# PROVING PROGRAM INCLUSION USING HOARE'S LOGIC 

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#### Abstract

We explore conservative refinements of specifications. These form a quite appropriate framework for a proof theory for program inclusion based on a proof theory for program correctness. We propose two formalized proof methods for program inclusion and prove these to be sound. Both methods are incomplete but seem to cover most natural cases.


Key words. Data type specification, program correctness, conservative refinement, program inclusion, program equivalence, prototype proof, logical completion.

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## Introduction

This paper aims at a detailed study of program equivalence, seen from the point of view of Hoare's logic for program correctness. Because program inclusion is just halfway program equivalence we can safely restrict our attention to program

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inclusion. Moreover, this has the advantage of connecting closely to the theory of programming using stepwise refinements as described in [2].
Our work can be seen as belonging to the subject of axiomatic semantics for programs. Its novelty lies in the precise mathematical analysis of the situation, in addition to a rather strict adherence to first order proof systems and first order semantics for data type specifications.
Deriving program equivalence from program correctness properties is, of course, not a new idea. It occurs in compiler correctness proofs (for instance, $[16,23]$ ) as well as in the general theory of program correctness [15].

Because of our interest in a proper theoretical analysis, we try to minimize the semantical problems by working with while-programs only; this by no means trivializes the problem.

In the sequel of this Introduction an intuitive account is given of the key definitions that underly the paper.

## Intuition

Suppose that for $S_{1}, S_{2} \in \mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}(\Sigma)$ we have
(i) $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \models S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} \quad$ (semantical inclusion)
and that we wish to prove this fact. Now obviously, (i) implies
(ii) $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \models\{p\} S_{2}\{q\} \Rightarrow \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \models\{p\} S_{1}\{q\}$ for all $p, q \in L(\Sigma)$.

However, there is no reason to expect that the reverse implication (ii) $\Rightarrow$ (i) will hold, since (ii) states only roughly that $S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$, where 'roughly' refers to the limited expressive power of $L(\Sigma)$. (In fact, Remark 7.8(2) shows that indeed (ii) $\nRightarrow$ (i).) Now consider
(iii) $\forall\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \geq(\Sigma, E) \quad \forall p, q \in L\left(\Sigma^{\prime}\right)$

$$
\operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \models\{p\} S_{2}\{q\} \Rightarrow \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vDash\{p\} S_{1}\{q\}
$$

Clearly (i) $\Rightarrow$ (iii) $\Rightarrow$ (ii). (For (i) $\Rightarrow$ (iii), note that if $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \geq(\Sigma, E)$, then the reducts of $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$-algebras to $\Sigma$ form a subset of $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$; hence $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \vDash S_{1} \sqsubseteq$ $S_{2} \Rightarrow \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vDash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$.

In fact, we will restrict our attention to a subclass of all refinements $(\geq)$ of $(\Sigma, E)$, namely to the conservative refinements $(\geq)$ of $(\Sigma, E)$, for reasons which will be clear later. So consider
(iv) $\forall\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E) \quad \forall p, q \in L\left(\Sigma^{\prime}\right)$

$$
\operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vDash\{p\} S_{2}\{q\} \Rightarrow \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vDash\{p\} S_{1}\{q\}
$$

Now we have (i) $\Rightarrow$ (iii) $\Rightarrow$ (iv) $\Rightarrow$ (ii); and it turns out that (iv) $\Rightarrow$ (i) (see Remark 7.8(3)). The conclusion is that one can treat the 'semantical' inclusion (i) by considering only first order properties of $S_{1}, S_{2}$ (i.e., asserted programs
$\left.\{p\} S_{i}\{q\}, i=1,2\right)$, provided one is willing to consider not only $(\Sigma, E)$, but all its (conservative) refinements.

This observation prepares the way for an approach via Hoare's logic of proving asserted programs. First of all, define
(v) $S_{i} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E)} S_{2}$ iff $\forall p, q\left(L(\Sigma)\left(\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} S_{1}\{q\}\right.\right.$

$$
\left.\Rightarrow \mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} S_{1}\{q\}\right) \text { (proof-theoretical inclusion) }
$$

and consider
(vi) $\forall\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E) \quad S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)} S_{2} \quad$ (derivable inclusion)
the proof-theoretical analogue of (iv). Indeed, it will turn out that this 'derivable inclusion', written as $\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$, implies the semantical inclusion (i). This is our first 'proof system' for proving semantical inclusion; we will prove that (vi), as a relation of $S_{1}, S_{2}$, is semi-decidable in $E$.

One more remark about why it is natural to consider (vi), in casu the quantification over all conservative refinements. The first reason of considering all (conservative) refinements of ( $\Sigma, E$ ) is that, only then, one is able to give as refined as possible first order descriptions of $S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$. This holds already on the semantical level. Moreover, in (vi) there is another reason: to prove $\{p\} S\{q\}$ we need invariants for the while-loops in $S$. It may be the case that these invariants cannot yet be expressed in the present specification, so we have to go 'higher-up'. If one attributes a defining power to statements $S$, namely to define the invariants of the while-loops, then one could say that the defining power of $S \in \mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}(\Sigma)$ is sometimes ahead of that of the assertion language $L(\Sigma)$.

Of course, the proof system given by (vi) is sound, i.e., $(\mathrm{vi}) \Rightarrow$ (i); otherwise it did not deserve the name. Some simple program inclusions that are in its scope, are program equivalences like 'loop-unwinding', and the kind of program equivalences considered in [20]. However, this proof system is not yet complete. In order to prove the semantical inclusion (i) it is sufficient that (see Fig. 1)


Fig. 1. Partial order of conservative refinements.
(vii) $\exists\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E) \forall\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \unrhd\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right)} S_{2}$.
(Notation: $\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \Vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$; in words: forced inclusion.)
The reason that (vii) $\Rightarrow$ (i) is a simple consequence of the invariance of semantical inclusion (i), i.e., if ( $\left.\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)$ and $S_{1}, S_{2} \in \mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}(\Sigma)$, then

$$
\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \models S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} \Leftrightarrow \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vDash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} .
$$

(This does not hold for $\geq$ instead of $\unrhd$.) So in order to prove $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \vDash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$ it is sufficient to find some $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)$ where $\operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \models S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$.

The proof system embodied by (vii) is stronger than that of the derivable inclusion (vi), and we will give some examples of program inclusion (which seem to have some practical interest, too) which require the extra strength of this last proof system.

Still, (vii) is not 'complete'-although it seems hard to find a non-pathological example of a program inclusion which is semantical (i), but which cannot be forced (vii). One can prove, however, that the following 'cofinal' inclusion is equivalent to semantical inclusion:
(viii) $\forall\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E) \exists\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \unrhd\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right)} S_{2}$.
(The equivalence (i) $\Leftrightarrow$ (viii) holds also when in (viii) $\unrhd$ is replaced by $\geq$. However, for $\geq$ we have (vii) $\Rightarrow$ (viii), not so for $\geq$.)

One could suspect that there is a multitude of such relations obtained by repeated alternating quantification $\forall \exists \forall \cdots$ from the basic relation $\sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E)}$ (prooftheoretical inclusion). It is a pleasant surprise, suggesting the naturalness of the notions involved, that this possible hierarchy does in fact not exist, and that one has no more relations than in Fig. 2.


Fig. 2.

As we have seen, conservative refinements $(\unrhd)$ are more natural for this theory than general refinements $(\geq)$. The technical reason is that for conservative refinements the 'Joint Refinement Property' holds, stating that (almost) every two refinements $\left(\Sigma_{i}, E_{i}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)$ can be refined to a common refinement $\left(\Sigma_{3}, E_{3}\right) \unrhd\left(\Sigma_{i}, E_{i}\right)$ ( $i=1,2$ ). (This is in fact a strengthened version of the well-known Robinson Consistency Theorem.) Also for conservative refinements we have a useful upward and downward invariance of the properties

$$
\operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \models\{p\} S\{q\} \quad \text { and } \quad \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \models S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} \quad \text { for }\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)
$$

This paper is built up as follows: in Section 1 some notions about logic, programs and Hoare's logic are given. Section 2 gives a criterion and a characterization of conservativity, and also Robinson's Consistency Theorem (our Corollary 2.6.2) is stated. Section 3 states Padoa's method (our Theorem 3.3) and gives some applications. Section 4 contains definitions of the various inclusions. In Section 5 we deal with the technical concept of protototype proofs, which will be basic for the proof systems in the sequel. In Section 6 a logical complete refinement is constructed for each specification. In Section 7 one of the main theorems is proved, establishing the existence of two proof systems for $\sqsubseteq$. In Section 8 we consider a prime example to yield more insight in the relations between the various inclusions. In Section 9 we will show that some additional information about the domains of $S_{1}, S_{2}$ can be converted to information about semantical and forced inclusion $S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$.

## 1. Preliminaries

In this section we will collect the necessary basic definitions and facts from logic in general as well as Hoare's logic.

### 1.1. Preliminaries about programs and logic

The notions of first-order language, derivability $(\vdash)$ and satisfiability $(\vDash)$ are supposed to be well known and we repeat them merely to fix the notations and terminology used in the sequel.

In this paper we will exclusively deal with $\mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}(\Sigma)$, the set of while-program $S$ defined inductively as follows:

$$
S::=x:=t\left|S_{1} ; S_{2}\right| \text { if } b \text { then } S_{1} \text { else } S_{2} \text { fi|while } b \text { do } S \text { od, }
$$

where $t \in \operatorname{Ter}(\Sigma)$, the set of terms over the signature $\Sigma, b$ is a boolean (i.e., quantifier-free) assertion $\in L(\Sigma)$, the first-order language determined by $\Sigma$. In general, assertions $\in L(\Sigma)$ will be denoted by $p, q, r$. The signature says what 'nonlogical' symbols we are considering; here equality ( $=$ ) is considered as a logical symbol. We also allow infinite signatures. For a further definition of signatures and specifications, see Definition 2.1. Note that the signature defined there is part of the alphabet of $L(\Sigma)$.

If ( $\Sigma, E$ ) is a specification (see again Definition 2.1), the algebras (or models) in $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$ will be denoted by $\mathscr{A}=\langle A, \ldots\rangle$ where $A$ is the underlying set of the algebraic structure $\mathscr{A}$.

We will need the following well-known fact.

### 1.1.1. Gödel's completeness theorem

$$
(\Sigma, E) \vdash p \Leftrightarrow \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \vDash p \quad \text { for all } p \in L(\Sigma) .
$$

We will also need the following lemma.
1.1.2. Computation Lemma. Let $\boldsymbol{x}=x_{1}, \ldots, x_{k}$ and $\boldsymbol{y}=y_{1}, \ldots, y_{k}$. Let $S=S(\boldsymbol{x}) \in$ $\mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}(\Sigma)$ (i.e., $S$ contains precisely the variables $\boldsymbol{x}$ ).

Then for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$ there is a quantifier-free assertion $\operatorname{Comp}_{S, n}(\boldsymbol{x})=\boldsymbol{y}$ in $L(\boldsymbol{\Sigma})$ such that, for every $\mathscr{A} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma)$ and all $\boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{b} \in A$,

$$
\mathscr{A} \vDash \operatorname{Comp}_{S, n}(\underline{\boldsymbol{a}})=\underline{\boldsymbol{b}} \Leftrightarrow|S(\boldsymbol{a})| \leq n \& S(\boldsymbol{a})=\boldsymbol{b}
$$

Here $\underline{a}, \underline{b}$ are constant symbols denoting $\boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{b}$ and $|\boldsymbol{S}(\boldsymbol{a})|$ denotes the length of the computation of $S$ on $\boldsymbol{a}$.

### 1.2. Preliminaries on Hoare's logic

Let $p, q \in L(\Sigma)$ and $S \in \mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}(\Sigma)$. Then the syntactic object $\{p\} S\{q\}$ is called an asserted program. If $\mathscr{A} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma)$, we define

$$
\mathscr{A} \vDash\{p\} S\{q\} \Leftrightarrow \forall \boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{b} \in A: S(\boldsymbol{a}) \downarrow \& \dot{S}(\boldsymbol{a})=\boldsymbol{b} \Leftrightarrow(\mathscr{A} \vDash p(\boldsymbol{a}) \rightarrow q(\underline{b})) .
$$

Furthermore, we define

$$
\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \vDash\{p\} S\{q\} \Leftrightarrow \forall \mathscr{A} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \mathscr{A} \vDash\{p\} S\{q\} .
$$

Hoare's logic w.r.t. $(\Sigma, E)$ is a proof system designed to prove facts like $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \vDash\{p\} S\{q\}$. We will call this proof system $\operatorname{HL}(\Sigma, E)$. It has the following axioms and rules, by means of which we can derive asserted programs (notation: $\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} S\{q\}):$
(1) Assignment axiom:

$$
\{p[t / x]\} x:=t\{p\}
$$

(2) Composition rule:

$$
\frac{\{p\} S_{1}\{r\} \quad\{r\} S_{2}\{q\}}{\{p\} S_{1} ; S_{2}\{q\}}
$$

(3) Conditional rule:

$$
\frac{\{p \wedge b\} S_{1}\{q\} \quad\{p \wedge \neg b\} S_{2}\{q\}}{\{p\} \text { if } b \text { then } S_{1} \text { else } S_{2} \mathbf{f i}\{q\}}
$$

(4) Iteration rule:

$$
\frac{\{p \wedge b\} S\{p\}}{\{p\} \text { while } b \text { do } S \text { od }\{p \wedge \neg b\}}
$$

(5) Consequence rule:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \frac{p \rightarrow p_{1} \quad\left\{p_{1}\right\} S\left\{q_{1}\right\} \quad q_{1} \rightarrow q}{} \quad\{p\} S\{q\} \\
& \text { where }(\Sigma, E) \vdash p \rightarrow p_{1} \quad \text { and } \quad(\Sigma, E) \vdash q_{1} \rightarrow q .
\end{aligned}
$$

1.2.1. Lemma. $\operatorname{HL}(\Sigma, E)$ is sound, i.e., for all $p, S, q \in L(\Sigma)$ :

$$
\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} S\{q\} \Rightarrow \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \vDash\{p\} S\{q\}
$$

Proof. For the proof, see, e.g., [13].
1.2.2. Definition. $\operatorname{HL}(\Sigma, E)$ is logically complete, if, for all $p, S, q \in L(\Sigma)$,

$$
\operatorname{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} S\{q\} \Leftrightarrow \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \models\{p\} S\{q\} .
$$

(In general, $\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E)$ is not logically complete. The notion of logical completeness is studied in [7].)

From the axioms and rules of $\operatorname{HL}(\Sigma, E)$ one can derive the following useful rules.
1.2.3. (i) Conjunction rule:

$$
\frac{\left\{p_{1}\right\} S\left\{q_{1}\right\} \quad\left\{p_{2}\right\} S\left\{q_{2}\right\}}{\left\{p_{1} \wedge p_{2}\right\} S\left\{q_{1} \wedge q_{2}\right\}}
$$

(ii) Disjunction rule: The same as (i) with $\wedge$ replaced by $\vee$.
(iii) Invariance rule: If the free variables in $p$ are disjoint from the variables in $S$, then $\operatorname{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} S\{p\}$
(iv) $\exists$-rule:
$\frac{\{p\} S\{r\}}{\{\exists z p\} S\{r\}}$ provided $z$ does not occur in $S$.

## 2. Conservative refinements

In this section we will collect some facts concerning the notion of refinement and, especially, conservative refinement. These notions will be of fundamental importance in the sequel. All the material in this section (and the next, on 'definability') is standard in Mathematical Logic and can be found (e.g.) in [24,21]. For easier
reference and to conform to our notations, we will give a fairly extensive survey of the subject. Since the arguments used in the proofs are relevant for the sequel, we have included some of the proofs.
2.1. Definition. (i) A signature $\Sigma$ is a set of nonlogical symbols to be used in Predicate Logic. These may be constant, function or predicate symbols; the arity of a function or predicate symbol is the number of arguments it is supposed to have.
(E.g., $\Sigma=\{\underline{0}, S, P,<\}$ is a signature where $\underline{0}$ is a constant symbol, $S$ and $P$ are unary function symbols and $<$ is a binary predicate symbol.) $L(\Sigma)$ denotes the set of assertions in which only nonlogical symbols $\pi, \sigma \in \Sigma$ occur.
(ii) If $E \subseteq L(\Sigma)$, the pair $(\Sigma, E)$ is called a specification.
(iii) $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma)$ is the class of all $\Sigma$-algebras.
(E.g., $\mathscr{A}=(\mathbb{N}, 0, s, p, k) \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma)$, where $\Sigma$ is as in the example above. Here 0 is a constant of $\mathscr{A}, s$ and $p$ are unary functions and $k$ is a binary relation. We will also write $S^{\mathscr{A}}$ for the interpretation or semantics of $S$ in $\mathscr{A}$, in casu $s$; for convenience we will often neglect to distinguish notationally the symbol from its interpretation.)
(iv) $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$ is the class of $\Sigma$-algebras $\mathscr{A}$ such that $\mathscr{A} \vDash E$.
(v) $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \vDash p$ means: for all $\mathscr{A} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E), \mathscr{A} \vDash p$.
2.2. Definition. (i) If $\Sigma^{\prime} \supseteq \Sigma$ and $\bar{E}^{\prime} \supseteq \bar{E}$ we write $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \geq(\Sigma, E)$ and call ( $\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}$ ) a refinement of $(\Sigma, E)$. Here $\bar{E}=\{p \in L(\Sigma) \mid E \vdash p\}$. We will always suppose that $E, E^{\prime}$ are consistent.
(ii) If ( $\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}$ ) is finite (i.e., both $\Sigma^{\prime}$ and $E^{\prime}$ are finite), then we write ( $\Sigma \cup \Sigma^{\prime}, E \cup$ $\left.E^{\prime}\right) \geq_{\mathrm{f}}(\Sigma, E)$.
(iii) Let $\mathscr{A}$ be some algebra. Then $\Sigma_{\mathscr{A}}$ is the signature of $\mathscr{A}$ and $E_{\mathscr{A}}$ is the theory of $\mathscr{A}: E_{\mathscr{A}}=\left\{p \in L\left(\Sigma_{\mathscr{A}}\right) \mid \mathscr{A} \vDash p\right\}$. Note that $\mathscr{A} \vDash p \Leftrightarrow \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma_{\mathscr{A}}, E_{\mathscr{A}}\right) \vDash p$.
(iv) Let $(\Sigma, E)$ be a specification. Then $E$ is complete if $\forall p \in L(\Sigma), E \vdash p$ or $E \vdash \neg p$.
2.3. Definition. (i) Let $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \geq(\Sigma, E)$ be a refinement such that: $\forall p \in$ $L(\Sigma) E^{\prime} \vdash p \Leftrightarrow E \vdash p$. In other words, such that $\overline{E^{\prime}} \cap L(\Sigma)=\bar{E}$. Then this refinement is called conservative over $(\Sigma, E)$. (So a conservative refinement does not yield more theorems in the 'original' language $L(\Sigma)$.)

Notation: $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \geq(\Sigma, E)$
(ii) $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd_{\mathrm{f}}(\Sigma, E) \Leftrightarrow\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E) \&\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \geq_{\mathrm{f}}(\Sigma, E)$.
2.3.1. Remark. Note that if $E$ is complete, $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \geq(\Sigma, E) \Rightarrow\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)$.
2.4. Definition. Let $\Sigma^{\prime} \supseteq \Sigma$.
(i) If $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$ is a specification, then the restriction of $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$ to the signature $\Sigma$ is $(\Sigma, E)$ where $E=\overline{E^{\prime}} \cap L(\Sigma)$.
We write $\rho_{\Sigma}^{\Sigma^{\prime}}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)=(\Sigma, E)$.
(ii) If $\mathscr{A}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$, then the restriction of $\mathscr{A}^{\prime}$ to $\Sigma$ is obtained by deleting all constants, functions, predicates in $\mathscr{A}^{\prime}$ corresponding to symbols in $\Sigma^{\prime}-\Sigma$. We write $\rho_{\Sigma^{\prime}}^{\Sigma^{\prime}}\left(\mathscr{A}^{\prime}\right)=\mathscr{A}$ for this restriction. $\mathscr{A}$ is also called a reduct of $\mathscr{A}^{\prime}$, and $\mathscr{A}^{\prime}$ is called an expansion of $\mathscr{A}$.

We will also write $\mathscr{A} \leq \mathscr{A}^{\prime}$.
(iii) Let $X \subseteq A$. Then $\mathscr{A}_{X}$ is the expansion of $\mathscr{A}$ obtained by adding the $a \in X$ as designated constants. Instead of $\mathscr{A}_{A}$ we write $\mathscr{A}$.

Example: For $\mathscr{A}$ as in Definition 2.1. (iii), $\mathscr{A}=(\mathbb{N}, 0,1,2,3, \ldots, s, p, k)$. (So in $L\left(\Sigma_{\mathscr{A}}\right)$ one can refer to all elements of $A$ by name.)
2.4.1. Remark. Note that if $\mathscr{A}^{\prime} \geq \mathscr{A}$, then $\left(\Sigma_{\mathscr{A ^ { \prime }}}, E_{\mathscr{A}}\right) \geq\left(\Sigma_{\mathscr{A}}, E_{\mathscr{A}}\right)$.
2.5. Definition. Let $\mathscr{A}, \mathscr{B} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma)$. Then:
(i) $\mathscr{A} \equiv \mathscr{B}\left(\mathscr{A}, \mathscr{B}\right.$ are elementary equivalent) iff $E_{\mathscr{A}}=E_{\mathscr{\circ}}$.
(ii) Let $A \subseteq B$. Then $\mathscr{A} \leqslant \mathscr{B}$ iff $\mathscr{A} \equiv \mathscr{B}_{A}$.
( $\mathscr{A}$ is an elementary sub-algebra of $\mathscr{B}$, or $\mathscr{B}$ is an elementary extension of $\mathscr{A}$.)
2.5.1. Remark. Note that $\mathscr{A} \leqslant \mathscr{B} \Rightarrow \mathscr{A} \equiv \mathscr{B}$.
2.5.2. Proposition. $\mathscr{A} \leqslant \mathscr{B} \Leftrightarrow \mathscr{B}_{A} \vDash E_{\mathscr{A}}$.

Proof. For the proof, see [24, p. 74].
In the sequel we will mostly deal with conservative refinements ( $E$ ). They have the pleasant property that two refinements $\left(\Sigma_{i}, E_{i}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)(i=1,2)$ can be joined to a refinement $\left(\Sigma_{1} \cup \Sigma_{2}, E_{1} \cup E_{2}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)$, provided the obviously necessary requirement that $\Sigma_{1} \cap \Sigma_{2}=\Sigma$ is satisfied. This is a (strong) form of Robinson's Consistency Theorem (RCT). The version we will need is slightly stronger than the usual statement of RCT. For that reason we include part of the proof. We start with the very useful Joint Consistency Theorem (JCT); for the (hard) proof we refer to [24, p. 79]. From JCT the remaining theorems in this section easily follow. In [21] another order of presentation is followed.
2.6. Joint Consistency Theorem (Craig-Robinson). Let ( $\Sigma, E$ ) and ( $\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}$ ) be specifications. Then $E \cup E^{\prime}$ is inconsistent iff there is a closed assertion $p \in L\left(\Sigma_{1} \cap \Sigma_{2}\right)$ such that $E \vdash p$ and $E^{\prime} \vdash \neg p$.
2.6.1. Corollary (Craig Interpolation Lemma). Let $p$ and $q$ be closed assertions such that $\vdash p \rightarrow q$. Then there is a closed assertion $r$ such that
(i) $\vdash p \rightarrow r$ and $\vdash r \rightarrow q$,
(ii) every nonlogical symbol occurring in $r$, occurs in both $p$ and $q$.

Proof. Clearly the specification $\{p, \neg q\}$ is inconsistent: $\{p\} \cap\{\neg q\} \vdash p, p \rightarrow$ $q, q, \neg q$, false. Hence by Theorem 2.6 there exists a closed assertion $r \in L(\{p, \neg q\})$
such that $\{p\} \vdash r$ and $\{\neg q\} \vdash \neg r$. By the Deduction Theorem it follows that $\vdash p \rightarrow r$ and $\vdash \neg q \rightarrow \neg r$.
2.6.2. Corollary (Robinson's Consistency Theorem) (see Fig. 3). Let ( $\left.\Sigma_{i}, E_{i}\right) \unrhd$ $\left(\Sigma_{0}, E_{0}\right), i=1,2$, such that $\Sigma_{1} \cap \Sigma_{2}=\Sigma_{0}$. Then
(i) $E_{1} \cup E_{2}$ is consistent, moreover
(ii) $\left(\Sigma_{1} \cup \Sigma_{2}, E_{1} \cup E_{2}\right) \unrhd\left(\Sigma_{0}, E_{0}\right)$, and even
(iii) $\left(\Sigma_{1} \cup \Sigma_{2}, E_{1} \cup E_{2}\right) \unrhd\left(\Sigma_{i}, E_{i}\right)(i=1,2)$.


Fig. 3.
Proof. Part (i) immediately follows from (ii), which follows by transitivity of $\_$ from (iii).

Ad (iii): Suppose $E_{1} \cup E_{2} \vdash p$ for a closed assertion $p \in L\left(\Sigma_{i}\right)$.
Therefore, $\left\{e_{1}, e_{2}\right\} \vdash p$ for some closed assertions $e_{i} \in L\left(\Sigma_{i}\right), i=1,2$, such that $E_{i} \vdash e_{i}$. By the Deduction Theorem:

$$
\vdash e_{2} \rightarrow\left(e_{1} \rightarrow p\right) .
$$

By Craig's Interpolation Lemma 2.6.1:

$$
\vdash e_{2} \rightarrow r
$$

and

$$
\vdash r \rightarrow\left(e_{1} \rightarrow p\right)
$$

for some $r \in L\left(\Sigma_{1} \cap \Sigma_{2}\right)=L\left(\Sigma_{0}\right)$. By $(\star)$, we have $E_{2} \vdash r$. Hence $E_{0} \vdash r$, since $\left(\Sigma_{2}, E_{2}\right) \unrhd\left(\Sigma_{0}, E_{0}\right)$. So, by $(\star \star), E_{0} \vdash e_{1} \rightarrow p$. Therefore $E_{1} \vdash p$; and this proves $\left(\Sigma_{1} \cup \Sigma_{2}, E_{1} \cup E_{2}\right) \unrhd\left(\Sigma_{1}, E_{1}\right)$. Likewise for $\left(\Sigma_{2}, E_{2}\right)$.

Next, we will give a characterization of the conservativity of refinements. For many purposes, however, the following criterion for conservativity is sufficient.
2.7. Definition. Let $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$ be a refinement such that every $\mathscr{A} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$ can be expanded to an $\mathscr{A}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$. Then this refinement is called simple (see Fig. 4).


Fig. 4.
2.7.1. Proposition (Criterion for conservativity). Simple refinements are conservative.

Proof. Suppose $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$ is a simple refinement of $(\Sigma, E)$, i.e., $\forall \mathscr{A} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$ $\exists \mathscr{A}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \mathscr{A}^{\prime} \geq \mathscr{A}$. Let $E \nvdash p$ for some closed assertion $p$. Then by Gödel's Completeness Theorem 1.1.1, $\mathscr{A} \nexists p$ for some $\mathscr{A} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$. So there is an $\mathscr{A}^{\prime} \in$ $\operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$ such that $\mathscr{A}^{\prime} \geq \mathscr{A}$. Hence $\mathscr{A}^{\prime} \vDash \neg p$; reasoning backwards we have $E^{\prime} \nvdash p$ 。

In general, the situation is more complicated. If $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)$, it may be the case that some $\mathscr{A} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$ cannot be expanded to an $\mathscr{A}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$. So we may 'lose' models when taking a refinement. However, such a 'lost' model $\mathscr{A}$ is always an elementary substructure of (and hence elementary equivalent to) an $\mathscr{A}^{\prime}$ which is not 'lost' (see also Theorem 2.7.3 below).
2.7.2. Example (Shoenfield [24, p. 96]). Let $\Sigma^{\prime}$ contain the constant symbols $c_{0}, c_{1}, c_{2}, \ldots$ and let $E^{\prime}=\left\{c_{i} \neq c_{j} \mid i \neq j\right\}$. Let $(\Sigma, E)$ be obtained by omitting $c_{0}$ and let $\mathscr{A}$ be $(\mathbb{N}-\{0\}, 1,2,3, \ldots)$. Then $\mathscr{A}$ cannot be expanded to an $\mathscr{A}^{\prime} \in \mathrm{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$, since there is no 'room' for (an interpretation of) $c_{0}$.
2.7.3. Theorem (Characterization of conservativity) (see Fig. 5). Let $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \geq$ ( $\Sigma, E$ ). Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \in(\Sigma, E)$.
(ii) $\forall \mathscr{A} \in \mathrm{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \exists \mathscr{A}^{\prime} \in \mathrm{Alg}(\Sigma, E), \mathscr{A}^{\prime \prime} \in \mathrm{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$ such that $\mathscr{A}^{\prime} \leqslant \mathscr{A}^{\prime}<\mathscr{A}^{\prime \prime}$.
(iii) $E^{\prime} \cup E_{\exists}$ is consistent for all $\mathscr{A} \in \mathrm{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$.
(iv) $E^{\prime} \cup E_{: / 1}$ is consistent for all $\mathscr{A} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$.


Fig. 5.

Proof. (ii) $\Rightarrow$ (i): Suppose $E \nvdash p, p \in L(\Sigma)$. Then $\mathscr{A} \not \vDash p$ for some $\mathscr{A} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$. Now there are $\mathscr{A}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$ and $\mathscr{A}^{\prime \prime} \in \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$ such that $\mathscr{A} \leqslant \mathscr{A}^{\prime} \leq \mathscr{A}^{\prime \prime}$. By Remark 2.5.1, $\mathscr{A} \equiv \mathscr{A}^{\prime}$. Hence also $\mathscr{A}^{\prime} \vDash \neg p$. Therefore, $\mathscr{A}^{\prime \prime} \vDash \neg p$; so $E^{\prime} \nvdash p$.
(i) $\Rightarrow$ (iii): Let $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)$ and suppose that, for some $\mathscr{A} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$, $E^{\prime} \cup E_{\underline{g} g}$ is inconsistent. By Theorem 2.6 there is a closed assertion $p \in L\left(\Sigma^{\prime} \cap \Sigma_{\mathscr{A g}}\right)=$ $L(\Sigma)$ such that $E^{\prime} \vdash p$ and $E_{\mathscr{s}} \vdash \neg p$. By conservativity, $E \vdash p$. Hence $\mathscr{A} \vDash p$; a contradiction with $E_{\mathscr{q}} \vdash \neg p$, because $E_{\mathscr{s}} \vdash \neg p \Leftrightarrow \mathscr{A} \vDash \neg p \Leftrightarrow \mathscr{A} \vDash \neg p$.
(iii) $\Rightarrow$ (ii): Suppose $E^{\prime} \cup E_{\mathscr{\infty}}$ is consistent. Then there is a $\mathscr{B}^{\prime \prime}$ such that $\mathscr{B}^{\prime \prime} \vDash E^{\prime} \cup E_{\mathscr{Q}}$. Let $\mathscr{B}^{\prime}$ be the reduct of $\mathscr{B}^{\prime \prime}$ to the signature $\Sigma^{\prime}$, and let $\mathscr{B}$ be the reduct of $\mathscr{B}^{\prime \prime}$ to $\Sigma$. Then $\mathscr{B}_{A} \vDash E_{\mathscr{A}}$, so, by Proposition 2.5.2, $\mathscr{A} \leqslant \mathscr{B}$; and trivially $\mathscr{B} \leq \mathscr{B}^{\prime}$.
(iii) $\Rightarrow$ (iv): Trivial.
(iv) $\Rightarrow$ (iii): Suppose $E^{\prime} \cup E_{\infty}$ is inconsistent. Then, by Theorem 2.6, $E^{\prime} \vdash p$ and $E_{s q} \vdash \neg p$ for some $p \in L\left(\Sigma^{\prime} \cap \Sigma_{\mathscr{A}}\right)=L(\Sigma)$. Now $E_{s q} \vdash \neg p \Rightarrow E_{\& A} \vdash \neg p$, since $E_{\mathscr{A}}$ is complete. Hence $E^{\prime} \cup E_{\mathscr{A}}$ is inconsistent.
2.7.3.1. Example. Let $\mathcal{N}=(\mathbb{N}, 0,1,+, \times)$ and let $\mathcal{N}^{*}$ be some non-standard model of arithmetic, so $\mathcal{N}^{*} \equiv \mathcal{N}$. Then $\left(\Sigma_{\mathcal{N}^{*}}, E_{\mathcal{N}^{*}} \unrhd\left(\Sigma_{\mathcal{N}}, E_{\mathcal{N}}\right)\right.$.

Proof: $E_{\mathcal{A}^{*}} \cup E_{\mathscr{A}}$ is consistent for every $\mathscr{A} \in \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma_{\mathcal{N}}, E_{\mathcal{N}}\right)$ (i.e., every $\mathscr{A}$ such that $\mathscr{A} \equiv \mathcal{N}$ ) because $E_{\mathscr{A}}=E_{\mathcal{N}} \subseteq E_{\mathcal{N}^{*}}$. (Note that this refinement is not simple).

## 3. Definability

We now turn to a special kind of simple conservative refinement (the definitional refinement), collect some material about definability, and use this to prove that ' + ' is not definable in the algebra $(\mathbb{N}, 0, S, P)$ which will play an important role later on.
3.1. Definition. Let $\Delta \subseteq \Sigma$ and consider ( $\Sigma, E$ ). An $n$-ary predicate symbol $\pi \in \Sigma-\Delta$ is definable in terms of $\Delta$ in $E$, if there is an assertion $p \in L(\Delta)$ such that

$$
E \vdash \pi\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right) \leftrightarrow p
$$

(where $x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}$ are distinct variables). An $n$-ary function symbol $\phi \in \Sigma-\Delta$ is definable in terms of $\Delta$ in $E$ if there is an assertion $p \in L(\Delta)$ such that

$$
E \vdash \phi\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right)=y \leftrightarrow p
$$

(where $x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}, y$ are distinct variables).
3.2. Definition. $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd_{d}(\Sigma, E)$, in words: $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$ is a definitional refinement of $(\Sigma, E)$, if $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)$ and every symbol $\in \Sigma^{\prime}-\Sigma$ is definable in terms of $\Sigma$ in $E^{\prime}$.
3.3. Theorem (Padoa's method). Let $(\Sigma \cup\{\tau\}, E)$ be a specification where $\tau \notin \Sigma$. Then $\tau$ is not definable in terms of $\Sigma$ in $E$, if there are two models $\mathscr{A}, \mathscr{B} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma \cup\{\tau\}, E)$ such that $A=B$ and $\sigma^{\mathscr{A}}=\sigma^{\mathscr{1}}$ for every nonlogical symbol $\sigma \in \Sigma$, but $\tau^{\mathscr{A}} \neq \tau^{\mathscr{3}}$.

Proof. Let $\tau$ be a predicate symbol. (The proof for function symbols, including the constant symbols which can be considered as ' 0 -ary' function symbols, is similar.) Suppose $\mathscr{A}, \mathscr{B}$ exist as given in the theorem, and suppose that $\tau$ is definable in terms of $\Sigma$ in $E$. That is,

$$
E \vdash \tau(\boldsymbol{x}) \leftrightarrow p,
$$

for some assertion $p \in L(\Sigma)$. Then for $a \in A$ we have

$$
\boldsymbol{a} \in \tau^{\mathscr{A}} \Leftrightarrow \mathscr{A} \vDash p[\boldsymbol{a}] \Leftrightarrow \mathscr{B} \vDash p[\boldsymbol{a}] \Leftrightarrow \boldsymbol{a} \in \tau^{\mathscr{B}}
$$

(where the middle equivalence follows since $p \in L(\Sigma)$ and $\mathscr{A}, \mathscr{B}$ have the same interpretation for every symbol in $\Sigma$ ). Hence $\tau^{s /}=\tau^{1 / 2}$, contradiction.
3.3.1. Remark. (i) A much stronger theorem results when, in Theorem 3.3, 'if' is replaced by 'iff', namely Beth's Definability Theorem (BDT).
(ii) Write $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \geq^{1}(\Sigma, E)$ iff $\Sigma^{\prime}-\Sigma$ is a singleton. Then the version of BDT as indicated in (i) can be paraphrased as $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd_{\mathrm{d}}^{1}(\Sigma, E) \Leftrightarrow$ the mapping $\rho_{\Sigma}^{\frac{\Sigma}{2}^{\prime}}: \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$ is injective.

A slightly stronger version of BDT as, e.g., in [24, p. 81] says the same for $\unrhd_{d}$ instead of $\unrhd_{d}^{1}$.

Noting further that $\unrhd_{d}$ implies $\unrhd_{s}$, we have the following model theoretic characterization of definitional refinements:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \geq_{d}(\Sigma, E) \Leftrightarrow \\
& \quad \Leftrightarrow \rho_{\Sigma}^{\Sigma^{\prime}}: \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \rightarrow \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \text { is injective } \\
& \quad \Leftrightarrow \rho_{\Sigma}^{\Sigma^{\prime}}: \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \rightarrow \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \text { is bijective. }
\end{aligned}
$$

3.3.2. Application. In the sequel we will need the following.

Fact. Let $\mathscr{A}=(\mathbb{N}, 0, S, P)$. Then the function + is not definable in $\mathscr{A}$.
Proof (by Padoa's method). (For another proof, using elimination of quantifiers, see Section 8.) Suppose + is definable in $\mathscr{A}$; i.e., for some assertion $r$ we have

$$
\mathscr{A} \vDash r[a, b, c] \Leftrightarrow a+b=c .
$$

Now let $\mathscr{A}^{\prime}=(\mathbb{N}, 0, S, P,+)$, so

$$
\mathscr{A}^{\prime} \vDash r(x, y, z) \leftrightarrow x+y=z .
$$

Hence

$$
E_{\Omega^{\prime}} \vdash r(x, y, z) \leftrightarrow x+y=z,
$$

so the symbol + is definable in terms of $\Sigma_{S A}$ in $E_{\mathscr{S}^{\prime}}$.
To show that this is contradictory, we use Padoa's method (Theorem 3.3): We will try to find $\mathcal{N}_{1}, \mathcal{N}_{2}, \in \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma_{\mathscr{N}^{\prime}}, E_{\mathscr{N}^{\prime}}\right)$ such that $N_{1}=N_{2}, \sigma^{N_{1}}=\sigma^{N_{2}}$ for all $\sigma \neq+$, but $+^{N_{1}} \neq+{ }^{N_{2}}$. Two such models are readily obtained; we have to take 'non-standard' models:

$$
\left.\mathcal{N}_{i}=(\mathbb{N} \times\{0\}) \cup\left(\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{N}^{+}\right), O_{0}, S, P,+_{i}\right) \quad(i=1,2),
$$

where $\mathbb{N}^{+}=\mathbb{N}-\{0\}$, and where we write $a_{b}$ instead of $(a, b)$. Further, $S\left(n_{m}\right)=$ $(n+1)_{m}, P(n+1)_{m}=n_{m}, P\left(O_{0}\right)=O_{0}$ and $n_{m}+i_{i}^{\prime} n_{m^{\prime}}=\left(n+n^{\prime}\right)_{i\left(m+m^{\prime}\right)}(i=1,2)$.
(Intuitively; the $n_{0}$ are the standard numbers; there are nonstandard numbers divided in copies of $\mathbb{Z}$, indexed by positive integers. The point is that these indices are so to speak indiscernible for the specification in question, so there is considerable liberty in defining ' + ' on the non-standard part.)
3.3.3 Example. Some reducts of arithmetic. In the schema given by Fig. 6 most of the above concepts are illustrated. Upward lines denote conservative refinements (of the theory of the structure in question); the 'clusters' of structures are equivalence


Fig. 6.
classes w.r.t. the equivalence generated by $\sum_{d}$. Simple refinements are indicated with 's'. The most remarkable facts here are the definability of exponentiation from $0,1,+, \times$, which is well known; and less well known, the definablity of + in terms of $0, S, \times$, by the following:

$$
i+j=k \Leftrightarrow\left(i^{\prime} k^{\prime \prime}\right)^{\prime}\left(j^{\prime} k^{\prime \prime}\right)^{\prime}=\left(\left(i^{\prime} j^{\prime}\right)^{\prime}\left(k^{\prime \prime} k^{\prime \prime}\right)\right)^{\prime},
$$

where $x^{\prime}=S x, x^{\prime \prime}=S(S x)($ see $[11$, p. 219] $)$.

## 4. Program inclusions

We will now introduce the various notions of the inclusion $\sqsubseteq$ between statements $S_{1}, S_{2} \in \mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}(\Sigma)$ that we will study, and prove some elementary facts about them.
4.1. Definition. Let $S \in \mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}(\Sigma)$ and $\mathscr{A}=(A, \ldots) \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$. Let $S$ contain the variables $x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}(n \geq 1)$. Then $S^{*}: A^{n} \rightarrow A^{n}$ is the partial function determined
by $S$, i.e.,

$$
S^{\mathscr{a}}\left(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{n}\right)= \begin{cases}\left(b_{1}, \ldots, b_{n}\right) & \text { if } S \text { converges with input } \\ & \left(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{n}\right) \text { and yields }\left(b_{1}, \ldots, b_{n}\right) \\ \text { undefined } & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

4.1.1. Remark. The restriction to functions $f: A^{n} \rightarrow A^{n}$ is not essential. Instead of, e.g., $f\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right)=x_{1} \cdot x_{2}$ one may use $f^{\prime}\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right)=\left(x_{1} \cdot x_{2}, 0,0\right)$.
4.2. Definition (Semantical inclusion). Let $S_{1}, S_{2} \in \mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}(\Sigma)$. Then
(i) $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \vDash S_{1} \subseteq S_{2} \Leftrightarrow S_{1}^{\mathscr{A}} \subseteq S_{2}^{\mathscr{A}} \quad$ for all $\mathscr{A} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$.

This inclusion is said to be semantical. Instead of the left-hand side we will also use the notation $S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)} S_{2}$.
(ii) Semantical equivalence w.r.t. $(\Sigma, E)$ is defined by

$$
\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \vDash S_{1} \equiv S_{2} \Leftrightarrow \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \vDash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} \& \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \models S_{2} \sqsubseteq S_{1} .
$$

### 4.3. Definition (Proof-theoretical inclusion)

(i) $S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E)} S_{2}$ iff, for all $p, q \in L(\Sigma)$,

$$
\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} S_{2}\{q\} \Rightarrow \mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} S_{1}\{q\}
$$

(Note the direction of the implication. Intuitively: $S_{1}$ is less defined than $S_{2}$ so $\{p\} S_{1}\{q\}$ is more often trivially true.)
(ii) $S_{1} \equiv{ }_{H L(\Sigma, E)} S_{2}$ is the corresponding equivalence.

### 4.4. Definition (Derivable inclusion)

(i) $\quad \mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} \Leftrightarrow \forall\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E) S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)} S_{2}$.
(The terminology 'derivable' and the choice of the notation ' $\vdash$ ' is motivated by the sequel: it will be proved that derivable inclusion w.r.t. $(\Sigma, E)$ is semi-decidable in E.) As before we define $\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash S_{1} \equiv S_{2}$ derivable equivalence w.r.t. $(\Sigma, E)$.
(ii) $\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash_{\mathrm{f}} S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} \Leftrightarrow \forall\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd_{\mathrm{f}}(\Sigma, E) S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)} S_{2}$.
4.5. Definition (Forced inclusion)

$$
\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \Vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} \Leftrightarrow \exists\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E) \quad \mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} .
$$

As before, forced equivalence w.r.t. $(\Sigma, E)$ is defined.
4.6. Definition. The inclusion $S_{1} \subseteq S_{2}$ is cofinal, iff

$$
\forall\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E) \exists\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \unrhd\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) S_{2} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right)} S_{2}
$$

It is clear that all inclusions ( $\subseteq$ ) defined above are partial orders and that all equivalences ( $\equiv$ ) are equivalence relations, except for forced and cofinal inclusion resp. equivalence. For the last case, 'cofinal', we will eventually prove that 'cofinal $\Leftrightarrow$ semantical', hence cofinal inclusion is indeed transitive. We will now prove that also forced inclusion is transitive-hence it is a partial order and forced equivalence is an equivalence relation indeed. First we need a simple proposition about renaming of symbols.
4.7. Definition. $\left(\Sigma_{1}, E_{1}\right) \cong\left(\Sigma_{2}, E_{2}\right)\left(\left(\Sigma_{1}, E_{1}\right)\right.$ and $\left(\Sigma_{2}, E_{2}\right)$ are isomorphic specifications) if ( $\Sigma_{1}, E_{1}$ ) can be obtained from ( $\Sigma_{2}, E_{2}$ ) by renaming some of the nonlogical symbols; distinct symbols must be replaced by distinct symbols.
4.7.1. Remark. So Robinsons Consistency Theorem 2.6 .2 says (see Fig. 7) that if $\left(\Sigma_{i}, E_{i}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E), i=1,2$, then for some variant $\left(\Sigma_{2}^{\prime}, R_{2}^{\prime}\right) \cong\left(\Sigma_{2}, E_{2}\right)$ such that $\left(\Sigma_{2}^{\prime}, E_{2}^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)$ there exists a $\left(\Sigma_{3}, E_{3}\right) \unrhd\left(\Sigma_{1}, E_{1}\right),\left(\Sigma_{2}^{\prime}, E_{2}^{\prime}\right)$.


Fig. 7.
4.7.2. Proposition. Let $S_{1}, S_{2} \in \mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}(\Sigma)$. Suppose

$$
\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right),\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E), \quad\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \cong\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \quad \text { and } \quad \Sigma^{\prime} \cap \Sigma^{\prime \prime}=\Sigma
$$

Then
(i) $\quad S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)} S_{2} \Leftrightarrow S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right)} S_{2}$,
(ii) $\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} \Leftrightarrow \mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \vdash S_{1} \subseteq S_{2}$.

Proof. (i) routine; (ii) at once from (i).
4.8. Proposition. Let $S_{1}, S_{2}, S_{3} \in \mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}(\Sigma)$. Then

$$
\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \Vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} \& \mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \Vdash S_{2} \sqsubseteq S_{3} \Rightarrow \mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \Vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{3} .
$$

Proof. The assumptions are

$$
\exists\left(\Sigma_{i}^{\prime}, E_{i}^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E) \forall\left(\Sigma_{i}^{\prime \prime}, E_{i}^{\prime \prime}\right) \unrhd\left(\Sigma_{i}^{\prime}, E_{i}^{\prime}\right) S_{i} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right)} S_{i+1} \quad(i=1,2)
$$

(see Fig. 8).


Fig. 8.

Now consider such a ( $\Sigma_{i}^{\prime}, E_{i}^{\prime}$ ), $i=1,2$. By Proposition 4.7 .2 we may suppose that $\Sigma_{1}^{\prime} \cap \Sigma_{2}^{\prime}=\Sigma$. Now by Robinsons Consistency Theorem 2.6.2, $\left(\Sigma^{*}, E^{*}\right)=$ $\left(\Sigma_{1}^{\prime} \cup \Sigma_{2}^{\prime}, E_{1}^{\prime} \cup E_{2}^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)$. Also, by transitivity of $\sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}}$, in the 'upper cone' of $\left(\Sigma^{*}, E^{*}\right)$ we have $S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}} S_{2}$. Hence $\operatorname{HL}(\Sigma, E) \Vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{3}$.

Another corollary of Robinson's Consistency Theorem (RCT) 2.6.2 is the fol-
wing. lowing.
4.9. Proposition. Forced inclusion implies cofinal inclusion.

Proof. Suppose $\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \Vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$, i.e.,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\exists\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E) \quad \forall\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \unrhd\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \quad S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right)} S_{2} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

We have to prove the following (see Fig. 9):

$$
\begin{equation*}
\forall\left(\Sigma_{1}^{\prime}, E_{1}^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E) \exists\left(\Sigma_{1}^{\prime \prime}, E_{1}^{\prime \prime}\right) \unrhd\left(\Sigma_{1}^{\prime}, E_{1}^{\prime}\right) S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right)} S_{2} \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$



Fig. 9.

Take ( $\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}$ ) as in (1), and consider a ( $\Sigma_{1}^{\prime}, E_{1}^{\prime}$ ) as in (2). By Proposition 4.7.2(ii) we can 'shift' ( $\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}$ ) to an isomorphic variant ( $\Sigma^{\prime *}, E^{\prime *}$ ) such that $\Sigma^{\prime *} \cap \Sigma^{\prime}=\Sigma$, and still having the property that $S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HI}} S_{2}$ in all refinements.

Then take $\left(\Sigma_{1}^{\prime \prime}, E_{1}^{\prime \prime}\right)$ in (2) as the union of $\left(\Sigma_{1}^{\prime}, E_{1}^{\prime}\right)$ and $\left(\Sigma^{\prime *}, E^{* *}\right)$; by RCT 2.6.2 this is possible.
4.9.1 Remark. For $\geq$ instead of $\geq$ the above proposition fails. E.g., take

$$
\begin{aligned}
& S_{1}=x:=0 \\
& S_{2}=\text { if } 0>1 \text { then } x:=0 \text { else } x:=1 \text { fi. }
\end{aligned}
$$

Let $\Sigma=\{0,1,<\}, E$ is the theory of partial order, $E_{1}=E \cup\{0<1\}$ and $E_{2}=E \cup$ $\{0>1\}$. Then $\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma, E_{2}\right)^{\prime} \vdash{ }^{\prime} S_{1} \equiv S_{2}$, hence $\operatorname{HL}(\Sigma, E)^{\prime} \Vdash{ }^{\prime} S_{1} \equiv S_{2}$. However, for all $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \geq\left(\Sigma, E_{1}\right), S_{1} \exists_{\left.\text {HLI( } \Sigma^{\prime}, H^{\prime}\right)} S_{2}$.
4.10. Remark. All inclusions introduced above, except semantical inclusion, were obtained by quantification over the 'basic' proof-theoretical inclusion $⿷_{\text {H11 }}$. This suggests looking at all inclusions of the following general form:

$$
\begin{aligned}
S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{H}(., \ldots, E)}^{\forall \exists \exists \ldots \exists} S_{2} \Leftrightarrow & \forall\left(\Sigma_{1}, E_{1}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E) \exists\left(\Sigma_{2}, E_{2}\right) \unrhd\left(\Sigma_{1}, E_{1}\right) \\
& \forall\left(\Sigma_{3}, E_{3}\right) \unrhd\left(\Sigma_{2}, E_{2}\right) \cdots \exists\left(\Sigma_{2 n}, E_{2 n}\right) \unrhd\left(\Sigma_{2 n-1}, E_{2 n-1}\right) \\
& S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma_{2 n}, E_{2 n}\right)} S_{2}
\end{aligned}
$$

and likewise $\left.S_{1} \subseteq \underset{H I(\Sigma, E)}{\forall \exists \forall \cdots \forall}\right) S_{2}$, and the dual notions obtained by interchanging $\exists, \forall$.
(Note that only alternating strings of quantifiers are interesting, since obviously $--\forall \forall--=-\forall--$ and likewise for $\exists$.) So derivable inclusion w.r.t. ( $\Sigma, E$ ) is $\sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma . E)}^{\forall}$, forced inclusion is $\sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E)}^{\exists \forall}$, and cofinal inclusion is $\sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E)}^{\forall \exists}$. (In the sequel we will also consider 'inclusion in some refinement': $\sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) .}^{\exists}$.)

Now between these generalized inclusions there are a priori the following implications (see Fig. 10 where an implication is downward). (Only the quantifiers of $\sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E)}^{\forall \exists--}$ are mentioned.)


Fig. 10.
However, this hierarchy of inclusions 'collapses' because
(i) $\sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E)}^{\exists \exists}=\sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E)}^{\forall \exists \forall}$,
(ii) $\sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E)}^{\forall \exists}=\sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E)}^{\exists \forall \exists}$.

To see the nontrivial direction of (i), note that it was already proved in Proposition 4.9. By a similar argument (ii) also follows.

Now $\exists \forall \exists \forall=\exists \exists \forall=\exists \forall, \forall \exists \forall \exists \forall=\forall \exists \forall=\exists \forall$, etc. Hence the only inclusions are those displayed in Fig. 11.


Fig. 11.
(Remark: We did not prove that $\sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E)}^{\exists}$ is a partial order. Question: Is it?).
4.11. Remark. All inclusions that are defined above exhibit the desirable property of staying valid in a context: let $S_{1}, S_{2} \in \mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}(\Sigma)$ and let $C[\quad]$ be a context statement (also in $\Sigma$ ), i.e., a statement with a 'hole'. Then

$$
S_{1} \subseteq S_{2} \Leftrightarrow \forall C[\quad] C\left[S_{1}\right] \subseteq C\left[S_{2}\right] .
$$

The proof follows in a straightforward manner by observing that

$$
\forall p, q \in L(\Sigma) \mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} S_{2}\{q\} \Rightarrow \mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} S_{1}\{q\}
$$

implies

$$
\forall p, q \in L(\Sigma) \mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} C\left[S_{2}\right]\{q\} \Rightarrow \mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} C\left[S_{1}\right]\{q\}
$$

4.12. Remark (Invariances). For a better insight in what happens inside the 'cone of refinements', we will investigate whether the notions

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \vDash p & E \vdash p,  \tag{1}\\
\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \models\{p\} S\{q\} ; & \operatorname{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} S\{q\}, \\
\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \models S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} ; & S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E)} S_{2}
\end{array}
$$

are invariant under 'shifting ( $\Sigma, E$ ) upward or downward'.
Ad (1). Upward and downward invariant (i.e., $\forall\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)$ $\left(\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \vDash p \Leftrightarrow \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vDash p\right)$ ); this follows simply from Gödels Completeness Theorem 1.1.1 and the definition of conservativity.

Ad (2). Here the situation is already somewhat more complicated: $\operatorname{Alg}(,) \vDash\{p\} S\{q\}$ is upward and downward invariant (see Proposition 4.13). However, for HL(, ) $\vdash\{p\} S\{q\}$ we only have the (trivial) upward invariance, i.e.,

$$
\forall\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E) \operatorname{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} S\{q\} \Rightarrow \operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vdash\{p\} S\{q\}
$$

That here ' $\Leftarrow$ ' does not hold, is because an invariant needed for the proof of $\vdash\{p\} S\{q\}$ may be available in $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$ but not yet in $(\Sigma, E)$.

Ad (3). Again the semantical notion, $\operatorname{Alg}(,) \vDash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$, is invariant in both directions. For 'upward' this is trivial; for 'downward' certainly not (see Lemma 4.14).

Finally, $S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}(,)} S_{2}$ is neither upward, nor downward invariant. One can even show that it may happen that $S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}(,)} S_{2}$ is alternatingly true and false while following some upward path $\left(\Sigma_{0}, E_{0}\right) \leq\left(\Sigma_{1}, E_{1}\right) \leq \cdots$.
4.13. Proposition. Let $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \leq(\Sigma, E), \quad p, q \in L(\Sigma)$ and $S \in \mathscr{W P}(\Sigma)$. Then $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \vDash\{p\} S\{q\} \Leftrightarrow \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vDash\{p\} S\{q\}$.

Proof. ( $\Rightarrow$ ). Trivial.
$(\Leftarrow)$. To prove the reverse, we use Theorem 2.7 .3 , which says that for every $\mathscr{A} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$ there is an $\mathscr{A}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$ and an $\mathscr{A}^{\prime \prime} \in \mathrm{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$ such that $\mathscr{A} \leqslant \mathscr{A}^{\prime} \leq$ $\mathscr{A}^{\prime \prime}$. By Remark 2.5 .1 we have $\mathscr{A} \equiv \mathscr{A}^{\prime}$. Now the result follows by the following lemma from [7]: "Let $\mathscr{A} \equiv \mathscr{B}$. Then $\mathscr{A} \vDash\{p\} S\{q\} \Leftrightarrow \mathscr{B} \vDash\{p\} S\{q\}$ ".
4.14. Lemma. Let $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)$. Then, for all $S_{1}, S_{2} \in \mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}(\Sigma)$,

$$
\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \models S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} \Leftrightarrow \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \models S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} .
$$

Proof. $(\Rightarrow)$ is easy: take $\mathscr{A}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$. Then $\rho_{\Sigma}^{\Sigma^{\prime}}\left(\mathscr{A}^{\prime}\right)=\mathscr{A} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$. So $\mathscr{A} \vDash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$. But then trivially also $\mathscr{A}^{\prime} \models S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$, since the extra structure on $\mathscr{A}^{\prime}$ does not play a role.
$(\Leftrightarrow)$. The proof of the reverse follows by contraposition: Take $\mathscr{A} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$ such that $\mathscr{A} \nexists S_{1} \subseteq S_{2}$. Then there are $\boldsymbol{a}=a_{1}, \ldots, a_{n} \in A$ and $\boldsymbol{b}=b_{1}, \ldots, b_{n} \in A$ such that, par abus de language:

$$
\mathscr{A} \models S_{1}(\underline{\boldsymbol{a}})=\underline{\boldsymbol{b}} \quad \text { and } \quad \mathscr{A} \not \models S_{2}(\underline{\boldsymbol{a}})=\underline{\boldsymbol{b}} .
$$

More precisely, for some $n$ and for all $m$ :

$$
\mathscr{A} \vDash \phi_{n}(\underline{\boldsymbol{a}}, \underline{\boldsymbol{b}}) \wedge \neg \psi_{m}(\underline{\boldsymbol{a}}, \underline{\boldsymbol{b}}),
$$

where

$$
\phi_{n}(\underline{\boldsymbol{a}}, \underline{\boldsymbol{b}})=\operatorname{Comp}_{s_{1}, n}(\underline{\boldsymbol{a}})=\underline{\boldsymbol{b}} \quad \text { and } \quad \psi_{m}(\underline{\boldsymbol{a}}, \underline{\boldsymbol{b}})=\neg \operatorname{Comp}_{S_{2}, m}(\underline{\boldsymbol{a}})=\underline{\boldsymbol{b}} .
$$

Let $\Gamma$ be the set of assertions $\left\{\phi_{n}(\underline{\boldsymbol{a}}, \underline{\boldsymbol{b}})\right\} \cup\left\{\psi_{m}(\boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{b}) \mid m \in \mathbb{N}\right\}$.
Claim. For some $\mathscr{B}, \mathscr{B} \vDash E^{\prime} \cup \Gamma$. So $\mathscr{B} \not \vDash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$, hence $\operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \not \neq S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$ and we are through.

Proof of the claim. Suppose there is no such $\mathscr{B}$, i.e., $E^{\prime} \cup \Gamma$ is inconsistent. Then for some finite $\Delta \subseteq \Gamma$ we have that $E^{\prime} \cup \Delta$ is already inconsistent. Say $\Delta=\left\{\phi_{n}, \neg \psi_{0}, \ldots, \neg \Psi_{k-1}\right\}$. So $E^{\prime} \vdash \neg\left(\phi_{n} \wedge \bigwedge_{i<k} \Psi_{i}\right)$, hence

$$
E^{\prime} \vdash \neg \exists x, y\left(\phi_{n}(x, y) \wedge \wedge_{i<k} \psi_{i}(x, y)\right)
$$

By the conservativity of $E^{\prime}$ over $E$ we can replace $E^{\prime}$ here by $E$. However, this contradicts the fact that

$$
\mathscr{A} \vDash \exists x, y\left(\phi_{n}(x, y) \wedge \bigwedge_{i<k} \psi(x, y)\right)
$$

## 5. Prototype proofs

Let us abbreviate the implication

$$
\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vdash\{p\} S_{2}\{q\} \Rightarrow \operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vdash\{p\} S_{1}\{q\}
$$

by $\Phi\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}, p, q\right)$. So, by definition, $\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$ is equivalent to

$$
\phi\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}, p, q\right) \text { for all }\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E) \text { and all } p, q \in L\left(\Sigma^{\prime}\right)
$$

Now it turns out that among all these $\Phi\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}, p, q\right)$ there is a 'generic' one, $\Phi\left(\Sigma^{0}, E^{0}, r(\boldsymbol{x}), r^{\prime}(\boldsymbol{x})\right)$. I.e.,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \Phi\left(\Sigma^{0}, E^{0}, r(\boldsymbol{x}), r^{\prime}(\boldsymbol{x})\right) \Leftrightarrow \\
& \quad \Leftrightarrow \forall\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E) \forall p, q \in L\left(\Sigma^{\prime}\right) \Phi\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}, p, q\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

The situation is even further simplified, since the generic implication has an antecedent $\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{0}, E^{0}\right) \vdash\{r(\boldsymbol{x})\} S_{2}\left\{r^{\prime}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\}$ which is always true. This reduces checking whether $\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$ or not, to checking whether $\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{0}, E^{0}\right) \vdash\{r(\boldsymbol{x})\} S_{1}\left\{r^{\prime}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\}$, which is semi-decidable. (Hence our choice of the notation $\vdash$ in $H L(\Sigma, E) \vdash S_{1} \subseteq S_{2}$.)
Finding this generic implication is based on the observation that every proof $\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vdash\{p\} S\{q\}$ can be viewed as an instantiation of a prototype proof $\pi(S)$. In order to define this concept, we need an efficient notation for proofs of asserted programs. One method is to consider a proof as a proof tree; a second way is to consider a proof as a flow-diagram with assertions written at the cut-points. We will use a more workable linear notation of proofs which will be introduced now. First we will define the concept 'interpolated statement' which can be viewed as the flow-diagram corresponding to the statement plus some assertions written at some cutpoints.
5.1. Definition. The class $\operatorname{IStat}(\Sigma)$, with typical elements $S^{*}, S_{1}^{*}, S^{* *}, \ldots$, of interpolated statements is inductively defined by

$$
S^{*}::=S\left|\{p\} S^{*}\right| S^{*}\{p\} \mid \text { if } b \text { then } S_{1}^{*} \text { else } S_{2}^{*} \text { fi|while } b \text { do } S^{*} \text { od. }
$$

Here $S \in \mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}(\Sigma)$. So the class of interpolated statements contains next to the usual statements also asserted statements and statements interlaced with assertions in an arbitrary way; but it contains also proofs of asserted statements. These will be singled out by means of the following extended proof rules.
5.2. Definition. By means of the following axioms and extended proof rules we can derive proofs of asserted statements:
(1) Assignment axiom scheme:

$$
\{p[t / x]\} x:=t\{p\}
$$

(2) Extended composition rule:

$$
\frac{\{p\} S_{1}^{*}\{r\} \quad\{r\} S_{2}^{*}\{q\}}{\{p\} S_{1}^{*}\{r\} S_{2}^{*}\{q\}}
$$

(3) Extended conditional rule:

$$
\frac{\{p \wedge b\} S_{1}^{*}\{q\} \quad\{p \wedge \neg b\} S_{2}^{*}\{q\}}{\{p\} \text { if } b \text { then }\{p \wedge b\} S_{1}^{*}\{q\} \text { else }\{p \wedge \neg b\} S_{2}^{*}\{q\} \mathbf{f i}\{q\}}
$$

(4) Extended iteration rule:

$$
\frac{\{p \wedge b\} S^{*}\{p\}}{\{p\} \text { while } b \text { do }\{p \wedge b\} S^{*}\{p\} \operatorname{od}\{p \wedge \neg b\}}
$$

(5) Extended consequence rule:

$$
\frac{p \rightarrow p \quad\left\{p_{1}\right\} S^{*}\left\{q_{1}\right\} \quad q_{1} \rightarrow q}{\{p\} \quad\left\{p_{1}\right\} S^{*}\left\{q_{1}\right\}}
$$

5.3. Definition and notation. (i) Let $\operatorname{Pr}(\Sigma, E)$ be the class of proofs (interpolated statements) which can be derived using this axiom scheme and extended proof rules, such that in rule (5) only implications provable from $E$ are used.
(ii) If $S^{*} \in \operatorname{IStat}(\Sigma)$, then $\sigma\left(S^{*}\right)$ will denote the underlying statement obtained by erasing all $\{p\}$ in $S^{*}$. (So $\sigma$ can be inductively defined as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \sigma(S)=S \text { for } S \in \mathscr{W}(\Sigma) \\
& \sigma\left(S^{*}\{p\}\right)=\sigma\left(\{p\} S^{*}\right)=\sigma\left(S^{*}\right) \\
& \sigma\left(\text { if } b \text { then } S_{1}^{*} \text { else } S_{2}^{*} \text { fi }\right)=\text { if } b \text { then } \sigma\left(S_{1}^{*}\right) \text { else } \sigma\left(S_{2}^{*}\right) \text { fi } \\
& \left.\sigma\left(\text { while } b \text { do } S^{*} \text { od }\right)=\text { while } b \text { do } \sigma\left(S^{*}\right) \text { od. }\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

(iii) If $S^{*} \in \operatorname{Pr}(\Sigma, E)$, then $\kappa\left(S^{*}\right)$ will denote the set of consequences $p \rightarrow p^{\prime}$ used in the derivation of $S^{*}$. Note that these consequences can be read of directly from $S^{*}: \kappa\left(S^{*}\right)=\left\{p \rightarrow p^{\prime} \mid\{p\}\left\{p^{\prime}\right\} \subseteq S^{*}\right\}$. (Here ' $\subseteq$ ' denotes the relation of being contained as a 'subword'.)
(iv) If $S^{*} \in \operatorname{Pr}(\Sigma, E)$ and $S^{*}=\{p\} S_{1}^{*}\left\{q\right.$, then $\operatorname{pre}\left(S^{*}\right)=p$ and $\operatorname{post}\left(S^{*}\right)=q$.
(v) Let $S^{*} \in \operatorname{Pr}(\Sigma, E)$. Then $S^{*}$ is called a reduced proof, iff it contains no occurrence of a triple $\{p\}\{q\}\{r\}$. (By the transitivity of $\rightarrow$, every proof may be supposed to be reduced, up to equivalence.)
5.4. Definition. (1) Two interpolated statements $S^{*}, S^{* *}$ such that $\sigma\left(S^{*}\right)=$ $\sigma\left(S^{* *}\right)=S$ are called matching if at every place the same number of assertions occur in $S^{*}, S^{* *}$. (Notation: $S^{*} \sim S^{* *}$.)

To be precise:
(i) $S \sim S$ for $S \in \mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}(\Sigma)$,
(ii) $S^{*} \sim S^{* *} \Rightarrow\{p\} S^{*} \sim\{q\} S^{* *}$ and $S^{*}\{p\} \sim S^{* *}\{q\}$
for all assertions $p, q \in L(\Sigma)$,
(iii) $\quad S_{1}^{*} \sim S_{1}^{* *}, S_{2}^{*} \sim S_{2}^{* *} \Rightarrow$
if $b$ then $S_{1}^{*}$ else $S_{2}^{*}$ fi~if $b$ then $S_{1}^{* *}$ else $S_{2}^{* *}$ fi,
(iv) $S^{*} \sim S^{* *} \Rightarrow$
while $b$ also $S^{*}$ od $\sim$ while $b$ do $S^{* *}$ od.
(2) Let $S^{*}=--\{p\}-$ be an interpolated statement containing $\{p\}$. Then $S^{* *}=$ $--\{p\}\{p\}-$ is called a trivial expansion of $S^{*}$.
5.5. Definition. In the following definition we will use a set of $n$-ary relation symbols $\left\{r_{i} \mid i \in \omega\right\}$. If $S^{*} \in$ IStat contains some of these $r$-symbols, $\left[S^{*}\right]_{j}$ will be the result of
replacing each occurrence of $r_{i}$ in $S^{*}$ by $r_{(i, j)}$ where $():, \mathbb{N}^{2} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ is the usual bijective pairing function. (This device merely serves to 'refresh' the $r$-symbols where necessary.)
(i) Let $S \in \mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}(\Sigma)$ involve the variables $\boldsymbol{x}\left(=x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right)$. By induction on the structure of $S$ we define $\pi^{\prime}(S)$ as follows:

$$
\begin{align*}
& \pi^{\prime}\left(x_{i}:=t\right)=\left\{r_{0}(\boldsymbol{x})\left[t / x_{i}\right]\right\} x_{i}:=t\left\{r_{0}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\} .  \tag{1}\\
& \pi^{\prime}\left(S_{1} ; S_{2}\right)=\left[\pi^{\prime}\left(S_{1}\right)\right]_{0}\left[\pi^{\prime}\left(S_{2}\right)\right]_{1} .
\end{align*}
$$

(That is, $\pi^{\prime}\left(S_{1}\right)$ and $\pi^{\prime}\left(S_{2}\right)$ are concatenated, without infix. Moreover, the $r$. symbols in $\left[\pi^{\prime}\left(S_{1}\right)\right]_{0}$ are made distinct from those in $\left[\pi^{\prime}\left(S_{2}\right)\right]_{1}$.)
(3) $\quad \pi^{\prime}\left(\right.$ if $b$ then $S_{1}$ else $S_{2}$ fi) $=$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& =\left\{r_{0}(x)\right\} \text { if } b \text { then }\left\{r_{0}(\boldsymbol{x}) \wedge b\right\}\left[\pi^{\prime}\left(S_{1}\right)\right]_{2}\left\{r_{1}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\} \\
& \text { else }\left\{r_{0}(\boldsymbol{x}) \wedge \neg b\right\}\left[\pi^{\prime}\left(S_{2}\right)\right]_{3}\left\{r_{1}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\} \\
& \text { fi }\left\{r_{1}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

(4) $\pi^{\prime}($ while $b$ do $S$ od $)=$
$=\left\{r_{0}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\}$ while $b$ do $\left\{r_{0}(\boldsymbol{x}) \wedge b\right\} S^{*}$ od $\left\{r_{0}(\boldsymbol{x}) \wedge \neg b\right\}\left\{r_{1}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\}$
where $S^{*}=\left[\pi^{\prime}(S)\right]_{4}$ and $r_{0}(\boldsymbol{x})=\operatorname{post}\left(S^{*}\right)$.
(ii) Now $\pi(S)=\left\{r_{0}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\}\left[\pi^{\prime}(S)\right]_{0}\left\{r_{1}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\} . \pi(S)$ is called the prototype proof of $S$.
5.5.1. Example. Let $S$ be $x_{1}:=0 ; x_{2}:=1$; while $x_{2}>x_{3}$ do if $x_{1}=0$ then $x_{3}:=0$ else $x_{1}:=x_{2}+1$ fi od; $x_{1}:=x_{1}+x_{2}$. Then

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\pi(S)= & \\
& \left\{r_{1}\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right)\right\} \\
& \left\{r_{2}\left(0, x_{2}, x_{3}\right)\right\} \\
x_{1}:=0 & \\
& \left\{r_{2}\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right)\right\} \\
& \left\{r_{3}\left(x_{1}, 1, x_{3}\right)\right\} \\
x_{2}:=1 & \\
& \left\{r_{3}\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right)\right\} \\
& \left\{r_{6}\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right)\right\}
\end{array}
$$

while $x_{2}>x_{3}$ do

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \left\{r_{6}\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right) \wedge x_{2}>x_{3}\right\} \\
& \left\{r_{4}\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right)\right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { if } x_{1}=0 \text { then } \\
& \left\{r_{4}\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right) \wedge x_{1}=0\right\} \\
& \left\{r_{5}\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, 0\right)\right. \\
& x_{3}:=0 \\
& \left\{r_{5}\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right)\right\} \\
& \left\{r_{6}\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right)\right\} \\
& \text { else } \\
& \left\{r_{4}\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right) \wedge \neg x_{1}=0\right\} \\
& \left\{r_{7}\left(x_{2}+1, x_{2}, x_{3}\right)\right\} \\
& x_{1}:=x_{2}+1 \\
& \left\{r_{7}\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right)\right\} \\
& \left\{r_{6}\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right)\right\} \\
& \text { fi } \\
& \left\{r_{6}\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right)\right\} \\
& \text { od } \\
& \left\{r_{6}\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right) \wedge \neg x_{2}>x_{3}\right\} \\
& \left\{r_{8}\left(x_{1}+x_{2}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right)\right\} \\
& x_{1}:=x_{1}+x_{2} \\
& \left\{r_{8}\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right)\right\} \\
& \left\{r_{9}\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right)\right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

5.5.2. Proposition. Let $r$ be a 'new' relation symbol occurring in $\pi(S)$. Then $r$ has an occurrence in $\pi(S)$ of the form $\{r(x)\}$, i.e., the arguments are all variables.

Proof. Evident by inspection of the definition of $\pi(S)$.
5.6. Definition. Let $S^{*} \in \operatorname{IStat}(\Sigma)$ contain the $n$-ary relation symbol $r$, and let $p=p\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right) \in L(\Sigma)$. (Note that $p$ may contain other variables than those displayed.)

Then $\phi_{r}^{p}\left(S^{*}\right)$ is the result of replacing each $r\left(t_{1}, \ldots, t_{n}\right)$, occurring in $S^{*}$, by $p\left(t_{1}, \ldots, t_{n}\right)$. Likewise we define $\phi_{r_{1}, \ldots, r_{n}}^{p_{1}, \ldots, r_{r}}\left(S^{*}\right)$.
5.6.1. Remark. One can think of the prototype proof $\pi(S)$ as an initial object in
the category of proofs $\{p\} S^{*}\{q\}$ (where $\sigma\left(S^{*}\right)=S$ ); morphisms between proofs are the substitutions $\phi$.
5.7. Lemma. Let $S^{*} \in \operatorname{Pr}(\Sigma, E)$ be a reduced proof such that $\sigma\left(S^{*}\right)=S$. Then $\phi: \pi(S) \rightarrow S^{*}$ for some substitution $\phi$ as in Definition 5.6. (So every proof is an instance of the prototype proof.)

Proof. Consider $S, S^{*}$ as in the claim of the lemma. We may suppose that $S^{*}$ and $\pi(S)$ are matching; if not, only some trivial expansions (Definition 5.4) of $S^{*}$ are required.

We will construct by induction on the structure of $S$ a substitution $\phi: \pi(S) \rightarrow S^{*}$.
Case 1. $S=x:=t(\boldsymbol{y}, x, z)$, where all variables in $t$ are displayed. Now

$$
\pi(S)=\left\{r_{1}(\boldsymbol{y}, x, \boldsymbol{z})\right\}\left\{r_{2}(\boldsymbol{y}, t, \boldsymbol{z})\right\} x:=t\left\{r_{2}(\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{z})\right\}\left\{r_{3}(\boldsymbol{y}, \boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{z})\right\}
$$

and

$$
S^{*}=\left\{p_{1}\right\}\left\{p_{2}[t / x]\right\} x:=t\left\{p_{2}\right\}\left\{p_{3}\right\} .
$$

So the substitution will be $\phi: r_{i}(\boldsymbol{y}, x, z) \mapsto p_{i}(i=1,2,3)$.
Case 2. $S=S_{1} ; S_{2}$. So $S^{*}=\left\{p_{0}\right\}\left\{p_{1}\right\} S_{1}^{*}\left\{p_{2}\right\} S_{2}^{*}\left\{p_{3}\right\}\left\{p_{4}\right\}$.
By induction hypothesis we have substitutions

$$
\phi_{1}: \pi\left(S_{1}\right) \rightarrow\left\{p_{1}\right\} S_{1}^{*}\left\{p_{2}\right), \quad \phi_{2}: \pi\left(S_{2}\right) \rightarrow\left\{p_{2}\right\} S_{2}^{*}\left\{p_{3}\right\} .
$$

Now

$$
\begin{aligned}
\pi\left(S_{1}: S_{2}\right)= & \left\{r_{0}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\} \pi^{\prime}\left(S_{1}\right) \pi^{\prime}\left(S_{2}\right)\left\{r_{1}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\} \\
= & \frac{\left\{r_{0}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\} \cdots\left\{r_{0}^{\prime}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\}\left\{r_{1}^{\prime}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\} \cdots\left\{r_{1}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\}}{}
\end{aligned}
$$

where $-=\pi\left(S_{1}\right)$ and $----=\pi\left(S_{2}\right)$. From this it is evident how to construct the desired $\phi$. (Remark: The arity of the new $r$-symbols in $\pi\left(S_{i}\right), i=1,2$, is that of $S$ (i.e., $n$ if $S$ has the variables $x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}$ ).)

Case 3. $S=$ if $b$ then $S_{1}$ else $S_{2}$ fi. Then $\pi(S)$ and $S^{*}$ are as follows:

$$
\begin{gathered}
\pi(S)=\left\{r_{0}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\}\left\{r_{1}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\} \text { if } b \text { then }\left\{r_{1}(\boldsymbol{x}) \wedge b\right\} \pi^{\prime}\left(S_{1}\right)\left\{r_{2}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\} \\
\text { else }\left\{r_{1}(\boldsymbol{x}) \wedge \neg b\right\} \pi^{\prime}\left(S_{2}\right)\left\{r_{2}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\} \\
\text { fi }\left\{r_{2}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\}\left\{r_{3}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\}, \\
S^{*}=\left\{p_{0}\right\}\left\{p_{1}\right\} \text { if } b \text { then }\left\{p_{1} \wedge b\right\} S_{1}^{*}\left\{p_{2}\right\} \\
\text { else }\left\{p_{1} \wedge \neg b\right\} S_{2}^{*}\left\{p_{2}\right\} \\
\text { fi }\left\{p_{2}\right\}\left\{p_{3}\right\} .
\end{gathered}
$$

Again $\phi: r_{i}(\boldsymbol{x}) \mapsto p_{i}(i=0,1,2,3)$; the induction hypothesis takes care of the correspondence between $\pi^{\prime}\left(S_{i}\right)$ and $S_{i}^{*}(i=1,2)$.

Case 4. $S=$ while $b$ do $S^{\prime}$ od. (In the following ' $r_{i}$ ' stands for ' $r_{i}(\boldsymbol{x})$ '.)


Here $r_{1}=\operatorname{post}\left(\pi^{\prime}\left(S^{\prime}\right)\right)$ and $p_{1}=\operatorname{post}\left(S^{*}\right)$.
In the sequel we will need a simple proof-theoretical fact, stating that derivability in first order predicate logic is invariant under substitutions $\phi$ (as in Definition 5.6).
5.8. Proposition. Let $(\Sigma, E)$ be a specification and $p, q \in L(\Sigma)$. Let $\phi$ be a substitution of assertions $p_{i}$ for relation symbols $r_{i}$, as in Definition 5.6. (The $p_{i}$ 's are not necessarily in $L(\Sigma)$.) Let $\phi(E)=\left\{\phi\left(p^{\prime}\right) \mid p^{\prime} \in E\right\}$. Then
(i) $E \vdash p \Rightarrow \phi(E) \vdash \phi(p)$,
(ii) $\quad E \vdash p \rightarrow \phi(E) \vdash \phi(p) \rightarrow \phi(q)$.

Proof. (i) A routine induction on the length of the derivation $E \vdash p$.
(ii) follows from (i), noting that $\phi(p \rightarrow q)=\phi(p) \rightarrow \phi(q)$.
5.9. Proposition. Let $\Sigma^{0}=\Sigma \cup \Sigma_{\pi(S)}$ and $E^{0}=E \cup \kappa(\pi(S))$. Then $\left(\Sigma^{0}, E^{0}\right) \unrhd_{\mathrm{f}}$ $(\Sigma, E)$.

Proof. Take arbitrary $p, q$ such that $\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} S\{q\}$. (E.g., take $q=$ true.) Let $\{p\} S^{*}\{q\} \in \operatorname{Pr}(\Sigma, E)$ be the corresponding proof; we may suppose it matches $\pi(S)$.

Now let $\mathscr{A} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$, so by soundness of HL we have $\mathscr{A} \vDash\{p\} S\{q\}$. Further, it is not hard to see that the $r_{i}(\boldsymbol{x})$ can be interpreted in $\mathscr{A}$ just like the matching assertions in $\{p\} S^{*}\{q\}$.

Hence every $\mathscr{A} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$ can be expanded to an $\mathscr{A}^{0} \in \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{0}, E^{0}\right)$. So, by the conservativity criterium (Proposition 2.7.1), we have $\left(\Sigma^{0}, E^{0}\right) \geq(\Sigma, E)$. The finiteness is obvious.
5.10. Lemma. Let $\Sigma^{0}=\Sigma \cup \Sigma_{\pi\left(S_{2}\right)}, E^{0}=E \cup \kappa\left(\pi\left(S_{2}\right)\right)$ and let $r(\boldsymbol{x}), r^{\prime}(\boldsymbol{x})$ be respectively the assertions at the head and at the tail of $\pi\left(S_{2}\right)$.

Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) $\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$,
(ii) $\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash_{\mathrm{f}} S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$
(iii) $\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{0}, E^{0}\right) \vdash\{r(\boldsymbol{x})\} S_{2}\left\{r^{\prime}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\} \Rightarrow \operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{0}, E^{0}\right) \vdash\{r(\boldsymbol{x})\} S_{1}\left\{r^{\prime}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\}$
(iv) $\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{0}, E^{0}\right) \vdash\{r(x)\} S_{1}\left\{r^{\prime}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\}$.

Proof. (i) $\Rightarrow$ (ii) is trivial, (ii) $\Rightarrow$ (iii) follows from Proposition 5.9, and (iii) $\Rightarrow$ (iv) follows because it is obvious from the construction that $\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{0}, E\right) \vdash$ $\{r(\boldsymbol{x})\} S_{2}\left\{r^{\prime}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\}$. It remains to prove that (iv) $\Rightarrow$ (i).

Assume (iv): let $\left\{r_{0}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\} S_{1}^{*}\left\{r_{1}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\} \in \operatorname{Pr}\left(\Sigma^{0}, E^{0}\right)$ be the corresponding proof. Further, suppose for some $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E), \quad p, q \in L\left(\Sigma^{\prime}\right)$ that we have $\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vdash\{p\} S_{2}\{q\}$. Let $\{p\} S_{2}^{*}\{q\} \in \operatorname{Pr}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$ be the corresponding proof, which we may suppose matching with $\pi\left(S_{2}\right)$. By Lemma 5.7, $\{p\} S_{2}^{*}\{q\}$ is an instance of $\pi\left(S_{2}\right)$ via some substitution $\phi$.

Now consider $\phi\left(\left\{\boldsymbol{r}_{0}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\} S_{1}^{*}\left\{\boldsymbol{r}_{1}(\boldsymbol{x}\}\right)=\{p\} \phi\left(S_{1}^{*}\right)\{q\}\right.$. From the construction and by Proposition 5.8 it follows that this is a proof in $\operatorname{Pr}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$. Hence $\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vdash\{p\} S_{1}\{q\}$.
5.11. Theorem. $\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$ and $\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash S_{1} \equiv S_{2}$, as predicates of $S_{1}, S_{2}$, are semi-decidable in $E$.

Proof. This follows immediately by noting that $\left(\Sigma^{0}, E^{0}\right)$ can effectively be computed from $S_{2}$, given ( $\Sigma, E$ ), and using the equivalence (i) $\Leftrightarrow$ (iv) in Lemma 5.10.

## 6. Completions

In Section 7 we will need the possibility of taking, for given $(\Sigma, E)$, a refinement $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)$ which is logically complete (see Definition 1.2.2). Also we will use a refinement $\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)$ which has an $S P$-calculus (see Definition 6.3). The concepts and theorems thereabout, used below, are from Bergstra and Tucker [9, 10] and Bergstra and Terlouw [6]. There, however, the following restriction is made: $E$ must have only infinite models. Since we want to develop the present theory in full generality (also for, e.g., $E=\emptyset$ ), we will extend the above mentioned results by some 'formal' constructions which do not require the restriction on $E$, and which are made possible by the concept of a prototype proof $\pi(S)$. The disadvantage is that in this way we will need an infinite signature extension $\Sigma^{\prime} \geq \Sigma$, but for our purpose that is no objection. (Question: Given a specification $(\Sigma, E)$ such that $E$ has finite models, is there a logical complete $\left(\Sigma \cup \Delta, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)$ where $\Delta$ is finite? $)$
6.1. Theorem. For every $(\Sigma, E)$ there is a $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)$ such that $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$ is logically complete.

Proof. The proof is by a construction of length $\omega^{2}$. The first $\omega$ steps are as follows.

Enumerate $\mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}(\Sigma)$ as $\left\{S_{n} \mid n \in \mathbb{N}\right\}$ and let $\left\{\left(p_{n}, q_{n}\right) \mid n \in \mathbb{N}\right\}$ be an enumeration of the pairs of assertions $\in L(\Sigma)$. Now consider the sequence of asserted programs $\alpha_{n}=$ $\left\{p_{(n)_{0}}\right\} S_{(n)_{1}}\left\{q_{(n)_{0}}\right\}$ where ()$_{0},()_{1}$ are the projections corresponding to the wellknown bijection (, ): $\mathbb{N}^{2} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$. Note that every $\{p\} S\{q\}$ occurs in this sequence.

Now we define by induction on $n$ the specification $\left(\Sigma_{n}, E_{n}\right)$.
Basis: $\left(\Sigma_{0}, E_{0}\right)=(\Sigma, E)$.
Induction step: Let $\left(\Sigma_{n}, E_{n}\right)$ be defined, and consider $\alpha_{n+1}$.
Case 1. $\operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma_{n}, E_{n}\right) \not \vDash \alpha_{n+1}$. Then $\left(\Sigma_{n+1}, E_{n+1}\right)=\left(\Sigma_{n}, E_{n}\right)$.
Case 2. $\operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma_{n}, E_{n}\right) \vDash \alpha_{n+1}$. Say the prototype proof $\pi\left(S_{(n+1)_{1}}\right)$ has the form $\{r(\boldsymbol{x})\} S_{(n+1)_{1}}^{*}\left\{r^{\prime}(\boldsymbol{x})\right\}$ and let $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$ be the specification corresponding to $\pi\left(S_{(n+1)_{1}}\right)$. Then define

$$
\left(\Sigma_{n+1}, E_{n+1}\right)=\left(\Sigma_{n}, E_{n}\right) \cup\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime} \cup\left\{p_{(n)_{0}} \rightarrow r(\boldsymbol{x}), r^{\prime}(\boldsymbol{x}) \rightarrow q_{(n)_{0}}\right\}\right)
$$

(The $r$-symbols in $\pi\left(S_{(n+1)_{1}}\right)$ have to be fresh compared to previous $r$-symbols in ( $\Sigma_{n}, E_{n}$ ).)

Further, let $\left(\Sigma_{\omega}, E_{\omega}\right)=\bigcup_{n \in \omega}\left(\Sigma_{n}, E_{n}\right)$.
Claim 1. $\left(\Sigma_{0}, E_{0}\right) \leq\left(\Sigma_{1}, E_{1}\right) \leq \cdots \leq\left(\Sigma_{n}, E_{n}\right) \leq \cdots \leq\left(\Sigma_{\omega}, E_{\omega}\right)$.
Proof of Claim 1. To show that $\left(\Sigma_{n}, E_{n}\right) \unlhd\left(\Sigma_{n+1}, E_{n+1}\right)$ for all $n \in \omega$, we use the conservativity criterion of Proposition 2.7.1. Since we know (in Case 2 above) that $\alpha_{n+1}$ is true in every $\mathscr{A} \in \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma_{n}, E_{n}\right)$, the newly added $r$-symbols can be interpreted in $\mathscr{A}$; that is, $\mathscr{A}$ can be expanded to an $\mathscr{A}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma_{n+1}, E_{n+1}\right)$.

To show that $\left(\Sigma_{n}, E_{n}\right) \leq\left(\Sigma_{\omega}, E_{\omega}\right)$ for all $n \in \omega$, suppose $E_{\omega} \vdash p$, for some $p \in L\left(\Sigma_{n}\right)$. Then, for some finite $D \subseteq E_{\omega}, D \vdash p$. Hence, for some $m \geq n, E_{m} \vdash p$. Since $\left(\Sigma_{n}, E_{n}\right) \unlhd\left(\Sigma_{m}, E_{m}\right)$ as just shown, $E_{n} \vdash p$.
Now that $\left(\Sigma_{\omega}, E_{\omega}\right)$ is constructed, the statements $\in \mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}\left(\Sigma_{\omega}\right)$ and assertions $\in L\left(\Sigma_{\omega}\right)$ are again enumerated, and the procedure is repeated to yield $\left(\left(\Sigma_{\omega}\right)_{\omega},\left(E_{\omega}\right)_{\omega}\right)=\left(\Sigma_{\omega .2}, E_{\omega .2}\right)$. Likewise $\left(\Sigma_{\omega . n}, E_{\omega . n}\right)$ is constructed, and we put $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)=\bigcup_{n \in \omega}\left(\Sigma_{\omega, n}, E_{\omega, n}\right)$.

Claim 2. $\left(\Sigma_{\omega . n}, E_{\omega . n}\right) \leq\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$ for all $n \in \omega$; and $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$ is logically complete.
Proof of Claim 2. The first part is as in the proof of Claim 1. The logical completeness is shown as follows. Let $\operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vDash\{p\} S\{q\}$, where $\{p\} S\{q\} \in$ $L\left(\Sigma^{\prime}\right)$. Then $\{p\} S\{q\} \in L\left(\Sigma_{\omega . n}, E_{\omega . n}\right)$ for some $n \in \omega$, and $\operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma_{\omega . n}, E_{\omega . n}\right) \vDash$ $\{p\} S\{q\}$ follows from Proposition 4.13. (Alternative argument: Because no models were 'lost' in the construction, i.e., $\rho\left(\operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)=\operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma_{\omega . n}, E_{\omega . n}\right)\right.$ for the suitable reduction operator $\rho$.) Hence $E_{\omega .(n+1)}$ contains $\kappa(\{p\} \pi(S)\{q\})$, that is, $\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma_{\omega \cdot(n+1)}, E_{\omega \cdot(n+1)}\right) \vdash\{p\} S\{q\}$.
6.2. Corollary. Let $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \models S_{1} \subseteq S_{2}$. Then

$$
\exists\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E) \quad S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)} S_{2}
$$

Proof. Let ( $\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}$ ) be a logically complete refinement of $(\Sigma, E)$; by the preceding
theorem this exists. By Lemma 4.13 we have

$$
\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \models S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} \Leftrightarrow \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \models S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} .
$$

Now $\operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \models S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$ implies

$$
\forall p, q \in L\left(\Sigma^{\prime}\right)\left(\operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vDash\{p\} S_{2}\{q\} \Rightarrow \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \models\{p\} S_{1}\{q\}\right)
$$

Hence, by logical completeness of ( $\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}$ ), we have

$$
\forall p, q \in L\left(\Sigma^{\prime}\right)\left(\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vdash\{p\} S_{2}\{q\} \Rightarrow \operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vDash\{p\} S_{1}\{q\}\right)
$$ i.e. $S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)} S_{2}$.

6.3. Definition. Let $(\Sigma, E)$ be a specification. We say that $(\Sigma, E)$ has an SP-calculus (strongest postcondition calculus), if for each $p \in L(\Sigma), S \in \mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}(\Sigma)$ there exists an assertion $\operatorname{SP}(p, S) \in L(\Sigma)$ such that
(i) $\operatorname{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} S\{\operatorname{SP}(p, S)\}$,
(ii) if $\operatorname{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} S\{q\}$, then $(\Sigma, E) \vdash q \rightarrow \operatorname{SP}(p, S)$.
6.4. Theorem. Let $(\Sigma, E)$ be a specification without finite models. Then there is a conservative refinement $\operatorname{PA}(\Sigma, E)$ of $(\Sigma, E)$, called the Peano companion of $(\Sigma, E)$, which has an SP-calculus.

Proof. For the definition of $\operatorname{PA}(\Sigma, E)$ and the proof that it has an SP-calculus, see [10] and [6].
6.4.1. Remark. It is possible to construct a 'formal' companion having an SPcalculus, without the restriction on $E$, but at the cost of an infinite signature extension. For the sequel we will not need the full strength of an SP-calculus and we will be satisfied with the following proposition.
6.4.2. Proposition. Let $p, q \in L(\Sigma)$ and $S \in \mathscr{W P}(\Sigma)$.
(i) Let $p \leadsto^{s} q$ abbreviate $\forall(\operatorname{SP}(p, S) \rightarrow q)$, where $\forall$ denotes the universal closure. Then

$$
\operatorname{PA}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\left\{p \wedge p \leadsto^{s} q\right\} S\{q\}
$$

( $a$ kind of ' $S$-modus ponens').
(ii) Let $p \Rightarrow^{s} q$ abbreviate $\forall(\wedge \kappa(\{p\} \pi(S)\{q\}))$, i.e., the universal closure of the conjunction of the consequences in $\{p\} \pi(S)\{q\}$. Let $\Sigma^{\prime}=\Sigma \cup \Sigma_{\pi(S)}$. Then

$$
\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, \emptyset\right) \vdash\left\{p \wedge p \Rightarrow^{s} q\right\} S\{q\}
$$

Proof. (i) Follows at once from the definitions.
(ii) Follows by a tedious but routine verification by induction on $S$.

## 7. Proving program inclusion

We are now in a position to prove one of the main theorems of this paper, viz. the equivalence of semantical and cofinal inclusion. After that we will show how this fact can be exploited to give formal proofs of program inclusion.
7.1. Theorem. Semantical and cofinal inclusion coincide; i.e.,

$$
\begin{aligned}
\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \models S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} \Leftrightarrow \forall & \left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E) \quad \exists\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime} E^{\prime \prime}\right) \unrhd\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \\
& S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right)} S_{2} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Proof. $(\Rightarrow)$. Suppose $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \vDash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$ and consider $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)$. By Theorem 6.1 there is a $\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \unrhd\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$ which is logically complete. From $\operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \models S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$ we have

$$
\forall p, q \in L\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}\right)\left(\operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \models\{p\} S_{2}\{q\} \Rightarrow \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \models\{p\} S_{1}\{q\}\right)
$$

By the logical completeness we can replace ' $\operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \vDash$ ' by ' $\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \vdash$ '. This results in $S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right)} S_{2}$.
$(\Leftarrow)$. Let $E$ have no finite models. (The case that $E$ has finite models, can be dealt with analogously, as suggested by Proposition 6.4.2.)

Suppose $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \not \vDash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$. Then also $\operatorname{Alg}(\operatorname{PA}(\Sigma, E)) \not \vDash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S$ by Lemma 4.14. So there is an $\mathscr{A} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\mathrm{PA}(\Sigma, E))$ such that $\mathscr{A} \not \forall S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$. Hence for some $\boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{b} \in A$ we have ' $\mathscr{A} \vDash S_{1}(\boldsymbol{a})=\boldsymbol{b}$ ' but ' $\mathscr{A} \vDash S_{2}(\boldsymbol{a}) \neq \boldsymbol{b}$ ', par abus de language. These facts can be properly expressed by

$$
\theta=\left(\boldsymbol{x}=\underline{\boldsymbol{a}} \underline{\leadsto}^{S_{2}} \boldsymbol{x} \neq \underline{\boldsymbol{b}}\right) \wedge \operatorname{Comp}_{n, S_{1}}(\underline{a})=\underline{\boldsymbol{b}},
$$

for some $n$ (see Computation Lemma 1.1.2). The $\underline{\boldsymbol{a}}, \underline{\boldsymbol{b}}$ are new constant symbols. Let $\mathscr{A}^{\prime} \geq \mathscr{A}$ be the expansion of $\mathscr{A}$ with distinguished elements $\boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{b}$, and let $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$ be the conservative refinement of $\operatorname{PA}(\Sigma, E)$ obtained by adding $\boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{b}$ to the signature. (By Lemma 2.7.1 this is indeed conservative.) Now
(i) $\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vdash\{\theta \wedge \boldsymbol{x}=\underline{\boldsymbol{a}}\} S_{2}\{\boldsymbol{x} \neq \underline{\boldsymbol{b}}\}$,
(ii) $\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \nvdash\{\Theta \wedge \boldsymbol{x}=\underline{\boldsymbol{a}}\} S_{1}\{\boldsymbol{x} \neq \underline{\boldsymbol{b}}\}$.

Ad (i). This is Proposition 6.4.2(i).
Ad (ii). $\mathscr{A}^{\prime} \not \vDash\{\theta \wedge \boldsymbol{x}=\underline{\boldsymbol{a}}\} S_{1}\{\boldsymbol{x} \neq \underline{\boldsymbol{b}}\}$, hence $\operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \not \vDash\{\theta \wedge \boldsymbol{x}=\underline{\boldsymbol{a}}\} S_{1}\{\boldsymbol{x} \neq \underline{\boldsymbol{b}}\}$. By soundness of HL, (ii) follows.

Finally, we note that (i) also holds in refinements of ( $\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}$ ), trivially; and the same for (ii) by the downward invariance of $\operatorname{Alg}(,) \vDash\{p\} S\{q\}$ (Proposition 4.13). Therefore, $S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right)} S_{2}$ for all $\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \unrhd\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$.

We now know that the schema, given in Fig. 12, holds, and we want to prove that, in general, all implications are displayed in this figure. First we will show in


Fig. 12.
Examples 7.2 and 7.3 that $\sqsubseteq_{H L\left(\sum, E\right)}$ and $\sqsubseteq_{A \lg \left(\sum, E\right)}$ are incomparable (see also Fig. 13). Then, in Example 7.4, we show that derivable inclusion is strictly stronger than forced inclusion, in general. (I.e., the proof system corresponding to derivable inclusion proves less inclusions than the one corresponding to forced inclusion.) Further, it will be shown in the next section (Theorem 8.5) that forced inclusion and semantical inclusion are in general not equivalent. In other words, the proof system corresponding to forced inclusion is incomplete.

Finally, at the end of this section (Remark 7.8), we will prove that the 'dashed' implication for logical complete ( $\Sigma, E$ ) (see Fig. 12) can in general not be reversed, and we will prove some assertions in the part 'Intuition' of the Introduction.
7.2. Example. Let $\mathscr{A}=(\mathbb{N}, 0, S, P)$, the 'abacus-algebra' as in Section 8, and consider $\left(\Sigma_{g h}, E_{s k}\right)$. Define

$$
\begin{aligned}
& S_{1}=y:=0 ; S^{\prime} \text { where } S^{\prime}=\text { while } x \neq 0 \text { do } y:=S y ; x:=P x \text { od } \\
& S_{2}=y:=x ; x:=0 .
\end{aligned}
$$

So $\operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma_{M,}, E_{G A}\right) \vDash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$. However, $S_{1} \not{\mathbb{L H L}\left(\Sigma_{A}, E_{A}\right)} S_{2}$ because
(i) $\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma_{w}, E_{w}\right) \vdash\{x=z\} S_{2}\{x=0 \wedge y=z\}$,
(ii) $\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma_{i z}, E_{i z}\right) \nvdash\{x=z\} S_{1}\{x=0 \wedge y=z\}$.

Proof of (ii). Suppose not (ii). Then

$$
\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma_{w h}, E_{w /}\right) \vdash\{x=z \wedge y=0\} S^{\prime}\{x=0 \wedge y=z\} .
$$

Hence there must be an invariant $r(x, y, z)$ such that $E_{M / 2} \vdash \phi_{1} \wedge \phi_{2} \wedge \phi_{3}$ where

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \phi_{1}=x=z \wedge y=0 \rightarrow r(x, y, z), \\
& \phi_{2}=\exists x^{\prime}, y^{\prime}\left[x^{\prime} \neq 0 \wedge x=P x^{\prime} \wedge y=S y^{\prime} \wedge r\left(x^{\prime}, y^{\prime}, z\right)\right] \rightarrow r(x, y, z), \\
& \phi_{3}=x=0 \wedge r(x, y, z) \rightarrow y=z .
\end{aligned}
$$



Fig. 13. Venn-diagram of the various notions of inclusion.

1. Logical inclusion (i.e., $\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, \emptyset) \vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$, see Examples 7.6 and 7.7).
2. Derivable inclusion.
3. Forced inclusion.
4. Semantical inclusion $=$ cofinal inclusion.
5. Prooftheoretic inclusion.
6. Inclusion in some extension.

Also $\mathscr{A} \vDash \phi_{1} \wedge \phi_{2} \wedge \phi_{3}$. However, a simple proof then shows that $\mathscr{A} \vDash r(\underline{a}, \underline{b}, \underline{c}) \Leftrightarrow$ $a+b=c$, in contradiction with the non-definability of + in $\mathscr{A}$ (see Remarks 8.3.1 and 3.3.2).
7.3. Example. Let $\mathcal{N}=(\mathbb{N}, 0, S,+, \times), \quad \Sigma$ the signature of $\mathcal{N}$ and $E=E_{\mathcal{N}}$. Furthermore,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& S_{1}=x:=0 ; \text { while } x \neq y \text { do } x:=x+1 \text { od } \\
& S_{2}=x:=y
\end{aligned}
$$

Then (i) $S_{1} \equiv_{\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E)} S_{2}$, but (ii) $S_{1} \not \equiv_{\mathrm{Alg}(\Sigma, E)} S_{2}$.

Proof. (i) HL is relatively complete for $\mathcal{N}$, i.e.,

$$
\mathcal{N} \vDash\{p\} S\{q\} \Leftrightarrow \operatorname{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} S\{q\}
$$

Now $\mathcal{N} \vDash S_{1} \equiv S_{2}$ implies

$$
\forall p, q \mathcal{N} \vDash\{p\} S_{1}\{q\} \Leftrightarrow \mathcal{N} \vDash\{p\} S_{2}\{q\}
$$

or equivalently

$$
\forall p, q \mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} S_{1}\{q\} \Leftrightarrow \mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} S_{2}\{q\}
$$

i.e., $\mathrm{S}_{1} \equiv{ }_{\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E)} S_{2}$. Since in our case indeed $\mathcal{N} \vDash S_{1} \equiv S_{2}$, we have (i).
(ii) However, in a nonstandard model $\mathcal{N}^{*} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E), S_{1}$ will diverge when $y$ is nonstandard. So $\mathcal{N}^{*} \not \equiv S_{1} \equiv S_{2}$, hence $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \not \vDash S_{1} \equiv S_{2}$.
7.4. Example. Back to Example 7.2, which shows moreover that

$$
\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} \nLeftarrow \mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \Vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} .
$$

From $S_{1} \not \unrhd_{\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma_{\Omega,}, E_{s a}\right)} S_{2}$ it follows trivially that $S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$ is not derivable. However, for $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)=\left(\Sigma_{\mathscr{A ^ { \prime }}}, E_{\mathscr{A} \mathscr{A}^{\prime}}\right)$ where $\mathscr{A}^{\prime}=(\mathbb{N}, 0, S, P,+)$ we do have

$$
\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma_{\mathscr{Q ^ { \prime }}}, E_{\mathscr{Q ^ { \prime }}}\right) \vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}
$$

The proof of $(\star)$ is by the method of prototype proofs, as follows. Consider $\pi\left(S_{2}\right)$, this is given by

$$
\left\{r_{0}(x, y)\right\}\left\{r_{1}(x, x)\right\} y:=x\left\{r_{1}(x, y)\right\}\left\{r_{2}(0, y)\right\} x:=0\left\{r_{2}(x, y)\right\}\left\{r_{3}(x, y)\right\} .
$$

So we have to find a proof of $\left\{r_{0}(x, y)\right\} S_{1}\left\{r_{3}(x, y)\right\}$ in the theory

$$
E_{\mathscr{A}^{\prime}} \cup\left\{r_{0}(x, y) \rightarrow r_{1}(x, x), r_{1}(x, y) \rightarrow r_{2}(0, y), r_{2}(x, y) \rightarrow r_{3}(x, y)\right\} .
$$

This is indeed possible:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
y:=0 & \\
& \left\{r_{0}(x, y)\right\}\left\{r_{1}(x, x)\right\}\left\{r_{2}(0, x)\right\}\left\{r_{3}(0, x)\right\} \\
& \left\{r_{3}(0, x) \wedge y=0\right\} \\
& \left\{\exists x_{0}\left[r_{3}\left(0, x_{0}\right) \wedge x=x_{0} \wedge y=0\right]\right\} \\
& \left\{\exists x_{0}\left[r_{3}\left(0, x_{0}\right) \wedge x+y=x_{0}\right]\right\}
\end{array}
$$

while $x \neq 0$ do

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \left\{\exists x_{0}\left[r_{3}\left(0, x_{0}\right) \wedge x+y=x_{0} \wedge x \neq 0\right]\right\} \\
& \left\{\exists x_{0}\left[r_{3}\left(0, x_{0}\right) \wedge P x+S y=x_{0} \wedge x \neq 0\right]\right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
y:=S y
$$

$$
\left\{\exists x_{0}\left[r_{3}\left(0, x_{0}\right) \wedge P x+y=x_{0} \wedge x \neq 0\right]\right\}
$$

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
x:= & P x \\
& \left\{\exists x_{0}\left[r_{3}\left(0, x_{0}\right) \wedge x+y=x_{0}\right]\right\} \\
\text { od } & \\
& \left\{\exists x_{0}\left[r_{3}\left(0, x_{0}\right) \wedge x+y=x_{0}\right] \wedge x=0\right\} \\
& \left\{\exists x_{0}\left[r_{3}\left(0, x_{0}\right) \wedge y=x_{0} \wedge x=0\right]\right\} \\
& \left\{r_{3}(x, y)\right\} .
\end{array}
$$

The above concepts and theorems generalize without any effort (other than notational) to the case of multi-sorted signatures and algebras. To substantiate this claim, we give the following example.
7.5. Example. Let $\Sigma$ be the multi-sorted signature consisting of

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text { domains }: & \mathrm{NUM}, \mathrm{VEC}, \mathrm{FUN} \\
\text { constants }: & 0,1 \in \mathrm{NUM}, \emptyset \in \mathrm{VEC} \\
\text { functions }: & +: \mathrm{NUM} \times \mathrm{NUM} \rightarrow \mathrm{NUM} \\
& \because \mathrm{NUM} \times \mathrm{NUM} \rightarrow \mathrm{NUM} \\
& \mathrm{AP}: \mathrm{VEC} \times \mathrm{NUM} \rightarrow \mathrm{VEC} \\
& \mathrm{INP}: \mathrm{VEC} \times \mathrm{VEC} \rightarrow \mathrm{NUM} \\
& \mathrm{ROW}: \mathrm{FUN} \times \mathrm{NUM} \rightarrow \mathrm{VEC} \\
& \mathrm{EVAL}: \mathrm{FUN} \times \mathrm{NUM} \rightarrow \mathrm{NUM} \\
\text { variables }: & x, y, z \in \mathrm{NUM} \\
& X, Y, Z \in \mathrm{VEC} \\
& \alpha, \beta \in \mathrm{FUN}
\end{aligned}
$$

The specification ( $\Sigma, E$ ) we are interested in has the following axioms, describing how the inproduct between two vectors should behave:

$$
\begin{aligned}
E= & \{\text { Peano }+ \text { all induction axioms } \\
& \operatorname{INP}(\emptyset, Z)=\operatorname{INP}(Z, \emptyset)=0 \\
& \operatorname{INP}\left(\operatorname{AP}(Z, x), \operatorname{AP}\left(Z^{\prime}, x^{\prime}\right)\right)=\operatorname{INP}\left(Z, Z^{\prime}\right)+x \cdot x^{\prime} \\
& \operatorname{AP}(Z, x)=\operatorname{AP}\left(Z^{\prime}, x^{\prime}\right) \rightarrow Z=Z^{\prime} \wedge x=x^{\prime} \\
& \operatorname{ROW}(\alpha, 0)=\emptyset \\
& \operatorname{ROW}(\alpha, x+1)=\operatorname{AP}(\operatorname{ROW}(\alpha, x), \operatorname{EVAL}(\alpha, x+1)) \\
& \forall x \operatorname{EVAL}(\alpha, x)=\operatorname{EVAL}(\beta, x) \rightarrow \alpha=\beta\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Furthermore, let $S_{1}, S_{2} \in \mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}(\Sigma)$ be the following programs, both computing the inproduct of two vectors:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \left.\begin{array}{l}
S_{1}=A:=\emptyset, B:=\emptyset ; z:=0 ; x:=0 ; \\
\text { while } x \neq y \text { do } x
\end{array}\right)=x+1 ; \\
& z:=z+\operatorname{EVAL}(\alpha, x) \cdot \operatorname{EVAL}(\beta, x) \\
& \text { od } x:=0, \\
& S_{2}=A \\
& x:=\operatorname{ROW}(\alpha, y) ; B:=\operatorname{ROW}(\beta, y) ; z:=\operatorname{INP}(A, B) ; \\
& x:=\emptyset .
\end{aligned}
$$

Now we want to prove that $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \vDash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$. (The reverse does not hold by the presence of nonstandard models in $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$.) (This can be done by proving that $\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$, using the method of prototype proofs, as follows. First we write down $\pi\left(S_{2}\right)$ :

$$
\begin{array}{ll} 
& \left\{r_{0}(x, y, z, A, B)\right\} \\
A:=\operatorname{ROW}(\alpha, y) & \\
& \left\{r_{1}(x, y, z, \operatorname{ROW}(\alpha, y), B)\right\} \\
& \left\{r_{1}(x, y, z, A, B)\right\} \\
B:=\operatorname{ROW}(\beta, y) & \\
& \left\{r_{2}(x, y, z, A, \operatorname{ROW}(\beta, y))\right\} \\
& \left\{r_{2}(x, y, z, A, B)\right\} \\
& \left\{r_{3}(x, y, \operatorname{INP}(A, B), A, B)\right\} \\
z:=\operatorname{INP}(A, B) \quad & \\
& \left\{r_{3}(x, y, z, A, B)\right\} \\
& \left\{r_{4}(0, y, z, A, B)\right\} \\
& \\
& \left\{r_{4}(x, y, z, A, B)\right\} \\
& \left\{r_{5}(x, y, z, \emptyset, B)\right\} \\
& \\
& \left\{r_{5}(x, y, z, A, B)\right\} \\
& \left\{r_{6}(x, y, z, A, \emptyset)\right\} \\
& \\
& \left\{r_{6}(x, y, z, A, B)\right\} \\
& \left\{r_{7}(x, y, z, A, B)\right\}
\end{array}
$$

So $\kappa\left(\pi\left(S_{2}\right)\right)$, the set of consequences used in $\pi\left(S_{2}\right)$, entails the following implications:

```
ro}(x,y,z,A,B)
r
r}(x,y,z,\operatorname{ROW}(\alpha,y),\operatorname{ROW}(\beta,y))
r
r}(0,y,\operatorname{INP}(\operatorname{ROW}(\alpha,y),\operatorname{ROW}(\beta,y)),\operatorname{ROW}(\alpha,y),\operatorname{ROW}(\beta,y))
r
r
r
```

Using these implications together with theory $E$, we can prove $\left\{r_{0}(x, y, z, A, B)\right\}$ $S_{1}\left\{r_{7}(x, y, z, A, B)\right\}$ (and by Lemma 5.10 this proves $\left.\operatorname{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}\right)$ :
$\left\{r_{0}(x, y, z, A, B)\right\}$
$\left\{r_{7}(0, y, \operatorname{INP}(\operatorname{ROW}(\alpha, y), \operatorname{ROW}(\beta, y)), \emptyset, \emptyset)\right\}$
$A:=\emptyset ;$
$\left\{r_{7}(0, y, \operatorname{INP}(\operatorname{ROW}(\alpha, y), \operatorname{ROW}(\beta, y)), A, \emptyset)\right\}$
$B:=\emptyset ;$
$\pm \quad\left\{r_{7}(0, y, \operatorname{INP}(\operatorname{ROW}(\alpha, y), \operatorname{ROW}(\beta, y)), A, B)\right\}\left(\right.$ abbreviation: $\left.r_{7}^{\prime}\right)$ $z:=0 ;$

$$
\left\{r_{7}^{\prime} \wedge z=0\right\}
$$

$x:=0 ;$
$\left\{r_{7}^{\prime} \wedge z=0 \wedge x=0\right\}$
$\left\{r_{7}^{\prime} \wedge z=\operatorname{INP}(\operatorname{ROW}(\alpha, x), \operatorname{ROW}(\beta, x))\right\}$

## while $x \neq y$ do

$$
\left(r_{7}^{\prime} \wedge z=\operatorname{INP}(\operatorname{ROW}(\alpha, x), \operatorname{ROW}(\beta, x)) \wedge x \neq y\right\}
$$

$$
x:=x+1
$$

$$
\left\{r _ { 7 } ^ { \prime } \wedge \exists x ^ { \prime } \left(z=\operatorname{INP}\left(\operatorname{ROW}\left(\alpha, x^{\prime}\right), \operatorname{ROW}\left(\beta, x^{\prime}\right)\right) \wedge x=x^{\prime}+1\right.\right.
$$

$$
\left.\left.\wedge x^{\prime} \neq y\right)\right\}
$$

$z:=z+\operatorname{EVAL}(\alpha, x) \cdot \operatorname{EVAL}(\beta, x)$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \left\{r_{7}^{\prime} \wedge \exists x^{\prime}, z^{\prime}\left(z^{\prime}=\operatorname{INP}\left(\operatorname{ROW}\left(\alpha, x^{\prime}\right), \operatorname{ROW}\left(\beta, x^{\prime}\right) \wedge x=x^{\prime}+1\right.\right.\right. \\
& \left.\left.\quad \wedge x^{\prime} \neq y \wedge z=z^{\prime}+\operatorname{EVAL}(\alpha, x) \cdot \operatorname{EVAL}(\beta, x)\right)\right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

```
(Now use \(E\) )
    \(\left\{r_{7}^{\prime} \wedge \exists x^{\prime}\left(z=\operatorname{INP}\left(\operatorname{ROW}\left(\alpha, x^{\prime}+1\right), \operatorname{ROW}\left(\beta, x^{\prime}+1\right)\right)\right.\right.\)
        \(\left.\left.\wedge x=x^{\prime}+1 \wedge x^{\prime} \neq y\right)\right\}\)
    \(\left\{r_{7}^{\prime} \wedge z=\operatorname{INP}(\operatorname{ROW}(\alpha, x), \operatorname{ROW}(\beta, x))\right\}\)
od
    \(\left\{r_{7}^{\prime} \wedge z=\operatorname{INP}(\operatorname{ROW}(\alpha, x), \operatorname{ROW}(\beta, x)) \wedge x=y\right\}\)
    \(\left\{r_{7}(0, y, z, A, B)\right\}\)
\(x:=0\)
    \(\left\{r_{7}(x, y, z, A, B)\right\}\).
```

Hence $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \vDash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$.
7.6. Example. Define (as a special case of derivable inclusion) logical inclusion of $S_{1}$ in $S_{2}$ as follows: $\operatorname{HL}(\Sigma, \emptyset) \vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$. Now the following well-known equivalences are 'logical':
(i) (Loop-unwinding)

$$
\begin{aligned}
& S_{1}=\text { while } b \text { do } S \text { od } ; D(D=x:=x) \\
& S_{2}=\text { if } b \text { then while } b \text { do } S \text { od; } D \text { else } D .
\end{aligned}
$$

The proof that $\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, \emptyset) \vdash S_{1} \subseteq S_{2}$ immediately follows by computing $\pi\left(S_{1}\right)$ and using the thus obtained set of consequences $\kappa\left(\pi\left(S_{1}\right)\right)$ :

$$
\begin{aligned}
& r_{0}(x) \rightarrow r_{1}(x), \\
& r_{1}(x) \wedge b \rightarrow r_{2}(0), \quad r_{2}(x) \rightarrow r_{1}(x), \\
& r_{1}(x) \wedge \neg b \rightarrow r_{3}(x),
\end{aligned}
$$

to prove that $\left\{r_{0}(x)\right\} S_{2}\left\{r_{3}(x)\right\}$. Likewise for the reverse inclusion.
(ii) Another example of logical inclusion, which is equally simple to verify:
$S_{1}=$ while true do $S$ od, $\quad S_{2}$ is arbitrary.
Then $\operatorname{HL}(\Sigma, \emptyset) \vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$. This example is from [4, p. 93] as well as the next one:
(iii) $S_{1}=$ while $b_{1} \vee b_{2}$ do $S$ od

$$
S_{2}=\text { while } b_{1} \text { do } S \text { od; while } b_{2} \text { do } S ; \text { while } b_{1} \text { do } S \text { od od. }
$$

Here also a simple computation yields the logical equivalence of $S_{1}, S_{2}$.
7.7. Example. Manna [20, p. 251, p. 259] gives several examples of program equivalence which are all 'logical':
(i) $S_{1}=x_{2}:=f\left(x_{1}\right) ; x_{2}:=g\left(x_{1}, x_{3}\right) \quad S_{2}=x_{2}:=g\left(x_{1}, x_{3}\right)$
(ii) $S_{1}=$ while $p\left(x_{2}\right)$ do $x_{1}:=g\left(x_{1}, x_{3}\right)$ od $D$

$$
S_{2}=\text { if } p\left(x_{2}\right) \text { than DIV else } D \text { fi }
$$

Here DIV $=$ while $x=x$ do $x:=x$, and $D=x:=x$
(iii) $S_{1}=x:=y+1$; if $x=1$ then $z:=0$ else $y:=y+1$;

$$
\text { if } y=1 \text { then } z:=1 \text { else } z:=2 \text { fi fi }
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
S_{2}= & x:=y+1 ; \text { if } x=1 \text { then } z:=0 \text { else } y:=y+1 ; \\
& z:=2 \text { fi. }
\end{aligned}
$$

(Adapted from [20, p. 252]. Note that $S_{1}$ contains a useless branch.)
7.8. Remarks. (1) Abbreviate

$$
\forall p, q \in L(\Sigma) \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \models\{p\} S_{1}\{q\} \Rightarrow \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \models\{p\} S_{2}\{q\}
$$

by $S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{PC}(\Sigma, E)} S_{2}$ (where PC stands for partial correctness).
Then, for ( $\Sigma, E$ ) logically complete, it follows at once from Definition 1.2.2 that $\sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E)}$ and $\sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{PC}(\Sigma, E)}$ coincide.

Since $S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{Alg}(\Sigma, E)} S_{2}$ implies $S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{PC}(\Sigma, E)} S_{2}$ (trivially) for all $(\Sigma, E)$, we have therefore, for logical complete ( $\Sigma, E$ ),

$$
S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{Alg}(\Sigma, E)} S_{2} \Rightarrow S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E)} S_{2} .
$$

The reverse implication does not hold. We give a counterexample:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& S_{1}=x:=0, y:=0, \\
& S_{2}=\text { while } x \neq y \text { do } x:=x+1 \text { od; } x:=0 ; y:=0, \\
& (\Sigma, E)=\left(\Sigma_{\mathcal{N}}, E_{\mathcal{N}}\right) \text { where } \mathcal{N}=(\mathbb{N}, 0,1,+, x) .
\end{aligned}
$$

Now ( $\Sigma, E$ ) is logical complete (see [7]) and HL is relatively complete for $\mathcal{N}$ (see [4, Chapter 3]). From the last fact it follows that $S_{1} \equiv_{H L(\Sigma, E)} S_{2}$. However, due to the presence of nonstandard models in $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$, we have $S_{1} \neq \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) S_{2}$.
(2) Note that (1) also establishes that (ii) $\nRightarrow$ (i) (i.e., $S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{PC}(\Sigma, E)} S_{2} \nRightarrow$ $\left.S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)} S_{2}\right)$, as claimed in the Introduction. For another counterexample, see [5, Theorem 5.8].
(3) As claimed in the Introduction:

$$
\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \vDash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} \Leftrightarrow \forall\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E) S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{PC}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)} S_{2} .
$$

Here $(\Rightarrow)$ is trivial.
Proof of $(\Leftarrow)$ : Assume the right-hand side, and suppose $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \not \vDash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$. Then since semantical and cofinal inclusion coincide (Theorem 7.1), we have

$$
\exists\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E) \quad \forall\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \unrhd\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) S_{1} \not \ddagger_{H L\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right)} S_{2}
$$

Now consider such a ( $\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}$ ), and a ( $\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}$ ) which is logically complete. Then by the assumption of the right-hand side, $S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{PC}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right)} S_{2}$; and by logical completeness, $S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right)} S_{2}$; a contradiction.

## 8. Abacus arithmetic

In this section we will consider our paradigm algebra $\mathscr{A}=(\mathbb{N}, 0, S, P)$. It is useful by the following two well-known facts (already mentioned in Example 3.3.3).

### 8.1. Proposition. (i) $E_{\mathscr{A}}$ is a decidable theory, and (ii) every partial recursive function

 can be computed in $\mathscr{A}$ by some $S \in \mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}\left(\Sigma_{A}\right)$.Using this proposition we will calculate the degrees in the arithmetical hierarchy of the various inclusions $S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$ (as predicates of $S_{1}, S_{2}$ ) w.r.t. ( $\Sigma_{\mathscr{A}}, E_{s \mathcal{A}}$ ).

For a proof of Proposition 8.1 (ii), see, e.g., [11, Chapters 6 and 7], where results from [19] are presented. The proof there uses in fact not while-programs, but flow-diagrams composed of only two operations:
assignments: $x_{n}:=S\left(x_{n}\right) \quad(n=0,1,2, \ldots)$
branching operations:

(As pointed out in [19], such a flow-diagram is in fact computing on an infinite abacus. Variables as in such a diagram are known as counters.) Combined with the equally well-known fact that for every flow-diagram there is an equivalent whileprogram (see, e.g., [19]) we have Proposition 8.1(ii).

For the sake of completeness, we will now outline a proof of Proposition 8.1(i), as given in [14].
8.2. Definition. Let $A$ be some set and let $R \subseteq A^{n}$ be an $n$-ary relation. Let $a_{1}, \ldots, a_{n-1} \in A$ be fixed. Then $\left\{x \in A \mid R\left(a_{1}, \ldots, a_{i-1}, x, a_{i}, \ldots, a_{n-1}\right)\right\}$ is called a section of $R$ (where $1 \leq i<n$ ).
8.3. Proposition. (a) Let $\mathscr{A}^{\prime}=(\mathbb{N}, 0, S)$. Then
(i) $E_{\mathscr{A}^{\prime}}$ is decidable,
(ii) $E_{\mathscr{A}}$ admits elimination of quantifiers,
(iii) a subset $X \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ is definable in $\mathscr{A}^{\prime}$ iff $X$ is finite or cofinite (i.e., $\mathbb{N}-X$ is finite).

More general, every definable n-ary relation $R \subseteq \mathbb{N}^{n}$ has only finite or cofinite sections.
(b) The same as in (a) holds for $\mathscr{A}=(\mathbb{N}, 0, S, P)$.
(c) Likewise for $(\mathbb{Z}, 0, S, P)$.

Proof. (a) (see [14]). (i) is proved there by considering the following axiomatization of $E_{s l}$ :

$$
\begin{aligned}
& S(x) \neq 0 \\
& S(x)=S(y) \rightarrow x=y \\
& y \neq 0 \rightarrow \exists x(y=S(x)) \\
& \left.S(x) \neq x, S(S(x)) \neq x, \ldots, S^{n}(x) \neq x, \ldots \quad \text { (for all } n\right) .
\end{aligned}
$$

Using the Loś-Vaught test it is proved that this axiomatization is complete. Obviously it is also decidable. Hence $E_{\mathscr{A}^{\prime}}$ is decidable.
(ii) As demonstrated in [14], for every assertion $p \in L\left(\Sigma_{Q^{\prime}}\right)$ there is a quantifierfree assertion $q$ such that $E_{\mathscr{Q}^{\prime}} \vdash p \leftrightarrow q$. (This 'elimination of quantifiers' yields another proof of (i).)
(iii) Routine from (ii).
(b) Note that $P$ is definable in $\mathscr{A}^{\prime}=(\mathbb{N}, 0, S)$, by

$$
P(x)=y \leftrightarrow x=y=0 \vee S(y)=x
$$

Now use (a).
(c) A routine adaptation of (b).
8.3.1. Remark. Note that Proposition 8.3(b)(iii) yields an alternative proof of the nondefinability of + in $\mathscr{A}$. For, using a supposed definition of + one could define the set $X$ of even numbers in $\mathscr{A}$; a contradiction since $X$ and its complement are both infinite.
8.4. Application. The following is an example of $S_{1}, S_{2}$ such that the domain inclusion $\operatorname{Dom}\left(\mathrm{S}_{1}\right) \sqsubseteq \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{2}\right)$ is not derivable but can be forced (see Example 9.5(ii)).

Let $\mathscr{A}$ be $(\mathbb{Z}, 0, S, P)$ and $(\Sigma, E)=\left(\Sigma_{\mathscr{A}}, E_{\mathscr{A}}\right)$. Let

$$
\begin{aligned}
S_{1}=y & :=0 ; \text { while } x \neq y \text { do } y:=S(y) \text { od } ; \\
y & :=0 ; \text { while } x \neq y \text { do } y:=P(y) \text { od }
\end{aligned}
$$

and

$$
S_{2}=y:=0 ; \text { if } x=0 \text { then } x:=x \text { else DIV fi }
$$

where

$$
\text { DIV }=\text { while } x=x \text { do } x:=x \text { od. }
$$

Clearly, $S_{1}$ and $S_{2}$ converge on $x=0$ and nowhere else.
Now $\operatorname{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{x \neq 0\} S_{2}\{$ false $\}$, as can easily be proved; however, $\operatorname{HL}(\Sigma, E) \nvdash\{x \neq 0\} S_{1}\{$ false $\}$. This can be made plausible by considering an informal proof of $\{x \neq 0\} S_{1}\{$ false $\}$; then somehow one must mention the ordering $<$ on $\mathbb{Z}$. However, < is not present in $\Sigma$, and not even definable in $(\Sigma, E)$. (The nondefinability of $<$ in ( $\Sigma, E$ ) can easily be proved using Padoa's method (Theorem 3.3), by
permuting some of the nonstandard copies of $\mathbb{Z}$ in a nonstandard model of ( $\Sigma, E$ ); cf. 3.3.2.)

That $\operatorname{HL}(\Sigma, E) \nvdash\{x \neq 0\} S_{1}\{\mathbf{f a l s e}\}$ can be made precise as follows. If $\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{x \neq 0\} S_{1}\{\mathbf{f a l s e}\}$, then, using $x=S(y) \leftrightarrow P(x)=y$, one easily shows that the two invariants $r_{1}(x, y), r_{2}(x, y)$ in $S_{1}$ must satisfy:
(1) $\quad x \neq 0 \rightarrow r_{1}(x, 0)$,
(2) $\quad x \neq y \wedge r_{1}(x, y) \rightarrow r_{1}(x, S(y))$,
(3) $\quad r_{1}(x, x) \rightarrow r_{2}(x, 0)$,
(4) $\quad x \neq y \wedge r_{2}(x, y) \rightarrow r_{2}(x, P(y))$,
(5) $\quad \neg r_{2}(x, x)$.

There are several 'solutions' for $r_{1}, r_{2}$ as subsets of $\mathbb{Z}^{2}$. However, using (1)-(5) we have $r_{1}(1,0)$, hence $r_{1}(1,1)$, hence $r_{2}(1,0)$, hence $r_{2}(1, n)$ for all $n \leq 0$. Moreover, from (4) and (5), $\neg r_{2}(1, m)$ for all $m \geq 1$. Therefore, every solution $r_{2}$ has a section which is neither finite nor cofinite; so, by Proposition 8.3(c)(iii), $r_{2}$ is not definable.

As promised in Section 7, we will now show that semantical inclusion and forced inclusion are in general not equivalent.
8.5. Theorem. The proof system $\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \Vdash S_{1} \subseteq S_{2}$ is in general not complete for $S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{Alg}(\Sigma, E)} S_{2}$.

Proof. Let $\Sigma$ be the signature of $\mathscr{A}=(\mathbb{N}, 0, S, P)$. From Proposition 8.3(b) we know that $E=E_{\mathscr{A}}$ is decidable. Let $\rceil: \mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}(\Sigma) \rightarrow \omega$ be an effective coding of programs; we will write $s$ for $\lceil S\rceil . R$ and $r$ are two relations on pairs of codes of programs as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& r\left(s_{1}, s_{2}\right) \Leftrightarrow \mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \Vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}, \\
& R\left(s_{1}, s_{2}\right) \Leftrightarrow S_{1} \sqsubseteq \mathrm{Alg}(\Sigma, E) S_{2} .
\end{aligned}
$$

The incompleteness of $\Vdash$ for $\sqsubseteq_{\text {Alg }}$ is shown by considering the specification $(\Sigma, E)$ and demonstrating that $R \neq r$. It turns out that $R$ and $r$ have different positions in the arithmetical hierarchy. As a matter of fact $r$ is $\Sigma_{2}^{0}$ but $R$ is complete $\Pi_{2}^{0}$, and a fortiori $r$ and $R$ must differ.

We will first consider $r$. Working from its formal definition we obtain

$$
\begin{aligned}
r\left(S_{1}, S_{2}\right) & \Leftrightarrow \exists\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)\left[\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}\right] \\
& \stackrel{(1)}{\Leftrightarrow} \exists\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)\left[(\Sigma, E) \text { consistent \& HL }(\Sigma, E) \vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}\right] \\
& \stackrel{(2)}{\Leftrightarrow} \exists\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{*}\right)_{\text {finite }}\left[\Sigma^{\prime} \supseteq \Sigma \&\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{*} \cup E\right)\right. \text { consistent }
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\left.\& \mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{*} \cup E\right) \vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}\right]
$$

Step (1) is justified by the completeness of $(\Sigma, E)$ which entails that each consistent refinement of it is a conservative one. Step (2) follows from Lemma 5.10(ii) which says that the refinement in the definition of $\Vdash$ can be taken finite if one wants. Because ' $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{*} \cup E\right)$ is consistent' is a $\Pi_{1}^{0}$ predicate and $\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{*} \cup E\right) \vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$ is $\Sigma_{1}^{0}$ (due to Theorem 5.11 and the decidability of $E$ ), $r$ must be $\Sigma_{2}^{0}$.
Then consider $R$. $S_{1} \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{Alg}(, E)} S_{2}$ is in general $\Pi_{2}^{0}$ in $E, R$ is at most $\Pi_{2}^{0}$. We have to show that it is complete $\Pi_{2}^{0}$. A well-known example of a complete $\Pi_{2}^{0}$ relation is the following one: $t(s) \Leftrightarrow S$ computes a total function on $\mathscr{A}$ (for more information, see [22]). We show that $t$ is $1-1$ reducible to $R$. Let $X_{S}=\left\{x_{1}, \ldots, x_{k(S)}\right\}$ be the set of variables occurring in $S$. For $x \in X_{S}, H(x)$ abbreviates the program while $x \neq$ 0 do $x:=P(x)$ od. $H\left(X_{S}\right)$ abbreviates $H\left(x_{1}\right) ; H\left(x_{2}\right) ; \ldots ; H(k(s))$. The reduction of $t$ to $R$ works as follows:

$$
t(\lceil S\rceil) \Leftrightarrow R\left(\left\lceil H\left(X_{S}\right)\right\rceil,\left\lceil S ; H\left(X_{S}\right)\right\rceil\right)
$$

To see $(\Leftarrow)$, assume $H\left(X_{S}\right) \sqsubseteq_{\text {Alg }(\Sigma, E)} S ; H\left(X_{S}\right)$; then in $\mathscr{A}: H\left(X_{S}\right) \sqsubseteq S ; H\left(X_{S}\right)$; because $H\left(X_{S}\right)$ is total on $\mathscr{A}, S$ must be total on $\mathscr{A}$ as well, i.e., $t(\lceil S\rceil)$ holds. On the other hand assume $t(\lceil S\rceil)$. Let $\mathscr{B} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$; clearly $\mathscr{A}$ is isomorphic to a substructure of $\mathscr{B}$. As $H\left(X_{S}\right)$ and $S ; H\left(X_{S}\right)$ can only produce output 0 it is sufficient to show $\operatorname{Dom}\left(H\left(X_{X}\right)\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Dom}\left(S ; H\left(X_{S}\right)\right) . \operatorname{Dom}\left(H\left(X_{S}\right)\right)=\mathscr{A}^{k(S)}$, thus $S$ is defined on $\operatorname{Dom}\left(H\left(X_{S}\right)\right)$ and yields values in $\mathscr{A}^{k(S)}$ on such arguments; on these values in turn, $\operatorname{HL}\left(X_{S}\right)$ is defined.

## 9. Domain inclusion

In this section we will show that given some additional information about the domains of $S_{1}, S_{2}$, semantical inclusion and forced inclusion $S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$ coincide.

### 9.1. Definition. (i) (Semantical inclusion of domains).

Let $S_{1}, S_{2} \in \mathscr{W P}(\Sigma)$. Then $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \vDash \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{1}\right) \sqsubseteq \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{2}\right)$ if, for all $\mathscr{A} \in$ $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E), \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{1}^{Q^{\mathcal{A}}}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{2}^{\mathscr{A}}\right)$. Note that $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \models \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{1}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{2}\right)$
implies

$$
\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \vDash\{p\} S_{2}\{\text { false }\} \Rightarrow \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \vDash\{p\} S_{1}\{\text { false }\}
$$

(ii) (HL-inclusion of domains). $\operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{1}\right) \sqsubseteq_{H L(\Sigma, E)} \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{2}\right)$ iff

$$
\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} S_{2}\{\text { false }\} \Rightarrow \mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} S_{1}\{\text { false }\} \quad \text { for all } p \in L(\Sigma)
$$

(iii) (Derivable inclusion of domains). $\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{1}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{2}\right) \mathrm{iff}$ $\forall\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E) \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{1}\right) \sqsubseteq_{\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)} \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{2}\right)$.
(iv) (Forced inclusion of domains). $\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vDash \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{1}\right) \sqsubseteq \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{2}\right)$ iff $\exists\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E) \mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vdash \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{1}\right) \sqsubseteq \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{2}\right)$.
9.1.1. Remark. The mathematical theory of domain inclusion is quite complicated in fact. For instance, a pentagon of inclusion relations similar to the one after Theorem 7.1, can be constructed and will turn out to have analogous properties.

In order to prove the main theorem of this section, we need the following proposition.
9.2. Proposition. Let $S_{1}, S_{2} \in \mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}(\Sigma)$ contain both the variables $x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}$ and suppose $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \vDash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$. Then there is a $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)$ such that $\Sigma^{\prime} \geqq \Sigma \cup$ $\left\{f_{1}, \ldots, f_{n}\right\}$, where $f_{1}, \ldots, f_{n}$ are 'fresh' $n$-ary function symbols, and such that

$$
\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vdash\{\boldsymbol{x}=\boldsymbol{z}\} S_{i}\{\boldsymbol{x}=f(\boldsymbol{x})\}, \quad i=1,2 .
$$

(Here $\boldsymbol{x}=f(\boldsymbol{z})$ abbreviates: $x_{1}=f_{1}\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right), \ldots, x_{n}=f_{n}\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right)$.)

Proof. Let $\Sigma^{\prime \prime}=\Sigma \cup\left\{f_{1}, \ldots, f_{n}\right\}$ and $E^{\prime \prime}=E \cup \Gamma$ where

$$
\Gamma=\left\{\operatorname{Comp}_{n, s_{i}}(\boldsymbol{z})=\boldsymbol{x} \rightarrow \boldsymbol{x}=f(\boldsymbol{z}) \mid n \geq 0, i=1,2\right\}
$$

(for 'Comp', see Lemma 1.1.2).
Now every $\mathscr{A} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$ can be expanded to an $\mathscr{A}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right)$, since $\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \vDash S_{1} \subseteq S_{2}$. Choose for the interpretation $f^{\mathscr{A}}$ an arbitrary total function extending the partial function $S_{2}^{\infty}$ (which extends itself $S_{1}^{\mathscr{A}}$ ). Therefore, by the criterion for conservativity (Proposition 2.7.1), ( $\left.\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \geq(\Sigma, E)$. Clearly, $\operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \models\{\boldsymbol{x}=\boldsymbol{z}\} S_{i}\{\boldsymbol{x}=f(\boldsymbol{z})\}, i=1,2$.

Now let ( $\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}$ ) be a logical completion of ( $\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}$ ). (By Theorem 6.1 this exists.) Then $\operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \models\{\boldsymbol{x}=\boldsymbol{z}\} S_{i}\{\boldsymbol{x}=f(\boldsymbol{z})\}, i=1,2$, and by the logical completeness we have

$$
\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vdash\{\boldsymbol{x}=\boldsymbol{z}\} S_{i}\{\boldsymbol{x}=f(\boldsymbol{z})\} .
$$

9.3. Theorem. Suppose $H L(\Sigma, E) \Vdash \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{1}\right) \sqsubseteq \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{2}\right)$. Then

$$
\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \models S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} \Leftrightarrow \mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \Vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} .
$$

Proof. $(\Leftrightarrow)$ is already done in Section 7.
$(\Rightarrow)$. Let $S_{1}, S_{2} \in \mathscr{W P P}(\Sigma)$ be such that

$$
\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \Vdash \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{1}\right) \sqsubseteq \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{2}\right) \quad \text { and } \quad \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \models S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} .
$$

Let $\boldsymbol{x}=x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}$ be the variables occurring in $S_{1}, S_{2}$.
Step 1. Extend $\Sigma$ to $\Sigma_{1}$ containing $n$-ary function symbols $f_{1}, \ldots, f_{n}$ and $E$ to $E_{1}$ such that $\left(\Sigma_{1}, E_{1}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)$ and $\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma_{1}, E_{1}\right) \vdash\{\boldsymbol{x}=\boldsymbol{z}\} S_{i}\{\boldsymbol{x}=f(\boldsymbol{z})\}, i=1,2$. This is possible by Proposition 8.2.

By assumption, there is a $\left(\Sigma_{2}, E_{2}\right) \unrhd(\Sigma, E)$ such that $\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma_{2}, E_{2}\right) \vdash \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{1}\right) \sqsubseteq$ $\operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{2}\right)$. We may suppose $\Sigma_{2} \cap \Sigma_{1}=\Sigma$ (cf. Proposition 4.7.2), hence by Robinson's

Consistency Theorem 2.6.2, $\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)=\left(\Sigma_{1} \cup \Sigma_{2}, E_{1} \cup E_{2}\right)$ is a conservative refinement of ( $\Sigma, E$ ).

Claim. $\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right) \vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$. (Then we are through.)
Proof of the Claim. Consider a refinement $\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \unrhd\left(\Sigma^{\prime}, E^{\prime}\right)$ such that

$$
\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \vdash\{p\} S_{2}\{q\} .
$$

We have to prove
(0) $\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \vdash\{p\} S_{1}\{q\}$.

Obviously, since $q[f(\boldsymbol{x}) /(\boldsymbol{x}] \wedge \neg q[f(\boldsymbol{x}) / \boldsymbol{x}]$ is a tautology, (0) is equivalent with (1) \& (2) as follows:
(1) $\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \vdash\{p \wedge q[f(\boldsymbol{x}) / \boldsymbol{x}]\} S_{1}\{q\}$,
(2) $\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \vdash\{p \wedge \neg q[f(\boldsymbol{x}) / \boldsymbol{x}]\} S_{1}\{q\}$.

Proof of (1). By the rule of consequence, it is sufficient to prove that

$$
\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \vdash\{q[f(\boldsymbol{x}) / \boldsymbol{x}]\} S_{1}\{q\}
$$

We know that

$$
\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma_{1}, E_{1}\right) \vdash\{\boldsymbol{x}=\boldsymbol{z}\} S_{1}\{\boldsymbol{x}=f(\boldsymbol{z})\},
$$

hence, trivially,

$$
\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \vdash\{\boldsymbol{x}=\boldsymbol{z}\} S_{1}\{\boldsymbol{x}=f(\boldsymbol{z})\} .
$$

By Proposition 1.2.3 it follows that

$$
\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \vdash\{\boldsymbol{x}=\boldsymbol{z} \wedge q[f(\boldsymbol{z}) / \boldsymbol{z}]\} S_{1}\{\boldsymbol{x}=f(\boldsymbol{z}) \wedge q[f(\boldsymbol{z}) / \boldsymbol{z}]\}
$$

Hence indeed $\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \vdash\{q[f(\boldsymbol{x}) / \boldsymbol{x}]\} S_{1}\{q\}$.
Proof of (2). We know that $\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \vdash\{p\} S_{2}\{q\}$. So, by the Conjunction rule (1.2.3(i)) and Invariance rule (1.2.3(iii)) we have

$$
\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \vdash\{\boldsymbol{x}=\boldsymbol{z} \wedge p \wedge \neg q[f(\boldsymbol{z}) / \boldsymbol{x}]\} S_{2}\{q \wedge x=f(\boldsymbol{z}) \wedge \neg q[f(\boldsymbol{z}) / \boldsymbol{x}]\}
$$

where the postcondition obviously implies \{false\}. By the assumption $\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma_{2}, E_{2}\right) \vdash \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{1}\right) \sqsubseteq \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{2}\right)$ we have, therefore, the same for $S_{1}$ :

$$
\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \vdash\{\boldsymbol{x}=\boldsymbol{z} \wedge p \wedge \neg q[f(\boldsymbol{z}) / \boldsymbol{x}]\} S_{1}\{\text { false }\} .
$$

By the rule of consequence we have

$$
\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \vdash\{\boldsymbol{x}=\boldsymbol{z} \wedge p \wedge \neg q[f(\boldsymbol{z}) / \boldsymbol{x}]\} S_{1}\{q\}
$$

By Proposition 1.2.3(iv) we have

$$
\operatorname{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \vdash\left\{\exists \boldsymbol{z}(\boldsymbol{x}=\boldsymbol{z} \wedge p \wedge \neg q[f(\boldsymbol{z}) / \boldsymbol{x}]\} S_{1}\{q\}\right.
$$

I.e., indeed $\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma^{\prime \prime}, E^{\prime \prime}\right) \vdash\{p \wedge \neg q[f(\boldsymbol{x}) / \boldsymbol{x}]\} S_{1}\{q\}$.
9.4. Corollary. Let $S_{1}, S_{2} \in \mathscr{W} \mathscr{P}(\Sigma)$ and suppose that $S_{2}$ is everywhere converging, for all $\mathscr{A} \in \operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E)$. Then

$$
\operatorname{Alg}(\Sigma, E) \models S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} \Leftrightarrow \mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \Vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2} .
$$

Proof. $(\Leftarrow)$ has already been proved in Section 7 .
$(\Rightarrow)$. By the soundness of HL (Lemma 1.2.1) we see that $\mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \nvdash\{p\} S_{2}\{$ false $\}$ for all $p \in L(\Sigma)$. Hence trivially

$$
\operatorname{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} S_{2}\{\mathbf{f a l s e}\} \Rightarrow \mathrm{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash\{p\} S_{1}\{\text { false }\}
$$

i.e., $\operatorname{HL}(\Sigma, E) \vdash \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{1}\right) \sqsubseteq \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{2}\right)$.

Therefore, also trivially, $\operatorname{HL}(\Sigma, E) \Vdash \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{1}\right) \sqsubseteq \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{2}\right)$. Now apply the preceding theorem.
9.5. Example. (i) Let $S_{1}, S_{2}$ be as in Example 7.5. Then $\mathrm{HL}\left(\Sigma_{\mathscr{A}}, E_{\mathscr{A}}\right) \Vdash S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$ and $S_{2}$ is always converging. Hence by $8.4, \operatorname{Alg}\left(\Sigma_{\mathscr{A}}, E_{\mathscr{A}}\right) \models S_{1} \sqsubseteq S_{2}$.
(ii) In Example 9.5(i) the domain inclusion is already derivable. An example where domain inclusion is not derivable but can be forced, was given in 8.4.

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