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GENUINE AND RATIONAL TEARS

SUMMARY: In this paper I examine the emotions we feel while reading a work of fiction. Some philosophers think that our emotional engagement with fiction gives rise to a paradox and involves either irrationality or participation in a game of make believe. In this paper I argue that an Object Theory in a Meinongian style, by supporting a realistic perspective on fictional emotions, is able to dissolve the paradox of fiction.

KEY WORDS: emotion, fiction, paradox, rationality, genuine

I.

Some philosophers think that it is difficult to explain why we can be moved to tears by what happens to fictional characters. Fictional characters are, needless to say, *fictional*, and hence their hurts and sorrows are nothing but the product of a writer's imagination. There *exists* nothing to be afraid of and no one to cry for. Nonetheless we scream, tremble and cry. Are we pretending in responding this way? Or are we simply irrational?

Neither of these questions is the right one. We have to start from the fact that we perfectly well know they are fictional characters and we are perfectly serious and rational in responding the way we do (screaming, trembling, and crying). Let's take Anna Karenina's tragic end:

“She tried to fling herself below the wheels of the first carriage as it reached her; but the red bag which she tried to drop out of her hand delayed her, and she was too late; she missed the moment. She had to wait for the next carriage. A feeling such as she had known when about to take the first plunge in bathing came upon her, and she crossed herself. That familiar gesture brought back into her soul a whole series of girlish and childish memories, and suddenly the darkness that had covered everything for her was torn apart, and life rose up before her for an instant with all its bright past joys. But she did not take her eyes from the wheels of the second carriage. And exactly at

the moment when the space between the wheels came opposite her, she dropped the red bag and drawing her head back into her shoulders, fell on her hands under the carriage, and lightly, as though she would rise again at once, dropped on to her knees. And at the same instant she was terror-stricken at what she was doing. ‘Where am I? What am I doing? What for?’ She tried to get up, to drop backwards; but something huge and merciless struck her on the head and rolled her on her back. ‘Lord, forgive me all’ she said, feeling it impossible to struggle. A peasant muttering something was working at the iron above her. And the light by which she had read the book filled with troubles, falsehoods, sorrow, and evil, flared up more brightly than ever before, lighted up for her all that had been in darkness, flickered, began to grow dim, and was quenched forever”¹.

This is the most painful moment for readers. We knew, of course, that things were getting bad because Anna and Vronsky had become increasingly bitter toward each other, that a combination of boredom and suspicion had destroyed Anna’s mental health and that probably Vronsky was unfaithful and tired of her; yet we couldn’t imagine such a tragic end. We cry, remembering all the beautiful moments Anna and Vronsky spent together and thinking on how cruel life sometimes is.

According to many philosophers experiences as the one described clearly give rise to a philosophical paradox, the paradox of fiction. The paradox arises because we know perfectly well that a fictional character like Anna does not exist and yet we are saddened by her suicide. How can we be sad about something that does not exist (because being sad about x implies that x makes me sad, and something that we know does not exist cannot *make me* feel sad)? Here is the paradox:

(P1) We feel sad about Anna’s tragic end and we know Anna is a fictional character;

(P2) Believing in the existence of x (what makes us sad) is a necessary condition for having certain emotions towards x;

(P3) We do not believe in the existence of fictional characters.

We cry and despair for her suicide even if we are aware of her being a fictional entity. Why is it so? This happens because the fictional entity in question exhibits some *emotion-inducing properties* specific to the emotions we feel. Let’s see how Object Theory not only shows how fictional entities may exhibit, or better, have, properties, but also how it dissolves the paradox of fiction.

1 Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*, Ch. XXXI, Part 7.

II.

Object Theory considers objects in their absolute generality², i.e. objects defined only by the set of properties whose object-correlates they are³ and hence independently from their possibly also being for someone in some way objects of a particular kind. Actually, Object Theory takes into account all objects, chairs as well as unicorns, numbers as well as round squares, existent objects as well as nonexistent ones; everything which has at least one property is an object: everything which is not a mere nothing is something. It does not matter if Pegasus is a mythological object we will never meet in the street, whereas a cat is a real object we can meet, nourish and stroke. These differences do not pertain to Object Theory itself, but to more specific sciences: zoology will of course study cats, but surely not winged horses, as geometry will analyze the characteristics of the triangle and not those of the round square. This is because zoology – unlike Object Theory – studies only what exists, and geometry successfully analyses possible geometrical forms and not impossible, contradictory ones. Hence, from this point of view, it is possible to be an object without being an existing object, i.e. the definition of what an object is does not include its possible existence.

Once we have an object corresponding to a set of properties, we may of course wonder what kind of object it is: is it an existing, a fictional or an imaginary object? Since we are interested specifically in *Anna Karenina*, let's see what kind of object is at stake. It is a fictional literary entity created by Lev Tolstoy and accepted (i.e. recognized as such) by a community of readers and critics.

Tolstoy has generated *Anna Karenina*, making it be. The author is free to stipulate what properties a character is to have without ever being wrong⁴ (this is the essential creative freedom storytellers typically enjoy) and therefore he is the

- 2 For an historical sketch on Object Theory see Nef (1998), Raspa (2002) and Bakaoukas (2003). The most famous Object Theory undoubtedly is Meinong's (1904), the one I here consider as a constant reference point.
- 3 According to this definition everything which has at least one property is an object and the criterion for distinguishing what is an object from what is not, is the following: Pegasus is an object because the name 'Pegasus' stands for something to which certain properties correspond ('being a winged horse', 'being Medusa's and Poseidon's son', 'being a mythological animal'), while on the contrary wrtgh is not an object, because 'wrtgh' does not stand for anything. On the problems a criterion of this sort may raise, see Salmon (1999), in particular pp. 304-308, Kroon (2003), especially pp. 155-157, and Caplan (2004).
- 4 Of course, if the author wants to write a realistic novel, as is the case in *Anna Karenina*, all the natural, physical and moral laws which are valid in our world must apply in the novel. Nevertheless, as happens for instance in science fiction novels, mirroring reality is neither relevant nor common.

maximal authority⁵ for what concerns his *creatures* and the properties characterizing them. Anna Karenina could in fact have been different from what it is, if Tolstoy's use of language had been different, attributing to this entity different properties from those it actually has⁶.

III.

We have now elements enough to go back to the paradox. The paradox arises when we read about Anna's death and we cry, regardless of her non-existing. Is this normal? Is this irrational? Is this an evidence of our being part of a game of make-believe? The argument at the basis of this somehow paradoxical situation is made up by three premises:

(A1) Some people experience emotions towards characters or situations they take to be fictional;

(A2) People experience emotions only if they believe that the objects of their emotions both exists and exhibits at least some of the emotion-inducing properties specific to that emotion;

(A3) People taking fictional entities as objects of their emotions do not believe they exist or exhibit any emotion-inducing property.

Here is the paradox originating when we cry for Anna Karenina.

Colin Radford⁷, opening the philosophical debate on fictional emotions, in a famous 1975 article maintains that our apparent ability to respond emotionally to fictional characters and events is "irrational, incoherent, and inconsistent"⁸. He argues this on the grounds that existence beliefs concerning the objects of our emotions are necessary for us to be moved by them, and that such beliefs are clearly lacking when we read works of fiction. Since such works do in fact move us

5 For a position casting doubt on the principle according to which the author has the freedom of poetic license see Weatherston (2004) and the solution he proposes to the alethic puzzle.

6 Anna Karenina could have been different, but nevertheless still have remained the same object if, for instance, Tolstoy had attributed to her the property of having left a daughter in St. Petersburg instead of a son, or if he had endowed her with different properties of this sort. In that case the *shape* of the character would clearly have been preserved. And what if Tolstoy had attributed to her the property of being a cat? In that case, of course, we would still have an entity named 'Anna Karenina', but it would be a different one, only having the same name the previous object had (because the object would clearly not be the same). On problems of this sort, see Thomasson (1999: 56-69).

7 Radford (1975).

8 Radford (1975: 75).

at times, Radford concludes straightforwardly that our capacity for emotional response to fiction is irrational.

As evidence for his argument Radford takes the case of something very tragic we first believed was a true account and which subsequently turns out to be false: once aware of this fact, according to him, we no longer feel sad or desperate as before, because we know it is false, it is a lie, it is a novel. He writes that “It would seem that I can only be moved by someone’s plight if I believe that something terrible has happened to him. If I do not believe that he has not and is not suffering or whatever, I cannot grieve or be moved to tears”⁹. Clearly what Radford here means to say is that we can only be *rationally* moved by someone’s plight if we believe that something terrible has happened to him and that if we do not believe that, we cannot *rationally* grieve or be moved to tears. But such beliefs are absent when we knowingly engage with fictions.

One could object to Radford that while we are engaged in the fiction, we somehow forget that what we are reading is a fictional work and therefore that it is not real: we could read about Anna Karenina’s suicide temporarily losing our awareness of its fictional status. To an objection of this kind, Radford would answer by offering two different considerations. First, if we really forgot that what we were reading was not real, then we would not feel any of the various forms of pleasure that often accompany other negative emotions (fear, pity, sadness, etc.) in fictional but not real-life cases. Second, the fact that we do not even try to do something, to react somehow: when we read about Anna throwing herself under the train, we have the awareness of her fictional status even while we are moved by what happens to her^{10,11}. Nevertheless Radford does not offer the solution to a mysterious paradox, rather he stresses something strange concerning human nature: he does not explain how is it that we can be moved by what we perfectly know does not exist, all he says is that the fact of being moved by what we know does not exist is irrational and illogical. Nothing more.

Let’s consider the paradox again. The paradox arises because the three statements seem to be true if individually considered, but when taken together they contradict each other. The first claims that we have a genuine emotional responses to fictional characters and situations; the second that we experience genuine emotions only for objects we believe exist; and the third that we do not believe in the existence of fictional objects and situations. Since these premises contradict each other Radford comes to the conclusion that emotional responses to fictional characters and events are irrational and incoherent.

9 Radford (1975: 68).

10 Radford (1975: 71).

11 Radford (1977).

To solve the paradox we therefore need to deny or reformulate some (or at least one) of these premises. Pretence theorists, Kendall Walton¹² in the lead, robustly deny premise (A1)¹³, i.e. that we genuinely feel sad about the tragic end of Anna Karenina or genuinely fear horror film entities. Walton maintains that “It seems a principle of common sense, one which ought not to be abandoned if there is any reasonable alternative, that fear must be accompanied by, or must involve, a belief that one is in danger”¹⁴. According to Walton, it is only *make-believedly true* that we fear horror film entities, feel sad about Anna Karenina, etc. In fact he claims that when, for instance, we cry for Anna’s death, what we are *really* doing is participating in a game of make-believe: we would make *as if* there were a woman committing suicide and we would then feel a *quasi-emotion*, quasi-sadness, which clearly would not be considered as true. Such situations of make-believe would generate fictional truths, as for instance the one saying that *We are sad because of Anna’s death* (in this case, of course, what is true is that *it is fictional that we are sad because of Anna’s death*). While crying, we are playing a game and hence ours are nothing but crocodile tears, fake tears¹⁵.

According to Walton quasi-emotions differ from true ones primarily in that they are generated not by existence beliefs (such as the belief that the woman who is committing suicide really exists), but by *second-order beliefs* about what is fictionally the case according to the work in question¹⁶. This means that it is only make-believedly the case that we respond emotionally to fictional characters, and this happens because our beliefs concerning the fictional properties of those characters generate in us quasi-emotional states.

Many objections can be raised against Pretence Theory. The strongest is the one which focuses on the *differences* between these cases (e.g. Charles *fearing* the Green Slime) and the paradigmatic cases of games of make-believe. While proposing his theory Walton makes explicit reference to the familiar games of make-believe played by children, in which globs of mud are taken to be pies, for example, or games in which a father, pretending to be a monster, pursues his child and

12 Walton (1978).

13 See also Kroon (1994).

14 Walton (1978: 6-7).

15 We can also find exasperations of positions of that sort, according to which, for instance, women’s tears are always fake ones. Let us remember the famous expression used by Shakespeare in *Othello* (Act 4, Scene 1): “O devil, devil! If that the earth could teem with woman’s tears, Each drop she falls would prove a crocodile. Out of my sight!”.

16 “Charles believes (he knows) that make-believedly the green slime [on the screen] is bearing down on him and he is in danger of being destroyed by it. His quasi-fear results from this belief” (Walton 1978, p. 14).

attacks him¹⁷. One such difference concerns our lack of choice: unlike children playing a game, while reading a novel we cannot decide which will be our emotional responses. For instance we cannot simply refuse to *play* and prevent ourselves from being affected, as kids can¹⁸, nor we are able just to turn our emotional responses on (think about those fictional texts which simply fail to generate their intended emotional response). Another difference concentrates on the phenomenology of the two cases: it is simply not true to ordinary experience that consumers of fictions are in emotional states similar to those typical of make-believe games when watching movies, reading books, and the like^{19,20}. The experience of reading and enjoying literature isn't a sort of *adult game* we take part in²¹: actually it is a totally different experience, more deep and complex (ontologically speaking, of course) than *classical adult games* are.

Another possibility to solve the paradox is, following a classical line of thought, to deny premise (A2), i.e. that existence beliefs are a necessary condition for genuine emotional responses. In fact we could reasonably maintain that, although our emotional responses to actual characters require beliefs in their existence, there is no good reason to hold up this particular kind of emotional response as the absolute model for understanding emotional response in general. What makes emotional response to fiction different from emotional response to real world characters is that, rather than having to believe in the actual existence of the entity in question, all we need do is to 'present' it to ourselves²² believing that it is something and not a mere nothing. Hence the only kinds of beliefs we need have when engaging with fictions would be beliefs in those properties characters have

17 Walton (1978: 13).

18 "[...] if it [the fear produced by horror films] were a pretend emotion, one would think that it could be engaged at will. I could elect to remain unmoved by *The Exorcist*; I could refuse to make believe I was horrified. But I don't think that that was really an option for those, like myself, who were overwhelmingly struck by it" (Carroll 1990: 74).

19 "[...] many theatre-goers and readers believe that they are actually upset, excited, amused, afraid, and even sexually aroused by the exploits of fictional characters. It seems altogether inappropriate in such cases to maintain that our theatre-goers merely make-believe that they are in these emotional states" (Novitz 1987: 241).

20 Carroll strongly claims that "Walton's theory appears to throw out the phenomenology of the state [here 'art-horror'] for the sake of logic" (Carroll 1990: 74); in fact, in contrast with kids playing make-believe, when responding to works of fiction we do not seem to be absolutely aware of playing any games.

21 For the idea that emotional engagement with art is not best thought at as a game, see also Levinson (1996: 287-307).

22 Lamarque (1981) speaks about 'mental representation', Carroll (1990) about 'entertainment in thought' and Smith (1995) of 'imaginative proposal'.

and that make them funny, stupid, frightening, pathetic, and so on. In the next section I will pursue this second way of solving the paradox²³ which is compatible with Object Theory and its assumptions.

We could find a further solution to the paradox²⁴ also denying premise (A3) and suggesting a concept of weak (or partial) belief. In this case the emotions involved in response to fictional characters would be weaker if compared with those we experience in response to real life persons. To experience emotions for characters, many people need to have a sort of “willing suspension of disbelief”. This phrase was coined by Samuel Taylor Coleridge²⁵, according to whom creating a suspension of disbelief means creating a different kind of emotions from those experienced in real life. Nevertheless this third solution implies strong behavioral differences between our emotional responses to real versus fictional characters²⁶.

IV.

The solution I find most interesting is the one questioning if existence beliefs are a necessary condition for genuine emotional responses. According to the realistic position I here maintain, essentially based on Object Theory, all we need in order to have a genuine emotional response is to believe in the properties character-

- 23 Radford powerfully rejects this second way out: “Lamarque claims that I am frightened by ‘the thought’ of the green slime. That is the ‘real object’ of my fear. But if it is the moving picture of the slime which frightens me (for myself), then my fear is irrational, etc., for I know that what frightens me cannot harm me. So the fact that we are frightened by fictional thoughts does not solve the problem but forms part of it” (Radford 1977: 261-62).
- 24 Levinson (1997: 22-27) outlines seven different solutions to the paradox: the non-intentionalist solution, the suspension-of-disbelief solution, the surrogate-object solution, the antijudgmentalist solution, the surrogate-belief solution, the irrationalist solution and the make-believe, or imaginary, solution. But for my purposes the two sketched here are enough in order to explain how Object Theory could easily dissolve the paradox of fiction.
- 25 Coleridge coined the phrase ‘Suspension of disbelief’ in his *Biographia Literaria* (1817): “[...] it was agreed, that my endeavours should be directed to persons and characters supernatural, or at least romantic, yet so as to transfer from our inward nature a human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith” (Ch. XIV).
- 26 Even when the existence beliefs are of the weak or partial variety, Walton argues that: “Charles has no doubts about whether he is in the presence of an actual slime. If he half believed, and were half afraid, we would expect him to have some inclination to act on his fear in the normal ways. Even a hesitant belief, a mere suspicion, that the slime is real would induce any normal person seriously to consider calling the police and warning his family. Charles gives no thought whatever to such courses of action” (Walton 1978: 7).

izing specific fictional entities and events. Since we believe in some properties Anna has – i.e. the property of being desperate and abandoned, the property of being rejected by her friends, and the property of falling under a train – this is enough to feel sad.

My main concern here is ontological and not psychological, and this makes clear why I am not interested in explaining what happens in people’s minds while they read novels or what is the difference between reading about Anna Karenina’s death and about Diana Spencer’s death; what I mostly mean here is to point out that fictional entities are objects, that they are characterized by specific properties, and hence that there is something – in this case some properties characterizing Anna Karenina – I am directed to when I cry.

On the one hand, according to the paradox of fiction set forth by Radford, there is a problem with fictional emotions because in those situations there seems to be no object, i.e. no existing object. In his original article, he asks: “We are saddened, but how can we be? What are we sad about? How can we feel genuinely and involuntarily sad, and weep, as we do knowing as we do that no one has suffered or died?”²⁷. On the other hand, and in contrast with Radford’s point of view, Object Theory maintains that being an *object* and being an *existing object* are not one and the same thing: something – like Anna Karenina, Pegasus or even the round square – can be an object without being an existing one. From this perspective the paradox does not arise:

(S1) We feel sad about Anna’s tragic end and we know that Anna is a fictional character (and therefore that she *does not exist*);

(S2) To believe that *there is* (and not that there *exists*) an object exhibiting some of the *emotion-inducing properties* specific to sadness is a necessary and sufficient condition for being sad about it (i.e. the emotion has to be directed towards something);

(S3) We do believe that *there are* fictional characters exhibiting emotion-inducing properties (e.g. *there is* a fictional character whose name is Anna Karenina and whose end is tragic).

Distinguishing between *being* and *existing*, Object Theory makes it possible to identify an object (a fictional object, Anna Karenina) causing a specific emotion (sadness), even if that object does not exist. That is precisely the way the paradox disappears. Therefore the hypothesis of irrationality together with the hypothesis of make-believe can definitively be abandoned thanks to a realistic theory of fictional emotions according to which the necessary and sufficient condition for an emotion to be genuine and rational is to be directed towards an object exhibiting some of the

27 Radford (1975: 77).

emotion-inducing properties. And an emotion directed towards a fictional object clearly is directed towards an object exhibiting some of the emotion-inducing properties.

This means that we mustn't *believe* in the existence of Anna in order to be concerned for her and, to explain why we do not even try to intervene in what happens (for instance preventing her from committing suicide), it is enough to *disbelieve* in her existence. In fact what we just believe in is the *being* of an object, a fictional object, characterized by specific properties. That genuine emotions can be generated in us by non-existing persons (as fictional characters are) should not surprise: don't we register genuine feelings for dead persons, past and future situations, dreams and daydreams? Actually we do not need believing in the existence of something in order to be involved with it: I can cry for a never-born son and I can feel excited by a possible lover. Are they existing entities? Surely not. But they are something, at least they are those objects my emotions are focused on.

It is now clear how the paradox of fiction disappears: when we cry for Anna Karenina we are neither weeping crocodile tears nor we are irrational; on the contrary we are experiencing genuine and rational emotions. Nonetheless, even if we are authentically moved, we do not try to comfort Anna or save her²⁸, and this because we perfectly know that she is a fictional character and therefore that we can not have a causal power on her (probably Tolstoy could have had, but that is another matter).

It is true that the emoter disbelieves in any *real* reference of his feelings, yet he believes in a *fictional* reference of them. The emotion thus produced is real and is directed towards a fictional entity. Our disbelief in the existence of the object – and our consequent belief in its being fictional – does not preclude us from being moved by it. We pity Anna and do not try to communicate with her or stop her from committing suicide because we are aware of her being fictional and we realize that it is impossible to help her, yet we are moved. This, far from being an evidence of our irrationality is a proof of our being totally rational.

28 In fact, as Brock (2007: 217) underlines, we also do not experience emotions such as shame, embarrassment or remorse, and this happens because we are aware about the kind of ontological status fictional characters have: for instance, to regret our actions towards someone is somehow to believe that there is an existent person towards which we might have acted differently. But we do not believe so. We couldn't have acted differently to any fictional entity for the simple reason that we *do not act* towards any (hence we can not regret or be ashamed for our actions towards any of them). We are ontologically cut-off from having such kind of interactions with fictional entities.

V.

It is now time to ask²⁹: but how can we *look for* and then *enjoy* these fears and sorrows? If the previous inquiry concerned the *paradox of fiction* (where the main question was: How can we experience genuine and rational emotions towards fictional entities?), this latter is about the *paradox of tragedy and horror* pertaining those negative emotions we intentionally feel reading tragedies or watching horror movies.

One obvious way to solve the paradox is maintaining that we enjoy fear and sorrow precisely because we know that they do not concern real entities, but fictional ones, hence there isn't anyone who *really* suffered or died.

But is this really what happens? Do we really *enjoy* fears and sorrows (even if they refer to fictional entities)? Do we *take pleasure* in screaming (because we are frightened) and crying (because we are sad)? If so, we would undoubtedly be somehow irrational looking for something that definitely will make us suffer.

I think that here the right solution dates back to Hume³⁰: what we are pleased by aren't the sufferings of the characters, but the style and form of the work. Negative emotions are still there, but they are accompanied by (and never mixed with) pleasure and joy.

It is reasonable to suppose that the paradox of fiction grew out of the paradox of tragedy: the general problem in fact arises not simply for the emotions we feel for fictional entities, but for those negative emotions we experience towards them. How can we fear the Green Slime? How can we pity Anna Karenina? Hence from the paradox of tragedy and terror, the paradox of fiction directly follows: why do we care for fictional entities that clearly do not exist? This paper is an attempt to answer this question by dissolving the paradox.

So, we cry for Anna Karenina, not for nothing, not for an existing person whose destiny was similar to Anna's, nor for an abstract entity: we cry for a woman who, in a jealous rage, commits suicide by throwing herself in the path of a train, we cry because we remember how beautiful and passionate Anna and Vronsky were during the mazurka at the ball in Moscow and, in the end, we cry because we

29 Brock (2007: 226) stresses the fact that the paradox of tragedy concerns two different questions that should be considered separately: one problem is the one concerning our being interested in proving negative emotions (and this is not actually a paradox, but something more similar to a conflict in our desires), another is the one concerning the pleasure we get from these painful emotions (and this is a paradox because it looks like a conceptual impossibility that emotions like fear, pity and sorrow which are unpleasant experiences, make us find the experience of being emotionally affected by them a pleasant one). Brock calls the first "Aristotle's puzzle" and this second "Humean puzzle".

30 Hume (1757).

understand how true were the opening lines of the novel, “Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way”.

In order to have genuine and rational emotions we need an object causing them (it is not by chance that, for someone who starts crying without any reason – and ‘reason’ here is a synonym for ‘object’ – we would not say “she is sad”, but “she is depressed”). According to the theory outlined here, fictional entities derive both from the attribution of internal and of external properties; insofar, being the correlate of sets of properties, fictional entities are objects. That is why it is neither irrational nor absurd for anyone to cry for Anna Karenina’s death: because there is an object (even if a fictional one) we are crying for and, from an ontological point of view, that is enough.

While maintaining Object Theory we therefore solve the paradox of fiction by dissolving it: there is no paradox because there is an object. Hence the tears we shed for Anna aren’t crocodile tears: our weeping is not false or insincere, and what we display are genuine emotions. This does not mean, of course, that to produce tears is always symptom of sadness, as the crocodile’s example clearly shows (and differently from what legends on crocodiles tell us): crocodiles, in fact, can and do generate tears, even if they do not cry for remorse, sadness or something of that sort³¹. But this, obviously, is another story³².

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Literature

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31 Actually crocodile tears, exactly like ours, are products of the lachrymal glands, but they only help to clean the eye, lubricate the passage of the nictitating membrane across the eye’s surface, and probably also help to reduce bacterial growth while the crocodile’s eyes begin to dry out of water.

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Prave i racionalne suze

(Apstrakt)

U ovom tekstu istražujem emocije koje osećamo prilikom čitanja dela fikcije. Neki filozofi misle da naše emocionalno angažovanje povezano sa fikcijom vodi do paradoksa i uključuje ili iracionalnost ili učestvovanje u igri stvaranja verovanja. U ovom tekstu argumentujem da je neka teorija predmeta u majnongijanskom stilu, podržana realističkom perspektivom fikcionalnih emocija, u stanju da obesnaži paradoks fikcije.

KLJUČNE REČI: emocije, fikcija, paradoks, racionalnost, prave.