

NPOs and their Stakeholders' Psychological Contracts: The Value of Implicit Expectations in Bolivia

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Abstract. Managing non-profit organizations (NPOs) in developing countries constitutes a challenge due to the intrinsic hardship of their missions, and the pressure of balancing their stakeholder's interests and needs. Beyond the explicit challenges NPOs face (e.g., attracting volunteers, retaining employees, accounting to donors), we tackle the implicit obligations and returns that volunteers, employees, and donors hold towards an NPO. By introducing the concept of Stakeholder Psychological Contracts (SPC) and its three currencies (relational, transactional and ideological), we identify how each creates value for these stakeholders in a different way, using data from 409 respondents, representing 7 Bolivian NPOs. Despite the high levels of satisfaction and engagement among respondents, currencies such as *Transactional Obligations* in volunteers or *Relational Returns* in donors did not create substantial value. As predicted, *Ideological returns* showed relevance for all groups. However, in the case of employees, this currency shows a negative impact on satisfaction with the NPO, and engagement with the cause has no influence on their turnover intentions, as only satisfaction with the organization mediates in their intention to quit. We conclude that SPCs are a valuable concept for NPO managers when it comes to triggering engagement and satisfaction for each stakeholder group.

Key words: Stakeholder management, psychological contract, non-profit organizations, Bolivia.

Contratos Psicológicos de Actores: El valor de las expectativas implícitas en OSFLs bolivianas

Resumen. La gerencia de organizaciones sin fines de lucro (OSFL) en países en vías de desarrollo es un reto debido a la dureza intrínseca de su misión y debido a la presión en el equilibrio de los intereses de sus actores. Más allá de los retos extrínsecos (e.g. reclutamiento de voluntarios, retención de empleados y rendición de cuentas), nos referimos a las obligaciones y retornos intrínsecos que voluntarios, empleados y donadores tienen hacia la OSFL. Al introducir el concepto de Contrato Psicológico de Actores (CPA) y sus tres monedas (relacional, transaccional e ideológica), identificamos cómo cada una de ellas genera valor para estos actores clave de manera particular, utilizando datos de 409 participantes que representan 7 OSFLs bolivianas. A pesar de los altos niveles de satisfacción y compromiso en los participantes, monedas como las Obligaciones Transaccionales en voluntarios o los Retornos Relacionales en donantes demostraron no crear valor significativo. De acuerdo con lo anticipado, Retornos Ideológicos demostraron relevancia para todos los grupos. En el caso de los empleados, esta moneda indica un impacto negativo en satisfacción

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hacia la OSFL, y el compromiso con la causa no tiene influencia alguna en sus intenciones de renuncia, es únicamente la satisfacción con la organización que actúa como mediador en este caso. Concluimos en que el CPA es un concepto valioso para las gerencias de OSFL al momento de generar compromiso y satisfacción para cada grupo de actores.

Palabras clave: Gerencia de actores claves, contrato psicológico, organizaciones sin fines de lucro, Bolivia.

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1. Introduction

Since 2010, Bolivia is no longer considered a low-income country (World Bank, 2017). This evolution has led to decreasing international funding for Nonprofit Organizations (NPOs), and therefore, to increasing challenges. While the sector has long benefited from international aid, funds were often misused or used unsustainably (Barber & Bowie, 2008). New government directives further state that all cooperation funds entering the country be controlled for political intentions (García Linera, 2015), leading to a crowding-out of cooperation and funding agencies. Despite its economic growth, 36% of the Bolivian population remains below the poverty line (World Bank, 2017). Hence, NPOs are still prevailing in the country in order to counteract the effects of income inequality and low access to education in vulnerable populations. In order to sustain their efforts, NPOs compete not only for international funding but also for citizens' donations, for qualified staff and engaged volunteers, under increasing scrutiny of government and society.

These challenges and potential solutions have been documented, from NPOs showing their impact in society (Mook, Maiorano, Ryan, Armstrong, & Quarter, 2015), to increasing their accountability practices (Cavill & Sohail, 2007) and recruiting the right people in competitive environments (Barber & Bowie, 2008). Most of these challenges are addressed from a stakeholder management perspective, as NPOs need to satisfy each stakeholder's expectations (Balser & McClusky, 2005) and stakeholders need a differentiated treatment from NPOs towards realizing engagement. Recent literature has focused on the value that emerges from collaboration with other stakeholders such as volunteers (Kaltenbrunner & Renzl, 2019) or with other types of organizations (Austin & Seitanidi, 2012). However, there is little focus on what value creation exactly means for stakeholders, especially in southern or developing countries.

In this article, we study the expectations of three important stakeholders (volunteers, employees and donors) in the Bolivian nonprofit environment, by using the recently introduced concept of the stakeholder-psychological contract or SPC (Brown, Buchholtz, & Dunn, 2016). SPCs allows comparing implicit obligations and returns, which may prompt stakeholder satisfaction with the NPO as well as engagement with a cause. By introducing the SPC concept, we are able to unravel the concept of value into three main currencies, where value is obtained and exchanged in stakeholder relationships.

Brown, Buchholtz, and Dunn (2016) are the first to take the relational and transactional currencies as defined by Rousseau (1989) to a firm-stakeholder level. We adapt this to the nonprofit environment and add the ideological component developed by Bingham (2005) and studied mainly in volunteer or employment contexts (e.g., Vantilborgh et al., 2014). Together, these three aspects can be applied to stakeholder relationships, where the contribution to a cause is key for the relationship. The implications of our research are significant for NPO managers, as they will better understand which currencies are more likely to create value for certain groups of stakeholders.

In sum, the main objective of this paper is to adapt the concept of psychological contracts to a stakeholder perspective, enabling a formal comparison of stakeholders' implicit obligations and returns to an NPO, and determining the salience that emerges from different currencies or expectations. By addressing volunteers, employees and donors, we contribute to stakeholder theory by providing a managerial instrument for acknowledging stakeholders' expectations, we also contribute to psychological contract theory by expanding its application beyond the employee-employer relationship.

2. Stakeholder Management in NPOs

Stakeholder theory stresses the need for managerial attention to all stakeholders in a balanced way to achieve sustainable organizational success. Freeman (1984) posits that stakeholder management is the only way to sustainability, through integrating partners' interests in strategic decision-making.

In stakeholder theory, successful relationships exist when all parties provide value for all stakeholders, rather than taking advantage of one group to favor another (Freeman & McVea, 2001). Value creation for stakeholders occurs when all parties in a relationship are better off (Freeman, Harrison, & Wicks, 2007), with each stakeholder judging what makes them better off. In this context, the value within stakeholder relationships can be diverse and particular, but it may also be implicit, and value will be as subjective and idiosyncratic as the relationship itself (Sacconi, 2006).

Making stakeholder relationships the main unit of analysis provides great opportunities as it allows us to analyze the terms of a relationship and the role of each stakeholder in it. Given that NPO stakeholders hold diverse interests in the organization, they generate managerial challenges for the NPO (Wellens & Jegers, 2014). For instance, governments tend to have great power, as they set the regulatory context and can easily influence the fulfillment of NPOs' missions. Financers can impose certain expenses or overheads (Candler, 2010); and while beneficiaries should receive most of the attention, we often find unattended groups of stakeholders such as volunteers and employees, not having sufficient leverage with the organization to improve their working conditions. Recent literature has emphasized volunteer management as a highly relevant challenge for NPOs (Vantilborgh & Puyvelde, 2018), but studies regarding the balancing of needs of both employees and volunteers are scarce, as are comparisons between multiple stakeholders (e.g., Liao-Troth, 2005).

According to Balser and McClusky (2005), NPOs need to be responsive to their stakeholders and act according to the stakeholders' expectations to be effective. This responsiveness becomes problematic when expectations are conflicting, unaligned or unclear, in particular when it concerns beneficiaries' objectives versus less powerful, but equally legitimate, stakeholder objectives (Ebrahim, 2005). This confirms the need for an instrument that translates stakeholder's expectations and helps NPO managers understand stakeholders, in terms of specific sources of value creation.

3. Stakeholder Psychological Contracts

Psychological contracts (PCs) have been widely studied to describe employees' expectations towards their employer in a wide array of employment relationships (Cavanaugh & Noe, 1999; Dainty, Raiden, & Neale, 2004; Dries, Forrier, De Vos, & Pepermans, 2014; Rousseau, 1995). Most recently in nonprofit environments, PCs have been used to gain a better understanding of volunteers' motivations and their perceptions towards an organization (Nichols, 2013; Vantilborgh, 2015).

Rousseau (1989) defined PCs as the expectations and beliefs employees hold regarding the terms of their relationship with their employer and the obligations the employer owes in return. Fulfilled PCs have shown positive correlations with affect (Aranda, Hurtado, & Topa, 2018; Vantilborgh, Bidee, Pepermans, Griep, & Hofmans, 2016), job satisfaction (Robinson & Rousseau, 1994), increased performance (Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2000; Millward & Hopkins, 1998), work engagement (Soares & Mosquera, 2019), trust (Atkinson, 2007) and reduced turnover intention (Collins, 2010), while breached or unfulfilled PCs are associated with reduced commitment and engagement (Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2000), aggressive and decreased considerate voice (Vantilborgh, 2015), among other negative behaviors.

However useful the PC has proven to be, most of the literature focuses on the employee-employer relationship, where the employee's expectations are either described (Festing & Schäfer, 2014; Ho, Rousseau, & Levesque, 2006; Rousseau, 2000), fulfilled (Morrison & Robinson, 1997) or breached (Antonaki & Trivellas, 2014). Some authors have emphasized the need to explore further types of employment relationships (Herriot & Pemberton, 1997) even considering "there are as many contracts as there are relationships within the workplace" (Marks, 2001, p. 456). And although not all NPOs use volunteers as a resource, some are highly reliant on volunteer work at grassroots levels of the organization (Wellens & Jegers, 2014).

The application of PC theory outside the employee-employer relationship is not entirely novel, as it has been extended to describe customer-supplier relationships (Koh, Ang, & Straub, 2004; Pavlou & Gefen, 2005). The term "firm-stakeholder psychological contracts" is used to create a moral salient framework for trust repair between a firm and a stakeholder when some misconduct has taken place (Brown et al., 2016). This last approach applies the relational and transactional currencies in order to describe when stakeholder relationships can be easier to mend.

Using PC theory to analyze stakeholder relationships increases the opportunity for meaningful stakeholder management. As managers think about retributing their stakeholders, they may reflect on all possible currencies that will be valuable for stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). We, therefore, define Stakeholder Psychological Contracts (SPCs) as the perceived expectations stakeholders hold towards an organization, considering the obligations and returns that arise from the reciprocity of the relationship. Consistent with PC theory, SPC currencies exchanged among stakeholders can be divided into Relational, Transactional and Ideological.

The relational currency is associated with behavior or actions beyond written requirements, where arrangements are based upon mutual trust and loyalty and rewards are not necessarily conditioned to performance. Loyalty, stability and an open-ended time frame are the main characteristics (Rousseau, 1995, 2000). From this perspective, resources are provided freely and reciprocated over time; resources and capabilities are developed and shared between parties with high involvement and continuity in order to achieve the full potential of the relationship (Austin & Seitanidi, 2012).

The transactional currency focuses on economic exchange and limited involvement, whether in a specific time frame or limiting duties and tasks. The possibility of written

agreements with specific contributions is part of this currency. Contributions will be limited to what stakeholders will receive in return for their input in the short term. Hence, stakeholders such as funders may earn tax exemptions, volunteers receive contribution certificates and employees receive compensations (Wellens & Jegers, 2014).

We find the ideological currency particularly relevant for NPOs since it concerns the sponsoring of a cause or being committed to a mission above all else. This also includes involving other stakeholders in the cause in order to multiply its effects (Bingham, 2005). Ideological contracting can elicit further contributions from stakeholders that strengthen the relationship and create stronger bonds.

4. Hypotheses

Stakeholders hold varied motivations to engage with NPOs, therefore they may find value in one or more currencies of the SPC. Our first hypothesis addresses the general composition of SPCs for each group under consideration. According to social exchange theory, behaviors that are reciprocated by another party are sustained over time; according to Thacker (2015), in a working environment, when employees provide time and effort, they can be reciprocated with a paycheck, job security, and recognition. Contrary to this, Knutsen and Chan (2015) indicate that the nature of volunteer work is providing ‘something’ and expecting ‘nothing’ in return, thereby finding satisfaction in their obligations. However, they may expect other currencies above the monetary such as friendship, experience, etc. (Vantilborgh et al., 2011a). Meanwhile, donors delegate decision making to the NPO, where the latter becomes responsible for the outcome of the transaction, and therefore highly accountable for the results (Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois, & Jegers, 2012; Wellens & Jegers, 2014) making the donor highly expectant.

We state that, independently of the nature of the relationship, volunteers, employees, and donors engage in economic exchange, even though they may not exchange the same currencies. According to SPC, relationships are based on reciprocity and balance, therefore we expect to find it in stakeholders’ perceived *Obligations* and *Returns*.

- H1. *The composition of SPCs*: The SPC of each stakeholder group (volunteers, employees, donors) will not show significant differences when comparing their individual *Returns* and *Obligations*.

We insist that in order to sustain a stakeholder relationship both the stakeholder and the organization are receiving valuable outcomes. If one of the parties expects more returns than obligations, they may be destroying value for themselves. While if they have too high obligations, they may be being taken advantage of.

Through the SPC framework, we expect to find a combination of three currencies (transactional, relational and ideological) at two different levels: expected *Returns* and expected *Obligations*. From H1 we anticipate that stakeholders will find a balance between overall returns and obligations, however, for H2 we expect each stakeholder to behave differently by prioritizing specific currencies within returns and obligations.

- H2. *The currencies of SPCs*: Volunteers, employees, and donors will display different levels of *Relational*, *Transactional* and *Ideological* currencies within their expected *Returns* and *Obligations*.

Research on volunteers shows that although mission and value-oriented factors are highly relevant (Scheel & Mohr, 2012), close contact and appreciation from their

organization are also valued highly (Kappelides, Cuskelly, & Hoye, 2019). This indicates that for volunteers, *Ideological Obligations* and *Relational Returns* are highly relevant (Vantilborgh et al., 2014).

- H2.A) Volunteers SPCs show *Ideological Obligations* as being the most important, while *Relational Returns* come second. *Transactional Returns*, however, will be the least relevant.

The main discrepancy between volunteers and employees regarding the PC lies in the benefits perceived in exchange for their work, i.e., the *Transactional Expectations* (Liao-Troth, 2001). Atkinson (2007) mentions that employees find the *Transactional* currency particularly relevant as if the fulfillment of this currency would enable the creation of a *Relational* one and both of these will have an impact on trust in the employer. Although employees, in general, might be more transactional-driven, literature also highlights the relevance of the NPOs' mission in recruiting and retaining human resources, which would give high relevance to the *Ideological* currency (Bingham, 2005; Brown & Yoshioka, 2003), however, in a labor market as narrow as the Bolivian, Ideological returns may be irrelevant.

- H2.B) Employees' SPCs are balanced, however, *Transactional* and *Relational Returns* are most important.

NPOs are highly dependent on donors to perform their operations, and donors trust organizations to boost their reputation (Ebrahim, 2005). As Stevens and Hauser (2004) indicate, donating and cooperating is often driven by future benefits. Since this relationship is mainly focused on the spending of money for specific purposes (Lloyd, 2005), we expect that donors have high *Transactional Obligations* while expecting *Ideological* and *Relational* currencies in exchange.

- H2.C) Donors' SPC will show *Transactional Obligations*, *Ideological Returns* and *Relational Returns* as being most important; *Ideological Obligations* are the least relevant.

We also intend to assess some outcomes triggered by the SPC currencies in order to determine their value creation potential. *Satisfaction with the organization* was very early linked to PCs, as well as satisfaction with a particular aspect (e.g., job satisfaction, supervisor satisfaction, etc.) (Tett & Meyer, 1993). *Turnover intention* in employees has also been studied together with PC, (Kotter, 1973), however, *Engagement to a cause* has not yet been addressed through a PC perspective and could help to assess how value is delivered to the cause through the NPO (Manetti & Toccafondi, 2014).

We address global *Satisfaction to the NPO* as well as the *Engagement to the cause*, both as understood by the stakeholder. We assert that SPC currencies can have different priorities for each stakeholder group, but that all currencies have the potential for triggering value either for the NPO in the form of Satisfaction or for the cause as Engagement. Evidently, we expect *Turnover intention* to behave opposite from satisfaction and engagement.

- H3.A) *The salience of SPCs*: All SPC currencies relate positively to *Satisfaction towards the organization* and *Engagement towards the cause*.

- H3.B) *Satisfaction towards the organization and Engagement towards the cause will relate negatively to Turnover intention in employees.*

The model to be tested for this hypothesis is shown in Figure 1, considering *Turnover intention* is only measured in employees.




Figure 1. Model for testing Hypothesis 3

5. Methodology. Sampling procedure

The Bolivian Ministry of Planning and Development provided a list of current NPOs in the country, however, not all of them had running operations at the time of the study. We contacted only local NPOs, with managerial presence in the country and with a history of at least 5 years. After reaching out to more than 50 Bolivian NPOs fifteen organizations responded favorably to participating in the study and from those, 7 distributed the surveys to their stakeholders, being volunteers, employees and donors. The missions of these organizations are diverse, i.e., animal rights, protection of the elder, housing, children protection, young people with special needs, education and women’s rights, the biggest NPO had 60 employees on their payroll. Individual participants were contacted through email by their organization’s manager or by the researcher on behalf of the organization. The email contained an organizational and a personal link to the online survey and emphasized the voluntary and anonymous nature of people’s participation. An open link was also published through social media at the NPOs’ websites and sent to groups of people who participated in volunteer groups and/or had a network of personal donors that participated in fund-raising events, thereby increasing our pool of participants.

Overall, 650 individuals were contacted. We obtained 409 complete and valid responses (overall response rate: 63%), out of which 86.5% came from the contacted NPOs. 251 women and 158 men participated in the study: 271 volunteers, 171 employees and 21 donors. The donor sample is quite small compared to the other groups in view of further statistical analyses, therefore, caution as well as a particular analysis approach is needed. All the communications, as well as the survey, were done in Spanish.

6. Variables and Measures

The independent variables measuring SPCs’ expected Returns and Obligations are presented in Table 1, dependent variables are included in Table 2.

Table 1. Independent Variables

Variable	Definition	Subcategory	Definition
Stakeholder Psychological Contract	The perceived expectations stakeholders hold towards an organization, considering the obligations and returns that arise from the reciprocity of the relationship	Ideological	The espousal of a cause or commitment to a mission, that represents a distinct inducement to elicit employee contributions and commitment.
		Relational	Arrangements based upon mutual trust and loyalty. Rewards derive from membership and participation. Behaviour extends beyond the written requirements but for the benefit of the common good.
		Transactional	Contributions will be limited to what stakeholders will receive in return of their input in the short term. Primarily focused upon economic exchange; specific, narrow and non-flexible duties.

Table 2. Dependent Variables

Variable	Definition	Subcategories
Satisfaction with the organization	Overall satisfaction with the organization	Affective reactions a person has towards the organization which arise from establishing a comparison between what a person wants and what the person receives.
Engagement with the cause	Overall commitment to the cause sponsored cause of the organization	As perceived by each respondent
Turnover intention (for employees only)	The cognitive process that eventually leads to an employee quitting a job.	Consideration to leave Intention to leave Intention to search

The instrument consists of a questionnaire with four subscales (see Annex 1). SPC items were adapted from the scales by Bingham (2005) and Rousseau (2000) and were to be answered on a 5-point Likert scale. *Expected Returns* were measured asking participants to rate the statement “As a <stakeholder>, I expect <name of the NPO> to...”. For example, if the respondent was a donor for the fire department, it read “As a donor, I expect the Fire Department to...”. We provided a list of 8 Relational, 10 Transactional and 9 Ideological items.

In a similar way, we asked to rate *Expected Obligations* as “The Fire Department can expect from me as a donor that I...” and provided a list of 9 Relational, 8 Transactional and 10 Ideological observed variables.

For the dependent variables, we developed specific items for this study based on work by (McDonald & Makin, 2000; Robinson & Rousseau, 1994). We asked respondents their level of agreement with each statement and provided them with a slider scale from 0 to 100 as recommended by (Fisher & To, 2012) for single item measurement. *Satisfaction to the organization* ($\alpha= 0.945$) consisted of: level of satisfaction with the organization, perception of the organization's performance and the degree to which their expectations are in line with the organization's expectations. *Engagement with the cause* was measured through a single item by asking respondents to rate their level of personal commitment with the cause sponsored by the organization. *Turnover intention* (for employees only) was measured through three items as developed by Carmeli and Weisberg (2007), the items stem from the thoughts of quitting to the intention to search for another job. Finally, identification variables were included:

gender, the duration of the relationship with the organization and the frequency of contact with the NPO.

We first translated and back-translated the survey to Spanish, then run a pilot test using a small convenience sample (N= 93) to check comprehensibility and verify internal consistency of all subscales through Cronbach alpha coefficients: Expected Returns, *Relational* (RREL α =0.75), *Transactional* (RTRAA α =0.77) and *Ideological* (RIDE α =0.87); Expected Obligations, *Relational* (EREL α =0.82), *Transactional* (ETRA α =0.75) and *Ideological* (EIDE α =0.88).

We performed statistical analyses with SPSS Statistics 25 and STATA 14.2. We calculated frequencies, descriptive statistics, internal consistency (reliability), Pearson correlations and performed path analyses. Multicollinearity was controlled for when required.

7. Results

In order to check the reliability of the measures in the final sample, we analyzed the data for the volunteers, employees and donors separately. Accepting Cronbach's alpha coefficients above 0.70 (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013), we found that two items in the SPC had to be deleted; Table 3 shows all coefficients. Descriptive measures for each SPC currency can be found in table 4.

Table 3. Reliability Statistics. Cronbach's Alpha Coefficient per subscale

	SPCs (Returns and Obligations) Scale		Satisfaction Scale		Turnover Scale	N Items
	N Items	Scale	N Items	Scale		
Volunteers	0.951	38	0.845	4		
Employees	0.929	38	0.913	4	0.847	3
Donors	0.922	38	0.833	4		

Table 4. Descriptive indicators for SPC

	n	Returns (on a 5-point Likert scale)			Obligations (on a 5-point Likert scale)			Dependent Variables (on 100 scale)		
		REL	TRA	IDE	REL	TRA	IDE	SATISF. W NPO	ENGAG. W CAUSE	Turnover Intention
Volunteers	271	3.863	3.774	4.256	4.209	4.010	4.221	81.776	85.650	
Mean										
St. Dev.		0.773	0.737	0.657	0.700	0.710	0.695	16.469	17.741	
Employees	117	4.185	4.157	4.326	4.255	4.261	4.166	75.641	87.670	22.143
Mean										
St. Dev.		0.612	0.510	0.528	0.575	0.576	0.612	18.115	16.974	24.921
Donors	21	3.648	3.699	4.089	4.086	4.107	4.173	78.492	78.380	
Mean										
St. Dev.		1.077	1.065	0.799	0.625	0.673	0.488	21.550	20.402	

H1: The composition of SPCs

Returns and *Obligations* for each group of stakeholders were compared using the nonparametric Wilcoxon paired t-test (Table 5) since the data is not normally distributed and we have a small sample size in donors. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find significantly higher *Obligations* than *Returns* ($p < .01$) for volunteers. As expected, employees do not show significant differences between these variables, demonstrating balanced SPCs. The same happens for donors, where the difference between *Obligations* and *Returns* is not significant.

Therefore, we can only accept H1 for employees and donors showing a balance between *Obligations* and *Returns*.

Table 5. Discrepancy measures between Returns and Obligations

		Mean	St. Deviation	Z	Significance
Volunteers	Returns	3.964	0.605	6.939**	0.000
	Obligations	4.147	0.632		
Employees	Returns	4.222	0.461	0.316	0.752
	Obligations	4.227	0.501		
Donors	Returns	3.812	0.895	1.112	0.226
	Obligations	4.122	0.547		

** . Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

The balance between *Obligations* and *Returns* changes slightly when analyzing the separate currencies within them. We performed paired sample t-tests in order to compare each currency's *Obligations* vs. *Returns*. Table 6 shows this difference of means, where a positive outcome indicates higher *Obligations* and a negative outcome indicates higher *Returns*.

Table 6. Discrepancies between Returns and Obligations per currency

		t	Significance
Volunteers	Relational	9.064**	0.000
	Transactional	7.183**	0.000
	Ideological	-1.203	0.230
Employees	Relational	1.273	0.206
	Transactional	2.696**	0.008
	Ideological	-3.592**	0.000
Donors	Relational	1.762	0.093
	Transactional	1.667	0.111
	Ideological	0.433	0.670

** . Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

We find volunteers possess significantly higher Transactional (9.064**) and Relational Obligations (7.183**). The impression that employees' SPCs are balanced is not entirely so, as they expect significantly higher Ideological Returns (-3.592**) and hold high Transactional Obligations (2.696**). Donors do not show significant differences.

H2: The currencies for each stakeholder

In order to determine the priorities, we performed a one-way ANOVA and a Student T-test to establish the significance of the difference in means for each of the six currencies, the complete results for this analysis can be found in Annex 3. Figure 2 shows that volunteers prioritize Ideological Obligations and Returns as much as their Relational Obligations, not showing a significant difference between them. As expected, volunteers' Transactional Returns are significantly lower than all other currencies ($p < 0.01$). The results provide partial support for H2.A, especially when prioritizing the cause they contribute to, above economical rewards.




Figure 2. The priority of currencies for Volunteers

For employees, we do not find significant consecutive differences between currencies, however, we find two distinct priorities, where they expect more Ideological than Transactional Returns. Contrary to H2.B, we find employees hold even higher Transactional Obligations than Returns.




Figure 3. The priority of currencies for Employees




Figure 4. The priority of currencies for Donors

Finally, among donors, we find a surprisingly balanced SPC. And though there are no significant differences between each consecutive currency, we do find a marginal gap between the highest and lowest currency, this leads us to reject H2.C.

H3: The salience of SPCs

In this section, we used path analysis to identify if all SPC currencies relate significantly to *Engagement with the cause*, *Satisfaction to the Organization* and *Turnover Intention* (the latter only for employees). We will address the initial model as Model A. As Chen, Curran, Bollen, Kirby, and Paxton (2008) recommend, we use multiple statistical measures to test the fit of the model, chi-square ($p > .05$), RMSEA ($p > .05$), Tucker-Lewis index ($p > .08$) and SRMR ($p < .05$).

As seen in table 7 we first tested Model A, however, this did not yield adequate indexes for all stakeholder groups. We decided to delete the direction with the least significant p-value and the model was run again until we found a fit for each group. In some cases, this resulted in the deletion of the entire observed variable. The original z-coefficients and p-values for Model A and the Final Model can be found in Annex 4, while the values regarding model fit can be found in Table 6.

Table 7. Result of the Model coefficients in Model A vs. Final Model

Model	Role	Chi2	RMSEA	TLI	SRMR
Model "A"	Volunteers	0.000	0.535	-7.578	0.076
	Employees	0.000	0.329	-0.980	0.117
	Donors E	0.858	0.000	2.017	0.007
	Donors O	0.253	0.124	1.763	0.060
FINAL MODEL	Volunteers	0.186	0.050	0.988	0.020
	Employees	0.769	0.000	1.046	0.035
	Donors	0.896	0.000	1.723	0.034

We first elaborate on the results for volunteers and employees. For volunteers, we found that Ideological Obligations has a significantly positive relation with both *Satisfaction to the NPO* ($\beta=.33$, $z=4.64$, $p<.01$) and *Engagement with the cause* ($\beta=.28$, $z=3.31$, $p<.01$), while Transactional Obligations has a significantly negative relation with *Satisfaction to the NPO* ($\beta=-.18$, $z=-2.68$, $p<.05$) and no impact on *Engagement with the cause* (Figure 6). It is not a surprise to find a positive covariance between *Satisfaction to the NPO* and *Engagement with the cause* of ($cov=.516$, $z=11.51$, $p<.01$).




Figure 5. Final Model for Volunteers

For employees, we also find Ideological Obligations positively related both to *Satisfaction to the NPO* ($\beta=.39$, $z=3.91$, $p<.05$) and *Engagement with the cause* ($\beta=.24$, $z=2.72$, $p<.01$) (Figure 7). While Ideological Returns shows a negative effect on *Satisfaction to the NPO* ($\beta=-.33$, $z=3.67$, $p<.01$). After testing Satisfaction as a mediating variable according to the model proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986), we confirmed that it indeed has a mediating effect between *Engagement with the cause* and *Turnover intention* which

indicates that more satisfied employees are, the less likely to leave the organization ($\beta=-.52$, $z=-7.31$, $p<.01$).




Figure 6. Final Model for Employees

Due to the small sample size, it is not possible to estimate the entire model at once for donors, therefore we estimated Returns and Obligations separately. Despite having a good model fit, we did not find significant relationships between currencies and the dependent variables. After modeling Returns, we eliminated the Transactional Returns component, due to no significant relationship with the outcome variables.

When modeling Obligations in donors, we found that none of the components had significant p-values. Therefore, we took the Returns model and added the Obligations variables one by one in order to observe any possible impact this may have on the variability of the model. The final outcome, to be treated with caution, shows a significantly negative relationship of Relational Returns with *Satisfaction to the NPO* ($\beta=-.54$, $z=2.99$, $p<.01$) as well as with *Engagement with the cause* ($\beta=-.52$, $z=-2.26$, $p<.01$) (Figure 8). Ideological Obligations shows a significant effect on *Engagement with the cause* ($\beta=.47$, $z=2.85$, $p<.01$) as Relational Obligations over *Satisfaction to the NPO* ($\beta=.45$, $z=2.34$, $p<.05$).




Figure 7. Final Model for Donors

8. Discussion

In developing economies as the Bolivian, managers tend to neglect stakeholders by prioritizing financiers or donors above others such as employees working at ground level (Ebrahim, 2005). Previous research in the Bolivian non-profit context has focused either in the socio-political environment (Bebbington, 2004), the psychological factors that influence beneficiaries (Losantos, Berckmans, Villanueva, & Loots, 2014) or most recently, on touristic volunteering (Thompson, Curran, & Gorman, 2017). However, the challenges of NPOs in the face of changing legislation and decreasing funding are hardly addressed, especially for local NPOs who lack institutional leverage in front of the imposition of international development institutions (Arellano-Lopez & Petras, 1994). As international funding gets relocated to low-income countries, Bolivian NPOs need to compete for citizens' credibility to retain their staff and keep their volunteers engaged.

In order to give value to stakeholders, managers need to fulfill their expectations, and this may mean focusing on different currencies for each stakeholder. In this paper we aim to identify the currencies that Bolivian stakeholders value from the relationship with an NPO. Through SPCs, we were able to classify expected returns and obligations from volunteers, employees, and donors towards several Bolivian NPOs and the emerging outcomes of each of these currencies.

8.1 Volunteers

We were able to confirm that Volunteers show more expected Obligations than Returns. This positive imbalance comes from highly regarded *Relational* and *Transactional Obligations*; volunteers perceive their relationship and their feelings of belonging to the NPO is their own responsibility and they are willing to uphold the NPOs' image and reputation even beyond their agreement.

However, we found that volunteers' *Ideological* component is the highest ranked for this group of stakeholders, but their expected *Returns* and *Obligations* do not have the same effects. In line with previous research (Scheel & Mohr, 2012) their *Obligations* will generate engagement with the cause and satisfaction with the organization. Vantilborgh and cols. (2016) encounter for this group, when organizations ask too much from volunteers, in our case in the shape of *Transactional Obligation* (e.g. fees to participate in volunteering activities), *Satisfaction with the NPO* decreases, while providing support and supervision encourages them to participate more.

When volunteers feel the need to contribute to a cause and engage in it, they rank their own *Transactional Returns* as their lowest priority, which indicates they are the least demanding stakeholders. On the other hand, when volunteers do not have the resources or the conditions to perform their tasks, and they feel they need to take the lead in establishing the specific aspects of their relationship, value to the organization is being drained.

The lack of a relational currency driving *Satisfaction with the NPO* does not negate the conclusions drawn by Vantilborgh et al. (2011), stating that friendship is key, however, it signals the likelihood that the Bolivian NPOs are merely an enabler of volunteers finding this currency in peers or beneficiaries.

8.2 Employees

For employees, we find a balance between Returns and Obligations as expected. Surprisingly, we find higher *Transactional Obligations* than *Returns*, although the initiative for setting the transactional agreement generally comes from the employer. Employees themselves, in this case, are keen on setting the intentions and acting according to their responsibilities in their employment agreements, perhaps due to the need to retain their income in a limited job market as the Bolivian.

We also find that employees for Bolivian NPOs expect from the organization to contribute to the cause and engage with it more than they do themselves. We find a balance in the Relational currency, where employees show concern about the NPO's reputation and image and also expect to receive appreciation for their efforts and their wellbeing, even beyond the professional exchange, in line with general PC research (Aykan, 2014; Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2002; Morrison & Robinson, 1997).

Although *Ideological Obligations* is not employees' first priority, *Satisfaction to the organization* is mainly related to this component, as is their *Engagement with the cause*. While *Ideological returns* seem to have an opposite effect on *Satisfaction with the organization*. Based on (Ebrahim, 2005), we contemplate the possibility that employees

perceive they may need to compromise their own well-being when the organization engages more towards the main cause. Further, Bingham (2005) and Brown and Yoshioka (2003) already noticed the importance of the ideological currency at the moment of recruiting and retaining employees. Our results highlight the importance of sponsoring a cause and allowing employees to contribute actively and getting a sense of reward from their duties. This is probably the relationship where most value is exchanged between NPO and Stakeholder, as they reciprocally exchange relational aspects and the ideological salience delivers value to the cause.

Despite observing a high correlation between *Engagement with the cause* and *Turnover intention*, the final model for employees suggests that *Satisfaction to the organization* is a key mediator for employees' intention to leave the organization, which means that no matter how engaged an employee is to the cause, when they are unsatisfied with the organization, they will look for another job, even if this means stopping their contribution to the cause in line with Tnay, Othman, Siong, and Lim (2013).

8.3 Donors

In the case of donors, our sample size does not allow us to draw definitive conclusions. However, results showed a balanced SPC between Returns and Obligations, as well as among currencies, where we only found a marginal significance where *Ideological Obligations* were found to be slightly more relevant than *Relational Returns*. This may be because donors get involved very narrowly with the NPO, as Townsend and Townsend (2004) state, not all donors receive the accountability reports NPOs make, and sometimes they limit their involvement to eventual donations.

As for the outcomes of donors' SPCs, we find *Relational Returns* to associate negatively with *Engagement with the cause* and with *Satisfaction to the NPO*. This indicates that the more an NPO tries to engage the donor, the less satisfied the donor becomes. Contrary to this, *Relational Obligations* indicates higher levels of *Satisfaction to the NPO*, suggesting donors perceive more value when they control the relationship and they can contribute to the NPO with their own ideas. Finally, we find that Bolivian donors *Engage* further in a cause when they see NPOs contributing to it, advocating in its favor and encouraging others to get involved. In this case, value emerges from a relational exchange and multiplies towards the cause when the NPO is fully committed. Value arrives at the NPO when the donor can control its involvement and is given the opportunity to contribute to the cause.

9. Conclusions and further research

The concept of PC can be adapted to a stakeholder perspective in order to give an operationalization of how each stakeholder might create value for the cause. Being the first study to compare different NPO stakeholders through one research framework, we show that a single model does not hold for all stakeholders since the salience of the currencies changes among different stakeholders. We were able to see that the creation of value is both an expectation from the stakeholder, as well as an opportunity to contribute to a cause.

However, our study is not without limitations, and sampling is probably the most important one. As our sample was not randomly selected, and only limited to three stakeholders, we may have incurred a self-selection bias by having NPOs that are already quite attentive to their stakeholders being the most interested in participating. Also, because of sample size, we cannot generalize these results to all volunteers, employees, and donors from all Bolivian NPOs, nor the causality of the relationships found because of our cross-

sectional model. Nevertheless, the importance of ideological obligations for all Bolivian NPO stakeholders cannot be ignored.

Important to emphasize that we did not measure SPC fulfillment, therefore we cannot conclude that certain expectations are fulfilled or breached, this might be tackled in future research. But we do offer a comparable overview of different stakeholders' value appropriation from their relationship with their NPO.

Our application of SPC shows that a myriad of opportunities exists to shed light on the implicit expectations that contribute to other outcomes that we did not consider here. Our results also lead us to question the limit of volunteers' engagement and the outcomes associated with volunteers' expected obligations.

In line with Brown and Yoshioka (2003), we find satisfaction to the NPO and engagement with the cause positively associated both in volunteers and. However, since satisfaction mediates turnover intention in employees, it could also have an effect on the permanence of other stakeholders.

In a context where funding challenges and limitations can be used to restrict payroll and avoid providing employees with proper working conditions, the results showing higher employees' *Transactional Obligations* than *Returns* lead us to question whether they feel compelled to make transactional sacrifices. The fact that they would have to take initiatives to fulfill their agreements, can also signal employee neglect on behalf of management, which can be focusing their attention to funders above employees.

In the case of donors, it seems relevant to further study the *Relational* currencies, as it appears that when donors take the lead in the relationship, they can be more satisfied with the NPO they contribute to. However, we only considered personal donors, and only two of the NPOs in our sample rely on these stakeholders. Most Bolivian NPOs depend greatly in corporate donors and international cooperation, who may have a different impact on NPO management, especially in influencing their focus on certain development plans.

Finally, we provide an important step towards mapping several stakeholder's expectations. We anticipate SPC can be applied with other NPO stakeholders such as governments, society, and beneficiaries. The reciprocity cycle would not be finished without getting the perspective of the NPO and its agents, namely, managers and employees who act on behalf of the NPO towards other stakeholders and who actually face contradictory expectations. By mapping out all parties' expected returns and obligations we may actually be able to appreciate how the cycle of reciprocity and value appropriation works in a 'full' stakeholder network.

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11. Annexes

11.1a SPC Survey in Spanish as applied to the sample

Part 1. Como (voluntario/empleado/donador), YO ESPERO DE LA ORGANIZACIÓN QUE ESTA....	Part 2. La Organización puede esperar DE MI, COMO (voluntario/empleado/donador), que yo....
EREL Demuestre preocupación por mi reputación e imagen	OREL Demuestre preocupación por nuestra asociación
EREL Ofrezca una asociación/acuerdo seguro	OREL Responda a sus preocupaciones
EREL Se preocupe de mí, incluso más allá de nuestro acuerdo	OREL Tome decisiones con sus intereses en mente
EREL Demuestre aprecio por lo que hago y lo que soy	OREL Demuestre preocupación por su reputación e imagen
EREL Considere no solamente el resultado final, pero también mis esfuerzos	OREL Aporte con mis propias ideas a nuestra relación
ETRA Me rinda cuentas únicamente por las responsabilidades relacionadas a nuestro acuerdo o contrato	OTRA Actúe de acuerdo a las responsabilidades específicas establecidas en un principio
ETRA Limite su involucramiento conmigo a responsabilidades y tareas específicas	OTRA Establezca un acuerdo de nuestra asociación por escrito
ETRA Se comprometa a mantener nuestra relación en el futuro	OTRA Indique explícitamente mis intenciones y planes para nuestra relación
ETRA Establezca responsabilidades específicas y bien definidas para nuestra relación	OTRA Indique claramente si surgen problemas dentro de nuestra relación
ETRA Establezca acuerdos sobre nuestra asociación por escrito	OIDE Contribuya a la causa
ETRA Brinde una rendición de cuentas específicamente por los procedimientos y resultados que nos conciernen	OIDE Respalde la causa, incluso si esto requiere un sacrificio financiero de mi parte
ETRA Describa sin ambigüedad mis obligaciones hacia ellos	OIDE Demuestre compromiso con la causa y fomente que otros también se involucren en ella
ETRA Describa sin ambigüedad mis derechos al relacionarme con ellos	OIDE Actúe como defensor público de esta causa
EIDE Contribuya a la causa establecida	OIDE Contribuya al logro de esta causa
EIDE Comprometa recursos (financieros, humanos, en género u otros) hacia la causa	OIDE Actúe de acuerdo a los principios de la organización
EIDE Respalde la causa de la organización, incluso si esto requiere un sacrificio financiero	OIDE Desarrolle prácticas orientadas a contribuir a la causa
EIDE Fomente la participación de otros actores en la causa	OIDE Contribuya a la causa, incluso si esto significa no ser compensado por ello
EIDE Actúe como defensores públicos de la causa patrocinada	Part 3. ¿Cómo calificaría usted las siguientes...?
EIDE Sea devota de la causa de la organización	Satisf. Su nivel de satisfacción con la organización
EIDE Mantenga una cultura organizacional que promueva los principios de la organización	Satisf. El rendimiento de esta organización
EIDE Desarrolle prácticas en favor de la causa	Satisf. El grado en que sus expectativas están en línea con las de la organización
	Engagem. Su grado de compromiso personal con la causa de la organización
	Solo para FUNCIONARIOS o Empleados....
	Turnover Durante los últimos 6 meses he considerado seriamente buscar trabajo en otra empresa
	Turnover Considerando todo, haré todo por dejar mi trabajo actual lo más pronto posible
	Turnover Me encuentro buscando activamente otro trabajo

11.1b SPC Survey in English

Part 1. As a stakeholder, I EXPECT from the organization that it...	Part 2. The organization can expect FROM ME that I....
EREL Show concern for my reputation and image	OREL Show concern for our partnership
EREL Offers a secure partnership/agreement	OREL Respond to their concerns
EREL Shows concern for my wellbeing, even beyond our agreement	OREL Make decisions with their interests in mind
EREL Shows appreciation for what I do and who I am	OREL Show concern for their reputation and image
EREL Considers not only the end result, but also my efforts	OREL Contribute with my ideas to our partnership
ETRA Accounts to me only for the responsibilities limited to our agreement or contract	OTRA Act according to the specific responsibilities established in our agreement
ETRA Limits their involvement with me to a specific set of duties and responsibilities	OTRA Establish a written agreement on our partnership
ETRA Makes commitments to maintain our relationship in the future	OTRA Explicitly indicate my intentions and plans for this partnership
ETRA Establishes specific and well-defined responsibilities for our relationship	OTRA Clearly indicate if problems on our relationship arise
ETRA Establishes written agreements regarding our partnership	OIDE Contribute to their cause
ETRA Provides specific accountability regarding the procedures and results concerning our agreement	OIDE Stand by the cause, even if this means making a financial sacrifice
ETRA Clearly describes my obligations towards the NPO	OIDE Demonstrate engagement to the cause and encourage others to engage
ETRA Clearly describes my rights within this NPO	OIDE Act as a public advocate of the cause.
EIDE Contributes to the stated cause.	OIDE Contribute to the fulfillment of their mission
EIDE Commits resources (human, financial, etc.) towards the stated cause.	OIDE Act according to their organization's principles.
EIDE Supports the stated cause, even if it requires making a financial sacrifice.	OIDE Develop practices oriented to the contribution to the cause.
EIDE Encourages other stakeholders to participate in the cause	OIDE Contribute to the cause, even if it means not being compensated for it.
EIDE Acts as a public advocate in favor of cause.	Part 3. How would you evaluate the following statements?
EIDE Devotes itself to the contribution to the cause	Satisf. Your level of satisfaction with the organization
EIDE Maintains an organizational culture that promotes the organization's principles.	Satisf. The organization's performance
EIDE Develops internal practices and policies that advance on the organization's ideals.	Satisf. The degree to which your expectations are in line with the organization's expectations
	Engagem Your level of personal commitment with the cause sponsored by the organization
	For EMPLOYEES only...
	Turnover In the last 6 months I have seriously considered to look for another job
	Turnover Considering everything, I will do anything to quit my job as soon as possible
	Turnover I am currently looking for another job

11.2. Correlation coefficients between all variables per group of stakeholders

		Pearson Correlation						Satisfaction with the Organization	Engagement towards the Cause	Turnover Intention
		EREL	ETRA	EIDE	OREL	OTRA	OIDE			
Volunteers n=271	EREL	1	.626**	.473**	.640**	.567**	.449**	.158**	.194**	
	ETRA		1	.539**	.593**	.720**	.487**	0.005	0.053	
	EIDE			1	.667**	.636**	.756**	0.074	0.047	
	OREL				1	.753**	.724**	.133*	.183**	
	OTRA					1	.667**	0.032	0.083	
	OIDE						1	.209**	.175**	
	Satisfaction							1	.579**	
	Engagement								1	
Employees n=171	EREL	1	.558**	.520**	.498**	.492**	.343**	.204*	.184*	-0.003
	ETRA		1	.582**	.565**	.711**	.490**	0.072	0.11	0.163
	EIDE			1	.575**	.521**	.646**	0.035	.224*	0.063
	OREL				1	.581**	.658**	.258**	0.171	-0.045
	OTRA					1	.529**	0.082	0.134	0.104
	OIDE						1	.238**	.253**	-0.114
	Satisfaction							1	.698**	-.497**
	Engagement								1	-.368**
Donors n=21	EREL	1	.923**	.620**	0.187	0.172	-0.021	0.322	0.354	
	ETRA		1	.639**	0.249	0.227	0.073	0.382	0.381	
	EIDE			1	0.084	-0.056	0.127	.750**	.800**	
	OREL				1	.815**	.834**	-0.181	-0.255	
	OTRA					1	.640**	-0.209	-0.255	
	OIDE						1	-0.198	-0.247	
	Satisfaction							1	.811**	
	Engagement								1	

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

11.3 ANOVA Paired T-test between all currencies, results per group

Volunteers	Paired Samples Test						t	Sig. (2-tailed)
	Paired Differences			95% Confidence Interval of the Difference				
	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	Lower	Upper			
EREL - ETRA	0.08905	0.65361	0.0397	0.01088	0.16722	2.243*	0.026	
EREL - EIDE	-0.3928	0.74045	0.04498	-0.48136	-0.30425	-8.733**	0	
EREL - OREL	-0.34613	0.62862	0.03819	-0.42131	-0.27095	-9.064**	0	
EREL - OTRA	-0.14742	0.69232	0.04206	-0.23022	-0.06462	-3.505**	0.001	
EREL - OIDE	-0.35821	0.77286	0.04695	-0.45064	-0.26578	-7.630**	0	
ETRA - EIDE	-0.48186	0.67334	0.0409	-0.56239	-0.40133	-11.781**	0	
ETRA - OREL	-0.43518	0.64982	0.03947	-0.51289	-0.35746	-11.024**	0	
ETRA - OTRA	-0.23647	0.54194	0.03292	-0.30128	-0.17166	-7.183**	0	
ETRA - OIDE	-0.44726	0.72647	0.04413	-0.53415	-0.36038	-10.135**	0	
EIDE - OREL	0.04668	0.55576	0.03376	-0.01979	0.11315	1.383	0.168	
EIDE - OTRA	0.24539	0.585	0.03554	0.17542	0.31535	6.905**	0	
EIDE - OIDE	0.03459	0.4735	0.02876	-0.02203	0.09122	1.203	0.23	
OREL - OTRA	0.19871	0.49607	0.03013	0.13938	0.25804	6.594**	0	
OREL - OIDE	-0.01208	0.51801	0.03147	-0.07404	0.04987	-0.384	0.701	
OTRA - OIDE	-0.21079	0.57294	0.0348	-0.27931	-0.14227	-6.057**	0	
Employees								
EREL - ETRA	0.02792	0.53511	0.04947	-0.07006	0.1259	0.564	0.574	
EREL - EIDE	-0.14124	0.56317	0.05206	-0.24436	-0.03812	-2.713**	0.008	
EREL - OREL	-0.07009	0.59557	0.05506	-0.17914	0.03897	-1.273	0.206	
EREL - OTRA	-0.07607	0.59912	0.05539	-0.18577	0.03364	-1.373	0.172	
EREL - OIDE	0.02009	0.70159	0.06486	-0.10838	0.14855	0.31	0.757	
ETRA - EIDE	-0.16916	0.47467	0.04388	-0.25608	-0.08224	-3.855**	0	
ETRA - OREL	-0.09801	0.50874	0.04703	-0.19116	-0.00485	-2.084*	0.039	
ETRA - OTRA	-0.10399	0.41723	0.03857	-0.18039	-0.02759	-2.696**	0.008	
ETRA - OIDE	-0.00783	0.57316	0.05299	-0.11279	0.09712	-0.148	0.883	
EIDE - OREL	0.07115	0.50958	0.04711	-0.02215	0.16446	1.51	0.134	
EIDE - OTRA	0.06517	0.54129	0.05004	-0.03394	0.16429	1.302	0.195	
EIDE - OIDE	0.16132	0.48581	0.04491	0.07237	0.25028	3.592**	0	
OREL - OTRA	-0.00598	0.52646	0.04867	-0.10238	0.09042	-0.123	0.902	
OREL - OIDE	0.09017	0.49205	0.04549	0.00007	0.18027	1.982*	0.05	
OTRA - OIDE	0.09615	0.57713	0.05336	-0.00952	0.20183	1.802	0.074	
Donors								
EREL - ETRA	-0.05079	0.42172	0.09203	-0.24276	0.14117	-0.552	0.587	
EREL - EIDE	-0.44167	0.85514	0.18661	-0.83092	-0.05241	-2.367*	0.028	
EREL - OREL	-0.4381	1.13951	0.24866	-0.95679	0.0806	-1.762	0.093	
EREL - OTRA	-0.45952	1.16786	0.25485	-0.99113	0.07208	-1.803	0.086	
EREL - OIDE	-0.525	1.19169	0.26005	-1.06745	0.01745	-2.019	0.057	
ETRA - EIDE	-0.39087	0.82763	0.1806	-0.76761	-0.01414	-2.164*	0.043	
ETRA - OREL	-0.3873	1.09288	0.23849	-0.88477	0.11017	-1.624	0.12	
ETRA - OTRA	-0.40873	1.12358	0.24519	-0.92018	0.10272	-1.667	0.111	
ETRA - OIDE	-0.47421	1.13899	0.24855	-0.99267	0.04426	-1.908	0.071	
EIDE - OREL	0.00357	0.97164	0.21203	-0.43871	0.44586	0.017	0.987	
EIDE - OTRA	-0.01786	1.07332	0.23422	-0.50643	0.47071	-0.076	0.94	
EIDE - OIDE	-0.08333	0.88152	0.19236	-0.4846	0.31793	-0.433	0.67	
OREL - OTRA	-0.02143	0.39767	0.08678	-0.20245	0.15959	-0.247	0.807	
OREL - OIDE	-0.0869	0.34583	0.07547	-0.24433	0.07052	-1.152	0.263	
OTRA - OIDE	-0.06548	0.52085	0.11366	-0.30256	0.17161	-0.576	0.571	

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

11.4 Coefficients for all variables in Model A and Final Model

MODEL A		Volunteers			Employees			Donors			
		Coef	z	P> z	Coef	z	P> z	Coef	z	P> z	
Total Satisfaction	Expectations	Relational	0.178623	2.19*	0.029	0.217893	1.91	0.056	-0.65281	-1.48	0.14
	Expectations	Transactional	-0.10461	-1.15	0.25	-0.06899	-0.49	0.627	0.071932	0.16	0.877
		Ideological	-0.18592	-2*	0.046	-0.25888	-1.95	0.052	0.324926	0.81	0.42
		Relational	0.469287	0.44	0.662	0.170798	1.28	0.2	0.435598	0.96	0.336
	Obligations	Transactional	-0.18321	-1.74	0.083	-0.13963	-1.01	0.31	0.019208	0.06	0.956
		Ideological	0.409457	4.22**	0	0.311398	2.38*	0.017	-0.24464	-0.48	0.631
Turnover Intention					-0.52012	-5.55	0				
Engagement	Expectations	Relational	0.164415	2	0.046	0.130898	1.11	0.268	-0.50605	-1.2	0.231
	Expectations	Transactional	-0.074	-0.81	0.42	-0.09901	-0.68	0.493	-0.1628	-0.38	0.707
		Ideological	-0.25453	-2.74	0.006	0.115653	0.84	0.403	0.719956	2.03*	0.042
		Relational	0.180394	1.68	0.093	-0.0574	-0.42	0.676	0.0786	0.18	0.856
	Obligations	Transactional	-0.10766	-1.01	0.313	-0.01124	-0.08	0.937	0.260689	0.81	0.415
		Ideological	0.269289	8.65	0.007	0.218563	1.61	0.108	-0.40337	-0.85	0.393
Turnover Intention					0.008698	0.07	0.941				
FINAL MODEL		Volunteers			Employees			Donors			
		Coef (β)	z	P> z	Coef	z	P> z	Coef	z	P> z	
Total Satisfaction	Expectations	Relational			0.13662	1.82	0.069	-0.54399	-2.99**	0.003	
		Transactional									
		Ideological			-0.32861	-3.67**	0				
	Obligations	Relational						0.453902	2.34*	0.019	
		Transactional	-0.1814	-2.68**	0.007						
		Ideological	0.331144	4.64**	0	0.386607	3.91**	0			
Turnover Intention					-0.51823	-7.31**	0				
Engagement	Expectations	Relational						-0.5209	-3.26**	0.001	
		Transactional									
		Ideological	-0.1334	-1.68	0.093				0.474509	2.85**	0.004
	Obligations	Relational									
		Transactional									
		Ideological	0.275	3.31**	0.001	0.243312	2.72**	0.007			
Turnover Intention											
Engagement- Satisfaction Covariance		0.516189	11.51**	0	0.717175	15.22**	0				

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

