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Criteria for majority party leadership selection in the United States House of Representatives : evidence of institutionalization in the collegial style, 1962-1976 : a thesis ...

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CRITERIA FOR MAJORITY PARTY LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN THE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
EVIDENCE OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN THE
COLLEGIAL STYLE, 1962-1976

A Thesis

Presented to the Graduate Faculty
of the University of the Pacific

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the
Degree Master of Arts

by
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May, 1978

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

A study of the selection of party leaders in the Congress of the United States can vitally affect the understanding of the dynamic nature of that body. Congress has selected, in its nearly 200 years of existence, an array of individuals as party leaders who have not only been molded by institutional restraints and the traditions peculiar to a legislative body, but who have likewise affected the character of the Congress and have induced, by themselves, dramatic changes. There is a certain unanimity of agreement that many changes, some of which can be credited to the talents of specific leaders, have contributed to making it a more viable political institution responsive to the needs of the American people.¹

Of late, many critics of the modern legislative process have viewed with alarm the usurpation of legislative powers by the executive branch.² Some attribute this phenomenon to the weakness and decentralized leadership roles of those who are selected to lead the majority party.³ Still others suggest that the make-up of the modern Congress precludes any easy solution to answer the needs of a national constituency because Congress and its leaders lack the ability to identify and establish national priorities.⁴

The above critics are joined by certain members of Congress themselves who question the role of party leaders. Not all are in agreement as to the extent of the involvement of the party leadership at any given time, the degree to which leaders actually influence the outcome of legislation nor the nature of their role in maximizing the effectiveness of the lawmaking body.⁵ Further, there has been no agreement as to what kind of leaders are the most effective for a consistently responsive legislature. But, most students of the legislative process agree that the roles of leaders, their methods, their character, their ability, and their personalities have some effect upon their party's legislative policies and goals.

Whatever their degree of effectiveness or importance, the selection of leaders has traditionally been of keen interest to themselves and the public. Only in the last two decades, however, has any thorough study been done on the selection process itself. Recent studies have attempted to discover why certain individuals are chosen above others for the formal congressional party leadership positions. Further, the effort has been made to find an order, or pattern, to leadership change as well as to the study of style.⁶

This paper will explore further the process of selection of majority party leaders in the United States House of Representatives. It will seek to show that there were certain common denominators that existed among those who were selected for leadership positions between 1962 and 1976,

and that these common denominators were not present in those individuals who challenged the leaders and lost. Additionally, it will be argued that those certain qualities were particularly important to the style of leadership during that period, and that their importance to that style allowed the development of an institutionalization of the selection process during that period.

THE PROBLEM

Between 1962 and 1976 the House of Representatives had a collegial style of majority party leadership.⁷ This meant that leadership was dispersed among several leaders instead of being concentrated in the person of a single, powerful leader.⁸ Because it is necessary in leadership of this kind for there to be loyal cooperation among those leaders, ^{questions arise} the question arises as to what kinds of individuals, what qualities they possessed, what qualifications they had, ^{which} that enabled them to be selected for majority party formal leadership positions within this style. Further, what qualities or characteristics did those House members have who campaigned for leadership positions but were unsuccessful?

Once these differences have been established, it becomes necessary to analyze which of those qualifications were ultimately critical in the final leadership selection. Additionally, were the leaders who were chosen "establishment" members, whose tendencies led them toward approving traditional leadership practices, or were "change-oriented"

members selected who were interested in abandoning the selection processes of earlier decades?

Finally, were the requirements of the collegial style such that only certain qualifications for leaders were suitable for the perpetuation of that style? If so, was this evidence of a growing institutionalization?

There will be three hypotheses that will be tested in this research paper in order to establish some kind of pattern in the leadership selection process. The first hypothesis that will be examined concerns the qualifications of those who won majority party leadership positions within the time period indicated above. This hypothesis is: If a member of the House of Representatives possessed sufficient seniority, was a loyal party member, voted with his party more often than the average party member, was a protege of a senior party member, had participated in numerous House activities, had served on important committees, was a moderate, had an acceptable personality, had served in the whip organization, he was eligible for party leadership.

Second, those candidates who were defeated in their efforts to be selected for party leadership positions failed because they lacked certain critical qualifications that were necessary for the collegial style.

Third, it was the nature of the collegial style, during this period, which created and allowed institutionalization of the selection process. This institutionalization grew because of the requirements of the collegial style

itself.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study has a basically historical perspective. Because it has not been possible to acquire all of the necessary information from direct observation, the historical approach has been the only feasible way a proper analysis of such a subject could be made. It has been necessary, for the most part, to rely on the basic research of scholars who have studied various aspects of congressional leadership. The research of these scholars is supplemented, however, by the limited observations in personal encounters while visiting the House of Representatives, Congressman John J. McFall, and numerous other Representatives. The information acquired therein will be used largely to supplement historical research since the time spent in Washington D.C. (one week) was insufficient for the accumulation of large quantities of accurate data. The basic merit of such a visit was in the area of general "impressions" that were acquired which contributed many valuable insights.

The information for this study has come from the following sources:

1. General historical studies of the Congress of the United States.
2. Current periodicals and books related specifically to the area of congressional leadership.
3. Biographical sketches of majority party leaders

and potential leaders.

4. Personal interviews.
5. Congressional Quarterly studies relating to party voting records.
6. Newspapers and news magazines.

Research methods have consisted of comparing those characteristics of the members chosen for leadership positions with those who challenged these leaders in terms of the same criteria or qualifications. These criteria for selection of leaders were compiled from three sources: (1) lists compiled by other researchers; (2) analyses of the background and personalities of those who have successfully acquired leadership positions; (3) lists of common characteristics of those who have been selected as congressional party leaders.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Collegial Style

The term, collegial style, denotes the style of leadership used during the period of this study (1962-1976). Randall Ripley used the term when he suggested various patterns of leadership style that have been evident in the United States House of Representatives.⁹ Ripley indicates that it is generally created purposely when the single-leader style cannot be duplicated because of the lack of a particularly strong or charismatic leader. The collegial style is characterized by a cooperative effort among the three top

majority party leaders to discuss and plan strategy for the implementation of the party program.¹⁰ Ripley says, "From 1962 until 1967, the Democrats have relied on three principal leaders with an additional nineteen members important in the whip organization."¹¹

Institutionalization

The use of the term "institutionalization" in this paper will refer to the relative predictability by which leaders are selected for formal leadership positions. This is in keeping with the formal definition of the term which refers to an emphasis on organization above all other factors.¹²

Establishment

The term establishment, is used in reference to those members of the House who are considered to be satisfied with the status-quo as pertains to the present working-rules of the House. This term is used in opposition to those members considered "change-oriented" who would prefer reforms and even radical alteration of the working-rules.

"Exclusive" and "semi-exclusive" Committees

There is evidence that the standing committees of the House do not enjoy equal prestige and therefore some are considered more important than others.¹³ Thus, the terms, "exclusive" and "semi-exclusive" refer to those committees that are considered the most important. Those committees

constituting the first group are: Rules, Appropriations, and Ways and Means; the second group is made up of Armed Services, Judiciary, Agriculture, Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Foreign Affairs, and Government Operation.

CONCLUSION

An analysis of the problem, that of determining qualifications of leaders within the collegial style, should not only lead to a better idea of the types of individuals chosen, but it also will provide insight into the personality and character of the Congress of the last two decades. The analysis will reflect the ways in which leadership selection affects the dynamic nature of Congress.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter 1

1. Even though the characteristic of a "viable" legislative body may not have been determined as yet, today's Congress appears to be more subdued, at least. Depending on one's sense of humor, it is interesting to note here a description of a scene which took place in an early Congress and one which even the severist critics of present day congressional sessions would have to admit as being unlikely to occur. This is taken from DeAlva Alexander's History and Procedure of the House of Representatives. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1916), pp. 111-112.

"When Matthew Lyon, of Kentucky, spat in his face, Roger Friswold (of Connecticut), a member from 1795 to 1805, stiffened his arm to strike, but remembering where he was, he coolly wiped his cheek. But after the House, its vote failed to expel Lyon, he 'beat him with great violence', says a contemporary chronicle, 'using a strong walking stick'". Other sources indicate that this incident, not unusual, was typical of other episodes which occurred with alarming frequency.

2. This was clearly the theme of the book by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. The Imperial Presidency. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963).
3. David B. Truman, in the concluding chapter of Congress and America's Future. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965) cites the lack of centralized leadership as one of the great weaknesses of the Congress.
4. Samuel P. Huntington, "Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century", in David B. Truman's, Congress and America's Future, speaks of the diversity of constituencies represented in Congress at a time when national priorities are the greatest in our history, and of the irreconcilability of these two forces unless drastic readjustments are made. The average congressman, says Huntington, is just too busy answering the needs of his own district to be able to concentrate on larger national issues and policies that need immediate and long range solutions.

5. It is interesting that in a study of party leader influence on individual Congressman, John W. Kingdon, in Congressmen's Voting Records, (New York: Harper & Row, 1973) claims that congressmen are not influenced by party leaders to the extent that we might believe. That is, in the process of interviewing individual members, Kingdon asserts that they feel little pressure or inclination to vote as prescribed by congressional party leader. In question here, however, would be the extent to which members might actually reveal the real truth to an interviewer. No doubt there is certainly some merit to the suggestion that a member would like to portray an image to any interviewer that he is "his own man". The research techniques of such a study would be critical in order to arrive at any real answers to a subject such as this.
6. The establishment of "order" as referred to here was the result of the effort of Randall Ripley. That is to say, it is Ripley's work on this categorization of patterns of change and style that originally inspired the work for this thesis. Other writers have produced voluminous material on congressional party leaders but the establishment of a historical order certainly has to be credited to Ripley. Randall Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of Representatives, (New York: The Brookings Institution, 1967).
7. The definition of the term "collegial style" appears in the last part of this chapter under Definition of Terms.
8. Perhaps the most extensive work done to date on the types of individuals chosen for leadership positions has been done by Robert L. Peabody in Leadership in Congress, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1976). Peabody goes far beyond describing the type of individual chosen but rather describes the techniques used and the circumstances in which they were chosen. He was aided in this by extensive research of certain leadership contest by Nelson Polsby in his "Two Strategies of Influence: Choosing a Majority Leader, 1962", which Peabody has included in the book just cited.
9. Because the Democratic Party has been the majority party for all but two Congresses during this period, this study will concern itself only with Democratic party leaders in the House.
10. Ripley's work, which carries the identification of the types and styles of majority party leadership periods, says that the history of the House of Representatives shows that the styles have been (1) single-member leadership (either by the Speaker or the Majority Leader), (2) collegial, (3) Presidential leadership.

Any review of leadership in the House leaves little doubt that for purposes of study at least, categorical typing of leadership periods, even if challenged historically (is quite effective) and is moreover, helpful to subsequent studies and is probably as accurate as such a thing can be. Ripley, pp. 82-83.

11. Ripley, *Ibid.*, p. 85.
12. Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, (Springfield, Mass: G & C Merriam Co.) 1965.
13. Neil MacNeil, Forge of Democracy, (New York: David McKay Co, 1963), p. 408.

Chapter 2

REVIEW OF MAJORITY PARTY LEADERSHIP POSITIONS

Before the criteria for the selection process can be established, it is important to understand the functions of the formal leadership positions in a historical context. It must be understood just what the formal party leaders do and how they have come to function in the capacities that they perform today. The three formal positions, the Speaker, the majority leader, and the majority whip, have changed in both qualification and substance, and their roles today bear only slight resemblance to their earlier roles in history.

Speaker

The only constitutionally authorized leadership position in the House of Representatives is the Speaker. The other two leadership positions, not authorized nor even mentioned in the Constitution, are strictly party positions and for that reason do not have the dual nature that is imposed on the Speaker. The Constitution did not stipulate in detail the nature of the role of the Speaker. It only referred to his being the presiding officer of the House. He is that to this day and in so being has had power of immense proportions from time to time, the degree depending on the time period he has served, and the nature of his personal and

political skills. Often, that office has taken on the coloration of its occupant.

Even though the Speaker's position was created by the Constitution, he derives his power and duties largely from tradition, the rules of the House, and parliamentary law. He also possesses many informal powers which not only stem from his role in presiding over House sessions, putting questions, recognizing members on the floor, but which result from his mere contact with many House members and his extensive knowledge of the business of the House.

Traditionally the Speaker, having been chosen from the majority party has not only been in charge of the general proceedings of the House, but also has been considered largely responsible for the legislative output of his party's interests.¹ The majority of the members of the House have looked to him for leadership in achieving cohesion and accomplishing their legislative goals. It is obvious that this dual role which the Speaker holds puts him in a position of being the centralizing force around which his allies can rally.

The extent of his influence has been limited from time to time according to the formal powers which he has possessed. For example, when Joseph Cannon was Speaker of the House of Representatives from 1903-1911, he held enormous formal powers which included being able to appoint all committee members and their chairmen, which by itself constituted power of unlimited direction and scope.²

Sam Rayburn, on the other hand, (who served as Speaker from 1940-1961), did not have the formal powers that Cannon had, yet ruled with considerable authority and power.³ His source of power came prior to his selection as Speaker when he became familiar with nearly all the personalities and knew well how to use friendship to achieve his ends. Even though he did not have many rules that Cannon had been able to use, with the use of intuition based on such qualities as personal friendships, favors owed, seniority, trust, and persuasion, his was power developed largely through the use of these latter qualities.

With extensive personal influence a person as influential as the Speaker may directly or indirectly influence the committee which is charged with the selection of the standing committees. Even after the Speaker's influence was reduced by the "Revolt of 1910",⁴ Speaker Nicholas Longworth had four unreliable incumbent Republicans on the Rules Committee replaced with his own choices. In similar fashion, Rayburn at one time made sure that the Democrats on the Ways and Means Committee were favorable to his stand on such things as reciprocal trade and the issue of the oil depletion allowance.⁵ As a matter of fact, he was known to have interfered with the make-up of certain other committees from time to time. And so, without the strong formal powers once available to the Speaker, Rayburn became powerful through different methods than those used by Joe Cannon.⁶

In the history of the Speakership, Cannon can be said to represent an end of an era when the Speaker had enormous formal power. Today, those powers are limited by established and voluminous precedents and rules as well as limited power in rewarding members by choosing them for special committees. Rayburn represents the modern concept of the use of power through personal friendship and persuasion and based on past political favors plus his own skill and knowledge.⁷ This type of leadership has extended into what is now the collegial style by which the powers of the Speaker are more likely to be shared or dispersed among the three formal party leaders.

It is possible that Rayburn's style has set a precedent for the immediate past and for some years to come. This cannot necessarily be said of his methods. By style it is meant here that he used the powers of his personality rather than the rules of the House. By method is meant that he operated almost completely alone, depending on his own personal knowledge of other as well as depending on his own stature to secure loyalty to his causes. Both Cannon and Rayburn obviously had personalities that made leadership a personal thing even though both seemed to have had personal lieutenants who were extremely loyal and who devoted themselves to carrying out the wishes of the Speaker.

There is evidence that a great vacuum was created when Speaker Rayburn died.⁸ The era of the single-leader style of leadership came to an end and has not yet reappeared.

It is significant to note that when Cannon stepped down as Speaker of the House, his successor, Champ Clark, while operating with greatly reduced rules, called upon the help of the majority leader to a greater extent as did Rayburn's successor, John McCormack of Massachusetts. This is another indication of a vacuum being created when a strong leader dies or steps down.

When Speaker McCormack became the presiding officer of the House of Representatives on the death of Rayburn, he indicated that he intended to share his responsibilities with the other two leaders.⁹ This he apparently did and this leads into a discussion of the role of the majority leader.

Majority Leader

The majority leader is a leadership position that has only had formal designation since the turn of the century.¹⁰

Prior to that time the spokesman for the majority party was anyone who seemed to possess leadership qualities and who operated on the floor accordingly. It was not unusual for each piece of legislation to have its own spokesman, especially if that person was in particular favor with the Speaker.¹¹ James S. Young says in The Washington Community,

Party members selected no leaders, designated no functionaries to speak in their behalf or to carry legislative task assignments. The party had no whips, no seniority leaders. There were no committees on

committees, no steering committees, no policy committees: none of the organizational apparatus that marks the twentieth century congressional parties... there were a number of party leaders in the House but no fixed majority leader.¹²

Evidence has it then, that there were several de facto leaders until the last part of the 19th century when the chairman of Ways and Means Committee began to receive the formal designation as party leader. Finally, in 1919 the position majority leader became a full time position.¹³

In the history of the House of Representatives as we have seen, the majority floor leaders have been many things and their power has varied from time to time. Immediately following the "Revolt of 1910" when the Speaker was stripped of much formal power, many of the former duties of the Speaker fell to the majority leader. For example, when Clark was elected Speaker in 1911 following Cannon, the floor leader and party caucus gained control of the Rules Committee as well as exercising much control over other major committees of the House. Oscar Underwood, the newly elected floor leader under Clark, became the real leader of the House, and it is said that he could "ask and get recognition at any time to make motions and restrict debate or preclude amendments or both."¹⁴

Today, the majority leader, a technically unofficial officer of the House, is selected by the Speaker or the party caucus and need not be confirmed by the House itself. Owing no allegiance to a constitutionally prescribed position, he can proceed with the over-all management of his party's

program on the floor of the House. He has charge of the formal agenda of the House as well as being his party's chief spokesman on the floor. The majority leader, in being in charge of the House agenda, must develop a system for legislative action on the floor so that all important legislation can be considered before time runs out in a given session. By consulting with various committee chairmen he can plan an adequate and orderly time-table so that major legislation may be disposed of. Even though he may delegate the responsibility to other party leaders, the majority leader also has the responsibility of keeping all House members, both majority and minority, informed of the coming legislative program, usually announcing it weekly.

The majority leader, although his knowledge of rules must be thorough, is not able to use the rules to achieve his legislative goals although he can be very effective in giving tangible reward to party members through his influence with the Speaker.¹⁵ Perhaps his greatest power lies in the area of communication and "psychological preferment".¹⁶ Because his good will is sought by most party members, the use of this psychological preferment may be his greatest resource.

The majority leader generally works in three broad areas of policy making, according to Robert L. Peabody. He lists the three areas as being: (1) internal organization, which includes the supervision of his own staff and relationships with the minority party, (2) legislative strategy, the

formulation and implementation of policy, and (3) external coordination, which involves relationships with the White House, the party, the interest groups, the media, etc.¹⁷

It is appropriate to say that if the judgment of Peabody is correct in listing the above categories as being within the scope of the majority leader, then he must possess qualities befitting those of an ambassador as well as those of a skilled House technician. As Clark declared after having served as floor leader, the majority leader "must possess tact, patience, firmness, ability, courage, quickness of thought and knowledge of the rules and practices of the House."¹⁸

If the majority leader is to be charged with all of these responsibilities, then the need for an effective majority whip can easily be seen.

Majority Whip

The majority whip is the newest party leadership position, having been formally established at the end of the 19th century.¹⁹ The basic job of the whip has remained unchanged although the methods have modified from time to time. Essentially, the whip is to assist the Speaker and majority leader who have appointed him (with the concurrence of the party caucus) in informing party members of the wishes of the leadership and, likewise, in informing the leadership of the current feeling of the party members. This makes it necessary that the whip maintain close ties with House members so that an accurate appraisal of their attitudes may

be related to the Speaker and majority leader.²⁰

In order to instill a certain degree of accuracy in the above mentioned functions, the whip, prior to consideration of important legislation, polls his party's members in an effort to determine their views. Generally these "whip counts", taken at the request of the Speaker and majority leader, include specific questions on bills that are to be considered.²¹ This tells the party leadership if proposed legislation is acceptable or unacceptable to most party members. Additionally, possible attendance on the floor for certain legislative measures may be predicted so that the leadership may decide the most propitious time for House consideration. When attendance is needed, especially in order that a favored bill be assured of passage, the whip's office telephones each member to make sure he attends.

In his role as the party's information officer, the whip distributes at the end of each week that Congress is in session a "Whip Notice" which provides all majority party members with a list of bills to be considered the following week. A recent addition to the information packet members receive is the "Whip Advisory" which provides summaries of all major bills and amendments to be considered on the floor, thus enabling busy members to become acquainted with new measures almost at a glance. These advisories are generally prepared by the whip office after consultation with the committee from which the bill originated.²²

Because of the extensive amount of administrative detail involved as well as the numbers of contacts to be made, the Office of Majority Whip has expanded to include a chief deputy whip, three deputy whips, and twenty zone whips. These assistant whips, along with a special assistant to the whip, secretaries, writers, and researchers comprise a large staff which represents a sizeable increase in the past fifty years.

While Rayburn apparently did not make great use of the party whip organization, McCormack and Carl Albert saw the whip's office as a tool to gather necessary information regarding the moods of House members and to generally serve as intermediary between the leadership and the members.²³ Because he is still appointed by the majority leader, in consultation with the Speaker, the whip obviously serves those two leaders and the importance of his position depends on the needs of those leaders.

Since 1962 the whip has taken on greater importance and has become useful to the other leaders as they plan their strategy.²⁴ For example, extensive use of the Whip Poll since 1962 makes it evident that the leaders rely on the whip as the "eyes and ears" of the leadership and they may plan their strategy on the will of the House members based on the information gathered by the whip organization. The Whip Poll, which is usually taken after a bill has been reported out of committee and before it is scheduled for floor action, is generally a fairly accurate story of how House majority

members will vote on a given bill. Of the ten polls taken in 1963, the whip organization was correct ninety per cent of the time in ascertaining how each member would vote. On occasion, leaders were surprised at the outcome of certain members' votes, but in general, the polls were accurate. In order to reduce the number of surprises, it is necessary for the whip organization to become acquainted with the reliability of certain members in their responses to these polls.

The old tradition, in fact, the original duty of the whip organization, that of sounding out members and rounding up votes for bills that are urged by the leadership, continues to be an important whip function. By learning what the attendance each day will be, the whips can advise the majority leader of the most propitious time to schedule a bill for vote and can also work on advising absent members of the importance of their presence at a given time. The whip's office then helps to produce high voter turnout which is of critical importance to the leadership. Unless the Speaker or majority leader is of the sort who is able to know himself (as certain previous Speakers have) what the response to certain legislation will be, it is critical that he rely on the information gathered by the whip and work closely with him.

The extensive use of the whip organization in the collegial style is borne out by the increase in size and professionalism of the staff that occurred between 1972 and

1976. That office then had a full time administrative assistant with long prior staff experience in the executive branch along with three or four staff assistants who worked full time gathering information from committees for the digest of legislation for the Whip Advisories published each week.

In general it can probably be said that the duties of the whip have not changed over the years but the methods by which he performs these duties have changed depending on the person holding the office at any given time. Indications are that the whip organization is utilized to a greater extent under the present collegial style of leadership.

With each leadership position described and placed in historical context, the question arises as to how and in what way they function as a group. If it is the leaders' responsibility to see that their party's legislative policies are acted upon, it follows that they must be concerned with their own internal organization as well as their relationship with the opposite party. Additionally, they must plan legislative strategy in both policy formation and implementation, coordinating these plans with the President and the executive branch, as well as the electorate. It is obvious that a great deal of ground work must be done before schedules are made, and before the proper time for a bill to be considered. It is here that the individual functions of the party leaders are coordinated to achieve the desired results.

Background of Collegial Style

When John McCormack became Speaker in 1962 and after his announcement that he would lead with the help of the majority leader and whip, the three party leaders began to meet regularly to discuss the strategy that was being advanced by the committees. At times they met daily, but weekly meetings became a regular habit so that communication and information sharing might enhance the leadership effort.²⁵

The three formal congressional party leadership roles have changed during the long history of the House of Representatives. These roles have often been a reflection of the type of personality of the Speaker, who largely seems to determine the mode and style of leadership. He may, at his own discretion, choose to use the other two leaders in any capacity that he wishes. In general, during the collegial period from 1962 to 1976, the majority leader and especially the whip seemed to increase the function of their position in order to enhance the style of leadership chosen by the Speaker.

NOTES

Chapter 2

1. Henry Clay seems to have been the first Speaker to fully realize the dual nature of the Speaker's role. He saw that while the Founding Fathers intended the Speaker to be the presiding officer of the House, the Speakership could also be used as the position of greatest influence in promoting the party's legislative program. Neil MacNeil, Forge of Democracy, (David McKay Co., Inc. New York 1963), pp. 70-71.
2. Cannon operated under the "Reed Rules" which allowed the Speaker to disregard all motions and appeals that he considered designed to delay proper transaction of the business of the House. Additionally, a simple majority rather than a two-thirds vote could adopt a special order prescribing the order of business on the floor and the manner and length of debate on a particular bill. George Rothwell Brown, The Leadership of Congress, (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1922) p. 166. Additionally, Cannon was known to have waited until he accomplished his legislative goals to appoint members to committees, thus having something to threaten them with or hold over their heads. Further, in his capacity as Chairman of the Rules Committee he could determine what business the House was to consider, and on the floor used his parliamentary powers to recognize members and to decide what matters were to come before the House. MacNeill, *Ibid.*, p. 59.
3. Randall Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of Representatives. (New York: The Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 16.
4. The "Revolt of 1910" was the result of the House rebelling against the autocratic rule of Cannon. It culminated in the Norris Resolution which stripped many of the Speaker's formal powers. MacNeill, *Ibid.*, pp. 53-55.
5. Richard Bolling, House Out of Order, (New York: E. P. Dutton Co. 1965), p. 77. Bolling says that today the fullest power lies in the personal influence of the occupant of the Speakership.

6. Ripley, p. 22.
7. Bolling, *Ibid.*, p. 66. Rayburn apparently disliked using party machinery to accomplish his goals, but rather preferred the personal contact with individuals. His dislike of institutional forms, such as the party caucus and steering committee was evident. Again, he preferred to work with close friends in his appeals for their support. This fact is repeated in other books and biographies of Rayburn.
8. Robert Peabody, Leadership in Congress, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1976), p. 41.
9. Ripley, p. 102. Ripley says that when McCormack became Speaker he purposely created a collegial leadership situation in the Democratic Party. He says that McCormack was fully aware of the vacuum which existed due to the death of Rayburn and one which he could not fill immediately if ever.
10. Ripley, *Ibid.*, p. 102.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 198.
12. James S. Young, The Washington Community, 1800-1828, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 56.
13. Nelson Polsby, "Institutionalization of the United States House of Representatives", American Political Science Review, LXII (March, 1968), p. 157.
14. George B. Galloway, History of the House of Representatives, (Washington D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 98.
15. Ripley, p. 37.
16. Peabody, pp. 33-34.
17. Champ Clark, My Quarter Century in American Politics, Vol. II. (New York: Harper Bros., 1920), p. 337.
18. "The History and Operation of the House Majority Whip Organization", House Document No. 93-126, (Washington D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1973).
19. Randall Ripley, "The Party Whip Organization in the United States House of Representatives", in Nelson Polsby and Robert Peabody, (eds.) New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, (Chicago, Rand McNally & Co. 1969), p. 197.
20. Peabody and Polsby, p. 299.

21. Ibid., p. 280.
22. In February, 1974 during a one week's visit to Washington D. C., the writer had occasion to speak on the telephone with Mr. D. B. Hardeman, a retired congressional aide who had served many years on Capitol Hill in several capacities. (One time aide to Sam Rayburn, and administrative assistant to Majority Whip Hale Boggs were two of his positions). He was especially informative and graciously gave impressions as well as his opinions on changes in House leadership during that time. It was through conversation with him that this particular information was obtained.
23. The information that follows regarding the whip was given to the writer by Irv Sprague, administrative assistant to Rep. John McFall during this same visit to Washington, as well as by Mr. McFall himself. Both were generous in the information that they relayed, most of it consisting of answers to specific questions regarding the basic role and duties of the whip. Excerpts from conversations with both men will be referred to from time to time throughout this paper as well as with certain other aides that were extremely helpful.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.

Chapter 3

CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTY LEADERS

In order to determine what characteristics or qualifications were present in those who attained majority party leadership positions during the time period, 1962-1976, it is necessary to examine those requirements which have been set forth by earlier research as criteria for selection, and to pursue any other qualities that may be evident in an examination of these leaders. In so doing, a list of "common denominators" can be gathered and later compared with those individuals who challenged these leaders and lost. If it can be determined that the consistent lack of certain qualities resulted in defeat, then it is possible to isolate those qualities that were characteristic of the winners and establish them as being necessary for selection.

Seniority

The most conspicuous requirement for selection to a leadership position has been seniority.¹ So absolute has been this characteristic that its presence has been evident as far back as the early days of the 20th century. Although this study does not cover these years, it is significant to note, for emphasis, that from 1903 until the time that McCormack was elected Speaker in 1962, the average number of

years served before the individual's selection as Speaker was 24 years. Two Speakers, David Henderson of Iowa and Champ Clark of Missouri, served the least amount of time prior to selection, that being 16 years, and John McCormack served the most, 32 years.²

The presence of seniority as a factor in the selection of the Speaker has continued since 1962. Speakers McCormack, Albert, and O'Neill served an average of 27 years prior to their selection. Had Hale Boggs, elected majority leader in 1970, succeeded Albert as Speaker (his accidental death prevented this) the seniority pattern would not have changed since Boggs had 24 years of service when elected majority leader. The number of years prior to becoming Speaker has actually increased during the 1962-1976 period.

Seniority has also been the most obvious characteristic of those elected majority leader.³ Again, for emphasis, we find that majority leaders since 1911 have served on the average of 18 years in the House before their selection to this position. (John McCormack actually served the least time, 12 years, before becoming majority leader, but waited the longest time of any leader before becoming Speaker.) Since 1962, the average time before becoming majority leader has been 20 years.

The position of majority whip is another example of seniority as a factor in the selection process.⁴ An appointed leader, the whip has served at least 8 years in the House before selection and the average seniority for this

position since 1911 has been 14 years. Since 1962, the average time before becoming whip has been 16 years.

The fact that all of the leaders chosen since 1962 have accumulated significant seniority does not mean that they were, in fact, the most senior members of their party in the House, and that they were selected on this basis. The fact that there were others with similar or more seniority rankings shows that seniority is not the sole criterion for selection. What these facts do show, however, is that no leader attained his position without serving many years in the House of Representatives before becoming a leader. Therefore, seniority, as a qualification for leadership positions, is a definite factor in the selection process.

Party Loyalty

Most research lists strong party loyalty as a necessary qualification for leadership selection. This is a general thesis which is examined and supported by research conducted by both Truman and Hinckley in their studies of leadership.⁵ The importance of this characteristic is not without a certain amount of logic since it would seem reasonable that a lack of loyalty would hardly be rewarded in the selection process. It would be unlikely that a leader who is not a party regular, in terms of voting behavior, would work actively to promote his party's program, nor would he be as apt to gain the confidence of his party's leaders.

The degree to which a majority party member is loyal to his party and votes with the dominant wing of that party

can be measured by party unity scores.⁶ These scores show the percentage of time, on a given number of roll call votes, that an individual member has voted with the majority or the dominant wing of his party.

The party unity scores shown in Table 1 are those of Albert, Boggs, O'Neill and McFall, all selected party leaders during the 1962-1974 time frame. As the Table indicates, the scores shown begin with the 88th Congress (1963-64) and go through the 93rd Congress (1973-74). These scores are composite scores, based on an average of the two terms that compose an individual Congressional session.

The Table shows the average party unity scores of majority party (Democratic) members. It is against these scores that the party leaders can be compared in order to establish the degree of their loyalty. Looking at these averages, it can be seen that all four of the party leaders voted more often with the majority of the party than the average party member. There are no exceptions to this fact. For example, in all but one congressional session, Thomas P. O'Neill was at least 20 percentile points over the party average, thus confirming his own self assessment when he declared, "I'm a terrifically Democratic partisan."⁷ Of special interest are the scores of Hale Boggs, a Southern Democrat whose percentages show that he voted more often with his northern colleagues than one might expect of a southerner. Boggs was known to stray from party voting, but only one-half as often as other Southern Democrats.⁸ His image of being

"too conservative for a northerner, too liberal for a southerner", although it may fit him in many respects, is not entirely borne out by his liberal scores.

Peabody cautions against the use of party unity scores as absolute indicators of the degree of moderateness of a leader or potential leader or of their use toward developing a clear cut image of that leader.⁹ What is more important, Peabody says, is the general view that other members of Congress have toward a leader or the view that the leader has toward himself. For example, extensive study could reveal an effort by a leader to show a more moderate voting record than he might naturally show in hopes that it would stand him in good stead as a potential leader.

Table 1 reveals that the party leaders as a group had higher party unity scores than the average for the party. In the 90th Congress, for example, the average party member voted with his party 63% of the time while the leaders as a group voted 80% of the time. In the 91st Congress the average for the members was 59%, the leaders, 77%. The other scores reveal similar findings. (Party unity scores are for all votes, while "major bill" votes would probably show even higher party unity).

It can be concluded from the Table that the scores show that party leaders tend to vote more frequently with the majority of their party than does the average party member. This would confirm earlier findings that party leaders are strong, loyal, national party members.

Ideology

There are a limited number of in-depth studies regarding ideology as a criterion for the selection of majority party leaders. In recent years a few studies have emerged which have challenged the basic premise set forth by Truman, Hinckley, and Peabody that party leaders tend to be moderates who represent the median, or middle in party ideology, a view which has probably been the most widely accepted one regarding ideology.

David Truman has said that it is unlikely that a member could secure enough votes from all segments of the party unless he was an ideological moderate.¹⁰ Barbara Hinckley indicated that a moderate roll-call voting record is probably necessary to attain a leadership position.¹¹ Peabody says, "With only a rare exception or two, a potential candidate cannot deviate far from the mainstream of his party's ideological orientation if he hopes to become a leader."¹²

In a study conducted by Duncan MacRae in which he analyzed the roll-call voting of the House of Representatives during the 81st Congress, House leaders were found to score close to the median when compared with other Democrats on what he called the "Fair Deal" scale.¹³ Patterson, on the other hand, after studying two contradictory hypotheses regarding the ideological positions of party leaders, says that he can find no generally uniform relationship between leadership status and ideological position.¹⁴

Further speculation on ideological positions led to a study by Sullivan in which he concluded that, unlike the variables of personality and skill, seniority or regional consideration,

Norms of moderateness and party support are less than crucial variables...patterns of voting in the 84th and 92nd congresses indicate that party leaders are recruited neither on the basis of some party-support criterion, nor according to a strict middleman prescriptive norm.¹⁵

Since there seems to be a lack of agreement on the part of the previous studies, the need for further analysis is indicated.

Sullivan argues that "high party-support is not a very prevalent voting pattern for most, or indeed, even many leaders before their leadership recruitment."¹⁶ He concluded this from comparing Boggs, O'Neill, and McFall with non-leaders from like regions whose party unity scores tended to be higher than the leaders' scores. Sullivan likewise compared the leaders' Conservative Coalition scores,¹⁷ before and after selection, with their non-leader colleagues. In both comparisons he found the leaders moving toward moderateness after selection while the non-leaders' scores indicated little change during the same period of time.¹⁸

Sullivan then asks the question,

Does the change in scores reflect the impact of the leadership position on the voting or is it symptomatic of a more general trend toward moderateness in congressional voting in recent years?¹⁹

He answers this question with, "The movement of leaders toward more moderate positions in the party lacked any parallel

movement among non-leaders.²⁰ In conclusion, he says,

It appears that becoming a party leader does not carry with it the highly supportive voting behavior often thought to be required of a leadership position. The results indicate that not only is the high-party support pattern not a significant criterion shaping leadership selection, but it is not a behavioral outcome associated with the leadership position.²¹

Sullivan then goes on to reject ideology or voting behavior as being a crucial criterion for leadership selection.

Sullivan must be challenged on the following points:

(1) Party unity scores do show clearly that the party leaders, Albert, Boggs, O'Neill and McFall, are strong party members since their party unity scores are higher than those of the party average. (2) The intent of Truman, Hinckley, and Peabody's hypothesis seems to be that it is unlikely that an "extremist" would be recruited as a party leader. Also the implication is that the term "moderate" covers a wide range of ideology but excludes extremism. Sullivan consistently uses the term "strict" when referring to party scores or ideology, thus making his charge as to the inaccuracies of their hypothesis irrelevant since their basic definitions are different. (3) Sullivan's concern that the non-leaders' party unity scores were higher than the leaders' scores led him to conclude that the leaders' scores were not impressive enough to be considered high-support scores. Party unity scores of leaders need not be the highest in the majority party to be impressive or to indicate strong party loyalty. If they were, they might represent a partisanship that some would consider undesirable in potential leaders. In other

words, there is a difference between high party loyalty and strong or consistent party loyalty, the latter being, in all probability, what Truman et.al. had in mind. (4) It is unclear why Sullivan dismissed the possibility that the general congressional trend toward moderateness in recent years might account for a similar phenomenon among the leaders. Instead, he chose to find greater significance in the fact that the non-leaders group did not show the same trend toward moderateness. The fact is, a similar trend toward moderateness did occur among another group of non-leaders, namely that group of non-leaders who challenged the leaders and lost. Additionally, the average party-unity scores and conservative coalition scores of the entire party show a definite trend toward moderateness during the time period of Sullivan's study. He does not make it clear why he chooses to ignore this. There is a highly plausible argument that could be made for the changing trend which occurred within the leadership. An example of the above suggestion is John McFall's noteworthy decline in his opposition to the conservative coalition. There is no proof that this had anything to do with his selection as majority whip. Rather, coincidentally, the issues of these particular congresses, one issue in particular, Vietnam, could well have accounted for his change. As a matter of personal conscience, he strayed from the majority of his party and continued to support administration policies of the war rather than join the rest of the leadership in turning against the administration's policies.²² Additionally, the Nader report on

McFall indicated a definite conservative trend in his district, one which he would have been politically unwise to ignore.²³ (5) Sullivan's basic premise that ideology may have less to do with leadership selection than the other criteria may be correct, but his analysis in support of this reasoning lacks credibility. The hypothesis of the other researchers remains unchallenged.

In order to analyze whether or not party leaders tend to be moderates, some criteria must be established whereby the party leaders can be categorized. The standard used by Hinckley in her 1970 study of party leadership made the following designations. A "conservative" vote less than 40% of the time in opposition to the conservative coalition, a "liberal" vote 80% or more in opposition to the coalition, and a "moderate" vote between 40% and 79% in opposition to the conservative coalition.²⁴

Although these arbitrary designations may be questioned, they suffice nevertheless in establishing a rather loose interpretation of the ideological position of party leaders. Sullivan preferred using stricter criteria and his conclusions were based on those rather than Hinckley's. However, the very nature of ideology, its chameleon character, would seem more fairly and wisely placed within looser restrictions.

Using Hinckley's percentages it can be seen from the conservative coalition Table 2 that only one party leader, John McFall, could be labeled a "liberal", at least for a

time, but that was cancelled by his abrupt conservative swing between 1969 and 1974 when he definitely qualified as a "moderate". His over-all score clearly makes him a moderate, however, Thomas P. O'Neill, though within the designated range for moderate, could by a stricter definition be called a liberal here.

As the table indicates, the total average for the party leaders (69%) is exactly the same as that of the Northern Democrats (69), both being almost in the middle of the moderate range. A further study could conceivably analyze a table such as this and come up with the hypothesis that it is not party leaders' averages that are important, but only individual leader's averages in establishing leader selection criteria. However, there may be a special significance to the leaders' averages being a criterion for selection. It could be argued that there should be a variation in individual leader's scores so that there is a balance and they are collectively moderate.)

It is possible that Sullivan's hypothesis is true, that leaders become more moderate after attaining leadership positions than before selection and that moderateness, therefore, is not a criterion for selection. However, even his own data, while showing both O'Neill and McFall passing the mark from liberal to moderate after selection, indicate their doing so by the narrowest of percentages. For example, O'Neill's conservative coalition opposition score before selection as whip was 81% and after selection, 77%. A

different interpretation could show those scores to rest in either category both before and after. Five percent could hardly be regarded as a significant difference when related to an individual's ideology.

Both the Party Unity Table and the Conservative Coalition Table reveal strong party loyalty and moderateness on the part of the leaders of the majority party of the House of Representatives. If the hypothesis can be proven that a party leader is more moderate than he was as a recruit, it does not necessarily prove any relationship with the leadership selection process unless that change to moderateness is a consistent phenomenon exclusive to party leaders. The basic hypothesis here, that party leaders must be moderates in order to be selected, is not disturbed. The fact remains that all indications are that party leaders were moderates before selection and continued to be so after selection.

Safe-Seats

Another criterion for the selection of party leaders that has often been listed is the necessity of holding a safe-seat. Peabody says that "holding a safe-seat is a prerequisite for a party leadership position."²⁵ Wolfinger and Hollinger say that the most influential positions in the House are held by members whose districts continue to elect them without regard to national political trends.²⁶ These observations make it necessary to not only define the nature of the safe-seat, but to examine its importance as a

criterion for selection in the formal party leadership positions.

Wolfinger and Hollinger define the Democratic safe-seat as that which meets the following criteria: (1) won by a Democrat in every special and general election since 1940, (2) won by an average of 60% or more of the two-party votes since 1944, (3) won by not less than 55% of the vote in every election since 1946.²⁷

It has been proven that a member must be consistently re-elected in order to acquire the necessary seniority to be eligible for a leadership position. Now it is necessary to examine whether or not these party leaders have actually held safe-seats. Has it been necessary for leaders to have both seniority and a safe-seat?

The difficulty of obtaining the exact percentages by which the four party leaders, Albert, O'Neill, Boggs, and McFall have won in their respective districts every year since their initial elections makes it impossible to determine whether or not they have met the exact criteria of the safe-seat every time as established above. Information is available in enough elections, however, so that the actual point which is being examined here can be sufficiently studied and conclusions can be reached.

Of the four leaders studied here, only Carl Albert and Thomas O'Neill have won their seats in the House by margins that easily fall within those set forth by Wolfinger and Hollinger. For example, Carl Albert has won every general election since 1948 by at least 70 percent of the

vote with the exception of 1968 when he won by only 68 percent.²⁸ In all but a few instances he had only token opposition, having even won handily in the primary elections. Since 1966, with the exception of 1968, he has won re-election by 75 percent of the vote.²⁹

Thomas P. O'Neill, likewise, has had little trouble in his re-election efforts.³⁰ His most difficult election was in 1952, his first campaign for a House seat. Even then, however, he won by receiving 60 percent of the vote. Since 1956 he has received at least 73 percent of the vote in the general elections and five times he has had no Republican opposition. Since 1966 being unopposed, he has received 100 percent of the vote in every general election.

Hale Boggs does not have the record of either Albert or O'Neill in easy re-election.³¹ Although on numerous occasions he has won re-election handily, this was not always the case. In his first bid for re-election he lost, thus interrupting his House career for four years. It is significant that immediately prior to his campaign for majority leader, he won re-election in his home district by a bare 51 percent.(1968) His re-election in 1964, 1966, 1970 were won by an average of 64 percent of the vote. Even if Boggs had won some of his elections by the high percentage of the vote as had Albert and O'Neill, it is still significant that he had trouble at times. He not only was the only one of the four leaders who had lost an election, he was the only one who nearly lost another and at a time when he was

actually a party leader. (He was majority whip at the time. (1968)

John McFall, along with the other three mentioned leaders, has represented a traditionally Democratic district. McFall's district, however, has become increasingly conservative in the 1960s and 70s, which may account for the occasions when he did not win an overwhelming percentage of the vote.³² In the House general election of 1966, McFall won 57 percent of the vote, 54 percent in 1968, and 63 percent in the 1970 election. It can be seen that even though McFall's percentages have been high in the 1970s (he won by 69 percent in 1976 and in 1974 was endorsed by both parties) he has had years when his scores did not meet rule number two nor rule number three in the list of three rules which define a safe-seat. While he continued to build seniority by his consistent re-elections he, like Boggs, did not do so with the majorities of either Albert or O'Neill.

It can be said that the four men under study represented districts that had been traditionally Democratic strongholds,³³ but it cannot be said that all four won their elections with ease. It becomes dubious therefore, whether it is true that representing a safe-seat is necessary for selection for a majority party leadership position. What can be said with accuracy is that the four leaders under study have been returned to the House without interruption ten years prior to their selection for a leadership position, but that occasional close contests in their home districts

did not deter their eventual selection. As party leaders both Boggs and McFall were selected after relatively low percentage victories in the general election.

It may be significant that the average scores for the three general elections, those of 1966, 1968, 1970, show that in the cases of all four leaders, Albert, O'Neill, Boggs, and McFall, the average percentages were over the 55 percent established as the minimum which constitutes the safe-district or safe-seat. Albert and O'Neill were well above that 55 percent minimum while Boggs' average score was 63 percent and McFall's 58 percent. While this may be the score that researchers would consider important in making their point, this view must be faulted since even if the member had lost one election and was then re-elected in the following election, his average score could still have been above 55 percent. Yet, one defeat would hardly establish itself under the heading of a safe-seat. For example, in the case of McFall, had he received 49 percent of the vote in 1968, thereby losing the election, then was re-elected in 1970 by the 63 percent that he actually won by, his average for that three year period would be 56 percent. Yet what is important in determining a safe-seat is the ability to win every election by at least 55 percent. Average percentages would appear to be less significant. It cannot be said, in the 1960s at least, that John McFall held a safe-seat. Certainly Hale Boggs did not represent a safe-seat in 1968. In the cases of Albert and O'Neill, on the other hand,

indications are that their elections would have been secure regardless of any national political controversies which might have adversely affected their colleagues or party.

Contrary to prior research then, it must be said here that the safe-seat, although desirable, is not necessary for selection to a party leadership position. More specifically appropriate to this study, it has been established that all four of the party leaders in this study did not represent safe-seats. The only common thread here is that all four leaders were consistently returned to Congress ten years prior to their selection as leaders in their party and therefore, acquired sufficient seniority to be eligible for leadership positions.

Committee Membership

Little has been written about the importance of committee membership as a criterion for leadership selection. Nevertheless, because of the importance of committees, it is likely that a member's reputation would be a reflection, in part, of his work or contributions to committee work. His reputation here would surely affect his chances or eligibility for leadership.

It is a well known fact that the work of the House is done in committees. When a freshman congressman arrives for his first term in the House he will, in all likelihood, make an effort to be assigned to a committee appropriate to his own expertise or one which will enable him to serve the needs of his district. Certain members may jealously seek a

position on one of the so-called exclusive committees (Rules, Ways and Means, or Appropriations) or one of the semi-exclusive committees (Agriculture, Public Works, Armed Services, Banking and Currency, Education and Labor, Foreign Affairs, Interstate Commerce, Judiciary, Post Office, Science and Space Administration).

Even though tradition dictates that a freshman will not be appointed to one of the exclusive committees, many members quickly go to work trying to lay the ground work for eventual appointment to one of these committees. Those who soon become familiar with the traditions of the House learn that assignment to an exclusive, or next best, a semi-exclusive committee, is advantageous to their careers and may enhance their chances to elevate themselves to a leadership position.

All but one of the majority party leaders of the time period of this study served as a member of one of the exclusive committees and, moreover, were appointed to these committees very early in their House careers. The fourth leader served on a semi-exclusive committee. There is insufficient evidence to establish the exact reason behind the luck of their assignments. No doubt many of them happened to know the right person who was influential in helping them. Nevertheless, the fact remains that all of the majority party leaders have had experience on the prestigious committees.

Thomas P. O'Neill was chosen to serve on the Rules

Committee after only one term in the House, being the second member in the history of the House to be appointed after such a short tenure.³⁴ Hale Boggs was selected for the Ways and Means Committee after a similar period of service in the House.³⁵ This was unusual considering that, on the average, members have served at least three terms and more generally five terms before being appointed to this committee.³⁶ John McFall received an appointment to the Appropriations Committee in the third term of his service in the House. Carl Albert, the only leader who was not a member of an exclusive committee, served on the Agriculture Committee from his early years in the House until he became majority leader.³⁷

Service on the three exclusive committees gives an individual committee member a relatively higher degree of exposure to senior party leaders, a factor which later will be established as being critical to the career plans of an aspiring leader. The business of the Rules Committee, for example, is such that continuous coordination with party leaders is essential if the party-sponsored bills are to become legislation. Further, the Ways and Means Committee, influential because of its role as the Committee on Committees charged with all committee assignments (along with the party leaders) provides the member with a potentially powerful role as well as significant opportunity to acquire a high profile.

The point which must be emphasized here is that potential leaders are apt to find service on the important

committees as beneficial if they hope to become leaders, and it would seem necessary that they serve on those committees permitting the greatest amount of exposure of their talents. More to the point of this paper, however, is that all four leaders mentioned above were chosen very early in their careers to serve on the prestigious committees of the House.

"Extra-curricular" Activities

In addition to serving on an exclusive or semi-exclusive committee, these party leaders were inclined to distinguish themselves in other ways. Significant here has been participation in extra-curricular activities that in some way single them out early as having not only energy, but ambition as well as talent. This participation may not only have represented the above qualities, but may have indicated a loyalty to their role as a Representative, or further, it may have represented leadership aspirations.

There were numerous ways that these leaders distinguished themselves in activities other than the basic work load of the House. They may have: (1) been expert or active floor debaters pursuing causes with more than average energy and acumen, thus attracting the attention of their party and its leaders; (2) accepted party assignments that may have originally been assigned on a regional basis, and they may have performed them particularly well; (3) accepted appointments to joint or conference committees; (4) built intense personal friendships and loyalties; (5) become expert in a particular area of legislation; or (6) impressed senior party

leaders with their ability.

Brief sketches will show that all four of the leaders studied here qualify in nearly all categories. Those categories in which they all absolutely qualified will be singled out for placement among the common denominators peculiar to those who attain leadership positions, thus further reducing the number of members of the majority party who become eligible for party leadership positions.

Carl Albert

Albert, aged 38 when elected to the House, was known for his particularly hard work on the Agriculture Committee in the days when Sam Rayburn was Speaker.³⁸ Additionally, because of his oratorical skills dating back to college days, he became an extremely effective floor debater which brought him to the attention of Rayburn. Because of the proximity of Albert's district to Rayburn's, the two had interests in common even though representing two different states. As a result of a friendship which developed between the two and the obvious confidence that Rayburn had in Albert, Rayburn chose Albert to be majority whip in 1955. This close association which led to this appointment was referred to by Fischer as a father-son relationship.³⁹

Peabody says that Rayburn was also impressed with Albert's single-minded dedication to the House; that is, Albert never indicated any intention of abandoning a House career for other public office.⁴⁰ (Even though it may be difficult to prove that this appealed to Rayburn, it is

nevertheless true that Rayburn was known to have valued this kind of dedication and there is speculation that this caused him to by-pass Hale Boggs, an obvious contender for the whip position. Rayburn may have been annoyed at Boggs' entry as a gubernatorial candidate in Louisiana in 1962).

Albert became known for his ability to know members, call them by their first names and generally keep a high profile. His exposure and obvious interest in the House and its individual members resulted in his being chosen in 1970 as the most popular Democratic Congressman in the House.⁴¹

Albert was apparently not only dedicated to the House but to the work of the House as well, working as he did six out of seven days per week. This is not necessarily characteristic of all House members, especially of those who commute from other eastern cities to their jobs at the Capitol. Many of these long hours were spent attending sessions of the House, which he attended faithfully, observing procedures and the conduct of his colleagues. Said Albert of his own climb up the leadership ladder:

I guess you could say that the main element in my climb to the leadership is the fact that I've heard more speeches than anyone else and called more people by their first names. I've always been fascinated by them. There are so many variances and eccentricities. I got so I could guess within a few votes how they would vote on any given issue.⁴²

Hale Boggs

Boggs, aged 26 when first elected to the House, made an early impressive record in the House in much the same way as Albert, that is, as a forceful floor debater. Later he

gained a reputation for his ability to preside over the House in the absence of the Speaker. Peabody says:

He remained one of the few who could preside over the House and obtain almost instant attention with a quiet rap of the gavel...if any one trait could have been said to characterize Boggs, it was forcefulness.⁴³

Neil MacNeil said, along the same vein, that only certain men in the House in the 1960s could command the attention of their colleagues in the House chambers. Among a few other, he says, Hale Boggs could pull his colleagues from their cloakrooms to hear what he had to say.⁴⁴

Boggs gained a reputation over the years as being an expert in the area of trade and economic policy. This expertise made him an important member of the Joint Economic Committee and Chairman of the Joint Sub-Committee in Foreign Economic Policy. Additionally, he was appointed to the Warren Commission which investigated the John Kennedy assassination (1964), the Eisenhower Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (1958), and was chairman of the Platform Committee for the 1968 Democratic National Convention.⁴⁵

Boggs, like Albert, gained the favor of Speaker Rayburn and likewise became a protege of Rayburn's.⁴⁶ When Rayburn appointed Albert whip in 1955, he created the position of deputy whip and gave it to Boggs who probably saw this as a special favor although at the same time may have felt he was more in line for the whip position than Albert. Still, he must have known that Rayburn was impressed with him

if only from the knowledge that a position had been created for him.

Thomas P. O'Neill

O'Neill, elected to the House at age 38, and appointed to the Rules Committee after only one congressional term, was clearly a favorite of John McCormack.⁴⁷ McCormack always included O'Neill in his strategy planning meetings and often invited him to join in his private meetings with senior party members. O'Neill remained loyal to party leaders on domestic issues but was the leader, in later years, of a revolt against the policies on Vietnam of both Albert and Boggs. He actually voted against them on every war related issue only to have many party leaders follow him eventually.⁴⁸ Even though this may represent a certain lack of loyalty to the Speaker, it is a tribute to his forceful ability to convince the other leaders of his views.

In 1970 he became the Democratic Party Campaign Chairman and won the respect of party members by distributing funds fairly regardless of the candidates' political philosophies. He was also instrumental in many of the reforms in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970.⁴⁹

O'Neill is not a quiet man, but rather a dynamic, forceful, and highly partisan individual who makes his opinions known with enough effectiveness to be highly persuasive. He, like the other leaders, has kept a high profile and accumulated many friends and intense loyalties.⁵⁰

John J. McFall

John McFall, elected to Congress at age 38, gained a position on the Appropriations Committee early in his career. Seniority put him in a position of eventually becoming chairman of the Committee on Transportation, a sub-committee of the larger Appropriations Committee. Indications are that for one who eventually gained a formal leadership position, McFall kept a relatively low profile, not often speaking out in committee or having an exemplary record in the authorship of laws.⁵¹

McFall became active in the whip hierarchy early in his career.⁵² It was here where his extra-curricular activities grew. In 1962 he became assistant whip for California, one of 18 such positions throughout the country. John Moss, a fellow California Congressman, had become a deputy whip by 1962 and in his absence, or for one reason or another, McFall often substituted or stepped in when Moss was needed elsewhere. McFall even occasionally filled in for Carl Albert as acting majority leader. At the same time, McFall continued to be loyal to and worked closely with Boggs, whom he supported in the latter's race for majority leader. When Boggs became majority leader, O'Neill was appointed whip and McFall moved up to become a deputy whip along with John Brademus of Indiana. In 1973 McFall rose to become majority whip with many years of experience in the whip business.

McFall, in his capacity as deputy whip, had numerous occasions to work closely with Majority Leader O'Neill in

assisting him on the House floor mustering votes. Extensive floor exposure had surely made members of the House more aware of him than before. Additional personal contact made it easier to gather support for his own campaign for the whip position even though it was and still is an appointive position.

McFall acknowledges that he was a protege of Carl Albert. If he was given early recognition, the respect of a senior leader, especially one who seemed in line for the speakership, probably was significant.⁵³ That respect may have been great enough to have been partially responsible for McFall's rise in leadership ranks.

Extensive biographies of members of the House of Representatives are almost non-existent. For that reason it is difficult to obtain a complete list of all of the activities that these particular men have participated in. No doubt all of them have long lists of individual assignments that are not readily available to the researcher. However, it is not difficult to obtain an impression as to the level of activity or participation of each member studied.

The following is a list of the common denominators in the area of extra-curricular activities that the party leaders shared that may account, at least in part, for their rise in the leadership hierarchy. They can be considered, therefore, as necessary qualifications for leadership selection.

1. All of the above leaders entered the House of

- Representatives before the age of 40.
2. All of the individuals served an apprenticeship, became proteges, or were singled out for attention by a party leader who was or had served as Speaker of the House of Representatives.
 3. All served in some capacity or performed some task that could be considered to be above the normal legislative load.
 4. All had served as majority whip.
 5. All who eventually reached the rank of majority leader were considered to be forceful and dynamic floor debaters.

Leadership Potential

It has been shown thus far that the possession of seniority, protege status, party loyalty, certain committee assignments, moderateness and extra activities have been common characteristics of those selected for leadership positions from 1962-1976. With the exception of protege status and certain extra assignments, these qualities may not have been unique nor peculiar to majority party leaders only. Certainly other members of the majority party had adequate seniority, desirable committee assignments, and other qualifications that might have made them eligible to become party leaders. It is possible, also, that other members might have had the proper credentials that would have made them eligible for leadership in another style. (This latter point will be elaborated later.) What is important here is that there

obviously remain other qualities or characteristics that selected party leaders had that further separated them from their colleagues, thus confirming their eligibility. That quality can be called leadership potential.

Aside from being the most difficult characteristic to assess or even define, leadership potential, for purposes of this study, must be de-studied vis-a-viz its affect on the collegial style or vice versa. That is, it is not sufficient to define leadership potential as an element unto itself, but rather as it relates to the style which provided its backdrop.

It must be said at the outset that studies are probably more limited in this area regarding individual leaders than in any other element of congressional leadership.⁵⁴ However, three individuals who have written extensively on House leadership, Peabody, Polsby, and Ripley, have done so while they were in Washington D.C. for the express purpose of studying party leadership. While there are a few others who have made similar studies, it is these three who have probably written more extensively in the particular areas which are now in question.⁵⁵

While all of the 435 members of the House of Representatives likely possess a certain degree of leadership ability or they would not be members of Congress, leadership among one's constituents and leadership among one's peers require different qualifications. It is quite unlikely that all possess the unique leadership traits that make them eligible for party leadership positions.

If one were to poll all House members, it is reasonable to assume that many might express little or no desire to achieve a leadership position. The lack of personal ambition might reduce the list of potential leaders considerably. Because their personal goal may be to rise only to that level in the majority party where they can effectively serve their constituents and be consistently re-elected, they may have little or no leadership ambition. Further, the location of their district may disqualify them and inhibit any desire that might otherwise be there.⁵⁶ Therefore, for reasons that are impossible to discover here, party members may simply lack the will, energy, or desire to rise in the party leadership hierarchy.

Certain members who are eligible for leadership positions may find it more to their liking to rise to their committee's chairmanship. For example, even though Wilbur Mills was thought by his colleagues to possess leadership qualities, he did not choose to run for formal party leadership, being quite content with his role as Chairman of Ways and Means.⁵⁷ Many Southern Democrats, ineligible for leadership positions because of lack of moderateness, hardly suffer since they often acquire chairmanships through their seniority.

It is almost impossible to establish the time when desire to achieve high positions began on the part of party leaders, unless one were to personally interview those men. Surely there are instances where members of the majority

party embarked on a path which they hoped would lead to leadership the minute they were elected to Congress. Still others may not have realized the possibility until they were appointed to a lesser party position (such as zone whip). It seems reasonable to speculate that as re-election became easier each time, accumulated seniority and a respectable position on a prestigious committee became realities, the idea to achieve a formal majority party position may have come within the realm of possibility.

Equally as difficult to determine, without the benefit of personal interview, is the reason why they wished to become party leaders. In some cases, their ascent may have been quite accidental. Their colleagues, recognizing leadership ability, may have encouraged them through personal appeal. In some cases, an inner drive for personal power may have been present. Still others may have sought high position because they were dissatisfied with the leadership candidates at the time.

While those aspiring for leadership positions were obviously ambitious, others, for one reason or another, lacked the qualities, the behavior and determination characteristic of the aspiring leaders. Obviously, here we will not readily find common denominators, but the question must still be asked: in what way did their personalities, their skills, and ambition combine to make party leaders successful in their quest for leadership positions? Further, if some of these qualities were not as strong as others, which proved

the most important for that candidate? Through the use of biographical analysis, a general impression of the leaders will help to answer the question.

Carl Albert

It was shown earlier that Albert spent a great deal of time on the floor of the House observing his colleagues in action. He came to know their personalities well and to predict where they would stand on certain issues. He made it a point to get to know each party member and had a reputation of helping members when he could by granting political favors and helping them with their "pet" bills. He was also noted for the interest he took in the welfare of his colleagues.⁵⁸ These personal traits and activities on the part of Albert could undoubtedly be interpreted by some as Albert's way of recognizing early in his career the need for a deep knowledge of the House if one were to become a party leader. Without the benefit of an extensive personal biography of Albert, however, that presumption cannot be made. We can only assume that he either had a natural curiosity about people and their behavior or he felt this kind of knowledge was beneficial to the every day workings of the House of Representatives.

Albert's personal popularity is in evidence in any and all literature about him.⁵⁹ His own personal practice of loyalty toward his colleagues is surely part of the reason behind that popularity. For example, when it was suggested that he run against John McCormack for the speakership upon

the death of Sam Rayburn, his reply was, "I would never do that against John McCormack. Mr. Rayburn and Mr. McCormack picked me and made me whip, and to run against Mr. McCormack would have to be the act of an ingrate."⁶⁰

Albert's affability as a human being led to a comment which apparently summed up a general feeling about him; "Nobody's made at Carl."⁶¹ This stemmed, perhaps, from Albert's reluctance to be disagreeable when his opinion conflicted with others. No doubt this was interpreted occasionally as a weakness, but it apparently enhanced rather than hurt his popularity.⁶² In part, then, Albert's popularity may have been the result of an inoffensive nature which may have been a relief to a House often riddled with petty jealousies and ambitions.

Peabody refers to the importance of a subtle display of competence or intelligence as being an admirable quality and one which is valued by House members.⁶³ Those members who openly display or flaunt their superior abilities are often rejected by their colleagues when leadership races occur. Evidence is that whatever abilities or talents Albert had, he made no effort to display them in an offensive manner.

In Albert's campaign for majority leader in 1962, his strategy seemed to have suited his style. That is, the acceleration of the habit that had so long been his, namely personal member-to-member contact, was in keeping with his life-long congressional practice of becoming personally involved with his colleagues. Albert's main strategy

consisted of telegraphing all House members as soon as he had decided to run for majority leader upon Rayburn's death. Not only did he telegraph, but he telephoned each of the members individually asking for their support. Polsby refers to this strategy as an "inside" appeal as opposed to the "outside" effort of appealing to organizations external to the House for support.⁶⁴

Albert's strategy may have been based on the presumption that his own popularity was his greatest asset, or it may have been the result of a keen awareness of the merit of appealing to those who actually make the selection. For whatever the reasons, Albert concentrated his energy toward persuading his colleagues, rather than outside groups, to support him in the race for majority leader.

Albert's support during his campaign for majority leader consisted of many loyal friends in the Oklahoma delegation as well as those whom he had personally helped throughout his years in the House.⁶⁵ Polsby cites many of the reasons for that kind of support taken from personal interviews of majority party members. These comments offer insights into reasons why certain members voted the way they do in leadership selection contests. The following are comments from those interviews:

He's done so many things for people. They trust him. They think of him, "Here's a man I can talk to when I need help." When the members go about picking a leader, they want personal services, not intellectuals.⁶⁶

. . . . Albert developed quite a genius for knowing what people would do Another service he performed endears him to people. Carl's the kind of a guy everybody could find. He would talk to the leadership for the rank-in-file Congressman.⁶⁷

Albert's approach to legislative matters is, well, everybody ought to vote his own district He brings his friends and his enemies in to vote both Why the hell get a certain (southern Congressman) out to vote? He doesn't vote with us on anything. And he's a deputy whip! It's ridiculous . . . the function of the whip (under Albert) is room service to members.⁶⁸

Albert got on the phone and tracked me down in the frozen wastes of northern Rocky state the first day after the Speaker was buried. You wouldn't think politicians would fall for that but many of them did. They were impressed by the fact that he'd called them first. As a result, he was able to line up a lot of members, including many northern bleeding heart liberals in the first few days.⁶⁹

Carl has been very kind to me in the committee work and has done several things for me which have been very important for my people.⁷⁰

He is not only my neighbor but a member of my own committee and with it all a fine, able conscientious man who has been doing the dirty work for the leadership for a long time.⁷¹

Polsby quotes several members who felt that Albert deserved the position because of his service for six years as the party whip which not only gave him the support of the whip hierarchy, but gave him an active, highly visible role.⁷² While some accounts of whip activity under Albert indicate that Albert did not use the whip position as extensively as did later whips for its intended purpose, his role as whip is a constant reference by many members who thought he had "earned the position of majority leader."⁷³ (It may be that Albert's role as whip was not as thoroughly

studied, thus accounting for the scant references to his performance in political studies. Evidently, however, certain members felt that his service as whip warranted promotion which indicates that, if nothing else, he was highly visible in that role). The following comments by his colleagues emphasizes his role as whip:

Because I feel that he was entitled to it by reason of his effective part in the leadership of the House along with the Speaker and Mr. McCormack, I promised him my support.⁷⁴

I made a commitment to Carl based on his years of service as whip and the fact that he was in line for this⁷⁵ job from the standpoint of his long service as whip.

As one of his deputy whips, I feel committed to Carl Albert.⁷⁶

Albert's personal popularity, his service as whip, and his party loyalty all contributed to his selection as majority leader. Additionally, he had only one opponent, Richard Bolling of Missouri, who later withdrew from the race thus making Albert's selection unanimous. Of great significance also, is the fact that he evidently had the support of John McCormack although the latter did not publicly endorse Albert. According to Polsby:

Mr. Albert had an important further asset-- the apparent backing of John McCormack. "I have heard McCormack say again and again that we have to have a team player," one congressman said. "I guess he means by that a member of his team, and I suppose he favors Carl Albert." I asked a newspaperman who was following the situation closely to tell me who the most important congressman on Mr. Albert's side was, and he replied, "John McCormack".⁷⁷

In summary, Albert, who had all of the basic qualifications in order, won largely because of his own

personality and personal popularity coupled with his skill at capitalizing on the qualities that made him popular in the first place.

Hale Boggs

Hale Boggs represents the kind of candidate who, while lacking the great personal popularity of Albert, nevertheless managed to be appointed whip and later elected majority leader by the Democratic caucus. He is an example of a party leader who was elected in spite of numerous obstacles, most of which occurred immediately preceding his selection as majority leader.

As was noted earlier, Boggs had been chosen deputy whip by Rayburn who created that position for him. When Albert became majority leader, Boggs was chosen to be majority whip. The background events leading to this latter selection are not available although it can be assumed that his role as deputy whip placed him in good standing.

The degree of leadership potential which can be ascribed to Boggs is more difficult to assess than Albert's because of Boggs' own behavior throughout his years in the House. That behavior can safely be described as erratic, more notably so during his last few years as a Representative.⁷⁸ His earlier years, however, certainly proved to be significant to his eventual selection as a party leader since by the time he was chosen for a leadership position, his personal behavior had become quite suspect in the eyes of many of his

colleagues.

Boggs' forcefulness and oratorical ability had made him a very persuasive and prominent member of the House. As mentioned earlier, Boggs was able to find a ready audience when he chose to speak on the floor, and indications are that it was not only his oratorical skill that made him impressive, but also the content of the oratory. Additionally, according to Peabody,

Almost every member conceded that Boggs made a vigorous floor presentation and projected well on national television shows such as "Meet the Press" Aggressive, intelligent, and charming as nearly any House member when he wanted to be. . . .⁷⁹

Peabody also comments that Boggs' "stock-in-trade were intensive personal relationships with members of the House built up over the 26 years he had served in the House."⁸⁰ Apart from having loyal friends, however, some considered him arrogant and unapproachable, at least during certain time periods, and the latter feeling was widespread enough so that it is necessary to further examine Boggs' role in the House to find the reason why he was able to capture a position that might have eventually led to the Speakership.

It is necessary to insert here that Boggs' questionable behavior during his last few years in the House, referred to earlier, was the result of his own personal problem with alcoholism.⁸¹ Apparently, his active congressional life and his involvement in extra activities caused stress sufficient enough to create a need for alcohol to alleviate the pressure. The following are comments of a few

of his colleagues which present a picture of Boggs during this difficult time.

We had this mark-up session in committee--Hale came in, his face flushed; he was coherent, but arrogant as hell--he wanted to monopolize the session. The Chairman just kept quiet and let him run along. It finally seemed to work itself out.⁸²

Boggs came on to the floor--his face was flushed. It was as if he had taken a couple of amphetamines, or a couple of "belts". His arms were pumping up and down.⁸³ He was speaking loudly, but not making much sense.

Hale Boggs--I still can't believe that he's a serious contender. But he's come back some from June. At that time an awful lot of people were very leery of Boggs. . . I'm against Boggs becoming majority leader because he doesn't have sufficient emotional stability to undertake the job.⁸⁴

My normal inclination would have been to support Boggs, but his performance the last year or two--drinking or some sort of carrying on--convinced me he shouldn't be majority leader. I did a little checking around and I decided he couldn't win. He had no solid support, not even in the South. I looked over the other candidates and decided to become one myself.⁸⁵

Boggs had to come out strong, but very early I became convinced he did not have the votes, not even in the South. . . . My honest impression is that Hale Boggs is the least popular of the candidates . . . he has stepped on the toes of too many members, he's arrogant, and last year he must have flipped his lid. Now he's desperately trying to recoup.⁸⁶

If it wasn't for personal weakness of Boggs, his succession to majority leader would be a foregone conclusion. And that pattern is still his greatest asset. I had a liberal tell me today that it was a serious question in his mind as to whether or not we should upset the pattern of moving up from whip to majority leader.⁸⁷

Strangely enough, there are no comments of congressional members about Boggs in Peabody's discussion which are complimentary toward Boggs, thus increasing the mystery as to

the reason for his ultimate victory. (Part of the reason for the lack of comments of this nature in Peabody may be because the research which he was conducting may have been largely concerned with the phenomenon of the possible victory of an individual who was so obviously controversial, but whose credentials of an earlier career were such as to make him an obvious contender.) Yet, even in his earlier career, Boggs gave the appearance of one who was charming and charismatic at once, yet arrogant and condescending. The following comment may shed light on the nature of his arrogance.

His was not the intellectual and moral arrogance of a Morris or Steward Udall; it was a different kind. Boggs felt that once you were elected to the House you were a politician in your own right and past the stage where you needed to be coddled. He just got impatient with other members from time to time.

For want of information which might shed light on the leadership potential of Boggs, it appears that it is necessary to emphasize the appeal of his forceful, dynamic and persuasive deportment on the floor of the House as well as the periodic charm of his personality. There are indications that Boggs also developed strong friendships with older members of the House which may have enabled him to gain the following of an extremely loyal, perhaps partisan, and certainly more senior following.

One could infer from the statements regarding Boggs' personality and his condition later in his life, that he was inordinately ambitious for a leadership position. This cannot be proven as a fact, of course, but the intensity of

his activities and his own desire to stand for election in the majority party when he must have known himself that the stress of his life was taking its toll, show that he was not satisfied merely to represent his Louisiana district. This drive and ambition were probably his greatest asset in the light of his many handicaps.

Under the circumstances, how did Boggs actually win? First, like Albert, he campaigned on an individual member-to-member basis rather than appealing to outside sources for help. Also, he gradually acquired the momentum in his campaign to the degree that the Speaker, while not only openly endorsing Boggs, acknowledged that he was looking like a winner.⁹⁰ Additionally, his closest opponent, Morris Udall, while offering formidable competition, was very junior and had few prior leadership credentials.⁹¹ The other candidates managed to split the rest of the party's vote to the extent that Boggs finally finished with the greatest support.

Again, as with Albert, some members felt that he "deserved" the position by virtue of his service as whip. For others, it may have been a vote for the establishment. Boggs was the one candidate who had been blessed from time to time by senior party leaders and this, along with his personal relationships with senior party members, gave him essential endorsements.⁹²

There is further evidence that Boggs won because he managed to "pull himself together" during his campaign and

restore the earlier faith that his colleagues had in him.⁹³ This may have been helped by the fact that he won his 1970 election in Louisiana with ease rather than by the small margin of 1968. With this pressure gone, the earlier instabilities may have been forgotten.

Obviously, Boggs' leadership potential, which had early manifested itself through his forceful, persuasive personality, made a lasting impression on his colleagues. His ability to capitalize on this, to appeal to his old friends, the senior members, for support, enabled him to become majority leader, via the position of whip.

Thomas P. O'Neill

Personal popularity, often an attribute of people who achieve elected leadership positions, was one of Thomas P. O'Neill's strongest points. In referring to O'Neill's campaign for the majority leadership, (after the disappearance and presumed death of Hale Boggs in 1972), O'Neill's hole-card. . . .was his popularity, deep-seated and widespread."⁹⁴ Additionally, Neil MacNeil speaks of O'Neill's many friends and few enemies and his ability to be "unaffected by Washington power and social structure, of his ability to be as comfortable with presidents as with his colleagues."⁹⁵

Time Magazine, in a story on O'Neill said,

For all his easy manner, O'Neill is a deeply ambitious man, a man completely confident of his ability to lead after his long years of experience in the House. In his early days, the Rules Committee was stalemated by a split between conservatives and liberals. To get any legislation he

supported moving, O'Neill learned House techniques of bargaining, bluffing, pleading and bargaining again.⁹⁶

O'Neill had considered running earlier, in 1970-71, for the majority leadership, although he and his old friend, Edward Boland, could not decide which of them should do so.⁹⁷ As a result, each ended by supporting different candidates in that race, O'Neill supporting Boggs and Boland supporting Udall. Although this indicated a desire on the part of O'Neill to become a majority party leader, his personal request for the whip position was proof of this.

Traditionally, the whip position had been an appointive office. After a brief attempt at making it an elected position, the caucus chose to return to the selection of an appointive whip. O'Neill, went immediately to Boggs, reminding the latter of his support in the majority leader race, and asked Boggs to consider him for the whip position.⁹⁷ O'Neill did not feel secure that he would be selected even after the formal request since there had been rumors that a more junior member might be selected.⁹⁸ However, O'Neill did receive the whip appointment and even though it is impossible to prove, it may have come about as a result of Carl Albert's influence, who was known to like O'Neill. Nevertheless, a particular skill was apparent here, that is, O'Neill's political intuitiveness in seeing the value of actively seeking and asking for the position.

When O'Neill announced his candidacy for the majority leadership position in 1973, he conducted an extensive inside telephone campaign for that position, and received extensive

support early.⁹⁹ His only opposition was Sam Gibbons, a Florida Southern liberal, who chose to run an issue-oriented campaign claiming a need for stronger leadership.¹⁰⁰ Gibbons, in view of the strong support for O'Neill, eventually withdrew from the race. Said Gibbons, "I know better than anyone that Tip doesn't have an enemy in the House."¹⁰¹ Gibbon's style of campaign had not been effective, although O'Neill's personal popularity had probably been Gibbon's greatest stumbling block. Other members, namely, Hays of Ohio, Sisk of California, and Waggoner of Louisiana, had considered running against O'Neill but felt he would be impossible to defeat.¹⁰²

O'Neill, as had the other leaders of this period before him, had appealed to his friends, to the senior establishment, in short, to those who would be making the final selection. This was to be another example of an "inside" campaign. O'Neill's combination of personal popularity and ambition, his reputation for fairness and his ability to persuade, and negotiate for his party accounted for his qualities of leadership. Of these qualities, his popularity seemed to account most for his ultimate selection as majority leader. There is no reason to believe, however, that he would have been selected as his party's whip had he not actively sought and requested it. Additionally, O'Neill, who had been a protege of McCormack was likewise liked and respected by Albert who had helped in his initial selection as whip.¹⁰³ Even without a public endorsement, there is

little doubt that Albert wanted O'Neill as majority leader.¹⁰⁴

John J. McFall

After many years in Congress, certain party members find themselves in positions which may be stepping stones to higher leadership positions. Although in their early years in Congress, they may not have had aspirations for those positions, circumstances along the way made that possibility likely. John McFall is an example of this type of leader.¹⁰⁵

Even though McFall became a member of an important committee early in his career, there were not early signs that he made an extraordinary effort to push himself toward those activities that might make him visible and eligible for leadership positions.¹⁰⁶ However, his strong party loyalty allowed him to be appointed as a zone whip, then deputy whip, and eventually majority whip. Other factors, as well as the above mentioned party loyalty, no doubt accounted for his appointment to the whip position.

McFall has acknowledged that he was a protege of Carl Albert.¹⁰⁷ This, in addition to his strong, loyal work in earlier leadership positions, is largely responsible for his appointment by O'Neill and Albert to that whip position.

McFall does not project an aggressive, outgoing personality and yet he has the reputation of being one of the more popular members of the House with his colleagues.¹⁰⁸ His popularity is not of the same kind as Albert's nor O'Neill's

who were more outspoken and well-known outside the House itself. Rather, he projects a quiet, confident manner, and he attributes his own popularity to the quiet way in which he does favors for his colleagues and the integrity of his word and behavior toward those who have known him for the 20 years that he has served in the House.

McFall revised the many operations of the whip organization in order to enhance its usefulness to the party leaders.¹⁰⁹ In so doing, not only did he prove himself to be a loyal party member and loyal to party leaders, but placed himself in a highly visible position. Interviews with certain members of the majority party confirm this and show that they applauded his efforts at making greater use of the machinery of that office.¹¹⁰

McFall has been criticized from time to time because of his lack of forcefulness and his relatively low profile.¹¹¹ McFall's reaction to those criticisms is that he makes his opinions known where it counts, on the individual member-to-member basis that has become so prevalent in the House. He stresses the point that it is the House of Representatives who select their leaders, not anyone outside that House. He is resentful of those who do not consider him to be a great intellect, another criticism heard from time to time.¹¹² He declares that he has devoted his energies to his district and to his role assisting the majority party leaders, and on this basis developed the experience and expertise to qualify him for higher leadership positions.

With the accidental death of Hale Boggs, Thomas O'Neill was elected majority leader, leaving the whip position open. Both McFall and the other deputy whip, John Brademus, realized that they might have the opportunity to take O'Neill's place as whip.¹¹³

In 1973, when the effort was made to make the whip an elective office, both Brademus and McFall sensed the real possibility that the caucus might approve such a resolution. They both immediately began a campaign to retain the appointive whip position. Additionally, both men campaigned with the possibility in mind that the position, if it became elective, might go to either one of them.

Brademus conducted a more extensive campaign, perhaps because he had few advantages, being younger and less popular than McFall. McFall made fewer phone calls and began his campaign later, but he eventually won.¹¹⁴

The resolution for an elected whip was defeated and McFall was chosen by O'Neill to be the whip. Peabody attributes this appointment to McFall's seniority, his greater popularity and the size of the California delegation which had backed McFall.¹¹⁵ McFall, himself, attributes his selection also to the influence of Speaker Albert.¹¹⁶

McFall's selection as a party leader is indicative again of the importance of personal popularity, in whatever form that popularity may be. In his case, it was a popularity generally based on a quiet, likeable, honest manner, without the dynamism or the floor presence of an O'Neill or a Boggs.

NOTES

Chapter 3

1. The entire body of research used in this study refers to seniority as an absolute qualification for leadership selection.
2. The information given here on the years of service in the House prior to and during the Speaker's term is taken both directly and indirectly from Table 2.1, "Speakers of the House of Representatives" in Robert L. Peabody, Leadership in Congress (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown & Co. 1976), pp. 32-33.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37. Table 2.2, "Majority Leaders of the House of Representatives".
4. Table I, "Party Whips in the House." Robert L. Peabody and Nelson Polsby, (eds.) New Perspectives in the House of Representatives, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), p. 200.
5. David Truman, The Congressional Party, (New York: Wiley, 1959), pp. 106-107 and Barbara Hinckley, "Congressional Leadership Selection and Support: A Comparative Analysis", Journal of Politics, Vol. 32, May 1970, p. 284.
6. All party unity scores have been obtained from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Congressional Quarterly Service, Washington D.C.) Vols. XXI, XXII, XXIII, VXXV, XXX.
7. Ralph Nader Report, Citizens Look at Congress: Thomas P. O'Neill (Grossman Pub. 1972) by Mollie Boast.
8. Peabody, p. 168, Leadership in Congress.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
10. Truman, p. 106.
11. Hinckley, pp. 268-287.
12. Peabody, *Ibid.*, p. 470.

13. Duncan MacRae, Jr. Dimensions of Congressional Voting, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1958), pp. 293-295.
14. Samuel G. Patterson, "Legislative Leadership and Political Ideology", Public Opinion Quarterly, (Vol. 27, 1963), p. 410. The two hypotheses referred to here are (1) the middlemen hypothesis which predicts that legislative leaders will be ideological moderates, and (2) the extremity hypothesis which predicts that legislative leaders will tend to be more extreme ideologically than rank-in-file legislators.
15. William E. Sullivan, "Criteria for Selecting Party Leadership in Congress", American Politics Quarterly, (Vol. 3, No. 1, Jan., 1975), p. 41.
16. Sullivan, *Ibid.*, p. 35.
17. The Conservative Coalition is composed of Republicans and Southern Democrats who vote together on certain roll-call votes. Conservative Coalition scores reflect the percentage of times a member votes against the Coalition.
18. Sullivan, *Ibid.*, p. 39-40.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
22. The information given here regarding McFall is taken from a personal interview.
23. Nader Report: Citizens Look At Congress (Grossman Pub.) 1973, John J. McFall by Lora Jane Glickman, p. 10.
24. Hinckley, p. 282.
25. Peabody, p. 470.
26. Raymond Wolfinger and Joan H. Hollinger, "Safe Seats, Seniority, and Power in Congress" in Polsby and Peabody, New Perspectives in the House of Representatives.
27. Wolfinger and Hollinger, *Ibid.*, p. 60.
28. Peabody, Leadership in Congress, p. 472.
29. John Cerden, "Little Giant from Bug Tussle," Saturday Evening Post, Jan. 1962, p. 95.

30. Nader Report, Citizens Look at Congress: Thomas P. O'Neill (Grossman Pub. 1973) by Mollie Boast.
31. Nader Report, Citizens Look at Congress: Hale Boggs (Grossman Pub. 1970) by Mollie Shryer, p. 17.
32. Nader Report, John McFall, p. 21.
33. Michael Barone, Grant Ujifusa, Douglas Mathews, The Almanac of American Politics, (Boston: Gamlet Publishers, 1972).
34. Nader Report, Thomas P. O'Neill, p. 16.
35. Nader Report, Hale Boggs, p. 15.
36. Nicholas A. Masters, "Committee Assignments:", Polsby and Peabody, op. cit., p. 233.
37. Nader Report, Citizens Look at Congress: Carl Albert, (Grossman Pub. 1972), p. 8, by Louise De Costa Wides. The actual year that Albert was assigned to the Agriculture committee is not available.
38. Peabody, Leadership in Congress, p. 153.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid, p. 154.
41. National Journal, May, 1970 (Unpublished worksheet by the Journal's Center for Political Research. Only 74 out of 245 Democratic Congressmen responded.
42. Quoted in Peabody, p. 154.
43. Ibid., p. 156.
44. Neil MacNeil, Forge of Democracy, op. cit., p. 305.
45. Nader Report, Hale Boggs, p. 15.
46. Ibid.
47. Nader Report, Thomas P. O'Neill, p. 13.
48. Richard Lyons, "The Custodian of the House", Washington Post, Dec. 6, 1971.
49. Nader Report, Thomas P. O'Neill, p. 15.
50. Ibid.

51. Peabody tells here of an incident occurring when McFall was chosen majority whip. Three mid-career Senators approached a more highly visible member of the House and asked, "Who is this fellow McFall?" The member later complained, "And this after 16 years in the House." P. 264f.
52. From an interview with Irving Sprague, Administrative Assistant to the majority whip, Feb. 1975.
53. All of the information regarding John McFall other than specifically noted, was obtained through personal interview.
54. Studies in congressional "leadership potential" would require close observation of party leaders by researchers to gain accurate insights into the reasons why certain leaders are thought by their colleagues to possess that quality. This is difficult since only a few researchers have the opportunity for extended observations of the House operations itself. This point was stressed by Nelson Polsby in a personal interview. He also mentioned Robert Peabody's work as being valuable because of the latter's proximity to Washington D.C. and his access to the activities of the Congress.
55. The writer's personal observations of the House of Representatives will be used here from time to time, but they are valuable only in the area of general impressions since the time period of the visit was extremely short. Several interviews with John McFall however, have proved extremely valuable.
56. Conservative Southern Democrats are an example of this point.
57. National Journal, (May, 1970) conducted a poll among members of the House to find those members who were thought by their colleagues to possess the most leadership qualities. Specifically, the question the poll asked was: "Regardless of your personal feelings toward the individuals, who would you say are the three Democratic congressmen with the strongest leadership ability?" The results were as follows:

| | |
|--------------------|-----|
| Mills, Ark. | 104 |
| Albert, Okla. | 68 |
| Udall, Ariz. | 57 |
| Bolling, Mo. | 18 |
| O'Hara, Mich. | 17 |
| Fraser, Minn. | 15 |
| Boggs, La. | 11 |
| Edmondson, Okla. | 9 |
| Rostenkowski, Ill. | 8 |

(composite score: 3 pts., first choice; 2 pts. second choice; 1 pt. third choice.)

58. William Chapman, "Carl Albert: Winning With a Waiting Game." The Washington Post, (Jan. 10, 1971).
59. In the research conducted for this thesis regarding Albert, his personal popularity was the most commonly mentioned factor. Researchers may have disagreed on other points about him, but never on his popularity.
60. Polsby, "Two Strategies of Influence" in Peabody, op. cit., p. 75.
61. Peabody, Leadership in Congress, p. 155.
62. The criticisms of Albert as being a weak leader have probably been more prominent since he became Speaker than prior to his selection.
63. Peabody, Ibid., p. 66.
64. Polsby, Ibid., p. 66.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., p. 81
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid., p. 76.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid., p. 75.
72. Ibid., p. 74.
73. The whip organization has been thoroughly studied only by Randall Ripley and that study was done while Hale Boggs was whip.
74. Polsby, Ibid.
75. Ibid., p. 75.
76. Ibid., p. 75
77. Ibid., p. 77.
78. Peabody, p. 157.

79. Ibid., p. 158.
80. Ibid.
81. This information obtained from interview with Polsby.
82. Peabody, p. 157.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid., p. 158.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid., p. 157.
89. Peabody sees Boggs' support by the senior establishment members as being the key to his victory., p. 219. Boggs' party loyalty, his service as whip, and his acknowledged support of the status quo probably comforted his senior colleagues, according to Peabody., p. 220.
90. Peabody, p. 220.
91. Morris Udall's credentials will be presented later.
92. Peabody's line-up of the categorization of establishment and change-oriented members of the majority party reveal more establishment members, thus accounting for more votes for Boggs, p. 220-221.
93. Peabody, p. 230.
94. Ibid., p. 237.
95. Neil MacNeil, "The Impeachment Congress: House Leader 'Tip' O'Neill", Time, Feb. 4, 1974, pp. 14-22.
96. Ibid., p. 20.
97. Peabody, p. 239.
98. Peabody, pp. 218-219
O'Neill thought Hugh Carey of New York might receive the appointment but Peabody says that the New York delegation apparently resented the pace at which Carey was moving up in the House. This, in itself, tells a great deal about leadership selection. Also, O'Neill held a grudge, apparently, against Udall for running against McCormack in 1969 and this may have been one of O'Neill's reasons for supporting Boggs.

99. Peabody, Ibid., p. 241.
100. Ibid., p. 242.
101. Quoted in Peabody, p. 241.
102. Ibid.
103. Albert had concurred in Boggs' selection of O'Neill as whip.
104. McFall told this to the writer when questioned him about O'Neill.
105. This is an impression gleaned from Irving Sprague, McFall's Administrative Assistant in the whip office.
106. Ibid.
107. In personal interview with McFall.
108. Peabody, p. 252.
109. Sprague spoke of the whip organization becoming more "professionalized" under McFall. He himself, Sprague, was an example of this, having been a long time White House and Congressional Staff member. In Ripley's study of the whip organization, there is no indication that the whip office was quite as formal an organization as it appeared to be under McFall. (This is an impression.) McFall added the "Whip Notice" as a new innovation, a more concentrated digest of current bills.

Re: Randall Ripley, "The Party Whip Organization in the House of Representatives" in Nelson Polsby, Congressional Behavior. op. cit.
110. The interviewed six majority party members picked at random, and they were extremely complimentary of McFall's efforts as whip. Four of the six said that he was the best whip the House had ever had.
111. McFall acknowledged this of himself in one interview.
112. He became quite excited in defense of himself on this issue. Personal interview.
113. Peabody, p. 252.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid., p. 253.
116. In personal interview, McFall acknowledged the Speaker's support.

Chapter 4

CHARACTERISTICS OF THOSE WHO CHALLENGED THE PARTY LEADERS AND FAILED

Many of the individuals who challenged eventual winners in majority party leadership contests between 1962 and 1976 possessed certain qualities in common with the winners.¹ This fact is especially significant because it is indicative that not only did party leadership winners have an impressive list of credentials, but the same was true of those who chose to run against them. This confirms earlier research on congressional leadership which asserts what might seem obvious to most students, namely, that selection within the majority party is a complex phenomenon.

From 1962 until 1976, several majority party members were involved in leadership contests characterized by a certain amount of suspense, yet resulting in no dramatic change of style. Only one contest, however, can be said to have kept members in suspense up until the final balloting, and that was the race for majority leader in 1970. This contest developed as the result of the announcement of retirement plans by Speaker John McCormack. The majority leader's position was to be vacated with the presumed advancement of Carl Albert to the Speakership.

Several members announced their plans to run for the

majority leader position, and it is these men whose characteristics will now be studied. Aside from Hale Boggs, the winner, the men who ran were Morris Udall of Arizona, James O'Hara, Michigan, B. F. Sisk, California, and Wayne Hays of Ohio. In addition to these men, Richard Bolling made an attempt to stop the seemingly automatic elevation of Carl Albert to the speakership in 1969 and his qualifications will be studied along with the others. The basic qualifications of the losers can be found in Table 3. Additional information regarding the losers, which may be helpful in establishing their leadership potential begins below.

Morris Udall

Udall, according to Peabody, was the leading contender to Hale Boggs throughout the entire campaign.² This is significant in view of the fact that Udall was the most junior of all of the contenders with only nine years of seniority. This was far below the average seniority of anyone who had held that office in the 20th century. Not only was Udall seeking the majority leader position, he had earlier challenged John McCormack for the speakership (1969) with even less seniority, although Udall himself acknowledged that his effort was in protest to what he considered to be weak leadership. Nevertheless, there were indications that while his challenge to McCormack was applauded by some, it was deeply resented by the older, establishment members.³ The fact that his move was resented at all is further indication of the demand for seniority that has been prevalent

in the House.

While Udall lacked seniority, he did not lack ambition. There is evidence that he entered the House with the hope of rising to the leadership someday.⁴ Even though his challenge to McCormack may have been a symbolic move, it is obvious that he had definite aspirations for leadership. His early candidacy for majority leader confirmed this.

Udall was not a member of one of the prestigious committees, although this does not necessarily mean that the committees on which he served were not of his choice. His committees, Post Office and Civil Service, and Interior and Insular Affairs, were among the least sought after House committees, yet they may have represented Udall's interests and constituent needs. Udall, however, distinguished himself on these committees by exhibiting admirable expertise.⁵

As can be seen from both the Party Unity and Conservative Coalition Tables, Udall was a party loyal, a moderate, but relatively liberal. His membership in the Democratic Study Group, a House group composed of northern liberals, confirmed his interest in liberal, change-oriented legislation and procedures.⁶

None of the limited information on Udall gives any indication that his personality was objectionable aside from a reference to a kind of maoral sanctimony referred to earlier in this paper. It is not difficult to infer that there may have been a kind of resentment at his rapid rise in the House of the sort that certain members felt toward new

members, but there is no direct reference to this other than certain objections to his challenge to Speaker McCormack. It is known that he developed an extremely loyal following, especially among younger, change-oriented members.⁷

In general, Udall gained quite a distinguished reputation in the House. Even though his qualifications were not in order, as were those of Boggs and older more senior members, it is true that his colleagues recognized his leadership ability. Lacking in the other qualities, it seems quite probably that it was this quality, leadership potential, that enabled Udall to provide Boggs with formidable opposition. His described in this way by Peabody:

. . . , he was widely regarded as one of the most articulate speakers in the House. Udall combined technical mastery of legislation with a quick mind, a wry, engaging sense of humor. All these qualities⁸ were prime requisites for a successful floor leader.

It is clear, from other views presented by Peabody, that Udall was indeed change-oriented and seemed to feel a great dedication to interrupting those traditions of the House which he felt were obstructing the effectiveness of the leadership and procedures of the House itself. This point he projected clearly, but it is not clear what he felt his chances were of succeeding in this. Obviously, in his campaign for the position, it was necessary for him to make an appeal to the newer and younger members whose loyalties were split between himself and James O'Hara, another change-oriented liberal. Udall did make the effort to gain the support of these members and had he gained the support of as

many of them as he thought he had on his side, he might have won. In the end, however, it seems apparent that a significant number of those members went to the side of Boggs.

In the light of what some might consider to be naivete on the part of Udall in presuming that he could win a leadership contest with his own junior status, (he could have qualified for the whip position with his seniority), the case could be made for criticizing his inability to sense the temper of the House and being unwilling to wait for some future time when the likelihood of his winning might have been more real. Nevertheless, the fact remains that he was Boggs' greatest threat and remained so until the end. Because of his premature aspirations, he may have spoiled future chances for a leadership position if House members should choose to "punish" him for his presumptuous behavior.

In general, however, of all of the candidates for the majority position during that year, Udall clearly stands out as being the candidate possessing the greatest leadership potential, using the same criteria for that qualification that were used earlier for the party leaders.⁹

Richard Bolling

Of all of the candidates who ran for party leadership positions and lost who are being studied in this paper, Richard Bolling had, perhaps, more basic qualifications in order than any of the other members. He had adequate seniority, 22 years of service in the House, had been a protege of Sam Rayburn, served on the Rules Committee, was an

intellectual, an expert on the operation and function of the Congress, had gained much leadership experience while serving with Rayburn, and was respected for his great knowledge and expertise in many areas of legislation. In addition to these qualities, Bolling had been a loyal party member although he made numerous suggestions to modernize the operation of the House and the majority party which may have ultimately offended his colleagues.¹⁰ If nothing else, it was indicative of his being change-oriented as opposed to being purely an establishment member.

With all of his obvious qualifications, Bolling lacked the ability to rally majority party members to his side because of a personality which offended rather than impressed his colleagues.¹¹ Personality, as a quality which has been considered part of leadership potential here, seemed to be the single greatest handicap of Richard Bolling, although in no way can it be said that it erased all of his leadership abilities. His personality simply seemed to have prevented him from exercising the influence that his other leadership qualities might have allowed him to pursue. Following are some comments of his colleagues which, while they do not necessarily describe his personality, do reflect certain personality characteristics as perceived by those who worked with him, and they confirm his abilities in other areas:

Bolling loves the House. He loves it and has studied it. He has read everything that has been written about the House and has studied its power structure. He has a brilliant mind.¹²

I dare you to find a member of Congress who said Bolling had lifted a finger for him.¹³

Bolling's got a sort of chip on his shoulder.¹⁴

The thing you have to realize about Bolling is that he never bothers to speak to anyone else. I don't think Bolling understands politics.¹⁵

Despite a good deal of charm, Bolling just does not have a personality that inspires loyalty and friendship among men.¹⁶

Bolling's chief disadvantage, his personality, surely kept him from acquiring leadership positions. The combination of this and the fact that he might have been considered more a change-oriented party member than an establishment member (he authored two books which were critical of the House operations) placed him in a personally frustrating position in terms of his own leadership aspirations. Bolling was, however, a loyal party member if the Party Unity scores are a true indication of this even though his scores are not as impressive as those of the party leaders.

Bolling's appeal to "outside" sources during his campaign for the Speakership, cited by Polsby, did not compete effectively with Albert's "inside" efforts. However, it is doubtful if the nature of his campaign was the true reason for his defeat, considering the adverse reaction of so many of his colleagues to his personality and his recommendations for change. It may be that he conducted this outside campaign with the knowledge that it might provide his greatest hope for achieving a leadership position.

Wayne Hays

It is doubtful that Wayne Hays of Ohio was ever considered a serious contender for majority leader in 1970 by anyone but himself.¹⁷ While possessing considerable seniority, 22 years of service, Hays was in line for the chairmanship of the Committee on House Administration which he considered a suitable alternative if he lost the majority leader race. "Either way I couldn't lose",¹⁸ declared Hays, from which can be inferred that he would not be deeply saddened by a defeat in the majority leader race.

Hays' scores in the Party Unity and Conservative Coalition Tables indicate a conservatism bordering on questionable party loyalty which no doubt placed him in a precarious position. By the broadest interpretation he could have been considered a moderate, but his scores in both instances clearly show conservative leanings.

Hays' biggest drawback was in the area of leadership potential.¹⁹ Far from being the most popular of the candidates, he was, in fact, openly detested by some of his colleagues. This handicap made the likelihood of his success in winning quite remote considering the fact that many votes were needed as a base of support in a race with so many contenders. There is evidence that Hays found certain of his colleagues distasteful in turn, since by his own acknowledgement, he chose to run for majority leader because of his dissatisfaction with the slate of candidates. Of Hays, Peabody says:

Possessor of one of the most caustic wits and sharpest tongues in the House, Hays' style of floor debating had yielded several converts and not a few enemies.²⁰

Not all of Hays' caustic one-minute speeches on the floor earned admirers. More than one Democrat, with scars hardly healed, would remember and put Hays near the bottom of his own list of preferred candidates for majority leader.²¹

Hays, who conducted his campaign among the regular establishment conservative-to-moderate members, did so with an attitude expressed by his statement:

I'm not asking commitments from any members, I say to them--"I'd like to have your vote, but I don't expect anything in writing or in blood." On the basis of that, quite a few people have said they'll support me.²²

However, later in his campaign he threatened members with, "Would you rather have me as a happy majority leader or an unhappy Chairman of House Administration?"²³ The method Hays used of inviting potential supporters to luncheons where they could hardly openly deny him support, however, failed to achieve the desired result in the final protection of the secret ballot.

Hays, hardly popular, did not appear to have a record of active floor management or extra activities that made him as eligible as other more dedicated majority party members. He had held no previous party positions.²⁴

B. F. Sisk

B. F. Sisk, like Hays, was one of the more conservative of the candidates for the majority leadership. Both voted fewer times with their party than their Northern

Democratic colleagues, although Sisk's voting record, in opposition to the conservative coalition, was very close to Boggs'.

Sisk's seniority hardly placed him in a desirable position, with only 16 years of service in the House at the time he chose to run for majority leader, although in that time he had managed to rise to within six places from the top on the Rules Committee.²⁵ This indicated early appointment to that committee. Additionally, Sisk served on the Agriculture Committee, a departure from a tradition which generally bars anyone who serves on one of the three exclusive committees from serving on any other committee.

Sisk had been impressive in his floor management of certain of his pet bills, and he had also had a reputation for helping grant favors to certain members on request.

Peabody says:

As a member of the powerful scheduling group, Sisk had been in a position to do favors for members, sometimes by voting for a rule, other times by helping to bottle up legislation which a majority of members did not wish to see come to the floor. Finally, Sisk had done a commendable job of floor managing; the controversial Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 through to its final passage. Dealing with many of the most complicated internal matters of the House, methods of voting, staffing and possible changes in seniority, the calm, slow-talking Californian placated the senior power-wielders in the House, and at the same time brought about enough changes to satisfy all but the most reform-oriented younger members.²⁶

As impressive as this may have seemed, however, there was a lack of consensus as to Sisk's leadership ability. In question was his future ability to be a spokesman for his party, a desirable, if not necessary,

qualification for a party leader. This was surely a serious drawback considering that the majority party had leaders with Sisk's basic qualifications and who were, in addition, adept at speaking and presenting the party's policies.

Sisk, additionally, had been a member of the whip organization, being a zone whip, not without its advantages in a leadership race.²⁷ However, this did not help in his effort to make inroads among the southerners whose support he hoped for and needed, the southerners being the more conservative members. More votes than Sisk could spare went to Hale Boggs.²⁸

In summary, Sisk's greatest handicaps were his personal image, not being a strong, aggressive personality, his lack of consistent floor activity, and his lack of a strong undivided power base.

James O'Hara

As the Tables show, James O'Hara lacked adequate seniority, prestigious committee membership and was considered by some to be too liberal and change-oriented. The latter characteristic was manifested in O'Hara's chairmanship of the Democratic Study Group and his liberal and vigorous activities as a spokesman for labor, educational and civil rights causes.²⁹ However, he was thought by many to be one of the two or three most competent legislators in the fields of labor and civil rights and was also known to be an expert in legislative tactics.³⁰ Peabody says of O'Hara:

Not all of O'Hara's assets, however, were readily transferable into leadership support. First, he had to compete with Udall for most of the change-oriented votes in the House. As the long summer extended into the fall, O'Hara discovered that many of the votes he hoped for had been pre-empted by his Arizona colleague. Second, O'Hara's strong positions of labor and civil rights issues made him an anathema to most southerners. Further, many conservatives, including some big city-machine congressmen, resented O'Hara's liberal stance on education, social welfare, and issues of party pressures that O'Hara could bring to bear proved to be rather ineffective in a contest decided by secret ballot voting.³¹

O'Hara was not a real "member's member" in the sense that he did not make the activities of the House his foremost interest in life, a quality often considered a disadvantage for potential leaders. He had the reputation for being a family man and was jealous of extra time that those activities required that took him away from his family life. Of this Peabody says, "For these and other reasons O'Hara was probably the most ambivalent of all of the candidates about staying in the race".³²

O'Hara ran a "low-key" campaign much of the time which confirms Peabody's observation of his rather ambivalent attitude. He probably appealed to "outside" sources more than the other candidates, actively seeking the support of the AFL-CIO and other labor, education, and civil rights groups.³³

There is evidence that suggests that O'Hara's liberal, reform-oriented philosophies were a disadvantage to him, and in addition to this, his sometimes caustic tongue earned him enemies. Even though he was respected as being forthright, though sharp tongued, it has become increasingly

evident that a potential party leader suffers from such a luxury.

NOTES

Chapter 4

1. The limited amount of information on the members referred to in this chapter makes it necessary to repeatedly refer to Peabody's extensive research in the area of leadership.
2. Robert Peabody, Leadership in Congress, pp. 211-212.

At the end of the first ballot, the votes were as follows:

| | |
|--------|----|
| Boggs | 95 |
| Udall | 69 |
| Sisk | 31 |
| Hays | 28 |
| O'Hara | 25 |

The scores at the end of the balloting were:

| | |
|-------|-----|
| Boggs | 140 |
| Udall | 88 |
| Sisk | 17 |

An additional reference which referred to the close contest and to the effort, in particular, of Morris Udall was, Larry L. King, "The Road to Power in Congress: The Education of Mo Udall--and What it Cost." Harper's 242, June, 1971, pp. 39-63.

3. Peabody, *Ibid.*, p. 164. Peabody said of Udall's challenge to the Speaker,

However, Udall's forced confrontation with the Speaker was not without liabilities. Not only did he earn the ire of McCormack, Udall also made it difficult for himself to gain subsequent support from older colleagues. . . .
4. *Ibid.*, p. 163.
5. Nader Report, Citizens Look at Congress, Morris Udall, p. 9.
6. Mark F. Ferber, "The Formation of the Democratic Study Group" in Polsby's Congressional Behavior, pp. 249-267

7. Peabody, *Ibid.*, p. 163.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 164.
9. This might be considered a presumptuous statement, yet it seems a reliable conclusion when Udall's qualities are compared with the other members who competed in this contest.
10. MacNeil, Forge of Democracy, p. 90.

Polsby and Peabody in New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, pp. 73-75.

Bolling authored two books in which he offered constructive criticism of the procedure and operation of the House as well as its leadership. Those books were: House Out of Order, (New York: Dutton, 1965) and Power in the House, (New York: Dutton, 1968).

11. Peabody, *Ibid.*, p. 88.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 82
13. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Ibid.*
17. Peabody, p. 180.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 167
20. *Ibid.*, p. 167
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*, p. 180
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*, p. 164.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 184.
27. The History and Operation of the House Majority Whip Organization, (U.S. Government Printing Office: 93rd

Congress, 1st session, Wash. 1973. House Document No. 93-126), p. 9.

28. Peabody, p. 165.
There was much early speculation that Sisk had actually captured certain Southern votes that Boggs needed, but this was apparently a pre-mature view. This was the basic content of the articles by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Slipped Sisk," in the Washington Post, Dec. 20, 1970.
29. Nader Report, James O'Hara, p. 15.
30. Peabody, p. 165.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Peabody, p. 200.

O'Hara and Udall both received the "blessings" of the liberal press also, in "House Battle", New Republic, Dec. 5, 1970. "Udall and O'Hara", New Republic, Jan. 6, 1971 and "The House Afire" in The Progressive, Jan. 1971.

Chapter 5

A COMPARISON OF THE WINNERS AND LOSERS

Common Characteristics of Both Groups

Table 3 shows in brief form the characteristics or qualifications that were shared by both the winners and losers. From this table, it can be seen that all members who were candidates for party leadership positions between 1962 and 1976, without exception, shared the following qualifications: (1) In party unity scores, which indicate the degree of party loyalty, all potential leaders and selected leaders scored at least as high or higher than the party average scores, thus indicating at least an average degree of party loyalty; (2) All scored as high or higher than the party average in conservative coalition scores; however, not all scored as high as the average for Northern Democrats; (3) All were active in the extra activities of the House; (4) All exhibited some sort of legislative expertise in their particular area of interest.

The above characteristics are the only qualities both groups shared. It is accurate to say that they shared these qualifications in varying degrees, that is, certain individuals were more prominent in a given area than others, but in general, these particular qualifications were likely to be in order.

Differences in the Two Groups

While all of the party leaders studied had accumulated sizeable seniority, the losers had not. In the case of the losers, Wayne Hays and Richard Bolling were the only candidates who had sufficient seniority to meet those standards, for the positions they sought, that had existed in the entire 20th century. Although it must be understood that there was no formal requirement for such a standard, the fact is that its existence over a long time period established its importance and significance as a qualification.

The party unity scores of the party leaders (the winners) were all considerably above the party average, indicating a strong loyalty on the part of the leaders. The average majority party member voted with the majority or dominant wing of the party 64% of the time, while the average for the party leaders was 86%, with no leader voting under 85% of the time with his party.

For the losers, the average score was 74%, this being the percentage of the time they voted with the majority of the party. Although this indicates strong party loyalty, it must be noted that Hays, voted 64% of the time with the majority of his party, or the same as the party average.

The conservative coalition scores, which show the number of times a member votes against that coalition, reveal that the average score for the party leaders was 81%, while those of the losers was only 68%. The average for the Northern Democrats was 69%. Bolling's score was 68%,

Hays 53%, and Sisk 57%, scores which confirm their relative conservatism. O'Hara and Udall both had scores equal to or higher than the party leaders.

The numbers that have been compared here, while they show wide divergences, may represent more moderateness than the actual numbers indicate, or they may do just the opposite. They may not represent the "feeling" that individual members have regarding the ideology of their colleagues. On the other hand, those individuals whose scores represented a conservative moderateness may have lost their races because their colleagues actually viewed them as being too conservative, whereas the more liberal losers' scores were not drastically different scores than those of the party leaders, yet they were often thought to be more liberal than some of the party leaders. It is of interest to note here that Udall's score, 82%, was considerably higher than the man who defeated him, yet his score was closer to the party leaders' average. The significance of Udall's ideology and party loyalty will be discussed later in its relationship to his being Boggs' closest contender.

In the area of committee membership, all of the leaders served on prestigious committees while only three of the losers served on such committees. In addition to committee membership, only one loser served previously in the whip organization, while all of the leaders had served as majority whip.

Of equal significance is the fact that all of the

party leaders had served as proteges of a member who had been or was currently the Speaker of the House. Only one loser, Richard Bolling, had served such an apprenticeship. Albert, Bolling and Boggs had been singled out for attention by Speaker Rayburn while O'Neill had been close to John McCormack, and John McFall was a favorite of Carl Albert. While the other losers may have worked closely with other senior party members, none of the literature reveals a protege of apprenticeship status.¹

All of the party leaders seemed to have possessed such qualities as personality, floor presence, political skill and acumen, and personal popularity, to the degree that they were thought to rate high in leadership potential, qualifying them for selection. There was some question, however, that Hale Boggs, at least during his later years, possessed that popularity to the extent that had been true earlier in his career.

The losers, on the other hand, nearly all suffered from either lack of personal popularity, or aggressive leadership qualities. Only Morris Udall stood out as possessing those two qualities, however, the case might be made for criticizing his judgement in failing to understand the importance of traditional qualifications to many majority party members, especially those senior members who were establishment oriented.

Analysis of the Differences

The greatest difficulty in comparing the

qualifications of the winners and losers is weighing those differences in an effort to determine which qualities might have actually accounted for one candidate's victory and the other's loss. There are, however, certain common denominators that have clearly emerged as having been present which, while they were not responsible by themselves for victory or defeat, nevertheless combined with certain other qualities and accounted for the eventual outcome. Therefore, it can be said that in order to be selected for a majority party leadership position between 1962 and 1976, the following qualifications seemed to have been more important than others: (1) seniority, (2) being an establishment member, as opposed to being change-oriented, (3) having served as majority whip, (4) having been a protege or an apprentice of the Speaker of the House and (5) having been a moderate and a strong party member.

These qualifications or common denominators emerged as having been of greatest importance because of the following reasons: (1) each of the party leaders selected during that period, 1962-1976, had all of the above qualifications, (2) while all of the losers possessed many or most of the qualifications that were established earlier as criteria for selection for majority party leadership positions, it remains that not a single one of the losers possessed all of the above qualities.

NOTES

Chapter 5

1. Richard Fenno, "The Seniority-Protege-Apprentice System in the House of Representatives" in Polsby and Peabody's New Perspectives on the House of Representatives. Fenno discusses the protege system in its relationship to party leadership selection.

Chapter 6

LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN THE COLLEGIAL STYLE: EVIDENCE OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION 1962-1976

The majority party leaders who were selected during the period, 1962-1976, have been shown to have had certain characteristics in common that set them apart from other majority party members and enabled them to be selected for those positions. Further, those majority party members who challenged those leaders were unsuccessful because they did not possess the five significant qualifications that proved to be necessary for selection.

The qualifications that were found to have been necessary for party leadership selection during this period show a pattern of adherence to a status quo, or an observance of traditions that grew and became stabilized during this period. They also represented a formidable obstacle which the challengers for leadership positions found impossible to penetrate.

A review of those qualifications which were characteristic of party leaders will reveal that each quality, by itself, was symptomatic of the sustaining reverence for those values which fed a process of institutionalization. It is this fact, asserting itself repetitiously upon the leadership

selection process, which distinctly colored the collegial style of leadership during this period.

It bears repeating here that each one of the winners possessed all of the five, final qualifications which were found to be unique to the party leaders. Each of their challengers had, at most, three of the five qualifications. What is even more significant here, however, is that one qualification, leadership potential, although of immense importance to the selection process, as a final qualification it appeared that, in certain instances, it was not of the greatest significance. This may be credited largely to the fact that the nature of the collegial style itself diminished its importance as an essential qualification and certain other qualities more necessary to that style simply superseded it.

It must be inserted here that Peabody consistently referred to the personal popularity of individual leaders as being of importance when accompanied by the member's belief in his own ability to lead.¹ Peabody refers to leadership potential as being that quality that "winnows" out most of the remaining members from possible competition from leadership positions.² Yet, in this paper, leadership potential, which is acknowledged as being of critical importance as a criterion for selection, and certainly was undoubtedly responsible for "winnowing" out other individuals, nevertheless failed to be a final factor in at least two races between 1962 and 1976.

The first instance where leadership potential might have been secondary to institutional criteria was in the case of John McCormack. However, one is impressed, from general reading, of the questionable popularity and leadership ability of McCormack yet, at the time of Rayburn's death it was assumed that McCormack's long years as majority leader had earned him the right to the speakership. One would be pressed to prove that his personal popularity or other leadership qualities were the reasons for his selection.³

The election of Hale Boggs as majority leader in 1970 is another example of the reverence toward traditional and institutional qualifications that have been evident in the majority party. A Udall victory, in view of his lack of seniority, would have threatened a long tradition and undoubtedly would have made establishment members uncomfortable. In that election, the questionable emotional stability of Boggs was not a serious enough threat, although his behavior appeared quite suspect, to override his long tenure of loyal party service, his once dynamic leadership ability, and his occupation of the office of whip.⁴

There is a danger of over-simplification in the instances referred to above. Reviewing a member's qualifications from the pages of a book may be severely inadequate in determining qualifications or assessing personalities. Nevertheless, the restraints on potential leaders that have ~~evolved~~ evolved in the House of Representatives appear to be institutional restraints to a degree greater than might have

been perceived by one whose analysis of party leadership is oriented toward the "human" qualities in the selection of leaders. This by no means must be interpreted as an implication that "leadership potential" is not of inordinate significance. Its importance is a recurring theme in the study of leadership selection. What is being emphasized here is that, although leadership potential is a qualification that limited the number of those who might have been eligible for leadership positions, it did not appear to be the determining qualification in all leadership contest from 1962 to 1976.

It must be acknowledged that all of the qualities that were found to have been necessary for leadership selection during the period under study were not unique to the collegial style, nor were they all peculiar only to the majority party. The first qualification, for example, seniority, is a phenomenon found to be necessary for many positions in the entire Congress of the United States. Secondly, the elevation of the majority leader to the Speakership occurred during periods of other leadership styles as well as during this period of collegial style leadership. Thirdly, the period of 1962-1976 was certainly not the only period in the history of the House when the leaders tended to be loyal to party or were found to be moderates. If we were to include "leadership potential" in the list, again, that would not be considered a characteristic of style only.

There were then, two qualifications remaining which

were found to have existed during this period of collegial style leadership, and it is the presence of those qualifications which support the major hypothesis of this paper which is that: It was the nature of the collegial style which created and allowed an institutionalization of the leadership selection process, a process which was sustained by the requirements of that style.

The two remaining qualifications which were unique to the collegial style were: (1) the member had been either in the whip organization or had been majority whip, and (2) the member had been a protege or had been endorsed by the Speaker of the House.

The role of the whip organization and the subsequent selection of leaders from that organization is perhaps the most significant development which occurred in the majority party during the collegial period.⁵ Its growing importance during the past twenty years was a natural outgrowth of a style of leadership specifically ordered by John McCormack when he replaced Sam Rayburn as Speaker of the House in 1962. Speaker Rayburn had served in many instances as his own whip, having been remarkably intuitive in those areas which the present day whip organization serves. Speaker McCormack, who made no pretense of his own ability to duplicate Rayburn's perceptiveness, called for a cooperative or collegial effort which would require the coordination of the Speaker, majority leader, and majority whip in the planning and implementation of majority party policies. Evidence suggests

that this prompted a more active role for the whip and increased activity for the numerous deputy and zone whips. According to Ripley, "The Democratic Whip organization has become the focus of a corporate or collegial leadership in the House."⁶

There is evidence that the resources of the whip organization became more necessary as the majority party represented an increasingly diverse and desperate electorate whose needs called for continuous communication with the leadership. This further emphasized and justified the growing responsibilities of the whip organization.

The growth of the whip organization then was the logical result of its increased need by the leadership style of the period, (1962-1976). As the leaders found it necessary to coordinate, cooperate and plan strategy in order to achieve greater success in legislative planning, the whip organization provided the machinery with which to accomplish these goals. The traditional role of the whip and his organization did not need to be altered, only activated and expanded, to provide necessary services. That machinery, set in motion, became the communication between the leadership and the members, the purveyor of facts, of opinions, of will. The recent study by Ripley suggests that during this period of leadership, this machinery did, indeed, become more active to the degree that it also became the core of increased party activity and unity.⁷

The whip has traditionally been an appointive

position, as have the assistant whips. The choices for these positions, made by the Speaker and majority leader, have reasonably been those members in whom the leaders have had the greatest confidence. They were loyal party members with a demonstrated dedication to majority party policies, and were from regions that would provide an appropriate balance in the leadership hierarchy. To presume that the leaders would not choose members for these positions whose demonstrated loyalty they could be assured of, would be unrealistic. Their loyalty and dedication to the leadership would guarantee collegial leadership success.

The subsequent performance of the appointed whips, their experience and tested dedication, placed them in advantageous, highly visible positions for continuing on to higher leadership roles. They had not only learned elements of the leadership process, but had become experienced practitioners of a complex style.

If any further evidence is needed to establish the increased importance and status of the whip during this period, it can be found in the two recent attempts to convert the appointed whip position into an elected majority party position. In 1973 and 1975, resolutions appeared before the Democratic Caucus which called for this change, but which, both times were defeated.⁸

The reason for the proposed resolutions was relatively simple. The seeming ease with which the whip was elevated to majority leader had hardly gone unnoticed and

there were increasing protests toward a system in which the two top majority party leaders were essentially charged with choosing the future Speaker of the House.⁹ Offended members demanded a voice in the selection of a leader whose immediate and ultimate importance had suddenly become conspicuous.

The resolutions were defeated largely because of the subtle influence of the majority leader both times. Indications are that he feared the election of a less than loyal member who could conceivably develop an independence destructive to the collegial style of leadership.¹⁰ The majority leader's protest that he needed "his own man" in that position to assure absolute loyalty and cooperation, met with the approval of the caucus.

This attitude on the part of the majority leader provides valuable insight into the general reluctance of the majority party members to select other than establishment members for their leaders; it cautions members of the possible adverse effects on the quality and effectiveness of a leadership group chosen recklessly without regard to political or ideological compatibility.

The pattern which developed during this collegial style period, whereby the majority whip was elevated to majority leader, was interrupted in 1976 when John McFall failed in his effort to become majority leader. This fact, however, does not necessarily negate evidence of the existence of institutionalization during the 1962-1976 leadership period. There is reason to believe, however, that unusual

circumstances heretofore absent in the leadership selection of this period are responsible for McFall's defeat. McFall had acknowledged the acceptance of certain gifts and money from a foreign government and had chosen to withhold this fact until after the congressional election in his district.¹¹ Additionally, there was considerable criticism of his general handling of the episode (first denying it, then admitting it) which might have had a two fold effect on his chances in the leadership race: (1) the practical possibility that he might not be returned to Congress after the next election, and (2) his selection might reflect a "permissive" attitude on the part of his colleagues.

McFall's colleague, James Wright of Texas, who was elected to that position had likewise been in the whip organization as a zone whip thus satisfying that qualification.¹² The new, establishment oriented majority leader's other qualifications are not included in this paper; however, it may be significant to mention that he was selected over a change-oriented, liberal candidate known to have been in disfavor with the new Speaker, Thomas P. O'Neill.

Conclusion

There were certain qualifications that a majority party member needed in order to be selected for a leadership position during the period, 1962-1976. Numerous members of the majority party possessed many of these same qualities, but only those members whose qualifications were appropriate to the collegial style of leadership during that period were

successful in achieving leadership positions.

Many of the qualifications studied here were traditional characteristics of party leaders not unique to the collegial style. There were certain requirements of that style, however, that influenced and institutionalized the selection process. Foremost among these requirements was the need for the increased activity and participation of the majority whip in the leadership planning of the majority party. The subsequent enlargement of the role of the whip made the selection of that leader of critical importance to the Speaker and majority leader. Their own requirement that he be loyal to them and to their legislative strategy, made it desirable for them to choose one in whom they had the most confidence. This resulted in the selection of one of their proteges or favorites.

After years of loyal service to the majority party, the whip, or members of his organization, became an essential part of the leadership hierarchy and their abilities and experience were acknowledged by their selection for higher leadership positions. Thus, the perpetuation of the collegial style became the pattern for the period of 1962-1976. Leadership selection during that period was institutionalized because of the basic requirements of the style.

This institutionalization process met with challenge from time to time, as the resolution calling for an elected whip shows. In the future, this discontentment may result in a successful challenge to the collegial style. If the

change-oriented members increase their numbers to the degree that they can successfully "out-vote" the establishment members, a new style of leadership may occur. The selection of one change-oriented leader could conceivably interrupt the style to the degree that an era of the "single-leader" style might reappear. Much will depend on the political climate of the future; if the Democratic Party continues to be the majority party, members may be satisfied with the collegial style of leadership. In the event of a dramatic change in the voting patterns of the American people, the Democratic Party may seek to mend the problems by a change in leader-selection and methods.

NOTES

Chapter 6

1. Peabody, Leadership in Congress, p. 473.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 478. Peabody speaks of McCormack's decline in popularity; he also refers to Udall's challenge as being legitimate because of McCormack's being "vulnerable". Peabody, in a letter to me, commented that the circumstances surrounding McCormack's initial selection, as a party leader, were vague.
4. This point is discussed in: Andrew J. Glass, "Congress Report: House Democrats Back Establishment in Electing Boggs Floor Leader," National Journal 3, (Jan. 23, 1971), pp. 186-190.
5. Ripley's work in the Whip Office and his subsequent writings carry this theme. Randall Ripley, "Party Whip Organizations", in Nelson Polsby's Congressional Behavior, pp. 225-248.
6. Ibid., p. 239.
7. Ibid., p. 241.
8. Peabody, pp. 249-255.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 256.
11. Stockton Record, (Dec. 9, 1976).
12. San Francisco Chronicle, (Dec. 12, 1976), p. 13.

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APPENDIX

EXPLANATION OF CRITERIA USED IN COMPARING
LEADERS AND CHALLENGERS

SENIORITY - Minimum requirement 8 yrs. before selection as whip.
Minimum requirement 12 yrs. before selection as majority leader.
Minimum 15 yrs. requirement before selection as Speaker.

AGE - At least 40 yrs. of age before entering the House.

PARTY UNITY SCORES - Member voted with the majority of his party at least 70% of the time on roll call votes.

CONSERVATIVE COALITION SCORES - Member voted against the Conservative Coalition at least 65% of the time on roll call votes.

MODERATENESS - Member is not identified with the extreme wing of his party. i.e. is not considered an extreme liberal or extreme conservative. Did not vote more than 90% of the time with the majority of his party, or did not vote less than 30% of the time against the Conservative Coalition.

COMMITTEES - Served on one of the exclusive or semi-exclusive committees beginning by at least his 3rd term in the House.

PROTEGE STATUS - Served as a protege of a leader who either was or was to become the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

EXPERTISE - Was recognized by colleagues as being an expert in at least one area of legislation.

PERSONAL POPULARITY - Generally well-liked by an estimated three-fourths of colleagues.

EXTRA-ACTIVITIES - Served in some capacity other than as a member of a standing committee.

FLOOR DEBATE EFFECTIVENESS - Recognized by colleagues as being effectively persuasive and creditable on the floor of the House.

SUPPORT OF SPEAKER - Either privately or publicly endorsed or encouraged in campaign for leadership position.

WHIP ORGANIZATION - Served in some capacity.

ESTABLISHMENT MEMBER - Did not actively seek reform in established traditions in the collegial style.

CHANGE-ORIENTED - Actively sought reform in the leadership style during period of candidacy.

ACCEPTIBILITY OF PERSONALITY - Absence of offensive behavior.

LEADERSHIP AMBITION - Indicated desire to be a party leader early in career.

Table 1

PARTY UNITY SCORES

(Percentage of times member voted in agreement with the majority of his party)

| | Congressess (1963-68) | | | | Congresses (1969-74) | | | |
|-------------------|-----------------------|------|------|---------|----------------------|------|------|---------|
| | 89th | 89th | 90th | Average | 91st | 92nd | 93rd | Average |
| Carl Albert | 89 | 81 | 94 | 88 | 79 | x | x | x |
| Hale Boggs | 93 | 91 | 94 | 86 | 71 | 69 | 71* | 70 |
| Thomas P. O'Neill | 90 | 78 | 83 | 83 | 81 | 83 | 83 | 82 |
| John McFall | 96 | 94 | 91 | 93 | 79 | 64 | 80 | 74 |
| Party Averages | 71 | 67 | 63 | 67 | 59 | 61 | 62 | 60 |

+

x became Speaker

* incomplete

Table 2

CONSERVATIVE COALITION SCORES

(Percentage of times member voted against the coalition)

| | Congresses (1963-68) | | | | Congresses (1969-74) | | | |
|--------------------|----------------------|------|------|---------|----------------------|------|------|---------|
| | 89th | 89th | 90th | Average | 91st | 92nd | 93rd | Average |
| Carl Albert | 69 | 69 | 76 | 68 | 54 | x | x | x |
| Hale Boggs | 70 | 82 | 64 | 72 | 51 | 51 | 54* | 52 |
| Thomas P. O'Neill | 74 | 77 | 86 | 79 | 79 | 77 | 74 | 77 |
| John McFall | 85 | 92 | 84 | 87 | 61 | 50 | 63 | 58 |
| Northern Democrats | 75 | 77 | 69 | 74 | 63 | 65 | 67 | 65 |
| Republicans | 22 | 16 | 22 | 20 | 18 | 18 | 22 | 19 |
| Southern Democrats | 25 | 26 | 18 | 23 | 17 | 20 | 26 | 21 |

x became Speaker

* incomplete

Total averages for 1963-1974:

PARTY LEADERS: 69
 NORTHERN DEMOS: 69
 ALL DEMOS: 46

Table 3

QUALITIES OF PARTY LEADERS AND CHALLENGERS CONSIDERED AS ASSETS

LEADERS

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Carl Albert | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Hale Boggs | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Thomas P. O'Neill | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| John McFall | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |

CHALLENGERS

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Richard Bolling | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Morris Udall | | X | X | X | X | | | | X | | | X | X | X |
| B. F. Sisk | X | X | X | | X | X | | | | | | X | | |
| John O'Hara | X | | X | | | X | | | | | | | | X |
| Wayne Hays | X | X | | X | | | | | X | | | | | |
| Sam Gibbons | X | X | X | X | X | | | | | | | | X | X |

AMBITION
 CHANGE-ORIENTED
 ESTABLISHMENT MEMBER
 WHIP ORGANIZATION
 SUPPORT OF SPEAKER
 EFFECTIVE FLOOR DEBATE
 PERSONAL POPULARITY
 EXPERTISE
 PROTEGE STATUS
 PRESTIGIOUS COMMITTEES
 MODERATENESS
 CONSERVATIVE COALITION
 SCORES
 PARTY UNITY SCORES
 AGE
 SENIORITY