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### Repository Citation

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## **Memories Cloaked in Magic: Memory and Identity in *Tin Man***

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### **Introduction**

In *Replications: A Robotic History of the Science Fiction Film* [Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1995], J. P. Telotte argues that "through its long history, one that dates back to the very origins of film, this genre [science fiction] has focused its attention on the problematic nature of human being and the difficult task of being human." [1-2] The thesis of the book, he states, is "relatively simple—that the image of human artifice ... is the single most important one in the genre. [...] Through this image of artifice, our films have sought to reframe the human image and reaffirm that sense of self about which we ... appear so anxious today." [5]

Substitute "magical" for "technological" – or at least, substitute a magically-infused steampunk form of technology – and Telotte's thesis applies as well to the SciFi channel's miniseries *Tin Man* as to any other science fiction work. In particular, *Tin Man* offers a varied and subtle exploration of the sense of self in terms of the issue of the relationship between memory and identity by offering us not one but three characters who must regain and acknowledge ownership of their memories in order to restore their true identities, restorations which are important not only to the characters on a personal level, but which are critical in the resolution of the plot.

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### **Locke**

The gold standard for beginning a discussion on self-identity in the modern age of Western intellectual history is the philosophy of John Locke. Best known in the United States for his *Second Treatise on Government*, which provided the philosophical underpinnings of the American Revolution, Locke also propounded a highly influential view on self-identity.

"Since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational being: and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done." (*Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Chapter 27, Paragraph 9)

Locke's position is often glossed as saying that memory is the key to self-identity, but he does not precisely say that; rather, he says that **consciousness of past actions** is the crucial element. This understanding can help us explore issues of memory and identity in *Tin Man*.

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### **Prologue: The Mystic Man**

While the character of the Wizard is splintered into several analogues in *Tin Man*<sup>i</sup>, the Mystic Man is the most obvious; the heroine and her three companions travel to Central City to find him, hoping that he can help them on their quests. Upon reaching him, they are disappointed to observe that he has become addicted to a substance known as the Vapors that causes disassociation and memory loss. A character who knew him in the past says, "That's not the Mystic Man I remember," clearly linking his willingness to recognize the Mystic Man's identity to the Mystic Man's ability to access his own memory. The Mystic Man's memory is magically restored shortly thereafter, and he is then able to provide assistance to the characters. The transition from his first amnesiac appearance to his magical cure takes only a few minutes; nevertheless, his case demonstrates in microcosm the more extensive problems of memory and identity that three of the characters face throughout the course of the entire program.

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### **DG**

DG (the analogue to Dorothy) is a princess of the O.Z. (the "Outer Zone," the analogue to Oz in *Tin Man*), the younger daughter of the Queen. Killed at the age of five by an evil Sorceress (whom we shall discuss later), DG was brought back to life by her mother, a powerful magic user, and sent to live on the Otherside, that is, in our world. Her memories of her life in the O.Z. were deliberately cloaked in magic by her mother to safeguard valuable information. As a result, DG does not know that she is originally from the O.Z. She does not know that she is a princess, nor does she know that she has inherited considerable magical ability. Her life as a waitress and part-time student in small-town Kansas is the only reality she knows. At the age of 20, DG is brought back to the O.Z when a tornado descends on her farmhouse.

Aristotle says (Nicomachean Ethics III.1) that certain types of ignorance can relieve a person of moral culpability, although ignorance of one's own identity is extraordinarily unlikely:

[I]t is not mistaken purpose that causes involuntary action (it leads rather to wickedness), nor ignorance of the universal (for that men are blamed), but ignorance of particulars, i.e. of the circumstances of the action and the objects with which it is concerned. For it is on these that both pity and pardon depend,

since the person who is ignorant of any of these acts involuntarily. [...] A man may be ignorant, then, of who he is, what he is doing, what or whom he is acting on, and sometimes also what (e.g. what instrument) he is doing it with, and to what end (e.g. he may think his act will conduce to some one's safety), and how he is doing it (e.g. whether gently or violently). Now of all of these no one could be ignorant unless he were mad, and evidently also he could not be ignorant of the agent; for how could he not know himself?

[<http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.3.iii.html>, 1110b15 – 1111a17]

On one interpretation, DG is in exactly this situation. When she says to her companions in the O.Z., "I've never been here before," Aristotle might say that she cannot be blamed for lying, for she is ignorant of who she is, and therefore doesn't know that she is actually from the O.Z.

A more radical interpretation, however, and one more consonant with Locke's theory, is that the DG who utters these words is telling the truth because she is not the DG who lived in the O.Z. She has no access to those experiences in her memory and is thus not the same person. Although DG's physical substance is the same as that small child, her consciousness, that is, her true self, is not. The fact that her physical body is continuous is, to Locke, irrelevant.

"For, it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself, personal identity depends upon that only, whether it be annexed solely to one individual substance, or can be continued in a succession of several substances." (II.27.10)

Locke argues that when a being has been "wholly stripp'd of all the consciousness of its past existence" it is not the same self as the earlier being (II.27.14). Insofar as DG is not conscious of her past experiences, she is not the same person who had them.

Although DG's memories of her early life have been suppressed, she has three sources of information about the O.Z. that come to her before she travels there.

1. She frequently sketches scenes from the O.Z. as if they are fantasies from her own imagination.
2. As the miniseries begins, DG has just begun to have dreams featuring both memories from her life in the O.Z. and a vision of the Queen (her real mother, whom she does not recognize); these dreams were apparently sent by the Queen as a signal that it was time for DG to return to the O.Z.
3. Finally, DG's adoptive father Hank has been telling her stories and sayings since childhood, making sure that she has them memorized word-for-word. Because of her lack of memories about the O.Z., she does not understand the significance of these stories and sayings while she is on the Otherside. Only when she travels to the O.Z. does she realize that they provide clues to her quest. Her adoptive mother Em explains in Part I that "our deeper purpose was to tell you the stories of our world, stories that would prepare you for your return."

DG is initially guided in her adventures by these sources of information; she gradually recovers information on her own, recognizing places she has been but without recalling the experiences that she had there.

A close reading of Locke such as that proposed in John Sutton's *Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to connectionism* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998] strengthens this understanding of DG's position of discontinuity. Sutton observes that Locke explicitly moves away from an definition of memory common in earlier philosophers as a straightforward repository of information and toward the idea of memory as the power to revive at will perceptions that a person once experienced. [167-168] While DG has access to information about the O.Z., it is quite another matter for her to revive the perceptions that she once experienced.

Nonetheless, we must observe an important difference between DG and Locke's theoretical being who has been "wholly stripp'd of all the consciousness of its past existence." Locke only insists on a loss of identity when that consciousness has been lost "beyond the power of ever retrieving again" [ibid]. Since DG's memories have been cloaked in magic—a reversible process—she is able to regain consciousness of her previous existence. Beginning in Part II, she begins to recover actual memories, depicted as flashbacks, in which she is conscious of having experienced events from her childhood in the O.Z.

DG's magical abilities, a significant element of her identity, are tied to her memories. Unlike Harry Potter, her childhood in Kansas was not sprinkled with accidental mysterious incidents; there is no mention of her banishment from the reptile house at the local zoo. DG evinces magical powers in tandem with her recovering memory. Her first actual use of magic coincides with her first actual memory of the O.Z. that is not a piece of disconnected information, a dream, a sketch, or one of Hank's stories: she recognizes a spinning doll that her old tutor carries with him, and is able to make it spin, then remembers in a flashback the first time she made it spin as a child. Her subsequent uses of magic are also accompanied by flashbacks to her early childhood, and she demonstrates increasingly powerful magical abilities as she acquires more of her memories and further integrates them into her identity. It is a struggle for her to reintegrate this new awareness of her past experiences into her present self and one of the themes of the miniseries is DG's transition from denial to acceptance.

Part of what makes the transition especially difficult is that DG's suppressed memories include an experience, which she vividly relives, of her abandonment of her sister Azkadellia during an attack by an evil Witch. DG feels tremendous guilt as she realizes that everything that has happened since the Witch took possession of Azkadellia is at least partly her fault. Once this transition is accomplished, however, the DG we see at the end of the miniseries is continuous in identity both with the little princess of the flashbacks and with the frustrated waitress of small-town Kansas.

Early in the miniseries, DG is possessed of a vague sense, similar to Neo's at the beginning of *The Matrix*, that something about reality is not quite right. In Part I she tells

her adoptive parents, "This isn't my life!" and "I just don't feel at home here." Possibly because of her sense of dislocation, DG rejects the socially-constructed identity that is imposed upon her in Kansas. Resisting the expectations that would normally be placed on a pretty young woman in a rural community, she dresses like a tomboy, racks up speeding tickets on her motorcycle, and helps her adoptive father fix farm equipment. In addition, she seeks escape metaphorically through artwork, drawing pictures of her dreams and daydreams, and more literally by poring over travel brochures for exotic places like Australia<sup>ii</sup>. Although she clearly rejects social norms, they nevertheless play a role in her self-construction; her choice of jeans and sneakers is directed by her decision not to conform to more feminine garb, while her tomboyish behavior is directed by her decision not to adopt more ladylike hobbies. As feminist philosopher Sally Haslanger observes, "Whether or not I accept [social] norms, negotiating them was the process by which I became a woman." (Haslanger 2008)

Once in the O.Z., DG's social identity is entirely reconstructed, as she learns that she is a princess who is expected to save her people by wielding magical power. She resists this new imposition, curiously enough, by taking refuge in the identity she had previously striven so hard to escape. When her mother appears to her in a vision to urge her on, DG protests, "I'm a waitress. And a part-time student. I don't think I can do this." As she gradually recovers her identity in terms of her memory, however, she also becomes more and more capable of taking on the social identity of a world-saving princess. She never lets go of the behaviors she has developed in resistance to social expectations in our world; active and brave, she repeatedly rescues herself and comes to the aid of her companions in a refreshingly nonstereotypical manner.

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## **Glitch**

Glitch (the analogue to the Scarecrow) has lost his memory in a different way than DG. He was a royal adviser and inventor who had designed but not yet built a machine (partly technological, partly magical) to extend the growing season by altering the position of the suns, called the Sun Seeder. He refused to cooperate with the Sorceress' plan to build the machine in an altered, evil form intended to cast the O.Z. into perpetual darkness; as a result, she had a portion of his brain removed by alchemists, keeping it in a life-support mechanism and extracting from it the information required. Although this is not in fact how the human brain works—at least, not in our universe—the miniseries appears to propose a computer analogy, as if the portion of his brain removed was the filled memory storage, while the portion remaining to Glitch included the operating system, other software, and enough blank storage space to form new memories. The audience, along with DG, learns early in Part I that brain removal is a normally a punishment used to "re-educate" criminals.

Glitch has inconsistent access to his long-term memory. He does not know his real name, or the Queen's. He does not recognize most of the people he once knew. He clings

fiercely, however, to what little he does remember, particularly his status as an adviser to the Queen and his occupation as an intellectual; he has a strong sense of consciousness of himself as having experienced his life in the O.Z. prior to the removal of part of his brain. This explains why he retains such a strong sense of identity and even pride in his previous accomplishments.

Glitch makes a number of statements that indicate his attachment to his identity, beginning with his statement in Part I that part of his brain was removed "because of what I know, or used to know." Unlike DG, who initially insists that she is a waitress, not a princess, he consistently refers to his previous self as "I" and retains a strong sense of continuity between his former and present selves. Once they get to know him, his companions reinforce this sense of continuity. After observing a vision depicting his past self's refusal to cooperate with the Sorceress, a refusal that led to his debrainment, the other characters praise his self-sacrifice and refer to Glitch's previous, pre-operation self as "you," that is, a being whose identity is continuous with Glitch in his current state.

He cannot, at will, revive all of the perceptions that he once experienced; in this respect his long-term memory is severely damaged by the removal of part of his brain. On several occasions, however, he does appear capable of reviving those perceptions in a partial and disjointed manner. On another occasion, an empathic healer is able to retrieve memories to which Glitch himself did not previously have access, which suggests that the ability to revive further perceptions may still exist in a latent fashion. Sutton observes [170-171] that Locke is reluctant to discuss in detail the effects upon the continuity of identity of ordinary forgetfulness and the normal tendency of memories to fade over time; while Glitch's loss of memory is not ordinary or normal, some inability to revive distinct perceptions is yet compatible with continuity of identity within Locke's theory.

Locke also acknowledges the phenomenon that our memories are sometimes activated without our conscious control, reviving earlier perceptions that we did not particularly seek to reactivate [II.10.7; discussed in Sutton, 173]; we see this on several occasions when Glitch unexpectedly pops up with chunks of technical detail concerning the identification of a holographic projector or the characteristics of a rare chemical element.

Glitch's situation is thrown into sharp relief by contrast with the backstory of Cain, the Tin Woodman analogue. Cain had joined the resistance against the Sorceress, and as punishment his family was dragged away before his eyes while he was imprisoned in a tin suit, held captive there until DG and Glitch let him out. While in the suit, he was subjected to a holographic projection replaying his own capture and the seizure of his family, over and over. Thus, he was not able to rely on the normal tendency of memories to fade over time to soften the blow of what was done to him and the ones he loved; rather, he was forced to re-experience those perceptions repeatedly during his imprisonment. If we take memory in Locke's sense of a power to revive perceptions, Cain's was artificially enhanced, while Glitch's was artificially damaged; both forms of alteration were harmful.

In a scene that strongly echoes the Wizard's conversation with the Scarecrow, Tin Man, and Cowardly Lion in the 1939 movie, DG assures each of her companions at a critical moment in Part III that he already possesses the quality he seeks. She tells Glitch, "Glitch, you're the smartest guy I know. You helped me remember my past and that's probably the most important weapon I have now." In addition to explicitly linking Glitch's situation to her own<sup>iii</sup> DG's speech appears to affirm that Glitch has a complete identity of his own, whether or not he is ever reunited with the missing portion of his brain.

When Glitch is reconnected with the missing portion of his brain toward the end of the miniseries, he is able to retrieve the information needed to shut down the machine. He also uses his newly recovered memory to strengthen his identity; the first thing he says is, "My name isn't Glitch. It's Ambrose." The connection, however, lasts only long enough to achieve the desired goal of shutting down the machine, after which Glitch is once again disconnected. The miniseries ends very shortly thereafter and we never learn whether he will be reconnected permanently to the missing portion of his brain. DG's earlier speech, however, suggests that he does not need to be.

Glitch's case enables us to apply some of Locke's more outlandish thought experiments, which otherwise might go unexplored, particularly by the squeamish. For Locke, if part of the body is removed, and consciousness does not go along with that part of the body, and in fact the self loses sensation and awareness of that part of the body (for example, if a hand is cut off), then that part of the body ceases to be part of the person. We may compare this to Glitch's missing half-a-brain, of which (except for one brief period near the end of the third episode) he has no sensation or direct awareness. Conversely, for Locke, if part of the body is removed and consciousness does go along with that part of the body – he considers the possibility that a little finger is removed and that the person's self-consciousness is contained within that little finger – then that part of the body is the person. This again would seem to apply to Glitch's body with its remaining half-a-brain, as being the part of him in which his consciousness is contained.

There is one difficulty with this interpretation, which results from a lacuna within the script. We are never told whether Glitch's missing half-a-brain has its own consciousness or not. If so, we have identity problems that go far beyond even Locke's weirdest thought experiments. I prefer to believe that it doesn't, if only to keep from multiplying hypotheses unnecessarily.<sup>iv</sup>

Glitch experiences another complication with regard to his identity, well known to contemporary thinkers such as Haslanger, and also foreshadowed by Locke. Locke proposes yet another thought experiment to examine elements of identity; this one concerns a prince and a cobbler who swap bodies, so that the prince's consciousness now resides in the body of the cobbler. Locke observes that identity has a social and contextual component, so that the prince's consciousness, transferred into the body of the cobbler, will appear to those around him to be the cobbler, even though it will still appear to the prince to be the prince himself. Shabbily dressed in the rags of his former finery, marked as a "headcase" by the obvious zipper down the middle of his head, Glitch looks



like a vagabond and a criminal; no one initially believes his claim to be an inventor and royal adviser. He receives no reinforcement from society for his identity; in fact, quite the opposite. In addition to struggling internally to maintain his own identity, Glitch must also resist the erroneous socially-constructed identity that is constantly forced upon him.

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## **The Sorceress**

The character of the Sorceress (the Wicked Witch analogue) is a complicated one. At first, the audience is led to believe that she is DG's older sister Azkadellia; later we learn that she is a fusion creature, made up of Azkadellia herself and an evil, unnamed Witch who has taken possession of her.<sup>v</sup>

The Witch and Azkadellia never blend into a single being like the Companion-Commissioner in the *Star Trek: The Original Series* episode "Metamorphosis" or the learned gentleman and Rekh-mara in E. Nesbit's novel *The Story of the Amulet*. The Sorceress is depicted on multiple occasions having conversations with herself, which the audience comes to realize are conversations between Azkadellia and the Witch, who retain their individual personalities. Outside of these conversations, when the Sorceress speaks as "I," the Witch is clearly in control.

The Sorceress sometimes speaks as if she is relying solely on Azkadellia's memories, as when she tells DG in Part II that they were friends as children, sometimes as if she is relying solely on the Witch's memories, as when she rejoices in Part III that her plan is coming to fruition "and this time I'll get it right." The Witch appears to be in primary control even when the Sorceress is relating information based on Azkadellia's memories. This is reflected in the reactions of Azkadellia's family members. At various times the Queen tells her, "You are not my daughter" and "I am not your mother." DG says "You're not my sister." The Sorceress herself tells Azkadellia's father that his daughter is gone.

We are shown that Azkadellia has possession of her own memories and is able to revive her previous perceptions, but we also see the Witch constantly re-interpreting their significance for her. During an internal conversation in Part II when the Sorceress has returned to Azkadellia's childhood home, which DG has magically restored, Azkadellia sighs, "We were so happy here." The Witch sharply reminds her that her family has abandoned her, while the Witch will never abandon her.

While the Witch occasionally prods Azkadellia's memory to gain advantage<sup>vi</sup>, Azkadellia's mother and sister believe that her memories are the key to her ability to fight the Witch and re-assert her own identity. The Queen says to her in Part II, "And what about you, Azkadellia? Perhaps DG isn't the only one who needs to unlock her memories." DG helps her sister to reassert her own identity and escape from the Witch's control by reminding her of specific events that DG has remembered from their shared past, causing Azkadellia to revive her own perceptions of those events (depicted in flashbacks from Azkadellia's point of view). During this conversation, both DG and

Azkadellia are represented as their childhood selves, representing a return to the unambiguous identities that each once possessed.

Locke's philosophy is both helpful and problematic in the case of the Sorceress. The discussion of contextual identity found in the thought experiment of the prince and the cobbler is helpful in explaining why the Sorceress is frequently called Azkadellia, even though the dominant personality within her is that of the Witch. She has the body and therefore the physical appearance of Azkadellia, which determines her apparent identity to others. Unlike Glitch and DG, who both resist their socially-constructed identities, the Sorceress exploits her identification as Azkadellia – the elder Princess and heir to the throne – to wield authority over her realm.

Locke's discussion of bodyswapping, however, is also problematic for this case; he appears to assume that only one consciousness governs each substance at any given time; the cobbler's body is "deserted by his own soul" (presumably the cobbler's consciousness takes up residence in the prince's body). While Locke considers the possibility that more than one consciousness could inhabit the same substance, he is referring to the theory of metempsychosis; the separate consciousnesses would inhabit the substance sequentially, and his point is that there is very little sense in which one such individual is the same as another who lived a past life with the same soul. He does not address the possibility of two consciousnesses inhabiting the same body.

Furthermore, Locke's claim that "whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions, is the same person to whom they both belong" appears to raise a problem for the conclusion of the miniseries. We know that the compound being known as the Sorceress had access to the memories of both the Witch and Azkadellia. It is not clear to what extent the individual persons within the Sorceress had access to one another's memories; the most obvious interpretation, I believe, is that the Witch had some kind of access to Azkadellia's, while Azkadellia may or may not have had access to the Witch's.

If Azkadellia did have access to the Witch's memories, then the miniseries might not have ended the way we are meant to think it did. After Azkadellia re-asserts her own identity and separates herself from the Witch, the Witch reappears in her own physical form and is destroyed (in fact, melted). At this point we are meant to believe that the Witch is, in fact, really most sincerely dead. If, however, Azkadellia possesses her memories, then it is possible that the Witch still lives on, in Azkadellia. Although Azkadellia tells her parents, "It's over. The Witch is gone," that's also exactly what the Witch would say under those circumstances.

However, I believe this terrifying prospect may be averted by paying close attention once again to Locke's theory. While Azkadellia may possess the information that was stored in the Witch's memory, she would not have the consciousness of having experienced events in the Witch's past herself and thus does not have the capability of reviving the Witch's perceptions. Since she does not possess this consciousness or capability, she is not, and does not possess the identity of, the Witch. This also explains why, even when they are combined into the Sorceress, the Witch must prompt Azkadellia to revive the perception

of her past experiences at her childhood home; since memory is not merely a repository of stored information, only Azkadellia herself has the power to bring her past experiences to the fore. Thus we can say that the two persons within the Sorceress, who clearly differ in personality and will, are also distinguished by their consciousness of past experiences.

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## **Conclusion**

While concepts such as the constructedness of the self and the anxiety attendant upon our realization thereof may appear peculiarly postmodern, in fact they are supported by a close reading of Locke's classic theory of self identity. Whether we are considering ourselves as bearing the responsibility to create ourselves, or whether we are concerned about the social norms that we must negotiate in order to claim our identities, Locke appears to foreshadow these contemporary concerns.

For Locke, our continued identity through time is not merely a matter of the static possession of a warehouse of information (a common misunderstanding of his position). Rather, it is a function of the power we have to revive perceptions that we have experienced. This power, Locke admits, is subject to some normal loss over time owing to ordinary wear and tear; we have to come to terms with the fact that we can never wholly revive all of our perceptions, and thus the self-identity that we have the potential to build will always be incomplete.

Three major characters in *Tin Man* also demonstrate possible ways in which this power to revive our perceptions and thereby construct our identities can be damaged from without: in DG's case, by the complete though benevolent blockage of access to her experiences, including traumatic and guilt-inducing events that are painful for her to recover; in Glitch's case, by the partial removal of portions of his brain in which some of his memories were stored; in Azkadellia's case, by the constant exploitation and re-interpretation of her memories. These cases may reflect our contemporary anxieties about reports of recovered memories of trauma, the curious problems of people with severe brain damage, and the effects of brainwashing. Or they may reflect in an exaggerated way our simple awareness that, as described by Locke, the construction of our self-identity is a difficult ongoing task in which we can never completely succeed, a realization that threatens our commonsense desire to believe in a stable self.

Telotte also argues that science fiction products not only depict our anxieties metaphorically, but enable us to work through them. DG is able to recover and successfully reintegrate her childhood experiences into her adult self; Glitch, despite his situation, never loses his strong self of identity; Azkadellia is able to break out of her conditioning and reassert her independent self. If these characters can emerge intact despite these obstacles, then surely we can cope with the imperfections of our own mechanisms of self-construction.

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<sup>i</sup> DG's father Ahamo is the Othersider from Nebraska who comes to the O.Z. by accident in a State Fair balloon; as happens to the Wizard in the book series, his name apparently derives from a misreading of the balloon's lettering, and like the Wizard in the movie, he acts as his own gatekeeper. DG is the one who assures her companions near the end that each already possesses the quality he seeks. Two minor characters—a shady fortuneteller and a traveling entrepreneur—appear to reflect the 1939 movie's Professor Marvel.

<sup>ii</sup> A veiled reference to the original; Australia, of course, bears the nickname "Oz."

<sup>iii</sup> Like DG's other companions, Glitch doubles and highlights an element of DG's own quest, a motif found in many adaptations of *The Wizard of Oz* as well as in the original story.

<sup>iv</sup> We actually know very little about Glitch's missing half-a-brain. It is unambiguously described as a half-a-brain (on three separate occasions), but if you look closely into the steampunk tank, it is in fact an entire brain. (One hesitates to suggest that this may simply be a matter of the props department not reading the script, or receiving conflicting instructions.) It not only contains the knowledge of how to build the SunSeeder, which was mysteriously extracted from it, but it helps to control the machine as well. When Glitch is reconnected to the half-a-brain and helps Cain begin shutting down the machine, one of the alchemists reports from a separate control room that there is "power surging in the brain cortex—some kind of synapse interference." In context, the alchemist speaks of the half-a-brain as if it was simply a part of the machine. Further reinforcing the idea that the brain portion is part of the machine, when the reconnected Glitch cannot remember the final code to shut the machine down, Cain seriously considers destroying the half-a-brain, without which the machine cannot run. None of these details indicate that the half-a-brain has any consciousness of its own. Glitch's sudden change in demeanor when he is reconnected may be explained as the effect of the reintegration of the information contained in the half-a-brain into Glitch's consciousness, rather than as evidence of an independent consciousness or personality in that half-a-brain.

<sup>v</sup> Although the term "good witch" is not used in the miniseries, the Witch is always qualified as evil; the term "witch" alone is apparently not sufficient to indicate automatically that someone is a "bad witch."

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<sup>vi</sup>"DG's not the only one who can remember, is she?" the Witch says at one point in Part II, which prompts Azkadellia to remember a clue that helps the Sorceress to hunt down the long-lost Ahamo. Azkadellia's memory is depicted as a flashback, not simply a point of information but a perception revived and relived.