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Transforming NATO in the Cold War: Challenges beyond Deterrence in the 1960s (review)

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proclaimed policy as well as with public perceptions. Even more troubling is the evidence that policymakers in Washington, London, and Moscow were better informed than their counterparts in Stockholm about some aspects of Sweden's two-pronged strategic thinking during the early Cold War. In this respect the lifeline was potentially detrimental to Sweden's security and defense interests.

Agius, toward the end of her book, reveals her own sympathies with the non-belligerent stance of Sweden during the Cold War and attributes a "critical edge" and "unique world vision" to Swedish neutrality (p. 201). These comments, coupled with her earlier invocation of George W. Bush's remark that "there can be no neutrality," suggest that her view of the past may be shaped in part by her unease about recent world affairs (p. 1). She seems to be crediting Sweden with a moral authority and a capacity to resist taking sides, presumably in the war on terror or when developing countries could benefit from having an ally in the West.

Paradoxically, the normative lesson implicit in Dalsjö's analysis is almost the reverse, though in his case the relevant political arena is the domestic one. Dalsjö suggests that although Sweden maintained a high profile on foreign and security policy in Third World countries, an open-minded and frank debate about Sweden's own foreign policy and security interests hardly ever took place. "Credible neutrality" required that nobody question the possibility that a Warsaw Pact country would fail to respect Sweden's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In significant ways the dissonances between Agius's and Dalsjö's accounts of Swedish neutrality reflect a lingering ideational divide in contemporary Sweden, with some wishing to reinvigorate the "active" foreign policy of the 1970s and 1980s and others calling for a "normalization" of the country's stance along the lines of policies pursued by most European Union partners. When charged with the reins of government, however, political parties have almost invariably forged a pragmatic approach that remains in step with popular expectations and sentiments. Symptomatically, in recent years Swedish troops were promptly deployed in Kosovo and Afghanistan but not even contemplated for Iraq. Sweden's legacy of neutrality may have yielded a somewhat broader range of choices regarding when and where to commit to international engagement, but the menu of options is likely to shrink as the pace of European integration in this field increases.



Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist, and Anna Locher, eds., *Transforming NATO in the Cold War: Challenges beyond Deterrence in the 1960s*. New York: Routledge, 2007. 251 pp. \$120.00.

Reviewed by Ryan C. Hendrickson, Eastern Illinois University

Much of the existing scholarship on Cold War debates within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has focused on how the organization evolved to meet challenges posed by the Soviet Union. The literature has mostly focused on American

leadership of the alliance, using U.S.-Soviet developments to structure analysis of NATO.

In contrast to this approach, Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist, and Anna Locher have compiled an impressive collection of chapters that identify intra-alliance debates and contributions from many NATO members in the 1960s. Thanks to the opening of the NATO archives in 1999, coupled with outstanding use of national archives in many of the NATO members, the contributors to the volume shed new light—from an array of perspectives—on NATO's challenges during this tenuous period in the alliance's existence. The book, which is divided into four substantive sections—including analyses of NATO as an organization of shared political values, the challenge posed by French President Charles de Gaulle and the broader desire within the alliance for détente policies, NATO's nuclear dilemmas, and the role of domestic political concerns in shaping alliance debates—is a must read for students of NATO.

Many of the essays point to a more “participatory alliance” than is commonly assumed and taught (p. 10). Using a multinational analysis, the contributors depict NATO as a pluralistic security community in which debate among member-states, both large and small, frequently occurred. Early chapters find evidence of transnational groups within the alliance, consisting of key policymaking elites who fostered common transatlantic interests, as well as contributions from states such as Belgium, Canada, and the Netherlands, all of which are often absent from analyses of key Cold War questions that faced the alliance.

Several chapters also point to the role of NATO's institutional leaders, including the secretaries general and individual ambassadors. These essays fill a large void in the existing scholarship, especially on the role of NATO's secretaries general, including Paul Spaak, Dirk Stikker, and Manlio Brosio, during the Cold War. Anna Locher's chapter is especially good in capturing the challenges faced by Stikker in dealing with the French from 1963 on, when NATO's French ambassador essentially refused to speak in the North Atlantic Council.

Among the many impressive chapters, Christian Nuenlist's analysis of U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower shows that Eisenhower was far less consultative with the allies than has often been assumed. Eisenhower at one point in his communications with the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev criticized the NATO allies and encouraged Khrushchev not to let intra-alliance differences detract from U.S.-Soviet relations. Nuenlist also presents evidence that the Kennedy administration took more substantial steps to consult with the allies than previously believed. Nuenlist credits Secretary General Stikker with playing a “constructive role” at NATO headquarters during the Berlin crisis of 1961 (p. 83). His analysis diverges from most of the previous scholarship on Stikker, which emphasizes the secretary general's frequent absences because of health concerns and alleged lack of interest in fostering a more consultative environment within the alliance. Nuenlist thus offers unique historical insights into NATO's Cold War tribulations.

The section on domestic politics in the member-states, including analyses of Denmark, Italy, and the anti-nuclear/anti-American protest movements in Europe, also provides novel perspectives on intra-alliance discussions. Among these chapters,

Jonathan Søborg Agger's assessment of Danish politics and Denmark's reasons for supporting NATO's Harmel report and détente more generally highlights the importance of Denmark's domestic critics of NATO in shaping the Danish government's aggressive support of these initiatives at NATO headquarters.

One gap in the volume is the absence of analysis of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) during this period. Previous analyses have identified the SACEUR as NATO's dominant institutional leader during most of the Cold War. Although the evidence in this volume convincingly points to far greater pluralism than previously thought, further research is needed to examine the degree to which the SACEUR, especially Lauris Norstad, shaped intra-alliance decision-making and discussion.

In sum, this volume offers many new insights on NATO's history in the 1960s and is deftly edited around the four central themes. Nearly all of the essays suggest a much more "political" rather than strictly "military" alliance during the Cold War, with plenty of solid evidence to support this claim. This volume is a welcome and needed addition to the existing scholarship.



Nigel J. Ashton, ed., *The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967–73*. New York: Routledge, 2007. 212 pp.

Reviewed by William B. Quandt, University of Virginia

A challenge in teaching students today about the Middle East during the Cold War is to explain the complicated links between regional politics and superpower relations. One can go wrong in several ways: placing too much emphasis on the strings being pulled from Moscow or Washington, ascribing too much autonomy to regional actors, or ignoring domestic political factors that affect all decision-makers. This volume, skillfully edited by Nigel Ashton, is a welcome contribution to these debates, although the contributors at times disagree and leave a number of issues unsettled. Ashton portrays the links between regional politics and superpower relations as complex and unpredictable, which is probably about right but not necessarily very helpful for understanding specific cases. Fortunately, the individual chapters contain plenty of substantive material to satisfy the empirically minded reader, and they are of uniformly high quality.

I was impressed in most of these essays by the thorough use of recently released archival materials and, in some cases, of interviews as well. Unfortunately, we still do not have complete access to relevant documents, and by now the memories of those who lived through these events are not necessarily reliable. At some point researchers will obtain fuller information from Soviet, Arab, and Israeli archives. Even on the American side a bit more is still to be released. But the interpretive challenge will never be fully settled by documents and interviews alone.

After reading these unusually well-written essays, I found that most of my pre-