

THE EUROPEAN DILEMMA: CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW MIGRATION ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE

O DILEMA EUROPEU: OS NOVOS MOVIMENTOS MIGRATÓRIOS, CONSEQUÊNCIAS PARA A SEGURANÇA E DEFESA EUROPEIA.

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Abstract

European Union is experiencing its greatest dilemma since setting out on its project. With human rights, democracy and freedom as its political and constitutional identity, EU has been forced to reconsider its strategies in order to defend itself and protect its citizens. Politicians continue to alter the local, regional and communitarian legal system, placing legal barriers – and much more – before non-EU immigrants. This puts the community's ethos (**θός**: **θούς**) at jeopardy and the fear of the other is changing irreversibly the *acquis communautaire*, the legal corpus that has taken years to create. The panic and weakness of our political leaders has not reassured the people, nor there has been any evidence of reason or dignity in the search for solutions. The extreme reaction has weakened us all and has also undermined European Union's political aspirations to be a major global player. The difficulty of assimilating a large number of migrants with strong cultural identities of their own, who share a different religion from the majority of the native population, also presents a challenge to unity. They are accustomed to an anthropological political dialectic of dominated/dominant that is different from the European Union reality. Marginalisation and social exclusion will only increase as a result of the lack of assimilation policies as will xenophobia. Radical political changes will follow these social facts.

Keywords: War; Human Traffic; Refugees; Migrants; European S&D

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Resumo

A União Europeia vive o seu maior dilema desde a sua constituição. Tendo como matriz política constitutiva e identitária os Direitos Humanos, a Democracia e a Liberdade, vê-se forçada a reconsiderar a sua estratégia para se poder defender e dar segurança aos seus próprios cidadãos. Os políticos da UE estão e continuarão a modificar o sistema legislativo local, regional e comunitário, criando barreiras físicas e legais aos migrantes extra comunidade – mas não só. Está posto em causa o Ethos (Θs: θous) comunitário e o medo do outro modificará irreversivelmente o acquis communautaire, o acervo legal comunitário, conseguido ao longo de anos. O pânico e a fraqueza dos líderes políticos não ajudam a manter a calma das populações nem a raciocinar condignamente com vista a encontrar soluções governativas. O exagero das reações enfraquece-nos e tira à Comunidade o papel que ambiciona como um projeto político de grande ator global. A dificuldade de assimilação da grande quantidade de migrantes com culturas identitárias muito fortes e de uma religião diferente à maioria da população nativa é também um enorme desafio à Unidade. Os novos migrantes estão habituados a uma dialética política da relação antropológica coletiva entre dominador/dominado, diferente das realidades europeias. A marginalização e a exclusão social tenderão a aumentar por falta de políticas de assimilação, a xenofobia também. Estes factos sociais serão seguidos por políticas de carácter radical quanto às leis de migração se concerne.

Palavras-chave: Guerra, Tráfico Humano, Refugiados, Migrantes, S&D Europeia.

Introduction

‘Primary words do not describe something that might exist independently of them, but being spoken they bring about existence. Primary words are spoken from the being. If Thou is said, the I of the combination I-Thou is said along with it. If It is said, the I of the combination I-It is said along with it. The primary word I-Thou can only be spoken with the whole being. The primary word I-It can never be spoken with the whole being.’ (Buber, 2010, p. 3)

European Union is facing its first significant existential dilemma since its formation. Strategic management, as an academic discipline, serves the purpose of resolving or solving dilemmas throughout reflection, analysis and examination as a research question. Europe’s security and defence (S&D) strategy cannot be an exception.

As Cabral Couto put it in his doctrine *‘é objeto da estratégia toda uma gama de ações destinadas a proporcionar a uma unidade política as melhores condições de segurança para que possa lidar com as ameaças e hipóteses de Guerra admitidas* [The subject of the strategy is

the whole range of actions to provide a united policy, the best security conditions, so you can deal with threats.]’ (Cabral Couto, our trans., 1988, p. 201-202)

This article falls within the analytic scope of geopolitics and international relations (academic studies in S&D). It will address the variants of the problem that has become known as the *refugee crisis* currently afflicting the European continent, identifying – to the extent possible in a short academic piece – the causes and effects of this crisis, opening debate and reflection on this new political challenge – much needed in such an important subject.

There are no insurmountable dilemmas in this area of knowledge, and it would be very sad for the European Union (EU) political project if it were to be defeated by the first great challenge, or even if this crisis was to result in submission: an authentic checkmate, – as some Eurosceptics like to describe the current situation. A dilemma is a decision between two alternatives. It can just as easily be the affirmation of the validity of one premise in demonstrating the non-viability of another that opposes.

Europe’s dilemma concerning the current migratory flow, a real inundation of humanity flooding Europe with refugees from war and economic migrants, is based on two mutually antagonistic premises.

The first premise; is that part of EU founding, constituent and aggregating principles, is also a belief in fundamental human rights protected by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (adopted in 2000 and binding on all EU Member States since 2009),¹ with the EU also seeking, through this charter, to promote these very same human rights across the world in a policy that forms part of its Strategic Framework for Human Rights and Democracy, adopted in 2012 seeking to improve the efficiency and coherence of these policies within EU territory. To this end, Europe also adopted a five-year action plan from 2015² to 2020 that provides a common basis through which all EU Member States and EU institutions can develop a truly collective and balanced effort between all of them.³

The second premise; is essentially security based, follows recent attacks by Islamic extremists that have caused panic among European populations and, also, because of the new wave of disorganised migration striking up against EU borders: suffering people fleeing war who are overwhelming Europe’s ability to absorb and control them. The main question posed by this second premise is also interrogative: should the EU seal itself from the outside in order to protect its own internal security?

EU is a beautiful project, full of good intentions and principles, although for some of its opponents it is no more than a political utopia that is nearing its end.

As a believer of the grater goodness of this new Europe and the political EU, we shall be

¹ European Union, 2000. *Charter of Fundamental Rights*. Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_pt.pdf. [Accessed 12 June 2016].

² Council of the European Union, 2012. *Human Rights and Democracy. Strategic Frame and Plan of Action of the EU*. Available at <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11855-2012-INIT/pt/pdf>. [Accessed 12 June 2016].

³ European Commission, 2015. *Joint Communication to the European Parliament and Council*. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/joint_communication_on_human_rights_and_democracy_en.pdf. [Accessed 13 June 2016].

critic, not because we are against it, but because criticism can be a dynamic way of provoking movements towards a greater good. The EU is an unfinished project that frightens some, for the benefit of political populism on the rise now.

The reality is that EU politicians, as a whole, are afraid and has led them to making mistakes and committing all manner of excesses because of their usual lack of foresight, anticipation and ability to meet the challenges created. In order to defend itself from terrorist aggression, now classed as a war, the EU has turned in on itself, divided, – and is rejecting its own founding political principles in an attempt to ensure control. It is a difficult moment to implement its treaties and legislation – the *acquis communautaire*, or the community's legal corpus – because of the disaggregation and division between the national political goals of each Member State. The majority of the political decisions taken since 2015-16 would have been unthinkable just 10 years ago. The EU is denying itself politically because it does not have, and never has had, a consistent and effective strategy or S&D policy's. It has permanently delayed taking decisions and is now surprised by recent events. It has also begun to be criticised internationally, both by its opponents and even now by some of its allies.

The analysis of these antagonistic premises and their paradigm must be carried out academically: anthropologically, sociologically and in terms of human geography and political science. It should also involve cultural studies and the history of Europe. It is not the intention of this article to find solutions, but rather to reflect on the most significant problems affecting a European society that is beleaguered and afraid, as never before.

Political EU is tested through this new dossier on migrations in an attempt to discover resolutions that do not breach its constitutive, normative and legislative essence.

In order not to lose the sense of the original citations and the necessary concepts and definitions, they will be retained in their original language throughout this article.

European migration and political asylum legislative structures

When the current legislation on migration was conceived, approved and passed, no one expected that the problem it is causing today could ever come about. It was not possible to foresee the revolution that spread across the Arab world and the Near East as a result of the Arab Spring, the wars in Syria and Iraq and the continuing implosion of the Libyan state. The only thing that was anticipated was migratory flows caused by very large population increases on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. The wars on Europe's doorstep and the lack of monitoring of the organised criminal gangs responsible for human trafficking and clandestine migration have opened a veritable Pandora's Box.

European legislation and its organisational and operational structures on this matter seemed appropriate for its stated goals. However, the Syrian conflict has resulted in the greatest humanitarian crisis since the Second World War. Between four and five million people have fled the country, and more than thirteen million are in desperate need within

Syria. The wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and the problems in Eritrea have also produced flows of refugees seeking asylum in Europe.

All nations bordering the countries at war are at the limit of their ability to provide logistical support, refuge and asylum. Lebanon and Jordan have absorbed huge numbers of refugees. Turkey, which has applied to join the EU, has had to strike a balance between providing refuge and asylum and passing migrants on to Europe.

The Union's functional structures

The decentralised nature of Power in a Globalised world is affected by the technologic and scientific revolution, with several actors on the rise, creates a permanent security challenge for the Union.

Uncontrolled migration is no doubt, an easily recognised security problem.

From our point of view, the academic descriptive approach is probably the best – or the only way – to look at the structures created by the EU as they are innumerable, heavy and bureaucratic. Analysing and explaining the relationship and the interaction between these structures is an extremely complex task which falls beyond the possibilities and the actual purpose of this work.

Therefore, who are these structures and what do they do:

Directorate-General of the European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs (Commissioner: Cecilia Malmström) is responsible for developing European policy on migration, based on the principles of solidarity and responsibility in line with the EU 2020 Strategy.⁴

European Asylum Support Office (EASO) is a European agency set up to help those Member States under the greatest pressure with their asylum system. A product of EU regulation 439/2010 of the European Parliament and European Council, it is also an expert centre in asylum law and the application of European and international procedures. It operates in third countries in order to prevent undesirable and unnecessary migratory flows wherever possible and to manage crises⁵. It helps articulate the CEAS.

Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was a creation of the Amsterdam Treaty and of the conclusions of the 1999 Tampere council. In general terms, it is an advanced structure for the implementation of legislation on these matters, from the treaties to the determination of EU Court of Justice jurisprudence.⁶

⁴ European Commission, 2010. *Communication from the Commission. Europe 2020. A Strategy for Smart and Sustainable Growth*. Available at <http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/COMPLET%20EN%20BARROSO%20%20%20007%20-%20Europe%202020%20-%20EN%20version.pdf>. [Accessed 15 June 2016].

⁵ European Asylum Support Office. *About Us*. Available at <https://www.easo.europa.eu/about-us>. [Accessed 31 October 2016].

⁶ European Commission Migration and Home Affairs. *Policies: Common European Asylum System*. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm. [Accessed 31 October 2016].

Frontex promotes, coordinates and develops the EU border system and its integration through joint operations by Member States. It provides training, risk analysis, research, joint rapid response capabilities and assists Member States repatriate refused migrants and, finally, facilitates the flow of shared information.⁷

Europol is an agency that ensures application of the law. It is not a police force but exists to help European police forces. Terrorism, organised crime, the drugs and human trafficking, money laundering, cybercrime, organised fraud and currency counterfeiting are its areas of activity and it is plugged into European structures designed to combat clandestine migration networks. It has approximately 1,000 employees in its headquarters and liaison offices in other countries outside the EU.⁸

Within Europol the *EU Intelligence and Situation Centre* (EU INTCEN) and the *European Counter Terrorism Centre* (ECTC), the *Europol's Emergency Response Team* (EMRT) play an important role in differentiate the several reality's and types of migration flows establishing patterns of security.⁹

European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) is directly connected to the problem of migration. FRA helps apply laws on human and fundamental rights that are part of the constituent treaties of the EU and protects the rights of European citizens and migrants living in Europe.¹⁰

European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST) and the *European Police College* (CEPOL) link up with all European agencies working in the area of migration.¹¹

European Union Satellite Centre (SATCEN), created in 1992 and incorporated as a European agency in 2002, helps with security and defence decision-making by providing images and analysis of satellite images, ensuring coordination between Member States while operating as a link to allied states outside the EU.¹²

European University Institute, the *Migration Policy Centre* and the *Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies* help to reflect, coordinate, examine and study European migratory phenomena.¹³

⁷ Frontex. *About Frontex*. Available at <http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/origin/>. [Accessed 31 October 2016].

⁸ Europol. *About us*. Available at <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/about-us>. [Accessed 31 October 2016].

⁹ Europol. ECTC – *European Counter Terrorism Center* – infographic. Available at <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/ectc-european-counter-terrorism-centre-infographic>. [Accessed 31 October 2016].

¹⁰ European Agency for Fundamental Rights. *Apresentação da FRA*. Available at <http://fra.europa.eu/pt>. [Accessed 31 October 2016].

¹¹ Eurojust. *About Eurojust*. Available at <http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/about/background/Pages/History.aspx>. [Accessed 31 October 2016].

¹² European Union Satellite Center. *About the EU SatCen*. Available at https://www.satcen.europa.eu/about_the_eu_satcen/the_centre. [Accessed 31 October 2016].

¹³ European University Institute. *About the EUI*. Available at <http://www.eui.eu/About/Index.aspx> [Accessed 31 October 2016]; Migration Policy Centre. *About*. Available at <http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/about/> [accessed 31 October 2016]; and Robert Schuman Centre website. Available at <http://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/RobertSchumanCentre/Index.aspx>. [Accessed 15 June 2016].

European migration and political asylum legislation and strategy

‘The Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in Member States, and the prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings’ (TFEU, Article 79, 2007)

‘The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States. Whenever necessary, the Union acts adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle’ (TFEU, Article 80, 2007)

The Lisbon Treaty, signed on 13 December of 2007 which entered into force in 1 December 2009, introduced the possibility of co-decision making and qualified majority voting for legal migration while also provided a new judicial basis for promoting integration measures. With this, the European Parliament became a co-legislator on an equal footing with the European Council, together with the legal decisions of the European courts establishes European law, with the EU’s competence in this area shared with that of the Member States.

Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), adopted by the European Commission in 2011, establishes a general framework for the EU’s relationship with third countries on matters related to migration. It has four key objectives: legal immigration and mobility, illegal immigration and people trafficking, international protection and asylum policy, and maximising the impact of migration and mobility on development. The human rights of migrants are of overarching concern in this approach that focuses equally on regional and bilateral dialogue between the countries of origin, transit and destination. It allows the possibility of celebrating “Mobility Partnerships” with third countries covering both readmission agreements and a whole range of measures from developing aid to the granting of temporary visas, through circular migration and the struggle against illegal migration. Since 2005 it has been the EU’s main working tool: ensuring the better organisation of legal migration and assisting with fluid mobility, preventing and combating illegal migration and people trafficking, maximising the impact of migrations and mobility, promoting adequate international protection and enhancing the external dimension of asylum.¹⁴

The European Agenda on Migration, Brussels, 13 May 2015, is a communication from the Commission to the European Parliament that intends to help save lives, identify people-trafficking networks, respond to the large number of arrivals in the EU and their relocation, ensure a common approach in the provision of support to and the movement, protection

¹⁴ European Commission Migration and Home Affairs. *Policies on Global Approach to Migration and Mobility*. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/global-approach-to-migration/index_en.htm. [Accessed 12 June 2016].

and re-housing of those requiring it, and to work with third countries in an effort to stem the growth of migratory flows by using the tools available to the EU to help Member States with vulnerable borders.¹⁵

Link between European security and defence on migration

Today the boundary between the concepts of S&D within the EU is very thin. It is very difficult to define where one starts and the other ends or to differentiate the activities of either, as mentioned before. Both terms are related to the thematic of migration, particularly when seeking to ensure coordination between their causes, consequences and impact. *European External Action Services* (EEAS) is responsible for European security and defence through:

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSPD),¹⁶ Europe's common security and defence policy, created in December 2009 through the incorporation of previous treaties on this matter. The Lisbon Treaty of December 2007 was the main driving force behind this political definition.

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)¹⁷ is the security and defence policy that puts in practice, through civil and military action, the capabilities that have been developed to prevent conflicts and manage crises.

From an academic point of view in terms of S&D studies, the “*Parish School*” prevails at the Union functional structures. Mostly, because it doesn't differentiate between external and internal threats overlaying military force with police and border control, in both cases – inside and outside the European borders. Within the same Union, in the Nordic States, the Scandinavian approach is normally called the “*Copenhagen School*”. It has, with no doubt, an influence in the political thinking throughout its peace studies with emphasis on the social aspects of security. Sweden and Norway follow the same trend of research, hosting several Institutes that promote that line of teaching. The balance between these two academic frameworks is likely to have helped building the EU political legislation in these matters (cf. Barroso, 2014).

By comparison the US Homeland Security system has a different line of approach. The so called “*American School*”, an inherited praxis and set of political model that were built on a different type of fears during the Cold War – in that specific historical moment – and that are still maintained today, follows an entirely different political direction. For some analysts, mainly on the other side of the Atlantic, it works better. In our view, it is not adaptable to the EU political reality and out dated.

¹⁵ European Commission, 2015. *A European Agenda on Migration*. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf. [Accessed 12 June 2016].

¹⁶ European Parliament, 2016. *Common Security and Defense Policy*. Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_6.1.2.pdf. [Accessed 15 June 2016].

¹⁷ Congressional Research Service, 2013. *The European Union: Foreign and Security Policy*. Available at <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41959.pdf>. [Accessed 13 June 2016].

Conclusion for this chapter: A weak Europe

EU is not without a structure or appropriate legislation on the matter of migration and asylum seekers procedures, it has however a great deal of difficulty implementing them, in our personal experience we can reassure that is related to a gross lack of information within the Union.

The conclusion of a *weak Europe* stems precisely from the difficulties that Member States have in promoting laws and community directives.

European multiculturalism

‘Tolerating those who differ from us in matters of religion is so fitting to the Gospel and to reason that it seems monstrous for men to fail to see this clearly... And therefore peace, equity and friendship, are always mutually to be observed by particular churches, in the same manner as by private persons, without any pretence of superiority or jurisdictions over one another.’ (Locke, 1965)

Thinking that cultures meet with each other seems to be something truly outdated in modern social science. Perhaps it is more appropriate to say there are meetings of people who are cultural carriers, only because the concept of culture concerns people and their behaviour. EU is politically designed to be multicultural. The Europeans are not so different from each other, at least in terms of their ethnicity. There are certainly some common cultural matrixes that help to identify what is being a European, the so-called European identity, but it is above all in the desire to be part of a common political project based on the Union of European States that helps, – a new culture in the making.

The Kantian principle: ‘Act in such a way as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of anyone else, always as an end and never merely as a means’ (Kant, 1785), it is still in the imaginary on the European thought, through an ethic of solidarity normally called interculturality when concerning education. A multitude of respectful cultural experiences between them, with divergences that overcome the original cultural monogenism of each other, is on the genes of the EU politics.

Nevertheless, multiculturalism is no guarantor of educational interculturalism by itself. It is in the dynamic between community and society that the two great ideological lines of both political models – assimilation and interactive multiculturalism – developed. The German theorists of the sociology of migrations call the dichotomy between community and society ‘*Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft... Na primeira predominam as relações de tipo afectivo resultantes da convivência no seio do grupo; na segunda, sobressaem as relações mais estruturadas, hierarquizadas e de origem nacional. [Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft... Predominant in the former are the affective relationships resulting from coexistence within the group; in the latter, the relations of a more structured, hierarchical and rational nature are dominant]*’ (Rocha-Trindade, our trans., 1995, p. 72).

Europe is not and never has been racially homogeneous, as if such uniformity is possible in space and time on any part of the planet; that is to say, it is little more than a myth created by some political regimes, without any actual validity.

If the process of interaction and integration between Europeans has been difficult, the recent mass migration of refugees fleeing wars, the demographic explosion and miserable living conditions in the south, have begun to be a real cause for concern in the European political Union, simply because of the perception of dangers resulting from the uncontrolled nature of events. This perception, different from the realities, threats, challenges and opportunities, is also in itself a challenge to the desired unity.

The world has changed a great deal in recent years. It is now, according to Samuel Huntington, multipolar and with many civilisations (cf. Huntington, 2009, p. 21). Europe is divided and is interacting with this new world.

Three political models: Multiculturalism versus assimilation

The best examples of different political models towards dealing with migrants are the USA and Canada. Geographically so near and yet so different on political options. Both systems are highly functional and of great success. Comparing them with the EU can be of some guidance in understanding what the issues are from this side of the Atlantic.

The United States of America

The US political system is possibly the most integrative in a young country created by migrants. For many reasons, but particularly because of the policies devised for this reason over many years, the US is the country that has best assimilated the cultures of its immigrants. American identity is today completely consolidated, leading its citizens and migrants to accept the symbols defining its culture and is exporting its social, economic and political model, on a global level. Its political model has adapted to a continuous flow of immigration that has raised the country to a level of prosperity without precedent in contemporary history.

For Maria Beatriz Rocha-Trindade, a Portuguese doyen of the study of the sociology of migration, the “melting pot” concept defines nothing, despite it being widely applied to some definitions of American social structure. Assimilation is, therefore, the most appropriate and relevant term: *‘le concept d’assimilation, décrit comme un processus continue et prolongé, tendant à parfaire le mixage culturel d’un individu d’origine différente, au sein d’une société d’accueil* [the concept of assimilation is described as a continuous and prolonged process, tending to perfect cultural mix of different individual origin in a host society]’ (Rocha-Trindade, our trans., 2015, p. 54).

What has been called the American way of life is now the great unifying factor, both within and outside the US. The country’s economic strength, military and security hegemony as well as diplomacy, have established an unshakeable reputation that has led to the possibility

of a – polarity of diverse equalities, – while in a relatively short space of time it has created a common thread of different cultures, establishing a new one. The American National project has managed to establish a political community through its laws, and also an ethical community through the establishment of these same laws, based on legal coercion that has secured respect for *the concept and cult of freedom as a moral law*. The US political model is based on liberty that gives little importance to *freedom and equality* as understood through Europe’s French political norms.

It is a truth that throughout history the hegemonic empires have always been good at integrating the cultures of their constituent parts, and the US is currently the world’s only superpower or empire, we may risk saying.

Canada

This country, which inherited the political model of the British Empire, is perhaps the best contemporary example of multiculturalism. The Queen of the United Kingdom is the head of state of this Commonwealth member, in a clear demonstration of its British legal and institutional legacy. It is an ancestrally bilingual country, but one that is politically united in its diversity, managing the ‘*crystallisation d’un conflit potentiel entre les deux cultures majoritaire (d’origine française et anglo-saxonne), par le biais de l’inclusion de plusieurs autres cultures dans le même ensemble;... “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework”* [crystallization of a potential conflict between the two main cultures (French and Anglo-Saxon), through the inclusion of several other cultures in the same set...] (Rocha-Trindade, our trans., 2015, p. 55).

Canada, the second-largest country in the world behind Russia in terms of land mass, welcomes around 250.000 immigrants each year to a country with a population of 35 million. Around six million of its people are immigrants. There is a Francophone and an Anglophone Canada that despite their rivalries cooperate in the pursuit of a common project with a bipolar interaction from a sociological point of view. An organic nation that is also made up of a large number of small ethnic and cultural “islands” that are able to interact with each other in the essence of the spirit that unites them without losing their original identities. Conflict between ethnic, cultural and religious groups is almost non-existent.

Europe

Professor Kenan Malik, a British academic of Indian ethnicity who writes regularly about multiculturalism, pluralism and race for the *New York Times* and other publications, recently published an article in *Foreign Affairs* in where he argued the European multicultural project has failed. He claims it had subdivided the groups into others, based not only on cultural ethnicity and religion, but also on such phenomenon as social exclusion and consumerism that could not be achieved by a large part of the population: ‘Europe has allowed excessive immigration without demanding enough integration – a mismatch that has eroded social cohesion, undermined national identities and degraded public trust.’ (Malik, 2015). If on

the one hand his analysis theory is welcome to us, on the other it seems to state that the European project has been a failure, an exaggeration at the very least. We do not share this view, young Europeans also!

The European project is a very recent construct. It was never going to be possible in a few short years to politically and culturally unite and integrate 28 countries with very different cultures on a continent that had recently been torn asunder in two world wars.

Despite the existence of a European culture that is based on difference and tolerance, politically there is also a common will. The Europe that is under construction will take many years to consolidate. European identity will be created by the cultural interaction of the various people involved until stabilisation is possible. In our view, Europe is also a multicultural success.

The new wave of migrants

The new wave of immigration in 2015 and through the beginning of 2016 has been of substantial numbers. It certainly involved between 1.5 and 1.8 million people crossing Europe's borders in such a short space of time that it has been impossible for the existing structures to assimilate the new arrivals. Europe was not prepared.

Causes

The causes of migration, particularly of international migration, are linked to several factors throughout the entire history of human existence. The recent phenomenon of globalisation is not responsible for driving the movement of migrants, although it has given a transnational impetus to the problem – if we can call it that. Regional conflicts, climate change, natural disasters, disputes over natural resources and demographic shocks have always been among the factors forcing people to move across the planet. New means of transport, social communication and the promotion of consumption and leisure in some of the more developed societies, have involved changes in the distribution of power and economic capabilities, which in modern times has driven the movement of people on an unprecedented scale. There has been an increase in mobility and also an increase of population, largely because of medical advances that caused the opportunity to live longer.

The war and people trafficking in the Internet

Europe did not take sufficient account of the consequences of the wars in Iraq and Syria or the collapse of the Libyan state. Much less did it anticipate the real fruit of what was known as the Arab Spring brought about changes to regional political structures, at the limit of European borders. Mistakes were made in the analysis and there was too much optimism that led to an underestimation of the effect of something very serious.

The negligence was of such a scale that there was a transfer of computer software and digital technology, the so-called Darkweb, and Darknet too, to groups in opposition to the

ruling regimes, and therefore disseminated through their use by radical Islamists, people traffickers and criminal networks. By providing the technology, the control was lost.

‘To access the Darknet, in which anonymity is practically guaranteed to everyone, including criminals, one requires the TOR browser, a free program that can hide the users location and browsing history. Originally designed by the Naval Research Lab, TOR receives 60 percent of its backing from the State Department and the Department of Defence to act as a secure network for government agencies as well as dissidents fighting oppressive regimes.’ (Kushner, 2015).

The Islamic State, in its recent attacks in Europe, and criminal people and drug trafficking gangs operating in the Mediterranean have used digital information networks that have been impossible to intercept so far, and have been able to continue their criminal activities at a level they never had before. The even more recent development of new tools, such as Memex, to search sites in the deep web storing data in a manner similar to Google on the open web, represents a struggle without any foreseeable respite. For their part, both Apple and Firefox have developed new technologies to make it impossible to intercept their signals, arguing that by doing so they are defending the right of citizens, their customers, to privacy. There is also some justification in arguing that creating a backdoor for the police and security services may provide organised criminals and terrorist networks a way in. There are a large number of alternatives for those wishing to pass unnoticed on the net without decoding such as ‘privacy-preserving mobile chat apps like Telegram. Telegram offers encrypted messaging, a slick, intuitive interface, and a big user base: it hits 100 million active monthly users in February. Jihadis use, however, the TOR browser to hide what they’re browsing on the open web from prying eyes’ (Moore & Rid, 2016). A recent article of a specialized magazine, Helpnet Security, goes further and claims ‘The dark web exists on a variety of dark nets. Some are small, “private” peer-to-peer networks, others are large networks operated by public organizations and individuals (think Tor, Freenet, I2P). But the terms “dark web” and “dark net” are often (erroneously) used interchangeably’ (Zorsz, 2016).

The difficulty in combating both the migrant-trafficking mafias and the Islamic State is now cybernetic: that is to say, it is also a war being fought in cyberspace.

Foreseeable consequences

The physical barriers of fences, walls and borders are recurring images that enter our homes each night via television news broadcasts. They are an immediate response to the “fear of the other” that has gripped us all. In the countries of northern Europe – the preferred destination of migrants –, there are already small villages where children can no longer play sport because the sports centres have been filled with camp beds occupied by families of migrants forced to live there until proper accommodation can be arranged.

The extreme case of Södertälje, Sweden

Located approximately 40km from Stockholm, has 70% of its 95,000 (no update) Södertälje population made up of foreign migrants. In this particular case, the majority of migrants are Syrians and Assyrian Christians who have fled war and the persecution of Christians in the Near East. Many Syrians in this community still speak Aramaic. However, Arabic has become the first language and the conflict between eastern Christians and recently-arrived Muslims has become of great concern and is proving difficult to police. Södertälje is also a paradigmatic study of the various sociological theories of human capital, or of the impact of a young migrant population on the economy, because the commune is also an example of economic strength, with large companies locating industries in the area, serving also as a dormitory for employees of service companies in Stockholm.¹⁸ It is an authentic case study of the pros and cons of migration. It also incorporates into its social and political structures the characteristics typical of Piore's theory of economics enclave (Piore, 1972).

The difficulties of assimilation and bonding

Local and central politicians in these Nordic countries, for reasons of electoral survival, are keen to take up positions opposed to integration and asylum that are contrary to EU laws and directives. Legislative barriers are certainly a new defensive step being driven by a political populism that feeds this type of phenomenon and leads to the growth of xenophobia among EU citizens. In the United Kingdom, with a referendum on its EU membership, a great number of mosques have been set alight or otherwise damaged during the past year. In Germany refugees reception centres have been violently attacked. Some EU countries have refused to cooperate with the sharing of this burden with no end in sight. 'Indeed, the suppression of identity might lead to further oppression of certain groups... My thesis is that most racial and ethnic discourses related to questions of citizenship are ultimately false and nothing more than fear reactions based on the idea that we will lose something that we really do not possess and can never possess exclusively' (Assante, 2011). The balance and social harmony that was expected between native Europeans and migrants have been mortally wounded.

Because of their religion the new migrants have been associated with terrorism, with the result the Islamic State has benefitted from the climate of terror and confusion created by its war against the West: it has won a psychological victory and also a political victory in the case of Britain. Salafism and Waabism have proliferated within native and resident Islamic communities and because of the social exclusion created is spread through the extremist religious phenomenon. We agree with Huntington's analysis that argues social modernisation has generated increased economic, military and political power, which combined with alienation and the crisis of identity has resulted in a cultural and religious resurgence. *La Revanche de Dieu*, (God's Revenge), was generated within the most secular and least symbolic contemporary society: central Europe (Huntington, 2009).

¹⁸ Södertälje Kommun, 2011. *Facts about Södertälje*. Available at http://www.sodertalje.se/mainupload/dokument/Kommun%20o%20demokrati/Om%20S%C3%B6dert%C3%A4lje/SK_faktabr_2011_Eng.pdf. [Accessed 12 June 2016].

The terrorists have apparently made no inroads in the new wave of migrant community, although it may be possible to do so with great frequency in the future and may have already happened with the attack on Brussels. There are functional links between those who went to fight in the Near East and those who remained in the European rearguard. This is not a direct and defined tactic of the Islamic State has assumed to pursue its attacks, as we have showed in some detail in other academic analysis. Its combatant recruitment base is elsewhere and is endemic: it is among resident and native European communities, the so called, *home breed* or “*inner breed*” in terms of a laic definition for the phenomenon. If all the new migrants were registered and their biometric data collected on their arrival on the continent, the risk of them joining the terrorists would be minimal. The hermeticism of the “ethnic and religious pockets” of Muslim Europe is presently the greatest threat to European security. Different identities are being created, ones that are neither original nor native but which rather represent an authentic tribalisation, preventing dialogue and social interaction with the EU political project.

‘The carefully planned attacks demonstrated the elevated threat to the EU from a fanatic minority, operationally based and raised in the Middle East, combined with a network of people born and raised in the EU, often radicalised within a short space of time, who have proven to be willing and able to act as facilitators and active accomplice in terrorism.’ (Wainwright, 2016, p. 5).

Without doubt, with home grown terrorism on the rise, there are political difficulties of acceptance and integration of the new comers, despite the small number of migrants. One-and-a-half million is an insignificant number in the context of a European population of 508 million¹⁹. There is no plausible reason for the panic that has set in.

Recent strategic solutions for the problem created

Some of the most recent news has been encouraging:

- The Islamic State is losing ground in both Syria and Iraq.
- The Sunni hegemony has been counterbalanced with the opening of diplomatic dialogue between Shi’ite Iran and the West.
- Turkey, while part of the problem, is now prepared to cooperate in pacifying, containing the conflict and in repatriating those migrants who left it *en route* to the Greek islands.
- NATO is involved in border controls and in the struggle against people trafficking.
- EU seems more operative, prepared and with a different risk awareness against terrorism.

All of these advances are good signs that we all want to see, there are also some political decisions being made and even strategies for resolution, finally. Nevertheless, it does not

¹⁹ Eurostat, 2016. *Population on 1 January*. Available at <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00001&plugin=1>. [Accessed 15 June 2016].

seem possible to predict that attacks on European soil will diminish from one day to the next since the terrorist networks seem to be able to operate effectively both within and from the outside. However, there have been changes to the procedures and the relocation of operations to countries that are easier to control, such as the failed state of Libya, for example.

The Riga Statement was the first document of real concern in the EU about terrorist attacks. 'The Council asserts that counter-terrorism efforts both national and EU levels, and that terrorism, radicalisation, recruitment and terrorism finance are among the main threats to the internal security of the EU'.²⁰

The flow of migrants will diminish if EU and its allies manage to contain organised crime and people trafficking and therefore terrorism attacks. The EU will definitively resolve the problem created by the lack of control, when it imposes itself as a major and respected player in the international arena, and when it will be able to shape some decisions that suit its diplomacy and security. The majority of migrants will return to their countries of origin when the conflicts in the Near East come to an end.

NATO is, and will continue to be, of great importance in the context of the Union defence strategy, despite it not yet being completely adapted to current post-Cold War conflicts.

Conclusion

'For in dire danger fear hath more of might, / - the fear of danger, - than the danger feared' (Camões, 1880)

Panic and fear are always poor counselors in time of extreme conflict or war. When dealing with the question of refugee migrants we are speaking of people fleeing war and its causes and consequences, in this specific case, for EU security and welfare. It is not purely a mismatch to be addressed with some improper light populist political doctrines. A dramatic situation that we must face it, whether we like it or not. The panic and the weakness of political leaders has not helped maintain calm among the population, nor has there been evidence of any reason or dignity in reaching solutions. Unfortunately, '*as ameaças transnacionais, e em particular o terrorismo, têm marcado a agenda do sistema político internacional* [the transnational threats, and in particular that of terrorism, has marked the political system's agenda]' (Borges & Rodrigues, our trans., 2016, p. 34). The exaggerated reaction has weakened us and undermines EU political aspirations to be a major global player. EU has undoubtedly become a big payer although its big player ambitions have been delayed as a result of the adverse consequences of the negative image of itself created on the international scene.

The struggle, or lack thereof, against traffickers – the biggest problem of the moment – has not dignified EU security system and has aggravated the uncontrolled migratory flows. The scale of necessary external action requires military involvement and the military, to be

²⁰ Meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers, 2015. *Joint statement*. Available at https://eu2015.lv/images/Kalendars/IeM/2015_01_29_jointstatement_JHA.pdf. [Accessed 31 October 2016].

fit for this purpose, has to be retrained and re-educated to face the new challenges. Modern warfare is electronic, cybernetic, robotic, multifaceted, intermittent and permanent: it has to be because of the exceedingly continuously rapid pace of technological advance. As we have noted in this article, EU security is entirely linked to EU defence: there is no clear difference. Civil/military cooperation is no longer required; it is of the greatest importance and urgency. European legislation has to adapt with all possible haste, enabling more and better operability.

The routes used for trafficking migrants are the same as those organised criminals use to traffic drugs, tobacco, weapons, prostitution, archaeological artefacts and works of art, etc. It is all a form of illegal activity that feeds and moves in order to grow. 'In effect, in the geopolitics of trafficking, there is a third category of actor who stands between the migrant and the controllers: the people trafficker.' (Chiuri, Conglio & Ferri, 2010, p. 94). The links between the various organised crime groups operating alongside corrupt police and politicians, in some European countries, is something that is truly disturbing and highly damaging to the operation of EU institutions. The Islamic State and terrorist groups use these same operational networks, recruiting militants and find ways to introduce arms and explosives or to stash combatants in safe houses in the rear-guard for their tactical operations, '*sabemos que o terrorismo beneficia do crime organizado transnacional e que este, por sua vez, beneficia de um clima de caos causado pelos efeitos do terrorismo* [we all know terrorism benefits from transnational organised crime that is, for its part, the beneficiary of the climate of chaos caused by the effects of terrorism]' (Lemos Pires, our trans., 2016, p. 154).

Both the enemies of the European project and the organised criminals are better informed about EU law on asylum, borders and immigration than are most European citizens, and even than some of the EU institutions and major social actors.

The common idea, spread by political populists, that there is a connection between migrants and terrorists is danger move and creates an unnecessary fear in the European population.

Suspending social mobility within the EU is, however, a backwards step that cannot be easily accepted.

The European Union project's change of Political identity

The difficulty in assimilating a large number of migrants with their own strong cultural identities and with a different religion from the majority of the native population also presents a huge challenge, particularly when the union of 28 states is not itself consolidated. The majority of migrants are fleeing dictatorships and have no experience of democracy and its associated civic duties. Are we, therefore, endangering the framework structures of European cultural principles or the foundations of the constitution of European knowledge, which Pierre Bourdieu in his work, *Symbolic Power*, about history and society defined as the search for a conceptualisation of the relationship between symbolic systems and action or social dynamic? (cf. Bourdieu, 2014).

In terms of security study's, '*Uma ameaça é o produto de uma intenção, ou circunstância, capaz de provocar danos consideráveis, num período relativamente curto de tempo, nos valores adquiridos ou a adquirir.* [A menace is always a product of an intention, or a circumstance, capable of provoking considerable damage in short time within acquired values or values to be acquired.]' (Barroso, our trans., 2014, p. 14).

Europe is currently a space where there is a great movement of people, with all the inherent perils that may result if attention is not paid to the rules governing this reality.

EU politicians continue to act defensively and to modify the local, regional and community systems by erecting fiscal and legal barriers, and more, against non-EU immigrants. At its extreme, they are threatening the communitarian ethos (**θός: θούς**), and to this end are irreversibly altering the *acquis communautaire*, the community's legal corpus, that has taken years to achieve.

Human rights, democracy and freedom, while not being negotiable in the EU project, are now threatened by popular consultations promoted by anti-EU, xenophobic and nationalist political parties. The latest UK Referendum on the 23rd of June expresses this sociological approach shifting it to the political realm.

Lisbon, 27 July 2016

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