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Janmaat, J.G.

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JAN GERMEN JANMAAT Civic Culture in Western and Eastern Europe *

A POPULAR THESIS in the social sciences is that civic traditions are more salient in Western Europe than in Central and Eastern Europe. Among the scholars who subscribe to this view, there are many who have located the origin of the difference in the pre-modern past. Typically they see the appearance of autonomous cities in many parts of Western Europe in the late Middle Ages as the key factor (Bloch 1961; Chirot 1989). These cities prevented the Monarchy, the Nobility and the Church from exerting a stifling absolute rule and provided shelter for a growing class of entrepreneurs, merchants, craftsmen and clerks, who through their various forms of association and cooperation, in which they participated as equals, developed the attitudinal and behavioural patterns associated with civic culture. By contrast, Central and Eastern Europe, it is argued, lack a history of strong independent cities, and therefore the classes seen as supporting civic culture could not mature there to a sufficient degree. The rise of the absolutist state in this region (Russia, Prussia and Austria) actually exacerbated social inequalities as the aristocracy imposed ever more restrictions and duties on the peasant serfs to compensate for the imposition of central taxes needed for the institution of a permanent army (Anderson 1974). Only by brutally suppressing the occasional peasant revolts could the militarized states of the East maintain a fragile and stagnant social order. Under these feudal, violent and hierarchical conditions, which lasted up to the (late) arrival of modernization, civic culture could not flourish. Neither could modernization bring about a change of values as its specific brand in Central and Eastern Europe was too top-down, too artificial or too much imposed by foreign forces to be able to cultivate the civic-democratic patterns of Western Europe. Barrington Moore (1966), for instance,

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Jan Germen JANMAAT, Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Institute of Education in London and Researcher at the Department of Social Cultural Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences of the Free University of Amsterdam [g.janmaat@ioe.ac.uk].

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argues that the involvement of the aristocracy and the state in the industrialization of Germany and Japan proved fatal for the development of democracy in these countries. Instead of national identities based on civic-democratic principles, Eastern nations developed allegiances based on kinship, race, language and folk history, so the story goes.

A well-known historian concurring in this version of events is Hans Kohn (1944, 1994). He added a normative and thus provocative dimension to the civic-West/ethnic-East framework by contending that civic identities are conducive to democracy, tolerance and freedom while ethnic thinking is the necessary companion of authoritarianism, oppression and xenophobia. Unsurprisingly, it is precisely this normative element (civic = "good"; ethnic = "bad") that has inspired a heated debate in the study of nationalism in recent years. Scholars have attacked the framework on historical grounds by arguing that Western nations, like Eastern ones, have ethnic roots (Smith 1986) and have pursued exclusionary policies towards ethnic others in the past (Kuzio 2002). Theoretically, the dichotomy has been criticized for employing categories (ethnic, civic) that collapse too many unrelated notions (Kymlicka 1999a), and for failing to note that nations defining themselves in civic terms, such as the Latin American countries, need not always have strong democratic traditions (Nielsen 1999). Lastly, academics have questioned its empirical validity by observing that the variation *within* the West and *within* the East is larger than that *between* the regions in terms of how people understand their national identities (Shulman 2002). Given the profound criticism the framework has attracted, and notably the Hans Kohn variety, it has few supporters today in the field of nationalism.

Remarkably, in their analyses of the Kohn dichotomy students of nationalism have only assessed whether *national identities* are conceived in civic or ethnic terms, not the *substance* of civic culture itself. In other words they have not explored whether the citizenries of the West and the East differ in levels of social trust, participation in non-state organizations and public spiritedness, elements which are usually associated with civic culture. This theme has been the exclusive domain of social capital theory, a strand of research that has rapidly developed after the publication of Robert Putnam's influential work *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (1993). In this book Putnam argues that the presence of civic culture in the northern part of Italy and its absence in the South is the key explanation for the differential rate of success of regional government in the country. In tracing the roots of civic culture, he closely follows the historical argument outlined above: in the free cities of the North civic associations of equals based on trust, norms of

reciprocity and perceptions of the common good thrived, while the sophisticated authoritarian state apparatus left behind by the powerful Norman king, Frederick II, in the thirteenth century precluded similar processes from occurring in the South. By locating the origins of civic culture in the Middle Ages and by seeing it as the single most important factor shaping the performance of political institutions, Putnam accords a great amount of stability, solidity and explanatory power to civic culture. Although in later works he concedes that civic culture in its turn is affected by economic, political and technological developments (Putnam 2000; Putnam and Goss 2002), the emphasis is clearly on the reverse relationship in Making Democracy Work. On top of that, Putnam considers civic culture to embody a distinct set of interrelated attitudes. People in a civic community, he writes, "on most accounts, are more than merely active, public-spirited, and equal. Virtuous citizens are helpful, respectful, and trustful toward one another" (1993, p. 88). The idea of civic culture as a coherent syndrome of dispositions is expressed even clearer in Bowling Alone:

People who trust their fellow citizens volunteer more often, contribute more readily to charity, participate more often in politics and community organizations, serve more readily in juries, give blood more frequently, comply more fully with their tax obligations, are more tolerant of minority views, and display many other forms of civic virtue. (Putnam 2000, p. 137)

According to Jackman and Miller (2005), Putnam is certainly not alone in assuming civic culture to be a coherent and durable phenomenon that is relatively impervious to political and economic events. These assumptions, in their view, are characteristic of culture theorists in general, i.e. of those scholars who hold culture to be the key factor shaping societal trends, whether it is Weber (Protestantism), Banfield (amoral familism) or Huntingdon (civilizations primarly based on religion).

In this paper I focus on these crucial assumptions. I will examine the *coherence* and *durability* of civic culture by analyzing the nature of civic culture and the strength of civic attitudes in East and West. I rely on data from the 1990, 1995 and 1999 editions of the World Values Survey (WVS) and on the 1999 edition of the European Values Study to explore these issues. The first section of the paper discusses the various approaches to civic culture, the relation of the concept to the more commonly used notion of social capital, and the coherence of civic culture at both the individual and societal level. Subsequently, the paper compares the nature of civic culture in western countries and transition states. The last section introduces three perspectives on civic culture: the historical roots idea outlined above, a perspective stressing the legacy

of communism, and a theory on the effects of post-communist transition. Each of these perspectives accords a different degree of malleability to civic culture and predicts a slightly different pattern of civic values across and within East and West. By comparing the explanatory value of these perspectives, I will arrive at conclusions about the solidity of civic culture in general.

The relevance of examining the consistency and durability of civic culture is obvious as the phenomenon is often seen as a precondition for democracy and the rule of law (see discussion below). If civic culture is indeed crucial for democracy and it is as one-dimensional and resistant to change as cultural theorists contend, then all attempts to introduce democracy in non-civic environments (e.g. the Anglo-American efforts in Iraq) would appear to be a waste of time and energy. The results of this study, however, give the missionaries of democracy some grounds for optimism. Neither at the individual nor at the societal level does civic culture appear to be a cohesive one-dimensional syndrome. Only some aspects of civic culture seem to be quite durable, given that their crosscountry patterns are reasonably well explained by the historical perspective. Most aspects would appear to be quite changeable since their distributions are more in line with the two perspectives that see civic culture as a more pliable phenomenon. These findings imply that "civic culture" needs to be understood as no more than an umbrella term embracing a collection of highly diverse values which are more pliable than is often thought. This suggests that socio-economic and political transformations do have the potential to bring about a desired change in values, also in traditionally "uncivic" environments.

Civic Culture and Social Capital

How has academia understood and evaluated civic culture? A review of the literature reveals, first of all, that the term is subject to much confusion as there seem to be as many definitions of civic culture as there are scholars writing about the subject. These definitions are partly overlapping and partly diverging. All of them for instance stress attitudes such as public spiritedness, participation and tolerance but only some include critical engagement (Kymlicka 1999, 2002) or certain economic virtues (Galston 1991). Moreover, although essentially referring to the same phenomenon, each scholar employs his or her own distinctive labels. Thus, whereas Almond and Verba (1963) indeed speak of "civic culture", Putnam (1993) uses "civic community", and Kymlicka (2002) and Galston (1991) speak of "civic virtues" and "liberal virtues", respectively.

These differences, however, hide one important similarity. In an echo of Kohn, all four scholars see civic culture as a sine qua non for democracy. In other words, even with all the institutional arrangements in place, a democracy will not function effectively and will not be sustainable in the long run if it is not supported by an active and engaged citizenry. As Kymlicka (1999b, 2002) explains, this has become painstakingly clear from events in the post-colonial world, where political elites have abused the state apparatus to favour their own ethnic group or class at the expense of others. In order to prevent irresponsible elites from hijacking the state, a democracy, he argues, needs a citizenry that critically scrutinizes policy, holds politicians accountable, and actively engages in public affairs through reasoned and civilized deliberation. These for him are the core civic virtues on which democracy rests. Though having a broader understanding of civic culture than Kymlicka. Almond and Verba, as the pioneers in this field of study, would also subscribe to the view that democracy is upheld by politically engaged citizens. They see civic culture as an all-inclusive phenomenon comprising "participant" attitudes in addition to the more traditional "parochial" and "subject" orientations, yet hold only participant attitudes to be distinctive of democracies: "In general, a parochial, subject, or participant culture would be most congruent with, respectively, a traditional political structure, a centralized authoritarian structure and a democratic political structure" (Almond and Verba 1963, p. 20). Espousing a similarly broad view of civic culture, Galston clusters a variety of social, economic and political virtues under the label "liberal virtues" and argues that a majority of citizens must have these qualities for democracy to perform well:

When I speak of certain virtues as instrumental to the preservation of liberal communities, I mean not that every citizen must possess these virtues but, rather, that most citizens must. The broad hypothesis is that as the proportion of non-virtuous citizens increases significantly, the ability of liberal societies to function successfully progressively diminishes (Galston 1991, p. 220).

The vast literature on social capital has likewise mainly focused on the link between social networks, as the core component of social capital, and democracy. Central to the debate has been the question whether high levels of civic associations and activity are always conducive to social trust and democracy. Critics of social capital theory have argued that organizations based on ethnic, religious or other cultural commonalities, particularly in culturally diverse societies, could well reinforce existing divisions, promote distrust between communities and therefore

complicate democratic government (Portess and Landholt 1996; Dowley and Silver 2002; Norris 2002; Green, Preston and Sabates 2003). Advocates of the theory have responded that a distinction needs to be made between *bonding* (exclusive) and *bridging* (inclusive) forms of association. Bonding networks are good for "thick" interpersonal trust, solidarity and psychological security, but they need to be complemented by bridging networks which, though based on weak ties, help individuals in getting access to new information and expanding their horizons. It is the bridging rather than the bonding forms of social capital that hold society together (De Souza Briggs 1998; Putnam 2000; Putnam and Goss 2002).

The preoccupation of social capital theory with democracy and social cohesion seems to have diverted attention away from issues of coherence and conceptual clarity. How does social capital for instance relate to civic culture? While some authors use the terms interchangeably, others, Putnam included, seem to regard social capital as a specific subset or core component of the values associated with civic culture. Defining social capital as "features of social organization, such as trust, norms [of reciprocity, JGJ] and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions" (Putnam 1993, p. 167), he sees the phenomenon as capable of not only reproducing itself, but also of engendering the other characteristics of the civic community. Perhaps because social capital in most accounts is a more parsimonious concept than civic culture, it has largely replaced the latter in cultural theory and political science. Yet, given the widely diverging definitions of civic culture and Putnam's insistence on seeing it as a coherent syndrome of attitudes (see above), it is surprising that the concept of civic culture has not drawn more attention from the academic community.

Interestingly, Putnam (1993) himself did explore the internal consistency of the concept. Using aggregate data at the regional level, he discovered a one-dimensional syndrome of the "civic community" consisting of preference voting, referendum turnout, newspaper readership and density of sports and cultural associations, but, as Jackman and Miller (1996) rightly point out, this construct captures only aggregates of behavioural indices and does not include attitudes, values and dispositions. In response to this criticism, Brehm and Rahn (1997) have shown that a social capital syndrome comprising both a behavioural indicator (civic associations) and an attitude (interpersonal trust) does exist at the individual level. Their analysis, however, does not cover the many other notions associated with civic culture and is only based on data from the United States (the General Social Survey). It is quite feasible that different patterns emerge in other countries. Moreover, they have not explored the conceptual

boundaries of their construct. We thus do not know to what extent it can be separated from concepts in the semantic vicinity.

Related to the issue of coherence is the question on which level civic culture is operating and how it compares in this regard to social capital. Scholars are not in agreement regarding the nature of the latter. On the one hand there are those who view social capital as a private good which can be mobilised by individuals to accumulate wealth and status (Bourdieu 1993) or to engage in politics and attain political goals (Olson 1993). Other scholars consider social capital to be a property of a community rather than an individual (Putnam 1993; Newton 2001; Norris 2002). In their view, the public good nature of social capital means that individuals living in a society with high levels of social capital automatically benefit from this situation irrespective of their contribution to the phenomenon (Van Deth 2001). They also hold social capital to be self-perpetuating and reinforcing. In other words, individuals cannot be excluded from the consumption of social capital, but this is not problematic since consumption increases rather than decreases overall stocks of social capital. Remarkably, though seeing social capital as a public good, Putnam argues that its components also cluster at the individual level:

Our discussion of trends in social connectedness and civic engagement has tacitly assumed that all the forms of social capital that we have discussed are themselves coherently correlated across individuals. This is in fact true. Members of associations are much more likely than non-members to participate in politics, to spend time with neighbors, to express social trust and so on. (quoted in Badescu and Uslaner 2003, p. 8)

Likewise, as illustrated by the quotation above, he considers individuals in the "civic community" to display a range of civic virtues simultaneously. Thus, in Putnam's philosophy, there should at least be a coherent syndrome of civic culture at the individual level. On top of that, social capital, as the set of core characteristics of civic culture, should constitute a one-dimensional phenomenon at both the individual and the societal level. The idea of social capital as a distinct societal phenomenon has, however, been questioned by Green, Preston and Janmaat (2006). They argue that contextual factors operating at the societal level may have such a large impact on trust and association as the core characteristics of social capital that in their aggregate these characteristics are no longer interrelated. To illustrate their argument they note that the Nordic countries combine high levels of trust with moderate levels of associations while the reverse applies in the USA. In the following I explore to what extent survey data support the idea of a distinct syndrome of civic attitudes at either the individual or societal level.

The problem of conceptual coherence and the public or private nature of civic culture have obvious relevance for this paper as civic culture may be understood in different ways across the East and the West. I will turn to this issue in the next section. First I assess to what extent the elements of civic culture cluster at both the individual and the societal level using the pooled data of Eastern and Western countries (I labelled countries with a communist past as "Eastern" and all others as "Western") (1). To begin with the individual level, when would civic culture, statistically speaking, be accepted as an internally homogenous and externally distinctive concept? It would be accepted as such if the notions it includes meet two conditions: 1) the correlations *amongst* them are stronger than those *between* them and concepts not associated with civic culture; 2) these correlations are in the expected direction. To take an example, the civic culture elements of participation and social trust should be more closely related to one another than either of the two with, say, baldheadedness at age 30, and this correlation should be positive - i.e. those participating should be more trusting than those not participating.

I employed the set of characteristics Putnam (1993, pp. 87-89) ascribes to the civic community to identify indicators of civic culture in the WVS and EVS data bases (see Table 1). The table also states how these indicators will be referred to in the following. Subsequently, I correlated the civic culture items with each other and with items not associated with civic culture – level of education, feeling of happiness, state of health, importance of work vs. leisure (see Table II) (2). To be

(1) I use the unweighted data, which means thateach nation has an equal weight in the pooled data set. The data set consists of 56 countries in total. The East is represented by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania. The West is represented by Canada, USA, Australia, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Ireland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, The Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, France, Luxemburg, Switzerland, Austria, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Malta and Greece.

(2) The scales of a number of items have been reversed to ensure that a positive correlation between two civic items always denotes a relationship in the expected direction. The answers to the civic items have been interpreted in the following way:

discuss politics with friends: the more often - the more civic; signing a petition: have done - the more civic;

jobs scarce priority men: disagree - the more civic;

jobs scarce priority own nationality: disagree – the more civic;

most people can be trusted/can't be too careful: most people can be trusted – the more civic;

proportion of compatriots claiming state benefits: the less mentioned – the more civic:

immigrants and foreign workers unwanted as neighbours: not mentioned – the more civic;

homosexuals unwanted as neighbours: not mentioned – the more civic;

number of different organizations, belonging to: the higher the number – the more civic;

number of different organizations, doing voluntary work for: the higher the number – the more civic.

Components of civic culture identified by Putnam	Indices from data bases	Referred to in the following as	In WVS or EVS
Civic engage- ment (active partici- pation in public affairs)	 Discuss political matters with friends (frequently, occasionally or never) Signing a petition (have done, might do, would never do) 	1. Political discussions 2. Political activity	wvs wvs
Political equality (accepting the other as equal)	 3. When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women (agree, neither, disagree) 4. When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to [OWN NATIONALITY] over immi- grants (agree, neither, disagree) 	 Gender equality Ethnic equality 	wvs wvs
Solidarity (being helpful)	Would you be prepared to actually do something to improve the conditions of 5. the elderly in your country? (I absolutely yes — 5 absolutely no) 6. the sick and disabled in your country? (I absolu- tely yes — 5 absolutely no)	5. Helping elderly 6. Helping sick & disabled	EVS EVS
<i>Trust</i> (trust in the anonymous other)	7. Most people can be trusted / can't be too careful 8. How many compatriots claim state benefits to which they are not entitled? (1 almost all — 4 almost none)	7. Social trust 8. Civic honesty	WVS EVS
<i>Tolerance</i> (respect for people from other culture / with different lifestyles and ideas)	Which people would you not like to have as neighbors? 9. Immigrants/foreign workers 10. Homosexuals (mentioned — not mentioned)	9. Ethnic tolerance 10. sexual tolerance	WVS WVS
Association (membership of and active involvement in organizations)	11. Number of different organizations respondent belongs to*12. Number of different organizations respondent does voluntary work for	11. Passive participa- tion 12. Active participa- tion	WVS WVS

TABLE 1 Indices of Civic Culture

* The WVS asked respondents whether they belonged to and did voluntary work for the following types of organizations: social welfare for elderly, handicapped or deprived people; religious or church organizations; education, arts, music or cultural activities; labor unions; political parties or groups; local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality; third world development or human rights; conservation, environment, animal rights groups; professional associations; youth work; sports or recreation; women's groups; peace movement; voluntary organizations concerned with health; other groups. It needs to be underlined that this measure only asked respondents whether they belonged to one or more organizations of each single type. Thus it does not measure the variation of membership *within* each type.

at the individual level (pooled data of eastern and western countries) Correlations between indices of civic culture TABLE II

Political Politica discussions activity				India		Inne						5	Uther indices	SS
	-	Gender equality	Ethnic equality	Helping elderly	Helping sick & disabled	Social trust	Civic honesty	Civic Ethnic honesty tolerance	Sexual tolerance	Passive participation	Active] participation	Education Feeling Leisure happy importa	Feeling happy	Leisure important
.18**		.o4**	.o5**	**90.	**90.	**60.	.04**	.04**	**IO.	.14**	**11.	.20**	<u>8</u>	.o3**
		• I 3**	.12**	**91.	•17**	•I5**	.02**	**60.	.27**	.27**		•14**	.20**	.14**
			61.	10.	.02	**70.	.04**	**90 [.]	• I5 **	**90.	***0.	**7o.	**90.	.04**
				.04**	.o5**	·I3**	** 0.	**01.	• I5 **	·I3**	· 10**	.I2**	** 60.	.05**
					64.	.o3	**90	.05 **	**9o.	• I 5**	·I3**	02**	**	.08**
						.o3**	**90	.o3 **	.08**	** 9 1.	. 14 **	01	•I3**	.o8**
							11.	.08	• I5 **	**61.	**11.	**11.	•I4**	**90.
								.o5 **	.04**	**60.		**90.	.04 **	02**
									.26**	**90.	.o3**	**co.	**80.	.o4**
										.I2**	*** 0.	.04**	.20**	**11.
											.63**	.20**	**61.	II**
												9 1 .	·I3	08**

* P <.o5

** P <.oI

NB1: Correlations larger than 0.1 are printed in bold. NB2: Unexpected correlations between civic culture items (negative signs) are underlined.

NB3: The scales of some of the other indices have been reversed so that positive correlations always express the regularity that higher levels of civicness are linked with higher levels of education, stronger feelings of happiness, and more importance attached to leasure.

NB4: The N ranges from 35,000 to 60,000 respondents in the cells.

sure, these non-civic items are likely to show a link with the civic culture items (notably education), but if these links are stronger than the relations among the civic culture items themselves, the conceptual coherence of civic culture is undermined. The results of Table II support the idea of a coherent syndrome of civic culture at the individual level only to a certain degree. The good news for civic culture theorists is that the correlations amongst the indicators of civic culture are nearly all in the expected direction (only 2 out of 66 correlations do not conform to the expected pattern). The bad news, however, is that the correlations amongst the civic culture items are not stronger than those between the civic and the non-civic items (while 29 out of 66 civic-X-civic correlations are larger than 0.1, roughly the same proportion (16 out of 36) applies to the civic-X-noncivic correlations which are larger than 0.1). The overall level of correlations, moreover, is low with many correlations not exceeding the value of 0.25. The vast majority of the correlations are significant but this is only because of the high number of respondents $(N \ge 37,000 \text{ for all correlations})$. In sum, the data for all countries combined do support Putnam's claim that more politically engaged individuals are also more trusting, helpful, tolerant etc, but the links between these civic virtues are not very strong and many are as closely linked to notions not associated with civic culture. There is thus no evidence of a clearly demarcated syndrome of civic culture at the individual level. One could equally well cluster the items of Table II completely differently and argue that a certain group combining civic and non-civic items represents the syndrome of, say, "positive outlook on life".

Let us now see if a more convincing syndrome of civic culture can be found at the *societal* level. I used national aggregates of the WVS/EVS items to explore this issue (3). It turns out that the pattern of correlations at the societal level differs in two ways from that found at the individual level (see Table III for the correlations between national aggregates). First, there are more cases of unexpected relations between civic culture items. Notably the items *political discussions* and *civic*

found at the micro-level. Aggregate data would thus not be an appropriate tool to study macro-level phenomena. I disagree. Theoretically, it is possible that a relationship at the macro-level between aggregates of individual characteristics is not manifested at the microlevel. It is for instance feasible that overall levels of civic values are high in a country while individuals in this country vary in the degree of support for these values.

⁽³⁾ Obviously, the national level is only one of the collective levels at which civic culture could operate. Putnam for instance observed varying levels of civic traditions across regions *within* Italy. It must therefore be acknowledged that country aggregate data can hide important internal differences. Another matter is whether aggregate data can be used at all to measure a phenomenon at the societal level. According to Van Deth (2001), the cross-correlation of aggregate data only reproduces relationships

at the societal level (aggregate data of eastern and western countries) Correlations between indices of civic culture TABLE III

				Indiv	Indices of civic culture	ilture						Ō	Other indices	es
Political discussions	Political Political discussions activity	Gender equality	Ethnic equality	Helping elderly	Helping sick & disabled	Social trust	Civic honesty	Civic Ethnic honesty tolerance	Sexual tolerance	Passive participation	Active participation	Education	Feeling Leisure happy importa	Leisure important
	00	04	.12	18	£1	61.	.39*	91	60'-	.21	.13	.28	16	22
		.65**	•63**	•S1**	•51**	•57**	.15	·47**	.81 **	**89•	•76**	o6	.80**	•73**
			•58**	.16	.14	** 1 7.	•49**	•44**	•78**	·55**	·55**	19	•59**	·47**
				.16	.14	.62**	.49**	.63**	**99'	.67**	·SI**	19	·50**	·52**
					•79**	.13	27	61.	.46**	·45*	·54**	22	.42**	.56**
						11.	26	81.	.48**	.46**	•55**	20	•44**	·56**
							۰Sr**	.48**	**6 5 •	**89•	•42 ^{**}	.02	•55**	•47 ^{**}
								.33	.27	.38*	£1.	.23	.21	.o4
									.64**	·53**	.36*	04	·50**	.42**
										·55**	•52**	29	•77**	·71**
											.84**	.25	·56**	·47**
												·45**	•50**	.60**

* P <.o5

** P <.oI

 $\operatorname{NB1:All}$ correlations with a significance of 99 % or larger are printed in bold.

NB2: Unexpected correlations between civic culture items (negative signs) are given in italics. NB3: For the country aggregate values on the civic indices and the way they were calculated, see Table v1. The aggregate values on the education indicator are mean scores. The aggregate values on the feeling happy indicator are the addition sums of the individual responses "very happy" and "quite happy". Similarly the aggregate values on the leisure indicator represent "very important" and "rather important".

NB4: The N ranges from 30 to 46 countries in the cells.

honesty are correlated negatively with several other items, although these correlations are not significant. Second, the correlations between the civic items are much stronger with 39 out of 66 binary correlations having values that exceed 0.40. This difference, however, is obviously related to the number of units on which the analysis was performed as the N in the correlations of aggregates is only a fraction of that in the correlations of individual level data. Indeed, as was the case at the individual level, the civic indices are as strongly correlated to the non-civic items as to each other.

To probe the data further and explore underlying dimensions, I performed a principle component analysis on both levels of data (see Table IV). The results of these analyses confirm that correlations between aggregates are stronger than those between individual level items. Whereas the (varimax-rotated) solution for the individual level finds as much as five dimensions which together explain a mere 52.4% of the variance, the three dimensions extracted at the aggregate level account for no less than 77.7% of the variance. Moreover, while each of the dimensions at the individual level is clustering items that refer to one component of civic culture only, the societal dimensions unite items which belong to different components. The first societal dimension, for instance, combines the items referring to *political equality*, *trust* and tolerance with passive participation (factor loadings of .60 and more), and explains an impressive 35.4% of the variance even in a rotated solution. By contrast, the first dimension at the individual level only groups the two items representing *solidarity* and accounts for just 12.2% of the variance. Yet, and most importantly, there is not a single dimension capturing all or almost all of the components of civic culture at either of the two levels. Even at the macro-level, the first dimension faces strong competition from the second dimension which groups four civic items and collects almost as much of the explained variance as the first dimension (28.9%). Moreover, both these dimensions are "polluted" by a non-civic item which also shows a high loading on the extracted factors. In short, neither at the individual nor at the societal level can a convincing syndrome of civic culture be found, i.e. a syndrome that is internally homogenous and externally distinctive. Interestingly, even the elements of the more restricted concept of social capital do not neatly group in one dimension at the societal level (active participation is the dissident as it loads on the second dimension). This means that the idea of social capital as a distinct phenomenon with the characteristics of a public good is not fully supported either.

Variables			Indi	vidual	level		Agg	regate l	evel
Comp	oonent	Ι	II	III	IV	V	Ι	II	III
Civic culture indices	Political discussions	.05	.09	04	01	•73	.15	08	.80
	Political activity	.18	.21	.20	.39	·34	·54	.72	00
	Gender equality	.03	06	.41	06	.31	.82	.15	.07
	Ethnic equality	.04	.11	.55	04	.18	.83	.20	.13
	Helping elderly	•93	.07	.03	.05	01	02	.92	17
	Helping sick & disabled	•93	.07	.04	.06	01	02	.92	14
	Social trust	04	.33	.38	.07	.12	.83	.16	.12
	Civic honesty	17	·34	.32	30	18	•75	40	.15
	Ethnic tolerance	.02	06	.63	.05	06	.69	31	31
	Sexual tolerance	.04	.05	.63	.32	07	.72	27	27
	Passive participation	.10	.83	.08	.18	.14	•75	.53	.23
	Active participation	.10	.83	07	.06	.10	.48	.71	.36
Other indices	Education	10	.11	16	.04	.67	04	II	.84
	Feeling happy	.06	.19	.17	.63	16	.60	.52	39
	Leisure important	01	.01	03	•74	09	.50	.70	28
Eigen-value		1.83	1.72	1.62	1.34	1.33	5.3	4.3	2.0
% of explained variance		12.2	11.5	10.8	9.0	8.9	35.4	28.9	13.4
Ν				60,000				46	

T A B L E I V Principal Components Analysis of civic attitudes in 46 eastern and western countries (varimax rotation)

NB: Loadings of 0.6 and more are given in bold.

The Nature of Civic Culture in East and West

As noted before, issues of conceptual coherence and level of analysis have an obvious relevance for the topic of this paper as the nature of civic culture may differ across geographical contexts. Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1997) for instance have argued that civic cooperation takes a completely different form in the postcommunist countries in comparison to the West. In the former, informal social networks with minimal links to the state predominate. This has been the legacy, the authors contend, of decades of totalitarian rule in which the relations between the state and the citizen were characterized by oppression, dependency and arbitrariness. Under these conditions, citizens developed a profound distrust in the state and in institutions under its control. Contacts with the state and formal institutions were minimized for fear of unexpected persecution, and if contacts were unavoidable the prevailing attitude was one of exploiting the state before it exploits you. The result of all this, Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer explain, has been the appearance in communist times of an hourglass society, composed of a mass of citizens minding their own business at the bottom, economic and political elites vying for power and wealth at the top, and a "missing middle" of minimal connections between these two groups (*ibid.*, p. 91). Given these circumstances, it is no surprise that independent civic organizations, when they were finally permitted to exist alongside official institutions towards the end of the 1980s, quickly defined themselves in *opposition* to the state and the Communist Party (Smolar 1996). In the civic democracies of the West, by contrast, the individual is connected to the state through a network of informal and formal civic associations that negotiate with the state rather than blindly oppose it. Summing up, in the transition states there is a sharp rift between the private and the public, between the informal and the formal, while these domains are closely interwoven in the West.

Communist rule, however, has not only isolated individuals from the state but also from each other. In a society where the state makes use of informers to spy on its citizens, you "really cannot be too careful in dealing with other people" as Uslaner (2003, p. 81) explains. The result, he notes, has been that people distrust strangers and will only share their innermost thoughts and political convictions with family and close friends. Networks of acquaintances and friends therefore tend to be much smaller, though perhaps at the same time much more intense and focused, than in the West. In a similar vein, Schoepflin (2000, p. 155) has

argued that the authoritarian nature of communism not only strengthened vertical links of dependency but also undermined horizontal bonds of solidarity:

The hyperétatism of communism predictably produced [...] forms of dependence and individuation in which interpersonal connections and interactions, other than those within the family and with very close friends, were laden with suspicion, distrust and a zero-sum game mentality, to create an atomized society.

In this environment, he contends, ethnic loyalties prevailed as they were the only bonds people could rely upon to counter feelings of alienation and atomisation.

Because of the alleged different nature of citizen-state and intercitizen relationships, social capital in the transition countries has mainly been understood and examined as a micro-level phenomenon reflecting informal social networks (Mateju 2002). Indeed, describing the coping strategies of three entrepreneurs in Hungary, Swain (2003) argues that the Bourdieu approach to social capital, which defines the concept as "contacts with influential people" and therefore sees it as the property of an individual, is better equipped to analyse social relations in postcommunist countries than the public good type of social capital advocated by Putnam. If civic relations in the East are as different as is claimed, what syndrome, or non-syndrome, of civic culture can we expect to find at the individual level using the indicators introduced in the previous section? As most of the indicators refer to citizen-state relations (political activity; civic honesty; passive and active participation (4) – see once again Table I), to relations with the anonymous other (social trust), and to relations with people with different lifestyles or different ethnic backgrounds (sexual tolerance; ethnic tolerance), we would expect levels of civic attitudes to be low across most indicators. This would have the effect of mitigating the correlations between them to the point they would no longer be significant or show a reversed sign. Among the remaining indicators, *political discussions* is the only one that seems to represent the informal social capital held to be so typical of the East. As it is not so much interest in politics per se as the *way* in which this interest is expressed, on which the regions are seen to differ, levels of political discussions are expected to be at least as high in the East in comparison to the West. The variation this produces on the indicator should be reflected in the correlations of this indicator with the other indicators of civic culture, which are likely to be of a higher magnitude.

that associations are legal entities registered at some state institution.

⁽⁴⁾ Passive and active participation in civic associations have a link to the state in a sense

Let us see if the data confirm these conjectures. Table v presents the correlations between the civic culture items for the two regions separately. It appears that the correlations are indeed weaker in the transition countries. Out of 66 correlations in total 20 correlations in the West and 19 in the East have values of 0.10 or more. Seven correlations in the West and 18 in the East are not significant at the.05 level or show a reversed sign. Moreover, while in the West these seven correlations are confined to the two items representing solidarity, in the East the 18 correlations affect many more components of civic culture. Remarkably though, it is political activity, passive participation and the two solidarity indicators that show the highest correlations with other civic items in the East, not *political discussions* as we might have expected. What is more, the interregional differences are not dramatic. In both regions the vast majority of correlations are in the expected direction – in fact in only two cases in the West and five cases in the East is the sign reversed. Thus, civic values form an even weaker complex at the micro-level in the East as compared to the West, but this syndrome does not seem to be radically different. However, to fully explore the "bad effects of communism" argument, the levels of civic culture in the two regions have to be examined, which is what the next section does.

Levels of civic culture in East and West

This study is decidedly not the first to examine differences in civic culture in East and West. In recent years many studies have explored levels of civicness in the two regions and their relation to political and economic processes. Raiser et alii (2001) for instance found levels of social capital (interpersonal trust and civic participation) to be significantly lower in the East. Interestingly, they show that trust is not related to economic growth in the transition countries while it is positively correlated with growth in the OECD countries. Civic participation, on the other hand, is correlated with economic performance in both regions, a relation Raiser et alii (ibidem) attribute to the ability of civic organizations to facilitate information exchange, reduce the cost of enforcement and offer interest groups the opportunity to participate in the political process. Using data from the mid-1990s, they also observe that social capital, in its turn, is negatively affected by income inequality, leading them to suggest that redistributive policies could be an effective way of increasing social and political trust. Examining the link between social T A B L E V Correlations between indices of civic culture at the individual level in East and West (pooled data of eastern and western countries)

bation	.63**	
bation		
Passive particip .11** .20** .04** .05** .14** .07** .01 .01		.62**
	70. **	.02
2	.o.***	.02**
	.14**	.o. **
tturst	.20**	** II *
ist age of the second sec		• I3 **
90 L		** II •
Erhnic equality .00 .01 .16** .16** .16** .16** .16** .15**	·I3**	8 8 9 8 9 8 8 9 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Gender equality .04** .12** .12** .01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01	****	.o3**
Polititaal activity .24** .08** .06** .06** .05** .03** .03**	·23**	**91.
stons		•I5**
	ation	Active participation
West		

* P <.o5 ** P <.o1

NB1: Correlations larger than 0.1 are printed in bold. NB2: Insignificant correlations and correlations with an unexpected sign are given in italics. NB3: The N ranges from 15,000 to 30,000 respondents in the cells.

capital and democratization, Dowley and Silver (2002) found no correlation between aggregate indicators of social capital and Freedom House measures on political rights and civilliberties for 20 post-communist states. At the individual level, however, they did find a relationship between social capital and attitudes supportive of democracy. Most notably, they discovered contrasting patterns for titular majorities and ethnic minorities. While there was a positive correlation between civic participation and support for democracy among the titular group, the reverse relationship applied for members of ethnic minorities, i.e. the more active members were less trusting of democratic institutions than the more passive ones. In ethnically diverse societies the links between social capital and democracy can thus be quite different from those seen in homogenous societies. While also examining social trust and civic participation, Uslaner (2003) is more concerned with their determinants than with their effects. He finds that the same set of factors influences trust and participation in the two regions, despite their diverging political histories and different levels of civic mindedness. Consequently, he concludes that the socio-psychological mechanisms shaping civic attitudes have cross-regional validity.

What distinguishes the current study from the ones reviewed above is that it is much broader in scope, covering not only trust and participation but all the aspects of civic culture. Second, it explores the *durability* of civic culture in the two regions and in the transition countries in particular. It does so by introducing three perspectives on civic culture and by assessing to what extent the pattern of aggregate civic attitudes found in the WVS and EVS data matches the expected outcomes of these perspectives. Each of the perspectives assigns a different degree of stability to civic culture and predicts a different pattern of attitudes. The historical perspective locates the phenomenon in the distant past and assumes it to be highly resilient to the political and economic conditions prevailing at a given time in modern history. As noted before, it links civic culture to the emergence of independent cities and middle classes in Western Europe. Consequently, it expects civic culture to be stronger in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe. The communist perspective outlined in the previous section sees civic culture as a more elastic phenomenon that is not as immune to political events as the historical perspective claims. It argues that communism either destroyed civic traditions or prevented civic values from developing in the countries where it monopolized political life. The main fault line regarding civic values is thus predicted to run along the former Iron Curtain. As noted above, the current study also uses this cleavage to identify "Eastern" and "Western" nations.

At first sight, it seems difficult to assess which of these two perspectives has the most explanatory power since both seemingly predict the same outcome (West-civic vs East-uncivic). On close inspection, however, there are differences. The historical perspective assumes only some regions in the West to have strong civic traditions (England, France, Switzerland, the Low Countries, the British settler colonies). In the more peripheral parts of this region and notably in countries with a history of top-down modernization and (foreign) authoritarian rule (Germany, Austria, Greece, southern Italy, Spain, Portugal) or a legacy of semi-feudal relations exacerbated by religious divisions (Ireland), civic culture is expected to be underdeveloped. Likewise it predicts some variation among the former communist states, considering countries with a Standenstaat tradition - such as Bohemia (the Czech Republic) until the imposition of Austrian absolute rule in the seventeenth century (Anderson 1974) – and with a legacy of close economic ties with the West (the Baltics) to have stronger civic institutions than the isolated feudal societies further east. Thus, the historical perspective would predict almost as much variation within each region, certainly within the West, as between East and West. The communist perspective would not deny variation within the postcommunist world as both the duration and nature of communist rule differed from country to country. Yet it anticipates more variation *between* the postcommunist countries and the western market economies than within these regions, and most definitely on the indicators of civic culture that refer to citizen-state relations and attitudes towards strangers or ethnic others.

In the third perspective civic culture is an even more flexible phenomenon, affected not only by long term regime policies but also and above all by sudden and drastic socio-economic changes. This we might call the *transition* perspective, which obviously has particular relevance for the postcommunist states. In this view, the socio-economic restructuring following the collapse of communism and the inability of the new democratic regimes to enforce the law, offer moral guidance and guarantee a basic level of economic livelihood gave rise to profound feelings of existential insecurity and helplessness. Under these conditions people developed a deep distrust of politicians and institutions and withdrew into the small circles of family, friends and ethnic kin to retain some measure of control over their lives. According to Snyder (1993, p. 86) ethnic nationalism was the logical consequence of these processes: "It [ethnic nationalism] predominates when institutions collapse, when existing institutions are not fulfilling people's basic needs, and when

satisfactory alternative structures are not readily available". Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p. 141) similarly stress that "Existential threats drive people to seek safety in closely knit groups [...]. Under conditions of insecurity, social capital is bonding rather than bridging". What pattern of civic attitudes would the transition perspective predict? It would anticipate that civic attitudes by and large correspond to economic trends in the transition period. This means that levels of civic consciousness should be at their nadir at the same time as or soon after the moment the economy starts to grow after several years of sharp decline. For some countries this turning point happened before 1995 (Poland, the Baltic republics) while others had to wait for the end of the 1990s for this to occur (Ukraine, Russia). However in all postcommunist states there should be a sharp decline in civic values after the fall of communism. Some, the transition perspective predicts, would already have recovered from the mid-1990 malaise by the close of the decade; others will still show a declining trend. I will use World Bank data and the 1990, 1005 and 1000 waves of the WVS to explore the validity of the transition perspective.

First I explore the explanatory power of the historical and communist perspectives. Table VI presents the country aggregate values on the 12 indicators of civic culture. To facilitate interpretation the countries are ranked, with the postcommunist and western countries printed in bold and normal style respectively. This allows the reader to determine at a single glance whether Eastern countries cluster at either the top or bottom end of the scale. The top end always signifies strong civic culture. As we can see, western countries, as a group, exhibit significantly higher levels of civic consciousness than postcommunist societies on nearly all indicators. Only on *civic honesty* and *political discussions* is the difference in mean scores between the regions not significant or in the other direction, respectively. These findings broadly support both perspectives. The real test is the degree and nature of variation within each of the regions.

To begin with the historical perspective, it can be seen that the countries in the West that are expected to have strong civic traditions indeed top the rankings on a good many indicators (particularly the Nordics, the former British settler colonies and the Netherlands). In contrast, versa, the "uncivic" countries in the West generally display only average values on most indicators (Germany, Austria, Italy) with some occasionally showing very low scores even in relation to the post-communist countries (cf. Portugal on *social trust* and *passive* and *active participation*; Malta on the two indicators of equality). Likewise, in the

T A B L E V I Civic attitudes in East and West (national aggregates)

Civic En	gagement			Political	Equality				Solic	larity	
Discuss p	politics	Signing p	oetition	Priority 1	men	Priority	nation	Help eld	erly	Help sic	k & disab
country	% fre- quently + occa- sionally	country	% have done	country	% dis- agreeing	country	% dis- agreeing	country	% yes and absolu- tely yes	country	% yes and absolu- tely yes
CZE	87.30	SWE	87.40	SWE	97.60	SWE	87.40	SWE	85.40	SWE	87.80
SLV	86.50	USA	81.10	ICE	96.40	NL	69.10	IRE	80.50	ICE	82.70
Nor	86.00	GB	79.30	DEN	93.50	DEN	61.30	ITA	80.40	ITA	82.20
LIT	85.20	AUS	78.40	FIN	89.40	NOR	55.40	CRO	76.40	MAL	82.10
Ger	83.90	CAN	73.30	USA	89.20	AUS	51.80	MAL	76.30	IRE	81.40
EST	82.10	В	68.50	NL	87.10	EST	48.10	ICE	73.00	CRO	79.40
MOL	81.30	FRA	68.30	EST	84.80	CAN	47.40	FIN	71.90	CZE	76.30
Den	80.10	NOR	64.70	NOR	84.70	LUX	46.60	SLV	69.20	FIN	73.30
Swe	80.00	SWI	63.60	CAN	84.40	USA	44.80	В	67.20	SLV	71.70
BELA	79.90	N IRL	60.40	IRE	83.50	В	40.90	POL	67.20	POL	71.50
MAC	79.90	IRE	59.60	N IRL	82.60	FRA	40.00	DEN	66.70	GRE	70.80
Nl	79.70	SLV	59.30	SLO	79.20	GB	35.60	ROM	66.50	SLO	70.80
CRO	79.70	NL	59.10	GRE	78.50	GER	33.90	GRE	65.80	DEN	70.10
MONT	78.70	CZE	58.70	CZE	78.20	FIN	29.60	SLO	64.90	В	68.10
Gre	78.60	DEN	56.80	LAT	77.80	SWI	28.60	CZE	62.60	N IRL	66.10
Ice	78.30	AU	56.70	FRA	75.80	ICE	27.30	N IRL	62.40	NL	65.80
UKR	77.90	ITA	54.60	SP	74.30	POR	26.30	NL	62.20	LUX	65.50
ARM	77.80	LUX	53.20	GB	73.60	UKR	25.30	LUX	60.60	POR	65.40
ALB	77.60	ICE	53.00	В	73.50	ARM	25.00	FRA	58.70	BUL	65.00
Swi	77.50	GER	50.60	HUN	73.00	ITA	24.80	POR	58.50	ROM	63.90
LAT	77.40	GRE	49.60	AUS	72.70	SP	23.20	BUL	58.30	FRA	61.80
SERB	76.60	FIN	49.60	LIT	72.20	IRE	22.70	AU	57.80	HUN	59.50
POL	76.40	CRO	35.00	BELA	72.00	RUS	22.10	HUN	57.40	LAT	58.70
RUS	75.00	MAL	33.20	LUX	70.90	N IRL	20.40	SP	56.80	GB	58.30
Usa	74.60	SLO	32.40	SLV	69.30	AU	20.20	LAT	55.80	AU	57.30
Au	74.20	SERB	28.80	CRO	68.50	LAT	19.80	GB	54.00	SP	54.70
BUL	73.80	SP	28.60	ITA	67.80	MOL	17.80	GER	50.20	RUS	48.60
Fin	73.70	LIT	27.40	GER	67.80	ROM	16.40	RUS	49.80	GER	48.50
BOS	73.00	MAC	26.50	AU	67.10	SLO	13.90	UKR	39.80	UKR	41.00
GEOR	72.50	MONT	23.90	SWI	67.00	GRE	13.90	LIT	35.00	EST	39.70
SLO	72.20	POR	22.60	POR	66.70	SERB	11.20	EST	33.10	LIT	35.00
Aus	69.30	POL ALB	22.50	UKR	66.10	GEOR	10.40	BELA	7.40	BELA	9.50
Lux	69.00		22.40	MONT	65.80	BELA CZE	10.20	NOR	•	NOR	•
Ita N irl	67.60	BOS EST	22.00	SERB BOS	64.70	MAC	9.60	AUS CAN	•	AUS CAN	•
Fra	66.40	LAT	20.60	RUS	64.30	ALB	9.60	USA	•	USA	•
Can	64.80	MOL	19.10	POL	59.00	ALB	9.10	SWI	•	SWI	•
B	63.70 62.80	ARM	18.00	ROM	57.80		8.70	ARM	•	ARM	•
Mal	62.80 62.40	HUN	17.80	BUL	55.60	MONT HUN	7.20 6.80	MOL	•	MOL	•
ROM		UKR	14.70	MAL	53.70	BUL	6.20	SERB	•	SERB	•
Ire	62.30 59.60	GEOR	14.20 13.90	MAL	48.30 46.40	CRO	6.20 6.10	GEOR	•	GEOR	•
пс		GEOR	13.90	MAC	46.40	SLV	5.50	MAC	•	MAC	•
HUN	27	RUS			43.40			ALB	•	ALB	•
HUN Sp	53.90	RUS			40.20	MAL	1 4 50				
Sp	53.90 52.90	BUL	11.10	ALB	40.30	MAL	4.50		•		•
Sp AZE	53.90 52.90 52.50	BUL ROM	11.10 10.70	ALB ARM	34.30	POL	3.90	AZE	•	AZE	•
Sp AZE Por	53.90 52.90 52.50 50.90	BUL ROM AZE	11.10 10.70 10.10	ALB ARM AZE	34.30 30.50	POL LIT	3.90 3.70	AZE MONT	•	AZE MONT	•
Sp AZE	53.90 52.90 52.50	BUL ROM	11.10 10.70	ALB ARM	34.30	POL	3.90	AZE	•	AZE	•
Sp AZE Por Gb	53.90 52.90 52.50 50.90 48.50	BUL ROM AZE	11.10 10.70 10.10 8.80	ALB ARM AZE	34.30 30.50 28.50	POL LIT	3.90 3.70	AZE MONT	•	AZE MONT	•
Sp AZE Por	53.90 52.90 52.50 50.90	BUL ROM AZE	11.10 10.70 10.10	ALB ARM AZE	34.30 30.50	POL LIT	3.90 3.70	AZE MONT	•	AZE MONT	•

Trust				Toleranc	e			Associat	ions		
Interpers	onal	Compati	riots	Don't lik	e	Don't lik	æ	Belongin	ig to	Voluntar	у
trust		claiming		immigra	nts	homosex	uals	different		work for	different
		state ben	efits	as neight	ours	as neight	oours	organiza	tions	organiza	tions
country	% most	country	% some	country	% not	country	% not	country	Ave-	country	Ave-
	people		+		men-		men-		rage		rage
	can be		almost		tioned		tioned		number		number
	trusted		none								
DEN	66.50	NL	92.40	POR	97.50	SWE	93.90	USA	3.26	USA	1.88
SWE	66.30	SP	79.60	SWE	97.20	NL	93.80	SWE	3.24	SWE	1.15
NOR	65.30	LAT	72.60	ICE	97.00	ICE	92.10	NL	3.06	CAN	1.06
NL	59.80	LIT	70.00	CAN	95.80	DEN	92.00	ICE	2.70	GRE	.96
FIN	58.00	DEN	69.30	AUS	95.40	GER	86.90	CAN	1.96	NL	.93
BELA	41.90	BELA	69.30	NL	95.00	NOR	85.70	DEN	1.92	SLV	.81
ICE	41.10	SWE	67.10	SERB	92.30	FRA	84.40	FIN	1.86	В	.66
SWI	41.00	В	67.10	LUX	91.60	SP	83.60	ALB	1.72	FIN	.65
AUS	39.90	FRA	62.40	GER	91.40	CAN	83.10	В	1.65	LUX	.63
N IRL	39.50	FIN	62.30	SP	90.70	В	82.60	AU	1.48	DEN	.57
CAN	38.80	EST	60.00	LAT	90.20	SWI	81.50	LUX	1.45	IRE	.57
SP	38.50	RUS	59.40	NOR	90.20	LUX	81.40	GRE	1.25	SLO	•54
USA	35.80	CZE	55.90	SWI	90.00	CZE	80.30	IRE	1.15	ICE	.53
IRE	35.20	ICE	55.60	USA	89.90	FIN	78.70	MAC	1.13	CZE	.50
GER	34.80	UKR	52.80	DEN	89.40	USA	76.70	SLV	1.12	MAL	.50
AU	33.90	CRO	52.60	GEOR	89.10	GB	75.70	CZE	1.02	AU	•47
MONT	33.70	BUL	51.90	RUS	88.90	AUS	75.30	SLO	.98	ITA	.46
ITA	32.60	GER	50.80	FRA	88.00	POR	74.80	N IRL	.93	N IRL	.37
В	30.70	IRE	46.80	AU	87.80	AU	74.60	MONT	.89	FRA	.37
GB	29.70	POR	42.70	IRE	87.70	GRE	73.20	MOL	.89	CRO	•35
UKR	27.20	SLV	40.80	FIN	87.00	IRE	73.10	GER	.84	LAT	.29
BUL	26.90	AU	40.60	GRE	86.30	ITA	71.30	ITA	.78	EST	.28
LUX	26.00	N IRL	40.00	UKR	85.10	N IRL	64.80	CRO	.67	GER	.27
LIT	24.90	GB	38.20	MAL	84.70	MAL	60.40	MAL	.62	SP	.27
ARM	24.70	POL	36.60	GB	84.50	SLV	56.00	FRA	.61	HUN	.26
ALB	24.40	GRE	33.70	SLO	84.00	SLO	55.70	GB	.61	BELA	.25
CZE	23.90	ITA	24.40	ITA	83.50	LAT	54.50	BOS	•55	BUL	.24
GRE	23.70	MAL	20.70	ALB	83.50	EST	53.80	BELA	.52	ROM	.21
RUS	23.70	ROM	14.20	BELA	82.90	SERB	50.90	EST	.50	POL	.20
EST	22.80	HUN	4.40	N IRL	82.00	CRO	47.20	SP	.48	POR	.18
FRA	22.20	NOR	4.4.	В	81.80	MAC	46.50	SERB	•47	UKR	.16
HUN	21.80	SWI		MAC	81.40	BUL	46.10	UKR	.45	LIT	.16
SLO	21.70	AUS		MOL	81.20	POL	44.80	HUN	•43	RUS	.10
MAL	20.70	CAN		CZE	80.60	RUS	42.10	LAT	.41	ALB	.10
AZE	20.50	USA		AZE	80.10	BELA	36.70	POL	.40	MAC	•
POL	18.90	MONT		MONT	79.90	BOS	35.80	RUS	•39	MONT	•
SERB	18.80	LUX	•	EST	79.10	ROM	34.80	POR	·39 ·33	MOL	
GEOR	18.70	ARM	•	ROM	78.90	UKR	34.30	BUL		GB	•
CRO	18.40	ALB	•	ARM	78.40	LIT	34.30	ROM	.32 .31	BOS	•
LAT	-	SLO		CRO	78.30	MONT	26.30	LIT	-	SERB	•
BOS	17.10 15.80	AZE	•	SLV	78.30 77.10	GEOR		NOR	.23	NOR	•
SLV	-	SERB	•	POL		MOL		SWI	•	SWI	•
MOL	15.70	GEOR	•	LIT	76.50	ALB	22.60	AUS	•	AUS	•
MAC	14.70	BOS	•	BUL	76.40		17.40	GEOR	•	GEOR	•
	13.50		•	BOS	75.40	ARM AZE	16.70	ARM	•		•
ROM	10.10	MOL	•		75.20		9.30		•	ARM	•
POR	10.00	MAC	•	HUN	•	HUN	•	AZE	•	AZE	•
Winni	a9 a				80.0		80.6				
West	38.7		52.6		89.8		80.0		1.5		0.7
East	21.7		49.3		81.6		39.4		0.7		0.3
West-East	17.0**		3.3		8.2**		40.6**		0.8**		0.4**

Note: * p. <.05; ** p. <.01. Eastern countries are given in bold; Western countries in normal style. The values under "West" and "East" denote regional averages. The values in the last row denote the differences in means between West and East.

East the historically more "civic" states perform well across a range of indicators (Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Latvia), whereas the countries in the Balkans and the Caucasus generally trail the rankings. Yet, there are also plenty of surprises. In the West, Britain and France have remarkably low scores for "civic" nations on many indicators. "Uncivic" Spain has high values on civic honesty and on the two tolerance indicators. In the East "uncivic" Slovakia does very well across a range of indicators, and "uncivic" Belarus has high scores on the two trust items. Moreover, country scores can fluctuate widely across indicators. Portugal for instance trails the ranking order on social trust but tops the one on *ethnic tolerance*. Similarly, Greeks are surprisingly *active* participants but have a dim view of the civic honesty of their compatriots. These large cross-indicator differences confirm the observation above that the internal consistency of civic culture is not very impressive. More importantly and to the detriment of the historical perspective, they also suggest that country specific factors have a substantial impact on civic values.

The data of Table VI provide an equally mixed pattern of support for the communist perspective. On the one hand, the country rankings on *political activity, ethnic equality, social trust* and *ethnic tolerance* are in line with the expectation in a sense that the postcommunist countries almost *en bloc* occupy the lower half of the scales. These are moreover precisely the indicators on which the regions are expected to diverge most strongly. The higher average scores of postcommunist countries on *political discussions* is also anticipated as this particular indicator is likely to tap the informal type of social capital considered to be so salient in the East. On the other hand, the communist perspective cannot account for the lack of regional differentiation on *civic honesty*. This indicator *par excellence* should show a substantial difference as citizen-state relations in the East are purportedly marked by mutual hostility and abuse. Equally disturbing for the theory is the substantial variation among the transition states on *ethnic tolerance* and the two association indicators.

The survey data discussed here thus do not express a clear preference for either of the two perspectives. Both perspectives are supported in a more or less equal measure. In order to fully appreciate the durability of civic culture, however, the validity of the *transition* perspective needs to be examined. I assessed civic trends in those transition states that participated in all three WVS waves (1990-1991; 1995-1997; 1999-2000) since the demise of communism. Figure I shows the economic performance of these states during the 1990s measured in GNP per capita. Except for Poland and Slovenia whose economies started to recover at a






FIGURE I Trends in GNP per capita in selected transition states during the 1990s

very early stage, the other six states experienced a sharp decline in the early 1990s and had to wait for the turning point until 1993-95. Towards the end of the millennium their economies had not yet reached their pre-independence levels. Consequently, the transition perspective would expect civic attitudes in these states to fall sharply between 1990 and 1995, to reach their lowest point in the mid-1990s and to show a modest recovery thereafter. In Slovenia and Poland levels of civic attitudes should be higher at the close of the decade than at the beginning. Table VII presents the developments in civic values on seven indicators

		tical discuss ntly and occ			olitical activ	
	· · ·		* /			1
Deltered	1990	1995-97	1999-00	1990	1995-97	1999-00
Bulgaria	88.3	70.0	73.8	21.6	5.7	11.1
Estonia	94.6	79.I	82.1	39.0	13.0	20.6
Latvia	96.4	84.5	77.4	64.6	29.8	19.1
Lithuania	94.4	76.8	85.2	58.3	27.I	27.4
Poland	82.7	67.6	76.4	14.1	18.7	22.5
Slovenia	82.0	75.3	72.2	27.6	18.8	32.4
Belarus	90.7	79.4	79.9	27.0	9.1	8.8
Russia	82.0	74.0	75.0	27.1	9.1	11.6
		ender equali			thnic equali	
		eeing with			eeing with	
	"prior	ity men whe	en jobs	"priority	own nation	
		are scarce")			are scarce"))
	1990	1995-97	1999-00	1990	1995-97	1999-00
Bulgaria	50.7	53.I	53.7	10.8	7.3	6.2
Estonia	14.9	61.9	84.8	3.5	46.2	48.1
Latvia	29.6	69.1	77.8	5.7	50.2	19.8
Lithuania	II.2	60.9	72.2	2.7	3.7	3.7
Poland	21.6	48.0	57.8	12.3	4.8	3.9
Slovenia	68.I	67.6	79.2	16.0	8.6	13.9
Belarus	58.6	46.2	72.0	39.7	16.8	10.2
Russia	55.4	43.6	59.0	39.7	19.2	22.1
rtuoolu	55.4	+3.0	39.0		19.2	22.1
	E	thnic toleran	ce	S	exual tolerar	lice
		xpressing r			xpressing 1	
		nigrants as n			out homosex	
	about min	ingrants as in	cigiibours)		s neighbour	
	1990	1995-97	1999-00	1990	1995-97	1999-00
Bulgaria				32.5	59.2	
Estonia				32.5	50.2	46.1
Latvia	65.5	84.4	75.4			7.0 9
Lithuania	82.9	81.0	79.1	27. I	36.1	53.8
Litnuania	82.9 69.2	81.0 81.8	79.1 90.2	27.1 21.6	36.1 40.8	54.5
	82.9 69.2 85.2	81.0 81.8 70.6	79.1 90.2 76.4	27.1 21.6 12.6	36.1 40.8 23.3	54·5 32·5
Poland	82.9 69.2 85.2	81.0 81.8 70.6 78.7	79.1 90.2 76.4 76.5	27.1 21.6 12.6 -	36.1 40.8 23.3 33.9	54.5 32.5 44.8
Poland Slovenia	82.9 69.2 85.2 - 60.4	81.0 81.8 70.6 78.7 81.9	79.1 90.2 76.4 76.5 84.0	27.1 21.6 12.6 - 57.5	36.1 40.8 23.3 33.9 38.8	54.5 32.5 44.8 55.7
Poland Slovenia Belarus	82.9 69.2 85.2 - 60.4 83.0	81.0 81.8 70.6 78.7 81.9 93.7	79.1 90.2 76.4 76.5 84.0 82.9	27.1 21.6 12.6 - 57.5 21.0	36.1 40.8 23.3 33.9 38.8 36.6	54.5 32.5 44.8 55.7 36.7
Poland Slovenia	82.9 69.2 85.2 - 60.4	81.0 81.8 70.6 78.7 81.9	79.1 90.2 76.4 76.5 84.0	27.1 21.6 12.6 - 57.5	36.1 40.8 23.3 33.9 38.8	54.5 32.5 44.8 55.7
Poland Slovenia Belarus	82.9 69.2 85.2 - 60.4 83.0	81.0 81.8 70.6 78.7 81.9 93.7 87.8	79.1 90.2 76.4 76.5 84.0 82.9 88.9	27.1 21.6 12.6 - 57.5 21.0	36.1 40.8 23.3 33.9 38.8 36.6	54.5 32.5 44.8 55.7 36.7
Poland Slovenia Belarus	82.9 69.2 85.2 - 60.4 83.0 88.9	81.0 81.8 70.6 78.7 81.9 93.7 87.8 Social trust	79.1 90.2 76.4 76.5 84.0 82.9 88.9	27.1 21.6 12.6 - 57.5 21.0	36.1 40.8 23.3 33.9 38.8 36.6	54.5 32.5 44.8 55.7 36.7
Poland Slovenia Belarus	82.9 69.2 85.2 - 60.4 83.0 88.9 (% most p	81.0 81.8 70.6 78.7 81.9 93.7 87.8 Social trust people can be	79.1 90.2 76.4 76.5 84.0 82.9 88.9 e trusted)	27.1 21.6 12.6 - 57.5 21.0	36.1 40.8 23.3 33.9 38.8 36.6	54.5 32.5 44.8 55.7 36.7
Poland Slovenia Belarus Russia	82.9 69.2 85.2 - 60.4 83.0 88.9 (% most 1 1990	81.0 81.8 70.6 78.7 81.9 93.7 87.8 Social trust people can b 1995-97	79.1 90.2 76.4 76.5 84.0 82.9 88.9 e trusted) 1999-00	27.1 21.6 12.6 - 57.5 21.0	36.1 40.8 23.3 33.9 38.8 36.6	54.5 32.5 44.8 55.7 36.7
Poland Slovenia Belarus Russia Bulgaria	82.9 69.2 85.2 - 60.4 83.0 88.9 (% most p 1990 30.4	81.0 81.8 70.6 78.7 81.9 93.7 87.8 Social trust people can b 1995-97 28.6	79.1 90.2 76.4 76.5 84.0 82.9 88.9 e trusted) 1999-00 26.9	27.1 21.6 12.6 - 57.5 21.0	36.1 40.8 23.3 33.9 38.8 36.6	54.5 32.5 44.8 55.7 36.7
Poland Slovenia Belarus Russia Bulgaria Estonia	82.9 69.2 85.2 - 60.4 83.0 88.9 (% most 1 1990	81.0 81.8 70.6 78.7 81.9 93.7 87.8 Social trust people can b 1995-97	79.1 90.2 76.4 76.5 84.0 82.9 88.9 e trusted) 1999-00	27.1 21.6 12.6 - 57.5 21.0	36.1 40.8 23.3 33.9 38.8 36.6	54.5 32.5 44.8 55.7 36.7
Poland Slovenia Belarus Russia Bulgaria Estonia Latvia	82.9 69.2 85.2 - 60.4 83.0 88.9 (% most p 1990 30.4	81.0 81.8 70.6 78.7 81.9 93.7 87.8 Social trust people can b 1995-97 28.6	79.1 90.2 76.4 76.5 84.0 82.9 88.9 e trusted) 1999-00 26.9	27.1 21.6 12.6 - 57.5 21.0	36.1 40.8 23.3 33.9 38.8 36.6	54.5 32.5 44.8 55.7 36.7
Poland Slovenia Belarus Russia Bulgaria Estonia	82.9 69.2 85.2 - 60.4 83.0 88.9 (% most p 1990 30.4 27.6	81.0 81.8 70.6 78.7 81.9 93.7 87.8 Social trust beople can b 1995-97 28.6 21.5	79.1 90.2 76.4 76.5 84.0 82.9 88.9 e trusted) 1999-00 26.9 22.8	27.1 21.6 12.6 - 57.5 21.0	36.1 40.8 23.3 33.9 38.8 36.6	54.5 32.5 44.8 55.7 36.7
Poland Slovenia Belarus Russia Bulgaria Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland	82.9 69.2 85.2 - 60.4 83.0 88.9 (% most p 1990 30.4 27.6 19.0 30.8	81.0 81.8 70.6 78.7 81.9 93.7 87.8 Social trust beople can be 1095-97 28.6 21.5 24.7 21.9	79.1 90.2 76.4 76.5 84.0 82.9 88.9 e trusted) 1999-00 26.9 22.8 17.1	27.1 21.6 12.6 - 57.5 21.0	36.1 40.8 23.3 33.9 38.8 36.6	54.5 32.5 44.8 55.7 36.7
Poland Slovenia Belarus Russia Bulgaria Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland	82.9 69.2 85.2 - 60.4 83.0 88.9 (% most j 1990 30.4 27.6 19.0 30.8 34.5	81.0 81.8 70.6 78.7 81.9 93.7 87.8 Social trust people can be 1995-97 28.6 21.5 24.7 21.9 17.9	79.1 90.2 76.4 76.5 84.0 82.9 88.9 e trusted) 1999-00 26.9 22.8 17.1 24.9 18.9	27.1 21.6 12.6 - 57.5 21.0	36.1 40.8 23.3 33.9 38.8 36.6	54.5 32.5 44.8 55.7 36.7
Poland Slovenia Belarus Russia Bulgaria Estonia Latvia Lithuania	82.9 69.2 85.2 - 60.4 83.0 88.9 (% most p 1990 30.4 27.6 19.0 30.8	81.0 81.8 70.6 78.7 81.9 93.7 87.8 Social trust beople can be 1095-97 28.6 21.5 24.7 21.9	79.1 90.2 76.4 76.5 84.0 82.9 88.9 e trusted) 1999-00 26.9 22.8 17.1 24.9	27.1 21.6 12.6 - 57.5 21.0	36.1 40.8 23.3 33.9 38.8 36.6	54.5 32.5 44.8 55.7 36.7

TABLE VII Trends in civic attitudes in eight transition states

of civic culture (5). It can be seen that the transition perspective works reasonably well for *social trust*, *political discussions* and *political activity*. The majority of countries display the expected mid 1990s dip on these indicators, and in only three countries, two of them being Poland and Slovenia on political activity, are levels of civic values higher at the end of the decade than at the beginning. Nonetheless there are also unexpected trends. Latvian levels of *social trust* first rise and then decline. In Poland civic values are stronger at the beginning of the 1990s than at the end (with the exception of *political activity*). What is also slightly difficult for the transition perspective to digest is that the fluctuations are fairly small. Levels of *social trust* remain low and the frequency of *discussing politics* remains high throughout the 1990s. Only the trends on *political activity* almost perfectly match the predicted pattern. Thus, the socio-economic transformation seems not to have impacted on civic values to the extent that the transition perspective expected.

More damaging for the perspective is that the trends on the other indicators do not at all follow the anticipated pattern. Developments on *ethnic equality* and *ethnic tolerance* go in all kinds of directions. What can be observed is the persistent consensus across the board (Estonia excepting) that it is legitimate to give priority to co-nationals over immigrants when jobs are scarce (i.e. low levels of *ethnic equality*). Truly spectacular, however, are the steep upward trends on *gender equality* and *sexual tolerance*. During the 1990s people in the eight transition states, and most notably in the Baltics, have become much more accepting of homosexuals and have embraced the idea of gender equality in ever higher numbers, contrary to the prediction of the transition perspective. Possibly, these trends are not so much linked to socio-economic restructuring but to the change from a secluded communist society to an open democratic one absorbing cultural influences from the West.

Reviewing the empirical evidence for the three perspectives, the rather unsatisfactory conclusion has to be drawn that there is some measure of support for all three of them. In other words, civic culture is a function of both slowly evolving historical processes and short and medium term political and economic developments. The support for each of the three perspectives, however, varies from country to country, which suggests that country specific factors have a strong bearing on civic culture as well. It also varies from indicator to indicator. The his-

(5) The table does not present the two indicators on solidarity the other trust indicator on trust (*civic honesty*) because these items were not asked in the 1995-97 wave. *Passive* and *active participation* are not included because the wording for these questions was different in the 1995-97 wave.

torical perspective is endorsed by political activity, social trust and passive and active participation as the allegedly strong civic nations top the rankings on these indicators and the "uncivic" nations are at the bottom end. The communist perspective is supported by those indicators on which the difference between the former communist world and the West is the largest, i.e. ethnic equality, sexual tolerance, and, once again, political activity. The transition perspective relies above all on political activity (yet again!) and to a lesser extent on social trust and discussing politics, as the trends on these indicators are as anticipated. Paradoxically, the variation on one single indicator (*political activity*) matches the predicted outcome of all three perspectives simultaneously. This illustrates as no other that all three perspectives seem to have a more or less equal measure of explanatory power. In a broader sense, theories that assume cultural dispositions to react strongly to recent events are corroborated by the drastically changing attitudes on gender equality and sexual tolerance in the transition states. The variation between indicators, moreover, underlines the observation above that civic culture is a highly heterogeneous concept as it includes notions that are highly responsive to recent events and notions which seem to have a fair amount of durability. Interestingly, though focussing on secular-rational values and self-expression values, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) arrive at remarkably similar conclusions regarding the tenacity of culture and the main factors impinging on it. They find that age old religious traditions, national idiosyncrasies, the legacy of communism and more recent socioeconomic developments all exert a powerful influence on a society's value system. The influence of these factors however differs from value complex to value complex. Cultural legacies have a relatively greater impact on secular-rational values, while the dynamic process of modernization can best account for changes in self-expression values.

Conclusion

Using WVS and EVS data to assess patterns of civic attitudes in East and West, this article has demonstrated that civic culture is not as coherent a set of attitudes as some cultural theorists, Putnam first of all, claim it is. At the individual level, the attitudes commonly associated with civic culture do not cluster to a sufficient degree for them to be clearly distinguished from other dispositions. Moreover, there are geographical variations in the nature of civic culture as the correlations between civic attitudes are weaker in the East than in the West. When

tested empirically, the theoretical notion of civic culture thus not only constitutes a rather arbitrary collection of attitudes in the individual's mind, it also assumes different characteristics across regions. Civic values cluster slightly better at the societal level, but they do not form a convincing clearly demarcated one-dimensional syndrome at that level either. Even the more focused notion of social capital appears to be more a bi- than mono-dimensional phenomenon at the macro level, which is bad news for theorists who contend that it has the properties of a public good.

This study has also found civic culture to be significantly weaker in the former communist states across a wide range of indicators. The question it sought to answer is whether this difference is rooted in the pre-modern past or whether it is the consequence of more recent developments. In other words, how persistent are civic values and how insensitive are they to political and economic events? As it turns out, the data examined in this paper only partially support the notion that civic culture is a durable phenomenon. If it had been as durable as claimed, the pattern of civic attitudes across western countries and transition states would have closely matched the one expected by the historical perspective, which traces the roots of civic culture back to medieval times. Instead, the historical perspective correctly predicts the variation on only some attitudes in only some countries. The patterns on other attitudes are more in line with the expected outcomes of the legacy of communism perspective and the post-communist transition theory. These perspectives may be said to rival with the historical perspective in that they assign a higher degree of pliability to civic culture. Furthermore, the trends on two attitudes, gender equality and sexual tolerance, show such a spectacular and unexpected increase throughout the 1990s in several transition societies, that other factors not explored in this study are likely to have impacted on civic values as well. Yet, it must be borne in mind that this study, by relying on survey data that cover a time span of no more than ten years, could only partially explore the persistence of civic attitudes. Examining trends of civic culture across much larger time intervals, in a manner that Putnam has done for Italy, would have produced stronger conclusions.

Summing up, civic culture seems not to be the coherent and durable phenomenon that some theorists assume it to be. This has two implications. First, the continued use of the term "civic culture" should be questioned. Is seems wiser to rearrange the conceptual labelling and grouping of civic values to arrive at syndromes which include more restricted but more coherent sets of values. Even the more parsimonious

notion of social capital and the elements it is said to include in this sense needs revision. An interesting direction of future research, therefore, would be to identify these syndromes, to examine their durability across a substantial period of time, and to assess the extent to which democracy and socio-economic development depend on them. Second, because civic values would appear to be at least as much the result of recent economic and political processes as the outcome of path dependencies, "uncivic" regions are not doomed to be burdened with authoritarian cultures and atomized societies forever. This is positive news for all those who believe that civic values are a crucial condition for democracy.

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