




1960

## The Arab Boycott of Israel

Hussein Abu-Bakr El Kadi  
*University of the Pacific*

Follow this and additional works at: [https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/uop\\_etds](https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/uop_etds)


 Part of the [Arabic Studies Commons](#), [Islamic World and Near East History Commons](#), [Political History Commons](#), and the [Political Science Commons](#)

---

### Recommended Citation

El Kadi, Hussein Abu-Bakr. (1960). *The Arab Boycott of Israel*. University of the Pacific, Thesis.  
[https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/uop\\_etds/1436](https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/uop_etds/1436)

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of the Pacific Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [mgibney@pacific.edu](mailto:mgibney@pacific.edu).



10181

THE ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL  
.. 073

---

A Thesis  
Presented to the Faculty  
of the Department of History and Political Science  
College of the Pacific

In Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirement for the Degree  
Master of Arts

---

by  
Hussein Abu-Bakr El Kadi  
1960

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

RANGE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

PAGE

In presenting this thesis, the author would like to express his sincere thanks and profound gratitude to Professor Rom Landau for his guidance, patience, and invaluable help throughout the writing of this thesis.

The author is also grateful for the use of the periodicals and other references in the Arab Information Center, especially the New York office, and the University of California Library in Berkeley.

.....	90
.....	102
.....	120
.....	129

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
Acknowledgement.....	v
Table of Contents.....	vi
I. Introduction and Background.....	1
II. The Arab League.....	23
III. The Arab Boycott.....	33
IV. The Boycott of the Jews in Palestine.....	43
V. The Boycott of Israel.....	54
VI. The Boycott in Operation.....	77
VII. The Israeli Reaction to the Boycott.....	90
VIII. Controversial Viewpoint on the Effectiveness of the Boycott.....	102
IX. Summary and Conclusion.....	120
Bibliography.....	125

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The study of international relations in the critical years were... it, therefore, desirable

CHAPTER I

of the conflict between the... provides the subject

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

... assumed a role... yet to the author's... investigated in a... in any available publi-... in the hope that... Middle Eastern... for its clear understanding... officially, in 1950... regarded it as of... significance was brought... American longshoremen refused... passenger-cargo ship

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

An intelligent understanding of international relationships requires a special study of the critical places where continuous crisis arises. It was felt, therefore, desirable to examine a significant aspect of the conflict between the Arab World and the State of Israel that provides the subject of this study.

The economic boycott of Israel has assumed a grave significance in international relations, yet to the author's knowledge this subject has not been investigated in a scholarly and comprehensive manner in any available publication. The writer embarks on this topic in the hope that it may provide the American student of Middle Eastern affairs with the essential data for its clear understanding.

When the Arab boycott started officially, in 1950, most of the Western authorities tended to regard it as of minor importance. Its wider significance was brought home to them, when in April, 1960, American longshoremen refused to unload the United Arab Republic passenger-cargo ship

"Cleopatra" at New York harbor.\* In response, harbor workers throughout the Arab World, refused to unload any American ships at their seaports. This double boycott naturally threatened to provoke tension between the Arab States and the United States, indicating the dangerous international repercussions of the Arab boycott of Israel.

It seems obvious that the problem of Arab-Israeli relations should be of some relevance to the American student of international relations. The United States has great economic, strategic, and political interests in the Arab World, supposedly one of the natural defence outposts of Western democracy.

While the usual books and periodicals have been used in preparation of the present study, the main source material was provided by United Nations documents and, particularly, original documents in Arabic emanating from the various authorities directing the boycott and unavailable in English. Besides these and other Arabic material, documents from Israeli sources, too, have been used. While it is not claimed that this survey is exhaustive, it is hoped that it might provide the American

---

\*This attitude towards this Arab ship was noticed by the Arab Press, and linked by it to the visit of Israeli's Prime Minister (Ben Gurion) to the United States in March, 1960, that is, a few weeks before the boycott of the "Cleopatra" was proclaimed.



reader with a factual survey and the vital data unobtainable elsewhere.

BACKGROUND AND ORIGIN

Since for an understanding of this problem it is imperative to have some knowledge of the history and background of Palestine and of the Arab League - the chief agent for the boycott of Israel - these two subjects were chosen as an introduction to the main theme.

... of their country ... through Palestine ... of the Ottoman Empire, geographically it is ... a single region which stretches from the ... of the Anatolian Plateau down to Sinai and ... to the Syrian and Arabian Deserts. ... this area was divided by the British and ... into four regions: Palestine, Transjordan and Syria. In spite of this political ... division it still retained its geographic, ... historical unity, as evidenced by common ... of climate, vegetation and physical structure ... of an indigenous Arab population that shares ... language and historical and cultural background.<sup>1</sup> ... however, Palestine has always played an essential

<sup>1</sup> ... Palestine in the Middle East, Cairo, Egypt, ... 10.

## BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS

The problem of Palestine was created during and after the First World War. The main cause was the conflict between political Zionism which wished to turn Palestine into a Jewish state and the Arabs who formed the vast majority of Palestine's inhabitants, anxious to preserve the Arab character of their country and to continue living there.

Although Palestine has had a separate existence since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, geographically it is part of Syria, a single region which stretches from the southern edge of the Anatolian Plateau down to Sinai and from the Mediterranean to the Syrian and Arabian deserts.

After 1918 this area was divided by the British and French governments into four regions: Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. In spite of this political and administrative division it still retained its geographic, national and historical unity, characterized by common features of climate, vegetation and physical structure and by the presence of an indigenous Arab population that shares the same language and historical and cultural background.<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, Palestine has always played an essential

---

<sup>1</sup>Fou'ad No'shi, Palestine in the Battle, Cairo, Egypt, May, 1958, p. 10.

part in the religious life of the Muslims, who regarded Jerusalem as their holiest city after Mecca and Medina. One of the Islamic holiest shrines, the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, was created by the Umayyad Caliph Abdal Malik Ibn Morwan more than a thousand years ago, that is, in 691 A.D.

Its Arab population descended from the indigenous inhabitants, who had been in the country since the earliest recorded time, who were there when the Jews entered it in Biblical times, and who went on living in it after the Jewish dispersion. The country became completely Arabised and integrated in the Arab World in the 5th Century B.C. The Jewish political connection with Palestine had almost come to an end 2,000 years ago in the first century A.D. At no time during those 2,000 years did the Jews form more than a small minority of the population.

In 1917 - Palestine was and has been for 1,300 years, an Arab country - of its population of about 650,000, more than 600,000, or about 90% were Arabs and only about 45,000 were Jews. Of the 45,000 Jews who lived in Palestine in 1917, many were long established citizens who had become Arabised themselves and lived at peace with Muslim and Christian Arabs.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup>Jamal Nasir, A Day of Justice, Jerusalem, Jordan, 1956, p. 7.

The last European Jews who came to Palestine during the preceding 40 years, had no political ambitions, their presence in Palestine having been motivated exclusively by religious considerations.

The political challenge to the Palestine Arabs did not, therefore, come from the local Jewish Community in Palestine merely as a symbolic spiritual home.

There were other Jews, however, who believed that if their race was to fulfill its mission in the world it must preserve and expand the Jewish heritage in Palestine; and, finally, there was a group for which spiritual and cultural considerations counted for less than did national and political ones. This group believed that Palestine should become the home of all the Jews persecuted in the countries in which they happened to live and, finally, of all Jews. Gradually, it was the political national element within Zionism that succeeded to determine the policies of the movement.

It is, therefore, essential to sketch out, however briefly, the sequence of events that led to the establishment of the State of Israel. The decisive phase in that story is represented by what has come to be known as the Hussein-MacMahon Correspondence.

During World War I (1914-1918), Turkey sided with the Central Powers. England knew that Turkey was the weakest

of four and her collapse could weaken, or even lead to the defeat of Germany, Bulgaria and Austria. Knowing the Arabs had numerous grievances against the Turks and exploiting stirrings of nationalism among the educated young, Great Britain encouraged the Arab to revolt against the Turks.

### PROMISES

Sir Henry MacMahon, Kitchener's successor in Egypt with the title of High Commissioner, began corresponding with King Hussein of Mecca and the guardian of the Holy Places of Islam, in the hope of enlisting his support for the allied cause.<sup>3</sup> The Hussein-MacMahon correspondence began on July 14, 1915 and continued until January 30, 1916. In this correspondence Great Britain declared her willingness to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arab countries and their inhabitants and her readiness to approve an Arab Caliphate upon its proclamation. After some negotiation King Hussein outlined the territory of the proposed Arab State as stretching from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, north to the Bay of Alexandrette, east to the Persian frontier and finally south to the Persian Gulf. The British expressed certain reservations in the interests of their ally, France, especially about the two Vilayets,

---

<sup>3</sup> Rom Landau, Islam and the Arabs, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., Woking and London, 1958, p. 240.

Aleppo and Beirut, but there was no doubt in Arabs minds that Palestine fell within the territories agreed upon as belonging to the Arabs. The Sharif, convinced that his proposals had been accepted, gave the signal for revolt, and the Arabs threw their lot with the British against the Turks.

On the other side, Britain, France and Czarist Russia opened discussions on the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and a division of the spoils. The agreement reached during these discussions is known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement. It was concluded in London on May 16, 1916.<sup>4</sup> Professor Rom Landau in his book Islam and the Arab said:

In this agreement many of the promises given to Hussein were disregarded by the big powers, while prepared to recognize an independent Arab State or confederation of Arab State, the three powers were guaranteeing one another certain rights in areas that the MacMahon correspondence had either explicitly or implicitly promised to the Arab.<sup>5</sup>

A few months later, on November 2, 1917, the British government issued the statement destined to become historic as the "Balfour Declaration:"

---

<sup>4</sup>George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1938, p. 244.

<sup>5</sup>Rom Landau, op. cit., p. 243.

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.<sup>6</sup>

In this statement the British government had promised the Jews a "national home" in Palestine, a Palestine that was to have formed a part of the new Arab Kingdom.

It was not until December 1917 the Arabs received through the Turks, the text of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and King Hussein expressed his alarm by asking his ally, Great Britain, for an explanation. In its reply of February 8, 1918, His Majesty's Government tried to set his mind at rest by informing him

. . . that the Turkish policy is to create dissension by luring the Arabs into believing that the Allied Powers have designs on the Arab countries. His Majesty's Government reaffirm their former pledge in regard to the liberation of the Arab peoples . . .<sup>7</sup>

#### THE MANDATE AND THE COMMISSION

In November 1918, at the end of World War I, the

<sup>6</sup>J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. II, p. 26.

<sup>7</sup>Quoted by Rom Landau, op. cit., p. 243.

British were in military control of Palestine, the larger part of Syria and the whole of Iraq, the French had occupied Beirut, the Lebanon and Syrian Coast, including Cilicia. Shortly before the end of hostilities, on November 7, 1918, Britain and France reiterated their good intentions toward the Arabs. They declared that they were working for the final liberation of the peoples who had for so long been oppressed by the Turks and would set up national governments and administrations which would derive their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous population. However the British and French military occupations in the area remained in force, ostensibly to continue until a final settlement could be reached at a general peace conference.

Prince Faisal the son of King Hussein, who had been largely responsible for directing the Arab revolt, arrived in Europe to take part in the Peace Conference at Versailles. He was snubbed by the French who had no desire to recognize him, and was received only coolly by the British, and on January 1, 1919, he sent a memorandum to the Supreme Council at Paris Peace Conference in which he made a strong plea for the preservation of the



essential unity of the Arab world.<sup>8</sup>

The Zionist organization also sent a memorandum to the Supreme Council at the Paris Peace Conference; which, in fact, was a draft resolution for the future Mandate of Palestine. It was based on the Balfour Declaration but added that the Mandatory should administer the country in such a manner as to render the creation of an autonomous commonwealth possible.<sup>9</sup>

When Prince Faisal realized that his plea was not heeded, he urged the Peace Conference to send at least a commission of inquiry to Syria and Palestine in order to ascertain the wishes of the populace. Thus started the long line of commissions which repeatedly studied the problem and usually came up with similar findings, but with different recommendations.

The first commission was the King-Crane Commission,<sup>10</sup> whose report was published on August 28, 1919.

---

<sup>8</sup>Hurewitz, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 38-39.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 45-50.

<sup>10</sup>George Antonius, op. cit., Recommendation of the King-Crane Commission with Regard to Syria-Palestine and Iraq. Appendix H. p. 443.

However, mention should first be made here of the General Syrian Congress which assembled in July 1919, in Damascus and demanded a full and absolute political independence for Syria, understood to be the territory from the Taurus Range to a line somewhat south of Gaza to the Gulf of Agaba, and Syria to be a constitutional monarchy based on democratic principles and that Amir Faisal shall be their king, and they will reject the idea of a mandate as they believe that the Arab inhabitants of Syria are not less fitted or gifted to govern themselves as certain other nations (Bulgarians, Serbs, Rumanians) when granted independence.

The resolutions stated:

If, however, the Peace Conference should insist on establishing a Mandate, we ask the United States of America to be the mandatory power, for a period not exceeding 20 years, and if the United States should find herself unable to accede to our request for assistance, then Great Britain should be given the Mandate. We do not recognize that the French government has any right to any part of Syria. We reject claims of the Zionist for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in the part of southern Syria which is known as Palestine.<sup>11</sup>

The King-Crane Commission submitted a very detailed report which contained many fruitful suggestions, recommendations and warnings of impending danger. Here are

---

<sup>11</sup>G. Antonius: op. cit., Resolution of the General Syrian Congress, appendix G. p. 440.

some of the points:

We recommend that the unity of Syria be preserved, in accordance with the earnest petition of the great majority of the people of Syria.

It is conceivable that circumstances might drive the peace conference to some such form of divided mandate, but it is not a solution to be voluntarily chosen, from the point of view of the larger interests of the people.

The commissioners urge, therefore, for the largest future good of all groups and regions like, the placing of the whole of Syria under a single mandate.

A national home for the Jewish people is not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish state; nor can the erection of such a Jewish state be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities.

If the principle of self-determination is to rule and the wishes of Palestine are to be decisive as to what is to be done with Palestine, then it is to be remembered that the non-Jewish population of Palestine--nearly nine-tenths of the whole--are emphatically against the entire Zionist program. The Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that the anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine and Syria is intense and not lightly to be flouted.<sup>12</sup>

Despite this, England and France continued with their plans and ignored the unity of the Arab world. The

---

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., Appendix H.

<sup>13</sup>Samir M. Hussein, *Al-Kuwait* (1946), p. 26.

<sup>14</sup>Seavill Harbour: *Al-Kuwait*, London, 1946, p. 127.

decisions taken by the Supreme Council of the Allied powers on April 25, 1920, at San Remo, spelled disaster for the Arabs.<sup>13</sup>

Syria was to be broken up into three separate entities, Palestine, the Lebanon, and a "reduced" Syria, consisting of what was left. Iraq was to remain undivided. The mandates were distributed to suit the interests of England and France. Syria and Lebanon were given to France; Palestine, including Transjordan, and Iraq went to Great Britain. To the Arabs this was the "Great Betrayal."<sup>14</sup>

The Arabs believed that the Palestine Mandate was devised under the influence of the Zionists as an appropriate means to give effect to the "Balfour Declaration." During the thirty years that ensued, with the British supervising immigration, about 600,000 Jews entered the country, so that by 1948 Jews comprised one-third of the population.

Zionist immigration led to disturbances which increased in violence, and in 1939 the British Government announced that the "national home" already existed; Jewish immigration would cease after admitting another 75,000 persons; and that Palestine would become independent within ten years.<sup>15</sup> The Zionists condemned the statement as treachery

---

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 305-306.

<sup>14</sup>Shaikh M. Hussein Naseff-Al-Hussein Ibn Ali, Cairo, Egypt, 1926, p. 28.

<sup>15</sup>Nevill Barbour: Nisi Dominus, London, 1946, p. 147.

and began to attack government personnel and installations which culminated in July 1946 with the blowing up of King David Hotel in Jerusalem. One hundred persons connected with the Palestine Administration were killed by the explosion.<sup>16</sup>

#### LONDON CONFERENCE

On September 9, 1946 - the conference convened; neither the Jewish Agency for Palestine nor Palestinian Arabs had accepted the invitation, but it was attended by representatives of the Arab States and the Secretary General of the Arab League.

No agreement could be reached and the conference adjourned at the beginning of October and did not reassemble until January 27, 1947.

On February 7, 1947, the British delegation submitted new proposals which provided for a five-year period of British trusteeship independence. When these proposals also were rejected, the British Government decided it had had enough.

On February 18, 1947, the Foreign Secretary announced that His Majesty's Government had decided, as no other course was open for reconciling the conflicting points

---

<sup>16</sup>Jamal Nasir, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

between Arabs and the Jews, to submit the whole problem to the United Nations.<sup>17</sup>

UNITED NATION DECISION

On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly adopted the Palestine Partition Plan which provided for the establishment of a "Jewish State", and "Arab State", and an International Zone of Jerusalem. The plan gave the "Jewish State" 56% of the total area of Palestine, including the fertile coastal plains and rich belt, leaving 44% for the "Arab State" and Jerusalem International Zone.

The Partition Resolution stipulated that the Jewish and the Arab State were to come into being two months after the date of termination of the Mandate, which the British Government had declared would take place on May 15, 1948. In addition, the resolution provided for the establishment of a Palestine Commission with the responsibility of taking over administration as the Mandatory Power withdrew and in due time hand over this responsibility to respective governments.<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup>Palestine, A Study of Jewish, Arab, and British Policies, published for the ESCO Foundation for Palestine, Inc. Vol. II, pp. 37-38.

<sup>18</sup>U. N. Resolution No. 181 (11) of 29th November, 1947.

The Arabs rejected the Partition because they maintained that the United Nations had no jurisdiction to partition countries and requested that the matter be referred to the International Court of Justice for an expression of opinion as to the legal aspects of the case. Their rejection of the proposal was also due to the fact that the population of the "Jewish State" was to be 50 per cent Arab and 50 per cent Jewish, with the Jews owning less than ten per cent of the total land area.<sup>19</sup>

The United Nations tried to protect the Arabs of the proposed "Jewish State" by providing that their civil, political, economic, religious, and property rights were in no way to be prejudiced by the partition. But shortly after the partition resolution was adopted on November 29, 1947, the Zionists began a campaign of terror aimed at expelling the Moslem and Christian inhabitants, confiscating Arab property without consideration, and occupying as much of Palestine as they could before the British left.<sup>20</sup>

The United Nations became alarmed at the violence that was taking place in Palestine; and in March, 1948, met

---

<sup>19</sup>Sami Hadawi, Palestine Partitioned - 1947 - 1958 (Excerpt and Documents), New York, 1959.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

to reconsider the partition, and there was talk of voiding it and making all of Palestine a United Nations trusteeship.<sup>21</sup>

As the date of British withdrawal approached, and fearing that the United Nations would alter its partition, the Zionist underground forces--which later formed the Israeli Army--intensified their attacks against Arab towns and villages. On April 9, 1948, they attacked the Arab village of Deir Yasin and massacred 250 men, women and children. This had the effect of creating panic among the Arab inhabitants who began to flee with no fixed destination in view.<sup>22</sup>

The result: Before the British had left and before a single soldier from any Arab State was on Palestine soil, the Zionists had occupied territory reserved for the "Arab State" and the "International Zone of Jerusalem" as well as the area assigned to the "Jewish State" while over 300,000 Palestine Arabs were refugees in adjacent Arab countries.

The Palestine Arabs appealed to the Arab States, and on May 15, 1948 the Arab League cabled the Secretary General of the United Nations and informed him that the Arab States

---

<sup>21</sup>Clyde Eagleton, Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, New York University Press, 1949, p. 153.

<sup>22</sup>Miller Burrows, Palestine is Our Business, The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1950, p. 68.



"were compelled to intervene in Palestine because the disturbances there constituted a serious and direct threat to peace and security in their territories and in order to restore peace and establish law in Palestine."<sup>23</sup>

Count Bernadotte of Sweden was appointed United Nations Mediator and entrusted with the task of first terminating hostilities and then arranging for a peace settlement. On September 17, 1948, he was assassinated by the Israelis in Jerusalem.<sup>24</sup>

In December 1948, the United Nations met and resolved that the refugees wishing to return to their homes should be permitted to do so and that compensation should be paid for the property of those not choosing to return. At the same time, the United Nations appointed a Palestine conciliation commission and entrusted it with the task of settling the dispute. A meeting was called by the commission in Lausanne, Switzerland; and on May 12, 1949, a "protocol" was signed whereby Israel and the Arab States undertook to settle the Palestine problem within the framework of the 1947 Partition Plan. But no sooner was Israel accepted into the membership of the United Nations, when her

---

<sup>23</sup>S. Hadawi, op. cit., p. 14.

<sup>24</sup>Millar Burrows, op. cit., p. 69.

leaders repudiated their signature.<sup>25</sup>

The United Nations has not ceased to remind Israel of her obligations under the United Nations resolutions, and Israel has just as consistently refused to comply. Ben-Gurion has repeatedly declared that not one inch of territory occupied beyond the area assigned to the "Jewish State" under the Partition Resolution would be surrendered, not one single refugee will be allowed to return, and Jerusalem shall remain for all times the capital of Israel.<sup>26</sup>

The Arabs of Palestine, on the other hand, maintain that their right to Palestine is indisputable and rests on three distinct foundations: the first is the natural right of a people to remain in possession of the land of its birthright, the second is that the Palestine Arabs have been in uninterrupted occupation for over 1300 years, and the third is that they are still the rightful owners of the homes and lands in which the Israelis now live and work.<sup>27</sup>

Henry Labouisse, former director of the U. N. Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees, reported to the

---

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>David Ben-Gurion, Rebirth and Destiny of Israel, Philisophical Library, New York, 1954, p. 489.

<sup>27</sup>Nejla Izzedin, The Arab World, Past, Present, and Future, Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1953, p. 221.

General Assembly as far back as 1954 that the refugees must be given the choice between repatriation and compensation as prescribed in Assembly Resolution of 11 December, 1948. The Arab States accepted the proposal, but the Israeli representative rejected it outright and attacked it as an encroachment on the sovereignty and the integrity of his country.<sup>28</sup>

In his June 15, 1959, report to the General Assembly recommending continuation of UNRWA until 1970, the Secretary General said: "No reintegration would be satisfactory, or even possible, were it to be brought about by forcing people into their new positions against their will. It must be freely accepted, if it is to yield lasting results in the form of economic and political stability."<sup>29</sup>

Whether justified or not, it became inevitable that the establishment of the State of Israel in the heartland of Arabism would monopolize most of the political anxieties and energies of the Arab States. Their overall, central instrument for political action was the Arab League. Though the League had come into existence already before 1947, it was soon to find itself dealing more with the problem of Israel than it did with any other single problem.

---

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 223.

<sup>29</sup>S. Hadawi, op. cit., p. 5.

CHAPTER II  
THE ARAB LEAGUE

## CHAPTER II

### THE ARAB LEAGUE

On December 25, 1944, after nearly two years of consultations, an Arab conference, presided over by Mustafa Al Nahass Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt, and attended by delegates from Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the Yemen, met in Alexandria and formulated what has come to be known as the "Alexandria Protocol," which delineated the outlines of an Arab League. Six months later, on the 22nd of March, 1945, the pact of the Arab League, based on the Alexandria Protocol was signed at Cairo, Egypt.<sup>30</sup>

The Pact, which became the constitution of the Arab League, contained twenty articles and three annexes. The main purpose of the League, as embodied in the pact, is as follows:

To co-ordinate the domestic and foreign policies of member states, to settle their internal disputes without recourse to

---

<sup>30</sup>Jameel Shukairy and B. Ghazal, National and International Aims, of the Arab League, Damascus, Syria, 1955, p. 27.

force,' and to submit inter-Arab disputes to the League Council, whose decision would be 'executory and obligatory.'

To protect and safeguard the integrity and the independence of the member states.

To insure that, within the framework of the regime and the conditions prevailing in each state, close cooperation between member states should exist in economic and financial affairs, and in matters connected with nationality, passports, visas and extradition, social matters, advancement of education and public health.<sup>31</sup>

Membership in the League, according to Article I, is open to any independent Arab state. This condition precludes from membership all non-Arab countries, although they may happen to be of the same geographical area, the same culture and the same religion. The ten Arab states which are independent and now make up the League are the United Arab Republic, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, Libya, Lebanon, Sudan, Tunis and Morocco.

The Arab League as a "regional organization" fits very well within the provisions of Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations. First, its objectives go beyond the domain of merely maintaining peace and security, because it aims at closer unity among the members. In 1945, when the seven states signed the covenant of the League, they bound themselves, under Article 19 of the pact, to pool their individual efforts towards the achieve-

---

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., pp. 36-37.

ment of goals common to them in their region, and to the United Nations.

As a regional organization within the framework of the United Nations, the Arab League can contribute to the pacific settlement of disputes under Article 6 of its pact, which is in line with Article 51 of the Charter. Furthermore, to emphasize its character as a regional organization, the council of the Arab League, under Article 3 of the pact decreed that it shall decide upon the means of cooperation with existing international bodies and any that may be created in the future.

The first political problem faced by the League was the crisis that came to its climax in 1945 between Syria and Lebanon, on the one hand, and France, on the other. In reaction to this crisis all the League member states were brought to a unified stand, considering the crisis as a common issue, and working toward a solution within the framework, guidance and direction of their regional organization.<sup>32</sup>

The same situation also prevailed in 1948, with respect to Palestine; but the League was unsuccessful in this case chiefly because of political pressures and conspiracies, and differences among the then governing Arab

---

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 170.

regimes themselves. The military failure of the Arab armies in Palestine was only a consequence of those pressures, conspiracies and differences, and of the deep-rooted corruption in the Arab governments, as was to be revealed in later years by the succeeding ones.

Although all the members stood united in the Palestine case they nevertheless failed; and their failure taught them that only by maintaining and strengthening their unified stand, would they eventually achieve victory against the initial Zionist success.

The civil war which started in January, 1948 in the state of Yemen at the death of its monarch, Iman Yahya, offers a good instance of the role which can be played by the League. The Arab League acted immediately by sending an investigating committee and by recognizing the new ruler. By so doing, the League brought to that area peace and order.

In 1950, the General Assembly of the United Nations, on the basis of the precedent already established in the case of the organization of American States in 1948, invited the first Secretary-General of the Arab League to attend its meeting as an observer.<sup>33</sup>

---

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 60.



The members of the League took steps to further their cooperation by signing the collective security pact of the Middle East, in conformity with the principles and objectives of the pact of the Arab League and the charter of the United Nations.

The Arab League did not limit itself to political activity only. In fact, some of its most constructive work was done in the legal, social, cultural, and economic fields. Thus, the League prepared the code for inter-Arab private international law; and, in October, 1949, it concluded an agreement on the nationality of citizens of Arab states residing abroad.

In 1952, three more legal agreements were approved by the League: one related to the "Serving of Summons and Power of Attorney," another relating to the "Execution of Judgement," and one on "Extradition Agreement," providing for close collaboration with regard to the surrender of criminals. Several other agreements were drafted and approved by the Arab League.

However, it is to be noted that the procedure adopted for concluding agreements is very slow, because a draft agreement adopted by the council and signed by the delegates must also be ratified by the parliaments of each country before going into effect.

In the social field, the Arab League organized, in collaboration with the United Nations, four seminars, which were attended by experts and delegates from the Arab states and foreign countries. The first seminar held in Beirut from August 15 to September 1, 1949, made a general and preliminary study of social welfare in the Arab states; the second seminar held in Cairo from November 22 to December 14, 1950, dealt with rural sociology; the third one held at Damascus, from December 8 to December 20, 1952, dealt with social assistance; and the fourth one held at Baghdad, from March 6 to March 21, 1954, dealt with social welfare in agricultural development and industrialization of the Arab States.<sup>34</sup>

The Arab League established model welfare centers in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Yemen, and held a social workshop in Cairo for two months (September and October, 1956). Twenty-six Arab Health Conferences have been held by the League, and a permanent Health Bureau was established in the Secretariat besides the Anti-Narcotics Bureau, which investigates the cultivation, smuggling and trading of narcotics. The League concluded, on May 28, 1959, an agreement with the International Labor Organization (ILO) to promote social and labor standards in the Arab states.<sup>35</sup>

---

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 81.

<sup>35</sup> Arab League Bulletin, Cairo, June, 1959.

One of the League's major concerns was in the cultural field. On November 27, 1945, a cultural agreement was signed which defined the goals and principles of inter-Arab cultural cooperation.

The two chief aims of the League in this field were the standardization of various educational systems and the enrichment of Arab culture. Agreements designed to insure the realization of this first objective included inter-Arab exchange of teachers, professors, and scholars; standardization of scientific terms; information concerning the social, cultural, economic, and political conditions in all Arab countries by means of broadcasts, the cinema, and the press.

The means to enrich Arab culture were: the translation of foreign works, the encouragement of intellectual pursuits in the Arab countries by granting prizes, opening institutes for scientific and literary research, promulgating legislation for the protection of authors' rights in member states of the League, organizing visits by Arab scholars, and encouraging cultural, scientific and educational conferences.

The Arab League established an Institute for the Microfilming of Arabic Manuscripts throughout the world and an Institute of Higher Arabic Studies; it held several Arab cultural, scientific, archaeological and linguistic conferences, and sports tournaments; established a museum

for Arab culture, and continues to cooperate with international cultural organizations, such as UNESCO and others.<sup>36</sup>

In the economic field, the Arab League made a great effort. Many projects have been studied but not all of them have reached the stage of practical application.

In accordance with Articles 7 and 8 of the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty (1950), the League established an Economic Council "to bring about security and prosperity in the Arab countries." In general, the council was to organize and coordinate economic activities and to formulate agreements necessary for raising the standard of living among member states. Accordingly, the Economic Council concluded in 1953 the following two conventions:

1. Convention for facilitating trade exchange and regulating transit trade between states of the Arab League.
2. Convention for the settlement of payment of current transactions and the transfer of capital between states of the Arab League.<sup>37</sup>

---

<sup>36</sup>Jameel Shukairy, and B. Ghazal, op. cit., p. 276.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 275.

One of the most vital achievements of the Economic Council was the establishment of the Arab Financial Institution on June 3, 1957. The Institution officially came into being on January 12, 1959, when total subscriptions exceeded 75 per cent of the \$57,400,000 called for in the original charter of the institution.

The aim of the Institution (popularly known as the Arab Development Bank) is to encourage economic development through private and public projects in Arab states. Its participation in these projects can either be through the extension of loans or by preparing blue-prints for such projects. It is also empowered to solicit foreign investment for such projects.<sup>38</sup>

In addition to the Arab Development Bank, the Economic Council founded a Federation of Commercial, Industrial and Agricultural chambers, an Arab Tourist Association, an Arab Maritime Company, a Postal Union, and a stamp museum at the League Secretariat in Cairo. The Council has also approved establishment of an Arab Broadcasting Union, an Arab Aviation Company, established an Arab Potash Company to promote production of potash in Jordan, an organized general Arab Petroleum Congress and exhibition, which is to be convened shortly in Cairo.

---

<sup>38</sup>Arab League Bulletin, Cairo, Egypt, February, 1959.

Last and not least, the Arab League has been waging a partially successful boycott against Israel. This boycott is the topic of the present study. In order to do so, the League has founded a special Boycott Office with its headquarters in Damascus, Syria, and local offices in the various member states.

The work of the Arab League, has suffered some failure and disappointments in the political realm, but on the other hand, it should be credited for the achievements accomplished through its nonpolitical activities.

CHAPTER III  
The Arab League, as it stands now, works to promote and fulfill the principles set forth in its pact. It has tried to help its members to achieve full independence and to check interference by the Great Powers in an area of strategic importance and oil wealth.

The Arab League has given its members a more prominent place in world affairs, but many internal problems have caused occasional embarrassment. Its future will depend finally on the strength of the principles which hold it together.

CHAPTER III

THE ARAB BOYCOTT

...the Arabs did nothing to prevent them from  
...new land for further settlements, and they helped  
...other ways.

CHAPTER III

THE ARAB BOYCOTT

The Arab States urged their boycott of Israel as a defensive measure against the establishment of that state. It represents a protest against the fact that Israel has persistently refused to live up to the United Nations Resolution of 1947, under which it came into being, and continues to occupy 40 per cent more territory than was granted it by the United Nations.

Israel prevents the return of the million Arab refugees who had been expelled from their homes. Internationalization of Jerusalem, decided upon by the United Nations, continues to subject the Arabs who remained in Israel to discrimination and persecution. Moreover, Israel harbors expansionist designs, and has made military attacks against Arab civilians and villages.

In the past, relations between Arabs and Jews in Palestine were not friendly. After 1880, the Arabs welcomed the immigrants who arrived as refugees from Russian persecution or who came from religious reasons. Despite the fact that the Jews were established in their



own settlements, the Arabs did nothing to prevent them from acquiring new land for further settlements, and they helped them in many other ways.<sup>39</sup>

The Arab attitude toward the Jews did not alter even when the newly established Zionist organs sent to Palestine the so-called "Second Aliyah"--a far greater wave of immigrants reached Palestine. But while the Arabs continued to welcome their Jewish guests, the Zionist leaders in the new settlements soon initiated the practice of "boycotting" their Arab hosts. The first step was to expel the Arabs who had been and were being hired by each settlement to watch over its property and guard its assets. In a paper written in 1917 under the heading, "On Judea and Galilee," and recently published in his book, Rebirth and Destiny of Israel, Mr. Ben-Gurion describes how he and his associates agitated within their settlements to expel the Arab watchmen.

"We wished to vindicate our national honor, the honor of our work of revival," he writes.<sup>40</sup>

Having prevailed on their fellow-settlers to expel

---

<sup>39</sup>General Union of the Arab Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture, The Arab Boycott of Israel: Its Grounds and Its Regulations, Beirut, Lebanon, 1959.

<sup>40</sup>David Ben-Gurion, op. cit., p. 15.

Arab "Watch and Ward," as the first Prime Minister of Israel later confessed, the leaders of the first decade Zionist settlement in Palestine soon moved on to consolidate their gains. Their next objective was to bar Arab workers and farmers from working on Jewish settlements. This policy was later adopted officially by Zionist congresses, and laid down as one of the basic principles of Zionism. It was a condition which the Jewish Agency, in order to secure the cooperation of Zionists came to accept as one of the inviolable principles.<sup>41</sup>

By virtue of this principle, innumerable Arabs who were dispossessed of their lands were also being denied the means of livelihood on those lands. It was to be expected that the swelling of the ranks of such displaced Arabs would eventually prove explosive. Yet Zionist historians speak of this practice as one of the most farsighted measures introduced by the early Zionists and one of the most significant features which differentiated the Zionist settlements of the 1900's from the Pre-Zionist settlements of the 1880's. Thus Mr. Israel Cohen, one-time General Secretary of the Central Office of the World Zionist Organization, writes:

A radical change was brought about by the Zionist organization and the Jewish National

---

<sup>41</sup>Israel Cohen, A Short History of Zionism, p. 125.

Fund, for the Jews whom they settled on the soil were primarily activated by the desire that the land should remain permanently in Jewish possession, and they considered it essential to this end that it should always be cultivated by Jewish labour.<sup>42</sup>

Speaking of the earlier Pre-Zionist settlement, he says: "The most serious blemish, from the Jewish point of view, was that the hired labour consisted entirely of Arabs."<sup>43</sup> Again, contrasting the two types of immigration and settlement, he says:

From the year 1905 there was a new wave of Jewish immigration into Palestine, the Second Wave. . . they were animated by socialist ideas, they wished to see Jewish hands, and they were looked at with AsKance by the older generation of colonists, who employed Arab labour. . .<sup>44</sup>

Thus, as the above quotations indicate, the principle of boycott of one community by the other was first introduced, not by the Arabs, but by the Zionists.

#### THE EXPANSIONIST DESIGNS OF ISRAEL

The Arab attitude toward Israel is greatly influenced by the fear of further Israeli expansion. Israel is on record as harboring designs for further territorial

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 116.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., pp. 63-65.

expansion. To Israelis of all walks of life, Israel is not an end in itself, nor is it the complete embodiment of the Zionist vision. Again and again Zionist and Israeli leaders have said that Israel is merely a phase in self-realization of the Zionist Movement--a station along the road, not a terminus. The ultimate Zionist vision is of a state in the entire area known in Zionist terminology as "Eretz Israel." This area, covering the whole of mandatory Palestine and former Trans-Jordan, is eight times as large as that assigned to the "Jewish" state by the United Nations in its Partition Resolution of 1947.

There are today in the Parliament of Israel, 38 members out of a total membership of 120 who are committed to the principle that the remainder of so-called "Eretz Israel" shall be brought under the control of the state. When we recall that parliamentary elections in Israel are conducted on the basis of "proportional representation,"<sup>45</sup> we realize that close to one-third of the voting population of Israel has thus expressed itself in the 1955 election as being in favor of an "activist" program of expansion. According to its official platform, the Herut Party "Calls for the territorial integrity of Eretz Israel (Land of Israel) in its historic boundaries on both sides of the

---

<sup>45</sup>State of Israel, Facts and Figures, 1955, p. 17.

Jordan."

Ahdut Haavoda-Poalei Zion struggles for the creation of "a socialist state of Israel in entire homeland," and the General Zionist Party proclaims that "The State of Israel does not exist for its own sake but as an instrument for the implementation of the Zionist ideal."<sup>46</sup>

Nor is this candid avowal of expansionist aims confined to so-called "extremists." Premier Ben-Gurion, writing in the Government Year Books, asserts that the state "has been resurrected in the western part of the land of Israel,"<sup>47</sup> and that independence has been reached "in a part of our small country." He says:

Every state consists of a land and a people. Israel is no exception, but it is a state identical neither with its land nor with its people. It has already been said that when the state was established it held only six per cent of the Jewish people remaining alive after the Nazi Cataclysm. It must now be said that it has been established in only a portion of the land of Israel. Even those who are dubious as to the restoration of the historical frontiers, as fixed and crystallized and given from the beginning of time, will hardly deny the anomaly of the boundaries of the state.

---

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., pp. 17-19.

<sup>47</sup>State of Israel, Government Year Book, 5713 Introduction, 1952, p. 13.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

But, apart from what its political or its national leaders proclaim, the State of Israel, as a state, is officially on record as committed to this expansionist program. In the most authoritative official state document that Israel publishes, the Government Yearbook (for 1955), the statement is made in behalf of the state itself that the creation of the new state by no means derogates from the scope of historic "Eretz Israel."<sup>49</sup>

Arabs believe that the decision to expand, having been made by Israel, means that its implementation is only a matter of time. Zionism in the past sixty years has proved itself to be not unprepared to seek its ultimate goals piece-meal. While expressing apparent contentment, with a lesser goal, according to the concrete possibilities of the moment, Zionism has always been poised for ascension from the temporary goal, at the convenient moment, towards further objectives formerly disavowed in public. There is no reason to assume that today's disavowal of expansionist intentions, which are occasionally made by Israeli leaders, for international consumption, reflects more truly the aims and designs of Zionism than do the perennial pronouncements of Zionist masters, the political declarations made in Israel by responsible political leaders, and the practical

---

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 32. *The Arab Boycott of the State of Israel*, p. 237, 29, January 21, 1954

indications embodied in Israeli measures and policies--all of which jointly point in the direction of future expansions.

THE GOALS OF THE BOYCOTT

The Arab states realized that Israel, a small and unviable country, could not supply the necessary food production, raw materials for industry or natural resources for her survival without the assistance of the surrounding Arab countries. It was clear to the Arab states that Israel, at the center of the Arab world, dreamed of being the industrial seat for the Arabs, and thus dominate their economics. Through economic strength, Israel, with its steady flow of immigrants, would be in a position for political domination.<sup>50</sup>

Could the Arab States safeguard themselves against such dominations by political means? The political support Israel found in the most influential Western States put her politically in a very favorable position, and the Arabs had to think of other weapons than political ones. Only through economic pressure might they possibly prevent the territorial growth of Israel. In the light of this, the Arab states envisaged the economic boycott of Israel as the only defense against Israeli economy.

<sup>50</sup>Bulletin of the Main Office of the Arab Boycott, No. 207, 59, (January 25, 1959).

The Arab states knew that if the Arab food supply to Israel were cut off, Israel would have to import foodstuffs from more distant countries; this would substantially raise the cost of living. If Arab raw materials for industry were withheld, along with natural resources, Israel would be forced to import these materials from non-Arab neighbors, thus raising the cost of production and the cost of each product. With the higher cost of living, wages would also spiral so that production costs would raise even higher, making it impossible for Israel to compete with other industrialized countries or even to find foreign markets for her over-priced products. Under the law of supply and demand, Israeli production could not be sufficiently great to make it economical under these conditions. In the long run, Israeli factories might be forced to close entirely. Thus, according to the Arab reasoning, Israel would face the possibility of economic distress.

The Arab boycott has run through to stages. The first, with limited goals and means started during the days of the British Mandate, and was directed toward the Jews of Palestine. It began in 1945, but was met with little success. The second stage of the boycott was directed against Israel. It began officially in 1951 and still continues. Actually, it was only a continuation of the first boycott.



1941

1941

1941

1941

THE BOYCOTT OF THE JEWS IN PALESTINE

The first stage of the boycott began in 1930 when, following the British Mandate of Palestine, the British government was to protect the Jewish population of Palestine and, subsequently, the establishment of a Jewish state.

CHAPTER IV

THE BOYCOTT OF THE JEWS IN PALESTINE

The British Mandate, issued on September 2, 1922, stated that the Jews of Palestine were to be treated as a separate community and that the British government was to protect their rights. The Mandate also stated that the Jews were to be treated as a separate community and that the British government was to protect their rights.

The Arab League Council adopted the following principles:

- 1. All commodities and manufactured products of Palestine Jewish origin are undesirable in the Arab countries. Importing such goods would further the realization of the Jewish state.

1. "The Arab League," Arab League, pp. 211, 2. 191.

political objectives of Zionism. When these political objectives are changed, the Council of the League of Arab States decided that

CHAPTER IV

THE BOYCOTT OF THE JEWS IN PALESTINE

The first stage of the boycott began in December, 1945, during the British Mandate of Palestine. During that stage, the objective was to prevent the Zionist industrialization of Palestine and, subsequently, the establishment of a Zionist state.

The Council of the League of Arab States, in its meeting of December 1, 1945, found that "so long as the aims of the Zionist industrial, commercial and other economic activities were mainly political, and so long as the success of these aims depended on the exploitation of Arab markets, the Arab states had to defend Palestine and resort of effective means to keep it Arab."<sup>51</sup>

The Arab League Council adopted the following guiding principles:

1. All commodities and manufactured products of Palestine Jewish origin are undesirable in the Arab countries. Importing such goods would further the realization of the

---

<sup>51</sup>Jameel Shukairy and B. Gazal, op. cit., p. 141.

political objectives of Zionism. Until these political objectives are changed, the Council of the League of Arab States decided that each state must take necessary measures, appropriate to that state, in accordance with the laws and administrative procedures of the country concerned. For example, it envisaged the use of import licenses in order to prevent the importation--either directly or indirectly--of goods from Palestine. In addition, the use of any possible means to resist the Zionist industrialization of Palestine was considered desirable. Whatever measures taken should be effective prior to January 1, 1946.<sup>52</sup>

2. The Arab League Council invited the Arab peoples not represented in the League to cooperate with the states of the League in the execution of this resolution and to

---

<sup>52</sup>Collection of the Resolutions of the Council of the League of Arab States from the first session (January 4, 1945) to the 27th session (March 18, 1957) Resolution No. 16, second session, 22nd meeting, (December 2, 1945), p. 8. Hereafter cited as Resolution.

prevent institutions, organizations, merchants, middlemen, and all individuals, from handling, distributing or consuming Zionist products and manufactured goods.

- 3. A committee representing the states of the Arab League was to be established to execute this resolution and to study any proposals which would lead to the realization of the Arab objective of curbing the Zionist economic threat.<sup>51</sup>

On January 5, 1946, the committee established by Article 3 of the above Resolution, held its first meeting in Cairo. At that meeting, representatives from member states of the Arab League reported any legislation adopted and measures taken in order to carry out the proposed economic boycott of Palestinian Jews. The reports clearly indicated that each member state had approved and executed the boycott resolution adopted by the Council.

Further, the individual states offered encouragement to Palestinian Arabs wishing to import raw materials from neighboring Arab states and to export agricultural and manufactured products.

The boycott committee, in cooperation with the Arab High Committee of Palestine and the local chamber of

---

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. 8.

commerce, established a permanent office in Palestine to provide member states with information indicating the origin (Jewish or non-Jewish) of manufactured products. The structure of small business in Palestine, with Jewish craftsmen working among Arabs and all producing nearly identical articles--made such an office necessary in order to differentiate between prohibited Jewish products and other Palestinian products.<sup>54</sup>

At its third session in March, 1946, the boycott committee reported to the Arab League the various measures taken by individual member states toward the implementation of the boycott resolution. In addition, the committee suggested to the League that the boycott could be furthered through an increase of foreign imports which would replace goods formerly imported from Palestinian Jews. This would discourage merchants from illegally importing Palestinian Jewish goods for which there was a strong demand in the market. Noting that the measures taken by individual Arab states were in some cases lax, the committee suggested a tightening of the already established boycott machinery.

In June, 1946, at the fourth session of the Council of the League of Arab states, local boycott committees were established in Palestine and in every member state. These local committees were connected with the permanent committee

---

<sup>54</sup>Jameel Shukairy, op. cit., pp. 142-143.

of the League directly.

The Council also decided to give 50 per cent of any illegally imported merchandise confiscated to the individual responsible for the seizure of such goods.

At the same session the Council decided that restrictions against the use of Palestinian Jewish services--such as banking, transport, insurance, construction, and professions--should be established. The positive aspect of the boycott, i.e., the encouragement of Arab services, was emphasized.<sup>55</sup>

In March, 1947, at its sixth session, the Council of the League entrusted the Permanent Boycott Committee with complete responsibility for the implementation of all boycott resolutions. This gave the Committee the right to take any measures necessary for the furtherance of the boycott.<sup>56</sup>

The Permanent Boycott Committee, at its seventh session, in October, 1947, submitted to the Council of the Arab League, a comprehensive report on the activities of the Arab Boycott during the period between January, 1946, and

---

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., Resolution No. 70, 4th Session, 6th meeting, June 6, 1946, pp. 19-20.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., Resolution No. 152, March 24, 1947; p. 35.

September, 1947. The report concluded with the following recommendations aimed at tightening the boycott and facilitating trade between the Arab countries:

1. Further legislation, including prohibition of export of raw materials to Palestinian Jews, should be adopted by the individual member states.
2. Inter-Arab trade should be encouraged through the states, during the interim period preceding the adoption by the Arab League members of new passport and nationality regulations facilitating travel.
3. Any trade restrictions held over from war time must be eased, in order to increase trade between members of the Arab League.
4. The Permanent Boycott Committee noted that as a result of the boycott, the Jewish manufacturers in Palestine were forced to reduce costs, in order to underprice products, and thus encourage Arab smuggling of Palestine Jewish products. Consequently, the committee recommended that Arab manufacturers be encouraged to reduce costs through utilization of modern methods of production, in order to compete favorably with the Zionist market and thereby remove, from the merchants,

- the temptation to smuggle.
5. In cases where Zionist industry in Palestine closed as a result of the boycott, Arab capital should be employed to re-establish the industry under Arab ownership and management.
  6. Noting that capital was being transferred from industries affected by the boycott to the transportation industry, thus re-employing those Jews who had lost jobs as a result of the boycott and enabling the Zionists to facilitate smuggling through their control of transportation, the Committee recommended that the Arab League resolution of December, 1945 be amended to include the boycott of Zionist-operated transportation in Palestine.
  7. Noting that some Arab manufacturers retained Jewish agents in Palestine, the Committee recommended that the member states of the League take action to abolish this practice.
  8. Noting the establishment of the local boycott committee by the resolution adopted by the Council, at its fourth special session, the Permanent Boycott Committee recommended that the Council suggest the following methods



to the member states in order to standardize the boycott machinery;

- a. Local committees should supervise the implementation of all boycott resolutions adopted by the Council of the Arab League and any locally adopted decisions or measures concerning the boycott.
- b. The local committees should remain in constant contact with the Permanent Boycott Committee, in Cairo, in order to insure cooperation and the effective working of the boycott machinery.
- c. The local committee should maintain similar contact with the concerned branches of local government, in order to judge the practical results of the boycott as locally implemented.
- d. The local committee should inform the public of the boycott and its meaning through constant contact with local groups and organizations.
- e. The local committee should work through the concerned branches of government in order to facilitate the export of agricultural products, raw materials and manufactured goods to Palestinian Arabs.

- f. The local committee should examine all import-export licenses for Palestine on the basis of information furnished by the permanent boycott office in Palestine and the instructions given by the concerned branches of local government in order to overcome any illegal trade.
- g. The local committee should be informed by concerned branches of local government (police, customs, etc.) of any breaches of the boycott.
- h. All data and statistics should be analyzed by the local committees in order to determine the effect of the boycott on Zionist production.
- i. The local committees should organize boycott propaganda in cooperation with various local media of information.
- j. The local committees should submit to the permanent boycott committee, in Cairo, a monthly progress report.

The Council of the Arab League approved the recommendations of the permanent boycott committee.<sup>57</sup>

---

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., Resolution No. 190, 7th session, 6th meeting, (October 15, 1947), p. 44.

In spite of the efforts of the permanent boycott committee, the boycott did not fully accomplish its objectives at this stage for the following reasons:

1. Although the Council of the Arab League recommended the establishment of local committees in each member state, not all such committees were established. Where the responsibility of implementing the boycott resolution was left to the various branches of government, without the supervision of a local committee, the boycott machinery was completely ineffective. In some cases, economic considerations took precedence over political ones. Other considerations, such as the shortage of trained civil servants and budgetary limitations, prevented the establishment of local committees.
2. In addition to the ineffectiveness of the local committees, the permanent committee was hampered by its own inefficiency in the early stage and by the inherent difficulties of maintaining an effective boycott. Thus, for example, a number of industries in Palestine were foreign owned, yet managed and operated by Jewish labor. The permanent committee did not extend the boycott to include these non-Jewish owned factories.

Furthermore, the permanent committee did not foresee the possibility of Jewish manufacturers' exporting products to Arab countries through such neighbors as Cyprus, Turkey and Greece and importing Arab raw materials through the same channels.

3. Since the trade between Palestine and the other Arab countries excluded only Palestinian Jews while encouraging trade with Arabs in Palestine, it was impossible, at this stage, to make certain that raw materials, destined for Arabs in Palestine, did not, in some cases, reach the Jewish industries.

The opposition of the British authorities to the boycott further hindered its effectiveness.<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>58</sup>League of Arab States - Secretariat General, Minutes of the Meeting of the Seventh Regular Session of the Council of the League of the Arab States, (October 7, 1947-February 22, 1948).

CHAPTER V

THE BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL

The boycott of Israel was first initiated in 1948, at the time of the establishment of the State of Israel, the permanent boycott of Israel, in 1948, stopped the activities. The Arab League, however, since the establishment of the State of Israel, has been effective since against the activities of Israel. Consequently, at the High School

CHAPTER V

THE BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL

The boycott of Israel was first initiated in 1948, at the time of the establishment of the State of Israel, the permanent boycott of Israel, in 1948, stopped the activities. The Arab League, however, since the establishment of the State of Israel, has been effective since against the activities of Israel. Consequently, at the High School

This office was directed by a Secretary and several other staff members. The Secretary of the office, who was appointed by the Department of Education, was responsible for the administration of the office. The office was located in the Department of Education, and its activities were supervised by the Department of Education.

The objective of this office was to coordinate the activities of the various organizations and individuals who were engaged in the boycott of Israel. The office was responsible for the collection and dissemination of information regarding the activities of the boycott. The office was also responsible for the coordination of the activities of the various organizations and individuals who were engaged in the boycott of Israel.

...of its better implementation,  
...must be established for the  
...and clearing of measures which  
...CHAPTER V of Israel.

THE BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL

Due to the crisis of May 15, 1948, which resulted in  
the creation of the state of Israel, the permanent boycott

committee, in Cairo, stopped its activities. The Arab  
states felt, however, that the continuation of the boycott  
would be one of the most effective tools against the newly-  
created state of Israel. Consequently, in its 14th session  
of May 19, 1951, the Council of the Arab League, acting on  
the recommendation of the Political Committee of the League  
(August 1950), adopted a resolution establishing regional  
offices in each of the member states under the supervision  
of a main office in Damascus, Syria.

This office was directed by a commissioner general,  
appointed by the Secretary General of the League, assisted  
by liaison officers from every Arab country. The latter  
were appointed by the respective home governments.

The objective of this new system was to organize dif-  
ferent ways and means of putting the boycott into effect.

The text of the resolution was as follows:

1. Noting the resolution of the Political  
Committee of August, 1950, and the

necessity for its hasty implementation, machinery must be established for the organization and planning of measures which will realize the boycott of Israel.

This machinery should consist of a commissioner appointed by the Secretary General of the Arab League.

The Commissioner would be assisted by representatives appointed from each of the member states. The commissioner should be appointed within one month, his assistants, within two months, and the whole machinery should be in operation within three months.

2. The commissioner should establish a main office in Damascus, Syria. The function of the main office would be the coordination of the activities of the regional offices toward the realization of the boycott. The main office would assure the continuation of the boycott on the regional level.
3. The Commissioner should invite the liaison officers (who would otherwise head the regional offices) to meet with him at any designated place, when he deems such a conference necessary.

4. Each member should establish a separate office (regional) to be adequately staffed, and equipped in order to perform its function satisfactorily.
5. The regional offices will be in constant contact with the commissioner and the main office in order to receive information and instructions from the Commissioner, who will supervise these offices.
6. The Council of the Arab League recommends that each member state provide every facility to the staff of the regional office in order to expedite the work, as the Commissioner sees fit.
7. The Commissioner should submit monthly reports on the activities of the offices and their employees to the Secretariat General of the Arab League which will immediately transmit the reports to the member governments and the Council of the League. The Commissioner, at his discretion, or upon request from the Secretariat, should submit special reports on particular cases; these special reports should be sent by the Commissioner to the regional offices directly.



8. The Council of the League recommended that each member state regulate its foreign trade, paying attention to Israel's efforts to overcome the boycott, by using foreign countries for transit of Israeli goods destined for Arab countries and Arab raw material destined for Israel.
9. The Council of the Arab League recommends that the member should, through legislation and administrative procedures, take whatever steps are necessary for the implementation of the resolution and prosecute whoever violates the adopted legislation by dealing with the Israelis.

In accordance with the above resolution, the Secretary General of the Arab League appointed a Commissioner, and an appropriate staff was selected from the Secretariat General of the League.<sup>59</sup>

Through the Commissioner, the machinery of the boycott was established, and the liaison representatives, from the regional offices, met with the Commissioner for their first conference on November 3, 1951. This was the beginning of

---

<sup>59</sup>Resolutions, No. 357, 14th Session, 4th meeting, (May 19, 1951), pp. 78-79.

the second stage of the Arab boycott.<sup>60</sup>

The main boycott office and the regional office, after a thorough study of the problem, agreed upon two types of boycott: the first, the boycott of Israel, directly and indirectly; the second, hindering the development of Israeli economy.

#### THE BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL, DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY

The principle of the boycott of Israel was based upon the prohibition of all commercial relations between Israel and the member states of the Arab League. This applied to the importing of agricultural, manufactured or any other commodity from Israel to the Arab countries and the export to Israel of raw materials and foodstuffs.

The application of the boycott took two forms. The direct method involved direct trade between Israel and Arab countries. The second was aimed at any indirect trade using a foreign country as an intermediary between the Arab countries and Israel.

##### 1. Direct Method of the Boycott of Israel

In order to realize the boycott directly, the main office and the liaison boycott officers

---

<sup>60</sup>Minutes of the meeting of the Council of the Arab League at its 15th regular session (October 3-13, 1951),

submitted recommendations concerning the boycott to the Council of the Arab League. Once approved by the Council, these recommendations concerning the boycott to the Arab League, the recommendations were put into effect by the member governments. The measures employed in the direct boycott of Israel were the following:

- a. All means of transportation between Israel and the Arab countries were controlled. Ships and airlines were prohibited from stopping at any Arab port if, during a roundtrip, they had touched at an Israeli port. Any violation of this rule resulted in the ship being placed on a permanent blacklist. Should such a ship ever attempt to stop at an Arab port, it would be refused admission.<sup>61</sup>
- b. In order to prevent the transfer of money from the Arab countries, strict controls were placed on all banking and

---

<sup>61</sup> Resolution No. 560, 18th Session, 3rd meeting, meeting, April 9, 1953, p. 128.

- other channels of exchange. Any individual attempting to make illegal transfers of money was prosecuted by law, and any concern, involved in the illegal transfer of money, was closed.
- c. Lists and information regarding all known or suspected smugglers were provided by the boycott machinery, to all relevant departments of governments, especially to that concerned with the issuing of import and export licenses.

The main boycott office was required to prepare black-lists of all convicted smugglers, for distribution to all concerned departments of member governments.

- d. In order to prevent Israel and individuals from taking advantage of the long borders separating Israel and the Arab countries and the seacoast, strict border controls, both mechanical and other, were intensified. In addition, the flow of goods to border areas was regulated

so as to prevent a surplus of material which could be profitably smuggled into Israel.

2. The Indirect Method of the Boycott of Israel

Realizing that direct trade was not the only means of exchange between Israel and the Arab States, the boycott machinery called attention to the following possibilities through which Israel might attempt to overcome, to some extent, the direct boycott of trade.

- a. Indirect importation of Arab foodstuffs and raw materials to Israel.

Unable to secure the necessary imports from the Arab countries directly, Israel resorted to using such neighboring countries as, Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and Italy as intermediary routes of trade between the Arab countries and Israel. The boycott machinery took the following preventive measures against the indirect importation of foodstuffs

and raw materials to Israel.

(1) All materials needed by Israel required licenses for export from the Arab countries. A list of all foodstuffs and raw materials in this category was prepared. It was stipulated that before receiving a license, an exporter must give a guarantee that certification from the proper authority, notarized by the Arab Consulate and indicating that the goods had been consumed in the country to which it was consigned, would be forthcoming. These regulations applied equally to the Arab free zone. The regional offices were required to submit weekly reports of all materials exported, to the above mentioned countries, in order to determine whether the quantities received, from various Arab sources, were consumed in the countries to

32. ibid.

33. ibid.

which they had been consigned. In this way a further check was possible.

(2) The Council recommended to each member state that economic agreement between an Arab state and any foreign state should include a clause prohibiting the re-export of Arab goods to Israel.<sup>62</sup>

(3) Through diplomatic channels, Arab governments should inform foreign countries of the importance the Arabs attach to the smuggling of either Arab or Israeli goods, through foreign countries to Israel and Arab countries, respectively.<sup>63</sup>

(4) The boycott apparatus established special regulations of trade between Arab countries and the neighboring countries such as Cyprus and Turkey which were suspected of re-exporting Arab goods to Israel.

b. Indirect exportation of manufactured goods from Israel to the Arab countries.

---

<sup>62</sup>Ibid.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid.

The boycott apparatus considered the possibility of Israel's overcoming the boycott against exports from Israel to the Arab countries by sending her goods to a free zone or to a foreign country for further processing and re-export under a foreign label. To prevent this indirect exportation of Israeli products to the Arab world, the boycott machinery took the following measures:

- (1) To prevent the import of Israeli goods through foreign countries to the Arab states, licenses were required for all goods, whatever their origin. In addition, to the import licenses, a certificate of origin from the chamber of commerce or industry of a foreign country with the notarization of the Arab consulate in that country was required.
- (2) All trade agreements between Arab and foreign countries must include a clause prohibiting the export to the Arab countries of goods of Israeli origin of goods which had,



in any degree, been produced, added to or changed by Israeli labor.<sup>64</sup>

- (3) In order to facilitate the boycott work of the concerned departments of Arab countries, the machinery made available lists of all goods exported by Israel to all foreign countries. The lists consisted of three categories: The first category included all goods exported from Israel to the foreign countries which the latter did not itself produce in kind. The goods in this category were not to be imported to the Arab states from that country. The second category included goods produced in a foreign country, in a limited quantity, thus requiring importation of this same product from Israel, for its own consumption. When sufficient proof was provided indicating that goods in this category had been produced in the foreign country, the Arab countries

---

<sup>64</sup>Ibid.

could import such goods.

The third category included goods produced in the foreign country but not produced in Israel in an amount which would permit export. These goods could be imported by Arab countries.

- (4) All goods imported to the Arab zones would come under the same restrictions as goods imported to the Arab countries.
- (5) Special regulations were instituted concerning three countries. In the case of Cyprus and Turkey, whose geographical proximity to Israel and the Arab countries made trade relatively easy and inexpensive, measures were taken to prevent Israel's establishing trade bases. Because of German reparation to Israelis, special restrictions were placed upon West German imports.
  - (a) Imports from Cyprus - Only products produced in Cyprus itself, and not produced by Israel were accepted for

import by the Arab countries.<sup>65</sup>  
All Cyprus-produced imports  
required a certificate of origin  
from the chamber of commerce  
or the Union of Commerce and  
Industry and a notarization by  
the government of Cyprus and  
the concerned Arab Consulate in  
Cyprus.<sup>65</sup>

- (b) Imports from Turkey - Imports  
from Turkey must be accompanied  
by a certificate of origin which  
includes a clause stating that  
the product had in no way been  
changed or added to of Israeli  
products or labor. The cer-  
tificates issued by the Turkish  
authorities or the chamber of  
commerce, required the notariza-  
tion of the concerned Arab  
consulate.<sup>66</sup>

---

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., Res. No. 685, 20th Session, 8th meeting,  
January 27, 1954, pp. 160-161.

<sup>66</sup>Resolutions, No. 1077, 24th Session, 4th meeting,  
November 15, 1955, p. 251.

(c) Imports from West Germany - In order to prevent Israel's selling materials, received through the German Reparation program, to the Arab countries, (through other countries) the following measures were taken:

- (1) Unless the importer proved beyond a doubt that the goods of West German origin imported from other countries were not reparation goods, these goods could not be imported to the Arab countries.
- (2) Importers bringing goods from West Germany must present certificates from the proper West German authorities and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and notarized by the concerned Arab consulate stating that the goods came directly from the producer in Germany and were not a part of the Israeli reparation

goods.<sup>67</sup>

(d) Products of Foreign Industries

in which Israel or individuals in Israel own stock, partially or entirely.<sup>68</sup> Having noticed that both Israel and individual

Israelis were investing abroad, by participating in certain foreign industries, the Arab countries took necessary measures to prevent the products of these industries from reaching the Arab market. Such products, having a foreign (non-Israeli) origin, would otherwise not have been

restricted. Industries of this kind were established in Turkey, for example.

The Arab states passed legislation classifying the following

products in the same category

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., Res. No. 688, 20th Session, 8th meeting, January 27, 1954, pp. 162-163.

Israel was developed as Israeli goods: all products produced outside Israel, owned by Israel, Israelis, persons living in Israel, organizations in Israel, Israeli agents or persons serving the interest of Israel.<sup>68</sup>

(e) Zionist Capital - While encouraging foreign investment in Arab economics, the Arab countries imposed through investigations on foreign capital in order to prevent Zionist capital from operating in the Arab world and thereby controlling Arab economics and directing them toward Zionist goals.

HINDERING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISRAELI ECONOMY

The boycott of Israeli trade with the Arab world did make its mark on the Israeli economy. However, it did not strangle that economy, the doors of non-Arab countries being of course open to her.

<sup>68</sup>Economic Council of the Arab League-First regular session, December 5, 1953-July 22, 1954, p. 506. The unified law of Arab Boycott, Article II.

individuals, especially in the United States, Israel had been able to encourage substantial

Israel was developing her economy through land reclamation, irrigation and industrialization. Through her agricultural and industrial development, Israel was able to overcome to some extent the existing unemployment and to provide employment for the constant flow of immigrants. Such a development program required considerable capital not available in Israel; therefore, Israel encouraged foreign investments.

At the same time Israel tried to overcome her trade difficulties by importing foodstuffs and raw material from non-Arab countries and by exporting her manufactured products to Asian and African markets, or any other under-industrialized country.

The boycott apparatus decided that its efforts must be extended in order to impede Israel's trade and economic relations with other countries. To this end the Arab League adopted the following measures.

1. Discouraging the flow of foreign capital to Israel and encouraging already invested capital to withdraw.

Using the Zionist movement to influence world Jewry and, that Jewry in turn, to influence banking houses, industries and individuals, especially in the United States, Israel had been able to encourage substantial

foreign investment. With the assurance of attractive terms of investment, industries had established branches, assembly plants, and distribution centers in Israel.

2. The Arab boycott machinery took the necessary steps to lead certain industries to drop their plans for investment in Israel and some already established industries, to liquidate their Israeli operations and to withdraw all capital from Israel. These measures taken by the boycott machinery prohibited the import by the Arabs of the following companies:

- a. Firms that had branch factories in Israel.<sup>69</sup>
- b. Firms that had assembly plants in Israel, or firms whose agents assembled their products in Israel.<sup>70</sup>
- c. Firms that had agencies or main offices in Israel for their Middle Eastern operations.<sup>71</sup>

---

<sup>69</sup>Resolutions, No. 560, 18th Session, 3rd meeting, April 7, 1953, p. 128.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid., Res. No. 935, 23rd Session, 2nd meeting, March 31, 1955, p. 226.



- d. Firms that give patents, trade marks, copy-  
rights, etc., to Israeli companies.<sup>72</sup>
- e. Firms and private or public organizations  
that purchase shares in Israeli companies or  
factories.<sup>73</sup>
- f. Technical or consultant firms that offer  
their services to Israel.<sup>74</sup>

The Arab countries informed the foreign governments of these measures through their regular diplomatic channels. The Arab boycott offices informed the specific industries having branches, etc., in Israel that they must choose, within a period of not more than three months, to terminate their operations in Israel and retain their branches in the Arab countries and the Arab market for their products, or continue in Israel and lose the Arab market and discontinue their Arab operations.

In order to encourage the establishment in the Arab world of foreign industries that left Israel, the Arab

---

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., Res. No. 560, 18th Session, 3rd meeting, April 9, 1953, p. 128.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., Res., No. 1684, 20th Session, 8th meeting, January 27, 1954, p. 161.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., Res., No. 692, 20th Session, 8th meeting, January 27, 1954, p. 165.

League recommended that Arab countries offer the most favorable encouragement to these foreign industries.<sup>76</sup>

#### COMPETING WITH ISRAEL IN THE FOREIGN MARKET

The necessity, created by the Arab boycott, of Israel's going to other countries, often at some distance, for raw materials, foodstuffs and markets for her own products, led the Arab League to recommend that Arab countries secure needed raw materials from the same source Israel used and compete with Israeli products in foreign markets. The Arabs were able to compete favorably, both in imports and exports, with the Israelis, due to low costs of production.<sup>77</sup>

#### PENALTIES FOR BOYCOTT VIOLATIONS

In the beginning of the boycott the individual Arab states enacted their own laws and regulations concerning smuggling and any other type of violation of the boycott. These laws varied in degree, but in general they were lenient, and in some countries did not exist. Realizing this, the boycott machinery recommended to the Arab League the necessity of establishing unified boycott legislation to be applied in each member state. This legislation was

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., Res. No. 701, 20th Session, 8th meeting, January 27, 1954, pp. 169-170.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., Res. No. 693, 20th Session, January 27, 1954, pp. 165-166.

drafted and adopted at the 20th meeting of the economic council of the Arab League and approved by it on December 11, 1954.<sup>78</sup> Each member state of the League agreed upon the legislation.

The unified law prohibited any dealings with Israel, including the Israeli government, institutions or groups, Israelis, persons living in Israel and those working in the interest of Israel--either directly or indirectly. In general, the law restricted all foreign trade and specified the commodities considered Israeli in nature. The unified law contained a penalty of forced labor for a period of not less than three years and not more than ten years and for a fine of not more than 5,000 Egyptian pounds (or the equivalent).<sup>79</sup> In any case, the merchandise, as well as the involved means or transportation, would be seized by the government. The law allotted 20 per cent of the value of the merchandise seized to the informer whose information led to the arrest or to the officials responsible for making the arrest.

---

<sup>78</sup>Economic Department of the League of Arab States-  
First Session of the Economic Council, December 5, 1953-  
July 22, 1954, pp. 506-508.

<sup>79</sup>Collection of the Resolution of the Council of the  
League of the Arab States; p. 207.

CHAPTER VI

THE BOYCOTT IN OPERATION

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE BOYCOTT OPERATIVES

The first consideration of the boycott operatives was to find a good strategy, directed at the Arab world and the British in Egypt. General Inceby's mission is one of his knowledge of smuggling and his contacts with officials in the Arab capitals.

On June 1, 1951, immediately after his appointment,

CHAPTER VI

General Inceby set up the main office of the boycott

strategy in Paris. THE BOYCOTT IN OPERATION was to prefer to encourage the establishment of the local boycott officials.

General Inceby and his staff made a study of the most effective ways of controlling the Arab borders with Israel. He contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with requests for its following intervention.

1. The extent and incidence of smuggling between the Arab states and Israel, in either direction.

<sup>60</sup> Report on the activities of the...  
of the...  
in...  
of...

## CHAPTER VI

### THE BOYCOTT IN OPERATION

#### THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOYCOTT APPARATUS

The first commissioner of the Boycott apparatus was General Waheed Shawky, Director of the Coast Guard and Customs Guards of Egypt. General Shawky was chosen in the light of his knowledge of smuggling and his contacts with customs officials in the Arab capitals.<sup>80</sup>

On June 1, 1951, immediately after his appointment, General Shawky set up the main office of the boycott machinery in Damascus and toured the Arab states in order to encourage the establishment of the local boycott offices.

General Shawky and his staff made a study of the most effective ways of controlling the Arab borders with Israel and contacted the Ministries of Foreign Affairs with requests for the following information:

1. The extent and incidents of smuggling between the Arab states and Israel, in either direction.

---

<sup>80</sup>Report on the Activity of the Secretariat General of the League of Arab States between the 10th and the 18th Sessions from March 17th, 1949 to March 28, 1954. Report of the 15th Session.

2. Lists of persons, companies, and organizations

involved in smuggling activities to and from Israel. In addition, such local reports were

3. The economic situation in Israel and Israeli

needs for Arab products.

4. The condition of Israeli industry and the

type of products which might be exported to

the Arab world.

5. Penalty in each Arab country for individuals

involved in smuggling between Israel and the

Arab countries.<sup>81</sup>

The relations between the main office in Damascus and the newly organized local offices were such as to ensure the necessary cooperation for the effective implementation of the boycott.

The main office of the boycott was responsible to the Council of the League of Arab States for the execution of the boycott. The main office consisted of legal experts, economists, attaches, and secret informers. It worked in cooperation with the various departments of the Arab League especially the economic and the Public Information departments.

<sup>81</sup>Ibidi, Report on the activity of the main office of the boycott, dated September 15, 1951.

and tried by the local authorities. All information on the

The main office submitted a report every six months to the Arab League concerning its activities and those of the local offices. In addition, occasional reports were submitted when necessary.

Every local office had its own apparatus consisting of employees and informers. The local offices worked in cooperation with the local departments concerned such as customs, police, security, and others.

They also worked in cooperation with the economic attaches in their mission abroad.

#### The Activity of the Boycott Apparatus

The main office concentrated on permanent research of the Israeli economy with emphasis on commerce and industry, agriculture, water development, etc. It also watched closely the economic and financial relationships between Israel and other countries. Reports were circulated to local offices and departments, local liaison officers were invited usually twice a year, to conferences for a thorough discussion of all aspects of the boycott. Methods employed, results, new situations and possibilities, etc., were explored. Recommendations were presented to the Arab League Council and/or to the Economic Council of the Arab League.

Incidents of violation of the boycott were investigated and tried by the local authorities. All information on the

incidents was sent by the local boycott offices to the main office for further investigation. If the main office found the case a valid violation, the information was sent to all the local offices and the persons involved were placed on the black list.

The activity of the boycott organization could be summarized as follows:

1. Watching the local market and the possibilities of smuggling between the Arab States and Israel; petty incidents of smuggling of Israeli merchandise by individual Arabs took place here and there, and smugglers were punished through seizure of the merchandise.

Through its agents in foreign countries the main office investigated the consumption of Arab products to determine whether such products were re-exported to Israel.

2. Foreign Companies - The main boycott office placed on a black list all companies which had violated the boycott regulations. No Arab country was permitted to deal with such companies.

Before such companies were black-listed they were given three months in which to comply

with the boycott regulations and thus avoid



the black-list. Many companies which were black-listed discovered that the loss of the Arab market was not economically justified by the gain of the Israeli market. Consequently, they complied with the boycott regulations, and their names were removed from the black list.

3. Foreign Maritime Companies -- No foreign

passengers and cargo ships with regular Arab ports of call were allowed to stop at an Israeli port during one round trip. The only exception to the rule was for international tourist ships.<sup>82</sup>

Ships carrying strategic military material to Israel or hired by Israel or an Israeli citizen were black-listed. Ships so black-listed, having occasion to stop at an Arab port, would receive no water, food or other services. Should the necessary guarantees be presented to the boycott office, a black-listed ship could be removed from the list. Should such a ship violate the boycott a second time, it would be permanently black-

---

<sup>82</sup>Report on the activity of the main office and the local offices of the boycott for the first half of 1957, p. 8.

listed with no opportunity for clearance. A substantial number of black-listed ships have been removed from the list.

4. Airline Companies - Foreign airline companies having main office, branches or agents in any of the Arab States that did not obey this regulation, would receive neither permission to land nor to fly over Arab territories.

It is to be noted that no violation of the above regulation has occurred. However, Air France has been black-listed, not because of a violation pertaining to air flights, but because of violations against the general rules for foreign companies. The violations committed by Air France were due to its investments in Israel, its membership in the joint French-Israeli Chamber of Commerce, and its hesitation in providing for Arab tourism in the way it provided for Israeli tourism. When Air France made the proper adjustments and followed the boycott regulations, it was taken off the black-list and its planes were permitted to land in and fly over Arab territories.<sup>83</sup>

---

<sup>83</sup>Report of the Secretary General to the Council of the League of Arab States - in its 30th Session, October 1958,  
p. 51.

5. Motion picture, sound recording and publications -

The boycott apparatus watched all import of movies, records, books, magazines and newspapers and black-listed the following categories of information media:

- a. Everything produced in Israel or by Israelis.
- b. Movies starring, directed or produced by Israelis or individuals known to have contributed in any way to the welfare of Israel.
- c. Records presenting pro-Israel sentiments or featuring Israeli artists or persons known to have contributed to the welfare of Israel.
- d. Publications which, after publishing pro-Israel articles or articles of a derogatory nature about Arabs, refused to publish a corresponding article in the interest of the Arabs.

6. Petroleum - The Arabs prohibited the flow of petroleum originating in any Arab country to Israel, either directly or indirectly. The boycotting of this essential commodity caused an increased in the price of Israeli industrial products.

Although Israel was able to obtain oil from

Venezuela, Rumania, USSR, and Iran, the expense of transportation over long distances raised the price of the oil. Even in the case of nearby Iran, the closure of the Suez Canal to such essential shipments to Israel made it necessary to transport the oil by pipeline from Elath to the refinery in Haifa. The initial cost of the pipeline through the desert, not to mention the additional cost of such a transport operation, counter-acted any advantage obtained from the purchase of Iranian oil.

The existing pipeline between Arab oil fields directly to the Haifa refinery has not been permitted to operate under the boycott regulations.

The oil that Israel receives from other sources is not sufficient, not is the supply regular enough, to insure efficient operation of the refinery.

7. Suez Canal - In order to fulfill the aims of Arab boycott, Egypt prohibited the passage of Israeli vessels or of goods destined for Israel through the Suez Canal. Egypt considering itself in a state of war with Israel,
- Year Book of the United Nations, 1951, p. 299.*

acted in accordance with the provisions of Article 10 of the Constantinople Convention of 1888.

The Constantinople Convention provided that the Canal must remain free and open to all shipping, in time of war as well as in time of peace. Article 10 of this treaty, however, gives Egypt the right to take measures necessary to its defense.

When Israel complained to the Security Council, the latter adopted a resolution, on September 1, 1951, in which it "calls upon Egypt to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal whenever bound and to cease all interference with such shipping beyond that essential to the safety of shipping in the Canal itself and to observance of international conventions in force."<sup>84</sup>

It must be recalled in this connection that the Security Council based its resolution not on a legal interpretation of the 1888 Convention,

---

<sup>84</sup>Year Book of the United Nations, 1951, p. 299.

an interpretation which the Council is not competent to make, but in the desire of the Council for a "peaceful settlement" between Egypt and Israel. Now this resolution is one of more than 70 resolutions adopted by different organs of the United Nations with respect to the Palestine problem. This is the only resolution with which the Arabs have not complied, and the only one Israel is willing to accept.<sup>85</sup>

Moreover, Egypt claims that its action is justified in terms of the inherent right to self-defense, a right which cannot be curtailed by invocation of the 1888 convention. Egypt claims that she cannot be expected to allow an integral part of its territory to be used by a country with which she is at war in order to reinforce the military potential of that country.

On July 18, 1957, Egypt declared her acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court

---

<sup>85</sup>Poud Mos 'hi, op. cit., p. 171.

of Justice. She agreed that any unresolved differences among the signatories over the meaning of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, guaranteeing freedom of navigation in the Canal, shall be referred to the International Court.<sup>86</sup> Egypt asserted her willingness to have the matter of Israel shipping referred to the World Court.

8. Boycott Propaganda - The Boycott apparatus, a relatively small organization, faced certain difficulties in the initial stages of its operations. In the first place, instead of dealing with one state, it had to work with eight Arab States (now 10 members and two non-members of the Arab League) under different circumstances, both economic and political.

The national consciousness differed from one Arab state to another. Therefore, it was for the main boycott office to initiate a campaign through various social, cultural and

---

<sup>86</sup>United Nations General Assembly, A/3576/add., I, S/3817/add.1, July 23, 1957.

<sup>87</sup>Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly of the United Nations, 1957, para. 365.

political organizations in the Arab World in order to educate the people toward an understanding of the importance of the boycott.

One organization, "Every Citizen is a Watchman" (Kul Mowaten Khafeer) in Damascus, Syria, is an example of such an organization which encouraged the people to be constantly on the alert for any violation of the boycott from any quarter.

The main boycott office explain that the boycott was not a matter of prejudice, but of national security for the Arabs. It used for its purpose all media of information-radio, press pamphlets, etc., in Arabic, French, and English.<sup>87</sup>

In order to counter the attack of Zionists abroad who presented the boycott in terms of anti-Semitism, the boycott office published pamphlets than explained its various measures, as a legal means of protecting Arab national security. The propoganda stressed the importance of the neutrality on the part of foreign firms in the Arab Israeli dispute; i.e., contribution to either side.

---

<sup>87</sup>Report of the Secretary General to the Council of League of Arab States in its 27th Session, March, 1957, pp. 367-368.



## CHAPTER VI

### THE ISRAELI REACTION TO THE BOYCOTT

During the early stages of the boycott, Israel declared that it would be an expression of the state of war existing between itself and the Arab states. At the same time, it said, the boycott was implemented directly by withholding financial aid and raw materials from Israel, and to counteract the effects of the boycott, Israel, at first, turned to foreign sources for raw materials.

## CHAPTER VII

Then, however, the Arab League implemented strictly the boycott. **THE ISRAELI REACTION TO THE BOYCOTT** occurred and foreign companies which invested in Israel or helped in any way the economy of that country, were, in violation of the boycott, not able to Israel by the withdrawal of several companies which did not wish to lose the Arab markets.<sup>38</sup>

Instead, Israel resorted to world Jewry which was to exert pressure of its own on companies which complied

<sup>38</sup> Journal of the State Office of the Secretary of Defense 1947-1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 2040 2041 2042 2043 2044 2045 2046 2047 2048 2049 2050 2051 2052 2053 2054 2055 2056 2057 2058 2059 2060 2061 2062 2063 2064 2065 2066 2067 2068 2069 2070 2071 2072 2073 2074 2075 2076 2077 2078 2079 2080 2081 2082 2083 2084 2085 2086 2087 2088 2089 2090 2091 2092 2093 2094 2095 2096 2097 2098 2099 2100

CHAPTER VII

THE ISRAELI REACTION TO THE BOYCOTT

During the early stages of the Boycott, Israel considered that measure as an expression of the state of war existing between itself and the Arab states. At its beginning, in 1950, the boycott was implemented directly by withholding foodstuffs and raw materials from Israel, and to counteract the effects of the boycott, Israel, at first, went to foreign markets for her needs.

Then, however, the Arab League implemented stricter, more indirect boycott measures, such as putting pressure upon foreign companies which invested in Israel or helped in any way the economy of that country. Now, the weight of the boycott was felt in Israel by the withdrawal of several companies which did not wish to lose the Arab markets.<sup>88</sup>

Instead, Israel resorted to world Jewry which was to exert pressures of its own on companies which complied

<sup>88</sup>Phaboker, Israel, August 17, 1952, quoted in the  
88 Reports of the Main Office of the Boycott in  
Damascus during 1951, 1952, 1953, and 1954.

with Arab boycott restrictions. Thus, when the British Overseas Airways Company decided to yield to the Arab demand, and, in 1955 liquidated her installations in, and service to Israel, British and Western European Jews refused to patronize BOAC. The financial losses incurred through this counter boycott of BOAC led the company to reconsider the situation. Consequently, BOAC found a way to circumvent the boycott and counter-boycott by using its affiliate, Cyprus Airways, for flights to and from Israel.<sup>89</sup>

The continued Arab pressure on Foreign companies and the latter's compliance led the Zionist world congress, in its early 1956 meeting in Jerusalem, to discuss the seriousness of the Arab boycott. The Congress declared that "the economic institutions in Israel, in cooperation with certain economic institutions abroad, are preparing a counter-boycott on the international level. . . The purpose of the counter-boycott on the international level is to make the Arabs understand in practical terms that it is possible to fight them by the same method in order to force them to back down."<sup>90</sup>

<sup>89</sup>Haboker, Israel, August 12, 1957, quoted in the periodical Bulletin No. 73, Cairo, November 4, 1957; p. 8, Palestine office, League of Arab States.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid.

The organized counter-boycott by Israel, however, did not materialize immediately, and it took the withdrawal of the Shell Oil Company and the British Petroleum Corporation in 1957 to precipitate the formation of a counter-boycott.

The withdrawal of these two large companies in the summer of 1957 was in answer to Arab pressure begun after the Sinai campaign in 1956. Since these companies had almost exclusive control of oil marketing and distribution in Israel their withdrawal was a blow which aroused Israeli public opinion and prompted the Israeli authorities to establish a committee for the counter-boycott.

The Jewish Observer of London editorialized on this event on August 23, 1957: "A serious prestige blow such as the Shell and the British Petroleum decision to withdraw from Israel was needed to rouse the Israeli government to consider a move which it had been reluctant to take for many years a counter-boycott." The committee against the Arab boycott was established under the auspices of the Jewish Agency. It included representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Agriculture, as well as leading personalities in private enterprises and cooperative industries in Israel.

Three principal areas of activity were foreseen: collection of data on the Arab boycott, measures against firms which submit to Arab demands, and a counter-boycott

of the products of firms which help the Arabs in their economic warfare.<sup>91</sup>

The idea behind the Israeli counter-boycott was clearly expressed by a leading Israeli newspaper, Haboker, which stated that:

"Every company exposed to Arab pressure and which intends to terminate its relations with Israel must weigh the importance of the loss of Arab trade against the loss of not only Israeli trade but also the antagonism of millions of Jews throughout the world who would also boycott the company's products or services."

The newspaper continued:

"The companies which gave in to Arab pressure in the past had calculated the loss of the Israeli market only and gave no thought to the possibility of a boycott of world Jewry."<sup>92</sup>

In October 1959, the Renault Company made a public announcement of its cancellation of the contract. It seems clear from an admission contained in the company statement and in subsequent developments, that Renault cancelled its contract with Kaiser-Fraser of Israel because Arab

<sup>91</sup>"Counter-Boycott Body Formed," Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, August 23, 1957, p. 5.

<sup>92</sup>Haboker, Israel, August 8, 1957, quoted in periodical Bulletin No. 73, Cairo, November 4, 1957, p. 7, Palestine office, League of Arab States.

authorities would not permit Renault to operate in Arabia so long as Renault continued to do business in Israel. The following is an excerpt from the Renault statement of October 22, 1959:

1. "It is true after many years, contrary to the rules and practice, that certain states prohibited the admission of merchandise to proceed from firms executing industrial contract with enterprises situated in the State of Israel.
2. Regie Renault being unable, despite repeated efforts, to bring an end to this situation of fact, found, as have numerous French and foreign businesses before her, it had to make an unwilling choice for an enterprise exclusively industrial and commercial. This choice is obviously not motivated by political considerations. The sale criterion of the number of vehicles depends, in the final analysis, on the number of jobs assured to French workers."<sup>93</sup>

On November 30, 1959, the Lebanese Embassy in Paris disclosed that Renault had submitted to the Arab League Boycott Office its proposed letter of cancellation before it was sent to Kaiser-Fraser in Israel. Several days later, the U. A. R. newspaper, El Akhbar, reported Renault had begun negotiations to establish an auto assembly plant in Egypt, and on December 7, the Cairo Radio reported Renault had committed itself to an investment of \$22,400,000 for construction of a new plant.

---

<sup>93</sup>Quoted in Jewish Community Relations Council of Great Philadelphia, The Arab Boycott and Renault, February 26, 1960.

It seems reasonable that Renault cancelled its contract with Kaiser-Fraser of Israel in order to be removed from the black-list of the Arab League Boycott Office and that Renault has also yielded to the Arab Boycott.

The Israeli counter-boycott was put into operation on several occasions. One example is that of the Shell Oil Company. The American Jewish War Veteran's Organization called for a boycott of that company.<sup>94</sup> British Jews, led by Zionists, boycotted Shell gasoline stations.

One maneuver often used was to pull into a station, wait until an attendant arrived to give service, and then pull away with a critical remark.<sup>95</sup> This campaign against the Shell Oil Company was dropped by the Israeli Foreign Ministry in a decision taken following assurance from Shell that it would insure "desirable" sources of oil for Israel.<sup>96</sup> Another example of the operation of the Israeli counter-boycott is that of the Brown and Williamson Tobacco Company, which stopped sales of its cigarette, Viceroy, in Israel after Arab pressures boycotted by Jewish organizations in the United States, Viceroy sales dropped by almost 19

<sup>94</sup>Jewish Observer, August 23, 1957, p. 6.

<sup>95</sup>Herut, Israel, August 2, 1957, quoted in Periodical Bulletin No. 73, November 4, 1957, Palestine office, League of Arab States.

<sup>96</sup>Jewish Observer, September 20, 1957, p. 9.

per cent in 1958, according to a report on sales of all cigarette companies.<sup>97</sup> Jewish sources attributed this significant decrease primarily to the effectiveness of their boycott.

Implementation of the counter-boycott, however, has been hampered by wide disagreement among the Israelis themselves as to whether this type of policy should be employed and what the goals of the counter-boycott should be. First of all, when the boycott committee was formed, there seemed to be no official unanimity about the counter-boycott policy. The Finance Ministry seemed to be strongly opposed to it.<sup>98</sup>

Furthermore, when the Jewish Agency decided to boycott Shell Oil Company in the United States, the Israeli Embassy in Washington protested such action. The Embassy advised Jerusalem to reconsider the advisability of a publicity campaign. As a result, the Foreign Ministry has now, to all intents and purposes, called off the campaign.<sup>99</sup>

---

<sup>97</sup>The National Jewish Post and Opinion, New York, Vol. XIV, No. 19, January 2, 1959.

<sup>98</sup>Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, August 23, 1957, p. 6.

<sup>99</sup>Jewish Observer and Middle East Review "Israel Drops Anti-Shell Campaign," September 20, 1957, p. 17.



Confusion about the intentions of the counter-boycott, also was indicated in the statements of some Israeli leaders. Although the boycott of firms acquiescing to Arab pressures was distinctly named as an area of activity for the counter-boycott (see footnote No. 91), the chairman of the counter-boycott committee, Meir Grossman, had this to say:

The Government of Israel and the Jewish Agency have never thought of boycotting the Arab countries or the foreign companies who submit to the Arab boycott. Our purpose is to fight the Arab aggression in the economic field by reasoning and by explaining our attitude, uncovering the hidden goals of the Arab boycott and exposing the efforts of the boycott liaison officers who stir-up and exploit the racial and religious prejudices. If necessary, we will take further steps to combat the Arab boycott.<sup>100</sup>

One of the main reasons for differences among Israeli leaders on the institution of a counter-boycott appears to be the belief that such measures would give the Arabs the impression that their boycott was succeeding. Reporting that "Powerful voices both in the Treasury and the Foreign Ministry" had spoken against the counter-boycott, "The Jewish Observer wrote: "It would serve only to give the Arab boycott both an undeserved standing and unnecessary publicity."<sup>101</sup>

<sup>100</sup>Lamerhav (newspaper) Tel Aviv, September 5, 1957, quoted in periodical Bulletin No. 73, Cairo, November 4, 1957, p. 10; Palestine Office, League of Arab States.

<sup>101</sup>Jewish Observer, loc. cit.

Although Israelis disagree on using a counter-boycott, they have agreed upon attacking the Arab boycott through a publicity campaign in the information media. This campaign centers on three main points:

1. The Arab boycott is an act of aggression.
2. The Arab boycott is a result of racial and religious prejudices activated by the establishment of the State of Israel, and
3. Protests to public opinion, governments and institutions against the Arab boycott.

One good example of this campaign is a report published in February 1958 by the presidents of Seventeen Major American Jewish organizations under the title, "Bigotry and Blackmail - a report on the Arab boycott." It stated in part:

The Arab boycott activities encroach upon the elementary American freedom to trade, to invest and to travel... American citizens in this country are questioned about their religion by consular and diplomatic officials of the Arab states. American Jews are denied because of their religion the privileges granted to non-Jews...

In the broadest sense, the Arab boycott, therefore, constitutes political and economic aggression. By creating and maintaining tension, of near-war, continually threatening world peace and stability.

While the boycott lasts, interests vital to America are jeopardized. On political, economic and moral grounds, it must therefore be resisted by the United States Government by American business and by American public opinion.

January 7, 1958.

In January 7, 1960, the same organization released a new report to the Yiddish and English Jewish Press which stated:

The Arab League boycott--"is a form of political and economic aggression that creates and maintains tension in the Middle East. By keeping the Middle East in a state of near war, the boycott is a continuing threat to world peace. So long as the boycott lasts, interests vital to America are jeopardized.

Because the boycott imposes unnecessary expenditures and economic losses upon all the countries of the Middle East, it subverts the purposes of the United States economic assistance and makes the Middle East more dependent upon such American aid. Arab League economic warfare therefore places unnecessary and additional burdens upon the American taxpayer.

It is therefore suggested that the evils of the Arab boycott should be exposed.<sup>102</sup>

Confronted with this campaign, the League of Arab States initiated a counter-publicity campaign in which it endeavored to answer the Zionist charges. Against the first point, the Arabs argued that the boycott was a defensive measure known and accepted as such in international law, and practiced in the same way by the United States against Communist China. Secondly, the League denied racial or religious prejudice against the Jews. Lastly, it asserted that the boycott does not constitute a threat to international commercial cooperation. The boycott was based, it asserted,

---

<sup>102</sup>Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, January 7, 1960.

on the natural right of everybody to choose the individual or company with which he wishes to do business.<sup>103</sup>

There is an interesting point of speculation on why, after beginning a publicity campaign protesting the Arab boycott, Israel has not filed a complaint at the United Nations. One strong hypothesis is that the United States would stop Israel before she reached the United Nations because the complaint would reflect upon the American and Nationalist Chinese blockade of Red China. Then, too, if the complaint did reach the United Nations, there is the strong possibility that the Afro-Asian block in the General Assembly would have enough votes to defeat it.<sup>104</sup> An editorial in the Herut party newspaper indicates that while some Israelis have considered filing such a complaint at the United Nations, they have failed to act, not because

. . . this measure was doomed to failure because of the Soviet veto in the Security Council, or because the Arabs would be able to get the necessary votes to throw out the Israeli complaint if the case should go to the Assembly, but because the Arabs are not expected to change their position.<sup>105</sup>

---

<sup>103</sup>Bulletin of Secretary-General of Arab League, December 12, 1958, pp. 8-10.

<sup>104</sup>The Ministry of Education, This is the Zionism, Cairo, Egypt, 1956, p. 192.

<sup>105</sup>Arab League Bulletin, No. 73, November 4, 1957, p. 9. (Excerpt from Herut, August 2, 1957.)

CHAPTER VIII

CONTROVERSIAL VIEWPOINTS

ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BOYCOTT

In order to see more clearly the scope of the...  
of the Arab boycott, the investigation found...  
of, or information on, such...  
essentially regarding to...  
It will be helpful...

CHAPTER VIII

CONTROVERSIAL VIEW POINTS ON THE  
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BOYCOTT

Arab sources...  
show that the...  
in her balance of trade...  
spread, nevertheless, Arab...  
already has its effect...  
has realized...  
the main office of the boycott...  
of the Arab League...  
state of chaos. Prices, the office...  
and controls...  
existence of raw materials...  
and the foreign exchange...

## CHAPTER VIII

### CONTROVERSIAL VIEWPOINTS

#### ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BOYCOTT

In order to see more clearly the broad picture of the effects of the Arab boycott, the investigator found that most evaluations of, or information on, such effects differ substantially according to whether the sources are Israeli or Arabic. It will be helpful, prior to presenting conclusions, to discuss first, the Arab views on the effectiveness of their action and secondly, the Israeli views.

Arab sources recognize that it is not easy to inflict a serious blow on the Israeli economy as long as Israel can fill the gap in her balance of trade with special funds pouring in from abroad. Nevertheless, Arabs do believe that the boycott has already had its effect on the economic life of Israel, and has realized at least part of its intended aim. In 1957 the Main Office of the Boycott reported to the Secretary General of the Arab League that the Israeli economy was in a state of chaos. Prices, the office reported, were going up. Rationing and controls dominated the market. An acute shortage of raw materials existed, the foreign trade deficit was widening, and the foreign exchange position of the state

was becoming precarious. There had been a sharp decline in the value of Israeli currency, and a loss of confidence in the stability of the economy.<sup>106</sup>

In their evaluation of the effects of the boycott on Israel, the Arabs mentioned the following:

1. Despite all the efforts made by the Israeli Government to tighten their imports and to encourage and promote exports, Israel has failed to balance her foreign trade. The following table shows the imports and exports and the annual deficit in her trade balance in millions of dollars between 1949 and 1956.

BALANCE OF TRADE

(Millions of dollars)

Year	Imports	Exports & Re-exports	Excess of Imports over Exports
1949	253.1	29.7	223.4 <sup>107</sup>
1950	298.8	36.9	261.9
1951	379.8	46.8	333.0
1952	320.7	45.6	275.3 <sup>108</sup>

<sup>106</sup>A Report on the activity of the Main Office of the Boycott for the second half of 1956, the Secretary General Report to the 27th session of the council of the Arab League, March 1957, pp. 365-366.

<sup>107</sup>Facts and Figures, Israel Office of Information, New York, 1955, p. 39.

<sup>108</sup>Israel, Government Year Book, 5715 (1954), p. 228.

1953	286.9	59.6	227.3 <sup>109</sup>
1954	376.6	135.8	240.8
1956	529.3	171.3	358.0 <sup>110</sup>

2. The value of Israeli currency has suffered a sharp decline resulting in inflation. In 1949, the Israeli pound was equivalent to the British pound sterling or \$2.85; today it is equivalent to \$0.85. This is a sign which indicates that increase in the value of Israeli exports is only theoretical. Speaking in terms of Israeli currency, the value of exports has increased considerably because of the decline in value of the Israeli pound. In terms of volume, however, there was only a slight increase.

3. The Arab success in stopping the flow of raw materials and foodstuffs to Israel from neighboring Arab countries has led to a sharp rise in the cost of living. It almost tripled between 1951 and 1958. The following table shows this gradual rise:

---

<sup>109</sup>Israel, Government Year Book, (1957), p. 137.

<sup>110</sup>Israel, Government Year Book, 1718, (1957), p. 108.



## CONSUMERS' PRICE INDEX

(Base: September 1951-100)

September	1951	100
	1952	153
	1953	196
	1954	220
	1955	233
	1956	248
August	1957	264 <sup>111</sup>

4. Due to the continuing rise in the cost of living, the Israeli Government employees and workers continued to demand higher wages. The Israeli press regularly contains items about strikes and demonstrations by workers. Some factories have had to lay off part of their labor force because of the high cost of production and the lack of a ready market to absorb their products. Other factories or business ventures had to close down entirely.

This had led to an increase in unemployment

with which neither the government nor the

<sup>111</sup> Statistical Bulletin of Israel (English Summary), September 1958, Vol. IX, No. 9, p. 338.

labor agencies could cope. As is often the case, this crisis in unemployment resulted in social problems. Many unemployed workers resorted to pilfering, robbing, and various other crimes. The statistical abstracts and the reports of the Ministry of Police reveal an increasing rate of crime in Israel.<sup>112</sup>

5. The Arab pressure on foreign companies which invested in Israel, established branches there, or helped in any way to build the Israeli economy, led to the withdrawal of many companies and changes in the plans of others.<sup>113</sup>

Tightening of boycott rules concerning foreign passenger and cargo ships, not allowing them to stop in an Arab country if they had visited Israel, led to a rise in the costs of shipping to and from Israel. In a report, "Bigotry and Blackmail," the presidents of major Jewish organizations in the United States acknowledged this fact and reported that the American Export Lines, for example, must at a considerable expenditure of time and money operate a separate Middle East service to the Israeli ports of Haifa and Tel Aviv.

<sup>112</sup>A Report on the activity of the Main Office of the Arab Boycott for the 2nd half of 1956, The Secretary General's Report to the Council of the Arab League During its 27th Session, March 1957, pp. 365-366.

<sup>113</sup>Ibid., for the first half of 1957, August 1957, pp. 7-8.

In the case of foreign air line companies, Israel suffered the same trouble. In spite of its strategic location between three continents, Europe, Asia and Africa, Israel could not achieve her hope of becoming the international air cross-road between the East and West. The Arab countries forbade planes using Israeli airports from flying over Arab territory or from receiving flight information or services from Arab sources.

Turning to the Israeli sources, unfortunately, the investigator found that they are almost entirely silent on the subject of the Arab boycott. Even the most painstaking studies of Israeli publications, both official and unofficial, fails to reveal Israeli's own assessment of the boycott and its effects. This paucity of relevant material could possibly be interpreted as indicating at least some effectiveness of the boycott.

It is possible, however, to get a certain idea of their views from articles and editorials in Israel's leading newspapers.

The Arab boycott is generally pictured by most Israelis as a failure. In their opinion, the boycott has not had serious effects on the Israeli economy and has not accomplished its aim. A good example of this view point is provided in the March 27, 1959 issue of the Jewish Observer and Middle East Review.

In the article describing the boycott as the "Arab Double-Edged Weapon," David Rossone wrote:

The use of economic boycott in the Arab World, however, has not generally been so sporadic and incidental. It has been a consistent instrument of policy. Surprisingly, it has not been directed only against Israel, but also to a growing degree, against Western countries. As far as Israel is concerned, the Arab boycott, when first initiated had damaging effects on the Jewish economy in Palestine, but even since 1948 the losses which have been inflicted upon the Arab countries in export-proceeds, in customs and oil revenues have far outweighed the losses incurred by Israel.<sup>114</sup>

G. Meran asserts in an article entitled, "The Arab Boycott and its Economic Effect,"

. . .that after the creation of the state of Israel, the Arab states lost more as a result of the boycott than did Israel. Israel exports mainly citrus and diamonds, two products for which the Arab countries hardly provide a market. For its industrial exports, on the other hand, if they were competitive at world prices, Israel would always find Western Europe hard-currency markets more lucrative.

Only in one aspect might the Arab boycott prove damaging to Israel. If Israel succeeds in diverting its export trade more and more from Europe to Asia and Africa, it may find the blockade of its regular shipping services, through the Suez Canal and through the alternative route of the Gulf of Elath, threatening.<sup>115</sup>

---

<sup>114</sup>David Rossone, "Boycott Arab's Double-Edged Weapon," Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, March 27, 1959, p. 13.

<sup>115</sup>G. Meron, "The Arab Boycott's and its Economic Effects," The Economic Quarterly, Vol. I, No. 3, January, 1954.

A more recent Israeli definition of the failure of the boycott was given in a new book published by the Israel Office of Information in New York which stated:

Nearly eleven years of Arab economic warfare have not checked Israel's economy and the possibility of its infliction of vital injury in slight. It has been a weapon of spite rather than a serious danger to Israel development. In some respects it has even served to stimulate Israel's economic progress by encouraging a larger agricultural output and the discovery of new export markets.

The boycott aggravates and perpetuates tension, and flouts the principles of economic international intercourse. It endangers the peace of the world, because boycott and blockade are instruments of warfare.<sup>116</sup>

Despite this prevailing view of the boycott, some economic experts' voices are heard now and then acknowledging the effects of the boycott. In an article under the title, "Can Israel Support Herself?", an Israeli, Oded Remla, wrote that: "The Arab boycott cost the Israeli economy an estimated \$40 million annually, in heavier expenses for importing oil, in denial of nearby market and sources of supply, and in other ways."<sup>117</sup>

Yet other Israelis deny an economic effect of the boycott, while admitting a political one. Haboker, an Israeli

---

<sup>116</sup>Israel Office of Information, Israel's Struggle for Peace, Marstin Press, Inc., New York, 1960, p. 87.

<sup>117</sup>Oded Remla, Can Israel Support Herself?, Commentary, New York, November 1956, p. 433.

daily newspaper asserted that:

The Jewish experts in Israel think that the success of the Arab boycott has more political repercussions than economic, and whatever success it accomplishes will have a direct effect on the possibilities of concluding peace between Israel and the Arab States.<sup>118</sup>

While it is difficult to estimate the exact damage inflicted upon Israeli economic life, it can hardly be denied that the boycott has resulted in definite problems for Israel. For example:

1. Israel and world Zionism were upset by the effects of the Arab boycott to the extent that, after years of publicly ignoring it, they have discussed it in public and in several Jewish conventions with the resulting decision to initiate a counter-boycott.
2. Emigration from Israel has gradually increased, startling the Israelis who never expected such a reversal. Early in 1957 the Israeli Director of Immigration Affairs announced that:

The number of Jews who arrived in Israel since the establishment of the State was 835,000 at the end of 1956. There are 50,000 Jews in Israel who did not apply for Israeli citizenship, preferring to keep their original nationalities. These Jews represent 3 per cent of the population of Israel. The number of Jews who emigrated from Israel

---

<sup>118</sup>Haboker, Israel, September 5, 1957, cited by Periodical Bulletin No. 73, November 4, 1957, p. 5, Palestine Office, League of Arab States.

<sup>120</sup>Bulletin of the United Office of the League of Arab States, January 25, 1959.

since the establishment of the State until the end of 1956 is about 70,000, or 8.5 per cent of the Jews who immigrated to Israel. It is to be noted that the number of newcomers to Israel who emigrated is only 5 per cent of the total number of emigrants. This means that most of those who left Israel are original inhabitants and this is very disturbing.<sup>119</sup>

The emigration of such a large number of Jews from Israel, and especially from among the "Sabras," that is, Jews native to the country, appears to be due to dissatisfaction with economic and social conditions. According to Arab sources, this situation prompted the Israeli Government on January 1, 1959, to appropriate a special fund for extensive research on the immigration problem to be undertaken by a group of experts from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.<sup>120</sup>

3. That the Israeli economy is in a shaky

condition appears clearly in the information and statistics released by the Government of Israel in official documents and in other Zionist publications. An Israeli economic

expert, in the Jewish Observer, analyzing a

United Nations report, "The Development of

Manufacturing Industry in Egypt, Israel, and

Turkey," wrote:

There is no longer any surprise when international experts, confronted with the facts of Israel's

<sup>119</sup>Report of the Secretary General of the Arab League to the Council in its 27th Session, Cairo, March, 1957, pp. 263-264.

<sup>120</sup>Bulletin of the Main Office of the Boycott, No. 207/5 9, Damascus, January 25, 1959.

economic life, throw up their hands in horror and proclaim it impossible. A study carried out by the Stanford Research Institute in 1955 concluded that labour productivity in Israel is perhaps only about 50 per cent of that in many industrial nations and probably in the vicinity of 25 per cent of productivity in the United States.

At the same time, wages in Israel are in some cases higher than in several more industrialized countries, including Germany. Average hourly earnings in manufacturing during 1954 were 48 cents in Israel, 40 cents in Germany, 38 in France, 27 in Turkey, and 23 in Japan. Profits, on the other hand, are low according to the United Nations report. The situation in Israel has become an increasingly serious problem. The Stanford Research Institute stated: 'There is only a modest amount of business profits in the aggregate in the whole of Israel.' This suggests that many industrial enterprises are probably suffering losses.<sup>121</sup>

In a 1956 survey of Israel, the committee of Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives reported that:

At present, Israel produces 70 per cent of her food. Israel can not yet pay her own way. It can only hope to maintain itself fully if it can develop its industry and export the products of its skill and technology to other nations, without the economic boycott which restricts her at the present time.<sup>122</sup>

It must be noted that there were some factors which helped the Arab boycott and played an important role in weakening the Israeli economy. In no way related to the boycott apparatus, these factors included the strain of

---

<sup>121</sup>Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, February 16, 1959, p. 13.

<sup>122</sup>84th Congress, 2nd Session, Union Calendar No. 588, House Report No. 1683, Report of the Study Mission to Europe.



providing for large numbers of immigrants and the great expenditures resulting from a policy of maintaining a large standing army. These are discussed in detail below.

1. Jewish immigration to Israel: It is estimated that 934,000 Jewish immigrants arrived in Israel between May 15, 1948, and the end of 1958. This mass immigration required a substantial increase in government spending, the more so since jobs had to be provided for the newcomers, few of whom arrived with any means of their own. For all the generosity of world Jewry, contributions from abroad did not cover this cost. Consequently, a large portion of the country's income, which should have been utilized on building the economy, was spent on immigrants.

2. The Israeli policy of maintaining a large standing army: The defense budget, the total of which has always been secret, and Israeli labor power were both drained by a standing army with large reserves constantly called out for drill or emergencies, and by the time devoted to guard duty in the border settlements. Military expenditures, therefore, took a further total of the country's resources.

On the other hand, there was one factor which bolstered the Israeli economy and thereby hindered the effectiveness of the Arab boycott. This factor was the flow of capital from abroad.

Israel's balance of trade shows an annual deficit of \$350 million.<sup>123</sup> This gap is made up partially by special funds from abroad totaling \$265 to \$280 million a year. These funds include German reparations, German restitution payment to Jewish families, annual donations from Jews abroad, sale of State of Israel Bonds abroad, and remittances from foreign Jews to relatives in Israel. The total influx of capital in the period between 1949-1957 amounted to \$2.5 billion.<sup>124</sup>

Despite the considerable, but limited, success which the Arabs have realized in their boycott of Israel, the Arab League suffered a number of failures which aided Israel.

First of all, the Arabs failed to stop the flow of funds in aid and donations to Israel, especially from the United States. Regardless of all the pressure they applied to stop this, the flow of capital continued.

Secondly, they failed to prevent West Germany from paying Israel \$822 million in reparations and substantial

<sup>123</sup>New York Times, January 15, 1959, "Israel's Budget Raises Outlays."

<sup>124</sup>Geoffery D. Paul "Facing Israel's Economic Challenge," Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, February 6, 1959, pp. 14-15.

amounts in restitution payments to Jewish families.

Thirdly, the Arabs failed to prevent Israel from using the Gulf of Aqaba Bay, thus enabling the Israelis to use their southern port of Elath, which until then had been blockaded by the Arabs. Through Elath, Israel was, for the first time, able to contact the Asian and African countries from whom she acquired some of her needs in raw materials in exchange for her manufactured goods.

A primary reason for these failures may be the influence of world Zionism and its strong grip on most media of information, as well as the pressure Zionists could exert on international and local political and economic institutions. Such Zionist pressure is quite understandable since, if the Arabs should succeed in their boycott, it would be a matter of life or death for Israel. Therefore, Zionists have fought with great determination.

Future prospects for any major changes in the boycott appear to be negligible. The tendency among the Arab states today is to tighten the boycott. The Arab League has instructed the main office of the boycott to speed up measures in every respect.

As a result of this stricter application of boycott measures, the United Arab Republic, which used to forbid foreign vessels from carrying only petroleum or other strategic goods through the Suez Canal to, or from, Israel

embarked upon a policy of also forbidding all or any Israeli goods in foreign vessels from using the canal. During February and March, 1959, United Arab Republic authorities detained three foreign vessels and seized their cargoes of Israel cement, potash, and scrap iron.<sup>125</sup>

The success or failure of the Arab boycott in the future will depend, of course, upon the continued support which Israel received from abroad, and upon the general political development of the Middle East.

Addressing a Mapai party meeting, the former Israeli Commander-in-chief warned that:

Israel's honeymoon with the West might be nearing its end. The facts now have to be faced that a rapprochement between the West and the Arabs was likely to happen and the Israelis had to be prepared for consequently harder times and dangerous situations.<sup>126</sup>

Some of Israel's external sources of income are already exhausted. These include the \$135 million in export-import bank loans, the \$100 million in sterling balances, and \$15 million in foreign securities held by Israelis.<sup>127</sup> Some other major sources on which Israel is now relying to finance

<sup>125</sup>New York Times, March 27, 1959, "Israel Sees Loss in Suez Ship Ban."

<sup>126</sup>"Dayan warns: West May Turn," Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, December 19, 1958, p. 12.

<sup>127</sup>Oded Remla, "Can Israel Support Herself?," Commentary, New York, November, 1956, pp. 438-439.

economic development would no longer be available within a number of years. Grants from the United States have been declining from \$85 million in 1952 to \$36.6 million in 1955 to \$7.5 million in 1959. In the next fiscal year no United States aid is planned at all since Israel has been removed from the United States foreign aid program.<sup>128</sup> Deliveries to Israel of \$822 million in goods and services is due to expire by 1967, depending on the rate of annual deliveries. More than one-half of the total has already been used.

For the Arabs, the boycott is just one aspect of the Arab-Israeli conflict. They intend to continue it until a solution is reached for the whole Palestine problem. For the Arab people the boycott has assumed a symbolic aspect of the struggle between them and the Israelis. They intend to force Israel to accept the United Nations resolutions which she first accepted but has continuously repudiated, and to insure the repatriation of those Arab refugees who want to return to their homes with fair compensation to those who wish to settle elsewhere.

If, as presently seems the case, Israeli sources of economic aid continue to dwindle, the Arab boycott will undoubtedly loom as an even greater deterrent to Israeli economic growth and survival. It is possible that Israel may

---

<sup>128</sup>"Directed United States Help to Israel Ending," New York Times, April 5, 1959.

have to limit or stop further Jewish immigration for want of resources to provide for them. Then, if no new sources of economic aid, which Israel needs for balancing her budget, are forthcoming, she might well be forced to meet Arab demands in order to end the boycott. However, only the future holds an answer to such speculations.

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

30

The purpose of this thesis was to describe and analyze the Arab boycott of Israel including its goals, its structure and its operations, in addition to the role of the League of Arab States in it.

In order to represent the problem, it was necessary to introduce the following chapters: the League of Arab States and a brief account of the Arab League.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The Arab League, discussing the main aspects of the conflict between the Arabs and the Jews.

In addition to the various Arab boycotts of 1947, the League of Arab States was organized, the latter being a direct consequence of the former.

In regard to the Arab League (the organization of independent of the Arab States) see Article 1 of the Charter of the Arab League of 1945, which delineates the objectives of the Arab League. The pact of the League was signed in Cairo on the 22nd March, 1945, by the representatives of seven Arab States. The machinery of the League consists of a Council, a number of special committees and a permanent secretariat. On the

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis was to describe and discuss the Arab boycott of Israel including its goals, its structure and its operations, in addition to the Israeli and Zionist reaction to it.

In order to understand this problem it was thought advisable to introduce the first two chapters in the thesis with a brief account of the recent history of Palestine and the Arab League, discussing the main causes of the conflict between the Arabs and the Jews.

In addition to the Belfour Declaration of 1917, the Palestine Mandate was discussed, the latter being the direct consequence of the former.

In regard to the Arab League (the regional organization of the Arab States) the author discussed the Alexandria Conference of 1944, which delineated the outlines of the Arab League. The pact of the League was signed in Cairo on the 22nd March, 1945, by the representative of seven Arab States. The machinery of the League consists of a council, a number of special committees and a permanent secretariat. On the



upon the prohibition of all arms. The council may meet in any Arab Capitals. Its functions includes mediation of disputes between any of the League states or with a country outside the League. The council has a political committee consisting of Foreign Ministers of the Arab States. Membership in the League is open to any independent Arab State.

Chapters three and four discussed the Arab boycott and the boycott of the Jews in Palestine, and how the boycott was organized after the tragedy of Palestine. What was its idea and its goals? Why do the Arabs regard it as a defensive measure against Israel? The Israeli refusal to implement the United Nations Resolution of 1947 and their preventing the return of the million Arab refugees from Palestine to their original homes were the major causes of the Arab boycott. In the light of this, the Arab States envisaged the economic boycott of Israel as the only defensive measure against Israeli expansion.

The two stages that the boycott ran through were presented. The first stage, with limited goals and means, was begun in 1945 during the days of the British Mandate. It was directed towards the Jews of Palestine. The second stage, which was actually only a continuation of the first, was directed against Israel.

Chapter five and six dealt with the boycott of Israel and its operation. The principle of the boycott was based on boycott-organizers.

upon the prohibition of all commercial relations between Israel and the member states of the Arab League. This applied to the importing of agricultural goods or any manufactured or other commodities from Israel to the Arab countries and to the export to Israel of raw materials and foods. The different forms the boycott took were described in great detail. So were the methods applied by the Arab League in general and individual Arab States in particular.

Chapters seven and eight dealt with the Israeli reaction to the boycott and the controversial viewpoint as to the effectiveness of the boycott. Recognizing that an exclusively Arab verdict might be biased, a number of Israeli sources and records were consulted and quoted from and the pertinence of such material was remarked upon. Data were also given on the Israeli counter-boycott. While the Israeli and Arab assessments of the Arab Boycott Movement obviously greatly differ, the data supplied should enable the reader to form a fairly accurate picture of the main issue.

The conclusion drawn from the extensive material contained in this thesis indicates that the Arab boycott has been indeed effective. While at the present time it is difficult to estimate the exact damage inflicted upon Israeli economic life, there would seem no doubt that the boycott created some grave economic problems for Israel. Mention was also made of several partial failures on the part of the Arab boycott-organizers.

Since the boycott still continues, it is obviously impossible to give a final verdict on its success or failure. It is, however, hoped that the detailed discussion of the entire boycott operation, with all the relevant political and economic data, may enable the student of the present tensions in the Middle East gain a much clearer comprehension of the forces primarily responsible for these tensions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Arab

Antonius, George. The Arab Awakening. London: Hamish Hamilton, 3rd print, 1955.

Arab Information Center. ARAB AWAKENING OF THE PAST of the Arab World. New York, 1951.

Atar M. Muhammad. ARAB AWAKENING OF THE PAST. Cairo, Egypt, 1955.

(1955) (Arabic text)

Barbour, Nevill. ARAB AWAKENING OF THE PAST THE CONFERENCE. BIBLIOGRAPHY. London: George G. Harrap & Company, Ltd.

Baron, David. ARAB AWAKENING OF THE PAST. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951.

A. A. Boustros, Ghali. "The Arab Awakening 1919-1922." International Herald Tribune, no. 907, (1951).

Barrows, Miller. ARAB AWAKENING OF THE PAST. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1949.

Baron, Israel. ARAB AWAKENING OF THE PAST. London: Frederick Muller, 1951.

Baron, Joyce. ARAB AWAKENING OF THE PAST. New York: University Press, 1951.

Baron, Sami. ARAB AWAKENING OF THE PAST (General and Documental), New York, 1950.

Baron, George. ARAB AWAKENING OF THE PAST. Beirut, Lebanon, 1955.

(1955) (Arabic text)

Baron, J. C. ARAB AWAKENING OF THE PAST. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1950.

Hurewitz, J. W. DIplomacy in the Middle East. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1950.

Hutchison, E. M. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ENTITIES. New York: Harper and Row, 1953.

Israel Office of Information. A. BOOKS. Jerusalem: Israel Office of Information, 1955.

Antonius, George. The Arab Awakening. London: Hamish Hamilton, 3rd print, 1955.

The Arab Information Center. Basic Documents of the League of the Arab States, New York, (April 1955).

Attar M. Muhammad. Egypt Between Two Revolutions, Cairo, Egypt. 1955.

(مصريين ثورتين: محمد مصطفى عطا، القاهرة ١٩٥٥)

Barbour, Nevill. Nisi Dominus: A Survey of the Palestine Controversy. London, W. C. I.: George G. Harrap and Company, Ltd.

Ben-Gurion, David. Rebirth and Destiny of Israel. New York: Philosophical Library, 1954.

B. Y. Boutros, Ghali. "The Arab League 1945-1955," International Conciliation, No. 908, (May 1955).

Burrows, Miller. Palestine is Our Business. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1949.

Cohen, Israel. A Short History of Zionism. London: Frederick Muller, 1951.

Eagleton, Clyde. Annual Review of United Nations Affairs. New York: University Press, 1949, p. 153.

Hadawi, Sami. Palestine Portioned 1947-1958 (Excerpt and Documents), New York, 1959.

Hanna, George. Conception on the United Arab Republic, Beirut, Lebanon, 1958.

خواطو حول الجمهورية العربية المتحدة: الدكتور جورج حنا، بيروت ١٩٥٨

Hurewitz, J. C. The Struggle for Palestine. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1950.

- Hurewitz, J. C. Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., Vol. II, p. 28.
- Hutchison, E. H. Violent Truce. New York: The Devin Adair Company, 1953.
- Israel Office of Information, Israel Struggle for Peace. New York: Marstin Press, Inc., 1960.
- Izzeddin Nejlá. The Arab World, Past, Present and Future. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953.
- Jamal, A. Muhammad. Colonialism and Struggle. Mecca, Saudi Arabia, 1955.  
(استعمار وكفاح: للأستاذ أحمد جمال، مكة المكرمة، الطبعة السادسة، ١٩٥٥.)
- Janowsky, Oscar. Foundation of Israel. Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1960.
- Landau, Rom. Islam and the Arabs. Woking and London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958.
- Lazaron, Morris. Olive Trees in Storm, Kohinur Series No. 2. New York: American Friends of the Middle East, Inc., 1955.
- Lenczowski, George. The Middle East in World Affairs. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1957.
- Lilienthal, Alfred. What Price Israel. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953.
- Lilienthal, Alfred. There Goes the Middle East. New York: the Devin Adair Company, 1957.
- The Ministry of Education. This is the Zionism. Cairo, Egypt, 1956.  
(هذه هي الصهيونية: وزارة التربية والتعليم، القاهرة ١٩٥٦.)
- Naseef Sheikh M., Hussein. Al-Hussein Ibn Ali. Jedda, Saudi Arabia, 1926, p. 27.  
(الحسين بن علي: للشيخ محمد حسين نصيف، جدة، الطبعة السادسة، ١٩٢٦.)
- Nasir, Jamal. A Day of Justice. Jerusalem, Jordan, 1956.  
(يوم العدل: جمال ناصر، القدس، الأردن، ١٩٥٦.)

Nooshi, Fou'ad. Palestine in the Battle. Cairo, Egypt, May, 1958.

(فلسطين في المعركة : فؤاد نصحي ، القاهرة ، مايو ١٩٥٨.)

Palestine. A Study of Jewish Arab and British Policies, published for the ESCO Foundation for Palestine Inc., Vol. II, pp. 37-38.

Parkes, James. A History of Palestine From 135 A.D. to Modern Times. New York; Oxford University Press, 1949.

Polk, Stamler and Asfour. Backdrop to Tragedy. Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1957.

Safwatt Muhammed, The Unfounded Israel. Cairo, Egypt, 1952.

(إسرائيل المزعومة : محمد صفوت ، أركان حرب ، القاهرة ، ١٩٥٢.)

Sayegh, A. Fayez, The Arab Israeli Conflict. New York: Arab Information Center, November, 1956.

Sayegh, A. Fayez. Arab Unity: Hope and Fulfillment. New York: The Davin Adair Company, 1958.

Shukairy, Jameel and Ghazal. National and International Aims of the Arab League, Second edition. Damascus, Syria, 1955.

(الأمم والقومية والدولية لجامعة الدول العربية ، جميل الشقيري ، وبرهان غزال دمشق ، سوريا ، ١٩٥٥.)

State of Israel. Government Year Book 5715, (1954), p. 228.

State of Israel. Government Year Book 5718, (1957), p. 137.

State of Israel. Facts and Figures, Israel Office of Information, (1955).

#### B. OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

Collection of the Resolutions of the Council of the League of Arab States - from the first Session (January 4, 1945) to the 27th Session (March 18, 1957).

Economic Council of the Arab League - first regular Session, December 5, 1953, - July 22, 1954.

(تقرير للمجلس الاقتصادي بالجامعة العربية: الدورة الأولى العادية، ديسمبر - ١٩٥٣ - ١٩٥٤ يوليو ٢٢ - ١٩٥٤)

Minutes of the Meeting of the Council of the Arab League at its 16th regular Session (March 18, 1954).

Report on the Activity of the Secretariat General of the League between the 10th and the 18th Sessions, from (March 17, 1949, to March 28, 1954).

Report on the Activity of the Main Office and the Local Offices of the Boycott for the first half of 1957, (August, 1957).

(تقرير عن نشاط المكتب الدائم والمكاتب المحلية لمقاطعة إسرائيل للفترة الأشهر الأولى من عام ١٩٥٧)

Report on the Activity of the Main Office of the Boycott, (September 15, 1951).

(تقرير عن نشاط المكتب الدائم لمقاطعة إسرائيل، الخامس من سبتمبر، ١٩٥١)

Report on the Activity of the Main Office of the Boycott for the 2nd half of 1956.

(تقرير عن نشاط المكتب الدائم لمقاطعة إسرائيل للفترة الأشهر الأخيرة من عام ١٩٥٦)

Report of the Secretary General to the Council of the Arab League in the Following Sessions: 28, 29, 30 and 31.

(تقرير السكرتير العام للجامعة العربية في الجلسات: ٢٨ - ٢٩ - ٣٠ - ٣١)

Report of the Study Mission to Europe, 84th Congress, 2nd Session Union Calendar No. 588. House Report No. 1683.

Report on the Arab Boycott Renault, Jewish Community Relations Council of Greater Philadelphia; February 26, 1960.

Report on the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, January 7, 1960.

United Nation Resolution No. 181 (II) of 29th November, 1947.



C. JOURNALS AND ARTICLES

Arab League Bulletin, Cairo, December 1956.

(نشرة الجامعة العربية: القاهرة، ديسمبر ١٩٥٦.)

Bulletin of the Main Office of the Arab Boycott, No. 207/59,  
January 25, 1959.

(نشرة أخبار المكتب الدائم للمقاومة العربية رقم ٢٠٧/٥٩ يناير ١٩٥٩.)

Business International, May 31, 1957.

Commentary, New York, November 1956.

Economic Horizons, November 1957.

Economic Quarterly, Vol. I, No. 3, January, 1954.

Foreign Commerce, Weekly, March 5, 1956.

Fortune Magazine, August, 1957.

Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, London, September 20,  
1957.

Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, London, August 23, 1957.

Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, London, March 27, 1959.

Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, London, February 13,  
1959.

Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, London, December 19,  
1958.

Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, London, February 6,  
1959.

League of Arab States, Palestine Office Bulletin No. 73, Cairo,  
November 4, 1957.

Statistical Bulletin of Israel (English Summary), September,  
1958, Vol. IX, No. 9.

D. NEWSPAPERS

Haboker, Tel Aviv, Israel, August 8, 1957.

Haboker, Tel Aviv, Israel, August 12, 1957.

Herold-Tribune, February 12, 1956.

Herut, Tel Aviv, Israel, August 2, 1957.

Herut, Tel Aviv, Israel, August 2, 1957.

L'amerhav, Tel Aviv, Israel, September 5, 1957.

The National Jewish Post and Opinion, New York, Vol. XIV, No. 19, January 2, 1959.

New York Times, January 6, 1959, "Israel's Budget Raises Outlays."

New York Times, February 3, 1956.

New York Times, October 15, 1956.

New York Times, May 11, 1956, Tests of Hammarskjold's Report to U.N. on his Peace Mission to the Middle East.

New York Times, April 5, 1959, "Directed United States Help to Israel Ending."