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Is Nigeria's conflict ethnic or religious?: Resolving the escalating conflict in Nigeria

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IS NIGERIA'S CONFLICT ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS?

RESOLVING THE ESCALATING CONFLICT IN NIGERIA

(TITLE)

BY
EJIKEME NONSO ALO

THESIS

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FOR THE DEGREE OF

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
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DEDICATION

This essay is dedicated to likeminded people with an open mind. Also to those who wish to say and see less, while they know more.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My prime intellectual debt goes to my committee members, Dr. David Carwell, Dr. Richard Wandling and Dr. Ryan C. Hendrickson for their valuable advice and recommendations. I must not forget to mention Dr. Bukola Oyeniya and Dr. J Shola Omotola for their useful contributions.

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Abstract

The history and politics in Nigeria have often been characterized and marred with conflict, ranging from political to religious, ethnic and electoral violence. In this study, Edward Azar's Protracted Social Conflict theory which advocates for a multidimensional analysis of conflict was adopted in an attempt to properly understanding the nature and manifestation of the current Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Methodologically, both the qualitative and quantitative methods were deployed. Survey's (questionnaires and evidence from social media) was conducted in the three regions with the aim of comparing and contrasting various perspectives on the root cause of the conflict. While lack of an effective leadership was the dominant perspective held by respondents and findings from Boko haram tweets on twitter, the study compared the findings from the survey as well as contending perspectives both of scholars and prominent political gladiators such as past leaders, and notable and distinguished scholars, human right advocates, and civil organization leaders from the various regions. The use of a chronological overview or a date by date analogy of the Boko haram attacks was also deployed to draw inferences on the possible causes of the current conflict. In the final analysis the Boko haram crisis was found to be motivated at first by religious factors such as extremism and the quest to revive Islamic tenets. However, from the turnout of events it appears that the current conflict is motivated by a whole array of factors (re-emphasizing Azar's protracted conflict theory) such as inadequate government action at both military and non-military responses, lack of political will and legitimacy to act in a decisive manner (failure of its Amnesty proposals and a late declaration of state of emergency in the conflict zones). However, two notable conclusions were made, at the scholarly level any analysis on the current Boko haram conflict must go beyond the publicly avowed intentions of the sect and must carefully examine its actions which highly contradicts its stated and publicly held intentions. Finally, at the policy level, there is a need for the government to apply a more tactical and transformational approach in search of solutions to the current crisis. In other words it needs to go beyond the current declaration of state of emergency and an all-out military attack which have human rights implications as ordinary citizens are affected. The need for an adequate partnership between security agencies at both the local and national level must be encouraged. This is necessary as it will promote strong information system and intelligence gathering. The government must also aim at checking the linkages between local insurgent groups and global partners through adequate training of military personnel and other security agencies.

Chapter One

1.1 Introduction

Nigeria's political history has been characterized and marred with conflict, ranging from political to religious, ethnic, and electoral violence, especially since her independence in 1960 (John, Mohammed, Pinto & Nkanta, 2007; Ibrahim, 1991). It is practically difficult to discern the root cause of this disastrous phenomenon threatening the sustainability of the Nigerian federal structure. In some instances, conflicts with political outlook might really have religious undertones, and vice versa. Certainly, conflicts in Nigeria have their foundation in the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria in 1914 by the British colonial government, an amalgamation for sheer administrative convenience. The British indirect rule in the conservative North allowed for the retention of the traditional hierarchical administrative structure, but in the progressive South (comprising eastern and western Nigeria) the colonial system subjected the pre-colonial political institutions under the rule of colonial officers (Newbury, 2004). On the other hand, the progressive South ruled indirectly by the British benefited from the introduction of Western Education, Christianity, and generally the British lifestyle, while the conservative North were rather backward and more traditional in these respects. These different administrative approaches adopted by the British colonial government laid the foundation for the socio-economic and political differences in the post-colonial Nigerian federation.

Divisive interests governed the post-independent Nigerian polity. The North lacked the necessary economic potentials to begin a struggle for independence, but with the Nigerian federation it saw it as an only option for survival. The South-South (Niger Delta) had large

amount of oil deposit and wanted to monopolize the economic advantage. The Igbos in the Eastern part of Nigeria (South East) felt they were marginalized and they agitated for a seceded Federal Republic of Biafra. There was the coup d'état in 1966 in which the Northern military leaders, mostly, lost their lives. This was followed by the massive killing of Christians from the South who resided in the Northern part of Nigeria, in apparent retaliation.

After the subsequent years of military interventions, the transition to a democratic system of government in 1999 was received with high hopes and expectations by Nigerians. But while the pluralist system had appeared to be successful in reorganizing a state like India, the Nigerian case has been different. The various ethnic groups in Nigeria still have un-aggregated interests. In more recent times, the constant bloodshed and conflict involving the Muslim fundamentalist, the Boko Haram group in the Northern part of Nigeria are pointers to the fact that the post-civil war General Yakubu Gowon's policy of reconstruction and rehabilitation and the slogan of 'no victor, no vanquished' was futile. The phenomenal Boko Haram group in the Muslim-dominated North has engaged in massive and excruciating killings, especially the resident Christian Southerners who are the major victims. What really lay at the root of the incessant conflict in the Nigerian federation?

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Coming upon the radical upsurge of bombings and killings in Northern Nigeria, orchestrated by the Boko Haram, since the inception of the present President Goodluck Jonathan's tenure, much debates and conclusions have been made on the root cause of conflict in Nigeria. Some of these arguments have hinged on the ethnic and religious differences among the diverse peoples. Some have also viewed the phenomenal conflict as an expression of the struggle for power by the Northern elites. For instance, Emmanuel Ojo (2009) contended that violence in Nigeria was the consequence of lack of a viable consensus in the process of Nigerian state formation. Similarly, the different historical antecedents, socio-economic and political divides in Nigeria which were instituted by the British colonial government have ensured the constant ethnic or religious tensions in the country (Nafziger, 1973). Poverty rate is assumed to be higher in the North compared to the South, thus occasioning a feeling of economic deprivation (Ahokegh, 2012, pp. 49-50) (UNDP's Human Development Index Report, 2011). Based on the statistical findings of UNDP (2011), North-east Nigeria had a total poverty rate of 67.2%; North-west Nigeria 60.0%; North-central 33.8%; South-east 9.3%; South-west 9.4%; and South-south 11.6% (Human Development Index, 2011).

However, other than political, religious or ethnic undertones, a more holistic approach to scrutinizing the root cause of conflict, or "war", in Nigeria is adopted in this research including the issue of leadership deficit which inevitably breeds socio-economic stagnation, poverty, mass frustration, and ultimately upsurge of conflict. Indeed, the Boko Haram people perpetrating violence in the North are mainly from the unemployed youth (the Almanjiris). A study has

shown that unemployment tends to be higher in commercial cities in the South-west and South-east, such as Lagos at 27%, Cross River at 27.9%, Enugu at 29% and Rivers State at 27.8%, compared to the North where Kaduna State had 12.4% unemployment, Katsina had 11% and Niger State 11.7% (National Bureau of Statistics, 2011). Ironically, the states in the North have received the highest statutory allocations in the federal budget (Akeem, 2011). Worse still, Okpaga, Ugwu and Eme (2012) have asserted that the recent conflict in Nigeria has been informed by a pact among some notorious opposition leaders in the North who are determined to force power back (return the presidency) to the North, since the death of President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua in 2010.

What has gone wrong with the Nigerian government's agenda of economic empowerment of the youth? In spite of Nigeria's huge natural endowments and economic potentials, food sufficiency and security have remained unattainable goals in the country. Official statistics showed that over 112 million Nigerians live on less than US\$1.00 a day. No doubt, the issue of poverty in Nigeria is closely linked to the corruption and leadership deficit in the polity. However the study will focus on a multi-dimensional perspective to the current crisis in the Country. It goes beyond a limited view of either blaming the current crisis on religion, ethnicity, leadership deficit or international linkages.

1.3 Theoretical Frame work: The Nigerian Conflict and the Theory of Protracted Social Conflict

In conflict and conflict resolution studies, Edward Azar's theory of protracted social conflict has remained relevant in the study of contemporary social conflicts at both national and international level (Azar, 1990). Given the lack of clarity and divergent opinions on the Nigerian conflict situation or on the root cause of the conflict, Azar's position provides the most relevant spectrum to be tested with empirical standards, in the attempt to underscore the prime factor necessitating the conflict in Nigeria (Ramsbotham, 2005). To put Azar's perspective in summary, he emphasized on social conflicts as necessitated by the deprivation of basic needs, especially communal identity (Ramsbotham, 2005). Azar's works and theoretical postulation are somewhat all-encompassing in scope. This is because the deprivation of basic needs including communal identity is a resultant effect of a complex causal chain, which involves, but not limited to, the pattern of international linkages, weak governmental structures, domestic historical setting, colonial legacy, multi-communal nature of the society in question (language, religion, ethnicity, etc.). Moreover, Azar's perspectives about social conflicts sharply contrast with the realist position on conflict. The realist perspective views conflict as an inevitable end-product of class struggle whereby actors of all social strata aim at establishing control over another. In his theoretical postulation, Azar represents conflict as an all-encompassing phenomenon shaped by diverse factors. He thus broke down every conflict into three phases: the genesis stage, process dynamics, and outcome analysis. To better apply Azar's theory in the understanding of the conflict in Nigeria, it is important to briefly examine these levels or stages of social conflicts (Ramsbotham, 2005).

The genesis stage of conflicts

To Azar, "genesis" as a concept refers to those set of societal status that necessitate the evolution of non-conflictual situations into conflictual ones. In this respect, Azar identified four salient variables, and these are communal content, human needs, government and state roles and international linkages (Azar, 1990).

Communal content

To begin with, Azar argued that multi-communal composition is the essential social characteristic that leads to a protracted conflict. In other words, the nature of divide-and-rule system in place, the historical rivalry amongst culturally distinct groups that make up a society and the basis of legitimacy of the state weakens any effort to enforce integration and cooperation. Fragmentation therefore, is more likely to characterize the society with such historical and political fabrics (Azar, 1990). This, in particular, is more relevant in the understanding of the Nigerian conflict, as the history of the nation has been marred with ethnic, religious and political crises, all institutionalized by the history of divide-and-rule and of the state formation (Azar, 1990).

Human needs

Emphasizing on the importance of human needs as a prime factor necessitating conflict in societies, Azar argued that deprivation of any kind can lead to aggression. For him, deprivation does not necessarily mean economic or material deprivation; it could also imply the deprivation in terms of relevance of cultural and religious beliefs. Deprivation could yet mean the degree of social accessibility of the minority groups, like the minority access to market and political institutions, or the recognition of their communal existence. To a large extent again, Azar's point of view is much relevant in the study of the Nigerian conflict, because it can facilitate understanding on a broader scale the needs and crucial factors responsible for the Nigerian conflict apart from the widely claimed economic deprivation (Ramsbotham, 2005).

Government and the state's role

Reinforcing the role of the state in conflict in societies, Azar stressed that violent conflict can be eminent in societies where the state neglects its primary responsibility of meeting the needs of the people under its jurisdiction or sphere of influence. He noted that in countries experiencing protracted conflict, power tends to be dominated by one identity group, and in this situation such group uses all resources at its disposal to maintain power and avoid or resist participation in power exercised by minority groups. Therefore, the state becomes highly incapacitated and its resolution to balance the sharing of power exacerbates into a protracted conflict, asserted (Azar, 1990).

International linkages

According to Azar, domestic affairs are shaped by international factors. In other words, it is not just governance at the state level that can be responsible for conflicts, but the extent to which a state is economically dependent on the broader international economic system determines its level of economic autonomy, an autonomy which weakens as economic development policies are partly dictated by the outside influences or factors. It can also be inferred that the relative internal weakness of the state necessitated by outside influences could serve as an impetus for conflict situations. In addition, the relative ideological differences among communities in the state, in terms of religion, and the international ideological conflict might serve to trigger national ideological rivalry.

These preconditions as discussed above are necessary for the emergence of conflict, in Azar's postulation. Having examined these basic theoretical positions, Azar went further to examine the process through which protracted conflict takes place in societies.

Conflict process dynamics

Azar discussed the process through which social conflict develops to embrace three factors. These are communal actions and strategies, state actions and strategies and built-in mechanism.

Communal actions and strategies

In understanding conflict and its emergence in the society, Azar argued that there must be an initial "trigger". While stating that all the other factors are not unimportant at all and that conflict is a product of the factors combined, Azar underscored that communal actions and strategies are the "initial triggers" to be given a very significant reasonable consideration. As tension increases, to Azar, the victimized groups in the society begin to adopt resistance strategies in order to provide security for their members. In application to the Nigerian conflict situation, one could begin to reason on the initial factors that led to the present violent upsurge? The pertinent question is why the violence now? Or why is it much more escalating now? This point of view has relevance in the Nigerian conflict, as since the upsurge of the recent violence most Southern and Eastern Nigerian leaders have continually converged in meetings urging their indigenes to leave the troubled North. Azar pointed out that as the level of communal organization and mobilization becomes greater, communal groups attempt to formulate more diverse strategies and tactics which may involve guerrilla warfare and secessionist movements. Again, this explanation is exemplified in the reactivation of the MASSOB group, a movement agitating for an independent state of Biafra.

State actions and strategies

The actions of the state are an important variable that will not only play an independent role in creating social conflict, but they can also act as a catalyst either to accelerate or decelerate the momentum of societal conflict. According to Azar, the response of the state to communal violence, especially states with weak structures, is one of violent repression which in most cases is countered by violent response from the oppressed groups. But why then is a weak state like

Nigeria, having weak governance structures, not responding initially by violent repression to the “Boko Haram” insurgency in the country? It can be inferred that states inaction is a consequence of the role of the state in the complex dynamics of conflict as well as a manifestation of its lack of legitimacy. That is to say, governance failure must be given critical consideration when analyzing the recent conflict situation in the country, Nigeria.

Built in mechanism

Azar held that for conflict to thrive, there are essential mechanisms that affect long-term perception of the groups involved in the conflict. The perceptions and motivations behind behavior of the states and the communal actors in times of conflict are conditioned by experiences, fears and belief systems.

Outcome analysis

Given the combination of factors that can trigger conflict in societies, Azar concluded by pointing out that societies undergoing this sort of “protracted conflict” find it very difficult to initiate the search for answers to their problems. Understanding Azar properly, it can be inferred that there is no one factor that singly causes conflict, but there can be triggers, and social conflict is highly multi-causal in nature. Given the multi-causal nature of conflict, the Nigerian conflict situation can hence be assessed, with the Azar's theoretical explanation. And indeed, the aim from the onset is to draw the line between what theory says and what inferential evidences reveal.

The protracted conflict in Nigeria has been on for years. Considering the recent upsurge of violence by the Boko Haram elements in Northern Nigeria, the aim of this study will be to empirically understand the salient factors behind the violent phenomenon. To this end, this study will be guided by four research questions

- (1) Is ethnic division in Nigeria the root cause of the violent uprising in Nigeria?
- (2) Are highly fragmented states with leadership deficit more likely to experience violent uprisings?
- (3) Is religious division the root cause of violent uprisings in Nigeria?
- (4) Can it be argued that international factors including the influence of global terrorism drive conflict in Nigeria?

1.4**Literature Review**

Africa's polities have been threatened with instability and discontinuity in the 21st century as a result of the unprecedented prevalence of violence in the continent. In Nigeria, there is the Boko Haram group, a 'religious' faction of the Muslim-dominated Northern Nigeria, who in recent times has engaged in massive killings and bombing of major cities in the North. Of course, Al-Shabaab in Somalia has similarly raised such prolonged brutal insurrection, and the group is believed to be connected to Al-Qaeda too. Because of Al-Shabaab the East African country Somalia is now a notorious war ground. The explanation for the disastrous phenomenon of violent conflict in the continent of Africa has often been based on the division inherent in most African societies. Colonialism has been claimed to have intruded into the African affairs and caused Africa societal damage resulting in the loss of African democratic values, as they characterized the pre-colonial African societies (Ekeh, 1975). But Africa's political problems are essentially multidimensional. In particular, by just examining one factor an accurate supposition on the root cause of violence in the Nigerian society may not be possible. Hence, it is the task of this study to examine scholarly perspectives and views on the root cause of this disastrous trend of violence in the country, Nigeria.

The analysis here will be guided by four main research questions. Scholarly perspectives based on the four questions, the empirical findings in the studies as well as their conclusions, will be examined, in other words. Furthermore, the scholarly perspectives will be related to the four notable dimensions of conflict in Africa.

The four main questions to be adopted here in this research, therefore, include:

- (1) Is ethnic division in Nigeria the root cause of the violent uprising in Nigeria?
- (2) Is religious division the root cause of violent uprisings in Nigeria?
- (3) Can it be argued that international factors including the influence of global terrorism drive conflict in Nigeria?
- (4) Are highly fragmented states with leadership deficit more likely to experience violent uprisings?

Question One

Is ethnic division in Nigeria the root cause of the violent uprising in Nigeria?

Determining the causal relationship between ethnicity and conflict has generated a lot of debates in the available literature. Some scholars have argued that it is virtually a norm that ethnic multiplicity engenders political violence, and that this fact is most characteristic of the multi-ethnic African societies, up till date. Other scholars have examined the causal relationship between ethnicity and violence, among who were Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis. (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000), in their field analysis of prevalence of civil wars in 161 countries between 1960 and 1999, specifically drew more of their instances from Africa. They argued that conflict in Africa was not due to ethno-linguistic or religious divisions, but it was the outcome of high level of poverty, failed political institutions and dependence on natural resources. Thus, their argument implies that ethnicity is not a factor encouraging conflict in societies. It is even noteworthy that Elbadawi and Sambanis's contention agrees with the primordial school of thought that views ethnicity as being a permanent feature of the society and

a means for socio-political stability, as well as the medium for identity and exchange in societies (cited in Geertz, 1963).

More significantly, (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000) advocated the instrumentalist argument holding that due to the distributive injustice (characterized by endemic poverty, deprivation and neglect) in most African societies ethnicity is an escape route from the injustice and deprivation. The contention of the instrumentalists implies that states tend to perform well when there are relative ethnic differences among the population. An ethnically homogeneous state, though rare to find, promotes stability, togetherness, national integration as well as socio-economic development. The clans or ethnic groups identify with one another, provide for one another and promote the common good of their members.

While these scholars have argued for ethnicity as fostering societal progress, there have been other scholars arguing for ethnicity as a root cause of conflict, as earlier noted. (Ogunbadejo, 1979) and (Ekeh, 1975) began by asserting that colonialism in Africa laid the foundation for the ethnic conflict in the continent. They argued that the establishment of centralized states by the colonialists had encouraged ethnic politics, and it 'delegitimized' the prior existing socio-political institutions in African societies leaving them with a fragile system of ethnic divides. The awareness of ethnic differences and the need to promote the interest of one's tribe over others became the order of the day during the colonial period and thereafter. In this regard (Ogunbadejo, 1979) and (Ekeh, 1975), corroborated that the politics of identity (also meaning ethnic politics) was entrenched when the colonial powers instituted a system that was antithetical to the existing socio-political system.

Given the highlighted pro-ethnicity and anti-ethnicity contentions, it is necessary to ask: Has ethnicity played a significant role in the conflict in Nigeria? What is the contribution of colonialism to the threat of political stability being experienced in the country, Nigeria? (Osaghe, 1998) was one of the major scholars to analyze conflict in Nigeria. To Osaghe, the issue of ethnic minority implying the neglect or marginalization of certain members of the society has often been significant a factor in the outbreak of violence in Nigeria. The inequality in the distribution and allocation of national resources by the government to the masses attests to this fact. Osaghe's work on minority exclusion laid emphasis on how the issue of ethnic minority has transformed from the ethnic character to a national one.

Osaghe traced back the history of ethnic division in Nigeria to as far back as the introduction of regionalism in the country in 1945, by the colonial MacPherson Constitution. MacPherson Constitution allowed for the formation of political parties on ethnic lines and it served as the foundation for ethnic division. The 1945 colonial constitution predetermined the abortion of the first and second republics of Nigeria. Specifically, there was an eruption of conflict in the western regional parliament, and this was followed by the long period of the Nigerian civil war, all encouraged by the ethnic politics.

In the same vein, (Salawu and Hassan, 2010) noted that a discussion on the genesis as well as on the concomitant factors that ensured ethnic division in the Nigerian political and social sphere must begin on the seed sown by the colonial masters. Salawu and Hassan held that:

The colonial constitutions, tended to engender ethnic division and hinder national integration, and of particular interest is Arthur Richard Constitution of 1946. This 1946 constitution established the first regional governments in Nigeria. Although the constitution achieved the

integration of the North and the South in a common legislative council, it actually brought to force the concept of regionalism (Salawu and Hassan, 2010).

(Salawu and Hassan,2010) further contended that the problem of violence in the new Nigerian state could not only be addressed from the perspective of its colonial antecedents. There was a more fundamental fact of the failure of the new Nigerian state to manage the society by ensuring the equitable distribution and allocation of resources. With the inequitable resource distribution and allocation, ethnic division was fostered in the country. So, conflict in Nigeria had been multi-dimensional; really, it cannot be addressed from just one perspective only.

Among the factors identified to encourage violent conflict in the country were accusations and allegations of neglect; oppression, domination, victimization, discrimination, marginalization, nepotism and bigotry; the inability of the Nigerian leaders to establish good governments; breakdown of traditional vehicles of social control; and the long history of military intervention in politics, which legitimizes the use of force and violence as instruments of social change and attainment of set goals and demand (Salawu, 2010).

From the foregoing the review has examined contending views on conflict as necessitated by ethnic divide. While (Osaghe, 1998) explained that the ethnic division in Nigeria was initiated by the colonial power and it has accounted for the upsurge of violence in the West African country, (Salawu, 2010) provided a multidimensional perspective that derived from different factors for the conflict. The next review will examine in details the arguments on religion as an important factor necessitating conflict in African societies.

Question Two

Is religious division the root cause of violent uprisings in Nigeria?

Religion, says Karl Marx, is the "opiate of the masses". This controversial statement has been subjected to series of analyses and debates. Certainly, Karl Marx's idealistic statement is not at the praxis of this analysis. That religion is an intrinsic factor for conflict in a political system has been contended. First, there is the argument that religion is merely a deception and another for the impact of religion on conflict in societies. In this latter regard, conflicts are considered to be necessitated by the commitment to and belief in one's religious identity.

So, can religion be truly responsible for the outbreak of violence in Africa? Or are there other factors behind the much theorized notion of religious divides? Interpreting Karl Marx's statement

Religion is an opiate to numb the faculties of men against the injustices all about them; to make them content with a miserable state in life; to accept oppression, grinding poverty, lack of the comforts of life, and misery. Religion accomplishes this, they say, by preaching that this is God's Will for the individual person, preaching that men are to forget such things in this life by laboring only for the reward of heavenly delight in the world to come. In brief, religion is dope. (Marx, 1845).

Paul Collier also disagreed with the hypothesis of religion in his field work entitled "Doing Well at War". Collier empirically investigated the causes of violence in African societies and found that, often, religion was used as a praetextum to explain violence in African societies, but in reality, political divisions and agitation for resources distribution and allocation are stronger reasons for conflict situations.

Moreover, given the different beliefs of religions and religious factions, most importantly, those of Islam and Christianity, the meaning and interpretation of the religious norms guiding these groups have also been contended. Virtually all violent crises have been linked to Islamic fundamentalism, particularly in Africa. Even in nearly religiously homogenous societies like Somalia where the population is 90% Muslim and there is an insignificant number of Christians, Islamic fundamentalism has often been linked to the outbreak of violence. However, Bruce Lawrence (1999) debunked the argument for the religion hypothesis, Islam is beyond violence, he claimed. He argued that the frequent linking of Islamic fundamentalism and conflict situations in African societies must be accorded a second thought and allowed thorough analysis. The fact that violence is predominant among a race of people does not necessarily eliminate alternative explanations for it. He stated that:

There is no generic category of religious protests that applies to the past three centuries of Islamic history. Instead, there are three distinct phases of protest. In each phase, certain Muslim groups revolted against ascendant world order linked to Western Europe. The ascendant world order in time became the dominant world order, but not without resistance, protest and rebellion. Not all protesters were Muslims, nor did all Muslims protest, but the nature of religiously valorized Muslim protests merits careful consideration (Lawrence, 1999)

So, given the dynamic nature of violence, religion may not be a sole cause of violence.

Eric (Brahm, 2005) further explained that religion did not serve a manifest function in conflict, but it only serves a latent function in it. According to Brahm, religion permeates the cleavages in societies and strengthens division which triggers and broadens the scope of conflict. He stated:

In virtually every heterogeneous society, religious difference serves as a source of potential conflict. Because when individuals are often ignorant of other faiths there is some potential tension, but it does not necessarily mean conflict will result. Religion is not necessarily conflict-oriented, but as with ethnicity or race religion serves as a way to distinguish one's self and one's group from the others. Often, the group with less power be it political or economic power, is more aware of the tension than the privileged group. When, however, the privileged group is a minority (such as the Jews historically were in much of Europe), they are often well aware of the latent conflict (Brahm, 2005).

It therefore implies that the long-held perspective that religious divide is the central framework for the understanding of conflict in societies is only one variable among others. Religion is used as an excuse to unleash terror in order to promote other parochial interests in a society. Yet, what are the factors necessitating violence in the name of religion? Who are responsible for the violence and of whose interest is the conflict?

It is not impertinent in order to understand the role of religion in conflict in Nigeria to consider the instance obtained in Somalia. According to (Tadesse, 2001), in understanding the role and nature of Islamic fundamentalism in Somalia, two crucial factors must be accounted for. The important factors are the international Islamic terrorist groups and, the lack of effective, efficient and performing governance. Religion has no direct role in the upsurge of conflict in Somalia; it is rather the division into clans, political and economic contestations and agitations that paved the way for the emergence of the militant group Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab has deceptively portrayed itself as fighting for the course of its religion (Islam). Tadesse elaborated

After the fall of Siad Barre clan extremism surfaced in Somalia which greatly weakened pan-Somali nationalism. Clan loyalty became the order of the day. Evidently, Islamists begun to argue that the only alternative to 'clanism' and the failed Somali nationalism was political Islam. Evidently, Islamic

fundamentalism is being used as an alternative unifying factor (or ideology) by the Somali fundamentalist movement, Al-Shabaab. The stateless situation has not only created a fertile ground for the emergence and development of Islamic fundamentalism as a political trend in Somalia. But it also has become conducive for the free movement of extremist and terrorist forces (Tadesse, 2001).

Again, it is apparent that the nexus between religion and conflict in Africa cannot be satisfactorily justified. Al-Shabaab insurrection in Somalia as an example has had visible political and economic undertone.

It is not impertinent to stress that the root cause of the conflict in Somalia was basically the inability of the ruling majority to define and devise an acceptable mode of representation which would accommodate the displaced minority (Omar, Mohamed & Van Lehman, 2010). The occupation and exploitation of southern Somalia had continued to aggravate agitation by the militia Al-Shabaab. Indeed, Al-Shabaab has seen the Somali government as exploiting their mandate for selfish interests. The under-representation of the indigenous owners of the land also has contributed to rise in the conflict. Buttressing this point, Omar et al. (2010) stated:

The formula, known as the 4.5 system, reduces their share of political representation to 50% of that allocated to each of the four other major umbrella clan groups, roughly speaking, Isaaq in the far north, Darood in the north centre, Hawiye in the centre, and Digil and Mirifle, of which the Reewiin or Rahaween is the prominent sub-clan, in the south. (Omar et al., 2010)

Considering now the outbreak of violence in Nigeria, especially in the North, its nexus with religion has among scholars been highly contended. Without doubt, there has been the notion of religious division in the country, Nigeria. Most account at analyzing and understanding the conflict have been premised on the claimed religious division. In particular, any violent attack or conflict in the Northern Nigeria is usually seen as religiously propelled. According to Isaac

(Terwase, 2012), religious divide between the Christian South and the Muslim North has been the root cause of violence in Nigeria, for instance. Justifying his view, he held that historically there was a long contest on establishing the dominance of one religion over the other in the country. Traditional Christian religious activities such as crusades and similar gatherings tended to disrupt and obstruct public high ways, as they obstruct both vehicular and human movement in the North. And given the spread and penetration of Christianity and its activities in Northern Nigeria, there was a tendency for conflict to emerge for the preservation of the Islamic religious heritage.

To the point, (Terwase, 2012) argued that Islamic fundamentalism was the root cause of conflict in Northern Nigeria, in particular. For him, Boko Haram was an Islamic faction and a unit with extended links and the group is hell-bent on an Islamic revolution beyond the North to the whole country. Again, the goal of enforcing Islamic culture is a historical trend whereby the two major religions in the country contest for dominance over each other. (Abimbola, 2010) supported the assertion too:

The Boko haram uprising was not the first forceful attempt to impose a religious ideology on a secular Nigerian society. But like the first major attempt and subsequent small-scale attempts, Boko Haram widened the scope of the efforts at Islamic revivalism. More significantly, despite the brutal suppression of previous attempts, the gallantry of the Boko haram soldiers, the spread and swiftness of its military organization, and the belief of its leadership and perhaps of its membership that it could successfully engage a modern state in a military duel all show an extraordinary commitment to the cause (Abimbola, 2010).

To ascertain the justifiability of religious explanation of violence in Nigeria, it will be useful to refer to (Kagoma, 2007). Kagoma made an empirical study of the conflict in Northern Nigeria using questionnaires. In the questionnaires, the question of the possibility of a Christian and Muslim Nigeria was posed. Kagoma interpreted the result of the empirical study that: 52% of the respondents agreed and were optimistic about the future; 13% strongly agreed; 4% disagreed about future peace; and the remaining 5% neither agreed nor disagreed. With the study result above, the role of religion in the outbreak of violence in Nigeria is insignificant. Otherwise, the response should indicate a total disagreement on a relative peace in the future of the nation; but the reverse was the case. Again, it can be observed that given the all-encompassing nature of the casualties of the "madness" in the North, the argument for religious fundamentalism may be a parochial postulation. Christians and Muslims are both casualties of the bizarre bombing and killings by the Boko haram, questioning the claim for its religious undertone.

(Odaró, 2003) also provides a substantive argument as he evaluated the historical manifestation of religious violence in Nigeria. His contention shows no grievance with the position of Marx, arguing that religion had been seen as a medium to advance the desires of the selfish elites in the North, the elites who were incapable of justifying their mandate as leaders. Odaró stated:

Knowing fully well the emotional attachment of Northern Nigerian Muslims to religion and the psychological equanimity they derive from it, politicians ruling the northern Nigerian states introduced Sharia law in order to enhance their political prospects and direct attention away from their own looting and their failure to improve living standards... (Odaró, 2003 p. 16)

Thus, (Odaró, 2003) is skeptical about the nexus between violence and religion in Nigeria, as it concerns Islam in particular. Religious conflict is only a pretext for politicians divided along ethnic lines for political and economic advantages, to put it succinctly. Indeed, in the country,

political leaders use religion to blindfold the masses from understanding the political reality. Religion really does not cause conflict, therefore. Religion is used to advance political and economic interests and the political and economic interests really power the conflict. The next phase of this review will examine the relationship between international influences and conflict in Africa.

Question Three

Can it be argued that international factors including the influence of global terrorism drive conflict in Nigeria?

International factors like activities of terrorist groups have been argued as probable causes of conflict in Africa, and especially the Boko Haram insurgency in the northern Nigeria. Bagaji, Etila, Ogbadu and Sule (2010) discussed the recent Boko Haram violence from the perspective of international terrorism. These scholars viewed the Boko Haram violence as a manifestation of terrorism. With its elaborate plans, the intensity of its attacks, sophistication of its strategies and the remarkable commitment of the members of this sect, the authors concluded that the Boko Haram phenomenon is not unconnected with international terrorism. For David Cook (2011), the Boko Haram crisis was typically a version of al-Qaeda, based on the disclosure made by its leaders. David Cooks (2010) and Bagaji et al. (2010) shared similar organizational perspective about the Boko Haram violence.

On the other hand according to Hoffman, in any attempt to understand the underlying factors for terrorism, the individual (social, political, economic, psychological and emotional) and organizational perspectives must both be recognized. In the Nigerian case, it has so far been

demonstrated that no single perspective, explanation or hypothesis accounts for the totality of the Nigerian conflict, the Boko Haram phenomenon in particular.

A convergence of both schools of thought, the organizational and individualist schools of thought, certainly broadens the understanding of the Boko Haram violence in the North. If the organizational perspective implies that the Boko Haram insurgency is linked with international terrorism being perpetrated by a group having clearly defined objectives, then the individualist school of thought stresses that the formation and existence of group objectives is notwithstanding dependent on the strong will and individual beliefs and interests of the Boko Haram members (and their possible sponsors) whose cause the group will advance. It can then be stated that the fundamental element of the terrorist organization Boko Haram is the individual belief in the ability of the organization to serve as a means to perpetuate his or her personal beliefs, ideology and interests.

Of course, the core argument of the individualist school of thought is that Boko Haram insurgency is typically a Nigerian violence that is engendered by the leadership deficit in the polity, a leadership deficit causing economic and social deprivation and frustration in the individual citizens, and leading to the formation of aggressive groups and upsurge of conflict. That is to say, the irresponsibility and irresponsiveness of nation's leaders inform the Boko Haram violence in the North.

Also, in respect of the organizational school of thought (perspective) there is a related approach to the explanation of the violent phenomenon: the elitist perspective. In the elitist perspective, the Boko Haram violence is essentially motivated and financed by the Northern elites. One of the members of the Boko Haram group recently confessed that they were paid a huge sum of money

by the elites to bomb strategic locations in the country. Thus, the understanding on the causes of the violence in the country is further deepened. The conflict in Nigeria can have both individualist and organizational explanations. An understanding of the situation in Somalia will help to highlight the Nigerian case of conflict, yet.

The increasing division of clans and the dominance of 'warlordism' in Somalia question the assertion that the country's conflict is externally engineered. In fact, the position that the aggressive group Al-Shabaab has an affiliation with international terrorist organizations appears to be a mere gimmick. It is as though Al-Shabaab as a 'religious' faction rather seeks to gain more credibility in their attempt to deter other warlords. According to the International Conflict Group:

The recent announcement that Al-Shabaab has formally joined Al-Qaeda may have been a tactic by some of its leaders, including Ahmed Abdi Godane, to acquire greater international financial support, but could alienate more nationalist Somali factions not interested in jihad or supportive of international terrorism (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 4).

It is hence apparent that the organizational explanation has little or no relevance in the Somalia's al-Shabaab scenario. Rather, internal dynamics of clan factions and warlords better account for the Somalia violence, certainly having at the base individual interests. While conflict in Africa has often been connected to international terrorism or crisis, the more prominent role of the internal dynamic should not be downplayed. The identification with international terrorist groups by most of the warlords in Africa can be seen as attempts to increase their individual profile and dominance within their spheres of influence. By implication, any linkage of outbreak of violence in Africa with international terrorism must take into paramount consideration the historical, economic and political conditions of the societies concerned.

The International Crisis Group also corroborated thus:

Al-Shabaab, though weakened, is far from a spent force; its militant jihadist's ideology is radicalizing young Somalis at home and abroad; veteran foreign jihadists are exerting ever greater influence; and recently its emir pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda and global jihad. But it is no longer the only threat to stability; the resurgence of inter-clan competition and "warlordism" is as serious challenge (International Crisis group, 2012, p. 1)

There is left to be examined the fact that interplay of domestic factors impact on conflict in African societies. The individualist proponents have contended that the state of terror is not unconnected with the economic conditions of individuals, leading to a situation of individual frustration, and ultimately individuals taking to violence. The elitist proponents of the individualist school have also argued that terrorism in Nigeria is not financed internationally but sponsored by some aggrieved elites in the North. This similarly described the Somalia conflict situation, where the violence are perpetuated by clan warlords and where claim to Al-Qaeda connection serves more to deter and dominate other competing warlords. The next phase in this review will examine in details scholarly views on the relationship between conflict and ineffective or inefficient leadership.

Question Four

Are highly fragmented states with leadership deficit more likely to experience violent uprisings?

The factor of leadership deficit in conflict in African countries has, earlier on, been subsumed under the individualist school of thought. As a hypothesis, discussing the leadership deficit must begin with understanding the concept of leadership itself. Leadership has been a controversial concept in the extant literature. An agreement on what factors shape the outcome of leadership has been difficult to arrive at in scholarly literature. Indeed, a number of questions have been posed in this respect. Can the attitudinal dispositions of leaders be informed by the environmental and social trends which could influence behavioral outputs? Can leadership be explained by inherent personal traits? Do leaders learn from each other? Or do leaders act based on what they feel is right, moral and desirable? The earliest attempt to provide answers to the questions and understand leadership was advanced by the personality school of thought. According to the personality school of thought, leadership is neither a learned characteristics nor a product of social integration, but that would-be leaders are born with certain inherent characteristics (Zaccaro, Kemp & Bader, 2004).

However, (Kenneth, Blanchard and Natemeyer, 1979) argued that the individual leader encountering and experiencing societal dynamics could develop a perception which ultimately affected his or her personality. The view of Kenneth, Blanchard and Natemeyer though behavioral in orientation sharply contrasts with the personality perspective. Kenneth, Blanchard and Natemeyer definitely imply that inherent leadership characteristics are a product of individual accumulation of societal experiences. Their analysis was corroborated by (Uhl-Bien,

2006) that leadership was neither a trait nor a personal characteristic, but leadership was learned. Individuals' accumulation of societal experiences provides the motivation, direction and instinct needed in public administration.

Furthermore, (Bachiochi, Rogelberg, O'Connor and Elder, 2000) viewed leadership from the perspective of accountability and responsibility. Their argument is tailored after that of (Uhl-Bien, 2006). In their analogy, the prominent factors characterizing the behavioral patterns of leaders are explained. The scholars held that leaders were often given multiple responsibilities but little room to perform such responsibilities; and this led to stress and the weak performance of the organization or system they lead. In contrast to the accountability and responsibility perspective, there is the transformational leadership perspective which holds a different view. The concept of transformational leadership was introduced by leadership expert and presidential biographer James MacGregor Burns. According to Burns, transformational leadership can be seen when "leaders and followers make each other to advance to a higher level of morale and motivation". Through the strength of their vision and inspire their followers and change their expectations, perceptions and motivations at work towards common goals. Bass (1985) also elaborated on the transformational leadership. Bass asserted that the process of transformation was not only limited to the leadership and the followership, but the transformational leader also provided the basis for an idealized influence. This implies that the transformational leader becomes a role model of high ethical behavior, able instill pride and increasingly gain respect and trust among his or her followers (Bass, 1985).

Yet, Kenneth, Blanchard & Natemeyer (1979) provided a most interesting explanation. Emphasizing on the contexts of sources of power and the impact on leadership styles, they stressed that situational factors, societal pre-conditions and the source of power shape the act of

leadership. This perspective of transformational leadership can facilitate the understanding of the African experience. Indeed, on the debate on democratization and sustainable leadership, any leadership theory that will situate Africa in the spectrum of its analysis must begin with the sources of leadership power. By implication, in the African context the source of power is inextricably linked with the resultant output of leadership. The extent of democratization in Africa and African societies as a source of power becomes the benchmark for assessing leadership and leadership qualities, therefore. Needless to say, democratic leadership has eluded the African societies (Gakuru, 2005) and (Iheriohanma & Oguoma, 2010). The logic here is, if the source of power in a democratic system is compromised then the expectation of fair leadership will become an illusion; and in a situation where leadership is so elusive and absent the society becomes worse for it.

One greatest societal threat in modern-day Africa is the unfortunate leadership deficit. Leadership implies critical management of scarce resources and endowments in a country (Gakuru, 2005). Sure, Africa possesses indigenous knowledge, traditional technologies and wealth, but the problem is that the leaders are unable to capitalize on the strengths of the continent to better the lives of their peoples. There is this get-rich-quick syndrome which has eroded integrity and transparency in the dealings of the states in Africa (Iheriohanma & Oguoma, 2010). The African countries have been exploited, poorly and dishonestly administered by the privileged few who get into positions of power. The resultant effects of these negative governance features in the continent are poverty, brain drain, unemployment, inequality and ultimately the upsurge of conflict (Emeagwali, 2004). If there is some degree of responsiveness and responsibility among the leaders in power, African societies will be at peace and experience accelerated development. If the game of politics is played according the rule, giving 'to Caesar

what belongs to Caesar', Africa will no more be at its state of backwardness. The decay in infrastructures, poor road networks, dilapidated public schools and hospitals, typical of African societies in the 21st century are all indicators that the continent suffers from leadership deficit.

A leading African writer, Chinua Achebe, noted that African leaders were nothing but an epitome of failure. To a large extent, Achebe might be right, because a government that cannot justify its legitimacy by taking responsive and responsible actions can only be considered as a rule by cabals. Violence, whether ethnic or religious, is not new to the country. In fact, Dudley (1965) averred that the trend of violence in Nigeria had followed the historical development of corruption, nepotism and inequality in the country. Good leadership is the hallmark of any democratic governance. The leaders are expected to be visionaries. The leaders are expected to show a strong commitment to the protection of the interest of the people as well as to advancing their aspirations. Unfortunately, leadership in the Nigerian state has been different. The leaders have sought personal gains and neglected the masses. In the words of Yagboyaju (2010):

More than ten years later, there is still strong evidence of unrealistic and unreasonable demands from lawmakers. For example, in May 2010, a majority of the legislators in the lower chamber of the National Assembly demanded a new quarterly allocation of N42 million (\$277,000) each. This is apart from their monthly salary of about N1.3 million (\$8,600) each. Obviously, the request of the upper chamber of the same Assembly should be higher and thus more provocative in a country where the vast majority of ordinary citizens earn less than \$2 or N300 per day (Yagboyaju, 2010).

To discredit the often illusive and deceptive perspective of a possible linkage between ethnicity and violence in Nigeria, Clement Kagoma's (2007) field work entitled "Leadership and the Politics of Religious Conflict in Nigeria" has provided a more convincing opinion on the impact of poor leadership on the Nigerian conflict. Using the survey method, 150 questionnaires were

deployed to different parts of northern Nigeria and 40 to Nigerians residing in the United States. A total of 117 questionnaires were returned of which 99 came from Nigeria. The result of the study reveals that the failure of political leadership appeared to be a significant factor in the Nigerian crisis. Analyzing the responses to the question on what was the best way to minimize conflict in Nigeria, Kagoma noted:

I am shocked that electing good leaders was selected by only 17% of respondents, and the option became the least accepted among the best ways for minimizing conflict in Nigeria. Education scored 45% as the best way, tolerance 25%, and dialogue 20%. About 15% respondents agreed with more than one answer (Kagoma, 2007).

From the study outcome, it appears that the Nigerian populace had lost faith in the government. The government was not considered an option in solving the conflict problem in the country. This simply connotes that the Nigerian government lacked the acceptance of the people. Moreover, the citizens perceived the idea of leadership as an avenue for the very few individuals in power to exploit state resources for their own benefit. Largely, leadership has lost its respect. There has been a complete separation of the masses from the leaders. This development does not accord with the accountability and responsibility thesis about leadership, as systemic performance is hindered by the quest to amass state wealth, in the Nigerian context.

The negligence in governance of the Nigerian populace which has soiled the perception of the leaders as possible solution providers to the problem of conflict is connected with the leadership deficit in the country. The critical challenge is that the ruling elites themselves are divided. In this respect, (OKpaga, Ugwu and Eme (2012) argued that any analysis on the Nigerian conflict situation, particularly the Boko Haram violence, cannot overlook the role of the elites. In their explanation, there is a pact among certain notorious opposition leaders in the North who after the

death of President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua in 2010 were determined to force power back to the North. To be sure, the Boko Haram group is largely made up of the poor peasants in the North. Or how have the Boko Haram been able to purchase such sophisticated weapons used in orchestrating violence, given their economic status?

In the absence of unity among political elites, responsible and accountable leadership becomes impossible in any society, and violence becomes the order of the day. In countries where there is disunity among the elites, the resultant effect is the polarization of the elites, leading to a state of instability and consequent vulnerability to violence (Burton, Gunther & Higley, 1992). Nigeria has indicated relative weakness in leadership, with the failure to embrace the core democratic principles as its determinant factor. The elites in Nigeria appear to be divided and are disconnected from the masses. And this leadership state has resulted in the unprecedented prevalence of violence in the country, witnessed up till date.

In conclusion, the above review has examined various factors or variables that shape the nature and pattern of violence in Nigeria. The variables examined here do have varying significant in their contributions to the conflict situation especially in the North, varying significance in comparison with the variable of leadership deficit. However, this study does not align with any of the variables on the current debate of violence in Nigeria. Rather it takes a holistic and multi-dimensional position to the current violence. The next chapter will examine in detail the methodology to be adopted in the study as well as the limitations of the methodology used

Chapter Two

2.1 Methodology

This research will make use of both qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis. Data will be collected from academic journals, newspaper publications, extant literature and quantitative questionnaire survey. The quantitative questionnaires will provide statistical data on and confirm the hypothesis about the probable cause of the current violence in Nigeria. The questionnaires were sent to friends and colleagues who reside in Eastern, Northern and Western Parts of Nigeria who helped in the distribution to available participants. A total of 300 questionnaires was distributed to the Public in both Rural and Urban areas. A total of seven close-ended questions were asked in the questionnaire (See Appendix for questions). The aim of the questionnaire is to show the feelings of the Nigerian people about leadership and governance in Nigeria, thus reflecting the root cause of the greater conflict in the northern region. In addition, the results from the questionnaires so administered will be analyzed and placed on graphs or bar charts. Yet, for an adequate interpretation of the questionnaires, the comparative method will equally be employed for their analysis, to explain and rank the various views on conflict in Nigeria. To complement and compare the findings from the survey, contending perspectives, both of scholars and prominent political gladiators such as past leaders, and notable and distinguished scholars, human right advocates, and civil organization leaders from the various regions will be examined. The use of a chronological overview or a date by date analogy of the Boko Haram attacks will also be deployed to draw inferences on the possible causes of the current conflict. More also, evidence from social media such as inferences from Boko haram's tweets on Twitter. This will emphasize on the acclaimed reasons for attacks. In both chapters 3 and 4, data would be gathered from academic journals, newspaper publications, relevant

literatures, television and radio broadcast and internet sources. This will be useful as it examines divergent views, perspectives and the historical development of the Boko Haram conflict.

While the study will not engage in the hazardous venture of seeking information from the Boko Haram group in the North, a survey in the selected northern states will provide reliable data on the feelings of the impoverished northern Nigerians and their engendered propensity to violence, in opposition to and defiance of the Nigerian government. Of course, the Nigerian conflict in the North emanates from the poor northerners and a large number of the Boko Haram group members are recruited from their areas.

2.3 Relevance

The Boko Haram insurgence, without a doubt, has been the greatest threat to the security of lives and properties in Nigeria. There are different accounts or perspectives on what motivates the current conflict in the country. This ranges from religious, ethnic, Political or leadership dimensions. A more recent study established that the Nigerian conflict was a product of the unequal distribution of resources in the federation – much like the Marxian proletarian struggle against the bourgeoisie class (Forest, 2012, p. 6). On the other hand, the fundamentalist explanation, unlike the elitist, is quite a parochial account. However, the aim of this essay would be to incorporate these various dimensions and accounts on conflict in an attempt to proffer sustainable pathways to peace in Nigeria. Over the years there have been a continuous inhumane killing in the North and the Nigerian government appears to be very confused on what appropriate approach to adopt in solving the current problem. This largely spawns from the fact

that the reason for the current violence is largely unknown as Boko Haram has blamed its insurgency on multiple factors.

The research will provide a holistic approach to understanding the Nigerian violence from diverse perspectives, as it will incorporate and emphasize on the diverse accounts and explanation of the conflict in Nigeria. It re-emphasizes the multi-dimensional frame work for the analysis of conflict in modern Africa. The study will by implication serve to understand the nature of conflict in Africa, from its diverse perspectives.

2.2 Limitations of the study

Given the methodology adopted in the study there are three major limitations; The methodology adopted in the survey or data collection such as the target population, the emphasis on a limited population size and the sampling method which will make use of the snowball method.

Firstly, the study emphasizes on a comparative understanding of perspectives on the Boko Haram conflict in Nigeria. Ordinarily, the data collection process should be aimed at getting valid information from the insurgent group itself. This possesses a major challenge not only to this research work but to other research works done in the area of conflict. How do we discern the major cause of conflict or why do insurgent group act or react the way they do? Despite these challenges, leading scholars in the field of conflict and conflict resolution as (Collier and Sambani, 2003) and (Omotola, 2013), have argued that any attempt to study insurgent groups must resist the temptation of drawing inferences from the portrayed reasons for insurgency by such groups. In other words, hidden intentions may not necessarily be declared. Though scholars have emphasized much on drawing conclusions from a chronology or history of attacks (Onuoha,

2012) and (Oyeniya 2013) but this historical and chronological analysis does not clearly quantify divergent views on the recent conflict. For sure, the aim of this study is not to disregard the authenticity of the aforementioned scholarly works, but there is a need to go beyond reading portrayed actions to a comparative understanding of the reason behind such actions.

Secondly, the study will draw largely on public opinion polls as well as a limited or small “n” size. This to a large extent constitutes a limitation. More cases, more numbers, justifies the authenticity of a wide survey in terms of coverage and inclusiveness. This work is largely limited by this factor. However, the reason behind the small “n” sized population is that the study is not aimed at generalizing that a common factor is responsible for the recent Boko Haram crisis, but most importantly it is aimed at comparatively understanding divergent opinions and constructively proffering solutions from these diverse views. Again what may constitute a limitation and in some sense a defense is that given the time frame and logistic factors behind this research it may not be effective to rely on a large “N” survey. Rather, a much more focused small “n” survey will be used to draw inferences and provide insightful and analytical perspectives on the current conflict in Nigeria.

2.4 Sampling method: Snowball Method

Snowball sampling is a special non-probability method used when the desired sample characteristic is rare. It may be extremely difficult or cost prohibitive to locate respondents in these situations. Snowball sampling relies on referrals from initial subjects to generate additional subjects. While this technique can dramatically lower search costs, it comes at the expense of introducing bias because the technique itself reduces the likelihood that the sample will represent a good cross section from the population. There are a number of reasons why snowball sampling

will be beneficial in this study. One is the time and finance necessary to accomplish this task. Given the importance of the topic, selecting a particular definite population will result to a bias on its own. Rather, the aim is to build on participants who are well informed and knowledgeable about the current crisis in the country. Secondly, unlike other surveys using the snowball method, the research is not intended to offer any incentives to quicken the process of information gathering but its emphasis is largely drawn from Nigerians who are well informed on the topic. Of course majority of Nigerians have access to current information on the conflict in the country given its disastrous impact and as such opinions are formed from social media, News broadcasts etc. However, one limitation of this method is that the degree of information of the general public largely differs. For instance what a university professor knows about the current conflict in the country will be more important than the perspectives of mere citizens. Likewise the degree of information available to a civil servant in the department of defense will greatly differ from what a university professor knows. In other words, the study may largely ignore the opinions of vital interests as well as top stake holders in the current crisis. However, there is every possibility that the perspectives of a university professor may be wider than that of a government official who ordinarily may take a defensive stance if the research is aimed at understanding the role of government in the current crisis. Be that as it may, since the survey is aimed at a comparative understanding of the conflict in Nigeria the snowball method used here is not primarily aimed at collecting information from any specific group but will obtain a degree of information from individuals in every facets of the society.

Borrowing from the works of (Browne, 2005), the Snowball sample is often used because the real population under study is hard to approach. By implication and in relations to this study, any risky venture at getting insurgent groups to fill up questionnaires in order to understand the

reason behind their actions will be threatening not only to the individual involved but the research itself. First the group according to the position of Collier and (Omotola, 2013) may become suspicious of the researchers intent and provide false claims. In using the snowball sample, the survey representatives in the various regions assumed that the first participant to be recruited for the survey has the most limited information on the conflict. The study was aimed at getting referrals from subsequent participants and building on existing perspectives. However, the study will draw largely from public polls or opinions from public parastatals /civil servants, educational institutions/university professors, e.t.c in the three regions specifically The North (Kano state), East (Anambra state) and Western (Lagos state) parts of the country. It is also targeted at recruiting men and women (adults 18 years and above) enlightened and knowledgeable about the current conflict situation in the country. The specific locations will be interpreted taken into cognizance the location where the participants resides e.g Urban, Semi-Urban or Rural Areas.

2.5 Organization of Study or Clarification of study plan

The study is organized into five chapters. Chapter one includes the background of the study, statement of the problem, theoretical framework, and literature review. Chapter two deals with the methodology used in the study, relevance of the work, Limitations of the Methods used in the study as well as the organization of the study from chapter one two five. Chapter three lays emphasis on the interpretation and analysis of data collected, as well as a revisit of the contending perspectives on the current Boko Haram conflict. Specifically it examines in details contending views from existing literature on leadership as a significant variable in the understanding of the current conflict in Nigeria. This analysis was largely based on the findings from both the survey results from social media and questionnaire results which indicated that poor leadership such as high rate of unemployment, poverty in the North is a cogent variable in the analysis of the current Nigerian conflict. Chapter four contextualizes the prior assumptions (Theoretical frame work); comparing and analyzing its relevance in the understanding of the Nigerian Conflict based on the findings. It does this by digging deep into the historical development as well as the changing and inconsistent goals of the Boko Haram sect. It also examines the various military and non-military responses of the Nigerian government. Chapter five concludes with necessary recommendations.

Chapter three

3.1 Findings and Interpretations

The Chapter focused on the interpretation of the survey questions. As earlier noted in the methodology section 300 questionnaires were distributed in three regions: Northern Nigeria (Kano) In the South East Anambra and Enugu States, South West, Lagos and Ogun States. The survey was not a large nationwide investigation but will be useful in complimenting the inferences that will be made from the chronological overview of attacks by the Boko Haram in chapter 4. In interpreting the questionnaire I first showed the general Survey Overview such as the sample size, Universe, Design, stratification, location, and response. The total percentage of respondents was also calculated and weighed. Finally the answer to the question on the root cause of the Boko Haram conflict in Nigeria was placed of a chart. This was necessary in comparing various regional responses and perspectives. This was also followed by a thorough examination of contending perspectives of both scholars and prominent political gladiators such as past and present leaders in Northern Nigeria, and notable and distinguished scholars, human right advocates, and civil organization leaders.

SURVEY OVERVIEW

Dates of Field Survey: 20th of April 2013-21st of September 2013

Sample size: 300

Sample Universe: Citizens of Nigeria and adult population above 18 (Muslims/Christians)

Sample Design: Random: Rolling Basis

Stratification: Districts: Urban/Semi-urban and Rural Areas

Locations: Universities, Local Government Areas in Enugu, Lagos and Kano States

Respondent Selection: Individuals with key interest in the Boko Haram crisis where asked for their consent and interest in filling up the questionnaire

Languages: Igbo, Hausa, Yoruba

Outcome rate: 68.8%

Contact rate: 68.8%

Response rate: 70%

Results

The survey specifically asked eight questions. However, our interpretation was based strictly on the responses to the question "What could be the cause of the current Boko Haram conflict in Nigeria?" Here I briefly examined general responses from the general population. Then I divided these responses into regions such as North, East and West. Figures 1.0 and 1.1 shows the general perspectives of participants on the root cause of the current Boko Haram insurgency. Figures 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 specifically divided these responses into regions.

Fig 1.0

variables	URBAN	SEMI-URBAN	RURAL
Poor Leadership	62	38	16
Religious Conflict	39	23	11
Ethnic Struggle	21	16	10
International Influences	29	4	7




Fig 1.1 General Perspectives of respondents on the root cause of the Current Boko Haram

Conflict




Fig 1.2 Perspectives from the North




Fig 1.3 Perspectives from the West




Fig 1.4 Perspectives from the East

From table 1.0 which shows the general demographic locations of respondents (Urban, Semi-Urban, and Rural areas), 62% of the respondents in the Urban area supported the leadership factor as an important and significant variable in explaining the current boko haram conflict, same as 38% for the semi-urban areas and 16% for the rural areas. Comparatively other variables had less significant outcomes in the various location. 39% (Urban), 23% (Semi-urban) and 11% (Rural) of the respondents supported the religious conflict variable. 21% (Urban), 16% (Semi-Urban) and 10% (Rural) of the respondents supported the Ethnic conflict variable. Finally, 29% (Urban), 4% (Semi-Urban) and 7% (Rural) held that the present boko haram conflict in Nigeria is caused by international influences or factors. Following the above responses it shows clearly that poor leadership was a dominant perspective held by the respondents. From the three regions except respondents from the rural area of eastern Nigeria poor leadership seem to reoccur in a dominant manner. However this study will not make generalizations based on these perspectives rather I will examine the evidence from social media investigation particularly twitter and I will

also draw largely from existing perspectives in the literature to confirm or disprove the above position. The next section will examine evidence from twitter and will make analysis based on the result that follows.

3.2 Evidence from Twitter

Fig 1.5 Speech and Pragmatic Acts from Boko Haram's Tweeter Page

Speech and Pragmatic Acts	Occurrences in %
Accusing & blaming the Nigerian government	61.4
Condemning & denouncing Islam and Violence	6.9
Accusing & Blaming the Western Countries	12.1
Supporting and Identifying with Boko Haram and Islam	19.5

See: https://twitter.com/BOKO_HARAMM

In this study, the pragmatic acts or actions on Boko Haram's tweeter page is deployed with the goal of understanding the major cause of the conflict in the country which is the central aim of this essay. To achieve this aim I adopted clearly Chiluya and Adegoke (2013) approaches in the study of the Boko Haram conflict in Nigeria. The difference between the results and interpretations made here and that of Chiluya and Adegoke (2013) is that the latter had a total of 140 tweets as evidence at the time when the findings of the research were reported. However, at

the time of this research, there were a total of 148 tweets. As clearly noted in the previous study, though these users claim to be members of the sect Boko Haram, but it is not certain that they were real members of the Boko Haram sect. However, going by the works of (McMains and Mullins, 2010), there are various levels of terrorist groups such as the leaders, the hard core members, the Affiliates, Fringe members, and the “wanna-be’s”. A concise study on the reason behind any insurgency must not neglect the inferences that can be drawn from the pragmatic actions of these other groups such as the fringe members and the “wanna-be’s” (McMains and Mullins, 2010). The Fringe members could be described as individuals who clearly want to be part of a group but lack the necessary criteria to become one (McMains and Mullins, 2010). These individuals also share an important aspect of the beliefs of terrorist or insurgent groups. For instance individuals from rich parents from Northern Nigeria who are well educated, forcefully converted to Christianity or just mere Muslims who resides in the south may be disenchanted with the practice of Islamic tenets but their status as well as their pedigree in the society prohibits them from joining the Boko Haram group who “Claim” that western education and life style are totally against Islam. These fringe members or “wanna-bes” are incapacitated by their status in the society and to this end may only air their views on the current happenings through the social network.

In the study, it was evident that 61.4 % of the tweets accused and blamed the federal government of being responsible for the current outbreak of conflict in the country, 6.9 percent of the tweets went to the direction of condemning and denouncing Islam and violence, and 12.1% accused the west of infiltrating the country Nigeria and partnering with the Nigerian government. They blamed the west for laying the foundation for the current conflict not just in Nigeria but in other parts of Africa such as Somalia and Mali. However, it was evident that 19.5 percent of the tweets

went to the direction of supporting the current violence in the country. Most of the tweets pledged allegiance to the Boko Haram group and boasted of their prowess and influence in the country. What is the implication of the above results in the analysis of the current Nigerian conflict? Though the two evidences provided, strongly tie the current insurgence to leadership issues, however, it is necessary to state that this study does not align with the dominant paradigm view of conflict, rather, it sees the current conflict as a combination of diverse factors, a fact that would be closely examined in chapter four of this thesis. However given the leadership bent of our present results it is necessary to dig deep into contending views on the current Boko Haram insurgence.

3.3 Contending Perspectives on the Boko Haram Conflict

What really is behind the current Boko Haram insurgence in Nigeria? This question has generated a controversy in the academic and political domains. To some, Boko Haram connotes an Islamic group that sees politics in northern Nigeria as seized by a cult of fake Muslim to create a "clean" Moslem community governed by Islamic tenets (Walker, 2012: 9). Many other perspectives see Boko Haram as a dangerous Moslem sect participating in chaotic revolt (LeVan, 2013; Hill, 2013). This implies that, Boko Haram is a sect for the revival and solidification of a Moslem state.

Some of Nigeria's prominent leaders also hold divided opinions on the current conflict. For instance, General Muhammad Buhari, a previous head of the Nigerian State during the military dispensation and chairman of the Congress of Progressive Change (CPC), holds the opinion that there are different types of Boko Haram, and this can be divided into three types such as the "the original, the criminal and the most lethal of them all, the political" namely the federal

government. As Buhari spoke openly at a press interview in counter response to his appointment by Boko Haram as one of its spokesman in a scheduled negotiation with the government:

As we have stated in an earlier communication, the People's Democratic Party (PDP), as a corporate entity, is the harbinger of the insecurity travails of the Nigerian People for the sole reason of ensuring perpetuity in governance. From recollection of events of the last two years, there are three variants of the Boko-Haram: the original Boko-Haram that is at daggers drawn with the Nigerian authority for the extra-judicial killing of their leader; the criminal Boko-haram that is involved in all criminality for economic reasons and of course, the most lethal of all, the Political Boko-Haram-which this PDP-led Federal government represents.

It continues:

The President, Dr Goodluck Jonathan, had once alerted the Nation of the ubiquitous presence of Boko-Haram in his government- a fact aptly amplified by his erstwhile National Security Adviser, General Andrew Azazi. Undoubtedly, the latest revelations by the State Security Services (SSS) on the complicity of the top echelon of the PDP leadership in Boko Haram activities aptly bear testimony of the noxious subterfuge to extirpate the essence of our Nationhood (Fasakin, 2012).

Too a large extent, while a good number of Nigerians sees and even applaud the above explanation of Boko Haram insurgence over many other interpretations, the view of General Buhari is far different from what Nigerians may assume. Majority of Nigerians interpret the current insurgence taken cognizance of the highly demarcated and conflict riddled nature of Nigeria's politics in 2011. The crisis over the late President Yar'Adua's dilapidating health status, the determination of his successor by a crop of political bid wigs, which ultimately led to the dearth of the constitutional procedures and the eventual exaltation of the former Vice-President Jonathan to the status of interim president (Omotola, 2011), staged the drama for the

divided politics of electing a new president. Furthermore, declaration of President Jonathan to run as the presidential flag bearer under the PDP, after the demise of late Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, in contrast to PDP's constitutionally established doctrine of zoning presidential candidates between the north and the south, generated more schism and further fuelled the current crisis. To further complicate the whole issue, it was the triumph of the interim Vice President, against Muhammad Buhari, a northern candidate in the 2011 Presidential Election which was widely criticized by many politicians from the North as fraudulent that fuelled the violence that took place widely in the North after the elections. Many of the Northern Elites however concluded that the Nigerian Society will remain ungovernable, publicly supported more chaos and conflict if a Northern candidate is not in power. For instance, Alhaji Lawal Kaita, a close associate of former Vice President Atiku Abubakar said:

The North is determined, if it happens, to make the country ungovernable for President Jonathan or any other Southerner who finds his way to the seat of power on the platform of the PDP against the principle of the party's zoning policy. Anything short of a Northerner president is tantamount to stealing our presidency. Jonathan has to go and he will go. Even if he uses incumbency power to get his nomination on the platform of the PDP, he would be frustrated out (Anya, 2012: 2).

In related statements, Buhari said:

There may be no Nigeria. I draw parallel with Somalia so many times (Somalisation of Nigeria). I am scared about that. Somalia, they are one ethnic group, one religion, Islam, but for 18 years, Somalia became so selfish, so corrupt, so undisciplined and they have wrecked the country.

Former Vice President Atiku Abubakar in his own words also held that 'those who make peaceful change impossible will make violent change inevitable' (Anya, 2012). To summarize

these Political statements made by these Northern elites, it will be essential to examine what Professor Wole Soyinka says about Nigerians views on a Boko Haram orchestrated by the political elites. As Soyinka surmises:

Much play is given, and rightly so, to economic factors – unemployment, misgovernment, wasted resources, social marginalization, massive corruption – in the nurturing of the current season of violent discontent in Nigeria. To limit oneself to these factors alone, is an evasion, intellectual and moral cowardice, and a fear of offending the ruthless caucuses that have unleashed terror on society, a refusal to stare the irrational in the face and give it its proper name and response. This horde has remained available to political opportunists and criminal leaders desperate to stave off the day of reckoning. Most are highly placed, highly disgruntled, and thus highly motivated individuals who, having lost out in the power stakes, resort to the manipulation of these products of warped fervor. Their aim is to bring society to its knees, to create a situation of total anarchy that will either break up the nation or bring back the military, which ruled Nigeria in a succession of coups between the mid-1960s and the late 90's. Again and again they have declared their blunt manifesto not merely to Islamize the nation but to bring it under a specific kind of fundamentalist strain (Anya, 2012).

For many others, Boko Haram encapsulates both the political and economic perspectives. John Campbell, a former U.S. ambassador to Nigeria and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, expresses this sentiment when he claims that Boko Haram connotes several things at once. As he argues, “Boko Haram writ large is a movement of grassroots anger among northern people at the continuing depravation and poverty in the north. It is also a core group of Mohammed Yusuf's followers who have reconvened around Abubakar Shekau and who are exacting revenge against the state for their treatment. He further stated, ‘There is another aspect to the group that is often overlooked. The group could also be seen as a kind of personality cult,

an Islamic millenarianism sect, inspired by a heretical but charismatic preacher” (Walker, 2012: 9).

From the above perspectives, the definition of Boko Haram is very complicated. Its evolution and consolidation are contradictory, making it difficult for a proper conceptualization and categorization. Digging deep into further studies, scholarly contentions explains the Boko Haram insurgence as necessitated by the greed-grievance undertone. In other words, political-economic softness is to be blamed (Agbibo, 2013, Onuoha, 2012). This perspective is highly connected to the perspective that argues of profit in times of chaos. (Chabal and Daloz, 1999) argue that this latter perspective in their popular and highly criticized book, “Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument”. Their contentions have tempted to influence a policy prescription that simply argues that the most important solution to Boko Haram is to initiate a ‘significant governance and political reforms, projected at correcting the historic social and economic imbalance in northern Nigeria’ (Sampson, 2013).

However, some scholars have argued that it is highly impossible to define what Boko Haram means, what it stands for and what their objectives are. Raufu Mustapha, a respected Nigerian political economist of Oxford University’s Department for International Development explicates why this has been so:

Throughout its existence, the organization has constantly morphed and changed its nature as it has gone through various incarnations. This evolution has made it difficult for observers to pin the organization down and define it. Clarity has been obscured because contact with the organization is difficult. When there has been contact with the outside world, the organization has proved elliptical. It has made announcements about its goals that are contradictory, not really achievable, or unrealistic. The water has been muddied further by the number of interpretations of motive and causation that

observers attribute to anything that happens in Nigeria, and the conspiracy theories that flow from them (Walker, 2012: 8).

In summary, the debate continues as to what is the motivation behind Boko Haram. In this chapter we have examined results from a survey as well as evidence from the Boko Haram's Twitter page. Both findings point to leadership crisis as a cogent variable. We also examined contending perspectives from scholars, prominent political elites from the North. Though these diverse opinion sounds convincing, we haven't closely examined the activities of the group, Boko Haram. In the next chapter, Edward Azar's theory on protracted Social conflict is brought back to our memory. The chapter, in detail also, examines the activities of Boko Haram as well as the various responses of the Nigerian government both military and non-military.

Chapter Four

4.1 Edward Azar's Protracted Conflict theory and the Nigerian Situation

As earlier noted in chapter one, Edward Azar's theory of protracted conflict advocates for a multidimensional understanding of conflict. In other words conflict is motivated by a whole array of factors which should be considered in collaboration with other factors; these includes, but not limited to, the deprivation of basic needs or human needs, international linkages, communal discontent and Government incompetence or states roles. From the findings above as well as the examined contending perspective, it brings to the fore that Azar's perspective on the root causes of conflict captures the Nigerian situation. As the above findings attests to this fact, the various perspectives on the Nigerian conflict has no clear factor on the root cause of the insurgence rather there is an existence of divergent, divided and contending opinion on the current disaster in the country. This does not only reaffirm Azar's long held work but provides a clear part on the conclusions and recommendations to be made in the chapter five of this essay. However before such conclusion or generalization will be made, it is necessary to explore in chronological terms the various phases and stages of the Boko Haram insurgence in Nigeria. This will give us a clearer understanding of the phenomenon and the conclusion and recommendations that will follow.

4.2 Goals and Objectives of Boko Haram Sect: A Chronological Overview

Fig 1.6 Time Line of Boko Haram Activities

Date of Attack	Casualties and Professed reason for Attack
2003	<i>College students in the North became radicalized, tore their certificates and protested against western Education.</i>
24 th December 2004	<i>Stormed the police quarters in Yobe demanding the release of its captured members</i>
Between 2005 and 2008	<i>There was no single attack</i>
Between 26 and 27 July 2009	<i>Group resumed attack. Demanded the release of its members. Destroyed Mosques, Police headquarters in Borno and Yobe states with more than 200 casualties</i>
October 6 th 2010	<i>Stormed Maiduguri prison and released 732 inmates. Killed more than 20 Police officers</i>
17 th March 2011	<i>Attacked the bauchi prison and burnt down the prison building</i>
August 26 th 2011	<i>Attacked the UN building, Accused Jonathan of aligning with the west and polluting Islam, demanding that the president convert to Islam</i>
November 4 2011 and December 25 th 2011	<i>Attacked Christian dominated areas in damaturu killing 150 people and also attacked a catholic church on Christmas day</i>
January 20 th 2012	<i>An attack in Kano state left 150 people dead</i>
January 21 st 2013, March 2013, April 2013	<i>The convoy of Emir of Kano was attacked. Abubakar Shekau claimed that their major targets are the leaders not the people. Attacks in kano and Borno killing over 500 people</i>

If the activities of Boko Haram are easily known without any controversy, it is not the same with its objectives, which has been and will continue to be characterized by controversy. However, paying close attention to the leading scholars in the field of conflict studies in Nigeria such as (Collier and Sambanis, 2005), (Oyeniyi, 2013a), any analysis on the real objective of any insurgent group should look beyond the publicly claimed intentions to accommodate other hidden and hypothesized objectives of the group. This is very necessary, as (Collier and Sambanis, 2005) argued 'while an insurgent group's stated aims may point to a certain level of discontent, their actions in some occasion, reveal their unstated or inferential objectives.

Such scholarly position questions the whole essence of the human needs or economic perspective on conflict in Africa. It ignores new scientific approaches and evidence based body of knowledge on African conflicts that debunks a unidirectional focus of analysis which ignores contending perspectives. To a large extent the real goal of a violent group can be unclear and multi-dimensional.

Having this in mind, it is obvious looking at the turn out of events in recent times from the Public exposition of Boko Haram itself, that its major intentions were 'the revival of Islam and Islamic tenets to its formal, pristine state based on the Quran and Hadith of Prophet Mohammed, and the introduction of the Sharia in Nigeria' (Oyeniyi, 2013a). In an attempt to affirm this goal or objective, the group Boko Haram requested that President Goodluck Jonathan should turn to Islam as one of its important pre-requisite for dialogue and negotiation. For Boko Haram, the distortion of Islamic tenets cannot be diverged from those of western beliefs, principles and practices accountable for the de-purification of Islam and other societal ills which includes but

not limited to misappropriation and embezzlement of public funds. Thus the primary intent of Boko Haram can be elaborated to fighting the prevalence of western enlightenment, which it considers to be evil, and ungodly and should therefore be banned (Oyeniyi, 2013). However, in recent times, the killing of its second in command, Muhammad Yusuf, its goals transformed to include (i) the exoneration of its group members held in different police custodies and prisons, and (ii) the trial and prosecution of the police officers responsible for the unlawful killing of its members in July 2009, including its leader, Muhammed Yusuf, who was killed while in police station (Oyeniyi, 2013).

However, certain inferential conclusions and analysis can be made from these above stated goals of Boko Haram. First, the goal of turning Nigeria into an Islamic state outside the lawfully established and diverse existence of Nigeria is highly unrealistic and unreasonable. Second, and on the part of the government no sovereign government will remain silent at such catastrophic gestures or actions. Thirdly, reclaiming of Islamic tenets and the cleansing of its decayed followers should, realistically, be an issue left for the religious leaders in the Northern part of Nigeria. Therefore the argument brings to the fore another question of the intentions of the Boko Haram sect. This is because keeping the country in a state of dilemma ordinarily attests that there is a hidden objective or agenda.

Therefore to say the least, if the acclaimed objectives of the Boko Haram are debunked as unreal, it will be left for us to consider some inferential goals of Boko Haram, which can be weighed and analyzed in chronological terms through its recent actions. Like other conflicts, the Boko Haram has used the deployment of different forms of strategies including guerrilla and terrorist tactics (Onuoha, 2012c; Walker, 2012; Zenn, 2012a, 2012b, 2011). Judging from the chronology of its attacks (Seen Appendix 1 and fig 1.6) the Boko Haram launched its first violent attack on

24 December 2003 when a mob of about 200 members of the Boko Haram attacked police stations in towns of Kanamma and Geidam in Yobe state. It is important to bear in mind that the violent attacks of Boko Haram became fierce in 2004 when some college students of higher institutions in Borno and Yobe states, two mainstream northern states where the group has its strong hold, protesting under the impact of the teachings of Boko Haram, left their schools, destroyed their degree certificates and pledged allegiance to the group for radical Islamic teachings and preaching (Onuoha, 2012b; 2010). The group's first attack was executed in the same year and was directed to security agents. There was no attack between 2005 and 2008 the group started its attacking prowess in 2009. Since 2009 till date the Boko Haram has grown from strength to strength and has orchestrated violent attacks and killings against the Nigerian government, its structures, public buildings, and citizens (Omotola, 2013) and (Zenn, 2012). To be precise on 26 July 2009 when the current tide of violence erupted, the boko haram group attacked the Dutsen Tanshi police station in Bauchi, resulting in the death and arrest of over 40 and 200 members of the group.

More also, between 26 and 27 July 2009, the group attacked the state police headquarters, the prison and other government offices in Bornu state, killing a sergeant, a prison warden and five police officers; destroyed more than 30 vehicles, churches and mosques, and the inmates of the prison were set free. Again in a similar attack on 27 July 2009, against Police area command, Federal Road Safety Commission and others in Damaturu and Potiskum, both in Yobe state, the sect murdered four policemen, 2 fire service staff, and eight other armed policemen were wounded, they also set free suspects in police stations awaiting trial in the law court. Accordingly on the 6th October 2010, the sect released 732 inmates in the Maiduguri prison, and at least 150 of its convicted group members awaiting trial. Likewise, on 17 March 2011, it

attacked the Bauchi prison, burnt down the prison building and released members of the group who were jailed there following 2010 unrest (Onuoha, 2010).

To a large extent the above actions were nothing when compared to the heartless bombing of Police Headquarters. In this devastating event which took place on 16 June, 2011, the Boko Haram displayed a very important sophistication in its abilities when it orchestrated a bombing attack using a vehicle-borne IED in the Police Headquarters (Pharm, 2012: 4). Though the number of victim was not much, however it implied that the sect now adopts a tactical approach used by international terrorist groups in orchestrating its activities and that Boko Haram has grown from a mere sect attacking local prisons to a more formidable threat at the national scene. (Pharm, 2012: 4). However, the bombing of the UN building on 26 August 2011, where twenty-five people were killed and at least 80 others wounded was the scariest scene. This devastating attack drew Boko Haram to the international scene. Other important and significant attacks by the sect include the 4 November, 2011 assault on Damaturu, capital of Yobe State, which involved bombing of various police stations and other Christian dominated residential areas, resulting in the demise of about 150 people, the December 25th morning attack at the Catholic church in Madalla, near Abuja, which killed at least 32 as the morning service came to a close, and the organized January 20, 2012, attacks in Kano, Nigeria, which left more than 185 people dead (Pharm, 2012: 4). The gradual localization, and internationalization of the sect, can be seen in the fact that its members supported the 2012 coup in Mali (Oloja, 2013).

In more recent times, Boko Haram has also attacked some parts of the country in a deadly manner. On 21 January, 2013, for example, the entourage of the Emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero, was violently attacked. Though the emir made it out alive, six of the officials in his convoy were murdered in the attack. Likewise in March 2013, the Boko Haram deployed an

unsuccessful attempt to bomb the Third Mainland Bridge in Lagos, Nigeria (Oloja, 2013). More also on the 18th March 2013, Boko Haram blew up a travelling bus at a motor park in Sabon Garin area of Kano, killing over 60 passengers, visitors and others. On 25 April 2013, Boko Haram, attacked Bama Divisional police station, murdering six and kidnapping the Divisional Police Officer (DPO) and yet another attack the on 28 April Boko Haram attacked security agents in Baga, community in Borno state, killing two military Personnel. The retaliation of the military led to the demise of about 288 people and over 2000 buildings including houses were destroyed.

What does this chronology of actions imply to us about the goals of Boko Haram? From a first glance level, violent insurgents are noted due to the use of conflict in the actualization of a given goal.

Looking at the Boko Haram events, these actions imply some degree of lack of precision in their objectives. This makes it difficult to define the cause of the present agitation and what type of group one can call the Boko Haram, either a religious militia or a terrorist group. However it could be inferred that the bombing of the UN building in Abuja attests to its stated goals of fighting against western civilization. To further confirm this viewpoint, Abubakar Shekau has publicly defined the UN as as a 'common enemy', who collaborates with the Nigerian government and the United States, to violate the rights of the Moslem followers. He further held that the UN is 'the forum of all the global evil' (Zenn, 2012: 21). However, this view point can be quickly debunked given the fact that Boko Haram itself has, so far, been orchestrating violent uprisings with sophisticated weapons of western civilization, which includes cars, information technology, bombs etc.

Again to be realistic in the analysis of the real cause of the Boko Haram conflict, the violent attack on the Emir of Kano, one of the prominent leaders and a core advocate of Islam and Sharia in Nigeria, who's religious and leadership goals is the same goal and cause Boko Haram represent was an alteration of its professed intentions. The question lingers on Could it be that the Boko Haram sees the emir as one of the political miscreants and enemies of the North likewise the Nigerian government? To answer this question, in a five-minute video, Abu Shekau held that the sect would not attack ordinary citizens of Nigeria, holding that their target was the state and its corrupt officials, its intelligence and security apparatus etc. In his words:

'We are just fighting those who are fighting us, soldiers and police and the rest; and anybody, even if he is a learned Muslim teacher, if we confirm that he exposes us to the government, his children will become orphans and his wife will become a widow, God willing. That is our way' (quoted in Zenn, 2011: 9).

4.3 Official Responses

Amidst the various contending views on the current insurgence by Boko Haram, haven examined the historical development of this phenomenon it will be useful to also examine the official responses of the Nigerian government. This can be categorized into two:

Military Responses and Non Military Responses

Non-Military Responses

Under the non-military responses, the Nigeria leaders have used methods such as brainwashing or propaganda, deliberations and concessions, established doctrines, principles , regulations and a plead for intervention from the international community.

Brainwashing or simply put propaganda has constantly sufficed as a vital tool for most governments. In an attempt to resolve the Boko Haram menace, the president and his cabinet has adopted this strategy frequently to the extent that after each bombing, the government conducts a public interview debunking the influence and clout of the BokoHaram sect. The Goodluck Jonathan constantly and publicly urge Nigerians that the entire situation in the country is under security control and as such Nigerians should have no fear in resuming their normal day to day activities. But in reality each month comes with new attacks in the country which constantly consume several lives and properties (Omotola, 2012).

In terms of deliberation and concessions, this is evident in the multiple ventures to design an avenue for peace talk or negotiation with the leaders of the Boko Haram sect and the amnesty group or stake holders. In terms of negotiation and deliberation an insider report from the ruling cabinet holds that...

I can confirm to you that talks are ongoing at the background. But the talks are not the kinds being envisaged by Nigerians. I know that some Nigerians are expecting that a venue should be chosen and a banner will be placed there indicating that the Federal Government is holding dialogue with the group there. That is not the kind of talks we are talking about here. The ongoing talk is a back channel one in which those who know members of the group are talking with them on behalf of the government (quoted in Adeyemo, 2012:1).

The negotiation or what is popularly known as the amnesty proposal has also involved the formation of formal committees. This is evident when the president, Good luck Jonathan announced the setting up of an Amnesty committee on the 16th of April 2013 to dialogue with the key leaders of the Boko Haram sect. This was aimed at finding a lasting solution to the current uprising by the group (Onokwakpor, 2013). The amnesty group has been active in the attempt to create the avenue for dialogue between the sect and the Nigerian government. According to Kabiru Tanimu Turaki, the chairman of the amnesty committee, the committee met with Kabiru Sokoto, the leading figure in the Mandala church bombing, together with other members of the sect detained at Kuje prison. However, it is interesting to find out that Kabiru Sokoto has, denied any meeting, projecting the view point that the committee falsified their involvement and that he is not aware of any dialogue between the Nigerian government and the Boko Haram sect (Ughegbe, 2013).

The Jonathan's administration has also reacted, though in a passive manner, to the Boko Haram conflict through the enshrinement of certain rules and conventions in an attempt to curtail further attacks. Most notable of these new rules was the anti-terrorism act which was enacted in 2011. The reason for the enactment of this law was due to the flagrant bombing activities by Boko Haram in the Northern part, most notably the twin bomb explosions at the independence

anniversary of country in 2011 and the bombing at Party rallies, which murdered dozens and injure many killing several people. The law grants the security agencies the right to confiscate buildings or suspicious cars without an authorization from the court of law. More also it empowers judges to rule the arrest and temporary imprisonment of any individual who seem suspicious as well as detention for 30 days in the interest of the safety of the general public. Individuals who are tried after this period and found to be offenders will be imprisoned for 30 years based on the powers granted to judges by the federal high court (Omotola, 2012).

Finally, in discussing the non-military responses it will be important to examine the plea for help from foreign governments on the Boko haram violence. This was evident in the dialogue in the state house, Abuja between President Goodluck Jonathan and the Commander of the U.S. Africa Command, AFRICOM, Gen. Carter Ham. More also in a meeting with German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, in Berlin, Germany in 2012, Goodluck Jonathan requested for the aid of the developed countries through military assistance in other to help terminate Boko Haram insurgency ... In the ensuing discussion the president held that... You need superior technology to fight terrorists and we think Germany and others can help us in such areas' (Omankhanlen, 2012). In a current interview with the CNN, Goodluck Jonathan also pleaded for assistance from the global community.

Military Responses

In analyzing the responses of the Nigerian state through its military, this will include majorly the release of the Military Joint Task Force (JTF) to the troubled northeastern states, declaration of curfew, establishment of roadblocks and closure of borders and the declaration of a state of emergency. On two different incidences, President Jonathan has announced state of emergency

These counter-insurgency announcements by the Nigerian government have been accosted with arguments amidst Nigerians and the international community. These two reactions or responses will be examined thoroughly. First the amnesty question. The contention has always prevailed as to the propriety of bargaining with uprisings', specifically those with radical disposition like Boko Haram. America's position to the issue of insurgency, just like other developed countries is that of 'no acknowledgement' (Omotola, 2013). As it concerns the issue of Boko Haram, many perceived that the bargaining and amnesty choice was fascinating, while others disagreed with this position, and some doubted such arrangement, implying a tentative, reasonably successive step to amnesty. The argument exacerbated when Boko Haram announced its refusal of the bid. For example, the Middle Belt Dialogue group called for a discretionary and attentive inquiry prior to the amnesty (Akande et al, 2013a). Furthermore, Christians under the auspices of the Northern Elders Forum (NORSCEF) absolutely rebuffed the amnesty deal, claiming that nothing has been done to the casualties of Boko Haram dissent. Furthermore, former president of Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and chairman of Patini Local Council of Delta state, Dr. Chris Ekiyor, cautioned against utilizing the revenue of the Niger Delta to fund the amnesty, a progress he warned they would repel: So if you are granting them amnesty, where will you get the resources with which you are going to integrate them? Is it the Niger Delta resources, our oil money that will be used to integrate criminals and murderers in the North? (quoted in Akhaine et al, 2013: 2).

The above position is an important perspective which our analysis aligns with. Amnesty to some extent will be necessary in the process, but should not constitute the first approach of the Nigerian government. Amnesty should be granted but the government must be strategic in doing this. It must be followed by a peace talk and compromise.

The announcement of state of emergency has also engendered conflicting reactions by different factions and persons. From official quarters, especially the Nigerian Legislators, the emergency rule was excellent, in as much as some circumstances were satisfied, particularly that all constitutional framework were maintained and granted the autonomy to operate wholly and associated in all the interference of the federal government to subdue Boko Haram. More also that the Military be circulated around Northern Nigeria with an appropriate protocol, stressing human sympathy and compassion, as it concerns innocent civilians; and proper financing of the emergency rule (Akande et al, 2013b). Some also argued that while the idea was belated, the maintenance of constitutional structures was conflicting with a state of emergency and could certainly cripple its progress. To others, a state of emergency was viewed as inconsistent with the current discourse and bargaining with the Amnesty Committee created by the Jonathan's Administration. Femi Falana, a radical Nigerian lawyer, sees the amnesty approach as belated and can undermine the possibility of a positive result:

Frankly speaking, the controversy over the declaration of a state of emergency is totally unnecessary. It is indisputable that terrorists, kidnappers and other armed gangs have taken over the monopoly of violence in several parts of the country. As far as I am concerned, a state of emergency ought to have been declared in some of those states long before now. In less than three years, we have lost 4,000 people and properties worth over N2trillion to terrorists and other nihilists. The government has a duty to guarantee the security of life and property in the country. That is the basis of the emergency rule. It is not the best approach. After all, a state of emergency was partially declared in 15 local governments in Borno, Yobe, Niger and Plateau in January 2012 and was lifted in July, 2012. But the situation has since degenerated to near anarchy. So, the imposition of emergency rule alone cannot wipe out terrorism (quoted in Adeoye, 2013: 1).

To the civil society and human rights groups, the major difficulty with the resolution has to do with resolving security responses with human rights burden of innocent civilians in handling emergency rule. The two are known to constantly conflict under such war-like locations, notably in Africa (Omotola, 2008). Judging from the mass killing of innocent civilians in Damaturu, signs are already emerging about possible human rights abuses and complications in the war against Boko Haram.

Further fault finding countenances have also been lifted regarding the benchmark deployed in choosing the afflicted states. A lot of people have raised the question for example, what attention motivated the involvement of Adamawa, but omitted Kano, Bauchi, Plateau and Gombe states that had high records of Boko Haram attacks.

Another perspective to the debates posits that, even as Nigerians contest and anticipate the possible result of emergency rule in concerned states, the head of state has formally labeled Boko Haram, together with Jama'atu Ansarul as terrorist groups. The forbiddance regulation was expressed in agreement with Section 2 of the Terrorism Prevention Act, 2011, as modified, as the Terrorism (Proscription Order) Notice 2013. The initiation of this new regulation, according to Good luck Jonathan, is that the new regulation completely and 'formally brings the actions of both organization within the domain of the "Terrorism Prevention Act" and any individual linked with the two organizations will be lawfully and constitutionally sued and incarcerated in accordance with the penalties specified in the Act'. This include 'a term of imprisonment of not less than 20 years for any person who knowingly, in any manner, directly or indirectly, solicits or renders support for the commission of an act of terrorism or to a terrorist group' as spelt out in Section 5 (1) of the act. Specifically, the Act defines 'support for an act of terrorism or to a terrorist group' to include:

- (a) Incitement to commit a terrorist act through the internet, or any electronic means or through the use of printed materials or through the dissemination of terrorist information;
- (b) receipt or provision of material assistance, weapons including biological, chemical or nuclear weapons, explosives, training, transportation, false documentation or identification to terrorists or terrorist groups;
- (c) Receipt or provision of information or moral assistance, including invitation to adhere to a terrorist or terrorist group;
- (d) Entering or remaining in a country for the benefit of, or at the direction of or in association with a terrorist group; or
- (e) the provision of, or making available, such financial or other related services prohibited under this Act or as may be prescribed by regulations made pursuant to this Act.

In summary, the huge controversy over the real intent and cause of the Boko Haram insurgency remains unclear and undefined. On the Part of the government there has been a lack of tactical and strategic security solutions. These questions to a large extent it's will in solving the current problem. On the part of Boko Haram its actions, public statements are highly contradictory. To a large extent there is a mismatch between the actions and stated intent of Boko Haram, nevertheless the Nigerian government's wrong policy prescription and application have also heightened the tension in the country.

Chapter Five

5.1 Conclusion and Recommendations

All along the emphasis of this long essay was to examine the nature, intricacies, causes and manner of manifestation of the current Boko Haram Conflict in Northern Nigeria using Edward Azar's model of protracted social conflict. Conflict is inevitable in a society where there is inadequate governance, economic instability, societal divisions (Religious, cultural, Ethnic). However single handedly blaming a single factor as a prime cause of conflict in a society may lead to mental paralysis instead of enlightenment stimulation. The chapters above have carefully tried to analyze the Nigerian conflict from a critical point of view. Following the works of Edward Azar it argues and accepts the fact that there is no one causal factor when discussing conflict in Africa and Nigeria in particular. This is because from the implications of the study above, the stated intentions, actions and inactions of insurgent group often contradict itself. This view is further complicated by the lack of willingness of the state to act appropriately in times of disaster as the Nigerian case in recent months has shown.

To recap our analysis methodologically, both the qualitative and quantitative methods were adopted. Surveys were conducted in the three regions with the aim of comparing and contrasting various perspectives on the root cause of the conflict. To complement and compare the findings from the survey, contending perspectives both of scholars and prominent political gladiators such as past leaders, and notable and distinguished scholars, human right advocates, and civil organization leaders from the various regions were examined. The use of a chronological overview or a date by date analogy of the Boko Haram attacks was also deployed to draw inferences on the possible causes of the current conflict. In the final analysis the Boko Haram

crisis was found to be motivated at first by religious factors such as extremism and the quest to revive Islamic tenets. However, from the turnout of events it appears that the current conflict is motivated by a whole array of factors (re-emphasizing Azar's protracted conflict theory) such as inadequate government action at both military and non-military responses, lack of political will and legitimacy to act in a decisive manner (failure of its Amnesty proposals and a late declaration of state of emergency in the conflict zones). However, two notable conclusions can be made, first, at the scholarly level any analysis on the current Boko Haram conflict must go beyond the publicly avowed intentions of the sect and must carefully examine its actions which highly contradicts its intentions. Finally, at the policy level, there is a need for the government to apply a more tactical and transformational approach in search of solutions to the current crisis. In other words it needs to go beyond the current declaration of state of emergency and an all-out military attack which have human rights implications as ordinary citizens are affected. The need for an adequate partnership between security agencies at both the local and national level must be encouraged. This is necessary as it will promote strong information system and intelligence gathering. The government must also aim at checking the linkages between local insurgent groups and global partners through adequate training of military personnel and other security agencies.

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Appendix 1: Timeline of Boko Haram Activities and Attacks

February 12, 2003: In a video broadcast on Al-Jazeera, Osama bin Laden lists Nigeria as one of seven countries that is “ready for being liberated from the slavery of these ruling, apostate, unjust regimes who are enslaved by America.”

February 14, 2003: In the Sermon on the Feast of Sacrifice, Osama bin Laden urges his fighters to attack the global energy industry on which the United States and its allies depend.

December 23-31, 2003: A group of about 200 members of the Nigerian Taliban launch attacks on police stations in the towns of Kanamma and Geidam in Yobe State from their enclave outside Kanamma on the Nigerian border with Niger; 18 members are killed and others are arrested.

2004: Nigerian Taliban members carry out four attacks against Nigerian security, three of which are thwarted, and one in which 12 Nigerian security officials are killed.

2005-2008: The Nigerian Taliban goes underground, reducing its attacks and focusing on recruiting new members and shoring up resources. One of its leaders, Muhammad Ashafa, travels to Pakistan to receive funding from al-Qaeda for attacks on Americans in Nigeria.

July 26-29, 2009: Boko Haram launches a short-lived uprising in several states of northern Nigeria, but the uprising is quelled by a military crackdown that leaves more than 800 dead, including leader Muhammad Yusuf.

January 2010: AQIM’s leader Abdulmalek Droukdel accuses the Christians in Nigeria of killing hundreds of Muslims in a “crusader war” and offers training and weapons to Muslims in Nigeria to fight Christians, though the communication is not confirmed to be authentic.

September 7, 2010: More than 700 prisoners from Bauchi Prison are freed in a Boko Haram attack apparently inspired by a Boko Haram pledge that their members would not spend the EidulFitr holiday in prison.

May 28, 2011: Goodluck Jonathan is inaugurated as President of Nigeria and promises to fight corruption and promote democracy across Africa.

Mid July 2011: The Yusufiyya Islamic Movement (YIM) releases a series of fliers in Maiduguri saying, “We call on this evil group [Boko Haram] to desist, failing which we shall have no option than to expose and hunt them...”

August 26, 2011: Boko Haram claims responsibility for a suicide bomb blast on the UN Headquarters in Abuja, killing 23 people.

November 13, 2011 Algeria’s deputy foreign minister says that intelligence reports show coordination between al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram.

November 24, 2011: A spokesman for Boko Haram, Abu Qaqa, claims to “have links with al-Qaeda... They assist us and we assist them.”

December 25, 2011: A series of Christmas Day bomb attacks tore through Nigeria, killing at least 40 people. Some of the attacks targeted churches. Boko Haram claims responsibility.

January 20, 2012: More than 200 people are killed in bomb attacks and gun battles in Kano in the deadliest single-day strikes ever claimed by Boko Haram.

January 26, 2012: A German engineer is kidnapped in Kano and killed during a government raid to rescue him four months later. AQIM claims the kidnapping on its online media forum, Al-Andalus.

Late January 2012: Fliers circulate throughout Kano introducing a new group, Ansaril Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan, or Ansaru. The fliers are signed by Abu Usamatul Ansari, and state the group's motto, Jihad Fi Sabilillah, or "fighting and sacrificing for Allah's cause."

April 6, 2012: Tuareg fighters from the National Movement of Azawad (Mouvement national de 'Azawad; MNLA) who have captured three and a half provinces of northern Mali declare the independent state called Azawad.

June 2, 2012: Hausa and English videos emerge on YouTube proclaiming the existence of Jama'atu Ansaril Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan, or Ansaru, for the second time. The group criticizes Boko Haram for killing Muslims.

June 25, 2012: AFRICOM commander General Carter Ham says Boko Haram, AQIM and Somalia's Al-Shabaab are "seeking to coordinate and synchronize their efforts," which is a "real problem for the [United States] and African security in general."

July 30, 2012: Boko Haram fighters set off twin bomb blasts in Sokoto including a vehicle suicide-bombing at the zonal police headquarters, and then engage policemen in a gunfight in which two Boko Haram members are killed.

August 4, 2012: Boko Haram leader Abu Shekau releases a YouTube video in which he says "[he] doesn't know where the USA is" in response to reports that President Obama would label him and two lesser known Boko Haram operatives as "terrorists."

August 6, 2012: Boko Haram fighters surround a church in Okene, Kogi State during the middle of a service, chanting Islamic slogans, and open fire, killing more than 20 worshippers.

September 2012: Nigerian security initiate a series of raids on Boko Haram in Borno, Yobe, Kano and Adamawa states in northern Nigeria, in which more than 200 fighters are killed or arrested, including ten high-ranking members.

November 7, 2012: Boko Haram destroys 150 telecom stations, accounting for ruptures in telecommunications services in northern Nigeria.

January 20, 2013: Boko Haram attacked the Convoy of the Emir of Kano, Killing six people. The Emir and his son narrowly escaped assassination.

March 2013: Failed attempt to bomb Lagos Third Mainland Bridge. Explosive were allegedly transported to Lagos via a petroleum tanker.

28 April, 2013: Exchange of fire between Boko Haram and men of the JTF led to the death of 288 people and burning of over 2000 buildings in Baga, a small village in Borno state.

Appendix 2 Questionnaire

INSTRUCTION

Please tick the box that best suits your response and fill in the appropriate responses where necessary.

Section A (Socio – Demographic Factors)

1. Sex: Male Female
2. Age Group: Under 25 25-35 36-45 46-55 Over 55
3. Marital Status: Single Married Widowed Separated
4. If married, what is your spouse's ethnic group? _____
5. Ethnic Group: _____
6. Religion: _____
7. State of Origin: _____
8. How would you describe where you live? Urban Semi-Urban Rural

Section B

9. Which of the following in your opinion is the cause of the recent Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria? (You may select more than one answer)
Poor Leadership Religious Conflict Ethnic Struggle
International Influences
10. Do you think some political leaders are fostering division among the people and inciting violence as a cover up for their failed actions and to their promote narrow interests. YES NO INDIFFERENT

11. Do you think that educating and empowering the youths economically will help a great deal in reducing the conflict in Nigeria? YES NO
INDIFFERENT
12. Do you think that religious tolerance can be achieved among the different groups in Nigeria? YES NO INDIFFERENT
13. Do you think that the Boko Haram conflict in Nigeria is externally influenced? YES NO INDIFFERENT
14. Do you think that the government has done its best to curtail the Boko Haram conflict in Nigeria? Yes No INDIFFERENT
15. If No, do you think that the Government's inability to respond to this conflict is because its incompetence and thus a major cause of the conflict? Yes No INDIFFERENT