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The Dynamics of the United States Foreign Policy in Latin America: An Assessment of United States Police Assistance and Latin American Revolution

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The Dynamics of the United States Foreign Policy in Latin
America: An Assessment of United States Police
Assistance and Latin American Revolution
(TITLE)

BY

Mohammed Ehsanullah Ahrari
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THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF

Master of Arts

IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

1972
YEAR

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PREFACE

The study of the foreign policy of one country towards a regional grouping of several countries is a highly complex process. Some aspects of foreign policy either have to be ignored or just touched upon in order to pursue some more important ones. While doing this, one has to be cautious that the study's conclusions should not turn out to be predetermined.

But in a macroanalysis like this, an elaborate analysis could only be made by limiting oneself to broad classification of typologies, variables, and factors. Furthermore, heavy reliance has to be made on functional and causal explanations in the socio-psycho-politico-economic analysis. These analytical tools not only give more sophistication to the analysis, but the conclusions thus drawn tend to be more meaningful and scientific.

The focus of this study is the rationale and objectives of the foreign policy of the United States toward Latin America, both "stated" and "actual". An effort has been made to analyze the actual performance of the United States foreign policy, identify the gaps between the declared and actual motivations, and its impacts on the Latin American policy.

For Latin American republics, a fairly elaborate analysis of

Latin American policy has been made by developing common social and economic factors; and by developing various typologies for the identification of various political elements in Latin America; for example, forces for change, forces for status quo, and the armed forces as a transitional force for change. Conceptualization of political repression and of political instability, which is an endemic factor of the Latin American policy, has also been made for further explanation.

The intellectual debts are not easy to identify. No words could express the special debt of gratitude I owe to Dr. Margaret Soderberg, Associate Professor of Political Science, for her understanding, patience, and a high perception, while supervising the study. I owe her my interest in Latin American politics, and also my intellectual devotion for further research. I am indebted to Dr. Joe Connelly, Chairman, Political Science Department, for his kind help, guidance, and understanding during my undergraduate and graduate work at Eastern Illinois University. My acknowledgements also go to Mr. Lawrence Bates, Associate Professor, Department of Economics, for his kind cooperation and valuable comments on the part of this study dealing with the United States economic interests in Latin America. For offering valuable comments, encouragement, and for cheerful secretarial aid, I am grateful to Janis O'Hara. Finally to all my friends, especially Carl Mathews "Carlos", Gary Stuffle "Gariola", and Anisurrahman "Mutthi", my gratitude for putting up with me during the long and hard hours of my research.

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Mohammed E. Ahrari

Spring, 1972
Charleston, Illinois

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CHAPTER I

FROM HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE TO INTERNAL SECURITY

The history of the enormous importance of Latin America to the United States could easily be traced back to 1823, when President James Monroe expressly warned the European states against interference in the Western Hemisphere.

The famous Monroe Doctrine of 1823 declared that the United States would resist all future attempts at colonization by Europe, and reserved to itself the right to act as the protector of Latin America in the event of outside aggression:

. . . we owe it therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those (European) powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. . . ¹

From the declaration of that famous doctrine to the present day, United States foreign policy has undergone various radical changes. A study of contemporary United States foreign policy makes pertinent a

¹J. D. Richardson, ed., "The Monroe Doctrine," Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. XI, p. 209, as cited in The Record of American Diplomacy, Ruhl F. Bartlett, ed., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), p. 182.

review of the various changes that policy has undergone in the past in order to get a clear picture of United States-Latin American relations and also to understand the growing importance of Latin America for architects of United States foreign policy.

In 1904, when the threat of intervention from the European powers seemed almost inevitable, President Theodore Roosevelt promptly set forth a new policy which, he hoped, would remove all future excuses for European intervention in the Western Hemisphere. The "Roosevelt Corollary", as it came to be known, stated:

Chronic wrongdoing or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society may in Latin America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the western hemisphere, the adherence of the U.S. to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an internal police power.²

This controversial "Roosevelt Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine was used to justify several instances of United States intervention in the Caribbean--in Cuba in 1898; in Panama the first intervention was in 1904. During 1917, and again in 1918, United States Marines were sent to Panama temporarily. The United States intervened in Nicaragua in 1911; and in Dominican Republic the first United States intervention took place in 1905, and from 1916-24, the United States Navy ruled the troubled country. Haiti became the fifth United States protectorate and United States Marines were sent there in 1915. Furthermore, the Roosevelt

²Ruhl F. Bartlett, op. cit., p. 539.

Corollary altered the Monroe Doctrine from one denying the right of European intervention in the Americas to one condoning the process when conducted by the United States. William Taft's "Dollar Diplomacy" was more of a direct military intervention, by and for the United States in Latin America.

The foreign policy of President Woodrow Wilson from 1913 to 1917 produced the most blatant, and inexcusable examples of intervention in the history of United States-Latin American relations. The United States intervention in Mexico in 1914, in Haiti in 1915, and the Dominican Republic in 1916 were some of the prime examples of United States intervention.

The strong reactions in Latin American countries against these high-handed actions eventually brought a slow change in the United States foreign policy, which began under the Hoover administration and was completed under the administration of President Franklin Roosevelt. This change, which was accompanied by periodic reiterations of the principles of the Good Neighbor policy, helped to bring about a renewal of mutual trust and good faith between the Latin American Republics and the United States. One of the main highlights of the Good Neighbor policy was the United States' unequivocal abandonment of unilateral intervention in Latin America.

The Seventh International Conference of American States in 1933 approved the convention on the rights and duties of states, which contained a clause stating that "no state has the right to intervene in the

internal or external affairs of another".³ Only after the United States' acceptance of the principle of non-intervention, did Pan-Americanism become a complete doctrine.

Before proceeding, it might be helpful to define Pan-Americanism and briefly review its role in the later United States-Latin American relations. Pan-Americanism is defined as "the expression of the political, cultural, social, and economic solidarity of the American states".⁴ The Pan-American movement can be divided into three phases:⁵

The first phase (1826-1889) began with the Congress of Panama, convened by Bolivar, who elaborated an alliance of reciprocal assistance-- an early application of the principle of collective security. This congress could be considered as the birth of Pan-American movement.

The second phase (1889-1948) began with the First International Conference of American States in Washington, D.C., in 1889. The conference led to the establishment of a permanent inter-American organization, the Commercial Bureau of the American Republics, later (1910) designated as the Pan-American Union (PAU). The first inter-American Conference thus founded the new Pan-American organization. The third

³The International Conference of American States, First Supplement, 1933-1940 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 1940), pp. 121-123.

⁴O. Carlos Stoetzer, The Organization of American States (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965), p. 3.

⁵Ibid., pp. 5-9. (The following discussion of the Pan-American movement has been extracted from Stoetzer.)

phase was initiated with the establishment of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948, at the Ninth International Conference of American States.

Among other important conferences held between the 1930's and 1940's, two special conferences preceding the establishment of the OAS, worth mentioning for the purposes of this study, are the special Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace in Mexico City in 1945, which, by the Act Chapultepec, extended the principle of collective security insofar as it included aggression with the continent itself; and the special Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security in Rio de Janeiro (1947), which led to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, known as the Rio Treaty. These conferences of both Chapultepec and Rio de Janeiro are considered to be the highlights of the modern Pan-American movement. They laid the groundwork for the reorganization and modernization of the inter-American system, carried out through the establishment of the present OAS at the Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogota (1948). The principal agreement contained in the Rio Treaty is article 3, which states:

The high contracting parties agree that an armed attack by any state against an American state shall be considered as an attack against all American states.⁶

⁶Ibid., pp. 88-89.

The OAS, which is a regional political organization comprising the United States and twenty Latin American Republics, has institutionalized the principles embodied in the Monroe Doctrine. All hemispheric problems have been taken up since 1948 through the machinery of the OAS.

The post World War II period commenced with a change in the United States foreign policy coinciding with the opening of the Cold War. "Containment" of Soviet Communism became the preponderant doctrine of American foreign policy during this period; which meant in the words of its author George F. Kennan:

. . . the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by adroit and vigilant application of counter-force . . . corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy.⁷

The echos of containment were also heard in Latin America. The OAS declared itself clearly against the increased efforts of the Soviet Union to extend Communism from its natural borders. The Bogota Conference in 1948 adopted a strong declaration against communism, which read:

. . . by its anti-democratic nature and its interventionist tendency, the political activity of international Communism or any other totalitarian doctrine is incompatible with the concept of American freedom.⁸

⁷American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1951), p. 120. (First published anonymously as "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, XLV (July, 1947), pp. 566-82.

⁸J. Lloyd Mechem, The United States and the Inter-American Security (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1963), p. 429.

The signatories agreed to take the necessary measures to eradicate and prevent communist activities directed from abroad.

The Fourth Consultation of Foreign Ministers at Washington, on March-April 7, 1951, had among others the two following problems on the agenda:

- I. Political and military cooperation for the defense of the Americas; and
- II. Strengthening of the internal security of the American Republics.⁹

The Latin American countries agreed to develop their military capabilities in support of their obligations for the collective defense under the Rio Treaty and to strengthen their resources for support of the United Nations in preventing aggression in other parts of the world.¹⁰

The 1954 Caracas Resolution XCIII of the Tenth Inter-American Conference, which was entitled the "Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States against Intervention of International Communism", was another significant measure to control the spread of communism. The key passage stated:

That the domination or control of the political institutions of any American states by the international communist movement, extending to this hemisphere the political system of an

⁹Press Release, Department of State, No. 1240, December 16, 1950.

¹⁰Final Act, Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Washington: Organization of American States, April 6, 1951), pp. 10-11.

extracontinental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America, and would call for a meeting of consultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties.¹¹

In 1959, when Fidel Castro came to power, he shrewdly exploited the historical anti-American feelings among the Cuban masses in the name of national liberation and he announced that the Cuban revolution was "humanistic and non-communist". The diplomatic rupture occurred during a controversy over the staff at the American embassy in Havana. President Eisenhower's answer to this was the severance of diplomatic relations with Cuba.

In 1961 the Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa charged in the Security Council that the United States was plotting an invasion of Cuba. During the same session the United States countercharged that Castroism was incompatible with hemispheric political and economic principles and was striving to initiate guerrilla war throughout the Americas.¹² The ill-fated Cuban invasion (more popularly known as the Bay of Pigs debacle), which was originally planned during the Eisenhower administration, was carried out by the Kennedy administration. In his May Day speech following the unsuccessful invasion, Castro declared that the Cuban Revolution was socialistic, later, he further declared himself a

¹¹Tenth Inter-American Conference, Report of the United States Department of State, Publication 5692, 1955, pp. 43-58.

¹²Year Book of the United Nations 1961 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 118-119.

Marxist-Leninist, and Cuba became the first communist state of the western hemisphere.

Thus Cuba became a new threat to the security of the Latin American states because of Castro's "persistent and determined effort to export his revolution to the rest of Latin America".¹³ Castro's strategy includes:

- I. training revolutionaries from other Latin American Countries;
- II. maintaining Cuban embassies;
- III. voicing Cuban views in the press and on the radio;
- IV. promoting radical left movements as well as front groups and leftist parties that follow Fidelismo; and
- V. working with old communist parties and the embassies of Russia and satellite countries, which handle the distribution of propaganda.¹⁴

Thus Fidelismo, as this movement came to be known, found a considerable response among the various radical groups. As a result of this Castroite guerrilla movements emerged, who viewed Fidelismo as the most vital and effective counteractant for the political, social, and economic ills of their society. Violence is looked upon by them as the most potent and legitimate means to change the rotting status quo. The Castroite revolution, which is mainly based upon internal revolt, subversion, and insurgency through violent guerrilla movements, became a serious menace to the internal security of the Latin American nation-states.

¹³Edwin Lieuwen, The United States and the Challenge to Security in Latin America (Ohio State University Press, 1966), p. 36.

¹⁴Ibid.

This challenge has to be met quite differently than with the conventional means available for external threats. As a result, since 1961, the basis of the United States foreign policy and security assistance programs to the Latin Americas has changed from hemispheric defense to internal security.

The main purposes of this study will be:

- I. to document the proposition that the basis of the United States foreign policy and security assistance to Latin America was changed from hemispheric defense to internal security beginning in 1961; and to analyze the impacts of the United States police assistance to Latin American countries;
- II. to authenticate that the United States police assistance program performances, among other contributory factors, have promoted rather than reduced violent radical forces within Latin American sub-continent.

The United States police assistance, as distinguished from military assistance, is the main focus of this study, and hence the year 1961 has been selected as a turning point because of the following occurrences:

- (a) In January 1961 diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States were severed.
- (b) This was followed by the April 17, 1961, Bay of Pigs fiasco.
- (c) In his May speech following the invasion, Castro announced

that the Cuban revolution was socialistic and on December 1 of the same year he declared that he was Marxist-Leninist.

(d) Since the early sixties Cuba has operated Castroite guerrilla warfare training schools and encouraged and promoted radical leftist movements and other violent insurgent organizations within various Latin American states.¹⁵

(e) In January, 1961, the United States accused Cuba in the United Nations Security Council of striving to initiate guerrilla war throughout the Americas.¹⁶

Various references to incidents prior to 1961 will be made whenever necessary because the choice of the year 1961, despite the aforementioned reasons, is also somewhat arbitrary and is used as a matter of convenience.

Since this is a macro-study, the extensive development of generalizations based on the broad application of the variables encountered is quite indispensable, but exceptions will be clearly spelled out whenever the general factors and variables are not applicable to all the states of the Latin American subcontinent.

¹⁵U.S. Senate, "A Study Prepared at the Request of the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations," Insurgency in Latin America, January 15, 1968, pp. 7-9.

¹⁶Year Book of the United Nations, 1961 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 118-119.

CHAPTER II

THE LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Before the analysis of the United States foreign policy, we must focus our attention to the Latin American polity. As a starting point of our inquiry a brief look at the internal politics of the Latin American countries is quite pertinent since the root cause of instability lies there, which necessitated the major shift in the United States foreign policy from hemispheric defense to internal security. External factors only serve as an added element to the already existing internal factors and they together promote political instability and violence in Latin America.

The important questions which should be raised here are: What are the necessities for the United States police assistance to Latin America? Who are the insurgent elements in the area? What are the political, social, and economic factors in Latin America, which popularized the insurgents and subversive forces? Why have these forces become a threat to the internal law and order and stabilities of various governments? What role is the United States playing in the Latin American revolution? The answers to these and other related questions will be traced in this and the following chapters.

An Analytical Framework

The study of Latin American politics has been the focus of a variety of conceptual frameworks which have and are being developed by various scholars to explain the causes of political instability and violence in Latin America. Various approaches have been developed as the discipline attained maturity; but the quest continues in order to achieve more advanced and satisfactory explanations for the causes of political instability and violence.¹⁷

This writer's analysis of the causal factors of political instability in Latin America is based upon the paradigm presented by Kenneth Johnson and Ben Burnett. According to it:

Political instability occurs when the governing institutions of organized society are ineffective in gratifying popular wants and expectations. In that sense the governments are "maximizers" . . . sending out streams of satisfactions. Failure of governments to gratify popular wants leads to political alienation in varying degrees of intensity. Alienation in turn is not a fixed quality but varies according to a number of causal factors. Political alienation may be defined as a deeply felt resentment toward social and governing institutions which is so intense as to be manifested in happenings which contribute to political instability. Political instability, accordingly, is defined as a state of conflict between governments and (competing) power groups which is characterized by overt acts of violence by supports for extreme political radicalism or by apathy in the face of movements which are committed to extreme, radical, or violent dislocations of status quo. Thus,

¹⁷For a detailed survey of research in Latin American area of study see J. D. Martz, "The Place of Latin America in the Study of Comparative Politics," The Journal of Politics, XXVIII (February, 1966), pp. 57-80; and John D. Martz, "Political Science and Latin American Studies: A Discipline in Search of a Region," Latin American Research Review, VI (Spring, 1971), pp. 73-95.

political alienation is seen as a widely shared attitude-potential and instability is viewed as those phenomena proceeding therefrom.¹⁸

This political instability, explains Merle Kling, is "chronic; frequently accompanied by limited violence"; and the most important of all, "produces no basic shifts in academic, social and political policies".¹⁹ As an application of this theoretical concept to Latin American policy, this writer has developed a circular phenomena which is presented below.

A civilian government, which came to power either through democratic elections, or is there as a result of contunismo, or brought to power by the armed forces, comes under heavy pressure from the various groups within the country. These forces, as can be seen in the circular presentation, are:

Reform groups (Populist forces) which are devoted to change of the existing status quo by bringing about a sweeping alteration in the basic distribution of the existing values in their societies. They are basically non-violent and democratic in nature, a good example of which is the APRISTA movement in Peru.

Another force for change are the extreme radical groups, who, in contrast to the populist forces, are violent, non-democratic, and in some cases armed with Marxist ideologies.

¹⁸Kenneth F. Johnson, "Causal Factor in Latin American Political Instability," Western Political Quarterly, XVII (September, 1964), pp. 432-446.

¹⁹Merle Kling, "Towards a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America," Western Political Quarterly, IX (March, 1956), pp. 21-35.

Latin American Policy

Counter coup as a result of the increased massive discontent.

Indefinite continuation of military rule by one clique after another.

Pressure from armed forces a safeguard for its privileged position or as an obstacle to sweeping reforms introduced by the civilian government.

Pressure from reform groups.

Pressure from extreme political radical groups.

Growing frustration of the masses as a result of their disappointment with the governmental performance.

Pressure from the local and foreign capitalists.

Failure of the military groups

Civilian Government

Failure of civilian group to bring about the promised reforms, social order and economic growth--the breaking of order.

Military Coup ←

→ Anarchy

Military's condemnation of ineffective civilian group for their failure to bring about change and progress; and military's promises of bringing about economic reform and social justice.

Marked by massive anti-government demonstrations and strikes; the increase in activities of reform groups and above all extreme radical groups.

The forces in Latin societies opposed to both of the above are the remnants of traditional oligarchies whose very existence depends upon the retention of status quo.

One more force, which is not wholly traditional in nature, but still is undergoing a process of transformation in the direction of change, reform, and modernization in a few countries is the Latin American military as in the case of Peru.

No matter how sincere a government's intentions about social reforms and economic progress, it cannot function successfully under the pressures applied on it by powerful antagonistic forces. The forces for change demand drastic actions to bring about political, economic, and social reforms for the progress of the society. The opposing forces, on the contrary, put their pressure against these demands for change.

The government under the pressure of these forces faces several dilemmas. If the government works to bring about the reforms it will become the object of the wrath of the conservative forces. If it will not carry out the much needed sweeping changes, it not only faces the opposition of the populist and the radical forces, but massive frustration will increase due to the failure of the government to gratify popular demands, which is a normal function of every government. When frustration and alienation widens, "the support for extreme political radicalism" becomes one of the resultant factors.

Growing alienation among the masses, increasing ineffectiveness of the government, widening appeal and increased activities by the radical

forces add up as a catalyst for instability. This situation provides the rationale for military intervention.

Military intervention could very well be viewed as a product of a situation when the power of the center is inferior to the tasks it is faced with, i.e., when the center cannot cope with the demands and pressures stemming from the accelerating process of formation, intermingling, and consolidation of new groups within the societal structure.

The Military, naturally, blames the civil government for its failures, and in return commits itself to various extravagant promises for social reform and economic progress. The promises of reforms bring popular support for the military junta. During this brief honeymoon the military regime may launch "ambitious projects of economic development" and enact "social welfare measures". But somehow the regime moves away from political freedom and eventually from social reforms as well. They show little competence in dealing with economics. "Their drive for economic independence often led to overhasty industrialization programs."²⁰

One example is the overthrow of the Rightist Colombian President Laureano Gomez in June, 1953. General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, who came to power as a result of a bloodless coup, promised "peace, justice, and liberty", and Colombians believed him.²¹ He did work for

²⁰Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 145-46.

²¹L. Vincent Padgett and Enrique Low Murtra, "Columbia," in Political Forces in Latin America, ed. by Ben G. Burnett and Kenneth F. Johnson (California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 311-47.

social justice, but his regime too "degenerated into brutal, unthinking Caeserism. Civil liberties were violated, press censorship was clamped down, and the administration dipped its hands into the treasury while the economy foundered," and in 1957 when he tried to prolong his term without election, massive waves of indignation brought an end to his repressive regime.²²

Colonel Juan Domingo Peron is another example. First coming to power as a result of a lengthy power struggle within the armed forces and after overthrowing General Pedro P. Ramirez, he was later duly elected in 1946 and came to the office of the president with promises of economic emancipation of Argentina. His regime was, like Rojas Pinilla's, quite progressive; but his later suppression of opposition, brutal methods, and economic failures took him out of the office like many other caudillos of Latin America.

The failure of the military to carry out sweeping reforms and to provide an effective and progressive government leads either to the replacement of the military junta by another civilian group, or an indefinite military rule as a result of a counter-coup which only means change in the uniformed rulers; and this cycle repeats itself.

Now we come to our original points of inquiry--who are the forces for change in Latin America; why do they want change; and who are

²²John D. Martz, "Columbia: Qualified Democracy," in Political Systems of Latin America, ed. by Martin C. Needler (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nestrand Company, 1964), pp. 207-31.

the forces opposed to change; and what is their rationale for opposition to change in the Latin society?

Armed Forces as a Transitional Force for Change

The role that Latin American armed forces play in politics is of immense importance. Our analysis of their role will be limited to enquire whether the Latin American armed forces could be considered as a force for change in the Latin politics.

Until the time of World War II the Latin American armed forces defended the status quo.²³ But the post-war period has witnessed a marked change in the role of the armed forces. There is an increasing identification of the armed forces with the causes of the populist forces by encouraging and cooperating with them.

Examples of these trends could be seen in the revolution led by Juan Peron in Argentina in 1943; the tolerance or support of populist governments by the military in Peru in 1945, in Brazil in 1950; Panama and Bolivia in 1952; and Columbia in 1953. The most recent example of this trend is the so-called Nasserite military in Peru who came to power as a result of the overthrow of the civilian regime of Fernando Belaunde in October, 1968.

The coup which overthrew the ineffective regime of Paz Estenssoro

²³U.S. Senate, Survey of the Alliance for Progress, A Study Prepared at the Request of the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, The Latin American Military, October 9, 1967, p. 1.

on November 4, 194, in Bolivia is another example of this trend. General Rene Barrientos, who emerged as a strong-man of the coup, used a loose coalition of students, workers, and young and socially oriented officers as a power base during his regime. After the accidental death of Barrientos on April 29, 1969, his Vice President, Luis Adolfo Siles, succeeded to the Presidency until the next presidential election which was to be held in 1970. But General Alfredo Ovando Candia toppled the conservative civilian regime of Siles on September 26, 1969, and became another populist leftist president of Bolivia. This populist trend in the Bolivian army did not end at this point. When General Ovando's courtship with the leftist forces was over and he started moving toward the center, he found himself without any support and had to resign. Thereupon, his right wing radical army chief, General Rogelio Miranda moved himself to the presidency even though his power base was very weak. But he was forced into asylum by the leftist General Juan Jose Torres.

This marked change in some of the Latin American military was the outcome of the new breed of officers, who served as the bearers of this change and who inclined toward a technological approach to their problems. Their technocratic mentality demands a planned economy and a more efficient political system: one which reduces the compromises, negotiations, and postponements which are characteristic of the demo-

cratic process.²⁴ This new breed is largely recruited from the middle class "whose values are currently oriented toward rapid economic development with a minimum of state intervention".²⁵

As a result of this change the Latin American armed forces could be categorized as follows:

I. Non-Political Armed Forces.²⁶ --Five countries of Latin America--Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay, and Colombia--have non-political armed forces, since they demonstrated a remarkable degree of restraint from intervening in the civilian governmental process.

In Costa Rica and Mexico, the armed forces are firmly under the civilian control. The Mexican armed forces, which played a prominent role in the revolution, seem to have willingly accepted a subservient role to the leaders of peasants and workers. Chilean armed forces, too, have been quiet watchers of the growing power of labor and leftist political leaders and did not intervene in the inauguration of the first elected Marxist President in Latin America, Salvador Allenda.

In Colombia the armed forces have assumed their non-political role since 1958, after restoring power to the civilian leaders. But with

²⁴Victor Alba, "The Stages of Militarism in Latin America," The Role of Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. by John J. Johnson (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 165-183.

²⁵Irving Louis Horowitz, "The Military Elites," in Elites in Latin America, ed. by Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 146-189.

²⁶These categories have been derived from Arms and Politics in Latin America, op. cit., pp. 158-71.

the end of alternating rule between the dominant Conservative and Liberal parties in 1974, the issue of the subservience of Colombian armed forces to civilian groups is a question. In Uruguay the armed forces have maintained its traditional apolitical role and are loyal to the civilian authority.

II. Political Armed Forces. --Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, El-Salvador, Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua have political armed forces.

In Paraguay, Nicaragua, Haiti, El-Salvador, and Honduras, the military has been the traditional ruler. In the Dominican Republic, the armed forces play a dominant role as a supporting or opposing force of the civilian group which happens to be in power.

In Panama, the Guardia Nacional has served as a political watchdog. But on two occasions--once in 1952 when Colonel Remon took over the government, and at another time in 1968 when Arnulfo Arias was overthrown by the National Guards--the National Guards intervened in Panamanian politics.

In Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru, the armed forces took over proclaiming that civilian groups have proved themselves to be incapable of forming an effective and progressive government and do not deserve the chance to rule.

And in Guatemala the army is the dominant ruling force under the reportedly ruthless regime of Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio, who

came to power in July, 1970.²⁷

III. Transitional Armed Forces. --In Cuba, Venezuela and Ecuador, the armed forces seem to be transforming themselves from political to non-political in nature. In these countries some elements of the armed forces have "allied themselves with rising popular forces, launched successful revolutions and at least initially, backed programs of fundamental reform".²⁸

In Cuba, the revolutionary program calls for unconditional subordination of the military to the civilian authorities, and to this end plans have been announced for a complete reorganization of the armed forces with a view to forever separating them from political activities".²⁹ The main reason Castro could have taken such drastic measures in separating the armed forces from politics, perhaps, was that the regular Cuban army was defeated by the Castroite bands of revolutionaries, and surrendered cadres of the leftover Cuban army did not have any other alternative available other than accepting the supremacy of the Castroite forces.

But the role of the Latin American armed forces as a force for change has not yet become a commonly agreed on issue. Various scholars tend to draw quite conflicting conclusions. Edwin Lieuwen, whose

²⁷Joseph C. Goulden, "Guatemala: Terror in Silence," The Nation, CCXII (March 22, 1971), pp. 365-68.

²⁸Arms and Politics in Latin America, op. cit., p. 163.

²⁹Ibid., p. 164.

expertise on Latin American armed forces is widely recognized, is of the contrary opinion that the Latin armed forces are an "antidemocratic force". He argues that if the military would have refrained from intervention, "populist governments would probably be in power in most of the Latin American countries today". As a result of military intervention, he believes, the process of reform has slackened. Lieuwen's study, which was prepared before the military came to power in Peru and later established themselves as a genuine progressive force, further states:

There is not a single military establishment in Latin America today that advocates rapid social reform. The military are not opposed to all social reforms but they insist that it be restricted to a pace which they consider consistent with the preservation of public order.³⁰

Only a few years earlier, two other leading Latin American scholars took opposing point of view. John J. Johnson and Robert Alexander do not share Lieuwen's opinion. Johnson called the military's response to changes in civilian government a landmark in their historical development;³¹ and Robert Alexander, following the same line of argument notes that, "only in a few nations is the army still acting as a last-ditch defender of the economic and social status quo. In some cases it is even taking the side of revolutionary changes".³² George C. Lodge, another authority on Latin America, is prudent in his conclusions:

³⁰The Latin American Military, op. cit., p. 15.

³¹John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 254.

³²Robert J. Alexander, Today's Latin America (New York: Doubleday, 1962), p. 182.

It is clear that the armed forces of Latin America have some of the characteristics required of an engine of change-- authority, ability to communicate, access to power, the ability to protect, and competence. They have capacity to follow or at least to support and assist the sequence of action necessary for change.³³

A brief evaluation should be made of the new progressive military regime which came to power after toppling the civilian government of Fernando Belaunde on October 3, 1968. President Juan Velasco Alvarado "began a sweeping land reform program that aimed at expropriating all large estates, whether owned by Peruvian aristocrats or foreign corporations", in June, 1969.³⁴ The progressive and modernizing policies of the new military regime were quite unique in their style. "From the time of the proclamation of the revolutionary government of the Armed Forces it was clear that the government was headed by officials with modernizing and nationalistic purposes. In that proclamation the connivance of native sectors with foreign interests which impeded the country's development was denounced, establishing the urgency for structural transformations which would modify the country's condition of dependence. Yet at the same time, the new rulers invited the foreign investors to exploit the country's natural resources, emphasizing the new administration's recognition of international treaties and its inclina-

³³George C. Lodge, Engines of Change (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), p. 186.

³⁴Marvin Alisky, "Peru," in Political Forces in Latin America, ed. by Ben G. Burnett and Kenneth F. Johnson (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 373-398.

tion to maintain itself within the "western christian system".³⁵ The new military regime's attitude towards the United States emphasizes a more equal relationship, and less dependence on the United States. The regime had expressed quite explicitly its independence in its dealings and relationship from the United States and adopted a policy which only serves Peruvian national self interests. This policy of the new rulers resulted in its "reopened negotiations . . . with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries, establishing diplomatic relations with them, in order to obtain new possibilities of exchange and financing as well as the support by that bloc with regard to diplomatic and eventual economic assault by the United States."³⁶

The new trends of the military in Bolivia and Peru, and the performance of the armed forces under the afore-discussed category of apolitical armed forces, seem to indicate that Latin American armed forces are definitely passing through a transitory state and they seem to be gradually emerging as a force for change.

The Forces for Change

Church

The traditional role of the church in Latin America was support for civilian authorities and the ruling classes in exchange for its privi-

³⁵Julio Cotler, "Political Crisis and Military Populism in Peru," Studies in Comparative International Development, VI (1970), 102.

³⁶Ibid., p. 103.

leges. But the contemporary church felt the evergrowing need for change and accordingly went through a process of evolution, and "has changed its attitudes and tactics so as to maintain or improve its position in every one of the twenty republics".³⁷

According to one observer, the two underlying factors accounting for this change are that the older prelates are dying off and are being replaced by young radical priests for whom revolution is a moral necessity; and the second one is that for the first time in history the Vatican has placed itself squarely in support of those working for radical change in economic, political, and social structure.³⁸

As a result of this growing consciousness of change in Latin society, the clergy in Latin America has transformed itself into a strong force; and different groups among clergies have developed their own interpretations, and accordingly, have chosen their own strategies for action. Thus three groups of clergy could be identified in the contemporary Latin America:

The first group is convinced that the Latin society needs a "radical structural change"³⁹ to achieve social justice, and violence is the only course open to bring about this change. The second group shares the view of the first group for the dire need for radical changes in their

³⁷John J. Johnson, "The Latin American Military Elite as a Politically Competing Group in Transitional Society."

³⁸Lodge, op. cit., p. 188.

³⁹Ibid., p. 189.

societies, but they disagree from the former group on the means to achieve it. They are the proponents of the non-violent methods toward this end. The third group of clergy, who are in minority, are quite indifferent on the problems and needs for change in Latin America.

The first group of clergy are the focus of this study for they play a very significant role in societies as a force for change. This extremist group, which is also categorized as "People's Priests", draw their justification and legitimacy for revolutionary violence from Pope Paul's 1967 encyclical, Populorum Progresso (On the Development of Peoples), which states:

. . . When whole populations destitute of necessities live in a state of dependence barring them from all initiatives and responsibility, and from all opportunity to advance culturally and share in social and political life, recourse to violence, as a means to right these wrongs to human dignity, is a grave temptation. We know, however, that a revolutionary uprising--save where there is manifest, longstanding tyranny which would do great damage to fundamental personal rights and dangerous harm to the common good of the country--produces new injustices, throws more elements out of balance and brings out new disasters. A real evil should not be fought against at the cost of greater misery. We want to be clearly understood: the current situation must be faced with courage, and the injustices linked with it must be fought against and overcome. Development demands bold transformations, innovations that go deep. Urgent reforms should be undertaken without delay (emphasis added).⁴⁰

Another important document which brings legality for the extremists for their course of action is the Document of Peace, which was framed at the Second General Conference of CELAM (Latin American

⁴⁰Norman Gall, "Latin America: The Church Militant," Commentary, XLIX (April, 1970), pp. 25-37.

Bishop's Council) at Medellin, Colombia, in 1968. The Medellin statement, as it is popularly known, declared:

If the Christian believes in the fertility of peace for achieving justice, he believes also that justice is an unavoidable condition for peace. He does not overlook the fact that Latin America finds itself in a situation of injustice that could be called institutionalized violence because the present structures violate fundamental rights. This is a situation that demands wholesale, audacious, urgent, and profoundly renewing transformations. We should not be surprised if in Latin America what Pope Paul VI called the "temptation to violence" is born. One must not abuse the patience of a people who endures for years a condition that those with a greater awareness of human rights would hardly accept.⁴¹

Thus the radical group of clergy is committed to violent social revolution. They have witnessed the United States exploitations, and economic dominance, and their social consciousness forced them to take an anti-American position, as a result of which they face the wrath of the oligarchy and a conservative military regime. But the only way they see left open for them is to identify themselves with the descamisados (shirtless ones) of their society "by supporting their strikes against such exploiting combines as Kaiser or General Motors", or by accompanying the "starving landless Indians of Guatemala to the fallow estates of United Fruit", by "sharing oppressed's anger, and participating in the rebel's lust for social justice", when the oppressed form a great majority of the Latin society.⁴²

⁴¹Document on Peace, Second General Conference of CELAM, Medellin, Colombia, 1968, as cited by Normal Gall, op. cit., p. 25.

⁴²John Gerassi, ed., Revolutionary Priest (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 7.

Their frustration due to the chronic social injustices of their societies make them strong proponents of violent and bloody means of destruction of the existing order. A "manifesto", issued by a group of priests in Higüey (Dominican Republic), reads:

The violence (so much feared) is already among us. When a peasant with many children, who are hungry and naked, without house or school, looks at his children, he must turn to violence; when he looks at the great extensions of Pangola grass, he must turn to violence; when he sees the well-tended pastures, where the animals are better-fed than his own children, this peasant must turn to violence.⁴³

Father Emerson Negreiros, a Brazilian priest and an advocate of violent strategy once reportedly told his poor parishioners:

You should raise a goat to give milk to your children. If the landlord comes to kill your goat, he is threatening the lives of your children. Do not let him kill your goat; kill him first.⁴⁴

For Negreiros, the landlord represents the rotting system based on exploitation of poor and oppressed, which should be dealt with equal force as a retaliatory measure to destroy it.

This same zeal made the most prominent of the guerrilla priests, Father Camilo Torres of Colombia proclaim:

I took off my cassock to be more truly a priest. The duty of every catholic is to be revolutionary, the duty of every revolutionary is to make revolution. The catholic who is not a revolutionary is living in mortal sin.⁴⁵

⁴³From "Manifiesto de los curas de Higüey," as cited by Norman Gall, op. cit., p. 34.

⁴⁴John Gerassi, The Great Fear in Latin America (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 98.

⁴⁵John Gerassi, ed., Revolutionary Priest (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 1.

In his last message to the Colombians from the mountains, Father Camilo Torres further elaborated on his views. He wrote:

All sincere revolutionaries must realize that armed struggle is the only remaining way open. . .

From the Colombian mountains I mean to continue the struggle, arms in hand, until power has been won by the people.⁴⁶

The extremist group of priests goes even to the extent of cooperating with communists, as long as they share the common goal--a violent overthrow of the existing order. Especially after Pope John XXIII issued his historical encyclical--Pacem in Terris, in which he recognized in Marxism "good elements worthy of approval",⁴⁷ the extremists group of the radical priests found a religious justification for their action of cooperating with communist groups.

The movement for the cooperation between clergies and communists provided a strong justification for most of the existing regimes in Latin America to crush the clergy-led movements and even to use violent means in the name of anti-communism; and the reformist priest suffered a major setback resulting from this strategy and governmental retaliation.

Another important characteristic of the extremist group is their strong anti-Americanism. This group, like all other forces for change, tends to view the United States as the sole exploiter of Latin America,

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 426.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 9.

and an ardent champion for status quo. They believe that the United States is afraid of the blowing winds of change and that she views this force as a very serious threat to its political and economic dominance of Latin America. They are convinced that the United States is aware that the strong currents of change along with the existing system which is based upon exploitation and social injustice, will wash the United States "imperialism" away.

Salomon Bolo Hidalgo, a Peruvian priest, in his rejoinder to the Cardinal of Lima's denunciation of him for being a communist, traitor, and an advocate of violence, wrote:

The main culprits for the convulsion are not the communists but Yankee imperialists and the perjurers and pharisees who use religion as a puppet show . . .⁴⁸

Though in firm agreement for the need of change and the role of the Latin church as a force for change, the moderate group of Latin reformist clergies differ from their extremist counterparts in two major approaches: the first one is that the moderate group does not condone the violent methods advocated by the extremists to force the change; and the second difference between these two groups is the extremist's theme of cooperation with communists to attain the same goal--the violent overthrow of the existing order. The moderate group does not share the extremist's view that the end justifies the means. Moreover, the moderates view communism as a very serious threat to Christianity.

⁴⁸Solomon Bolo Hidalgo, in Arauco (Chile, No. 70), November, 1965, as cited in Revolutionary Priest, op. cit., p. 14.

They feel that communists will dominate the revolution in the event of victory and will exterminate every religion, once they get an upper hand, since communism views religion as an opiate for the masses. The argument of the moderates against the recourse to violence and against joining the clandestine guerrilla movements is that violent means do not necessarily bring about the greatly needed changes. Violence, on the other hand, will create counter-violence and this unending chain of violence and counter-violence, very likely, will destroy the supreme goal-- the change.

A brief reference should be made to Archbishop Dom Helder Camara of Brazil who is an internationally known figure and could be regarded as a chief spokesman of the moderate Latin clergies. Dom Helder Camara is an advocate of non-violent rebellion of the masses against the Brazilian military government. He has been the chief spokesman of a very small organized opposition in Brazil. As an arch-critic of political repression in Brazil he inspired the criticism of the Institutional Act formulated by the Bishop's Central Committee in February, 1969, which stated:

It permits arbitrary actions including violation of such basic human rights as self-defense, legitimate expression of opinion, and the right to be informed; it threatens the dignity of the person both physical and moral.⁴⁹

The Latin American church, undoubtedly, has emerged as a strong force

⁴⁹Gary MacEoin, "Brazil Speciality: Threat of Torture," The National Catholic Reporter, May 29, 1970.

for change, and as a serious threat to the forces for status quo.

Populists, Radical Leftists, Students, and Other Forces for Change

No analysis of the forces for change in Latin America will be complete without at least a brief reference to the traditional oligarchy, which was and to a lesser extent still is the chief exponent of the status quo and serves as the greatest obstacle to change.

John Kautsky, discussing the role of aristocracy in traditional societies (a term he loosely used to include the landed oligarchy of some areas), notes that, aristocracy in order to function in these closed societies, took on certain attributes that markedly distinguished them from the peasantry, which are: considerable physical mobility, ease of communication among themselves, and a level of literacy; and the large masses of peasantry were deprived of education and were kept disorganized and poor, so that the increasing hopelessness among them create a sense of resignation and apathy.⁵⁰

The Latin American oligarchy played the abovementioned role quite successful not only in becoming the sole privileged class of the Latin society; but their own elements in the armed forces and ecclesiastical order served them well as a physical and moral force, jealously guarding the interests of the oligarchs.

⁵⁰John Kautsky, "The Politics of Underdevelopment and Industrialization," Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962), pp. 13-29 and 90-119.

But the limited industrialization of the Latin traditional society brought about the following, among other, changes:

- I. A breed of native capitalists came forth;
- II. Rapid increase in the number of the white collar employees in response to the growing demands of industrialization for clerical and supervisory functions.
- III. Emergence of a large number of industrial workers to perform technical and menial jobs.⁵¹

The urban middle sector in Latin America came to political prominence as a result of industrialization. Presently, the role of the middle sector in Latin America stays on the level of polemic. John J. Johnson, who is a strong proponent of the role played by the middle sector for modernization, social justice and democracy, is of the opinion that the middle sector in Latin America is the vanguard of progress and social change. He also observes that despite the heterogeneity of the new middle sector, its members have the following common interests for political action:

1. Overwhelmingly, the new middle sector was located in the burgeoning urban centres;
2. having a higher than average education themselves, they pushed for wider educational facilities and services;
3. almost unanimously, the middle sector pinned its hope for the nation on further industrialization--to such a degree, in fact, that it seemed to be a fetish with them.
4. The middle sector believed that education and industrialization, as well as social welfare and other social enrichments, necessitate state intervention and that economically, for example, the state should protect domestic enterprises from compe-

⁵¹Ibid.

tition, amass capital, and stabilize the costs of products through price fixing. 5. More and more the middle groups associated with political parties because urbanization commonly broke the back of the family as a political unit. 6. The middle group pronounced an intensely aggressive form of nationalism that finally ended as economic assertiveness and xenophobia.⁵²

On the contrary, Caudilo Veliz, a Chilean scholar, is quite critical of the role of the middle groups in Latin America. He writes:

Until recently it was generally expected that Latin American middle classes . . . were going to behave by and large like their European counterparts and bring about the cultural and institutional changes demanded by the growth of industry. The rising expectations of the mass of the people, the impact of modern technology, the expansion of industrial activity: these factors in conjunction with the self-interested and determined political activity of a forward looking, reformist, anti-aristocratic, and generally progressive and modernizing middle class, should have been sufficient to solve the problem of development. But the problems have not been solved. The middle classes have been in power for three or four decades--depending on the country--and have obviously participated in the general process of industrial growth but, also allowing for regional differences, they have been responsible for maintaining or even strengthening the traditional structure and for leading some of the major countries into a situation of institutional stability and economic stagnation. This they have achieved precisely by defending their present interests and future prospects. Far from reforming anything, they have become firm supporters of the establishments; they have not implemented significant agrarian or fiscal reforms but have displayed remarkable energy trying to become landowners or to marry their offspring into the aristocracy.⁵³

Expressing similar views Peter Nehemkis states that the middle

⁵²John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 1-14.

⁵³Caudilo Veliz, ed., Obstacles to Change in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 2.

groups in Latin America "are not hell-bent for reform. They are essentially conformist. They are emotionally identified with the status quo. They want a bigger slice of the pie, but they do not believe that upsetting the apple cart is the way to get it."⁵⁴

Without getting too deeply into the polemic of the role of the Latin American middle sector or middle group, one can safely conclude that the activities of the middle sector have served, more or less, as an antecedent of the outgoing approach of the latter forces for change in the Latin societies.

Populists

One author has defined populist forces as "a political movement which enjoys the support of the mass of the urban working class and/or peasantry but which does not result from the autonomous organizational power of either of these two sectors. It is also supported by non-working class sectors upholding an anti-status quo ideology".⁵⁵

Victor Alba, who is one of the foremost authorities on the history of labor, social and political change in Latin America, observed that Raul Haya de la Torre of Peru "formulated the doctrine (Populism), that with adaptations and modifications, was the basis of populism. The

⁵⁴Peter Nehemkis, Latin America: Myth or Reality (New York: A Mentor Book, 1966), p. 210.

⁵⁵Torcuato S. Di Tella, "Populism and Reform in Latin America," in Obstacles to Change in Latin America, op cit., p. 47.

fundamental characteristics of populism are summed up by Alba:

. . . contrary to Lenin's view that imperialism is the final stage of capitalism, imperialism in Latin America is the first stage of capitalism. The struggle against imperialism is not the task of the working class alone but must unite in a single movement all the people (hence the name populism), starting with the peasants and workers and moving up through the middle sectors to the industrialists. In order to establish democratic regimes, it is necessary to awaken the people and mobilize them . . . The struggle against imperialism should seek the support of liberal and labor elements in the United States and must consist, first of all, in the struggle against the oligarchy, without which there would be no imperialism and no threat to national independence from foreign investment. . . ⁵⁶

Elsewhere, Alba further elaborated on the characteristics of the populist forces as "native" movements, which reflect the influence of syndicalism and anti-imperialism, among others. They hoped for widespread support by forming a single front of several classes (peasants, proletariat and middle groups); they are anti-communist and democratic; they support the principle of self-determination of peoples expressed through the electoral process. Their view on revolution is quite different from the Jacobin leftists. They are revolutionary in the sense that revolution is conceived as an accelerated evolution destined to change the social structure of countries where feudal systems predominate. They are anti-imperialistic but do not incorporate their anti-imperialism into anti-Americanism. ⁵⁷

⁵⁶Victor Alba, The Latin Americans (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 151-152.

⁵⁷Victor Alba, "Populism and National Awareness in Latin America," The University of Kansas, Centre of Latin American Studies, (June, 1966), p. 7.

Examples of populist movements in Latin America are not rare. A majority of the anti-oligarchic democratic parties of Latin America may be considered populist: the American Revolutionary Popular Alliance (APRA) of Peru; the Democratic Action Party (AD) in Venezuela; the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) of Bolivia; Febrerismo in Paraguay; the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) of the Dominican Republic; the National Liberation Party (PLN) of Costa Rica; the Auténticos and Ortodoxos in Cuba (before 1959); the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) of Mexico; and, in some degree, the Christian Democratic Movement.⁵⁸

Radical Left

Another force for change, which has been the major threat to internal law and order within the Latin American countries and a major source of concern for the United States is the Radical Left. Due to its activities, the United States Public Safety program in Latin America was instituted.

These forces in Lieuwen's words "are extremely hostile to the United States, and they would in all probability eliminate United States military programs, expropriate United States investments and adopt an anti-United States foreign policy stance if they emerged triumphant".⁵⁹

⁵⁸The Latin Americans, op. cit., p. 152.

⁵⁹The United States and the Challenge to Security in Latin America, op cit., p. 49.

This force mainly comprised of:

- (a) pro-Russian orthodox Communist parties
- (b) schismatic communist parties which follow Chinese ideology of violent revolutionary struggle, and
- (c) Castroite National Liberation Movements advocating violent overthrow of the existing order, which they believe is the root cause of all the ills and injustices of their societies.

Some of the organizations which come in the Castroite National Liberation movements in some countries of Latin America are:

Venezuela. -- The Venezuelan Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Venezuela PCV) which adopted violence terrorism and guerrilla warfare during 1960-1962, but later abandoned it.

Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionario -- MIR) is Castroite in nature.

The PCV in 1961 joined the MIR and other leftist radical elements to form the National Liberation Front (FLN--Frente de Liberacion Nacional) which was the political arm of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional -- FALN).⁶⁰

Colombia. -- The two guerrilla organizations in Colombia are: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia -- FARC) and the National Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional -- ELN). A terrorist organization, The

⁶⁰Kevin Delvin, "The Permanent Revolutionism of Fidel Castro," Problems of Communism, XVII (January, February, 1968), pp. 1-11.

Worker Student and Peasant Movement (Movimiento Obrero Estudiantil y Campesinos -- MOEC).⁶¹

Guatemala. -- The Revolutionary Movement of November 13 (MR - 13) is one of the guerrilla movements in Guatemala, under the leadership of Marco Antonio Yon Sosa. This organization is a strong supporter of the Chinese revolution and the armed struggle road to socialism.⁶²

Peru. -- In Peru MIR (the Movement of the Revolutionary Left) came into existence as a splinter group from the APRA, and started various guerrilla activities of subversion and terrorism.

Nicaragua. -- National Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional -- FSLN or FLN, which was formed in 1967, is a Castroite guerrilla organization in Nicaragua.

Uruguay. -- Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN) or more popularly known as Uruguayan Tupamaros are the most publicized guerrillas in Latin America.

Brazil. -- The guerrilla movement in Brazil is on the increase due to the oppressive policies of the military junta, as will be discussed later. An increased number of students and priests have been joining them as a result of their frustration and disgruntlement with the existing state of affairs in Brazil.

⁶¹Insurgency in Latin America, op. cit., p. 16.

⁶²James Petras, "Revolution and Guerrilla Movements in Latin America: Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala and Peru," Latin America Reform or Revolution (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, 1968), pp. 329-69.

Students

Latin American students are in the mainstream of the most ardent struggle to bring about radical structural changes in their society.

Luis Alberto Sanchez, Rector of San Marcos University in Lima (Peru) has described Latin American students this way:

. . . a Latin American student . . . is, above and beyond everything, a young person who is dissatisfied with the society in which he lives . . . with the means available to him for achieving his objectives . . . he will be dominated by the feeling of protest against the injustice that he feels binds him, and he will be carried away by the impulse to rebel against the powers that block the way to what he thinks are his ultimate goal.⁶³

Thus, in contemporary Latin American politics, students form a strong anti-status quo force. This basic drive also has several undercurrents, which have become the chief characteristics of the student movements, and these are: "a longing for a sense of national purpose, a vision of the future, a sense of legitimacy and independence, liberation from what is seen as the heavy hand of the United States materialism, honesty in politics".⁶⁴

Lodge has identified and categorized several student groups according to their ideological leanings. These are: right-wing activists and neo-fascist; anarchists; Marxists, undefined leftists and Fidelistas;

⁶³Luis Sanchez, "The University in Latin America: Part IV, as it Looks Today," Americas, XIV (February, 1962), p. 16.

⁶⁴Lodge, op. cit., p. 236.

Soviet Communists; Peking Communists. But the student movement, as a whole, is polarized between two groups: one group is comprised of those who favor Christian Democracy and its relatively peaceful methods, and the second group advocates radical change by adopting violent and speedy methods.⁶⁵

Organized Labor

The working class grew along with the increased industrialization. The laborer who lives in the city came in contact with "channels to literacy, broader consumption, political influence and organization for self defense."⁶⁶ Burnett and Johnson elaborating on the psychological effects on the newly arrived urban workers wrote:

Even though he is on the fringe of such opportunities, the new arrival to the urban working class is at least introduced to a conception of the better life, a hope of gaining it, and a rapidly increasing interest in the political process by which he might achieve it. Thus if few workers actually advance to a very superior economic position as a result of migrating to the city, they do contribute to an ever-larger percentage of the total population that is not only potentially alienated but also more and more politically activated. As members of trade unions, which the new urban workers would not have normally known in the rural setting, they are manipulated in countless ways in a struggle with the traditional order. Union ranks are greatly augmented for political ends by cajoling and deceiving unorganized workers, who are frequently gullible and who can often be easily moved to participate in demonstrations and street violence. Extremists who wish to incite labor have learned that several cups of aguardiente or

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Frank Bonilla, Continuity and Change in Latin America, as cited by Burnett and Johnson, op. cit., p. 15.

mezeal can buy services of many idle bodies for an afternoon protest and riot. The frequency of such incidents increases with the everwidening base of frustrations that grows because of the urban labor pool's inability to secure adequate employment and material reward.⁶⁷

This mobilization of labor force by the unions, though exploitative in nature at this stage, will politicize them, stimulate and incite in them a craving for change.

But the observation made above is not so simple as it appears to be. Goldrich, Platt, and Schuller, in a joint article, "The Political Integration of Lower-Class Urban Settlements in Chile and Peru", made a general statement on the issue of politicization this way:

Politicization may be a discontinuous process, contrary to the prevailing theory. A high level of politicization may not be established despite an important demand-making experience. One such experience may not establish the psychological basis for continuing demand-making. Furthermore, the general case retarding the Latin American urban lower class is one where alternative solutions to serious problems are not defined and this retards politicization. Consequently, meeting an important demand concerning housing and urban services, for example, does not necessarily trigger a chain of additional demands which would overwhelm governmental capacity in transitional societies.⁶⁸

On the contrary this writer believes that while politicization may be a discontinuous process, as far as Latin American urban labor is concerned it is definitely not a discontinuous process. Demand-making

⁶⁷Burnett and Johnson, op. cit., p. 15.

⁶⁸Daniel Goldrich, Raymond B. Pratt, and C. R. Schuller, "The Political Integration of Lower-Class Urban Settlement in Chile and Peru," in Masses in Latin America, ed. by Irving Louis Horowitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 175-212.

may not establish the psychological basis for continuing demand-making, but one has to consider the nature of the demands made. For example demand-making in one society for the amenities of life, if fulfilled, may or may not lead to the demands for better amenities or luxuries of life. But the demands for the basic necessities and requirements of life, for a better living and working conditions, and/or increased wages, could be continuous in nature and could provide a psychological basis for continuing demand-making.

Robert Alexander, discussing the causes for politicization of Latin American organized labor, supports this writer's view. He observed:

The low level of economic development of Latin America countries contributed to the politicization of their labor movements, and also tended to influence both the type of political group which dominated the labor movement in its early years, and the subsequent changes in the political control.⁶⁹

The labor movement in Latin America attained more and more sophistication and political maturity and their concerns no longer remain limited to the "bread and butter" issues. As again noted by Robert Alexander:

It has sought to obtain extensive social and labor legislation to protect its members and then organizations. In fact, it has gone beyond this: it has attempted to bring about a basic change in the structure of the Latin American societies. Thus, it has sought to bring about agrarian reform, to transfer the land from the traditional aristocracy to those who work it, and thereby to

⁶⁹Robert Alexander, Organized Labor in Latin America (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 15.

destroy the basis of power of the oligarchy as well as create potential markets for the industries in which the trade unionists were employed. It has supported industrialization so as to gain more jobs for its members and to make possible increases in their level of living.⁷⁰

Victor Alba writing about the challenges faced by the labor movements in Latin America noted:

Its new challenges: the need to struggle against both the traditional dictatorships and militaristic demagogues, who were trying to attract the workers; the wish to participate in decisions regarding industrialization, so that the workers should receive the largest possible share of its benefits, accelerated urbanization, which was changing great masses of peasants into members of the working class; . . . the need to be free of all direct or indirect governmental control, and to have unions independent of political parties . . .⁷¹

Thus politicization of the urban workers in Latin America has been and is a continuous process, whose interest includes a variety of demands--from bread and butter to the more sophisticated demands for the politico-socio-economic changes within their societies.

To sum up, ideologically the forces for change in Latin America are divided in various groups. Though they have their own prescriptions and strategies to bring about the much needed change in their societies, they have the following chief characteristics:

- I. They are extremely nationalistic in nature;
- II. they advocate radical socio-economic changes in their societies;

⁷⁰Ibid., pp. 8-9.

⁷¹The Latin Americans, op. cit., pp. 149-150.

- III. they are anti-imperialistic in nature (populists want more advantageous economic relations with the United States and leftists are anti-American and view the United States economic and political dominance of their societies as "imperialism");
- IV. they share a zeal for national and economic self-assertion and are for the economic progress, social justice and modernization of their societies.

CHAPTER III

INTERNAL SECURITY AND POLICE ASSISTANCE:

SOME KEY STATEMENTS

After a brief analysis of the Latin American polity we should turn our attention to the radical changes in the foreign policy of the United States and in the emphasis of the United States foreign security assistance programs for Latin America since 1961, as stated in the first hypothesis. As a first step toward this we will documentize some important official statements, and a few academic citations.

President Kennedy's message to Congress on March 28, 1961, opened up a new horizon for the changed emphasis:

The free world's security can be endangered not only by a nuclear attack but also by being slowly nibbled away at the periphery, regardless of our strategic power, by force of subversion, infiltration, intimidation, indirect or non-overt aggression, internal revolution, lunatic blackmail, guerrilla warfare or a series of limited wars.⁷²

Again in his report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1962, President Kennedy expressed his increased concern over the rising threats to the internal security of Latin American countries. For the first time he advocated the increasing need to change the emphasis of United States

⁷²President John F. Kennedy, "Foreign Aid Message," Congressional Record, March 22, 1961, p. 4470.

security assistance to Latin America in order to tackle this problem effectively:

By 1961 . . . the conditions which governed the foreign aid program during the 1950's had changed substantially . . . The need for large scale assistance had been reduced while there had been a decrease in overt communist aggression, the danger of internal subversion had increased. A new approach to the problem of communism was required.⁷³

Former Secretary of State Edwin Martin, discussing the United States strategy in dealing with the problem of communist subversion in Latin America, said that direct attack on this problem has been launched in two ways: one was to isolate Cuba from the hemisphere and discredit the image of the Cuban revolution in the hemisphere; and the other was to improve the internal security capabilities of the countries concerned.⁷⁴

The same emphasis on the internal security problems of insurgency were stressed by former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations for 1964. Explaining the changed rationale behind the United States security assistance to Latin America in 1960, McNamara said that when the United States became convinced that there was no threat of significant overt aggression to the subcontinent, the "emphasis shifted to internal security capabilities" to use against Castro-communist subversion or covert aggression

⁷³Report to the Congress on the Foreign Assistance Program for Fiscal Year 1962, p. 3.

⁷⁴Department of State Bulletin, March 11, 1963, p. 347.

and to civic action projects designed to contribute to economic and social development, and limited assistance was also provided for such activities as harbor defense, coastal patrol and surveillance.⁷⁵

The Johnson administration continued to emphasize internal security as the main basis of United States security assistance to Latin America, clearly spelling out three basic ends for the United States security assistance:

To maintain security against communist and other threats of violence and the movement of armaments and men clandestinely across land, sea, and air borders for subversive purposes.

To expand the use of military forces on civic action projects useful to the populace at all levels.

To contribute to the defense of the adjacent coastal areas of the Caribbean sea, and the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, with primary emphasis on surveillance, intercept, patrol, harbor defense.⁷⁶

In agreement with the officially stated policy position, Edwin Lieuwen, a noted authority on Latin American armed forces, wrote:

Since 1961, the basis for military aid to Latin America has been shifted from hemispheric defense to internal security and the protection of coasts against external aggression to internal defense against Castro-communist subversion and guerrilla warfare. This new emphasis upon counter-insurgency has reflected in a sharp shift in the training equipment offered by the United States to Latin America's armed forces.⁷⁷

⁷⁵Proposed Mutual Defense and Assistance Programs for Fiscal Year 1964 (Summary presentation to Congress), p. 60.

⁷⁶The Foreign Assistance Program (Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1964), p. 35.

⁷⁷The United States and the Challenge to Security in Latin America, op. cit., p. 16.

Willard Barber, a former State Department official, who served in various posts in Latin America; and C. Neale Ronning, a specialist in Latin American politics, in justifying the changed emphasis of United States foreign policy wrote:

As the danger of an armed attack from the outside became less and less likely, the threat of communist subversion (in Latin America) became more and more fixed in the minds of United States foreign policy makers. By the early 1960's, the process of revising the original emphasis was well under way.⁷⁸

The aforementioned citations support the hypothesis that the emphasis of United States foreign policy and security assistance has been changed from hemispheric defense to internal security. The next step will be to analyze the United States police assistance programs to Latin America, which were the result of the changed emphasis of United States security assistance.

The descriptions and workings of United States police assistance which will be presented in the following pages are drawn from official statements about the objectives and performance of the police assistance programs. The reader should be aware that he is reading the officially stated rationale and official statements about the effectiveness of these programs in Latin America. The gaps between the stated goals and actual performance of these programs will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

⁷⁸Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966), pp. 30-31.

Police Assistance Programs for Latin America:
Origins and Rationale

The rationale behind the shift to internal security was to provide the law and order necessary for the Alliance for Progress to succeed.⁷⁹ The growing threats to law and order, and the increasing activities of the insurgency forces within the Latin American countries, resulted in the establishment of programs for police assistance. The aim was to train the Latin American police as a counterinsurgency force to deal with rural as well as urban insurgency, sabotage and all other forms of subversion quickly and efficiently. The various threats to stability and internal order of the Latin American countries are discussed in an earlier chapter.

David Bell, former Administrator of the Agency for International Development (AID), defined counterinsurgency as "the term used to describe efforts to prevent the overthrow of the established governments by subversive aggression which may be aided or assisted by outside powers".⁸⁰

A State Department memorandum, issued in November, 1962, was the starting point of United States police assistance and training programs to Latin America. This memorandum declared that AID "vests

⁷⁹The Latin American Military, op. cit., p. 23.

⁸⁰ U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Appropriations for 1967, Hearings, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 1966, p. 160.

the Office of Public Safety with the primary responsibility and authority for Public Safety Programs and gives that office a series of powers and responsibilities which will enable it to act rapidly, vigorously and effectively . . . powers greater than any other technical office or division in AID".⁸¹

Thus AID established the office of Public Safety (OPS), which provides police assistance to Latin America, beside various other under-developed countries of the world; and it also had devised the Public Safety Program, under which assistance in the form of technical advice, training, and equipment to the police force was provided. The theory behind this assistance was that police constitute the first line of defense against subversion and terrorism, and that assistance to civil police forces both strengthens the host country's capacity to deal with subversive aggression and its ability to provide law and order.

David Bell described two chief objectives of Public Safety Program:

1. Strengthening the capability of civil police and para-military forces to enforce the law and maintain public order with minimum use of physical force, and to counter communist-inspired or exploited subversion and insurgency; and
2. Encouraging the development of responsible and humane police administration and judicial procedure to improve the effectiveness of civil police, and para-military forces, and enable them to become more closely integrated into the community.⁸²

⁸¹Taken from an undated article by Holmes Alexander, "The Inside Story of Venezuela."

⁸²U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Appropriations for 1965, Hearings, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., 1965, p. 72. (Hereinafter cited as Foreign Assistance Hearings, 1965.)

Bell asserted that the United States has very great interests in the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere of law and order under humane civil concepts and control, and in countering communist efforts in forms. The function of the AID Public Safety Programs was to meet the responsibilities of the police of the underdeveloped nations and to promote and protect United States interests.

From the economic point of view the police operations were regarded by the supporters of Public Safety Program as cheaper and more efficient. They were seen as frequently better-trained and well-equipped than the military to deal with minor forms of violence, conspiracy and subversion, since they are:

- (a) closer to the focal points of unrest;
- (b) more acceptable than the army as keepers of order over long periods of time; and
- (c) they are the most sensitive point of contact between government and populace.

In providing police assistance, OPS notes that most countries have a unified "civil security service", which "in addition to regular police, includes paramilitary forces such as gendarmories, constabularies and civil guards which perform police functions and have as their primary mission maintaining internal security".⁸³ According to the OPS--individual Public Safety Programs, while varying from country

⁸³"AID Assistance to Civil Security Forces," OPS Press Release, February 11, 1970.

to country, are focussed in general on developing balance within the civil security forces, that is:

A capability for regular police operations, with an investigative capability for detecting and identifying criminals and/or subversive individuals and organizations and neutralizing their activities, and with a capability for controlling militant activities ranging from demonstrations, disorders, or riot through small-scale guerrilla operations.⁸⁴

Police Assistance Programs and Operations, 1961-1971

The AID Public Safety Program is advised and assisted by an inter-agency police group with representatives from the Departments of Defense, Justice, State, Treasury, and other agencies. The specialists on tax administration from Internal Service; on police administration from the FBI and the State Police Services and city police service from the United States are assigned to train the police officials of Latin American and other underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa. This way the program is able to draw upon the extraordinary resources and capabilities of the FBI, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Border Patrol, the Secret Service, and Bureaus of Narcotics and Customs, and the police and security services of the United States military establishment.⁸⁵

The operational structure was instituted as far back as in Sep-

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵This and balance of the following presentation is excerpted from David Bell's testimony from Foreign Assistance Hearings, 1965, pp. 72-75.

tember, 1961, when President Kennedy had instructed the Agency for International Development to set up a police academy for the Latin American countries. Later, in 1962, the Inter-American Police Academy was established at Fort Davis in the Panama Canal zone. This academy was later transferred to Washington in order to open the Academy to police officers from the other countries of Asia and Africa; and was reorganized as the International Police Academy. The bulk of training is conducted in the United States principally through IPA and Inter-American Police Academy in Washington, D.C.

The training programs of foreign police officers have been centralized and placed firmly under the control of the United States government. This training includes instructions in the concepts and principles of police organization; administration; basic police operations; investigative techniques including scientific and technical aids, police instruction, training and internal security subjects.

The course of instruction at IPA is divided into three major branches:

Police Management

- (a) Organization,
- (b) Command and Staff relationships,
- (c) Public relations

Police Operations

- (a) Criminalistics,
- (b) Communications,
- (c) Border Control,
- (d) Intelligence

Internal Security

- (a) Riot Control Formations,
- (b) Chemical Munitions,
- (c) Terrorist Counter-measures.⁸⁶

For a detailed presentation of the list of curriculum, see Appendix I.

AID assistance to foreign police is a carefully balanced program of technical advice, training and equipment. Public Safety does not include costly complicated weapons and other items; it is relatively inexpensive. The Public Safety Program is always preceded by an on-the-scene study by qualified technicians to determine requirements, and there is constant evaluation of progress once undertaken. Programs are initiated and continued only after inter-agency consultations.

David Bell, describing the efficiency of the Public Safety Program, said:

The Public Safety Program has developed and utilized methods to deliver to threatened countries, in a matter of days, urgently needed assistance including equipment, training, and technical advice.⁸⁷

For instance, when the government of Venezuela, headed by President Raul Betancourt in 1962 came under heavy pressure from guerrillas of the Armed Forces of the National Liberation (FALN), John Kennedy launched a crash program to upgrade the Caracas police. According to Peter T. Chew:

⁸⁶"Curriculum," IPA Review, January, 1967, as reported in NACLA Newsletter, July-August, 1971, V, p. 9.

⁸⁷Foreign Assistance Hearings, 1965, p. 74.

In May 1962 John "Jake" Longan, a slow-talking, fast-thinking Oklahoman, flew secretly to and set up an advisory group . . . Longan's men worked with city policemen, teaching such fundamentals as how to approach a suspicious car on foot and how to still a sniper in a building without harming residents. They persuaded Venezuelan police to favor the old-fashioned shot-gun and showed how shotguns firing buckshot and gas grenades, could be effectively used against terrorists . . . They also demonstrated how to bounce birdshot off the pavement for effective nonlethal riot control.⁸⁸

OPS advisors were also brought in the Dominical Republic after the 1965 insurrection. Thousands of Dominican police received training in riot-control techniques from an American team that included several former police Department.⁸⁹

From a brief account of the AID Public Safety Programs in sixteen Latin American countries, which is presented in Appendix II, the following main characteristics of these programs appear to be:

- (a) they provide rank and file policemen training;
- (b) they also aim to provide training to senior police officials and specialists;
- (c) they establish a highly sophisticated communication system; record maintenance of the population by issuing identification cards; a scientific record of criminals and saboteurs, mob control and patrol techniques, to mention a few components;
- (d) they are aimed at increasing the capabilities of rural as well

⁸⁸Peter T. Chew, "America's Global Peace Officers," The Kiwanis Magazine, April, 1969, p. 24.

⁸⁹Michael T. Klare, "U.S. Police Assistance Programs in Latin America," NACLA Newsletter, May-June, 1970, p. 29.

as urban police forces in dealing with, and in controlling the rural and urban insurgent elements.

Analysis of United States Security Assistance from 1962 - 1972

In order to demonstrate the increasing importance of Police assistance programs, which were included in the larger frame of security assistance, an examination of the appropriations from 1962 to 1972 will be made. The analysis will indicate an overall increase in emphasis on police assistance rather than year by year increase during sixties. Another point worth mentioning is that, separate figures of the amount allotted for Public Safety assistance year by year have been itemized. But sometimes, from the available data, it is difficult to isolate public appropriations from larger security assistance appropriations, in which Public Safety assistance is included.

The Alliance for Progress Security assistance for fiscal years 1962 and 1963 (as shown in the table below) shows the increasing importance of security assistance which includes Public Safety assistance. As noted in Table I, only four Latin American countries--namely, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru--had received security assistance in 1962. But this number was doubled, and in the fiscal year 1963 the number of aid recipients increased to thirteen. The amount allotted specifically for Public Safety for fiscal year 1963 for Latin America was \$7,050,000.⁹⁰

⁹⁰The Foreign Assistance Program (Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1963), p. 30.

Table I
 U.S. Military Assistance to Latin America for
 Fiscal Years 1962 and 1963

Alliance for Progress Security	(In thousands of dollars)	
	Fiscal Year 1962	Fiscal Year 1963
Argentina	-----	-----
Bolivia	-----	1,817
Brazil	2,200	2,156
Chile	860	2,019
Colombia	-----	1,488
Costa Rica	-----	-----
Dominican Republic	-----	596
Ecuador	1,500	323
El-Salvador	-----	534
Guatemala	-----	863
Honduras	-----	84
Nicaragua	-----	59
Panama	-----	-----
Paraguay	-----	840
Peru	1,135	2,794
Uruguay	-----	546
Venezuela	-----	-----

[Figures include public Safety program assistance, but there is no breakdown in these figures to differentiate between military and police assistance.]

Source: Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies, Appropriations for 1966, Hearings, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 89th Cong., 1st sess., p. 304.

For Fiscal Year 1964, grant military assistance totalling \$68.7 million was provided to nineteen Latin American countries. The amount provided for Public Safety for Fiscal Year 1964 was \$5,600,000.⁹¹ The reason for this considerably lower amount for 1964, appears to be due to the lower amounts allotted for Bolivia from \$1,817 in 1963 to \$469 in 1964; Peru from \$2,794 in 1963 to \$1,263 in 1964; Dominican Republic from \$596 in 1963 to \$64 (in thousands) in 1964; El-Salvador from \$534 in 1963 to \$225 in 1964; Guatemala from \$863 to \$554 in 1964; Honduras from \$84 (in thousands) in 1963 to \$20 (in thousands) in 1964; no aid was allotted for Nicaragua in 1964 (see Table II). Table III shows Public appropriations for 1964 on a country by country basis.

Another possible reason could be that countries such as Brazil, Bolivia and Peru had a good start in 1963 and they could be given lesser aid for a while without hurting the working of the program there. In the meantime new programs were started in Costa Rica, Venezuela, El-Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama.

In Fiscal Year 1965 military grant assistance totalling \$73.3 million was provided to Latin America. This \$73.3 million was divided between \$44.8 million for defense articles and \$28.5 million for defense services, including \$12.3 million for training and \$6.6 million for supply operation.⁹² (Table IV)

⁹¹Foreign Assistance Program (Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1964), p. 50.

⁹²Foreign Assistance Program (Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1965), p. 13.

Table II
 U.S. Military Assistance to Latin America
 for Fiscal Year 1964

Alliance for Progress Security	(In thousands of dollars) Fiscal Year 1964
Argentina	306
Bolivia	469
Brazil	2,168
Chile	1,376
Colombia	1,732
Costa Rica	230
Dominican Republic	64
Ecuador	647
El-Salvador	225
Guatemala	554
Honduras	20
Nicaragua	-----
Panama	2
Paraguay	1,344
Peru	1,263
Uruguay	470
Venezuela	23

Source: Foreign Assistance Appropriations for 1966, op. cit., p. 304.

Table III
List of Latin American Countries Having
Public Safety Program and the Money
Appropriated for it for Fiscal Year 1964

(In thousands of dollars)

Bolivia	284
Brazil	1,098
Chile	163
Colombia	347
Costa Rica	60
Dominican Republic	60
Ecuador	271
El-Salvador	134
Guatemala	128
Honduras	137
Panama	107
Peru	639
Venezuela	310

Source: Foreign Assistance Hearing, 1965, p. 73.

Table IV
 U.S. Military Assistance to Latin America for
 Fiscal Year 1965

(In thousands of dollars)

Argentina	1,064
Bolivia	338
Brazil	2,425
Chile	429
Colombia	537
Costa Rica	44
Dominican Republic	103
Ecuador	883
El-Salvador	85
Guatemala	171
Honduras	191
Nicaragua	1
Panama	17
Paraguay	670
Peru	2,276
Uruguay	260
Venezuela	64

Source: Foreign Assistance Appropriations for 1966, op cit., p. 304.

The major portion of the 1965 program was allocated to meet internal security needs. Civic action projects, which were part of the Public Safety program, were undertaken by the military; and the amount supplied for Public Safety for that year is \$5.2 million. Seventy-four American advisors and Public Safety specialists were sent by this program to Latin America.⁹³

The amount allocated to the military assistance for Fiscal Year 1966 was \$77.3 million; out of which 56.6 per cent (i. e., \$44 million) was to maintain internal security.⁹⁴ The amount provided for Public Safety was \$3.9 million and eighty-two United States Public Safety advisors were sent to Latin American countries.⁹⁵ For a detailed allocation, see Table V.

In the Fiscal Year 1967 military assistance continued to emphasize the strengthening of the indigenous forces capable of maintaining internal security against threats of violence and subversion, and of dealing effectively with guerrilla warfare and the clandestine movement of men and armaments across land, sea, and air borders for subversive purposes. The military assistance for Latin American for Fiscal Year

⁹³Ibid., pp. 36-37.

⁹⁴U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Appropriations for 1966, Hearings, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, p. 224.

⁹⁵The Foreign Assistance Program (Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1966), p. 38.

Table V
 U.S. Security Assistance Program
 for Fiscal Year 1966

Latin America	(In thousands of dollars)
Argentina	530
Bolivia	114
Brazil	1,961
Chile	634
Colombia	696
Costa Rica	-----
Dominican Republic	122
Ecuador	104
El-Salvador	65
Guatemala	343
Honduras	71
Mexico	20
Nicaragua	-----
Panama	22
Paraguay	576
Peru	2,871
Uruguay	103
Venezuela	59

Source: Statement of Vice Admiral Heinz, U.S. Navy, Director of Military assistance, Foreign Assistance Appropriations for 1967, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., p. 618.

1967 amounts to \$74.9 million.⁹⁶ Of this \$42.2 million or 64 per cent was devoted to strengthening internal security (see Table VI) with emphasis on communications, mobility, and counterinsurgency training; and ninety-six United States Public Safety advisors were sent to Latin America.⁹⁷ Table VI shows internal security appropriations under various categories for Fiscal Year 1967.

The military assistance for Fiscal Year 1968 was \$45.5 million for eighteen Latin American countries; out of which \$13 million were to be spent in training and \$32.5 million for equipment and services.⁹⁸ The amount to be spent on Public Safety in particular was \$34.7 million, and ninety United States Public Safety advisors were sent.⁹⁹ (See Table VI)

The amount allocated for Fiscal Year 1969 for Public Safety was \$3.5 million;¹⁰⁰ and for Fiscal Year 1970 it was lower than that of the preceding year, \$209 million, but it was primarily aimed at improving the internal security capabilities of Latin American Countries. Table VII

⁹⁶U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Appropriations for 1967, Hearings, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 1966, p. 6.

⁹⁷The Foreign Assistance Program (Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1967), pp. 56-57.

⁹⁸U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Appropriations for 1968, Hearings, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, p. 332.

⁹⁹The Foreign Assistance Program (Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1968), pp. 50-51.

¹⁰⁰The Foreign Assistance Program (Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1969), p. 46.

Table VI

U.S. Military Assistance to Latin America

	(In millions of dollars)	
	Fiscal Year 1967	Fiscal Year 1968 (proposed)
Grants:		
Internal Security	42.2	34.7
Supply Operations	7.9	5.1
Civil Action	4.2	3.9
Maritime Defense	1.5	1.8
Training	<u>13.3</u>	<u>13.0</u>
Total	55.8	45.5
Sales:		
Credit Sales	29.6	37.5
Cash Sales	<u>12.9</u>	<u>15.0</u>
Total	42.5	52.5

Source: Survey of the Alliance for Progress, op. cit., p. 25.

shows a marked decrease in the Public Safety appropriations from 1970 to 1972, the reason for which will be discussed a little later. This drastic cut in Public Safety assistance to Latin America seems to be due to the widened scope of the United States security assistance by the Nixon administration, which resulted in the considerable importance of many other under-developed countries of Asia and Africa; Latin America alone did not remain to be the focal point of the United States security assistance.

From the quantitative data on security assistance to Latin America, it is clear that there is not only a definite shift in the United States foreign policy from hemispheric defense to internal security and that there has been a positive shift in the emphasis of security assistance to Latin American countries since 1961; but also that the United States emphasis on internal security has been constantly increasing.

The year 1969 had brought an important change as far as the United States assistance to Latin America is concerned. The increased emphasis of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations on the importance of security assistance in Latin America seemed to be fading away with the Nixon administration.

The "Nixon Doctrine" had not only promised an increasing involvement of the internal forces of the countries of the third world for their particular governmental stability and to face the internal threats of violence and insurgency; but at the same time it promised United States military and economic assistance to counter the threats of both external and internal communism. It also declared that the United

Table VII

Summary of Public Safety Programs by Country
from Fiscal Year 1970 to 1972

	(In thousands of dollars)		
	F.Y. 1970 Actual	F.Y. 1971 Estimated	F.Y. 1972 Proposed
Bolivia	209	143	115
Brazil	614	370	174
Chile	106	17	---
Colombia	267	260	340
Costa Rica	230	200	198
Dominican Republic	386	378	370
Ecuador	153	142	135
El-Salvador	83	64	56
Guatemala	1,129	377	377
Guyana	149	146	99
Honduras	107	121	171
Jamaica	75	70	96
Nicaragua	---	118	91
Panama	131	164	203
Peru	27	---	---
Uruguay	285	624	225
Venezuela	284	186	200
Sub Total	4,235	3,380	2,850

Source: AID's Office of Public Safety (OPS), budget requests to Congress to cover operations in Latin America for Fiscal Year 1972.

States will refrain from active involvement of American forces abroad. Thus the Nixon Doctrine brought a major change in the direction of the United States security assistance policy. The three principles of the Doctrine, which are the major elements of that change are:

1. The United States will keep all its treaty commitments.
2. The United States shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole.
3. In cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriated. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.¹⁰¹

On another occasion, President Nixon declared:

The nations of each part of the world should assume the primary responsibility for their own well-being; and they themselves should determine the terms of well-being.¹⁰²

From this statement, like the Nixon Doctrine, it seems quite evident that the Nixon administration considers security assistance to the countries of the underdeveloped world very essential. Although the emphasis on internal security remains, one can conclude that:

On account of the widened scope of the United States security assistance by the Nixon administration, which resulted in the considerable importance of many other underdeveloped countries of Asia and

¹⁰¹U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign Military Sales Act 1970-71, Hearings, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1969, (Testimony of David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense), p. 6.

¹⁰²Ibid.

Africa; Latin America no longer remained to be the only focal point of United States security assistance.

Another major foreign policy shift which was introduced by the Kennedy administration and was in progress under Johnson but brought about in full swing by the Nixon administration is the marked reduction in grant security assistance and an increased United States weapon sales to Latin America and other underdeveloped countries. Describing this strategy of the administration, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, during testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee for Appropriations for 1971, said:

The basic policy of decreasing direct United States military involvement cannot be successful unless we provide our friends and allies, whether through grand aid or credit sales, with the material assistance necessary to assure the most effective possible contribution by the manpower they are willing and able to commit to their own and common defense. Many of them simply do not command the resources or technical capabilities to assume greater responsibility for their own defense without such assistance. The challenging aspect of our policy can, therefore, best be achieved when each partner does its share and contributes what it best can to the common effort. In the majority of the cases this means indigenous manpower organized into properly equipped and well-trained armed forces with the help of material, training, technology, and specialized skills furnished by the United States through the military assistance program or as Foreign military sales (emphasis added).¹⁰³

In accordance to the changed basic promises, the Nixon Doctrine required an adequately funded security assistance program to enable

¹⁰³U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations for 1971, Hearings, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1970, p. 307.

the United States:

to strengthen the self defense capabilities of the friends and allies while at the same time fostering local initiative and self reliance;

to make possible the reduction of the United States forces overseas in certain areas, without a reduction in allies, security; and raise the threshold of direct United States involvement;

to provide on a selective basis, technical advice, training, material and financial assistance for internal security in situations where such aid is important to the United States security and where the local government has demonstrated its ability to respond constructively to the aspirations of its people.¹⁰⁴

On the basis of this rationale President Nixon in 1971 sought approval for the largest Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program in the United States' history: \$510 million in credits and loan guarantees was requested from the Congress to help finance total arms purchases estimated at \$2.15 billion--a 700 per cent increase over the pre-1961 average of \$300 million a year and twice the average rate during the 1960's.¹⁰⁵

Naturally the shift in United States foreign policy from reduced grant assistance to increased arms sales has resulted in the growing resentments from various ruling circles of the Latin American subcontinent. Governor Nelson Rockefeller in his report discussing this concern observed that many countries of Latin America "have been puzzled

¹⁰⁴U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Hearings, 92nd Cong., 1st sess., 1971, (Testimony of John N. Irving II, Under Secretary of State), pp. 2-3.

¹⁰⁵"Arms Now Pay Later: United States Arms Sales to the Third World," NACLA's Latin America and Empire Report, VI (January, 1972), p. 4.

by the reduction in United States military assistance grants in view of the growing intensity of the subversive activities they face".¹⁰⁶ Citing the declining amount of grant assistance \$21.4 million (proposed) for 1970 as against \$80.7 million in Fiscal Year 1966, Rockefeller recommends the United States to reverse the recent downward trend in grants for assisting the training of security forces for the other hemisphere countries.¹⁰⁷

The following graph shows a remarkable decline in the United States grant military assistance from Fiscal Year 1966 to 1970.

The changed patterns of the United States security assistance, brought about by the Nixon administration, made the necessity of organizational changes quite imperative. To fulfill the changed premises of security assistance, and for the purposes of organizational changes, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 was introduced. This Act, in an effort to strengthen the planning and coordination of all security assistance, pulled together the following components of security assistance:

- (a) Military Grants;
- (b) Foreign Military Credits;
- (c) Economic Supporting Assistance and Public Safety Program.¹⁰⁸

The internal security assistance (Foreign Assistance Act of 1971) also incorporates other recommendations, which are:


¹⁰⁶Rockefeller Report on Americas (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), p. 60.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 63.

¹⁰⁸Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, op. cit., p. 5.

Figure 1. Decline in U.S. Military Grants to Latin America

Source: Foreign Military Sales Presented to Congress, as cited in The Rockefeller Report on the Americas, op. cit., p. 64.



1. It provides for a high-level coordinator in the Department of State to carry out the Department's responsibility for policy direction of the program and to assure that military assistance and related supporting assistance will be considered together in security planning.
2. It lays the basis for shifting military assistance from grant to a loan basis by providing authority for soft as well as commercial lending terms. This will help the United States to assure that recipient countries make their decisions on security expenditures with full recognition of competing development and other budgetary requirements within the total resources available. (emphasis added)
3. It should make for a more healthy relationship as well as a more effective program.¹⁰⁹

The proposed new organization through this act is expected to tackle the following basic problems regarding security assistance:

Is the proposed level of defense expenditures by allied and friendly countries reasonable in terms of their security objectives?

What is the likely impact of such expenditures on their economy and what portion of such expenditure should the United States support?

What degree of force modernization is required?¹¹⁰

The Department of Defense will, as at present, administer the grant military aid and foreign military sales programs but under the continuing guidance of Department of State.

The new organizational structure, and the advantages of the

¹⁰⁹U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign Assistance Legislation for 1972, Hearings, 92nd Cong., 1st sess, 1971, p. 155.

¹¹⁰The balance of this and the following discussion is prepared from the hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, op. cit. The testimonies of various experts and government officials have been extensively used. For further details see the documents cited above.

integrative approach of the new legislation will facilitate the proper mix of military and economic components of security assistance and a fuller, more explicit consideration of economic factors in the formulation of military assistance programs. In implementing the new program, the administrator will be guided by the following precepts:

The emphasis is on selectivity in the use of these programs and in United States involvement. This will be accomplished through close day-to-day policy supervision and control which will be exercised by the Secretary of State through the new Security Assistance Coordinator.

Emphasis on strengthening the self reliance of the recipient. The ultimate purpose is to make recipients capable of defending themselves in local conflicts that do not involve other major powers.

A more equal partnership. At this transfer of responsibilities and cost progresses, judgments will increasingly substitute for those of the United States. As the local resources take the place of United States resources, the countries concerned will have to weigh and appraise critically their own security requirements in relation to other pressing social and economic needs competing for the same limited resources. The United States' goal will be to reduce the dependence of the recipients on her and to create new incentives for recipient countries to reexamine their security needs.¹¹¹

In spite of the changes and broader approach toward the security assistance under the Nixon administration, the United States still puts the same emphasis on internal security; and the Latin American countries still receive United States security assistance for Public Safety Programs.

Total OPS expenditures in the fifteen Latin American countries reached an estimated \$39 million by July 1, 1970 (outlays in individual

¹¹¹Ibid., p. 6.

countries ranged from the \$1 to 2 million spent in Bolivia, Costa Rica, El-Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Uruguay, and Venezuela, to \$3 to 4 million subsidies to Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru. The leading beneficiary of the Public Safety Program in Latin America was Brazil, which received \$7.5 million in OPS funds by the middle of 1970.¹¹² As of January, 1970, 3500 officers of commissioned status had graduated from the International Police Academy.¹¹³

Following is Table VIII which shows the United States Police Assistance¹¹⁴ to Latin America from 1961 to 1969.

The total OPS expenditures in Latin America from the year 1956 through the 1970's are shown in Table IX and the proposed appropriations for Fiscal Year 1971 are also included.

The number of Latin American police personnel trained within the United States and the Latin American countries during the years 1967-1969 is shown in Table X. Also included in the table is the number of United States Public Safety advisors involved in the Public Safety Programs.

AID had requested \$26 million in police assistance for Fiscal

¹¹²Michael T. Klare, "Policing the Empire," Commonweal, XCII (September 18, 1970), p. 456.

¹¹³U.S., Department of State, AID, Office of Public Safety, Program Guide Public Safety Training (Washington, D.C., 1968).

¹¹⁴Includes commodities delivered (e.g., Radio equipment, anti-riot gas, small arms, patrol vehicles), training in the United States and other countries and in-country training provided by United States Public Safety Advisors.

Table VIII

Police Assistance - Worldwide 1961-69 by Fiscal Year
(Thousands of dollars)

Region and Country	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	Total 61-69
LATIN AMERICA, Total	2,518	2,886	7,951	4,486	5,448	7,087	5,306	4,037	3,931	43,630
Argentina	-	1	5	26	41	47	-	-	-	120
Bolivia	155	339	413	286	104	13	62	109	117	1,598
Brazil	718	596	1,292	1,098	774	754	699	623	862	7,416
Chile	-	206	449	283	459	435	290	75	68	2,265
Colombia	16	-	1,607	340	818	1,799	503	341	299	5,723
Costa Rica	-	-	165	60	141	182	233	239	215	1,235
Dominican Republic	-	-	440	44	97	569	769	762	435	3,116
Ecuador	142	374	1,117	270	307	340	247	223	199	3,219
El-Salvador	325	105	366	168	183	220	187	173	99	1,826
Guatemala	319	77	166	128	270	249	644	218	411	2,482
Guyana	-	-	-	44	12	552	98	84	165	955
Honduras	83	61	104	137	300	127	119	99	158	1,188
Jamaica	-	-	-	-	-	-	166	197	88	451
Mexico	500	-	-	-	245	-	-	-	-	745
Panama	160	27	569	77	125	137	141	103	128	1,467
Peru	46	226	466	639	737	1,060	529	280	132	4,115
Uruguay	-	3	-	11	288	160	188	158	224	1,032
Venezuela	-	27	263	338	459	425	431	353	331	2,627
Other Countries	24	558	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	582
Regional	30	266	529	537	88	18	-	-	-	1,468

Source: U. S. Agency for International Development, Statistics and Report Division, Operation Reports, Data as of 30 June 1961, 30 June 1962, 30 June 1963, 30 June 1964, 30 June 1965, 30 June 1966, 30 June 1967, 30 June 1968, and 30 June 1969.

Table IX

AID Public Safety Program Expenditures in Latin America, 1956-1970

(Amounts in thousands of dollars)
(FY = Fiscal Year)

Country:	Program initiated FY:	Expenditures through 6/30/69:	Estimated expenditures in FY 1970:	Estimated expenditures thru 6/30/70:	FY 1971 Request:
Bolivia	1956	1,900	118	2,018	143
Brazil	1959	6,830	732	7,562	456
Chile	1963	1,571	90	1,661	71
Colombia	1963	4,350	217	4,567	240
Costa Rica	1963	985	240	1,225	200
Dominican Republic	1962	2,583	470	3,053	423
Ecuador	1962	3,290	186	3,476	134
El-Salvador	1961	1,825	87	1,912	86
Guyana	1966	711	311	1,022	232
Honduras	1960	1,074	167	1,241	165
Jamaica	1967	272	172	444	70
Panama	1959	3,059	383	3,442	135
Peru	1962	3,528	114	3,642	0
Uruguay	1962	869	230	1,099	200
Venezuela	1963	2,318	285	2,603	210
Totals		35,165	3,802	38,967	2,765

Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, Program and Project Data Presentations to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1971. (Does not include data for countries where OPS program terminated prior to FY 1970.)

Table X

Training of Latin American Police Personnel in the
United States and in Latin American Countries

Region and Country	Personnel trained in the U.S. 1967-69	Personnel trained in Latin Amer- ican countries 1967-69	Public Safety Advisors as of 30 June 68
LATIN AMERICA, total	1,135	4	90
Argentina	33	-	-
Bolivia	14	-	3
Brazil	224	-	17
Chile	30	-	1
Colombia	89	-	7
Costa Rica	64	-	4
Dominican Republic	66	1	15
Ecuador	30	-	6
El-Salvador	34	-	4
Guatemala	105	2	2
Guyana	33	-	2
Honduras	29	-	2
Jamaica	31	-	2
Nicaragua	35	-	2
Panama	51	1	3
Paraguay	8	-	-
Peru	36	-	9
Uruguay	43	-	3
Venezuela	172	-	10
Other/Regional	7	-	-

Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, Statistics and Reports Division, Operations Report, Data as of 30 June 1968, 30 June 1969.

Year 1972.¹¹⁵ The new emphasis is reported to be on the modernization of the police forces in anti-subversion techniques to deal with urban guerrillas, especially in Latin American countries. For details of the amount allotted to the various countries in Latin America, see Table VII on page 70. A significant change is that from Fiscal Year 1972, the Public Safety Programs are being reduced in thirteen Latin American countries; terminated in Peru and Chile, because of their criticism of the role of the United States assistance programs; and increased in Colombia, Jamaica, Honduras, and Panama.

The future of the United States Safety Program appears to be quite pessimistic because the program has been under strong criticism from within the United States and in various Latin American countries. Lately serious questions have been raised about the wisdom of assistance to certain repressive regimes,¹¹⁶ and two large recipients of police assistance--Guatemala and Dominican Republic--have been criticized as the violators of human rights by the OAS.¹¹⁷

The United States decision to end a \$200,000 a year police training program in Brazil¹¹⁸ is an indication that the total police assistance

¹¹⁵Tad Szulc, "United States Plans to Increase AID to Foreign Police to Help Fight Subversion," The New York Times, June 14, 1971.

¹¹⁶Dan Griffin, "Senator Church Assails United States Aid to Brazil Police," The Washington Post, July 25, 1971.

¹¹⁷"United States to End Police Assistance to Brazil," The Washington Post, July 15, 1971.

¹¹⁸St. Louis Post Dispatch, August 8, 1971.

to the fifteen Latin American countries will be eventually discarded.

But the possibility that the United States might continue its involvement in the form of FMS credit and/or cash sales of the weapons to increase the capabilities of counterinsurgency forces in Latin America cannot be ruled out.

CHAPTER IV

THE PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAMS: AN ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL REPRESSION AND THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN BRAZIL

After an understanding of the underlying objectives and functioning of the public safety program in Latin America, an analysis of the actual performance of these programs becomes quite necessary. Since it is quite impossible to study the performance of public safety programs in all the twenty states of the subcontinent, a case study is the most advisable and prudent technique available because:

- (a) The case study will help us identify the gaps between the states objectives and actual performance of the United States police assistance to the Latin American subcontinent in general.
- (b) The case study will enable us to enquire into the positive and negative impacts of the United States police assistance to the subcontinent.

Brazil has been selected as a case study for the performance of public safety programs for the following reasons:

- 1) Brazil is the largest country of the subcontinent in terms of area, population, and has been the largest recipient of the United States public safety assistance.
- 2) The recent reports of the police brutalities in Brazil and torturings of political prisoners raises serious questions about the role played by the United States public safety program in Brazil in particular.
- 3) The excessive violence and increased activities of radical guerrilla movements in Latin American countries in general bring up serious doubts about the effectiveness and the necessity of the continued public safety programs in Latin America.

The point of inquiry here is what is the role played by the United States public safety program in the increasing police brutalities in Brazil? In other words, if the emphasis of the United States police training is on the minimum use of force in Brazil and elsewhere in Latin America, why are Brazilian police reportedly so inclined towards torture and brutality in dealing with political prisoners and accused saboteurs?

If United States police assistance really focuses on better civil-police relations, and promotes social justice, why are the United States trained Brazilian police reportedly involved in the orderly elimination of politically dissent and of oppositional forces?

Before we probe these questions, it is quite necessary to study the United States public safety program in Brazil in considerable detail.

The public safety program was started in Brazil late in 1959 at

the request of the Brazilian government. The basic goals for the program were: to establish a federal police organization at Brasilia, to deal with the interim problems of police development in key states in the country; and to help Brazil modernize its police operations by expanding and improving police training and central information service. The program also attempted to provide coordination between the to-be established federal police and individual state police forces.¹¹⁹

During the period from 1960-69 public safety assistance was tailored to the particular requirements of the police forces of various states of Brazil. In September, 1968, the main thrust of the United States assistance was to be with the federal police rather than both federal and state police forces. The reason was that the federal police were expected to assume an increasing responsibility in the training and technical services for itself as well as for state police forces. Another rationale underlying this new emphasis was to provide for the development of appropriate police institutions which would result in a reduction in the number of United States public safety advisors stationed in Brazil. By 1972 this number will be reduced to four. Table XI provides details concerning the numbers of Brazilian officers trained for

¹¹⁹U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Policies and Programs in Brazil, Hearings, 92nd Cong., 1st sess., 1971, p. 3. (The substance of the following information has been extracted from the testimony of Theodore D. Brown, Chief Public Safety Advisor, U.S. AID, Brazil.)

Table XI

Public Safety Program Participant Trainees, Brazil

	Fiscal year--								Totals
	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	
1. International American Police Academy (Panama) (general course).	46	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	46
2. General course	--	4	42	54	74	52	73	69	368
3. Senior course	--	1	--	--	--	1	1	10	13
4. Police executives	1	1	10	10	--	13	6	17	58
5. Communications.	--	--	1	1	1	1	--	--	4
6. Riot control (IAPA)	7	8	--	--	--	--	--	--	15
7. Motor transport	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0
8. Criminalistics	--	--	--	1	--	--	2	--	3
9. Traffic.	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	--	1
10. FBI National Academy	--	--	--	1	--	--	--	1	2
11. Miscellaneous.	--	6	1	--	--	--	--	1	8
Total.	54	20	54	67	75	67	83	98	518

Source: United States Policies and Programs in Brazil.

various courses from 1963 to 1970. Table XII provides the number of Brazilian officers who have specialized in various courses of public safety programs during 1963-1970.

Table XIII provides details concerning police officers who have been trained from the various states in Brazil. Table XIV furnishes the actual dollar funding from Fiscal Years 1962-1970 for the public safety program. The funding includes the salaries and allowances of the public safety advisors assigned to the program, costs of training Brazilian police officers in the United States, and the commodities provided to achieve specific project objectives.

The total Brazilian police forces are reported to be 271,000 and is comprised of non-uniformed federal police numbering 38,000, uniformed Federal District Police numbering 6,500, uniformed state military police numbering 176,000, and 84,000 non-uniformed State Civil Police.¹²⁰

Let us focus our attention on the reported police brutalities in Brazil. European and American newspapers lately have published numerous reports and articles alleging the widespread and excessive application of torture by the Brazilian police and military to exterminate the remaining vestiges of opposing political forces in order to gain a complete subjugation of the Brazilian society. Some citation of various reports of torture is felt necessary for the sake of documentation.

¹²⁰Ibid.

Table XII

Public Safety Program General Course Specialization Phase*

	Fiscal year								Totals
	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	
IAPA (General Course No. 3, 4, 5):									
1. Firearms	4	7	--	--	--	--	--	--	11
2. Investigations	2	8	--	--	--	--	--	--	10
3. Counterintelligence	5	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	7
4. Handling explosives	3	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	5
5. Instructor methods	--	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	2
(Declined special training)	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	1
Total	14	22	--	--	--	--	--	--	36
IPA:									
1. Crim/security invest	--	--	22	13	20	12	17	28	112
2. Instructor methods	--	4	9	20	40	15	14	4	106
3. Patrol operations	--	--	2	12	9	13	16	16	68
4. Riot control	--	--	--	7	2	6	4	3	22
5. Traffic	--	--	--	--	1	3	15	3	22
6. Border/Customs control	--	--	8	2	2	1	--	4	17
7. Narcotics	--	--	--	--	--	--	7	5	12
8. Records/identification	--	--	--	--	--	2	--	3	5
9. Firearms	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	3	3
10. Crime Lab Admin.	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	1
Total	--	4	42	54	74	52	73	69	368

*Note--Each member of the general course is given 4 weeks of additional training in a special functional area consistent with the needs of the respective country and the attainment of project goals. Specialization was offered only to IAPA general course Nos. 3, 4, and 5 but was not offered to general course Nos. 1 and 2 (10 participants).

Table XIII

Public Safety Participant Program, by State and by Funding Year

States	Fiscal year--													
	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
Acre	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Alageas	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	6	4	--	--	--
Amazonas	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	4	--	--	--
Bahia	--	--	--	--	--	2	5	5	7	3	7	3	2	--
Ceara	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	5	5	5	1	2	--
Espirito Santo	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	5	--	2	--
Federal District	--	--	--	4	9	--	2	3	3	3	5	4	4	--
Federal police	--	--	2	3	1	--	5	5	2	1	10	17	13	--
Goias	--	--	--	--	1	5	3	8	6	3	6	3	3	--
Guanabara	4	4	1	1	7	--	6	8	6	4	3	--	1	--
Maranhao	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	5	2	--	--
Mato Grosso	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	1	--	--
Minas Garais	--	1	1	6	24	1	9	4	5	1	6	1	3	--
Para	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	6	2	2	--
Paraiba	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	5	8	--	2	--
Parana	--	--	--	3	5	9	1	4	6	2	8	2	1	--
Pernambuco	--	1	4	4	1	--	1	8	6	3	10	1	1	--
Piaui	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	6	6	1	2	--
Rio de Janeiro	--	--	--	--	--	--	8	7	4	3	8	4	--	--
Rio Grande do Norte	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	6	1	2	--
Rio Grande do Sul	--	1	--	--	--	2	13	6	8	3	8	1	2	--
Santa Catarina	--	--	--	--	2	2	5	4	8	3	9	1	--	--
Sao Paulo	--	1	4	5	12	6	6	5	9	1	10	--	2	--
Sergipe	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	7	6	--	2	--
Total	4	8	12	26	62	27	64	67	75	59	146	45	46	--
Grand Total														641

Source: United States Policies and Programs in Brazil.

Table XIV

Brazil Public Safety Funding, 1962 Through June 30, 1970

(Dollar amounts in thousands)

	Total	Technicians	Participants	Commodities	Other Costs
Through fiscal year--					
1962*	\$1,287	504	76	660	47
1963	648	334	41	163	110
1964	1,159	410	59	618	72
1965	1,076	469	70	501	36
1966	972	443	115	376	38
1967	639	374	124	129	12
1968	567	367	94	103	3
1969	482	248	132	101	1
1970	727	308	198	219	2
Total expenditures	7,557	3,457	909	2,870	321

*Yearly figures not available.

Source: United States Policies and Programs in Brazil.

The international Commission of Jurists, whose headquarters are in Geneva and is a non-governmental organization having consultative status with the UNESCO have published various reports on the political repression in Brazil by the police. One of these reports states that there is a civil war in Brazil and the principal organs of Brazilian government are accused of political repression. The report contains a detailed list of various kinds of oppositional forces to the military regime and also carries a detailed list of various techniques of torture inflicted by the Brazilian police.¹²¹

A report published in the Washington Post makes the usual denials of the government of Brazil (that the reports of police torture and brutalities are over exaggeration and fabrication of the facts) more dubious. According to this report the government of Brazil (herein will be referred to as GOB) has refused to let the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, an organ of AOS, enter into the country to investigate the charges that political prisoners are being tortured there.¹²² Another report published by the International Commission of Democratic Jurists adds more weight to the authenticity of the reports of torture and terror in Brazil. This report which was published in November, 1969, entitled Brazil '69:

¹²¹ "Report on Police Repression and Tortures Inflicted Upon Political Opponents and Prisoners in Brazil," CIDOC, Geneva 70-07-22, Doc. 70/230. Also refer to "Ill-treatment of Political Prisoners in Brazil," CIDOC, Geneva 70-07-24, Doc. 70/232. "Prison Treatment in Brazil," CIDOC, Geneva 70-07-24, Doc. 70/231.

¹²² Dan Griffin, "Tortures in Brazil Leak Out Despite Rebuff of OAS Probe," Washington Post, March 7, 1971.

Torture and Repression, charged the military government of Brazil with torturing political prisoners. The publication, however, was largely devoted to an analysis of how the new, loosely defined National Security law (decreed in September, 1969) transforms almost any act of opposition to the present government into a crime against the "national security" of Brazil. It also reproduced several important documents and letters containing the names of about one hundred students, professionals, and clergymen; and also gives a brief description of the tortures inflicted upon each.¹²³ In the same article Ralph della Cava cited a widely publicized dossier on torture which was submitted to Pope Paul VI at the end of 1969 and was endorsed for its reliability by sixty prominent European intellectuals and religious leaders. The dossier was entitled "Livre Noir: Terreur et Torture au Brasil," and contained eleven separate documents; two worth mentioning concerned the murder of Father Antonio Henrique Pereira Neto in May, 1969. Father Neto was a northeastern priest much admired among university students who was assassinated by reportedly army-condoned right wing terrorists. Another document was a public protest issued in July, 1969, by thirty-eight priests in Belo Horizonte against "the physical and moral outrages" continuously committed against imprisoned priests and laymen since December, 1968.

European and American clergy also joined with the Brazilian clergy in their vehement condemnation of reported Brazilian torture.

¹²³ Ralph della Cava, "Torture in Brazil," Commonweal, XCII (April 24, 1970), p. 135.

The Department of International Affairs of the United States Catholic Conference denounced the "reported campaign of widespread imprisonment, detention, threats, harassment, and even torture" of Brazilians¹²⁴ and Brazilian clergy are the strongest critics of the repressive activists of their government.

As a final citation of the reports of political oppression in Brazil, the New York Times states that the Education Minister of Brazil, Jarbas Passarinho had acknowledged the use of torture in Brazilian jails and said, "to deny that torture had been used in Brazilian jails would be untrue," but added that it wasn't true to say there was a systematic policy of torture.¹²⁵ This report is more significant because this was the first admission of the use of torture by a member of the Brazilian government.

It is quite evident at this point that torture has been a weapon of the military rulers in Brazil; so let us address ourselves to an analysis of the utility of political repression in Brazil.

A Conceptual Analysis of Political Repression in Brazil

Our analysis of political repression in Brazil will be limited to the developments subsequent to the overthrow of the Goulart regime, and this will be pursued within the following conceptual framework chalked out by this writer:

¹²⁴The National Catholic Reporter, June 5, 1970.

¹²⁵New York Times, December 4, 1970.

- I. Formation of a rightist military regime after a successful military coup.
- II. Struggle between the moderate rightists ("soft-liners") and ultra rightists ("hard-liners") and a "coup within a coup" which resulted in the victory of the "hard-liners".
- III. Effective measures by the victorious hard-liners to strengthen their grip on the government and to eliminate massive opposition and protesting elements to their regimes such as:
 - a) government by decree; passage of various executive decrees to declare political opposition an act of treason, protest against the military regime as an act of subversion punishable by severe penalties.
 - b) attempts to bring about institutional changes like closing down of legislature or such radical changes in the judiciary that its existence becomes merely symbolic; the complete transformation of the educational process and institutions into a school of the ideology of the ruling clique, and this is usually accomplished by the frequent closing down of educational institutions, massive arrest and constant harassment of the students, termination of the services and arrests of the anti-regime professors, control of syllabi of studies, banning of political discussion, or assembly within the campuses; complete control and monopoly of mass communication through censorship

of news and banning of the critical newspapers.

- c) an exhibition of force which will transform the society into a garrison state; the rationale behind this is to create a psychological feeling of terror, helplessness, and depression among the masses so that they refrain from opposition, resistance, or demonstration against the regime.

IV. Thus the development of a systematic elimination of political opposition by the oppressive regime whose chief targets are:

- a) anti-regime elements of the upper and middle classes,
 b) intellectuals,
 c) students.

Before we proceed further, let us define terror. Thomas Perry Thornton defined terror as a "symbolic act designed to influence political behavior by extra normal means, entailing the use or threat of violence,"¹²⁶ and classifies terror as, "enforcement terror and agitational terror," the first being "terror (or counter terror) launched by those in power," and the latter, "terrorist acts by those aspiring to power."¹²⁷ The difference between the two types of terror according to Thornton is that

¹²⁶ Thomas Perry Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation," in Internal War: Problems and Approaches, ed. by Harry Eckstein (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 71-95.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 72.

the former is terror perpetrated by incumbents in power as an extreme means of enforcing their authority (thus name enforcement terror); and the latter is applied by insurgents out of power with a view to provoking certain reactions from the incumbents or an otherwise apathetic population.¹²⁸

During our analysis of political repression in Brazil, we will only deal with "enforcement terror", as defined by Thornton.

The vast majority of the Brazilians applauded the surprisingly quick collapse of what is more popularly known as the leftist regime of president Joao Goulart in 1964, and the people expected the military to follow the historical tradition by working for the restoration of civilian rule. However, the failure of military to do so led to the general disgruntlement and frustration against the military. The military takeover, among other factors, was the result of the long standing conflict between the populist politicians, who were busy mobilizing new mass voters on the one side, and the old oligarchy and military on the other. The nature of the conflict of military and oligarchy with the populist politicians was quite different in nature.

The oligarchy was afraid that populists, due to their liberal ideas and modern approaches, might radicalize the methods of government by discarding the traditional techniques of compromise and conciliation; and the military was convinced that no civilian sub-group is capable of solving

¹²⁸Ibid.

the political, social, and economic problems of Brazilian society; and this conviction made them determined against the delivering of government to civilians this time.

Besides this, the Brazilian military had become a prey to the internal squabbling and conflicts from within. Jordan M. Young had identified three basic groups within the Brazilian army striving to control the government. The first is composed of hard-line men who feel that the civilian political groups are "absolutely and incontrovertibly corrupt."¹²⁹ This group is mainly comprised of young colonels, "strategically situated in the army system of command, who have been ideologically influenced and led by Carlos Lacerda before he shifted to oppose the military regime . . ."¹³⁰ This group has disregarded the more liberal policies of the soft-liners.

Soft-liners, according to Young, are, "at the opposite end of the pole." They are of the opinion that the army should play a more historic role of the jealous guardians of the constitution and status quo, and whenever the status quo is jeopardized by the liberal or radical civilian populist groups, the army should react for constitutionalism and traditional order and retire to the barracks.

¹²⁹ Jordan M. Young, "Brazil," Political Forces in Latin America, op. cit., pp. 557-595.

¹³⁰ Helio Jaguaribe, "Political Strategies of National Development in Brazil," in Latin American Radicalism, ed. by Irving Louis Horowitz, Josue de Castro and John Gerassi (New York: Vintage Books, a division of Random House, 1969), pp. 390-439.

The third group, as differentiated by Young, is "oscillating between these two groups," which has "tried to steer a middle course between the opposing tendencies of the military." Many of these men are quite conscious of the "shortcomings of military solutions for complex economic and social problems," and are of the view that these matters could be dealt with more effectively by the civilian experts and bureaucrats; hence they should be left along to tackle them.¹³¹

The moderates, as expected, were inclined to play the "traditional role as the guardians of the political equilibrium,"¹³¹ after the 1969 coup, the hard-liners gained an upper hand having a majority over the moderates.

For a better understanding of events leading to the reign of terror, we will begin our analysis from 1966 when Costa e Silva was elected president by the Congress, and Brazilians listened patiently when he promised to "humanize" the government and bureaucracy, and declared a war on inflation. Though the economic conditions were improved by 1968, the political performance of the government deteriorated.

The first major event was the Institutional Act which was passed arbitrarily, ignoring the congressional version of the emergency act, by the three military ministers under the acting president Mazilli. It began by stating that the constitution of 1946 and the state constitutions were to

¹³¹ Jordan M. Young, op. cit., p. 578.

¹³² Thomas E. Skidmore, "The Military in Poser," Political Power in Latin America: Seven Confrontations, ed. by Richard R. Fagen and Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall; 1970), pp. 187-192.

re-unite in force, subject to modifications included in the articles of the Institutional Act. The new powers granted to the executive included the following:

1. The power to submit constitutional amendments to the congress which would have only thirty days in which to consider the proposals, and need only approve them by a majority vote rather than the two-thirds vote required in the 1946 constitution; the president was also given exclusive power to propose expenditure bills to congress and Congress was denied the right to increase expenditures on any bills proposed by the president. The president was also given the power to declare a state of siege or to prolong such a state of siege for a maximum of thirty days without congressional approval.
2. The executive was given sweeping powers to suppress the political rights of political undesirables for ten years. This included the right to cancel the mandates of members of state, municipal, or federal legislatures. There was also an article suspending for six months the constitutional guarantees of job security in the civil service.¹³³

The Institutional Act cancelled specifically the Ineligibility Clause in the constitution, thus making eligible for election military officers on active duty.¹³⁴ The second Institutional Act was issued in October, 1965,

¹³³Skidmore, op. cit., p. 189.

¹³⁴Ibid.

"restoring many of the special (executive) powers that had expired under the first Institutional Act."¹³⁵ Some other characteristics of the Second Institutional Act were: the political parties were to be dissolved; the presidential election of 1966 as well as the gubernatorial elections would be indirect (by the congress for the president and by the legislatures for governors) and the president regained the right, on his own discretion, to remove the political rights of those Brazilians considered to be a threat to the security of the government. There were many other provisions to the new Institutional Act, including an increase in the membership of the Supreme Court from eleven to sixteen; the additional judges were to be appointed by the president. This packing of court was a response to the court's repeated rulings in favor of the liberation of political prisoners.¹³⁶

The military regime was making steady progress towards complete political control. The major stroke came in December, 1968, when the military dictatorship transformed itself into a reign of terror. The fusion of ultra-rightists and moderate rightists fell apart and led to a coup within a coup. The government of Costa e Silve yielded to the mounting pressure from the hard-liners to crack down on its political opponents.

The crisis resulted when Congress refused to permit one of its members to be arrested, tried in the Supreme Court, and stripped of his political rights for ten years. The indicted member was (the well-known

¹³⁵Ibid., p. 192.

¹³⁶Ibid.

journalist and then Congressman) Marcio Moreira Alves, who during a speech from the chamber floor, asked his countrymen to boycott independence day military parades to express their disapproval of the military regime. Alves was the chief parliamentary critic of the military clique behind president Costa e Silva. In 1967 he wrote a book entitled Tortures and the Tortured which dealt with the brutalities that the military rulers were using to deal with their political opponents. The military junta had its eye on Alves for a considerable period of time and they were waiting for an appropriate excuse to arrest him. Alves provided them that long-awaited excuse when he assailed the military rulers as the "nest of torturers."

The event was utilized by the military to justify their action, which they were about to take anyway. The generals knew of the hostilities around them from much of the Roman Catholic clergy, the press, the students, and some businessmen. When the Congress tried to defy them, they retaliated not only with the Congress, but also with other sources of opposition and elements of hostility by arresting a number of politicians and journalists, and by instituting excessive press censorship, and most important of all by enforcing the Fifth Institutional Act. This act provided full dictatorial powers to the president in "defense of the necessary interest of the nation."¹³⁷ It also gave the executive the right to close Congress rule by decree, to cancel the political rights of any person, declare

¹³⁷ Ibid.

a state of siege, dismiss public officials, waive writs of habeas corpus, and permit the seizure of assets of those who illegally enriched themselves. The executive, of course, was final authority to determine the legality of anyone's wealth. The content of the Fifth Institutional Act is provided in Appendix III. The greatest targets of the military regime's repression are students and the educational institutions. The students are a threat to the absolutist regime because as a group they are one of the chief proponents of civil liberties and democracy. Their demands and efforts to promote these ends have been very frequently met with violence from the government such as by forcibly obstructing and then outlawing the National Union of Students. The penalty for students' strikes or other prohibited activities is the loss of all credits to date, plus suspension from school for three years. A professor loses his right to teach or hold any public job for five years. Especially during the first half of 1968, thousands of students were sent to jail when they marched in several cities and demanded an end to the dictatorship. The increased popular support for student demands was met with increased police repression. Services of several hundred professors were also terminated under this provision. This action and constant surveillance of professors and student activities has a very strong negative impact on the student activities and on the university education itself.

Another section of the government was a decree-law of the "Civic-Education program." This law made civic education a required subject for all students in all levels from kindergarten to post-graduate studies.

The official texts, printed and distributed by the Ministry of Education, are a mixture of praise for the regime, slander of the previous liberal-democratic system, and appeals to primitive symbols of patriotism; such as the national anthem and flag. Every mention of the military stresses its right to guide the country, its selflessness, and its heroism. This measure of political control of education, along with the constant purges of students and teachers and the banning of "subversive" books is intended to produce docile generations for the future.¹³⁸

The Brazilian clergy were equally repressed by the military regime. The Brazilian clergy traditionally was considerably cooperative with any government, military, or civilian which guaranteed political stability and was anti-communist. However, for the last several years a remarkable radicalization appeared within the rank and file of Brazilian clergy, which often took shape as an identification with the groups demanding radical justice and civil liberties.

Alves has identified four ways in which the Brazilian clergy has organized itself against the military dictatorship. The first one is the non-violent group which follows Archbishop Helder Camara, who preaches "violence of the peaceful." His movement which is formed for "irresistible moral pressure," is being resisted quite successfully by the government. Not only Camara's words are barred, but protest meetings and marches are most violently repressed. A second group is comprised

¹³⁸Marcio Moriera Alves, "Brazil: What Terror is Like," The Nation, CCXII (March 15, 1971, pp. 337-41.

of those who believe that teaching people to recognize the society and the world in which they live is the best way to transform both. Since teaching peasants and slum dwellers is regarded as an activity almost as subversive as attacking a barracks, many of the exponents of the written word end up in jail. The third group consists of young clergy and laymen who believe that the only way to oust the military is by force, but they refuse to choose one of the resistance organizations preferring to help several. This help means giving sanctuary to revolutionaries, smuggling them out of the country, and providing transport, food, and meeting places for illegal groups such as National Student Union. Finally, the fourth group makes a clear cut option for one of the resistance organizations, following the example of Camillo Torres, the Colombian guerrilla priest killed in 1966.¹³⁹

Military rulers are afraid of the clerical involvement, sympathy, and most of all, identification with the cause of the civil populist leaders, leftist students, and intellectuals; and their increased call for accelerated efforts to eliminate the social injustices and military authoritarian rule. Another reason for the military's fear of the activist churchmen is that the church is well established and well organized on all levels of the society and its appeal is far reaching. The result of its effectiveness came out in the form of widespread condemnation by various church organizations in Europe and North America against the oppression of the military

¹³⁹Marcio Moriera Alves, "Brazil: A Country Where Christians Are Outlaws," Catholic World, CCXII (November, 1970), pp. 65-68.

junta and various messages sent to the Pope by Brazilian and foreign clergies and church organizations asking him to help put an end to the atrocities committed by the regime. In dealing with activist clergies the military regime proved to be ruthless; the reports of inhuman torture of Brazilian priests and deportation of foreign activist clergies are the living examples of this.

For the masses, Brazilian politics became an arena for a constant struggle between the ultra-rights and the radical lefts. The ultra-rights comprised of various ultra-conservative elements organized into a number of secret para-military and quasi-religious groups to eliminate what its members view as dangerous threats from the left. The radical left, on its part, mainly consists of students, populist leaders, intellectuals, and a considerable number of reformist clergy.

Most notorious of the rightist group is the Communist Hunting Command, whose slogan is reported to be, "For every dead democrat we will kill five communists."¹⁴⁰ The same news item reports that the ultra-rightists have in fact gained a sympathetic ear in the highest military and government circles. President Costa e Silva's wife during the end of 1968 signed a petition asking Pope Paul IV to take measures in cleaning Brazilian church of leftists. The police too seem to be interested in arresting only leftists while appearing to ignore rightist terrorists.

¹⁴⁰Newsweek, December 9, 1968, p. 51.

The Death Squad, according to Brown, chief United States safety advisor in Brazil, is alleged to be "a group of irresponsible police that have taken the law into their own hands, . . . and felt that it was their duty to take direct action and not bother recourse to the courts."¹⁴¹ Another report quotes Nelson Fonseca, chief criminal judge of Sao Paulo telling newsmen, "The members of the death squad are policemen . . . and everyone knows it."¹⁴² Another report discussing the activities of the death squad says, ". . . it has been unofficially estimated that the vigilante groups (death squads) have killed 500 to 1,000 people . . . in the six years . . . None of the investigations carried out by the police have been completed or made public . . ."¹⁴³

Operacao Bandeirantes (OB) is another rightist terrorist group which was established in Sao Paulo in mid-1969 as a pilot project to coordinate military and police efforts to combat terrorist activities according to one report which, further elaborating on OB, says, "The various security agencies represented in OB include representatives of the local army, Air Force, and Navy intelligence sections of the local state and federal police organizations. The coordinator is the army intelligence representative in Sao Paulo."¹⁴⁴

¹⁴¹Brown, op. cit., p. 45.

¹⁴²The Miami Herald, July 24, 1970.

¹⁴³The New York Times, July 21, 1970.

¹⁴⁴Brown, op. cit., p. 43.

Membership in these groups is drawn mainly from local police officials, and the rightist civilian element which channels its indignation over the populist middle class politicians, whom they only consider as radicals. These ultra-rightist sprung up during mid-1968 when popular resentment against the more moderate regime of Costa e Silva found greatest expression.

From the above study it is quite clear that Brazilian Military junta came to power in 1964 with the intention of staying indefinitely. The Institutional Acts passed by the dictatorship, the institutional changes, monopoly of means of communication and especially the measures taken to control the whole system of education are not the measures taken by a regime whose existence is temporary. Brazil seems to be experiencing a long military rule, which is deepening and strengthening its roots, and which apparently has the complete support of the United States.

The Role of the United States Police Assistance Program

The increased strength, seemingly permanent stability, and increased torture in Brazil raises an important point of investigation: What is the role of United States police assistance in providing stability to the regime and to the training of the Brazilian police which has been the regime's main tool for torture and political repression? Furthermore, if as claimed by David Bell and others, the emphasis of the United States Public Safety Programs is on the minimum use of force, why are the Brazilian police employing torture?

The response of the United States officials to this issue is confusingly strange. As noted earlier, David Bell has emphasized that the objectives of the United States public safety program were to train the foreign police in techniques of effective control, among other things, by minimum use of force. Theodore Brown, chief public safety advisor in Brazil, also played the same tune while testifying before a Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs.¹⁴⁵ Brown also said that Brazilian police advocate humane methods "through training at their academy, through their inservice training, and through mobile training courses."¹⁴⁶

Brown told the subcommittee that he thinks the United States public safety programs have been successful in achieving their objectives of the use of minimum force and humane methods. To the widespread reports of violence and inhuman treatments of political prisoners, Brown said, "within any organization there is always the possibility that there might be isolated cases of unnecessary use of force, Mr. Chairman. That is possible in any country."¹⁴⁷ Brown's statement, which was vigorously questioned by Senator Church, called the reports of police torture in Brazil unproved allegations. Never once was he willing to accept that violence has been used excessively.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵Brown, op. cit., p. 18.

¹⁴⁶Ibid.

¹⁴⁷Ibid.

¹⁴⁸For further details see United States Policies and Programs in Brazil, op. cit., pp. 18-20.

William M. Rountree, United States Ambassador to Brazil, stated during his testimony, "the general public reaction in Brazil (to the United States public safety system) has not been adverse."¹⁴⁹ At a later point he further said, "There has not to my knowledge been any strong adverse reaction to this Public Safety program, although there has been some, including criticism of it, in propaganda appearing abroad."¹⁵⁰ Rountree called the numerous reports of excessive torture by Brazilian police, "propaganda."

The responses of the United States officials is one of either con-
niving with or overlooking the existing political realities in Brazil. From
their statements it is quite evident that by calling the reports of torture
in Brazil, "isolated cases of use of force, 'allegations', and propaganda,"
they are trying to neutralize or liquidate the American public opinion
against the political oppression.

Dan Mitrione: A Study in Violence

The violent death of Dan Mitrione, a United States advisor to
Uruguyan police, at the hands of Uruguyan Tupamaro guerrillas, not only
raises serious questions about the role of the United States public safety
programs in the states south of Rio Grande, but it also increases doubts
about the credibility of United States official claims that public safety
programs are well-received in Brazil or in any other country of Latin

¹⁴⁹Ibid., p. 280.

¹⁵⁰Ibid., p. 281.

America and they are successful in their objectives of minimum use of force or inhuman methods.

Dan Mitrione was the police chief of Richmond, Indiana. Later he became a public safety advisor to Brazilian police and spent most of his time in Rio de Janeiro and Belo Horizonte, the areas where police brutalities and torture were the highest. In 1969, he was sent to Uruguay, because he supposedly was an expert on the operations of Tupamaro guerrillas. Mitrione became the chief United States public safety advisor to Uruguayan police. While in Uruguay, he was kidnapped by the Tupamaros, and held as ransom for the release of about 150 political prisoners held by the Uruguayan government. The refusal of the government of Uruguay to fulfill the Tupamaros' demands resulted in the execution of Mitrione at the hands of the Tupamaros.

Commenting on Mitrione's involvement in police torture, the left-wing NACLA wrote, "one of the best examples of OPS connection with torture and other forms of brutal repression in Latin America is Dan Mitrione."¹⁵¹

An interview published in Journal do Brazil was reported in New York Times, which charged Mitrione's direct connections with the torture activities. The former chief of Uruguayan Secret Police, Alejandro Otero, who worked with Mitrione, accused him of having employed violent

¹⁵¹"OPS and Torture: Mitrione Style," NACLA Newsletter, V (July-August, 1971), p. 8.

methods of oppression and torture against the captured Tupamaros.¹⁵² He also added that his disagreement with Mitrione's violent strategy resulted in his replacement. He felt that before Mitrione made violent methods a daily routine, Tupamaros used violence only as a last resort; but the later increased violence by Tupamaros, according to him, was a direct response to the methods practiced by Mitrione.¹⁵³

Referring to Alejandro Otero's statement, Father Louis Colonnese, Director of the Division of Latin America of the United States Catholic Conference, called for an investigation into the possibility that the United States is "exporting torture" to Latin America, and he hoped that the quest into the murder "will be done from the perspective of cause and effect rather than isolated acts of violence. . ."¹⁵⁴

Father Colonnese further added that Mitrione's presence in Belo Horizonte and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the areas with extremely high instances of alleged torture of political prisoners by Brazilian secret police and military, forces one "to speculate concerning the United States government possible complicity in such tortures."¹⁵⁵ Those excerpts of Father Colonnese's interview in which he explored the evidence of the above allegations is provided in Appendix IV.

¹⁵²New York Times, August 15, 1970.

¹⁵³"Uruguay: Deadlock," Latin America, IV (August 21, 1970), p. 272.

¹⁵⁴National Catholic Reporter, September 4, 1970, p. 3.

¹⁵⁵"The Case of Dan Mitrione," Worldreview, XIII (October, 1970), p. 18.

Mitrione's alleged use of torture and United States complicity in police brutalities invoked a storm of criticism and the United States Catholic Conference, of which Father Colonnese was director, was the main source of criticism. When this barrage of criticism led to Senate investigation, United States Catholic Conference supplied data on torture in Brazil to Senators Church and Proxmire, who were investigating the United States police assistance to Brazil and elsewhere in Latin America. Commenting on the performance of the public safety program in Latin America, James T. Cotter, information director of Latin America Bureau of United States Catholic Conference, in a letter to Worldview, wrote, "we pointed out the Mitrione case because it illustrates that in the minds of many Latin Americans, United States police advisors are considered part of the local police apparatus which uses torture to suppress not only terrorism, but also legitimate dissent. These United States police advisors are popularly thought by many Latin Americans to be involved in the financial support, implementations and even teaching of torture methods."¹⁵⁶

In the same letter, Cotter published an interview with Romeo Perez, an editor of a Christian Democratic newspaper in Montevideo, Uruguay, where Mitrione was executed. This interview reveals some information vital for our purposes, and is quoted verbatim:

The general reaction in Uruguay to the killing of United States police advisor Dan Mitrione was one of indifference.

¹⁵⁶ James T. Cotter, "The Mitrione Case," a letter to Worldview, XIV (September, 1971), pp. 19-20.

Even the most unaware of our citizens suspect that Mitrione was advising our police in the methods of torture which have become their new pattern of interrogation in recent years. Because of this, Mitrione was a little-liked figure, and his killing by Tupamaros did not produce that same negative public opinion which would have resulted if someone else had been killed. . . . Because of the function Mitrione was fulfilling in our country, he was looked upon as an expression of United States support of our repressive police organization and an example of United States intervention in Uruguayan internal affairs. He is believed to be responsible for introducing methods of torture to Uruguayan police.¹⁵⁷

From the above discussion we can conclude that:

- 1) The AID Public Safety program has apparently failed in its officially stated purpose of humanizing police methods in countries such as Brazil, Uruguay, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Haiti, which are the worst examples of use of inhumane methods.
- 2) The image of the United States, because of its assistance to the Latin American police, has suffered considerable damage in Latin America.
- 3) The United States Public Safety advisors seem to be involved in and seemingly a party of police brutalities.
- 4) Increased police brutalities have resulted in the increased violence from the Clandestine organizations in certain Latin American countries.

¹⁵⁷Ibid., p. 20.

The New York Times reported a unique example of the United States image among the Brazilian students. Comments by a Brazilian politician were made regarding the 1968 police occupation of the University of Brasilia. He is reported as having said, "Those kids are never going to forget that the police who used clubs on some of them were wearing equipment that still had USA stencilled on it."¹⁵⁸ It is highly unlikely that in a society like Brazil, where the masses are yearning for social justice and democracy, and are ruthlessly suppressed by foreign trained and foreign-armed police, that the foreign government will be well-regarded by the masses or that the public safety programs which strengthen the police will be well received.

Journalist Gary MacEoin, commenting on Brazilians' reaction about the United States support to the military regime, notes that they are convinced that the Brazilian regime is a puppet of the United States and incapable of unsupported survival. As an example of this, the Brazilians cite the increase in AID progress from \$15 million in 1964 to \$187 million in 1970 while AID programs elsewhere were being started. They also point out the increased efficiency in Brazil government at every level, from "tax gathering to torture," as conclusive evidence of the omnipresent American knowhow.¹⁵⁹

Another observer notes that the over-indulgence of the United

¹⁵⁸New York Times, April 6, 1971.

¹⁵⁹Gary MacEoin, "Brazil Specialty: Threat of Torture," The National Catholic Reporter, May 29, 1970.

States in too wide a sector of Brazilian affairs produced an anti-American backlash in Brazil. He also is of the opinion that the United States identification with the ruling military clique and the American penchant for material exhibitionism alienated the Brazilian masses.¹⁶⁰

The Congressional hearings on the various aspects of the United States police assistance programs in Brazil; innumerable protests by various religious and humanitarian organizations in Europe, Latin America and in the United States against the inhuman treatment of political prisoners and police brutalities in Brazil, seem to be the reason for reported termination of the United States police assistance to Brazil; although the official reason for this policy change, given by the chief of Public Safety advisor for Brazil, Theodore Brown, was that Brazilian police will be "sufficiently well-trained by the end of 1972".¹⁶¹

¹⁶⁰Dom Bonafede, "Washington Backs the Pooh Bahs," The Nation, CCVIII (May 26, 1969), pp. 663-666.

¹⁶¹United States Policies and Programs in Brazil, op. cit.

CHAPTER V

THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Revolution and Reaction

After a brief presentation of the internal forces of change in Latin America we should analyze the United States' role in the Latin American revolution.

This writer intends to examine this problem under the light of his two contentions, which are:

- I. The internal forces of change have viewed the United States as one of the major obstacles to the changes they are dedicated to bring about in their society. The United States, through her economic dominance, military support, and police assistance to the existing regimes of various Latin American countries has further strengthened their opinion that the United States is one of the major supporters of status quo in Latin America. As a result of this some elements of the forces for change, disappointed with the existing governments, and frustrated due to their inability to bring about the much needed

changes in their society turned to violent means to overthrow the existing regimes, and some of them went to the extent of even cooperating with the communist forces to achieve commonly-shared goals.

The governments in power, as a retaliatory measure, armed with the United States police training and assistance, have been ruthlessly suppressing these forces in the name of anti-communism. These violent measures for change, which in turn are being suppressed violently, have resulted in an unending chain of violence and counter-violence; and violence, which originally was adopted as the last measure to bring about sweeping changes in their society by these forces, has become a customary and permanent tool of anti-status quo forces.

- II. The second contention is that the Castroite doctrine, which legitimizes the violent insurgency measure of overthrowing of the status quo has been viewed by the United States as a main threat to Latin American stability and has provided strong justifications for continued United States military assistance to Latin America, which has been used by the governments in power to control insurgency and internal violence of the forces for change.

In this light, we can analyze the role of the United States foreign policy in terms of interaction of the United States and the Latin govern-

ments in power on one side, and the forces for change on the other.

Patterns of the United States Dominance

The United States and Latin American regimes have been associated with each other in a symbiotic relationship at the expense of Latin American economic progress, self-sufficiency and modernization. There are several patterns of the United States dominance in Latin America. To start with, the patterns of United States economic dominance in the subcontinent will be analyzed.

From the several patterns of United States economic dominance in Latin America, a great majority could be used to make very convincing case of the United States economic dominance, but some of them are quite controversial in nature in the sense that no clear-cut argument of United States "exploitation" of Latin American economy can be made.

One such issue is the issue of international trade. However, it is very hard to make a strong case for United States economic dominance without going into various complexities of international trade such as terms of trade, change in exchange rates and international transfer payments, etc.; and even then clear-cut conclusions cannot be drawn concerning United States economic dominance without raising some other technical questions which affect the authenticity of those conclusions.

The long term trend in the terms of trade between the developed and underdeveloped countries has been one of the most controversial issues. (Terms of trade is defined as "the terms of exchange between the

goods bought and sold.) The economists are sharply divided on this issue. The point of difference is the question that--regarding the terms of trade who is the long-term benefactor between the producers of raw materials and the producers of manufactured goods? There are two opposing views on this issue.

The classical economists believe that the terms of trade would shift in the long run in favor of primary products and against manufacturers, because primary products are subject to diminishing returns whereas manufacturers are subject to increasing returns. With increased factor supplies but unchanged technology, this meant that production frontiers were moving out more rapidly along the axis for manufacturers than along the axis for primary products. On the supply side the growth of inputs has an anti-trade bias in the less developed countries and pro-trade bias in the more developed countries. The net effect of the production change would be, therefore, a reduction in the prices of manufactures and an increase in the prices of primary products. The classical view ignored the demand effect of growth.¹⁶²

A contemporary group of prominent economists argued that the terms of trade have actually deteriorated for the poor countries rather than improved.¹⁶³ Dr. Raul Prebisch, a Latin American economist and Secretary of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

¹⁶²M. O. Clement, Richard L. Pfister, and Kenneth J. Rothwell, Theoretical Issues in International Economics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), p. 159.

¹⁶³Ibid.

(UNCTAD) observed that prices for the raw materials which the underdeveloped countries sell to the developed ones, have fallen 12 per cent since 1957, while the prices of manufactured goods, sold by the industrial countries to the non-industrial, have risen during the same time. The result has been a 16 per cent decline in the balance of trade of the poor nations in ten years. This meant that the payments received by them for their products have fallen 16 per cent in terms of what they must pay for their purchases abroad. In ten years this has caused a drop of more than \$13 billion in the earnings received by the underdeveloped nations for their export,¹⁶⁴ Thus according to this argument greater quantities of agricultural and mineral raw materials were exchanged for lesser finished goods.

Whatever may be the outcome of this argument, one thing which is quite clear is that as a whole the terms of trade worked quite favorably for the developed and unfavorably for Latin American countries and made deep-rooted impacts on their economies and development. One significant result is that:

- (a) the United States and the western European countries remain major profiteers by buying cheap raw materials and selling high priced finished goods to Latin America.

For example, the "value of world exports of manufactured articles increased at the rate of 8.1 per cent annually from

¹⁶⁴Annual Report 1968 ADELA; investment Co. S.A., pp. 42-44.

1955 to 1968 as compared with a rate of 3.1 per cent for commodities, or some two and a half times faster than the rate increase of commodity imports. Trade in manufactured goods appears, therefore, to be the way in which to obtain rapid increases in export goods and foreign exchange.¹⁶⁵

- (b) the industrialized societies were able to provide more jobs for a greater sector of their populace, and were able to raise their standard of living;
- (c) the underdeveloped Latin America became a promising market for finished goods, and as a result of this, economically more dependent.

From the point of view of the Latin societies this phenomena possessed various negative impacts:

- (a) The process of industrialization of the Latin societies became very slow;
- (b) since they were the producers of raw materials, they earned less, while their resources continued to be controlled from abroad (the price fluctuations of raw materials in the world market was controlled by the industrially advanced societies);
- (c) their economic progress became stagnant and their standard of living remained lowest.

¹⁶⁵William O. Douglas, Holocaust or Hemispheric Co-op: Cross-Currents in Latin America (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 131.

According to the Pearson Report, Latin American industry has not yet contributed significantly to the expansion of export earning, and an overwhelming share of export is still made up of primary products, usually with unstable world prices:

<u>Latin American Merchandise export during 1965-66</u>	<u>Percentage of export earnings in 1965</u>
Tropical foodstuffs (sugar, coffee, cocoa, bananas)	21 per cent
Temperate zone food and fibre (cotton, meat, cereals, and wool)	21 per cent
Petroleum	26 per cent
Other mineral products (copper, iron ore, lead, zinc, tin)	11 per cent
Other primary products	10 per cent
Non-primary products	16 per cent

Petroleum, coffee and copper accounted for nearly half of Latin American export earnings in 1965. Half of the countries depend on a single product for more than half of export receipts (e.g., oil in Venezuela, copper in Chile, coffee in Ecuador), although there has been some progress in diversifying exports.¹⁶⁶

Even this export is not looked upon by the industrialized societies with much appreciation or encouragement. The Pearson Report discussing the "increased open or disguised import restrictions" applied

¹⁶⁶Partners in Development, Report of the Commission on International Development (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 242.

by the developed countries on the exports of the Latin American countries, observed:

Few economic policies are as harmful to Latin American growth hopes as those which single out new and promising Latin American exports for restrictions in the United States market. Recent examples include limitations on United States import of Latin American meat, textiles, tomatoes, strawberries, and soluble coffee, European discrimination against Latin American exports, high domestic taxes on certain primary products, and "sanitary" controls also frustrate the achievement of higher export growth rates.¹⁶⁷

The measures have further decreased the already low rate of increase in Latin American exports. According to one report: Latin America has little share in the expansion of world trade. Thus from 1955 to 1968, while merchandise exports from developed nations increased on a compound annual basis by 8.1 per cent, exports from Latin American countries on the same basis rose by only 3.6 per cent. Consequently, Latin American share of world trade fell from 8.9 per cent in 1955 to 5.7 per cent in 1968 (trade of socialist countries excluded). While the price index of exports from developed areas to Latin America during the same period rose from 100 to 106 points, the price index of exports from Latin America to developed nations declined during that period from 100 to 96 points. The terms of trade (that is, the export price index of Latin American countries to developed nations) declined consequentially from 100 to 91.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁷Ibid., p. 257.

¹⁶⁸William O. Douglas, op. cit.

The composition of exports of Latin American countries shows the preponderance of primary commodities--food, agricultural raw materials, tobacco, beverages, mineral oil and fuel. Although manufactures including refined ores have been the most dynamic element of world exports, they accounted in 1967 for only 14.8 per cent of the exports of Latin American countries.¹⁶⁹

This phenomena of Latin American economic dependence on the United States and other western European countries does not end at this point. Another pattern of the United States economic dominance in Latin America are the large United States investments, especially the large amounts of capital investment of the big United States corporations and the resultant large sums of profits they gain, which is a net capital drain on Latin American economics. The amounts of profits made by the private enterprises are a closely guarded secret, and even the declared profits are questionable for its authenticity. However, it is quite obvious that profits are the main factor for the large investments made by the United States private business interests in the politically unstable Latin America. But the investment figures could be safely used for documentation. Some examples of the United States investments and percentages of private investments are cited below.

The amount of direct United States investment in Latin America in 1958 was \$229 million; in 1959, \$218 million; in 1960, \$95 million;

¹⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 131-132.

in 1961, \$141 million, in 1962, \$159 million, and in 1964, \$156 million.¹⁷⁰

Total United States assets and investments in 1965 amounted to \$18,207 billion; the majority of these investments and assets, which were owned by private investments, were \$14,387 billion, or 79 per cent of the total United States assets and investments.¹⁷¹

Total United States assets and investments in 1966 was \$19,387 billion, and private investments amounted to \$15,183 billion, or approximately 78 per cent.¹⁷²

Total United States assets and investments in 1967 were \$20,748 billion and private investments were \$16,172 billion or approximately 78 per cent.¹⁷³

Another report cites further interesting figures on the United States private investments in Latin America. According to this report the total United States assets and investments amounted to \$20 billion; about one half of this amount is the result of direct private investment. About 12 per cent or 12. billion dollars of the United States private investment is in "trade"; 32 per cent in "manufacturing" and 29 per cent in "Petroleum", which is about six billion dollars in petroleum and manufacturing combined; 6 per cent or over half a billion in public utilities;

¹⁷⁰ Peter Nehemkis, op. cit., p. 228.

¹⁷¹ Survey of Current Business, XLVI (September, 1966), p. 40.

¹⁷² Survey of Current Business, XLVII (September, 1967), p. 40.

¹⁷³ Survey of Current Business, XLVIII (October, 1968), p. 20.

1.2 billion or 12 per cent in "mining and smelting", and about a billion or 9 per cent in "others".¹⁷⁴

Naturally these large amounts of private capital investments are bound to bring about quite impressive outputs in favor of the United States big corporations at the expense of Latin American economy. Thus of the total Latin American exports of manufactured goods in 1966, the exports of United States affiliates represented about 41 per cent. Furthermore, the annual export of the manufactured products by United States affiliates increased by \$585 million between 1957 and 1966, while such exports by all other producers combined increased by only \$319 million or 51 per cent.¹⁷⁵

Senator Frank Church has also presented some more interesting figures as a further evidence of the deep United States penetration of Latin American economy with an immense outlay of private investment.

According to the data presented by Senator Church, by the end of 1968, American business interests had nearly \$13 billion invested in Latin American countries and in the Caribbean, nearly three fourths of which was concentrated in minerals, petroleum, and manufacturing industries. Another study by the Council for Latin America, a United States business group, which was cited by Senator Church, reports that

¹⁷⁴Emil L. Nelson and Frederick Cutler, "International Investment Position of the United States in 1966," Survey of Current Business, XLVI (October, 1966), pp. 19-32.

¹⁷⁵Douglas, op. cit., p. 126.

in 1966, the total sales by all United States affiliates in Latin America amounted to 13.7 per cent of the aggregate gross domestic product of all the countries of the region.¹⁷⁶

One more study done by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America estimated the flow of private investment to Latin America in the period 1960-1966 at \$2.8 billion while the repatriation of profits and income amounted of 8.3 billion. In other words, over this period foreign investment caused a net loss of \$785 million a year in Latin America's balance of payments.

Private capital investment in Latin America took an upper hand even in the economic assistance programs under Alliance for Progress. To understand this, the allocation of various types of funds under Alliance for Progress will be examined. The Alliance for Progress called for a program of foreign investment in Latin America of twenty billion dollars a year. The sources of these funds were to be the following:¹⁷⁷

U.S. export-import Band credits	\$4.0 billion
U.S. Private investments	\$3.0 billion
Total Commercial and Private U.S. Funds	\$7.0 billion
International agencies, plus European private capital	\$7.5 billion

¹⁷⁶ Frank Church, "Toward a New Policy for Latin America," Latin America and the United States in the 1970's, ed. by Richard B. Gray (Itoska, Illinois: F. E. Peacock Publishers, 1971), pp. 339-352.

¹⁷⁷ Hernan Echavarria, "Alliance for Progress," Socio-Economic Change in Latin America, ed. by Alberto Martinez Predra (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1970), pp. 3-7.

U.S. credits for social fund	\$2.5 billion
U.S. technical aid	\$.75 billion
Total U.S. Financial aid	\$5.0 billion
U.S. Food Aid	<u>\$1.5 billion</u>
Grand Total	\$20.0 billion

From the above figures it is quite clear that the greater part of this program, that is, 14.5 billion dollars, were to be private investment and commercial credits, from the United States and from other countries. In ten years the United States aid was to be only billion dollars, that is four hundred million dollars a year.¹⁷⁸

Thus the patterns of United States economic dominance in Latin America could be differentiated as:

- (a) purchase of cheap raw materials from Latin American countries and selling expensive finished goods to these countries;
- (b) keeping their export of finished goods to a minimum by passing import restrictions laws and by raising the tariff within the United States;
- (c) the investment of United States capital in Latin America, especially the capital by the United States-owned corporations.

Though higher levels of productivity will be achieved because of their

¹⁷⁸Hernan Echavarria, op. cit.

capital and technological advancement, the economy influenced by foreign based corporations or multinational corporations becomes characterized by chronic underemployment and unemployment. James Petras, a scholar of leftist leanings discussing this, points out that the decisions of large foreign-owned companies regarding production are made with the aim of increasing the profits of the company as a whole, not to serve the interests of the country in which the branch of the plant is located. Besides, the dependent government gets only a small fraction of the total value added in the production and sales of the raw materials extracted by the giant United States corporations integrated into the United States industrial economy.¹⁷⁹ Thus the foreign-owned corporations not only ignore the economic needs of the dependent country, but they also affect the indigenous economic sectors which are concentrating on the productions of finished goods, by their vast resources, capital and technological superiority.

These factors have very strong negative impacts on the relations between the Latin American governments and the governed. The cooperation between the United States business interests and Latin American governments results into strong resentments within the Latin American societies. The economic subservience of the Latin governments to the United States capital and its interests deprived them of the independence of action which sovereign governments enjoy within their own boundaries.

¹⁷⁹James Petras, Politics and Social Structure in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), pp. 231-32.

This means that these governments could not carry out the independent economic policies like nationalization of the United States-owned business or an introduction of sweeping economic reforms which would drastically affect the evergrowing profits of the United States big corporations or multi-national corporations.

When the ruling groups loose their independence of action, they become fearful of the various reform forces, even the genuine ones, of their societies. The demands for change from the forces for change and the inability of the Latin governments to take effective actions create a feeling of alienation and a general distrust within a society. The governments on their part become more dependent on the United States for its support, which means that they have to carry out the policies favorable to the United States business interests. This symbiotic relationship between the United States and the Latin governments is evident from the testimony of General Robert W. Porter, Jr., United States Army Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command:

The inability of governments to attain a sufficient rate of economic development to meet social pressures, together with high population growth and the continuing migration to the cities, will continue to generate more serious problems. The urban areas will become even more the centres of power, and their masses will become more susceptible to damagologic agitation and communist exploitation. The communist movement can be expected to become more aggressive, concentrating more attention on labor, students and urban slums. When added to the already serious situation, this increasing urban threat will create a serious internal security problem for the governments of Latin America.¹⁸⁰

¹⁸⁰U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, Hearings, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 1967, p. 538.

Current Trends of the United States Economic Policies

The Nixon administration's lack of emphasis concerning Latin American security assistance has been discussed earlier. This lack of accentuation is clearly seen regarding economic matters also.

Nixon made his political comeback with an approach which was quite favorable to United States big business, as has always been the policy of every potential presidential candidate. He said in 1968 that foreign aid could only be fruitful if "the American private enterprise system for development is adopted in the poor nations. It is not just seeds and fertilizer the hungry countries need. It is a system of incentives and rewards of prices and markets."¹⁸¹

Some major foreign policy adjustments of the Nixon administration could be observed as:

- (a) Cutbacks in United States foreign aid programs. The rationale behind it was that other developed countries who were financed by the United States during the post-war period should pay their share for the assistance of the underdeveloped countries.
- (b) His inaugural address was marked with an absence of any specific statement concerning the Latin American problems. This was a clear indication that the Nixon administration feels that Latin America is no longer a focal point of United

¹⁸¹New York Times, September 13, 1968.

States foreign policy.

- (c) The Nixon administration did not invoke the Hickenlooper amendment when Peru expropriated the International Petroleum Company (IPC);¹⁸² and, surprisingly enough, the Nixon administration did not react significantly when Marxist President Allende was elected in Chile.
- (d) The continuation of foreign aid and recognition to all the military regimes which came to power in Latin America, which was a marked deviation from the policies of the Alliance for Progress.

On October 31, 1969, President Nixon made his first major policy speech on Latin America. His speech began with an indirect criticism of the Alliance for Progress. Two of his policy statements worth mentioning were:

a firm commitment to continued United States assistance for hemisphere development; and

a belief that the principal future pattern of this assistance must be US support for Latin American initiatives, and this can best be achieved on a multilateral basis within the Inter-American system.¹⁸³

That is, such aid would no longer be subject to United States short-term

¹⁸²For a detailed version of this, see Richard Goodwin's "Letter from Peru," The New Yorker, (May 17, 1969), pp. 41-109.

¹⁸³Richard M. Nixon, "Action for Progress for the Americas," Latin America and the United States in the 1970's, op. cit., pp. 262-269.

interests.

On Latin American trade matters, President Nixon promised that the United States, among others, will take the following major steps:

to lead a vigorous effort to reduce the non-tariff barriers to trade maintained by nearly all industrialized countries against products of particular interest to Latin American and other developing countries;

to support the establishment, within the Inter-American system, of regular procedures for advance consultation on all trade matters . . . before decisions affecting its members are taken, not after;

in world trade forums for liberalized tariff preferences for all developing countries including Latin America . . .¹⁸⁴

One major change declared by President Nixon was that "loan dollars sent to Latin America under AID be freed to allow purchases not only here, but anywhere in Latin America."¹⁸⁵ This new policy still barred the Latin American countries from buying from European or Asian countries, and they are still forced to spend their dollars in purchasing from the United States monopoly; since no other Latin American country could provide competent prices against the United States goods as the industrialized countries of western Europe or Japan could.

Overall, the economic policies of the Nixon administration are a continuation of the old ones. Latin American economies remain greatly dependent upon the United States economy, United States private investments, and above all, on the United States big business, which still carries a dominant influence on the United States foreign policy in the

¹⁸⁴Ibid., p. 265.

¹⁸⁵Ibid., p. 266.

countries south of the Rio Grande.

Another important aspect of the United States foreign policy in Latin America is the long-standing controversy that the United States foreign policy is dictated by the United States business and military interests. This statement probably is too strong in its present frame of reference, but it is quite prudent to say that the United States foreign policy seems to be guided or influenced by a complex of military and business interests which is controlled by the United States business and military elites. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk admitted that the United States corporations dictated United States State Department policy and are substantially benefited by it. He observed: "A number of them (United States corporations) would prefer to sell out their utility holdings and then reinvest in industries in the same country that has access to free market . . ."186

Arguing on the same line, Horowitz wrote:

United States foreign policy toward Latin America is not a simple one-to-one relationship, but often filtered through a grid of Soviet and Chinese aspirations on the one hand, and its own internal entrepreneurial aspirations on the other. What occurs is a conflict at the level of policy making between military sectors which believe in the need to respond always and everywhere to socialist and communist threats; State Department sectors which tend to advocate a benign approach based upon tolerance and respect for sovereignties as long as business interests are not menaced, and Department of Defense orientations which view intervention as a subtle matter based on generating civic action and counter-insurgency pro-

¹⁸⁶ John Hickey, "The First Year: Business," Inter-American Economic Affairs, XVI (Summer, 1962), p. 50, as cited in Political and Social Structure in Latin America, p. 240.

grams. In short, the complexities of world order make the various formulators of the US policy toward Latin America either substantially or downright self-contradictory.¹⁸⁷

Later in the same article he made a very significant observation by noting that the aim of every American president from Truman to Eisenhower to Kennedy to Johnson, and finally Nixon has been the same: to abolish Latin American dependency on non-American producers and to establish Latin American dependence upon the United States.¹⁸⁸

Timothy F. Harding views the motivations of the United States foreign policy toward Latin America as one to gain more control and influence on the subcontinent. As a result of this policy, he sees the role of the Pentagon as more dominant than that of the State Department:

An important new trend in US control over Latin America is the control exercised over Latin American nations by the Pentagon through the local Latin American military, completely by-passing the State Department. This was apparently the case in the Dominican Republic where the US military mission encouraged the overthrow of Bosch while the State Department supported him. The US counter-insurgency forces have directed anti-guerrilla operations in Venezuela and Colombia and have prepared "contingency plans" to deal with instability in nearly every country in Latin America.¹⁸⁹

One more interesting aspect of the contemporary United States foreign policy could be observed in the various types of United States

¹⁸⁷Irving Louis Horowitz, "United States 'Policy' in Latin America," New Politics, IX (Spring, 1970), p. 76.

¹⁸⁸Ibid.

¹⁸⁹Timothy F. Harding, "The New Imperialism in Latin America: A Critique of Conor Cruise O'Brien, Readings in U.S. Imperialism (Boston, Mass.: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1971), p. 19.

intervention in Latin America--varying from direct military intervention to political and diplomatic manipulations--which have been used in contemporary politics even when all types of interventions are often condemned under the various declared and undeclared principles and policies, and under the various doctrines and statutes of international law. The current examples of various types of United States interventions, as presented by James Petras, bring forth a very important thesis--that United States intervention still remains to be the one greatest threat to Latin American sovereignty. The examples of these interventions are:

<u>Types of Intervention</u>	<u>Country</u>
Direct military intervention	Cuba, 1962 Dominican Republic, 1965
Indirect military intervention	Guatemala, 1954 Cuban invasion, 1961
Direct economic intervention	Cuba, 1960 Dominican Republic, 1961
Economic manipulation (loans, credits, debts, payments, grants utilized as policy instruments)	Throughout Latin America
Political and diplomatic manipulation (training and indoctrinating of military personnel, recognition of governments, etc.)	Throughout Latin America ¹⁹⁰

For the forces of change in Latin America, all these factors are negative. Their urge for national identity, national pride, respect and

¹⁹⁰Politics and Social Structure in Latin America, op. cit., p. 308.

intensive nationalism has long been frustrated as a result of the United States foreign policy performance, and the role of their own governments. They resent the United States' domination and their national subjugation to a foreign power. Every major shift in the United States foreign policy toward their countries is viewed by them with increased suspicion and doubts. Unfortunately the Alliance for Progress, which was introduced with great enthusiasm and high expectations by the Kennedy administration, became a victim of this attitude. This, however, was not the main reason for the failure of the Alliance. A detailed analysis of the Alliance for Progress is very pertinent at this point.

An Assessment of the Alliance for Progress
and the Latin American Revolution

The Alliance for Progress was the United States' answer to the Latin American revolutionary movements and Cuban revolution. The United States had already sensed the Latin American revolution, whose clearly defined objectives were:

. the participation of the people in the government and the destruction of the oligarchies; the redistribution of land and the ending of the feudal or semi-feudal regimes in the countryside; the securing of equal access to cultural and educational facilities and wealth, thus putting an end to inherited privilege and artificial class divisions. Finally a main objective of the revolution is to secure economic development, coupled with a fair distribution of its products and the utilization of international capital for the benefit of the national economy.¹⁹¹

¹⁹¹Eduardo Frei Montalva, "The Alliance that Lost its Way," Foreign Affairs, XLV (April, 1967), 437-48.

The Alliance was aimed to promote political democracy in Latin America through economic progress and social reforms on the one hand, and on the other, it was aimed at defeating the Cuban strategy of exporting Castroite revolutions which was viewed not only as a great danger to Latin American political stability, but also as a great threat to the United States and its various interests in Latin America.

The Alliance, which was very ambitious in its nature, could not achieve its goal of bringing about the changes it promised. One of the main causes of this failure is the generally agreed upon argument presented by various scholars, according to which the major planned changes should be preceded by the organizational changes. In other words, adequate organizational changes should be brought about before ambitious progressive plans are introduced. In the words of Eduardo Frei, former President of Chile:

The problem is that what was fundamental to the Alliance for Progress--a revolutionary approach to the need for reform--has not been achieved. Less than half of the Latin American countries have started serious programs of agrarian reform. Drastic changes in the tax system are even scarcer, while the number of genuinely democratic regimes, far from increasing, has actually declined. In other words, there has been no strengthening of political and social foundations for economic progress in Latin America. This is the reason why the ultimate objective of the Alliance--the formation of just, stable, democratic and dynamic societies--is as distant today as it was five years ago. Several experiences indicate that economic progress alone does not suffice to ensure the building of truly free societies and peaceful international coexistence. The problem does not stem solely from the inadequate internal financial resources. What has been lacking is a clear ideological direction and determination on the part of the political leaders to bring about change. These two factors are inti-

mately related and they involve collective political responsibility of all the members of the Alliance.¹⁹² (emphasis added)

George C. Lodge, who is a well-respected Latin American scholar, agreed with Frei's criticisms when he brought up the following points during his testimony:

We have failed to recognize that changes required for what is generally labelled "economic development" are radical and structural and cannot occur unless there are socio-political institutions . . . in their place which can provide the motivation, organization, protection, authority, and competence which are essential to break down old structures and to build new ones. In Latin America these include rural and urban worker organizations, many different groups affiliated with the radical action element of the Roman Catholic Church, cooperatives, some university activities, and various business enterprises, particularly those engaged in integrated food production, processing and distribution.

We have failed to perceive that most Latin American governments have neither the capacity nor the will to introduce the radical--indeed the revolutionary--change which was promised at Punta del Este. We have paid them to promise to do what no government can do; namely to subvert the power base upon which it rests. In so doing we have corrupted them and ourselves.¹⁹³

Another reason for the failure of the Alliance for Progress was the general prevailing mistrust among the Latin Americans toward the United States and a long-standing anti-Americanism, which is the result of the historical role of the United States in Latin American policy.

Galo Plaza, former president of Ecuador, noted this phenomena.

¹⁹²Eduardo Frei Montalva, op. cit., p. 443.

¹⁹³U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Military Policies and Programs in Latin America, Hearings, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, pp. 14-19.

He feels that most Latin Americans did not understand the Alliance for Progress, and mistrusted it as a tool of United States foreign policy.¹⁹⁴

Peter Nehemkis, who was a member of the Harvard University group who prepared the report, "Alliance for Progress", in 1960, also is of the opinion that anti-Americanism blunted the purpose of the Alliance. "Like an ocean current," he wrote, "it (anti-Americanism) runs deep and wide through the southern part of the hemisphere. Its presence renders suspect virtually anything that emanates from the Colossus of the North."¹⁹⁵

One of the main reasons the Alliance for Progress came into existence was the Cuban revolution.

It was widely believed that Castro's Cuba represented the advance base of a Soviet (or even "Sino-Soviet") threat to United States interests in the hemisphere, and that the USSR would seek other such bases. Cuba was thought to pose a potentially grave security threat to the United States, directly because of its links with the international communist movement and indirectly because of its support for subversive groups elsewhere in Latin America.¹⁹⁶

The government of the United States felt threatened that the Cuban example would be followed by the radical groups in various countries. The United States had two alternatives--either to wait and see other countries follow the Castroite path, or to introduce an ambitious plan

¹⁹⁴Galo Plaza, "The State of the Hemisphere: Latin America," Vital Speeches of the Day, XXXV (November 15, 1968), pp. 66-68.

¹⁹⁵Peter Nehemkis, op. cit., p. 208.

¹⁹⁶Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Alliance Rhetoric Versus Latin American Reality," Foreign Affairs, XLVIII (April, 1970), pp. 494-508.

for economic progress and social reform under the moderate leadership which would work for the promotion of democracy and liberty.

At this point we should address ourselves to the threats which Castroism posed for the existing order in Latin American countries. (The Alliance for Progress will be further discussed at a later point.) Castroism emerged as a new leftist ideology when flamboyant Fidel Castro had firmly established himself in power, leading a successful revolution which overthrew the corrupt right-wing government of Batista.

Castroism as an ideology

holds that present "neocolonialism" in Latin America, under the leadership of Yankee imperialism, forecloses the peaceful road to power in most of the area. For nearly all of Latin America, prolonged armed conflict is thus the only possible revolutionary strategy. In order to succeed, the revolutionaries must make guerrilla warfare their principal mode of violence, and destruction of government military forces their prime goal. At the same time that they strike at government outposts, the guerrillas need to win the peasantry gradually over to their side. The next step is to center revolutionary leadership in the rural command itself.¹⁹⁷ (emphasis added)

Any discussion of Castroism would be incomplete without, at least, a brief reference to the contribution of the patriarch of the Latin American guerrilla movement, Earnesto "Che" Guevara, and French Marxist intellectual Regis Debray. Che Guevara, in his now famous book Guerrilla Warfare, stated three fundamental principles to conduct a successful "revolutionary movement" in Latin America:

¹⁹⁷Communist Activities in Latin America, 1967, Report of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing House, 1967), p. 1.

1. Popular forces can win a war against the army.
2. It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them.
3. In the underdeveloped America, the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting.¹⁹⁸

Regis Debray, on the contrary, had emphasized urban terrorism and the urban guerrilla movement¹⁹⁹ as opposed to the rural guerrilla bases as advocated by Che. Furthermore, Debray is a strong proponent of the subservience of the communist party to the guerrilla organization.²⁰⁰

The synthesis of the Castro-Guevara-Debray ideology for conducting a guerrilla war in the countries south of the Rio Grande is that the imperialistic role of the United States in Latin American society has a very strong negative impact on the already problematic society. To help the Latin masses get rid of their political, social, and economic ills, they emphasize that:

1. The peasants, not the urban workers, are the only base for revolution. (Only Castro and Che agree.)
2. The only method is guerrilla warfare . . . (Castro, Che, and Debray agree.)
3. Peasant guerrilla forces will take over and reorganize an ever larger portion of the countryside for self support and deny the government those resources. (Only Castro and Che agree; Debray's emphasis is on the increased

¹⁹⁸ Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, trans. by J. P. Morray (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), p. 1.

¹⁹⁹ Regis Debray, "The Party and the Guerrilla," A Revolution in the Revolution? (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), pp. 67-91.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.; pp. 67-91 and 95-116.

activity in the urban base.)

4. Urban terrorism can play a supportive role. (For Debray, urban terrorism plays more than just a supportive role.)²⁰¹

Five Latin American countries--Bolivia, Guatemala, Colombia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela--faced a major threat from Castroite insurgency forces. In Bolivia, these forces were crushed by the United States trained counterinsurgency forces, which resulted in the death of Che Guevara in 1967. Some other countries which have experienced Castroite guerrilla insurgency since 1959 (the date Castro took over in Cuba) are Haiti, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua (Castro-sponsored invasion in 1959), Ecuador (1962), the Dominican Republic (1963), Peru (1964-65), Argentina and Honduras (1964), Paraguay (1965), and Brazil (1967).²⁰²

These examples of the activities of the Castroite insurgency are a clear indication that the Alliance for Progress failed in its objectives of reaching the people or involving them in its goals. "And without a sense of mutual involvement, without a sense of shared participation by the ordinary people"²⁰³ the Alliance only remained a check-writing agency for Latin America.

One important point often ignored by Latin American scholars is that Castroism has played upon the age-old tune of Yankee imperial-

²⁰¹Insurgency in Latin America, op. cit., p. 8. (The comments within parentheses are made by this writer.)

²⁰²Ibid., p. 1.

²⁰³Peter Nehemkis, op. cit., p. 212.

ism, and its main propaganda tool has been the neocolonialistic role of the United States in Latin America. The United States, on her part, had not only over-reacted to the threats of Castroite insurgency forces in Latin America, but its numerous military missions, increased military appearances through massive police assistance and training programs, and its extensive business investments in Latin America helped Castro in building up a very convincing argument that the United States was against social change and economic progress in Latin America. To ensure its objective of defending status quo and its huge economic investments, the United States had started arming the Latin Army and police with modern weapons and techniques to crush all the forces of change in the name of anti-communism. The point of confusion on the part of the framers of United States foreign policy was viewing Castroism only as communism and Castroite insurgency forces only as communist insurgency. Castroism, so the argument goes, is more than communism; and this was realized when the Alliance for Progress was originally introduced. As mentioned earlier, the Kennedy administration intended the Alliance to be another alternative to the Cuban revolution for Latin America, and by doing so, it has recognized Castroism as more than just communism--a force for change.

It was some time later that the Alliance lost its original meaning and its Public Safety programs became communist-killing programs, which the rightist regimes of Latin America--the most notorious of which are Brazil, Guatemala and Venezuela--monopolized for crushing

even the most genuine protest and the forces for change in the name of anti-communism.

As a quick example of what Castro represents to Latin Americans, a high Latin American official from the OAS reportedly told John Gerassi:

The United States is trying to stop Castro, nothing more. That it may do; money and guns can stop a man. But it will never stop Castroism. True reforms require planning, state planning at all levels, not to mention expropriations and nationalizations, which is exactly what the United States hopes to avoid. That's why nothing will stop Castroism--except occupation armies, of course. Castroism means all that junk that leads our countries. It means wholesale reforms. More than that, it means a new life, at least for those who have never seen a doctor, eaten a chicken, or been inside a school.²⁰⁴

"Communist subversion" in Latin America has been viewed as the greatest menace to the security of the United States. Though the immediate threats of the "expansion" of "international communism" (which was extensively used and is still being used in the official jargon) to the free world has become a matter of post-war history, the State Department and Pentagon policy makers still seem to be hounded by the memories of John Foster Dulles, who viewed the post-war world as divided into two major camps--free world and communist expansionists; every movement for reform in Latin America as communist infiltration and subversion; and every critic of the United States policies as a genuine communist or a commie collaborator; and who put the cart before the horse by giving top priorities to military actions, to crush what he

²⁰⁴The Great Fear in Latin America, op. cit., p. 254.

termed as communist subversion in Latin America and postponing the much-needed social and economic reforms, which, if carried out wholeheartedly, would perhaps never have created Fidel Castro.

The Kennedy era was also marked by the same paranoia, because Kennedy had witnessed the post-war commie-phobia in his formative years and was in the Senate when Senator Joseph McCarthy was suffering from the extreme symptoms of commie-phobia. Hence, the United States foreign policy in the 1960's was focussed on anti-communism and building up modern and effective counterinsurgency forces in Latin America.

But the truth of the matter is that communism ceased to be a major threat to Latin America in the 1960s, especially after the Sino-Soviet ideological rift, when pro-Soviet factions of communist parties started looking for new alliances and peaceful means to widen their political base as their changed strategy. An example of this is the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV), which in April, 1965, during the seventh plenum of the PCV Central Committee, "reflected the leadership's dilemma--while reaffirming the party's commitment to the guerrilla alliance, it also adopted a five-point 'minimum program', acceptable to 'the majority of the people', aimed at achieving a democratic peace in which the PCV and the MIR (guerrilla organization) would function as legal opposition parties."²⁰⁵ (emphasis added) And in April, 1966, the eighth plenum of the Central Committee decided to "abandon the

²⁰⁵"The Permanent Revolution of Fidel Castro," op. cit., p. 2.

armed struggle in order to incorporate the party in the movement for the integration of the national Left."²⁰⁶

Another example is Guatemala, where, according to an official study, all the "rightist groups defined 'communist' broadly and imprecisely to include non-communist leftists and moderates, as well as individuals who had antagonized a member of the rightist group or who had the misfortune to hold position under Perez."²⁰⁷ (emphasis added)

The same study makes the following observations concerning the communist parties in some other Latin American countries:

Bolivia: Bolivian communism is weak because the non-communist revolutionary tradition has foreclosed its appeal, because the movement itself is seriously factionalized . . . The communist parties do not command the allegiance of the campesionos.²⁰⁸

Nicaragua: The Nicaraguan Communist Party (PSN) has more than negligible strength in labor and the national university. Its leadership is pro-Moscow, and although it has maintained ties with Cuba, Nicaragua was not named in the 1964 Havana agreement as ripe for the Castro road. . .²⁰⁹

Brazil: The orthodox Communist Party of Brazil has suffered a decline in fortune since 1964 and has no interest in the violent road. It has paid a minimum attention to Cuba in past years, except to complain to Moscow about Castro's support and friendship for other Brazilian radicals.²¹⁰

²⁰⁶Ibid.

²⁰⁷Insurgency in Latin America, op. cit., p. 21.

²⁰⁸Ibid., p. 25.

²⁰⁹Ibid., p. 27.

²¹⁰Ibid., p. 28.

Argentina: The Argentine Communist Party follows the peaceful line and had nothing to do with the 1963-64 People's Guerrilla Army.²¹¹

Professor Lodge made some very convincing observations on the anti-communistic aspect of the United States foreign policy. He notes:

We have failed to recognize that, although we regularly pledge ourselves to support change, we have militarily and economically, in fact, strengthened the obstacles to change, prolonging the status quo, and thus frustrating development. Governments of both the United States and Latin America have been able to ignore this fundamental contradiction between words and actions largely because of a higher commitment to anticommunism, a notion which today has become hollow, vague, misleading, defined differently, depending on one's interests.

We have failed to acknowledge that in fact today the communist party apparatus generally in Latin America is neither a revolutionary force nor a major threat to US interests. Consequently we have failed to appreciate that the ideology of anticommunism is no longer either valid or useful. The least significant thing about Castro is that he is a communist. The most radical elements in Brazil today are not the communists, but priests and their worker, student followers. The guerrillas in Guatemala are more properly described as revolutionary nationalists than as members of the International Communist Party or as tools of Moscow or Peking. . .

We have failed to perceive that the danger to peace in Latin America is not from communism, but from predatory scavengers of the revolutionary process--right or left, foreign or domestic--who seek to use the chaos of change as a means for extension of control and power . . .²¹²

From the above discussion, it is obvious that the tone of increasing strength of communist insurgencies in Latin America has been over-

²¹¹Ibid.

²¹²United States Military Policies and Programs in Latin America, op. cit., p. 15.

played by the United States; as a result of this rationale, internal security assistance and police training has been continued.

As far reaching effects of continued United States arms and security assistance, Robert Alexander notes that

. . .if the United States continues to follow a policy of giving more and more armament to Latin American military forces, it is aiding the armed forces of these countries to install and maintain dictatorships. To do this is to play directly into the hands of the communists.²¹³

He further observes that

Apparent US support of the military dictatorships gives the communists "evidence" to prove to their fellows in the opposition that the United States is really responsible for the tyranny under which they are all suffering. It allows them to put forward the logical argument that the "friends of our enemies are our enemies" to the disadvantage of the United States, and the companion bit of logic that "the enemies of our enemies are our friends" to the advantage of the Soviet Union. In a word the United States' support of military dictatorship in Latin America is one of the surest ways possible to break down the barriers between those genuine advocates of the Latin American social revolution and the communists.²¹⁴

Now we will analyze one of the greatest contradictions of the United States foreign policy in Latin America.

One declared motive of the United States military assistance to Latin America is "to foster a constructive and democratic approach by the military to their professional responsibilities and to the solution of

²¹³Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1956), p. 89.

²¹⁴Ibid.

national problems."²¹⁵ The rationale underlying this was that by their association with the United States missions and by their training in United States military schools, Latin American officers would develop a high sense of military professionalism and would be less interested in politics. This is one aspect of the United States foreign policy. We will leave our discussion of this aspect here and further discuss it later.

When the major shift in the United States military assistance program came from "hemispheric defense" to that of internal security, civic action programs were also introduced under the Alliance for Progress, which "were to encourage the Latin American military to engage in nation-building activities which would win the support of the people and thereby deny guerrillas the environment they needed in order to survive."²¹⁶ As a result of the civic action programs, the Latin American military was to become involved in the civilian affairs rather than restricting itself to the military matters which was the rationale behind the development of military professionalism aspect of the United States foreign policy discussed in the preceding paragraph.

None of these objectives could be fulfilled due to the obvious contradictions in the United States foreign policy--that while one aspect

²¹⁵Testimony of Robert S. McNamara, former Secretary of Defense, Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1967, op. cit.

²¹⁶U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Military Assistance Training, Hearings, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1970, (Testimony of Dr. Alfred Stepan, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Yale University), p. 108.

of the United States foreign policy was to promote military professionalism within the Latin military, another aspect was working at the same time under the civic action programs to indulge in civilian affairs.

What was the effect of these conflicting policies? Did the United States succeed in achieving any or all of these objectives? First we will analyze the aspect of military professionalism.

This objective could not be greatly fulfilled. Dr. Alfred Stepan, a Yale University expert on Latin America, stated during his testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments:

In the last decade the United States military assistance training has definitely helped to increase the professional military expertise of most of the Latin American armies, but these same institutions--most notable in Brazil, Peru, Panama, and Bolivia--have also become more deeply embedded in politics.²¹⁷

Stepan believes that the United States is solely responsible for this apparent paradox:

The doctrine of counterinsurgency which, the United States emphasized at its military schools attended by Latin American officers, stated that revolutionary warfare involved the economic, political and ideological sectors as well as the military.

Both the US military schools and the US military missions implicitly and explicitly urged the Latin American military to shift their attention from traditional missions such as frontier defense or from any goals that entailed acquiring and mastering "sophisticated" military hardware, in order to concentrate instead on domestic problems of insurgency and the ways to prevent or curtail it.

The military institutions in Latin America were urged

²¹⁷Ibid., p. 106.

to become involved in a wide variety of economic and social activities to aid the process of development and to act as a bulwark against revolution.

In all these activities, the Latin American military acquired increased professionalism in the 1960's. But logic and empirical observation indicate that to the extent that military expertise is increased in the areas of counterinsurgency, nation-building, and multi-sectoral development planning, the military becomes intrinsically more than less involved in politics.²¹⁸

Some major impacts of the civic action programs on Latin American armed forces are noteworthy. The general attitude of the Latin American military men is an increased antagonism "toward aggressive advocacy of civic action by the United States. Army officers feel that it reduces their service's role from that of a professional army to that of a police force or a peace corps. Officers of all services resent the implication that they have no national defense mission."²¹⁹ The civic action program was intended to improve the relationship between the civil and military authorities and to build up a feeling of cooperation between them. But according to Dr. Stepan's observations, "civic action programs may enacerbate rather than improve civil-military relations. This is particularly obvious when the military strong-arms civilians to volunteer books, medicine, material, and advertising for civic action projects."²²⁰

In Brazil, for example, some civilians feel that they, rather

²¹⁸Ibid., pp. 106-107.

²¹⁹Ibid., p. 108.

²²⁰Ibid.

than the army, should receive funds from the Ministry of Transportation to execute large construction projects. In Colombia and Peru, on the other hand, military men often complain of being improperly burdened with functions rightfully belonging to civilian ministries. Civic action programs in general tend to increase the political involvement of the military.²²¹

Thus the Latin American armed forces, as a result of the increased support of the United States, have emerged as a politically dominating force, and the Latin American armed forces, through their performance, have shown very little sign of respect for constitutionalism and civilian authority and superiority. Instead, the Latin armed forces, in general, have emerged as a symbol of authority and a controlling force over the protest movements. The increased capabilities of the armed forces and police due to United States training and assistance has been used to crush even the most legitimate protest movements and to suppress political opposition. For the Latin American masses, the United States military and police assistance programs complicate their internal problems, interfere with the process of social change, and hinder progress in economic development.

Though Latin America is no longer the focal point of United States foreign policy, a brief analysis of the policies of the Nixon administration is quite relevant in order to draw important conclusions for the coming decade.

²²¹Ibid.

CHAPTER VI

PROSPECTS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SEVENTIES

When Nixon came to office it became evident that Latin America and its problems would not be a prime concern of the new administration. As it is evident that Latin American political, social, and economic problems still remain to be solved, the new administration looked for a foreign policy posture which would create a "generation of peace", while ignoring the rising revolutions next door.

United States-Latin American relations were not one of the election issues of the 1968 presidential campaign. Nixon not only avoided addressing himself to the existing problems of Latin American subcontinent, but in his inaugural address, surprisingly enough, no direct mention was made of this issue.

Before we proceed, let us make some observation on the major political and military aspects of The Rockefeller Report on Americas. The Rockefeller Report, which was the result of Governor Rockefeller's winding trip to the Latin American subcontinent on the request of President Nixon, suffers from McCarthyite paranoia concerning the communist

conspiracy. It states ". . . all of the American nations are a tempting target for communist subversion. In fact, it is plainly evident that such subversion is a reality today with a alarming potential." Praising the indigenous forces for their effective performance, Rockefeller notes that these forces have gradually improved their capabilities for dealing with Castro-type agrarian guerrillas. But at the same time he warns that radical revolutionary elements in the hemisphere appear to be increasingly turning toward urban terrorism in their attempts to bring down the existing order.²²²

In his "Recommendations for Action", the Governor suggests that the United States should "reverse the recent downward trend in grants for assisting the training of security forces for the other hemisphere countries". He feels that it is in the interest of the United States to upgrade the police forces of Latin America by continuing and strengthening the police training program and by providing the Latin American countries trucks, jeeps, helicopters and other equipment to increase the counterinsurgency capabilities of the forces of these countries.

He minimized the reports of police repression in some Latin American countries and stated: "there is not in the United States a full appreciation of the important role played by the police. There is a tendency in the United States to equate the police in other American republics with political action and repression, rather than with security".

²²²The Rockefeller Report on Americas, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

Though he acknowledges the fact that "there have, unfortunately, been many such instances of the use of police"; his major concern remains security and further strengthening of these forces.²²³

The Nixon administration apparently shared Rockefeller's views of continuing aid toward the internal security capabilities of the Latin American military and police. Besides, this policy helps the Nixon administration in its pursuit of a lower profile and lesser engagement in Latin America. The rationale behind this policy is to sustain the counter-insurgency and internal law and order capabilities of the indigenous in Latin America by continuing a steady pace of security assistance, which in turn will maintain the United States' involvement to the minimum. But Rockefeller's recommendation for increased grants-in-aid have been ignored by the Nixon administration up to date.

One major recommendation made in the Rockefeller Report, which was accepted by the Nixon administration, was the recommendation for recognition and continued aid for the military regimes in Latin America. This is a major shift from the Alliance for Progress policy of Kennedy and Johnson administrations, when recognition and aid were the tools vigorously used by the Kennedy administration, but were not high on the priority list of the Johnson administration, to promote political democracy and discourage militarism in Latin America.

A revised approach toward Alliance for Progress was made by

²²³Ibid., pp. 61-62.

the Nixon administration. Discussing the new premises of the Alliance under the Nixon administration, Abraham F. Lowenthal states that "complacency and disappointment mark Washington's approach in 1970".

Searching for a rationale for this marked change Lowenthal writes:

Cuba under Castro is no longer perceived as an advance base of a Soviet (or "Sino-Soviet") threat to US interests. The administration's cool reaction to Governor Rockefeller's call for a Western Hemisphere Security Council stems not only from Washington's realization that the plan is opposed throughout Latin America but also partly from the fact that no immediate security threat to the United States is expected in or for that region . . . It is now generally agreed that the international communist movement is fragmented, that the Soviet Union has no great interest in promoting "more Cubas" in Latin America, that the USSR seeks to avoid confrontations with the United States in this hemisphere and that Cuba is not mere satellite. Nor is the indirect threat posed by subversive groups in Latin America likely to materialize. No insurgent movement in Latin America seriously threatens governmental authority on a national scale: Direct Cuban support for guerrilla activity appears to have dropped off sharply, at least since Che Guevara's death, and Russian noncooperation with such movements was clear long before that.²²⁴

The fact that the Rockefeller Report presented an exaggerated version of the explosive nature of communist and radical forces could be generally seen from the official statements. Charles A. Meyer, President Nixon's Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, testifying before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs stated:

. . . We believe that there is very little likelihood of a major external threat to the area in the foreseeable future. Communist insurgency is currently at a relatively low ebb in Latin America . . . The defeat of the Che Guevara-led guerrillas in 1967 by elements of the Bolivian army, largely equipped and trained in counter guerrilla warfare by the United

²²⁴ Abraham F. Lowenthal, op. cit., p. 497.

States, seems to have made the Cuban regime more cautious about initiating new areas of insurgency in the hemisphere.²²⁵

Most of the very recent literature published on the United States-Latin American relations for the 1970's have these common themes: that the United States has exaggerated Fidel Castro's capabilities of exporting Cuban revolution; that the United States foreign policy makers became too panicky over the "growing" forces of communism and insurgency in Latin America; and more over confused nationalistic protests with communist subversion; that the United States should minimize its military appearance in Latin America since the Latin American regimes have developed tremendous counterinsurgency capabilities as a result of the massive United States police assistance and training; and that Cuba is no longer a threat to the United States security; and that it is in the interest of the United States to normalize diplomatic relations with Cuba now. This would be a very realistic approach on the part of the United States, since more and more Latin American countries are becoming more vocal about normalizing diplomatic relations with Cuba.²²⁶

²²⁵U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Military Policies and Programs in Latin America, Hearings, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, pp. 57-61.

²²⁶Lowenthal, op. cit.; Testimony of Charles a Meyer, op. cit.; David Bronheim, "U.S. Military Policies and Programs in Latin America," in Contemporary Inter-American Relations, ed. by Yale H. Ferguson (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1972), pp. 337-347; John Plank, "We Should Start Talking With Castro," Latin America and the United States in the 1970's, op. cit., pp. 241-52.

An important criticism in the contemporary literature on the Alliance for Progress is that the Alliance has raised the hopes and expectations of the Latin masses for a better life to an unprecedented level.²²⁷ To understand this phenomena more clearly, we have to analyze the process of modernization and how it affects the aspirations and expectation of the masses in transitional societies.

Ivo and Rosalind Feierabend in their widely published study on the aggressive behaviors in the developing societies presented the following hypothesis on this issue:

The higher the want formation in any given society and the lower the social want satisfaction, the greater the systematic frustration and the greater the impulse to political instability.

$$\frac{\text{want satisfaction low}}{\text{want formation high}} = \text{high frustration}^{228}$$

Elaborating on their hypothesis the authors wrote that the notion of modernity denotes a very complex set of social phenomena, which includes aspiration and capacity in a society to produce and consume a wide range and quantity of goods and services, high development in science, technology education, and new structures of social organization, among other things. Modern affluent nations, with their complex of

²²⁷Tad Szulc, in the "Introduction" to The Rockefeller Report on Americas, op. cit., p. iv; Bronheim, op. cit., p. 339.

²²⁸Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors within Politics, 1948-1962: A Cross-National Study," Journal of Conflict, X (September, 1966), pp. 249-71; the cited part of the study is done in collaboration with Betty A. Nesvold.

economic, political, and social systems, serve as models of modernity to the nations emerging from traditional society. Once traditional societies are exposed to the modern way of life, without exception they desire benefits associated with modernity.²²⁹

When the tangible results are lagging or lower than the rising expectations, then "the revolution of rising expectations" transforms itself into "the revolution of rising frustrations". That is exactly what the Alliance did in Latin America. Following is a graphic presentation of the above-discussed phenomena.

Discussing the social, political and institutional problems involved with development David Bronheim wrote:

Development almost by definition necessitates the redistribution of political and economic power. It raises aspirations and expectations faster than it can satisfy them. It puts serious strains on social institutions faster than it can reform those institutions . . . Generally the very poor and oppressed are not an explosive mass. They tend to be passive and resigned. It is only when they begin to achieve and have aspirations that they become a potentially explosive force. Development is what makes them explosive. The acceleration of the development process is naturally accompanied by increased instability.²³⁰


Thus the Alliance for Progress raised the aspirations, hopes, and expectations of the Latin masses to an unprecedented degree, it injected a new yearning for modernity and progress in Latin America; but it could not close the gap between "high want formation" and "low want satisfaction".

²²⁹Ibid.

²³⁰Bronheim, op. cit.

Figure 2. Need Satisfaction and Revolution

Source: James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," American Sociological Review, XXVII, 1 (February, 1962), p. 6.



It is for the economists to draw conclusions on the economic performance of the Alliance; but the Alliance definitely failed to achieve its political goals. Political democracy is far from a reality in almost all of the Latin American countries (Mexico, Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Colombia and Venezuela excluded). A great majority of the Latin masses still live under military regimes. Thus militarism, the extermination of which was one of the major goals of the Alliance, still remains a chronic characteristic of the Latin American policy.

Another important goal of the Alliance was to uproot "communist subversion" or "Castroite insurgency" in Latin America. As discussed earlier, the Alliance not only overexaggerated the "communist menace" and the ability of Castro to export Cuban revolution in Latin America, but it also quite often confused the nationalistic, non-communist forces of change with communist subversive force or Castroite insurgency. Due to this confusion (which the Washington policy-makers call justification) Washington poured in lavish security assistance; and supported extensive police training programs, which in return were frequently used to suppress even the most genuine political dissent and civil demonstrations in the name of anti-communism.

More often, for example in Brazil, the policies of the military regimes either crushed the moderate opposition to their regimes or, as a result of their repressive policies, forced them to join the violent left. So the Alliance failed in achieving this aspiration, too.

The chances for the success of Castroite revolution in Latin

American countries were never too bright; and now the trend of events and increased counterinsurgency capabilities of the indigenous forces in Latin America have convinced the Nixon administration that the Cuban example probably will never be successful in Latin America. But as long as the political, social, and economic conditions remain unchanged, the possibilities of the repetition of the Cuban example cannot be ruled out entirely.

As concluding remarks of this study some foreign policy recommendations for the United States are:

The United States should discontinue the police assistance programs. The United States, as a result of these programs, is not only promoting militarism and identifying itself with status quo elements, but it also is making itself an easy target of groups suffering from increased political repression. Perhaps the aforementioned recommendation could further be elaborated this way: The United States, by its continued military and police assistance, is looked upon as a supporter of many oppressive regimes, such as those in Brazil, Uruguay and Guatemala. Political oppression and police brutalities toward the dissident elements are the heritage of underdevelopment and ignorance of most of the non-democratic countries of the third world (also of the authoritarian or military regimes of the western European societies) where political dissent is least tolerated. . . . Repression of massive protest is carried on by various regimes whose chief motive is to stay in power.

But the United States, by its continued security assistance and

acquiescence toward the various regimes has become an easy and justifiable target of the radical leaders of the Latin masses. The United States should respond to the political realities in Latin America rather than economic motives. And one of the foremost political realities is that the forces for change in the subcontinent are craving for more and more economic independence from the United States. This means that the United States has to respond to the demands for economic independence and should adopt policies which favor a gradual and balanced industrialization in Latin American countries under their own control.

The United States should not raise a big diplomatic hue and cry over the nationalization of its economic interests; because nationalization is viewed by progressive governments and nationalistic Latin forces as national self-assertion, added national prestige and economic independence from foreign economic domination.

So far the United States puts its greater emphasis on military participation in the civic action programs; but this emphasis should be changed to only for the participation by civil groups in Civic Action Programs. This will eliminate or at least minimize the military involvement in civilian affairs, and will tend to make the military more professional. Another advantage of this action will be an emergence of civil force armed with technical know-how to fight the economic and social ills of their societies. Furthermore, a new confidence will build up among masses as a result of the involvement of civil groups in the civic action programs; and they will cooperate with reformist civil re-

gimes more wholeheartedly.

The changing scenes of International politics do not affect the importance Latin America and the United States have for each other. What is needed is a mature partnership, which should be more beneficial to the Latin Republics in terms of their social and economic problems. If economic progress will not be made in the states south of Rio Grande, and if the gaps between want formation and want satisfaction are not filled, then more Castros and Guevaras will emerge with new theories of anti-Americanism and new strategies of revolution which even a United States-supported garrison-state cannot stop.

APPENDIX I

CURRICULUM

Police Studies Offered at the International Police Academy

<u>Police Management</u>	<u>Police Management (contd.)</u>
The Changing Society	*Logistics
Police and National Security	*Fiscal Management
Comparative Police System	
Police Management	<u>Related Training</u>
Police Leadership	Firearms Training
Police Organization	Unarmed Defense
Command and Staff Relationship	Police Physical Fitness
Personnel	Communication Skills
Police Training	Thesis Program
Workshop in Police Organization	Washington International Center
Police Public Relations	
Police and Modern Society	<u>Police Operations</u>
Crime Prevention	Police Patrol
*Police Communications Systems, Management	Police Communications Systems
	Investigations

Police Operations (contd.)

Criminalistics
 Counterfeiting
 Customs Control
 Narcotics Control
 Forensic Medicine
 Control of Vehicular Movement
 Special Operations
 Border Control
 Police Intelligence
 Records and Identification
 Detention and Confinement
 Juvenile Delinquency
 **First Aid
 Police Patrol
 **Principles of Police Photography
 **Field Observations

Internal Security

Introduction to Internal Security
 Nature of Insurgency
 Counter-Insurgency Intelligence
 Terrorist Counter-Measures
 Field Instructional Tour

Internal Security (contd.)

Basic Framework for Counter-insurgency Policy
 Operational Views on Insurgency
 Introduction to Civil Disturbances
 Records and Internal Security
 Planning for Riot Control
 Riot Control Formations
 Photography in Civil Disturbances
 Special Equipment for Control of Civil Disturbances
 Workshop in Control of Civil Disturbances
 Police Baton
 Chemical Munitions
 Explosives and Demolitions
 *Environmental Factors of Insurgency
 *Economic Views on Insurgency
 *Legal Considerations in Crowd and Riot Control
 Targets of Insurgency
 **The Internal Security Service
 **The Threat to Latin America
 **Crowd and Mob Psychology
 **Tactical Communications in Control of Civil Disturbances

Internal Security (contd.)

The Police and Resources Control

Causes and Characteristics of
Riots

*Offered in Senior Course only

**Offered in General Course only

Source: Internal Police Academy Review - January 1967, as cited by
NACLA Newsletter, Vol. V., No. 4, July-August, 1971, p. 9.

APPENDIX II

AID "PUBLIC SAFETY" PROGRAMS

The AID Public Safety programs provide assistance in the form of technical advice, training, and in some cases limited amounts of equipment to civil police in 16 Latin American countries. Basic to all public safety efforts is the developing of a police institution and the improvement of its capability to exercise its proper role in its country's development. In addition to improving the police responsibility for the preservation of law and order and the protection of life and property, the programs seek to orient the police to function as an important community service and inculcate the concept of "public service" in policing, including the protection of the peoples' rights to dissent within the boundaries of the law.

BOLIVIA: The basic program objectives in Bolivia are (1) to improve and expand the National Police Academy's capacity for training, (2) to establish a country-wide telecommunications system and (3) to develop a capability for the provision of adequate police services to the public in lesser cities and rural areas.

BRAZIL: The Public Safety program has assisted the Brazilian police in the installation of a national communications system and the establishment of federal law enforcement institutions which provide training and technical services to the police of any requesting state within Brazil. To this end, the National Police Academy, National Institute of Criminalistics have been established and the National Telecommunications Training and Maintenance Center is nearing completion.

CHILE: The Public Safety program in Chile has been limited primarily to technical assistance in the telecommunications and vehicle fleet management fields. The basic national telecommunications installation was completed by the end of 1968; program emphasis is presently being placed on the telecommunication maintenance and repair training.

COLOMBIA: The purpose of the Public Safety Project in Colombia is to increase the police capabilities to maintain law and order in a humane manner through the improvement of training institutions and assistance in the telecommunications and vehicle patrol fields. Communications equipment has been extended to 13 of the 22 departments, as well as to 19 major cities which previously were lacking such services.

COSTA RICA: The program began in Costa Rica with fragmented

and decentralized public forces in 10 separate agencies. Progress has been made in the establishment of a National Police School, organization, administration, and management training and in the field of telecommunications installation and maintenance.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Public Safety assistance has been provided the Dominican Republic to rebuild the police forces after Trujillo by improving mobility, establishing modern training institutions, expanding and improving the communications network and developing their maintenance capabilities.

ECUADOR: Public Safety efforts in Ecuador have been directed toward (1) providing technical assistance in creating an adequate police capability in urban areas, (2) improvement and expansion of the telecommunications network, (3) technical assistance in establishing vehicle maintenance facilities, (4) improvement in the rural police school and (5) assistance in establishing a central identification system.

EL SALVADOR: The Public Safety program encompasses the civil law enforcement agencies and the primary program objectives are (1) to establish a basic police communications network, (2) implementation of a modern records system, (3) improvement of the National Police School and crime laboratory and (4) assistance in the reorganization of patrol zones.

GUATEMALA: Public Safety has assisted the police of Guatemala in establishing a model precinct in Guatemala City and a model rural town police system, in improving the crime and photo laboratory in

converting the fingerprint system to conform with other countries in the Western Hemisphere and in establishing a mobile crime scene processing unit.

GUYANA: The purpose of the Public Safety Project in Guyana is to provide technical assistance in training, operations and communications, in addition to assistance in the development of police leadership and expanding planning at the national level to improve research, budgeting and operational procedures.

HONDURAS: The Public Safety program in Honduras has devoted its efforts to the reorganization of the civil security force and the establishment of a modern training facility in addition to implementing an effective communications network. Current efforts are devoted to improvements in leadership, organization, administration and in the police management field.

JAMAICA: The Public Safety program has been designed to assist the Jamaican government in carrying out a major reorganization of its police force. This is being accomplished through technical assistance in the areas of training, administration, communication, records, operations, and identification procedures. In addition, a highway patrol unit has been established to curb the growing highway traffic fatalities.

PANAMA: The Public Safety project assists the government of Panama in correcting deficiencies in organization, operations, communications, records, patrol, inspection and training of its forces performing civil police functions. Improvements have resulted in all these areas,

particularly in training, organization and communications. Technical assistance has also been provided in the implementation of police social-civic action programs.

PERU: The Public Safety program in Peru assists three law enforcement agencies, the Civil Guard, the Investigative Police of Peru and the Republican Guard. Administrative and organizational assistance in addition to technical advice in police records and communications have been the primary efforts of the program. This program has been greatly reduced recently.

URUGUAY: The Uruguay Public Safety program provides assistance to highly decentralized police forces. Pilot mobile police patrols have been implemented in the capital city which are serving as examples to other urban areas, with a substantial decrease in the crime rate. Technical assistance has also been provided in police communications, establishment of maintenance facilities for both communication and vehicle repairs and in the field of training by upgrading the instructional material in the police training institutions.

VENEZUELA: Public Safety technical advice has been provided to the Government of Venezuela in developing a unified command and Communications Center, implementation of an automatic data processing for records, improved urban mobility and an improved rural police capability.

Source: Guardian, July 18, 1969, as published in NACLA Newsletter, III (January, 1970), p. 11.

APPENDIX III

TEXT OF INSTITUTIONAL ACT NO. 5

Article 1. The Constitution of January 1967 and the State Constitutions, with the changes in this act, remain in force.

Article 2. The President of the Republic may decree recess of the National Congress, the state assemblies and the municipal chambers through complementary edicts whether or not a state of siege is in force. They will be called into session again only by the President of the Republic.

Paragraph 1. Until the Congress begins operating again, the executive power may legislate on all matters set forth in the constitutions or laws of the municipalities.

Paragraph 2. During the recess, Senators, Deputies and Councilmen will receive only their basic salaries.

Paragraph 3. In case of the recess of municipal chambers, the financial and budgetary inspection of municipalities which do not have auditing agencies (Tribunais de Contas) will be exercised by the auditing agency of the respective states. Its action will extend to auditing functions and to the judgment of accounts of administrators and other persons responsible for public properties and valuables.

Article 3. The President of the Republic in the national interest may decree intervention in the states and municipalities without the limitations set forth in the constitution.

Sole Paragraph. The interventors in the states and municipalities

will be appointed by the President of the Republic and will exercise all functions and duties which are the respective responsibility of the Governors or Mayors and will enjoy all privileges, salaries and benefits fixed by law.

Article 4. In the interest of preserving the revolution, the President of the Republic after consultation with the National Security Council and without the limitations established in the constitution will be able to suspend the political rights of any citizen for ten years, and to cassate federal, state or municipal elective mandates.

Sole Paragraph. Federal, state and municipal legislative members whose mandates are cassated will not be replaced and the parliamentary quorum will be adjusted in accord with the number of places effectively filled.

Article 5. The suspension of political rights based on this act will simultaneously: (1) terminate the right of special hearing for certain privileged officials (Foro Privilegeado); (2) suspend the right to vote and to be a candidate in labor union elections; (3) prohibit activity or manifestation of a political nature; (4) apply when necessary the following security measures: (a) freedom under surveillance; (b) prohibition against visiting certain places; (c) designation of place of residence.

Paragraph 1. The Act which determines the suspension of political rights may establish restrictions or prohibitions related to the exercise of any other public or private rights.

Paragraph 2. The security measures dealt with in item 4 of this

article will be applied by the Minister of Justice and excluded from review by the judicial authority.

Article 6. The following constitutional or legal guarantees are suspended (a) life tenure, (b) fixed place of employment, (c) job tenure, plus the exercise of functions for fixed periods.

Paragraph 1. The President of the Republic may by decree dismiss, remove, retire, or place on call any holders of the guarantees referred to in this article as well as employees of autonomous entities, of public enterprises or of mixed public and private organizations, and he may dismiss or transfer to the reserve, or retire, members of the armed forces or the military police. He may also guarantee, when appropriate the salaries and other advantages which are due them according to their time in service.

Paragraph 2. The provision of this article and its first paragraph applied also in states, municipalities, the federal district and the territories.

Article 7. The President of the Republic in any of the cases set forth in the Constitution may decree or extend a state of siege and fix the period it will be in force.

Sole Paragraph. In case the national congress is recessed, the requirement of paragraph 1, Article 153 of the Constitution is dispensed with.

Article 8. The President of the Republic, after investigation, may decree confiscation of property of any persons who have illegally enriched

themselves while exercising public office including autonomous entities, public enterprises or mixed public and private organizations without waiving any penal sanctions which may also be applicable.

Sole Paragraph. If the properties are proven to be legitimately acquired, they will be returned.

Article 9. The President of the Republic may issue complementary edicts for the execution of this institutional act as well as adopt, if necessary for the defense of the revolution, the measures established in items (d) and (e) of paragraph 2 of Article 152 of the Constitution.

Article 10. The guarantee of habeas corpus is suspended in cases of political crimes against the national security, the social and economic order and the consumer economy.

Article 11. All activities carried out in accordance with this act, its complementary acts and its respective effects are excluded from judicial review.

Article 12. The present institutional act goes into effect on this date and all provisions to the contrary are hereby revoked. Brasilia, December 13, 1968 signed by the President of the Republic and all Ministers of State.

* * * * *

Articles 152 and 153 of the Brazilian Constitution are as follows:

CHAPTER V--THE STATE OF SIEGE

Article 152. The President of the Republic may decree a state of siege in case of:

I. Serious disturbance of order or threat of the outbreak of such disturbance;

II. War.

Paragraph 1. The decree of a state of siege shall specify the regions it is to cover, shall name the persons responsible for its execution, and shall indicate the standards that are to be observed.

Paragraph 2. A state of siege authorizes the following coercive measures:

- a. Obligation to reside in a certain place;
- b. Detention in buildings not intended for persons convicted of common crimes;
- c. Search of and arrest in the home;
- d. Suspension of freedom of assembly and association;
- e. Censure of correspondence, printing, telecommunications, and public amusements;
- f. Use of temporary occupation of property of an autonomous entity, public enterprise, mixed-capital company, or holder of a concession for public services, as well as suspension of the exercise of a post, function, or employment in such an entity.

Paragraph 3. In order to preserve the integrity and the independence of the country, the free functioning of the powers, and the operation of the institutions, when these are seriously threatened by elements of subversion or corruption, the President of the Republic, having heard the National Security Council, may take other measures provided for

by law.

Article 153. Except in the event of war, the duration of a state of siege shall not exceed sixty days, but it may be extended for an equal period.

Paragraph 1. In any case, the President of the Republic shall submit his act to the National Congress, accompanied by a justification, within five days.

Paragraph 2. If the National Congress is not in session, it shall be convoked immediately by the President of the Federal Senate.

Source: United States Policies and Programs in Brazil, op. cit., pp. 46-48.

APPENDIX IV

FATHER LOUIS COLONESE ON DAN MITRIONE'S ROLE AS POLICE ADVISOR

Q. You mention that Dan Mitrione was formerly assisting police in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, which is reportedly a center for torture activities. Can you document any relationship between the police in that area and tortures?

A. There is much documentation concerning reported tortures in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. For example, the American Committee for Information on Brazil prepared a dossier in April of 1970. The Committee is comprised of university professors of Brazilian affairs. Its dossier on Brazil has been endorsed by a U. S. congressman belonging to the

Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the President Emeritus of Princeton Seminary, the President of Union Theological Seminary and several other churchmen concerned and informed about Latin America.

The dossier contains a specific reference to "the use of torture against the opponents of the present military regime" which "now appears to surpass all other techniques of police investigation and inquiry."

The dossier then quoted a December 19, 1969 report from twelve Brazilian political prisoners concerning a class in torture techniques held in October, 1969, at the headquarters of the State Police of Minas Gerias in the city of Belo Horizonte:

"'On the eighth of October [1969] a class in interrogation was held at PE [State Police Headquarters] for a group of about 100 military men, the majority of them sergeants from the three branches of the armed forces,'" the report states. "'Just before the class, [name of a political prisoner] was given electric shocks to see if the equipment was in good working order. At about 4:00 p.m., just before the class was to begin, ten political prisoners [their names are listed] were led up to the classrooms where the session was already in progress. They were ordered to enter the room and strip. While Lt. Haylton was showing slides and explaining each type of torture, its characteristics and effects, [a group of Brazilian military personnel] were torturing the prisoners in the presence of 100 military men in a live demonstration of the various torture methods in use.'"

That is the type of thing which is reportedly going on in Belo Horizonte. Police in Belo Horizonte had the benefit of Public Safety advice from the Agency for International Development.

Q. Do you have any reason to believe that the Uruguayan Police, with whom Dan Mitrione worked as an advisor, were guilty of using torture methods?

A. Yes, I do. The upper house of Uruguay's legislature recently appointed an investigatory commission comprised of seven Uruguayan Senators to check out repeated accusations from citizens that torture was being used by police in Montevideo. The committee spent five months investigating these charges and published a 15-chapter report stating that torture is a "normal, frequent and habitual occurrence" in Uruguay. The report cited twelve types of torture used by police, including "needless beatings, electric shocks, daily use of psychological torture" and "inhuman treatment" of pregnant women "held as reprisals against relatives." The investigatory report included medical certificates and testimony from both torture victims and police. The investigation showed that many of the torture victims were students and labor leaders. This is the type of police force which Mitrione was advising.

Q. Do you think that Mitrione's work as a Public Safety advisor employed by the U.S. Government made his death a predictable occupational risk or is this a unique case?

A. Mitrione and the other A.I.D. Public Safety advisors were serving in a situation which in many ways resembles that of a war. I'm sure

that this fact is realized by both sides in this confrontation. It's true that in Brazil and Uruguay the war is undeclared, but it has also never been formally declared in Vietnam.

Dan Mitrione was the seventh A.I.D. Public Safety advisor to be killed on duty. The six others were stationed in Vietnam. Another A.I.D. Public Safety advisor serving in Bolivia was seriously wounded and is now paralyzed from the waist down. Six other A.I.D. Public Safety advisors have also suffered serious wounds.

Q. Should the questions you raise concerning Dan Mitrione's death be considered as personal criticism of the man or are they directed toward the role of the A.I.D. Public Safety program in Latin America?

A. They should be considered as questions concerning the possibly dire implications and effects of the A.I.D. Public Safety program in Latin America. Mitrione was a part of this program. If the impartial investigation I have requested clears A.I.D., then it also clears Mitrione of possible complicity in torture under the guise of fostering internal security.

If the investigation, and I stress it must be both competent and impartial, finds that A.I.D. shares the blame for these alleged inhuman acts of torture with the police who allegedly performed them, Mitrione shares that guilt if only by association. I also stress that denials from A.I.D. officials or other compromised sources are meaningless. An impartial investigation is required. The focus of my questions is not the guilt or innocence of Mitrione, but an effort to force an investiga-

tion of the program for which he worked as it related to the democratic principles of our nation.

Source: "The Case of Dan Mitrione," Worldview, XIII (October, 1970), p. 18.

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