

Sect and house in Syria: History, architecture and bayt amongst the Druze in Jaramana

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Sect and house in Syria: History, architecture and *bayt* amongst the Druze in Jaramana*

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Abstract

This paper explores the connections between the architecture and materiality of houses and the social idiom of *bayt* (house, family). The ethnographic exploration is located in the Druze village of Jaramana, on the outskirts of the Syrian capital Damascus. It traces the histories, genealogies, and politics of two families, *bayt* Abud-Haddad and *bayt* Ouward, through their houses. By exploring the two families and the architecture of their houses, this paper provides a detailed ethnographic account of historical change in modern Syria, internal diversity and stratification within the intimate social fabric of the Druze neighbourhood at a time of war, and contributes a relational approach to the anthropological understanding of houses.

Keywords: Syria, Druze, sect, house, *bayt*, family

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OF SECTS AND HOUSES

'Now the days of happiness are over. I wish we could go back, we used to be happy. Do you remember when you were here?' said Umm Samir, who adopted me as her anthropological 'daughter' during my fieldwork in Syria, on the phone on July 2012. Despite her hard life, her ten children and fifteen grandchildren, I had never before heard Umm Samir's voice cracking with pain, heavy with sadness.¹ Her two youngest sons in the military, her country bathed in blood: 'Jaramana sends its sons to the army and receives back their coffins,' said my other Syrian 'mother,' Najwa. The coming year would be worse for Syria as for both their families, *bayt* Abud-Haddad and *bayt* Ouward, respectively. Umm Samir's son was abducted for 51 days by armed militia, Najwa's husband was arrested for four days by the police, both families count relative deaths from the conflict. Jaramana, the Druze suburb of Damascus, where they live, has become a refugee camp hosting some of the estimated total of 4 million internally displaced, a battleground between government and opposition forces, and as friends inform me, a large real estate construction site. All these are the ingredients that form the political economy of war, an economy that crudely and profitably trades in regional and international markets the human loss, displacement, weapons, as well as the economic or para-economic development. And this is despite the fact that Jaramana is not nearly as badly affected as some other areas around Damascus, in Aleppo, Homs or Raqqa.

The shifting contours of international friendships and enmities are transforming the resolution of the Syrian war from a near-impossibility to a second Somalia. The 'axes of evil' have reincarnated and reformed into sectarian battles of religious fundamentalism mixed with freedom, democracy, and human rights. These concepts are not contradictory terms: neither

¹ For a portrait of Umm Samir see Kastrinou Theodoropoulou 2010.

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3 sectarianism, religious fundamentalism, freedom, democracy, nor human rights emerge
4
5 together by historical circumstance or chance. As Makdisi reminds us, sectarianism *is* the
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7 modern story: '[neither] simply or exclusively a native malignancy [n]or a foreign conspiracy'
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9 (2000: 3). Similarly, Mahmood (2012) traces the association of religious minorities to human
10
11 rights discourses early in the Ottoman Empire as a European strategy of fragmenting and
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13 contesting Ottoman authorities through the construction of Christian religious protectorates
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15 within its borders, while Neep (2012) describes the crystallisation of sectarian identifications
16
17 during the French Mandate in Syria. Outside of Middle Eastern geographies, Appadurai
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19 (2006) shows how the macabre poetics and politics of majorities versus minorities are not
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21 the civilisational fossils of bygone eras but the intimately spelt, structural foundations of the
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23 modern phenomenon of the nation-state. Following such line of enquiry, this paper,
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25 concerned with the Druze community in Jaramana, Syria, takes sectarianism (*ta'ifiyya*), as
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27 both a dangerous reality as well as a historically and socially constructed phenomenon.
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29 Where minorities in Syria are violently lacerated and distributed as war trophies, it is
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31 important to question the homogeneity and historicity of such formations. In this direction,
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33 the first aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the Druze of Jaramana are not homogenous in
34
35 their beliefs and actions, and that they have never in fact been.

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37 Four kilometres southeast of Damascus and with approximately 200,000 inhabitants,²
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39 Jaramana had one of the highest population densities in Syria: 15,000 inhabitants per km²
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41 (Al-Migdad 2008). Historically a Druze village, the social fabric of contemporary Jaramana
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43 threads together a majority Druze population, with Syrian Christians and Muslims, Iraqi and
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45 Palestinian refugees. The Druze, which occupy the central position in the town both
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54 ² The Central Bureau of Statistics of the Syrian Arab Republic estimated 114,363 inhabitants in
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56 Jaramana in 2006 (Central Bureau of Statistics, SAR, 2009). Informal population estimates put the number as
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58 high as 400,000.

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3 politically and spatially, is a religious sect that emerged during the Fatimid Dynasty in 11th
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5 Century Cairo, and whose contemporary communities primarily reside in Lebanon, Syria,
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7 Palestine and Jordan.³ Druze religion, based on the doctrine of *tawhid* which advocates strict
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9 and esoteric monotheism (Makarem 1979), shares a historical relationship with Islam,
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11 especially the Ismaili branch of Shi'a Islam from which it emerged, and it incorporates
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13 strands of Sufi, neo-Platonic, Persian, and Hindu thought (Betts 1988). A distinctive
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15 characteristic of the faith is its non-proselytism: Druze are born Druze, they cannot 'become'
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17 Druze (Khuri 2004). This is theologically reinforced through a belief in human-to-human
18
19 reincarnation (*taqamous*), in which Druze souls only inhabit Druze bodies (Makarem 1979).
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21 Moreover, endogamy is strictly practiced and prescribes that all members of the religious
22
23 community, irrespectively of gender, be married exclusively within the Druze community.
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25 When a member marries 'out' they, and possibly their family, become ostracised from the
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27 community (Alamuddin & Starr 1980; Layish 1982).
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33 The paper explores the histories, politics and houses of two Druze families that live in
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35 Jaramana but occupy different positions and networks. *Bayt* Abud-Haddad is considered *ahl*
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37 *al-Jaramana* (natives); it is one of the oldest and religiously significant families of Jaramana,
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39 a family that has been providing religious *shaykhs* and '*uqqal* (religious initiates). The family
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41 lives in a traditional Arabic courtyard house, the male adults work in manual occupations.
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43 None but one of the family's ten offsprings have gone to university. On the contrary, the
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45 family of *bayt* Ouward, who are relative newcomers to Jaramana and live in a modern
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47 apartment, all have university degrees, they are secular and socialise in political, intellectual
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49 circles they are considered *mouthaqafin* (intellectuals). While their houses are less than a
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51 five-minutes walk, their social cycles, networks but also perceptions and practices are
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56 ³ The Druze population is estimated to be 420,000 in Syria, 390,000 in Lebanon, 75,000 in Palestine, 15,000
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58 in Jordan and 80,000 outside the Middle East (Makarem 2007).
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3 different and contested, evidence of internal stratification, such as differences in status and
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5 class, within the Druze sect.
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8 The second aim of this paper is an analytical concern with *bayt*, meaning house, household,
9
10 and family in Arabic. The Arabic term *bayt* combines diverse meanings and social variations
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12 for the built material house, kinship terminology of family, minimal and also maximal lineage
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14 (Chatty 1974: 101). Precisely because *bayt* is pervasively used and because it is fluid, it is
15
16 useful: everybody in Syria has a *bayt* but precisely what that means, who it includes and
17
18 excludes, varies greatly depending on circumstance and time. I use the term *bayt* in this
19
20 flexible idiomatic way, to denote the minimal lineage of households in Jaramana, and also the
21
22 maximal lineage. Concurrently, I use it to denote the material, structural dimension of a house
23
24 building. This context-based definition underscores that houses or *bayts*, whether in terms of
25
26 kinship or material architecture, are not 'things' but 'things of relations.' As relations, they
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28 exhibit a past, present and future, and as things they are material. It is about this changing
29
30 materiality of relations that this paper is about.
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35 Specifically, I ask: what may the social life of a house tell us? How do the social, material
36
37 and historical traces of families and genealogies transform in time and space? What does
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39 architecture tell us about people and how social organisation affects the material forms of
40
41 their houses? In order to explore these questions I take the house as a living dynamic process
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43 (Carsten and Hugh-Jones 1995; Kopytoff 1986; Waterson 1990), rather than a structuralist
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45 model of social organisation (Lévi-Strauss 1982; 1987). However, I do not wish to relegate
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47 architecture into a mere function of ideology, a communicator of external, stable signifiers,
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49 but to trace the house itself as a *relationship* (Bourdieu 2005 [1990]; Mitchell 1990: 50).
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51 Besides, from Engels (2007 [1882]) to Miller (2005), it has been demonstrated that people,
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53 environment and things are dialectically related and mutually constructed. However, as
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3 Vellinga (2007: 756) points out, the anthropological study of the 'house' has often rigidly
4 distinguished between the house as a form of architecture with its symbolic significance in
5 the cosmos, and the house as a social category for cultural systems relating to kinship.
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9 Instead, Vellonga argues, the house must be studied as both architecture and social
10 organisation, specifically how 'architectural processes relate to social and symbolic ones, to
11 see how the construction of materiality of the house as a work of architecture relates to the
12 construction of social groups (whether identified as 'Houses' or not) and vice versa' (2007:
13 760). This paper analyses the material structure of the built house side-by-side with the
14 genealogical memories and kinship organisation: the design, stories, conflicts, the social,
15 political and economic transformations in the country and in the families are traced. I show
16 how *bayt*, in Syria, as in the wider region (see Bahloul 1996; Delaney 1991; Geertz et al
17 1979; Oppenheimer 1980), is practically inseparable from its material and immaterial aspects
18 of belonging, and is an important local idiom which structures relationships and their political
19 contestations (cf. Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Pine 1996; Gonzales-Ruibal 2006; Yeoh 2006;
20 Tamari 1981).
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37 However, in order to underscore the materiality of social organisation and family relations,
38 and to show how these relate to material changes in the house and the political economy of
39 Syria over the past decades, the paper is divided into three historical sections: pasts, presents
40 and futures. In the first section, I outline the social, political and economic changes that took
41 place in Syria since the beginning of the 20th century, with particular emphasis on Jaramana
42 and the Druze *bayt* of Abud-Haddad, showing how houses change according to broad social
43 and economic transformations, but that the ways they change, are neither uniform nor
44 politically uncontested. In 'presents' I provide a view of Jaramana from the ethnographic
45 present of my fieldwork: neoliberal development, gentrification, and the conflicts within the
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3 middle class *bayt* of Ouward as these become apparent through memories of the house and
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5 family dwelling and narrated in specific rooms. Following Telle (2007: 196), I hope that this
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7 biographical approach brings out vividly the multiple relations between peoples and things,
8
9 time and space. In this way, I built on the connection between materiality and historicity,
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11 defined as the 'past of objects and persons' (Hirsch and Stewart 2005: 262), the 'on-going
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13 social production of accounts of pasts and futures' (*Ibid.*) through a composite account of the
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15 economic, social, political and material transformations of *bayt* through recourse to
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17 architecture, history, memories, and stories. The last section, 'futures', concludes the paper by
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19 combining the findings with the present moment of war.
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27 PASTS: HISTORICAL TRANSFORMATION

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32 Since the end of the French Mandate in 1946, populist political coalitions alongside rural
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34 movements and socialist or state-capitalist redistribution of wealth have led the establishment
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36 of new elites through 'revolution from above' (Hinnebusch 2001) – an abrupt reversal of the
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38 political order through Ba'th Party's rise to power and the consolidation of the Assad regime
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40 (Khalaf 1981; Khoury 1991; Van Dam 1996; Perthes 2001). Our houses in Jaramana are
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42 emplaced within this context of historical changes, and this section aims to outline the
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44 particular configurations, underlying that spaces and houses embody social, political and
45
46 economic relations of production and reproduction.
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52 The rise of Arab nationalism(s), the unstable political climate, and the growing economic
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54 inequalities defined the years between independence and the rise of the Ba'th Party to power
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56 (1946-1963), and favoured the foundation of the Arab Resurrection (Ba'th) Party in
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3 Damascus by young nationalist intellectuals Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Bitar in 1947
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5 (Galvani 1974: 5; Kaylani 1972). Combining socialism with ideals of Arab nationalism and
6
7 pan-Arab unity (as in its slogan *waḥda, ḥurriya, ishtirakiya*: unity, freedom, socialism), the
8
9 party was populist rather than strictly ideological (Hinnebusch 1990, 1991), with support
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11 from the army, minorities and a strong rural base (see Batatu 1999; Khoury 1991;
12
13 Hinnebusch 1991). The party was invited to govern the country after a successful military
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15 coup by the Military Committee on March 8th, 1963.

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18 On February 3, 1966, a counter-coup was successfully led by the more Marxist faction inside
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20 Ba'th (Galvani 1974: 8). Between 1966–1970, known as the Neo-Ba'th, the new leadership,
21
22 although politically organised on a narrow basis, was able to implement radical socialist
23
24 policies, such as nationalisation of resources and radical agrarian reform. It was also able to
25
26 build up wider mobilization through *munazzamat sha'biya* (popular organizations) (Khalaf
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28 1981: 168; Galvani 1974: 10–12), such as the General Federation of Peasants and the General
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30 Federation of Labour Unions.
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35 The radical policies of the Neo-Ba'th and the Arab defeat of 1967 had a direct effect on the
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37 regime, as it was losing popular legitimisation and support. The political, economic and
38
39 social problems were epitomized by Hafez Al-Assad's seizure of power on the 13th November
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41 1970, in *al-ḥaraka al-taḥrīkiya* (the corrective movement). Seeking to re-establish regime
42
43 authority by gaining broader social support, Assad's policy, from the 1970s until his death in
44
45 2000, sought to deal with the two-fold problems of (a) regional and international foreign
46
47 relations since 1967 (Hinnebusch 1996; Perthes 2001; Seale 2000) and (b) economic policies
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49 such as *al-infītāḥ 'ala al-sha'ab* (opening to the people) and *al-infirāj* (relaxation and/or
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51 politico-economic liberalization) (Khalaf 1981: 181). The nationalist foreign policy and the
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53 development of state capitalism helped strike a precarious balance between the regime, the
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3 private sector and the changing dynamics of the region and world (Haddad 2012; Rabo
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5 2005).
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10 Agrarian change, industrial development and urbanisation

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13 Syria was radically transforming since the 1970s, in terms of social structure of its agrarian
14 and nomadic communities (Chatty 1984), its industrial development (Rabo 2005), and the
15 drift of population from rural to urban centres in search of waged labour. In its struggle for
16 legitimation and power consolidation, the Ba'th regime implemented land reform and
17 redistribution (Hinnebusch 1991:37) which greatly affected the rural social and economic
18 structures (Khalaf 1981, 1991). Through these policies, the Ba'th party was able to mobilize
19 nationalist-populist ideologies in its recruitment of 'rural intelligentsia' (Hinnebusch 1991:
20 32), and to provide the basis of popular/mass support from rural peasantry. The demolition of
21 latifundist capitalism (Hinnebusch 1991: 37) resulted in the political and economic
22 disempowerment of the historically elite group in Syria: the urban 'notables', while allowing
23 previously disenfranchised groups, such as rural peasantry and minorities, to ascend to power
24 (Khoury 1991: 27). Khalaf's ethnography of a rural village in Northern Syria, captures the
25 dynamics of change and their dialectic relationship between socio-economic transformations:
26 from the 'old order' (Khalaf 1981: 45) of tribal solidarity, to the 1950s entrepreneurial
27 capitalism, to socialist reforms, 'corrections' and transformations up until 1980. Through the
28 description of the social and economic transformations from Bedouin tribal leaders to the
29 'cotton shaykhs' to the infrastructural socialist changes of Ba'th in the 1960s, the author
30 shows how certain traditional values and systems of practices are maintained and yet, 'how
31 people ... utilize the framework of traditional cultural forms to negate the very traditionalism
32 which is normally associated with such terms' (Khalaf 1981: 563). Through the appropriation
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3 of tradition and the metaphor of the *mukhadram* (cultural collage), Khalaf sketches the
4
5 contingency of an impressive flexibility to shifting social and economic contexts, uncovering
6
7 the rationality of the seeming 'bundles of contradictions' (Khalaf 1981: 523). From 'camel to
8
9 truck', to borrow the title from Chatty's work on rural transformation (1986), economic and
10
11 technological developments greatly affected Syrian lives and livelihoods.
12

13 14 15 16 Jaramana 17

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20 There are two studies focusing on Jaramana, one by Jaramana Council (2000), and an online
21
22 publication concerned with Iraqi refugees and urban planning in Jaramana (Fahmi and Jaeger
23
24 2009). Jaramana Council states that Jaramana is as old and as continually inhabited as
25
26 Damascus, but does not provide specific historical references as to when the village was
27
28 established as Druze. Fahmi and Jaeger (2009: 21) do not provide a date but estimate the
29
30 development of Jaramana as a Druze village in the late 19th century. Historical resources
31
32 complicate matters further since mention of Jaramana occurs only in passing, as a Druze
33
34 agricultural village in the vicinity of Damascus' agricultural provinces, the fertile plains of
35
36 Ghuta (Abu Chakra 2006: 175; Batatu 1999: 14; Betts 1988). However, Druze villages
37
38 surrounding Damascus existed since the start of the Druze Call (*dawa*) in the 11th century.
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40 Firro (1992: 34) puts the Ghuta area within the first five oldest Druze settlements, but he
41
42 mentions that the village of Jaramana was established after 1860. In term of political and
43
44 economic change, Hinnebusch offers the most significant findings regarding the surrounding
45
46 Ghuta region by tracing the change from fertile agricultural gardens through industrial
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48 development to absorption into the Damascene suburbs during the Ba'thist era (1990: 247-
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50 249). Batatu classes the Ghuta peasants of 'peaceful deposition' (in contrast to 'peasants of
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52 worrier origin'), whilst stressing that 'the fiercest ... and the most difficult to harness
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3 politically are the peasants of the mountain, notably the montane Alawis and the Druze'
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5 (Batatu 1999: 12).
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7 Informants in Jaramana support the view of the Council (2000) regarding Jaramana's ancient
8 past (Jaramana, they argue, in Aramaic means 'brave men'). However, based on family
9 genealogies and oral histories collected during fieldwork, most of Jaramana's inhabitants
10 inhabited the village at the turn of the 19th century, while some of the oldest families in
11 Jaramana, those considered *ahl al-Jaramana* (natives of Jaramana, such as *bayt* Abud-
12 Haddad) can trace their genealogies and residence in Jaramana up to 200 years ago. Land
13 distribution and ownership in Jaramana is predominantly Druze, which explains the relative
14 wealth of the Druze population vis-a-vis their neighbours or newcomers.
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27 Before the current war, it was estimated that half of Jaramana's residents were Iraqi refugees
28 (UNRWA 2010). While there was overwhelming Iraqi presence in certain parts of Jaramana,
29 evidence of geographic and social segregation were obvious, for example the historical centre
30 is almost exclusively inhabited by the Druze community (as mapped in *figure 1*). Both *bayt*
31 Ouward and *bayt* Abud-Haddad live within the vicinity of the historical centre of Jaramana.
32 Due to the high proportion of Druze land ownership in Jaramana and the development of real
33 estate opportunities, the community in Jaramana have largely benefited from the economic
34 policies of Hafez Al-Assad. The neoliberal policies of Bashar Al-Assad did not affect the
35 wealth accumulation of this community which was fostered during the same time from
36 increased housing demand from Iraqi immigrants.
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52 *Figure 1: Spatial composition of ethnic residence in Jaramana, 'Syrian majority' correlates*
53 *with Druze residence, Fahmi and Jaeger (2009).*
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3 Material houses and the materiality of social relations: the house of *bayt* Abud-Haddad
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6 Together with the changes in economic relations of production, the shift from agriculture to
7
8 industry to services, and the rise in population, Jaramana at the time of fieldwork had already
9
10 transformed from a village to one of the capital's bustling suburbs. The material and
11
12 functional aspects of houses had similarly shifted from village houses (a rectangular
13
14 formation of two or more adjacent rooms with an open courtyard) to tall contemporary
15
16 apartment buildings. And yet, patterns of the social structure and social existence of the
17
18 house, such as verilocal residence and the functionality of rooms, had been adapted rather
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20 than completely transformed: whole apartment blocks were owned by a single family that
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22 would likely accommodate verilocal marriage patterns within the same building.
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26 Similarly, while construction materials had changed, many of the social idioms, forms and
27
28 functions of the house remained. Specifically, hospitality and the reception of guests,
29
30 continued to be practices of daily activity holding significant social, political and economic
31
32 value, important ways of relating and belonging (see Sweet 1974; for a historical account see
33
34 Makdisi 2000: 43-44). The architecture of houses embodies this relational social practice in a
35
36 way that, as Piot observes for Kabre houses: it is not the 'real' practices that derive from an
37
38 'ideal' model but rather the 'ideal' which derives from reality (1999: 127). In this way, the
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40 guesthouse (*madafa*, *qa'a* or *mijlis*) is the biggest room, or even a separate house where:
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42 'under its arches coffee beans were roasted and pounded, clients earned and symbolic capital
43
44 accumulated' (Khalaf 1981: 128). The formal guesthouse of *bayt* Abud-Haddad is shown on
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46 figure 2. Druze, and generally Syrian houses today, continue to maintain this form, as Khuri
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48 (2004: 142) notes that 'in Jabal al-'Arab today, the first room to be built and furnished in a
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50 new house is the *madafa*, and the primary supplies are coffee and coffee pots.' In the modern
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52 apartments of Jaramana, most rooms are not functionally distinct (cf. Mitchell 1991; Weber
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3 2009), are dedicated to the reception of guests, while sleeping arrangements of the household
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5 members shift often and may not coincide with a specific room for sleep.
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11 *Figure 2: The qa'a, internal ground elevation is called 'ataba (threshold), see Weber 2009:*
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13 *236. Drawing by Tariq Abud-Haddad.*
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19 The definition of spatial boundaries varies historically and depends on the perceived social
20 proximity or closeness of interpersonal relations (Eickelman 1977; Rugh1997; Weber 2009).
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22 One aspect of the construction, continuity and change of spatial boundaries is concerned with
23 the gendered spaces of the Arab house (cf. Weber 2009: 232). Associated with the feminine,
24 the cold and the separable, *bayt al-sheta* (lit. house of the winter, *figure 3*) was where the
25 gendered activities of food preparation, cooking, family eating, socialising, and birth took
26 place, as well as where the women and children slept. This 'heart of the hearth' that was the
27 warmest part of the house, the 'house of winter' can both literally as well as figuratively be
28 conceptualised as a 'house' on its own, as in its name, a stand-alone entity. Today, while *bayt*
29 *al-sheta* has been replaced by modern kitchens and appliances, bur the activities associated
30 with it, i.e. the gendered division of labour have been maintained especially in *bayt* Abud-
31 Haddad where none of its female members works outside of their house.
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49 *Figure 3: Bayt al-sheta. Photograph by author.*
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3 Patterns of social structure, forms and functions of space, and the reproduction of gendered
4 relations, are interrelated dialectically to changes in the social, political and economic realms
5 of Jaramana and Syria. Architecture changes along with shifts in social relations and social
6 organisation such as the shift from agriculture to industry to services; similarly, the
7 materiality of the house changes along with the social contours of everyday life of the social
8 entity that inhabits it. This simultaneous shift in both architectural form and social
9 organisation of the *bayt* is best demonstrated in the case of *bayt* Abud-Haddad, where
10 architecturally (from a village to a traditional Damascene house), economically (from lower
11 economic status to relative wealth) and socially (from ordinary peasants to religious
12 prominence) the house changes completely, along with the atypical matriarch, Nadira, who
13 spearheads this change, and to whose story we turn next.

31 *Bayt* Abud-Haddad: Material houses and the materiality of social relations

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33
34 Her portrait, lively eyes and plum cheeks framed by a white *foutah*, still dominated the
35 formal reception room (*qa'a*) of the house, more than a decade after her death at the time of
36 my stay at *bayt* Abud-Haddad. Nadira Latif was Ali's mother (Ali is the current head of the
37 household, better known as Abu Samir, father of Samir). Nadira was the second wife of
38 Hussein Haddad (see kinship diagram on figure 4). Hussein had one son and four daughters
39 from his first marriage, and when his first wife died he remarried Nadira, who bore him a son
40 and a daughter. Hussein died five years later, and Nadira, who never married again, looked
41 after her children and Hussein's four daughters. Hussein's eldest, Hassan, however wanted to
42 take as his own all of his father's inheritance. In Jaramana at the time, legal codes followed
43 spatial proximity rather than religious doctrine. This meant that at instances of personal
44 status, such as marriage or inheritance, the Druze inhabitants of Jaramana followed Sharia

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2
3 law as was implemented in Damascus, rather than the Druze codes that were in place
4
5 elsewhere in Suwayda and in Lebanon. Based on Sharia law, the male siblings' share of the
6
7 inheritance must be twice that of the female; Druze religious code provides equal inheritance
8
9 rights to all siblings irrespectively of gender (Layish 1982). Nadira, confident in her Druze
10
11 legal rights, publicly challenged Hassan, shook religious advice, and took him to the religious
12
13 court in Suwayda, where she obtained a favourable order and was thus successful in
14
15 protecting the rights of her children and also of Hussein's four other daughters. Hassan broke
16
17 away from the family, Nadira nurtured all six children until the daughters got married and left
18
19 the house, and remained the loving and determined household matriarch during Ali's marriage
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21 with Amal (better known as Umm Samir), until her death.
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29 *Figure 4: Bayt Abud-Haddad kinship diagram.*
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35 Nadira's story of determination and struggle for justice, as a woman who challenged and won
36
37 over a man during patriarchal times through Druze religion, has become as important as a
38
39 foundational myth for *bayt* Abud-Haddad, whose members continue to talk, praise and
40
41 reinvent her. Here, I use 'foundational' intentionally to underline a structural change in the
42
43 architecture of the house that was affected by Nadira: over the past century Abud-Haddad's
44
45 house has gone through three distinct architectural phases (see figure 5), the last two of which
46
47 were instigated and supervised by Nadira, and perhaps embody much of the shifting and
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49 atypical organisation of the household.
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3 *Figure 5: Drawing of the three phases in the development of Bayt Abud-Haddad. Drawing by*
4
5 *Tariq Abud-Haddad.*
6
7

8 *Figure 6: The house at the beginning of the 20th Century. Drawing by Tariq Abud-Haddad.*
9
10

11 Nadira entered a house that had been built at the turn of the 20th century. The house was a
12 rectangular construction comprised of four almost square rooms adjacent to one another (in
13 order from the bottom of figure 6: *bayt al-sheta*, a kitchen/family room; *qa'a*, a
14 reception/guest room; *iwana*, open reception room; and another *qa'a*). The house was not
15 gated but 'open,' readily accessible to the passer-by; such architecture is typical to what
16 generally referred to as a 'village house' in Syria, opposed to a traditional Damascene 'city
17 house' which is gated (see Tergeman 1994: xvi-xvii, 16, 31).
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27 After Hussein and Nadira's marriage, the exterior of the house was expanded to occupy a
28 large courtyard garden in the front. Walls guarded the house and a distinct entry point, a gate,
29 was built. Further changes reflected the necessities of the intensification of the agricultural
30 livelihood of the family (figure 5). Nadira was able to maintain the economic survival of the
31 family through small-scale farming and herding, concentrated around the household. This
32 phase of the house lasted well into the 1970s, when Ali sold the family's plot of land, derived
33 through the recent agrarian reforms, to finance his wedding and to buy a smaller farming plot
34 on the eastern side of the village.
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46 Talking of her entrance into *bayt* Abud-Haddad, Umm Samir, who was also orphan by mother
47 and married Abu Samir from love in 1974, used to exalt the qualities of the Arabic house, that
48 with its numerous self-contained rooms surrounding an internal courtyard, provided adequate
49 facilities for the accommodation of more than one nuclear family: 'Arabic houses were not
50 made for just one family. But now, everyone wants to live in their own apartment...' Yet, only
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3 in the last and most recent architectural phase, *bayt* Abud-Haddad became a traditional
4 Arabic Damascene house (see figures 7 and 8). Weber defines traditional Damascene houses
5 as ‘houses with various living rooms ... grouped around one or two more spacious
6 courtyards,’ noting that ‘the house looks “inwards”’ (Weber 2009: 231-232) because the
7 windows of the house face the internal courtyard of the house, and since ‘as a rule of
8 Damascene architecture, representation takes place mainly in the interior parts of the house’
9 (Weber 2009: 233).
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22 *Figure 7: Ground plan of bayt Abud-Haddad. Drawing by Tariq Abud-Haddad.*
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24 *Figure 8: Inside the courtyard house of Bayt Abud-Haddad. Drawing by Tariq Abud-Haddad.*
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31 During the last architectural phase, the structure of the oldest part of the house remained the
32 same, but *bayt al-sheta* was no longer in use, and the second *qa‘a* now functioned as a walk-
33 in closet and storage. Seven new rooms were added. In the central courtyard, where the
34 fountain used to exist, a mosaic with a central Damascene geographic pattern is covering the
35 earth. There are three salons that used to entertain, in the following order, casual, formal, and
36 very high status visits; two of these rooms are used as family spaces accommodating
37 everyday socialising, eating and sleeping.
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47 The third phase of the house took place roughly over the span of two decades (1980-2000),
48 coinciding with the birth of Umm and Abu Samir’s children, the development of industry and
49 trade in the expense of agriculture, population rise, the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli
50 war. Let us linger for a while on the (re)construction of the house in the traditional
51 Damascene form at a time when construction of modern apartment buildings was common,
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3 and indeed when courtyard houses were rebuilt as apartment blocks (as in the case in *bayt*
4
5 Ouward). Increasingly after the 1920s and 1930s the construction of courtyard houses
6
7 dropped dramatically as such types of house no longer fulfilled 'the criteria of class
8
9 distinction' (Weber 2009: 395). So, what could explain such seemingly against the tide
10
11 decision of *bayt* Abud-Haddad? Why did they make a traditional house when all around them
12
13 were constructing modern apartment buildings? Why a traditional Damascene, *urban* house –
14
15 neither a traditional peasant nor a specifically Druze dwelling?
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19 The decision to build a traditional Damascene house has had profound effects on the ways
20
21 that the family is perceived internally in Jaramana, specifically in terms of reputation and
22
23 status. Firstly, the decision to go back, as it was, into something 'traditional' went against the
24
25 prevailing strife at the time to be 'modern' associated with the emerging middle classes and
26
27 the nouveau riches (Watenpaugh 2006; Salamandra 2004). This decision underscores the
28
29 family's strategy not only to be *ahl-al-Jaramana*, but to *show it* by inscribing its origin (*asil*)
30
31 on the new-built traditional walls of the house.
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35 Secondly, this decision lays a concrete claim in changing status – from landless peasants
36
37 (Hussein was an agricultural worker) to *materially* becoming part of the traditional elite
38
39 landscape. This claim to a higher status, crucially, was subtly made not by way of buying
40
41 one's way up, or by adopting the latest trend, or through conspicuous consumption – the tools
42
43 accessible to middle classes or new elites (Salamandra 2004), but rather by going back and
44
45 embodying the hindsight 'traditional' values of household, through the adoption of a
46
47 traditional *urban* rather than rural or peasant design for the house. This decision offers
48
49 historical force to the aesthetics of the house that state that we have always been here
50
51 (claiming tradition and authenticity), but we have never been poor (claiming a higher status).
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55 It also underscores another incident of Nadira's strategic use of identities: while she had used
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3 Druze religious identity to maintain the family's property against Hussein, she, like Khalaf's
4
5 *mukhadram*, used urban Damascene architecture to make a claim *in* the Druze community of
6
7 elite urban status.
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11 In this gradual development of *bayt* Abud-Haddad's status and reputation, the material
12
13 structure of the house helped greatly: not only as a visual symbol, but mainly because the
14
15 house, with its nice rooms and spacious courtyard lent itself to wedding celebrations and
16
17 funeral rites, ceremonials that necessitate large number of visitors, not only for the family but
18
19 for much of the surrounding neighbourhood. By the time I was conducting fieldwork, the
20
21 house had become a representation for the 'traditional Druze Jaramana', where large
22
23 gatherings, shaykhly meetings and celebrations of expatriates, took place. In this way, the
24
25 family, like the house, became indisputably part of the traditional, religious and social elites
26
27 of Jaramana.
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31 On a final level, building a traditional house of indistinct sectarian denomination may be
32
33 understood as a subtle critique of modernisation and industrialisation, a strategy shared with
34
35 the old disenfranchised elites that developed a politics of resistance through claims to
36
37 authenticity of an old Damascus (Salamandra 2004). Yet, at the same time, *bayt* Abud-
38
39 Haddad provides a critical foil to these old 'notable' Damascene elites that demand the
40
41 historical monopoly over authenticity, status, and taste (also see Salamandra 2004; Shannon
42
43 2006), as their claim to a historical transcendental belonging to a traditional elite has been
44
45 affected by the Ba'th policies of land redistribution through which Nadira and Abu Samir
46
47 were able to own agricultural land.
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55 PRESENTS: MIDDLE CLASS, POLITICS, AND A FAMILY CONFLICT
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3 By 2011 Jaramana was bearing the marks of gentrification: continuous development in real
4 estate, emerging entertainment spaces and cultural hubs, increasing residence by artists,
5 intellectuals and students. At the same time, the Druze community was redefining its
6 boundaries more actively and more publicly than ever before: building a grand temple,
7 establishing entertainment halls specifically designated for religious celebrations, even the
8 increasingly public visual display of Druze symbols on windows, cars and doors. The
9 intimate, almost exclusive, social relationships between the Druze inhabitants of Jaramana
10 were creating and reinforcing visual and spatial boundaries of Druzeness through economic
11 accumulation and social networks, articulated in segregated neighbourhood clusters of new
12 Druze immigrants, Christians from Damascus, and Iraqi refugees in the town's geography.
13 The emerging visibility and distinction of the Druze community related to a new kind of
14 confidence, then, steaming from elite investment in the area in the context of neo-liberal state
15 reforms, middle class consumption combined with 'identity' politics, and the country's long
16 term stability. All these flows of people, capital, even of the illusions of national prosperity
17 (about 30% of the total population was living in poverty, Hinnebusch 2013) partook in a
18 process of redefining communal groups and boundaries, and sustaining the re-imagination of
19 the Druze community as a publicly distinguishable entity. Thus, while the Druze, especially
20 those in close proximity to Muslim-majority cities, had historically refrained from publicly
21 displaying religious affiliation as a way of protection and dissimulation (*taqiyya*, see
22 Makarem 1979), the community now were publicly displaying its religion in a way that made
23 it more Druze than ever before. This public display of sectarian identification served to mask
24 to some extent the economic, social and political differences that stratified the Druze
25 community internally, along broader class divisions (cf. Batatu 1999; Haddad 2012;
26 Hinnebusch 1990), that cross-cut Syria's religions, ethnicities and regions. Because most of
27 the Jaramana Druze own some property and many diversify their income from both labour
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3 and rent, local class structure, distinctions and social capital are complex. Most of Jaramana's
4
5 Druze belong to working and middle class in terms of income, while in terms of occupation
6
7 there is a wide range from manual workers, small business owners, as well as civil workers
8
9 and professionals. However, one of the most obvious internal divisions in Jaramana is that of
10
11 education and political affiliation. Formal education is opposed to religious Druze education
12
13 of the *mijlis*: that religious people are uneducated was a phrase I often heard from within the
14
15 circle of Druze intellectuals. This is the defining distinction between our two households of
16
17 Abud-Haddad and Ouward: while both are financially well-off, the first through land, rent
18
19 and as occupation the male offsprings are independent tradesmen; the second through owning
20
21 of a small business, they belong to different social circles: *bayt* Abud-Haddad is part of the
22
23 religious elite, *bayt* Ouward is part of the politically dissident leftist intellectual elite
24
25 (*muthaqafin*). *Bayt* Ouward is mainly composed of university graduates, *bayt* Abud-Haddad
26
27 only has one offspring in University education. What is more distinguishable perhaps is the
28
29 global 'hierarchies of values' (Herzfeld 2004) that *bayt* Ouward ascribes to: the global
30
31 liberalism associated with international middle class aesthetics and consumption; *bayt* Abud-
32
33 Haddad, on the other hand, should one not know their economic standing, do not partake or
34
35 try to partake in this global market of middle class identification. As such, they are content to
36
37 uphold traditional religious conduct, practices, aesthetics and power. It is based on this local
38
39 distinction of religious versus new political elites, and the definition of middle class as a
40
41 global category for 'modernity' and capitalist consumption and reproduction (Watenpaugh
42
43 2006), that I specifically define *bayt* Ouward as a 'middle-class' household.
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53 *Bayt* Ouward: Genealogical memory, political resistance
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3 *Bayt* Ouward traces its origins to a Bedouin tribe in Yemen. Based on the family's
4
5 genealogical tree, three ancestral brothers migrated around 1500 to Greater Syria, and settled
6
7 in three different villages. Ouward was one of the brothers, and the head of the extended
8
9 lineage (*bayt*) and settled in modern-day Lebanon. The father of Farid, Karem, migrated to
10
11 Jaramana in 1920. Karem married a woman from a village in the Chouf Mountains, Lebanon,
12
13 and had five children, born and raised in Jaramana, four daughters and Farid. Farid Ouward,
14
15 born in 1941, was the only male heir of *bayt* Ouward.
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19 Farid Ouward is married to his matrilineal cousin (see kinship diagram on figure 9), Najwa,
20
21 and they have four children: Zahra, Hiba, Nidal and Karem. Najwa's parents, migrated to
22
23 Suwayda, capital of the Druze province in Jabal al-'Arab, from Lebanon at the beginning of
24
25 the 20th Century. Najwa's father, now in his 90s, lives in his grand European-styled mansion
26
27 in Suwayda, and proudly recalls the days he was a General in Sultan Pasha Al-Atrash's army
28
29 during the Syrian Independence Revolution (1925-1927) against the French Mandate forces.
30
31 Najwa grew up with her five sisters and three brothers in Suwayda, and moved to Jaramana
32
33 after her marriage with Farid Ouward.
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41 *Figure 9: Kinship diagram of Bayt Ouward*
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47 Najwa received primary education in Suwayda and passed into the Mathematics Department
48
49 of Damascus University. Her family, however, vetoed her movement to Damascus, and
50
51 instead she enrolled in a local institute to acquire teaching qualifications. Najwa explained, as
52
53 we were looking through old black and white photographs – photographs of young Najwa
54
55 with long hair and short skirts – that becoming a teacher was a much more accepted
56
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3 occupational path for a young woman. However, her family valued education and, like other
4
5 well-off families of the late 1960s, also saw the economic and social benefits of such a
6
7 financial strategy in times of social change and radical political reforms.
8
9

10 Farid studied in the University of Cairo, from 1960 to 1968, during the swirl of Nasserism
11
12 and its painful aftermath in 1967, the Six Day War. His leftist inclinations led him to become
13
14 involved in several intellectual and activist circles in Cairo, and although he was never a
15
16 sworn Nasserite, he supported the broad ideological platform of Arab socialism (*al-*
17
18 *ishtiraqiya al-'arabiya*). Farid's acquaintance with Arab socialism in Egypt, as well as his
19
20 support of the Lebanese Social Progressive Party (see Hazran 2009), brought him at odds
21
22 with the Syrian regime upon his return to Syria in 1969. He spent five months as a political
23
24 prisoner. Upon his release the secret services (*moukhabarat*) kept a close watch over him.
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28
29 When Najwa married Farid, they moved into his house in Jaramana. Najwa enrolled in the
30
31 University of Damascus and graduated after the birth of their first daughter, Zahra. She
32
33 worked as a schoolteacher in Jaramana and so did Farid, but in the rural provinces of Syria;
34
35 he believes that his postings to relatively secluded rural places were not coincidental, but a
36
37 means of punishing his political dissent. During the early 1980s, a time of political turmoil in
38
39 Syria, Farid was made to 'voluntarily' retire from his teaching job, due to his political
40
41 involvement. It was during this time that Najwa, Farid, and his sisters, decided to start a
42
43 family business and convert their house from a single storey courtyard house into a modern
44
45 three-floor apartment building.
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50 In 1985, Farid endured a life-threatening stroke, in the course of which he suffered internal
51
52 brain haemorrhage. He underwent a successful operation and six months of hospitalisation.
53
54 Farid received a medical certification of 'brain damage.' With this certificate, the state
55
56 authorities and secret services cannot arrest him, or so Farid claimed, on the basis of his
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3 political conviction: 'I am free to say whatever I want, for, if I show them this paper they
4 know that I'm just mad and hence they cannot arrest me!' Farid thoroughly enjoyed
5 occupying a risqué oppositional stance vis-à-vis the government in Syria, routinely making
6 jokes against the president and the lack of freedom, whether he is with his family, friends or
7 in his business with customers.
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13 Conflict in a middle-class Druze *bayt*

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20 In the late 1980s the house was re-built from a ground level courtyard house into a three-
21 storey apartment building. The ground floor of the apartment was converted into one spacious
22 shop, while at the back of the ground floor the apartment of Yousra, Farid's eldest divorced
23 sister, is located. There are rooms and open spaces in the basement, functioning as storage for
24 the business, and a big open space that functions occasionally as a reception or *hafleh* (party)
25 room.
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35 Farid and Najwa live on the spacious first floor of the apartment building. The apartment is
36 approximately 150 m², with nine rooms, marble floors and balconies to the front and rear of
37 the house. It has two large living rooms and a spacious library. The family room, *qa'a*, is a
38 small room in comparison to other rooms in the house. During winter, this is the room the
39 family spends much of its time in. There are three modern functionally-defined bedrooms in
40 the house for the daughters, sons, the couple, and two toilets. Interestingly, the organisation of
41 the house conforms to the traditional expectations for social proximity: distant guests are
42 accommodated in one part of the house without the need to pass through any of the more
43 intimate family rooms such as kitchen and bedrooms. With its two entrances and two toilets,
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3 *bayt* Ouward could be imaginary cut into two halves, related but separate, one for the
4
5 accommodation of guests and the other for the family.
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8 The house has a large living room decorated with baroque-style sofas and armchairs in royal
9
10 blue, containing Damascene in-laid mother-of-pearl wooden tables, and impressive paintings.
11
12 Zahra, Najwa and I, were sitting in the living room with the air-conditioning on, sipping
13
14 Arabic coffee in July 2009, when a different geography of the house and the family emerged
15
16 in conversation. I recount that geography here, because, although ‘immaterial’ it permeates
17
18 the materiality of the house both its rooms and its social organisation.
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22 Najwa had a miscarriage prior to the birth of Zahra, and when her daughter arrived everyone
23
24 in the family rejoiced upon the news of the healthy baby. ‘The family – well, my auntie
25
26 Yousra to be precise – were less happy for the birth of my sister, Hiba,’ said Zahra in a
27
28 humorous tone. ‘When Hiba was born I was almost four years old, and my mother returned
29
30 from the hospital with Hiba and a doll for me. She said that my sister had brought this gift,
31
32 and for many years I believed that Hiba had been in the belly of our mother with the doll!’
33
34 Her humour alongside the recollections from childhood that she and her mother were
35
36 recreating, were intended to alleviate the tensions of Zahra’s imminent departure. Zahra had
37
38 been living in Europe for many years, completing a doctorate. Her younger sister, Hiba, had
39
40 joined Zahra, for higher education. Emigration is very common in Syria: to the Gulf, Europe,
41
42 America, legally and illegally, for work and studies. Yet, it is quite uncommon for females to
43
44 pursue higher studies outside Syria. Although Umm Nidal helped her daughters to get into
45
46 higher education and to travel outside of Syria, she was increasingly concerned about their
47
48 marriage prospects: ‘for an over-qualified woman it is difficult to find an equal husband in
49
50 our society... and the more they [her daughters] grow older the more difficult it becomes.’
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55 Umm Nidal’s daughters were not visiting Syria often: more than a year had passed since
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3 Zahra's previous visit. Now, Zahra had been in Syria for a week and she was due to leave in
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5 an hour.
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8 'Yousra was happier when Nidal arrived... But I couldn't understand how my mother became
9
10 Umm Nidal from Umm Zahra!' Keeping with Arabic traditions, the Druze follow the
11
12 prevalent Arabic cultural patterns in naming: the parents take the name of their first-born son,
13
14 and in his absence, the first born-daughter. Nidal was in his mid-twenties, and also had a
15
16 Damascus University degree. Umm Nidal had been trying to find him a bride during my stay
17
18 there, that is a bride other than the girl that Nidal was in love with. That girl was deemed by
19
20 Umm Nidal as 'uneducated' and not equal to him. Thus, although Nidal had remained in
21
22 Syria, his marriage preferences also caused tensions within the family.
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27 On the day of her departure, Zahra's caustic humour was focused on Yousra, Farid's elder
28
29 sister. The two women had a verbal disagreement the day before, and Yousra decided to go
30
31 for an excursion so she would not be present at the time of Zahra's departure. Many pressures
32
33 surrounded Zahra's presence in the house: when and whether she will return, who is to blame
34
35 for Zahra's departure. In recreating pleasant common memories with her mother, Zahra was
36
37 not only evoking the ties that bind a mother-daughter relation, but was painting a picture of
38
39 Yousra, as a common, to her and Najwa, enemy. Zahra was remaking the story of childhood
40
41 from her current point of view, in an attempt to reinforce the relationship with her mother.
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45 As the story continued, Zahra narrated how she used to play in the neighbourhood always
46
47 beyond her curfew, Najwa adding that Zahra used to be *galizah* (undisciplined). Najwa would
48
49 punish her by grounding her, but Zahra would continue to disobey. I remember Najwa
50
51 nodding her head in agreement, and looking at me during the story. I wondered whether this
52
53 was to make sure that I understand or because she was avoiding looking at her daughter
54
55 whose departure was daunting and painful. Maybe she also knew that the memories of
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3 childhood narrated were not so innocent, as they contained present implications, tensions and
4
5 disagreements. Family relations were strained, although at that point, still brewing beneath
6
7 the surface. Umm Nidal was concerned about her two daughters living in Europe: will they
8
9 return, will they marry a Druze, is it her fault for letting them go? Abu Nidal was more
10
11 concerned about philosophical and political matters than domestic politics. Nidal did not
12
13 approve of his sisters' life outside of Syria and outside of the Druze realm of endogamy. He
14
15 understood their reasons, but he argued somewhat cynically 'these are our traditions, this is
16
17 our society, we cannot change them.' Only Kareem, the youngest offspring of the family,
18
19 supported his sisters. Being the youngest saved him the social pressure of marriage. At the
20
21 time of the above conversation, and for some years prior to it, Najwa had been putting up
22
23 with local rumours, and their social implications, that her daughters were apostates. During
24
25 and after this conversation, Najwa was increasingly critical of Farid's liberalism, and was
26
27 turning to religion and tradition for solace.⁴ This is how Najwa, perhaps feeling responsible
28
29 for her daughter's liberal upbringing, described herself jokingly:
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35 'There was a man fishing on the shore and he falls in the sea. He cannot swim and
36
37 cries out for help. Passersby gather at the shore and they all stand watching the
38
39 drowning man, too afraid to jump in and save him. Somehow, another man is
40
41 accidentally pushed into the water. He can swim so rescues the angler, while the hoard
42
43 of onlookers applaud his brave heroic act as he comes out of the sea. And he replies:
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45 "You may call me a hero, but I'm searching for the dog who pushed me into the
46
47 water!"' (Najwa, 16 August 2009).
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56 4 For similar stories, see Kastrinou Theodoropoulou 2012 and Shaaban 1988.
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FUTURES: WAR ARCHITECTURE

Ya zaman al-ta'ifiyya, ta'i fiyyi wa ta'i fik ... Ziad Arahbani

[Oh the confessional times, they fuck me and fuck you]

This paper has explored two interrelated themes: the Druze community of Jaramana as a heterogeneous historical entity; and the architecture of *bayt* as both a social unit, an idiom for relations and a material entity. Through the renditions of pasts and presents, the paper demonstrated how houses are part of the wider social context and economic transformations in contemporary Syria. Moreover, through the juxtaposition of the two *bayts*, it explored architecture as the embodiment of ideals and of practices, but also of ideals and practices that are not equally shared in the Druze sect or within a Druze family, revealing differences in taste, status, class and generation. The concept of *bayt* challenges the analytical distinction between the house and its inhabitants, emphasising the relational and material connection between social content and physical form. Through the architectural development of the house of Abud-Haddad, and through the shifting contours of a family conflict in the narrative construction of a common house and memory in *bayt* Ouward, it shows how the materiality of the house changes along with changes in the social entity that dwells in it. In this direction, the paper underlined that a relational approach needs to be combined with a historical understanding of change, through architecture here. Relations, like houses, have pasts and futures, and sometimes their presents may hide more than what they reveal, just like the public/private façade of Arabic houses. The worlds houses inhabit, and the worlds their inhabitants create, are tense, contradictory and, borrowing from Strathern (2004), partial and

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3 multiple. Houses are embodiments, but their traces, resemblances and differences are more
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5 nuanced, complex and uncertain than the location of their doors and windows.
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8 If 'the legitimacy of the house stems partly from its capacity to endure' (Pine 1996: 445), then
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10 what form does this endurance take at times of war? Perhaps the 'confessional times,' as in the
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12 song of Ziad Arahbani, becomes firmly entrenched in the future trajectories, unearthed, as if,
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14 by the latest bomb or shield. However, as demonstrated in the two cases, houses, in both
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16 social and material composition are always changing, their endurance firmly connected with
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18 their capacity to adapt, to combine and to reassemble. Then, it might not be such an
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20 exaggeration to extent Khalaf's notion of *mukhadram*, cultural collagist, from people to
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22 architectural and social *bayts*, in order to underscore the patchwork through which change
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24 constitutes continuity. The danger for the *mukhadram*, then, are the solid physical boundaries
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26 that a war erects, be them sectarian, political or economic. As Jaramana becomes contested
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28 between government and opposition forces, internally divided by class and sect, 'natives' and
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30 refugees, in a Syria where no one side holds the olive branch of peace and justice, the
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32 architecture of war was succinctly drawn in Tariq Abud-Haddad's words: 'they fight, we die'
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35 (26 August 2013).
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Figure 1: Spatial composition of ethnic residence in Jaramana, 'Syrian majority' correlates with Druze residence, Fahmi and Jaeger (2009).
164x136mm (72 x 72 DPI)

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


Figure 2: The qa'a, internal ground elevation is called 'ataba (threshold), see Weber 2009: 236. Drawing by Tariq Abud-Haddad.
1243x907mm (72 x 72 DPI)

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Figure 3: Bayt al-sheta. Photograph by author.
221x166mm (300 x 300 DPI)

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


Figure 4: Bayt Abud-Haddad kinship diagram.
332x207mm (72 x 72 DPI)

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


Figure 5: Drawing of the three phases in the development of Bayt Abud-Haddad. Drawing by Tariq Abud-Haddad.
1264x784mm (72 x 72 DPI)

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


Figure 6: The house at the beginning of the 20th Century. Drawing by Tariq Abud-Haddad.
944x581mm (72 x 72 DPI)

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


Figure 7: Ground plan of bayt Abud-Haddad. Drawing by Tariq Abud-Haddad.
1277x952mm (72 x 72 DPI)

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


Figure 8: Inside the courtyard house of Bayt Abud-Haddad.
1286x965mm (72 x 72 DPI)

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


Figure 9: Kinship diagram of Bayt Ouward
267x153mm (72 x 72 DPI)

Review Only