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Angola: A victim of the Cold War cross-fire

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ANGOLA: A VICTIM OF THE COLD WAR
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ANGOLA : a victim of the Cold War Cross - Fire

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BY

Johnson Kofi Kuma

THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

1995

YEAR

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING
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
This thesis completes my research activities in partial fulfillment of the "comprehensive knowledge" requirement for the M.A. degree in Political Science. I would like to express my profound gratitude to Dr. Abdul Lateef for his encouragement, patience, and advice while supervising this work. I would like to mention the efforts of Dr. Andrew McNitt and David Carwell, in their directives and concerns that helped me to improve on this task. Dr. John Faust's "International Policy Issues" Seminars helped, to expand my "Global Views" on the politics of International Relations, and Security Interests. My special thanks go to Ms. Luciana Gomes, whose Brazilian ethnicity helped me, to understand "all the Luso twists" in this thesis. I owe special gratitude to my colleagues, especially Professor Jeffrey C. Barr, who took time off their busy schedules, to read large portions or the entire manuscript, and made useful suggestions. Of course, this thesis would not look so "clean" without Ms. Pat Miller's sharp eyes and nimble fingers.

In the final analysis, however, hold me responsible for all errors of fact, controversies and interpretation.

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. Angola



Source: Morrison, D.G, Black Africa: a comparative handbook. p.357

(1989)

ABSTRACT

Angola became a victim of super-power competition during the Cold War. Portugal's colonial policy of Lusotropicalism in Lusophone territories in Africa, especially in Angola, was a myth and a camouflage for perpetuating her colonial domination. Portugal's attempt to use a group of "degradedos" or "rejects" of that society to "assimilate" and educate the "Indigenas" or the indigenous Angolans in "Luso" or Portuguese civility was, at best, an effort in futility. As a weak colonial administrator, in addition to her inability and unwillingness to prepare Angola for self-rule, Portugal had created a condition for intervention by the super-powers.

This thesis indicates that the three major liberation movements in Angola; the FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA, became pawns in the super-power competitive game during the Cold War. The struggle for sovereignty by most emerging Third World nations during the Cold War resulted in conflicts similar to the case of Angola.

A model called the Super-Power Intervention Model (SPIM) is developed to describe this process. SPIM is shown to be a tool for describing covert or clandestine activity by the super-powers during the Cold War. This model indicates that detente became the *raison d'etre* of covert action rather than overt action by the United States of America, the Soviet Union, and their proxies.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

RESEARCH PROBLEM:

After World War II, it became increasingly clear that mankind had to find alternative means of resolving conflicts without resorting to war.

In 1942, President Roosevelt of the United States of America, Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain, Maxim Litvinov of the U.S.S.R., and T.V. Soong of China signed a document that became the Charter of the seven principles upon which the United Nations Organization was founded.¹ Since then, UNO has become a forum for resolving conflicts among nations and the maintenance of world peace and freedom.

Provisions in the Charter compelled all colonial powers to abide by its principles, which included relinquishing power and granting authority to the peoples of their colonial territories for self rule.²

The Portuguese were the first European settlers in Africa arriving in 1442. Merchants, led by Diogo Cao in 1483, discovered the mouth of the Congo (Zaire) river.³ The Portuguese and other Europeans such as the Dutch, French, British, and Germans who later followed built fortresses along the west and southwest coasts of Africa, which became

trading posts for commerce in slaves and minerals.

A few centuries after the arrival of the Europeans (a period which was often described as "The Scramble for Africa"), the continent was portioned out by these Europeans, and arbitrary boundaries drawn to determine ownership to these territories, and the people who lived there.

When it was time to grant independence to these colonies in the 1950's and thereafter, after many years of colonial domination, some of these European invaders like the Government of Portugal were not ready or willing to grant this right to their colonies. It is rather disconcerting that, though the Portuguese were the first colonial power to come to Africa, they were the last to leave even when forced to do so.

Table six (on page 28) shows that of the last ten African countries to achieve independence, five of them were the five Portuguese colonial territories that included Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe. A major focus of this thesis is to identify some of the factors which made the decolonization process in these Lusophone (Portuguese speaking) countries in Africa, specifically in Angola, such a unique experience in comparison with other colonized countries in Africa. This thesis examines the policy of Lusotropicalism in Lusophone African countries; a policy this thesis rejects because it failed to bring "racial harmony, peace, and acculturation" to Angolans as promised by the colonial government in Portugal.

This thesis explores Portugal's Lusophone African policy which made Angola's road to self-rule so traumatic and chaotic. Portugal's weakness as a colonial power is shown to have contributed to the intervention in both the colonial and civil wars in Angola by the super-powers. It is demonstrated that the super-power Cold War polemics paved the way for young and emerging democratic states like Angola to get easily drawn into East-West Cold War power struggle.

This thesis examines the Angolan situation that exemplifies this pattern, and identifies some of the factors which contributed to that demise, such as the Cold War super-power struggles, Portugal's weak colonial administration in Angola, liberation movements in Angola and Southern Africa, and the power struggle among the Angolan revolutionary leaders.

METHODOLOGY:

The thesis, which is both descriptive and analytical in approach, surveys the literature that is available on why Angola became a victim of super-power rivalry. The analysis involves issues such as Lusotropicalism and its effects on the people of Angola. Several books and articles reviewed Portugal's Lusophone African policy in the states that include Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Sao Tome and Principe, and compares it to the Brazilian situation.

The thesis shows that the policy turned Angola into a society which is divided not only by race but also by class.

These different classes are identified, including the effects of this stratification.

Account is given of the various liberation movements, including the policies they pursued. Membership in these movements, and the political alliances which they formed with the super-powers are examined. The thesis identifies the liberation movements and the agenda pursued by the leaders. It examines briefly, the composition of the UPA (Uniao das Populacoes de Angola) - Angolan People's Union; FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola) - Angolan National Liberation Front; UNITA (Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola) - National Union for the Total Independence of Angola; and the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola - Partido de Trabalho) - Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola - Worker's Party.⁴

Change of government in Portugal marked a turning point in Angola's history. For the first time, a serious attempt was made by the colonial government in Portugal to re-examine the policy of Lusotropicalism in Lusophone colonies in Africa. The thesis describes these changes, especially the Alvor Agreement which brought a Transitional Government into Angola.⁵ On April 25, 1974, the government of Marcello Jose Caetano was overthrown in a coup d'etat by some of his young military officers who had become disillusioned with his African policies. As a result of this change, Portugal lost control and power in Angola. It is shown that a "conduit" was

created for the super-powers to enter Angola. This thesis develops an argument to support the fact that Angola is located in the Southern African region that is vital to the "security interests" of the super-powers.

The following are some of the major issues the thesis has identified as contributing to super-power involvement:

- a. The United States of America's foreign policy of Containment of the Soviet Union's expansionism beyond Eastern Europe.
- b. The Soviet Union's Marxist-Leninist ideology in the Third World countries, especially in Angola.
- c. The fulfillment of detente in the Cold War era as it applied to Angola.
- d. The rich resources in Angola are of major interest to both Eastern and the Western blocks.

The events that explain the above agenda form the main chapters of this thesis.

Chapter two examines Portugal's theory of Lusotropicalism and how it was used in Angola. This policy as it applied to Brazil was modified or misapplied in all the colonial territories in Africa or Lusophone Africa, and perhaps in East-Timor, in Indo-China. An attempt is made to discuss the shortcomings of this policy as it applies to Angola and why it was bound to fail as it did.

The failure of Lusotropicalism in Angola seemed to be one of the contributing factors which led to both the colonial and

civil wars in Angola. The eventual collapse of the Marcello Jose Caetano government in Portugal was attributed to the Angolan conflict. This assumption is explained based on those events.

Chapter three of this thesis examines the conflict in Angola during the Cold War period and briefly describes the participation in the conflict by the major ethnic groups. This chapter describes the feuding tribal groups, especially Savimbi's central and southern Ovimbundu tribe. Dr. Neto's Mbundu tribe in the North East, and around Luanda became the fiercest opponent of Savimbi's majority Ovimbundus. Roberto's Bakongo tribe became the most troublesome colonial fighters against the Portuguese because of their trans-border location into Zaire.

The "Cabinda Factor" is examined, including its oil-rich land in close proximity to Congo (Brazaville), and Congo (Leopoldville 'Zaire'), both of which played major roles in this conflict. This chapter further examines President Mobutu's support for FNLA, and his connection with the CIA's covert or clandestine operations in Angola.

Chapter four explains what the Super-Power Intervention Model (SPIM) is, and how it was used in the Angolan conflict. This model is a descriptive tool for explaining intervention in the "politics" of Third World countries. The model indicates that super-power intervention occurs when the internal political machinery of a state begins to crumble.

This stage was reached in Angola during the Transitional period for self-rule. At that time, power struggles ensued among the various liberation movements.

This chapter examines Portugal's weakness as a colonial power, and inability to contain this conflict, and why the country was unwilling to grant independence to the Lusophone African territories. It is shown that Portugal's intransigence in not granting independence to its Lusophone territories was a major contributory factor to the conflict in Angola. The model, SPIM, describes the reasons United States, and the Soviet Union used Angola as a stomping ground to fulfill their Cold War agendas.

This thesis discusses the United States' Containment Policy as propounded by George F. Kennan, particularly in his anonymously published "X" article, and the Soviet Union's Marxist-Leninist philosophy, and how they were implemented in newly emerging, self-governing, Third World countries such as Angola.

SPIM indicates why the methods of super-power operations in Third World countries changed after the Vietnam war. During the Vietnam war, the United States "intervened/invaded" in that country using American military might. In Angola, however, the super-powers "intervened" covertly or used their proxies. The Soviet Union used the Cubans, Algerians, North Koreans, and their East European allies, mainly the Polish, and Hungarians. The United States operated through the CIA by

recruiting mercenaries from Portugal, South Africa, France, the U.S., and the Rhodesias (Zambia and Zimbabwe). President Mobutu of Zaire was the U.S. "contact person" who offered his country as a rendezvous for U.S. covert or clandestine operations.⁶ China played a role in the earlier stages of the colonial war against the Portuguese by supporting both the FNLA and MPLA, but this role diminished as soon as the two super-powers increased their involvement in Angola.

Chapter five explains how the model (SPIM) fits the case of Angola. While applying the model, the thesis examines the U.S. conflicting covert action in comparison with President Truman's March 12, 1947, proclamation which stated that the "U.S. would support all free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures."⁷ President Truman's affirmation was never implemented in Angola. Instead, President Reagan's "constructive engagement" policy in the Southern African region which is based on the tenets of democratic capitalism was substituted. The thesis shows that the U.S. substituted Reagan's policy in the Southern Africa region, thereby not only betraying President Truman's policy, but completely eroding that stance.

The Soviet Union's Marxist-Leninist political philosophy and how it was used in the third world, specifically in Angola, is examined. Some of the literature examined included Francis Fukuyama's, The 10th Period of Soviet Third World

Policy which explained Soviet Union's behavior for each of those periods. Congresses of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) provided sources for policies which were formulated by that government.

The last part of the thesis, which is the summary and conclusion, highlights the main points of this thesis.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE:

The Cold War began soon after World War II in 1945, and lasted until the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Agreement (STAR) by President Bush and Premier Gorbachev in July, 1991. This period is shown to be "full of war mongerings, war threats and intense super-power struggles between East and West".⁸ The Cold War game seemed to become a "balanced power game" when the Soviet Union developed the atomic bomb in 1949, and thus ending the U.S's bomb monopoly.

The thesis shows why the Soviet Union's occupation of Eastern Europe after World War II alarmed the U.S. and her Western allies. They became suspicious of the Soviet Union's Marxist-Leninist policy intentions beyond Eastern Europe. At that time, the Soviet Union was accused by the West of breaking the Yalta Conference Agreement that was supposed to protect the borders of the liberated countries.

This thesis examines some of the reasons why the United States and her allies were compelled to reformulate their foreign policies to counteract Soviet expansionist behavior.

The "Truman Doctrine" and the "Policy of Containment" during the Cold War are examined. The champion of this policy is shown to be George F. Kennan, who was the American charge d'affaires in Moscow in 1946. His famous "X" article, as reported in Kennan Memoirs: 1925-1950, and Foreign Affairs Journal, provided excellent sources for this thesis.

The Cold War policy of "detente" as pursued by the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger doctrines are shown to be a policy of covert actions in Third World countries. Some of the books that were consulted for the U.S. covert war in Angola included John Stockwell's, In Search of Enemies. Being a former chief of the CIA Angola Task Force, Mr. Stockwell revealed how the U.S. conducted this clandestine war.

Several journals such as; Africa Today, African Affairs, African Report, Journal of African History, Africa and the World, Journal of Modern African Studies, and African Recorder, provided rich sources for the study of American Foreign Policy in Angola. Most of the journals provided information on the U.S. policy makers such as President Carter's hardliners (like Zbigniew Brzezinski), who advocated tough stands against the Soviets and their proxies in the Angolan conflict. Some of the journals explained President Reagan's policy of "Constructive Engagement" in the Southern Africa Region, including Angola.

The Angolan Liberation Movements like MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA, provided rich sources of information on how the

revolutionaries fought to liberate Angola from Portuguese colonialism. The subsequent struggle for leadership that ensued after the Colonial War, was reported in several of the above journals, and most of the major U.S. newspapers such as: The New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and Christian Science Monitor.

This thesis examines Soviet Union's Third World policy that derives from the Marxist-Leninist philosophy of socialism, and support for revolutionary movements from colonial oppression. It is shown that the Soviets aggressively pursued this policy in some emerging, self-governing, Third World countries.

In Angola, this policy brought in some of the strongest supporters or proxies of the Soviet Union's socialist philosophy like Cuba, Vietnam, and North Korea. Some of the sources consulted for the Soviet Union's official policies included several issues of the journal known as Strategic Review. A section in this journal known as "Soviet View," offered translated excerpts from Soviet publications, including addresses to the Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU), by the highest hierarchy of that Party. Carmelo Mesa-Lago's book, Cuba in Africa, provided insights on Cuba's involvement in the Angolan conflict.

Portugal's colonial policy of Lusotropicalism, and her Angolan policy were found in numerous books including Gerald J. Bender's book, Angola Under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality. Professor Bender has written extensively on

Angola, including his Ph.d dissertation: The Myth and Reality of Portuguese Rule in Angola: A study of Racial Domination. Other books include; Eric Axelson's, Portugal and the Scramble for Africa; Neil Bruce's, Portugal: The Last Empire; William Minter's, Portuguese Africa and the West; Daniel Spike's, Angola and the Politics of Intervention; and A Country Study Series, on Angola, and Portugal.

Most of the journals, and the newspapers already listed, provided rich sources on Angola's struggle towards independence. Some of the books consulted for the independence struggle were: Fola Soremekun's Angola: The Road to Independence; and John A. Marcum's The Angolan Revolution - Volumes 1 & 2.

The World Almanac and Book of Facts, and the Historical Dictionary of Angola (2nd edition) provided definition of terms. Encyclopedia of the Third World, provided additional useful information about population, and ethnic composition of the Angolan people.

CHAPTER 2

LUSOTROPICALISM AND THE CASE OF ANGOLA:

A Brazilian sociologist, Gilberto Freyre, popularized the term "Lusotropicalism". He said, "The Portuguese were particularly adept at adapting to life in the tropical regions and to the culture of the indigenous inhabitants of those areas." Freyre thought that this policy or behavior led to "cross-cultural marriages and acculturation" that "have produced an especially harmonious, multiracial society".⁹

We will discover later in this chapter that Lusotropicalism took a "twisted" turn and meaning when Freyre's philosophy was applied in Lusophone African countries like Angola. It is very important to point out the truism and fallacy of Lusotropicalism in Brazilian society and Lusophone African countries, because much of the conflict in Angola evolved from this policy.

In the analysis which follows, we discover that the policy seemed to work in Brazil but not in Lusophone African countries where racial disharmony and ethnic strife occurred among the various ethnic groups, and races such as the whites, mulattoes (mestizos), and Africans.

TABLE 1.

RACIAL COMPOSITION OF ANGOLAN POPULATION (1777-1970)

YEAR	<u>WHITE</u>		<u>MESTICO</u>		<u>BLACK</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1777	1,581	---	4,043	---	---	---	---	---
1845	1,832	0.03	5,770	0.10	5,378,923	99.9	5,386,525	100
1900	9,198	0.20	3,112	0.06	4,777,636	99.7	4,789,946	100
1920	20,700	0.48	7,500	0.18	4,250,000	99.3	4,278,200	100
1940	44,083	1.20	28,035	0.75	3,665,829	98.1	3,737,947	100
1950	78,826	1.90	29,648	0.72	4,036,687	97.4	4,145,161	100
1960	172,529	3.60	53,392	1.10	4,604,362	95.3	4,830,283	100
1970	(290,000)	(5.10)	---	---	---	---	5,673,046	100

Source: Bender, Gerald J. (1978). Angola Under the Portuguese, p. 20.

TABLE 2.

RACIAL COMPOSITION OF BRAZILIAN POPULATION (1818-1970)

YEAR	<u>WHITE</u>		<u>MESTICO</u>		<u>BLACK</u>		<u>OTHER</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1818	1,000,000	27	500,000	13	2,000,000	53	250,000 (Indian)	7.0	3,750,000	100
1872	3,787,289	38	4,188,737	42	1,954,543	20	---	--	9,930,569	100
1890	6,302,198	44	5,934,291	41	2,097,426	15	---	--	14,333,915	100
1940	26,171,778	63.5	8,744,365	21	6,035,869	15	242,320 (Oriental)	0.6	41,194,332	100
1950	32,027,661	61.8	13,786,742	26.6	5,692,657	11	329,082 (Oriental)	0.6	51,836,142	100
1970	---	---	---	--	---	---	---	--	92,237,570	100

Source: Bender, Gerald J. (1978). Angola Under the Portuguese, p. 21.

The figures, in Tables 1 and 2, indicate that there was more assimilation (assimilados) in Brazil than there was in Angola. The assimilation was in the form of race mixing which resulted in the number of mulattoes or mesticos. In 1950, the mestico population in Brazil was 26 percent compared to Angola's less than 1 percent.

In Brazil, Blacks, who in 1950 made up 11 percent of the total population, were forced to learn Portuguese because of historical circumstances which subjugated them to slavery and domination. They had no choice in the acculturation process. In Angola, however, Africans were in the majority (97 percent of the population), and could do without a colonial language that was imposed on them. This was because most Angolans lived in the rural areas and had almost no interaction with the white Portuguese colonial administrators, 60 percent of whom lived in the cities like Luanda, Benguela, and Huambo.¹⁰

It appeared there was very little contact between the Portuguese and Africans, so much so that one of the 1974 coup leaders in Portugal said:

Pouco aproveitamos da Africa, e a Africa pouco aproveitou de nos. O Povo Portugues e o Povo Africano permaneceram desconhecidos um do outro: estrangeiros.

We benefitted little from Africa and Africa benefitted little from us. The Portuguese people and the African people remained unknown to each other: foreigners.¹¹

While some of the literature expressed hope in the

Lusotropical theory of acculturation, others knew the policy was heavily in favor of the Portuguese colonial settlers, who pursued this policy purposely as a tool of exploitation. An editorial in one Portuguese newspaper expressed this view very succinctly:

We must always keep alive in the Portuguese people the dream of beyond the seas and the pride and consciousness of the Empire. Africa is more than agricultural land and it is capable of producing what a metropole needs. Africa is for us a moral justification and a reason for being as a power. Without it we would be a small country, with it we are a great nation.¹²

As expressed in the above editorial, Lusophone Africa remained a territory rich for providing resources--including slave-labor for the Portuguese colonial government. Both government, and non-governmental organizations (NGO's) never meant to pursue policies that were meant to be mutually beneficial. Slavery was abolished in all British colonial territories in 1833. In the U.S., slavery was abolished through President Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation of 1863, that was followed by the 13th Amendment to the Constitution in 1865. Portugal officially pronounced the abolishment of slavery in 1858, but made no serious attempt to enforce it in any Lusophone African country.¹³ Portuguese colonists in these countries flouted the official decree and instituted forced-labor which continued until 1961.¹⁴

New legislation was introduced as far back as 1875, for example the "vagrancy law", whereby any African found in a

non-productive labor was declared to be a vagrant and was put under a "non-paying labor contract."¹⁵ This legislation was abused by the colonists who used it as they pleased. In 1967, a British Consul of the Congo Independent state, after visiting a number of farms in Angola observed that the contract laborers were being treated like slaves.¹⁶ Others like Basil Davidson (1972) wrote a report to confirm the above allegation. Davidson, in his book, In the Eye of the Storm referred to A. T. Steele, who in a 1948 report said, "When an Angolan plantation owner requires labor, he notifies the government of his needs. The demand is passed down to the village chiefs, who are ordered to supply fixed quotas of laborers from their communities. If the required number is not forthcoming, police are sent to round them up."¹⁷

Henry Nevinson (1906), who investigated these allegations earlier, found the same conditions of contract labor. According to Nevinson's estimation at that time, "as much as half the Angolan population was under some form of slavery."¹⁸ Nevinson also noted that the attitude of the Portuguese was that, "contract labor was beneficial to the African because it brought him/her in contact with a higher civilization and afforded him/her a comfort and well-being which would have been forever beyond his reach if he had not become a slave."¹⁹ This indicated that several of these incidents were true as far back as 1906.

Freitas Morna (1942) observed that \$1.50 per month, was the

maximum paid for forced-labor.²⁰ In 1966, Manuel da Cruz Gasper, while doing a similar study for his Master's thesis, found that the pay for contract labor was between \$3.00-\$4.00 per month.²¹ These low wages, and mistreatment of Angolans by the colonial Portuguese settlers, forced many of them to flee their country to the neighboring countries like Zaire, Congo, South West Africa (Namibia), and Zambia. A United Nations report (1962) indicated that as many as 500,000 Angolans left their country.²²

Lusotropical theorists did not attempt to integrate the people of Angola into one harmonious, multiracial society, as claimed, instead it made laws that segregated that society. During the Salazar regime in the 50's, Portuguese immigration to her territories increased tremendously. About 55,000 of these immigrants, known as "colonos," went to Africa, most of them to Angola.²³ The various books described the colonos as "generally poor, ignorant and illiterate, without much ambition, withdrawn and lacking initiative."²⁴ Settlements known as "colonatos" were created for these immigrants on arrival. It was shown that these settlements were located on some of the best agricultural lands that had been seized from rural Angolan farmers. This created a lot of hostility between rural Angolans and the colonos.

The "colonatos" experiment seemed to have failed miserably because these immigrants were not used to farming. The records indicated that most of them migrated to the larger

CHARLES W. ...

cities in Angola, where they resumed the frivolous and indolent life they once enjoyed in Portugal.²⁵ Once in the city, some colonos displaced or competed with Africans in unskilled urban jobs such as taxi driving, shoe shining, vending, and door men.²⁶

An educated African was expected to have absorbed Luso civility and education as a prerequisite for being deemed civilized or assimilated. These "assimilated Africans, or assimilados," in the Angolan society had to be at least 18 years old, read and write Portuguese fluently, and be gainfully employed. As indicated in Table 3, below, this group is less than 1 percent at any time.²⁷

TABLE 3.

ANGOLAN POPULATION BY RACE AND 'CIVILIZATION STATUS', 1940 AND 1950

RACE	TOTAL POPULATION	TOTAL 'CIVILIZED'	PERCENT 'CIVILIZED'
1940			
a) African	3,665,829	24,221	0.7
b) Mestico	28,035	23,244	82.9
c) White	44,083	44,083	100.0
1950			
a) African	4,036,689	30,089	0.7
b) Mestico	29,648	26,335	88.8
c) White	78,826	78,826	100.0

Source: Bender, Gerald J. (1978). Angola Under the Portuguese, p. 151.

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Heimer (1974) did research covering 80 percent of 2,976 rural Angolans. He found that 53 percent of rural Angolans had no knowledge of the Portuguese language; while 16 percent had some degree of fluency, only 1 percent were fluent. In measuring the acculturation process, 59 percent of rural Angolans said in the survey that they did not find the need to use Portuguese language, while 31 percent of the respondents to the survey said they very rarely used it.²⁸

It should be realized that there were other ominous reasons why an African would choose not to become "assimilated." One reason was that a higher tax was imposed on assimilated Africans who were paid less than their white counterparts with the same qualifications. On the contrary, assimilated Africans were exempted from doing contract labor. While this was advantageous to the African, the colonial administrators who needed more contract African laborers would like to put a limit on this group.²⁹

THE CASE OF MESTICOS:

If the ultimate aim of Lusotropicalism was to forge a harmonious multiracial society where race mixing or miscegenation was considered part of this process, then the Angolan experiment failed miserably. The Portuguese miscalculated that the policy worked successfully in Brazil, where 26.6 percent of the 52 million were classified as mesticos in 1950. In Angola, however, only 0.72 percent of the

4 million were in the same category at that time (see Tables 1 and 2 on page 14).

It was recorded that the white population of Angola in the 1600s and 1700s was less than 1,600, and the ratio of Portuguese men to women in the colony was eleven to one. This led to increased miscegenation of which in 1777, it was estimated that there was a 4,000 mestizo population.³⁰ Though the records did not indicate that inter-racial marriages in Brazil and Angola occurred between Black men and white women, it is suspected that miscegenation was mostly between White men and Black women. Dr. Augustinho Neto may be an exception in this case, because he was married to a White Portuguese woman.³¹

In Angola, Blacks resisted Portuguese domination by crossing the borders into neighboring African countries so as to avoid forced labor, and learning the Portuguese language. In Brazil, however, Blacks were transported there as slaves and were deprived of their culture, language and property. Their domination was a total enslavement during which they were subjected to forced assimilation into the dominant culture. As such, miscegenation was considered as a normal acculturation or assimilation process.

When the slave trade ended, coupled with the enactment of immigration quotas in 1890, the Black population in Brazil steadily decreased. Ironically, the immigration quotas prohibited Africans, who were once the favored human cargo,

and Asians from entering Brazil without special congressional approval.³²

Nowhere in Lusophone Africa was the number of Mesticos a factor in proving the validity of the Lusotropical theory (see Table 4, page 23). With the exception of the two off-shore islands, Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe that had larger Mestico populations than the rest of Lusophone Africa, all had 1 percent or less than 1 percent mestico population.

The off-shore islands, Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe have a different historical perspective from any of the major Lusophone countries. The fact that they are islands further restricted free flow of populations. This provided an avenue for effective racial and gender control which resulted in increased miscegenation. The mestico population indicated in the table proves the validity of this supposition.

Bender (1978), noted that the rate of miscegenation decreased as the white-male to white-female ratio narrowed. In 1940 mestico population was 6.8 percent, and decreased to 3.3 percent in 1960.³³ He also observed that the superior status accorded the mesticos, including civil service jobs, diminished because the government enacted decrees that raised educational standards for holding such jobs. In order to qualify, a student had to get a high school certificate, even though, there were no high schools in Angola until 1919.³⁴

TABLE 4.

NUMBER AND PERCENT OF MESTICOS AND RATIO TO WHITES
IN FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONIES

TERRITORY	OFFICIAL CENSUS	TOTAL POPULATION	MESTICO POPULATION	NUMBER OF MESTICOS PERCENT MESTICO	PER 100 WHITES
Cape Verde	1950	148,331	103,251	69.60	4,600
Brazil	1950	51,836,142	13,786,742	26.60	43
Sao Tome and Principe	1950	60,159	4,300	7.15	400
Angola	1960	4,830,449	53,392	1.10	31
Guinea	1950	510,777	4,568	0.90	200
Mozambique	1960	6,578,604	31,465	0.48	32
Macau	1950	187,778	122	0.06	4
Goa and Dimao	1950	637,591	200	0.03	22
Timor	1950	442,378	48	0.01	8

Source: Bender, Gerald J. (1978). Angola Under the Portuguese, p. 32.

The quality of the white Portuguese settler in Angola always raised many questions. As noted in historical records and literature, and in the works of Bender (1978), Marcum (1969, 1978), Soremekun (1983), Bruce (1975), and Axelson (1967), the Portuguese colonial government sent white Portuguese settlers of highly dubious character, and low caliber into her Lusophone African countries. According to the records, most of the settlers were labelled as criminal elements in Portuguese society, otherwise known as "degredados." They included ex-convicts, prisoners, prostitutes, deserters, and the dregs of that society, some of whom were exiled to these Lusophone colonies for rehabilitation.³⁵

Most of these white Angolans had little formal education and job training (see Table 5, below).

The figures in the following table indicate that in 1950, about 83 percent of the White settlers in Angola had four years or less of education. This shows that the Portuguese colonial government did not seem to consider education as one of the top priorities in its so called "asssimilation," and "civilizing" policy.

TABLE 5.

NUMBER OF YEARS OF EDUCATION OF WHITES IN ANGOLA,
FIVE YEARS OLD AND MORE, 1950.

YEARS OF EDUCATION	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE
None	30,506	44.2
1-4	27,042	39.2
5-11	10,058	14.6
12+	1,389	2.0
TOTAL	68,995	100.0

Source: Bender, Gerald J. (1978.) Angola Under the Portuguese, p. 228.

To get a complete picture of this analysis, we should compare the illiteracy rate of students in schools in Angola with other former European colonies in Africa. In 1952, Angola had 14,898 primary school students (more than two-

thirds of whom were white) for a total population of 4,168,000; in Ghana (British) there were 418,898 primary school students for a population of 3,089,000; in Zaire (Belgian Congo - French) there were 943,494 primary school students for a population of 11,259,000.³⁶

The above figures indicate that the Portuguese colonial government did not really make any attempt to build a sound educational infrastructure to prepare Angolans for development, and self-determination. One may wonder if this was the best Portugal could offer as a "civilizing force." As the figures indicate in Table 5, on page 24, these immigrants were mostly illiterates--44 percent had no education at all, and 39 percent had four years or less of education. Most of them had distaste for agriculture and manual labor, and job training, reasons why they should be regarded as poor choice as role models for the so called "indigena" or indigenous Africans whom they regarded as "uncivilized".

In Brazil, unlike Angola and other Lusophone African countries, the Portuguese (30 percent of the population) were joined by other Europeans like Italians (32 percent of the population), Spanish (12.5 percent of the population), Germans (4.7 percent of the population), and the Japanese (4.0 percent of the population.)³⁷

It is possible to attribute the success of Freyre's Lusotropicalism in Brazil to the presence of other European settlers, in comparison to Lusophone African countries where

the Portuguese were the only settlers. But this thesis is limited to the conflict in Angola, and that supposition cannot be further explored.

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CHAPTER 3

LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND INDEPENDENCE:

African Nationalism and agitation for self-rule marked the decade after World War II. European countries like Britain and France became alarmed by the Suez Canal crisis in 1956, and the Algerian crisis in 1957-62. Thereafter, most of their colonial territories were granted independence as indicated by table 6, on page 28.

The Government of Portugal pursued a different agenda in her Lusophone African territories in defiance of all world opinion for independence by holding onto these territories. In the 1960's, the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514/XV was adopted by 89 member countries. It stipulated that "All peoples have the right to self-determination... Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing-Territories, or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations...in order to enable them to enjoy independence and freedom".³⁸

It is interesting to note here, that some of the western States such as Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, U.K. and the United States, which advocated for "self-determination" or self-rule in all colonial territories, abstained when the U.N. vote was taken

on the above issue.³⁹


TABLE 6.

DATES OF INDEPENDENCE OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES
IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF INDEPENDENCE--POST-WAR

Libya	24 Dec. 1951	Burundi	1 Jul. 1962
Sudan	1 Jan. 1956	Algeria	3 Jul. 1962
Morocco	2 Mar. 1956	Uganda	9 Oct. 1962
Tunisia	20 Mar. 1956	Zanzibar (now part of Tanzania)	10 Dec. 1963
Ghana	6 Mar. 1957	Kenya	12 Dec. 1963
Guinea	2 Oct. 1958	Malawi	6 Jul. 1964
Cameroon	1 Jan. 1960	Zambia	24 Oct. 1964
Togo	27 Apr. 1960	The Gambia	18 Feb. 1965
Mali	20 Jun. 1960	Botswana	30 Sep. 1966
Senegal	20 Jun. 1960	Lesotho	4 Oct. 1966
Madagascar	26 Jun. 1960	Mauritius	12 Mar. 1968
Zaire (as the Congo)	30 Jun. 1960	Swaziland	6 Sep. 1968
Somalia	1 Jul. 1960	Equatorial Guinea	12 Oct. 1968
Benin (as Dahomey)	1 Aug. 1960	Guinea-Bissau	10 Sep. 1974
Niger	3 Aug. 1960	Mozambique	25 Jun. 1975
Burkina Faso (as Upper Volta)	5 Aug. 1960	Cape Verde	5 Jul. 1975
Cote d'Ivoire	7 Aug. 1960	The Comoros	*6 Jul. 1975
Chad	11 Aug. 1960	Sao Tome and Principe	12 Jul. 1975
The Central African Republic	13 Aug. 1960	Angola	11 Nov. 1975
The Congo (People's Republic)	15 Aug. 1960	Seychelles	29 Jun. 1976
Gabon	17 Aug. 1960	Djibouti	27 Jun. 1977
Nigeria	1 Oct. 1960	Zimbabwe	18 Apr. 1980
Mauritania	28 Nov. 1960	Namibia	21 Mar. 1990
Sierra Leone	27 Apr. 1961		
Tanzania (as Tanganyika)	9 Dec. 1961	*Date of unilateral declaration of independence,	
Rwanda	1 Jul. 1962	recognized by France (in respect of three of the	
		four islands) in December 1975.	

Source: Europa Publications Ltd. Africa South of the Sahara (1994), p. 102.

Three liberation movements whose aim was to get rid of the Portuguese colonial government emerged. These were the FNLA (later UPA), the MPLA, and UNITA. All three groups were tribally based, and were led by leaders who strongly identified with their tribes. (see map below)



Source: Marcum, J. (1969). The Angolan Revolution, Vol. 1, p. 12.

MPLA:

The strongest of the three liberation movements was MPLA, which was led by Dr. Augustinho Neto. His movement was supported mainly by the Northern Mbundu tribes and the mesticos who were concentrated in the city of Luanda. Dr. Neto and his movement pursued the Marxist-Leninist ideology. He also had support from the Portuguese Communist Party, Soviet Union, Cuba, East European Socialist Block, China, and other African countries like: Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Algeria Congo (Brazaville), Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Mozambique and Tanzania. There was inconsistency in support for the various Angolan leaders by African heads of State.

Of the three liberating forces, Dr. Neto was the most consistent in his policies, which included liberating Angola from Portuguese colonialism. He wanted to create a sovereign state devoid of racism, classism and tribalism. Having noticed the revisionist forces who were working against him from within the movement, he said "after we are freed from Portuguese colonialism, we must be liberated from our neighbors and brothers". He was referring, of course, to President Mobutu who facilitated much of the opposition against him, and to his warring compatriots.⁴⁰

UNITA:

UNITA became MPLA's rival. It was led by Jonas Savimbi, who broke away from Roberto's FNLA. He trained as a guerilla

in China and received support from China at the earlier stages of the revolution, but later turned to South Africa and the United States for support. Mr. Savimbi was supported mainly by the Southern and East-Central Ovimbundu tribes.⁴¹

FNLA/GRAE:

FNLA, which was the smallest of the three movements, was in fact the first to launch an attack on the Portuguese colonial government forces in Angola. The leader of the FNLA was Holden Roberto of the Bakongo tribe. His supporters covered an area which stretched to Zaire, which made his operation more dangerous to the Portuguese forces because of some tribes which could cross borders more easily than the other movements. That is why FNLA also called his movement "Governo Revolucionaris de Angola no Exilo" - GRAE, or Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile. He had support from Zaire, the United States, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.⁴²

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT:

The tribal divisions of the Angolan Liberation Movements and their international supporters looked like a "mosaic of alliances" because the conflict brought "politically odd-bedfellows" together. The United States, China, and South Africa supported both Savimbi's UNITA, and Roberto's FNLA. UNITA, and MPLA were political rivals, yet maintained their headquarters in the same city of Lusaka, Zambia at the

beginning of the civil war. The Zambian government was forced to support Savimbi because the Zambian copper was transported by Benguela railway, which passed through a territory that was controlled by Savimbi's forces. Members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), who opposed the apartheid regime in South Africa, thought Savimbi had betrayed their cause when he began accepting military aid from that regime.⁴³

Not only were African soldiers who were drafted into the military during the Portuguese colonial rule caught in the middle of these liberation wars, included were a large number of mesticos who had supported the white Portuguese colonialists since slavery.

The greatest loser in this medley of international warrings in Angola was the Portuguese colonial government, which was fighting what could be described as a "multiple revolutionary war" in her Lusophone African territories, all of which she eventually lost to the African liberation fighters.


PORTUGAL EXITS ANGOLA:

By 1974, there was discontent among the young Portuguese soldiers, who were being killed in Lusophone African wars. Led by General Antonio de Spinola, a coup d'etat was staged to overthrow Marcello Jose Caetano's government. Soon after the take over, a provisional constitution for Angolan independence was drawn by the new military leaders in conjunction with the leaders in Angola.

The losses to Portugal during the colonial wars in Africa were quite high by the time change of government occurred. Over 3,000 Portuguese soldiers were killed in Angola alone, and about 11,000 killed and 30,000 wounded in all her Luso-African wars, which left the Portuguese government a \$400 million yearly deficit.⁴⁴

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Super-Power Intervention Model-SPIM



CHAPTER 4

SUPER POWER INTERVENTION MODEL (SPIM) :

This chapter describes the general structure of the Super Power Intervention Model (SPIM), and how it could be applied in similar situations like Angola during the Cold War. In the next chapter, the model will be used as a test-case to describe super power intervention in Angola.

SPIM is being developed to explain East-West rivalry and how global politics was affected. For most Third World countries, alliance with either the U.S. or the Soviet Union depends on which colonial power controlled that State before independence. SPIM will show that intervention occurs whenever a State changes a political direction during the decolonization process or after independence has been achieved. Intervention is likely to take place if a proxy of a Western hegemonic force or block decides to form a new alliance with an Eastern bloc or vice versa. For example, after achieving an independent rule, Ghana which was an Anglophone country decided to experiment with "socialism", but Great Britain and her Western allies cut off most aid until Nkrumah government in Ghana was overthrown in a coup d'etat in 1966. In this case, Ghana's policy change seemed to offend Britain and other Western democratic systems which thought Ghana has betrayed their cause, and system of government.

SPIM is constructed according to a recurring pattern of super-power involvement in the political process in most Third World countries during the Cold War period. This thesis uses SPIM to describe this pattern and how it specifically applies to the case of Angola.

In most Francophone and Anglophone countries in Africa, the colonial governments in Britain and France willingly relinquished power to their colonial territories, such that by the end of that short decade in the sixties, over two-thirds achieved independent status (see table 6, page 28).

In all the Lusophone African countries such as Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, and Angola, the Portuguese colonial government was unwilling to grant sovereignty to those States. SPIM is being used to describe how these events unfold.

The first of the models on page 34a describes the evolution of this pattern. It consists of a political power structure, whereby the colonial government represents an authority symbol. This authority figure was both autocratic, and unwilling to grant sovereignty to a State that demanded self government. Inevitably, independence can only be achieved through a revolution. SPIM describes the forces of the revolution as the local leaders (nationalists or revolutionaries). The opposition forces to the revolution include the colonial government, the white settlers (colonial vestiges), and their local or native supporters (neo-

colonialists).

The East-West rivalry seems to revolve around a political, economic, security, socio-cultural, and religious interests. SPIM identifies this stage as the focus of this model. Super-power intervention is based on a stage when the internal political security of that State is broken down. This stage is reached when all the interests as mentioned above are compromised. For the Western democratic States, economic interests may be categorized as being governmental or non-governmental (NGO), while in the Soviet Union or Socialist States, economic interests are government controlled, and can not easily be identified or categorized.

The introduction of nuclear technology into World War II by the United States marked the beginning of a new era of how future wars would be fought. This became evident when the Soviet Union developed its own atomic bomb in 1949. Thereafter, competition for nuclear arms acquisition became very fierce until this race seemed to reach a "balancing point" or a "zero sum game" between the two nations. Other nations like China, France, and Great Britain, developed their own bombs. This proliferation of nuclear technology among nations forever changed how international diplomacy would be conducted. The fear of a shooting war between the bipolar forces even became unthinkable.

All the nations that possessed such nuclear arsenal accepted the Cold War dogma that, "To Jaw-Jaw is better than

to War-War". The above stage which dictated the behavior and conduct in the usage of nuclear technology by the super-powers became known as the Cold War era. Most of the conflicts that occurred among nations during the Cold War seem to fit into the model being described.

SPIM STRUCTURE AND ALLIES:

SPIM is based on East-West competition for economic, and political superiority during the Cold War era. This confrontation was supported by the respective allied governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGO'S). These NGO'S may include IMF, the World Bank, and Multi-National Corporations. The United States, and her NATO allies formed one of these hegemonic units. In Angola, Multi-National Corporations or financial institutions like Gulf Oil, Mobil, Boeing, and DeBeers, played a major role in the conflict. Gulf Oil Corporation (Chevron) paid monies into an escrow account for MPLA. CIA used Boeing for transporting arms for UNITA. ⁴⁵

The United States of America and the Soviet Union emerged as the two super-powers after World War II, and both determined how the Super Power Intervention Model (SPIM) functioned. Each of the two hegemonic powers, and their allies arrogated to themselves the unofficial title as the conductors of the world's political agenda.

During the Cold War, the newly emergent Third World nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America were compelled to follow

this agenda in order to truly evolve. It was rather ironic that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which had nothing to do with "colonial conquests" in the Third World, should now determine how each of the Third World nations conducted their affairs.

As shown in SPIM below, every independent Third World country's economic, political and security interests were tied onto that of the colonial government. In Africa, all Anglophone or English-speaking countries became members of the British Commonwealth, except Liberia; and Francophone countries formed members as the French Alliance, while Luso-African countries referred to themselves as "The Five." The five countries: Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe met regularly to promote cooperation at several levels--cultural, economic and political.⁴⁶

In most British and French colonial Africa, independence was achieved without armed struggle or intervention by any super-power. In countries like Zambia (Northern Rhodesia), and Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia), where there were large numbers of white colonists (mostly British), and in South Africa with the Afrikaans (Dutch), independence came only through sanctions from international organizations like the OAU, UNO and several Non Governmental Organizations (NGO'S). In Algeria, there was an armed engagement with the French government forces for several years before independence was

achieved. In Kenya, the Mau-Mau nationalists fought the British before gaining independence. Notably, however, the above conflicts did not invite the two super-powers like the Angola or Mozambique situation.

SPIM, which fits the latter two cases, could be used to describe the conflict in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. However, each of the cases in Vietnam or Afghanistan was a super-power "invasion" rather than "intervention".

COLD WAR AND SPIM:

Ideological difference was the *raison d'être* of the Cold War. The United States and her Western allies--Great Britain, France, West Germany, and members of NATO--became suspicious of the aggressive expansionist behavior of the Soviet Union, and the export of her Marxist-Leninist ideologies worldwide in the post World War II era. In his Memoirs, 1925-1950, which were published in 1967, George F. Kennan called publicly for "a long-term, patient, but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies," especially after the Soviet Union violated the Yalta Conference agreement of 1945 by occupying the liberated territories in Eastern Europe.⁴⁷ Mr. Kennan repeated this call in his famous "X" article, in which he analyzed Soviet behavior, and suggested policies which the United States should formulate to counteract the Soviet behavior. He differentiated between Soviet political ideology

and security interests in comparison to those of the United States and her Western democratic, capitalist allies. He explained that the Soviet system had "deficiencies" which will be hard to correct, and thus make that system "the more dangerous" if "transported abroad." He warned that the Soviet Union was powerful enough to challenge the United States and her allies, and as such, must be regarded as a "rival," not a "partner" in the political arena.⁴⁸ Mr. W. Averell Harriman, United States Ambassador in Moscow in the early 40s, expressed his uncertainties with President Roosevelt's compromising political stance with the Soviets. Harriman advised that "we must make clear what we expect of them as the price of our goodwill...unless we take issues with the present policy, there is every indication that the Soviet Union will become a world bully wherever their interests are involved."⁴⁹

The U.S. Cold War policy was put in place by President Truman who, on March 12, 1947, proclaimed, "It must be the policy of the United States to support 'Free Peoples' who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed, minorities or outside pressures," and when dealing with the Soviet Union by "patience and firmness."⁵⁰

The Soviet Union's post war Third World policy was based on the Marxist-Leninist philosophy of "class struggle". The speeches recorded from the Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) by the leaders Joseph Stalin, Leonid Brezhnev, and Aleksei Kosygin stressed "struggle

against Western imperialism by Third World National Liberation Movements."⁵¹ During the Suez Canal crisis in 1956, Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev's threat of military intervention halted Britain and France who were advancing into the Canal Zone.

The strategic importance of Southern Africa to the super-powers seemed to dominate the politics of this region. There is some speculation that the Soviet Union wanted to establish a base in Angola that would serve as a spot for launching Soviet missiles capable of reaching the shores of the United States. This seemed to be her short-term goal.⁵² Angola would also provide rich mineral resources. A Soviet official, V. Baryshnikov, said, "Africa holds a leading position in the world in reserves and output of many kinds of raw materials. The deposit of some of the minerals in Africa are unique...most of them concentrated in Southern Africa."⁵³

In Angola, there are huge deposits of oil in the Cabinda region being exploited by the American Gulf Oil Company (Chevron), and presence of minerals such as diamonds, iron ore, manganese, copper, gold, phosphates, granite, marble, uranium, quartz, lead, zinc, wolfram, tin, fluorite, sulfur, feldspar, kaolin, mica, asphalt, gypsum, and talc.⁵⁴ Most of these are yet to be exploited.

SPIM MODUS OPERANDI:

Most interventions by the super-powers during the Cold War

period were through covert operations, who used their allies as proxies or surrogates. In Angola, East-West power struggles brought all the proxies into the fray. The super-power security interests, and the wealth of Angola in the southern Africa region seemed to be too tempting so as not to get involved. The threat of nuclear war, and prospects of detente, however, prevented direct confrontation between the bipolar forces. Moreover, the Vietnam experience was too painful for the United States to repeat same in Angola. The Soviet Union, however, thought that this confrontation was an opportunity to fulfil her Third World policy of "helping liberation movements fight colonialism," an agenda which included "weakening of the Western Capitalist System."


In the 1970s, the Soviet Union's fulfillment of the Third World agenda received full support of Soviet policy makers. Military assistance to liberation movements in Sub-Saharan Africa totalled about \$3.9 billion. Ethiopia received about \$2.5 billion by 1980, while Angola received over half a billion dollars.⁵⁵ These expenses included Cuban troops being engaged in combat as proxies of the Soviet Union. In Angola, there was minimal presence of Soviet military personnel; some Soviet technicians were used to deliver artillery and military hardware. Other Soviet proxies included, Libyans, Algerians, Vietnamese, North Koreans and Hungarians.⁵⁶

The United States' military activity was through the CIA, which funneled military hardware through NATO, Zaire, and

mercenaries of both Portuguese and South African extraction. Official war expenditure could not be pinpointed, but it is known to run into \$100 millions, an amount which was approved by the "40 Committee" of the National Security Council.⁵⁷ This 40 committee, which operates secretly, is responsible for approving covert actions or clandestine operations in foreign countries. Washington seemed to circumvent the Congressional approval of loans for covert operation in Angola by sending most of the aid through Salazar's government in Portugal. Between 1953 and 1961, about \$301 million was received by the Portuguese government as military aid, and \$27 million in economic assistance.⁵⁸

Other Western allies which contributed to the war effort indirectly were the multinational corporations which paid monies into the accounts of Portuguese government, such as the South African mining conglomerate known as the DeBeers. The Cabinda Oil Company, which was controlled by Gulf Oil (Chevron), paid monies to an escrow account on behalf of FNLA and UNITA. Other Multi National Corporations which were operating in Angola included Boeing, and Mobil.⁵⁹

Super-Power Intervention Model-SPIM-in Angola



CHAPTER 5

SUPER POWER INTERVENTION MODEL: ANGOLA

In this chapter, SPIM is being used as a descriptive tool for the case in Angola. Portugal represents the colonial power, which was unwilling to relinquish power to her Lusophone countries in Africa. As a result, Portugal created a stage for revolution. In Angola, the revolution was led by FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA. After the colonial war was won, the revolutionaries turned the revolution into a civil war.

SPIM occurred in Angola when the United States and Soviet Union entered the stage after the Transitional Government collapsed, and civil war ensued. Western interests were represented by the United States while the Eastern bloc was represented by the Soviet Union. U.S proxies were South Africa, Portugal, and mercenaries. The Soviets used the Cubans, Vietnamese, North Koreans, and her East European allies.

A critical analysis is being used here to examine the events that led to the failure of Portuguese rule in Angola, and why the transitional government failed. All of the analysis indicated that Lusotropicalism remained just a theory, and that Angola continued to be more divided by race and class than before the civil war started in 1975. Portugal remained as a weak nation that won her a title "The Sick Man

of Europe"⁶⁰ The whites of Angola, and their mestizo sympathizers realized the pent-up anger that was about to erupt after five centuries of enslavement and the life of degradation they inflicted on blacks in Angola, whom they thought to be "indigenato" or uncivilized or un-assimilated. The coup makers in Portugal, led by General Antonio de Spínola, set November 11, 1975 for granting independence to Angola, and as this date was approaching, 350,000 Portuguese had already fled Angola, fearing for reprisals.⁶¹

STAGE SET FOR SPIM:

The liberation movements and their foreign supporters set the stage for SPIM's full operation. The colonial government failed to prepare Angolans for peaceful self-determination, which left the liberation movements divided and unprepared for self-government. This situation led the MPLA leader, Augustinho Neto, to scoff that "three rams cannot drink from the same pot."⁶²

ALVOR AGREEMENT:

The young Antonio Spínola government known as Armed Forces Movement (MFA), which became exhausted financially and morally with the overseas African liberation wars (and one of the factors why the MFA replaced General Marcello José Caetano's dictatorship in Portugal on April 25, 1974), wasted no time in hastily preparing to hand over self-rule to Angola. This

consisted of forming a Triumvirate, Primenisterial, Transitional Government made of the leaders of the warring factions. This was according to the agreement signed on January 15, 1975 in Alvor, which is located in Portugal's southernmost province of Algarve. This agreement consisted of ten chapters and sixty articles. Each chapter dealt with aspects of the Transitional Government which included the following clauses: the Portuguese High Commissioner in Angola, The Formation of Transitional Government, National Defense Commission, Refugees and Resettlement Problems, General Elections, Angolan Nationality, Economic and Financial Matters, Cooperation between Angola and Portugal, and Committees. The three leaders of FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA agreed to hold a cease-fire, and stay within the present borders controlled by each of them. The agreement reaffirmed Cabinda enclave as an integral part of Angola. Essentially, each of the three leaders was made part of the Council of Ministers.⁶³ Power sharing became an important, and a delicate issue in this agreement, because the conflict was based on power imbalance, and suspicion. Any agreement that did not consider equitable power-sharing was doomed to failure. The agreement provided that each leader governed on a rotational basis, and decisions would be made by a vote of two-thirds majority. Thirteen ministries were to be set up and shared by the three movements down to the level of secretaries and under-secretaries.⁶⁴

POWER STRUGGLE:

By March 1975, the Transitional Government was in trouble. FNLA leader Holden Roberto accused Dr. Neto's MPLA of killing an important FNLA member. This developed into group skirmishes which spread into the oil-rich Cabinda area. By June, the attacks on each other increased in frequency with rumors that President Mobutu, along with a supporter of Roberto's FNLA, were the chief architects for the conflict. This was because Mobutu wanted to take over Cabinda, and gain access to the Cabinda oil.⁶⁵

The OAU, fearing the collapse of the Transitional Government, quickly arranged a conference in Nakuru, Kenya for the three leaders from June 16-21, 1975. With President Jomo Kenyatta presiding, they went over the original Alvor agreement and tried to patch up any loopholes. One major breakthrough was the insertion of a clause that civilians be disarmed. Tentative dates were set to publish the electoral laws for the November elections, and preparation of the voter registration and campaigns. Although the three leaders agreed to a cease-fire, they were filled with apprehension and full of distrust for each other. Moreover, the conflict had already assumed international proportions in which the bipolar Cold War adversaries have taken sides.

LAST STAGE BEFORE SPIM:

By August 14, 1975, the Transitional Government collapsed.

This was before independence day, which was set for November 11, 1975.⁶⁶ Full scale civil war erupted among the three liberation movements. The last attempt at reconciliation was made at the OAU January, 1976 summit in Kampala, Uganda under the chairmanship of President Idi Amin. At this meeting, the OAU members were so divided that a 22-22 tie vote resulted in support for UNITA-FNLA coalition against the MPLA.⁶⁷ Portugal was forced to abandon its last African territory in the midst of this chaos and civil war.

CLEARANCE FOR SPIM:

The second part of SPIM occurred when the super-powers got the final entry clearance when the Portuguese government gave up on Angola. The Cold War bipolar forces quickly jumped in to implement their Cold War agenda. For the United States, this agenda meant the defense of President Truman's proclamation known as the "Truman Doctrine" which meant "support for free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."

During the Cold War, "outside pressure" referred to the Soviet Union's socialist influence in the Third World. This policy called on the United States and her Western allies to deal with the Soviet Union "patiently" but "firmly" and to "contain" her aggression and expansionism.⁶⁸

When liberation movements in Angola were fighting the colonial government of Portugal for self rule, the United

States increased military aid and technical assistance to Portugal through NATO.⁶⁹ This aid was meant to "fight communism" wherever it reared its head. For the Angolans, this war was not a communist-inspired revolution, but a legitimate struggle to get rid of Portugal's colonial domination and enslavement. This was in accordance with President John F. Kennedy's policy in Africa. In several of President Kennedy's speeches and policy statements during his administration, the President called for "self-determination, full sovereignty, and the paying of attention to human rights issues on the continent in Africa."⁷⁰ He called on the U.S. to extend her wealth to Africa, and "not to treat Africans as pawns in the Cold War."⁷¹ This pronouncement was the policy that Kennedy wished for Africa, but certainly, not United States policy deeds.

POLICY FAILURES AND SUCCESSES:

In the final analysis, we should look at the success and failures of Kennedy's African policy statements. There were some successes which led to political independence for several countries in Africa, but not necessarily economic independence. Economic dependence forced several of these newly independent countries to seek economic security from East or West bipolar economic and political security systems. Most often, a choice was forced by a super-power covert

intervention or clandestine operation, like the CIA intervention in the Congo, Ghana, and Sudan; or intervention by the Soviet Union in Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Guinea; or U.S invasion of Vietnam or similar invasion by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

The United States's Third World policy of labelling every struggle for self-rule as "communist inspired" seemed to be a strategy of putting Western capitalist agenda in place. The Southern Africa liberation movements, whether it was the ANC against the apartheid system in South Africa or FRELIMO in Mozambique, or SWAPO in Namibia, should be considered as a legitimate struggle of oppressed Africans, for self-rule or self-determination, which Presidents Truman and Kennedy advocated. However, the U.S. pursued policies--like President Reagan's "constructive engagement" policy in southern Africa--which seemed to compromise U.S. foreign policy.

This episode vividly portrays the confused policy by the U.S. in the Southern Africa region during the Cold War. At one of the hearings of the Senate Sub-committee on African Affairs, Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State, "asked what the Soviets and Cubans were doing in Angola, since they did not have any historic interests in that area?"⁷² Perhaps, Kissinger ought to explain to the American people, what America was doing in Angola. Kissinger thought that since Portugal was a member of NATO, this automatically legitimized the United States presence by the virtue of its NATO

affiliation.

The power struggle among the three liberation movements seemed like an opportunity for the Nixon-Kissinger collusion for U.S covert intervention in Angola. After all, this was not the first time the U.S. was involved in this region. The CIA was involved in replacing Lumumba, a Marxist in Congo (Zaire) in 1961, with General Mobutu.⁷³ This was not the first time the Soviet Union was in the region either; as far back as 1960, the Soviets were involved in Congo (Brazaville) and Congo (Leopoldville or Kinshasha now Zaire). There was the presence of the Cubans in the Congo (Brazaville) along with the Chinese. Mobutu at that time was double-dealing with the Chinese and with the United States.

Mobutu was a strong supporter of Holden Roberto, whose FNLA consisted of the large number of Bakongo supporters both in Angola and in Zaire. The U.S. and China militarily armed Roberto's FNLA, and later UNITA. China decided to bail out of this embarrassing situation of policy mixed ups, so as not to offend or antagonize her other African friends.

U.S. COVERT ACTION IN A STATE OF FLUX:

The U.S covert action in Angola brought her in contact with "odd political bed-mates." Pursuing the same policy as China in Angola was embarrassing enough. For South Africa to join forces openly with Savimbi's UNITA, which the U.S. strongly supported, became a policy disaster for Washington policy

makers. The U.S. government was caught in a difficult political quagmire of having to join forces with China and South Africa against the "communists" in Angola. This did not seem convincing enough for many Americans. The aftermath of the Vietnam experience remained too fresh in the American mind to tolerate such an intervention as in Angola.

Washington's double dealings with the Apartheid regime in South Africa seemed to infuriate most leaders in Africa and Black Americans. This embarrassment seemed to drive Washington policy-makers further "underground" for clandestine activities.

Most of the literature of Mesa-Lago (1982), Bender (1978), and Marcum (1976) stated that Vietnam had a halting effect on the foreign interventionist policy of the U.S. government. While it was easy for Washington Hawks to try to circumvent certain foreign policy decisions, it became difficult to persuade Congress to approve those engagements like Angola. It was even more difficult to try to match the massive military aid that Soviet Union and her proxies were pouring into Angola.

The "40 Committee", the sub-committee of the National Security Council, was the official Washington CIA representative which was responsible for the Angola operation. In addition to Henry Kissinger who chaired this committee, were the CIA Director William Colby, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. George S. Brown.⁷⁴ At the House Committee

in Intelligence Hearings, it was revealed that CIA aid to both FNLA and UNITA was being misrepresented. The \$300,000 to each of the aid recipients, as reported, was found to be about \$32 million,⁷⁵ while about \$60 million meant for the secret operation in Angola was being channeled through President Mobutu of Zaire. This amount was to buy arms and supplies from Belgium and other Western European countries for FNLA and UNITA.⁷⁶ In addition to these revelations, an article in the Christian Science Monitor by David Anable reported that the CIA was recruiting mercenaries from the U.S., Europe and South Africa. This was confirmed by a similar article which appeared in the December issue of South African Star Weekly which said, "Scores of American mercenaries are fighting in Angola and hundreds more are expected to be signed up in the United States in the next few days."⁷⁷ The Portuguese who lost the Angolan revolutionary war previously were in the forefront of the CIA mercenary recruitment. Stockwell in his book, In Search of Enemies, identified a colonel named Castro as being in charge of the Madrid mercenary recruiting office. Castro was reported to have recruited over 300 Portuguese mercenaries to fight alongside FNLA against MPLA.⁷⁸ It sounds unbelievable that Portuguese soldiers were going back to Angola the second time to fight alongside the same Africans who just fought and defeated them.

SPIM AND THE U.S. PROXY: SOUTH AFRICA

The South African Defense Forces (SADF) were stationed in the southern border towns between South West Africa (Namibia) and Angola so as to prevent the infiltration of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas from southern Angola where they had taken refuge from SADF. South Africa's strategy was to create a safe zone between Angola and South Africa. The liberation movement in Namibia was SWAPO, which had been battling with SADF for self-rule since the early 60s. The investment in the Angolan mineral prospecting business with the former Portuguese colonial government by South African businesses was enormous. A South African diamond mining conglomerate known as the DeBeers had been doing business in Angola for a long time.⁷⁸ The government of South Africa had an agenda of destabilizing this region.

For political security reasons, the presence of Soviet and Cuban military in support for MPLA threatened the white rule in South Africa. The South African white regime, led by the Prime Minister John Vorster, called on the Western leaders for "more direct Free World action" to counter Moscow's involvement in Angola.⁷⁹ The South African regime was, of course, looking at the larger picture than other Western countries. They thought that if the Marxist-Leninist leader, Dr. Neto, gained power in Angola, this would generate a domino effect. As a result, the other liberation movements like SWAPO, FRELIMO, and ANC would be empowered politically.

By the time the Pretoria regime was making this call for outside help, the U.S. was already sending military aircraft and large war transport planes to the Pretoria regime during a CIA clandestine engagement, that was code named, "Operation Tar Baby". A total of \$272 million worth of military hardware was sent to South Africa.⁸⁰ During this time, South Africa's military budget reached a record high of \$1.4 billion, which represented 20 percent of the total budget during the 1975-76 fiscal year.⁸¹ SADF plunged into this war well and more heavily equipped than other forces in Angola. David B. Ottaway said in the November 30, 1976 issue of "Washington Post" that "between 2,500 and 6,000" SADF entered from Southern Angola. Within a few weeks of entering Angola, SADF wiped out several columns of MPLA fighters. Most of the literature, which described SADF engagement, blamed the escalation of the war on the aggressive "destabilization" policy of the White South African regime.

U.S. CONGRESS HALTS CIA OPERATION:

In August 1975, the Chairman of the Sub-committee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Richard Clark, toured the Southern African region on a fact-finding mission.⁸² On his return to the U.S, he blew the cover off the Colby-Kissinger cover-up of CIA covert operation in Angola. He told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "Americans were in fact sending arms directly

into Angola, that Americans were involved in the conflict, and that the CIA was illegally collaborating with South Africa."⁸³ On December 5, Senator Clark recommended to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to end its Angolan operation. This vote came on January 27, with the House voting 323 to 99 in favor of the motion which was signed into law by President Ford on February 9, 1976. Within months of this decision, the CIA operation in Angola was terminated, and the mercenaries fled back to their respective countries.⁸⁴

SPIM AND THE SOVIET UNION IN ANGOLA:

The Soviet Union consistently supported Dr. Neto's MPLA movement. Detente was supposed to create trust between East and West, and this made it difficult for each of the super-powers to directly intervene in the Angolan conflict. Support for the Soviet intervention came from Cuba and East European communist allies such as; Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and from North Korea, Vietnam and Algeria. The Soviet Union spent over \$4.9 billion in military equipment and deliveries to MPLA. Poland and Czechoslovakia transferred \$10 million and \$5 million worth of arms respectively to MPLA.⁸⁵

The largest foreign military presence in Angola was the Cubans. A total of 300,000 had served in Angola since the beginning of the civil war in 1975, and the Soviet Union had paid for their services, which amounted to about \$300 to \$600 million annually.⁸⁶

TABLE 7.

CUBAN MILITARY ADVISORS AND TROOPS IN AFRICA: 1976-1979

COUNTRY	1976	1977	1978	1979
Angola	13,000	19,000	19,000	20,000
Equatorial Guinea	200-500	150-200	150	b
Ethiopia	0	400	16,500	13,500-15,000
Guinea-Bissau	25-300	60-120	140	100
Guinea-Conakry	100-300	300-500	200	50
Libya	0	100-125	200	b
Mozambique	1,200	650-750	800	300
Others	3,000	700	500	400
TOTAL	17,525-18,300	21,360-21,795	37,490	33,850-35,850

Source: Mesa-Lago, Carmelo (1982), Cuba in Africa, p. 163a.

Cuba was in a close alliance with the Soviet Union from which it benefitted militarily, economically and politically. This relationship with the Soviet Union diminished Cuba's role in the Non-aligned Movement of which she became a member in 1961.⁸⁷ Cuba's contribution to "the revolutionary wars of liberation" in several Third World Countries, especially in Africa under the tutelage of the Soviet Union, had been tremendous during the Cold War. Table 7 on page 57, indicates the Cuban military intervention in seven of these African countries: Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Libya, and Mozambique.

SUCCESS OF SOVIET UNION AND THEIR PROXIES:

The Soviet Union consistently pursued its International Security Third World Policy by not reneging on any agreements reached with the liberation forces that were fighting the Portuguese colonial domination in Angola. Dr. Augustinho Neto, who was the leader of MPLA, had been the recipient of aid from the Soviet Union and her proxies. The MPLA policy had been consistent in the struggle against colonial domination or any foreign domination. Neto's government, with its Mbundu ethnic supporters and racially mixed mesticos, seemed to draw more support from most of the OAU members than the other two rivals.⁸⁸ This support was strongest from those countries that pursued the socialist policies after independence, such as; Ghana, Guinea, Algeria, Sudan, Tunisia, Tanzania, Congo (Brazaville), Mali and Egypt. Other neighboring countries like Zaire and Zambia made choices of whom to support based on how their own security interests were affected. For Zambia, her economy depended mostly on the copper that is transported through Angola by the Benguela railroad. Savimbi's UNITA controlled this territory, and some of the smaller Nganguela ethnic groups, like the Lwena and the Luchazi, who have families across the Zambian border. Savimbi exploited this geographical proximity to manipulate Zambia's support for his UNITA movement.⁸⁹

Francis Fukuyama presented several papers on Soviet Third World policy for the Rand Corporation on "Problems of

Communism" at the Harvard Center for Independent Action National Security Conference, Cape Cod, Massachusetts, June 1987. He divided these policies into "Ten Periods" of which the "Eighth" and "Ninth" were relevant to SPIM. He characterized the "Eighth Period" as the era in which Soviet Premier Khrushchev ventured into the Third World political arena. Fukuyama said that Khrushchev labelled these Third World leaders as "bourgeois nationalists" or "revolutionary democrats" of the right. Among these rightists were Nasser's Egypt, Nehru's India and Sukarno's Indonesia.⁹⁰

Fukuyama observed that Mr. Brezhnev, who succeeded Khrushchev, adopted a leftist political course by abandoning the orthodox communist ideology as known in the Stalin era. Fukuyama described the new leftists as "self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninists."⁹¹

Of the three revolutionary leaders in Angola, Dr. Neto's policies identified more with the leftists. Dr. Neto pursued the nationalist fighter ideology unwaveringly with the aim of overthrowing not only the colonial oppressor, but eliminating the "bourgeoisie nationalists" like Roberto and Savimbi.

Both Savimbi and Roberto pursued policies that could be described as protean or wavering. The two leaders compromised their nationalist fervor and ideals by accepting military support from the same colonial oppressors.

Detente forced Soviet Union to enter into this conflict through the third party or proxies. The Soviets had earlier

successes in the Congo (Brazzaville) during the Congo crisis in the 60s. Congo provided a base for landing and transportation of military hardware. Though detente had a halting effect on superpower strategic policies, the Soviet Union was not hampered by domestic political dissensions like the United States. The "Ghost of Vietnam" and "Watergate" and the failures in Iran culminated into the U.S. being cautious, and at best, being secretive in the military engagements and expenses in other countries. The Soviet Union had an advantage of having a strong ally like Cuba to do its dirty work. The Cubans have had the military capability and technical training to use Soviet military equipment.

Massive Soviet airlifts started coming in through the Congo by March, 1975, the same time Cuban troops started arriving to fight alongside Neto's MPLA. By 1979 there were 20,000 Cuban troops in Angola (see Table 7, page 57).

SPIM: SOVIET AND CUBAN LOSSES

The cost of the Angolan war to the Soviet Union as reported in the New York Times was \$2 billion worth of military equipment.⁹² In the beginning of the war in 1975, there were about 7,000 Cubans in Angola, and by 1987 this number increased to about 40,000⁹³ at the cost of \$500 million to the Angolan economy. The casualties of the war varied according to which source that provided it because the war is full of propaganda and clandestine activity. From Savimbi's war

report of 1984, we learned that 5,000 Cubans were killed and 11,000 wounded since 1975. According to General Rafael Del Pino Diaz, the commander of the Cuban air-force in Angola for ten years (who later defected to the U.S.) said 10,000 Cubans were killed.⁹⁴

SPIM AND SOVIET PROXY: CUBA

Most of the literature indicated that Cuba was coerced to enter the conflict in Angola by the Soviets. However, the Cuban presence in Africa and its involvement in the Angolan conflict was part of the long legacy that started in the early 60s. Cuban soldiers were involved in the 1963 Algerian revolution against the French, and in the Congo Republic in 1965.⁹⁵ The contribution made by Cuba to Africa's development had been mostly in the civilian sector, especially in the health field, and construction. Airports were built in Guinea, schools in Tanzania, 2,000 housing units, and bridges in Angola and Libya. Several African students trained in Cuban medical schools in medicine and dentistry, others in the construction trades and agriculture.⁹⁶

The economic benefits Cuba derived far outweighed the losses in her involvement in African conflicts. These gains involved "increased leverage with the Soviet Union, potential supply of petroleum, diversification of foreign trade markets, exportation of surplus labor, and service charges for technical personnel and advice."⁹⁷ Nevertheless, Cuba is

heavily indebted to the Soviet Union because of the trade restrictions imposed by the United States and the rest of Western democratic institutions. Cuba's cumulative debt to the USSR was estimated at \$4.6 billion in 1976, and projected to be \$8 billion by 1980.⁹⁸

SPIM: NO WINNERS

The U.S. policy in the Southern African region remained inconsistent from the beginning. There were so many ambiguities, such as supporting the Portuguese colonial government by channeling arms and military personnel through NATO to fight against the Angolan liberation movements, while advocating the policy of "struggle for self determination." Roberto of FNLA, who was a recipient of U.S. military aid said, "I came to the conclusion that western countries are hypocritical. They help our enemies while paying lip service to self determination. The U.S. supplies its NATO ally, Portugal, with arms that are used to kill us".⁹⁹ The U.S. failed to support the 1975 Alvor accord that was to prepare the liberation movements for self rule. The covert action involved too many groups such as; South Africa, whose racial policies were anathema in the world community of nations.

The Soviets pursued a more consistent policy which conformed to their international security interests in this region. The Cold War and detente were some of the reasons that deterred direct Soviet military involvement. However,

the Soviet Union seemed to have one major advantage over the U.S. for covert political activities. The Soviet system lacked public scrutiny and accountability to the electorate. In this case the U.S. was limited while the Soviets drew power from a leadership that was autocratic.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

This thesis attempted to show how the Cold War rivalry between the super-powers, the Soviet Union and the United States and their proxies or surrogates, affected a regional conflict as in Southern Africa, especially in Angola. The Super-Power Intervention Model (SPIM) was developed to explain these policies and their modus operandi. It could be used also, to explain super-power interventions in countries like; Afghanistan, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, South Korea, Vietnam, or any other countries in which these occurred. In doing so, however, one should differentiate between an "invasion" and "intervention".

The super-power rivalry which prepared the stage for conflicts during the Cold War was predicted by authors like Alexis de Tocqueville, who said that "one day the United States and Russia would each sway the destinies of half the globe; and it is doubtful that the two nations could have reached such positions of primacy except as rivals."¹⁰⁰ Similar observations of political and ideological differences were made by George F. Kennan in his famous "X" article when he said, "The United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena."¹⁰¹

In his book, Making of the Second Cold War, Fred Halliday

alluded to the writing of the 14th century Spanish writer, Don Juan Manuel, who described the conflict between Christians and Muslims as "war that is very strong and very hot ends either with death or peace; whereas Cold War neither brings peace nor gives honour to the one who makes it."¹⁰² The Cold War, and its aftermath, indeed did not bring an honor to the combatants. The rivalry between the super-powers severely blinded them so much, as to compromise their political security interests. One could well say that it was the lure of Angola's riches or resources that brought the prospective suitors together, even turning political rivals like China, and the U.S. into bedmates.

In Angola, the model indicated that after the revolution was fought and won by MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA, against the colonial oppressor, these leaders failed to share power among themselves. Dr. Neto correctly predicted this outcome during the colonial war against Portugal by saying that "three rams cannot drink from the same pot." This failure to resolve power-sharing plunged Angola into one of the most brutal, and devastating civil wars of this century.

As indicated in chapter four, Angola, unlike Somalia or Ethiopia, conjured attention from the bipolar forces because Angola is a very rich country, laden with tons of mineral wealth yet to be tapped. This fact was already mentioned in this thesis by a Soviet official, V Baryshnikov, who said, "Africa holds a leading position in the world in reserves and

output of many kinds of raw materials...that the deposit of some of the minerals in Africa are unique, and are concentrated in Southern Africa."

The super-powers had a Cold War agenda to fulfill, and Angola provided that opportunity. Yet, while "Kings" played their Cold War Super-Power Game, "Pawns" like Angola, became victims that were caught in the cross-fire.

As a victim, Angola started with a poor and weak European colonizer, which was described by others "The Sickman of Europe." Portugal's Lusophone African policy was at best a camouflage for oppression and exploitation of Angolans. Freyre's Lusotropicalism might have worked in Brazil but failed completely to make any dent in "civilizing" and "assimilating" Lusophone Africans in Luso civility. In the end, not more than 1 percent of Africans became "assimilated." Not much should have been expected from this group of Portuguese "colonos", most of whom were uneducated (over 85 percent who had only 4 years or less of formal education) "degradados" who were responsible for preparing Angolans for self rule, and self-determination.

UNICEF reported that, from 1980 to 1988, 500,000 or more Angolans have died from the wars, 331,000 of whom were babies and young children.¹⁰³ About 20,000 to 50,000 rural Angolans had legs or limbs blown off by land mines and have become amputees. Almost 700,000 have been displaced and 600,000 fled to the neighboring countries and remained as refugees. About

600,000 needed nutritional assistance.¹⁰⁴

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