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West Germany's Ostpolitik and Relations with the United States Under Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, and Helmut Kohl

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WEST GERMANY'S OSTPOLITIK AND RELATIONS WITH THE
UNITED STATES UNDER WILLY BRANDT, HELMUT SCHMIDT, AND HELMUT KOHL
(TITLE)

BY

David J. Bollmann

THESIS

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ABSTRACT

Many questions arose during the late 1970s and early 1980s about the reliability of West Germany's relationship with the United States. This thesis was written to examine the relationship between the United States and West Germany during the post-war years, especially during the Chancellorships of Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, and Helmut Kohl.

The initial phase of U.S.-FRG relations was marked with a great deal of harmony between the two countries. The United States placed a great deal of emphasis on West Germany as part of its evolving containment of communism strategy. The FRG was recognized as a nation in 1949 and integrated into NATO in 1955.

During the late 1960s under West Germany's Grand Coalition, a slow but steady move toward an Ostpolitik with the East led to tension. A major turning point was the 1968-69 elections of Richard Nixon and Willy Brandt.

The initial phase of West Germany's Ostpolitik was part of a global detente between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Bonn negotiated treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland in 1970, which led the way to a Four-Power Agreement over the status of Berlin signed in 1971. As global detente waned in the mid-1970s, relations between the two allies became more difficult. America's involvement in Vietnam, American troops in Europe, and the "Year of Europe" as called for by Henry Kissinger caused minor irritations.

However, with the signing of the new Atlantic Declaration in 1974 and the Helsinki Accords in 1975, harmonious relations were once again restored.

Increasing tension became evident during the late 1970s. With the decline of global detente and the eventual Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States began to feel that the policy of linkage and detente had failed. The FRG desired to maintain detente as part of its Ostpolitik, as it had witnessed concrete benefits in relations with the East. As the policy of the United States shifted more to one of confrontation and containment, the FRG found itself increasingly at odds with its Atlantic partner.

Several issues caused the Alliance partners extreme difficulty during the early 1980s. NATO's 1979 two-track agreement to explore arms-control agreements with the Soviet Union while at the same time deploying modernized Cruise and Pershing II missiles caused trans-Atlantic relations a great deal of strain. Hundreds of thousands of Europeans protested the stationing and the U.S. feared that West Germany would not be able to live up to its end of the agreement. This split in the FRG was so large that even the SPD, after being voted out of office in 1982, voted against missile deployment. The issue of trade with the Eastern bloc became an issue between the two countries, as President Reagan imposed sanctions to cancel the Siberian natural gas pipeline between the Soviet Union and Western

Europe. The FRG's response to the imposition of martial law in Poland and its improving relationship with East Germany led some American observers to question West Germany's reliability as a NATO ally. They feared a neutralized or "self-Finlandized" West Germany caught between East and West.

While on the surface there appears to be many disagreements between the two Atlantic partners, when one analyzes the post-war relationship there is actually a great deal of unity. The basis for this unity is the common interest of the two countries to withstand the threat of the Soviet Union. After examining each country's views on the East-West conflict, the importance of detente, the role and structure of defense, the role of each country in the Alliance, and economic relations between the East and each other, it is clear that West Germany is still a reliable partner in the Atlantic Alliance. While the FRG has increasingly voiced its views on major issues within the Alliance, and while those views are not always in agreement with the United States, West Germany is not on the road to neutralism or "self-Finlandization."

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my mother and the memory of my father. Without their assistance both in my early years and throughout my school days none of what I enjoy today would be possible. Also to Darla, Christina, Rachel, Brandt, and Sarah, whose love and support are a constant inspiration.

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INTRODUCTION

During the post-war period, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and United States have created a most stable and lasting partnership. The United States has long considered West Germany one of its closest allies. The United States helped to create the country in 1949 and has guaranteed its safety during the post-World War II era. Close adherence to Washington's policies was maintained by the West German governments during the 1950s and 1960s.

In the late 1970s, questions began to arise about the future of the partnership with West Germany. Issues rose to the fore that created feelings of ill will among the two countries. Headlines and newspaper articles appeared such as "Can U.S. Still Count on West Germany?," "Two Allies in Trouble," and "Bonn and Washington: From Deterioration to Crisis?," all of which questioned the reliability of the FRG as an Alliance partner.(1)

Further difficulty arose when America began to question Bonn's commitment to NATO. Cries of "self-Finlandization" and fear of West German neutrality became evident.(2) Europe's peace movement became larger and more vocal. The Green Party began to call for neutralism and increased its size and strength. The leftist faction of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) helped give the impression that West Germany was on the road to neutralism.

The "German problem" has long been one of history's

most difficult. This thesis will analyze the relationship of the United States and West Germany during the post-war era, concentrating especially on the Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, and the early Chancellorship of Helmut Kohl. Issues concerning the countries' relationship with each other will be examined. Was Bonn really on the road to neutralism during the late 1970s and early 1980s as numerous analysts argued, or were there other reasons for the difficulties in the two countries' relationships during this period?

CHAPTER I

GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS DURING THE POSTWAR ERA

1. West German Dependency and Integration into the West

After World War II, the victorious Allies were unable to agree on a policy or a peace treaty for the whole of Germany. What evolved was a divided Germany, with the western occupation zones dependent chiefly on the United States and the eastern zone tied to its occupant, the Soviet Union.

Immediately after World War II, the United States issued a harsh set of instructions on how to deal with the German population. Socializing between Americans and German citizens was prohibited, any elements of Nazism were to be eradicated, and the standard of living in Germany was to be drastically lowered as punishment for the evil done by the Third Reich during the war. However, these policies were only briefly executed. The U.S. forces provided considerable amounts of foodstuffs and increased the low levels of industrial production allowed in the occupied zones.

With the evolution of the Cold War, the United States decided to integrate the western zones of occupation into the evolving Western Alliance. Washington viewed western occupied Germany as a vital part of its containment of Soviet pressure and aggression. Throughout the phases of West Germany's political development, U.S. authorities strongly supported the principle that the German democracy

should evolve from the grass roots and have a decentralized federal system.

2. A Period of Harmony: 1949-1955

The Federal Republic was founded in September of 1949. It became a subordinate partner of the Western powers and of the United States in particular. The initial phase of US-FRG relations, lasting from 1949 to the late 1950s, was a period of harmony for both sides. During this period, the FRG did not question American hegemony in the Western Alliance, but instead largely supported it.⁽¹⁾ West Germany's first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), achieved remarkable success in strengthening West Germany politically and economically. Achievements in these areas did not carry over into Bonn's reunification policy, which during this period was a failure. Adenauer's unification policy was based on two key assumptions: first, that Washington and Moscow held the key to the German reunification question, and second, that the balance of power would eventually shift in favor of the West. This would allow Bonn to negotiate from a position of strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and eventually force the Eastern Bloc to make concessions. Only the first of these assumptions proved to be correct. Washington and Moscow did hold the keys to German unification. However, the balance of power did not shift to the West, thus the Soviets were not forced to make concessions to West Germany from a weakened position as

Adenauer had hoped.(2)

3. A Period of Tension: The Late 1950s to the Late 1960s

In the second stage of US-FRG relations, the period from the late 1950s to the late 1960s, Bonn was forced to make difficult choices between Washington and Paris. The conflicts that developed between the Anglo-American powers and France during this period immensely complicated Adenauer's aim of integrating the Federal Republic in a cohesive West European community. The United States clearly remained the indispensable partner of West Germany's security policy. However, France and its leader, Charles de Gaulle, were determined to reduce Anglo-American influence in Europe, and the French remained indispensable for West Germany's European policy. Nevertheless, until Adenauer's resignation in 1963, and initially under the Chancellor's successor Ludwig Erhard, close adherence and even subservience to the policies of the United States continued.

After the Cuban Missile Crisis in October of 1962, both the Americans and the Soviets realized the need for reducing the tensions that nearly led to a nuclear confrontation. The Soviet Union felt that by relaxing tensions it could import technology, particularly from West Germany and the United States, which would benefit its industries.

For Washington, the German problem was only one part of the complex contest against communism. By the 1960s,

the United States was primarily concerned with the war in Vietnam, which was becoming an increasing drain on its military and economic resources. In view of increasing Soviet atomic power, Washington began to give priority to arms control negotiations with Moscow over the German reunification issue.

4. Reunification as an Issue

During the 1950s, the reunification issue was a vital concern to the West Germans and Americans. Solving the German problem was viewed as the most important step towards improved Western relations with the Communist Bloc. Beginning in the early sixties, particularly after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States and the West began to feel that the only way to achieve peaceful reunification of the two Germanies was through detente. This was communicated to Chancellor Erhard by President Lyndon Johnson in 1966 during the former's visit to the United States.(3) It was now up to the Germans themselves to pursue a flexible "policy of movement" with the nations in Eastern Europe. The Social Democrats became interested in this idea and intended to take the initiative in seeking these contacts, short of diplomatic recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Egon Bahr, a close advisor to Willy Brandt, coined the phrase "change through rapprochement" to describe his program for bridging the gap between the two German states. As the United States continued to search for detente with the Soviets, Bonn

increasingly wanted to become an equal partner rather than a dependent of the United States in order to explore the possibility for an intra-European detente process.

5. The Years of the "Grand Coalition"

In 1966, Kurt Kiesinger became Chancellor of what was known as the "Grand Coalition" between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats. This coalition of the two largest parties in the German Bundestag (Parliament) gave them an overwhelming majority. The most impressive member of the "Grand Coalition" government cabinet was Willy Brandt of the Social Democratic Party, who served as both the Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister.

The foreign policy of the "Grand Coalition" was largely a compromise. The two major parties agreed on a more independent foreign policy, less hostile to Paris, less dependent on Washington, and more active toward the East.(4) The "Grand Coalition" also began to change the way it dealt with East Germany, opting for a policy which tried to include the GDR in their detente efforts instead of attempting to isolate East Germany as past West German governments had attempted to do.

An important part of this gradual change in foreign policy was Bonn's modification of the Hallstein Doctrine. This doctrine prohibited the German Federal Republic from establishing diplomatic relations with a state that recognized the German Democratic Republic, with the exception of the Soviet Union. Under the "Grand

Coalition," West Germany began to pursue establishing full diplomatic relations with the Eastern European states. A signal of this desire was the establishment of diplomatic relations with Romania in 1967 and the resumption of relations with Yugoslavia in 1968 after they had been broken the previous year. In both cases, the politicians avoided conflict with the Hallstein Doctrine by developing the theory of "birth defects." According to this theory, the East European states were forced to recognize the GDR in the 1950s and thus the FRG could not treat them like those countries that chose to recognize East Germany.

In conjunction with the attempt at establishing diplomatic relations was the drive to increase West German trade and credits to the countries of Eastern Europe. The primary aim of these increased trade contacts was to further the political influence of Bonn in Eastern Europe.

However, the SPD went further than the CDU in several key areas of foreign policy, specifically in movement toward recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, the boundary between East Germany and Poland, and de facto recognition of East Germany. Conservatives in the CDU were hostile to these ideas. The result was that the "Grand Coalition" postponed progress on these critical issues, particularly in recognizing the status quo in Eastern Europe.

6. FRG-U.S. Differences During the "Grand Coalition"

Under the coalition, West Germany's relations with the United States were not as close as they had been under

Chancellor Erhard. Several disagreements between the United States and West Germany occurred during the CDU-SPD coalition years.

First, the American forces in Europe were costing the United States large amounts of money. A powerful segment in the United States Congress began calling for either a reduction in American forces in Europe or offset payments by the FRG to reduce U.S. costs. Thus, in 1967, 1968, and 1969, West Germany invested approximately a half billion dollars each year in U.S. government securities to satisfy the American government.

Secondly, conflict over the West German currency increased tensions between the two countries. Britain, France and the U.S. pressured the FRG to revalue their currency upward, as huge amounts of foreign capital poured into the FRG. Initially, the West German government delayed, and only after immense pressure by the Allies did the West Germans revalue the mark at approximately 9 percent above its former level.

The final and most serious cause of disagreement between the two nations developed over the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), completed between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1968. The NPT was the result of six years of negotiations in Geneva. The intent of the document was to restrain lesser powers from acquiring nuclear weapons and to prevent their use in a regional conflict which, in turn might escalate into a

global thermonuclear war. Bonn feared that signing the treaty might imply diplomatic recognition of East Germany, which had agreed to sign the treaty. It also feared the treaty would both hinder the creation of a European nuclear force and prevent West German participation in joint nuclear planning, which it desired. Additionally, the West Germans saw the possibility of opposing the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a lever to extract concessions from the Soviets on the German reunification issue. Although the value of this threat is doubtful, it did seem the Soviets' main goal in signing the treaty was to deny the West Germans access to nuclear weapons. The Soviets made it very clear they would not sign the treaty until the FRG did so as well. The FRG finally signed the treaty in November 1969, but did not ratify it until early 1974. These three crises served to strain relations between the U.S. and FRG during the last year of the "Grand Coalition."(5)

7. The 1969 Elections: A Turning Point

Willy Brandt's accession to the chancellorship in October 1969 marked a significant turning point in postwar West German history. During the latter years of the "Grand Coalition," especially as the election approached, the CDU and SPD asserted their rivalry. The 1969 election campaign was more hard fought and far reaching in its consequences than any of the previous five elections in West Germany had been. Campaigning under the slogan "Twenty years are

enough," Brandt's SPD garnered 42.7 percent of the popular vote, thus receiving 224 seats in the Bundestag. The Social Democrats formed a coalition with the Free Democratic Party (FDP), who won 5.8 percent and received 30 seats. The Christian Democrats were out of the governing coalition for the first time since the Federal Republic's inception in 1949, even though they were still the largest party with 46.1 percent of the popular vote and 242 Bundestag seats.(6)

According to several studies on the 1969 campaign, foreign policy played only a marginal role. However, of the major foreign policy issues, detente was central.(7) All three major parties gave priority to the following foreign policy issues: relations with the GDR (concerning recognition and reunification); relations with Poland (over the Oder-Neisse line); and relations with the Soviet Union (concerning European security). Each of the three parties differed in their positions on these issues.

The CDU desired the traditional policy of overcoming Germany's division through self-determination. Priority was given to relations with the West, the alliance with the United States, and cooperation with NATO.

The SPD differed from the CDU. It no longer proposed unification as a goal. Instead it suggested comprehensive agreements with the GDR in order to normalize relations and improve contacts. Additionally, the SPD wished to strengthen NATO while at the same time reduce the number of

foreign troops stationed in Western Europe.

The FDP program went much further than either the SPD or CDU programs. It called for a state treaty with the GDR, renunciation of the FRG's claim to be the sole representative of the German people, and a guarantee of the security of Berlin with treaties between the two German states. Moreover, the FDP suggested a two stage program for the reduction of American and Soviet presence in Europe, including a European security system and an all-European cooperation program independent of the two super-powers.

In 1969, a new administration had also taken office in the United States, led by Republican President Richard Nixon. Nixon wished to make the seventies an "Era of Negotiations," a fact born out by the President's state visits to Romania and to Yugoslavia in 1969 and 1970 respectively, his 1971 reception of Yugoslavian President Tito, and his state visits to Peking and Moscow in 1972.(8)

CHAPTER II

OSTPOLITIK UNDER BRANDT

In Bonn, the new Brandt government made it apparent that it wished to conduct an active policy with Eastern Europe, which became known as Ostpolitik. This reflected a distinct shift from the previous West German government position. Under Adenauer, the watchword had been no detente without progress on the German problem. The Erhard government intended to press ahead with detente while seeking progress on the German problem. A major shift took place during the "Grand Coalition" of Kiesinger and Brandt. Detente became so important that the West Germans were ready to make unilateral concessions towards improved relations and agree on a solution to the German problem at a much later date. During the chancellorship of Willy Brandt, the readiness for unilateral concessions became more evident and the acceptable delay in the solution of the German problem became much longer. The time was ripe for an active pursuit of detente in both Bonn and Washington.(1)

The first step towards detente after Brandt's election occurred in November 1969, with the FRG's signing of the NPT. With the initiation of Brandt's Ostpolitik, the West feared that the FRG intended to loosen its ties to NATO and follow a more independent security policy or play off East against West. Bonn's signature on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was a sign of commitment to the

West as well as a signal to the East that the FRG desired detente. Ratification by Washington and Moscow was completed on 5 March 1970.

1. Global Detente: The SALT Talks

The main focus in arms-control talks now shifted to the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) which began in November 1969. The agreement, signed in May 1972 by President Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, consisted of two parts. One placed a permanent limit on the number of anti-ballistic missiles the United States and Soviet Union could maintain. The other fixed the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) both sides could deploy.(2)

The SALT I Treaty contained little to upset the West Germans. The United States had consulted all the European Allies on the negotiations. There were, however, two European reactions which emanated from the SALT talks, each of which to varying degrees lent itself to disagreements between America and Europe.

One was the increased sense in Western Europe that detente was under way and there was little to fear from the Soviet Union. An "era of good feelings" had evolved and the steadily improving relationship between the Americans and Soviets meant that the Soviets were less of a threat than they had been formerly.

The West Europeans also began to question America's reliability as an ally. The security of Western Europe,

especially West Germany, continued to depend on the guarantee of the American military presence in Europe and in particular upon U.S. deterrence of a possible Soviet nuclear attack. Brandt's Ostpolitik hinged on the maintenance of the security balance. Any negative change in that balance would be a blow not only to the FRG's Ostpolitik, but to West German security as well.(3)

2. FRG's Ostpolitik and U.S. Reaction

Within a few months after his accession to the Chancellor's Office, Brandt initiated exploratory talks with the Soviet Union, Poland, and the German Democratic Republic.(4) The United States was initially ambivalent if not skeptical towards the West German Ostpolitik. Washington quite clearly favored improved relations between West Germany and her Eastern neighbors, and had for some time been urging Bonn to recognize the status quo in Eastern Europe. However, some Americans were concerned about the speed of Ostpolitik. They feared that the West Germans might prematurely grant concessions to her eastern neighbors and get nothing in return. According to a newspaper report of 5 December 1969, the deputy chief of the United States Embassy in Bonn had delivered a note complaining that the West Germans had failed to discuss with Washington preparations for an agreement with Moscow on the renunciation of force. Reportedly, this reflected the opinion of Dr. Henry Kissinger, then National Security Advisor to President Nixon, and not that of the Department

of State. The next day the State Department denied the rumor.(5) The main American concern was fear of premature, unreciprocated concessions on the part of Bonn.

3. The FRG and the Soviet Union

The key to any lasting West German detente with Eastern Europe was improved relations with the Soviet Union. Bonn, quite naturally, placed its contact with the Soviet Union at the center of its Ostpolitik. Initial talks were begun in early 1970 between Egon Bahr, Brandt's State Secretary, and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. On 7 June, after the initial discussions were completed, Bonn decided to open formal negotiations with the Soviet Union. Walter Scheel, Brandt's Foreign Minister, was appointed to conduct the negotiations. Not everyone in West Germany was pleased with the government's Ostpolitik. The CDU attempted to challenge Bonn's decision to negotiate with the Soviets with a vote of no-confidence on 18 June 1970. The attempt failed, as the CDU could not obtain a majority.

Concomitantly, Brandt made a special attempt to keep the Allies apprised of the negotiation process with the Soviet Union, visiting Britain in March, the United States in April, and France in May of 1970. All three major allies voiced uneasiness, stating that any treaty must refer to the four-power responsibility for Germany and Berlin. William Rogers, American Secretary of State, expressed U.S. concern in a West German television

interview, stating that "any final juridical decisions that are made would have to be made in the light of those [the Potsdam Agreement and the Paris Agreements of 1954] reservations."(6)

The Brandt government had no reservations about including and consulting the Allies regarding the current negotiations. Chancellor Brandt stated in a French television interview that "we cannot solve by ourselves the whole series of problems related to the subject of the present talks between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic." He strongly felt that any change in the relationship between the FRG and her Eastern European neighbors would be "closely coordinated with our Western partners."(7)

By early summer, the two sides had agreed on a detailed list of issues to be discussed. Unfortunately, this list was leaked to the press by Baron von Guttenberg, a right-wing member of the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Bavarian counterpart of the CDU. It became known as the Bahr-Paper. The opponents of Ostpolitik argued that a satisfactory answer to the Berlin question must first be obtained prior to the acceptance of any treaty. Additionally, the treaty must not affect "the right of the Germans for self-determination," that is, for reunification.(8)

Brandt responded to this criticism by reiterating the pledge that no treaty would be submitted for ratification

until progress on the Berlin issue was made. Despite the revelations made in the Bahr-Paper, a poll conducted by the SPD in July indicated that 79 percent of the West Germans polled supported the government's position.(9)

After extensive negotiations, the West German-Soviet Treaty was completed and signed on 12 August 1970 by Brandt, West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin, and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev present. The treaty contained five relatively simple articles in which the two parties affirmed their desire "to maintain international peace and achieve detente." They agreed to further "normalization" in Europe in accordance with "the actual situation existing" on the continent (Article 1). Both nations "shall settle their disputes exclusively by peaceful means and undertake to refrain from the threat or use of force" in accordance with Article 2 of the United Nations Charter (Article 2). They pledged to respect "without restriction the territorial integrity of all states in Europe within their present frontiers," which are inviolable. Specifically mentioned in the treaty were the borders between East and West Germany and between the GDR and Poland, the Oder-Neisse line. German reunification was not mentioned, but in a separate letter addressed to Foreign Minister Gromyko, Scheel stated that the treaty did not alter the FRG's aim that the "German nation will recover its unity in free self-determination." The Soviets

accepted the letter.(10)

The American response to the West German-Soviet Treaty was generally favorable. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Martin Hillenbrand, stated before a Senate Committee on 24 June that "we approve the efforts of the German Government in Bonn to normalize its relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union," a fact confirmed by numerous other public statements by Washington officials.(11)

However, under the surface of these positive statements lay misgivings about Soviet motives, particularly with regard to the Berlin situation. Secretary of State William Rogers stated that "the West would now expect tangible evidence of Soviet cooperation towards bringing about substantial practical improvements for the people of Berlin."(12)

4. The FRG-Polish Treaty

The U.S. had further misgivings about Ostpolitik after the signing of the German-Polish Treaty of Friendship on 7 December 1970. Like the Soviets, the Poles insisted on recognition of the Oder-Neisse line explicitly. Bonn only pledged to "respect" the boundary and offered a non-use of force provision to guarantee Poland's borders.

Negotiations lasted through six arduous sessions from 5 February to 12 November 1970. In the final document, the two parties stated "in mutual agreement that the existing boundary line, the course of which is laid down in Chapter

IX of the Decisions of the Potsdam Conference. . . shall constitute the western state frontier of the People's Republic of Poland" (Article I). The states also reaffirmed the "inviolability of their existing frontiers now and in the future" and declared that they "have no territorial claim whatsoever against each other and that they will not assert such claims in the future" (Article I). The Poles did withdraw their demand that German guilt for the Second World War be mentioned, and settled instead for the listing of Poland as the "first victim" of the war. The general emphasis in the preamble centered on the future and the necessity of establishing "peaceful coexistence." The Poles also promised in an official declaration, not part of the treaty, to adopt a positive attitude toward the emigration from Poland of "tens of thousands" of Germans or persons of mixed origin wishing to rejoin their families in either of the two Germanies.(13)

Of all the Eastern treaties negotiated by the FRG, the Polish Treaty was undoubtedly the most difficult adjustment for the West Germans. The regions Germany lost meant a great deal, both economically and emotionally. The kneeling of Willy Brandt during a wreath-laying ceremony for the victims of the Warsaw ghetto dispelled more Polish suspicions about West German sincerity than any joint proclamation possibly could.

5. The Four-Powers Agreement on Berlin

After the signing of the treaties with Moscow and

Warsaw had been completed by Bonn, only the process of ratification remained. Throughout the negotiation process, the Brandt-Scheel government insisted that the treaties would only be ratified in conjunction with or after an East-West agreement on the status of Berlin had been reached. The negotiation process had thus been narrowed to a single frame of reference: the status of Berlin. The FRG had accepted the existing realities in the East and given de facto recognition to the Oder-Neisse line. It now expected the East to follow suit with respect to Berlin.

For the past quarter of century, West Berlin had been the focus of East-West tensions. During this time, the city of Berlin had become the symbol of the problems that remained from the Second World War. It had symbolized the determination of the West to withstand communist pressure and maintain West Berlin's status as a free city. It also symbolized the permanence of the division of the Germanies and of Europe between East and West. There had been several attempts to settle the Berlin question, all unsuccessful basically due to the importance of Berlin to both the East and the West. (14)

The United States had accepted the idea of a new attempt to settle the Berlin issues as early as February 1969. However, there was a serious divergence of perception between Bonn and Washington over the Eastern issue. For the FRG, ratification of the treaties with Moscow and Warsaw was virtually a series of unilateral

acceptances by West Germany of already existing Eastern borders. For the United States, hard pressure on the Soviets had to be used if successful results on the Berlin issue were to be forthcoming. (15)

The actual negotiations over the status of Berlin by the former wartime allies did not begin until March 1970 and lasted throughout the entire year. The value each side placed on Berlin made it difficult to offer concessions. The Soviets viewed their authority in Berlin as indispensable for exercising influence in West German affairs. The U.S. felt its rights in West Berlin demonstrated its leadership in the free world and commitment to the ideal of self-determination. East Germany viewed with suspicion Bonn's design to preserve Berlin as a symbolic capital of reunited Germany. This symbolism led to a questioning of the sovereignty of the GDR. Finally, West Germany valued West Berlin as an extension of the Federal Republic's statehood. Any unfavorable settlement would jeopardize Bonn's sovereignty.

6. U.S. Reaction to FRG policy

After the signing of the German-Polish Treaty in December 1970, Bonn began to put increasing pressure on Washington to conclude a Berlin agreement, for the Moscow and Warsaw treaties could not be ratified until an agreement on Berlin had been reached. Relations between the two nations became increasingly tense, as evidenced by the visit of West German Economics Minister Horst Ehmke to

the United States for discussions with representatives of the State Department and the White House. On the surface, Washington reiterated its support for West German Ostpolitik. However, underlying tensions soon surfaced. Brandt expressed his concern over a deterioration of relations between Bonn and Washington which he attributed to a "'constellation' of leading American officials who have become increasingly suspicious of his attempts to seek normal relations with Communist Europe."(16) Included in this "constellation" were Henry Kissinger, National Security Advisor, Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense, Martin J. Hillenbrand, State Department expert on German affairs, former High Commissioners in Germany Lucius D. Clay and John J. McCloy, and former Secretary of State Dean Acheson.

The Germans expressed concern over the continued criticism supposedly attributed to these men in spite of the positive declarations voiced from Washington. Typical of the criticism was that of Acheson, who was quoted as "expressing alarm" over West Germany's Ostpolitik. He charged that Brandt was using his eastern policy as a "domestic political maneuver to hold together his governing coalition of Socialists and Free Democrats." Additionally, Acheson emphasized that Brandt's move to the East was weakening the West's bargaining position on Berlin and the planned reduction of troop levels in Europe. The fear was that Brandt would be entrapped by the Soviets in these

diplomatic adventures which would result in a loosening of West Germany's ties to the Atlantic Alliance. Finally, Acheson feared that Brandt was not receiving enough concessions from the Soviets.(17)

This crisis in confidence was quickly denied by a State Department spokesman, who called the rumor "stupefying."(18) He emphatically voiced American support for Brandt's Ostpolitik as, reportedly, did Henry Kissinger to Brandt's representative, Horst Ehmke.

Further support came from Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. He emphasized Brandt's past record as an anti-Nazi and his dedication to West Berlin as its former mayor.(19) Goldberg logically argued that through the NPT, Washington pressured Bonn to recognize the nuclear situation. With the signing of the Soviet and Polish Treaties and the prospect of an agreement on Berlin, Bonn was responding by recognizing the current political situation.

This position was criticized by George Ball, former Undersecretary of State to Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson.(20) He argued that the West German-Soviet Treaty provided the West no tangible benefits while it contributed to a legitimizing of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe. He also expressed fear of German power and independence, a strong reminder to Bonn that many planners of American foreign policy still did not trust the West Germans.

7. The Berlin Agreement

Finally, several weeks into 1971, an agreement on negotiating tactics and final conditions for the Berlin Agreement was reached between Washington and Bonn and harmony between the two nations was restored. A series of Soviet concessions brought an agreement on Berlin nearer, including a compromise in the concurrent SALT negotiations, the removal of Walter Ulbricht and his replacement by Erich Honecker as head of the GDR, and the announcement that the U.S.S.R. was willing to discuss force reductions in the context of a European Security Conference.

The Berlin negotiations were completed in August 1971, and the Four Power Treaty was signed on 3 September 1971.(21) The agreement basically represented an acknowledgement by the four signatories of the status quo of Berlin. The four governments agreed that "irrespective of the differences in legal views, the situation which has developed in the areas. . . shall not be changed unilaterally"(Part I, Article 4). The three Western Powers acknowledged that West Berlin was not a "part of the Federal Republic of Germany and not to be governed by it"(Part II, B), while the Soviet Union acknowledged that the FRG may "represent the interests" of the Western sectors of Berlin in international organizations and conferences and provide consular services for the inhabitants of the Western part of Berlin(Annex IV, B). In essence, the Soviets abandoned any attempt to maintain that

West Berlin was part of East Germany. They gave up the claim that East Germany controlled the access to Berlin. Unimpeded civilian access was guaranteed by the Soviet Union and any powers exercised by the GDR were to be used only on approval of the U.S.S.R. (Part II, A. and Annex I). (22)

8. Ratification of Eastern Treaties

With the negotiation and signing of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, the road was now clear for the Brandt government to present the Moscow and Warsaw treaties to the Bundestag for ratification. Since 1969, the SPD-FDP majority had been steadily eroding. (23) Members of Brandt's coalition partners, the FDP, as well as several members of his own party had steadily been defecting to the opposition. When an SPD member changed parties at the end of February 1972, Brandt's strength was reduced to 250, only one above the bare majority. The Christian Democratic opposition used every opportunity to discredit or overthrow the Brandt government and exploited every hint of American reservation about the FRG's Eastern treaties.

The first treaty ratification vote took place on 9 February 1972 in the Bundesrat (upper house) and the treaties were rejected. It now became constitutionally necessary for Brandt to obtain an absolute majority in the Bundestag.

The end of April saw another defection and an attempt to overthrow the Chancellor, which failed by only two

votes. When the crucial vote on the Eastern treaties came on 17 May, the Christian Democrats abstained, for they realized that if the treaties did not pass, their party would be isolated not only from Germany's allies but also from the majority of German opinion.(24)

At the beginning of June, when Brandt gave his Marshall Plan anniversary address at Harvard, the Eastern treaties had been ratified, the Quadripartite Treaty had come into force, Nixon and Brezhnev had signed the SALT I agreements and Washington and Bonn were again in close harmony with each other.

The series of agreements signed and ratified emphasized the change in government policy in both Bonn and Moscow. Since the end of World War II, Moscow's aim had been to consolidate and legitimize its rule in Eastern Europe. An important instrument of this was the specter of West German imperialism, which became the prime reason for Warsaw Pact solidarity. The West German hard-line policy had the effect of aligning the Northern Warsaw Pact countries closely behind Moscow, for fear of West Germany's territorial claims.(25)

The FRG under Willy Brandt finally accepted the fact that reconciliation with East Germany would have to be made on Moscow's terms, specifically acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe, which neither the FRG nor the U.S. was willing to challenge. Conversely, Moscow also realized that it could not complete consolidation of its Eastern

bloc without dealing with the West Germans. They could not expect the West Germans to participate in a policy of coexistence without making concessions to FRG interests.

The acceptance of the Moscow, Warsaw, and the Quadripartite Treaties by the FRG drastically changed relations within the Eastern bloc. East German allies no longer placed GDR interests ahead of their own, but instead placed their national interests above the GDR objectives. The Berlin Agreement particularly had a negative effect on East Germany, as its claims to West Berlin and its rights to regulate transit traffic were not upheld. It now made inter-German relations easier, as the crucial questions concerning West Berlin and the Oder-Neisse line had been answered.

In September 1972, Brandt called for new parliamentary elections after losing a vote of no-confidence. The elections were held in November. The SPD won a majority of seats for the first time and provided the SPD-FDP coalition government of Brandt with a 48 seat majority, a substantial increase over the 12 seat majority of 1969.(26)

In the same month, elections were held in the United States, with the Republicans and Richard Nixon returning to power in a landslide. Both men would resign their offices in 1974, Brandt due to the discovery of an East German spy in the Chancellor's Office and Nixon over Watergate.

9. The Basic Treaty

Brandt's election victory in 1972 allowed him to

continue his Ostpolitik by signing a treaty between the two Germanies. The leaders of the two nations had met in 1970, first at Erfurt, East Germany in March, and then at Kassel, West Germany in May. Little was accomplished at either meeting. Serious negotiations started in November 1970, when Egon Bahr, the FRG emissary, and Michael Kohl from the GDR initiated discussions. Agreements were reached between the two countries over the Berlin issue in December 1971, subsequent to the Four-Power Treaty on Berlin. These agreements allowed West Germany to represent West Berlin in international organizations and gave unrestrained access to the city, but denied the FRG the right to govern the city or treat it as a full-fledged state of the Federal Republic.

Following these agreements on Berlin, it remained for East and West Germany to reach an agreement on their relationship with each other. Formal negotiations on an FRG-GDR treaty began on 15 June 1972. After strenuous negotiation, a treaty was finally agreed on between the two Germanies.(27)

The Basic Treaty (or Grundvertrag) was a short document consisting of only ten articles, supplemented by additions, protocols, and letters elaborating on the Treaty's provisions. The two Germanies agreed to respect each other's territorial integrity and to refrain from the threat or use of force (Article 3). Neither country could speak for Germany as a whole, as West Germany had previously done, and the national question was carefully

avoided, except to state in the preamble that the FRG and the GDR held "differing views on the national question." Collaboration on a large number of "practical and humanitarian questions was also agreed to" (Article 7).(28) The treaty was signed in December 1972, and this act was followed by the entry of the two Germanies into the United Nations the following September. Washington looked with favor on the Basic Treaty. West Germany had finally accepted the fact the two German states existed, something the U.S. had urged for several years.

10. U.S. Pressure on the FRG

The year 1973 placed increasing pressure on the Bonn-Washington relationship. The Watergate affair, the breaking into the Democratic headquarters in Washington during June 1972, began to create turmoil in the Washington White House. By the summer of 1973, a Senate investigating committee indicated there was strong evidence that even President Nixon might be involved in the affair. The administration was increasingly unable to hold back the forces which endangered America's relationship with Western Europe, particularly with West Germany. The most notable of these forces were a group of Democrats led by Senator Mike Mansfield, who renewed their demand for a reduction of American troops in Europe. Although little concrete action was taken on the subject, it became increasingly clear that the Allies could not expect America to keep her forces at that level forever.(29) This growing call for American

troop reduction in Europe forced the Alliance to rely increasingly on the nuclear deterrent to contain the Soviets. While nuclear arms might be fully capable of deterring the Soviets, public opinion in the late 1970s increasingly showed that the Europeans were against using nuclear weapons even for "demonstration" purposes in a crisis.

Further difficulties were created when other Democrats, led by Senator Henry Jackson, called for the linkage of the U.S.S.R.'s most-favored-nation-status to Soviet emigration policy for Jewish citizens. This amendment was attached to the President's Trade Bill, which would have allowed him to negotiate a new set of General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules with Europe. On 7 November, Nixon announced that he was abandoning the attempt for Congressional approval of the bill, for in its present form it would have damaged detente with the Soviet Union. The postponement of the bill meant GATT negotiations would not begin until at least the summer of 1974. European reaction to the delay of the GATT bill was mixed. Some felt it was not necessary for early negotiations, while most, including West Germany, felt the postponement represented an American victory over European interests.(30)

Americans also found unwelcome forces in West German political life during 1973. A youth section in the SPD, the Jungsozialisten, developed and became very outspoken

towards American policy in Vietnam and the American military presence in Europe. Additionally, late in 1973, a widely circulated article of an off-the-record interview given by Egon Bahr, political advisor to Brandt, appeared in the quarterly journal Orbis. In the article, Bahr states that the ultimate goal of Ostpolitik was a European collective security system in which the two Germanies would come close together, and NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be dissolved. The West German government distanced itself from Bahr's remarks, explaining that the remarks were not Bonn policy but merely speculation by a foreign policy planner, an explanation that was accepted by the United States government.(31)

Greater difficulty arose over what Secretary of State Henry Kissinger termed as the "Year of Europe" in a speech given in April 1973.(32) The "Year of Europe" phrase was first used by President Nixon in the inauguration ceremony at the beginning of his second term and reiterated in a U.S. foreign policy report Nixon issued to Congress on 3 May 1973. To the Americans, the term was meant to imply that in 1973 the U.S. would turn towards improving relations with its European allies after achieving a breakthrough in relations with the Soviets and Chinese in 1972. The U.S. voiced its support for European unification efforts and promised to continue to do so in order to strengthen the West. In his April speech on the subject, Kissinger stated that the U.S. would ". . . maintain our

forces and not withdraw from Europe unilaterally. In turn, we expect from each ally a fair share of the common effort for the common defense." He called for the Europeans to cooperate in working out "a new Atlantic Charter setting the goals for the future -- a blueprint that. . . creates for the Atlantic nations a new relationship in whose progress Japan can share."(33)

The statements by Nixon and Kissinger received mixed reviews. Many Europeans gained the impression that Kissinger and Nixon wanted to put Europe in its place. However, these suggestions by the U.S. did view Europe as a unit, something the Europeans had urged the Americans to do for a period of years. Few, if any concrete proposals were offered in the speech, only principles and questions. The West German response was to accept the aim of redefining the Alliance while at the same time allowing the European states to work out their own positions rather than accept the American view uncritically. The task of writing this new "Atlantic Charter" was given to the European Community (EC) and NATO, who were to each write a separate draft. The EC draft appeared first, but was rejected by Kissinger who called the document a "bland statement lacking in substance."(34)

The Americans modified the text of the EC draft, but used the words "interdependence" and "partnership," which were unacceptable to the French.(35) Finally, the NATO version written on the basis of a French draft appeared in

late November, but by this time, Kissinger's appeal was interrupted by the Middle East crisis of October 1973.(36)

The Arab-Israeli War sparked increased differences between the U.S. and FRG. The American commitment to Israel was very clear from the beginning, as was the pro-Arab position of the European states due to their dependence on Arab oil.

Initially, the FRG took a neutral position in the Middle East conflict. In the beginning, the West Germans allowed the U.S. to use their bases in the Federal Republic for deliveries of war materials to Israel. However, when these deliveries continued after the cease-fire agreement of 22 October, the West German government became concerned about their relations with the Arabs and asked the U.S. to cease the deliveries. This caused great consternation in Washington. Kissinger informed the West German ambassador that the U.S. reserved the right to take any action it regarded as right in the interests of national security.(37)

Even these 1973 crises did little to damage seriously the U.S.-FRG relationship. Both nations continued to deal constructively with the problems each faced, and mutual interdependence helped to maintain stability. However, the Middle East crisis did point to the fact that an agreed point of view between the U.S. and FRG could no longer be taken for granted.

Relations in 1974 generally improved from their 1973 low during the Yom Kippur War. The Atlantic Declaration

called for by Henry Kissinger during the "Year of Europe" speech was finally signed in June 1974, almost fourteen months after Kissinger's original appeal.(38) Although the text of this document did not contain the far-reaching "blueprint for the future" Kissinger had called for, it did pledge the alliance to more effective consultation in the future.

During 1974, both the FRG and U.S. experienced a change of leadership. Willy Brandt resigned in May upon the discovery that an East German spy had been operating in the Chancellor's Office. It was clear, however, that deeper reasons led to Brandt's resignation. The strains of coalition politics had obviously taken their toll on Brandt as well as the threatened disintegration of the EC. Brandt's successor was Helmut Schmidt, a man who had previously served as Minister of Defense and Minister of Finance. A change was also made in the foreign ministry, as Hans-Dietrich Genscher from the FDP replaced Walter Scheel, who was sworn in as President of the Federal Republic. In the U.S., Richard Nixon resigned as President in August. Vice-President Gerald Ford moved into the White House, but his term as President was to be of short duration and had little effect on West German-American relations.(40)

11. The Climax of Detente: The Helsinki Accords

During the following year, an event occurred that had a great effect on West German-American relations. The

climax of the "Era of Negotiations" between East and West, which had begun with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, occurred in August 1975 with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. This document was the consummation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Conference had opened in July 1973 in Helsinki and had reconvened in Geneva later that year. Results from this conference were initially expected in early 1974, but were delayed until 1975.

The CSCE had been proposed by the Soviets for many years, originally to sanction the status quo in Europe after World War II. The agreements signed between West Germany and the Eastern Europeans during the early 1970s seemed to remove the need for a general European conference, but the Soviets continued to urge that a meeting be held.(39) Since it was the Soviets that desired the conference, the Western powers were able to gain concessions on a number of other issues, such as the Berlin Agreement, Soviet restraint during the Middle East crisis of 1973, and an agenda for the talks which discussed such issues as human rights and the free movement of people and information.

One of the interesting features of this conference was the effectiveness in which the European Community coordinated its views. The final document signed by the thirty-three continental European states (all except Albania), as well as the U.S. and Canada, contained three

major "baskets."(41)

The original Soviet motives in promoting Helsinki were expressed by the document's statement that "the participating states regard as inviolable each other's frontiers, as well as the frontiers of all states in Europe." Additional statements were added concerning the elimination of the use of force and pledging non-interference in internal affairs of other nations.

"Basket Two" contained ways to improve cultural, scientific, and economic cooperation, many of which were already in practice. The famous "Basket Three" of the Helsinki Final Act contained provisions which required the signatories to "ease regulations concerning movement of citizens from other participating states in their territory" and allow contact between religious and professional organizations of various nations.

The main thrust of the human rights agreements is found in the introductory declaration, which stated that "the participating states will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion. . . . They will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural, and other rights. . . [which] derive from the inherent dignity of the human person."(42)

The CSCE talks served to cement Bonn's Ostpolitik into Western Alliance policy, for while they confirmed the political and territorial status quo in Europe, the

conference also made Brandt's policy part of a larger European and global movement. The Helsinki Agreement stood as the climax and beginning of the decline of U.S.-U.S.S.R. and inter-German detente. Both the Soviets and the East Germans had achieved their main goal of confirming Europe's status quo. Their incentive to cooperate with the West subsequently declined. The Soviet Union increased its activities in the Third World and continued its military build-up through the deployment of SS-20 medium-range missiles. Western public opinion grew increasingly disillusioned with detente.

CHAPTER III

OSTPOLITIK AND THE DECLINE OF GLOBAL DETENTE: 1976-1980

There were many changes in the relationship between the U.S. and FRG during the mid-1970s and early 1980s. One factor, however, remained a constant, and that was the Chancellorship of Helmut Schmidt. During his government, West Germany continued to increase its influence within NATO and the European Community. Evidence of this growing stature may be found in the publication of such articles as "Germany Steps Up," and "A new political giant? West German foreign policy in the 1970s."(1) This was not the only testimony to the growing power of the FRG. Additionally, the FRG came through the mid-1970s recession in better shape than many of the other European powers. By the late 1970s, the West German's held one-third of the wealth of the European Community and the German mark was much more stable than the dollar on the international money market.(2)

The rising economic power of West Germany coupled with the relative stability of the West German government compared with many of the NATO powers allowed Chancellor Schmidt to speak more independently than many of his predecessors on world issues. It was this outspokenness that caused a great deal of friction between the German Chancellor and newly elected President Jimmy Carter. During their mutual time in office, several key issues surfaced which caused great strain on the trans-Atlantic

relationship.

1. The Issue of Human Rights

A major source of strain in the Bonn-Washington relationship was the differing method used by both governments to approach world problems. The government of Jimmy Carter preferred to view the world in idealistic terms. This idealism was the worst kind of approach from Schmidt's point of view, who looked at problems from a more tough minded, pragmatic perspective. In addition to the divergent styles of the two governments, there were major differences in dealing with problems that occurred during the Carter-Schmidt years.

When President Carter took office in January 1977, he made it very clear that one of the central planks of his foreign policy would be the issue of human rights. Yet, this was not an evenhanded policy. Carter was specifically critical of the Soviet Union for their violation of human rights, but overlooked obvious violations by other world countries when it was convenient to do so. Since neither Chile nor Brazil, Idi Amin nor the Shah, was condemned for human rights violations during the initial months of Carter's presidency, it became clear to many that this crusade for human rights had simply degenerated into a renewed antagonism between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. One concrete example came from the country of Iran and its leader, the Shah. At a state dinner for the Shah in January 1977, President Carter praised the Iranian leader

for his "great leadership" and stated that ". . .there is no leader with whom I have a deeper sense of personal gratitude and personal friendship."(3) Yet in December 1978, when the Shah was on the verge of being overthrown, Carter commented on the "difference in human rights values. . . . There have been abuses. . . under the Shah's government that would not be acceptable in our own country."(4)

Although Chancellor Schmidt agreed in principle with the position of the United States, he regarded the specific condemnation of the Soviets as unproductive. It was his contention that the status of the 17 million Germans in the GDR and the chances for emigration of German minorities throughout Eastern Europe could only be improved through patient, quiet negotiation, not public criticism.(5)

2. The FRG Nuclear Deal with Brazil

A further difficulty between the U.S. and FRG emerged early in 1977 with the proposed sale of a nuclear reprocessing plant to Brazil by the West Germans. The Federal Republic's reliance on imported energy, emphasized by the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74, led to the active pursuit of nuclear energy production. In turn, this led to the FRG's development as one of the leading exporters of nuclear technology. On 27 June 1975, a deal was struck between the FRG and Brazil for the sale of eight nuclear power stations and an uranium enrichment plant. This sale was the largest nuclear transaction in the history of the

atomic age (\$4 billion) and it was also the first sale of fuel and reactor technologies together.(6) It would also provide Brazil with the capability of manufacturing nuclear weapons, a fact that was underscored by Brazil's non-ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In Washington, particularly among members of Congress, the prospect of the Brazilians acquiring a nuclear capability aroused fear that the deal would set a precedent for other non-nuclear nations to demand the fuel-cycle technology. This would undermine the premise of American diplomacy that rested on nuclear non-proliferation. The American attitude was reflected in a New York Times article which stated that this "reckless move could set off a nuclear arms race in Latin America, trigger the nuclear arming of a half-dozen nations elsewhere, and endanger the security of the United States and the world as a whole."(7) Initially, the U.S. government attempted to scuttle the deal. However, sensing that the cost to Bonn would be too great if the sale was cancelled, Washington urged that several changes be made in the deal. These changes included safeguards and control arrangements stricter than in any previous major sale to a non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty signee. Although both President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger were uneasy about the deal, Kissinger felt the changes the West Germans had made at the American's request were sufficient. Thus the West Germans signed the agreement.

For the FRG, the loss of this sale would have meant the loss of \$4 billion in revenue, which was hoped to help finance West Germany's own nuclear program and would also cost or endanger the security of thousands of jobs. Chancellor Schmidt defended the sale on the grounds that the "relevant question was not whether a country like Brazil should obtain such technology but when it will." (8) The West Germans were also convinced that the Americans had stooped to shady business tactics in earlier West German nuclear deals in order to steal potential clients for themselves. They cited incidents in Yugoslavia in 1973 and a similar case in Spain, both of which led them to believe that the U.S. might resort to this strategy with Brazil as well. The West Germans had gained the advantage over what would have been the American nuclear deal of the century. It was a reminder of the decline of U.S. exports in this area. In 1974, the Americans had controlled 66% of the market, but by 1976 it was under 50%. (9)

After President Carter's election, the West Germans became uneasy about the future of their deal with Brazil. During the election campaign, the future President had made nuclear non-proliferation a major campaign issue and had been very critical of the Ford administration's nuclear policies. The West Germans began to wonder if the issue would be reopened. One of the first official actions of the Carter Presidency was to send Vice President Walter Mondale to the FRG in another effort to convince the Federal

Republic to either withhold the fuel technologies or place them under multinational control. His arguments did little to persuade the West Germans and in April 1977, having waited several months to see what policy the Carter Administration might adopt, Bonn began sending the plans for the fuel plant to Brazil. After intensive negotiations between the two countries, a compromise was reached in June 1977. The U.S. lifted its opposition to the West German sale to Brazil and in return the FRG promised to temporarily halt the sale of nuclear recycling technology. The American government proposed an international dialogue evaluating the fuel cycle from the energy and non-proliferation viewpoint. This International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Conference (INFCE) began meeting on 19 October 1977 with 40 countries participating. It established eight working groups to deal with all aspects of the fuel cycle, and both the Americans and West Germans seemed satisfied. However, differing approaches to nuclear policy would again become evident over the development of the neutron bomb.

3. The Neutron Bomb

For a period of years, NATO had urged the development of a new nuclear weapon which would not totally destroy the area to be defended. Unlike the old tactical nuclear weapons, this device would cause less fallout, more concentrated radiation, and a reduced blast effect. This weapon, the enhanced-radiation or fusion warhead, known as

the neutron bomb, was developed during the 1960s in the United States but never put into production and thus was forgotten by the public.

In late 1977, the Carter Administration decided to move forward with the production of the neutron bomb due both to the three-to-one tank advantage of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe and as part of a NATO missile modernization plan.(10) The U.S. position on the neutron bomb was based on the assumption that, unlike theater nuclear weapons, the neutron bomb would cause little collateral damage and could be used during an attack by Warsaw Pact forces. The President made it quite clear that he would not begin production until its deployment was accepted by America's allies, especially the Federal Republic.

The West Germans debated the issue for almost a year without reaching a clear consensus. Chancellor Schmidt came under intense pressure from the West German public, his party, and from Moscow to reject deployment of the weapon. Due to the limited range of the bomb, many West Germans feared that it would make a conventional conflict in Europe escalate quickly into a localized nuclear war. It would be possible for the U.S. to engage in a nuclear confrontation with the Warsaw Pact on West German soil with little risk to the American homeland. Egon Bahr, now the Secretary General of the SPD, denounced the weapon as a "symbol of mental perversion." Retired West German Air

Force General Johannes Steinhoff stated that he was "in favor of retaining nuclear weapons as political tools but not permitting them to become battlefield weapons. . . ." He was quoted as saying, "I am firmly opposed to their [nuclear weapons] tactical use on our soil. I cannot favor a nuclear war on German territory while the two superpowers observe safely at a distance."(11)

President Carter's approach, to allow NATO members to accept or reject the bomb unhindered by American pressure, eventually brought private West German acceptance in January 1978. Chancellor Schmidt wanted the bomb, but did not want to say so publicly. Both sides agreed to a compromise on the issue. The President would announce that development of the bomb had been completed, but that he would like to talk to the U.S.S.R. before production began. If the Soviets were unwilling to make concessions during the concurrent SALT II talks, he would tell the NATO allies that the negotiations have failed. Carter would then announce that he has decided to produce the neutron bomb and that it will be stationed in the Federal Republic and at least one other European country.

Debate on the issue continued and in the end the President did not stick to his agreement, announcing instead that the bomb would not be produced. This unilateral rejection of the bomb resulted in a trip to Washington by West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, whereupon the President announced that neutron

production had not been stopped, but simply postponed.

Quite possibly, this change in American policy was the result of mounting U.S. internal political pressure on Carter, who in turn did not wish to force the bomb on another country. It is also possible that Carter saw less need for the bomb, especially in light of the floundering SALT II negotiations with the Soviets.

For the FRG, the Schmidt government suffered a loss of prestige among the West German electorate. The SPD had been split on the issue and the CDU had accused the Schmidt government of wavering in the face of Soviet criticism of the neutron bomb. It seemed clear though, that in this issue, the Schmidt government was more to blame than President Carter. Bonn obviously wanted the bomb, or Foreign Minister Genscher would not have traveled to Washington when production postponement was announced. However, the Federal Republic wanted to be pushed into accepting the bomb rather than openly professing its desire for it.

4. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

Further pressure was placed on the U.S.-FRG relationship during the Carter years with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In 1978, a Marxist coup in Afghanistan placed a pro-Soviet government in control of their strategic country. However, in 1979, the new government began to falter and came under increasing pressure from Islamic groups both inside and outside the

country. By the end of the year, it had become apparent to many Soviet advisors that the country was on the brink of disintegration.(12) On the night of 24 December 1979, a large number of Soviet troops entered the capital of Kabul and took over the city.

The significance of this invasion was not lost on the American government. The invasion meant that the Soviets would now be poised along vast stretches of territory bordering important oil fields in Iran and important trade routes in Iran and Pakistan.

President Carter responded on 8 January 1980 by stating that "the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is the greatest threat to world peace since the Second World War."(13) In his State of the Union Address fifteen days later, Carter added that "an attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by use of any means necessary including military force."(14) This proclamation became known as the Carter Doctrine.

Many Americans viewed the invasion of Afghanistan as another incident in a long line of Soviet adventures in the late 1970s, including activity in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. In June 1978, Carter stated that detente must be based on reciprocal restraint, whereas the Soviet Union had exploited detente to cover "a continuing aggressive struggle for political advantage and increased influence in

a variety of ways."(15) "Detente is dead" proclaimed the Washington Post.(16)

As punitive measures against the Soviets for their recent action, the U.S. announced a grain embargo, introduced restrictions on technology transfer to the U.S.S.R., promised to increase U.S. defense spending by five percent annually, and asked its allies to join in a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. European governments viewed the events in Afghanistan as a struggle between East and West which should lead to no major adjustments in western defense policy or to economic or even symbolic reprisals against the Soviet Union. Many in Europe stressed the defensive motives of the Soviet Union and claimed once again that the U.S.S.R. was merely reacting to the trauma caused by encirclement and past invasions rather than expanding their empire through military means. SPD chairman Willy Brandt emphasized the importance of condemning Soviet action without "overreacting and returning to the Cold War."(17)

The lines across the Atlantic were indeed clear. President Carter had essentially abandoned the use of detente as a means of controlling Soviet action. West Germany, however, did not wish to risk losing or limiting intra-European detente which had provided them with tangible benefits. The FRG was now in the dilemma of either supporting the U.S. and its sanctions or maintaining its desire for Ostpolitik with the Soviet Union. After

considerable pressure Chancellor Schmidt reluctantly agreed to boycott the 1980 Olympics.

CHAPTER IV

OSTPOLITIK IN THE ERA OF CONFRONTATION: 1980-1984

The leaders of both the United States and FRG faced reelection in 1980. Conservative Republican Ronald Reagan challenged and defeated Jimmy Carter in the November election. A major theme of Reagan's campaign was the military imbalance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. If elected, he promised to close this "window of vulnerability" and restore American military might and prestige in the world as a whole. During the era of detente, the Western Alliance strove to curb Soviet adventurism by enmeshing them in a net of trade and technology transfers, credit lines, and arms control agreements. Once involved, the Soviets would be unwilling to risk peace and prosperity for the pleasures of territorial aggrandizement. Reagan felt that U.S.-Soviet detente had been used solely to the Moscow's advantage, as a ". . .one way street that the Soviet Union has used to pursue its own aims." He claimed the Soviets had reserved "unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat."(1) Having little to lose from the breakdown of superpower detente, Reagan responded to the perceived Soviet threat with sanctions and rearmament.

The new Administration tended to view global issues and problems within the scope of the East-West conflict and saw NATO as a key element in a worldwide collective security arrangement against the Soviet Union. The

conflicts in Central America and the Middle East were both viewed as prime targets for Soviet military intervention. President Reagan believed that increased defense spending was the best answer to the Soviet rejection of detente. The Soviets must be kept out of the Third World through the use of military force. In spite of former President Carter's 1980 increase in defense spending, the Reagan Administration expanded the American military budget by seven percent for each of the next five years. This increase totaled \$1,280.6 billion by the end of 1986, about \$200 billion more than the program instituted by President Carter. This amount was the largest peacetime military expenditure in American history.(2)

In West Germany, Chancellor Schmidt was opposed in the October 1980 election by Franz Josef Strauss of the Christian Social Union (the Bavarian sister of the CDU). The SPD campaigned with the slogan "Security for the Eighties," clearly emphasizing continuity, stability and preserving the status quo. The October election resulted in the SPD/FDP coalition gaining a 45 seat advantage over the CDU/CSU, thus returning Schmidt to the Chancellor's office.(3)

Schmidt and the West Germans, as well as many West Europeans, had great misgivings about President Reagan's "revitalization of containment." The demise by 1980 of U.S.-Soviet detente had also become a threat to the European-Soviet detente, which the West Germans desperately

wanted to maintain. Since the initiation of Brandt's Ostpolitik, governments of the FRG had insisted in the maintenance of the process of detente as a method of reducing tensions in Europe. We will "defend detente tooth and nail" stated West Germany's Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.(4)

Bonn believed that detente was an essential precondition to its security. The Western Alliance in general and West Germany in particular were dependent on American nuclear protection. However, if this nuclear protection was to be used, it would lead to a nuclear war which would be particularly devastating to West Germany. The American rearmament effort signaled to many West Europeans the beginning of a new arms race. The Schmidt government felt that Soviet advances, especially in the Third World, could be best met by treating the causes that produced them, particularly poverty and subsequent government instability. In addition, the reassociation between the two Germanies was dependent on European detente. Since the early 1970s, approximately 300,000 ethnic Germans had been allowed to emigrate from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. An estimated three million Germans still remained, their movement dependent on good relations between Bonn and Moscow. Counting their tangible benefits, Europe and especially the West Germans felt that the ensuing times of tension called for more, rather than less detente.

Further tension in the Western Alliance was evidenced by several statements and decisions from the Reagan Administration in 1981 regarding nuclear weapons. In August, President Reagan announced the decision to produce the neutron bomb that had been scuttled during the Carter Presidency. This decision was responsible for a major outcry in Europe, where it was argued that the weapon would only be suitable for use against a possible Soviet attack in Western Europe.

European fears increased even further when President Reagan stated during a news conference that he "could see where you could have the exchange of tactical weapons against troops in the field without it bringing either one of the major powers to pushing the button." (5) This view was seemingly confirmed several weeks later by Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, who commented before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that a nuclear explosion could be used in Europe "for demonstration purposes" against a Soviet conventional attack. One day later, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger disputed Haig's contention, stating that "there is nothing in any [NATO] plan that I know of that contains anything remotely resembling that [demonstration blast], nor should there be." (6) Many Europeans viewed these two statements with confusion and pointed to them as examples of President Reagan's lack of commitment to arms reduction and peace.

1. The INF Missiles in Europe

Without a doubt, the issue that caused the greatest concern for the NATO Alliance during the early 1980s was the stationing of Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Western Europe. Throughout the Netherlands, Italy, Great Britain, and West Germany, millions demonstrated against the deployment of the Cruise and Pershing II missiles. When coupled with the remarks of President Reagan and Secretary of State Haig, many Europeans felt the stationing of new missiles was meant to localize the dangers of nuclear war, shifting the nuclear threat from the United States to Europe. A West German government poll in the spring of 1980 revealed that citizens opposed the stationing of more and new atomic weapons on the soil of the Federal Republic by 60 percent to 24. Respondents favored military neutrality of the FRG and GDR by a 45 to 34 percent margin.(7)

It had been West German Chancellor Schmidt who had urged NATO to modernize its nuclear force in Europe during a speech given in October 1977. This proposal was based on several developments of the late 1970s that seemed to weaken America's nuclear deterrent.(8)

Due to the fact that the U.S. itself was not particularly vulnerable to a land-based Soviet invasion, only a creditable second-strike nuclear capability was necessary to defend itself. However, because Western Europe was vulnerable to such an attack, the U.S. deterrent

must include a first-strike capability to sufficiently meet a Soviet conventional attack. During the late 1970s, with the advent of approximate Soviet-American parity in strategic weapons, this strategy would now mean that American as well as European cities would be vulnerable to a Soviet response if nuclear weapons were used. The West Europeans began to question Washington's willingness to use nuclear weapons to save Europe in the event of a Soviet attack.

A second development of the late 1970s was the increased accuracy of the land based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) of the Soviet Union. A U.S. first-strike in Europe would become undesirable due to the fact that a Soviet response could destroy all or most of the U.S. ICBMs, thus rendering huge losses in the U.S. and Europe while leaving the U.S.S.R. virtually untouched.

A final development was the massive buildup of Soviet SS-20 missiles in the western Soviet Union aimed at Western Europe. These mobile missiles were equipped with multiple warheads, making them far superior to NATO's Pershing I's.

In December of 1979 NATO agreed to begin modernizing its nuclear deterrent by stationing a total of 572 medium range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, with deployment beginning in December of 1983. Prior to this deployment the U.S. and the Soviets were to begin arms control negotiations. This decision became known as the "two-track" agreement. During the previous 30 years of the

Alliance, nuclear procurement decisions had been made by the United States and afterwards, through bilateral arrangement, specific countries were asked to deploy the new weapons. This concept had been discarded during the neutron bomb debate of 1978 and was again scrapped during the INF discussions. Before the new weapons were even produced, American allies were asked to commit to deployment on their soil. Initially, the U.S. view was that this deployment was unnecessary but intended to reassure the European allies that the defense of Europe would remain coupled to an American strategic response. It was meant also as a visible sign of American support against the mounting number of Soviet SS-20s. This visible sign soon became the center of controversy. When the Reagan administration did not pursue the second track of the two-track agreement, i.e. negotiations with the Soviet Union, thousands of Europeans took to the streets in protest of the scheduled December 1983 deployment.(9)

Faced with mounting criticism and pressure from its allies, President Reagan agreed to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union in December 1981. He called for the Soviets to dismantle all of the recently deployed SS-20s in central Europe in return for an American agreement not to deploy the Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe. This proposal became known as the "zero option" which had been earlier discussed by Helmut Schmidt. The President further proposed to resume negotiations on

strategic nuclear weapons in June 1982, discussions that became known as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). When little progress was made at the INF talks in Geneva, the Peace Movement in Western Europe, especially in the FRG, greatly increased during 1982 and 1983. Washington began to question Schmidt's ability to carry through on the proposed INF deployment in 1983.(10)

2. The Development of the Greens

One of the most important trends in West German politics during the 1970s and 1980s was the rise of the Greens, a party formed outside the mainstream of West German party politics. While this movement was present in other West European countries, it was more pronounced in the FRG. This was due mainly to the centrist nature of the major parties and the lack of a viable left-wing alternative.(11)

Additionally, there was a rise of anti-Western attitudes among West Germany's left wing that had no historical contact with trans-Atlantic cooperation following World War II. This group began to increasingly call for the FRG to find a "third way" between the two superpowers. Coupled with unease about American willingness to use the nuclear deterrent was a general rejection of the trends of American society, including American replacement of detente with rearmament, the conservative swing in American politics, and the severe cutbacks in American social welfare programs. These two

elements together helped produced the large amount of anti-Americanism the Peace Movement became known for.(12)

The Peace Movement of the early 1980s encompassed a broad political spectrum, from communists to clergymen, from ecologists to military men, from the youth of the SPD and FDP to the members of the media. It was led in West Germany by the Green Party, whose growth was fueled initially by an internal SPD split over the NATO INF decision.

The Green Party began in 1982 and 1983 to challenge the West German INF commitment. America began to view the implementation of the deployment program as a test for the Alliance and a collapse of support as a sure sign of the "Finlandization" of Europe.(13) This was one reason the Reagan Administration was pleased with the election by the Bundestag of Helmut Kohl as chancellor in October 1982, who soon after his election vowed to maintain West Germany's INF commitment. However, Kohl also attempted to influence the United States and Soviet Union to reach an agreement in Geneva before the day for deployment was reached. He met with Soviet leaders in July 1983 and sent Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in October of the same year. Bonn also pressured the Reagan Administration to accept the concept of an interim solution which would trade a reduced number of SS-20s for a reduced number of Cruise and Pershing II missiles. In July 1983, Kohl visited the United States and

urged the suspending of the stationing of Pershing II missiles during the Geneva negotiations.

During the fall of 1983 between two and three million West Germans demonstrated against the impending deployment of the INF weapons. At a special November 1983 party congress, the SPD clearly rejected the NATO two-track agreement and the stationing of new nuclear weapons in West Germany. Helmut Schmidt's motion in favor of deployment received only 14 out of 400 votes.(14)

In spite of growing opposition to the stationing of the missiles, the West German Bundestag voted later in November to support deployment as scheduled. In response, the Soviets suspended both the INF and START talks.

The position of the Kohl government was to attempt to revive the arms control discussions and dialogue between the two countries. In the words of Foreign Minister Genscher, the Atlantic Alliance must be ready for "dialogue, negotiations and cooperation on equal terms with the East, with the aim of keeping a check on the East-West conflict and reducing tensions."(15)

3. The Trade Issue

The West German readiness for dialogue and negotiations can be illustrated with the issue of trade and technology transfer to the Eastern bloc. It was very clear that the FRG and Americans held differing views regarding the effects of trade on East-West relations.

The Federal Republic looked at trade with the Soviets

as a way to develop and enhance long-term relations. West Germany felt the U.S.S.R. was economically self-sufficient and not reliant on the West. Hopes that the Soviets would curtail their massive arms build-up and restrain themselves in the Third World were unfounded. Western economic relations had not reached a level large enough to induce political concessions from the Soviet Union. According to Foreign Minister Genscher, the Soviet economy was made up of two components, a military economy and a civilian one, of which the military held absolute priority.(16)

In addition to this lack of leverage, the Europeans questioned the effect of economic sanctions on the U.S.S.R. as compared with the West. The U.S. grain embargo imposed by President Carter in 1979 was seen to have a major effect on American farmers while having a minimal effect on the Soviets. The Washington Post estimated that if trade of finished products with the Soviet Union were to be cut in half during the years 1982 and 1983, the Soviet GNP would be reduced by \$4.5 billion while the Western GNP would be reduced by \$30 billion.(17) In Bonn, trade was a means by which the Soviet Union could be incorporated into international economic interdependence. Instead of linking trade, credits, and the transfer of technology to the good behavior of the Soviets, Bonn felt that Moscow's economic problems should be used to demonstrate to the Soviets how much they could profit from peaceful cooperation with the West. Once Moscow realized this, there would be a chance

that they would not wish to jeopardize this cooperation through acts of violence such as Afghanistan. The motto was change through trade.(18)

For the Americans and the Reagan Administration, trade with the East was first and foremost a political instrument to be used for rewarding or punishing the behavior of the Soviet Union. The U.S. had generally discarded the view that strong trade relations could produce stable relations with Moscow. The State Department was especially critical of technology transfers to the Soviets, citing enhanced military capabilities and a need for an increased Western military buildup as a result.

The U.S. demonstrated their views on trade with the East after General Wojciek Jaruzelski declared martial law in Poland and attempted to break-up the Polish trade union Solidarity in December 1981. President Reagan responded by imposing sanctions on the U.S.S.R. and Poland and asked the allies to do the same.(19)

However, as was the case in 1979 after Afghanistan, the European allies were reluctant to impose sanctions on the Soviets. The Reagan Administration felt the dismantling of Solidarity was a move by Moscow to quash the forces of freedom and democracy in Poland. The Schmidt government viewed these events as an internal Polish matter in which they should not become involved. Bonn's government spokesman Kurt Becker stated that the crucial "question is whether martial law was an autonomous Polish

decision as we believe, or whether the American belief is true that the Polish government did not act within its own competence and the Soviet Union was behind the action."(20)

In June 1982 at the Western Economic Summit in Versailles, France, the United States attempted to force the other Western Alliance nations to coordinate their Eastern economic trade policies with the United States. This position was rejected by the summit participants.

Divergence between the FRG and the U.S. on the trade issue was most pronounced over the Siberian natural gas pipeline. During the 1970s, natural gas became an important source of fuel for the Europeans. After the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo of 1973, there was a realization that the West, and especially the FRG, was overdependent for its energy needs on the Middle East region. A reduction of this dependence became a central element in the energy policies of most industrial nations, including the U.S. and FRG. The European nations were much more dependent on oil imports than the U.S. and they began to view natural gas as a viable alternative to imported oil. The volume of natural gas consumed in Western Europe increased by approximately 50 percent between 1973 and 1980.(21) Faced with the increased demand for natural gas and a limited amount of European gas reserves, it was only natural that other sources for the fuel would soon be sought. Thus, the Europeans looked to the Soviet Union, whose reserves were

massive. Moreover, energy sales by the Soviets would aid European steel markets, which contracted European firms to manufacture the steel pipe needed for gas pipeline construction. In addition, Bonn viewed the expanded East-West commerce as a means for facilitating political ties useful for moderating Soviet behavior.

Negotiations for the controversial Siberian natural gas pipeline began in 1980. The 3,500 mile pipeline would supply 40 billion cubic meters of gas to Europe after 1984 and would run from the Urengoi gas fields in northwest Siberia through Czechoslovakia to Waidhaus, West Germany. At Waidhaus, the pipeline would hook on to an existing European grid, where gas would be distributed to France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Austria. After long and tough bargaining, a contract between the leading German gas distributor, Ruhrgas AG, and the Soviets was signed on 20 November 1981. This agreement would mean that by 1990, the FRG would be importing 24 percent of its natural gas from the U.S.S.R. and approximately 5 percent of its total energy supplies.(22)

The Americans tried repeatedly to persuade the Europeans not to sign this agreement. They argued that although Europe would only be dependent on the U.S.S.R. for about 6 percent of their total energy supplies, they must look beyond the aggregate numbers to more fundamental energy security considerations. The pipeline would earn the Soviet Union \$10 billion a year in foreign exchange

which would enable the U.S.S.R. to buy Western technology on the world market, mainly advanced technology to aid the massive Soviet arms build-up. The Reagan Administration wanted to link East-West trade, including technology transfer, export credits, and trade of agricultural products to overall Soviet behavior. The general feeling of the President was that increased technology transfer enhanced the Soviet military capability.

Washington also believed that the pipeline increased the dependence of Western Europe in general, and the Federal Republic in particular, on the Soviets for their energy so as to allow the Kremlin political leverage in an East-West crisis. Assistant Secretary of State Robert Hormats warned that "in the past the Soviet Union has used energy exports as a political lever, interrupting supplies to Yugoslavia, Israel, and China among others."(23) President Reagan, when questioned about Europe's natural gas deal, asked "Do they want to be dependent on someone who has 900 nuclear warheads aimed at them?"(24)

The basic American argument was that the natural gas contract would relieve the pressure on the Soviet Union exerted by their own economic problems. They questioned the Europeans' purpose in granting subsidized export credits to the Soviets. Washington held that by granting the Soviets interest rates of 7.8 percent, the Europeans would underwrite some of the cost as well as most of the risk involved with the project. The hardliners in the

Reagan Administration believed that by exerting pressure on Moscow through a tough economic stance, eventually the Soviets would either relent on their massive defense build-up or watch their economy crumble. As an alternative to the gas pipeline deal, the Americans suggested an increase in the amount of American coal imported for European energy use.(25)

After the crackdown on the Polish trade union Solidarity by General Jaruzelski, President Reagan announced a suspension of the export licenses of U.S. companies selling pipeline technology to the U.S.S.R. for the construction of the Siberian pipeline. Reagan's tough stance toward the Soviets and the pipeline was made even tougher with the announcement in June 1982 of an extension of the earlier sanctions on pipeline technology. The new sanctions were to include "equipment produced abroad under licenses issued by U.S. companies as well as subsidiaries of U.S. companies."(26) The President erroneously believed that the extension of these sanctions would favorably advance the position of the people of Poland.

This new development deeply disturbed Bonn and the Europeans. The West Germans emphasized that the latest sanctions were in contradiction to agreements reached at the economic summit at Versailles in June 1982. The countries at the summit agreed "to pursue a prudent and diversified economic approach to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe" and agreed to "work together to control exports of

strategic materials" as well as to apply "commercial prudence in limiting export credits."(27) The Europeans were also angered by the prospect that many workers would lose their jobs and saw the action as an attempt to interfere in their policymaking decisions. The Europeans felt there were serious inconsistencies in the Reagan position. While the President was attempting to scuttle the pipeline deal, in July 1982 he decided to extend the sale of American wheat to the Soviet Union for another year.

By July 1982, it was apparent that the West Germans, as well as other European governments, and the Americans were on divergent policy courses. Bonn viewed the sanctions as a move by Washington to exert leadership in the Western Alliance. Especially angered that the U.S. did not even consult them before imposing the sanctions, former West German Finance Minister Manfred Lahnstein told the Bundestag that "U.S. action violates the basis of faith and credibility in international relations," and Economics Minister Otto Lambsdorff stated that "the pipeline would be built, embargo or no embargo."(28) The Europeans continued to defy the embargo and ship pipeline technology to the Soviets.

The West Germans backed up their words with action. On 13 July 1982, a consortium of German Banks guaranteed credits of DM 2.8 billion at 7.8 percent interest to the Soviets for pipeline use, with 85 percent of the loan

backed by Bonn.(29) Other counter actions were considered, including attacking the U.S. law in world courts and international bodies and imposing duties on the \$9 billion in annual farm exports to the European Community. At risk for the U.S. was \$52 billion a year in exports to the EC, which in 1981 earned the Americans a bilateral trade surplus of \$18 billion as well as billions in profit earned by U.S. multinationals in Europe.(30)

It was clear to the Europeans that the U.S. had considerable flexibility in deciding how hard to punish the sanction violators. Penalties ranged from token fines to such drastic measures as the severance of all U.S.-European business relations. Before the Versailles summit, the Administration told the Europeans that U.S. action on the pipeline issue would be influenced by negotiations on curbing export credit subsidies. It would now be difficult to offer further tradeoffs due to the linkage with the easing of tensions in Poland. From the American point of view, the sanctions had to be enforced or the President's credibility would have been severely questioned, both in the U.S. and abroad as well.

Finally, after months of negotiation, a solution to the problem appeared. Impetus for the settlement came from U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, who won allied backing for an agreement on curbing credit to the East. He was also responsible for convincing President Reagan that an agreement with the allies would be a better policy in

the long run than maintaining the rift in the Alliance caused by the sanctions.

In November 1982, President Reagan reached a compromise agreement with the European allies and decided to lift the embargo on American subsidiaries in Europe and companies operating under American licensing agreements. This agreement, as released by President Reagan, included a ban on trade agreements that contributed to the Soviet military capability, with a special emphasis on products that involved high technology. It strengthened the controls on strategic items through the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) and established procedures to monitor financial relations with the U.S.S.R. The language of the new agreement was similar to that of the Versailles Communique and appeared to be only a face saving measure for President Reagan. That fact was echoed by a West German official in Bonn, who stated that the agreement was an attempt by the allies to let Mr. Reagan abandon the sanctions without a loss of prestige.(31) In August 1983, President Reagan even dropped the embargo on the export of pipe-laying equipment to the Soviets. The President realized that this crisis over the pipeline had taken relations in the Western Alliance to their lowest level in many years.

4. Inter-German Relations

Despite their original opposition to the Ostpolitik begun by Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, the Christian

Democrats under Helmut Kohl have been consistent supporters of the process of European detente. The maintenance of friendly relations with the Soviets was a consistent theme of early statements by Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher both on the July 1983 state visit to Moscow and after the September shooting down of a Korean airliner by the Soviets. One of the most important benefits of European detente for West Germany has been the steady improvement of inter-German relations after the signing of the 1972 Basic Treaty. Since that time, several million citizens of West Berlin and West Germany have on an annual basis been able to visit friends and relatives in the German Democratic Republic. East Germany has also allowed 20,000 political prisoners to emigrate to the FRG for which Bonn had to pay approximately 2 billion marks.(32)

Even during the period of tension during the late 1970s and early 1980s, inter-German relations were for the most part strengthened and improved. Initially, the East Germans were concerned about the October 1982 change in government in the FRG. The Christian Democrats had never accepted Ostpolitik and had deplored practically every inter-German accord, including the Basic Treaty. Many leaders of the party, including Bavarian Prime Minister Franz Josef Strauss, seemed committed to the radical anti-communism of the 1950s. However, once in power, the CDU/FDP coalition accepted all the inter-German agreements and committed itself to the continuation of Ostpolitik.

Humanitarian improvements in the inter-German relationship were readily apparent as well, as Kohl opened the Berlin-Hamburg highway which had been financed mainly by West German capital. During early 1983, 46,000 East Germans received exit visas to West Germany, twice the number of 1982. In July 1983, Strauss made a most dramatic announcement of a \$380 million unrestricted loan to the GDR. This loan helped the East German government during a time of great financial strain and allowed inter-German relations to prosper despite the looming INF deployment. Negotiations were held in mid-1983 on nine different issues, including river and air pollution, the safety of nuclear reactors in border areas, science and technology, cultural exchanges, and the upgrading of transit routes. The GDR accelerated the dismantling of automatic shrapnel guns along the inter-German border and abolished the minimum currency exchange for children under age 15. Even the popular West German rock star Udo Lindenberg, who had ridiculed East German Communist party chief Erich Honecker in a popular song after having been denied permission to perform in East Germany, was finally allowed to play in East Berlin.(33)

A second West German loan for \$300 million was cancelled by Kohl during late 1983 when more significant concessions from East Berlin were not forthcoming. Tension was evident between the two Germanies as the impending INF deployment date approached and many felt that this issue

would cause a crisis in inter-German relations.(34)

In the months following initial deployment of the Cruise and Pershing II missiles, the GDR offered a startling surprise. Instead of joining Moscow in its harsh criticism of the U.S. and FRG, Honecker and the East Germans expressed their desire to "limit the damage" caused to detente by the stationing of these missiles. In a move toward a more independent foreign policy in 1984, the GDR refused to freeze inter-German relations as requested by Moscow and instead intensified its desire for improved relations. East Germans openly criticized the Soviet announcement of new nuclear missile deployment intended to match that of NATO and only reluctantly boycotted the Los Angeles Summer Olympics of 1984. During the first half of 1984, 31,000 people were permitted to emigrate to the West and in July the second FRG loan for \$380 million was reinstated.(35)

For the first time in almost 20 years West German government leaders openly talked about reunification. Helmut Kohl was the most outspoken post-war Chancellor in support of eventual reunification. He promised his government would not "accept a division of the fatherland" and made clear the existence of a "special relationship" between the two German states, whose commonalty included language, history, and strong human bonds.(36) Articles which appeared in the late 1970s stating that German reunification was a "dead issue" appear to have wrongly

forecast the death of German nationalism. Public opinion polls during the mid-1980s show wide support for German reunification.(37) President Reagan demonstrated a less enthusiastic response to these developments, informing Bonn that "careful consultations" were needed between the U.S. and FRG in order to maintain their friendship. However, in a November 1984 meeting with Chancellor Kohl, President Reagan reaffirmed American support for West German "efforts to lower the barriers between the two German states."(38) The two German states were clearly in closer harmony with each other during the mid-1980s than at any other time in the post-war era.

CONCLUSION

In analyzing the American-West German post-war relationship, the high degree of unity between the two countries is readily apparent. In spite of the disagreements which the partnership has endured during the post-war years, a common interest and concern has consistently evolved. The basis for this unity of purpose has been the common interest of both countries to withstand the threat of the Soviet Union. This threat has manifested itself in several key areas of the American relationship with West Germany, including views on the East-West conflict, the importance of detente, the role and structure of defense, each country's role in the Alliance, and economic relations with each other and the East.

1. The East-West Conflict

The American view of the threat from the Soviet Union was very different from that of the West Germans. The FRG saw the East-West conflict centered in Europe as a dispute between NATO on one side and the Warsaw Pact on the other. It was because of the division of Europe after World War II that NATO was formed in 1949.

The Soviet threat in central Europe was of primary importance to the U.S. during the 1950s, but extended to Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa during the 1960s and 1970s. Because of its status as a global power, Washington became increasingly involved toward the Soviet challenge in other parts of the world.

American policy of the 1950s and 1960s had been one of containment, meeting the challenge of communism whenever it presented itself.(1) During the 1970s, Nixon and Kissinger had hoped to induce the Soviet Union, through a policy of linkage, to modify its foreign policy, slow down its arms build-up, and refrain from military initiatives in the Third World. This would effectively freeze the military and political status quo on a global basis and allow the U.S. to reduce defense expenditures and relinquish its role as world policemen.(2)

The hopes of the U.S. were not realized. While the U.S.S.R. desired stabilization of the status quo in Europe, Moscow continued its massive arms build-up and militarily intervened in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. The Americans viewed these events and the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan as a sign that the policy of linkage had failed. With a major military build-up of its own, sanctions against the Soviets, and withdrawal from ratification of the SALT II Treaty, President Carter signaled an end to the policy of linkage and a return to military strength and containment.(3) The election of Ronald Reagan confirmed the American return to these policies. The Reagan Administration viewed the United States in a global power conflict with the Soviets to be waged throughout the world. U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig stated at his first press conference that "the whole world had now become NATO's concern."(4)

Most European governments, including West Germany's, did not share this view. In contrast to President Carter, who viewed the Afghanistan invasion as a first step toward Soviet expansion into the Persian Gulf and Western energy supplies, most Europeans felt the conflict was a regional issue outside the scope of NATO. While Washington imposed sanctions as a way of punishing Moscow and hoped it could force the Soviets to withdraw, Bonn wanted to continue cooperation with Moscow in hopes it could urge the Soviets to remove their troops. The Europeans felt that the Soviet invasion was defensive in nature and rejected the idea of the expansionist nature of Soviet foreign policy. The offsetting of the Soviet threat posed by the SS-20s, either through increased defenses or disarmament, was incomparably more important than growing Soviet influence in the Third World. Thus, while the FRG continued its policy of viewing East-West problems from the standpoint of a regional power, the U.S. as a world power saw Soviet expansion as part of a more complex world conflict.(5)

While differences between the U.S. and FRG in this area are evident, American foreign policy made a gradual shift in the late 1980s. Arms control became a priority for the U.S. and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan helped ease tensions in U.S.-Soviet relations. The conflict of interest between Washington and Bonn seemed much less severe than it did during the early 1980s. The dramatic changes in Eastern Europe during the late 1980s

and early in 1990 have yet to demonstrate what the future holds for the U.S.-FRG relationship.

2. The Significance of Detente

Throughout the 1960s, the various American administrations began a gradual move toward a policy of peaceful cooperation with the Soviets, a feeling that manifested itself in the era of negotiations initiated by Richard Nixon. Concomitantly, initially under the "Grand Coalition" government of 1966-1969 and especially with the election of Willy Brandt in 1969, the governments of West Germany began to adopt a similar policy.

This did not mean that there were not moments of great tension between the two capitals, especially when one capital dealt with the adversary on a unilateral basis. When Kennedy appeared to soften America's stance on access to Berlin, on arms control, or on recognition of the German Democratic Republic, Konrad Adenauer became alarmed. When the Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt began moving faster than the U.S. felt was best, Washington expressed concern. During the late 1970s, when the Carter Administration imposed sanctions on the Soviets and returned to the policy of containment and confrontation, Bonn was irritated. As the FRG maintained its policy of detente as a means of reducing military tension and improving contacts with the East, Washington feared West German "self-Finlandization" or neutralism.(6)

The decade of detente provided few benefits for the

U.S. and in many ways Americans agreed with President Reagan that detente had been a "one way street" for the Soviets. In contrast, the years of detente had brought significant benefits to the Western European states, benefits they were unwilling to abandon. The FRG was the main beneficiary of this relaxation of tensions, particularly through the humanitarian and political benefits of the accommodation with the GDR after 1971.

The increasing use of non-military rather than military means was indispensable for West Germany, since any potential conflict would result in the Germanies becoming a battlefield. Detente as a means of reducing military tensions was and still is vital for the Federal Republic.(7)

This approach directly conflicted with the U.S. policy of confrontation and containment reinstated by Carter and Reagan. The Carter Administration needed Alliance solidarity for its sanctions after Afghanistan, as did President Reagan after his pipeline sanctions following the Polish crackdown in 1981. The refusal of the Europeans to support U.S. demands led to a great deal of bitterness and antagonism. Western Europe's failure to criticize the invasion of Afghanistan and Polish martial law led to cries of "self-Finlandization" from America.(8)

Here, the essence of the differences between the two countries lies not in conflicting policies, but in priorities. While Washington favored defense over detente,

Bonn felt the opposite was best. The essence of their disagreements were due mainly to differences in geography and world political power, not in a loosening of ties with the West.

3. Role and Structure of Defense

European objections to U.S. policies grew stronger during the early 1980s. Hawkish Reagan rhetoric and references to fighting and winning a limited nuclear war in Europe led to new anxieties in wide parts of the European public. The fear of the 1960s and 1970s that the U.S. would not fight a war in Western Europe in the event of a Soviet attack gave way to the new fear that the U.S. would risk and attempt to limit nuclear war to the European theater. The INF debate, the rising West German peace movement, and the increasing neutralism of the left as witnessed by the SPD's 1983 rejection of NATO's two-track agreement, put even more distance between the U.S. and FRG. Many European governments, especially that of the FRG, were faced with two contradictory requirements. They had to preserve the unity of the Alliance in order to maintain their security, but also wanted to assert their independence to accommodate the popular will against the U.S. governments policy of strength.(9)

Not only did the FRG have the biggest stake in a strong defense and in the continuance of detente, it was most closely watched by the two superpowers. In spite of its boycott of the Moscow Olympics and several attempts to

maintain loyalty to the U.S., the FRG bore the brunt of U.S. frustration with the Alliance. Although the West Germans worked hard at maintaining detente, it became the focus of Soviet pressure during the 1980s.

The INF debate is the best example of the critical but temporary differences between the U.S. and the FRG. It was the government of Helmut Schmidt which called attention to the Soviet build-up of SS-20 missiles. This was a key factor in the implementation of NATO's two-track decision of 1979. As it gradually became more difficult for Bonn to guarantee its commitment to the new medium-range missiles, the Americans viewed the deployment as a test of Alliance strength. This switch in position was due mainly to the different assessment of the two NATO pillars of defense and detente. Bonn wished the Soviet SS-20s removed and failing this, only then desired implementing the deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles. Washington placed preeminence on the deployment and wished to negotiate through a position of strength. Here, the critical issue was how to meet the Soviet missile build-up, not whether it should be met. The difference between the two capitals was again found in which of the two tracks should be emphasized, defense or detente.

Cries of "self-Finlandization" or neutralism have periodically been heard from Washington regarding Bonn's policies. However, when examining the West German commitment to NATO, the word neutral hardly applies. The

FRG's Bundeswehr has accounted for 50 percent of NATO's land force in central Europe, 30 percent of the combat aircraft, and 70 percent of NATO's Baltic naval fleet. In 1982 it provided 7.6 percent of NATO's defense spending, behind only the nuclear powers America (65.1 percent), Britain (8.5 percent) and France (7.8 percent). In no other NATO country has there been such a concentration of military forces and nuclear weapons, of which the German government has no control.(10)

Criticism of West Germany's desire for neutralism cannot be regarded as an accurate reflection of public opinion either within the West German government or on the streets of West Germany. A survey of the West German public revealed a desire for alliance compared with neutralism by 64 to 35 percent.(11) Similarly, pro-American opinion in West Germany reached a 56 percent high in September 1981, surpassed only in May 1965.(12) Large public protests held during the early 1980s had little to do with anti-Americanism. They were simply an expression of disappointment over the failure of arms control up to that time. These protests abated with the deployment of the medium range missiles beginning in December 1983 and the softening of President Reagan's anti-Soviet rhetoric during the mid-1980s. The fears within the Alliance of a general drifting apart have faded. Suspicion that inter-German relations would lead to German neutralism has disappeared. Helmut Kohl has been

allowed to become more aggressive in his pursuit of a closer relationship with East Germany during the late 1980s, mainly due to the fact that no one has accused him of anti-Western sentiments.

4. Role in the Alliance

A similar conclusion can be drawn when examining the different roles each country plays in the Alliance. It is unquestioned that the FRG continues to be a special Atlantic partner, given its geographic position.

Detente is essential to the West Germans due to the fact that even a small use of military force would have devastating effects on both Germanies. Bonn has continued to utilize Henry Kissinger's strategy of linkage as a means of stabilizing the conflict between East and West. The fact that Soviet leaders have more frequently visited Bonn than Washington and West German leaders have gone to Moscow during periods of icy relations between Americans and Soviets was symbolic of this special role.

To allege, as some analysts have expressed, that increased contacts between West German officials and the Soviet Union might lead to West German neutralism is questionable in view of the FRG's consistent commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. Three West German Chancellors since the beginning of West German Ostpolitik have stated and restated their commitment to the West. Willy Brandt told the American Chamber of Commerce in Germany in 1978 that "the Alliance. . . is indispensable for every one of us [in

West Germany]."(13) Helmut Schmidt wrote in 1981 "the most important factor contributing to [West German] stability is and remains the partnership between Europeans and Americans."(14) Helmut Kohl stated on Austrian television that the "Federal Republic is tied to the West, it is not a wanderer between the blocs."(15)

Bonn's Ostpolitik could not survive without a successful Westpolitik. The FRG has consistently demonstrated a solid commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. Given the fact its relations with the West are successful, it can work towards bridging the differences between East and West and reducing the tensions in Central Europe to a much greater degree.

5. Economic Relations

Harmony in West German-American relations is also readily apparent in light of overall economic relations and trade between the two countries. This unity has as its base West Germany's membership in the European Community.

While trade between the two countries has increased dramatically during the 1970s and 1980s, each finds itself using trade with the East in a different manner. Under Presidents Carter and Reagan, the U.S. used trade as means to affect Soviet behavior, as was the case after the invasion of Afghanistan and crackdown in Poland. West Germany used trade to encourage acceptable Soviet political behavior, as was the case with the Siberian natural gas pipeline.(16)

Though economic relations cannot replace politics, they can and do provide an important foundation for improved political relations. They express both the dependability of American defense of West Germany and the commitment of the FRG's integration into the West. While the West Germans have been forced to remain dependent on the U.S. for their defense during the post-war period, through the EC they have been able to establish themselves as a partner on equal economic footing with the United States.(17)

"We are the allies of the United States, not their vassals," spoke a West German politician in 1984.(18) While at times policies of either the U.S. or West Germany have caused temporary problems, after careful analysis it is clear that Bonn is not on the road to "self-Finlandization." The two important pillars of West Germany's foreign policy continue to be integration with the West and detente with the East, a policy which the Kohl government has continued to pursue.(19) Based on West German postwar history, the FRG seems to desire strong and continuous integration in the West, especially the EC, while improving relations with the East. Konrad Adenauer decided to integrate West Germany into the West through NATO and the EC. This policy has been continued by his successors, Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, and Helmut Kohl, while improving relations with the U.S.S.R., Poland, and other Eastern European countries. These aspects have remained

during the dramatic changes of 1989-1990. The Ostpolitik of the 1970s and 1980s contributed to an improvement of German-German relations, greater communication between the two states and the German people. Helmut Kohl is determined "not to miss the reunification train, which may not come at another time," while at the same time his government has remained committed to the West.(20) West German neutralism was not, nor is in the future a viable option.

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