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A STUDY OF PERCEIVED PROTEST ATMOSPHERES: HOW DEMONSTRATORS EVALUATE POLICE-DEMONSTRATOR INTERACTIONS AND WHY[*]

Anouk van Leeuwen, Bert Klandermans, and Jacquelien van Stekelenburg[†]

Using a multilevel dataset of seventy-five European street demonstrations (2009-13), we assess how demonstrators evaluate the interactions between the police and other demonstrators. In doing so, we study demonstrators' perceptions of the protest atmosphere. Understanding these atmosphere assessments is relevant, as demonstrators and other protest actors (e.g., police and the media) widely refer to the atmosphere (i.e., mood or climate) of protest events. To the best of our knowledge, scholars have not yet studied this aspect of protest participation. We start our study with a conceptualization and operationalization of protest atmosphere. Subsequently, we assess how demonstrators perceive atmosphere. Our analyses reveal that four types of protest atmospheres can be distinguished: harmonious, volatile, tense, and chaotic. We describe examples of these atmospheres and study why they are perceived. We find that the perception of atmosphere by demonstrators is influenced by individual characteristics (e.g., age) and demonstration characteristics (e.g., police repression).

At the beginning of the march the majority of students were very well behaved, but a small minority seemed intent on causing trouble. But after the march was somehow diverted, *the atmosphere* became much more hostile. Certain people appeared to be agitating the students and they made repeated attempts to break through the police ranks and march on Parliament. (Reicher 1996: 124, italics added)

This quote from a chief superintendent of the police who was responsible for public order during a student demonstration in London on November 24, 1988, illustrates how the concept of "atmosphere" is used to describe police-demonstrator interactions. Examples abound, not only from the police, but also from demonstrators and the media. "The atmosphere is peaceful," several participants of a demonstration against the Dutch Monarchy on April 30, 2013 said (van Leeuwen, van Stekelenburg, and Klandermans 2014). *Breaking News*, an online news media outlet, twittered on July 8, 2013: "Egyptian military sporadically shooting into the air; tense atmosphere around barricade separating protesters from army." These portrayals of atmosphere often describe interactions between demonstrators and the military or police in terms of the level of conflict.

Scholars also refer to protest atmosphere (Adang 2009; della Porta, Andretta, Mosca, and Reiter 2006; Drury, Cocking, Beale, Hanson, and Rapley 2005; Fillieule 1997; Schreiber and Adang 2006, 2010; Tilly 2003) or one of its synonyms, such as *mood* (Waddington 2007), *climate* (Bessel and Emsley 2000), *character* (Soule and Davenport 2009), *nature* (Schreiber

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and Adang 2010), *state* (Holgersson and Knutsson 2011), *situation* (Schreiber and Adang 2006) or *course* (Vitale 2007). A variety of adjectives are used to clarify what is meant by the term, such as good, positive, peaceful, calm, collaborative, friendly, respectable, festive, holiday, negative, chaotic, serious, tense, hostile, aggressive, volatile, or violent (e.g., Waddington, 2007; Schreiber and Adang 2006, 2010). To the best of our knowledge, the concept has not been systematically conceptualized or operationalized. This is striking given the widespread use of the term. In fact, some western and northern European police forces (e.g., Dutch, Danish, and Swedish) base their crowd management tactics on the atmosphere perceptions of their officers (Holgersson and Knutsson 2011).

Although scholars have not yet studied the atmosphere of street demonstrations, the concept is not completely new. Psychologists have studied how people's perceptions of atmosphere in marketing, organizational, and societal contexts shape their behavior. *Atmospherics* (Kotler 1973)—such as music and the behavior of others—have been found to increase or decrease people's consumerism at retail stores, restaurants (Turley and Milliman 2000), and sporting events (Uhrich and Benkenstein 2010). These researchers assert that people's behavior is shaped by the perception of their surroundings.

In this article, we expand current theorizing on the concept of atmosphere to a particular social environment: street demonstrations. Although a great variety of contextual factors might influence how atmosphere is perceived, we focus on the way demonstrators perceive the interactions between the police and other demonstrators. Based on sociological and social psychological research on protest events, we maintain that the level of conflict within police-demonstrator interactions is the central factor shaping demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions. We study how demonstrators perceive the atmosphere, rather than the perceptions of other actors (e.g., the police or media reporters), as demonstrators generally are the predominant group—they are the ones who stage the event and usually outnumber all other groups present. That being said, other groups may well have different atmosphere perceptions, which can lead to conflict. For instance, while demonstrators may perceive a festive atmosphere, the police might view the crowd as a potential threat and act accordingly (Reicher, Stott, Drury, Adang, Cronin, and Livingstone 2007). So, as we hold that the atmosphere is in the eye of the beholder, we study demonstrators' atmosphere *perceptions*, rather than the atmosphere at these events.

We first explore how demonstrators perceive the protest atmosphere. After having discerned different types of atmospheres, we provide case descriptions for each. Then, we examine why demonstrators perceive the protest atmosphere in a particular way by considering individual-level and demonstration-level characteristics. For our analyses, we employ a multi-level dataset of seventy-five European street demonstrations that occurred between November 2009 and May 2013. This dataset includes survey data on demonstrators' evaluations of the behavior of the police and other demonstrators. We also use contextual data on the demonstrations under study, which are based on researchers' observations at the event, post-event interviews with protest organizers and the police, and media reports.

CROWD CONFLICT

A street demonstration is a particular form of collective action, staged by people who are generally aggrieved by violated interests and/or principles. By taking to the streets, demonstrators want to prevent or promote social change on behalf of their group (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2009). Generally, the police manage demonstrations to maintain public order. Interactions between demonstrators and the police can be tense and confrontational. Although very few events turn violent (Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Fillieule 2006; Tilly 1978), many studies seek to understand when and why this happens.

Traditionally, crowd theorists believed that conflict resulted from the crowd's characteristics. Le Bon ([1895] 1985) thought crowd members behaved irrationally as a result of a

psychological transformation that took place within crowds. By contrast, Allport (1924) stated that conflict emerged when antisocial individuals came together. Contemporary scholars widely agree that to understand crowd conflict, one must also take the contextual setting into account, and most notably, in the case of street demonstrations, this involves the behavior of the police. Since the end of the twentieth century, many studies have sought to understand how and why certain protest events and social movements are repressed (both during a particular moment in history and over time) and how this influences protest mobilization and participation. Studies have also focused on the initiation of crowd conflict by demonstrators. Our study builds on both strands of research.

The "threat-based model of repression" (Davenport 2000; Earl et al. 2003) and the "blue approach" to police action (Earl and Soule 2006) explain why the police repress certain protest events. The threat approach explains protest repression in terms of the extent to which a particular protest event is perceived as threatening by political elites. For instance, large protest events are threatening because they demonstrate the potential power of an opposing group (Tilly 1979). The blue approach maintains that the institutional characteristics of the police determine the character of protest policing.[1] Institutional concerns such as the loss of control over public order and officer safety determine the "situational threats" to which officers respond. More complex protests, such as large or moving events (protest marches), are typically perceived as more threatening and are therefore more repressively policed (Soule and Davenport 2009).

Independent of the reasons why the police repress certain protest events, evidence abounds that such police behavior is likely to set off confrontational interactions with demonstrators. The "elaborated social identity model" (ESIM) (Cocking 2013; Reicher et al. 2007; Stott 2009) explains how and why crowd conflict emerges. ESIM originated from social identity theory (Tajfel 1982) and self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell 1987), which maintain that crowd behavior results from individuals' self-categorization with a salient social identity (e.g., demonstrator). When individuals identify with other crowd members, this may lead them to behave differently as they shift from a personal to a social identity, which prescribes appropriate behavior. Police repression can reinforce this social psychological process as it can make a social identity more salient. For instance, this happens when the police repress demonstrators indiscriminately or engage in behaviors that are considered illegitimate (e.g., striking a pregnant protester). As demonstrators perceive themselves as sharing a common fate, they start to feel more connected and behave collectively. Individuals who have come to an event with peaceful intentions might come to oppose the police or defend fellow protesters they previously did not know. As the police generally respond to such demonstrator behavior with more repression, this may lead to the escalation of conflict.

However, not all crowd conflicts are due to police behavior. Evidence suggests that young men are more likely to confront the police and/or engage in violent behavior. For instance, a study of the initiation and escalation of collective violence at seventy-seven Dutch protest events (1986-89) showed that 90 percent of violent protests involved young (age 15-25) male protestors (Adang 2011: 52).[2] Experienced demonstrators who previously engaged in confrontational and violent forms of collective action are also considered more likely to confront the police (della Porta et al. 2006). Previous interactions with the police also shape the behavior of activists during a protest event (Scholl [2010] 2013). Anticipating police repression, activists might start to provoke the police from the onset. Some activists might even enjoy fighting the police, driven more by an impulse of "hooliganism" than by "legitimate" political beliefs (della Porta 1998). However, research on (football) crowds has shown that conflict is better explained by interactions between crowd members and the police than by the presence or absence of "hooligans" (Stott, Hutchison, and Drury 2001).

In conclusion, contemporary scholars widely agree that crowd conflict generally results from the dynamic interactions that take place between demonstrators and the police. Police repression or demonstrator provocation might trigger such a conflict. For both groups, the perceived behavior of the other group is a key factor shaping interactional dynamics. In this article,

we study demonstrators' evaluations of police-demonstrator interactions to understand their perception of protest atmosphere.

CONCEPTUALIZING ATMOSPHERE

As mentioned, the concept of atmosphere is not completely new, but it has not yet been adequately conceptualized by social movement scholars. Psychologists have studied how consumers perceive atmosphere in a variety of social contexts and how this influences behavior. We extend this concept to social movements to study how demonstrators experience the atmosphere of the protest events in which they participate. For this study, we build on the recent work of Uhrich and Benkenstein (2010) who, to the best of our knowledge, are the first psychologists to conceptualize and operationalize the concept. Their research is based on theories of environmental psychology, an interdisciplinary area of research that seeks to explain how characteristics in the environment influence human perceptions, cognitions, emotions, and behavior (Gifford 1997). In their research on sport stadiums, Uhrich and Benkenstein (2010: 216) defined perceived atmosphere as "a preferential affective state that spectators attribute to the idiosyncratic environmental features of a sport stadium." The concept was then operationalized by an expert survey that distinguished seventy-seven aspects of the sport stadium atmosphere, such as the number of fans, cheering (to motivate the team), and friendly behavior by stewards (Uhrich and Benkenstein 2010: 235-7). After reducing these aspects into seven underlying dimensions, Uhrich and Benkenstein concluded that the most important determinant of the perception of atmosphere was interactions with other people.

Like sports events, street demonstrations are social events where groups of people gather together in a particular location. We presume that, just as in sports stadiums, participants at street demonstrations perceive a certain atmosphere. We largely follow the definition that was proposed by Uhrich and Benkenstein, but ee make two changes to better align it with street demonstrations. First, we do not think the atmosphere of street demonstrations should be conceptualized as preferential, as these events are not about enjoyment (although they might be experienced as such). For instance, the previously mentioned media reporter who perceived the "tense atmosphere" around the Egyptian barricade would probably not use the term "preferential." Second, building on current theorizing on crowd behavior, we argue that the perceived atmosphere of protest events is not so much shaped by their environmental features, but by police-demonstrator interactions. We define the perceived atmosphere of street demonstrations as *the affective state that people attribute to the idiosyncratic features of a demonstration.*

DESIGN

We first explore how demonstrators perceive the atmosphere at contemporary European protest events. As we hold that demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions are largely influenced by police-demonstrator interactions, we study how demonstrators evaluate such interactions. For this study, we use measures from a postal survey that was distributed to nearly 16,000 demonstrators at seventy-five European street demonstrations and completed after the event. These assessments indicate to what extent demonstrators thought the interactions were conflictual. So, the atmosphere perceptions will range from nonconflictual to conflictual. We will show which types of atmospheres were perceived and use rich contextual data to describe what these atmospheres were like.

We subsequently assess why demonstrators perceived a certain atmosphere. Basing our analysis on current knowledge of protest policing and crowd behavior, we assume that demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions are based on individual and demonstration characteristics. On an individual level, gender, age, and previous protest experiences are expected to influence

demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions. We assume that demonstrators who are *male*, *young*, and have recent *protest experience* (especially in *direct action* and *violent forms of action*) are more likely to perceive a conflictual (than a harmonious) atmosphere as they will be more willing to participate in events where clashes with the police are expected.

When it comes to demonstration characteristics, we expect that demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions are mostly shaped by the behavior of the police. We include a direct measure of *police repression*, as well as two indirect measures: *large demonstration* and *moving demonstration*. Both large and moving demonstrations are more likely to be repressed as they pose a situational threat to the police. We expect that when demonstrations are large, moving, or repressed by the police, demonstrators are more likely to perceive a conflictual atmosphere (than a harmonious one). We test the main effects of the individual and demonstration characteristics on demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions. As we expect *police repression* to have an effect on demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions irrespective of their individual characteristics, we also analyze whether this demonstration characteristic interacts with *male, young, protest experience, direct action*, and *violence*. In addition, we control for country as the demonstrations in our sample were staged in nine different countries. After all, previous studies indicated that protest policing varies across countries (e.g. della Porta and Reiter 1998).

Our design has its limitations. First, we acknowledge that demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions are probably not only shaped by police-demonstrator interactions. Various other demonstration features can influence the perception of protest atmosphere as well. For instance, warm sunny weather probably makes for a relaxed protest atmosphere, and upbeat protest songs could make the atmosphere more cheerful. However, as we think that police-demonstrator interactions are one of the most influential determinants of the protest atmosphere, we operationalized the concept as such. Second, the atmosphere categorizations that are distinguished by this study might deviate from demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions, as respondents filled out the postal surveys after the event. Yet, as we asked demonstrators to evaluate the behavior of the police and other demonstrators for the whole event, we do not think deviations will be large. Notwithstanding these limitations, we think our design is strong as we introduce both a categorization of perceived protest atmospheres and study why demonstrators had such perceptions.

METHODS

This study is based on the multilevel dataset of street demonstrations that was gathered by the international collaborative research project called, Caught in the act of protest: Contextualizing Contestation (CCC). Our study includes data from seventy-five street demonstrations that were gathered in nine European countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) between November 2009 and May 2013. In total, 15,999 demonstrators completed questionnaires that were distributed during the demonstration they attended. The project also gathered contextual data about the demonstrations. After the events, researchers completed factsheets on their observations at the events, protest organizers and police officers were interviewed, and media reports were collected. All employed questionnaires and procedures were standardized (van Stekelenburg, Walgrave, Klandermans, and Verhulst 2012).

Sampling Demonstrations

The CCC project started to gather data at the end of 2009 in six European countries. In each country, eight to twelve demonstrations were sampled. During the project, data were gathered in three more countries: the Swedish team sampled a Danish demonstration; the Italian team joined the project in the spring of 2011; and the Czech team followed in the summer of 2012. There were several criteria used to select events. First, demonstrations needed to be relatively large ($\geq$ 3,000 expected participants) since we aimed to distribute 1,000 questionnaires.[3] Demonstrations

that were expected to be violent would not be sampled, as we were responsible for the safety of our interviewers. We aimed to sample demonstrations that were staged by various social movements. More practically, demonstrations needed to be known at least two weeks beforehand so that data collection materials could be prepared.

The sample of seventy-five demonstrations that we employ for this study deviates somewhat from the predefined requirements. First of all, it proved hard to predict the size of demonstrations: 30 percent of the sampled events attracted less than 3,000 participants. Still, at most of these events (16 out of 23) more than 1,000 demonstrators were present.[4] Also, some of the demonstrations we sampled turned violent (e.g., second student national demonstration in London, 2010). When it comes to protest issues, we sampled events staged by old social movements (28 percent) and new social movements (31 percent). Also, ritual parades such as May Day parades and gay pride parades were included (41 percent).

The CCC dataset is not necessarily a representative sample of contemporary European street demonstrations. Due to the project's guidelines, large events are probably overrepresented. Also, the selection of events might be biased in countries where researchers had to choose from a large number of protest events (e.g., Spain).[5] Nevertheless, the CCC dataset is the largest sample on contemporary European protest events that we know of. Violent protests only appear to be slightly underrepresented. Van Leeuwen and McCarthy (2014) drew this conclusion based on a protest event analysis for a subsample of the dataset.[6] Thus, we are confident that we can use this dataset to study how demonstrators perceive the protest atmosphere and why.

Sampling Demonstrators

At each demonstration sampled, up to 1,000 demonstrators were asked to accept a postal questionnaire, which they were to fill out at home and send back to the university in a prepaid envelope. The response rate for our seventy-five demonstrations fluctuated between 13 percent and 52 percent, with an average of 31 percent. To control for response bias, a subsample of up to 200 participants was asked to participate in a short interview, which included some identical questions to those in the postal survey. After the interview, these respondents were also offered a postal survey. Response rates for the interviews ranged from 40 to 100 percent, being 85 percent on average. A comparison of the answers people gave during these interviews with those in the postal survey indicates a relatively small systematic response bias (Walgrave, Wouters, and Ketelaars forthcoming).

To make sure each demonstrator had the same chance of being selected, we used a sampling strategy designed by Walgrave and Verhulst (2011). Each demonstration was sampled by a team consisting of three to five so-called "pointers" and eight to twenty interviewers. The pointers selected the respondents, while the interviewers approached them. This division of labor was crucial to prevent sampling biases as interviewers tend to approach people they deem willing to cooperate. To make sure the demonstration was covered completely, pointers and interviewers were spread over the protest area and used a count ratio. This ratio was based on the estimated number of participants, and determined how many rows of respondents were skipped before a demonstrator was selected (for more information see Klandermans, van Stekelenburg, van Troost, van Leeuwen, Walgrave, Verhulst, van Laer, and Wouters 2011). According to Walgrave and colleagues (forthcoming), selection biases in this dataset are scattered and have few systematic effects.

Measures

To assess how demonstrators perceived the atmosphere at a protest event, they were asked to evaluate the interactions between the police and other demonstrators. We used four measures from two questions in the postal survey. The first question was, "How do you evaluate the behavior of the police at the demonstration?" Demonstrators were asked to assess how (1) co-

operative and (2) aggressive the police had behaved on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). The second question was, "And what about the demonstrators? Were they…?" Here, demonstrators were asked to assess how (1) cheerful and (2) disorderly other demonstrators had behaved on the same Likert scale.

We used descriptive statistics, as well as correlation, principle component, and cluster analyses to discover that these four measures of perceived police-demonstrator interactions could be reduced to two. First of all, *cooperative police behavior* and *aggressive police behavior* were strongly related. On average, demonstrators thought the police were quite cooperative (mean = 3.78; s.d. = 1.24) and not at all aggressive (mean = 1.45; s.d. = .89). We found a medium-to large-sized significant negative correlation between the two variables (r = -.43), suggesting that they partially measure the same aspect of police behavior. This assumption was confirmed by a principal component analysis, which permitted the items to correlate (direct oblimin method). The results showed that the two items load on the same factor. Because we could not discern the two variables theoretically, apart from the fact that they are each other's opposites, we decided to collapse them. To do so, we first reversed the answer categories of the variable *aggressive police behavior*. The new merged variable was called *respectful police behavior*. A reliability test showed that the average correlation between the items is respectable (α = .58).

We also simplified our measure of perceived demonstrator behavior. The variable *cheerful demonstrator behavior* proved to have little differentiating value: demonstrators generally thought other demonstrators had behaved quite cheerfully (mean = 4.27) and their perceptions varied only slightly (s.d. = .87). A cluster analysis confirmed this finding. Theoretically, *cheerful demonstrator behavior* did not seem to fit well with our other measures, since it refers to a collective emotion rather than a conflictual interaction. For these reasons, we excluded the variable from our analyses. A second measure to assess the behavior of demonstrators, *disorderly demonstrator behavior*, showed that demonstrators generally thought other demonstrators had not behaved very disorderly (mean = 1.59; s.d. = .85). A cluster analysis indicated that this variable was able to differentiate demonstrators based on their perceptions. To make this variable match well with *respectful police behavior*, we reversed the answer categories. We called this recoded variable *orderly demonstrator behavior*. So, for our study of how demonstrators perceived the protest atmosphere we will use two measures for police-demonstrator interactions: *respectful police behavior* and *orderly demonstrator behavior*.

For our subsequent study of why demonstrators perceived a certain atmosphere, we use eight variables. First of all, we include five measures of individual characteristics that are expected to shape demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions: *male, young, protest experience, direct action*, and *violence*. The data are self-reported from the postal survey. All measures were turned into dummy variables (0 representing "no" and 1 for "yes").

The variable *male* comes directly from the demographics section of the postal survey. *Young* are demonstrators between 11 and 29 years of age. Respondents had *protest experience* when they participated in at least one demonstration in the past year. This variable was based on the question: "How many times have you in the past 12 months taken part in a demonstration?" Answer categories ranged from 1 representing "never" to 5 for "21+." The variable *direct action* came from the question, "There are many things people can do to prevent or promote change. Have you in the past 12 months taken part in direct action (such as: blockade, occupation, civil disobedience)?" Answer categories were binary; all respondents who said yes were assigned a value of 1. For *violence* we used the question, "There are many things people can do to prevent or promote change. Have you in the past 12 months used violent forms of action (against property or people)?" Also these answer categories were binary, and all respondents who said "yes" were coded 1.

We included three measures of demonstration characteristics that are expected to shape demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions: *large, moving*, and *police repression*. All of these variables are dummies (0 representing "no" and 1 for "yes").

Large indicates demonstrations with at least (an estimated) 10,000 participants We base this operationalization on the largest protest event size category suggested by Martin, McCarthy, and McPhail (2009). To estimate the size of events, we took the mean of the estimations made by pointers, the police, and the media. If one of the estimations was missing, the measure was based on the other two estimations. For seven events only one actor estimated the event size.

Moving demonstrations are protest marches. The measure was based on the observations made by pointers. We selected all events for which pointers filled out the factsheet question, "If moving demonstration: Place of departure…? Place of arrival…?"

Police repression refers to events that were repressed by the police. This measure was based on the observations made by pointers and protest organizers. First of all, we selected eight events where, according to pointers, the police had used at least two of the following types of interventions: helmets donned, shields taken up, forming a closed police line, pushing and shoving, use of baton, use of mobile nets ("kettling"), putting up barricades, use of police dogs, or deployment of plain clothes snatch squads. Secondly, we selected five events where, according to the organizers, demonstrators had been arrested *and* injured. As pointers' and organizers' observations coincided for three events, we identified ten events in total (see appendix).

Description of Sample

Table 1 contains basic data on the two variables that we use to study how demonstrators perceive the atmosphere at street demonstrations. As shown, the means of both variables are above 4. Meaning that, on average, demonstrators thought the police behaved quite respectfully and other demonstrators behaved quite to very orderly. The slightly more positive assessment of demonstrator behavior makes sense, as people generally evaluate the behavior of their peers more positively than that of outgroup members. In the results section we will show how demonstrators' perceptions of these inter-actions diverged between events.

These preliminary results show we have some missing data. For the variable *respectful police behavior*, 916 cases are missing. This means that 6 percent of the respondents did not answer either of the two questions on police behavior. An analysis of these missing cases showed that at almost all events some demonstrators did not answer these questions. As the missing cases represent a small proportion of the sample, we did not add weights for them.

To verify whether demonstrators were able to evaluate the behavior of the police, we continued to analyze these missing cases more thoroughly. After all, some previous studies showed that the police are not always present at street demonstrations (e.g., Earl et al. 2003). Missing cases proved to be relatively high (15-42 percent) for five demonstrations. Some demonstrators had written "no police seen" in the survey booklets next to the questions they omitted. At three of these events, pointers did not see any police either. Due to these missing cases, demonstrators' evaluations of the behavior of the police might be less accurate for up to five events. At the remaining seventy events, we believe that participants were able to evaluate the behavior of the police.

For the variable *orderly demonstrator behavior,* we have almost twice as many missing cases (2,046), representing 13 percent of the sample. We find that at almost all events, a small percentage of respondents did not answer this question. Missing cases are at least twice as high (26-44 percent) for five demonstrations. An analysis of these missing cases suggests that they are not related to the question posed. Many of the demonstrators who did not answer this ques-

Table 1. Demonstrators' Evaluations of Police-demonstrator Interactions

	N	Missing data	Mean	St. dev.	Min.	Max.
Respectful police behavior	15,083	916	4.15	0.93	1	5
Orderly demonstrator behavior	13,953	2,046	4.41	0.85	1	5

tion had also omitted the previously posed question on cheerful demonstrator behavior. Some of them explicitly mentioned that the demonstration was not about a cheerful issue. So, we did not add weights for these missing cases.

Table 2 provides the frequencies of the eight variables that we use for our subsequent study of why demonstrators perceived a particular protest atmosphere. The first five variables represent demonstrator characteristics. As we can see, 52 percent of our respondents are men and 23 percent are younger than thirty years of age. In the last year, 76 percent had participated in at least one protest event; for 17 percent this was (or included) direct action, and for 2 percent violent forms of action. The second row of variables represents demonstration characteristics: 36 percent of the events were large ($\geq$ 10,000 participants), 69 percent were moving, and 13 percent faced police repression (according to pointers and/or organizers). The composition of our sample, which is indicated by these percentages, does not diverge much from what we had expected based on social movement theories.

Missing data are relatively low for the variables that indicate demonstrator characteristics, ranging between 288 and 1,153 missing cases, which represent 2 to 7 percent of our sample. An analysis of the missing cases shows that they are quite evenly distributed over the 75 demonstrations. As these missing data represent only a fraction of our sample, we did not weigh for them. Worth mentioning, though, is the large number of missing values for participation in direct action and violent forms of action in comparison to the number of respondents who indicated they had engaged in such behavior. We found that demonstrators especially omitted these questions at events where police-demonstrator interactions were perceived as conflictual. At these events, the (hypothesized) effect of demonstrators' protest experiences on their atmosphere perceptions is probably slightly stronger.

For the variables that represent demonstration characteristics we have no missing data. This is because seventy-four out of seventy-five events were observed by pointers. In addition, the police and media estimated the event sizes, and protest organizers observed the behavior of the police. The only event for which no contextual data was gathered, the second student national demonstration (London, 2010), was extensively reported in the media. Thus, we were able to report on this demonstration as well.

Table 2. Demonstrator and Demonstration Characteristics

	N	%	Missing data
Individual characteristics (N =15,999)			
Male	7,970	51.8	609
Young (age 11-29)	3,582	22.8	288
Protest experience	11,273	75.9	1,153
Direct action	2,540	16.7	744
Violence	230	1.5	772
Demonstration characteristics (N =75)			
Large ($\geq$ 10,000)	27	36	0
Moving	52	69.3	0
Police repression	10	13.3	0

RESULTS

To explore how demonstrators perceive the atmosphere at street demonstrations, we performed a series of *k*-means cluster analyses. This statistical method is appropriate to study latent variables: by clustering objects or variables that are considered to be indicators of a latent variable, underlying dimensions of this variable can be identified. In *k*-means cluster analysis,

the researcher defines the number of clusters (*k*) based on theoretical assumptions and/or a comparison of the clustering of groups or variables over a different number of clusters. Then, cluster membership is determined by "*k*-means," an algorithm that iteratively estimates the cluster means and assigns each case to the cluster for which its distance to the cluster mean is the smallest (Bailey 1983).

We studied how demonstrators perceived the protest atmosphere by clustering their evaluations of police-demonstrator interactions. With two variables, demonstrators could theoretically be grouped in two to twenty-five different ways. After having performed a range of cluster analyses, we concluded that four clusters classified demonstrators in the most meaningful way (see table 3). Theoretically, the four clusters could be interpreted as a two-dimensional model of perceived police behavior (respectful/disrespectful) and demonstrator behavior (orderly/disorderly). This model coincides with Fillieule's (1997: 307) two-dimensional model of (peaceful/violent) police-demonstrator interactions, which is based on theoretical assumptions. Our theoretical conclusions are substantiated by the fact that at almost all events one atmosphere type was predominant (see appendix).

As described, the four clusters represent four different ways in which demonstrators perceived police-demonstrators interactions. Cluster 1 represents a *harmonious* protest atmosphere: demonstrators perceived the behavior of the police as respectful and thought other demonstrators had behaved in an orderly fashion. Demonstrators in cluster 2 perceived a *volatile* atmosphere: they evaluated the behavior of the police as disrespectful and other demonstrators as disorderly. For demonstrators in clusters 3 and 4, police-demonstrator interactions were not in sync. Cluster 3 represents a *tense* atmosphere: demonstrators thought the police behaved disrespectfully, while other demonstrators behaved orderly. Demonstrators in cluster 4 perceived the opposite: they evaluated police behavior as respectful and the behavior of other demonstrators as disorderly. We refer to this atmosphere type as *chaotic*. So, demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions diverged. While 66 percent of the respondents perceived a harmonious atmosphere, 21 percent thought it was tense and only a small minority (5-8 percent) perceived a volatile or chaotic atmosphere. On a demonstration level, however, demonstrators' atmosphere assessments often did coincide (see appendix). This finding is very interesting because we know that participants of large demonstrations do not necessarily witness the same interactions, nor do they equally take part in them (McPhail 1991: 152-86).

Table 3. Clustered Demonstrators' Evaluations of Police-demonstrator Interactions (*k* = 4)

	Clusters			
	1 (harmonious)	2 (volatile)	3 (tense)	4 (chaotic)
Respectful police behavior	4.64	2.74	2.88	4.54
Orderly demonstrator behavior	4.71	2.60	4.58	2.64
N	8,785	733	2,827	1,056
% of cases	65.55	5.47	21.1	7.88

Notes: N = 13,401; missing cases: 2,598 (excluded list wise); convergence achieved with 4 iterations; distances between the cluster centers range from 1.80 (between clusters 1 and 3, and clusters 2 and 4) to 2.84 (between clusters 1 and 2).

Illustrating Four Protest Atmospheres

To show what demonstrations were like where a majority perceived a harmonious, volatile, tense, or chaotic atmosphere, we present four cases. The first three cases (harmonious, volatile, and tense) were demonstrations where this particular atmosphere was perceived by an ample majority (62-91 percent). For the fourth case (chaotic atmosphere), we chose a demonstration

where a large minority (31 percent) perceived such an atmosphere. This is because this atmosphere type was not perceived by a majority at any demonstration in our sample. Descriptions that are not followed by a reference are based on the CCC dataset (results of the demonstrator interview survey, observations by pointers and/or protest organizers). For the second and fourth case studies (volatile and chaotic atmosphere) we also used observational and interview data that were gathered by the British team and the first author, respectively.

Harmonious Atmosphere: National Climate March (London, 2009). On December 5, 2009, the "stop climate chaos coalition" organized a protest march in downtown London. The event was staged to support the United Nations climate change conference, which would take place in Copenhagen, Denmark on December 7-18, 2009. Being "the UK's largest group of people dedicated to action on climate change and limiting its impact on the world's poorest communities, with a combined supporter base of more than eleven million people that spans over a hundred organizations, from environment and development charities to unions, faith, community and women's groups" (Stop Climate Chaos, 2009), this coalition was able to mobilize 50,000 participants. The four-kilometer march went from Grosvenor Square to Trafalgar Square with the goal to "encircle Parliament, calling on the UK government to settle for nothing less than a climate deal in Copenhagen that avoids dangerous climate change and protects the worlds' poorest who are already feeling its effects" (Stop Climate Chaos, 2009). The event was very festive, featuring many marchers who were dressed up for the occasion, a brass band, and several groups of drummers.

All age groups were represented, but most participants were in their twenties (31 percent) or forties (24 percent). Women were overrepresented (58 percent). Interactions between demonstrators and the police were cooperative. Both groups had previously reached an agreement on the conditions under which the march could take place, and they kept to it. Organizers had hired safety guards from a private security firm to marshal the march, leaving the 600 police officers to control the traffic around it. As one pointer noted, "policing was benign in the extreme."

Volatile Atmosphere: Second Student National Demonstration (London, 2010). This event was the last of a wave of student protests that spread over the United Kingdom in the last months of 2010 in response to announced budget cuts on higher education. Some of the previous demonstrations had been massive, especially the first on November 10 in London (fund our future: stop education cuts), which drew an estimated 50,000 participants. At these protests, police and demonstrators clashed repeatedly. At the first event, fifty-four demonstrators were arrested and about seven were injured when demonstrators attacked and vandalized 30 Millbank, the headquarters of the Conservative Party. According to Scotland Yard, seven police officers were injured at that protest event (Harrison 2010; *The Telegraph* 2010). The clashes probably hardened police-demonstrator interactions at the following events.

On December 9, the ad hoc coalition of resistance against cuts and fees staged the second student national demonstration in a last effort to influence the Houses of Parliament, which voted on education reform that day. Tens of thousands of protesters from across the country marched in London from Malet Street (University of London Union) to Parliament Square (Asthana, Dyer, and Helm 2010). The police had deployed 2,800 officers (Asthana et al. 2010), anticipating "a number of people will come to London intent on causing violence and disorder" (Walker and Paige 2010). "For much of the afternoon the mood of the demonstration, in particular at its centre, was good natured" (Addley 2010), but it shifted during the course of the afternoon. At Parliament Square, some demonstrators scuffled with riot police, trying to break through fences and police lines; others were seen throwing paint bombs and flares (Shahid 2010). The police pushed demonstrators back, using their batons. In one of the most violent incidents, a group broke through to the other side using a metal battering ram. This time, the police responded with a horse charge. Demonstrators were kettled on several occasions (Addley 2010). Yet, the police could not prevent windows from being smashed at the Supreme Court, Her Majesty's Treasury, and several West End stores (*Newsweek* 2010). The police arrested about thirty-four demonstrators. Demonstrators as well as police officers were injured (forty-

three and twelve, respectively). Two of these injures were severe: a police officer sustained a neck injury and a student suffered a stroke and required brain surgery after allegedly being struck by a police baton (Asthana et al. 2010; *Newsweek* 2010).

Tense Atmosphere: Real Democracy NOW! (Madrid, 2011). On May 15, 2011 the newly erected platform *¡Democracia Real YA!* (Real Democracy NOW!) staged fifty demonstrations throughout Spain. Being a grassroots citizens' organization that associated with approximately 200 smaller organizations, the platform was able to mobilize an estimated 100,000 people. Protest was directed against the corruption of politicians and the powerful influence of banks in the political sphere, both of which were blamed for unemployment, loss of homes and poverty. Protesters called for a cultural revolution and a new democratic model that was to deal differently with the economic crisis (¡Democracia Real YA! 2011a; Wikipedia 2011).

In Madrid, 20,000 (according to police) to 50,000 (according to organizers) people participated in the two-kilometer march from the *Plaza de Cibeles* to the *Plaza Puerta del Sol*, where several manifestos were read. Most participants were in their twenties and thirties (67 percent) and women were underrepresented (44 percent). Nearly all demonstrators had previously engaged in protest (96 percent). At the end of the event, protesters blocked the *Gran Vía* avenue and staged a peaceful sit-in in Callao street, to which police responded by beating protesters with truncheons. As a result of the clashes and the following riots, several shop windows were destroyed and trash containers burned. In total, twenty-four people were arrested and five police officers got injured (Durán 2011). We assume that the police expected to confront the demonstrators, as officers had brought safety helmets, shields, and batons. This expectation is substantiated by the deployment of specialized dialogue police and helicopters. Dialogue police proactively seek to communicate with demonstrators to prevent any clashes from occurring (Holgersson and Knutsson 2011), while helicopters help to maintain an over-view of the crowd. The organizers said they had nothing to do with the clashes and condemned the "brutal police repression" (¡Democracia Real YA! 2011b).

Chaotic Atmosphere: Pink Saturday Parade (Haarlem, 2012). Pink Saturday is an annual Dutch gay rights event aimed at enhancing the visibility of LGBT's (Lesbian, Gays, Bisexuals, and Transgenders), promoting equal rights, and strengthening their self-awareness. The day traditionally starts with a parade, which includes speeches and people making claims. On July 7, 2012, Pink Saturday was organized in Haarlem by a temporary foundation consisting of about 100 volunteers. The organizers were fully supported by the municipality and the police as the mayor of Haarlem had brought the event to town. Before the event, organizers and police had agreed on the route of the parade, the duration, and its expected size. Organizers were requested to hire security stewards to marshal the parade so that police officers could manage traffic around it.

The parade was festive: parade participants danced on decorated floats that passed by and interacted with the crowd. Speeches were held at the end of the parade, including one by the mayor. Yet, far fewer people than expected participated in the parade (550-1000 instead of 5000). There were many onlookers though. All ages were represented, but people in their fifties represented the largest age group (36 percent). Women were slightly overrepresented (58 percent) and nearly a third of the participants (32 percent) had not taken part in protest before. Twenty-five police officers were deployed to the event. Besides, fifty members of the police network "pink in blue" participated in the parade to promote the LGBT interests (Politie 2015). The few police-demonstrator interactions that took place were very benign. However, the police were worried about the disorderly way in which the parade took place: the route was not clearly signed, some of the larger objects could barely make it through the narrow streets, and the event lasted more than twice as long as expected (120 minutes instead of 45).

Summary of Illustrations. The four case descriptions give a first impression of why demonstrators perceived a particular protest atmosphere. Clearly, the contextual setting of an event influences demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions. Police-demonstrator interactions have special importance and, in the minds of demonstrators, are mainly shaped by the behavior of the

police. At those demonstrations where the police openly repressed demonstrators, either by dispersing, kettling, arresting, or beating them, most demonstrators perceived a volatile or tense atmosphere. When the police either facilitated an event or did not interfere, demonstrators generally perceived a harmonious or chaotic atmosphere. Many factors might have influenced the police to behave in a certain way. These descriptions show that the police behaved more repressively when demonstrators did not behave as anticipated or confronted them. The extent to which demonstrators and the police opposed each other determined whether a chaotic (minor opposition), tense, or volatile (major opposition) atmosphere was perceived.

However, the contextual setting does not entirely determine how demonstrators perceive the atmosphere. The previously performed cluster analysis showed that demonstrators did not all perceive the atmosphere of a particular demonstration in the same way (see appendix). For instance, at the national climate march (London, 2009; case description 1), where 91 percent of the demonstrators perceived a harmonious atmosphere, some demonstrators thought the atmosphere was tense (6 percent), while others considered it volatile, or chaotic (3 percent). We assume demonstrators do not all perceive the atmosphere in the same way as perceptions are also shaped by individual characteristics.

Determinants of Perceived Protest Atmosphere

Using a multilevel multinomial logistic regression analysis, we analyzed the extent to which demonstrators' perceptions of the protest atmosphere were influenced by individual and demonstration characteristics. The independent variables of our model are five demonstrator and three demonstration characteristics, which are related to conflictual police-demonstrator interactions. Our dependent variable is perceived protest atmosphere, which consists of the four unordered categories: harmonious, volatile, tense, and chaotic. We took the largest answer category (harmonious) as a reference category. As the country variable does not consist of enough categories to include it as a third level in our hierarchical model, we could only control for any country effects. To do so, we included eight country dummies; the largest dummy (the Netherlands) was our reference category. Next to the main effects, we also studied the interaction effects between the individual characteristics and one of the demonstration characteristics (police repression) on the four perceived atmosphere categories.

Table 4 presents the main effects of our model. We find significant variation between the seventy-five demonstrations with respect to demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions (harmonious, volatile, tense, and chaotic; σ^2 demonstration = .61, standard error = .05, $p \leq .001$). This variation was driven by both individual and demonstration characteristics. At the individual level, male demonstrators are significantly more likely to perceive the atmosphere as volatile or chaotic than as harmonious. Young demonstrators (age 11-29) have a greater likelihood of perceiving a volatile, tense, or chaotic atmosphere (rather than a harmonious one). Demonstrators who in the last year participated in at least one other demonstration, in direct action, or in violent forms of action, are more likely to perceive a volatile or tense (than a harmonious) atmosphere. When it comes to demonstration characteristics, we find that demonstrators who participate in large demonstrations are significantly more likely to perceive a volatile or chaotic atmosphere (than a harmonious one). At moving demonstrations and events that are repressed by the police, demonstrators have a greater chance to perceive a volatile, tense, or chaotic atmosphere (than a harmonious one).

These findings confirm our hypotheses. Both individual and contextual characteristics shape demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions. Those features known to promote crowd conflict also increase the chance that a demonstrator perceives a conflictual atmosphere, rather than a harmonious one. The most important predictor of demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions seems to be police repression. By comparing the *z*-values of the variables in our model, we find that police repression indeed has the most predictive power on whether someone perceives a volatile, tense, or chaotic atmosphere (rather than a harmonious one).

To further scrutinize the impact of police repression on demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions, we also tested whether this demonstration feature interacts with demonstrators' individual characteristics. These results are largely consistent with our previous findings as none of the interactions reach statistical significance. So, demonstrators who participate in protests that face police repression are more likely to perceive a volatile, tense, or chaotic atmosphere, irrespective of their gender, age, and recent participation in protest, direct action, or violent forms of action.

Table 4. Influence of Individual and Demonstration Characteristics on Demonstrators' Atmosphere Perceptions

	Volatile	Tense	Chaotic
Fixed part:			
Individual determinants:			
Male	.31***	.07	.15*
Young (age 11-29)	.70***	.30***	.79***
Protest experience	.38**	.40***	-.07
Direct action	.81***	.62***	.01
Violence	1.07***	.99***	.40
Contextual determinants:			
Large (≥ 10,000)	.34**	-.03	.22*
Moving	.77***	.24*	.66***
Police repression	2.97***	2.20***	1.47***
Constant	-4.21***	-2.50***	-2.60***
Random part (level 2 – demonstration):			
Variance intercept	.61***		

Notes: Main effects model, logit. Sample size 11,869 respondents at seventy-five European demonstrations; harmonious is the reference category; coefficients of control variables (Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom) are not displayed; * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .001$ (two-tailed tests).

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

In this article, we studied how and why demonstrators' perceptions of protest atmosphere diverge. As this concept has not been studied by social movement scholars before, we first conceptualized the perceived atmosphere of street demonstrations as the affective state that participants attribute to the idiosyncratic features of a demonstration. Based on social movement and crowd behavior studies, we operationalized the perceived atmosphere as demonstrators' perceptions of police-demonstrator interactions. A cluster analysis of these perceptions among participants of seventy-five contemporary European street demonstrations revealed that demonstrators perceive four different atmospheres: harmonious, volatile, tense, and chaotic.

Case descriptions of these four atmosphere types confirmed that police-demonstrator interactions are of key importance. For demonstrators, these interactions are mainly shaped by the behavior of the police. When the police facilitate a protest event, most demonstrators perceive a harmonious atmosphere. However, when the police do not cooperate or repress a demonstration, a chaotic, tense, or volatile atmosphere is perceived. Because not all demonstrators at an event perceive the same atmosphere, we assumed that perceptions were not only influenced by the contextual setting, but also by their individual characteristics. A multilevel multinomial logistic regression analysis confirmed this hypothesis. Our results showed that when demonstrators are male, young, and have recently participated in a demonstration, direct action, or violent forms of action, they are more likely to perceive a conflictual atmosphere (than a harmonious one). Those demonstrators who participate in large events, moving events, or events that are repressed by the police also have a greater chance to perceive a conflictual (rather than

harmonious) atmosphere. In line with the case descriptions, police repression proved to be the single most important predictor of demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions.

This study builds on current social movement and crowd behavior theories. Our operationalization of the perceived atmosphere was based on the ESIM, which maintains that police-demonstrator interactions determine whether demonstrations turn conflictual. Two measures of police-demonstrator interactions were used, which are both related to conflictual interactions. Our atmosphere categorization coincides with Fillieule's two-dimensional model of (peaceful/ violent) police-demonstrator interactions. To explain why demonstrators perceive a particular atmosphere, we studied whether such perceptions are influenced by a variety of demonstrator and demonstration characteristics. We included characteristics that, according to the ESIM, threat approach, blue approach, and several studies on confrontational demonstrator behavior, lead to more confrontational police-demonstrator interactions.

The added value of our study is twofold. First of all, our findings validate the ESIM. In the minds of demonstrators, the police largely determine whether or not intergroup conflict emerges. Secondly, and more importantly, we introduce a new concept to current theorizing: perceived protest atmosphere. We proposed an operationalization of this concept and a model that accounts for the variation in demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions. We believe this concept is relevant, because it sheds light on how demonstrators experience their protest participation. Such insight is interesting by itself, but will also help explain future protest mobilization. After all, protest experiences shape people's willingness to engage in protest again.

This is a first study of how demonstrators perceive the atmosphere at street demonstrations. By studying both how and why demonstrators perceive a particular atmosphere, we feel we have given a valid portrayal of how participants experience their protest participation. Yet, our study has its limitations. Although the sample includes the perceptions of thousands of demonstrators at seventy-five contemporary European protest events, it is not necessarily representative. For this reason, our atmosphere model might distinguish different atmosphere types when applied to other European protest events. Furthermore, our operationalization of the perceived atmosphere is unidirectional. Clearly, interactions between demonstrators and the police do not only shape demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions, but are also shaped by them. We did not take reverse causality into account since our goal was to understand how and why demonstrators perceive protest atmosphere. How demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions shape their behavior and the behavior of others is the topic for another study. Lastly, a critical reader might wonder what demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions say about the atmosphere of a protest event. We maintain that the atmosphere is in the eye of the beholder. In this report, we studied the atmosphere from one perspective; other actors (e.g., police) might very well view the atmosphere differently. How all of these atmosphere perceptions come together and shape the atmosphere at a protest event remains to be seen.

As scholars have not studied the perceived atmosphere of protest events before, we see various avenues for further research. First of all, the operationalization of perceived protest atmosphere could be expanded. To explore which indicators should be added, we think qualitative methods would be well suited. Such studies would probably yield a more nuanced portrayal of demonstrators' atmosphere perceptions. Also, scholars could study how demonstrators perceive the atmosphere at other types of protest events, such as mass meetings or small demonstrations. Studying how protest atmospheres are perceived in other regions of the world would be interesting too, as we presume the concept is culturally defined. Equally interesting would be to study how police officers and media reporters perceive protest atmosphere. For some police forces, such insights would help validate their crowd management tactics. Knowing how reporters perceive the atmosphere at protest events would help explain how demonstrations are depicted in the media. Such insight would be relevant, as media representations have been found to influence future protest mobilization and protest policing. Ultimately, having adopted the concept from scholars of sports events, we assume atmosphere perceptions can be studied at other crowd events as well.

**APPENDIX: DEMONSTRATORS' ATMOSPHERE PERCEPTIONS AT
75 EUROPEAN DEMONSTRATIONS (%)**

Demonstration (name/issue, year, city and country)	N	1 (harmonious)	2 (volatile)	3 (tense)	4 (chaotic)
May day, Soc. Dem. Party/LO*, 2011, Stockholm (SE)	79	98.73	0.00	1.27	0.00
May day, Soc. Dem. party/LO*, 2012, Gothenburg (SE)	132	96.97	0.76	1.52	0.76
May day march, Soc. Dem. Party, 2010, Stockholm (SE)	139	94.24	0.00	5.04	0.72
Million women rise, 2011, London (UK)	146	91.10	0.00	6.16	2.74
National climate march, 2009, London (UK)	**213**	**90.61**	**0.47**	**6.10**	**2.82**
May day, left party, 2012, Gothenburg (SE)	191	89.53	1.05	7.33	2.09
No to hate crime vigil, 2010, London (UK)	138	88.41	0.72	6.52	4.35
Antinuclear demonstration, 2012, Mühleberg (CH)	402	87.31	0.25	10.95	1.49
May day, left party, 2011, Stockholm (SE)	134	87.31	0.00	11.19	1.49
Antinuclear demonstration, 2011, Stockholm (SE)	212	87.26	0.47	12.26	0.00
Antinuclear manifestation, 2011, Beznau (CH)	420	87.14	0.95	9.05	2.86
London pride parade, 2012, London (UK)	185	87.03	1.62	6.49	4.86
Seeds of Justice. Flowers of co-responsibility, 2013, Florence (IT)	165	86.06	0.00	12.12	1.82
Pride demonstration, 2012, Zürich (CH)	138	84.78	0.00	7.25	7.97
May day march, left party, 2010, Stockholm (SE)	137	84.67	0.73	13.87	0.73
National climate march, 2010, London (UK)	319	84.64	0.63	14.42	0.31
Prague Pride, 2012, Prague (CR)	127	83.46	0.79	3.15	12.60
Take back parliament, 2010, London (UK)	318	83.33	0.94	12.58	3.14
Military demonstration, 2011, The Hague (NL)	181	81.77	1.10	15.47	1.66
Marcia Perugia-Assisi, 2011, Assisi (IT)	188	80.85	1.06	16.49	1.60
No government, great country, 2011, Brussels (BE)	319	79.94	1.57	6.58	11.91
Women's demonstration, 2011, Geneva (CH)	171	79.53	4.09	9.36	7.02
Anti-nuclear demonstration, 2011, Amsterdam (NL)	338	78.40	2.37	13.91	5.33
Rainbow Parade, 2012, Gothenburg (SE)	142	76.06	0.70	17.61	5.63
Czech Communist Party May Day, 2013, Prague (CR)	129	75.97	1.55	18.60	3.88
Retirement demonstration, 2009, Rotterdam (NL)	250	74.80	2.80	16.00	6.40
Scream for culture, 2010, Amsterdam (NL)	144	74.31	0.69	11.81	13.19
Scream for culture, 2010, Utrecht (NL)	138	73.91	0.72	11.59	13.77
Demo against labor law, 2010, Santiago de Compostela (SP)	133	72.93	3.76	17.29	6.02
Gay pride, 2011, Geneva (CH)	188	72.87	2.13	2.13	22.87
May day celebration, 2011, Vigo (SP)	51	72.55	0.00	23.53	3.92
TUCs march for the alternative: jobs, growth, justice, 2011, London (UK)	*174*	*72.41*	*2.87*	*22.99*	*1.72*
Demonstration against abortion, 2010, Madrid (SP)	227	72.25	2.64	21.59	3.52
Together strong for public work, 2011, The Hague (NL)	284	70.77	3.17	14.08	11.97
Not in our name, 2011, Brussels (BE)	174	70.69	2.87	12.07	14.37
May day demonstration, 2011, Geneva (CH)	165	70.30	3.64	18.18	7.88
May day, 2011, Florence (IT)	60	70.00	6.67	18.33	5.00
May day march, 2010, Antwerp (BE)	175	69.71	4.00	10.86	15.43
Nonprofit demonstration, 2011, Brussels (BE)	181	68.51	2.76	12.15	16.57
Climate demonstration, 2009, Utrecht (NL)	146	67.81	5.48	14.38	12.33
Fukushima never again, 2012, Brussels (BE)	168	66.67	4.17	17.26	11.90
Stop the Government, 2012, Prague (CR)	158	66.46	3.80	23.42	6.33
Gay pride, 2012, Bologna (IT)	201	64.18	3.98	28.86	2.99
Pink Saturday parade, 2012, Haarlem (NL)	**86**	**62.79**	**3.49**	**2.33**	**31.40**
Against racist politics, 2010, Stockholm (SE)	172	62.21	6.40	24.42	6.98
Climate change, 2009, Brussels (BE)	297	61.95	4.71	15.82	17.51
Stop racism and exclusion, 2011, Amsterdam (NL)	103	61.17	5.83	17.48	15.53

Continued, Demonstration (name/issue, year, city and country)	N	1 (harmonious)	2 (volatile)	3 (tense)	4 (chaotic)
World march for women, 2010, Bern (CH)	*124*	*58.87*	*6.45*	*26.61*	*8.06*
The end of godfathers, 2013, Prague (CR)	136	58.09	2.94	21.32	17.65
Unite against fascism, 2010, London (UK)	172	56.40	2.91	37.21	3.49
May day labor march, 2010, London (UK)	*157*	*56.05*	*4.46*	*36.94*	*2.55*
We are a nation, we decide, 2010, Barcelona (SP)	245	55.10	6.12	19.59	19.18
Stop cuts on care and welfare, 2011, The Hague (NL)	242	54.55	7.44	22.31	15.70
Florence 10+10/Joining forces for another Europe, 2012 (IT)	91	53.85	8.79	32.97	4.40
Self-determination is democracy, 2010, Barcelona (SP)	242	53.31	4.55	38.02	4.13
May 1, labor day, 2010, Barcelona (SP)	129	51.94	10.85	27.91	9.30
General strike, 2011, Florence (IT)	173	50.87	10.40	31.21	7.51
Demonstraton against language decree, 2010, Santiago de Compostela (SP)	263	49.43	3.42	42.97	4.18
We have alternatives, 2011, Brussels (BE)	151	47.02	11.26	8.61	33.11
Euro May day, 2011, Milan (IT)	117	47.01	6.84	43.59	2.56
No to austerity, 2010, Brussels (BE)	117	46.15	15.38	25.64	12.82
March for work, 2010, Brussels (BE)	117	45.30	11.11	18.80	24.79
For employment, not capital reforms. Defend our rights, 2011, Vigo (SP)	137	43.80	6.57	48.18	1.46
Don't drain higher education, 2010, Amsterdam (NL)	155	42.58	12.90	9.03	35.48
Occupy London, 2011 (UK)	124	37.10	6.45	51.61	4.84
Fund our future: stop education cuts, 2010, London (UK)	*136*	*36.03*	*22.06*	*15.44*	*26.47*
Knowledge crisis, 2011, The Hague (NL)	*274*	*32.48*	*22.63*	*26.64*	*18.25*
No Muos, 2013, Niscemi (IT)	122	30.33	4.92	63.11	1.64
Against labor law, 2010, Madrid (SP)	271	29.89	12.55	53.87	3.69
No Monti Day, 2012, Rome (IT)	*159*	*27.67*	*13.84*	*54.72*	*3.77*
Climate march, 2009, Copenhagen (DK)	*228*	*27.19*	*18.42*	*50.00*	*4.39*
Against the Europe of capital, crisis and war, 2010, Barcelona (SP)	56	19.64	8.93	71.43	0.00
Real democracy NOW! 2011, Madrid (SP)	***312***	***19.55***	***16.67***	***61.54***	***2.24***
May 1st demonstration, 2010, Zürich (CH)	*120*	*19.17*	*26.67*	*51.67*	*2.50*
2nd student national demo, 2010 London (UK)	***93***	***4.30***	***66.67***	***26.88***	***2.15***

Notes: Listed from most harmonious to least. LO stands for Swedish Trade Union Confederation. Abbreviations between parentheses indicate countries in which demonstrations were staged (BE = Belgium, CH = Switzerland, CR = Czech Republic, DK = Denmark, SP = Spain, IT = Italy, NL = the Netherlands, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom). Italicized demonstrations involved police repression (according to pointers and/or protest organizers). Demonstrations in bold are illustrated by case descriptions.

NOTES

[1] Organizational features of police departments (e.g., size, resources, and level of professionalism) are thought to influence protest policing as well.

[2] These events were generally composed of an even amount of men and women, estimated average age of 30-35 years.

[3] In the Czech Republic, the size threshold was lowered to a thousand foreseen participants as few protests in this country attract more participants.

[4] Demonstration sizes are based on the mean of estimations made by pointers, the police, and the media (see description of "large demonstrations" in the measures section).

[5] We expect the selection bias to be smaller in countries where few large events were staged (e.g., the Netherlands).

[6] Van Leeuwen and McCarthy (2014) performed a protest event analysis for three countries: Czech Republic, Spain, and the Netherlands. These countries were selected as they were expected to differ considerably in terms of selection bias. The analysis consisted of two steps. First, the authors determined what the full population of protests for these three countries was. To do so, they searched national newspapers using search terms such as "demonstration" and "protest." This was done for the period during which the three country teams had been sampling. Second, they assessed which of the staged and sampled events turned violent. A comparison of the two indicated that violent events are only slightly underrepresented in this subsample of the CCC dataset.

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