing a "security spiral" where normally non-aggressive neighbors, through their signaling, overestimate the security threat of the opposing state (Snyder 1984). Morrow (2016) finds evidence that defensive alliance signaling deters conflict if there is a recent history of conflict, but incites conflict if there is not a recent history. These results give an insight onto China's view of its regional sphere. Viewing these alliances allied with America provokes fear and potentially incites greater levels of conflict due to the threat of being surrounded.

Certain conditions predicted the success and length of an alliance. Alliances that are highly institutionalized with explicit norms regulating the decision making are those alliances that last the longest. Additionally, alliances are more likely to last longer if the alliance member states are predominantly liberal regimes (Bennett 1997; Reed 1997). This result comes from the different goals that states pursue when forming an alliance. Liberal regimes have adopted international norms and values that are consistent with other liberal regimes. These norms predicate cooperation as alliances are formed for more than just mutual defense, but to reduce transaction costs and increase cooperation between regimes (Conybeare & Kim 2010). These past three points highlight the weakness of these predictive variables. When applied to the two cases, both the

Philippines and Japan should maintain their alliance with the United States, but they do not, and thus more research is needed.

Alliances can also be affected by the signaling of domestic politics to the state's leader. Domestic opposition can increase the state's bargaining power in the alliance, but it also puts pressure on the leader to alter the state's relationship towards the alliance (Kim 2014a). The level of the effect depends on the amount of unhappiness towards the alliance and the level of exposure that the leader can be affected by the domestic will of the populace. Thus, the domestic attitudes of a democracy can potentially affect the alliance patterns of that state. As both of the cases are democracies, domestic attitudes and feelings are important points of information for determining alliance maintenance.

The original literature assumes that alliances are formed among relatively equal power states. Morrow (1991) identifies two types of alliances: symmetric and asymmetric, and how these power relationships alter the assumptions of alliances. Symmetric alliances occur when two states join in a mutual alliance to protect each other's security. Asymmetric alliances grant different benefits to different partners. The dominant partner gains "autonomy benefits." These benefits are described as the ability to alter the status quo - an alternative definition of power. The minor states give up a portion of their autonomy in exchange for greater levels of security. This autonomy can be conceptualized as the ability for a state to decide its own actions. This might show in a minor power being compelled to form or decide a treaty in the interest of its security partner instead of in the interest of itself, or by providing geo-strategic support to the stronger ally. Oppositely, this bargain increases the level of autonomy for the dominant state to garner more security. This conclusion is supported by the model analysis of

Bennet (1997). This is the first ground mark study that highlights how relative capabilities changes the costs of alliance formation. Weaker states must pay using different value, leading to their cost benefit analysis being different from states more equal in capability.

The benefits of military alliances are variable as well. Alliances allow for states to piggyback off the security produced by other states (Olson & Zeckhauser 1966). To a point, security is not an excludable benefit, and security benefits provided to one state for an alliance can also be applied to another state in lesser quantities. The level of general protection is increased by America's maritime force projection, as the navy protection of waterways is transferred to all states that use those waterways. This further complicates a smaller powers cost benefit analysis. There is a level of free security for minimum cost provided by an alliance, but the further security comes at an increased cost of economics or autonomy.

Entrapment is one of the greatest fears produced from an alliance. If a war occurs within an alliance it will drag the rest of the members into the conflict. Entrapment is more likely to occur in a bipolar system as opposed to a multipolar system. In a bipolar system, the minor power states are split among the two great powers, and those great powers fear their entrapment against the other through a proxy conflict (Snyder 1984). Kim (2011) shows that member states are constantly worried about being entrapped. When a state suspects that it is going to be pulled into a conflict, it will try to alter its relationship to avoid that responsibility. Further, stronger states can alter or change potentially entrapping situations. America has the greatest capacity to alter alliance conditions, and this ability is altered depending on the alliance dyad. It will actively work

to change a situation to escape the possibility of entrapment. A possible fear is being pulled into a hot conflict with China by one of its allies in the region, and thus why it works so hard to defuse conflict prone situations.

Entrapment is dovetailed with the opposing problem of abandonment. Leeds et al. (2000) finds that a significant portion of alliances abandon their partners when the call for aid is sounded. In his analyses, 24.5% of alliances do not fulfill their commitments. Of all the relationships tested, major powers and non-democratic states most consistently abrogate their alliances due to the low cost for these states to do so (Leeds 2003a). A defensive alliance may not be formed with a true guarantee of military commitment. Instead they exist to deter potential military engagements with the hope of never getting involved. Instead, they work to actively signal intention to the alliance's enemies (Morrow 2000; Fearon 1997). The best utility an alliance provides to its members is deterring potential action rather than providing true military assistance in an act of defense. These situations can lead to fear of abandonment by the smaller powers in the alliance. This fear can either lead to the state reinforcing its relationship with the more powerful partner, or taking less risks when the perceived fear of abandonment is high (Cha 2000).

World Security threats have become more frequent from internal sources. After World War II, the instances of intrastate war have surpassed instances of interstate war. Alliances can serve a similar purpose to disperse an internal threat. However, the likelihood of this happening is lessened by the fact that the most established military alliances also coincide with the most internally stable states. It is possible for alliances to provide some form of military support to help a state combat some forms of insurgency

(Stepan 1973). The United States has provided arms to a plethora of alliance partners for the expressed purpose of fighting internal insurgencies. The Philippines throughout its history used its military alliance with the United States to help it fight its insurgency (Brands 1992).

It is also important to briefly highlight the link between economy and security. Very broadly speaking, a state that performs better economically can defend itself against perceived threats from other states; however, security is a broad term with multiple definitions spanning the literature, and consistency is needed when referencing the term. Baldwin (2001) highlights the evolution of the concept of Security. At first it started as the perceived wellbeing of a state, but it has since evolved into “low politics” that includes concepts such as human security, economic security, environmental security, and a host of others. When looking at the mix between economy and security, it can be shown that having more economic output leads to problems in “low politics” security such as increased levels of terrorism and environmental degradation (Hameiri & Jones 2015); however, for the purposes of simplicity in regards to the research question, when this paper uses the term “security” it is in relation to a state’s perceived capability to defend itself against the power from another state. Thus, through that distinction, having a better economy is correlated with greater level of security from state entities. For the most part, the alliance literature remains silent on whether the internal domestic economic condition of a state influences their alliance formation and maintenance – especially in regards to an oppositional power providing economic benefits. Thus, the research will see how economic conditions, combined with the other causal variables, alters how states maintain their alliances.

Super Powers, Major Powers, Middle Powers, and Minor Powers.

There is an unequal distribution of power between the states in the international system. In the foundational international relations literature, Waltz details how these superpowers run the global system. Per Waltz' neorealism, great powers are the only states that truly matter. Non-great powers may be part of coalitions to balance against upcoming great powers, but they are merely reactive in nature. New literature presents a different picture. Non-great powers are not small pawns that purely react to transitions of power, but present more complicated behavior with their own rules and assumptions (Rothstein 1968; Gilley & O'Neil 2014).

The first change is the sprouting concept of "middle powers" in the literature, and how they can affect the global system. Middle powers are defined by Gilley & O'Neil (2014) by the power they have in relation to other states. They are defined as states that do not qualify as major powers, but who still have significant power or capabilities to alter the system in a meaningful way (Gilley & O'Neil 2014 P. 4). Seeing as the difference of capability is the main variable distinguishing between minor, middle, regional, and super powers, its definition should be clear. However, the definition is problematic because of the subjective interpretation required to put states into their classification. Super powers are characterized as the states with the greatest concentration of power. They have the greatest ability to exert their influence over other states within the system. Middle powers can best be described as those states with enough power to be able to successfully resist the influence of the super powers. This definition by itself leaves the concept wanting as the edges of the "middle power" circle is blurry enough to

leave some ambiguity. South Korea is a solid middle power with enough capability to have a meaningful influence on the international arena while also lacking the required power to make significant or lasting changes that would dictate the global order as a major power would be able to.

The inherent ambiguity to the definition muddies the water for reliable interpretation for those states that straddle this line of power. India is bordering on the upper line of regional power status. For another example, Japan reached the requirements to be known as a regional great power, but chose in its national narrative to reduce its power capabilities to upkeep its image as non-threatening (Berger 2004), and thus its status is altered. On the other side of the spectrum is Thailand, which is not dominant in the global international system but has an extended influence in Southeast Asia as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Thailand could both be considered a middle power or a minor power due to its relatively sizable, but comprehensively small, levels of capability. To a certain extent, classifying middle powers is subjective; however, there is a consensus within the literature on which states are clear middle powers.

Middle powers have played an increasingly active role in the formation and passage of international institutions and international peacekeeping treaties such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the Ottawa Land Mine ban, and the Proliferated Security Initiative (Cooper 2011). By spearheading these actions, middle powers have a growing influence on the formation and evolution of the norms in the international system (Behringer 2012). There is a further argument that middle powers have greater power than minor powers but lack the ambitions of the major powers, which leads them to be

uniquely suited for peacekeeping initiatives. Behringer further extrapolates that the ambitiousness of middle powers is the drive for the evolution of human security. This, however, is countered by (Gilley & O'Neil 2014 P.36) to show that this idealized image of middle powers being benign in nature is unproven. There is no convincing evidence that middle powers are less threatening or have less threatening ambitions than their great power cousins. Further, the argument that middle powers prefer to act multilaterally due to their ideology also falls flat, as they usually have no other option (Keohane 1969).

Most important, middle powers are pro-multipolarity or counter hegemonic (Gilley & O'Neil 2014 P. 31). They can side with great powers among certain issues, but they are not cemented with the current great power partner. This is contrasted with those minor powers that pick sides, and are all but forced to maintain their relationships due to their deep level of dependence. For example, South Korea is currently aligned and allied with the United States, and this alliance is a deeply ingrained pact that can be traced back to the end of World War II; however, if South Korea wanted to alter or break off its relationship with the United States, it will suffer greatly, but it has the capability to do so if it wished.

The most important take away of major powers is that they have agency. They may not be able to dictate the rules of the entire system, but they do have a sizable ability to decide their own decisions and bear the consequences, which in turn gives them a freedom to tread their own path in the international system, as well as working with other middle powers to check the major powers that exist. Using this concept of the middle power in the analysis of the research question then leads to an interesting avenue for analysis. It allows for a more nuanced understanding of these East Asian states and how

they handle this courting of great powers. They are not stuck making the decision between two great powers, as balance of power theory suggests, and instead can choose to alter their actions to dictate how great powers act towards them – at least for the stronger middle powers.

Minor powers fall at the bottom of the hierarchy of the international arena. These are the states that fall below any other state in relative power capacity. They have fielded their own study as they work with assumptions different from the other two categories. Minor powers do not have the agency to directly alter events to those more powerful than them; they do not have the power to achieve the goals they are trying to achieve. They are drifters reacting to the flow of the greater powers. When forming alliances, minor powers must compromise or bandwagon, and as often as naught they are unsatisfied with the terms of their military alliance (Rothstein 1968). However, minor powers are not helpless. In the same way that middle powers can exert influence over the system in non-traditional ways, so too can these minor powers. They can provide narratives, influence norms, and take advantage of the international legal system to their benefit. Further, when they combine, they can amplify their influence. The G77 exists because it is more efficient than in the absence of cooperation. Understanding the differences in alliance relationships between super powers, middle powers, great powers, and minor powers is crucial to the study of Japan, the Philippines and the United States. Japan is a regional, major power, and thus has moderately more capability to determine its own decisions. The Philippines is a minor power, and therefore is stuck with the least agency in carving its own path, and must choose in the relationship between the two giants it is caught between.

Two Asias

Classical international relations theory has been based off the European experience. East Asia has been routinely downplayed in the inclusion of IR theory formation and application post World War II (Hundley et al 2015; Johnston 2012). Now, as the states in East Asia join the ranks of the great and regional powers, more attention is being paid towards the region. This shift can be characterized most famously when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signaled the “pivot to Asia” through the Obama administration. As Japan, and then China, became the third and second biggest economies respectively, and also considering the potential growth of other powers in the region -- specifically India -- there is an understanding that Asia will have the greatest share of importance in the future of international relations.

Starting with a narrative, the cold war ended, and Pax Americana began. These foundations were laid at the end of World War II. The war concluded, and two global superpowers rose from the ashes. Of the two, America came out unscarred, willing to lead the new, liberal, global order. It established the global foundations for this new system, and entrenched itself as the head of the international economic system. As the cold war played out, America and the Soviet Union both established extensive alliance networks to improve their respective status and to project their power around the globe. When the Cold war ended and the Soviet Union fell, Russia was unable to maintain most of its global allies, but America still had its network intact. Post 1991, for a brief glimpse, the United States was the unchallenged, unchecked global superpower. With its power, it

established a pseudo-hierarchical structure out of the traditional international anarchy (Goh 2008; Walt 2009).

Asia's future is centered on the actions of China because it is the growing potential superpower. Superpowers, and to some extent regional powers, have a great influence on proximal states, and although minor and middle powers can affect the workings of superpowers, these superpowers are the leaders of the international parade. Realism paints a grim future for the region. Going back to Organski (1958), when states accumulate enough power to become major players in the system, conflict is inevitable. Rising great powers will challenge the current unipole. The dominant great power will do everything in its power to actively oppose this new challenger. Conflict of some form is inevitable, and either the new power will win and establish a new global order, or the established power will win and the same order will stay in place.

This paradigm still has some utility, but it has become outdated in the modern world. For those interested in a catchy narrative, the rise of China will eventually result in conflict with the United States, but China's potential rise is more nuanced and requires a greater level of academic rigor. The polarity of the system creates the setting for analysis of international relations, and thus determining the conditions of the setting is paramount; however, the literature on China's rise emphasizes how scholars become stuck in a dichotomy of "unipolar," "multipolar," and "bipolar" which then narrows their analytical capacity (Brooks & Wohlforth 2016). China is a potentially rising superpower, and is beginning to challenge the unipolarity of the system, but it still has considerable challenges before it reaches superpower status, and analyzing those challenges is more useful than arbitrarily deciding if the system is unipolar or bipolar.

Will Asia's future follow Europe's past? There are worrying signs as China has been accelerating its defensive spending at an exponential rate (SIPRI). The fear is the promotion of a classic security dilemma; as China increases its defense spending, other states in the region will feel less secure and subsequently increase their defensive spending, which leads into a feedback loop. The literature, for the most part, assumes that events will not play out exactly to this point due to various ameliorating institutions, but the potential for a frictionous relationship in the region is still high (Liff & Ikenberry 2014). Paying homage to the fact that security is not what happens but what is perceived to happen, there is a fear that China and the United States have been, and will be, contentious with each other solely for the fact that there is a narrative that they will be in contention with each other (Pan 2014). This is not to say that a fear of China from its Asian neighbors is unfounded. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has not been the only military spending that has been increasing exponentially. The PLA navy, although still in its infancy, has been growing with China trying to deploy two aircraft carriers into their regional waters. The PLA has also deployed a series of conventional strategic ballistic missiles along its coast. These missiles are colloquially called "carrier killers" among the forces manning them and they serve a dual purpose of hitting enemy command structures and providing a credible threat to American carrier groups in the region (National institute for defense studies 2016). Among the other Asian powers, these actions look threatening; however, turning the table, it is entirely reasonable China has been pursuing this defense spending growth due to its own insecurity. Since the Obama administration pledged a "pivot to Asia" the US navy has pledged to convert sixty percent of its operating procedure into the pacific (De Castro 2016).

Except for a few holdouts, most recent scholars hold different, more optimistic predictions about the future of Asia. The argument is not just the pure peaceful relationship between the two, but that there will not be a titanic struggle to reaffirm the new world hierarchy. China, at the outset of its rise, has supported status-quo measures instead of projecting great power challenges (Johnston 2003; Beeson 2009; Schweller & Pu 2011). The United States has established itself as the premier power in East Asia through a combination of security relations and international institutions developed after World War II. This might be an argument that requires more time, but for China to rise to regional hegemonic status in the region, it should challenge the United States both economically and militarily. However, China has displayed a supporting – or at least shirking – role to the US led international order (Lee 2015). China is still gaining extreme levels of benefit from the current international order, and it would be counterproductive for it to challenge a system that has benefited it so much. Simultaneously even if China wanted to challenge the current US led system, it is still too weak to do so. The nature of great power conflict has also changed within the system. The likelihood of a direct conventional military challenge in the future is miniscule due to the self-destructive nature of nuclear warfare as well as the norms promoted by the international institutions post-World War II (Finnemore 1993).

Since the end of the cold war and the economic rise of China, there has been a trending concept among the literature about the idea of a “Two Asias.” Traditionally, security and economic prosperity are two parallel concepts in a state’s measure of success, but this Two Asias idea has thrown that on its head. Instead, as Feigenbaum and Manning (2012) eloquently writes, “In today’s Asia, economics and security ... are

almost completely in collision.” Traditionally, economic benefit translates into greater power both through economic means as well as the ability to acquire martial power (Nye 1990). There is some debate about whether power increases security with context depending on the state’s situation, but the assumption will be made in a vacuum of total consensus that an increase of economic power leads to an increase in security through the greater ability for higher levels of defense spending. However, the Two Asia’s argument asserts that in Asia, these two forces are separated, and gaining greater economic benefit through China will ultimately reduce the state's security due to the distance acquired from the United States.

John Ikenberry is the principle scholar arguing this point of view. In Ikenberry (2016) he asserts the occurrence of a dual hierarchy of security and economy, and how America and China are going to be competing at greater levels to sway the middle and minor powers of the region to their respective side. Further, he argues that these middle powers want this dual hierarchy to continue as it increases the value and resources that they can get from the competing superpowers. He further merges this argument with the influential ability of the “middle powers,” and how they combined are the third balancer to maintain the status-quo in the region. This argument of action among the middle powers needs to be expanded. Not all the powers will react in the same way. Borrowing on psychological literature, individuals become more risk averse the wealthier they become. A poorer individual will partake in more risk seeking behavior to increase his or her wealth (Kihlstrom et al 1981). Extrapolating from this assumption from humans to states, economically strong powers will act differently from the powers that are economically weak. If there is a contention between economics and security in the

region, poor states may be more risk averse to gain some form of economic benefit in exchange for less security.

There has been a long running and contentious history between the states in this region. This historical memory causes a tremendous quantity of tension between these Asian states. The historical memory, in some circumstances, is so vivid that it affects the state's security perception (Gustafsson 2014). Japan is the most iconic example of this historical memory. Before and during World War II, its imperial ambitions led it to colonize the Korean peninsula, colonize both Southeast Asia and Indochina, and humiliate China by stripping it of its rights and territory. Then during World War II, it warred with China, and instigated some of the worst human right atrocities during the war. Each of these states affected by Japan have a strong memory about these events. For example, Shin (2010) notes how South Korean students were equally as fearful of Japanese ambitions as they were of China's ambitions against Korea. This attitude has required Japan to present itself as a pacifist state with no imperial ambitions. However, this narrative has been contrasted by the state's unwillingness to acknowledge the atrocities that it committed during World War II. This historical memory plays into the perceived threat of Japan by China, and the reactionary perception of threat from Japan thereafter.

China has existed in a US dominated Asia. After World War II, the United States made the crucial decision to play an active role in the rebuilding of Japan, and the formation of an alliance network to counter both the Soviet threat, and then the Communist Chinese threat later. The United States formally created a web of allies within Asia, which will be known hereafter as the US block. This block included: Japan,

South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines. For the rest of the 20th century, America provided both security goods and economic goods to these countries; it was the sole hierarchy in the region (Ikenberry 2016).

Since Deng Xiaoping became the de facto ruler of mainland China, China's GDP has had a steady double digit growth up until the late 2010s (World Bank). Starting in 1978, and going to 2016, China has had consistent, double-digit GDP economic growth every year. In the span of thirty years, hundreds of millions of people have been lifted out of poverty, and the state is undergoing the fastest industrialization seen in history. Its growth was the single greatest contribution to global growth in world GDP, and it is the biggest exporter in the world. This growth in GDP and exportation has natural spillover effects to all the other states in the region who have piggybacked on that growth (Wong 2013). In pure economics, America has been the principal trading partner with almost every state in the region. Now, China has been supplanting America as the dominant trading partner for these states. Further, China has been willing to share some of its newfound wealth by giving "no strings attached" loans to these countries to promote economic growth as a part of its soft power Charm Offensive (Kurlantzick 2006).

One of the newest shifts in China's action towards the international system is the creation of the Asian Infrastructure investment bank (AIIB). This bank was created to provide low cost loans toward developing states to close the infrastructure gap in the region while simultaneously improving the connectivity in the region through this transportation infrastructure. The bank would give precedence towards ASEAN states, but any state willing to pay the fee towards it would be allowed to join. The bank was lauded by foreign policy experts as one of the first major challenges to the Bretton

Woods financial systems. China was placing its cards on the table as an economic world leader, and the United States saw the establishment as a direct affront to its own financial institutions (Mishra 2016). At this point, these states now have an alternative supply of economic goods to promote their national growth policies. The investing power of the AIIB does not seriously contend with the World Bank, but it signaled a break on the traditional monopoly.

The current argument now, is that Chinese economic growth is significant enough to not necessarily outweigh the benefits provided by the United States, but for it to be a viable contender in providing benefit to these countries. The problem comes from both the anticipated threat that these countries fear from China, and the threatening actions that China has already performed. Many of these US allies suffer from a historical memory with China, and it is now increasing its military capability at an accelerated rate. These countries are presented with the greater potential economic benefit by working with China, but suffer from a potential security loss from the United States if they do so. China has been actively trying to suppress this threatening image that the world is trying to paint over it. Dispelling this image was the principal motivation for their Charm Offensive. However, the success of this Charm Offensive has been variable with non-Asian states being the most convinced (Glosny 2017).

There is an opposition argument that economic integration in the region will cause a decrease in the region's insecurity (Sridharan 2014). The mechanisms for this argument follow the pathway that greater integration will cause an inter reliance of the relationships between these states that would make it too costly for conflict to occur. Second, closer economic integration will increase interactions between these powers and simplistically

allow for better relationships through repeated and systematized interactions. This argument holds support when analyzing Europe as the continent is relatively conflict free, which can partially be ascribed to the extreme level of economic integration present; however, there are some major differences between Europe and Asia that could be the deciding variable in different outcomes for the region. Europe benefits from a whole host of international institutions that increase communication between the member states which allows stable avenues of conflict resolution. Asia, for the most part, is lacking in these strong institutions that are present in Europe, and if conflict were to break out, the powers in the region have less institutional support to peacefully resolve the conflict (Moon & O'callaghan 2005). Furthermore, Europe is experiencing a relative stability in power relationships. There is no country that is growing in power relative to the other states in the region that would cause any potential conflict. In Asia, in the span of three decades, two of the three most powerful economies in the world sprang up with an external balancer in the mix, and the tension level between these powers is much higher than anything in Europe. Higher economic integration is part of the pathway to ensure greater peace, but it is not a guarantee for the absence of conflict.

Testing the alliance structure of Asia by doing a case comparison has been done in the field before. Park (2011) performed a case comparison of South Korea and the Philippines and found that each country's security needs determined who they strengthened their alliance with. De Castro (2001) in his Ph.D. dissertation performed a case comparison of Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and found that alliance management combined with external threat explained the long-lasting nature of the alliances in the region. Of all the comparisons done find that external threat is a problem

that determines alliance relationship, but no one focuses on whether economics has a noticeable effect on whether these states strengthen or alter their relationship with the United States. This is the gap within the literature.

Economic Theory of Alliances

Olson & Zeckhauser (1966) started the literature of applying economic theory to the creation and maintenance of alliances. This theory works with the assumptions that alliance assurance and security are public goods with non-excludable benefits. The original theory, known as the exploitation hypothesis, provided a formal model that showed the relationship of spending between two partners in an alliance, and how there was an imbalance between how much the most powerful partner paid towards the alliances in relations to the less powerful partner. Smaller states piggybacked off the spending of the more powerful states. The evidence for this conclusion is drawn from NATO spending, and how the United States paid the overwhelming majority for defense benefits in that security regime (Ringsmose 2009). The most important assumption of Olson and Zeckhauser is that security is a non-rivalrous good that states want and pay for. By conceptualizing security as an abstract good economic laws and theories can be applied to the analysis and applications of these goods.

The model presented in the *economic theory of alliances* was further expanded upon by multiple scholars (Sandler 1977; McGuire 1990). For example, In Sandler (1999), the model is expanded to factor in the net benefit of alliance formation and expansion in regards to the geography of the states. The model created shows how the closer geography of a threat causes the alliance member to contribute more defense towards the whole alliance. Overall, Sandler & Hartley (2001) performs a good summary

of the evolution of these models, and where they can still evolve. His two biggest critiques involve factoring in arms races of opposing alliances and applying time series analyses to capture the fluctuating demand for defense among certain states. A debate within the literature is the level at which these defensive goods are shared among the member states in the regime. They argue that the ability to share depends on the good. Certain goods only provide benefit to the producing state while others provide benefit to the entire alliance. The new model provided altered the traditional economic model by representing the utility spending of a country on the alliance as a cooperative relationship, based on each state's comparative advantage.

Hitch & McKean (1960) shows that states have different comparative advantages in regards to their defense industry. This comparative advantage then affects the nature of security derived from the defense relationship because certain goods provide general benefits to the alliance whereas others are more specific. Hartley (2006) shows the nature of the defense goods depends on the trade policy between the states in the alliance. The trade policy has a tremendous effect on the goods developed and ultimately the nature of the entire relationship. Using NATO as an example, a relationship begins to show that the free trade policy between the European members increased the specialization of production and allows for a more efficient production of defense within the regime.

Kim (2016) contends with the assumptions of these models. He argues three points. First, security is rivalrous and excludable. In other words, security should be treated as a private good instead of a public good. Second, it is assumed that alliance goods are also rivalrous. By becoming a member of one alliance, the state is losing out on the opportunity to form an alliance with another state. Last, the supply of security is not

infinite, and in fact comes with its own rules. Great powers in security relationships are only willing to supply security if it is in their interest to do so. The less valuable it is to supply security, the more it cost for the minor powers to buy into the relationship. Kim argues that this supply is affected by the polarity of the international system. Two major powers who are contending against each other are more willing to supply security to minor powers; whereas, a lone major power has no oppositional force, and will charge more for their security benefits.

This applies to the modern historical system in three separate phases. The first was during the Cold War where the United States actively provided a supply of security to counter the Soviet Union. The second phase occurred when the Soviet Union fell, and America was the lone superpower in the world. At this point, the supply for security fell as America no longer had any enemy to work against. The last phase is now involving the perceived rise of China. With another superpower potentially on the rise, the supply of security coming from America is costing less as the United States is actively trying to keep its allies in preparation from a potential new superpower.

Kim's theory further contributed to the literature by involving the idea that there are nonmilitary goods that affect the relationships between these countries. These non-military goods can be used as part of the bargaining process for security goods in a security relationship. Lastly, the value of these goods is determined by the law of supply and demand. The marginal utility of both security and non-security goods is determined by how much a state already holds. Each state has a marginal utility in wanting security which is determine by the current amount of security that the state already holds. The prices for each good is set by these forces.

The economic theory of alliances will be used to analyze the research question. Part of this analysis will involve using an internal utility exchange model. Sandler & Hartly (2001) provide a basic internal exchange utility model:

$$U^i = U^i(y^i, q^i + Q_{-i}, T)$$

Which highlights the maximum utility that a powerful or weak state can get from sharing the burden of defense. “y” represents a public good of defense; “q” represents the state’s spending on defense; Q represents the other members spending on defense; and T represents the threat. They then take this indifference curve and apply it to an alliance dyad to show the equilibrium of spending for both partners. This model shows the possibilities of modeling the utility value of security goods. The model used in this analysis looks different and ascertains its values in different ways, but this study shows the validity of applying an internal utility exchange model to the research question to highlight the relationship of security versus economy, while ascertaining generalizable assumptions afterwards.

Kim’s theory is also going to be an important tool to analyze the research question. The alliances between the states in Asia and the United States will be treated using this economic theory of alliance interpretation. Security can be classified as a rivalrous good that these states want, and they trade some form of economic benefit in exchange for these security goods. The American alliance provides security that each one of these states receives in return for goods that they provide the United States. This security comes at a cost for the American allies both in the value that they give in exchange for the security as well as other benefits that they would not otherwise receive because they are paying for the security. Oppositely, strengthening relationships with

China will lead to greater economic goods, but also cost security in lower relationships with the United States. These assumptions will be combined with an original model of internal exchange to highlight the marginal utility value of security versus economy for the economically strong Japan and the economically weak Philippines.

There are two additions that are conjoined in character that this research paper will ultimately add. The temporal security conditions of the states within the alliance as well as the economic conditions of the state. The models provided in the economic alliance literature never explicitly write about changing security relationships. They all assume that states are in alliances, and that their contributions are only predicated on their capacity to give towards the alliance. The argument provided is that states that feel less secure are more willing to either donate a greater level of their own resources into the alliance's security, or to provide a greater exchange of resources to the alliance to garner more security from their great power allies. States that experience greater levels of threat spend more on their defense (Gadea et al 2004; Nordhaus et al 2012). The second addition also considers the specific "Two Asia's" argument that security and economic structures are different in Asia, and that economic conditions affect how states play off these two different hierarchies in conjunction with the wealth of those states.

Analysis and Model Application.

Part of the analysis focuses on determining the level of effect that a state's economic condition plays in that state's decision between the two powers. To highlight the theoretical relationship between economic conditions and how those conditions contend with threat to alter state behavior, a formal internal utility exchange model will

be constructed. This formal model will allow for a deductive insight into the research question by presenting a simplified picture of the real world (Lave & March 1975).

An internal exchange utility model is predicated by the conditions and context by which each resource is considered valuable. An entity's utility is based on the conditions that determine the resources it has and more importantly the resources it does not have. There are two component parts that create a model of internal exchange. The first part is the budget constraint equation. This equation shows the marginal utility value of the two contrasting goods to the entity in question, while also showing the maximum amount of currency that the entity can spend on buying both. Simplistically, the entity values two goods differently, and it has a finite amount of currency to spend on a combination of those two goods.

The second component part of the model is the indifference model equation. This equation shows a specific utility, and all the possible combinations between the two items that equal the specific utility. The entity is indifferent to all combinations on the curve because it gains the same utility from any combination of the goods. When putting these two equations together, the budget constraint shows the possible combinations that the entity could buy with the currency it has, while the indifference curve, when it is tangential to the budget constraint line, shows the best possible combination with the currency available. For this analysis, the most important result is the steepness of the indifference curve. The shallower the curve for the good's respective axis, the more valuable that good is in relation to the other good.

The Two Asia's argument relies on the assumption that there is a difference between security and economy; that states must choose between one against the other on

a sliding scale between their great power relationships. There are different times for both Japan and the Philippines that shows their different level of security perception based on the actions of China. This threat perception changes the value of the security and economic goods that changes the indifference curve to highlight the marginal utility value of these goods. The indifference curve shows the point at which the entity received equal value based off the diminishing marginal returns for both goods. The steeper the curve for one of the utilities means the less valuable that resource is in relation to the resources already acquired.

The slope of this curve changes in relation to external circumstances, and the value of these circumstances needs to be determined in a reliable way. To keep the reliability of the original exchange model consistent, another model was developed to highlight the level of security that a state holds. The value for this equation will detail the level of perceived security that a state has, which will then be used to find the insecurity to prescribe value to additional good increases. This model will be applied to the budget restraint equation to determine the maximum utility that a state derives from security goods. The model involves the analysis of the ratio of force projection capabilities that both it and the oppositional state has. Then this value will be subsequently multiplied by the perceived intent of the original country. It is important to note that this equation represents the perceived level of security, not the actual level of security. The model presents itself as:

$$(1). S_i = \left(\frac{F_i + F_u}{F_j + F_z} \right) \cdot I_{ji}, 0 > I_{ji} > 1$$

For this equation S_i is representative of the perceived security of the state “i.” The F variable is a representation of military force projection capabilities of the state labeled in the subscript. The variables in the numerator within the parenthesis is a representation of the state being studied in addition to the combined force projection powers of that state’s alliance. The variables within the denominator represent the force projection capabilities of the threatening state and the composite force projection capabilities of other threats in the immediate region. Combined, the value derived within the parenthesis shows the ratio of force projection capabilities between the two states.

The variable I in equation 1 represents the perceived intent of state “j” towards state “i”. This variable is counted on a range of 0 to 1 with 1 indicating an intent of total benevolence in regards to its force capability against country “i”, and 0 representing a total and immediate perceived intent to use force against country “i”. This value is included within the model to highlight how the perceived intent of a state to use its military alters the threat perception from that state. This variable is included on the basis that threat perceived from the amount of military power is interacted on the likelihood that a state is willing to use that power. Weaker states that show a greater perceived willingness to use their power will cause more insecurity than states with greater levels of power coupled with benign intentions. Once the force projection ratio has been calculated and multiplied by the intent variable, a value between 0 and 1 will be acquired that represents the broad perceived security of the state. 0 represents total insecurity, while 1 represents total security.

The value of security goods is determined by the quantity of goods that a state holds contrasted with the demand of those goods. By working with the assumption that

all states want perfect security, the insecurity variable labeled IS, is attained by subtracting the value of security by 1.

$$(2). IS_i = 1 - S_i$$

Once the insecurity value is obtained, that will then be applied to the budget restraint model in equation 5. This lack of security is what predicates the value of a security variable as states want universal maximum security.

An internal exchange model with an indifference curve demands two goods that an actor must choose from, and the second one in this model is economic need. This variable will use the Human Development Index (HDI) which is an established model that rates a state's life expectancy, education, and GDP per capita to create a scale between zero and one that rates the overall development of a state with a higher value equaling more development. In this model, 0 represents the total void of humanity, and 1 represents a perfect Utopia. The HDI is the scale that both the UN and the IMF apply to analyze the development level of a state. To accurately quantify the need for greater levels of economy, the economic need equation will be represented as:

$$(3). EN_i = 1 - HDI_i$$

This equation will be used to denote the intensity of the economic need of a state. The higher the value of EN_i indicates the hypothetical level that a country can grow in development, as well as how valuable an additional unit increase of economic goods is.

Once these values are derived, they can be applied to the internal exchange model. Which consists of two parts: the budget constraint equation and the indifference curve equation. These equations are represented respectively as

$$(4). (EN_i)x + (IS_i)y = BR$$

$$(5). U_i = U_i(EN_i, IS_i)$$

The budget restraint model is represented by equation 4. This model takes the two values derived from equation 3 and 2, and attaches them to each variable. BR represents the amount of “spending points” that each country holds. Within the equation, each entity has a limited amount of currency for which they can spend for the two goods available.

The actual amount of this spending points for this research is arbitrary for two reasons. First, the economic and security goods that this model portrays are too abstract to have any real meaning. Second, the amount of spending alters the optimal combination of goods, but it does not affect the curvature of the indifference curve, which is the focus of this model.

Higher values for either EN or IS represents a greater need for economics or security, and thus dictate that the marginal utility for each of these curves. Within the graphical representation, the steepness of the curve indicates the value of one good to another. If the curve is shallow for the specific good’s axis, then that shows the higher value of the good. For example, if the curve is more shallow for security, it shows that the state is willing to trade more units of economic goods for just one unit of security goods. The steeper the curve for the specific good, the more valuable the opposing good is. Almost all the variables through the various models are relatively stable over a combination of years. The force projection capabilities and the economic conditions of a state can change, but that change is gradual, and it almost always happens over years or decades. Thus, the only variable that has the capacity to change at a moment’s notice is the intent variable in equation 1. The perception of intention can change within a day. For example, China has spent years promoting itself as having harmonious intent on a

peaceful rise, but this image can be challenged immediately when they use military force to bully a neighboring minor power. The intent represents this capacity for perceptions to change suddenly, and the tremendous effect that has on a state's insecurity.

On an aggregate, this model portrays the value of economic and security goods in relation to threat, economic need, and intention. When values are inserted into the model, the difference in value between poor states and rich states should be immediately shown, as poor states will value economic goods higher than rich states in the presence of equal threat. Once these initial relationships are established, the model will portray how this value is altered on the more volatile intent variable. The change in this variable will highlight the extremes for both poor and rich states. At the lowest values of intent, rich and poor states should value security goods over economic goods; however, at the highest values of intent, rich states will still value security goods over economic goods while poor states will value economic goods over security goods.

Model Application Example

Formal models are an exercise in theoretical deduction that highlight potential relationships based off the variables included in the model. The model constructed highlights a relationship for state's demand for security goods based off its insecurity and the contrast in its economic need. A graphical representation will be shown to highlight how the interaction of these variables alters the preferences of the states. To provide an example of this model, values will be attributed to the two proposed cases which differ on their economic strength as well as their potential security threats. Applying this model should indicate how a state's economic conditions affects its demand for security and economic goods.

The values for the two cases will be used as examples to provide a representation of how alterations to these variables changes utility value of the opposing goods to these states. To provide initial consistency for the values within the equation, the Correlates of War Composite National Capability Index will be used to input values for the force projection variable. The Composite Capability variable is an aggregate of each state's military personnel data, expenditure, iron and steel production, energy consumption, and total population. It is developed to represent the total capacity for a state to make war. This does not necessarily capture the concept of force projection, but in the absence of a consistent measure of force projection, this value will suffice.

For the application of this model, subscript "i" will represent both cases. The model will be applied to Japan and the Philippines over different episodes in their timeline. Subscript "j" will represent China. Subscript "u" will represent the United States and other security allies within Asia. Subscript "z" will represent any other composite threat that is presented to either of the cases in the region by other powers. Thus, the composite abilities of the United States, the US block, and the current case will be added together, and then divided by the capabilities of China and any other potentially threatening state in the region. This will represent the force projection capabilities of the US alliance, and the perceived oppositional military forces that China can present against it. Once this is calculated, the economic need of each case will be determined through the HDI of each country for their respective time periods. These values will be inserted into the budget restraint model, which will then highlight how the two cases value economic and security goods.

The last important value to consider is the intent variable. The intent variable can immediately change after the occurrence of a threatening event or action. The quick changing nature of this variable can alter the cases' utility value for the two competing goods almost instantaneously. With the other two variables from the model only changing at a gradual pace, the intent variable will provide the greatest level of variance within the model, and the change in the intent will have different effects of the evaluation of one good over the other. More importantly, the change of the intent variable will highlight how poor and rich countries evaluate the value of economic and security goods differently under different conditions of threat.

Running the values of the two cases through the equation presents a graph that shows insightful results which represents how these two differing countries value security and economy over time. Figure 1 is a representation of Japan in the year 2000. During this period, China's military capabilities are still growing, but it has not turned any heads yet. Further, to use Deng Xiaoping's phrase, the foreign policy of the country still followed the phrase of "biding one's time." The threat from North Korea was also slightly cooling down because of the efforts of South Korea in the Sunshine policy, and at this point it had not yet developed atomic weaponry or ICBM capabilities. Thus, the equivalent value of Japan's security and economic goods are roughly equal with security goods being only slightly more valued. Figure 2 represents Japan in 2013. This Figure represents the change in value of the two goods when China has been exponentially expanded its military while also projecting a threatening posture towards Japan. China at this point has been actively confrontational towards Japan regarding the issue of the Senkaku Islands. North Korea has actively tested multiple atomic weapons, and is in the

process of developing ICBM technologies. In this stage, security is tremendously more valuable to Japan than economic gains. At this point in the graph, Japan is willing to trade a tremendous number of economic goods for a single unit increase in its security goods. This correlates with the real world as Japan has maintained the strength of its alliance with the United States since 2013. Figure 3 combines both graphs and shows the difference in the optimal combination while also highlighting the different indifferent curves per each situation. The change in force projection capabilities dovetailed with the more threatening intent resulted in the change of these two goods' value.

Figure 4 shows the Philippines in the year 2000. Again, at this point, China had not been actively projecting its military force within the region, and thus the Philippines held comparatively less security fears from it. This representative as the graph shows that economy is more valuable than security for the state. This value only slightly changes by 2012. In Figure 5 the need for security has gone up only slightly, but the economic need of the Philippines has stayed relatively consistent. The curve changes in figure 6 right after the Scarborough Shoal incident. Security goods become more valuable than economic goods, but the ratio of value between the two goods is slight. It would only take a small difference in the combinations to produce an exorbitant ratio of goods in exchange for the other. Again, this correlates with the state at the time. It has security issues and it was willing to strengthen its relationship with the United states, but its relative poverty means that economic goods are still important. With a small change of intent, economic goods become more valuable, and therefore they are willing to go back and work with China. This is the opposite result for Japan. A positive change of the intent variable does little to change the utility that it gains from increasing economics.

Models are simplistic representations of the real world. They are constructed to simplify phenomena that occur within the world. This model ultimately represents a relationship between rich and poor states, and how they interact to greater levels of threat. Economic conditions matter when determining how non-great powers react towards two oppositional hierarchies. When states feel threatened, they strengthen their relationship with their Security ally, but when that threat partially subsides, the weaker economy of the Philippines values economic goods more highly, while Japan maintains the security over economic goods relationship. Through the examples provided by this model, the effects of economic conditions are highlighted in the in the relationship and decision that these powers have between the two contrasting forces. The next step is providing support for this model by looking at the events in the real world through a comparison of the two cases.

Research Methods

Mixed Methods

How do middle and minor powers react towards the shift of great powers in East Asia? Does the economic strength of a country affect the decision that country makes between two oppositional great powers? Will the economic conditions of Japan and the Philippines affect how these two countries decide between strengthening their relationship with China or the United States? These are the research questions that this research project will try to answer.

First, the question requires an initial population to be studied. The problem is there is a small initial population for this research question. On one aspect, in a more

abstract sense, the research question addresses the courting of non-major powers into alliance relationships with the current great powers. On another aspect, the question involves the decision of states to choose between their economic interests and their security interests. Both aspects combine to present the situation in Asia. This situation in Asia has provided one of the clearest cut examples of the economic and security benefits for a state being so perpendicular to each other. Therefore, studying these Asian-American allies are the best modern examples to study how states react to opposing great powers and the utility that each one provides. Thus, to test the theory, I am going to perform qualitative analysis using a Mill's Most Similar System's Design with a critical paired comparison between Japan and the Philippines to provide support for the relationship shown in the formal model. The hypotheses are:

H₁: The economic conditions of a state affect the level of maintenance that the state invests in its alliance.

H₂: In the presence of threat, both a rich state and a poor state will strengthen its relationship with its military ally.

H₃: In the absence of threat, a rich state will maintain its relationship with its military ally.

H_{3a}: In the absence of threat, a poor state will strengthen its relationship with the economic power at the expense of its military ally.

With the number of observations possible, a large-N study using statistical hypothesis testing would be inappropriate. A small-N comparative case study will

provide an internally valid insight into identifying and understanding this process as well as the variables that drive it (George & Bennett 2005). Thus, for this research project, two cases will be chosen within the population in accordance to the variance of the independent variable. The two cases chosen are Japan and the Philippines.

Small-N comparative case studies have the endemic problem of selection bias. It is the flaw that always works against the qualitative researcher. That the researcher “picks cases to prove a hypothesis rather than to test one.” The formal model does ameliorate this problem slightly. These two states were chosen to fit the relationship highlighted within the formal model. Poor states act differently from rich states, and Japan is rich while the Philippines is poor. By evaluating the actions of these states in relations to their alliance with the United States and their economic relationship with China, it can be discerned whether there is evidence for economic conditions affecting alliance maintenance. The hopeful conclusion of this research project is to show how economic status of a state affects the relationship of its allies especially when there is an opposing power providing some level of economic benefit.

Japan and the Philippines will be analyzed using process tracing measures which will look at specific points in the timeline of the two cases to capture the decision change the cases make in their relationship between the two hierarchies. The two cases will then be compared by the difference of their actions throughout their timelines. This qualitative critical case comparison will provide support for the relationship detailed in the model by providing insight into how these non-major powers react towards oppositional forces that confront them in their interstate relationships.

Case Studies

Justifications

The selection process for the two cases involved multiple steps. The potential population for this research equation was initially restricted to states within the region of the Asia-Pacific excluding China. This decision was made to adequately capture the states fully exposed to the Two Asia's dual hierarchy. The population was further restricted to those states that have an official military alliance with the United States. This was to ensure that the cases officially received their security benefits from the United States and not from some other source. Within this population, the cases would be chosen based of their variance on the main independent variable.

Japan and the Philippines were chosen based off the variance in their economic conditions within the population of interest. Per the World Bank, Japan's GDP per capita is \$34,523 and the Philippine's is \$2,904. In the rankings, Japan is shown as 27th and the Philippines as 117th in relation to the rest of the world. These countries' overall GDP are \$16.7 trillion and \$292 billion respectively. In terms of ranking of GDP Japan is 3rd, and the Philippines is the 38th. The discrepancy between these two is the difference between a developed and a developing economy, and this alteration in economic capability versus the relative stability in security presents an acceptable test to show how economics affects the decisions of non-great powers to choose their allies per the Two Asias Theory.

In addition, they both hold a host of similar variables constant, which allows for a greater ability to isolate the causal variables to identify this alliance maintenance process. Both the Philippines and Japan are in approximately the same region. Both are island states, with roughly the same population. The Philippines has a population of 100 million,

and Japan has a population of 120 million. Their cultures are not shared, but they are more similar to each other than to western culture. They are both allies of the United States and have been so for more than 50 years. Japan is a fully established and mature democracy, and the Philippines officially became a democracy in 1992 with the election of President Ramos. Additionally, both states have had some form of anti-American domestic protest within their recent history.

Both states have, at one point in their history, been occupied by the United States. However, this occupation has presented itself in different forms. The Philippines was a colony of the United States from 1898 to 1946, but Japan was occupied by American military forces from 1945 to 1952 after a scorched earth military bombing campaign. Long term colonial occupations produce different moods and feelings within the population than heavily damaging military bombing campaigns; however, there is still a similarity that both states lost their sovereignty for a period of time to the United States.

In relation to the research question, each state has had a contentious altercation with China over disputed territory. The Philippines has had a continuous six-year fight for a host of island chains in the South China Sea including the landmass of the Scarborough Shoal. The Japanese had the contest of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. These disputes are not identical as Japan has the capacity to challenge China militarily, and the Philippines does not; however, in both cases, China has used military force to try and assert its authority on the subject. Furthermore, both territorial disputes have not been resolved. The Senkaku/Diaoyu island debate has cooled off, but both states have not made any indication that they relinquish their control over the islands. For the

Scarborough Shoal, there has been a maritime court ruling in favor of the Philippines, but China is not recognizing the decision, and is still asserting its authority over the region.

Philippines

America's history with the Philippines goes back to 1898 when it defeated Spain in the Spanish American War. America maintain administrative control over the country and established the traditional ties of a colonizer to the country and the population. The Japanese occupied it during World War II, and performed a list of war crimes against the population and the soldiers who were unable to escape. Their occupation did not last long as America took it back by the end of the war. After World War II, the United States formed an alliance with the Philippines at the initial bequest from the Philippine government. The Quirino administration was a United States upheld government getting up to half of its state revenue from American foreign aid. The government also had to deal with the HUKs, a left over communist insurgency from World War II that began to pursue their goals of turning the Philippines into a communist state. Thus, the Filipino government actively worked to court the United States' support at a discounted rate (Goodwin 1997). It was not until the fall of China to the communists that America realized the necessity of ensuring its allies in the region to propel its anti-communist agenda. The official alliance was signed in 1951.

Like NATO, the military commitments between the United States and its allies in Asia survived the cold war. The Soviet Union fell, and everyone looked to America to see how they were going to act. NATO survived the fall of the Soviet Union, and Like NATO, the Philippines alliance also stayed after the original goal for its formation was

no longer relevant. From 1992 to 1998 the Philippines was controlled by the Ramos administration. This administration took part in the great uncertainty after the conclusion of the Cold War. The Soviet Union no longer existed. Vietnam and China were still technically communist, but Vietnam had no power projection outside of its own borders, and China had already implemented capitalist reforms for more than a decade that transformed it from a communist to a quasi-capitalist state. In this decade, the intensity of the relationship between the America and the Philippines cooled. America no longer had the “evil empire” to contend against, and therefore was more focused on domestic politics. The Philippines no longer had an overly powerful ally willing to give anything to fight against a foreign threat. The Philippine government just assumed that the American military bases were always going to stay because they existed before the Soviet Union even existed; however, there was a growing nationalist anti-American sentiment brewing in the Philippines that wanted the bases gone (De Castro 2001). This combined with the devaluation of security in Asia led to the eventual closure of the military base in the Subic Bay (Sanger 1991).

In 1995, for the first time, China began to claim its territorial right in the South China Sea. The claim originated in the Mischief Reef within the Spratly Island chain (Dutton 2011). The Mischief Reef is one of the various islands within the South China Sea that has multiple claimants of sovereignty. The initial altercation was a relatively low tension affair that was quickly mitigated by Jiang Zemin and the Ramos administration; however, it signaled the first time that China was willing to enforce its will onto lesser powers over territorial disputes. Directly after this event, The Ramos administration

started initiating more talks with the United States, and started receiving loans of military naval vessels (De Castro 2001).

In 1997, the East Asian Financial Crisis rocked the entire region. When the economic reverberations hit the Philippines, the country was also simultaneously hit by an El Niño storm. In comparative damage, the Philippines got it off easily when the effects of the crisis are evaluated among other affected states. The biggest indicator of economic weakness that resulted from the crisis was an increase in poverty, which was caused by a combination of higher unemployment from the crisis and the destruction of agriculture from the El Niño storm (Khandker & Philippine Institute for Developmental Studies & The World Bank Institute 2002). The important part about the financial crisis is not necessarily the actual effects of the crisis but the perception and reactions to the crisis. During its peak, this economic downturn spread throughout the entire region, and there was speculation that the effects would spread throughout the world and cause a global recession. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) intervened throughout the region giving massive economic loans on the condition of greater economic liberalization (Um, Lim, and Hwang 2014). These loans received a backlash in the receiving countries. They were criticized for being a new form of imperialism as the IMF only gave the loans if their suggestions for a more liberal economy was passed into law. At this point, China was also affected in part by the crisis, and it could not project the economic power it has today; however, this moment is important because it highlights the mistrust that came from these countries about American economic institutions.

In 1999, more than a decade after the amendment to the constitution, the mood of the Philippine legislature shifted and a new military aid deal from America was presented

to the Filipino government; President Estrada, who originally voted against the policy for increasing the number of troops being stationed into the country in the first place, passed it to the senate who then subsequently passed the deal. Even though this came just two years after the Asian Financial crises, this decision was a result of the start of Chinese pressure in the Spratly Islands in 1995 in addition to the 1998 resurgence of the Moro insurgency. However, this new military deal does not shift the Philippines away from more potential relationships with China. It only represents their slight increase in need for more defense.

In 2001, after the September eleventh terrorist attack, the Philippines was one of the first states to join America's global war on terrorism. The Philippine government allowed the United States to post their special forces inside of the country, and to work together with the Philippine armed forces to counter the Islamic threat on the southern island Mindanao (De Castro 2016). Both states received equally beneficial terms from the deal. The American government got a science lab to test the efficacy of its counterinsurgency forces by subduing and preventing a possible terrorist cell from grow inside the country, and it got to increase the alliance strength after the waning of the relationship in the early 1990s. The Philippines received the benefits of working with the US military and gaining surplus equipment and training for their armed forces, while also receiving help from the US special forces in the three separate insurgent groups that were fighting against the government at the time. By 2002, America was providing 50 million dollars per year for military assistance (Simon 2013a).

The Philippines made an additional measured appearance of solidarity after September eleven. They sent a noncombatant, humanitarian aid group to Iraq upon the

request from America in the volunteer coalition. The force was predominantly medical, and worked to provide support to civilians behind the front lines. The force was withdrawn by the Philippine government after a member of the force was kidnapped. The insurgent group demanded that the Philippine government leave Iraq in exchange for the man's life. There was a measured debate in the Philippines, but President Arroyo ultimately decided to withdraw the forces. This withdrawal was done against the behest of the US government, and it caused a small rift between the two countries. Almost immediately afterwards, president Arroyo set up a meeting with Hu Jintao to promote greater levels of cooperation (De Castro 2016).

The mid 2000s was the greatest time of cooperation between the Philippines and China. At the time, China was using Nye's soft power approach and trying to garner international friendships across the globe. In 2004, China received a visit from the Arroyo administration and both states established a strategic partnership in the same year. This agreement included putting aside the South China Sea dispute and instead cooperating on a joint exploration of marine resources, with a joint signature of the Philippines National Oil Company and the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company to perform joint seismic studies (Zhao 2012). Earlier, China increased its cooperation with the ASEAN states signing a China-ASEAN free trade agreement in 2002. It was looking for supporters to be signatories for the trade agreement, and it was actively providing benefits to the various ASEAN member states to get it passed. Part of this effort was the proposed benefits of greater levels of integration in the region while also providing economic support to both partners in the agreement. The agreement was eventually passed and was implemented in 2010.

During the election of President Aquino, there was an extended dialogue on both sides over the views of America and China in relation to the Philippines. Despite America being a long time military ally of the Philippines, there was a prevailing mood among both members that the United States was feeding its table scraps to the Philippines without offering any true support to propel past its economic challenges. Further, the view of America in contrast with China showed that there was an equal level of dissatisfaction. The belief was that they were both bullies in their own respective ways (Hayton 2014, p.163). There was a growing national sentiment that the political elite of the Philippines had sold their country to the United States for personal profit and political power. This narrative seemed to be that of a highly political sub-group of the population inside the Philippines that was in opposition the current regime because Pew Research Center (2014) found that Filipinos were the most pro-American population in the world. This popular opinion is then further contrasted with the policy makers in the Philippines. The United States is an important ally, but there is a cynicism of Manila's importance in relation to Beijing. China's relationship is more important to America than Manila's. Their question boils down to, "if there is a conflict between China and the Philippines, will America really side with the less valuable Manila?" Between these two attitudes, there is a duality of support for America as a country, but there is a realization of the realism of American geo-strategic interests in the region and how it values the Philippines for those interests. The Philippines is only so valuable to Washington, and the Filipino policy makers understand this.

With China's growing power, the state has been actively working to reassert control over territory lost. During the Century of Humiliation, which took place roughly

between the first Opium War in 1849 and the Chinese Communist Party's win over the nationalist in 1949, China was the victim of just about every major power exploiting it through unfair trade treaties and forceful territorial acquisitions. The British, the Portuguese, the Soviets, the Americans, and the Japanese all profited at the expense of China. As the CCP gained more power, it went looking to regain its lost territories. These territorial disputes began with China's geographic neighbors. China's claims moved outward when it started developing its maritime power (Dutton 2011).

For most of these disputes, China has used a long and historic legacy to reclaim these lost territories. There are Islands in the South China Sea that the Chinese empire has historically ruled over. It claims to have the historical legacy over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands as well as the Spratly Islands. The myriad of islands that constitute the Spratly Islands are claimed by multiple powers. These include China, Taiwan, Vietnam, France, the Philippines, and India. The Chinese claim originates from an ancient Chinese document that highlights that there were islands under the control of the Chinese Empire, but it falls to controversy as there is a discrepancy to whether the map referred to the specific Spratly Islands, or another chain in the Pacific (Erickson 2016). The first United Nations conference on the Law of the Sea was held in 1958. When this convention was held when Taiwan, not mainland China, was the representative of China in the United Nations. Even though the third round was held in 1982 when the People's Republic of China represented China in the UN, this is still an excuse for China to discount the law as illegitimate (Eastin 2013). This further highlights why it has been artificially creating islands in the South China Sea. Despite the legitimacy of these islands being recently

struck down in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, China boycotts the decision based on this fact, while it still holds a de facto control over eighty percent of the Spratly Islands.

The Scarborough Shoal is a small shoal within the South China sea that is 200 kilometers west of the Philippines. Including the lagoon, it has an area of 150 kilometers squared, and resides about 6 feet above sea level on high tide. The area around the shoal is home to fishing operations traditionally conducted by Filipino fisherman. In addition, the Shoal is also used both by Filipino Scientists for oceanographic purposes and as a lane for shipping travel. For most of the latter half of the 20th century, the Scarborough Shoal has been under control of the Philippines.

Starting in 1997 and intermittently thereafter, China has used its warships to prevent Philippine Fisherman from using the waters that the Scarborough Shoal would normally allow. The Philippines barely has any navy to speak of, and they do not have one that could potentially stand up to the People's Liberation Army navy. For their protection, they receive a part of their security from American naval forces in the area; however, these American naval forces refuse to directly confront the Chinese military vessels so to not provoke a war. The debate on who controls the Shoal will continue for the next few decades, and is part of a bigger struggle between China, and the other minor powers in the region over who controls the greater Spratly Islands chain.

On April 8, 2009, China officially asserted its sovereignty over much of the disputed territory in the South China Sea. 2012 was home to the intense standoff over the Scarborough Shoal that lasted for nearly two months (CNN 2012). On multiple attempts, the Philippines tried to send fishing vessels into the region, and the Chinese repeatedly repelled them. These actions continued even after strong condemnation from both the

United States and Japan. In reaction to these condemnations, as a direct response, a wargame exercise between America and the Philippines that included a mock naval invasion of China was expedited and carried out on April 16, five days later (Whaley 2012). The standoff slowly diffused as President Aquino ordered the Philippine coast guard to withdraw, while the Chinese administration did the same. No one relinquished sovereignty over the islands in the exchange, and China started planting people and resources in the area to promote its legal claim of sovereignty. Directly afterwards, the President Aquino in his new administration requested military assistance from the United States, which it gladly granted (De Castro 2014). This increased military assistance fit the Obama administration's agenda to strengthen their diplomatic relations in Asia for the Pivot to Asia.

In 2013, the Philippines responded by involving the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to settle the dispute. This tribunal stems its authority from the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and settles disputes between states based off those provisions. The Philippines challenged China with the position that they exercised sovereignty in the exclusive economic zone, while China counters that it had historical control over the area through its infamous "nine dash line" map. China announced that it would not participate in the convention. On 2016, the tribunal ruled that China has no historical right to claim the contested islands, and that the Philippines has legitimate sovereignty over the region. Further, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that China cannot exert its influence over these islands through a historical basis (PCA 2016). The Chinese government has rejected this decision and still projects a military presence in the region.

One of the indications for an oppositional shift of the Philippines back in the favor of China revolves around the choice for it joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The Philippines was one of the founding members of the bank signing on in 2014 just two years after the Scarborough Shoal standoff. Additionally, this action went directly against the wishes of America (Mishra 2016). The Philippines was the rule rather than the exception, as nearly every state in the region signed on to the bank as members. The total as of 2017 is 57 members across all five continents. The only two countries that were invited that currently have no intention of joining are the United States and Japan. The Philippines joined, as with most other countries, because there was no inherent downside to do so. Money is money, and the more money that the state can get to boost its economic potential without any apparent downside is too beneficial of an opportunity to reject. The Philippines may understand why the United States is antagonistic towards the bank, but its alliance partner lamenting a challenge to its international order -- which has a negative reputation in Asia from the financial crisis -- is not a good enough reason to not join.

The newly elected president of the Philippines Rodrigo Duterte has signaled an additional shift in relations with the Philippines and both China and the United States. Upon election, Duterte has reversed the countries strengthening of US relations that began at the beginning of the decade. This correlates with the issues that are more salient in domestic Philippines politics. The country has been dealing with domestic instability, corruption, poverty, unemployment, and organized crime, and Duterte was elected as a response to these problems. As it seems now, money will help support a solution to these

problems, and China is letting on that they are willing to give the Philippines more and more, while the United States offers criticisms of the Duterte administration.

Manila has been trying to collect investments from any entity willing to give them money. President Duterte has motioned to kick out the U.S. Marines in the southern region of the Philippines. At first, this seems like a shift away from the United States, but this is not the first time there has been a call against the US military presence in the country. In 1987, the Philippine government enacted an amendment to their constitution which required the permission from the Philippine senate to allow foreign military troops inside its sovereign borders (Park 2011). Duterte originally wanted the counter terrorist troops out of Mindanao, and further he has stated his want to remove all American troops out by a two-year time table (Denyer 2016). However, Duterte has not followed the timeline to implement these demands. In all likelihood, these public displays of independence from America correlate with Duterte's attempted diplomacy with Beijing. Through initial negotiations, China has shown its willingness to share access to the Spratly Islands with the Philippines, and they have been buying the right to do so. As an example, in October 2016, China signed a deal providing 13.5 billion dollars' worth of loans to the Philippines, with another 6 billion in march 2017 (Dumlao-Abadilla & Daxim, 2016; Huang 2017). Preliminary numbers for 2017 show that China will become the Philippines number one trading partner (Remitio 2017). With the somewhat rocky relationship between Duterte and Obama, and the unknown of President Trump, the Philippines seems like it is cashing in on the maximum benefit it can gain from China.

President Duterte said it best when he proclaimed "We cannot go to war because we cannot afford it" (Reuters 2017). This highlights the main problem that is presented to

the Philippines. It is a poor country, and its domestic issues, and specifically its economy, are its chief concern. Throughout its timeline, anytime China started aggressively asserting control over Philippine territory, the country strengthened its relationship with America. When China cooled off and started looking more benign, Manila relaxed and started initiating talks to gain closer support from China. In the late 2000s, the Philippines starts working closer with China, until the infamous standoff that causes Manila to fall in with Washington. The standoff cools down, and the Philippines works with China and their bank by taking billion dollar loans while also kicking out American soldiers. Now with the ruling of the ITLOS, and China asserting its claims in the South China Sea again, there should be another resurgence of Manila-Washington relations at the expense of the Chinese.

This variation in moods between the two powers in such a short time highlights the inconsistent nature of the Philippines and the path it tries to take. It is more than willing to work with America on promoting the defense of the state while simultaneously working with China to develop its economy. As an important note, the Philippines does not necessarily hold a positive view of China and its economic incentives. It does not have split personality disorder in positive view ship of these two powers. Instead, it holds an opportunistic attitude. It feels uneasy making deals with China to potentially improve its own domestic situation (Hongfang 2006). To a point, the Philippines is not wholly invested in one partner or the other, but views its relationship between the two in a more pessimistic light. In a sense, if China is willing to offer what seems like no strings attached loans, the Philippines will cautiously take it. Conversely, it has a longer relationship with the United States, and feels more confident in security or economic

benefits provided by the United States, but it is not blindsided with love towards America either.

Japan

Japan's relationship with America is opposite to that of the Philippines. It has maintained itself as a consistent alliance partner to the United States, and has had one of the longest running positive relationships with America since the end of World War II. This alliance relationship was not voluntary for Japan at first, but after the country regained its sovereignty in 1952, the value for Japan in staying in its relationship with the United States was more beneficial than rocking the boat. The United States made the same conclusion after the Chinese Communist Party won the Chinese civil war, and kicked the nationalist to Taiwan. Japan became the cornerstone of America's anti-communist efforts in East Asia. The United States invested an unprecedented level of funds into the Japanese economy to help it recover from the trauma of World War II, and created a strong ally to counter the new communist threat in Asia.

Throughout the formative years after World War II, Japan was a demilitarized state. Article 9 of its constitution specifies that Japan cannot maintain an offensive military. After the United States officially returned sovereignty back to the country, Japan was forced to not have a military. However, due to America's commitment to the region as a military ally against the communist threat, America became more lenient about Japan's military, and promoted them having a "defensive military force." Japan also had the benefit of increased security from America as they were placed right in the center of America's security umbrella in the region. The lion's share of American military installments is shared between Japan and South Korea with the biggest base being held

by Japan. The Japanese routinely perform joint military exercises with the American Navy, and Japanese admirals have taken overall command of the joint allied forces during these exercises.

Japan's economy was the spearhead of the Asian Miracle. This miracle consisted of countries who experienced tremendous and consistent economic growth without an increase in wealth inequality that normally goes hand in hand. Japan, along with the four tigers of Asia, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, all went from poor, developing states to extraordinarily wealthy in the span of two or three decades. In 1988, the GDP of Japan surpassed the GDP of the Soviet Union. The growth was so phenomenal that it spawned temporary fears in the United States that Japan was going to become the next superpower that America would have to contend with. This growth stayed consistent until the Asian Financial crises of 1997, which rocked Japan's boat, but the boat did not sink. After the crisis, Japan's economy grew at a stagnated rate, but it was still the second biggest economy in the world up until 2010 when it was surpassed by China. However, Japan is still a tremendous economic powerhouse that has an enormous effect on a regional and international level economics.

Overall, the Japanese have benefited from the combination of a deep and extended military alliance with the greatest military power in the world for more than half a century. The country also experienced one of the biggest, fastest, and most equal economic growth episodes in the history of the world. The alliance between Japan and America experienced a deep management that extended through the cold war and afterwards as well. The alliance was consistently strengthened by measures from both the

United States and Japan, as well as the threatening nature of the Soviet Union and communist China.

When the Cold War ended the alliance between Japan and the United States remained in full force. The alliance relationship benefited from a renewed regional threat in North Korea, which started heavily building up its defense infrastructure after the fall of the Soviet Union. The threat from North Korea multiplied when it was discovered that they were building a capacity to make atomic weaponry. From the Soviet Union, to China and North Korea, the alliance between Japan and America has always had an external threat to cement itself. These threats have only developed further from the failure of South Korea's sunshine policy (in part due to the Bush Administration), as well as China's growing military presence.

This condition ultimately predicated both how Japan will react to China's growing influence, and America's supply of stable security as well as how it values one utility over the other. The Liberal Democratic Party has kept an iron grip on the Japanese Parliament (the Diet) since the government's formation. This was the party that directed the domestic policy of the Japanese government which contributed to the Asian miracle. This party has always had a traditional pro-American foreign policy that it has routinely promoted within the government. Combine that with the fact that it only lost the majority in the Diet during the period of 1993-1994 and the period of 2008-2012, and the alliance with America has remained continuous throughout the government's history.

The relationship between Japan and its neighbors is complicated. The relationships have deep wounds that never fully healed right, and when the history of its actions in the region are brought into the public dialogue, it strikes a nerve for the other

states in the region. Japan's actions as an imperial power has left a long and lasting memory, with special attention paid to their actions during World War II. The Japanese imperial forces committed war crimes in all its occupied territories. They performed mass killings with extra lethal violence, enforced thousands of women into prostitution for the army, and conducted horrific and unnecessary scientific experiments on live human beings. Unlike the Germans after the war, the Japanese never fully atoned for their actions. In 1972 the Japanese and Chinese agreed to a deal which would have the Japanese government recognize the People's Republic of China as the legitimate representation of China, while also allowing the Chinese to trade with Japan in exchange for dropping the charges of crimes against humanity.

This recognition deal that the Japanese made with China resulted in the Japanese never officially apologizing for their actions in World War II (Zhao 2016). This historical wound keeps re-opening because the Japanese both refuse to apologize or take legal responsibility for their crimes, and it also fails to teach of its actions in its public-school system (Lind 2009). The recurrent textbook controversy then subsequently incites nationalistic backlashes in both South Korea and China, and the Chinese government subsequently uses these backlashes to strengthen its internal legitimacy by directing grievances to outside problems instead of internal domestic problems. This domestic signaling then requires the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to act in a confrontational matter towards the Japanese for its domestic audience, which then increases the threat that the Japanese feel from China (Weiss 2013).

In 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan beat the Liberal Democratic Party in the national Diet. This was the first time in since 1994 that the Liberal Democratic Party lost

their majority in the Diet. The DPJ was originally elected in the context of the recession with the promise to cut public spending projects and provide tax cuts to Japanese households (Tabuchi 2009). The victorious Prime Minister Hatoyama shifted Japanese foreign policy to distance itself with Washington to strengthen ties with Beijing (Powell 2010). He worked towards removing American military bases on Honshu and Okinawa wishing to have American troops in Japan only when times of defense necessitated it. He was never able to successfully pursue this goal due to pressure from Washington and the Obama administration. Through the combined influences of a minority internal backlash within the Diet and Washington's influence, the Hatoyama's government abandon the position as the pressure proved to be too much.

This was the only time that the Japanese explicitly chose to weaken its military alliance for the sake of a stronger relationship with China. The timing of this foreign policy shift correlates with the 2008 economic recession. Japan was hit less hard than America, but it still experienced a reduction of GDP growth following the initial three quarters after the start of the recession. Additionally, China had a buffer from the negative effects of the recession, and it was at this point that a narrative began that questioned the validity of America's global economic leadership. This point highlights the importance of perception and internal domestic economics and how they affect the relationships of these countries. Japan views its economy as weakened with a new narrative of Chinese stability among American Instability, and then Japan's foreign policy objectives change to be more China centric. This shift only lasted for two years before returning to the American foreign policy, but the small hiccup is an important note in this analysis.

For Japan's security, it is heavily under militarized for its economic position in the international system. It spends less than one percent of the GDP on its military (SIPRI), and Article IX of its constitution restricts it from having any offensive military. More recently, Japan has had a slight, but growing, trend towards remilitarization as a conservative element in the Liberal Democratic Party has risen to prominence in Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. This has received domestic backlash, but with the passage of the amendment to article 9, a consistent shift in opinions is occurring in the Japanese political arena. Part of this buildup has been due to the observed buildup of China's People's Liberation Army (NIDS 2016).

It is important to highlight the distinction, that security threats do not just come from China. North Korea has developed atomic weaponry as well as the ability to delivery those atomic weapons using intercontinental ballistic missiles, which can reach Japan. Japan is in a catch-22 of protecting themselves from the perceived threat through a system of anti-ballistic missile defense systems readily provided by America. The installation of these defenses instills a tremendous amount of fear in the surrounding states, which could then spiral out of control in the traditional security dilemma. Ultimately, these defense systems might be used for North Korea, but they also can apply to Chinese missiles as well. These anti-missile defense systems reduce second strike capabilities for oppositional great powers (Powell 1990). Additionally, they can work to counter China's conventional ballistic missiles in the hypothetical situation of conventional conflict between the two states.

In the early 2010s, The Japanese were militarily challenged by the Chinese in the East China Sea. This follows a history of territorial acquisition. During the conclusion of

the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, Japan took control over the current area known as Taiwan as well as the Diaoyu islands. The Diaoyu Islands, which were renamed into the Senkaku Islands, were part of the general grouping of islands that China lost in the region. When America was administrating over Japan post World War II, they relinquished Japan's colonial territories that it took during its imperial reign. The Senkaku islands were considered under the administrative control of America through Japan, but control over the islands was never solidified by America. China opposes Japanese control because it was not party to them, and they claim the islands based off their historic right (Loja 2016). There is some precedent for territorial acquisition based off historical precedent, but there must be some form of sovereignty exertion onto the territory by the state proposing control. The biggest complication revolves around the lack of certainty for territorial claims. As there is no constitutional authority that dictates to the world how territory should be partitioned off, the customs and rules of deciding who rules what is not consistent and has evolved from multiple different legal forces (Hayton 2014, p.93).

When it comes to the control over the islands, both China and Japan have not given up their right. The Chinese government is promoting a narrative of regaining its rights lost during the century of humiliation, and that narrative has been promoting an ardent nationalism across the Chinese population that is especially sensitive to relations involving the Japanese (Hughes 2011). Among their territorial disputes, the Chinese have been the most contentious towards the Diaoyu islands. Naoto Kan became the newly elected prime minister under the Democratic Party in 2010, and his new administration saw the first heightened level of tension over the Senkaku Islands. A fishing boat captain was arrested by the Japanese coast guard, and the incident spiraled out of control as the it

tapped into the national fervor of both countries over who controlled the Senkaku Islands (Fackler & Johnson 2010).

The Japanese proclaim the islands to be theirs, and the Chinese do as well. Part of the controversy also comes from the UNCLOS provisions for the EEZ as well as the continental shelf. For China, the Senkaku Islands lay within their continental shelf, and thus with the historical argument, they are the rightful owners of the islands. Japan looks at its administrative past, and assumes that the EEZ for the islands is met halfway for the Chinese EEZ from their shores. Each state has flown military aircrafts -- at times in reaction to one another -- over the island chain to claim as a symbol of their authority. The fervent Chinese nationalism in reaction to this dispute has caused a counter reactionary movement of growing nationalism in Japan (Kang 2013). In 2013, the issue was at the highest point of its tensions. The dispute became a public relations event in both countries as the heightening of international tensions caused a backlash in the domestic politics of each country, with riots being held against the Japanese population in China, and pro-nationalistic parade demonstrations against China being held in Japan. This is the point at which Sino-Japanese relationships were at their greatest stress. America remained neutral on who officially controls the island, but in de-facto action sided with the Japanese. This signals the shift when Japan moves back to strengthening its relationship with America. The intensity of this situation has cooled off slightly, but Chinese fishing vessels routinely violate the island's borders, which is still considered to be Japanese territory, and Japan still routinely sorties its air force for unidentified flying objects over the airspace.

Shinzo Abe was re-elected prime minister of Japan in 2012. He is a part of the Liberal Democratic Party, and it took control back from the Democratic party. He has maintained this position for the last five years. With his rise to power, Japan has shifted its intention to increase its spending on its military. This increase of spending spearheaded an effort in the Japanese Diet to amend the constitution to allow Japan to increase the capacity of the Japanese Self Defense Force as well as changing its role to be more offensive in nature. In 2015, Article 9 was not formally amended, but a series of laws were passed to allow for a reinterpretation of the article. This reinterpretation would allow Japan to use its military in foreign engagements to support its allies. The reason being that Japan's relationship with its allies would weaken if it failed to provide support upon the ally's request (BBC 2015). This introduction did not start with Abe's administration, but it has accelerated its growth. Spending on the Self Defense Force has increased (NIDS 2016), and the size and capability restrictions on the war machines used by the Japanese military have been surpassed through a combination of loopholes and lax oversight by those in charge of regulating the framework.

Prime minister Abe has been especially proactive in regards to foreign policy. He has expanded the normal relations of Japan beyond the big three -- China, the United States, and South Korea -- to be more incorporated into Southeast Asia, the European Union and NATO. These greater commitments to areas outside the region have dovetailed with a tri-pillar foreign policy that deals with the promotion of international rule and norms, a guardianship of the international commons, and an effect ally to the United States (Przystup 2015). Japan has made its bed with America in it, and that does not look like it is going to change anytime in the future.

With the introduction of China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Japan most famously rejected the offer to join at America's urging. They did this in opposition to every other state in the Asian region. This action was one of the strongest indicators of Japan's commitment to the US block in the region. South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and allies not even in Asia all opted to join the bank. America, however, saw it as a threat to their hegemonic strength in control of the international financial institutions, and tried to convince all its allies to boycott the membership. Japan is the only state that followed America's lead. It was invited as signatory member, but it refused and has signaled that it currently has no interest in joining.

With the election of Donald Trump, Japan has signaled that it will increase its military strength both for its own purposes and at the behest of America. This comes in relation to President Trump commenting on America's possible reduction of military spending for its allies in the East, and his wish for Japan to pick up more of the load required to protect itself. This is the point that the supply and demand of security comes into play. Japan has always had the benefit of readily available security provided by the United States. The supply of security is signaled to be dropping, but it is still readily available for Japan. Because Japan has had a continuous security threat from the growing great power in the region, it is still willing to maintain its security alliance with the United States. Further, it being willing to increase its share of the defense cost shows the level of value and commitment it has on its relationship with America. Through the post-Cold War era, Japan has continuously maintained its relationship with the United States.

This maintenance and consistency is explained through a combination of Japan's economic strength and exposure to continuous threats. As the theories state, Japan has experienced consistent threats to its security and strengthens its relationship to America in a reactionary manner. Further, Japan, like every other country, tries to work towards a stronger economy; however, its economy is comparatively one of the strongest economies in the world. Therefore, the value of economic gains presented to Japan is worth less due to its present strength. This economic strength then allows them to sacrifice some potential economic benefit to ensure and maintain its security.

Conclusion

This paper performed an analysis of the alliance behavior between Japan and the Philippines towards The United States in relation to China's growing economic capabilities. Using the popular "Two Asias" argument provided in the literature as well as the economic theory of alliances, this paper performed a mixed method analysis of the research question. A formal model was constructed which highlighted the differences in utility for each state between economy and security, and the value that each state derived from the security based on their own economic indicators. This model established a pattern of how poor states acted differently from rich states. To provide support for the pattern established in the model, a critical case comparison was used to analyze the actions of Japan and the Philippines in regards to their relationship with American and China.

The conclusion drawn from the analysis shows that there was a consistent pattern between the two cases showing that they both strengthened their alliance with the United

States when their perception of external threat increased; however, the economic strength of Japan provided a buffer that allowed it to maintain its alliance in the face of threat, while the economic weakness of the Philippines made the country more willing to risk insecurity for greater economic gain. The Philippines was much ficker in its relationship between the two powers. This difference was caused, in part, by the state's developing status. On an aggregate, The Philippines finds more value in any form of economic stimulus; whereas, Japan has a stronger economy and thus is less willing to sacrifice its security for small levels of economic stimulation. When a threatening situation becomes partially diffused the Philippines more readily tries to re-evaluate its position between China and the United States to gain more benefit for itself while Japan stays consistent in its relationship to the United States.

The hypothesis of this paper was supported by the analysis. This result shows that the economic strength of a state matters in Asia when those states must choose how to maintain their alliances. The result can be generalized to other cases which are, or have been, in similar situations. For further research, there are more cases in Asia that can be used to study this phenomenon. Studying the other American allies in Asia will provide a more internally valid analysis. More examples would be states like Thailand and South Korea. Examples outside of the region are harder to find, but would provide more generalizability to the analysis. The Ukraine and its relationship with Russia and the European Union would also provide valuable insight into these two oppositional forces. Contrastingly, Estonia would provide an alternative to the Ukraine in the rich poor dichotomy. In macro IR theory, this paper provides support that alliance maintenance is also dependent on the economic conditions of a state, and thus economics should be

considered when studying the variability of alliances in addition to external threat perception.

Figure 1. Japan Indifference Curve 2000.




Figure 2. Japan Indifference Curve 2013






Figure 3. Japan Indifference Curve 2013.**Figure 4. Philippines Indifference Curve 2000.**

Figure 5. Philippines Indifference Curve Pre-Shoal Incident.




Figure 6. Philippines Indifference Curve Post-Shoal Incident.





Figure 7. Philippines Indifference Curve Combined.

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