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Concepts of Ethos in Classical and Modern Rhetoric

Corinne Thomley

Eastern Illinois University

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CONCEPTS OF ETHOS IN

CLASSICAL AND MODERN RHETORIC
(TITLE)

BY

CORINNE THOMLEY

THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF

Master of Arts in Speech Communication

IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

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CONCEPTS OF ETHOS IN

CLASSICAL AND MODERN RHETORIC

BY

CORINNE THOMLEY

B. S. in Speech, Northwestern University, 1951

Abstract of a Thesis

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree of Master of Arts at the Graduate School
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Charleston, Illinois
1978

<center>Abstract</center>

Statement of Purpose:

     Ethos, or the character of the speaker, is a subject of interest to students of rhetoric. This study traces the concepts of ethos from classical to modern times, and identifies philosophical value systems on which these concepts are based.

Hypothesis:

     The study explores the hypothesis that similarities and differences exist between classical and modern concepts of ethos and that the concepts can generally be identified with philosophical value systems.

Criteria and Procedure:

     The study is focussed by the following seven questions:

(1) What philosophical value systems provided the bases for the concepts of ethos set forth by classical rhetoricians?

(2) What concepts of ethos are set forth by classical rhetoricians?

(3) What similarities and differences exist between the concepts of ethos set forth by classical rhetoricians?

(4) What value systems provided the bases for the concepts of ethos set forth by modern rhetoricians?

(5) What concepts of ethos are set forth by modern rhetoricians?

(6) What similarities and differences exist between the concepts of ethos set forth by modern rhetoricians?

(7) What similarities and differences exist between concepts of ethos set forth by classical and modern rhetoricians?

Materials:

Both primary and secondary sources were used in this study. Basic sources included classical and modern rhetorics plus philosophical essays. Articles providing critical analyses were also consulted.

Conclusions:

The conclusions reached in this paper are as follows:

(1) Classical value systems that could serve as bases for concepts of ethos were idealistic, naturalistic, and pragmatic.

(2) Ethics in classical periods largely saw education as productive of righteous life styles and rhetoric as advisory.

(3) Similarities in classical concepts of ethos are found in agreement on the importance of audience analysis, speaker wisdom, and speaker honesty or sagacity. Differences are seen in emphasis given to audience adaptation and speech content.

(4) Modern value systems that have related to the concepts of ethos in rhetoric have been predominately naturalistic and pragmatic.

(5) Education and rhetoric are more generally considered amoral, unrelated to value structures, by modern theorists.

(6) Modern theories of ethos emphasize the importance of the speaker's reputation and language usage. They differ on the importance of content, purpose, and forms of proof needed to gain credibility.

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The author wishes to express her sincere appreciation to Dr. Beryl F. McClerren for his invaluable aid in advising, guiding, and encouraging the development of this study. The helpful suggestions and constructive criticism of Dr. Jon Hopkins and Dr. Calvin Smith were also very much appreciated. The author would also like to express her appreciation for the many hours Mrs. Frances Willis spent in the typing of this thesis.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND ORIGIN OF STUDY

Aristotle defined rhetoric as a "faculty of discovering all the possible means of persuasion in any subject."[1] The most effective of the artistic proofs used in persuasion is designated as the true and perceived character of the speaker..."we may practically lay it down as a general rule that there is no proof so effective as that of character."[2]

The interpretations men have given to ethos are some of the most controversial to be found in the field of rhetoric. William Sattler gives us a commonly accepted interpretation of ethos. He points out that the Greek word $\H{\epsilon}\theta o\varsigma$ (ethos) is derived from $\hat{\eta}\theta o\varsigma$ which means a custom or habit.[3] This habit becomes a standard of morally approved conduct discernible in social groups. Sattler states, "The traits or qualities which make up ethos are approved and respected by the society in question, but do not necessarily have the status of 'welfare principles.' Ethos is therefore a more comprehensive term, meaning 'totality of characteristic traits.'"[4] Sattler applies this ethos to rhetoric by pointing to the impression of the speaker gained by members of the audience through their

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[1]J. E. C. Welldon, trans., The Rhetoric of Aristotle (London and New York: MAcmillan and Company, 1886), p. 10.

[2]Welldon, pp. 10-12.

[3]William Martin Sattler, "Conception of Ethos in Rhetoric," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, 1941, p. 8.

[4]Sattler, p. 5.

view of his habits and customs in relation to their own. If the image

created by the speaker agreed with that held most desirable by the audi-

ence, the speaker had established his "ethos."

Craig Baird, in Rhetoric: A Philosophical Inquiry, points to the

relationship between the character of the speaker and the ethos that will

persuade the audience.

> To Aristotle, the ethical proof is thus connected
> with the speech itself--one of the three elements
> of "proof". Ethical character produces belief in
> the realm of opinion--as produced in the speech
> itself. This ethos of the speaker is not an ante-
> cedent impression held toward the speaker by the
> audience, but consists of materials and persuasive
> details of the communication itself.[5]

Arthur B. Miller, in a Speech Monograph article in November, 1974,

takes exception with both these interpretations and a number of others as

well. He most particularly notes the mistakes that have been made due to

the failure of scholars in the field to apply the concept of both habit

and character in ethos, as found in the Nichomachean Ethics, to the classi-

cal meaning of ethos.

> Corts[6] neglects to discuss Aristotle's statements in
> the Nichomachean Ethics about the relationship between
> ethos and eethos and neglects also the accompanying
> footnote. Most important, however, Corts misses the
> significance of the relationship between ethos and
> eethos to the Rhetoric and he wrongly argues that
> "ethos is morally neutral," and "that it is not
> vital to ancient rhetoric."[7]

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[5]Craig Baird, Rhetoric: A Philosophical Inquiry (New York: The
Ronald Press Company, 1965), pp. 101-102.

[6]Thomas E. Corts, "The Derivation of Ethos," Speech Monographs, 35
(1968), pp. 201-202.

[7]Athur B. Miller, "Aristotle on Habit and Character; Implications
for Rhetoric," Speech Monographs, 41 (November, 1974), footnote, pp. 309-
310.

Miller cites the Nichomachean Ethics when he explains the Aristo-
telian concept of the meaning of ethos. However, since the concept of
intended meaning is derived from the meanings and relationships taken
from the Greek language, it would be logical to assume that the meaning
Miller found was closely allied to the true meaning in the minds of
classical theorists.

> ...moral and ethical virtue is the product of habit
> (ethos), and has, indeed, derived its name, with a
> slight variation of form, from that word.[8]

Miller notes that the translator, Rackham, points out in a foot-
note to the above passage that it is probable that (ethos) "habit" and
(eethos) "character" are kindred words in the original Greek. He pro-
ceeds to carry the interpretation even further.

> Even more specifically, regarding the Greek term
> accompanying the citation above, the word for "moral
> or ethical virtue" is (eethikee)--from the same stem
> as (eethos) or "character," and (ethos) not only is
> translated "habit", but is also the key word referred
> to in the final phrase, "from that word." The point
> of Aristotle's statement is that (eethikee) (and thus
> eethos) is derived from (ethos). Therefore, the sense
> in which eethikee means "moral or ethical virtue" and
> "eethos" means "character" is understood within the
> context of "ethos" or "habit."[9]

The significance for this study is that this analysis shows the
original meaning of "ethos" was more comprehensive than the often cited
"custom" or "habit." By definition there is no room for the theory that
the classical concept of ethos was amoral. Moral or ethical virtue, habit
and character are all part of the same word stem and their close relation-

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[8]Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Rackham trans. (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1962), Book II., pp. i, 1.

[9]Miller, "Aristotle on Habit," p. 309.

ship was recognized and pointed to by Aristotle himself during his discourse on ethics. Ethos will be defined from this viewpoint for this study.

When the ethos is introduced into the rhetorical situation both the true character of the speaker and the ethos as perceived by the audience are present. Since it is the ethos of the audience that shapes their perception of the speaker, in rhetoric audience analysis has to be part of the picture. Since men are not always rational in their observations, often the rhetorician becomes involved in problems of man's relation to society and his environment in general in his efforts to determine what reactions might be expected in any rhetorical situation.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to survey concepts of ethos set forth by selected classical and modern rhetoricians. To give accurate interpretations of ethos as seen in the eyes of respective rhetoricians, their philosophical approaches will first be identified, giving particular attention to their value systems. The paper will center around these questions:

1. What philosophical value systems provided the bases for the concepts of ethos set forth by classical rhetoricians?

2. What concepts of ethos are set forth by classical rhetoricians?

3. What similarities and differences exist between the concepts of ethos set forth by classical rhetoricians?

4. What value systems provided the bases for the concepts of ethos set forth by modern rhetoricians?

5. What concepts of ethos are set forth by modern rhetoricians?

6. What similarities and differences exist between the concepts of ethos set forth by modern rhetoricians?

7. What similarities and differences exist between concepts of ethos set forth by classical and modern rhetoricians?

Hypothesis

Similarities and differences exist between classical and modern concepts of ethos and the concepts can generally be identified with philosophical value systems.

Review of the Literature

Wherever possible the most comprehensive and divergent views of the works of selected rhetoricians were consulted. This was done to give as broad a view of the area as might be possible in a paper of this scope. A review of the literature revealed two dissertations dealing with comparative views of ethos in rhetoric. The first was completed by Dr. Wilhelm Suss in 1910.[10] Here the concepts of ethos are examined as taught by Corax, Tisias, Antiphon, Gorgias and from the viewpoint of the Rhetorica Alexandrum and the Rhetoric of Aristotle. Dr. William Sattler, author of the second study,[11] refers to the Suss dissertation as having been of much benefit to his own preparation. The Sattler dissertation begins with Tisias and Corax and ends with Richard Whately.

Critical evaluations of the writings of selected rhetoricians were reviewed for this study. C. S. Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic; George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece; Craig Barid, Rhetoric: A Philosophical Inquiry; Daniel Fogarty, Roots for a New Rhetoric; Sir Alexander Grant, The Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle; as well as a study

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[10]Wilhelm Suss, Ethos: Studien zur alteren griechischen Rhetorik, published Ph.D. dissertation, University of Giessen, 1910 (Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1910).

[11]William Martin Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos in Rhetoric," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, 1941.

by J. Donald Butler, <u>Four Philosophies and Their Practice in Education</u> <u>and Religion</u>, were among those that provided analyses of the concepts set forth in this study.

Anthologies of articles written by various rhetorical critics and edited by Lester Thonssen,[12] Richard L. Johannesen,[13] Maurice Natanson and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr.,[14] and Joseph Schwartz and John Rycenga,[15] greatly facilitated the process of gathering diversified views from the field.

A thorough search of the speech journals added the opinions of such authorities as Everett Lee Hunt,[16] Bromley Smith,[17] Clarence Edney,[18] and many others to the views already in hand. Others not listed here will be referred to in the course of this study.

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[12]Lester Thonssen, ed., <u>Selected Readings in Rhetoric and Public</u> <u>Speaking</u> (New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1942).

[13]Richard L. Johannesen, ed., <u>Selected Readings in Rhetoric and</u> <u>Public Speaking</u> (New York: Wison Company, 1942).
_____, ed., <u>Ethics and Persuasion</u> (New York: Random House, 1967).

[14]Maurice Natanson and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., eds., <u>Philosophy,</u> <u>Rhetoric, and Argumentation</u> (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965).

[15]J. Schwartz and J. Rycenga, <u>The Province of Rhetoric</u> (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1965).

[16]Everett Lee Hunt, "Plato on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," <u>Quarterly</u> <u>Journal of Speech</u>, Vol. VI, April, 1920.

[17]Bromley Smith, "The Father of Debate: Protagoras of Abderra," <u>Quarterly Journal of Speech</u>, Vol. VI, April, 1920.
_____, "Corax and Probability," <u>Quarterly Journal of Speech</u>, Vol. 7, February, 1921, 13-42.
_____, "Gorgias, A Study of Oratorical Style," <u>Quarterly</u> <u>Journal of Speech</u>, Vol. VII, November, 1921, 335-359.

[18]Clarence Edney, "George Campbell's Theory of Logical Truth," <u>Speech</u> <u>Monographs</u>, Vol. XV, No. 1, 1948, 19-32.
_____, "Richard Whately on Disposition," <u>Speech Mono-</u> <u>graphs</u>, Vol. XXI, August, 1954, 227-234.
_____, "Hugh Blair's Theory of Disposition," <u>Speech Mono-</u> <u>graphs</u>, Vol. XXIII, March, 1956, 38-45.

Significance of the Study

This study has rhetorical, philosophical and personal significance. The study is significant to the field of speech-communication in the areas of theory and practice. Nowhere can educators or practicing rhetoricians find in one source the collected and analyzed views of leading rhetoricians on ethos in classical and modern theory. This study will be useful as a source for existing theory and as a reference to use in the formulation of new theory.

The philospher may gain insight into the rhetorical behavior of speakers. The examination of prevailing theory that molded the rhetorical precepts of the speakers along with the speech content may give a different final picture of the event.

The writing of this paper gives me, as a student of rhetoric, the opportunity to make discoveries, exercise research methods, integrate knowledge, and form some opinions about the theory and practice of rhetoric. As a teacher of speech I feel it is particularly important to have a thorough understanding of the ethical principles of my field. This study should provide that.

Finally, this study should indicate whether further investigations of this sort into similarities of concepts of ethos during different periods of rhetorical history are likely to prove fruitful. This work could serve as the basis for future studies.

Organization and Materials

The first chapter of this study is devoted to an introduction to and description of the investigation entailed in this analysis of ethos

in rhetoric. The literature is reviewed and the hypothesis on which the
work is to be based is formed.

The second chapter deals with Egyptian and Greek concepts of
ethos. The third chapter deals with Roman concepts of ethos.

British concepts of ethos, beginning with a discussion of the
philosophies developed by Thomas Reid, John Locke, and David Hume will
be the focus of the fourth chapter. This is followed with an analysis
of Hugh Blair, George Campbell and Richard Whately. Their views of rhet-
oric in general and ethos in particular will be examined.

The fifth chapter deals with later modern concepts of ethos pre-
sented by I. A. Richards, Kenneth Burke, and Richard Weaver.

Finally, charts answer all questions including: What similarities
and differences exist between classical and modern concepts of ethos?
Suggestions for further study in this area will be made.

The materials used in developing this study included translations
and the original primary sources. More specifically, Plato's Euthydemus,
Gorgias, and Phaedrus; Aristotle's De Rhetorica and Nichomachean Ethics;
Isocrates' Works of Isocrates, Vols. I, II, III; Cicero's De Oratore; Ad
Herrenium; Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria; Hugh Blair's Lectures on
Rhetoric and Belles Lettres; George Campbell's The Philosophy of Rhetoric;
Richard Whately's Elements of Rhetoric; I. A. Richards' The Philosophy of
Rhetoric; Kenneth Burke's A Grammar of Motives; Richard Weaver's Language
is Sermonic.

Other materials included, for the classical period, Alexander
Grant's Philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, Craig Baird's Rhetoric: A
Philosophical Inquiry, and J. Donald Butler's Four Philosophies and their

<u>Practice in Education and Religion</u>. For the modern period, James L.
Golden and Edward Corbett's <u>The Rhetoric of Blair, Campbell and Whately</u>,
and Daniel Fogarty's <u>Roots for a New Rhetoric</u> provided helpful source
material.

Method and Procedure

The historical method will be used in this study. First the
original source will be read and the ideas pertaining to ethos will be
recorded. Next, the secondary sources pertaining to the concepts of
ethos of that rhetorician will be read. The axiology of the rhetori-
cian's concept of ethos will be identified and similarities and differ-
ences between the concepts will be noted. The methodology allows this
study to fall into the category of research known as a "history of ideas,"
as identified by Auer.[19]

After a brief sketch of historical background found in Egyptian
records of Kagemni and Ptah Hotep, the study will deal with Corax and
Tisias and the beginnings of Greek rhetorical concepts. Since philo-
sophical views of "first truths" as opposed to "perceived probabilities"
are basic to ethics in rhetoric and, therefore, to concepts of ethos in
rhetoric, this study will, whenever possible, identify the stand of the
rhetorician on these basic views. Protagoras of Abderra and Gorgias of
Leontini will be viewed from this standpoint and the influence their
philosophies had on the ethics of the rhetorician of that period will be
explored. Socrates and Plato will represent those who held philosophies
opposed to Protagoras and Gorgias. Aristotle and Isocrates will be

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[19]Auer, Jeffrey, <u>An Introduction to Research in Speech</u> (New York:
Harper, 1959), p. 120.

be studied from the standpoints of their philosophical orientation, their ethical views of rhetoric, and, finally, their concepts of ethos in rhetoric.

The next section, the third chapter, will explain the philosophical stands of the Stoics and the Skeptics in early Rome. When looking at the works of Cicero and Quintilian and at the Ad Herrenium, the influence of these concepts will be seen in their views of ethics and ethos in rhetoric.

The fourth chapter will again be oriented in the leading philosophical arguments of the day. Thomas Reid, John Locke and David Hume will be explained in reference to the potential relationship of their philosophies to the field of the ethics of rhetoric. Hugh Blair, George Campbell and Richard Whately will be reviewed and their orientations in ethics and concepts of ethos duly noted as well as any alliance they might show with the dominant philosophical thought of their day.

The fifth chapter will be devoted to three current rhetorical concepts of ethics in rhetoric and the role the speaker is to play in his relationship to his audience. The concepts used in this paper are those of I. A. Richards, Kenneth Burke and Richard Weaver.

The last chapter will summarize the findings on a series of charts designed to show the theories held by each of the rhetoricians in this study. The chart will give page references for the concepts credited to each rhetorician. This chapter will trace the development of some of the more persistent and dominant theories. Again page references will be given for each assertion.

Limitations of the Study

The study will be limited to rhetoricians in each period recognized as most significant for their era by teachers, texts and course outlines dealing with ancient and modern rhetoric. Secondly, it will be limited to rhetoricians who include statements pertaining to the concepts of ethos. The sources will be limited to classical and modern periods because the inclusion of those from medieval and rennaissance eras would make the study too extensive.

CHAPTER II

THE GREEKS

This chapter will trace the beginnings of rhetorical concepts

of ethos. The written records of Kagemni and Ptah Hotep, ancient

Egyptians, date from 2900 B.C. and clearly show the interaction of

audience and speaker in a rhetorical situation.

The Greek period begins with Tisias and Corax, the traditional

founders of rhetoric, and proceeds with an analysis of the popular philo-

sophies of the "sophistic" teachers of Athens. Two of the most outstand-

ing, Protagoras of Abderra and Gorgias of Leontini, will be explored in

depth. Critical evaluations of their views on the ethics of rhetoric

will be cited and some tentative conclusions made about their contribu-

tions.

Next, the chapter will deal with the efforts of Socrates and Plato

to establish the ethical footing for rhetoric. Plato carried ethics into

his discussion of the character, or ethos, of the speaker. Richard Weaver's

explanation of this application of ethics to rhetoric will be cited.[1]

Aristotle and Isocrates were two of the first teachers of rhetoric

to use ethics in teaching of speech and in making extensive applications

of the theories to establish the concepts of ethos taught in their schools.

Aristotle wrote extensively in the areas of both philosophy in general and

ethics in particular. These writings will be applied to his concepts of

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[1]Richard Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Heney Regenery
Co., 1970).

the ehtos of the speaker so as to make considerations of ethos found in
De Rhetorica consistent with what else we now know about Aristotle's views
on man's relation to man and society, or ethics.

The Early Egyptians

A little more than one hundred years ago, an ancient scroll,
supposedly the "oldest manuscript in existence,"[2] was discovered by the
French Egyptologist, N. Prisse d'Avennes. The eighteen pages of hier-
atic characters were designed for training young men in ways of living.
A few of the sanctions are related to the communication arts and demon-
strate an awareness of the importance of ethos in speech.

Kagemni

Kagemni and his later proto-type, Ptah-Hotep, evidently wrote the
scrolls as lessons for students in the courts of Pharoah. The former,
the earlier of the two teachers, relates in one section:

> The cautious man flourisheth, the exact one is
> praised; the innermost chamber openeth unto the
> man of silence. Wide is the seat of the man
> gentle of speech; but knives are prepared against
> one that forceth a path, that he advance not save
> in due season.[3]

Though certainly aware of the effectiveness of a speaker who has
gained the good will of his audience, Kagemni also realized different audi-
ence types do not react in the same manner. More particularly, there are
those who cannot be reached by any means.

---

[2]Giles Wilerson Gray, "The Precepts of Kagemni and Ptah-Hotep,"
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 32, p. 446.

[3]Gray, p. 447.

> If a man be lacking in good fellowship, no
> speech hath any influence over him. He is
> sour of face toward the glad hearted that
> are kindly to him; he is a grief unto his
> mother and his friends; and all men (cry):
> Let thy name be known; thou art silent in
> thy mouth when thou art addressed."[4]

Ptah-Hotep

As vizier of King Isesi about 2675, B.B., two hundred years after

Kagemni, Ptah-Hotep was described by James Baikie in A History of Egypt,

as a wise old man who advised honesty as the best policy. Baikie, accord-

ing to Gray, ventured the opinion that he had probably tried the other

course and found it wanting. Honesty for the speaker and conduct "without

defect" were cited as good attributes for the would-be effective speaker.

Gray, in his QJS article, doubted that this was an indication of any

philosophy other than, "This is the way to be if you want to succeed."

Such a judgement of philosophy underlying teaching precepts is difficult

to make. It must be remembered that what we have are a number of guide-

lines written for young people to follow. When teaching a child, reward-

punishment is the most used system. Only in rare cases would philosophical

rationale for the rules be incorporated into the lesson. That Ptah-Hotep

recognized the value of education in leading one into a noble concept of

living is shown by the following:

> A well taught heart hearkenth readily; one hath
> remorse for even a little covetousness when his
> belly cooleth; Repeat not extravagant speech,
> neither listen thereto, for it is the utterance
> of a body heated by wrath; Let that which thou
> speakest implant true things and just in the
> life of thy children.[5]

---

[4]Gray, p. 447.

[5]Gray, p. 454.

The thirty-sixth paragraph and the fifth dealt with honesty and
good conduct. "If you follow these instructions, your conduct will be
above reproach for 'the quality of truth is among their excellences.'"
The fifth paragraph cautions "that thine own conduct be without defect."

Evidences of the need to adapt one's speaking to the members of
an addressed audience are seen in admonitions to keep silent when meeting
a more capable debater and when unsure of your position in the presence
of superiors.

> If you meet a debater more capable than yourself,
> silence will be your best defense.
>
> In council with your superiors, if you would be
> wise, avoid speaking of that which you know
> nothing. Silence is more profitable than
> abundance of speech.[6]

The speaker is cautioned against undue manifestations of intel-
lectual pride when speaking to people without educational advantages. He
also advises one to guard against flaunting any superior talent or know-
ledge when debating someone of obviously inferior abilities.

> Be not proud because thou art learned; but
> discourse with the ignorant man as with the
> sage, for no man ever reaches perfection.
> Fair speech is more rare than the emerald that
> is found by slave maidens on the pebbles.
>
> Refute the false arguments of your equal in
> debate; you will thus appear wiser than he.
> But if your opponent is weaker than you, do
> not scorn him; let him alone; then he con-
> found himself...it is shameful to confuse a
> mean mind. If you are tempted to ridicule,
> overcome it as a thing rejected of princes.[7]

---

[6]Gray, p. 450.

[7]Gray, p. 450.

Obvious greed or covetousness was another trait to be avoided by the effective speaker. Specifically, Ptah-Hotep stated that, "...he that is covetous lacks persuasiveness in speech." Note here there is no mention of appearances. The state of "being covetous" is enough.

In conclusion, while reading these guidelines we must keep in mind the purpose for which they were designed--teaching the young. To arrive at a positive declaration of the philosophy behind them is not a practical possibility. There are indications that education is known to result in a more judicious and virtuous mode of behavior. Anything beyond this is more conjecture without adequate proof.

The Sophists

Conditions in Sicily during the days of Corax and Tisias were responsible for the development of a system of rhetoric designed to aid dispossessed landowners recover their property. Under a new government the citizen was given the right to appear in court to establish his claim to land a former tyrant had seized. The claimant was often at a great disadvantage without knowledge or ability to win his case. Corax and his pupil, Tisias, were the first to offer their services as teachers for those who needed their knowledge and could afford to pay their fees. Since their writings are extant, there is really nothing to learn of their ethics other than this: they sought to teach their clients how to win a decision in court.

There are two areas to be covered in a discussion of the views of Corax and Tisias on ethos in rhetoric. The first of these is their doctrine or probablity. The second concerns the parts or divisions of speech.

Doctrine of Probability

D. A. G. Hinks explains the doctrine of probability as developed

by Corax. He refers to two classes of argument.

> ...the form of reasoning is strict and only the
> doubtful truth of the premises makes the conclu-
> sion uncertain; and the arguments in which the form
> of reasoning itself is no more than probable, even
> if the premises are true. It is the importance to
> the orator of the arguments of the latter class that
> Corax recognized.[8]

The line of argument is based on the reasoning that, "What will happen or

has happened in a particular case is inferred from what usually happens."[9]

In pursuing this line of argument, the speaker has accepted the fact that

people generally are more easily convinced by what they have observed to

be a truth than by pure logical reasoning. The speaker establishes his

ethos in this type of argument through use of audience beliefs or experi-

ences he cites as being identical to his own. The audience agrees with

his premise, this he has established ahead of time, and therefore sees

the speaker as a truthful, dependable type person.

> ...and far more people are impressed by admitted
> truth in the premises than by logical cogency in
> the reasoning. The orator who can adduce general
> probability but no particular evidence on his side
> appeals to a real sentiment in his audience when he
> urges them, however fallaciously, to prefer prob-
> ability to testimony because it is incorruptible.[10]

The writings of Plato, Aristotle and Isocrates left no doubt about

their disapproval of the ethics of this approach.[11] In accepting their

---

[8] D. A. G. Hinks, "Tisias and Corax and the Invention of Rhetoric,"
The Classified Quarterly, XXXIV, p. 63.

[9] Hinks, p. 63.

[10] Hinks, p. 63.

[11] Hinks, pp. 61-69.

evaluations we must remember Corax was being classified with what was being labelled "undesirable" in the teaching of rhetoric. Just how accurate they were in their appraisal we cannot be too certain. They did all agree, and here there seems little reason to doubt the conclusion, that the line of reasoning they developed was designed for the courts and really not suited for any other use.

Parts or Divisions of Speech

Corax has commonly been given credit for observing and defining the parts of speech. Bromley Smith attributes the five-part division to Corax.[12] These are: the proem (introduction), the diegesis (narration), the agon (proof or argument), the parekbasis (digression of subsidiary remarks), and the epilogos (peroration or conclusion). Hinks cites a four-part system as being generally attributed to Corax. Hinks, however, seriously doubts that there is enough evidence to make this claim.[13]

Our concern is not for the validity of these claims, but rather the fact that there seems to be general agreement that Corax recognized the opening of the speech, the proem, to be the place to win the favor of the audience.

> All that we know of this "Art" is that it laid down
> a regular form and regular divisions for the oration;
> above all, it was to begin with a distinct proem, cal-
> culated to put the hearers in a favorable train; and
> to conciliate their good will at the very opening of
> the speech.[14]

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[12]Bromley Smith, "Corax and Probability," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 7, pp. 13-42.

[13]Hinks, pp. 66-68.

[14]K. O. Muller and John W. Donaldson, A History of the Literature of Ancient Greece (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1881) II, 98-99.

In conclusion, then, we find the development of a system of rhetoric designed for use in pleading legal cases. Though strongly criticized by later writers, the doctrine of probability as developed by Corax and his pupil Tisias, was widely used in the courts. The proem was recognized as the place to gain the sympathy of the audience.

"Sophist Philosophy"

In the term "sophist" we have a word that has been so overworked and misunderstood as to render it almost useless as a label for any group or movement. For our purpose the term is used in reference to those who taught rhetoric for pay during the Fifth Century, B. C., in Greece or Sicily. No one philosophy could be called "sophistic." The teachers who allowed themselves to be called "Sophists" varied as widely in their ethics as in all else they said or did. Not all of them were primarily rhetoricians, but since this was a field of learning certain to attract clients of means, most of them included it in their course of study. Two of the most outstanding "Sophistic" teachers of rhetoric were, first, philosophers, and, second, teachers of speech. Although the claim is made that they attempted to keep their philosophies separated from the teaching of rhetoric,[15] in actual practice this was not possible. The philosophical orientations of Protagoras of Abdera and Gorgias of Leon- tini colored much of the rhetorical teachings and practice in early Athens. These philosophical orientations will be considered in turn followed by a discussion of the impression they made on contemporary theories of ethics in rhetoric.

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[15]Sir Alexander Grant, The Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle (New York: Arno Press, 1973), p. 135.

Philosophical Principles of Protagoras of Abdera

Protagoras was known as one of the earliest and greatest of the

Sophists. He was rooted in a philosophy that starts with the spirit of

Heraclitus that "all is becoming." Plato treats with this doctrine in

the "Theotus" where he has Protagoras analyze this becoming into two sides,

the active and the passive, or the objective and the subjective.

> Nothing exists absolutely, things attain an
> existence by coming in contact with and acting
> on an organ of sensation, that is, a subject.
> Thus, all existence is merely relative, and
> depends in each case on the individual per-
> cipient, and, therefore, man is the measure
> of all things, of the existent that they exist,
> and of things non-existent that they do not
> exist.[16]

Grant goes on to point out that this is at once the germ or start-

ing point of all philosophy is to lift men out of their absolute belief

in the existence of external objects. It asserts that all knowledge, and

therefore all existence, as far as we can conceive it, consists in the

relation between an object and a subject, that every object implies a

subject and every subject an object. From the standpoint of the philo-

sopher, according to Grant, where Protagoras goes too far is in stating

that objects exist only in relation to an individual's perception of them.

This allows for an object being two things at the same time as observed by

two different people. Any statement about an object or subject is mean-

ingless for it will have to do only with the object as seen by the person

making the statement--not with the way others see it. In other words,

the same object may possess contradictory elements at the same time as

as seen by different individuals. This ethical precept affects rhetoric

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[16]Grant, p. 135.

and the entire role of the speaker profoundly. Grant claims Protagoras

acknowledges this:

> What appears true to a person is true to him.
> I cannot call it false, I can only endeavor to
> make his perceptions, not true, but better, i.e.,
> such as are more expedient for him to entertain
> ...Protagoras despairs of a theology and pro-
> claims his despair, and falls back upon practical
> success.[17]

Hunt is skeptical of this extreme to the point of absurd inter-

pretation of Protagoras.

> ...scholars are far apart in their interpretation
> of the meaning of Protagoras; but they are gener-
> ally agreed that the Platonic interpretation of it
> in the Theatus is quite unfair. Few interpreters
> now consider it to involve the degree of relativity
> and subjectivism with which Protagoras and the
> Sophists generally have been burdened.[18]

One authority with an entirely different point of view expressed

his conviction that in Protagoras we have the roots of the only philosophy

with any true meaning.

> Our only hope of understanding knowledge, our only
> chance of keeping philosophy alive by nourishing
> it with the realities of life, lie in going back
> from Plato to Protagoras, and ceasing to misunder-
> stand the great teacher who discovered the measure
> of man's universe.[19]

Suggestions for projection of ethical orientation are lacking in

our knowledge of Protagoras. It has been conjectured the man who is

credited with being the originator of "sophistic philosophy," if indeed

such a philosophy can be identified, would be pleased with the educational

aims attributed to him by Plato:

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[17]Grant, pp. 135-136.

[18]Hunt, "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric," p. 12.

[19]F. C. S. Schiller, Studies in Humanism (London, 1907), p. xiv.

> If a young man come to me he will learn pru-
> dence in affairs private as well as public,
> he will learn to order his own house in the
> best manner, and he will be best able to
> speak and act in affairs of state.[20]

The Philosophy of Gorgias of Leontini

Another of the philosophers among the sophists was Gorgias of

Leontini. Although his book, On Nature, the Non-Existent, is no longer

extant, a sketch of the work remains in the Peripatetic treatise called,

"Aristotle's, De Xenophone, Zenone et Gorgias," and also in "Sextus

Empiricus."[21] Grant, in his work, calls this one of the most startling

utterances in antiquity. There are three premises: (1) Nothing exists.

(2) If it does exist it cannot be known. (3) If it can be known it

cannot be communicated. The difficulties facing a rhetorcian who has

devoted himself to this philosophy are obvious. Isocrates made this

point in the opening of his Helen:

> He is speaking of the inveterate habit of
> defending paradoxes which had for so long
> prevailed, and, he asks, "who is so behind-
> hand as not to know that Protagoras and the
> Sophists of that time left us compositions
> of the kind I have named, and even more
> vexatious? for how could anyone surpass
> the audacity of Gorgias...Elsewhere (De
> Permatat, page 268), he mentions as the
> "theories of the old Sophists," that, "the
> number of existences was, according to
> Empedocles, four; according to Ion, three;
> according to Alcmaeon, two; according to
> Parmenides and Melissus, one; according to
> Gorgias, absolutely none."[22]

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[20] Plato, Protagoras, p. 318.

[21] Grant, pp. 135-136.

[22] Grant, pp. 136-137.

Grant goes on to compare the last two theses of Gorgias with the philosophies of Kant. Saying that we cannot know something even if it does exist, and, supposing we know something we are unable to communicate it, places an impassable gulf between the material world and the human mind.

Plato's treatment of rhetoric in the Gorgias dialogue is one of the most popularly used assessments of Sophistic style rhetoric and has been taken by many as a factual account of the teachings and practice of Gorgias. The unfortunate result has been the belief on the part of many that Gorgias' chief contributions to rhetoric were stylistic devices and that he was nothing more than a glib nihilist who advanced no positive theories and was unconcerned with ethics.[23] R. L. Enos makes the statement that Gorgias himself denied that he had uttered any of the lines in the Gorgias--in fact, he dismissed the work as a humorous satire.[24]

Everett Lee Hunt and Bromley Smith made scholars aware of the fact that Gorgias was, in fact, a participant in the philosophical arguments of his day and opened the door for further investigation of his ideologies.[25] These studies and others have led to the work done by Enos that indicates Gorgias was influenced by both Empedocles and Zeno, the respective inventors of rhetoric and dialectic, and that he developed a

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[23]George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 182.

[24]Richard Leo Enos, "The Epistemology of Gorgias' Rhetoric: A Re-Examination," The Southern Speech Communication Journal, XLII, 1, 35.

[25]Hunt, "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," in Studies in Rhetoric and Public Speaking in Honor of James Albert Winans, ed. A. M. Drummond (New York, 1925), p. 14. Bromley Smith, "Gorgias: A Study in Oratorical Style," QJS, Nov. 1921, pp. 335-359.

pre-Socratic dialectic and rhetoric that were at odds with the later
school. To understand the development of that conflict it is necessary
to look at some of the precepts of Empedocles. In these will be seen
the roots for a fundamental lasting disagreement on the nature of ethics
and, growing from this, on the nature of ethos in rhetorical practice.

There is found in the extant writings of Empedocles a profusion
of contradictory beliefs. These have drawn criticism from scholars.
Enos points out that these seeming contradictions are actually the "juxta-
position of antithetical concepts," and were more a matter of "correlative
balancing of thesis and antithesis than of intellectual inconsistency."[26]
This antithetical process was "anticipated by the philosophical inquiry
of the Pythagoreans and by the dichotomic method of Zeno." This notion
of contraries was the foundation for philosophical inquiry for Empedocles.

Empedocles rested his verification on the human sense mechanism.
He placed trust not with the gods but with human sense perception.

> Man's ability to acquire knowledge, and for that
> matter to perceive existence itself, was dependent
> upon the degree of his sense-perception. Since
> man's capacity for understanding reality was
> finite, complete communication was impossible,
> and required a system of probability which was
> limited by sensory experience. Empedocles' view
> of knowledge led him to dismiss the possibility
> of perceiving the gods and of communicating with
> them, for they were beyond the positivistic
> reality of the senses.[27]

These concepts were adopted by Gorgias while a pupil of Empedocles.
Later they were developed by him into a sophisticated system of rhetoric.

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[26]Enos, p. 40.

[27]Enos, p. 41.

Another major influence for Gorgias was Parmenides. A good summary statement of his point of view follows:

> Unlike Plato, Parmenides believed that the limited capacity of the human mind, and the inherent deception in communication, precluded man's acquiring certain knowledge of the existence of real truths and compelled an epistemology that secured convictions on probable opinions and not on certain knowledge.[28]

What developed was a dialectic that argued from contrary positions, proceeding from premises that have not been agreed on with conclusions resulting in a choice of probable positions. Thus, "contrary to the dialectic of Plato, conclusions expose contradictory positions in relative degrees of strength."[29]

When the initial concept of Gorgias' philosophy states that "nothing exists," he is not speaking of the material world, for this would be a contradiction of the fundamental beliefs of his teachers and of his own empirical observations of sense perceptions. Enos points out that Gorgias is using the verb "to be" in an intransitive manner to indicate existence itself and not in the material or physical sense. The concepts of the mind are the ones without real existence and Platonic notions of "ontological 'essences' such as the ideal rhetoric were absurdities to Gorgias."[30] The world is ever-changing and man functions in this world with his manufactured ideas losing their existence the instant they pass from the mind of the thinker.

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[28]Enos, p. 42.

[29]Enos, p. 43.

[30]Enos, p. 47.

> Accordingly, ideals attain "existence" only
> through the extrapolations of the mind, and
> are dependent upon the referential percep-
> tions of their creator. As such, they cannot
> therefore even attain this existence without
> a manufactured antithesis or anti-model, and
> by their very nature they can form no ideal
> at all since each individual predicated his
> own ideals upon personal experience. In this
> respect, each thinker's transient notion of
> the ideal rhetoric is an amorphous grouping
> of relative notions.[31]

The second precept of Gorgias, "That if anything actually did

exist, it would be incomprehensible to man," refers to Gorgias' concept

that an abstract idea has no referent for sense perception--man's only

avenue for perception--and therefore, even if it did exist, man would

have no knowledge of its existence.

The final precept, that even if he had the knowledge of such an

idea he would be unable to communicate it, refers to Gorgias' observation

again of the lack of a sensory referent for the abstract idea--there is

no experience that can be communicated--only references to experiences

which cannot be the same as those which the senses perceive and which

actually exist. When rhetoric, song or poetry are used to arouse the

emotions, this to Gorgias is deception--for the reaction is to words,

not to experiences and the words are not the experiences and therefore

emotions kindled by them are deceptive. However, to Gorgias, this decep-

tion was not necessarily morally wrong.

> The possibility for deception is apparent when
> words, which have no uni-vocal meaning, are
> used within their context to guide the soul
> by interpreting and recreating an experience.
> Hence a persuasive speaker could use the power

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[31]Enos, p. 47.

> of words to deceive listeners into becoming as
> frightened in the verbal recreating of a battle
> as they would be if they actually were in the
> encounter.[32]

Gorgias was deeply aware of the power of persuasion to "mold souls" as it desired. As such it could be used for good or evil. He saw nothing in rhetoric indicative of a built-in moral code. Rhetoric itself was neutral. The motives for good or evil were to be found in the person using it. And so, the sophist who is known to have made no claims of his ability to "teach virtue" was fully aware of the potential for good or evil lying in the province of rhetoric.

Gorgias belonged to a strong philosophical tradition that stressed probablity, antithesis, relativism and sense-perception.

Athenian Rhetorical Practices

Another bit of "philosophy" popularly discussed in Athens at the time was a traditional piece of dialectic "older than Protagoras," that argued that it was impossible to speak falsely. If one were to speak falsely it would mean he was uttering the non-existent. The non-existent has no existence whatsoever. To conceive or utter it is impossible.[33]

> Plato maintains against this argument and against
> the doctrines of the Eleatics, that in some sense
> "not being" was an existence. We see then that to
> set the relative meaning of a word against its abso-
> lute signification, to play off the accidental
> against the essential, formed a main view of the
> Eristic art.[34]

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[32]Enos, p. 49.

[33]Plato, _Euthydemus_, tran. Rosamund Kent Sprague (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1965), Scene III, 284A-286E, pp. 23-30.

[34]Grant, pp. 133-134.

Certainly these early theories of referrent, symbolization, perception and encoding-decoding messages are interesting to any modern student of interpersonal theory. The foundations for such schools of thought were laid generations earlier than the Socratic-Platonic systems to be discussed in the next part of this chapter.

These doctrines were popular in the Sophistic schools of Athens and the inquisitive minds of the early Greeks eagerly explored the various channels of reasoning now opening to them. When charges are brought against the early sophists for corruption of the youth, it was not an accusation that revolutionary thought was being taught. The accusations rather concerned the negation of the accepted social-moral values of Athenian society. Efforts of the teachers of rhetoric were often directed toward clothing old ideas in fresh words to make the trivial worthy of discussion. Often, through the use of an antithetical dialectic, called perverted by Plato, the basic values of society were attacked and destroyed. The students of the day were left without the steadying influence of traditional value systems to guide them and their teachers were neglecting to replace old concepts with ones of equal or superior worth.

The Platonic dialogue, Euthydemus, is written to show the effects on a young person "attacked" by such a system of dialectic as this. The young person depicted was without enough maturity or judgement to evaluate the worth of the arguments being advanced against him. Grant explores this facet of Sophistic teaching and gives this evaluation of the actual practices of the art of rhetoric during this period.

> Prominent association connected with it (Sophism)
> is--fallacious reasoning. Plato and Aristotle
> both directly accuse the Greek Sophists or pro-
> fessional teachers of the practice of consciously
> using fallacious arguments to suit their own

>purposes. These accusations seem to come in
>the later dialogogues of Plato. <u>Euthydemus</u>,
><u>Sophistes</u>, <u>Theoetetus</u>, are the three later
>works that show the Sophistic practicing a
>perverse dialectic. They are putting ques-
>tions to people and trapping them through
>contradictions and verbal quibbles. The
>last of the trio talks of an Eristic with
>no regard for the truth but only for a
>victory as opposition for an honest dia-
>lectic whose object is the discovery of
>the Truth.[35]

Certainly from the discussion of antithetical dialectic as
developed by Gorgias and his predecessors we can see that this was an
honest appraisal of the actual practice of the dialectic of the day.
The purpose was not to arrive at any truth--for man could not perceive
truth in the realm of ideas even if such truth were to exist. The pur-
pose of the dialectic being used was to arrive at opposing premises with
varying degrees of prbability assigned to them.

Isocrates also wrote about the influence of this "Eristic" art on
the practice and reputation of rhetoric. Norlin explains in his transla-
tion of <u>The Works of Isocrates</u> that he was criticizing the same sort of
dialectic dealt with in the <u>Euthydemus</u> of Plato. (It is interesting to
note that to the best of our knowledge, Isocrates was a pupil of Gorgias.)

>Indeed, who can fail to abhor, yes to condemn,
>those teachers, in the first place, who devote
>themselves to disputation, since they pretend
>to search for truth, but straightway at the
>beginning of their professions attempt to
>deceive us with lies? (Isocrates is refer-
>ring to captious argument in the field of
>ethics.)[36]

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[35]Grant, p. 131.

[36]Isocrates, "Against the Sophists," <u>Isocrates</u>, Vol. II, tran.
George Norlin (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 163.
Parenthetical material is a footnote by Norlin, p. 162.

These complaints with the practice of dialectic in the schools of the Sophists appear in Plato's later writings and other complaints against them are found in the earlier dialogues. Gorgias, Protagoras, and Republic are primarily critical of the Sophists' worldliness, habit of declaiming and making long speeches, ignorance of the art of argumentation, and inability to discuss a subject by means of short questions and answers.[37] Grant makes the suggestion that there may have been a change in the practice of rhetoric that led to this change in the focus of criticism. Although Isocrates was not known for his overwhelming agreement with Plato on many subjects, here we do find common ground between the two.

> If all who were engaged in the profession of
> education were willing to state the facts
> instead of making greater promises than they
> can possibly fulfill, they would not be in such
> bad repute with the lay public. As it is,
> however, the teachers who do not scruple to
> vaunt their powers with utter disregard for
> the truth have created the impression that
> those who choose a life of careless indo-
> lence are better advised than those who
> devote themselves to serious study.[38]

Although not in agreement on the remedy for the plight of education, both critics are stating that the conditions as they saw them were in need of some corrective measures. It remains for other sections of this work to differentiate between the courses chosen by each to follow.

There is a passage in Grant's work that is comprehensive in its analysis of many of the problems besetting the practice of rhetoric in

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[37] Grant, p. 132.

[38] Isocrates, "Against the Sophists," p. 163.

ancient Greece. He points out that Plato's complaint is not that the

Sophists are teaching lax morality to their disciples, but rather that

they trifle with it.

> The procedure of the Sophists was two-fold,
> either it was rhetorical or dialectical. They
> would (1) trick out the praises of justice and
> virtue with citations from the old poets, with
> ornaments of language, and with allegories and
> personifications...Such (like) compositions of
> the Sophists form a sort of parallel to the
> popular preaching of the present day. Or else
> (2) they gave an idea of their power and sub-
> tlety, by skirmishes of language, by opening
> up new points of view with regard to common
> everyday duties, and making the old notions
> appear strangely inverted.[39]

In his analysis of the Sophistic teachings Hunt pointed to the

fact that these varied with the individual. In general, however, sophi-

stic education aimed at enabling the pupils to become leaders of men in

a democracy. The Sophists exerted much more influence on their society

than did Socrates or Plato. The public generally might have distrusted

the Sophists for their skill in speaking on either side of a question--

just as we may tend to distrust modern lawyers for the same reasons.

However, in matters of public concern, the Sophists were the conserva-

tives--the upholders of the status quo.

> The Sophists as public orators illustrated and
> reenforced the received dogmas of Athenian
> society...Rhetoric, as we know, as the art of
> persuasion, must always appeal to the people
> upon the basis of whatever beliefs they have
> ...It was not likely then that it was the
> rhetoric of the Sophists that led to the
> charge that they broke down religion and
> corrupted the youth.[40]

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[39]Grant, pp. 146-148.

[40]Hunt, p. 17.

It was rather a problem of the Sophists devoting themselves enough to philosophy to incur something of the distrust with which speculative thought has always been viewed. It was this philosophical side that excited the general distrust of the Athenians toward all Sophists as well as Socrates and Plato. The quarrel between philosophers was unrelated to this outside distrust from the general public.

How would we look at that quarrel today? What would Plato have to say about our modern society? Hunt speculates:

> The perversions of such education--half knowledge
> propaganda, demagogery, philistinism, worship of
> the appearance of success--are probably even more
> prevalent now than then. Whether they are worse
> than the perversions of Platonism is too large a
> question to be argued here. But whether for good
> or ill, the conceptions of the aims and purposes
> of the American liberal college as set forth by
> the most distinguished modern educators, is much
> closer to Isocrates and Protagoras than to Plato.

The Reformers, Socrates and Plato, Aristotle and Isocrates

The dissatisfaction with the moral tone of the teachings of the Sophists resulted in the emerging ethical theories of Socrates and his famous pupil, Plato. This portion of the chapter will describe the philosophical orientation of Socrates. This will be followed with the account of Plato's use of Socrates' approach in the formation of his own code of ethics. The section will conclude with the adaption of these theories to rhetoric and some comments on the practicality of these theories.

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[41] Hunt, p. 22.

Socrates

One of the first to make a departure from the philosophical orientation described in the preceding discussion of the Sophists was Socrates. In the writings of Aristotle we find many references to Socrates and Sir Alexander Grant points to the difference between the historical Socrates and the literary Socrates. Aristotle, as a pupil of Plato, is deeply rooted in the Socrates of literature. The Socrates of the Platonic Dialogues is mouthing the thoughts of Plato. As Socrates' pupil Plato has taken the teachings of the master and applied them to his own philosophy. The historical Socrates is quite distinguishable from this use of him and it will be our endeavor to discover these distinctions. Since Socrates taught by lecture and discourse rather than putting his views in writing, we must turn to secondary sources for our references. In Aristotle's Metaphysics I. vi2, XII. iv. 3-5, Grant points to passages that distinguish between the views of Plato and Socrates.

> Aristotle is relating the history of the "doctrine
> of ideas." He tells us how it sprang from a belief
> in the Heraclitean principle of the flux of sensible
> things, and the necessity of some other and permanent
> existences, if thought and knowledge were to be con-
> sidered possible. He proceeds, that Socrates now
> entered on the discussion of the ethical virtues,
> and was the first to attempt a universal definition
> of them--definition, except in the immature essays
> of Democritus and the Pythagoreans, having had no
> existence previously. "Socrates was quite right in
> seeking a definite, determinate conception of these
> virtues, for his object was to obtain a demonstra-
> tive reasoning, and such reasoning must commence
> with a determinant conception. There are two
> things that we may fairly attribute to Socrates,
> his inductive discourses and his universal defini-
> tions. But the Platonists made them transcendental,
> and then called such existence "Ideas."[42]

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[42]Grant, p. 159.

Socrates' Concept of the Ethical Virtues

This passage describes Socrates' subjects of inquiry--the ethical virtues. It also relates that his universal definition of these virtues would be established by means of inductive discourses using experience and analogy. This was a great deal more than anyone had attempted before --and, indeed, those adhering to the teachings of Gorgias, proclaimed this stance ridiculous. It was a syllogistic or one-sided concept.

> His conceptions were definitely fixed so as to exclude one another. He knew nothing of that higher dialectic, which, setting aside the first limited and fixed conception of a thing, from which the contrary of that thing is wholly excluded, asks, "Is there not the same science of things contrary to each other? Is not a thing inseparable from, and, in a way identical with its contrary? Is not the one also many, and the many one?

Xenophon agrees with Aristotle in saying that Socrates always confined himself to ethical inquiries.

> ...he never ceased discussing human affairs, asking, What is piety? what is impiety? what is the noble? what is the bane? what is the just? what is the unjust? what is temperance? what is madness? what is a State? what constitutes the character of a citizen? what is rule over man? what makes one able to rule? (memor. I. i. 16).[44]

Because of this concentration in the areas of human behavior and the evaluation of what constitutes behavior of a certain kind, Socrates has been called the first moral philosopher. To say that he divided philosophy into logic, ethics and physics would not be correct. He had no concept of ethics as such and if asked the category of topics he was considering would have said "Politics" before anything else. In Plato

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[43]Grant, pp. 159-160.

[44]Grant, p. 161.

there is no logic--only a dialectic that is really metaphysics. In
Aristotle, logic still has no name and ethics is only becoming a study
in itself. The subjects of ethics were Socrates' favorites.[45]

The thought of "Virtue as a science" was very far from the
abstract. It was closely associated with life and reality and connected
to education through the claims of the sophists that they taught virtue.
(Gorgias was the notable exception.) Socrates agreed with the sophists
that it could be taught but he gave a new dimension to such instruction.
He wished to make action into a kind of art and to make self-knowledge
and wisdom predominate over every part of life. It was later that Plato
said, "No, virtue cannot be taught," and that aspect will be discussed
in the next section.

The second thing to note about "Virtue is a science" is that it
was related to Socrates' use of inductive reasoning or generalization.
He brought the various virtues that had been enumerated by Gorgias under
one heading--wisdom. These virtues were justice, temperance, courage and
wisdom. The significance of the other three being reduced to the universal
classification of "wisdom" should not be overlooked. In Socratic philo-
sophical thought wisdom is co-equivalent with the other three virtues.
Wisdom becomes the purpose of education and later the qualification
for an orator.

The third aspect to consider is that the doctrine had two sides.
The one side could be said to involve "habits." This means such state-
ments as, "Courage consists in being accustomed to danger." The other

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[45]Grant, p. 162.

side of the doctrine had more to do with self-knowledge and consciousness of the law. Courage must have knowledge of good and evil and the presence of mind to keep hold of right principles even in the presence of danger.[46]

Next, there is the fact that Socrates felt that all politics was not learned through systematic study as were other crafts. (Politics is derived from "polis" and refers to society, the relationship of man to his organized society.) Socrates' view was that all human life must have its proper function within the polis or society and in this way virtue became the Science of Living. This can take a selfish turn and one offshoot of Socratean Philosophy did so. If Virtue is called the Science of Living it could be and was equated with pleasure. The Philosophy of Pleasure as an end for human existence has been the substance of several philo- sophies since the time of Socrates.

The fifth aspect of "Virtue is a Science" offered an appeal to a society beset by materialistic relativism. A foundation has been laid for a conscious morality in the preceding steps. The grounds for right and wrong are placed in individual reason and exist in and for the mind of the individual. The Sophistic saying that "justice is a convention," now gives way to "justice is a science." Justice no longer depends on society and external authority but exists as a constant value within the individual. This is a big step out of the morass that can characterize a completely relativistic or nihilistic society such as threatened Athens.

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[46]Grant, p. 167. This doctrine is given in Aristotle, Ethics III. viii 6 and in Xenophon, Memorab III ix 2. The second doctrine is found in Laches and Plato's Republic.

Later, the Peripatetics would point out that this conception ignored all distinction between the reason and the will. Early ethics contained little psychology. Socrates did not perceive the difference between "what is good" and "what is right." He argued that everyone would do what is the "good" without realizing that there are two ways of looking at the "good." There is the "good" which is the end result. Certainly anyone looking at this would agree that this is what he wanted and would not knowingly do anything against the achievement of that good. The trouble begins when we consider the good that is the means of getting the other good. Here it might be more difficult to correlate the means with the end and there is no assurance that everyone will go along with the same proposition of means to the end. Later it will become evident that this is a basic difference in the ethical orientations of some of the leading rhetoricians.

Socrates on Education

The charges that were brought against Socrates stating that he had corrupted the youth could be traced to some of his educational policies. In the Xenophontean "Apology" Socrates is charged with inducing his pupils to disobey their parents. Parents traditionally have the last word in the education of their children. Socrates was in fundamental disagreement with this. He pointed out that when one was sick he consulted a medical doctor. When the country is at war it trusts the advice of generals in the fighting of battles. In affairs of state the statesman determines the course of action. When the question of education arises the educator should be the guide as to what is best for the youth. The

professional educator is trained in his pursuit--not the parent. The

charge against him was that he constituted youths to judge of their own

education and this they were unfit to do. Socrates was condemned.

On the surface certainly Socrates appeared to be a Sophist and he

must have presented a purely sophistical image to many of his contempor-

aries. However, when his teachings are closely examined the differences

become evident.

> But from another point of view, looking at the
> internal character and motive of the man, his
> purity and nobility of mind, his love of truth,
> his enthusiasm, his obedience to some mysterious
> and irrational impulse, and his genius akin to
> madness,--we must call him the born antagonist
> and utter antipodas of all sophistry.[47]

Since Grant agrees that Sophists were not in any sense to be considered a

homogeneous grouping, since we know they had no universal philosophy and

that there were differences in their teachings, we must assume that

"sophistry" here is referring to fallacious reasoning--the application

of a perverted dialectic to everyday affairs. The kind of "sophistry"

referred to in the Euthydemus of Plato would have been strongly opposed

by Socrates.

Interpreting Socrates

Generally people have had trouble interpreting a paradox that

develops in the study of Socrates. He states that injustice done volun-

tarily is better than injustice done involuntarily. Aristotle assumed

the opposite stance and Plato defended it dialectically. The key is in

the wording of the statement that inserts the phrase, "If it were possible."

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[47]Grant, p. 165.

By hypothesis it has already been established that it is impossible for any man to knowingly do wrong. In this system wrong is equated with ignorance. The wise man can only do what is seemingly wrong since to himself his actions have been justified as right. The effects of this proposition is to forcibly drive home the fact that wisdom and knowledge come first, action later.

Conclusions

Throughout this discussion it can be seen that Socrates had many things in common with the Sophists in addition to being called one of them. His dialectic disturbed the popular conceptions on moral subjects. He was convicted of corrupting the youth. However, there are three ways in which the dialectic of Socrates left the methods of the other Sophists and moved on to a newer concept.

> (1) that there was a higher and truer conception to be discovered by thought and research; (2) it seized upon some permanent and universal ideas amidst the mass of what was fluctuating and relative; (3) it left the impression that the most moral view must after all be the true one.[48]

According to Grant, Plato saw in the method of Socrates' discourses indications of a philosophy that could rise above empirical generalizations. The inquiring spirit, the effort to connect a variety of circumstances into a general law and the efforts to test the law through application to new circumstances, were all potentially the beginnings of a philosophy that could be carried to a higher plane than Socrates himself had envisioned.

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[48]Grant, p. 171.

> ...the conception formed by Socrates differed
> from the Ideas of Plato--that they had no absolute
> existence, they had no world of their own apart
> from the world of time and space. The historic
> Socrates was quite excluded from that sphere of
> contemplation on which the Platonic philosopher
> enters, where all hypotheses and all sensible
> objects are left out of sight and the mind deals
> with pure Ideas alone.[49]

Plato

The conclusions of Socrates were the starting point for Plato.
He appears to have carried forward all the many-sided arguments of the
master through his dialogues. By imagining Socrates still on earth,
Plato carries on perpetual conversations with him on the highest subjects.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider any more than a fragment
of these philosophies. Our area of concern is ethics, its development as
it affected the concept of the orator and the practice of rhetoric.

The foundation for Plato's inquiries was, "Namely, that in the
affairs of human life it is absolutely necessary to obtain universal con-
ceptions; that to arrive at these a suitable dialectic, and the refutation
of inadequate notions, are requisite; and that it is the general outcome
of all such inquiries to show that "virtue is a science."[50]

Plato and "Virtue is a Science"

The questions asked by Plato concerned the four cardinal virtues
identified by Socrates and generally accepted by his contemporaries. These
four were wisdom, justice, courage and temperance. The problem he saw was

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[49]Grant, pp. 159-160.

[50]Grant, p. 183.

to determine whether the virtues were an entity or separate and distinct from each other. If virtue were an entity in itself, why and how did the different terms come into being? There should be but one name for a whole. He also seriously considered the question of virtue being a teachable sub-ject. The question he posed was: "If virtue is a science (capable of being learned), then does it follow that vice is ignorance?" If this is true (that vice is ignorance), then it would follow that no man can be blamed for vice since no man can be held liable for wrongs committed in ignorance. This step was further emphasized by the previously stated hypo-thesis that no man is ever knowingly and willfully bad. These problems are directly discussed in Protagoras, Gorgias, Meno and the Republic. To find the answers Plato called on psychology and we find the first introduction of this discipline in ethics.[51]

The first psychology was in a very rudimentary form. It resulted in Plato putting wisdom in a different category than the other virtues. The soul was divided into three parts: the Reason (rulers), Anger (sol-diers), and Desire (working class). From this he argued that wisdom, or thought on moral subjects, enters as a guide for all of the other moral virtues. None of the others can exist without it. At the same time, thought or reason is one of the tripartite divisions of the soul, an intuitive faculty, possessed in some degree by all men. As an inherent quality it may be misdirected, it may be obscured, but it cannot be endowed by one man on another. According to Plato, the virtue of wisdom cannot be taught. The Platonic concept of wisdom is similar to our modern I.Q. Present at birth, the quality may be developed and directed or sub-

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[51]Grant, p. 185.

dued and diverted from the realization of its potential. Since this is
the case Plato emphasizes the importance of turning the "eye of the soul"
away from earthly vices toward higher purposes and a more noble life.
While the child is young his direction of seeking for fulfillment should
be turned to the acquisition of the other three virtues.

> ..."and hence," it is said, "while the other
> qualities (i.e., Courage, Temperance, and Justice)
> seem to be akin to the body, being infused by
> habit and exercise and not originally innate,
> the virtue of wisdom is a divine essence, and
> has a power which is everlasting, and by this
> conversion is rendered useful and profitable,
> and is also capable of becoming hurtful and use-
> less."[52]

A reference is made to the "narrow intelligence flashing from the
keen eye of the clever rogue." This is recognition that a man highly
endowed with this "virtue of wisdom" may not treat it as though it is a
virtue. Plato points out that a wisdom taken into the service of evil in
this fashion is dangerous in direct proportion to the degree of intelli-
gence possessed by the individual. In the Republic Plato proposes how to
avoid this unfortunate situation.

> But what if there had been a circumcision of such
> natures in the days of their youth; and they had
> been severed from the leaden weights, as I may
> call them, with which they were born into the
> world, which hang onto sensual pleasures, such
> as those of eating or drinking, and drags them
> down and turns the vision of their souls about
> the things that are below--if, I say, they had
> been released from them and turned around to the
> truth, the very same faculty in these very same
> persons would have seen the other as keenly as
> they now see that on which their eye is fixed."
> In this passage also is indicated the relation of
> at least one other of the cardinal virtues, namely
> temperance, to the virtue of wisdom or thought.

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[52]Grant, pp. 185-186.

> "Had sensual indulgence," says Plato, "been
> checked in many a man when he was young, his
> innate divine power of thought would have
> turned around to the idea of Good, instead
> of fastening itself on Evil."[53]

The relationship of temperance to wisdom is that it conserves it

and is a necessary condition to it. Courage is expanded from steadiness

in the face of danger to steadiness in the face of pleasure and tempta-

tion. Both temperance and courage play important parts in preventing the

disturbance of and misdirection of thought. At the same time that these

qualities are necessary to the proper function of thought, they in them-

selves have no ethical value without thought being behind them. There is

no virtue in blind instinct or in worldly and non-moral motives prompting

courage or temperance. (Phoedo, p. 68 d.) Centuries later Quintilian

writes about the qualities most needed in the earliest associates of the

child. He is relating to the Platonic principles of early direction

determining the direction the soul will take in later life.

In the Platonic concept, the three virtues of wisdom, courage and

temperance are not separate but rather stand together and grow into a whole.

This whole we may call virtue. Plato calls it Justice in the Republic

where it is seen reigning over all the functions of the soul giving it

supreme regularity, good order and sanity.[54]

Plato's Concept of Ethos in Rhetoric

When this philosophy is applied to rhetoric we have the development

of the Platonic ideal rhetorician. When considering rhetoric the question

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[53] Grant, pp. 185-186.

[54] Grant, pp. 185-186. This discussion of Plato on "Virtue is a
Science" is found in Sir Alexander Grant's The Philosophies of Plato and
Aristotle.

that bothered Plato was, "If truth alone is not sufficient to persuade men, what else remains that can be legitimately added?" The answers are to be found through interpretation of Plato's Phaedrus.

Truth plus artful persuasion containing dialectic as its first process will give the serious rhetorician an ethical art. The virtuous rhetorician as envisioned by Plato will have a soul of such movement that its dialectical perception is consonant with that of a divine mind. There is no true rhetoric without dialectic having been used to determine the truthful orientation of the speaker. The true rhetorician is a noble lover of the good who works thorugh dialectic and analogical association. The discourse of the noble rhetorician will concern itself with the unreal- ized future. The discourse of the exaggerator speaks of unreal potenti- ality. The noble rhetor has the insight to speak of real potentiality or possible actuality. This might also be called a responsible probablity as opposed to idie conjecture. Understanding followed by actualization seems to be the role of the universe and the interpretation is the dialectiti- cian followed by the rhetorician.[55]

The kind of rhetoric that is condemned by Plato is that which is uttered without the support of a position adjudicated by reference to the universe of discourse. Rhetoric at its truest seeks to perfect man by showing him better versions of himself, links in that chain extending up toward the ideal, which only the intellect can comprehend and only the soul have affection for.

A summary of Plato's theory for the rhetorician as described in Phaedrus includes these eight concepts:

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[55]Richard M. Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Heney Regency Co., Gateway Edition, 1970), this description of Plato's refer- ence is taken in its entirity from Weaver's interpretation of the Phaedrus.

1. The mind of the speaker should know the truth of what he is going to say.

2. The rhetorician must classify his subject with reference to his definitions as to possibility of debate upon them.

3. He must introduce a principle of order in presenting the topics.

4. He must see unity and plurality in nature so that he can classify particulars under a general head or break up universals into particulars.

5. He must know the nature of the soul.

6. He must speak of the instruments by which the soul is affected.

7. After having classified souls and speeches, he must point out the connection between them, showing why one is persuaded by one kind of argument and another by a different kind.

8. He will think little of the art of writing.

Through the various dialogues of Plato we are familiar with the shortcomings of sophistry. In the _Phaedrus_ the concept of the "noble lover" gave us his ideal rhetorician described above.

> Thus when we finally divest rhetoric of all the
> notions of artifice which have grown up around it,
> we are left with something very much like Spinoza's
> "intellectual love of God." This is its essence
> and the fans et origo of its power. It is "intel-
> lectual" because, as we have already seen, there is
> no honest rhetoric without a preceding dialectic.
> The kind of rhetoric which is justly condemned is
> utterance in support of a position before that posi-
> tion has been adjudicated with reference to the
> whole universe of discourse—and of such the world
> always produces more than enough. It is love
> because it is something in addition to bare theo-
> retical truth. That element in addition is a
> desire to bring truth into a kind of existence
> or to give it an actuality to which theory is
> indifferent.[56]

Richard Weaver admits that probably Plato had no intention of giving every meaning to his dialogue that has been imputed to him. He

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[56]Weaver, p. 25.

does say, however, that it fits nicely and the thought is certainly in line with Platonic reasoning. In this respect we might say that Weaver is to Plato as Plato is to Socrates. Each took the master, studied carefully his approach to rhetoric, then, using the master's own words proceeded on in the pointed direction to a more fully developed concept.

Conclusions

Before leaving this discussion of Plato it would be well to once more look to the pages of Hunt's article on the "Rhetoric of Plato and Aristotle" for an evaluation of the view of rhetoric developed by Plato.

> At the conclusion of his earlier attacks...Plato offers an outline of a reconstructed rhetoric. Here, too, he shows his inability to conceive of rhetoric as a tool; the ideal rhetorician sketched in the Phaedrus is as far from the possibilities of mankind as his Republic was from Athens.[57]

Aristotle

It remained for Aristotle, as the pupil of Plato, to further refine his ideas and make the practical application for rhetoric. During his years at Plato's Academy Aristotle became increasingly independent in thought and it is postulated that this resulted in his being passed over in the selection of a Scholarch for the Academy on Plato's death.[58] Aristotle left Athens for a time and it was on his return that he established the Lyceum as his own school. Later it would be known as the Peripatetic.

It became Aristotle's purpose to gather and systematize the writings of Plato.

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[57]Hunt, p. 42.

[58]Grant, p. 181, see footnote.

Aristotle, with the greatest gifts for the
analytic systematizing of philosophy that
have ever been seen, unconsciously applied
himself to the required task. He treated
the Platonic dialogues as quarries out of
which he got the materials wherewith to
build up in consolidated form all the
departments of thought and science so far
as they could be conceived by the ancient
Greek. He thus codified Plato, and trans-
lated him into the prose of dogmatic theory,
at the same time that he carried further and
completed many of his results and suggestions.[59]

The aim of Plato was that of a Dialectician and Poet. Aristotle's aim w

was directed at being a man of science. The latter endeavored to collect

all that could be known on a subject for the purpose of stating it in pre-

cise terminology. Plato had a strong moral earnestness that never lost

sight of the importance of everything that might serve to improve or deter-

iorate the human soul. Aristotle endeavored to sift the truth of every-

thing and express it as he saw it regardless of what the consequences might

be.

This discussion of Aristotle will begin with his view of the

Virtues and the ethical character of man. In Aristotle there is a clearly

defined application of this ethical nature to the province of rhetoric and

this application will be the subject of the second concern of this section.

Finally, ethos as used in De Rhetorica will be examined keeping these first

basic conceptions of Aristotle firmly in mind as being the basis for his

application. The final section will be devoted to any conclusions pointed

to at this point in the study.

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[59]Grant, p. 182.

Virtues and the Character of Man--Aristotle's Perspective

In reviewing the thoughts of Socrates and Plato there have been recurrent references to Virtue. Socrates held that "Virtue is Knowledge" or "Wisdom." Plato redefined Virtue as "Justice." Aristotle alters these concepts only slightly--but significantly. Virtue, to Aristotle, is "accompanied by thought" rather than being equated with thought. Aristotle then proceeds to divide thought or moral wisdom from philosophy. Plato requires that virtue is acheived by "flying as far as possible from the evil of the world--to be as much like God as possible." There is a requirement here that every act should take place in absolute conscious- ness and no distinction is made between physical acts and pure speculation. The Aristotelian concept places virtue in a more practical focus.

> The Peripatetic (Aristotelian) account is that a
> moral consciousness must accompany every act, a
> sort of wisdom which is the center of all the
> moral virtues (Eth. VI. xiii. 6), but this kind
> of consciousness is quite distinct from the philo-
> sophic reason, it deals with the contingent and
> not with the absolute. The doctrine that Temper-
> ance preserves Thought (Eth. VI. v. 5), and that
> Thought without Virtuous habits may degenerate
> into cunning, is taken from the Republic.[60]

Plato, it will be remembered, stated that through the development of courage and temperance in interaction with wisdom we will arrive at virtue in justice as governor of the soul. Aristotle rejects this concept and instead divides virtue into many categories. To more clearly define "virtues" he classifies, categorizes and looks at contraries. These are enumerated in De Rhetorica.[61]

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[60]Grant, p. 194.

[61]Aristotle, De Rhetorica (list virtues or give location in Rhetoric.)

The virtuous acts of man are to be first, conscious choices. To be classed as a virtuous act it must be, first, a human act and not merely an act of man. Secondly, the act must be habitual and not an isolated instance.

A human act as distinguishable from an act of man can best be described by illustration. Imagine someone walking through his neighbor's flower bed, stumbling and falling. He knows that in falling he is going to ruin some of the flowers. He did not intend to fall and there is no way he can help himself. In Aristotle's system this amounts to an act of man, not a human act.[62]

A truly human act proceeds from a rational agent who knows what he does and freely chooses to do it. Man is distinguished from beast by his reason. He knows the end of his actions, knows the means and knows the relationship. "To perform human acts we need knowledge and freedom of choice so that 'it is in our power to do or not to do, and to act in this way or in that, and...(to) know the reason why.'"[63] Whenever a man is free to know the consequences of his act and refuses to avail himself of this information, he is considered to be liable for the consequences. Where the person did not realize his ignorance he is, in the Aristotelian system, judged innocent of the consequences.

It is important to note that a choice of alternative actions must be present. Aristotle's summary of his doctrine of choice is given in Ethics, III. iii. 19.

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[62]Lawrence J. Flynn, "The Aristotelian Basis for the Ethics of Speaking," Ethics and Persuasion, ed. R. L. Johannesen (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 116-122.

[63]Flynn, p. 116, from Magna Moralia 1189[b]7.

> As when the object of choice is something
> within our power which after deliberation
> we desire. Choice will be a deliberate
> desire of things in our power; for we
> must first deliberate, then select, and
> finally fix our desire according to the
> result of our deliberation.[64]

Where external forces is used to get the desired action the imputability

of the act to the agent is reduced or entirely removed. A man who is

forced to give his friend's car to a thief at the point of a gun is not

said to have committed a human act. When volition is removed from the

act through some motivating force such as fear, the person cannot be said

to have committed an imputable act.[65]

Another basic tenet in considering the moral worth of a human act

is the degree of habitual behavior it represents.

> The agent must also be in a certain condition
> when he does them (acts): in the first place
> he must have knowledge, secondly, he must choose
> the acts and choose them for their own sakes, and
> thirdly, his action must proceed from a firm, and
> unchangeable character.[66]

The full meaning of this philosophy, according to Grant, cannot be ade-

quately translated from the Greek to contemporary English. We can explain

his meaning, but to get the full concept we have to feel rather than talk

or read. A morally good act that is isolated is given little credit in

Aristotle's system. Rather, it is an act that comes from the stable, set

character of the person who consistently steers himself in that direction.

This final condition is compared to the relationship of the flower to the

seed or the statue to the rough block of marble. The orator who has

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[64] Arthur B. Miller, "Aristotle on Habit and Character: Implica-
tions for Rhetoric," Speech Monographs, 41, 4, 312.

[65] Flynn, p. 117.

[66] Grant, p. 119, Magna Moralia, 1195[a]17.

achieved this state has answered his questions about ethics and set his sights firmly on the truth in topics such as virtue. His actions will consistently reflect this deep commitment to values.[67]

Nor does Aristotle leave any room for misconceptions on the cirtuous choices his subjects are to make. First of all, we must realize the one key premise in Aristotle's thinking on ethics is, "Man functions in society--the political community--as a political animal."[68] Next, "Early in the Ethics Aristotle asserts that '...the good of man must be the end of the science of politics.'" (Ethics I ii 8) "' This good relates, of course, to that of the nation or state and equates with happiness--the end at which all actions aim.'" (Ethics I. vii. 8)[69] How does one obtain happiness within the context of the polis? Aristotle states that:

> ...the Good (happiness) of man is the active
> exercise of the soul's faculties in conformity
> with excellence or virtue, or if there be
> several human excellences or virtues, in con-
> formity with the best and most perfect among
> them. (Ethics I. vii. 15).[70]

Thus, within the polis, a person's virtuous actions will aim at happiness. There is certainly opinion expressed here that what is for the good of the state or society as a whole is the same as the good or happiness of the individual.

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[67]Grant, pp. 240-243.

[68]Miller, p. 310.

[69]Miller, p. 311.

[70]Miller, p. 311.

Doctrine of the Mean

The individual is still confronted with choices to make among the virtues enumerated by Aristotle. How is he to suit his actions to make the most prudent choices from those alternatives available to him? Here is found Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. Aristotle does not in any way diminish the difficulty inherent in choosing the mid-point between two extreme courses of action. There are three guidelines to aid one in finding that mid-point.

> To aim at the mean we should use three pre-
> cautionary rules:
>
> 1. Avoid the extreme most opposed to the mean
>   --take the least of the evils.
> 2. Notice errors in which we are most prone--
>   steer wide of our own errors. (Our own
>   errors are discovered by observing our own
>   pleasure or pain.)
> 3. Must be on guard against what is pleasant
>   and against pleasure. (Ethics II. ix 3-6.)[71]

Miller closes his discussion of the ethical views of Aristotle with this observation:

> ...one may observe that man, the political animal,
> is to strive to live virtuously in the polis by
> aiming at the mean, that is, at perfection. If
> he lives by the mean he commits neither deficiency
> nor excess; that is, he lives according to moral
> virtue, and, combining that with experience, he
> makes prudent decisions. Therefore, prudence is
> the virtue of deliberation, and the prudent man,
> after deliberating (calculating), selects courses
> of action, then he consciously desires them. Such
> courses of action repeated until well engrained
> become states or depositions. It is thus that
> habitual behavior or ethos is indicative of a
> man's character or eethos.[72]

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[71] Miller, p. 312.

[72] Miller, p. 313.

From this discussion it is evident why the "ethos" as conceived by Aristotle can be the most powerful form of persuasion available.

Application of Aristotelian Concept of Ethos to Rhetoric

When Aristotle applies the actions of this ethical person to rhetoric he recognizes three components. First, the object of the act; second, the intent of the agent; third, the circumstances.[73]

First, the moral object of a human act is the quality that gives it a name or puts it in a class such as murder, theft, or charity donations. The object is that in which the act naturally culminates or terminates. It is a goal that man's freedom of choice gives him the opportunity to plan for himself.

When we think of the agent's intent, we are talking of his purpose, aim or motive in taking some action. Here is the classical concept that sees men always acting with good intent. Even when the choice is evil, men are acting from what they consider a good intent, "For mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good."[74] Aristotle requires an evil intent as an essential condition for a morally evil act. It makes no difference whether this intent is directly tied to the object of the act or more removed, as an ulterior motive. If the purpose is evil, the entire act is morally evil. Conversely, to have an act be morally good it is essential that there be a morally good motive for "all virtue implies deliberate choice...(that) makes a man choose everything for the sake of some end...which is the noble."[75]

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[73] Flynn, p. 117.

[74] Flynn, p. 120 (Aristotle's _Politica_, 1252[a]2.)

[75] Flynn, p. 121 (_Ethica Eudemia_, 1230[a]27-29).

In discussing what are to be considered virtuous intents, we have already explored the "doctrine of the mean." There is another concept in Aristotle that is particularly interesting in light of later observations of a correlative nature made by others.

> ...some (actions or passions) have names that already imply badness, e.g., spite, shamelessness, envy, and in the case of actions, adultery, theft, murder; for all of these and suchlike things imply by their names that they are themselves bad...Nor does goodness or badness...depend on committing adultery with the right woman at the right time, and in the right way, but simply to do any of them is to go wrong...however they are done they are wrong.[76]

Here Aristotle makes it clear that he repudiates the notion that the end can justify the means. Under no circumstances will the ethical person employ anything less than ethical means to reach his object.

> It is not according to man's nature as a free deliberate agent to do evil for the sake of good. We have seen, moreover, that certain objects are evil in themselves, such as murder, theft and adultery. These and others cannot be whitewashed by good intentions, "because however they are done they are wrong." (Nichomachean Ethics 1107[a]24) Since laws bind by nature or by precept (the former of which man will know instinc-tively: for there is a natural and universal notion of right and wrong; (De Rhetorica 1373[b]6.) the latter we will learn from social contact) he should know right from wrong. Besides, a just man does just, noble and temperate deeds (Nicho-machean Ethics, 1105[b]5-12) so that human good turns out to be activity of the soul in accord-ance with virtue. (Nichomachean Ethics, 1098[a]15)[77]

The question of circumstances involves all of the other acci-dental determinants accompanying a human act without which an act would

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[76]Flynn, p. 119 (Nichomachean Ethics, 1107[a]10-25).

[77]Flynn, p. 122.

not exist but which in some ways add certain morality other than that derived from the object and the intent. The circumstances included here are: who? what? where? why? when? and how? If John Brown were to commit a felony as a private citizen it would not be as bad as if he were to commit the same felony while serving as a Senator in the United States Congress. Again, Richard Nixon committing his Watergate indiscretions had the criminality of his actions intensified by the fact that he was the President of the United States at the time of the incident.

To summarize briefly, then, Aristotle took his ethical person who had developed a habitually virtuous character through repeated deliberate choice of the moderate course of action, and placed him in a position of interaction with his environment. Here he is held responsible for the object of his actions, his intent and the means he employs to attain his ends. Independent circumstances surrounding the event alone could alter the intensity of the moral imputations given to the act.

Ethos as Viewed in De Rhetorica

The first consideration here is to fix the degree of importance assigned to ethos in De Rhetorica. Next, the three aspects of ethos in the speaker will be analyzed and this will be followed with recommendations found in De Rhetorica for acquiring these attributes in the eyes of the audience.

The high character of the speaker is of paramount importance in subjects that do not allow absolute certainty in their resolution. When a decision could go either way the high moral character of the speaker

can in itself influence the audience to accept his position over his opponent's. The other modes of proof, pathos and logos, are also referred to in the following passage:

> The proofs provided through the instrumentality
> of the speech are of three kinds, consisting
> either in the moral character of the speaker,
> or in the production of a certain disposition
> in the audience or in the speech itself by
> means of real or apparent demonstration. The
> instrument of proof is the moral character,
> when the delivery of the speech is such as
> to produce an impression of the speaker's
> credibility; for we yield a more complete
> and ready credence to persons of high charac-
> ter not only ordinarily and in a general way,
> but in such matters as do not admit of abso-
> lute certainty but necessarily leave room for
> difference of opinion, without any qualifica-
> tion whatsoever.[78]

Unlike many others, Aristotle specifies that the impression of the ethos of the speaker be derived totally from the speech content itself, and not from preconceived ideas of character the audience may have about the speaker. Certainly this is an ideal that can seldom be attained. The speaker is identified in some way in the minds of the listeners and this identification is certain to affect their judgement of him and his message. However, when we remember Aristotle's views on virtue and morality, and apply them to the rhetorical scene, the moral rhetorician is going to consistently display that quality through con- sistently moral choices of topics, arguments, goals and maxims. These are all part of the speech and if not evident would indicate a lack of nobility in the speaker. When this noble nature is consistently mani- fested throughout the speech we have a highly effective mode of proof.

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[78]Aristotle, The Rhetoric of Aristotle, trans. J. E. C. Welldon (London and New York: Macmillan and Company, 1886), pp. 10-12.

> (It is requisite, however, that this result
> should itself be attained by means of the
> speech and not of any antecedent concept of
> the speaker's character.) For so far from not
> following the example of some authors of rhet-
> orical handbooks, who in their art regard the
> high character of the speaker as not being
> itself in any sense contributory to his per-
> suasiveness, we may practically lay it down
> as a general rule that there is no proof so
> effective as that of the character.[79]

There can be no doubt about the importance of ethos in speech from Ari-
stotle's point of view. The question next arises of just how is this
moral character to be manifested in the speech body.

> He holds that there are three sources of
> personal credibility in orators: "or in
> other words there are three things, apart
> from demonstrative proofs, which inspire
> belief, viz., sagacity, high character
> and good will."[80]

To demonstrate what is involved in establishment of a high moral
character and sagacity in the eyes of the audience, the discussion turns
to the various virtues. As we have pointed out, Aristotle defines eighteen
distinct virtues and proposes his doctrine of the mean. Since this is a
practical application of the theory, reference is made to the delight felt
by the audience when the speaker cites a particular quality everyone agrees
is to be most desired and is assuredly a sign of good and high character.
This can be done through the use of maxims.

> A maxim is a declaration, not however relating
> to particulars, as ..., e.g., to the character
> of Iphicrates, but to universals; nor yet again
> to all universals indiscriminately, as, e.g.,

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[79]Aristotle, p. 12.

[80]Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism (New York:
The Ronald Press Company, 1948), p. 384.

> that straight is the opposite of crooked,
> but to all such as are the objects of human
> action and are to be chosen or eschewed in
> that regard.[81]

Aristotle gives several examples of the pleasure given an audience when

the speaker chooses a maxim involving something with which they are all

familiar. To strengthen his ethical appeal these maxims will assume a

moral tone.

> It is proper, therefore, to conjecture what
> are the manner and character of their pre-
> possessions, and, having done so, to put
> forward a general statement in regard to
> them. This is one advantage of the use of
> maxims, but there is another which is more
> important, as they impart an ethical charac-
> ter to our speeches. A speech is ethical if
> its moral purpose is apparent. But this is
> the invariable effect of maxims; for a speaker
> who gives utterance to a maxim makes a state-
> ment in general terms about the subject of his
> moral predilection, and hence, if the maxims
> are virtuous, they give the appearance of a
> virtuous character to the speaker.[82]

The older or more mature speaker is more effective in his use of

maxims. With age comes prudence and prudence is needed in making judicious

determination of the mean through the use of the three precautionary rules

cited earlier in the chapter.

> The prudent man will avoid excess and deficiency
> by habitually taking the foregoing precautions.
> ...Aristotle does not consider prudence a quality
> of the young. Therefore, a young person has diffi-
> culty in the area of ethical proof with an older
> audience. The greater the age difference, the
> greater the difficulty.[83]

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[81]Aristotle, p. 184.

[82]Aristotle, pp. 180-190.

[83]Miller, p. 312.

There are also indications that the use of maxims is simply unbecoming

for a younger person, even without the foregoing considerations.

> The use of maxims is suitable to elderly men, and
> in regard to subjects with which one is conversant;
> for sentiousness, like story-telling, is unbecoming
> in a younger man; while in regard to subjects with
> which one is not conversant, it is stupid and shows
> want of culture. It is token enough of this that
> rustics are the greatest coiners of maxims, and the
> readiest to set forth their views.[84]

The discussion of methods used in rhetoric to convey the feeling

of good will to the audience is extensive, implicit, and remarkably modern

in concept. Kenneth Burke's identification, the Heider balance theory and

others seem to be echoes of these early descriptions.

> They are friends, then, for whom the same things
> are good and evil, and who are friends and enemies
> of the same people; for they must need have the same
> wishes; and so, one who wishes for another just what
> he wishes for himself, appears to be that person's
> friend. Men like, too, those who have done good to
> themselves, or to those for whom they care;--whether
> such benefits were great, or zealously done, or done
> at such and such moment, and for the recipient's
> sake.[85]

The qualities of friendship are then enumerated in great detail. Ari-

stotle has analyzed the human conception of what is pleasant in another

person in a most thought-provoking manner. The speaker wherever possible

should employ these methods to assure his listeners that he has their best

interests at heart. All the indications of sagacity and character are

useless if the recipients are left in doubt about the attitude of the

speaker toward their best interests. The speaker should in no way pose

himself or his actions as a threat to the listener's well-being. Rather

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[84]Aristotle, The Rhetoric of Aristotle, trans. R. C. Jebb (Cambridge, England: The University Press), II, iv, 32 (1382a).

[85]Aristotle, Jebb trans., II, iv, 1(1381a).

he should identify himself with their interests and desires and show how their goals naturally coincide with each other.[86]

Conclusion

This section concerning Aristotle has traced his ethical orientation in the habitually moral character of the individual which follows the doctrine of the means in exhibiting his virtuous behavior. This person will have a moral goal and means of obtaining that goal. If either of these is not strictly virtuous in nature the act cannot be called morally and ethically demanding of approval. When these concepts are applied to rhetoric, Aristotle is practical in realizing the effectiveness of the speaker is going to be limited or enhanced by audience perception of him as an ethical person. The proper use of maxims and choice of topics should demonstrate intelligence and character, but without good will these attributes will be lost in the rhetorical situation. To establish this good will a bond of friendship is described as developing between the speaker and the audience. Although practical attention is given to the means of being perceived as an ethical person, in Aristotle we cannot separate the philosophical orientation of the ethical person from the ethical rhetorician. The rhetorician has special techniques to project his true and good chracter to the audience. Certainly there is nothing in Aristotle's writings to suggest that he seriously entertained any thought of this being a false representation. His insistence on ethos being established throught the body of the speech alone is evidence of his basic assumption that truly ethical behavior, in the Aristotelian

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[86]Aristotle, Jebb trans., II iv, 1(1381a)-32(1382a).

sense, cannot be faked. A statement was made earlier in this study that
Aristotle recognized rhetoric was amoral. If this be true, certainly
the statement could not be carried over into his concept of the practice
of rhetoric or to the qualities of the rhetorician.

Isocrates

Isocrates founded his school of rhetorical training ten to twenty
years after Plato made his famous attacks on the sophists in Protagoras
and Gorgias. Aristotle came even later and is not directly referred to in
Isocrates' writings. Isocrates is discussed here to give the alternate
rhetorical theories of ethos developed in opposition to the Platonic system.
Isocrates criticized his former master, Gorgias, in the area of ethics
quite as severely as he did Plato. This coupled with definite Socratic
influences place Isocrates in a definite niche of his own in rhetorical
theory. There are some indications that Isocrates had some association
with Socrates and was highly regarded by him.[87]

This discussion will begin with Isocrates' concept of the true
meaning of philosophy. This will be followed with a brief look at his
attitude toward the lesser socratics and the members of the Platonic
school. After thus showing his rationale for choosing what has been
called "the middle course," the major concepts of Isocrates philosophy
will be discussed. Two primary concepts can be easily identified here.
The first is philosophy will provide a goal and that goal will be vir-
tuous and noble. Secondly, philosophy is the salvation of the state and
most primarily of the Athenian state.

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[87]Werner Jaeger, "The Rhetoric of Isocrates and Its Cultural Ideal,"
The Province of Rhetoric, ed., Joseph Schwartz and John A. Rycenga (New
York: The Ronald Press Company, 1965), p. 89, footnote.

Isocrates developed a philosophy that was above all practical and put it to work in his school. To assess his concept of ethos it is necessary to look at his concept of education. Talent or natural endowment, its value relative to education, and the value of education to the individual will be explained from Isocrates' point of view. Finally, Isocrates has some unique observations to make on audience evaluation and how best to adapt to the orientation of the masses of the people.

The Philosophy of Isocrates

In defining Isocrates' concept of philosophy, we should first consider the label given him by the moderns and then look at his own conception of the meaning of the word. Jaeger mentioned that Isocrates is the father of "humanistic culture."

> Historically, it is perfectly correct to describe him (in the phrase used on the title-page of several modern books) as the father of "humanistic culture"--inasmuch as the sophists really cannot claim that title, and from our own pedagogic methods and ideals a direct line runs back to him, as it does to Quintilian and Plutarch.[88]

Isocrates, in his conception of the meaning of terms, attached different values to philosophy and sophism than those with which we are familiar.

> ...but he preferred to apply the title "sophist" only to theoristis, whatever their special interests might be. He used it, among others, for Socrates and his pupils, who had done so much to discredit the name. His own ideal he called "philosophy." Thus, he completely inverted the meanings given by Plato to the two words.[89]

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[88]Jaeger, p. 84.

[89]Jaeger, p. 88.

Norlin has a slightly different interpretation of the distinction made
by Isocrates in the meanings of the two terms.

> In the "Antidosis," especially, Isocrates terms
> his culture a "philosophy" and himself a "philo-
> sopher." He does not disclaim the title "sophist,"
> but seems to prefer the other as more descriptive
> of his work. The appropriation of this term has
> been imputed to him for arrogance, as if he wished
> to set himself up as a Plato or Aristotle. How-
> ever, the word has at this time no definite asso-
> ciation with speculative or abstract thought,
> signifying only a lover of wisdom or a seeker
> after the cultivated life, and is in fact more
> general and modest than the honorable title of
> sophist which the sham pretenders who called
> themselves sophists were only just beginning
> to make invidious. Indeed, the use of this
> term by Isocrates may be nothing more than a
> protest against the preposterous claims made
> by certain sophists for the omnipotence of
> their instruction.[90]

During our analysis of the works of Gorgias, some of the sentiments
of Isocrates were cited as instances of current opinion regarding philo-
sophies and the practice of false dialectic among the sophistic teachers.

> Here his criticism is centered upon two classes
> of sophists, the Eristics, who devoted themselves
> to theorizing in the field of ethics, and the
> sophists of the rhetorical school, who taught
> oratory as an instrument of practical success.
> Of these latter he singles out, finally, for
> special rebuke the authors of "the so-called
> arts (of oratory).
>
> Both classes are called to account because of
> their impossible pretensions; the former for
> professing to teach an exact science of happy
> and successful living and then indulging in
> captious logomachies which have no relation
> to life; the latter for professing to teach
> the science or art of oratory as if it could
> be acquired by anyone by rote, regardless of

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[90]George Norlin, Trans., Isocrates, Vol. I (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1928, reprint, 1966), introduction, p. xxv.

native ability or practical experience, as one
learns the letters of the alphabet. Furthermore,
the authors of the "arts" might have devoted
themselves to a worthy oratory whose end is
justice, whereas in fact, they emphasized only
forensic skill, whose object is to defeat
justice.[91]

Isocrates' well-known translator, George Norlin, never specifi-
cally includes the teachings of Plato in those so vigorously attacked by
Isocrates. Werner Jaeger, on the other hand, sees much in the writings
of Isocrates indicating the strong disapproval he entertained for the
type of abstract reasoning being developed in the Platonic school. There
is also some indication that Isocrates, along with many of his contemp-
oraries, found little to distinguish the "dialectic" of Plato from the
"eristic" of the other sophists. Both were completely repugnant to
Iscorates—perhaps useful as a gymnastic exercise for the mind, but
nothing more.

Now is it possible, he asks, to put any trust in
their yearnings for truth, when they themselves
arouse so many false hopes? Isocrates names no
names, but every word of his polemic is aimed
straight at Socrates, whom here and elsewhere he
contemptuously calls disputer. In Protagoras and
Gorgias Plato had presented dialectic as an art
far superior to the long winded orations of rhetori-
cians. His opponent makes short work of dialectic:
he couples it with eristic—namely, argument for
argument's sake....No wonder then that Isocrates
does not see dialectic in the same favorable light
as the socratics, who thought it was a perfect
panacea for all spiritual ills. The infallible
knowledge of values which they promise as a result
of their teaching must appear to ordinary reasonable
people to be something too great for mankind to
attain. ("Against the Sophists," 2).[92]

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[91]Norlin, trans., into., "Against the Sophists," pp. 160-161.

[92]Jaeger, p. 96.

Jaeger makes a case for the subject of much of the attack against his
contemporaries being aimed at the Socratics and their most notable
exponent, Plato. He points to the fact that Isocrates has gathered
together all the features that made Platonism repulsive to ordinary
common sense. The method of controversy by question-answer, the almost
mythical importance attached to "knowledge of true values" as a special
organ of reason, the intellectualism that holds that knowledge is the
cure for everything, and the supernatural enthusiasm that imparts
"blessedness" to the philosopher.[93]

> Plato and the Socratics are among the foremost of
> the opponents whom Isocrates attacks, and since
> he attacks them with special violence and com-
> pleteness, it is clear that he fully understands
> the danger that threatens his ideal from their
> teaching. His invective is entirely realistic.
> He never makes it a theoretical refutation of
> his opponent's position, for he knows that if
> he did he would lose his case. The terrain he
> chooses is that of ordinary common sense. He
> appeals to the instincts of the man in the
> street—who, without comprehending the philo-
> sopher's technical secrets, sees that those who
> would lead their followers to wisdom and happi-
> ness have nothing themselves and get nothing
> from their students.[94]

According to Jaeger's interpretation, the second type attacked by
Isocrates includes those who teach their craft without any sense of moral
responsibility. A third group included those who taught nothing but for-
ensic oratory through patterns of speech making and abstract forms, learned
by rote to be called into play when needed. Because of the subjects used
the topics could only be trifling and the techniques useless.

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[93]Jaeger, p. 86.

[94]Jaeger, p. 99.

In finding his own solution to the problem, Isocrates attempts to take the middle road. Somewhere between the completely amoral quibbling of the Eristic discourse and the abstract realm of Plato's "Ideas," he forged a rhetoric pointed toward a moral, noble and completely practical goal.

Primary Philosophical Principles of Isocrates

It has already been mentioned that Isocrates was influenced by the Socratic movement for moral reform of rhetoric. Jaeger points out that he does not reject the doctrine of Ideas. "In fact, his writings show that he largely adopted that doctrine." (Plato's).[95] Jaeger goes on to point out that Isocrates felt rhetoric was the answer to bringing the abstract idealism of Plato into the real world. The goals to be found in philosophy were those that would lead to a successful life style in the society or polis of Athens. The nature of the person who has achieved the heights of the Isocraten philosophy of practical ethics is described in this passage:

> First, those who manage well the circumstances
> which they encounter day by day;...next, those who
> are decent and honorable in their intercourse with
> all with whom they associate; furthermore, those who
> hold their pleasures always under control and are
> not unduly overcome by misfortune;...fourthly, and
> most important of all, those who are not spoiled by
> successes and do not desert their true selves and
> become arrogant...Those which have a character
> which is in accord, not with one of these things,
> but with all of them--these I contend, are wise and
> complete men, possessed of all the virtues.[96]

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[95]Jaeger, p. 102.

[96]Isocrates, "Panthenaicus," Isocrates, Vol. II, trans., George Norlin (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1929, reprint, 1962) 30-33, pp. 392-393.

In Isocrates' view the wise man would be a virtuous man. Just as the signs of virtue were completely practical, so were the reasons for assuming such traits.

> ...nothing in the world can contribute so much
> to material gain, to good repute, to right action,
> in a word, to happiness, as virtue and the qualities
> of virtue. For it is by the good qualities that we
> have in our souls that we acquire also the other
> advantages of which we stand in need.[97]

After pointing to the fact that the good qualities of our souls are responsible for fulfilling our other needs, Isocrates continues in the same vein--expressing wonder that anyone should seriously believe there could be any other motive for virtuous actions than self-interest.

> But I marvel if anyone thinks that those who prac-
> tice piety and justice remain constant and stead-
> fast in these virtues because they expect to be
> worse off than the wicked and not because they
> consider that both among gods and among men they
> will have the advantage over others. I, for my
> part, am persuaded that they and they alone gain
> advantage in the true sense while the others
> gain advantage only in the baser sense of that
> term. For I observe that those who prefer the
> way of injustice, thinking it the greatest good
> fortune to seize something that belongs to others,
> are in like case with animals which are lured by
> a bait, at the first deriving pleasure from what
> they seize, but the moment after finding themselves
> in desparate straits while those who live a life of
> piety and justice pass their days in security for
> the present and have sweeter hopes for all eternity.[98]

A primary concern of Isocrates was his theory that philosophy was the salvation of the state. He realized the futility of the endless wars among the Greek City States and that their only defense from ultimate

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[97] Isocrates, "On the Peace," 28 29, p. 26.

[98] Isocrates, "On the Peace," 30-34, pp. 27-28.

defeat by foreign barbarians lay in unity. As Gorgias had done before him, he called for a cessation of inner hostilities and common purpose for all Greek States--the Hellenes--in their efforts to remain free. In this cause Isocrates saw a high moral purpose and goal for his education in discourse. The topics would be lofty, the prose in a style closer to poetry than to the practice of the forensic orator, and the benefits would go to Athens and to the newly trained statesmen of his school who were expounding these principles.

> But I urge and exhort those who are younger and
> more vigorous than I to speak and write the kinds
> of discourses by which they will turn the greatest
> states--those who have been wont to oppress the
> rest--into the paths of virtue and justice, since
> when the affairs of Hellas are in a happy and
> prosperous condition, it follows that the state
> of learning and letters is greatly improved.[99]

Jaeger points to the fact that in Isocrates the teachings of rhetoric became naturalized--part of the Athenian life style.[100] The dialogues of Plato and the attitude of the times gave respect to the great learning the sophists had in their own fields. However, they were foreigners to Athens, to the problems of Athens and to the easy refinement of the Athenian life style. Isocrates, the Ahtenian sophist, changed this and made himself and his art typically local in nature. "Isocrates' rhetorical teaching emerged as part of the great postwar educational movement of Athens, into which all the efforts of his day to reform and rejuvenate the Athenian state were inevitably destined to flow."[101]

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[99]Isocrates, "On the Peace," 145, p. 97. (A footnote by Norlin to the above states, "The state of affairs and the state of learning are not disassociated in his mind; philosophy is the salvation of the state.)

[100]Jaeger, p. 89.

[101]Jaeger, p. 90.

The common national purpose needed to save Greece was equated with true

statesmanship that saw the necessity of eradicating corruption and the

cause of corruption--"the poisonous mutual hatreds of the separate states

and parties."[102]

> But Isocrates did not, like the Platonic Socrates,
> believe that the sorely needed reformation could be
> achieved by the creation of a new moral world, a
> state as it were within each man's soul. He held
> that the "nation," the idea of Greece, was the
> point round which the new elements in the spiri-
> tual renaissance were to crystalize.[103]

Educational Theories of Isocrates

These philsophical goals were to be reached through Isocrates'

system of education incorporated into his school. We have only a broad

sketch of his ideas on education, but some fundamental ideas do stand out.

Elementary education had no serious fault as it stood. The study of eri-

stic disputations served as good gymnastic exercises for the mind if not

carried too far. Higher education should be devoted to more serious

studies.

> What, then, is the nature of higher education? It
> consists, says Isocrates, in the cultivation of the
> art of discourse...discourse is both the outward and
> inward thought; it is not merely the form of expres-
> sion, but reason, feeling and imagination as well;
> it is that by which we persuade others and by which
> we persuade ourselves; it is that by which we direct
> public affairs and by which we set our own house in
> order; it is, in fine, that endowment of our human
> nature which raises us above mere animality and
> enables us to live the civilized life.[104]

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[102] Jaeger, p. 91.

[103] Jaeger, p. 92.

[104] Norlin, trans., _Isocrates_, I, intro, p. xxiii.

Isocrates becomes quite eloquent in his evaluation of the importance of discourse to the human estate. Both outward and inward speech are necessary for the establishment and the maintenance of civilized life. It is necessary for the education of the ignorant, to persuade people on the best course of action and to debate subjects in our own minds.

> ...for the power to speak well is taken as the surest index of a sound understanding, and discourse which is true and lawful and just is the outward image of a good and faithful soul...And, if there is need to speak in brief summary of this power, we shall find that none of the things which are done with intelligence take place without the help of speech, but that in all our actions as well as in all our thoughts, speech is our guide, and is most employed by those who have the most wisdom.[105]

Just how education in his school is to carry discourse in a direction to better meet these goals is discussed in the introduction by Norlin. Isocrates complains that rhetoric has been too limited in its scope. Largely confined to the courtroom, there has been no consideration given to great causes and to large ideas.

> He himself chose, he says, to write discourses which were Hellenic in their breadth, dealing with the relation of states, and appropriate to be spoken at the pan-Hellenic assemblies; akin more to the literature that is composed in rhythm and set to music than to forensic oratory...And it is oratory on this high plane, distinguished by breadth and view and nobleness of tone, by literary finish and charm, and by permanence of interest and value, which he proposes to cultivate in his students. They are to be led by their desire for praise and honor not to support causes which are unjust or petty, but those which are great and honorable, devoted to the general good and welfare of mankind.[106]

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[105]Isocrates, "Antidosis," 255-257, Vol. II, pp. 328-329.

[106]Norlin, trans., Isocrates, I. intro., p. xxiv.

Isocrates in no way claims for his education the power to endow every man who comes to him with the powers to speak and think as described. Nor does he claim that through his education the correct answers will come to mind in every situation.

> For since it is not in the nature of man to
> attain a science by the possession of which
> we can know positively what we should do or
> what we should say, in the next resort I hold
> that man to be wise who is able by his powers
> of conjecture to arrive generally at the best
> course and I hold that man to be a philosopher
> who occupies himself with studies for which he
> will most quickly gain that kind of insight.[107]

Of the three attributes contributing to the success of a rhetorician, native ability, practice and education, Isocrates places ability first and education last. He admits that there is no education that can make a depraved nature noble, just as there is no education that can completely compensate for a complete lack of talent in the pupil.

> He himself, at any rate, admits that formal
> training plays a minor part in the making of
> a successful man: first and most important
> is native ability; next is practice and experi-
> ence, and last is education; and no education
> amounts to anything which does not involve
> hard work on the part of the student himself.[108]

For those who go through the rigors of this hard work but do not possess the talent to be highly successful in discourse, there are still rewards. The "effort they make to write and speak on such themes will tend to liberate their minds from mean and selfish interests and so to enoble their moral natures.[109]

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[107]Norlin, intro., I, pp. xxvii-xxviii.

[108]Norlin, p. xxvii.

[109]Norlin, p. vviv.

> Isocrates prides himself more upon the sound
> moral influence of his work and teaching than
> upon any other thing. The primary object of
> his instruction is right conduct in the man
> and in the citizen. Indeed, there are times
> when he seems to think of his influence
> expressing itself more worthily in action
> than in speech. He says in the "Panathen-
> aicus" that he took greater pleasure in those
> of his students who were respected for the
> character of their lives and deeds than in
> those who were reputed to be able speakers.[110]

Isocrates on Audience Analysis

Isocrates could never be labelled an idealist when it came to his

assessment of the true natures of men. He did not share the Platonic

ideal that no man would knowingly do a wrong act. He accepts the fact

that few men will seek to do right even when given the opportunity to

know right from wrong.

> ...they choose for their associates those who share
> in, and not those who dissuade them from their faults.
> ...people prefer to occupy themselves with each
> other's follies rather than with the admonitions
> of their teachers...if we are willing to survey
> human nature as a whole, we shall find that the
> majority of men do not take pleasure in the food
> that is most wholesome, nor in the pursuits that
> are the most honorable, nor in the actions that
> are the noblest, nor in the creatures that are
> the most useful, but that they have tastes that
> are in every way contrary to their best interests,
> while they view those who have some regard for their
> duty as men of austere and laborious lives.[111]

When giving advice on the treatment of an audience composed of such beings,

Isocrates is realistic in pointing out it does no good to tell them what is

for their best interests--for they will not listen. He admits that all men

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[110] Norlin, p. xxv.

[111] Isocrates, "To Nicocles," 43-49, I 68-69.

are not so difficult to approach as the ones described, but realistically

we must accept the fact that this is the estate of many audiences.

> This much, however, is clear, that those who aim
> to write anything in verse or prose which will
> make a popular appeal should seek out, not in the
> most profitable discourses, but those which most
> abound in fictions; for the ear delights in these
> just as the eye delights in games and contests...
> With such models, then, before us, it is evident
> that those who desire to command the attention
> of their hearers must abstain from admonitions
> and advice, and must say the kinds of things
> which they see are most pleasing to the crowd.[112]

Conclusion

Looking at the influence of these men of ancient Greece from a

distance of twenty-five hundred years, there is a tendency to distort

their relative importance during their lifetimes. It was the influence

of Protagoras, Gorgias and Isocrates that most molded the rhetoric of the

Greeks. Socrates and Plato were not highly thought of by their contemp-

oraries. It has been postulated that Aristotle's Rhetoric was written as

the outcome of a feud with Isocrates—who was already well established as

a teacher of rhetoric.

> The story says that during his first residence in
> Athens (347-367 B.C.) Aristotle sneered at the ideas
> of Isocrates and the method of their dissemination
> in bundles of speeches hawked by the booksellers.[113]

Certain it is that there must have been some rivalry between the two giants

of Greek rhetoric. Norlin points out that in spite of the fact that Iso-

crates charged a very large fee, he had more students than all of the other

sophists put together.

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[112] Isocrates, "To Nicocles," 49, I 68-69.

[113] W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., and Cleanth Brooks, "The Verbal Medium: Plato and Aristotle," The Province of Rhetoric, ed., J. Schwartz and J. Rycenga (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1965), p. 120.

> Isocrates, says Dionysius, was the most illustrious
> teacher of his time and made his school the "image
> of Athens." The ablest young men of Athens and of
> Hellas came to study under him, and went out from
> his tutelege to become leaders in their various
> fields--oratory, history, and statesmanship.[114]

Plato's efforts to put rhetoric on a higher visionary plane

required the services of an Aristotle to put into effect. While during

their lifetimes Isocrates commanded the greater following, there can be

no doubt but what the movement toward a morally responsible rhetoric

resulted in greater emphasis on this element than would have otherwise

occurred.

> The course (Aristotle's) was a challenge to the pro-
> fessional teachers of speech; more particularly it
> was a gauntlet thrown down before the celebrated
> leader of the Athenian school, Isocrates, who had
> made the art of rhetoric both more elastic and more
> elaborate, and in whose eyes rhetorical education
> was synonymous with liberal education and at the
> same time a passport to a splendid political career.
> ...Aristotle's Rhetoric...breathes the same contempt
> for the fashionable--and presumably often successful
> devices as Plato's own polemic against rhetoric as an
> art of flattery or as the "artificer of persuasion"
> at all costs.[115]

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[114]Norlin, intro., I, xxix.

[115]Friedrich Solmsen, "Notes on Aristotle's Rhetoric," The
Province of Rhetoric, p. 131.

CHAPTER III

THE ROMANS

This chapter will show the developments and adaptations of concepts of ethos in rhetoric made by the Romans. Generally, the Romans believed in man's capability and method for discerning right and wrong, good and evil. If these concepts are rooted entirely in the sensations of each person, then the rhetorician is perfectly free to choose his topics, his arguments, his position on an issue, in the light of the particular situation or audience confronting him. He is free to adapt in any way he feels desirable to the "needs of the moment." If, on the other hand, the theorist has accepted the existence of certain unalterable "Ideas" of right and wrong, of moral constructs of society that are the same for all men for all time, then the orator is obligated to suit his discourse to these concepts. The allowable adaptations for audience acceptance of these ideas is problematical and certainly one of high interest to the speaker. Also, as these theories of man's perception of and relation to his society change and adapt themselves to the different cultures under consideration in this paper, recurrence, alteration or abandonment of early theories and their replacements with new can be identified. One of the primary questions to be answered by this paper is concerned with this philosophical approach to the concept of ethos. Detailed explanations are the only adequate means to answer this question. Anything less would result in incomplete and inconclusive answers. In short, it would defeat the purpose of the paper.

Keeping this in mind, before considering the writings found in the _Ad Herrenium_, the _De Oratore_ of Cicero and the _Institutio De Oratoria_ of Quintilian, the first consideration of this chapter will be to trace the development of two opposing schools of philosophical thought as they developed between the Fifth Century, B.C. and the Fist Century of the Christian Era. Most simply identified as the Stoics and the Skeptics, these two schools of thought influenced the thinking of the Roman rhetoricians in the fields of ethics in rhetoric and the ethos of the speaker.

The _Ad Herrenium_, author unknown, is the first Roman rhetorical work with which we are acquainted. Because of its structured form it has traditionally been associated with the Stoic School. The _Ad Herrenium_ gives precise and, up to this time, unique instructions for projection of ethos under varying circumstances.

Becoming disillusioned after the death of Caesar failed to improve the political climate of Rome, Cicero withdrew for a time and devoted himself to the development of political and rhetorical theory. He used current schools of thought along with what he could learn of Isocrates. _De Oratore_ gives detailed and practical advice for establishment of ethos for the rhetorician.

The last Roman to be included in this study is Quintilian. The discussion will consider the "good man speaking well" concept, the type of education proposed and the ways in which the "good man" projected his ethos or made it felt by the audience.

This will conclude the classical portion of the study. At this point, the questions asked about our concepts of ethos in rhetoric in the classical sources have been answered. These questions are:

1. What value systems provided the bases for the concepts of ethos found in classical rhetoric?

2. What concepts of ethos were set forth by classical rhetoricians?

3. What similarities and differences existed between classical value systems and classical concepts of ethos?

Page references will be given for each concept that is cited in this comparison study. These are found in reference tables included in Chapter VI.

Philosophies of Early Rome

The Greek Academy altered over the years with early philosophies changing, blending and losing the distinct differentiations of their earlier form. With these changes came the development of the Stoic and Skeptic schools of thought on perception.

The Stoic epistemology as developed by Zeno described four degrees of knowledge. This ascending order of validity was used as the basis for the Stoic standard of truth. Beginning with impression, it proceeded to assent, comprehension and finally, science.[1] Epictetus states that, "We must remember clearly that man measures his every action by his impressions." These impressions come to us in four ways:

> ...either things are and seem so to us; or they are not and seem not to be; or they are and seem not; or they are not and yet seem to be.[2]

The further development of Stoic thought embodies the ideal of man's perception of the truth. A bit of Stoic writing by Aulus Gillius, a Latin grammarian, in Nostes Atticae reads:

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[1]Prentice A. Meador, Jr., "Skeptic Theory of Perception: A Philosophical Antecedent of Ciceronian Probability," Quarterly Journal of Speech, LIV (Dec., 1968), p. 341.

[2]Meador, p. 342.

> Impressions by which man's mind is struck
> are at first sight of anything that reaches
> his intellect, and not under his will or con-
> trol, but thrust themselves on the recognition
> of men by a certain force of their own; but the
> assents by which these impressions are recog-
> nized are voluntary and depend on man's control.[3]

Meador explains that if the soul correctly accepts or recognizes the

impulse the external object has been perceived. When this occurs it

is a "cataleptic phantasm" involving immediate certain grasping of the

external object after the sense experience. This is opposed to the

Epicurean "grasping beforehand."

> The soul must assent to an image which is faithful
> to the object it represents if "cataleptic phantasm"
> is to be absolute and moral progress is to take place.
> The mind, passive in the process, receives impressions
> of external objects. Hence, if it immediately grasps
> the true nature of the external world, an absolute
> correlation exists between perception and reality.
> By this means the gulf between the object in
> thought and the object in nature is bridged and
> their coexistensiveness is asserted. The adherence
> of this absolute correlation results in science.[4]

Meador illustrates the relationship of the different levels of

knowledge with different postures of the hand. With the fingers stretched

out and the palm upward there is perce ption. Slightly closed fingers

represent assent and the closed fist is comprehension.

> There is high tension in assent. He who possesses
> the "cataleptic phantasm" truly comprehends in this
> sense. While all men share perceptive abilities,
> only the truly wise man--the one who possesses this
> insight--could know the truth with real assurance.

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[3]Meador, p. 342.

[4]Meador, p. 343.

According to the Stoics, this epistemological
position, when combined with Stoic ethics of
acquiescence, is able to produce the virtuous
man--one free from emotions.[5]

In his refutation of the Stoic position, Arcesilaus of the Academy

agrees sense perception may be the source for human judgement. However,

he firmly denies that such perception could yield "knowledge" and he intro-

duces the formula of suspension of judgement into the Academy.

...subjective limitations prevent reliable recept-
ability of an external object. He argues: The
Stoic doctrine of immediate perception is incon-
sistent. There is no perception that has in itself
the power to recognize truth, and could not possibly
be deceived. Assent to an idea as true is an act of
judgement, and like all judgements cannot rise above
opinion. There can be no experience that bears the
absolute impress of truth. An unerring criterion
must not rest only upon an idea but upon a judge-
ment, and a judgement cannot be a criterion of
truth, for one has no criterion of judgement to
prove that it cannot err. Arcesilaus further
asserts that it is impossible to distinguish
true perceptions from false perceptions.[6]

The culmination of Academic Skepticism is seen in the writings of

Carneades. He used four arguments against the Stoics. The first was that

there are false perceptions. Secondly, these do not give us absolute know-

ledge. Thirdly, there is no difference between a false and true perception

which we can detect. Finally, there is no true perception to which the

false one may be opposed which differs in character.

Carneades maintains that no criterion of truth
is possible through the reasoning powers, because
all the material used by reason comes from experi-
ence through sense perception. Reason does not

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[5]Meador, p. 343.

[6]Meador, p. 343.

begin with anything that is immediately certain;
therefore, every proof presupposes other proofs
for the validity of its premises, which brings
about a regressus in infinitum, and leads to no
definite result.[7]

Even Carneades, however, agrees that there are different degrees
of probability. The first degree is the "probable." This is the realm
of the least degree of probability and belongs to a single idea, one that
stands alone. The next level is the "probable and undisputed." These are
ideas that can be united with other ideas without contradiction. The third
level of probability is labelled the "probable, undisputed and tested." As
the highest system that can be reached it is comprised of a whole system of
connected ideas, all agreeing logically with each other. These observa-
tions are found in Outlines of Pyrrhonism by Sextus Empiricus, translated
by Meador, on pages 227 to 229.

In interpretation level one is adequate for everyday life. This
level cannot be said to stand for knowledge. Association used to increase
probability is important in development of understanding of relationships
to the material world.

Carneades may be the first to realize the importance
of the association of ideas in forming degrees of
probability in perception. It is not in resemblance
of sensations to objects one can find a criterion of
truth, as it is impossible to verify it; neither is
it in the power of the sensation of the senses, for
that cannot be measured. But one can consider the
combination and order of the sensations and produce
the perception. Perception includes a family of
related ideas. In the ordinary circumstances of
life, it is impossible to take all the precautions
and one is content with the first two degrees of
probability.[8]

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[7]Meador, p. 344.

[8]Meador, p. 345.

When the actual content of appeals to the probable is examined there is
found the element, always represented, of what is going to afford light
for practice.   In this realm intellectual illumination is not represented
as speculative curiosity, but as practical application to everyday affairs.

AD HERRENIUM

As the earliest known representative Roman writing on rhetoric,
the Ad Herrenium has long held an honored position in rhetorical theory.
The author is unknown to us and any theories about his motivating philo-
sophy can be only theories.   Ray Nadeau, the translator of the Ad Herrenium
into English, has pointed to the organization of the work as distinctive
from all other known contemporary writings of the period.

> The Ad Herrenium represented Stoic flair for
> detail and classification, and as such, it was
> distinguished from other contemporary schools
> of rhetorical thought: the Attic ideal of
> Calvus, Calidius and Brutus, the Asianism
> of Hortensius, and the eclectic Rhodian of
> Cicero.[9]

The Ad Herrenium is also unique among its contemporaries in its
use of Roman illustrations, the clarity of its approach and the method of
the Greek rhetoricians.

> The method of the Ad Herrenium is that of the
> Greek rhetorician and Hermagoras, but many
> illustrations from Roman history and oratory
> and the clarity of its approach give it a well
> deserved reputation for originality.[10]

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[9]Ray Nadeau, "Rhetorica Ad Herrenium: Commentary and Translation
of Book I," Speech Monographs, Vol. XVI, August, 1949, pp. 57-68.

[10]Nadeau, pp. 57-58.

Since the identity of the author is unknown the consideration of this
work will have to confine itself to the written pages themselves. Here
we find a few general admonitions concerning the general practice of
rhetoric. The subject of the exordium is treated at length and some
suggestions are given for the winning of audience approval during the
narration portion of the speech.

Concepts of Ethos in Ad Herrenium

The author of our study in rhetoric emphasizes, as had Isocrates
before him, the importance of continuous practice in speech. Theory had
to always be adapted to practical application. The first portion of the
book also dealt with the educational qualifications of the orator as well
as his nobility of character.

> The duty of the orator is to be able to speak on
> all questions of civil order which are governed
> by customs or laws, and to conduct himself so as
> to obtain the agreement of the audience insofar
> as possible.[11]

With this efficient dispatch of these two questions, the author
proceeds with the methods to be used in winning the favor of the audience
for the speaker and for the speaker's case. Here the methods seem to over-
lap. To our writer it must seem self-evident that in winning approval for
oneself the feeling is going to carry over to the case being presented.
At the same time, gaining a favorable audience view toward the case being
presented will also result in audience favor for the speaker and other
representations made by the speaker.

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[11]Nadeau, p. 59.

The first consideration for the author is to point out that there are four kinds of cases requiring the use of two kinds of exordium.[12] The four kinds of cases are respectable, shameful, those of doubtful classification, and those of slight importance.

The case is respectable when we defend the righteous or attack the wicked. The case is shameful when you defend a wicked man or prosecute a righteous one. When the case is partially repsectable and partly shameful, it is doubtful and it is of little consequence when an unimportant or trivial matter is considered.

In the case of the respectable it is only necessary to use the simple exordium or introduction. In the matter of the shameful case, the use of the insinuatio is recommended. In the case of the doubtful case, the speaker will try to regain the good will of the audience, and in the case of the trifling case, he will attempt to get attention.

In using the simple opening, it is desirable to achieve the triple objective for an audience of having them amenable, attentive and well-disposed.

> We shall be able to have amenable audiences if we
> carefully explain the basis of our case, and if
> we gain their interest; for he is amenable, who
> consents to listen closely. We shall get atten-
> tion, if we promise to concern ourselves with
> things that are important, new and extraordinary,
> and with things which concern the State, the audi-
> ence, or the worship of the immortal gods. We
> shall also get attention, if we ask for it, and
> if we bring out in proper order the points we
> are going to take up.[13]

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[12]Nadeau, p. 60. The material referred to in this section is taken from Nadeau's translation of the first book of Ad Herrenium and was published in Speech Monogrpahs.

[13]Nadeau, p. 60. Ad Herrenium, Book I, IV.

Winning good feeling or getting the audience well disposed toward us entails the judicious use of four possible courses. The one chosen will depend on the cirucmstances being dealt with. Good feeling is gained by talking about:

> (1) ourselves, if we evaluate our services without arrogance, and if we discuss what we have done for the State, our parents, friends, or even for those who listen to us, provided that all these matters have a bearing on the matter in question. We also win good feelings if we discuss our difficulties, hardships, loneliness and misfortunes. Finally, we gain good feeling if we ask for the help of our hearers and make it clear that only in them are we willing to place our trust.[14]

Sometimes other methods are more easily adopted and suit the type of case better. The author recommends attacking the opponent to gain the same favorable audience reaction achieved through putting ourselves in a favorable light: (talk about)

> (2) our opponents, if we can cause the audience to react against them with hate, envy, and contempt. We shall bring hate upon them, if we mention some infamous deed in their past--some deed in which they acted arrogantly, traitorously, cruelly, presumptuously, maliciously, or perversely. We shall bring envy upon them, if we emphasize their influence, power, the party backing them, their riches, inordinate ambition, nobility, the number of their clients, guests, friends, relatives, and if we show that they put their confidence in these things rather than in the truth. We can make them fall into contempt if we dwell upon their lack of energy, ignorance, bad habits and soft living.[15]

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[14]Ad Herrenium, Book I, V2-14.

[15]Ad Herrenium, Book I, V, 15-33.

The next method for winning the good feelings of the audience involves recounting good things done by them in the past. The case can be aided through clever praise and through heaping abuse on the opposing case.

> (3) the audience, if we recall cases in which their decisions gave evidence of courage, wisdom, mercy, and greatness of soul, and if we make clear the high esteem in which we hold them, and the suspense which awaits their decision. We can also make the hearer feel well-disposed by talking about (4) the case itself, if we bring it forth with clever praise for its merits and cover the case of the opponents with abuse.[16]

When the case we are supporting is something less than honorable, the author of this work recommends use of the Insinuatio. This is the type case where the subject itself turns the hearer against the speaker. This type opening should be used when the listeners seem to already have been won over by the opponents. The third circumstance involves the members of the audience already being bored or tired from the speeches which have preceded ours.

When the case belongs to the shameful class there are five arguments to use:

> (1) It is necessary to have regard for the charge and not the man; (2) or for the man and not the charge; or (3) those things said by the opposition are not pleasing to us and they are unworthy or wicked. Then, after having discussed the gravity of the offense at some length, we shall show that what we have done is nothing quite like it. (4) On other occasions, we shall bring up a decision made by other judges in a similar case, or a less important one, or a more serious one; then, we shall outline our case step by step and show the similarity between the two cases. (5) One can accomplish the same effect by declaring that he will say nothing

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[16]<u>Ad Herrenium</u>, Book I, V, 33-44.

about the opponents or some other matter, and
then actually talking on these subjects by
casually interjecting ideas in the course of
the speech.[17]

The author of this work goes to some length to show the means to
win over the hearer who has already been convinced by the opponent. Among
the different ways listed to "wind one's way into the argument," we find:
Promise to talk first about the argument considered strongest by the oppo-
nent; start with one of the opponent's assertions--maybe the last; be
hesitant, wondering which argument to give preference to and which of
theirs to attack first.

When the audience is tired with attention wandering, the author
of the Ad Herrenium suggests a large repertoire of attention-getting
devices to bring them back to a condition of higher interest;

beginning with something to make them laugh, or even
with an apology, a seemingly true story, an imitation,
an accusation, a play on words, an insinuation, a sus-
picion, a mockery, some foolish allusion, an exaggera-
tion, a summary, or a substitution of letters. It is
especially effective to begin by exciting curiosity,
or by offering a parable, something novel, an anecdote,
or a bit of verse. We might well profit from some kind
of interruption, or a laugh from somebody in the audi-
ence. We might also say beforehand that we are going
to talk along lines other than those we had previously
prepared, and that we are not going to express our
thoughts just like others are in the habit of doing;
and in this last instance, we shall explain in a few
words the difference between their method and ours.[18]

The next purpose of the author is to define five faults of the
exordium to be avoided. First, he mentions the importance of speaking
with a friendly expression without wandering from everyday language. A

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[17]Ad Herrenium, Vol. I, VI, 14-34.

[18]Ad Herrenium, Vol. I, VI, 53-73.

universal type exordium, one that can be applied to many cases, is to be avoided. A general exordium which the opponent can use without alteration is just as bad as a universal one. Even if the wording has to be slightly changed to use the exordium against you, it is still considered a poor choice. Finally, poorly chosen wording, lengthy, unrelated or backward exordiums, called detached, are to be avoided. They do more harm than good.[19]

In the narration portion of the speech, the author goes into techniques used to gain the credibility of the audience. He mentions the importance of letting people imply what went before rather than repeating the obvious to them. He also gives advice on how best to gain credibility.

> Narration will be credible, if we make our language
> conform to usage, general opinion and nature, and
> if we have regard for lapses of time, the dignity
> of individuals, reasons behind decisions and the
> opportunities offered by certain places.[20]

In conclusion, there is little to distinguish this author in the area of ethos from some of his Greek predecessors other than his organization and the introduction of the concept of insinuatio. What he has given us is a very readable, tightly organized system of rhetoric that shows the primary importance to the system of various methods for establishing and maintaining ethos for the speaker and good will and credibility from the audience.

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[19] Nadeau, p. 62.

[20] Nadeau, p. 63.

CICERO

Traditionally Cicero was thought to be the author of the Ad Herrenium. In recent years it has been determined that this is not so. Although there are certain similarities between De Inventione of Cicero and Ad Herrenium, the differences are even more significant. It is now thought that the two probably had a common origin stemming from two different teachers who were educated in the same school but who chose to interpret the teachings in a different way.[21]

This section will first be concerned with Cicero's concept of probability. Rhetorical theories of ethos and ethics, virtue and education will next be discussed. Cicero also gives applications of these principles in actual rhetorical practice.

Cicero's Philosophy of Probability

Earlier in this chapter an explanation was given of Stoic and Skeptic philosophy as it manifested itself during Cicero's early years. We have seen how the arrangement and classification of the Ad Herrenium led some to the belief that the author was probably Stoic in his orientation. Cicero commits himself to relative or approximate knowledge. He expresses his belief that while he does not hold that nothing is true, still he realizes that humans cannot perceive that which is true and that which is not true. Cicero adopted the Carneadean theory that there is no way to distinguish a true sensation from a false one. For all practical theories man must operate under assumed propositions of probability because he has no way of ascertaining absolute knowledge.

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[21]Rhetorica Ad Herrenium, trans., intro.

> While he does not deny the existence of absolute
> knowledge, he does maintain man cannot know it.
> For Cicero, the nature of man's perception is
> fallible. Put another way, Cicero's philosophical
> theory of probability is the pragmatic realization
> man can conduct his affairs without absolute know-
> ledge as long as he utilizes probability.[22]

Cicero was a student of Philo and there is evidence that the degree of

probability attributed to Carneades was the basis for the concepts of

truths or accepted probabilities of truth adopted by Cicero. These con-

cepts of probability carried over into his rheorical theories of argu-

mentation and of ethos.

Probability as it Concerns Ethos in Rhetoric

That this doctrine of probability carried over into rhetoric

cannot be in the least doubted. We have seen the establishment of definite

degrees of truth or accepted truth in the discussion of Carneades' degrees

of probability. When the orator is preparing his arguments this relative

degree of certainty attainable on certain issues must be kept in mind.

> For the actual process of division, and those of
> defining and distinguishing the two different
> meanings of an ambiguous statement, and knowing
> topics of arguments and bringing the actual pro-
> cess of argument to a conclusion, and discerning
> what things are to be assumed in a line of argu-
> ment and what consequence follows from these
> assumptions, and distinguishing and differen-
> tiating true from false and probably from
> untrustworthy statements or censuring bad
> assumptions or bad conclusions, and treating
> the same topics either with close analysis,
> as do those who are termed dialecticians, or
> with braod exposition, as befits an orator,

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[22]Prentice A. Meador, Jr., "Skeptic Theory of Perception: A
Philosophical Antecedent of Ciceronian Probability," Quarterly Journal
of Speech, Vol. LIV, Dec., 1968, p. 345.

> all come under the exercises mentioned and
> are part of the science of subtle disputation
> and copious oratory.[23]

According to this system, man cannot always indicate a consistent, immutable visible connection between two ideas to demonstrate their basic agreement or disagreement. "So man, in the Ciceronian system, admits propositions as true upon arguments or proofs that are found to persuade him to receive it as true, without certain knowledge that it is so. Rhetoric is the instrument of such a process; having no infallible sign of truth, the wise man avails himself of probabilities."[24]

Cicero's concept of rhetoric as an art is also of interest in attempting to get an overall picture of his total rhetorical concept of ethos. In the discussion of rhetoric as an art in De Oratore the fact that since oratory is suited to the common understanding of the people and since this varies from time to time and place to place, there can be no exact science or art of oratory. The Ciceronian explanation of this is that "rheorical principles lack universality because the rhetorical act is situationally conditioned. Rhetoric, in general, may be considered an art because it is capable of abstracting and systematizing the practices of effective orators. Nonetheless, rhetorical precepts are limited in their application, and thus lack absolute and universal certainty."[25]

One of the primary points of interest in the preceding chapter was the interpretation of the quality of virtue by various rhetoricians. Cicero had a distinctive viewpoint of this quality:

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[23]Meador, pp. 347-348, taken from Cicero De Partitione Oratoriae 39. 139.

[24]Meador, p. 349.

[25]Meador, p. 349.

> Virtue for Cicero is the highest good; yet,
> virtue requires activity in the realm of human
> affairs. He considers the assumption of civic
> obligations one of the fundamental "duties" of
> men (criticizing philosophers like Plato on this
> count). Such a genuine social commitment seems
> to account for his devotion to rhetoric and for
> his sense of interconnection among philosophy
> (heavily ethics), rhetoric (heavily social
> control), and politics.[26]

Baird notes that Cicero discussed the moral qualities of good nature,

liberality, gentleness, piety, grateful feelings, freedom from selfishness

and avarice. When the speaker has mastered the art of making the audience

perceive these qualities in him he will also alienate the audience from

those in whom those qualities are not evident. Cicero notes that these

qualities must be genuine and not just an act.

> It contributes much to the success in speaking,
> that the morals, principles, conduct, and lives
> of those for whom they plead, should be such as
> to deserve esteem; and that those of their adver-
> saries should be such as to deserve censure and
> also that the minds of those before whom the
> cause is pleaded should be moved as well toward
> the speaker and toward him for whom he speaks.[27]

Another natural outgrowth of the theory of probability would be

that the orator must be an educated man. To have any understanding at all

of the relationships and degrees of probability that must be dealt with

and judged, an orator would have to be well versed in many areas of know-

ledge.

> Cicero, through his mouthpiece, Crassus, insists
> upon the orator's having virtually universal know-
> ledge and skill. In the dialogue, Antonious holds
> that somewhat less learning is necessary, although
> he, too, urges broad familiarity with the field of

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[26]Meador, pp. 348-349.

[27]A. Craig Baird, Rhetoric: A Philosophical Inquiry (New York:
The Ronald Press Co., 1965), p. 103.

> knowledge. But he insists upon a more intensive
> training leading to the acquisition of oratorical
> excellence. Antonious would develop the orator's
> natural talents and capacities for oratory, even
> if his intellectual control over the field of
> learning were somewhat more moderate than Crassus
> believed essential.[28]

Just how extensive this knowledge ideally should be is brought out in the

following passage. Although it sounds almost like impromptu speaking,

actually the type of knowledge that was to be acquired held all the essen-

tials for quite literally any subject in the memory of the orator. This

fund of knowledge could be quickly drawn upon when the need arose.

> If, therefore, anyone desires to define and compre-
> hend the whole and peculiar power of an orator, that
> man, in my opinion, will be an orator, worthy of so
> great a name, who whatever subject comes before him,
> and requires rhetorical elucidation, can speak on it
> judiciously, in set form, elegantly, and from
> memory, and with a certain dignity of action.[29]

Cicero had found much in the works of Isocrates that he admired. The two

both encouraged the development of statesmanship. They were practical in

their approach to rhetoric and had no patience with the philosopher who

refused to get involved in human affairs and matters of state. They were

also alike in their efforts to broaden the field of rhetoric. Cicero in

his day hoped "to restore rhetoric as a system of general culture which

would train men to write and speak competently on all possible subjects.

In this effort Cicero was guided by the doctrines of Isocrates whom he

regarded as the 'father of eloquence.'"[30]

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[28]Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, "Cicero and Quintilian on Rhetoric," The Province of Rhetoric, ed., J. Schwartz and J. Rycenga (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1965), pp. 143-144.

[29]Thonssen and Baird, p. 144, from De Oratore, I, xv.

[30]Thonssen and Baird, p. 142.

In Rhetorical Practice

It has already been mentioned that Cicero advocated that the orator live a life that would be above reproach. He recognized that it would be necessary to let the members of the audience know that this was the character of the person they were listening to and that there were ways for the speaker to project an ethical personality.

> But the qualities that attract favor to the orator
> are a soft tone of voice, a countenance expressive
> of modesty, a mild manner of speaking; so that if
> he attacks any one with severity, he may seem to
> do so unwillingly and from compulsion.[31]

The value of this type of projected ethos was, in Cicero's opinion, unequalled by any other technique that might be employed.

> To describe the character of your clients in your
> speeches, therefore, as just, full of integrity,
> religious, unpresuming, and patient of injuries,
> has an extraordinary effect; and such a description,
> either in the commencement, or in the statement of
> facts, or in the peroration, has so much influence
> if it is agreeably and judiciously managed, that it
> often prevails more than the merit of the cause.
> Such influence, indeed, is produced by a certain
> feeling and art in speaking, that the speech seems
> to represent, as it were, the character of the
> speaker; for by adopting a peculiar mode of
> thought and expression, united with action that
> is gentle and indicative of amiableness, such an
> effect is produced, that the speaker seems to be
> a man of probity, integrity and virtue.[32]

Conclusion

Cicero has taken the Skeptic theory of probability and accepted the standards needed for everyday truth. Virtue to him means nothing

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[31]Cicero, _De Oratore_, Watson, trans., 9ii, 43.

[32]Cicero, _De Oratore_, 9ii, 43.

without action--and that action should be for the good of the state--
the orator should be a statesman. He should also have attributes of
honesty, piety, good naturedness and gentleness for these, when perceived
by the audience can serve as his strongest form of proof. The education
of the orator should be very thorough leaving him capable of speaking
smoothly and intelligently in any subject that might be put to him.

QUINTILIAN

Paramount in the study of Quintilian's concepts of ethos are his
theories on the constructs of the good man. He does not recognize that
the study of this concept belongs exclusively to the field of philosophy.
In fact, he feels the entire study is much more suited to the field of
rhetoric than to philosophy. This discussion of Quintilian begins with
an explanation of this good man theory. Following, an analysis of
"speaking well" will complete this explanation of the definition of the
orator--" a good man speaking well."[33]

Quintilian's system of education designed to produce this happy
combination will be identified. It is outside the scope of this paper
to go into great detail on this topic.

Finally, Quintilian has some interesting theories of application
of these theories to the actual practice of rhetoric. These will be cited
and the rationale behind them explored for possible ramifications.

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[33]Quintilian's _Institutes of Oratory_, trans., H. E. Butler (Cam-
bridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1920, rep. 1962), I, 9-10.

Quintilian's Good Man Theory

Philosophy during the time of Quintilian concerned itself with such questions as rights to the succession to the throne, hereditary rights to property and positions of power in the Empire, and related problems. Quintilian was in favor with the emperor and wisely chose to exclude himself from philosophical disputations of all kinds.

When, in the course of his writings, he expresses the desirability of having instructors and other associates of students well versed in philosophy, Quintilian is not speaking of those engaged in this sort of disputation. Neither is he thinking of a Platonic type philosopher taking refuge in flight from the real world to a place of "Ideas." For Quintilian, as Isocrates and Cicero before him, the orator was to be a man concerned in the practical affairs of men. His philosophy and his education were to suit him for the execution of his role as an effective member of society. These concerns were in the natural province of rhetoric, not philosophy.

> For I will not admit that the principles of
> upright and honorable living should, as some
> have held, be regarded as the peculiar concern
> of philosophy. The man who can really play
> his part as a citizen and is capable of meeting
> the demands both of public and private business,
> the man who can guide a state by his counsels,
> give it a firm basis by his legislation, and
> purge its vices by his decisions as a judge,
> is assuredly no other than the orator of our
> quest.[34]

Above all other qualities, Quintilian held good morality and good character to be of primary importance. He flatly stated that an education

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[34] Quintilian, Institute of Oratory, trans., H. E. Butler (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1920, rep. 1962), I, Pre. 9-10.

that does not emphasize and attempt to instill good morals in the pupils

is "both dangerous and pernicious."

> The orator, then, whom I am concerned to form,
> shall be the orator as defined by Marcus Cato,
> " a good man, skilled in speaking." But above
> all he must possess the quality which Cato
> places first and which is in the very nature
> of things the greatest and most important,
> that is, he must be a good man. This is
> essential not merely on account of the fact,
> if the powers of eloquence serve only to lend
> arms to crime, there can be nothing more perni-
> cious than eloquence to public and private wel-
> fare alike, while I myself, who have labored to
> the best of my ability to contribute something
> of value to oratory, shall have rendered the
> worst of services to mankind, if I forge these
> weapons not for the soldier, but for a robber.[35]

In quoting Cato's statement that the orator is a "good man, skilled

in speaking," Quintilian takes this good man and gives him the qualities

of a good speaker.

> At the outset let us not think of rhetoric as
> something quite artificial and stultifyingly
> formal, for it can be defined simply as the
> study of the effective use of language or the
> art of clear, accurate, and skillful expres-
> sion in speaking and in writing, an art cru-
> cially important in the communication of
> ideas.[36]

Quintilian points out that speaking well does not simply involve

the memorization and practice of the rules of good rhetoric. Just as Iso-

crates recognized the needs for certain rules, Quintilian states that he

will lay them down. However, again, as with Isocrates, he cautions that

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[35]Quintilian, xii, i, 1.

[36]Frederick M. Wheelock, ed., Quintilian as an Educator (New
York: Twayne Publications, Inc., 1974), p. 15.

the rules are not rigid but are to be applied with discretion. There

is no system that can be assured of working for everyone under every

circumstance. From the practical standpoint it is necessary for the

orator to recognize circumstances that require adjustments of standard

procedure.

> I will not deny that it is generally expedient
> to conform to such rules, otherwise I should
> not be writing now; but if our friend expedi-
> ency suggests some other course to us, why,
> we shall disregard the authority of the pro-
> fessors and follow her.[37]

It is not enough, therefore, that the "good man" should know the

rules of good rhetorical practice and be able to use them, he must also

know when circumstances demand abandoning all rules and using common sense

to meet the contingency at hand.

Education of the "Good Man, Speaking Well"

Without going into detail on methodologies used in Quintilian's

system for education, it is important to look at a few of the major tenets

making up his philosophy of education. First, unlike his contemporaries,

Quintilian did not begin the orator's education with the higher education

of the rhetor. This did not begin until age sixteen and by that time

Quintilian recognized the "good man" part of the requisite would have to

have been inculcated into the would-be orator. Nothing else speaks so

clearly of Quintilian's serious efforts to effect his desired training

as the detailed accounts given of proper care of the infant, best qualifica-

tions for the nurse, attitude for the parents, and other details of everyday

living that inevitably will shape the developing personality of the child.

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[37]Quintilian, xii, i, 1.

He realizes that everything the child hears, the attitude of his associates, the approach to education, will ultimately affect the end product of the education system. The program described shows great insight and is surprisingly modern in concept.

> Quintilian's educational doctrines, promulgated
> nineteen hundred years ago, represented the best
> thinking of the ancient world concerning education
> and culture. These doctrines reflect the ideals
> and practices of his time, as, for example, in
> their emphasis upon skills of communication and
> rhetoric, essential elements of higher education
> in the Roman Empire. Yet, Quintilian's educa-
> tional philosophy was surprisingly modern in
> tone and character, antedating by nearly two
> millenia our contemporary respect for the
> rights and needs of children; and many of his
> views on learning, ethical training, and child
> development deserve to be studied and imple-
> mented in education today.[38]

The curriculum recommended by Quintilian could best be described as a broad humanistic basic liberal arts program. Not everyone would complete every subject and not everyone would become a rhetorician. The foundation for this education was literature, with liberal additions of grammar and linguistics. He recognized other advantages of this study of a more character-building nature.

> Furthermore, literature (e.g., all branches of
> Greek and Latin poetry, history, philosophy, and
> oratory) was no less important in the paramount
> matter of character (morals) indicated above;
> for by the reading, analyzing and memorization
> of great literature, the student gained ideas
> and philosophies and examples of great heroes,
> actions, characters and ideals which should be
> imitated, and also examples of others which
> should be avoided. Thus literature would
> mold a boy's character and would provide a
> thesaurus upon which to draw throughout life.[39]

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[38] Wheelock, p. 1, intro.

[39] Wheelock, p. 16.

From a modern standpoint the curriculum lacked reference to any training for "trade skills." This was a society utilizing slave labor for menial tasks and on-the-job training for others.

> ...it was tradition that education should be
> liberal and should be based on what Cicero
> called the "liberal arts," subjects suitable
> for free men, which included literature and
> language, rhetoric, philosophy, music, mathe-
> matics, geometry and astronomy. Though the
> list might vary somewhat, literature and
> rhetoric predominated. Such is the origin
> of the liberal arts curriculum, which, with
> some variations and additions, has survived
> down to our twentieth century, sometimes
> under the name of the humanities in contra-
> distinction to the sciences.[40]

Application of Ethical and Educational Concepts to Ethos in Rhetoric

Quintilian followed the concept that ethos of the speaker was one of the most powerful weapons he could possess. The nature of that ethos is described in the following passage:

> The (ethos) of which we form a conception, and
> which we desire to find in speakers, is recom-
> mended, above all, by goodness, being not only
> mild and placid, but for the most part pleasing
> and polite, and amiable and attractive to the
> hearers; and the greatest merit in the expres-
> sion of it is, that it should seem to flow from
> the nature of things and persons with which we
> are concerned, so that the moral character of
> the speaker may clearly appear, and be recog-
> nized, as it were, in his discourse.[41]

This ethos is not to be an act on the part of the speaker. Unless the qualities are genuine, the effectiveness is minimized.

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[40]Wheelock, pp. 16-17.

[41]Quintilian, Institutio de Oratoria, trans., J. S. Watson (London: H. G. Bohn, 1856, 2 vol.), VI, 2, 13.

All this species of eloquence, however, requires
the speaker to be a man of good character and of
pleasing manners. The virtues which he ought to
praise, if possible, in his client, he should
possess, or be thought to possess, himself.[42]

Another aspect of ethos is adaptation to the audience. Obviously

still speaking of forensic type situations, Quintilian has this to say:

The favor of the judge we conciliate, not merely
by offering him praise, (which ought indeed to be
given with moderation, though it is to be remem-
bered at the same time, that the privilege of
offering it is common to both parties.) But by
turning his praises to the advantage of our
cause, appealing, in behalf of the noble to
his dignified station, in behalf of the humble
to his justice, in behalf of the unfortunate
to his pity, in behalf of the injured to his
severity; and using similar appeals in other
cases.[43]

Turning from forensic type oratory, ethos is rated of primary

importance in deliberative oratory. Here the character and integrity

of the speaker is directly related to the validity of his proposals in

the eyes of the audience.

But what is of most weight in deliberative
speeches is authority in the speaker; for he
who desires everybody to trust to his opinion
about what is expedient and honorable, ought
to be esteemed, a man of the greatest judge-
ment and probity.[44]

Much of the good will of the audience and the projection of one's

own good character is accomplished in the exordium. As with other classi-

cal writers, Quintilian recognized the advantage to be gained when the

introduction of the speech effected this end.

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[42]Quintilian, VI, 2, 10.

[43]Quintilian, IV, 1, 16.

[44]Quintilian, III, 8, 13.

> In giving the exordium at all there is no
> other object but to prepare the hearer to
> listen to us more readily in the subsequent
> parts pf our pleading. This object, as is
> agreed among most authors, is principally
> effected by three means, by securing his
> good will and attention, and by rendering
> him desirous of further information; not
> that these ends are not to be kept in view
> throughout the whole pleading, but because
> they are pre-eminently necessary at the
> commencement, when we gain admission as
> it were into the mind of the judge in
> order to penetrate still farther into it.[45]

While for the most part good character of the speaker is impressed on the

audience through obvious manifestations of ethos, there are rhetorical

effects to be used to gain the desired regard from the audience.

> But as the character of the speaker becomes thus
> of the highest efficacy, if, in his undertaking
> the business, all suspicion of meanness, or hatred,
> or ambition, be far removed from him, so it is a
> sort of tacit commendation to him, if he repre-
> sents himself as weak, and inferior in ability
> to those acting against him, a practice which is
> adopted in most of the exordia of Messala.[46]

Quintilian on Means to the End

One issue in Quintilian has caused some analysts distress and

others downright confusion. The problem lies in the interpretation of the

ethical concept of the proper means to be employed to reach a desired end.

> But it is even true, although at first sight it
> seems hard to believe, that there may be sound
> reason why at times a good man who is appearing
> for the defense should attempt to conceal the
> truth from the judge. If any of my readers is
> surprised at my making such a statement (although
> this opinion is not of my own invention, but is

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[45] Quintilian, IV, 1, 8.

[46] Quintilian, IV, 1, 8.

derived from those whom antiquity regarded as
the greatest teachers of wisdom), I would have
him reflect that there are many things which
are made honorable or the reverse not by the
nature of the facts, but by the causes from
which they spring....I can see that there will
be many possible emergencies such as to justify
an orator in undertaking cases of a kind which
in the absence of any honorable reason, he would
have refused to touch.[47]

In the practical application of ethics in a rhetorical situation, Quinti-

lian's "good man" may have to go further to attain his desired ends.

Is not this another case where the orator will
not shrink even from lies, if so he may save one
who is not merely innocent, but a praiseworthy
citizen? Again, suppose that we realize that
certain acts are just in themselves, though
prejudicial to the state under existing cir-
cumstances. Shall we not then employ methods
of speaking which, despite the excellence of
their intention, bear a close resemblance to
fraud. Further, no one will hesitate for a
moment to hold the view that it is in the
interests of the commonwealth that guilty
persons should be acquitted rather than
punished, if it be possible thereby to con-
vert them to a better state of mind, a possi-
bility which is generally conceded.[48]

When reading these passages there are two things to remember. The

first is the definition of an orator and the second is the political climate

of Rome at the time under consideration.

No man, according to Qunitlian, is an orator who is not first a

good man. Anyone availing himself of this license to lie as an orator is

wise enough and righteous enough to correctly assess relative merits of

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[47]Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, trans., H. E.
Butler (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), XII, i, 36-39.

[48]Quintilian, trans., Butler, XII, i, 41-42.

possible positions. Doubtful means would only be employed when others
would end in disaster for the right cause.

Secondly, the political condition of Rome during the time of
Quintilian was not conducive to the citizen being assured a fair or even
reasonable trial under any kind of law. The Emperors that followed Nero
were often utterly selfish, absolute, sometimes lunatic in the administra-
tion of justice. For the welfare of Rome circumstances could arise demand-
ing that the counsel for the defense employ extraordinary means for the
protection of a client condemned by the arbitrary rulings of a tyrant.

Conclusions

This discussion of Quintilian has explored the basic tenets of
Cato's "Good man, speaking well." Education suited to the development of
such a person will be in the liberal arts with a heavy emphasis on litera-
ture. The ethos of the speaker will be evidenced through the quality of
the speech, and the adaptation to audience and subject matter. Because of
circumstances, there may be times when the orator will use dishonorable
means to attain an end that will prove to be for the good of the state

CHAPTER IV

THE BRITISH

It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt an exhaustive
study of British views of ethos in rhetoric. Time and space limitations
will alllow analyses of the representative works of Hugh Blair, George
Campbell, and Richard Whately. For the sake of orientation and contin-
uity three influential philosophers, Thomas Reid, John Locke and David
Hume, will be discussed. These three are frequently mentioned by Blair,
Campbell and Whately. Certainly the views of these philosophers colored
the innovative approaches to rhetoric during the eighteenth century.

After briefly surveying the works of the three philosophers men-
tioned above, each of the three rhetoricians will be examined from the
standpoints, first, of their philosophical and ethical orientations and
approaches to rhetoric. Examples of specific applications of their con-
cepts of ethics as exhibited in the ethos of the speaker and adaptations
to be made to the audience will follow. A section of brief comment and
conclusions will close the chapter.

THOMAS REID

The first consideration for this discussion of Reid's common sense
approach to philosophy and rhetoric will first state exactly what Reid
meant by "common sense." His reasons for preferring "common sense" to
reason and methods for testing first principles will be explained. Finally,

some references will be made relating Reid's concepts with some already
covered in the classical portions of the study.

The Meaning of Common Sense

Common sense can only be called a metarational approach to the
truth. The process is fundamental to the reasoning process and yet it
transcends reason. These two statements form the foundation for Reid's
theory. About the first, the metarational approach, Reid has this to say:

> If there are certain principles, as I think there
> are, which the constitution of our nature leads
> us to believe, and which we are under a necessity
> to take for granted in the common concerns of life,
> without being able to give a reason for them--these
> are what we call the principles of common sense;
> and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what
> we call absurd.[1]

These first principles are the ones that are lasting and accepted by all
men everywhere in all ages.

> We ought likewise to take for granted, as first
> principles, things wherein we find an universal
> agreement, among the learned and unlearned, in
> the different nations and ages of the world. A
> consent of ages and nations, of the learned and
> the vulgar, ought, at least, to have great
> authority,...There are many truths so obvious
> to the human faculties, that it may be expected
> that men should universally agree in them.[2]

In Reid's conception there can be no conflict between the reason
and common sense. They are not the same but they go hand in hand.

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[1]Thomas Reid, "An Inquiry into the Human Mind," The Works of Thomas
Reid, ed., Sir William Hamilton (Edinbourgh: Maclachlan and Stewart, 1863),
I, 108.

[2]Reid, "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man," Works, p. 491.

> Reid says, "It is absurd to conceive that there
> can be any opposition between reason and common
> sense. It is indeed the firstborn of reason; and
> as they are commonly joined together in speech and
> writing, they are inseparable in their nature."
> He adds further that, "A man who has common sense
> may be taught to reason. But if he has not that
> gift, no teaching will make him able to judge of
> first principles or reason from them." Common
> sense consists of self-evident principles which
> are universally taken for granted and which under-
> gird true propositions. Perhaps inadvertently
> exposing his interest in rhetoric, Reid adds that
> "...the province of common sense is more extensive
> in refutation than in confirmation," and states
> further that "a conclusion drawn from true prin-
> ciples cannot possibly contradict any decision of
> common sense, because truth will always be con-
> sistent with itself.[3]

Reid's concepts of first principles derived from common sense bear

close resemblance to classical maxims and the first premises of dialectic

--those concepts generally accepted by all as true.

> There is no searching for evidence, no weighting
> of arguments; the proposition is not deduced or
> inferred from another; it has the light of truth
> in itself, and has no occasion to borrow it from
> another. Propositions of the last kind, when they
> have been used in matters of science, have com-
> monly been called axioms; and on whatever occa-
> sion they are used, they are called first prin-
> ciples, principles of common sense, common notions,
> self-evident truths.[4]

Common Sense Preferred to Reason

Thomas Reid felt that too great reliance on reason resulted in

hopeless entanglements of doubt and an actual cessation in acquisition

of knowledge about our society and physical environment.

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[3]William G. Kelley, Jr., "Thomas Reid on Common Sense: A Meta-
rational Approach to Truth," The Southern Speech Communication Journal
(Fall, 1973), pp. 39, 45.

[4]Reid, p. 434.

> The ancients seem to have had too high notions,
> both of the force of the reasoning power in man,
> and of the art of syllogism as its guide. Mere
> reasoning can carry us but a very little way in
> most subjects. By observation, and experiments
> properly conducted, the stock of human knowledge
> may be enlarged without end; but the power of
> reasoning alone, applied with vigour and through
> a long life, would only carry man around like a
> horse in a mill, who labours hard but makes no
> progress.[5]

Reid does not, it should be noted, account for the syllogistic basic pre-
mise in his writings. He does, however, deplore endless logical reasoning
exercises that result in uncertain conclusions.

Guidelines for Testing Truth of First Principles

The understanding of common sense and its relationship to reasoning
leads to the tests to be used for so derived first principles. This test-
ing is a natural function of man.

> But the power of judging in self-evident propo-
> sitions, which are clearly understood, may be
> compared to the power of swallowing our food.
> It is purely natural, and therefore common to
> the learned and the unlearned, to the trained
> and the untrained. It requires ripeness of
> understanding, and freedom from prejudice, but
> nothing else.[6]

The first suggestion for differences of opinion concerning the
validity of a first principle, is that each person put away his own pre-
judice and "approach the proposition with a sound mind, but when the first
task proves futile, and when the opposing views still prevail, then the
parties must seek the marks or characteristics of an illegitimate first

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[5]Reid, "Aristotle's Logic," p. 701.

[6]Kelley, p. 47, quoting Reid.

principle."[7] The most outstanding characteristic of the first false

principle is:

> that they are not only false but absurd; and
> to discountenance absurdity, nature hath given
> us a particular emotion--to wit, that of ridi-
> cule--which seems intended for this very purpose
> of putting out of countenance what is absurd,
> either in opinion or in practice.[8]

The five methods for proving an argument absurd are these:

> 1. A good argument is to show a rejected principle
>   stands on the same footing as an accepted one.
> 2. Any first principle will have a chain of con-
>   sequences that proceed from it. If these con-
>   sequences are absurd, then the first principle
>   is also considered absurd and rejected.
> 3. The third method is authority that involves the
>   consent of ages and the nations. A principle
>   that has been universally recognized for many
>   years by all of mankind may be accepted as a
>   first principle.
> 4. Opinions appearing so early in the minds of men
>   that they were not placed there by education are
>   first principles.
> 5. Finally, a first principle is indispensible to
>   the conduct of life.[9]

Obviously, these tests could be ridiculed and exceptions made for each in

turn. Kelley does this in his article and seems to indicate a preference

for a more skeptical approach to our environment. Reid's philosophy could

be carried to the point of absurdity. Its use lies in the fact that for

all practical purposes it is accepted and used by most people. It is also

an oft-cited fact for the rhetorician in his philosophical approach to the

ethical position of truth and man's character in and through communication.

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[7]Kelley, p. 48.

[8]Kelley, p. 48.

[9]Kelley, pp. 49-52.

JOHN LOCKE

In the writings of John Locke and David Hume the theories of degrees of probability used during the time of Cicero are further developed. These two reject the transcendental origin for concepts of right and wrong, good and bad in the human mind. They are grounded in the theory that all we know is gained through the senses. These sensory experiences are individual, cannot be transmitted, and the only knowledge that is truly passed from one person to another is that that can be verified by repeated sensory experiences. The mind can reflect on these experiences and draw inferences. It may speculate, establish degrees of probability, but in all cases all knowledge comes from sensory experience.

The intellectual climate of the seventeenth century was prepared for an epistemology of rhetoric that would call physical and experimental data the only genuine knowledge. The realms of values, beliefs and opinions crucial to traditional rhetoric were rejected as pseudo-knowledge.

> Seen from this perspective, the Lockian epistemology rested on what W. T. Jones has termed "a drastic change in the conception of authority, from that of the written word, especially the inspired Word of God, to that of nature and empirical fact"....In short, Locke synthesized a variety of empirical inclinations into a thoroughly nominalist epistemology which eschewed concern for universal principles of values and "held that only particulars are real." The cataclysmic implications of this position for rhetoric become clearer as we examine the central features of Locke's thought.[10]

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[10]John H. Patton, "Experience and Imagination: Approaches to Rhetoric by John Locke and David Hume," The Southern Speech Communication Journal, 41, 14.

It was Locke's belief that the mind is like a blank, white sheet of paper in its original form. There are no words there, no references or ideas of things. From sensory experience references are accumulated and word symbols are attached to them. Locke's expression of these ideas sparked attacks on rhetoric as "fanciful" and heightened distrust of the medium.

> Thus, by means of the basic postulate that words are separable from ideas, Locke supplied a principle which formed the cynosure of attacks on rhetoric as a "fanciful device" in the seventeenth century. Locke arrived at this decisive premise as a function of his belief that there were no innate ideas present in the mind. Indeed, his views on the issues of innateness contain the central tenet of what later evolved into general semantics, namely, that words have no meaning by themselves but rather are assigned a meaning arbitrarily as a result of social conditioning.[11]

In dealing with the rhetorical significance of the Lockean position, we have to give attention to his criteria for "sensation" and "reflection."

> The primary and most powerful means of experimenting is through the mind. "The mind," says Locke, "has several distinct perceptions of things" which result in ideas such as "yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities." Only if one senses the object in this direct manner can he have a genuine idea of what it is; ideas never precede the sensible perception of objects.[12]

Reflection as the other aspect of experience has two distinct differences from sensation. Called an internal sense by Locke, it is, first, not directly stimulated by objects external to use. Secondly, it cannot occur at all unless it is secondary to other mental activities.

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[11]Patton, p. 15.

[12]Patton, p. 16.

> The assumption, however, that reflection could
> only occur following sensation is extremely vital
> from a rhetorical standpoint. Indeed, Locke's
> criticism of rhetoric is perhaps best understood
> when it is realized that he indicted rhetoric for
> engaging in reflection without the benefit of
> prior sensation.[13]

The implications for rhetoric were profound. Certainly, as suggested by Patton, the dual form of sensation and reflection suggests a constructive refinement for rhetoric; at the same time, it fosters serious drawbacks. Locke reinterpreted Aristotle, substituting authentic subject matter for the topics suggested in De Rhetorica. Wilbur Howell pointed out that he would remove topics as the vital center of rhetoric and dialectic and:

> recommend mathematics as a preferable pattern for
> arriving at probable truth. Thus did Locke lend
> heavy authority to the belief that the topics
> would have to be abandoned in the new rhetoric,
> and the procedures of science and scholarship
> established in their place.[14]

Here is a rhetoric concerned with the transmission of actual sensory experiences from one person to another. Words symbolize the sensory happening. There is no room for emotion and complete knowledge of the subject is an imposed requirement of the individual.

> Locke seems to affirm, just as Aristotle did, that
> the speaker should "know" his subject as thoroughly
> as possible before speaking. He also holds that
> sensory experience is the only way for such know-
> ledge to occur. While this may provide an adequate
> basis for rhetorical presentation of the predomin-
> ately or purely informative sort, it can neither

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[13] Patton, p. 17.

[14] Wilbur S. Howell, "John Locke and the New Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 53 (1967), 323-324.

account for nor generate forms of speaking which
transcend efforts to establish the mere existence
or non-existence of events.[15]

Locke has relegated "reflection" to a secondary realm of know-
ledge. This further raises the question of whether his approach leaves
any room for persuasion. This art essentially has to do with influencing
"beliefs," part of the realm of "reflection."

In other words, if rhetorical invention is restricted
to sensory experience, can a speaker ever attempt to
alter general attitudes, change firmly held beliefs,
or motivate specific actions?[16]

This is a system that quite justifiably demands that a speaker have know-
ledge about his subject of discourse. However, when you limit that know-
ledge to direct sensory experience you have also limited the subject
matter. This precludes any discussion about the future, about what should
or should not be, for these are matters that are barred from our personal
realm of experience. So, too, are moral values, for there can be no sen-
sory experiences that could in any way ascertain what these might be.

Indeed, by Locke's epistemology, it becomes vir-
tually impossible to include propositions of value
or policy within the domain of rhetoric. The upshot
is a tendency toward a discourse void of ethical
quality.[17]

The Lockean epistemology has cleared the way for a system of what Wayne
Brockriede calls "non-argumentative processess" such as description and
classification.[18]

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[15]Patton, p. 18.

[16]Patton, p. 18.

[17]Patton, p. 19.

[18]Wayne Brockriede, "Rhetorical Criticism as Argument," <u>Quarterly</u>
<u>Journal of Speech</u> (1974), 60, 165-174.

> Because questions of value and policy are pre-
> cisely those which are most open to dispute (i.e.,
> are debatable in the fullest sense), their omis-
> sion under the guise of adhering to an apparently
> "scientific" and "verifiable" approach renders
> rhetoric lifeless by reducing, if not eliminating,
> its capacity for true advocacy.[19]

The facts as seen by Patton indicate that what has happened to much of modern rhetorical scholarship is a result of this. The following is his illustration of just what has happened. He is speaking of Robert Jeffrey's dismay over the press handling of the Watergate episode of President Nixon.

> Our own publications reflect a preoccupation with
> Nixon's predictability, his appeals to audiences,
> his mastery of the television medium, and so on.
> Few articles have analyzed the ethics or morality
> of his statements.[20]

Other instances of modern abstinence from evaluation of ethical qualities in a rhetorical event could be cited. It could further be postulated that these instances are related to Lockean originated theories.

One more difficulty with this system comes in considering "identi-fication." If sensory experience is the basis for all knowledge, then we are returned to the Gorgian problem of relating my referent to my corre-spondent's since we do not have identical referents for the message to be transmitted.

> If the experience of the speaker, then, is funda-
> mentally different from the experiences of the audi-
> ence, the Lockean approach would not allow for the
> possibility of genuine communication. By Locke's
> analysis, cross-cultural communication, for example,

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[19]Patton, p. 19.

[20]Patton, p. 20.

while not being a completely meaningless term,
would yet be limited to communication based on
common experiences alone.[21]

DAVID HUME

Like John Locke, David Hume stands firmly in the empirical tra-

dition. Unlike him, he does not feel that pure sensory experience is

sufficient for man to reason at his best and arrive at the best conclu-

sion. Locke certainly had found a respectable basis for the transmission

of information, but he made any further deductions from those experiences

solely the responsibility of the individual. In short, he left no room

for the persuasive powers of the rhetorician. Hume remedied this.

> Hume rejected such zealous confidence in reason,
> concluding that the very elevation of reason as
> the contemporary god-term accounted in large part
> for the decline of oratory. Furthermore, it is
> precisely on these grounds that he contrasts ancient
> with modern rhetoric: "Ancient eloquence, that is
> the sublime and passionate, is of a much juster
> taste than the modern, or the argumentative and
> rational: and if properly executed, will always
> have more command and authority over mankind.[22]

Hume notes that any subject can be suitable for debate, that reason is

certainly not always the basis for argument, and that probability in

different degrees is an element in persuasion.

> Significantly, he ties this observation to his
> suspicion of experience-based reason and cer-
> tainly, noting that the role of reason is not
> always dominate in rhetoric and that legitimate
> discourse can occur on other bases besides reason
> alone. Consequently, Hume maintains that, "Amidst

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[21] Patton, p. 21.

[22] Patton, p. 22.

all this bustle 'tis no reason which carries the
prize, but eloquence; and no man needs ever des-
pair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant
hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in
favorable colors." ...Hence, whereas the Lockean
epistemology confined the practice of rhetoric to
the use of words as "sensible marks of ideas,"
Hume supplies the essential counterpoint for a
full-bodied rhetoric by accentuating the realm
of mental interpretation and persuasive discourse.[23]

In attempting to explain Hume's rationale for the reintroduction
of passion and imagination into oratory, it is necessary to realize that
he saw a difference in the "liveliness" of beliefs derived from sensation
and those derived from fancy. This superior force of the idea allows
Locke's sterile rhetoric to take on the life and vitality of a more viable
form. He maintains that, "an idea assented to feels different from a fic-
ticious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: And this different
feeling I endeavor to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity,
or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness."[24]

The introduction of degrees of liveliness among
ideas sustains the imagination by supplying the
essential raw material it requires. This opens
the way for the formation of mental images not
immediately present to the senses and for the
synthesis of images derived from concrete experi-
ence. While degrees of liveliness remain empiri-
cally verifiable, Hume's doctrine of belief
reshapes Locke's insistence on ideas derived
only from sensory experience into a much more
rhetorically viable concept. In sum, the way
an idea "feels" incorporates a personal element
into the epistemology of experience and the
dynamics of language, leading toward a rhetoric
which seeks to influence the fundamental beliefs
and basic commitments of persons.[25]

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[23]Patton, p. 23.

[24]David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London and New York:
J. H. Dent and Sons, Ltd., Everyman's Library Edition, 1964), I, iii, 7, 99.

[25]Patton, p. 24.

Hume explained an assumption the mind must make when perceiving an object. This is that the object will continue to exist. The mind must jump to a conclusion of this kind to go beyond the momentary sensation of recognition. In fact it is inferring a double existence and supposes a relationship of resemblance and causation. This capacity makes possible the development of a full interpersonal and persuasive communication theory. Under Locke's orientation this lack of identical sensory experience prohibited true communication.

> The role of the imagination, then, assumes para-
> mount importance for Hume as the means by which
> objects are connected in the mind. Rhetorically
> this position suggests the possibility that the
> most effective communication is that which most
> directly engages and places the heaviest demand
> upon the image-making potential of an audience,
> a possibility beyond the scope of Locke's
> strictly defined sensory epistemology.[26]

Hume remained totally within the empirically oriented conception of origins for all subject matter for thought. In other words, he did not in any way assume Reid's philosophy that anything might be known by instinct. This became a controversial subject in discussions on religious questions. This awakening of science saw many doubts and questions raised on the authenticity of Biblical accounts of miracles. Hume was one of the first to voice these doubts and he devised a system for evaluation of testimony in the process. In an essay, "Of Miracles," and later in a book, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, two arguments on validity of testimony about events are presented.

The first argument stated that no testimony can be accepted as truth unless the falsity of the testimony would be more improbable than

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[26] Ralph S. Pomeroy, "Whately's 'Historic Doubts': Argument and Origin," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, pp. 65-66.

the non-existence of the alleged fact. In substantiation, he points out that all inference is founded on our experience with the consistency with which certain events take place. These consistent experiences include the testimony of others who have observed them. When non-concurrent testimony is heard, this violates two accepted experiences--consistent testimony about an event and our own sensory experiences relating to the event. It is Hume's contention that in the case of miracles, the value of human testimony is reduced to an absolute zero through the employment of these known consistencies.[27]

Secondly, Hume contends that no miracle has ever been advanced to the status of "probability" let alone, "proven," status. There has never been a sufficient number of unimpeachable witnesses to a miracle. Widespread belief in "miracles" is accounted for by the universal "passion" for surprise and wonder. He points out, next, the "miracles" occur among primitive and barbarous people or else are handed down through the generations from a historical background of primitive and barbarous people. He finally states that since an infinite number of people testify against the miracle, not only does the miracle destroy the credit of the testimony, but the testimony destroys itself. This is made so by the fact that conflicting religions testify against each other's miracles.

> The scope or adequacy of testimony for any event is
> determined by the number of witnesses who claim to
> have observed the event directly. Thus, the more
> unusual the event, the more improbable the testimony,
> and the more implausible the witness claims. The
> function of testimony is to gain "degrees of assur-
> ance" for a proposition rather than to establish

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[27]Pomeroy, pp. 65-66.

> occurrences of events. Thus, the primary
> condition for accepting a witness-claim is
> plausibility. A witness-claim should be
> judged plausible only if it satisfies,
> rather than conflicts with, most of the
> listeners' "habitual expectations." The
> eventual value of testimony is primarily
> corroborative. A witness-claim, in other
> words, is not necessarily a sign (much less
> a proof) that event X occurred. It is a
> statement of what the witness either believes
> or wants the listeners to believe about X.
> It should be accepted only to the degree
> that it confirms what the listeners would
> expect to observe--had they been the wit-
> nesses.[28]

Locke and Hume both belong to the ranks of those who place the

source of all we know in sensory experience. The two vary in their inter-

pretations of associations and the ideas that may be arrived at through

the utilization of these stored experiences. Locke trusts nothing to com-

munication that cannot be mutually experienced while Hume allows emotion

and feelings to have their place in human discourse.

Conclusions

The philosophies of the three that have been discussed in this

chapter all influenced the rhetoric of Hugh Blair, George Campbell and

Richard Whately. While there may be some indication of the individual

writers leaning toward one philosopher more than the others, there are

indications of Locke and Hume in all three and of Reid in at least two

of them. Interpretations and adaptations vary, relative strengths fluc-

tuate throughout the writings. Since this is not a completely comprehen-

sive study from every possible aspect, some theories belonging to the

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[28]Pomeroy, p. 66.

philosophers may be referred to that are not included in this paper. The
theories that have been covered are those that seem most closely allied
to ethos in rhetoric. The other references that are made are relatively
self-explanatory.

HUGH BLAIR

Although living during the period of the Great Awakening and the
evangelical movements on both sides of the Atlantic, Hugh Blair remained
aloof from the religious controversies of his day. This was due, first,
to his own convictions, and, secondly, to his awareness of the beliefs of
his constituents. The skepticism of the day strongly affected his Christian
teaching. Thomas Reid's philosophy of common sense was the basis for much
of Blair's concept of "good taste" or the critical evaluation of any rhe-
torical work of art, whether written or spoken.

Ethos in rhetoric was of primary importance to Hugh Blair. This
work will explain the two requirements for character in the speaker, methods
for treating the audience, requirements of good taste, and the functions of
the exordium in respect to ethos.

Ethical Principles of Hugh Blair

One of the outstanding qualities in Blair was his ability to assim-
ilate many divergent philosophies and use them in the ways that best
suited his ends. As a popular minister of the Presbyterrean Church in the
eighteenth century, he was faced with the decision of either joining the
evangelical movements of George Whitefield and the Wesleys, or of staying
in the mainstream of popular religious dogma of the day. Hugh Blair chose
the latter course.

> Blair made little, if any, reference to the vital
> religious issues paramount in the eighteenth cen-
> tury. While Whitefield, Wesley and many of the
> Scottish divines were preaching the doctrines of
> original sin and eternal punishment, the minister
> of St. Giles carefully avoided such controversial
> matters.[29]

The probable reasons for this choice are two-fold. The first is explained

below.

> ...important in determining Blair's choice of sub-
> jects were his own religious views. He freely
> admitted to Boswell that "he did not believe in
> the eternity of punishment." And at a time when
> the pious church leaders frowned upon such worldly
> amusements as card playing and the theatre, Carlyle
> reports that he taught Blair and Robinson how to
> play cards and dice, and that Blair visited the
> great actress Mrs. Siddons in private.[30]

The second reason for his avoidance of religious controversy

involved Blair's realistic assessment of the sentiments of his parishioners.

The course chosen by Blair allowed for Christian ethics without offense to

skeptical intellectualism.

> The agnostic tendencies which characterized the
> thinking of the eighteenth century Scotsmen were
> so prevalent that in many communities the Church
> lost its influence. Men...now openly expressed
> their disbelief in the existence of a Divine Being.
> Since Blair preached to the "most refined congre-
> gation in Scotland" skepticism was a serious
> problem.[31]

While being careful not to offend his listeners with a too funda-

mental approach to Christianity, Blair never wavered from high moral stand-

ards in his sermons or in his personal life.

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[29] James L. Golden, "Hugh Blair: Minister of St. Giles," The
Quarterly Journal of Speech, p. 157.

[30] Golden, p. 157.

[31] Golden, p. 157.

> He constructed his discourses around those
> ethical principles which, readily acceptable
> as theoretical truths, are often neglected in
> daily life. The following list of titles
> illustrates the minister's preference for
> moral rather than evangelical questions: "On
> Gentleness," "On Candor," "On Sensibility,"
> "On Fortitude," "On Envy," "On Idleness," "On
> Patience," "On Moderation," "On the Influence
> of Religion on Prosperity," and "On Devotion."[32]

From the organization of these sermons it is evident, according to Golden,

that they were not written to tell the listeners what they wanted to hear,

but rather to stimulate them to lead a better life.

Although seeming to join the skeptics in their questioning of basic

Christian doctrines, Blair approved of George Campbell's refutation of

Hume's attack on the validity of Biblical testimony concerning miracles.

He also recognized an inborn instinct in every human that, when developed,

results in relatively stable standards of what is considered "good taste"

in art, literature and oral delivery.

To consider Blair's concept of good taste it is necessary to accept

his definition of terms.

> Blair begins his analysis by defining taste as
> "the power of receiving pleasure from the beauties
> of nature and art."[33]

This taste is more than a reasoning power of the mind. Since

reception of a work that is in good taste gives pleasure, and since plea-

sure is not normally associated with reasoning powers, and since the same

objects illicit pleasure from people of varying educational backgrounds,

it is further noted there must be some innate characteristic of man deter-

mining the pleasant and unpleasant.

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[32]Golden, p. 157.

[33]Herman Cohen, "Hugh Blair's Theory of Taste," The Quarterly
Journal of Speech, p. 266.

> Hence, taste seems more closely allied to a
> feeling or sense than to a process of the mind.
> Although he believes that taste is ultimately
> founded on a certain natural and instinctive
> sensibility to beauty, Blair is careful to
> point out that reason is not entirely excluded
> from its exertions.[34]

This innate or instinctive sensibility is allied to Thomas Reid's "common sense" through its universal presence as an inherent quality. On the other hand, Hume influenced Blair in his explanation of the development and refinement of this good taste. Refinements of taste are cultivated through repeated exposures to highly respected works of art. The basis for those refinements remain indelibly engraved in the natural instincts of men.

> Taste, in Blair's view, is far from being an
> arbitrary force which is subject to the fancy
> of every individual and which admits of no
> criteria for determining whether it is false
> or true. Its foundation is the same in all
> human minds. It is built upon sentiments and
> perceptions which belong to our nature; and
> which, in general, operate with the same uni-
> formity as our other faculties. When those
> sentiments are perverted by ignorance and
> prejudice, they are capable of being rectified
> by reason. Their sound and natural state is
> ultimately determined by comparing them with
> the general taste of mankind.[35]

Ethos in Rhetoric

It can never be doubted that Hugh Blair placed ethos for the speaker in high priority both for himself and others.

> The ethical appeal of the speaker was further
> enhanced by his virtuous character. As he stood
> before his auditors, he was regarded as a good

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[34]Cohen, p. 266.

[35]Cohen, p. 273.

man who practiced as well as preached a high
standard of morals. At no time did he deviate
from high principles, and consequently his
character was respected throughout his life.[36]

For the speaker himself, Blair's advice was two-fold:

1. Let it be kept in view, that the foundation
    of all that can be called eloquence, is good
    sense and solid thought.
2. In the next place, in order to be persuasive
    speakers in a public assembly, it is, in my
    opinion, a capital rule that we be ourselves
    persuaded of whatever we recommend to others.[37]

Blair here voiced his disappoval of young speakers taking the weaker side

of an argument for experience's sake. This only served the development of

flimsy and trivial discourse. It also could lead to later imputations on

character if done in public.

Ethos in Rhetoric--Audience

The audience should be treated with respect at all times. Even

when the speaker has a rather low regard for their general intelligence

level this is so.

Even the common people are better judges of
argument and good sense than we sometimes think
them; and upon any question of business, a plain
man, who speaks to the point without art, will
generally prevail over the most artful speaker,
who deals in flowers and ornament, rather than
in reasoning. Much more, when public speakers
address themselves to any assembly where there
are persons of education and improved under-
standing, they ought to be careful not to
trifle with their hearers.[38]

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[36]Golden, pp. 156-157.

[37]Hugh Blair, Lecture XXVII, "Different Kinds of Public Speaking--
Eloquence of Popular Assemblies--Extracts from Demosthenes," ed., James L.
Golden and James P. Corbett, The Rhetoric of Blair, Campbell and Whately
(New York, Chicago: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1968), p. 100.

[38]Blair, Lecture XXVII, p. 100.

Although conviction is not won without appeals to reason, Blair realized

more than this is needed for persuasion.

> For arguments may convince the understanding when
> they cannot conquer the passions. Irresistable
> they seem in the calm hours of retreat; but in the
> sense of action, they often vanish into smoke.
> There are other and more poswerful springs, which
> influence the great movements of the human frame.
> In order to operate with success on the active
> powers, the heart must be gained. Sentiment and
> affection must be brought to the aid of reason.
> It is not enough that men believe religion to be
> a wise and rational rule of conduct, unless they
> relish it as agreeable and find it to carry its
> own reward.[39]

Blair showed his accurate knowledge of audience psychology in other ways.

This was a day of sermons of interminable length by modern standards. Hugh

Blair limited his discourses to one-half hour and further enhanced their

acceptance.

Ethos in Rhetoric--Good Taste

Hugh Blair, as previously mentioned, felt good taste to be

innate in human beings. This good taste must be developed and pointed in

the right direction through exposure to highly regarded works of art.

Passing fads may for a time distort this sense but the test of time will

see the "tried" and "true" good taste again predominate. This is true

with art, literature and all branches of oratory. Good taste in oratory

will recognize that different types of speaking call for different mani-

festations of character.

> The eloquence of a lawyer is fundamentally
> different from that of a divine or a speaker
> in parliament; and to have a precise and proper

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[39]Blair, Sermon "On Devotion," p. 16.

> idea of the distinguishing character which any
> kind of public speaking requires, is the founda-
> tion of what is called a just taste in that kind
> of speaking.[40]

Not only must one consider the type of speaking being done, he must also

realize the type of speaking that is best suited to his person.

> No one should ever rise to speak in public without
> forming to himself a just and strict idea of what
> suits his own age and character; what suits the
> subject, the hearers, the place, the occasion, and
> adjusting the whole train and manner of his speaking
> on this idea.[41]

One aspect of taste is treated in general as a matter of taste and then

more specifically as used in the exordium. The degree of vehemence or

passion exhibited by the speaker must be considered carefully when con-

forming to good taste. In most situations "a temperate tone of speech"

will be found to be the most useful. On the other hand, "he who is, on

every subject, passionate and vehement, will be considered a blusterer,

and meet with little regard.

There is also the question of age. A person in authority may use

a vehemence that would be quite unsuitable for a younger person. The young

are expected to be more modest in their presentation.

However, vehemence and passion expressed in speech can be effective

when properly used. On these occasions, one who has mastered the technique

can be truly an inspiring speaker. Occasions for such empassioned expres-

sion are described below."[42]

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[40]Blair, Lecture XVII, p. 99.

[41]Blair, p. 99.

[42]Blair, p. 104.

> The very aspect of a large assembly, engaged in
> some debate of moment, and attentive to the dis-
> course of one man, is sufficient to inspire that
> man with such elevation and warmth, as both gives
> rise to strong impressions and gives them propriety.
> Passions easily rise in great asemblies, where the
> movements are communicated by mutual sympathy
> between the orator and the audience.[43]

This type of eloquence, properly used, is certainly one of the highest

types of oratory.

> That ardor of speech, that vehemence and glow of
> sentiment which arise from a mind animated and
> inspired by some great and public object, from
> the peculiar characteristics of popular eloquence,
> is its highest degree of perfection.[44]

This passion and eloquence must be suitable to the occasion and the subject.

The warmth should always be genuine, never counterfeit. The speaker should

not in the expression of passion lose command of himself or go further than

the audience is willing to tolerate. Finally, again Blair reminds us to

retain the amenities proper for the time, place and character of the

speaker.[45]

One final word should be said on this subject. The heights of good

taste in rhetoric are shown in naturalness in manner and style.

Ethos in Rhetoric--the Exordium

The beginning of the speech can cause the speaker the most trouble

and is at the same time the most important portion of the speech for acquir-

ing the good will of the audience.

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[43]Blair, pp. 102-103.

[44]Blair, p. 103.

[45]Blair, p. 104.

> It is always of importance to begin well; to
> make a favorable impression at first setting
> out; when the minds of the hearers, vacant as
> yet and free, are most disposed to receive any
> impression easily.[46]

Generally speaking, there are two kinds of exordiums, the Prin-

cipium, "where the orator plainly and directly professes his aim in

speaking," and the Insinuato:

> ...where a larger compass must be taken, and
> where, presuming the disposition of the audi-
> ence to be much against the orator, he must
> gradually reconcile them to hearing him before
> he plainly discovers the point which he has in
> view.[47]

Since the first impression of the speaker is to be gained in the

exordium, Blair explicitly states what should be done to make that impres-

sion as favorable as possible.

> All appearances of modesty are favorable and pre-
> possessing. If the orator set out with an air of
> arrogance and ostentation, the self-love and pride
> of the hearers will be presently awakened, and will
> follow him with a suspicious eye throughout all his
> progress. His modesty should discover itself not
> only in his expressions at the beginning, but in
> his whole manner; in his looks, in his gestures,
> in the tone of his voice....Indeed, the modesty
> of an introduction should never betray anything
> mean or abject. It is always of great use to an
> orator, that together with modesty and deference
> to his hearers, he should show a certain sense of
> dignity, arising from a persuasion of the justice
> or importance of the subject on which he is to
> speak.[48]

The exordium should begin without full strength of voice or passion, leaving

this for more full development later on. There are occasions and subjects

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[46]Blair, Lecture XXXI, "Conduct of a Discourse in All Its Parts--
Introduction, Division, Narration and Explication," ed. Golden and Corbett,
p. 108.

[47]Blair, p. 108.

[48]Blair, p. 110.

which are exceptions to this. Whenever starting vehemently, however, the speaker is cautioned to be certain he can maintain the degree of intensity throughout the discourse. These are the uses for a passionate exordium:

> There are cases, however, in which it is allowable
> for him to set out from the first in high and bold
> tone, as, for instance, when he rises to defend some
> cause which has been run down and decried by the
> public. Too modest a beginning might then be a
> confession of guilt. By the boldness and strength
> of his exordium he must endeavor to stem the tide
> that is against him, and to remove prejudices, by
> encountering them without fear.[49]

GEORGE CAMPBELL

Campbell clearly reflected the classical influence as well as current philosophical theories being discussed by his contemporaries. As an ecclesiastic his writings are filled with procedures to be used in homiletics.

This paper will first look at the philosophical concepts that may have shaped Campbell's concept of ethos. Next, specific references to ethos will be referred to. Campbell recognized the different characters in the lawyer, senator and divine speaker. He treated each at some length. Adaptation for the audience will be looked at from the standpoint of Campbell as well as his views on the purpose of the exordium.

Philosophical Views of George Campbell

The philosophical views of Campbell were drawn from a number of sources. James Golden and Edward Corbett pointed to four tenets drawn from Locke, Hume and Hartley.

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[49]Blair, p. 110.

1. The mind is separated into faculties.
2. Experimental method is superior to syllogistic reasoning.
3. Ideas are held together by laws of association.
4. Belief and persuasion are dependent on the liveliness of an idea and the force of emotional appeals.[50]

To these should be added a further discussion of words and their meanings that ties in closely with the association of meanings but goes a bit beyond this.

Even while accepting many ideas from these sources, Campbell found some of their basic conceptions untenable.

> When Campbell stated that intuitive evidence consists in the immediate perception of conformity between "conception" and its "archtype," he disavowed, in one bold stroke, the representative theory of ideas which Locke had so reluctantly embraced and which lay at the heart of Berkeley's idealism as well as Hume's skepticism.[51]

In looking at Campbell's theories of logical truth, Edney also writes of Reid's assessment of Locke and Hume's skepticism.

> Neither Locke nor Berkeley, nor Hume, Reid pointed out, produced any evidence for the assumption that all the objects of knowledge are but ideas in the mind. The theory of ideas as objects, he argued, is inconsistent with the "common sense" of mankind. ...It was with Thomas Reid that George Campbell joined hands. There is no question but that his Philosophy of Rhetoric supplemented what Mills calls the "world of argument and illustration" employed by Reid to refute the doctrine of perception by means of ideas.[52]

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[50] James L. golden and Edward P. J. Corbett, eds., The Rhetoric of Blair, Campbell and Whately (New York, Chicago: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1968), Intro., p. 15.

[51] C. W. Edney, "George Campbell's Theory of Logical Truth," Speech Monographs, 20.

[52] Edney, p. 23.

In keeping with this adherence to the viewpoint expressed by
Reid and to his classical orientation, Campbell gave his own meaning
on "virtue."

> One reduceth all the virtues to <u>prudence</u> and is
> ready to make it clear as sunshine that there
> neither is nor can be another source of moral
> good, a right-conducted self-love; another is
> equally confident that all the virtues are but
> different modifications of disinterested <u>benevo-</u>
> <u>lence</u>; a third will demonstrate to you that <u>vera-</u>
> <u>city</u> is the whole duty of man; a fourth, with more
> ingenuity and much greater appearance of reason,
> assures you that the true system of ethics is
> comprised in one word, <u>sympathy</u>.[53]

With these noted exceptions, which, as we shall see, are not the
exceptions they would first appear to be, we can return to the four tenets
derived from Locke and Hume and examine, in turn, the use made of them by
Campbell.

1. First, the mind is separated into faculties.

There is some disagreement concerning the extent of Campbell's
acceptance of "faculty psychology." Campbell classified the faculties of
the human mind identified by the philosophers as the response aims of elo-
quence. These faculties included understanding and reason, will, appetite
and affection, and imagination. While he recognizes the distinctness of
these faculties in the collective minds of members of an audience, Campbell
is also well-aware of the interrelationships.

> On the surface, Campbell appears to be a faculty
> psychologist. His is not, however, a strict divi-
> sion of faculties. The faculties of understanding,
> imagination, passion, and will, blend into one
> another. The understanding assists the imagina-
> tion, the imagination stimulates the passions, and

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[53]Edney, "Campbell's Lectures of Pulpit Eloquence," <u>Speech Mono-</u>
<u>graphs</u> (March, 1952) XIX, 3.

> the passions move to action. Any one discourse
> may be completely and thoroughly rational in
> nature; another may be predominately emotional.
> Any given speech may be located at any point
> between these extremes of emotionalism and
> rationality.[54]

This use of the various functions of the human mind as the basis for

Campbell's recognition of the different ends of speech, affected both the

ethos of the speaker in the different situations, and the perceptions of

the audience at the time.

Next, Campbell felt the experimental method to be superior to the

syllogistic. Here is what may have been an internal inconsistency in

Campbell. Though he insisted the mind held certain intuitive truths, he

also insists these truths are arrived at by repeated consistent experiences.

> There seems to be no question that Campbell con-
> fused the "intuitive perception" of truth with the
> "rational" acquisition of truth. We have noticed
> that he classified such generalizations as "the
> course of nature will be the same tomorrow as it
> is today" as "intuitive" truths. Actually, gen-
> eralizations of this kind are inductive references,
> although probably no conscious process of "intel-
> lection" went into their apprehension. The same
> may be said if other "intuitive" truths furnished
> by our author.[55]

Although Campbell used the uniformity of nature as a fundamental

principle of induction, he did not admit the uniformity of nature as a

suppressed major premise in reasoning. (As proposed by Richard Whately.)

However, Campbell did recognize certain "first truths" on which all others

were based.

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[54]Edney, "Campbell's Lectures of Pulpit Eloquence," Speech Monographs (March, 1952), XIX, 3.

[55]Edney, p. 24.

> No attentive process of reasoning, he argued,
> is necessary to arrive at intuitive truth.
> Intuition furnishes us with first truths.
> Without first truths, knowledge would be in
> a sad plight; "the investigation of truth
> would be an endless and fruitless task; we
> should be eternally proving, whilst nothing
> could ever be proved."[56]

These first "truths" come from three sources: intellection, con-
sciousness and common sense. The first, intellection, is the instant

recognition we have of the truth of mathematical relationships, such as

one and four make five. Consciousness is our assurance of our own exist-

ence--that we are living and breathing entities. It is also the source

of mental judgements made by the mind "concerning resemblances or dispar-

ities in visible objects, or size in things tangible, darker or lighter

tints in colors, stronger or weaker tastes or smells." From "common sense"

we derive our assurance of such truths as "whatever has a beginning has a

cause." "The course of nature will be the same tomorrow as it is today."

> It is apparent that Campbell was in complete accord
> with Locke and with Mill on the empirical view that
> intuitionism consists in perceptions derived from
> sensation or reflection.[57]

Campbell's theory of "deductive evidence" is quite different from

general to specific and in no way relates to syllogistic reasoning. It

consists of uninterrupted series of axioms, a chain of intuitions or immedi-

ately perceived truths that in themselves mean nothing but together lead to

a perfectly conclusive argument. "Assertions opposite to demonstrative evi-

dence, being inconceivable and contradictory are not only false but absurd."[58]

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[56]Edney, p. 24.

[57]Edney, p. 24.

[58]Edney, "Logic," p. 25-26.

The second form of deductive evidence is moral evidence.

> Moral evidence is that form of belief which is
> derived from the actual, though perhaps variable,
> connexions subsisting among things actually
> existing. Moral evidence is in reality a group
> of independent truths, each of which bestows a
> certain degree of likelihood upon the credibility
> of a fact....Recognizing, as had Locke, that we
> think and speak and act upon the basis of pro-
> positions that vary in degree from certainty down
> to improbability, Campbell pointed out that, although
> we reach toward actual truth or matter of fact through
> moral evidence, we achieve only variant degrees of
> likelihood.[59]

In every instance mentioned, syllogistic style has been abandoned in favor

of the empirical or experimental.

Next, Campbell realized that ideas are held together by the laws

of association. All we know is perceived through the senses. This is

stored in the memory. These two faculties could give us only isolated

facts from past or present that have no use without further function.

> One could perceive thousands of similar individual
> facts and yet not perceive universal truth if the
> mind had not the power of focusing its attention
> upon qualities which the individual has "in common
> with the order" while other qualities of the indi-
> vidual remain unnoticed. Campbell agreed with
> Locke that the generals which remain after we
> have quit particulars "are only creatures of our
> own making: their general nature being nothing
> but the capacity they are put into by the under-
> standing of signifying or representing many
> particulars....General and universal belong
> not to the real existence of things, but are
> the inventions and creatures of the under-
> standing, made by it for its own use.[60]

This ability to associate ideas and impressions is essential to

the development of language in Campbell's theory. In ordinary matters it

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[59]Edney, "Logic," pp. 25-26.

[60]Edney, pp. 23-24.

is natural and easy for the mind to compare words with knowledge of things

signified; in matters of an abstruse and intricate nature, or in matters

treated in an uncommon manner, reference to fact is more difficult to

achieve. There are three kinds of word usage in which we are likely to

be imposed by words without meaning: "first, by an exuberance of meta-

phor; secondly, by the use of unfamiliar terms of a complicated nature

(such as church, power, state); and th..dly, in kinds of communication

in which the terms employed are very abstract, and consequently of very

extensive signification."[61]

> Mere sounds, which are used only as signs and
> which have no natural connection with the objects
> of which they are signs, convey knowledge to the
> mind even though they excite no idea of the things
> signified. This curious fact is accounted for by
> an explanation of (1) the connection that subsists
> among things, (2) the connection that subsists
> among words and things, and (3) the connection
> that subsists among words.[62]

The conclusion drawn from these observations compose Campbell's theory of

propositions.

1. No idea is known in isolation--only its relation-
   ship to other objects, things or events.
2. "Association of ideas" means propositions to Campbell.
3. Inference is relationship within propositions and
   between propositions.
4. Propositions are traditional subject-predicate type.
5. Campbell didn't recognize either the hypothetical
   or disjunctive proposition.
6. Campbell's relation of things (resemblance,
   identity, equality, contrarity, cause and effect,
   concomitancy, vicinity in time and place).
7. Propositions are assertions respecting things not
   ideas of things.
8. He objected to the assertion that the predicate of
   a proposition is a "name of the same thing of which
   the subject is a name."[63]

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[61]Edney, "Logic," p. 22.

[62]Edney, p. 23.

[63]Edney, pp. 21-23.

The last point mentioned by Golden and Corbett as originating with Locke and Hume, described belief and persuasion as dependent on the liveliness of ideas and the force of emotional appeals.

Campbell classifies speeches according to the audience reaction desired. He identified the explanatory speech as purposing to inform the listener. The controversial speech is also addressed to the understanding for the purpose of "conquering error" and to produce belief. The commendatory speech pleases the imagination. Stimulation of passions in the pathetic discourse relies on heavy emotional appeal. Persuasive discourse, designed to influence the will, is the most complex form.

> The speech to persuade includes all the ends of oral discourse; it informs, convinces, pleases, and moves. It is a combination or blend of reason and emotion which purposes to bring about action. To make me believe it is enough to show me that things are so; to make me act, it is necessary to show that the action will answer some end. That can never be an end to me which gratifies no passion or affection in my nature. In order to persuade, it is always necessary to move the passions. Passion is the mover to action, reason is the guide.[64]

Though much in the philosophy of George Campbell is directed toward rhetoric, and though many of these theories are derived from the writings of Locke and Hume, there still seems to be enough evidence here to show he had some leanings toward empiricism and even skepticism. However, Campbell recognized there were different levels for truth and our ascertainment of it. There are seen varying degrees of probability from the certainty of "first truths" all the way to the alternate propositions derived from

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[64]Edney, from Campbell's "Lectures on Pulpit Eloquence," p. 5.

moral evidence. He clearly recognized the different mental faculties but also sees them acting in consort during the rhetorical process called "persuasion."

Campbell's Views of Ethos in Rhetoric

In Campbell's eyes, ethos as proof carried this meaning: "By this we are to understand...that which is obtained reflectively from the opinion entertained of him by the hearers or the character which he bears with them."[65] The importance of ethos for the public speaker was recognized by Campbell as being of primary importance.

> It was remarked in general, in the preceding
> chapter, that for promoting the success of the
> orator, it is a matter of some consequence that,
> in the opinion of those whom he addresseth, he
> is both a wise and good man.[66]

Ethos, no matter what end of speech is sought, is best achieved through thorough education in relevant subject matter. For the preacher, thorough knowledge of the Scriptures is very important. Also included in this education should be the development of the capability allowing for relevant, comprehensive and mutually exclusive partitioning of speech content. The orator also must have a thorough understanding of "the natural and genuine grounds of reasoning...every public speaker should be conversant with the writings of Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian...and for the paraphernalia for which these three rhetoricians are almost exclusively responsible."[67]

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[65]McDermott, p. 497.

[66]Campbell, "The Philosophy of Rhetoric," ed., Golden and Corbett, Chapter 10, p. 226.

[67]Edney, p. 9. (Lectures on Pulpit Eloquence)

Edney further explains the forms of logic with which the speaker is to be familiar as well as the essential differences in things. This is an understanding of "first truths" compared to those propositions derived from moral evidence. A speaker living in this newly skeptical age was more creditable to his audience when he clearly understood his own position on these factors.

> In regard to liberal education, Campbell states emphatically that "whatever be the species of eloquence a man aims to attain, everything that serves to improve his knowledge, discernment and good sense, also serves to improve him as an orator. Also, he remarks that "true logic, it must be acknowledged, is best studied not in the scholastic system, but in the writings of the most judicious and best reasoners on the various subjects supplied by history, science and philosophy."[68]

The different types of public speakers were expected by their listeners to have different types of character or "ethos." Campbell recognized this and gave his readers an account of what was expected from the senator, the lawyer and the preacher. First, for the senator:

> ...reputation of sagacity, experience in affairs, and as much integrity as is thought attainable by those called men of the world, will add weight to the words of the senator.

For the lawyer:

> ...that of skill in his profession, and fidelity in his representation, will serve to recommend what is spoken by the lawyer at the bar.

For the "divine":

> But if these characters in general remain unimpeached, the public will be sufficiently indulgent to both in every respect. On the contrary, there is little or no indulgence in regard to his own failings, to be

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[68]Edney, p. 10.

> expected by the man who is professedly a sort
> of authorized censor, who hath it in his charge
> to mark and reprehend the faults of others. And
> even in the execution of this so ticklish a part
> of his office, the least excess on either hand
> exposeth him to censure and dislike. Too much
> lenity is enough to stigmatize him as lukewarm
> in the cause of virtue, and too much severity as
> a stranger to the spirit of the Gospel.[69]

The manner of speaking for the preacher is also a matter for discussion and explanation. The delicacy he speaks of should be evident in delivery.

> There is a certain delicacy in the character of
> the preacher which he is never at liberty totally
> to overlook, and to which, if there appear any-
> thing incongruous, either in his conduct or in
> his public performance, it will never fail to
> injure their effect.[70]

George Cambell shows a departure from the classical concept in his treatment of the audience. This is largely due to his classification of the ends of speech. He treats with "men in general" and then "men in particular" as Aristotle did, but he has a new list of the conditions that operate on the passions of men. These conditions include: probability, plausibility, importance, proximity of time, connection of place, relationship to the persons concerned and the degree of interest in the consequences.[71]

When the audience had developed an unfavorable attitude toward the speaker, Campbell recommends the use of some specific techniques:

> For this is only endeavoring, by the aid of
> laughter and contempt, to diminish or even
> quite undo, the unfriendly emotions that have

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[69]George Campbell, "The Philosophy of Rhetoric," Chapter 10, p. 227.

[70]Campbell, 228.

[71]Golden and Corbett, footnote, p. 10.

been raised in the minds of the hearers; or, on
the contrary, by satisfying them of the serious-
ness of the subject, and of the importance of the
consequences, to extinguish the contempt, and make
the laughter, which the antagonist wanted to excite,
appear, when examined, no better than madness.[72]

The exordium or proem of the speech should predispose the audi-
ence in favor of the speaker. However, Campbell does not see this as a
function for the introduction of a sermon.

Although Campbell is in sympathy with Aristotle's
suggestion that the proem remove any unfavorable
prepossessions that exist in the minds of the
audience, he does not accept it for the pulpit.[73]

RICHARD WHATELY

In analyzing the views of Richard Whately on concepts of ethos in
rhetoric, surely the first thing to consider is his censure of just the
type of analysis being given the subject in this work. Whately criticized
the perspective that puts morals, politics, law and other subjects all in
the realm of rhetoric. He claimed no such concerns for the rhetorician
and further doubted any of his contemporaries would seriously consider
these questions as being related to the subject.

...some of the ancient writers...even insisted on
virtue as an essential qualification for the perfect
orator: because a good character, which can in no
way be so surely established as by deserving it,
has great weight with the audience. These notions
are combatted by Aristotle; who attributes them
either to the ill-cultured understanding of those
who maintained them, or to their arraogant and pre-
tending disposition, i.e., a desire to extol and
magnify the art they professed.[74]

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[72]Golden and Corbett, pp. 221-223.

[73]Edney, p. 9.

[74]Golden and Corbett, p. 280.

Whately chooses to limit his work on rhetoric to "argumentative composition," generally and exclusively.[75]

Philosophy of Whately

To Whately the province of philosophy included investigation leading to certain conclusions. When the conclusions are made known to others, this is the province of rhetoric. His views are most clearly seen in religious related writings and theories.

> If a man begins (as is too plainly a frequent mode
> of proceeding) by hastily adopting, or strongly
> leaning to, some opinion which suits his inclina-
> tion, or which is sanctioned by some authority that
> he blindly venerates, and then studies with the ulti-
> mate diligence, not as an Investigator of Truth, but
> as an Advocate laboring to prove his point, his talent
> and his researches, whatever effect they may produce
> in making converts to his notions, will avail nothing
> in enlightening his own judgement, and securing him
> from error.[76]

His religious views held the Word of the Bible to be the truth for Protestants.

> The principles that governed the stand he took in all
> religious controversies was Chillingworth's premise
> that, "the Bible, and the Bible alone, is the reli-
> gion of the Protestants. And it was this allegience
> to the Scriptures that accounts for the emphasis he
> puts on testimony in his Elements of Rhetoric.[77]

The skepticism of the day challenged his logical mind to realistically reestablish the validity of Biblical testimony of Miracles that had been questioned and repudiated by David Hume. Whately wrote "Historic Doubts"

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[75]Golden and Corbett, p. 281.

[76]Golden and Corbett, p. 282.

[77]Golden and Corbett, p. 274.

using Hume's own criteria for acceptenace of testimony to prove that Napoleon Bonaparte never really existed. The work eloquently shows the application of Hume's tests for the truth of testimony can be used to prove even well-know facts to be mere myths.[78]

Whately on Ethos in Rhetoric

Quintilian's good man theory came under fire from Whately. He asserted the theory was not so wide spread as the classical writers had imagined--and certainly he felt the practice was even less wide spread. Whately feared the results of a theory that posed all orators as being good. This interpretation ignores Quintilian's statement that the "bad man" is not to be called an orator.

> It seems generally admitted that skill in compo-
> sition and speaking, liable as it evidently is
> to abuse, is to be considered on the whole as
> advantageous to the public...because truth,
> having an intrinsic superiority over falsehood,
> may be expected to prevail when the skill of the
> contending parties is equal; which is more likely
> to take place, the more widely such skill is
> diffused.[79]

Whately simply makes the doctrine of ethos conform to what he observes in orators. He demands excellent traits in the speaker, both because it is the judgement a "wise" man would make and because an audience, in most cases, esteems the good. He also views it as being of primary importance that the orator at least seem to feel the sentiments he is delivering are true and right. "The personal sympathy felt towards one who appears to be delivering his own sentiments, is such, that it usually

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[78] Pomeroy, p. 75.

[79] Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric (Oxford: John Murray, 1828), p. 17.

rivets the attention, even involuntarily, though to a discourse that seems hardly worthy of it."[80]

Whately recognized the same three general components in individual ethos assigned to it by Aristotle. Good character, good will toward the audience and knowledge or intelligence evidenced in the speech will all aid in giving ethos to the speaker.

> The qualities of ethos are called good principle, good sense and good will. Whately is speaking of audience opinion, not the true character of the speaker. He does, nevertheless, advise that the speaker possess these qualities.[81]

Whately recognized that there is often a "party spirit" or feeling present in the audience to be addressed. This "spirit" or possibly prejudice must be ascertained by the speaker and he must take appropriate steps to offset it. To do this there are strategies that can be employed and these are explained.[82]

The ehtos of the speaker can play so important a role in the rhetorical process that Whately sees it as a potential threat to an intelligent decision making process.

> Whately views this audience preoccupation with character or personage of the speaker a primary cause of inability to judge accurately. He sees little hope for remedying the situation. He also holds with Aristotle on the advisability of projecting wise, amiable and generous sentiments toward the audience.[83]

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[80] Whately, p. 377.

[81] Whately, pp. 122-123.

[82] Golden and Corbett, p. 145.

[83] Golden and Corbett, pp. 145-150.

Other advice for the effective orator includes the concealment
of any obvious manifestation of rhetorical skill. Obvious rhetorical
devices serve to arouse suspicion in the audience. The natural and
unaffected style of speaking is to be highly preferred to give the audi-
ence the impression of sincerity and spontaneity. Below is a summary of
suggestions for establishment of ethos with an audience.

1. Speaker with the authority of Pericles may
   explicitly state his good qualities of character.
2. Maxims and truisms may not be used indiscriminately.
3. Speech must be adapted to the education, profession,
   nation and character of the audience.
4. To the degree the speaker's arguments disagree with
   the audience they will tend to depreciate his
   intellectual and moral worth.[84]

In regard to this last point Whately did not mean to say that no speaker
should attempt a topic that was not already accepted by his audience. This
would remove the purpose and all persuasion from rhetoric. He did mean to
show the speaker the disposition of the audience to be overcome. The
"divine" particularly will often find himself talking about a subject the
listeners would rather ignore.

> The preacher, who is bound to be asserting things
> the audience does not accept, should win people by
> degrees—not demand too much at one time. Begin
> speech with propositions most people will agree with.[85]

Whately, in conclusion, cautioned that weak arguments would not be
enhanced by sublime language. To enhance ethos with the audience, speak
because you have something to say. Moral excellence in the speaker is
shown in lack of display or ostentation in manner. Delivery should be
natural, not to the point of being careless, but at the same time not
governed by strict rules.

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[84]Golden and Corbett, pp. 275-280.

[85]Golden and Corbett, p. 282.

CHAPTER V

THE MODERNS

I. A. RICHARDS

This discussion of Richards' philosophy will necessarily include

his views on rhetoric. Inherent in Richards' view of man is his symbol-

using power. This is the quality he has that sets him apart and above

the other life forms. He speaks of this as the stimulus-response pattern

that in its most primitive form is common to all life. The response may

accept or reject the stimulus and on this basis it is stored within the

memory for recall at will. Man recalls these past stimuli to compare

with current ones in a constant search for similarity. Richards has

defined four philosophies related to this pattern.

1. Sorting

The organization of these stimuli is needed to make them useful

as references for future experiences. Sorting is a part of this process.

> A sensation would be something that was just so,
> on its own, a datum; as such we have none. Instead
> we have perceptions, responses whose character comes
> to them from the past as well as the present occasion.
> A perception is never just of an it; perception takes
> whatever it perceives as a thing of a certain sort.
> All thinking from the lowest to the highest--what-
> ever else it may be--is sorting.[1]

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[1]I. A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1936), p. 30.

2. Abstraction

Man's response to a stimulus can at one and the same time be bio-
logical, emotional and conceptual. It is in the use of language it becomes
conceptual. All three responses may fight for dominance within the indi-
vidual in any stimulus-response situation. The process of selecting one
of these patterns is abstracting and is used as a basis for sorting. In
other words, instead of a conceptualized, or worded response, the indivi-
dual might make a completely emotional one. It is reason that makes the
difference.

> Richards' answer to this complexity of choice in
> the abstractive process is the reason whose func-
> tion it is to control both the emotional and the
> conceptual elements in the process in a way that
> ensures the proper, realistic, and balanced whole
> meaning of the event. It is under the guidance
> and control of the reason that the process of
> abstraction can produce true and realistic
> abstract symbols.[2]

Inherent in this process is the context or environment of the event—
where and under what circumstances the event takes place. From the
observed environment of the event we may recall other circumstances in
similar environments which will affect our immediate reason or judgement
affecting the abstraction or choice of responses to make in the given
situation.

> Richards' final admonition about the abstraction
> is that we should remember it is a mental activity,
> and valid only in that sense. In the discussion of
> parts of context and the conflict between emotion
> and intellect, we tend to think of these elements
> as really separate and distinct. This is one of
> the liabilities of abstraction. The parts of the

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[2]Daniel Fogarty, Roots for a New Rhetoric (New York: Bureau of
Publications, Teachers College, 1959), p. 35.

context are one, and the desiring of the emotions is never quite separable from the thinking of the intellect. As Richards puts it, "We cannot, in fact, wholly leave off wanting. No thinking can be motiveless."[3]

3. An Approach to Metaphor

According to Richards' theory the best explanation for language theory is metaphor. In metaphor, a quality is abstracted from one reference and a quality from another put in its place for the purpose of clarification or vividness. In respect to this type of metaphor, Richards says, "in the simplest formation, when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose manner is a resultant of the interaction."[4]

Two terms are adopted by Richards in his discussion of metaphor as a basis for language. "Tenor" is the underlying idea or principle subject in the instance. The term "vehicle" is used to refer to the selected characteristics used to make the tenor clearer or more vivid. The "ground" refers to the relationship between the two. With this background, Richards is ready to say that language is metaphoric.

> Richards' most emphatic contention about metaphor, thus explained, is that language is naturally metaphoric. Since metaphor is just abstraction for the purpose of clearer and more vivid communication, since it seems to be the nature of our thinking to be perpetually busy with sorting and classifying references and comparing contexts and their parts, and since our language symbolizes this thinking, it seems to Richards that our language must be highly, habitually, and even naturally metaphoric.[5]

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[3] Fogarty, p. 36.

[4] Richards, p. 93.

[5] Fogarty, p. 38.

Richards takes issue with Aristotle's contention that the art of metaphor cannot be taught to another but is a sign of genius. His counter-contention is that metaphor-making ability comes naturally to ordinary people and that we cannot get through "three sentences of ordinary fluid discourse without it."[6]

4. Thought-Word-Thing Relationships

In discussing Richards' theories it is obvious that his emphasis is operational. Rather than concern for the nature of thoughts, words and things, Richards is showing an interest in "how words work."[7]

Terminology used by Richards in this explanation has "reference" standing for thought, "symbol" for word or language unit, and "referent" for the actual event or object. The reference will include not just the immediate thought but all the concommitant elements and those from past experiences that go along with it. The "sign" is the one stimulus in the whole event that serves to remind the subject of the rest of the details. The "context" is the whole event with the psychological portion occurring within the individual and the external referring to the actual event. The "engram" is the residual trace of some past excitation left in some psychological part of the organism. The relationships between the three primary terms, reference, symbol and referent, are shown in the diagram below.


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                    reference
          causal              causal
   symbol  _ _ _ _ _ indirect _ _ _ _ _  referent
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
[6]Richards, p. 92.

[7]Richards, p. 8.

> As can be seen in Richards' diagram, there is a
> causal relationship between the reference and the
> symbol. In other words, the communicator using a
> certain word or expression can cause his hearers
> to form a thought somewhat similar to his own.
> And, conversely, the thought or reference can
> cause, at least in part, the use of a certain
> symbol to express it.[8]

The second relationship, between the reference and the referrent,
is also causal and is so because the referrent has acted on the organism
in such a manner as to cause it to have some reference about it. This
causation can be from either the current stimulus or it can be from past
stimulations or the memory of such stimulations.

> But the last relationship--and this is the important
> one for Richards--is not directly causal, nor is the
> relationship a real one in the sense of the other
> two. This "imputed" relationship points to the key
> principle from which stems Richards' theory of pro-
> positional truth, his value norms, his theory of
> definition, and the validity of his criteria for
> accurate interpretation. It is the principle
> stating that there is no referential relation
> between the symbol and the referrent, between
> the word and the thing. To phrase it differ-
> ently, the symbol, or word, does not really "refer
> to" the thing or referrent except indirectly through
> the thought or reference. The symbol merely "stands
> for" the thing referred to by the reference. Whereas
> it symbolizes the reference it does not symbolize the
> thing.[9]

To Richards it is this relationship that accounts for much of the
ambiguities and misunderstood messages in communication. When people mis-
takenly assume that the symbol and the referrent are directly related they
lose sight of the fact that the mental reference for the symbol can vary
from person to person and within a person at different times. It is to

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[8]Fogarty, pp. 41-42.

[9]Richards, pp. 10-12.

this reference that the symbol refers and not to the referrent at all

except by the indirect relationship existing between the two.

> This key contention about the indirectness of
> the relationship between the symbol and the
> referrent is of major importance to Richards,
> because a failure to understand and apply it
> is, for him, at the root of most of the prob-
> lems of conceptual meaning. The confusions of
> ambiguity and word shifts, multiple meaning,
> and out-of-place definitions are, in his theory,
> at least partly ascribable to the making of
> direct relationships between symbols and
> referrents.[10]

To understand the symbol one must constantly check the reference.

Richards deplores "any absolute doctrine of proper meaning which assumes

a direct, stable and real relation between word and thing."[11] From the

standpoint of the public speaker, this can be a most important concept.

> For one word or symbol there can be as many
> references or thoughts as there are persons
> to think them. The communicator faces as many
> interpretations of his symbols as he has hearers,
> and even each of these is momentarily changing.
> The hearer may be sure, when he hears a symbol,
> that it can mean something at least slightly
> different from any meaning it may have had at
> any other time in his hearing.[12]

Richards' Theory of Definition

Traditional definitions of words lead to four difficulties that

should be avoided by a practical theory of definition. There are confu-

sions between real and verbal definitions or the defining of words and

things. Confusion of the symbol and the referrent, forgetting the defini-

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[10]Richards, p. 2.

[11]Fogarty, p. 43.

[12]Fogarty, pp. 43-44.

tions are suited to the occasion in which they are used, and confusing

intensive with extensive definitions.

> Richards' answer to these four problems is the
> principle of indirect relationship between the
> symbol and the referrent. Whenever there is a
> difficulty about what a symbol means, when there
> is a question of definition, look for the refer-
> rent. A referrent common to all concerned, in a
> discussion for instance, must be found.[13]

The range of definition is falsely limited because of the human persistent

tendency to assume words have unalterable meanings. Words are actually

defined according to their ultimate use. A definition designed for use in

a discussion may be quite different from one designed for operational pur-

poses. These speculative inquiries result in Richards' instruments of

comprehending.

Since Richards is concerned about words and their changing meanings,

it is at all times wise to define the terms he is explaining the way he

intended them to be interpreted. Here "comprehending," "meaning," and

"interpreting" are all of primary importance to the understanding of

Richards' theories.

"Comprehending," to Richards means, "an accurate and true under-

standing, but is described...as the nexus or context, or the network of

contexts, that connect a whole series of past occurrences of partially

similar utterances in partially similar situations. This comprehension

is the seizing of meaning."[14] By meaning, Richards is talking about the

reference with its contexts. Interpretation includes both the processes

of seizing this meaning and having the comprehension.[15]

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[13]Fogarty, p. 45.

[14] Fogarty, p. 48.

[15]Fogarty, p. 48.

Richards lists seven speculative instruments that he hopes will be the basis for a new rhetoric. At various times he has called these "tasks of rhetoric," "aims of discourse," "language function," and "kinds of meaning."[16]

1. Indicating is pointing out the referent in the symbol situation.
2. Characterizing says something about the referent, sorts it out from others.
3. Realizing is the sense of understanding, having the reference before the mind more fully or vividly than in times of less realization.
4. Valuing assesses the saying from the standpoint of worth or obligation.
5. Influencing marks the state of wanting to change or preserve unchanged whatever the utterance in question concerns.
6. Controlling the instrument is making the decisions regarding the influence mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
7. Purposing is the measuring of the intention or motive of the utterance.[17]

There is no necessary set of relationships among or between these instruments. In Richards' speculation they may vary independently but they very seldom do so. The instruments actually have mutual control over each other. These instruments are, of course, used by the hearer. However, they can also be used by the speaker or originator of the message to clarify and objectivize his communication.

> These instruments as components of his system of comprehension are the heart and the head of Richards' proposed new rhetoric, the core of a discipline that will take the place of the old rhetoric among the liberal arts. A grasp of such things and much practice and exercising in them is Richards' tentative answer to the

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[16]Fogarty, p. 48.

[17]Fogarty, pp. 49-51.

rhetoric problem. As we saw in the early pages
of this analysis of Richards' theory, he is dis-
satisfied with the way current rhetoric concen-
trates upon the mere devices of persuasive compo-
sition and speech. He wants a whole treatment of
man's symbol-using power in prose, its philosophy
as well as its practical application. He proposes
that this wholeness should be reflected in a new
teaching rhetoric for classroom use.[18]

To Richards, rhetoric is the art of adapting discourse to its end. His

entire philosophy is devoted to this purpose. Theories of ethos or

character for the speaker, adapting oneself or discourse to the audience

or listeners in question, are all equated with the clarification of meaning

and nothing more. Certainly truth would seem, in this scheme, where values

and definitions are changeable, an entity that is defined in terms of the

purposes and needs of the communicants at the time in question.

His schematic idea of methodology is to start
with whatever sticks up as the most urgent and
pertinent element of a problem, and then work
in any direction at all that has the scent of
truth. The important thing, seemingly to
Richards, is to be able to seek in any direc-
tion, at any time.[19]

KENNETH BURKE

To Burke "man pours all his energies into establishing and main-

taining his personal world of hierarchic order." He further elaborates

on this same thought:

His survival depends on it. And rhetoric is his
specific means of seeking or keeping that order.
Not only in intrapersonal relations, where man
uses his rhetoric on himself, where he holds
inner parliament as both speaker and hearer,

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[18]Fogarty, pp. 54-55.

[19]Fogarty, p. 32.

but, in all his interpersonal, intergroup, and
interclass relations, he is striving for status
in an accepted order, for survival by social
balance with his inner self and with his world.[20]

For Burke, entreaty, overture, politeness and diplomacy are all forms of

rhetoric courtship employed for the sake of order. Rhetoric leads men

through the conflicts and scramble of everyday competition for the neces-

sities of life. Burke sees the possibilities for rhetoric to also be the

conveyance that would mean new peace and order for a war-weary world.

Richards approached rhetoric from the psychological order, Burke's

method is psychosocial. The scientific method that interested Richards

is replaced by the dramatic approach of Burke.[21]

There are six aspects to be explored in consideration of Burke's

concept of rhetoric.

1. Burke's background and approach to rhetoric.
2. The pentad format.
3. The theory of abstraction and the negative.
4. The theory of identification and definition.
5. His philosophy of literary form.
6. The instrumental applications of the theory.[22]

The Pentad Format

Burke was aware of a multi-dimensional view of every human, symbol

producing act. There are always these five points of view:

Scenes, the environmental point of view; act, the
thing itself as represented in an idea; agent, the
derivational or efficient cause aspect of the thing;

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[20]Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (New York: George
Braziller, Inc., 1950), p. 39.

[21]Fogarty, p. 58.

[22]Fogarty, p. 58.

agency, the "how" and "with what assistance"
of the thing or act; and purpose, the agent's
motivation.[23]

With this method Burke hopes to be able to ascertain the multiple
aspects of the meanings of symbols used to organize and protect our posi-
tion in the order of existence. Burke states that he often writes in
"pantalogue" to be certain to cover all possible aspects of a situation.

Theory of Abstraction and Negative

Burke's ideas of word-thought-thing relationships give a condition
of reality to the existence of ideas or thought as representing the object
conceptually.

> ...Burke can be considered as having two things to
> say about abstraction. First, it is the character-
> istically human ability that makes a rational man
> specifically rational. Not only is this abstracting
> power, which Burke calls "generalization," the speci-
> fic element of his essence as a man, but it lifts his
> nature, in kind as well as in degree, above that of
> other animals.[24]

The negative comes into play in the highest kind of symbol-using
activity of which man is capable. This is symbol-using about symbols them-
selves or the conscious use of words to talk about other words. The theory
of the negative comes into play here as the difference between human and
animal sorting. With each idea reducible to the material there is no need
for the metaphysical reality of ideas. Burke isolated or identified the
idea that cannot be reduced to an image and materialized.

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[23]Kenneth Burke, _A Grammar of Motives_ (Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1945) intro., pp. xv-xvii.

[24]Fogarty, p. 65.

> That idea was the idea of the "no" or "not,"
> or, in other words, the negative. It is Burke's
> contention that "not" can be conceived, in an
> idea, and yet one can have no image of it. All
> the images one has in connection with it are not
> really its image but images of the real things
> of which it is the negation.[25]

This gives the human being the unique capability of being able to conceive an idea for which there is not image. Earlier in this study (page 27), there is a reference to a sophistic topic for disputation "older than Protagoras himself," that says there can be no spoken falsehood for the false has no existence. However, nothing can be conceived or spoken of that has no existence. It is impossible to speak of the non-existent. Here, 2500 years later, is the antithesis.

> Though idea and image have become merged in the
> development of language, the negative provides
> the instrument for splitting them apart. For
> the negative is an idea; there can be no image
> of it. But in imagery there is no negative.[26]

This leaves the negative as the sole example of an idea that cannot be reduced to material.

Theory of Defintiion and Identification

Burke's theory of definition is empirical in the sense that he looks realistically at the actual practice as used in rhetorical situations. From observation he has isolated and identified four types of ambiguity that may arise in the process of definition. He then states his position of the use that is made of these in the creation of meaning in speech.

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[25] Fogarty, p. 66.

[26] Kenneth Burke, "A Dramatic View of the Origins of Language," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXVIII (October, 1952), pp. 256-259.

The four types of ambiguity are:

1. Contextual definition describes a class or group in terms of their environment without taking into account the characteristics of members of the group.
2. Derivational definition defines by source. "Sources, however, are often so highly abstract in a definitional statement that they allow many different meanings. Burke examines the terms 'general,' 'generic,' and 'genitive' etymologically and finds ambiguity."[27]
3. Circumference shifting in the tendency to shift the agreed on definition of a term to a new area as a discussion progresses.
4. Scope-reduction-deflection are used under varying circumstances to change the scene of the act.[28]

These ambiguities are the symbol-user's way of getting away from

kinds of meanings that do not fit his motivation. They are often used to

retain ethos with the audience when getting a desired point accepted.

> ...the four kinds of definitional ambiguity...
> (make) for unclear communication and reception,
> but...they are the symbol-user's conscious or
> unconscious ways of getting away from the kind
> of meaning that does not fit his motivations.
> It is part of the fortunate richness of lang-
> uage that makes it possible for people to adjust
> themselves to reality. Personally and subjectively,
> it allows them to be blind to reality in one spot
> and not another. The great point about this kind
> of ambiguity, as about every kind of motivatidnal
> manipulation of symbols, is that it must be under-
> stood thoroughly by those who wish to receive and
> communicate real meaning--motivational meaning.[29]

To Burke, then, ambiguities are not undesirable in communication, but need

to be studied with a view to clarifying the resources of ambiguity. For

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[27] Fogarty, p. 69.

[28] Fogarty, pp. 68-71.

[29] Fogarty, p. 71.

example, people in a dialectical give and take have subjective blind

spots due to different motivations. In the give and take of discussion

they may light up each others blind spots, fill out contexts, round out

and unify circumstances, and generally come to some degree of mutual

agreement in understanding and action. Burke lists motivational ambig-

uities used by people not, necessarily, to deceive, but often merely to

fit the requirements of the moment. Pair terms such as love-duty, piety-

impiety, the sacrifice and the kill, illustrate ambiguity of motivation

and of terms in a similar fashion.

> Often, too, the symbol-user will build what Burke
> calls eulogistic and dyslogistic labels for his
> acts, that enables him to indulge, whether con-
> sciously or not, for himself or for others, in
> limitless motivational window dressing. Depending
> on one's known or unknown motive or situation, he
> can describe industry either as "planned economy"
> or as "regimentation." Care with details can be
> labelled "fussiness" or "painstaking method."[30]

It is interesting to note here that neither alternative is given

preference over the other. The terms are used to adapt to the necessities

of the situation as they arise.

> I am merely attempting to suggest that a termin-
> ology of motives is not evasive or self-deceptive,
> but is moulded to fit our general orientation as
> to purposes, instrumentalities, the "good life,"
> etc.[31]

Identification

The identification Kenneth Burke speaks of is in reality consub-

stantiation. Two people, different in other ways, may have one common

factor in which they are substantially the same.

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[30]Fogarty, p. 74.

[31]Fogarty, p. 73.

> A doctrine of consubstantiality, either explicit
> or implicit, may be necessary to any way of life.
> For substance, in the old philosophies, was an
> act; and a way of life is an acting together; and
> in acting together, men have common sensations,
> concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make them
> consubstantial.[32]

When using identification or consubstantiality to persuade an audience, a
speaker proceeds according to their way of thinking. When using emotion,
the speaker feels the way the audience will be expected to feel. On another
occasion he will identify with some characteristic of the audience. When
talking to an audience of Boy Scouts, he might describe a scout troop he
belonged to as a boy.[33]

It is division, or partisanship, within any group of people that
creates a need for identification. It deals with one side of a proposition
as opposed to the other. Within a partisan group members share an identi-
fication and in this way it serves union and cooperation.

> Identification is affirmed with earnestness pre-
> cisely because there is division. Identification
> is compensatory to division. If men were not
> apart from one another, there would be no need
> for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity.[34]

Fogarty sums up Burke's theory of identification as "temporarily
and topically assuming the rational, emotional, and motivational level of
one's audience for the purpose of communicating motivational meaning."[35]

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[32] Burke, "Rhetoric of Motives," p. 21.

[33] Fogarty, p. 75.

[34] Burke, "Rhetoric of Motives," p. 22.

[35] Fogarty, p. 76.

The Philosophy of Literary Form

The philosophy here alluded to deals with kinds of form, the literary symbol, ideology, eloquence, manner and style. In the area of form, Burke speaks of the innate, internal patterns of expectancy within humans that are part of psychological and psychobiological patterns. The patterns are the innate forms.

> They involve the basic arrangements or processes like the succession of the seasons, stages of growth, contrast of opposites, and so on. Following these innate expectancies is the pattern of form in style of writing. Burke calls these forms of style or technical forms "an arousing and fulfillment of desires. That is, style has form when it builds up for an expectancy, with an innate form or pattern, and then answers that expectancy by satisfying it."[36]

An exception that Burke makes to this general rule for building and fulfilling of desires comes in the informative communication.

> Another thing to be noted is the antithesis between form and information in Burke's theory. When a literary product lacks form, it is usually because it is that type of communication which has as its purpose simply to relate facts as they are. Even though this kind of objective exposition is hardly possible in the strictest purity, present-day science aims at it as an ideal. Between this informational communication and literature of the richest form there can, of course, be literature with varying proportions of the two.[37]

The literary symbol is seen by Burke as the "verbal paralle to a pattern of experience."[38] The actual experience being cited is not part of a pattern with which the listeners are personally familiar. However, some

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[36]Fogarty, p. 78.

[37]Fogarty, p. 79.

[38]Fogarty, pp. 79-80.

part of the experience will relate to a similar one that is more frequent and familiar. Through the recall and association, the audience receives the meaning from the speaker. The experience to which the audience relates may be of smaller magnitude than the one referred to by the speaker, but it allows the listener to understand what he is hearing. Mark Antony used this sort of symbol when he showed the ingratitude of Caesar's friends who had responded to his friendship with betrayal and murder.

Burke's understanding of ideology was that it was a general belief or judgment that the artist, orator, or writer can be sure the audience has.

> The more popular type of newspaper makes use of
> such ideologies when its news articles on juvenile
> crime, let us say, imply that teenagers ought to
> obey and respect their elders; or its news articles
> on strikes imply two conflicting ideologies, the
> living wage and the need for public order. A
> symbol with the appropriate experience pattern
> and based upon an ideology is charged with con-
> siderable power.[39]

Style and manner will tell the speaker what to put where and how much should go there. Eloquence, joined with the other two, serves to give the discourse the interest and appeal to gain acceptance from the audience.

Some Instrumental Applications of Burke's Theory

The pentad is cited as the means of interpretation of communication. In its broadest application it answers all questions that might be asked about a problem. The categories are broad and within their confines will be found room for every possible question that might arise.[40]

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[39] Fogarty, p. 81.

[40] Fogarty, p. 82.

> Act, Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose become the
> "pentad" for pondering the problem of human
> motivation. Among these various terms gram-
> matical "ratios" prevail which have rhetorical
> implications. One might illustrate by saying
> that a certain quality of scene calls for an
> analogous quality of act. Hence, if a situ-
> ation is said to be of a certain nature, a
> corresponding attitude toward it is implied.[41]

The explanation given for this cites the speaker who implored that Presi-

dent Roosevelt be given "unusual powers" because the country was in an

"unusual international situation."[42] This focus on circumstances as a

determinant in the quality of the action is related to Aristotle's treat-

ment of motivation.

> Strongly allied with the classicists throughout
> all his works in both his ideas and his metho-
> dology, Burke shows indebtedness to Aristotle for
> his treatment of motivation. Taking a clue from
> Aristotle's consideration of the "circumstances"
> of an action, Burke concludes that "In a rounded
> statement about motives, you must have some word
> that means the act,...and another that names the
> scene;...also, you must indicate what person or
> kind of person performed the act, what means or
> instruments he used, and the purpose.[43]

The ratio between the scene and the act may be used either to show that a

certain policy had to be adopted, or that one should be adopted.

The application of the identification principles to rhetoric is

two-fold. Identification may be used in persuasion and it may be used as

an end in itself.

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[41] Marie Hochmuth Nichols, "Kenneth Burke and the New Rhetoric,"
Contemporary Theories of Rhetoric, ed., Richard L. Johannesen (New York:
Harper and Row, 1971), p. 109.

[42] Nichols, p. 109.

[43] Nichols, p. 109.

As for the precise relationship between identi-
fication and persuasion as ends of rhetoric, Burke
concludes, "we might well keep in mind that a speaker
persuades an audience by the use of stylistic identi-
fications; his act of persuasion may be for the pur-
pose of causing the audience to identify itself with
the speaker's interests; and the speaker draws on
identification of interests to establish rapport
between himself and his audience. So, there is no
chance of our keeping apart the meanings of per-
suasion, identification (consubstantiality) and
communication (the nature of rhetoric as 'addressed').
But, in given instances, one or another of these
elements may serve best for extending a line of
analysis in some particular direction.[44]

The other purpose of identification in rhetoric, as an end in

itself, is:

Identification, at its simplest level, may be a
deliberate device, or a means, as when a speaker
identifies his interests with those of his audi-
ence. But identification can also be an "end,"
as when people earnestly yearn to identify them-
selves with some group or other." They are thus
not necessarily acted upon by a conscious external
agent, but may act upon themselves to this end.
Identification "includes the realm of transcend-
ance."[45]

In Burke's concept of rhetoric, the sense of "morals" or "ethics"

is introduced on the intrapersonal level when the process of persuasion is

turned inward in the process of justification for one's stand on some issue.

By considering the individual self as "audience"
Burke brings morals and ethics into the realm of
rhetoric. He notes that a "modern 'post-Christian'
rhetoric must also concern itself with the thought
that, under the heading of appeal to audiences,
would also be included any ideas or images privately
addressed to the individual self for moralistic or
incantatory purposes. For you become your own audi-
ence...when you become involved in stylistic sub-
terfuges for presenting your own case to yourself
in sympathetic terms....Therefore, the "individual

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[44]Nichols, p. 101.

[45]Nichols, pp. 101-102.

person, striving to form himself in accordance with
the communicative norms that match the cooperative
ways of his society, is by the same token concerned
with the rhetoric of identification."[46]

Ethos, as the character of the speaker, the total of habits,

customs, is thus very closely allied to Burke's theory of identification.

Whenever the speaker is using identification, interpersonally to an audi-

ence or intrapersonally to self, he is identifying and establishing ethos.

RICHARD WEAVER

There are two orientations that are considered essential to any

study of the writings of Richard Weaver. The first of these is his poli-

tical conservatism and the second, his Platonic idealism.

> ...Weaver championed the Agrarian ideal of individual
> ownership of private property and disdain of science
> as inadequate to deal with values. He desired in
> society law, order and cohesive diversity. The just
> and ideal society, he believed, must reflect real
> hiearchy and essential distinctions. An orderly
> society following the vision of a Good Purpose,
> with men harmoniously functioning in their proper
> stations in the structure, constituted Weaver's goal.[47]

The Platonic idealist in Weaver strenuously rejected the theories of the

general semanticist and progressive educator.

> Secondly, Weaver was a devoted Platonic idealist.
> Belief in the reality of transcendentals, the
> primacy of ideas, and the view that form is prior
> to substance constituted his philosophical founda-
> tion. While not a Platonist in all matters, he yet

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[46]Nichols, pp. 105-106.

[47]Richard L. Johannesen, Rennard Strickland and Ralph Eubanks,
eds., "Richard M. Weaver on the Nature of Rhetoric: An Interpretation,"
Language is Sermonic (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1970), p. 11.

> looked for societal and personal salvation to
> ideals, essences, and principles rather than
> to the transitory, the changing, and the
> expedient.[48]

This study of the writings of Richard Weaver will consider first,
Weaver's conception of the nature of knowledge. Nest, the nature of man
in regard to the scientistic interpretation opposed to the human qualities
that defy scientific analysis will be looked at from Weaver's perspective.
Here also will come a discussion of Weaver's observation that "as a man
speaks so he is." Four sources of authority are the basis for this "classi-
fication" of men by argument sources.[49] The discussion of Weaver will con-
clude with statements of Weaver's concepts of rhetoric and the functions of
the teacher.

The Nature of Knowledge

Central to understanding other theories developed by Richard Weaver
is his concept of the nature of knowledge. His concept was complex but
did note three orders of knowledge.

> He partially agreed with Mortimer Adler that there
> are three "orders" of knowledge. First is the level
> of particulars amd individual facts, the simple data
> of science. Second is the level of theories, pro-
> positions and generalizations about these facts.
> Third is the level of philosophic evaluations and
> value judgements about such theories. At this third
> level, ideas, universals, and first principles func-
> tion as judgement standards. Knowledge based on
> particulars alone and on raw physical sensations
> is suspect since it is incomplete knowledge. True
> knowledge is of universal and first principles.[50]

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[48]Johannesen, p. 11.

[49]Johannesen, pp. 21-25.

[50]Johannesen, p. 12.

This knowledge of universals was to be arrived at in three ways: through dialectic, the ability to differentiate existents into categories, and through "intuition, the ability to grasp 'essential correspondences.'"[51] Certainly Weaver's concepts of the "good" were part of his understanding of the nature of knowledge.

> The ultimate "goods" in society were of central concern to Weaver. Reality for him was a hierarchy in which the ultimate Idea of the Good constituted the value standard by which all other existents could be appraised for degree of goodness and truth. Truth to him was the degree to which things and ideas in the material world conform to their ideals, archetypes, and essences.[52]

Nature of Man

During the Nineteenth Century a belief in the all-powerful and revealing scientific method entered our way of thinking. The Industrial Revolution had already developed a method for use in study of the physical world and the resultant material advantages confounded the minds of the Nineteenth Century philosopher. Certainly it seemed desirable to apply the same methods to the humanities that had done so much for the physical side of our existence. The process began. Experimentation moved from the physics and chemistry laboratories into the psychology and rhetoric classrooms. Men were to be analyzed in the same manner as chemicals and physical forces. To do this men had to be reduced to chemicals and physical forces. The result, Weaver points out, has been to downgrade the study of rhetoric and to demean the "human" or "emotional" qualities of men.[53]

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[51] Johannesen, p. 12.

[52] Johannesen, p. 12.

[53] Richard Weaver, "Language is Sermonic," Language is Sermonic, ed., R. L. Johannesen, et al. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), pp. 201-204.

> In this case we have to deal with the most potent
> of cultural causes, an alteration of man's image
> of man. Something has happened in the recent past
> to our concept of what man is; a decision was made
> to look upon him in a new light, and from this deci-
> sion new bases of evaluation have proceeded, which
> affect the public reputation of rhetoric. This
> changed concept of man is best described by the
> word "scientistic," a term which denotes the appli-
> cation of scientific assumptions to subjects which
> are not wholly comprised of naturalistic phenomena.[54]

Weaver goes on to explain that this led to man's efforts to deny the emo-

tional side of his being.

> From this datum it was an easy inference that men
> ought increasingly to become scientists, and again,
> it was a simple derivative from this notion that man
> at his best is a logic machine, or at any rate an
> austerely unemotional thinker. Furthermore, carried
> in the train of this conception was the thought, not
> often expressed, or course, that things would be
> better if men did not give in so far to being human
> in the humanistic sense.[55]

What was included in this "humanistic sense" were the capacities to feel

and suffer, to know pleasure, emotionality, the capacity for aesthetic

satisfaction. It was generally felt any such experiences were to be mis-

trusted and such inclinations in the individual were better suppressed.

Rhetoric had always recognized this "human" side of human beings and was

therefore thrown into greater disrepute.

> Under the force of this narrow reasoning, it was
> natural that rhetoric should pass from a status in
> which it was regarded as of questionable worth to a
> still lower one in which it was positively condemned.
> For the most obvious truth about rhetoric is that its
> object is the whole man.[56]

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[54] Weaver, p. 203.

[55] Weaver, p. 204.

[56] Weaver, p. 205.

Weaver recognized that man's fundamental humanness resides in four areas:

> He held that man's fundamental humaness is founded in four faculties, capacities, or modes of apprehension. Man possesses a rational or cognitive capacity which gives him knowledge; an emotional or aesthetic capacity which allows him to experience pleasure, pain, and beauty; and ethical capacity which determines orders of goods and judges between right and wrong; and a religious capacity which provides yearning for something infinite and gives man a glimpse of his destiny and ultimate nature.[57]

Plato's influence on Weaver may in part account for his tri-partite division of man's nature. Though the divisions are not the same, both did adhere to the same type perception of the nature of man.

> Weaver used a tripartite division of body, mind, and soul to further explain man's essential nature. The body, man's physical being, houses the mind and soul during life but extracts its due through a constant downward pull toward indiscriminate and excessive satisfaction of sensory pleasure....Man's mind or intellect provides him with the potential to apprehend the structure of reality, define concepts, and rationally order ideas....Man's soul or spirit--depending upon whether it has been trained well or ill-- guides the mind and body toward love of the good or toward love of physical pleasures...[58]

It has been mentioned that central to Weaver's rhetorical theories was his political conservatism. This is reflected in his thinking about the nature of man as indicated from the stylistic characteristics and modes of argument he uses in his speech. Weaver pointed out that a frequent use of the word "but" indicated a balanced point of view toward world affairs.

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[57]Johannesen, pp. 13-14.

[58]Johannesen, p. 14.

The modes of argument were even more specific indicators of a person's philosophical orientation.

> "A man's method of argument is a truer index of
> his beliefs than his explicit profession of prin-
> ciples," Weaver held as a basic axiom. "A much
> surer index to a man's political philosophy," he
> felt, "is his characteristic way of thinking,
> inevitably expressed in the type of argument he
> prefers." Nowhere does a man's rhetoric catch up
> with him more completely than in "the topics he
> chooses to win other men's assent."[59]

Weaver looked to the Aristotelian topoi for the arguments that would determine the philosophy of the speaker. These topics, used as the basis for argument in persuasive speeches, Weaver ranked from most ethically desirable to the least. The basis for his judgement was the philosophic conception of reality and knowledge. The most ethically desirable topic was that that relied on genus or on definition.

> A speaker would make the highest order of appeal
> by basing his argument on genus or definition.
> Argument from genus involves arguing from the
> nature or essence of things. It assumes that
> there are fixed classes and that what is true
> of a given class may be imputed to every member
> of that class...Definitions should be rationally
> rather than empirically sustained. Good defini-
> tions should be stipulative, emphasizing what-
> ought-to-be, rather than operative, emphasizing
> what-is...Weaver also included argument from
> fundamental principles and arguments from
> example...He believed that argument from genus
> or definition ascribe "to the highest reality
> qualities of stasis, immutability, external
> perdurance."[60]

Argument from similitude or analogy was placed second in Weaver's order of the topics. He noted that some of our deepest intuitions about

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[59]Johannesen, p. 20.

[60]Johannesen, p. 22.

the world around us are expressed in the form of comparisons. Although

not able to portray the actual essence of the thing at the moment, the

use of the comparison indicates an awareness of it.

> In this mode of argument are embraced analogy,
> metaphor, figuration, comparison, and contrast.
> ...The user of an anlogy hints at an essence he
> cannot at the moment produce. Weaver asserted
> that "behind every analogy lurks the possibility
> of a general term."[61]

Third in the hierarchy of topics is cause and effect. In this

category Weaver includes argument from consequences.

> This method of argument and its subvarieties, he
> felt, characterized the radical and the pragmatist.
> Causal argument operates in the realm of "becoming"
> and thus in the realm of flux. Argument from con-
> sequences attempts to forecast results of some
> course of action, either very desirable or very
> undesirable. The results are a determining factor
> for one in deciding whether or not to adopt a pro-
> posed action. Arguments from consequences, Weaver
> observed, usually are completely "devoid of refer-
> ence to principle or defined ideas."[62]

The fourth and least desired of the topics is argument from circum-

stance. This is the mark of the true liberal in Burke's eyes. Here is one

who is easily impressed by existing tangibles--with the status quo.

> The arguers from circumstance, concerned not with
> "conceptions of verities but qualities of percep-
> tions," lack moral vision and possess only the
> illusion of reality...."Actually," he explains,
> "this argument amounts to a surrender of reason.
> Maybe it expresses an instinctive feeling that in
> this situation reason is powerless. Either you
> change fast or you get crushed. But surely it
> would be a counsel of desperation to try only
> this argument in a world suffering from aimless-
> ness and threatened with destruction."[63]

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[61]Johannesen, p. 23.

[62]Johannesen, p. 24.

[63]Johannesen, p. 25.

Weaver has been criticized for his narrow view of criticism for ascertaining the relative conservativeness or liberalness of a speaker. He has overemphasized the "agency" of Burke's pentad at the expense of the agent, act, scene and purpose. Nevertheless, the system was meant to show a basic quality of reason deeply rooted in the mind. Those who naturally turn to a principle and definition for their arguments have the cast of mind that is less likely to be swayed by changing circumstances. On the other hand, one who consistently chooses circumstance or expediency as the premise for argument is fully tuned to a society in flux and is ready to suit his arguments to the needs of the moment.

Weaver's Concept of Rhetoric

Richard Weaver saw rhetoric as necessarily concerning itself with the right and wrong of policies and actions. By its very nature, rhetoric has to function in an advisory capacity and those who practice it are advisors.

> Rhetoric is advisory; it has the office of advising men with reference to an independent order of goods and with reference to their particular situation as it relates to these. The honest rhetorician, therefore, has two things in mind: a vision of how matters should go ideally and ethically, and a consideration of the special considerations of his auditors. Toward both of these he has a responsibility.[64]

Weaver, always the conservative, was deeply influenced by classic rhetoric in his conceptions of the nature of the art. He, at one point, widened the scope of rhetoric beyond the purely linguistic.

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[64]Johannesen, p. 17.

> As his writings on rhetoric show, he was familiar
> with the ancient theories of Plato, Aristotle,
> Cicero and Quintilian. And Plato's views on the
> subject held a special attraction for him. The
> influence of Kenneth Burke is also clearly reflected
> in Weaver's writings on rhetoric. At one point
> Weaver views rhetoric as a process of making identi-
> fications and he widens the scope of rhetoric beyond
> linguistic forms to include a "rhetoric of matter or
> scene," as in the instance of a bank's erecting an
> imposing office building to strengthen its image.[65]

The Platonic idealist in Weaver perceived rhetoric as constantly

showing men "better versions of themselves, links in that chain extending

up toward the ideal which only the intellect can apprehend and only the

soul have affection for."[66]

The Aristotelian influence manifested itself in his recognition of

the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric.

> Like Aristotle, Weaver perceived a close relationship
> between dialectic and rhetoric. Dialectic, he main-
> tained, is a "method of investigation whose object is
> the establishment of truth about doubtful propositions.
> ...Dialectic involves analysis and synthesis of funda-
> mental terms in controversial questions. Both dia-
> lectic and rhetoric operate in the realm of probability."[67]

Inherent in the practice of rhetoric is the use of words. Weaver's

concept of the place of words in the meaning of things was directly con-

trary to that of Richards. To Weaver, the meaning is in the word. To be

sure at some time an object receives a name. That essence for which the

symbol stands becomes so associated with the word that to change the mean-

ing would be to shake the foundations of civilization itself.[68] Weaver

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[65] Johannesen, p. 16.

[66] Johannesen, p. 17.

[67] Johannesen, p. 19.

[68] Richard Weaver, "Relativism and the Use of Language," Language
is Sermonic, ed., Johannesen et al., pp. 115-135.

also recognizes words do change from time to time in their meaning. However, this is only done with the assent of the people belonging to the culture that uses the word.

Closely associated with this is the definition of that which is unique.

> It must surely be granted that whatever is unique defies definition. Definition must then depend on some kind of analogical relationship of a thing with other things, and this can mean only that definition is ultimately circular....Such conclusions lead to the threshold of a significant commitment: utlimate definition is as Aristotle affirmed, a matter of intuition. Primordial conception is somehow in us; from this we proceed as already noted, by analogy, or the process of finding resemblance to one thing in another.[69]

Weaver equates this loss of true definition of words with the decline of a culture in "Relativism and the Use of Language." He points to terms such as "freedom," "democracy," and others that no longer can be precisely defined for every occasion and draws some parallels with these confusions and those existing in sophistic Athens.

> Certainly one of the most important relevations about a period comes in its thoery of language, for that informs us whether language is viewed as a bridge to the monumental or as a body of fictions convenient for grappling with transitory phenomena.[70]

What can be done to restore the purity of the language? Weaver looks to the educator for the answer.

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[69]Weaver, "The Power of the Word," ed., Johannesen, pp. 41-43.

[70]Weaver, "The Power of Words," p. 35.

Weaver's Views on Education

First, in a general nature, Weaver sees poetry as the vehicle to bring the scope of meaning again into the understanding of men. It takes minds with imagination and genius to give meanings to words. This is the realm of the poet.

> In brief, the discipline of poetry may be expected
> first to teach the evocative power of words, to
> introduce the student, if we may so put it, to the
> mighty power of symbolism, and then to show him
> that there are ways of feeling about things that
> are not provincial either in space or time. Poetry
> offers the fairest hope of restoring our lost unity
> of mind.[71]

With the instruction in poetry would come foreign languages. Here the student would be brought face to face with the concept of unchangeable meanings. He particularly favored the introduction of Greek into the curriculum.[72] Another aid in reestablishment of the concept of stable word definitions would be the study of Socratic dialectic.

> The student will get a training in definition which
> will compel him to see limitation and contradiction,
> the two things about which the philosophy of pro-
> gress leaves him most confused. In effect, he will
> get training in thinking, whereas the best that he
> gets now is a vague admonition to think for himself.[73]

Progressive education with "student centered" instead of "teacher centered" learning is not conducive to teaching the true meanings of things in Weaver's view. The teacher is placed in charge of his class as a "definer" and the students should be able to look to him (or her) to fill this role.

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[71]Weaver, "Word," p. 53.

[72]Weaver, "Word," p. 53.

[73]Weaver, "Word," p. 55.

The teacher is, according to Weaver, a "definer,"
a "namer," and an "orderer," of the universe of
meanings. After all, he argues, the "world has
to be named for the benefit of each oncoming
generation." Those who give the names have a
unique role in ordering and controlling society.[74]

According to Weaver it was in the Fourteenth Century that a choice
was made between teaching vere locqui (to speak the truth) and recte loqui
(to speak correctly). The choice was made for recte loqui because if the
"new" theories being disclosed by Francis Bacon. In Advancement of Learn-
ing he stated "the essential forms or true differences of things cannot by
any human diligence be found out."[75]

Empiricism was gathering strength, and the decision
was to teach recti loqui, as one can discover in the
manuals of rhetoric of the Renaissance. Once the
ontological referrents were given up, however, this
proved but an intermediate stage, and the course
continued until today we can discover on all sides
a third aim, which I shall take the liberty of
phrasing in a parallel way, utiliter loqui.[76]

This utiliter loqui is described as the hand maiden of success.
This is using language for betterment of position in the world. It is
using "language as a tool which will enable you to get what you want if
you use it well--and well does not mean scrupuously."[77]

Those who teach English on this level are the modern
sophists, as the homely realism of the world seems to
recognize. They are doing what the orators were once
accused of doing, making speech the harlot of the arts.

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[74]Weaver, "To Write the Truth," intro., Johannesen, p. 186.

[75]Weaver, "Truth," p. 188.

[76]Weaver, "Truth," p. 188.

[77]Weaver, "Truth," p. 189.

> More specifically, they are using the universality
> of language for purposes which actually set men
> against one another. They are teaching their
> students to prevail with what is, finally, verbal
> deception.[78]

The teaching of recte loqui seems more respectable because it

teaches a sort of etiquette. Because it seems the better of the two,

there is danger in its promotion.

> ...recte loqui requires the language of social
> "property." Because it reflects more than any-
> thing else a worldliness or satisfaction with
> existing institutions, it is the speech of
> pragmatic acquiescence. Whoso stops here con-
> fesses that education is only instruction in
> mores. Is it any wonder that professors have
> been contemptuously grouped with dancing masters,
> sleight-of-hand artists, and vendors of patent
> medicine?[79]

The only alternative left is to teach people to speak the truth

and this can only be done when the teacher recognizes the existence of the

truth and the fact that the truth can be ascertained and transmitted to

others.

> This means teaching people to speak the truth,
> which can be done only by giving them the right
> names of things. We approach here a critical
> point in the argument, which will determine the
> possibility of defining what is correct in expres-
> sion.[80]

Weaver was not unaware of the arguments that would be brought to

bear against this proposal. The idea of defining and clearly stating what

is right and what is wrong has departed from the classroom. In the spirit

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[78]Weaver, "Truth," p. 189.

[79]Weaver, "Truth," p. 191.

[80]Weaver, "Truth," p. 191.

of "letting the child learn to think for himself," and the belief that there are many possible answers for any questions, the teacher has been impressed with his own inadequacy in making an accurate assessment of the truth of any situation. In light of this, he feels very inadequate when called on to make positive statements of definition of concepts that have become loosely defined.

> I am not unaware of the questions which will come crowding in at this point. It will be asked: By what act of arrogance do we imagine that we know what things really are? The answer to this is: By what act of arrogance do we set ourselves up as teachers? There are two postulates basic to our profession: the first is that one man can know more than another, and the second is that such knowledge can be imparted. Whoever cannot accept both should retire from the profession and renounce the intention of teaching anyone anything.[81]

Much more could be written in explanation of these views of our modern-day Platonic philosopher. It is to be hoped that these summary statements of Weaver's views of rhetoric will serve our ends for comparison with other rhetoricians with similar and differing points of view.

Conclusions

This discussion of modern concepts of ethos has concerned itself with three contrasting and influential philosophical approaches to the field of rhetoric. It is relevant to the topic in the broad sense of ethos seen as the total character of the speaker. This would include his basic acquisition of knowledge and skills, his concepts of relativism or

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[81]Weaver, "Truth," p. 194.

permenance of value structure, and his ideas of the true purposes and
goals of rhetoric. It must also involve the audience members' expecta-
tions and reactions to the speaker, both as individuals and members of
a group. These are the ideas this chapter has dealt with.

The moderns have gone much further. Answers to modern concepts
of ethos questions are not complete as presented here.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

It has been the purpose of this study to discover the similarities and differences that exist between classical and modern concepts of ethos and to discover relationships of the concepts to philosophical value systems. The historical approach was used involving a search of literature to discover the philosophical orientations of the periods in question and of the rhetoricians writing during that period. Writings of selected rhetoricians were searched for specific concepts of ethos. The study was focused by asking seven questions that were to be answered during the course of the investigation:

1. What philosophical value systems provide the bases for the concepts of ethos set forth by classical rhetoricians?

2. What concepts of ethos are set forth by classical rhetoricians?

3. What similarities and differences exist between the concepts of ethos set forth by classical rhetoricians?

4. What value systems provide the bases for the concepts of ethos set forth by modern rhetoricians?

5. What concepts of ethos are set forth by modern rhetoricians?

6. What similarities and differences exist between the concepts of ethos set forth by modern rhetoricians?

7. What similarities and differences exist between concepts of ethos set forth by classical and modern rhetoricians?

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This paper has developed value systems of the ancients in some detail. As mentioned before, this is of primary concern in the study of ethics. A rhetorician who accepts the concept that each man has the ability to grasp the right and wrong through instinctive inborn knowledge must have a differently structured view of the relationship of the orator to his audience. Here there can be no compromise with the truth that remains constant for all men at all times and under all conditions. On the other hand, a rhetorician whose value system is colored by a viewpoint that "man is the measure of all things," will see nothing inconsistent with a speaker freely adapting his message, his audience appeals, evidence and his own character to the occasion at hand. When no man has the perception to distinguish right from wrong because he cannot verify the truth of his sensory perceptions, who can demand that the rhetorician display absolute reverence for a value system that has no other qualification than someone else's possibly false impression of right and wrong?

If each rhetorician fell neatly into his slot for one camp or the other, this portion of the paper would be simplicity itself. The originators of the concepts defined them clearly, and that is why they are included in discussion of the opposing stances. Rhetoricians are more practical than this, perhaps, and it is not unusual to find them using concepts from all camps as needed. Because of this complexity and possible confusion these concepts have been placed in chart form with page references.

Similarities and Differences in
Classical Philosophical Precepts Used in
Bases for Ethos in Rhetoric

All impressions are gained through sensory experience. Reference in mind may/may not be same as fact, as another's reference. Cannot communicate references.	Protagoras, 20, 21 Gorgias, 22, 25, 26 Arcesilaus, 79 Carneades, 79, 80
Repeated sense perceptions result in assignment of degrees of probability to some constructs.	Corax, 17, 18 Gorgias, 24, 25 Carneades, 79, 80 Cicero, 88, 89, 90
Association of ideas from sense perceptions to form degrees of probability	Carneades, 79, 80 Cicero, 88, 89, 90
Inductive reasoning from repeated sensory experiences results in absolute definitions.	Socrates, 33, 34, 35
Instinctive reaction to experience of the truth	Cullus Gillius, 77, 78 Meador, 77 Stoics, 77
Metaphysical, instinctive transcendental knowledge gives men right and wrong concepts	Plato, 40 Isocrates, 66 Aristotle, 53, 54

Similarities and Differences in
Ethics in Classical Rhetoric

Truth, virtue. nobility of character are objects of education	Ptah-Hotep, 14 Protagoras, 22 Plato, 41 Aristotle, 48, 49, 50	Isocrates, 63, 66, 67 Ad Herrenium, 82 Quintilian, 97, 98 Cicero, 90, 91, 93
Objective of education is material success	Protagoras, 22, 32, 63 Gorgias, 27, 32, 63	Corax, 17 Isocrates, 63, 66, 67
Education, conviction, come first, then speech.	Socrates, 38, 39 Plato, 41, 42, 43, 44 Aristotle, 56	Ad Herrenium, 82 Cicero, 91, 92 Quintilian, 99, 100
Virtue can be taught.	Protagoras, 22 Socrates, 34	
Virtue cannot be taught.	Gorgias, 27 Plato, 41 Isocrates, 30, 63, 64, 65	
Nature of man to do good	Socrates, 37, 39 Plato, 41 Aristotle, 54	
Nature of man is depraved	Isocrates, 71, 72	
Study and use of noble themes results in noble nature for orator	Isocrates, 70 Quintilian, 98, 99	
Good man is involved in affairs of man, the state	Isocrates, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70 Cicero, 92 Quintilian, 95, 96	
Good man removed from society, lives in world of Ideas	Plato, 46, 69	

Similarities and Differences in
Ethics in Classical Rhetoric and Education

None but honorable means to attain honorable ends	Aristotle, 52, 53, 54
Lie when needed to attain honorable ends	Quintilian, 101, 102, 103
Adapt any way needed to attain any desired end	Ad Herrenium, 84, 95, 86
Broad liberal arts education prepares speaker	Isocrates, 66, 69, 70, 71 Cicero, 91, 92 Quintilian, 95, 96, 98, 99
Orator should be trained from infancy	Plato, 41, 42, 43 Quintilian, 95, 98
If good for society, good for individual	Aristotle, 51 Isocrates, 67 Plato, 44
Men are virtuous for material gain	Isocrates, 67
Orator must be a good man	Quintilian, 95, 96
Men are virtuous because through education they realize this is true happiness	Plato, 42 Isocrates, 36, 67 Aristotle, 51
Rhetoric neutral, no built in value system	Gorgias, 27 Corax, 17, 18
Doctrine of the mean	Aristotle, 52

Similarities and Differences in
Concepts of Ethos as Presented in
Classical Rhetoric

Sources of ethos are sagacity, high character and good will	Aristotle, 55, 56, 57 Isocrates, 66, 67, 70 Ad Herrenium, 82 Cicero, 90, 91, 93 Quintilian, 99, 100		
Ethos gained during speech, not prior opinion	Aristotle,54, 55, 56 Cicero, 93	Ethos from whole of life, habits	Aristotle, 52 Ad Herrenium, 82 Isocrates, 63, 64, 66 Cicero, 91, 93 Quintilian, 99, 100 Ptah-Hotep, 14, 15, 16
In youth, modesty aids ethos	Aristotle, 58, 59 Cicero, 93 Quintilian, 97	Naturalness aids ethos	Ad Herrenium, 87 Quintilian, 97, 98
Be a friend to the audience, identify interests with theirs, praise them	Aristotle, 59 Corax, 17 Plato, 45 Ad Herrenium, 84, 85, 87	Tell stories to win favor of the audience	Isocrates, 73 Ad Herrenium, 86, 87
Exordium used to gain good will of the audience	Corax, 18 Ad Herrenium,84, 85 Quintilian,101	Insinuatio Exordium	Ad Herrenium, 85, 86 Quintilian, 100
Adapt to the audience, forget or change rules as needed	Isocrates, 73, 96 Cicero, 93 Quintilian, 96, 97 Ad Herrenium, 84, 85, 86	Adapt to audience, rules allow for this	Ptah-Hotep, 15 Plato, 44, 45 Aristotle, 57, 58, 59 Ad Herrenium, 85, 86
Rules for conciliation of the judge	Ad Herrenium, 83, 85 Cicero, 93 Quintilian, 100		
How to handle the opposition to gain favor of audience	Ptah-Hotep, 15 Ad Herrenium, 83, 84, 85, 86 Cicero, 93		

Similarities and Differences in
Modern Philosophical Precepts Used as
Bases for Concepts of Ethos
in Rhetoric

All impressions are gained through sensory experience. Reference in mind may/may not be equal to fact, equal to any other reference held by someone else. References cannot be communicated.	John Locke, 109
Repeated sense perceptions result in degrees of probability, result in adoption of language symbols	John Locke, 109, 110 David Hume, 114, 115 George Campbell,129,130,133 I. A. Richards, 144 Kenneth Burke, 160
Association of ideas from sense perceptions form more abstract associations for probabilies and language usage.	David Hume, 114, 115, 116 George Campbell,129,130,133,134 I. A. Richards,144,145,147,148 Kenneth Burke,160 Richard Whately,140
Inductive reasoning from repeated sensory experiences results in first truths, definitions.	George Campbell, 129, 131, 132 Richard Weaver,(against, 168) Richard Whately, 140
Instinctive reaction to the experience of the truth.	Hugh Blair (good taste),121,122 Thomas Reid, 105 George Campbell, 129, 131
Metaphysical, instinctive, transcendental knowledge gives men knowledge of truth, right and wrong precepts.	Thomas Reid, 104 George Campbell, 129, 131 Hugh Blair, 121, 122 Richard Weaver, 163, 164

Similarities and Differences in
Ethics in Modern Concepts of
Education and Rhetoric

Discourse is outward and inward thought.	Richard Whately, 140 Kenneth Burke, 152,153,162
Teachers should give rules for circumstantial definitions.	Kenneth Burke, 157 I. A. Richards, 149,150,151
Teachers should teach absolute definitions.	Richard Weaver, 173, 174
Universals are creations of man from experiences.	David Hume, 114, 115 John Locke, 109,110,111,113 George Campbell, 133
Universals are part of "real" world outside man's experience.	Hugh Blair (taste), 121,122 Richard Weaver, 164, 165 Kenneth Burke, 159 (form)
No image for the negative, man alone can conceive this.	Kenneth Burke, 154, 155
Opposed to scientistic study of humanities.	Richard Weaver, 164,165,166
Prefer scientistic approach to the humanities to the syllogistic.	John Locke,109,110,111,113 David Hume, 114, 115 George Campbell, 132, 133 I. A. Richards, 144 Kenneth Burke, 160
Ambiguous definitions serve men's purposes.	Kenneth Burke, 155,156,157
Ambiguous definitions are sign of deteriorating culture.	Richard Weaver, 172

Similarities and Differences in
Ethics in Modern Concepts of
Education and Rhetoric

Men are good, virtuous, when shown this is Christian, true happiness.	Hugh Blair, 119, 120
Men express virtuous sentiments when needed.	Kenneth Burke, 152, 155
Experience, true knowledge, eduaation, before speaking. Believe in what you say.	John Locke, 109, 110, 111 Hugh Blair, 122 Richard Whately, 140 Richard Weaver, 171
Truth, right definitions are the object of education.	Richard Weaver, 175, 176
Truth will prevail, all else being equal.	Richard Whately, 141
Broad education in literature, liberal arts.	Richard Weaver, 173
Rhetoric is neutral, no built-in value system.	Richard Whately, 139 Kenneth Burke, 155,56,157 I. A. Richards, 144
Antithetical dialectic-- alternatives of different degrees of probability.	George Campbell, 133
Change definitions to suit purposes.	Kenneth Burke, 155,156,157

Similarities and Differences in
Modern Concepts of Ethos in Rhetoric

Modesty of expression promotes ethos, in youth especially.	Hugh Blair, 125, 127
Accommodate to a skeptic audience.	Hugh Blair, 127 Kenneth Burke, 156, 157
Testimony an unreliable form of proof.	David Hume, 117, 118
Testimony a preferred form of proof.	Richard Weaver, 168 Hugh Blair, 121 George Campbell, 121 Richard Whately, 140, 141
Rules for use of testimony.	Richard Whately, 140, 141
Argument from definition most ethical.	Richard Weaver, 168, 169
Style of speaking differs for different types of speaking to gain credit with the audience.	Hugh Blair, 123, 124, 125 George Campbell, 137, 138
Use insinuatio exordium when needed.	Hugh Blair, 127, 128
Too intense style lessens persuasibility--ethos.	Hugh Blair, 124, 125, 126
If appropriate, intensity is most effective for ethos.	Hugh Blair, 124, 125, 126, 128

Classical and Modern Philosophical Precepts
Used as Bases for Concepts of Ethos
in Rhetoric

All impressions are gained through sensory experience. Reference in mind may/may not be equal to fact, equal to any other reference held by someone else. References cannot be communicated	Protagoras, 20,21 Gorgias, 23, 25, 26 Arcesilaus, 79 Carneades, 79, 80	John Locke, 109,110 David Hume, 114
Repeated sense perceptions result in degrees of prob- ability, result in adoption of language symbols.	Corax, 17, 18 Gorgias, 24, 25 Carneades, 79, 80 Cicero, 88, 89, 90	John Locke,109,110,111,113 David Hume,114,115 George Capmbell,129,130,133 I. A. Richards, 144 Kenneth Burke, 160
Association of ideas from sense perceptions form more abstract associations for probabilities and language usage.	Carneades, 79, 80 Cicero, 88, 89, 90	David Hume,114,115,116 George Campbell,129,130,133 I. A. Richards,144,145,147 Kenneth Burke, 160 Richard Whately, 140
Inductive reasoning from repeated sensory experiences results in first truths, definitions.	Socrates, 33, 34, 35	George Campbell,129,131,132 Richard Weaver,(against,168) Richard Whately, 140
Instinctive reaction to the experience of truth.	Cullus Gillius, 77,78 Meador, 77 Stoics, 77	Hugh Blair (taste)121,122 Thomas Reid, 105 George Campbell, 129, 131
Metaphysical, instinctive, transcendental knowledge gives men right and wrong concepts.	Plato, 40 Iscorates, 66 Aristotle, 53, 54	Thomas Reid, 104,105 George Campbell,129,131. Hugh Blair, 129,131 Richard Weaver, 163,164

Ethics in Classical and Modern Concepts of
Education and Rhetoric

Men are virtuous because, through education, they realize this is true happiness.	Plato, 41 Isocrates, 36, 67 Aristotle, 51	Hugh Blair,119,120
Men are virtuous for own material gain.	Isocrates, 67 Kenneth Burke, 152, 155	
Prefer scientistic approach to reaching conclusions in the humanities over use of syllogism.	Socrates, 34 John Locke, 109, 110 David Hume, 114 George Campbell, 129,130,133 I. A. Richards, 144	Kenneth Burke,157 Isocrates, 61, 62
Ambiguous definitions are sign of deteriorating culture.	Plato, 44 Isocrates, 29 Richard Weaver, 172	
Ambiguous definitions aid in reaching ends.	Gorgias, 26, 27 Kenneth Burke, 156, 157	
No image for the negative, man alone can achieve this.	Kenneth Burke, 154, 155	
No image for the false or negative, therefore man cannot conceive it.	Sophists, 27	
Rhetoric is advisory, shows men better versions of themselves.	Protagoras, 22 Plato, 45 Aristotle, 52,53,54,55 Quintilian, Isocrates, 70	Hugh Blair,119,120 Richard Weaver,170

Ethics in Classical and Modern Concepts of
Education in Rhetoric

Experience, true knowledge, education, conviction, before speaking. Believe in what you say.	Cicero, 91 Socrates, 38, 39 Plato,41,42,43,44 Aristotle, 56 <u>Ad Herrenium</u>, 82 <u>Isocrates, 70</u>	John Locke,109,110,111 Hugh Blair, 122 Richard Whately, 140 Richard Weaver, 171
Truth, virtue, the objects of education.	Ptah-Hotep, 14 Protagoras, 22 Plato, 41 Aristotle, 48,49,50	Isocrates,63,66,67,70,71,72 <u>Ad Herrenium</u>, 82 Cicero, 91,93 Quintilian, 93,97 Richard Weaver, 174,175
Nature of man to do good, truth will prevail.	Socrates, 37, 39 Plato, 41 Aristotle, 54	(Truth will prevail) Richard Whately, 141
Study and use of noble themes, study literature, poetry, foundation for broad and noble meanings used in rhetoric.	Isocrates, 70 Cicero, 91, 92 Quintilian, 98, 99	Richard Weaver, 173
Rhetoric is neutral, no built-in value system.	Gorgias, 27 Corax, 17, 18	Richard Whately, 139 I. A. Richards, 144 Kenneth Burke,155, 156,157
Antithetical dialectic, alternative solutions of different degrees of probability.	Gorgias, 25 George Campbell, 133	
Nature of man to be skeptic, depraved, must adapt for this kind of audience.	Isocrates, 72 Hugh Blair, 119, 120, 121	
Adapting meanings and methods to attain any end.	<u>Ad Herremium</u>,83,84,85 Quintilian, 101	Kenneth Burke, 155, 156, 157

Concepts of Ethos in Classical and Modern
Rhetoric

Sources of ethos are sagacity, high character, and good will.	Aristotle, 55,56,57 Isocrates, 66,67,70 Ad Herrenium, 82 Cicero, 90, 91	Quintilian, 93,95 Hugh Blair,122,123 George Campbell,136,139 Richard Whately, 142
Ethos gained during speech, not prior opinion.	Aristotle, 54, 55, 56 Cicero, 93 Weaver, 164, 168	
Ethos from whole of life, habits.	Ad Herrenium, 82 Isocrates,63,64,66 Cicero, 91 Quintilian, 95 Aristotle, 52	Ptah-Hotep, 15,16 Hugh Blair,121,122,123 George Campbell, 136 Richard Whately, 142 Richard Weaver, 164
Ethos can be strongest form of persuasion.	Aristotle (ethos during speech), 55, 56 Richard Whately (reputation, prior ethos), 142	
In youth, modesty aids ethos.	Aristotle, 58, 59 Cicero, 93	Quitnilian, 75 Hugh Blair, 125,127
Naturalness aids ethos.	Ad Herrenium, 87 Quintilian, 91, 94	Hugh Blair, 123 Richard Whately,143
Be a friend to audience, identify interests and character traits with them.	Aristotle, 59 Corax, 17 Plato, 45 Ad Herrenium, 80	Kenneth Burke,157,158,161 Richard Weaver, 171

Exordium used to gain good will of the audience.	Corax, 18
	Ad Herrenium, 83,84,85
	Quintilian, 101
		Hugh Blair,123,126
		George Campbell,
		   (no in homi-
		   letics) 139

Insinuatio Exordium.	Ad Herrenium, 85, 86 Quintilian, 100	Hugh Blair, 127,128
Argument from definition is most ethical.	Plato, 45 Aristotle, (Maxims and first truths)56,57,58 Richard Weaver, 164	

CONCEPTS HELD IN COMMON BY CLASSICAL AND MODERN RHETORICIANS

Man's Only Source of Knowledge is Sensory Experience

Protagoras:	Each person knows only his own image of an object. Truth is individual perception. 20, 21
Gorgias:	No man can conceive or transmit images of ideas. There can be no communication of the abstract. 22, 25, 26
Carneades:	There is no discernible difference between true and false perception, therefore, no way to know if experience is true ot life or not. 79, 80
John Locke:	All we know is gained through sensory experience. Only this experience can be transmitted to another who has had the same experience. 109
George Campbell:	Recognized thought-word-thing relationships. 129, 130, 133
I. A. Richards:	Recognized the indirect relationship between object and mental image. The symbol, or word, is tied directly to the object on the one hand and the mental image on the other. Guides are given to communicants to identify references for symbols. 147, 148, 149
Kenneth Burke:	Different people will have varying definitions for words as circumstances change. 154
Richard Weaver:	Loss of precise word definitions is a sign of a deteriorating culture. 172

Repeated Experiences Result in Recognition of "Degrees of Probability" for Constructs

Corax:	Recommended reasoning from probability in court. 17, 18
Gorgias:	Antithetical dialectic arrives at counter propositions of varying degrees of probability. 25
Socrates:	Repeated experience or observation results in absolute definitions. 33, 34, 35
Aristotle:	Use the experiences of the audience to establish common ground in persuasion. 59

Isocrates: Experience and observation proves the value of virtue. 36, 67

Carneades: Established degrees of probability for knowledge experientially gained. 79, 80

Cicero: Argument based on degree of probability. 88, 89, 90

David Hume: Repeated experiences result in increasing probability for the truth of a phenomenon. 114, 115

George Campbell: "Deductive evidence" of repeated experiences and "moral evidence" lead to propositions of varying degrees of probability. 129, 130, 133

I. A. Richards: Associations of ideas along preconceived guidelines can aid in the determination of word meanings. 148, 149

Kenneth Burke: Different circumstances will result in different interpretations of the same term. Probability of definition determined by co-existing conditions. 160

Richard Weaver: Definitions or argument taken from circumstance or shifting of conditions--from associations--called the least ethical. If taken from historical, or cause to effect, since it happened this way before it should again, then this use of probability is second only to the least ethical. 168, 169

There is a Transcendental Area of True Knowledge of Pure Ideas, Removed from Sensory Perception, Which all Men Hold in Common But do not Always Use and May Not be Aware of

Plato: This universal realm of Ideas held holds truths for all men for all time that are "above" everyday sensory experience. Man should strive to live and theorize in this "Ideal Republic." 40

Aristotle: Recognized an ideal state of virtue, truth and happiness, unrelated to material gain or earthly power. These truths are the true goals men seek and the ones that ultimately triumph. 53, 54

Thomas Reid: Common sense of man is an innate trait. 104

Hugh Blair: "Good taste" is a common inborn trait of men. 121, 122

George Campbell: First truths are known intuitively to man (they are
                       intuitively recognized when experienced). 129, 131

Richard Whately: First truths and virtue are not the concern of
                       rhetoric. 140

Richard Weaver: True knowledge is a function of the mind, the reason,
                       and is ideally colored by as few "experiences" as
                       possible. Should be concerned with the transcend-
                       ental realm of Ideas, not transitory experience. 172

Word Meanings are in People, Not Words   Meanings are in Words

        Protagoras, 20, 21   Plato, 40
        Gorgias, 22, 25, 26   Aristotle, 53, 54
        John Locke, 109, 110   (Thomas Reid)
        George Campbell, 129, 130, 133   (Richard Whately)
        I. A. Richards, 148, 149   Richard Weaver, 170,
        Kenneth Burke, 156, 157   171, 175

Rhetoric is Advisory, Should Show Men   Rhetoric is Amoral
Better Versions of Themselves

        Plato, 41   Gorgias (omits)
        Aristotle, 48, 49, 50   Ad Herrenium, 84, 85
        Isocrates, 63, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72   John Locke
        Quintilian, 97, 98   (Only experiences) 112,113
        Hugh Blair, 119, 120   Richard Whately, 140
        George Campbell, 136   I. A. Richards, 152
        Kenneth Burke (for peace and order) 152
        Richard Weaver, 170, 171

The Object of Education is to Teach
Truth, Right and Wrong, Ethics

        Protagoras, 21
        Plato, 41
        Aristotle, 48, 49, 50
        Isocrates, 63, 66, 67
        Cicero, 90, 91, 93
        Quintilian, 97, 98
        Hugh Blair (religious speaking) 119, 120
        George Campbell (religious speaking) 129, 131
        Richard Weaver, 173, 174

Conclusions

This study explored the hypothesis that similarities and differences exist between classical and modern concepts of ethos and that the concepts can generally be identified with philsophical value systems.

It was focused by the following seven questions:

(1) What philsophical value systems provided the bases for the concepts of ethos set forth by classical rhetoricians?

(2) What concepts of ethos are set forth by classical rhetoricians?

(3) What similarities and differences exist between the concepts of ethos set forth by classical rhetoricians?

(4) What value systems provided the bases for the concepts of ethos set forth by modern rhetoricians?

(5) What concepts of ethos are set forth by modern rhetoricians?

(6) What similarities and differences exist between the concepts of ethos set forth by modern rhetoricians?

(7) What similarities and differences exist between concepts of ethos set forth by classical and modern rhetoricians?

In answering these questions the following conclusions were reached:

(1) Classical value systems that could serve as bases for concepts of ethos were idealistic, naturalistic, and pragmatic.

(2) Ethics in classical periods largely saw education as productive of righteous life styles and rhetoric as advisory.

(3) Similarities in classical concepts of ethos are found in agreement on the importance of audience analysis, speaker wisdom, and speaker honesty or sagacity. Differences are seen in emphasis given to audience adaptation and speech content.

(4) Modern value systems that have related to the concepts of ethos in rhetoric have been predominantly naturalistic and pragmatic.

(5) Education and rhetoric are more generally considered amoral, unrelated to value structures, by modern theorists.

(6) Modern theories of ethos emphasize the importance of the speaker's reputation and language usage. They differ on the importance of content, purpose, and forms of proof needed to gain credibility.

Recommendations for Further Study

(1) In-depth studies of individual rhetoricians of the classical, Renaissance and modern periods should be done.

(2)Extensive studies should be made of current research in the area of ethos in rhetoric.

(3) Correlative studies of the interrelationships between historical, political, philosophical and rhetorical events should be made.

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