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The Convergence of Media, Candidate, and Public Agendas as Predictors of Voter Choice

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THE CONVERGENCE OF MEDIA, CANDIDATE, AND PUBLIC AGENDAS AS
PREDICTORS OF VOTER CHOICE

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examined the role of agenda setting effects in creating conditions that could predict vote choice within the context of the 2010 general election in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. This survey utilized a mail survey sent to independent voters to measure the public agenda and thorough content analyses of local television news, the major local newspaper, candidate television advertisements and candidate websites to measure the media and candidate agendas. These agendas were compared using an innovative convergence score which reported the percent similarity between any two given agendas.

This thesis found that relationships do exist between agenda convergence and vote choice and suggests the possibility of a model that could direct campaign activities. While this research focuses on the aggregate, campaign level, the methodologies and data herein may be used to examine complex individual level processes of political influence.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE

Every year voters in the United States go to the polls to participate in the American democratic process and every year, in the weeks and months leading up to the election, political candidates spend seemingly countless dollars and hours campaigning with the sole purpose of winning the election. Driven to understand the processes through which campaigns affect voter choice during elections, political scientists and communication scholars began to delve into the field of political communication in the 1940's (McCombs, 2004).

As political communication research evolved, researchers began to look into the media's role in changing the opinions of voters, with inconclusive results (e.g., Berelson, Gaudet, & Lazarsfeld, 1948; Trenamen & McQuail, 1961); however a byproduct of this research did yield strong evidence that the media play a role in educating voters about the issues in a campaign (e.g., McCombs & Shaw, 1972). These developments led McCombs and Shaw to their famous Chapel Hill study of the 1968 presidential election which identified the agenda setting function of the media, finding that the mass media influence the public agenda by giving a higher salience to certain issues which are then transferred to the public agenda (McCombs & Shaw, 1972).

Since Chapel Hill, over 400 studies have been conducted by researchers around the world looking at the agenda setting function of the media. This research has found not only that there is a consistently replicable agenda setting effect, but also that agenda setting is not confined to the media and public agendas (McCombs, 2005). The research has shown agenda setting occurs among a wide array of agendas including the party, candidate, corporate, and policy agendas (Fremlin, 2008; Roberts, 1992; Young, 2004; Yue & Weaver, 2009). There is also strong evidence for inter-media and inter-candidate agenda setting in which the agenda of one media outlet or candidate influences another media outlet or candidate (Dunn, 2009).

1.1 Purpose

Since its inception, agenda setting research has focused primarily on the idea of issue salience transfer from one agenda to another (McCombs, 2005). Wanta and Ghanem (2006) conducted a meta-analysis of 90 empirical studies, finding a mean Pearson's r of +.53, and the meta-analysis of 29 studies performed by Chen and Lasorsa (2008) found a mean correlation of +.76. These meta-analyses provide extremely strong support that salience transfer does occur regularly in a variety of situations.

With strong support for the existence of agenda setting, researchers are expanding the arenas in which the agenda setting function can be studied from social, athletic, and religious groups as agenda setters to the internet and its blogs, web pages, and social networking sites as channels that can change the ability of one agenda to transfer salience to another (McCombs, 2005). Unfortunately, while these areas are certainly deserving of attention, one of the original core concerns of political communication researchers has gone largely ignored.

While early political communication research focused on the media's ability to change attitudes in a campaign, agenda setting research has avoided the topic in favor of better understanding the process of and conditions necessary for salience transfer to occur (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; McCombs, 2005). Only a few studies have been conducted using the existence of agenda setting to extend the research that explains and predicts behaviors of the groups that are on the receiving end of salience transfer; four of these studies are identified below.

In 1986, a study was conducted on the agenda setting effects on the electoral preference of voters in West Germany based on the media coverage of political issues (Brosius & Kepplinger, 1992). This study found that media coverage "had a significant influence on the electorate's party leanings in seven of 64 potential cases... [taking account for] the influence of the traditional party links" (Brosius & Kepplinger, 1992, p. 900).

In the 1990 Texas gubernatorial election, a similar study sought to use the issue salience among voters as a predictor of voter choice (Roberts, 1992). In this study, Roberts found that rank-order similarities in issue salience between voters and candidates were capable of predicting voter choice 70% of the time; however, this relationship was only significant for a subset of issues, leading Roberts to conclude that "the total agenda of [public] concerns... is not relevant to the vote on election day" (Roberts, 1992, p. 889).

More recently, research during the 2000 Presidential election found that candidate salience, defined as the proportion of media coverage of one candidate versus media coverage of all candidates, is significantly correlated with polling preference over time, with a standardized regression coefficient of $\beta=.48$ (Young Jun & Weaver, 2005). In the

context of Israeli national elections, researchers found a significant correlation ($\beta=.27$) between opinions of the most important issue on the agenda and voting intentions; however, this study did not find significant aggregate level results (Sheafer & Weimann, 2005).

1.2 Significance

Given the limited nature of research in this area, it is important to further investigate and develop the predictive capacity of agenda setting research within the context of modern American political campaigns. While there is evidence that American voter behavior can be predicted using certain aspects of the media, candidate, and public agenda (Roberts, 1992; Young Jun & Weaver, 2005), there is no study that looks at the relationship as a whole. While Young Jun and Weaver found a significant correlation between the media's agenda of candidate issues and polling preference, their study did not take into account policy issues or the public agenda. By omitting these two crucial items, their study was unable to provide a complete picture of the media agenda and unable to make any direct claims relating the agenda setting function of the media to voter preference.

Roberts' (1992) research had the advantage of looking at a wide array of issues on the media, candidate, and public agendas, thereby making her study similar to the present study; however, there are a few key weaknesses to the Roberts study. First, Roberts used a rank-order measure of agenda that washes out subtle differences and amplifies large differences in the salience of issues. The use of ordinal measurement of agendas in Roberts' study damages the precision of the agenda and could be responsible for her finding that the total agenda does not affect the vote.

Both Sheafer and Weimann, and Brosius and Kepplinger's studies took place in a markedly different context from American elections. In both the Israeli and West German elections voters elect a party rather than a candidate; however, agenda setting research has been found to be generalizable and replicable across various electoral constructs (McCombs, 2005); therefore, the results of these studies can be used as a reference point for this research. While the West German study looked at the public agenda and the media agenda as a predictor of voter preference, it didn't measure the party agenda (Brosius & Kepplinger, 1992). Because Brosius and Kepplinger didn't measure the salience of the issues on the party platform, it prevents their research from suggesting a relationship between campaign behavior and voter preference. Their focus exclusively on the media agenda allows the agenda setting function of the media to explain voter choice, but it offers no insight into how this relationship can be used to predict it.

Sheafer and Weaver's study was exploratory in nature and as a result oversimplified the measurement of the party agendas. Despite the fact that Israeli elections are multi-party in nature, the study divided the parties into two groups based on whether the most prominent issue in the party platform was based on security issues or economic issues (Sheafer & Weaver, 2005). Because party agendas were so diluted for the purposes of the study, it is almost impossible to determine if the overall similarities between party, public, and media agendas are significant predictors of voter preference.

This current study aims to address these weaknesses in a variety of ways. In addressing the issue of the inherent lack of precision of a rank-order agenda and then comparing a comprehensive analysis of the media, public, and candidate agendas with voter choice, this study will attempt to build a predictive model of voter choice based on

the effects of agenda setting. In so doing, this study will draw upon the cross-disciplinary nature of political communication and agenda setting research by utilizing theory and methodology from the political science field to provide a deeper insight into the decision making process of voters in elections.

This current study will also be distinctive in the communication field in that it will focus exclusively on registered independent voters, thereby washing out the mitigating factor of strong partisanship in measurements of both voter choice and the public agenda. Because of these factors, this study may be able to identify a new campaign tactic for political campaign advisors and consultants to reliably influence the independent vote using a combination of the media and campaign messages.

CHAPTER II

CONCEPTUALIZATION

2.1 Agenda Setting Theory

Agenda setting theory is the basis of this study. The theory was best and most succinctly summarized by Cohen when he said, “the press ‘may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think *about*’” (as cited in McCombs & Shaw, 1972, p. 177). In essence what this means is that the agenda of issues covered in the media will have a high positive correlation with the public agenda (McCombs, 2004). As agenda setting expanded as a field, researchers no longer limited their study to media and public agendas; they now examine candidate, policy, corporate, and party agendas as well. For the purposes of this study, however, the focus will be on candidate, media, and public agendas. In order to understand the relationships between these agendas, one must understand what an agenda is, what makes an agenda, and how agenda setting as a process works.

In simple procedural terms, agenda setting is suggested to work in the following manner:

The media emphasize certain issues in their coverage of politics by devoting a greater proportion of the news hole to them or by placing them more prominently in the newspaper or newscast. This emphasis on issues in the media, in turn, influences the salience of these issues among the audience (Sei-Hill, Scheufele, & Shanahan, 2002, p. 7).

In this procedural model, media-public agenda setting is described; however, in each of the permutations of agenda setting theory the same basic process occurs in which one agenda gives extra attention to a set of issues in their communication channels, and that extra attention leads to an increased salience of those issues in the agenda of the person or organization on the receiving end of these messages.

2.1.1 Agendas

The most crucial element of agenda setting theory is the concept of an agenda. Agendas have been defined in a variety of ways; political scientists Cobb and Elder (1983) view an agenda as “a general set of political controversies that will be viewed at any point in time as falling within the range of legitimate concerns meriting the attention of the polity” (as cited in Dearing & Rogers, 1996, p. 2). Dearing and Rogers themselves define agendas in a communication context as “a set of issues that are communicated in a hierarchy of importance at a point in time” (1996, p. 2). While Dearing and Rogers define agenda at a point in time, they acknowledge that agendas will change over time as issues rise and fall in their hierarchical rank of importance; they argue that agendas can only be viewed as a “snapshot of this fluidity” (1996, p. 2). Zhu (1992) attempts to explore the ability of agendas to change over time, arguing that an agenda must be a zero-sum agenda, wherein as one issue rises in prominence another must fall. Zhu’s research

spurred the question of how large an agenda can be, the finding showed variability in the size of a valid agenda with the number of issues ranging from as few as five to as many as 10 issues per agenda (McCombs & Zhu, 2005).

For the purposes of this study, all of these perspectives will be taken into account in defining the general term “agenda.” In this study the agenda is defined as a zero-sum hierarchical set of between five and 10 issues that receive attention from the entity to which the agenda is ascribed.

2.1.1.1 The Media Agenda

The media agenda is a specific type of agenda, one that is quite central to agenda setting research. The vast majority of agenda research treats the media agenda as the independent variable, though some studies over the last decade have looked at media agendas as dependent on other factors (Dunn, 2009). There are several different channels which could be considered vehicles of the media agenda, as Cohen’s definition stated earlier in this paper shows; early agenda setting research focused on newspapers almost exclusively (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). However, as technology has made it much easier to perform content analyses of television news, both channels have been included in the definition of the media agenda; in fact some researchers have treated television as the sole owner of the media agenda (e.g. Brosius & Kepplinger, 1992).

Research has been conducted on which forms of media have a stronger agenda setting effect; the research has shown that the print media, newspapers and online newspapers, are both more effective in producing an agenda setting effect and in reflecting the candidate’s agenda than television (Ridout & Mellen, 2007; Roberts, 1992).

Therefore, to achieve a *comprehensive* media agenda, for the purposes of this study the media agenda is defined as the zero-sum hierarchical set of between five and 10 issues that receive attention in newspapers and television news programming.

2.1.1.2 The Public Agenda

The public agenda has been conceptualized in various ways that fall under two general typologies: hierarchical studies and longitudinal ones. In a hierarchical study, the public agenda is viewed as a hierarchy of all of the important issues at a certain point in time; longitudinal studies on the other hand follow trends in the rise and fall of a small number of issues over time (Dearing & Rogers, 1996). In both cases, the public agenda remains a hierarchical set of issues; however, while longitudinal studies often track only one to three issues, the hierarchical approach looks at every issue on the agenda at that point in time. Therefore the public agenda in a hierarchical study is larger than one in a longitudinal study; generally a hierarchical public agenda will contain between five and 10 issues.

On the other hand, the longitudinal approach only looks at one or two particularly volatile issues, resulting in a much smaller concept of an agenda. Because the longitudinal approach also omits less volatile or important issues from the agenda, a longitudinal public agenda is not a zero-sum agenda since a rise in one issue could be compensated for with a fall in an issue that is not being studied.

Because in most agenda setting studies the public agenda is viewed as a dependent variable in the context of an election, the public is often conceptualized as the voting public and frequently voters who are not committed to a candidate (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Tedesco, McKinney, & Kaid, 2007).

Therefore, for the purposes of this study the public agenda is defined as the zero-sum hierarchical set of between five and 10 issues that uncommitted voters consider to be important within the context of the election.

2.1.1.3 Candidate Agenda

The candidate agenda has also been conceptualized in many different ways based on whether the candidate agenda is viewed as an independent or dependent variable and which agenda(s) it is being compared to. When the candidate agenda is viewed as an *independent* variable influencing the *media* agenda, the candidate agenda is frequently defined in terms of the issues that candidates give attention to in their press releases (Dunn, 2009). When the candidate agenda is viewed as an *independent* variable affecting the *public* agenda, it is often defined in terms of the issues that candidates give attention to in their speeches and advertisements (Tedesco, et. al., 2007). When the candidate agenda is viewed as a *dependent* variable in any situation, all candidate produced messages including advertising, speeches, and press releases can be considered parts of the candidate agenda (Ridout & Mellen, 2007; Sigelman & Buell, 2004).

Therefore, since this study will look at the relationship of the candidate agenda with the media agenda and public agenda as an independent variable on voter choice, the candidate agenda is defined for this study as the zero-sum hierarchical set of between five and 10 issues that the candidate focuses on in candidate-created television advertising and websites.

2.1.2. Issues.

In order to fully understand what an agenda truly is, one must have a concept of what an issue is. Since in this study agendas is defined in terms of the hierarchical set of issues, it is important to define the constraints of issues and how they qualify to be on the agenda. According to Cobb and Elder (1983), an issue is “a conflict between two or more identifiable groups over procedural or substantive matters relating to the distributions of positions or resources” (as cited in Dearing & Rogers, 1996). This means that in order to be considered an issue an item must have at least two different positions that can be taken with regards to it. Therefore, absolute facts cannot be issues; for instance a candidate who focuses all of their attention on recounting the historical facts of a region does not address any issues because those facts cannot be reasonably disputed or disagreed with. However, as Dearing and Rogers (1996) point out, an issue can exist even if no one takes the other side. While issues such as drug abuse are not favored by anyone, the issue stems from the debate over how many resources should be allocated to and what approaches should be taken towards solving the problem.

Dearing and Rogers defined an issue as “a social problem, often conflictual, that has received mass media coverage” (1996, p. 3). This definition is unfortunately inadequate because not all issues categorized in research are necessarily social problems, as Patterson (1994) points out: “journalists...focus on the ‘horse race’ or ‘game’ aspects of a campaign since these are now central matters to predicting the outcome of the election” (as cited in Hayes, 2009, p. 3).

These “campaign” issues are further illustrated in Roberts’ study, which found that negative advertising was an issue (1992). Another type of issue that frequently

appears on issue lists are the candidates' personal backgrounds, experience, and criminal history¹ (Roberts, 1992; Sigelman & Buell, 2004; Ridout & Mellen, 2007).

Recognizing these three distinct definitions of an issue, Sigelman and Buell suggested the existence of three types of issues, each equally important to the campaign cycle. The three are categorized as campaign issues, candidate issues, and policy issues. Campaign issues are items including "charges, counter-charges, defenses concerning campaign tactics," candidate issues are related to items such as the candidates' "physical health or their leadership traits," and policy issues are the more traditional view of an issue including crime, economic policy, and others (Sigelman & Buell, 2004, p.654).

The next question to consider is how an issue becomes a part of an agenda; as previously mentioned, McCombs and Zhu (1995) found that agendas are typically limited to between five and 10 issues. However, one might wonder if the agenda has a maximum constraint of ten issues, how does research accommodate the fact that media often cover more than ten issues during a newscast? In their study, McCombs and Zhu used a salience threshold of 10% of total coverage as the cutoff point for whether an issue is on the agenda or not; this was based on previous research that found that "5-15 percent is the threshold for an issue to capture" attention (1995, p. 503). However, when they conducted a sensitivity analysis of their findings, they found that decreasing the threshold to 5% did not affect the results of their study.

In the context of this study, the salience of an issue may vary greatly across the various agendas being measured. Given that removing an issue from one agenda for failing to meet the 5% threshold when it may meet that threshold on another agenda, or with a specific subset of voters, may bias the results when comparing the agendas, a

1. Criminal history may include traffic tickets, arrests from the candidates' youth related to drugs and/or alcohol, and criminal ethics violations

salience threshold may prove problematic. In order to effectively compare two agendas, issues must be considered regardless of salience threshold; since McCombs and Zhu found that decreasing the salience threshold does not affect the results of a study, the omission of a salience threshold should not bias the results of this study.

Therefore, for the purposes of this study, an issue is defined as any two-sided topic of concern relating to the campaign, candidate, or policy that occurs in the entity to which the subsequent agenda is ascribed.

2.1.3 Salience

Salience is a key element of agenda setting; it is “the degree to which an issue on the agenda is perceived as relatively important” (Dearing & Rogers, 1996, p. 8). The vast majority of agenda setting research focuses on the concept of salience transfer in which the relative importance of an issue on one agenda influences the relative importance of that issue on another agenda.

Since the salience of the various issues alter the form and structure of an agenda, one must have a basic understanding how salience is determined in order to fully understand the concept of an agenda. Media salience, according to Kiousis (2004), is defined by three dimensions: attention, prominence, and valence (as cited in McCombs, 2005). Attention is defined by the number of stories on the issue, prominence is how much time and space is taken up by the story, while valence is considered the tone of the story (McCombs, 2005). Public salience is a much more complicated matter, which is usually conceptualized as either a perception based a personal frame of reference (i.e. what issues are important to you?) or a social frame of reference (i.e. what issues are most important to your country or community). The determination of the reference frame

used varies based on the nature of the study that the measure will be used for (McCombs, 2005). Unfortunately, there hasn't been any theoretical exploration of how to determine candidate salience; however, since the candidate agenda is generally drawn from candidate-produced media, it would make sense to use dimensions similar to those used in media salience.

Since the idea of valence is generally geared towards the positive or negative tone of a message, it is generally more relevant to studies in framing than in basic agenda setting; likewise since the use of a social frame of reference is less indicative of their personal beliefs it will be less likely to create an actual public agenda and is more likely to create a perceived public agenda, which isn't helpful in the context of this study. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, salience is defined as the degree to which an issue is represented in messages or perceptions as important and prominent in the context of the entity to which the subsequent agenda will be ascribed.

2.2 Discounting Theory

Discounting theory is a theory of voter behavior taken from the political science discipline. In general, discounting theory states that voters know that candidates cannot fully deliver on their campaign promises and so they 'discount' campaign pledges and instead select the candidate that they believe will cause the government to address the policies the voter desires (Tomz & Van Houweling, 2008). Because of this approach, Tomz and Van Houweling state that under discounting theory "voters may favor candidates unlike themselves, if such candidates stand the best chance of producing the most desirable policy outcomes" (2008, p. 303).

Discounting theory is among a group of models of voter choice that have been found to be employed under certain conditions (Tomz & Van Houweling, 2008). The research shows that uncommitted voters are most likely to employ discounting theory when selecting a candidate and that it is least commonly employed by strong partisan voters (Tomz & Van Houweling, 2008).

Noted political scientist Samuel Popkin has observed that there are three factors that must be present for an issue to be effective and relevant to a campaign. Popkin states that voters must see the connections between: the issue and the office, the issue and the candidate, and the issue and results they care about (1991, p. 100). In discounting theory voter choice is driven by an impulse to elect the candidate who will produce the best policy outcomes, and Popkin's three criteria provide the metric by which this potential outcome can be judged. In order for a voter to believe that a candidate will produce a desirable policy that voter must see that, if elected, the candidate would have the power to act on the issue, that the candidate would act on the issue, and that such action would produce a result that the voter cares about.

Most research involving discounting theory has focused on policy issues (e.g. Grofman, 1985; Kedar, 2005); however, the theory can be applied to candidate and campaign issues as well. In terms of candidate issues, the voter uses the candidate's focus on issues such as experience and personal background to affect his perception of how well the candidate will be able to perform his or her duties if elected. For instance, if a candidate focuses on his previous experience working across party lines, the voter will use that information to presume that, if elected, the candidate will work across party lines and be more effective in producing desirable policy outcomes. This connection between

candidate issues and anticipated performance of the duties of the office satisfies the first condition of Popkin's model of effective issues. Since these candidate issues are inherently a part of the candidate, the second condition of Popkin's model is also easily met. The third condition of Popkin's model is trickier to establish, since voters may not necessarily care about the benefits or pitfalls of certain character traits in the candidate; however, since discounting theory applies to voter choice relevant to desirable outcomes, those candidate issues that are tied to such outcomes would play a role in determining voter choice under discounting theory.

In terms of campaign issues, the voter looks toward the campaign style of each candidate as a predictor of the candidate's governing style. The tone of a campaign has been shown to affect voter perceptions of the candidates (Pinkleton, 1997). If voters are concerned with the prevalence of negative advertising, they will view candidates that use negative advertising as less likely to produce desirable outcomes. Here again the connections between the candidate and the issue are clear; also the same conditions that apply to candidate issues regarding desirable outcomes apply to campaign issues. The connection between campaign issues and the office can be quite difficult; there are two schools of thought on the topic of governing versus campaigning. Some political scientists argue that while the two are not mutually exclusive, their aims are so different that it is difficult to approach them with the same strategy (Tenpas & Dickinson, 1997). Others argue that modern elected officials will govern by campaigning; melding the two activities into a single approach (Edwards III, 2006). For those who ascribe to the latter opinion, campaign issues can easily be tied to the office; however, for those who hold that campaigns and governance are separate, the connection must be made in a more

roundabout manner. As Pinkleton (1997) identified, the tone of a campaign does affect voter perceptions of candidates; therefore, these campaign issues become indicators of latent candidate issues. In either case, the final condition of Popkin's model is met.

In order to bridge the conceptual gap between discounting theory and agenda setting, one must consider that independent voters are less likely to pay very close attention to any particular candidate. In doing so, they may limit their access to information about the candidate to media reports, television advertisements and literature that they receive either in the mail or from canvassers. This information, especially the former two, rarely contains specific policy proposals and instead contains messages that touch on issues and attempt to frame the problem. The media's role in communicating issue salience in this way is critical as it forces individuals without strong partisan beliefs to use discounting theory due to a lack of specific policy proposals to consider. The basic mechanics of agenda setting will only communicate issue salience, not issue valence or more complex information; therefore, agenda setting works to enable and reinforce the use of discounting by independent voters.

2.2.1 The Uncommitted Voter

A recurring concept through both discounting and agenda setting research is the idea of the uncommitted voter. McCombs and Shaw (1972) defined uncommitted voters bluntly as "those who had not yet definitely decided how to vote" (p. 178). In discounting theory, uncommitted voters are identified as registered independents and those with non-committal opinions on the issues (Tomz & Van Houweling, 2008).

For the purposes of this study, uncommitted voters are defined as individuals who are likely to vote and are not associated with either political party. This addresses the two key components of an uncommitted voter: party neutrality and their propensity to vote.

2.2.2 Campaign Promises

Campaign promises are rarely defined conceptually, more frequently researchers choose to view campaign promises in terms of the promises themselves. Campaign promises can be viewed within the context of issues, since promises address issues (Shaw, 1998). A campaign promise is operationally defined as a statement by a candidate regarding what he or she would do about an issue if elected (Tomz & Van Houweling, 2008). In order to conceptualize a campaign promise, one must look at the elements of a campaign promise. A campaign promise must advocate for a single policy position on an issue and it must be stated by the candidate in such a way that it shows the candidate intends on pursuing that policy. For instance, while taxes may be an issue the corresponding campaign promise would be to cut taxes by 5%. Therefore, a campaign promise is defined as a campaign statement that advocates for a specific action on an issue.

According to discounting theory, voters will discount campaign promises and will instead pay attention to the issues; therefore, the issues themselves become the predictors of the voter choice rather than the policy positions (Tomz & Van Houweling, 2008).

2.3 Convergence

Since the beginning of agenda setting research, the key to drawing any meaningful conclusions has been showing the similarities or differences between two

agendas. There are two ways to conceptualize the convergence of agendas that correspond to the two approaches to studying agendas. In a hierarchical approach, the convergence of agendas is conceptualized as a snapshot comparison, simply the hierarchical similarities between two agendas at any given time. In a longitudinal approach, convergence is more complex. Since longitudinal studies measure changes in the agendas over time, they must also account for the changes in similarities between the agendas over time. Since longitudinal studies also look at issues on an individual basis; the convergence must be addressed on an issue by issue basis. Therefore, in a longitudinal study, convergence is defined as the change in the difference between the salience of a single issue on two agendas over time.

This study will utilize a modified hierarchical approach, utilizing a percentage based convergence score developed by Sigelman and Buell (2004). The convergence score is a measure that shows a true measure of the similarity between agendas. Their equation compares the sum of the absolute difference between the percentages of attention given to each issue, divided by 2 to account for the inclusion of two agendas in the equation; this provides a divergence score, which then is subtracted from 100 to produce a convergence score (Sigelman & Buell, 2004). On this scale, a score of 100 would indicate that two agendas are perfectly identical while a score of 0 would indicate that two agendas are completely dissimilar. A convergence score of 75 would mean that the two agendas are 75% identical and 25% of one agenda would have to be redistributed in order to create a perfect match. A detailed explanation of this score is located in the methods section (see section 4.3.4).

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

3.1 The Media and Public Agenda

Agenda setting theory states that there will be a convergence between the media and public agenda and the research suggests that there is a positive correlation between the media and public agenda of between $r = +.53$ and $r = +.76$ (Wanta & Ghanem, 2006; Chen & Lasorsa, 2008). Since correlations are measurements of covariance and covariance is related to similarity, I hypothesize that:

H1: The convergence score between the media and public agenda will be greater than 50.

3.2 Candidate and Media Agenda

The research suggests that candidate and media agendas have a reciprocal relationship in which the media set the candidate agenda as well as the candidate setting the media agenda (Dunn, 2009). Since this reciprocal relationship is generally stronger than the one-way media-public correlation, I hypothesize that:

H2: The convergence score between each of the candidate agendas and the media agenda will be greater than the media-public convergence score.

3.3 Candidate and Public Agenda

Because the research and theory suggest that there will be significant convergence between the candidate and media agendas and between the media and public agenda, there should logically be a relationship between the candidate and public agendas. However, the strength of the impact that candidate-media convergence has on candidate-public convergence has not been tested. This leads me to the following research question:

RQ1: What is the relationship between the candidate-media convergence and the candidate-public convergence?

3.4 Candidate-Public Convergence and Voter Choice

According to discounting theory, voters will choose the candidate who they believe will have the best chance of bringing attention to the issues that they are concerned about (Tomz & Van Houweling, 2008). Since the convergence between the candidate and public agendas is a measure of how similar a candidate's issue salience is to the public's issue salience, there should be a relationship between the convergence and voter choice. As a result of this, I hypothesize:

H3: There will be a significant positive correlation between the candidate-public convergence score and the percentage of the vote won by that candidate.

3.5 Candidate-Media Convergence and Voter Choice

Given the logical premise of RQ1 that there will be a correlation between candidate-media convergence and candidate-public convergence and the theoretical basis behind H3 that there will be a correlation between candidate-public convergence and voter choice, the following research question is posed:

RQ2: Is there a relationship between candidate-media convergence and percentage of the vote won by that candidate?

CHAPTER IV

METHODS

4.1 Procedure

The present study examined these research questions and hypotheses in the context of the 2010 general election in Cuyahoga County. Specifically this study looked at the following races: Ohio Governor, United States Senate, Ohio Secretary of State, Ohio Attorney General, Ohio State Treasurer, Ohio State Auditor, and Cuyahoga County Executive. These races were chosen to reflect a diverse array of races that shared a common electorate with common media outlets across several political levels. The analysis of other elections such as State House of Representatives, State Senate, U.S. House of Representatives and County Council were not considered for analysis because of difficulties in ensuring a representative sample across smaller districts and the need for additional analysis of community level media outlets that are more difficult to identify and collect. A preliminary analysis was performed in August 2010 of candidate websites and the Cleveland Plain Dealer online edition. From this preliminary analysis, a list of every issue mentioned was developed for use in the subsequent content analysis and

survey. This list of issues represented between 8 and 10 potential issues that could appear on any of the three agendas (media, public and candidate) in each of the races.

In order to measure the public agenda and voter choice, a mail survey was distributed one week before Election Day, on October 25, 2010, with instructions to be completed prior to Election Day so that the questionnaires would be filled out before the respondents knew who won the elections. Unfortunately, due to delays at the post office, many respondents did not receive their surveys until after Election Day. Therefore, the majority of respondents are presumed to have completed the survey after the election.

4.2 Participants

A mail questionnaire (see Appendix A) was distributed to 2970 randomly selected independents that had neither have neither declared a party affiliation nor voted in a partisan primary within the last five years and were likely voters in a mid-term election as determined by the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections. The questionnaires were mailed only to respondents in cities with a 2010 census response rate of 75% or higher in order to maximize the response for this survey. The questionnaire was also made available online via Survey Monkey with a URL for the questionnaire identified in the mailing.

4.3 Measurement of Variables

4.3.1 Media Agenda

The media agenda was measured through a thorough content analysis of a census of political newspaper articles in the Cleveland Plain Dealer and transcripts of evening and late night local television newscasts (Channels 3, 5, 8 and 19) between October 1st and November 2nd 2010 in Cuyahoga County. Issue mentions were coded using the

computer-aided text analysis program Yoshikoder. Dictionaries (see Appendix F) were developed to represent keywords indicating issue mentions and the frequency of these keywords was used to represent the salience of the issues on the media agenda. This measurement is consistent with the conceptualization of the media agenda in this study and with the traditional approach to content analysis of agendas (McCombs, 2005).

Separate media agendas were calculated for all news, all television news, newspapers and each of the individual local television news stations. Newspaper articles were acquired via a Lexis-Nexis search for Cleveland Plain Dealer articles between October 1st and November 2nd within the subject category “Government and Public Administration.” Television news stories and their closed-captioned transcripts were captured using SnapStream Enterprise TV search software.

Once the total number of mentions is determined for each issue, the percentage of issue mentions will be calculated. For instance, if issues A, B, C, and D receive 50, 30, 18, and 2 mentions respectively ($n=100$) their percentages will be determined as 50%, 30%, 18%, and 2%, respectively.

4.3.2 Candidate Agenda

The candidate agenda was measured through a thorough content analysis of all of candidate generated television advertising during the last month of the election and websites for each major candidate that voters were likely to be exposed to. Active copies of candidate websites were downloaded on November 1, 2010 using HTTrack website copier. This enabled thorough and accurate content analysis of the campaign messages on candidate websites even after the election. Television advertisements were captured using SnapStream Enterprise TV software, the majority of these ads were not closed captioned

and were transcribed by the author and one volunteer. An agenda was developed for each candidate using the same methodology used in measuring the media agenda. Given the anticipated volume of advertisements issued on behalf of a candidate by political action committees and other non-candidate sources, these messages were collected and included in a secondary analysis; however, due to a lower than expected volume of these ads in the races being studied during the timeframe examined, these ads did not provide an adequate sample for a full analysis.

It is also important to note that in the case of the treasurer race there were a few problems in coding the agenda which may have impacted the results. One candidate, Josh Mandel, made frequent reference to his military service in television ads and on his website. The initial coding of these mentions placed military references under the category “veteran’s affairs.” Upon further review of the agenda, it became apparent that these references were more likely taken as proxies for “experience” and “responsibility.” However, since the survey had already been distributed with the “veteran’s affairs” issue included, it was determined not to attempt to recode this issue as it may bias the data.

4.3.3 Public Agenda

The measurement of the public agenda poses certain methodological problems, since public agenda is traditionally measured through the use of an MIP, or most important problem, question, which is then indexed ordinally based on the frequency of responses (Dearing & Rogers, 1996).

Although the MIP is the most commonly used measure of the public agenda for normal agenda setting research, it is inadequate as a predictor of voter choice. The question of “What is the most important problem facing the nation/state/county/city

today?" cannot be used as the basis for predicting voter choice because such a use would assume that individual voters consider only one issue when they go to the polls.

However, none of the predominant theories from political science suggests that voters use a single issue, in and of itself, as the basis of their candidate choice (Tomz & Van Houweling, 2008). The research suggests that voters make judgments about candidates based on a set of issues that the voter considers important. This set of issues is the individual level analog to the aggregate public agenda. Therefore, one way to measure the aggregate public agenda in relation to voter choice is to identify the set of issues that influence the vote at the individual level and then aggregate the data to form an overall public agenda.

The major problem with an ordinal measurement of an agenda is that it results in an over-representation of the differences between items that have similar salience and an under-representation of the differences between items that have dissimilar salience. For example, given three issues: A, B, and C with 800, 725, and 300 respective mentions in the media agenda and with 700, 100, and 50 instances as the MIP in the public agenda, the resulting analysis would show that the two agendas converge perfectly since they both share the rank-order A,B,C. However, the numbers clearly show that the media discuss issue B far more than the public is concerned with it.

One way to accurately show these differences is to use a percentage of the mentions. For the example above, the media agenda ($n=1,825$) would have a percentage of mentions of A=43.8%, B=39.7%, and C=16.4% while for the public agenda the percentage of instances as the MIP ($n=850$) would be A=82.4%, B=11.8%, and C=5.9%.

When the agenda is formed hierarchically based on percentage the differences between the two agendas becomes clear, even though the rank-order is the same.

Therefore, in order to measure the public agenda accurately and in a manner that can be used as a predictor of voter choice, the following method for collecting and aggregating the data was developed. A survey was distributed that contained a list of the 8 to 10 potential issues for each race that were identified in the preliminary content analysis. Respondents were asked to “In the race for _____, place a check mark next to every issue that you considered VERY IMPORTANT in deciding who to vote for.” This question appeared 7 times, once for each race that the respondent had the opportunity to vote in. Placing the words “very important” in all capital letters was intended to discourage the respondent from marking issues that they considered but that did not play a role in their deciding which candidate to vote for.

In order to calculate the aggregate public agenda, the total number of check marks for each issue was totaled and divided over the total number of check marks across all issues in that race to determine a percentage. For example, if there are three potential issues: A, B, and C and issue A receives 275 check marks, issue B receives 200, and issue C receives 90; the aggregate agenda will be calculated for $n=565$ that $A=48.6\%$, $B=35.4\%$ and $C=15.9\%$.

4.3.4 Convergence

Traditionally, convergence is determined by the use of a Pearson's r correlation between the rank-order emphases of issues on two agendas. This method, though common, is not necessarily the most accurate in showing convergence. While a correlation does show to what extent two variables co-vary, it does not give a true

representation of how similar they are. For example if the public agenda for issues A, B, C, and D is: 48%, 22%, 16%, and 14% respectively and the media agenda for those same issues is: 53%, 17%, 19%, and 11% respectively, $r = +.9799$ while this indicates a strong correlation, it cannot be said that the agendas are 97.99% similar or even the r^2 of 96% similar; in fact, this is not the case.

Knowing this and desiring a measure that provides a true measure of the similarity between agendas, rather than just the co-variance, Sigelman and Buell (2004) developed a convergence score that produces just that. Their equation compares the sum of the absolute difference between the percentages of attention given to each issue, divided by 2 to account for the inclusion of two agendas in the equation; this provides a divergence score, which then is subtracted from 100 to produce a convergence score (Sigelman & Buell, 2004). This equation, though relatively new, has been used to compare agendas between candidates (Sigelman & Buell, 2004), and between candidates and the media (Hayes, 2009; Ridout & Mellen, 2007).

The convergence score is appealing in two ways, as Hayes explains; first it allows researchers to “quantify the similarity among agendas and to compare those figures [across time]. Second, [it] is intuitively appealing, showing the amount of overlap between...agendas and how much of an agenda would have to be changed to achieve total convergence” (2009, p. 9). For the purposes of this study, this convergence score is appealing in that it allows for a direct comparison between the strength of the similarities between agendas and other variables, specifically voter choice.

To understand how the convergence score works, Sigelman and Buell provide an explanation that supposes that the researcher knows exactly how much attention is paid

by each candidate on every issue. By expressing these data in terms of a percentage, the researcher could chart a profile of the candidates and their issues by placing issues on the x-axis and the percentage of attention on the y-axis. Comparing these two profiles would give an idea of how much the two converged. In order to mathematically determine how much the two sides converge, one can sum the absolute differences between the levels of attention paid to each issue by each candidate.

Suppose that there are two sources and only three issues of concern, with the sources giving those issues attention in the following manner:

	Issue 1	Issue 2	Issue 3
Source A	100%	0%	0%
Source B	0%	100%	0%

In this case, both sources focus exclusively on different issues and completely ignore the third issue, resulting in zero convergence. Summing the absolute differences of the issue profiles would produce this equation $|100-0|+|0-100|+|0-0| = 200$. The difference is 200 because the calculation considers both how much of A would need to be redistributed to match B and how much of B would need to be redistributed to match A. If source A remained the same and source B shifted its attention to issue 1, the absolute differences would add to zero, meaning perfect convergence.

Since a sum of 0 indicates perfect convergence while a score of 200 indicates perfect divergence and this study aims to compare convergence scores to percentages, the equation must be calibrated to fall between zero and 100. Since there are two agendas, this is done by dividing the sum of absolute differences by two. Since in this case a

higher score indicates a case of more divergence and the intent is to create a scale of convergence, the recalibrated sum of absolute differences must be subtracted from 100 to produce a scale where a score of 0 indicates no convergence and a score of 100 indicates perfect convergence. The final equation is given as:

$$C = 100 - (\sum_{i=1}^n |P_{Ai} - P_{Bi}|) / 2$$

where P_{Ai} is the percentage of attention given to issue i on agenda A and P_{Bi} is the percentage of attention given to issue i on agenda B.

Suppose that for two sources and three issues the attention profile instead looked like this:

	Issue 1	Issue 2	Issue 3
Source A	60%	40%	0%
Source B	0%	40%	60%

In this case the sum of the absolute differences would be: $|60-0|+|40-40|+|0-60| = 120$. The recalibrated sum would be $120/2 = 60$, which would be subtracted from 100 to produce the convergence score of 40. This indicates that 40% of the sources' issue profiles overlap and that 60% of the total attention would need to be reallocated in order to produce a perfect match.

In this study, there will be three convergence scores calculated. For the media-public agenda convergence score the following equation will be used:

$$C_{mp} = 100 - (\sum_{i=1}^n |P_{mi} - P_{pi}|) / 2$$

where C_{mp} is the media-public convergence score, P_{mi} is the percentage of the media agenda given to issue i , and P_{pi} is the percentage of the public agenda given to issue i .

The media-candidate agenda convergence score will be determined by:

$$C_{mc} = 100 - (\sum_{i=1}^n |P_{mi} - P_{ci}|) / 2$$

where C_{mc} is the media-candidate convergence score, P_{mi} is the percentage of the media agenda given to issue i , and P_{ci} is the percentage of the candidate agenda given to issue i .

The candidate-public agenda convergence score will be determined by:

$$C_{cp} = 100 - (\sum_{i=1}^n |P_{ci} - P_{pi}|) / 2$$

where C_{cp} is the candidate-public convergence score, P_{ci} is the percentage of the candidate agenda given to issue i , and P_{pi} is the percentage of the public agenda given to issue i . It is important to note that since the absolute value of the difference between the agendas is taken, the order of the agenda terms does not matter. Therefore, the convergence score shares a weakness with Pearson's r in that it does not show ordering, a key component in attempting to establish causality.

4.3.5 Voter choice

Voter choice was measured based on survey respondents' self-reports of who they voted for divided by the total number of reported votes in the race. Therefore, voter choice is expressed in terms of the percentage of the vote received. Any votes cast for a candidate who was not included in the analysis will be treated as missing data. It is important to note that since the survey was distributed only to independent voters, the percentages of votes reported in the survey are not representative of the election results.

CHAPTER V

RESULTS

5.1 Descriptive Statistics

5.1.1 Participants

There were 241 completed questionnaires returned ($n=227$) or submitted online ($n=14$), of that number 226 reported voting in the election and were therefore included in the analysis. Therefore the net response rate was 7.6%. Of these 226 responses, there were 119 respondents that self-reported their political views as moderate or self-reporting a tendency to vote for equal numbers of Democrats and Republicans. In light of this, each of the hypotheses was tested using public agendas calculated for both the entire respondent pool and the independent only pool. Additionally, out of the 226 responses, only 18 respondents reported using candidate websites to get information. Therefore each of the hypotheses was tested using candidate agendas calculated for both television advertisements and website content combined and television advertisements alone, however website only agendas were not included in the analysis.

Demographically, the 241 respondents ranged in age from 22 to 94 ($n=241$, $M=53.74$, $SD = 14.1$); they were 51% female ($n=123$) and 49% male ($n=118$). The

respondents were 95% white ($n=227$), 2.1% Asian or Pacific Islander ($n=5$) and less than 1% African-American and Hispanic ($n=2$). This lack of racial diversity is likely due to using lack of political affiliation and likelihood of voting as a selection criteria as most African-Americans and Hispanics that are likely to vote in Cuyahoga County are affiliated with a political party.

5.1.2 Media Agendas

The television agenda included closed captioned transcripts from 228 evening and late night local television news programs. Of those 228, 61 were captured from Channel 3, 59 from Channel 5, 50 from Channel 8 and 58 from channel 19. The newspaper agenda included 590 articles from the Plain Dealer that were collected in a Lexis-Nexis search.

With regard to the Attorney General race, the Channel 3 agenda included 1356 issue mentions, the Channel 5 agenda included 1197 issue mentions, the Channel 8 agenda included 1734 issue mentions, the Channel 19 agenda included 1199 issue mentions, and the newspaper agenda included 5070 issue mentions. The total media agenda for this race included 10556 issue mentions.

With regard to the Auditor race, the Channel 3 agenda included 770 issue mentions, the Channel 5 agenda included 749 issue mentions, the Channel 8 agenda included 925 issue mentions, the Channel 19 agenda included 775 issue mentions, and the newspaper agenda included 4397 issue mentions. The total media agenda for this race included 7616 issue mentions.

With regard to the County Executive race, the Channel 3 agenda included 1636 issue mentions, the Channel 5 agenda included 1613 issue mentions, the Channel 8

agenda included 2218 issue mentions, the Channel 19 agenda included 1585 issue mentions, and the newspaper agenda included 5799 issue mentions. The total media agenda for this race included 12851 issue mentions.

With regard to the gubernatorial race, the Channel 3 agenda included 1573 issue mentions, the Channel 5 agenda included 1386 issue mentions, the Channel 8 agenda included 1998 issue mentions, the Channel 19 agenda included 1164 issue mentions, and the newspaper agenda included 5529 issue mentions. The total media agenda for this race included 11650 issue mentions.

With regard to the Senate race, the Channel 3 agenda included 1517 issue mentions, the Channel 5 agenda included 1298 issue mentions, the Channel 8 agenda included 1900 issue mentions, the Channel 19 agenda included 1100 issue mentions, and the newspaper agenda included 4883 issue mentions. The total media agenda for this race included 10698 issue mentions.

With regard to the Secretary of State race, the Channel 3 agenda included 729 issue mentions, the Channel 5 agenda included 706 issue mentions, the Channel 8 agenda included 821 issue mentions, the Channel 19 agenda included 657 issue mentions, and the newspaper agenda included 3812 issue mentions. The total media agenda for this race included 6725 issue mentions.

With regard to the Treasurer race, the Channel 3 agenda included 482 issue mentions, the Channel 5 agenda included 463 issue mentions, the Channel 8 agenda included 657 issue mentions, the Channel 19 agenda included 478 issue mentions, and

the newspaper agenda included 2698 issue mentions. The total media agenda for this race included 4778 issue mentions.

5.1.3 Candidate Agendas

Candidate agendas were determined by analyzing the candidates' television advertisements from the last month of the election and website content on Election Day. In the Attorney General race, Richard Cordray had nine television advertisements with 13 issue mentions and Mike Dewine had five television advertisements with 13 issue mentions. In the Auditor race, David Pepper had two television advertisements with 9 issue mentions and Dave Yost had four television advertisements with 19 issue mentions. In the County Executive race, Matt Dolan had four television advertisements with 13 issue mentions, Ed Fitzgerald had one television advertisement with six issue mentions and Ken Lanci had four television advertisements with 18 issue mentions.

In the gubernatorial race, John Kasich had seven television advertisements with 41 issue mentions and Ted Strickland had seven television advertisements with 50 issue mentions. In the Senate race, Lee Fisher had two advertisements in the last month of the election with 17 issue mentions and Rob Portman had eight television advertisements with 46 issue mentions. In the Secretary of State race, Jon Husted had two television advertisements with seven issue mentions and Maryellen O'Shaughnessey had three television advertisements with seven issue mentions. In the Treasurer race, Kevin Boyce had four television advertisements with 17 issue mentions and Josh Mandel had three television advertisements with 21 issue mentions.

Candidate websites were recorded on Election Day for the purposes of this analysis. In the Attorney General race, Richard Cordray's website had 55 issue mentions and Mike Dewine had 54 issue mentions. In the Auditor race, David Pepper's website had 217 issue mentions and Dave Yost's website had 20 issue mentions. In the County Executive race, Matt Dolan's website had 84 issue mentions, Ed Fitzgerald had 535 issue mentions, Ken Lanci's website had 369 issue mentions, David Ellison's website had 122 issue mentions, Tim McCormack's website had 62 issue mentions and Don Scipione's website had 273 issue mentions.

In the gubernatorial race, John Kasich's website had 274 issue mentions and Ted Strickland's had 475 issue mentions. In the Senate race, Lee Fisher's website had 472 issue mentions and Rob Portman's website had 738 issue mentions. In the Secretary of State race, Jon Husted's website had 82 issue mentions and Maryellen O'Shaughnessey's website had 88 issue mentions. Lastly in the Treasurer's race, Kevin Boyce's website had 24 issue mentions and Josh Mandel's website had 54 issue mentions.

The full scored agendas for the television only and the combined television and website candidate agendas can be found in Appendix C.

5.2 Hypothesis and Research Question Testing

5.2.1 Hypothesis 1: The convergence score between the media and public agenda will be greater than 50.

This hypothesis sought to test the simple descriptive measure of agenda convergence within the context of agenda setting theory. The results shown in Tables 1

and 2 indicate that the media public convergence score is above 50 in 85.7% of cases in both the total public agenda and the independent-only public agenda.

Table 1. Media convergence with the total public agenda

	All News	TV News	Newspaper	Ch. 3	Ch. 5	Ch. 8	Ch. 19
Governor	75	66	81	68	69	61	67
SOS	72	72	69	73	70	70	71
AG	63	58	68	53	54	56	68
Treasurer	54	49***	53	45***	41***	52	55
Auditor	67	62	71	65	58	62	61
Senate	68	63	72	64	63	59	64
County Executive	58	49***	64	52	50***	46***	47***

***Convergence score at or below 50

Table 2. Media convergence with the independent-only public agenda

	All News	TV News	Newspaper	Ch. 3	Ch. 5	Ch. 8	Ch. 19
Governor	77	69	83	70	70	64	69
SOS	72	74	69	74	72	72	72
AG	64	59	69	55	56	57	69
Treasurer	51	47***	50***	43***	39***	51	53
Auditor	65	60	69	63	56	61	60
Senate	69	64	74	65	64	59	64
County Executive	57	50***	63	53	51	47***	48***

***Convergence score at or below 50

The convergence score was above 50 in all cases and the newspaper convergence score substantially above 50 in all cases except for in the context of the Treasurer election and the average media public convergence score was 62 when using the total public agenda and 61.5 when using the independent only public agenda. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is supported.

To help understand this data, consider the gubernatorial race; the convergence score with all news for the independent public of 77 means that with regard to that race the total media agenda was 77% similar to the total public agenda.

The fact that the media-public convergence score was generally above 50 and that average convergence with both the total public and independent only public was near 62 indicates that the media and public exhibit very similar issue agendas during an election. Since convergence scores alone cannot establish causation the data cannot suggest how this convergence is created, however agenda setting theory would suggest that the convergence is the result of the agenda setting function of the media.

It is important to note here that the low convergence in the case of the treasurer race may be partially attributed to the aforementioned coding problem regarding the “veterans’ affairs” issue. Additionally, the research found that the public was concerned with “financial education,” which was an issue that was not highly represented in the media agenda.

5.2.2 Hypothesis 2: The convergence score between each of the candidate agendas and the media agenda will be greater than the media-public convergence score.

In order to test for a significant difference between the candidate-media convergence scores and the media-public convergence score, the comparable agendas were and evaluated in a paired-samples t-test under four conditions: using the independent-only public and total public agenda and total and television only candidate agendas. The test found that in both cases using the television only candidate agenda, the candidate-media convergence score was significantly *lower* than the media-public agenda (see Table 3 for a summary, see Appendix E for full t-test results). However, in both

cases using the total candidate agenda the all media - candidate convergence score was significantly higher than the all media – public convergence score. Therefore, hypothesis 2 is partially supported.

Table 3. Results of paired-samples t-test for differences between candidate-media convergence and media-public convergence

	All News	TV News	Newspaper	Ch. 3	Ch. 5	Ch. 8	Ch. 19
Independents and total candidate agenda (n=18)	Higher**	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.	Higher*	N.S.	N.S.
Independents and candidate TV agenda (n=15)	Lower**	Lower**	Lower**	Lower**	Lower**	Lower**	Lower**
All voters and total candidate agenda (n=18)	Higher**	Higher*	N.S.	N.S.	Higher*	Higher*	Higher*
All voters and candidate TV agenda (n=15)	Lower**	Lower**	Lower**	Lower**	Lower**	Lower**	Lower**

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$; n is the number of candidates with an agenda

The fact that candidate-convergences are higher than media-public convergence is a natural reflection of the reciprocal nature of candidate-media agenda setting. It is interesting to note that the convergence between the candidates' television advertising

agendas and the media-agenda was much lower than the convergence between the media and public agendas. This is because the vehicle for the reciprocal relationship between candidates and the media are often press releases, stump speeches and policy papers that are more accurately reflected on candidate websites than in their television advertising.

5.2.3 Research Question 1: What is the relationship between the candidate-media convergence and the candidate-public convergence?

To answer this question the candidate-public convergence scores for each of the 18 candidates were correlated with the candidate-media convergence measures for each media agenda. Since three candidates did not air television ads, the television only agendas were analyzed excluding those candidates.

For both the independents only ($r=.474, p<.05$) and total public agendas ($r=.473, p<.05$), a significant positive correlation was found between candidate-newspaper media convergence and candidate-public convergence. In the cases using only the candidate television advertising agenda, there was no significant relationship between candidate-media convergence and candidate-public convergence. There were also no significant correlations between candidate-public convergence and candidate-media convergence when considering any media agendas except the newspaper media agenda.

The significant correlations indicate that the closer the candidates' total agendas were to the newspaper agenda, the closer the candidates' total agendas were to the public agenda. Therefore, candidates whose issue agendas had higher convergence with the newspaper also had a higher convergence with the public. It is interesting to note that the candidate television agenda had no significant correlations, meaning that the media

agenda does not appear to play a role in developing convergence between candidates' television advertising agendas and the public agenda.

It is also interesting to note that the only significant relationships were found when looking at the newspaper agenda, while the television and total news agendas did not show a significant relationship. This may indicate that the agenda setting effect for television media is not as strong as it is for print media, therefore a candidate's convergence with the television media may not as strongly translate into convergence with the public. This is consistent with the literature that suggests that agenda setting is stronger in print media than in televised media (Ridout & Mellen, 2007; Roberts, 1992).

5.2.4 Hypothesis 3: There will be a significant positive correlation between the candidate-public convergence score and the percentage of the vote won by that candidate.

In order to test this hypothesis, again four variations of the agendas were used to reflect candidate total versus television only agenda and independent versus all voters for both their agenda and the percent of vote. As shown in Table 4, the analysis found a significant positive correlation between candidate-public convergence and the percent of vote won for both independents and all voters when considering the total candidate agenda ($r=.466, p<.05$ and $r=.422 p<.05$ respectively).

Although there was not a significant correlation between the agendas when using the candidate television only agenda, there were two interesting points to note. In the case of independents and the candidate television only agenda, the correlation approached significance ($r=.436, p=.052$) given that for this analysis $n=15$, it is possible that a sample of more races would have produced a significant correlation. Also in both the

independent and all voter cases when the candidates who did not run television ads were not excluded and were considered to have 0 convergence, the correlation between candidate-public convergence and percent of the vote skyrocketed to $r=.738$ ($p<.001$) for independents and $r=.658$ ($p<.001$) for all voters.

Table 4. Correlations between candidate-public convergence and percent vote

	Independents & total candidate	Independents & candidate tv	All voters & total candidate	All voters & candidate tv
Candidate tv n=15	.466*	.436 ^a	.422*	.377 ^a
Candidate tv n = 18	.466*	.738**	.422*	.658**

* $p <.05$, ** $p \leq .001$, ^a $p <.10$; n is the number of candidates with an agenda

As a result of these findings, hypothesis 3 is supported when considering the total candidate agenda.

This simply means that the higher a candidate's issue convergence with the public, the higher the percent of the vote they will receive. It is interesting to note that the correlation approached significance for the candidate television agenda, if future studies find a significant correlation in this measure it may indicate that issue convergence of candidate television advertisements bypass the intermediary effects of the media and have a direct impact on the outcome of an election.

It is also worth noting that when candidates who did not have television advertisements were included in the analysis and considered to have no convergence with the public, the significance of the relationship between candidate-public convergence and the vote skyrocketed. This may be due to several factors; primary among those factors is

the fact that these candidates were all minor party candidates with limited resources and therefore limited reach. It appears from these results that television advertising can be important in showing the public that candidates' do have similar issue agendas; therefore television advertising can be seen as a way to communicate convergence to the public.

5.2.5 Research Question 2: Is there a relationship between candidate-media convergence and percentage of the vote won by that candidate?

To examine the relationship between candidate-media convergence and the percentage of the vote won by a candidate, correlations were run to compare these variables. Again, these correlations were run under four conditions: independent versus all voters vote percent and candidate total agenda versus candidate television only agenda. In each of these cases, there were no significant correlations. However, when candidate-media convergence and percentage of vote won was examined without considering the treasurer race, the correlation when considering the candidate-newspaper agenda approached significance ($r=.449, p = .081, n=16$ where n is the number candidates).

Given these results, there was no significant relationship found, however further research is needed to examine these variables with a larger sample size to reduce the statistical impact of measurement error and other anomalous data.

If future research finds a significant correlation between candidate-media convergence and the percentage of the vote won by the candidate, it may indicate that the agenda setting effect is strong enough that candidates can increase their electability by attenuating their agendas to match the media agenda.

5.3 Supplemental Analysis

Given that there is a significant correlation between candidate-media convergence and candidate-public convergence as well as a significant correlation between candidate-public convergence and the percent of the vote won by candidates, logic would suggest that there would be a correlation between candidate-media convergence and the percent of vote won by candidates. However, since this is not the case in this sample, it becomes important to examine more closely the role of media-public convergence as an intermediary force. Supplemental analyses were conducted to explore the relationship between the media-public convergence and the candidate-public convergence as well as to examine the relationship between the media-public convergence and candidate-media convergence.

5.3.1 Media-Public Convergence and Candidate-Public Convergence

To examine the relationship between media-public convergence and candidate-public convergence a correlation analysis was conducted under the four scenarios for independents versus all voters and total candidate versus television only candidate agendas. The analysis found that for both independents and all voters when considering the total candidate agenda the candidate-public convergence scores were highly correlated with the media-public convergence scores with r ranging from .590 to .731 where $p < .01$. When considering only the candidate television agenda however, there were no significant correlations.

This indicates that as the media agenda gets closer to the public agenda, the candidate's agendas are also likely to get closer to the public agenda. The proximity of

the media agenda to the public agenda is an artifact of agenda setting effects, therefore this data suggests that the stronger the agenda setting effects of the media are in an election, the more likely the candidate is to converge with the public as well. This is of course due to the effects of candidate-media agenda setting.

Table 5. Media-Public and Candidate-Public Convergence

	All News	TV News	Newspaper	Ch. 3	Ch. 5	Ch. 8	Ch. 19
Independents and total candidate agenda (n=18)	.715**	.669**	.731**	.640**	.647**	.614**	.721**
Independents and candidate TV agenda (n=15)	.087	.087	.124	.075	.043	.128	.198
All voters and total candidate agenda (n=18)	.684**	.657**	.723**	.611**	.632**	.590**	.667**
All voters and candidate TV agenda (n=15)	.014	.033	.106	.012	-.023	.052	.104

** p <.01; n is the number of candidates, media-public agendas were constant within each race

5.3.2 Media-Public and Candidate-Media Convergence

Having established a relationship between candidate-public and candidate-newspaper convergence, between candidate-public convergence and vote choice and between candidate-public and media-candidate convergence but with a non-significant relationship between candidate-media convergence and vote choice, the last key

correlation to examine is the relationship between the media-public convergence and candidate-media convergence.

As has been the case in the previous tests, the analysis was run under four conditions; as in the previous tests, the candidate television agenda revealed no significant correlations. However for both the independent and total public agenda there were several significant correlations between media-public and candidate-media convergence as shown in Tables 6 and 7.

Table 6. Media- Total Public and Total Candidate-Media Convergence Correlations

	Public- All News	Public- TV News	Public- Newspaper	Public- Ch. 3	Public- Ch. 5	Public- Ch.8	Public- Ch.19
Candidate- All News	.531*	.554*	.413 ^a	.593**	.567*	.508*	.401 ^a
Candidate- TV News	N.S.	.465 ^a	N.S.	.448 ^a	.406 ^a	.484*	N.S.
Candidate- Newspaper	.628**	.596**	.603**	.668**	.676**	.485*	.417 ^a
Candidate- Ch.3	N.S.	.423 ^a	N.S.	.454 ^a	N.S.	.437 ^a	N.S.
Candidate- Ch.5	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.	.413 ^a	.412 ^a	N.S.	N.S.
Candidate- Ch.8	N.S.	.411 ^a	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.	.476*	N.S.
Candidate- Ch.19	.572*	.661**	N.S.	.580*	.569*	.671**	.639**

*p≤.05; **p≤.01; ^ap≤.10; n = 18; n is the number of candidates, media-public agendas were constant within each race

The significant correlations here show that under certain circumstances the more that candidates' agendas converge with the media, the more the public agendas will converge

with the media. This is likely an artifact of the relationships between both candidate-media convergence and media-public convergence with candidate-public convergence as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. The fact that the pattern of significance is consistent across candidate-media convergence, but not across media-public convergence, may indicate that candidate-media convergence is the intermediary force that causes the relationship between candidate-public and media-public convergence. In other words, unless the candidate attenuates his or her agenda to converge with the media, their convergence with the public will not be related to the media-public convergence or subject to the effects of traditional agenda setting.

Table 7. Media- Independent Public and Total Candidate-Media Convergence Correlations

	Public- All News	Public- TV News	Public- Newspaper	Public- Ch. 3	Public- Ch. 5	Public- Ch.8	Public- Ch.19
Candidate- All News	.509*	.561*	.401 ^a	.591**	.560*	.532*	.422 ^a
Candidate- TV News	N.S.	.450 ^a	N.S.	.426 ^a	N.S.	.491*	N.S.
Candidate- Newspaper	.629**	.626**	.599**	.692**	.685**	.526*	.462 ^a
Candidate- Ch.3	N.S.	.411 ^a	N.S.	.426 ^a	N.S.	.447 ^a	N.S.
Candidate- Ch.5	N.S.	.402 ^a	N.S.	.414 ^a	.404 ^a	N.S.	N.S.
Candidate- Ch.8	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.	.466 ^a	N.S.
Candidate- Ch.19	.550*	.646**	N.S.	.570*	.554*	.682**	.640**

*p≤.05; **p≤.01; ^ap≤.10; n = 18; n is the number of candidates, media-public agendas were constant within each race

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION

6.1 Hypotheses and Research Questions

This thesis generally sought to examine first how convergence scores can be used to add deeper meaning to agenda setting research and second how those convergence scores can be used to explain how voters choose which candidate to vote for. Given the fact that this research was aggregated in such a way that the unit of analysis was the individual race or candidate, the resulting n for each of the analyses was exceptionally low, with a range from n=15 to n=18. Having such a small sample size makes it incredibly difficult to detect significant results, but the analysis did uncover several significant relationships that were conceptually consistent with the agenda setting literature.

The fact that the relationships found in this study were significant for both the independent only and total public agendas suggest that these effects may be stronger than weak partisanship. However, it may also simply be an artifact of the nature of the issues at play in this election and further studies would need to be conducted under various political climates to validate that possibility.

6.1.1 Hypothesis 1: The convergence score between the media and public agenda will be greater than 50.

This research has established a baseline convergence score to represent the magnitude of the agenda setting function of the media. In almost every case, the media-public convergence was above 50 with the peak convergence being between the newspaper and the public at 81 and 83 for the total public and independents respectively in the gubernatorial race. In 5 of the 7 races, the newspaper agenda had the highest convergence among the 7 media sources, which is consistent with the agenda setting literature that suggests that the print media exhibit a stronger agenda setting effect than the television media (Ridout & Mellen, 2007; Roberts, 1992). These convergence scores indicate not only a baseline convergence measure for agenda setting research, but they also indicate variations between agendas based on the media source and the type of race. Of particular note is that the County Executive convergence score was generally lower than the convergence score for statewide or national races. This may indicate that in local races when the public is closer to the issues, the media may be less effective in setting the public agenda.

6.1.2 Hypothesis 2: The convergence score between each of the candidate agendas and the media agenda will be greater than the media-public convergence score.

The research suggested that due to the reciprocal nature of agenda setting between candidates and the media, the candidate-media convergence would be higher than the media-public convergence score. This was the case for 5 of the 7 media sources when considering the total public agenda but only 2 of the 7 media sources when considering the independent only public agenda. In both cases however, there was a significant

relationship between the candidate-all media convergence and the all media-public convergence. This suggests that while the agenda setting effect varies across the media sources, the reciprocal nature of candidate-media agenda setting is cumulative across the various media sources and not localized to any particular media source.

6.1.3 Research Question 1: What is the relationship between the candidate-media convergence and the candidate-public convergence?

The only significant correlations between candidate-media convergence and candidate-public convergence occurred when considering the candidate-newspaper convergence. This indicates that the higher the convergence between candidates and the newspaper, the higher the convergence between candidates and the public. This relationship occurs for both the total public and independent only public agenda and indicates the possibility of a process model for agenda setting by which candidates can enhance their convergence with the public by using the newspaper as an indicator of the public agenda.

6.1.4 Hypothesis 3: There will be a significant positive correlation between the candidate-public convergence score and the percentage of the vote won by that candidate.

The research shows a significant correlation between candidate-public issue convergence and the choice of voters, regardless of the specific stance of the candidate on those issues. This suggests that by increasing candidate-public issue convergence a candidate can increase the percent of the vote he or she will win. The correlation was significant for both all voters and independents only and this was the only analysis that

approached significance for the candidate television agenda (n=15) condition. This indicates that the convergence of the television advertising agenda of a candidate with the public may have an impact on the vote; it may also indicate that television advertising is a very important medium through which the existence of candidate-public convergence is communicated to the public.

6.1.5 Research Question 2: Is there a relationship between candidate-media convergence and percentage of the vote won by that candidate?

There was no significant correlation between candidate-media convergence and the percentage of the vote won by candidates. As noted in section 5.1.5, the absence of a significant correlation between candidate-media convergence and the percent of the vote is likely an artifact of the small n and error in the measurement of the treasurer agendas. The fact that the correlation approached significance when withholding the treasurer data points indicates that a larger n and corrective coding may reveal a significant relationship.

6.2 Supplemental Analysis

6.2.1 Media-Public Convergence and Candidate-Public Convergence

There were significant correlations between the media-public convergence and candidate-public convergence scores in both cases when considering the total candidate agenda for both the total public and independent only public conditions. There were no significant correlations with the television only candidate agenda. These results are an artifact of traditional media-public agenda setting effects and they indicate that stronger agenda setting effects enable candidates to increase their convergence with the public.

6.2.2 Media-Public and Candidate-Media Convergence

This analysis showed a significant correlation between the candidate-newspaper convergence and nearly all media-public convergence measures for both independents and the total public agenda. It also found that the candidate-all media convergence was correlated with most media-public convergence measures for both independents and the total public agenda. This indicates that the newspapers may play a role in setting the agenda of other news media sources.

When this result is combined with the result from the test in section 5.2.1, it suggests that the media-public convergence, otherwise known as traditional agenda setting effects, serves as an intermediary between the candidate and the public. Therefore, this study provides strong evidence that candidates can increase their convergence with the public by increasing their convergence with media. A more detailed description of this process can be found in section 6.6.

Despite the failure of candidate-media convergence to correlate significantly with vote choice, the fact that this analysis approached significance when withholding the Treasurer's race seems to suggest that a relationship exists that was not detected in this study due to the small n and measurement error in the Treasurer's race.

6.3 Relationships between the various convergence scores and vote choice

The previous analyses have drawn a complex picture of relationships between candidate, media and public agendas and the vote choice. In order to better visualize these relationships, it is helpful to graphically represent the relationships as a macro model analysis as is done in Figures 1 and 2. Note that the media-public convergence

could not be correlated with vote choice because media-public convergence relates to the races as a whole, while vote choice relates to individual candidates. Conceptually, a relationship between these two variables would not be expected to exist. For example, in any given race vote choice would be divided between the candidates, one would inevitably win a larger percentage of the vote. However media-public convergence is measured at the level of the race, since the issues remain consistent within a given race. Therefore, the media-public convergence would be identical for all candidates within a given race while the vote choice would split unevenly in each race.

Figure 1. Total Candidate-Independent Public Model





Figure 2. Total Candidate – Total Public Model



6.4 Limitations

This study is limited in several ways; first and foremost the small n of 15 to 18 at the aggregate level made it incredibly difficult to detect smaller relationships and wash out measurement error. As noted, there was a measurement error in determining the treasurer agendas due to coding military references literally as veteran’s issues rather than considering those mentions as proxies for experience and responsibility. Because this error was not detected until after the questionnaires were sent, it was impossible to use corrective coding on the content analysis portion of the research without distorting the convergence scores with the public agenda.

Additionally, by limiting the research to content issued one month prior to the election, the analysis did not include several early political advertisements that certainly contributed to the candidate agendas. By focusing on the candidate website and television advertisements, several modes of campaign communication were missed by the analysis. This is particularly important when considering down-ticket and more local races that

depend more on mailings, stump speeches and interpersonal communications to deliver campaign messages.

Further limitations include the fact that the survey was delayed at the post office, resulting in respondents answering the survey questions after learning who the winner of the elections were, which opens the vote totals to the threat of social desirability bias. The fact that the response rate for the survey was under 10% opens the survey data to the threat of response bias and the selection criteria of areas with a high census response rate did have an effect on the demographic diversity of respondents.

This analysis was limited in context to the 2010 general election in Cuyahoga County and to the individual races studied. This election was a highly partisan race, in which the overwhelming majority of winning candidates were Republicans; while limiting the sample to independents limited the effect of strong partisanship, it cannot be ignored as a contextual limitation on this study. Further studies should seek to conduct similar research in races that swing heavily Democratic and those that have a less partisan bias. For a further discussion of the context of this election, please see Appendix G.

Because this analysis was conducted at the aggregate, campaign and candidate, level the study is limited in the insights it can provide on the individual level processes from which these aggregate findings resulted. An individual level analysis of convergence coupled with the additional consideration of individual level decision-making theories would be required to garner those insights.

There were difficulties in comparing aggregate data to individual data to determine the relationship between convergence and partisanship. In order to accomplish

this, an individual convergence score would need to be calculated, such an analysis could be done with the data from this study; however it is a large enough undertaking to justify a separate study.


Lastly, the sample in this study was overwhelmingly older and white, while this demographic appears to adequately represent active, independent voters in Cuyahoga County it may not be a representative sample of active, independent voters in other areas.

6.5 Directions for Future Research

Future research should consider repeating this study's methodology in the context of a much larger number of races, particularly among races of the same type. It may be valuable to conduct this study nationwide in congressional districts that are known to change hands frequently. In the field of agenda setting, there is a great deal of research that can be conducted using the convergence scores to examine the real-world effects of agenda setting, a serial longitudinal study that tracks media-public convergence over time would be valuable to show the relationships between the traditional correlative research and convergence.

Other researchers may consider conducting a full path analysis of the relationships between the convergence scores to develop a more complete model of how agenda setting can be used to affect the outcome of an election. If such research was conducted with this data, it would be expected that the relationships would appear as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Expected Path of Relationships



Future research should seriously examine the findings of research question 2 in an attempt to detect this relationship with a larger N. The research does strongly suggest that a relationship should exist between candidate-media convergence and vote choice.

Given that this study focused on independent voters, it would be worthwhile for future research to consider examining partisan voters as well. It would be expected that both strong Democrats and strong Republicans would behave similarly but in opposite directions, the most interesting relationship to examine in such an analysis would be the differences between independents and strong partisans.

Lastly, future research should consider modifying the convergence calculation to determine individual level convergence scores between candidates or media and individual survey respondents to produce a richer data set and enhance the ability to control analyses for individual level differences such as partisanship, race, gender, education and socioeconomic status. Additionally, individual level analysis of this

process may enable the model to be expanded to incorporate decision making process models such as the elaboration likelihood model or others to explain how and why these relationships occur in individual voters. An individual level analysis would also provide large dataset to consider which would enable the detection of less powerful effects and add certainty to the effects which were found to be significant with an n of 15 or 18.

6.6 Conclusions

The stated intent of this study was to attempt to identify potential campaign tactics to reach independent voters more effectively. The research has suggested that candidates and campaign consultants may be able to reach independents by increasing their issue convergence with that of the newspaper. When the candidate converges with the local newspaper, their likelihood of converging with the independent public increases; given that convergence with the public is correlated with vote choice, this model is likely to improve a candidate's performance at the polls. Candidates may take advantage of this process by carefully monitoring issue salience in newspapers and attenuating their message strategy when communicating with voters to converge with the newspaper agenda.

The results of this study are consistent with the prior research in that it has shown a stronger agenda setting effect in the print media (Ridout & Mellen, 2007; Roberts, 1992). It is also consistent with the limited convergence score literature related to candidate-media convergence in showing that candidate-newspaper convergence is higher than candidate-television news convergence and that media-candidate convergence tends to be above 50 (Hayes, 2009).

This study has found that convergence scores are a valuable resource in examining agenda setting effects and suggested that complex relationships between agendas and outcomes can be more easily examined and translated into actionable strategies when using a convergence measure.

The fact that this study found many significant results despite a small n indicates the strength of the relationships uncovered. Although the research question at the logical end of the series of research questions and hypotheses in this analysis did not find significant results, the data suggests that further research may reveal evidence of a powerful model through which to use the agenda setting effect to tip the outcome of an election.

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APPENDIX A
QUESTIONNAIRE

COMMUNICATION AND POLITICS SURVEY

*Thank you for agreeing to participate. When answering the questions, please **circle** or **mark** the number that best represents your answer. Although answering every question is preferable, you have the right to skip any question that you do not want to answer. Please read all instructions carefully and answer each question as accurately as possible.*

The following questions ask about your media use, please select all responses that apply.

1. How much attention do you pay to state and local political news? (Circle one number)

None at all A lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

2. How much attention do you pay to state and local political news on LOCAL TELEVISION?

None at all A lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

3. How much attention do you pay to state and local political news in LOCAL NEWSPAPERS?

None at all A lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

4. How much attention do you pay to state and local political news ONLINE?

None at all A lot
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

The following questions ask about who you voted for in the 2010 General Election, held on November 2, 2010. Please select only one answer for each question.

5. Did you vote in the 2010 General Election, either at the polls or by mail? If NO, skip to the end.

Yes, I voted

No, I did not vote

6. In the race for Ohio Governor, who did you vote for? (Select only one)

John Kasich (R)

Ted Strickland (D)

7. In the race for Ohio Secretary of State, who did you vote for? (Select only one)

Jon Husted (R)

Maryellen O'Shaughnessy (D)

8. In the race for Ohio Attorney General, who did you vote for? (Select only one)

Richard Cordray (D)

Mike Dewine (R)

9. In the race for Ohio Treasurer, who did you vote for? (Select only one)

Kevin Boyce (D)

Josh Mandel (R)

10. In the race for Ohio Auditor, who did you vote for? (Select only one)

David Pepper (D)

Dave Yost (R)

11. In the race for United States Senate, who did you vote for? (Select only one)

Lee Fisher (D)

Rob Portman (R)

12. In the race for Cuyahoga County Executive, who did you vote for? (Select only one)

Matt Dolan (R)

David Ellison (G)

Ed Fitzgerald (D)

Ken Lanci (I)

Tim McCormack (I)

Don Scipione (I)

The following questions ask about your awareness of political advertising in this election, please select only one answer.

13. How aware were you of advertisements for either candidate for Ohio Governor?
(Circle one number)

Not at all aware

Somewhat aware

Very aware

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

14. How aware were you of advertisements for either candidate for Ohio Secretary of State?

Not at all aware

Somewhat aware

Very aware

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

15. How aware were you of advertisements for either candidate for Ohio Attorney General?

Not at all aware

Somewhat aware

Very aware

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

16. How aware were you of advertisements for either candidate for Ohio Treasurer?

Not at all aware

Somewhat aware

Very aware

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

17. How aware were you of advertisements for either candidate for Ohio Auditor?

Not at all aware Somewhat aware Very aware
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

18. How aware were you of advertisements for either candidate for United States Senate?

Not at all aware Somewhat aware Very aware
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

19. How aware were you of advertisements for any candidate for Cuyahoga County Executive?

Not at all aware Somewhat aware Very aware
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

The following questions ask you to identify the issues that you considered VERY IMPORTANT when deciding which candidate to vote for in each race. Please select every issue that you considered VERY IMPORTANT when making your decision.

20. In the race for OHIO GOVERNOR, place a check mark next to every issue that you considered VERY IMPORTANT when deciding which candidate to vote for. (Select all that apply)

- Jobs State Budget Education Taxes Health Care Gun Rights
- Veterans Affairs Wall Street Government Efficiency/Size 3C Train
- Others (specify): _____

21. In the race for OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE, place a check mark next to every issue that you considered VERY IMPORTANT when deciding which candidate to vote for. (Select all that apply)

- Jobs Fair Elections Election Participation Size and Cost of
 Government Taxes
Experience Redistricting/Reform Political Background Free Speech Issues
Others (specify): _____

22. In the race for OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, place a check mark next to every issue that you considered VERY IMPORTANT when deciding which candidate to vote for. (Select all that apply)

- Crime/Law enforcement Corruption Wall Street Reform
Jobs
Experience Education Gun Rights Abortion
Others (specify): _____

23. In the race for OHIO TREASURER, place a check mark next to every issue that you considered VERY IMPORTANT when deciding which candidate to vote for. (Select all that apply)

- Jobs Experience Corruption Fiscal Responsibility Financial Education
Terrorism Veterans Affairs Others (specify): _____

24. In the race for OHIO AUDITOR, place a check mark next to every issue that you considered VERY IMPORTANT when deciding which candidate to vote for. (Select all that apply)

- Taxes Jobs Corruption Wasteful Spending Reform
Experience Independence Crime Infrastructure

Others (specify):_____

25. In the race for UNITED STATES SENATE, place a check mark next to every issue that you considered VERY IMPORTANT when deciding which candidate to vote for. (Select all that apply)

Jobs Health Care Education Foreign Trade Budget Deficit

Taxes Military Issues Reform Energy

Others (specify):_____

26. In the race for CUYAHOGA COUNTY EXECUTIVE, place a check mark next to every issue that you considered VERY IMPORTANT when deciding which candidate to vote for. (Select all that apply)

Jobs/Economy Corruption Reform Health & Human Services

Education

Independence Foreclosures Leadership/Experience Public Safety

Medical Mart Others (specify): _____

The following questions ask about your media use, please select all answers that apply.

27. Where do you go to get information about state and local politics?

Television News Radio Newspapers Online Newspapers

Candidate Websites

Candidate pages on Facebook/Twitter Online Blogs I don't know

Other:_____

28. If you get state and local political information from television news, what stations do you watch most?

WKYC-Channel 3 WEWS – Channel 5 WJW- Channel 8 WOIO – Channel 19/43

Other: _____ I don't know/don't get political news from TV

29. If you get state and local political information from newspapers, what newspapers do you read most?

The Plain Dealer Cleveland Scene Sun Newspapers Crain's Cleveland Business

Other: _____ I do not get local political news from newspapers

30. If you get state and local political information from online news, what online news do you read most?

The Plain Dealer Online Cleveland Scene Online Sun Newspapers Online

Other: _____ Crain's Cleveland Business Online I do not get local political news online

31. On average, how many days per week did you pay attention to local political news from any source during this election? (circle one)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

The following questions ask about your demographics, please select only the one answer that best applies.

32. The terms "liberal" and "conservative" may mean different things to people, depending on the kind of issue one is considering. In terms of political issues, would you say you are:

APPENDIX B
SURVEY COVER LETTER

October 25, 2010

Dear Cuyahoga County Voter:

I am a researcher in the School of Communications at Cleveland State University and I am investigating how voter perceptions of campaigns affect the outcome of the 2010 general election in Cuyahoga County. Working under the direction of Leo W. Jeffres, Ph.D., it is my hope that your responses will help me complete a Master's thesis that has taken over a year to develop.

Dr. Jeffres and I are asking you to complete the enclosed survey which being given to voters like you who live in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. The survey will take about 15 minutes to complete and it will ask questions about your political activity in this election.

Your responses will be confidential and will be combined with others' responses for use in a research project which may be published and presented in the future. Your name will not be collected or reported in any published or presented version of the research project.

Your complete privacy is guaranteed. Your participation is completely voluntary and you are not required to answer any questions asked. There is no reward for participating or consequence for not participating and there are no risks associated with this survey other than those experienced during normal political discourse.

For further information regarding this research please contact Jonathan Simon at (216)687-4629 or via email at J.M.Simon80@csuohio.edu or you can contact my advisor, Leo W. Jeffres at (216)687-5088 or via email at L.Jeffres@csuohio.edu.

If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant you may contact the Cleveland State University Institutional Review Board at (216)687-3630.

By returning this survey in the enclosed, postage paid envelope you are agreeing that you are 18 years or older, have read and understood this letter and agree to allow your responses to be included in this study for which the results will be published.

Please make sure that you fill out the survey within a few hours of voting, or if you have already voted please fill out the survey and return it in the enclosed envelope before November 2nd.

For your convenience you may take this survey online instead of mailing back the paper copy. Please visit www.surveymonkey.com/CSUelectionsurvey2010 for the online version.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation and support.

-Jonathan Simon

APPENDIX C

AGENDAS

Media Agendas

Attorney General							
	All News	TV News	Newspapers	Ch. 3	Ch. 5	Ch. 8	Ch. 19
AG							
AG > Abortion	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
AG > Corruption	7%	4%	11%	3%	2%	3%	6%
AG > Crime/Law Enforcement	11%	12%	11%	8%	10%	10%	19%
AG > Education	33%	42%	23%	48%	39%	46%	32%
AG > Experience	12%	10%	15%	10%	10%	10%	9%
AG > Gun Rights	4%	4%	3%	2%	5%	4%	7%
AG > Jobs	21%	18%	24%	17%	22%	17%	17%
AG > Reform	5%	5%	4%	5%	5%	5%	7%
AG > Wall Street	7%	5%	8%	6%	7%	5%	4%

Auditor							
	All News	TV News	Newspapers	Ch. 3	Ch. 5	Ch. 8	Ch. 19
Auditor							
Auditor > Corruption	10%	6%	13%	6%	4%	6%	10%
Auditor > Crime	8%	10%	6%	6%	9%	9%	16%
Auditor > Experience	16%	16%	16%	17%	15%	18%	14%
Auditor > Independence	2%	1%	2%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Auditor > Infrastructure	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%	2%	0%
Auditor > Jobs	35%	38%	33%	38%	44%	36%	34%
Auditor > Reform	6%	9%	4%	9%	8%	10%	11%
Auditor > Taxes	10%	6%	13%	9%	5%	6%	6%
Auditor > Wasteful Spending	12%	12%	11%	13%	13%	13%	9%

County Executive							
	All News	TV News	Newspapers	Ch. 3	Ch. 5	Ch. 8	Ch. 19
County Executive							
County Executive > Corruption	6%	3%	10%	3%	2%	2%	5%
County Executive > Education	27%	32%	20%	39%	28%	35%	24%
County Executive > Foreclosures	2%	1%	4%	2%	1%	1%	0%
County Executive > Health and Human Services	2%	2%	3%	3%	3%	2%	1%
County Executive > Independence	1%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%
County Executive > Jobs	21%	17%	25%	18%	20%	15%	16%
County Executive > Leadership/Experience	12%	9%	15%	10%	9%	9%	7%
County Executive > Medical Mart	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
County Executive > Public Safety	25%	31%	17%	20%	31%	31%	40%
County Executive > Reform	4%	5%	4%	5%	4%	4%	5%

Governor							
	All News	TV News	Newspapers	Ch. 3	Ch. 5	Ch. 8	Ch. 19
Governor							
Governor > 3C Train	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Governor > Education	29%	37%	21%	41%	33%	39%	32%
Governor > Government Efficiency/Size	7%	6%	8%	6%	7%	6%	6%
Governor > Gun Rights	3%	4%	3%	2%	4%	4%	7%
Governor > Health Care	15%	18%	12%	15%	17%	22%	19%
Governor > Jobs	23%	20%	26%	19%	24%	17%	23%
Governor > State Budget	6%	3%	8%	4%	4%	3%	2%
Governor > Taxes	7%	3%	10%	5%	3%	3%	4%
Governor > Veterans Affairs	4%	3%	4%	4%	2%	3%	3%
Governor > Wall Street	6%	5%	7%	5%	6%	4%	4%

Senate							
	All News	TV News	Newspapers	Ch. 3	Ch. 5	Ch. 8	Ch. 19
Senate							
Senate > Budget Deficit	7%	4%	9%	5%	5%	4%	3%
Senate > Education	32%	39%	24%	42%	35%	41%	34%
Senate > Energy	1%	1%	2%	1%	2%	1%	2%
Senate > Foreign Trade	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%
Senate > Health Care	17%	19%	13%	15%	18%	23%	20%
Senate > Jobs	25%	20%	29%	19%	25%	17%	23%
Senate > Military Issues	7%	6%	7%	7%	7%	6%	6%
Senate > Reform	5%	5%	4%	5%	4%	5%	8%
Senate > Taxes	7%	4%	11%	5%	3%	3%	4%

SOS							
	All News	TV News	Newspapers	Ch. 3	Ch. 5	Ch. 8	Ch. 19
SOS							
SOS > Election Participation	1%	1%	0%	2%	1%	1%	1%
SOS > Experience	8%	11%	6%	8%	12%	14%	8%
SOS > Fair Elections	4%	5%	2%	4%	4%	3%	9%
SOS > Free Speech Issues	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
SOS > Government Size/Cost	13%	13%	13%	14%	14%	14%	11%
SOS > Jobs	40%	42%	38%	40%	47%	40%	40%
SOS > Political Background	16%	11%	20%	12%	8%	10%	12%
SOS > Redistricting/Reform	7%	10%	5%	10%	8%	11%	13%
SOS > Taxes	11%	7%	15%	10%	6%	6%	7%

Treasurer							
	All News	TV News	Newspapers	Ch. 3	Ch. 5	Ch. 8	Ch. 19
Treasurer							
Treasurer > Corruption	16%	10%	21%	9%	6%	8%	16%
Treasurer > Experience	10%	11%	9%	9%	10%	13%	10%
Treasurer > Financial Education	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Treasurer > Fiscal Responsibility	5%	6%	4%	6%	3%	8%	6%
Treasurer > Jobs	56%	58%	54%	61%	71%	51%	54%
Treasurer > Race/Religion	2%	1%	2%	0%	0%	3%	2%
Treasurer > Terrorism	2%	5%	0%	3%	4%	7%	4%
Treasurer > Veterans Affairs	9%	9%	9%	12%	5%	10%	7%

Candidate Total Agendas by Race

Attorney General		
Issue	Cordray	Dewine
AG		
AG > Abortion	0%	3%
AG > Corruption	16%	27%
AG > Crime/Law Enforcement	34%	24%
AG > Education	10%	15%
AG > Experience	15%	6%
AG > Gun Rights	0%	3%
AG > Jobs	16%	18%
AG > Reform	0%	4%
AG > Wall Street	9%	0%

Auditor		
Issue	Pepper	Yost
Auditor		
Auditor > Corruption	19%	13%
Auditor > Crime	18%	5%
Auditor > Experience	8%	21%
Auditor > Independence	2%	0%
Auditor > Infrastructure	1%	0%
Auditor > Jobs	14%	21%
Auditor > Reform	5%	0%
Auditor > Taxes	10%	15%
Auditor > Wasteful Spending	23%	26%

County Executive						
Issue	Dolan	Ellison	Fitzgerald	Lanci	McCormack	Scipione
County Executive						
County Executive > Corruption	4%	1%	3%	9%	0%	1%
County Executive > Education	12%	20%	17%	6%	24%	33%
County Executive > Foreclosures	1%	0%	1%	2%	0%	4%
County Executive > Health and Human Services	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	2%
County Executive > Independence	5%	4%	1%	5%	0%	2%
County Executive > Jobs	43%	65%	56%	50%	23%	41%
County Executive > Leadership/Experience	12%	8%	11%	18%	19%	12%
County Executive > Medical Mart	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
County Executive > Public Safety	7%	2%	9%	3%	23%	0%
County Executive > Reform	14%	0%	1%	7%	11%	4%

Governor		
Issue	Kasich	Strickland
Governor		
Governor > 3C Train	0%	0%
Governor > Education	8%	35%
Governor > Government Efficiency/Size	17%	3%
Governor > Gun Rights	10%	0%
Governor > Health Care	6%	7%
Governor > Jobs	34%	30%
Governor > State Budget	13%	4%
Governor > Taxes	10%	13%
Governor > Veterans Affairs	2%	3%
Governor > Wall Street	2%	4%

Senate		
Issue	Fisher	Portman
Senate		
Senate > Budget Deficit	4%	10%
Senate > Education	12%	5%
Senate > Energy	7%	13%
Senate > Foreign Trade	2%	0%
Senate > Health Care	20%	9%
Senate > Jobs	38%	43%
Senate > Military Issues	5%	7%
Senate > Reform	5%	3%
Senate > Taxes	6%	9%

Secretary of State		
Issue	Husted	Oshaughnessey
SOS		
SOS > Election Participation	0%	1%
SOS > Experience	2%	11%
SOS > Fair Elections	6%	19%
SOS > Free Speech Issues	0%	0%
SOS > Government Size/Cost	9%	3%
SOS > Jobs	38%	38%
SOS > Political Background	12%	18%
SOS > Redistricting/Reform	7%	4%
SOS > Taxes	26%	6%

Treasurer		
Issue	Boyce	Mandel
Treasurer		
Treasurer > Corruption	0%	4%
Treasurer > Experience	10%	21%
Treasurer > Financial Education	0%	0%
Treasurer > Fiscal Responsibility	10%	8%
Treasurer > Jobs	66%	12%
Treasurer > Race/Religion	15%	1%
Treasurer > Terrorism	0%	9%
Treasurer > Veterans Affairs	0%	44%

Candidate Television Only Agendas by Race

Attorney General		
Issue	Cordray	Dewine
AG		
AG > Abortion	0%	0%
AG > Corruption	23%	54%
AG > Crime/Law Enforcement	23%	8%
AG > Education	0%	8%
AG > Experience	46%	0%
AG > Gun Rights	0%	0%
AG > Jobs	8%	23%
AG > Reform	0%	8%
AG > Wall Street	0%	0%

Auditor		
Issue	Pepper	Yost
Auditor		
Auditor > Corruption	11%	5%
Auditor > Crime	11%	5%
Auditor > Experience	0%	16%
Auditor > Independence	11%	0%
Auditor > Infrastructure	0%	0%
Auditor > Jobs	0%	16%
Auditor > Reform	0%	0%
Auditor > Taxes	22%	21%
Auditor > Wasteful Spending	44%	37%

County Executive						
Issue	Dolan	Ellison	Fitzgerald	Lanci	McCormack	Scipione
County Executive						
County Executive > Corruption	23%	0%	67%	0%	0%	0%
County Executive > Education	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
County Executive > Foreclosures	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
County Executive > Health and Human Services	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
County Executive > Independence	8%	0%	17%	28%	0%	0%
County Executive > Jobs	15%	0%	0%	44%	0%	0%
County Executive > Leadership/Experience	8%	0%	17%	22%	0%	0%
County Executive > Medical Mart	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
County Executive > Public Safety	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
County Executive > Reform	46%	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%

Governor		
Issue	Kasich	Strickland
Governor		
Governor > 3C Train	0%	0%
Governor > Education	0%	16%
Governor > Government Efficiency/Size	7%	0%
Governor > Gun Rights	0%	0%
Governor > Health Care	0%	0%
Governor > Jobs	73%	60%
Governor > State Budget	17%	0%
Governor > Taxes	2%	8%
Governor > Veterans Affairs	0%	0%
Governor > Wall Street	0%	16%

Senate		
Issue	Fisher	Portman
Senate		
Senate > Budget Deficit	29%	13%
Senate > Education	0%	0%
Senate > Energy	0%	0%
Senate > Foreign Trade	18%	0%
Senate > Health Care	0%	2%
Senate > Jobs	35%	78%
Senate > Military Issues	0%	0%
Senate > Reform	0%	4%
Senate > Taxes	18%	2%

Secretary of State		
Issue	Husted	Oshaughnessey
SOS		
SOS > Election Participation	0%	0%
SOS > Experience	14%	43%
SOS > Fair Elections	0%	29%
SOS > Free Speech Issues	0%	0%
SOS > Government Size/Cost	29%	0%
SOS > Jobs	0%	14%
SOS > Political Background	14%	0%
SOS > Redistricting/Reform	0%	14%
SOS > Taxes	43%	0%

Treasurer		
Issue	Boyce	Mandel
Treasurer		
Treasurer > Corruption	0%	10%
Treasurer > Experience	12%	14%
Treasurer > Financial Education	0%	0%
Treasurer > Fiscal Responsibility	0%	19%
Treasurer > Jobs	53%	14%
Treasurer > Race/Religion	35%	5%
Treasurer > Terrorism	0%	0%
Treasurer > Veterans Affairs	0%	38%

Total Public Agenda

Governor	
	Public
Governor	
Governor > 3C Train	1.16%
Governor > Education	15.12%
Governor > Government Efficiency/Size	10.81%
Governor > Gun Rights	1.86%
Governor > Health Care	11.98%
Governor > Jobs	22.09%
Governor > State Budget	15.35%
Governor > Taxes	17.33%
Governor > Veterans Affairs	2.21%
Governor > Wall Street	2.09%

SOS	
	Public
SOS	
SOS > Election Participation	4.70%
SOS > Experience	9.76%
SOS > Fair Elections	14.98%
SOS > Free Speech Issues	1.57%
SOS > Government Size/Cost	17.94%
SOS > Jobs	19.51%
SOS > Political Background	8.19%
SOS > Redistricting/Reform	7.49%
SOS > Taxes	15.85%

Attorney General		Treasurer	
AG	Public	Treasurer	Public
AG > Abortion	3.09%	Treasurer > Corruption	19.34%
AG > Corruption	23.88%	Treasurer > Experience	13.15%
AG > Crime/Law Enforcement	21.99%	Treasurer > Financial Education	14.70%
AG > Education	8.76%	Treasurer > Fiscal Responsibility	30.37%
AG > Experience	14.78%	Treasurer > Jobs	16.25%
AG > Gun Rights	3.09%	Treasurer > Race/Religion	1.55%
AG > Jobs	13.23%	Treasurer > Terrorism	2.32%
AG > Reform	8.93%	Treasurer > Veterans Affairs	2.32%
AG > Wall Street	2.23%		

Auditor		Senate	
Auditor	Public	Senate	Public
Auditor > Corruption	18.36%	Senate > Budget Deficit	16.13%
Auditor > Crime	3.85%	Senate > Education	8.96%
Auditor > Experience	11.01%	Senate > Energy	6.05%
Auditor > Independence	4.90%	Senate > Foreign Trade	6.49%
Auditor > Infrastructure	2.80%	Senate > Health Care	14.89%
Auditor > Jobs	10.84%	Senate > Jobs	19.26%
Auditor > Reform	9.44%	Senate > Military Issues	4.82%
Auditor > Taxes	15.38%	Senate > Reform	7.17%
Auditor > Wasteful Spending	23.43%	Senate > Taxes	16.24%

County Executive	
	Public
County Executive	
County Executive > Corruption	23.33%
County Executive > Education	7.08%
County Executive > Foreclosures	4.17%
County Executive > Health and Human Services	7.08%
County Executive > Independence	5.42%
County Executive > Jobs	19.17%
County Executive > Leadership/Experience	10.83%
County Executive > Medical Mart	4.31%
County Executive > Public Safety	4.44%
County Executive > Reform	14.17%

Independent Only Public Agenda by Race

Governor	
	Public
Governor	
Governor > 3C Train	1%
Governor > Education	18%
Governor > Government Efficiency/Size	9%
Governor > Gun Rights	1%
Governor > Health Care	12%
Governor > Jobs	21%
Governor > State Budget	15%
Governor > Taxes	18%
Governor > Veterans Affairs	3%
Governor > Wall Street	2%

SOS	
SOS	Public
SOS > Election Participation	4%
SOS > Experience	12%
SOS > Fair Elections	13%
SOS > Free Speech Issues	2%
SOS > Government Size/Cost	17%
SOS > Jobs	20%
SOS > Political Background	8%
SOS > Redistricting/Reform	8%
SOS > Taxes	17%

Attorney General		Treasurer	
AG	Public	Treasurer	Public
AG > Abortion	3%	Treasurer > Corruption	18%
AG > Corruption	24%	Treasurer > Experience	14%
AG > Crime/Law Enforcement	22%	Treasurer > Financial Education	16%
AG > Education	11%	Treasurer > Fiscal Responsibility	31%
AG > Experience	14%	Treasurer > Jobs	14%
AG > Gun Rights	2%	Treasurer > Race/Religion	3%
AG > Jobs	13%	Treasurer > Terrorism	3%
AG > Reform	9%	Treasurer > Veterans Affairs	2%
AG > Wall Street	3%		

Auditor		Senate	
Auditor	Public	Senate	Public
Auditor > Corruption	18%	Senate > Budget Deficit	16%
Auditor > Crime	5%	Senate > Education	10%
Auditor > Experience	11%	Senate > Energy	7%
Auditor > Independence	7%	Senate > Foreign Trade	6%
Auditor > Infrastructure	3%	Senate > Health Care	14%
Auditor > Jobs	8%	Senate > Jobs	20%
Auditor > Reform	10%	Senate > Military Issues	4%
Auditor > Taxes	15%	Senate > Reform	6%
Auditor > Wasteful Spending	23%	Senate > Taxes	16%

County Executive	
County Executive	Public
County Executive > Corruption	23%
County Executive > Education	9%
County Executive > Foreclosures	4%
County Executive > Health and Human Services	8%
County Executive > Independence	6%
County Executive > Jobs	18%
County Executive > Leadership/Experience	10%
County Executive > Medical Mart	4%
County Executive > Public Safety	4%
County Executive > Reform	15%

APPENDIX D

CONVERGENCE SCORES AND VOTE CHOICE

Media-Public Convergence

Total Public Agenda

	All News	TV News	Newspapers	Ch. 3	Ch. 5	Ch. 8	Ch. 19
Governor	75	66	81	68	69	61	67
SOS	72	72	69	73	70	70	71
AG	63	58	68	53	54	56	68
Treasurer	54	49	53	45	41	52	55
Auditor	67	62	71	65	58	62	61
Senate	68	63	72	64	63	59	64
County Executive	58	49	64	52	50	46	47

Independents Only

	All News	TV News	Newspapers	Ch. 3	Ch. 5	Ch. 8	Ch. 19
Governor	77	69	83	70	70	64	69
SOS	72	74	69	74	72	72	72
AG	64	59	69	55	56	57	69
Treasurer	51	47	50	43	39	51	53
Auditor	65	60	69	63	56	61	60
Senate	69	64	74	65	64	59	64
County Executive	57	50	63	53	51	47	48

Candidate-Media Convergence

Total Candidate

	All News	TV News	Newspapers	Ch. 3	Ch. 5	Ch. 8	Ch. 19
Gv. Kasich	63	54	72	53	59	49	59
Gv. Strickland	81	79	79	80	81	75	79
SOS Husted	84	79	84	83	74	76	81
SOS Oshaughnessy	80	79	78	77	74	76	82
AG Cordray	64	56	72	54	55	54	64
AG Dewine	65	62	68	56	58	59	70
Tres. Boyce	72	76	69	76	79	71	72
Tres. Mandel	43	48	40	46	39	56	45
Aud. Pepper	69	64	70	63	60	63	69
Aud. Yost	74	67	78	71	63	68	64
Sen. Fisher	75	72	76	67	74	67	74
Sen. Portman	65	55	74	56	60	49	56
CE. Dolan	62	55	68	57	56	52	53
CE. Ellison	53	49	58	50	52	46	47
CE. Fitzgerald	64	58	69	60	60	55	55
CE. Lanci	55	45	66	47	47	42	44
CE. McCormack	83	78	79	77	80	75	75
CE. Scipione	70	67	71	71	67	66	55

Candidate Television Only

	All News	TV News	Newspapers	Ch. 3	Ch. 5	Ch. 8	Ch. 19
Gv. Kasich	38	32	44	32	38	28	33
Gv. Strickland	52	44	58	44	49	40	47
SOS Husted	47	42	48	44	40	44	38
SOS Oshaugnessy	33	41	28	36	39	43	45
AG Cordray	39	32	46	29	30	31	41
AG Dewine	48	43	53	41	45	40	45
Tres. Boyce	64	65	64	61	63	65	66
Tres. Mandel	49	51	48	50	39	56	49
Aud. Pepper	41	36	43	36	32	34	36
Aud. Yost	64	61	66	65	59	60	55
Sen. Fisher	39	29	50	30	34	24	30
Sen. Portman	40	34	47	33	39	30	35
CE. Dolan	34	31	39	31	29	30	33
CE.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Ellison							
CE. Fitzgerald	19	12	27	13	11	12	12
CE. Lanci	38	31	46	33	34	29	29
CE. McCormack	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
CE. Scipione	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Candidate-Public

Total Candidate, Total Public

TV Candidate, Total Public

	Public Convergence		Public Convergence
Gv. Kasich	74	Gv. Kasich	47
Gv. Strickland	69	Gv. Strickland	47
SOS Husted	67	SOS Husted	52
SOS Oshaughnessey	67	SOS Oshaughnessey	47
AG Cordray	77	AG Cordray	68
AG Dewine	84	AG Dewine	60
Tres. Boyce	37	Tres. Boyce	30
Tres. Mandel	43	Tres. Mandel	60
Aud. Pepper	82	Aud. Pepper	59
Aud. Yost	77	Aud. Yost	70
Sen. Fisher	71	Sen. Fisher	58
Sen. Portman	68	Sen. Portman	41
CE. Dolan	66	CE. Dolan	66

CE. Ellison	42	CE. Ellison	N/A
CE. Fitzgerald	48	CE. Fitzgerald	40
CE. Lanci	62	CE. Lanci	41
CE. McCormack	53	CE. McCormack	N/A
CE. Scipione	51	CE. Scipione	N/A

Total Candidate, Independent Public

Television Candidate, Independent Public

	Public Convergence		Public Convergence
Gv. Kasich	71	Gv. Kasich	46
Gv. Strickland	72	Gv. Strickland	48
SOS Husted	68	SOS Husted	53
SOS Oshaughnessey	67	SOS Oshaughnessey	47
AG Cordray	78	AG Cordray	66
AG Dewine	84	AG Dewine	60
Tres. Boyce	36	Tres. Boyce	28
Tres. Mandel	44	Tres. Mandel	61
Aud. Pepper	79	Aud. Pepper	61
Aud. Yost	75	Aud. Yost	67
Sen. Fisher	73	Sen. Fisher	58
Sen. Portman	68	Sen. Portman	41
CE. Dolan	65	CE. Dolan	66
CE. Ellison	43	CE. Ellison	N/A
CE. Fitzgerald	47	CE. Fitzgerald	38
CE. Lanci	61	CE. Lanci	39
CE. McCormack	52	CE. McCormack	N/A
CE. Scipione	51	CE. Scipione	N/A

Vote Choice

Total Public

Independents Only

	Percent of Vote		Percent of Vote
Gv. Kasich	71	Gv. Kasich	56
Gv. Strickland	29	Gv. Strickland	44
SOS Husted	76	SOS Husted	67
SOS Oshaughnessey	24	SOS Oshaughnessey	33
AG Cordray	43	AG Cordray	60
AG Dewine	57	AG Dewine	40
Tres. Boyce	19	Tres. Boyce	26
Tres. Mandel	81	Tres. Mandel	74
Aud. Pepper	37	Aud. Pepper	57
Aud. Yost	63	Aud. Yost	43
Sen. Fisher	22	Sen. Fisher	31
Sen. Portman	78	Sen. Portman	69
CE. Dolan	52	CE. Dolan	43
CE. Ellison	1	CE. Ellison	2
CE. Fitzgerald	17	CE. Fitzgerald	22
CE. Lanci	16	CE. Lanci	15
CE. McCormack	9	CE. McCormack	14
CE. Scipione	4	CE. Scipione	5

APPENDIX E
STATISTICAL ANALYSES

Condition 1: Total Candidate Agenda, Total Public Agenda

Hypothesis 2 Test:

Paired Samples Statistics

		Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Pair 1	MPAINews	63.67	18	7.013	1.653
	CMNewspapers	70.61	18	9.733	2.294
Pair 2	MPTVNews	57.44	18	8.556	2.017
	CMTVNews	63.50	18	11.633	2.742
Pair 3	MPNewspapers	67.33	18	7.388	1.741
	CMNewspapers	70.61	18	9.733	2.294
Pair 4	MPCh.3	58.22	18	9.149	2.157
	CMCh.3	63.56	18	11.947	2.816
Pair 5	MPCh.5	56.11	18	9.424	2.221
	CMCh.5	63.22	18	11.835	2.790
Pair 6	MPCh.8	55.33	18	8.246	1.944
	CMCh.8	61.06	18	11.180	2.635
Pair 7	MPCh.19	58.56	18	9.482	2.235
	CMCh.19	63.56	18	12.373	2.916

Paired Samples Test

		Paired Differences					t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
		Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference				
					Lower	Upper			
Pair 1	MPAllNews - CMNewspapers	-6.944	7.627	1.798	-10.737	-3.152	-3.863	17	.001
Pair 2	MPTVNews - CMTVNews	-6.056	10.773	2.539	-11.413	-.698	-2.385	17	.029
Pair 3	MPNewspapers - CMNewspapers	-3.278	7.910	1.864	-7.211	.656	-1.758	17	.097
Pair 4	MPCh.3 - CMCh.3	-5.333	11.277	2.658	-10.941	.275	-2.006	17	.061
Pair 5	MPCh.5 - CMCh.5	-7.111	11.702	2.758	-12.930	-1.292	-2.578	17	.020
Pair 6	MPCh.8 - CMCh.8	-5.722	10.254	2.417	-10.822	-.623	-2.367	17	.030
Pair 7	MPCh.19 - CMCh.19	-5.000	9.647	2.274	-9.797	-.203	-2.199	17	.042

Research Question 1 Test

Correlations

		PublicAgenda	Ch.3	Ch.5	Ch.8	Ch.19	AllNews	TVNews	Newspapers
PublicAgenda	Pearson Correlation	1	.015	.023	.034	.362	.284	.084	.473*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.953	.927	.893	.140	.254	.740	.048
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Ch.3	Pearson Correlation	.015	1	.926**	.938**	.835**	.932**	.971**	.729**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.953		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Ch.5	Pearson Correlation	.023	.926**	1	.836**	.848**	.931**	.943**	.774**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.927	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Ch.8	Pearson Correlation	.034	.938**	.836**	1	.860**	.844**	.964**	.549*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.893	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.018
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Ch.19	Pearson Correlation	.362	.835**	.848**	.860**	1	.896**	.920**	.730**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.140	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.001
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18

AllNews	Pearson Correlation	.284	.932**	.931**	.844**	.896**	1	.933**	.904**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.254	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
TVNews	Pearson Correlation	.084	.971**	.943**	.964**	.920**	.933**	1	.702**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.740	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		.001
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Newspapers	Pearson Correlation	.473*	.729**	.774**	.549*	.730**	.904**	.702**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.048	.001	.000	.018	.001	.000	.001	
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Hypothesis 3 Test

Correlations

		PublicConvergence	VotePercent
PublicConvergence	Pearson Correlation	1	.422*
	Sig. (1-tailed)		.041
	N	18	18
VotePercent	Pearson Correlation	.422*	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.041	
	N	18	18

Correlations

		PublicConvergence	VotePercent
PublicConvergence	Pearson Correlation	1	.422*
	Sig. (1-tailed)		.041
	N	18	18
VotePercent	Pearson Correlation	.422*	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.041	
	N	18	18

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).

Research Question 2 Test

Correlations

		PercentVote	AllNews	TVNews	Newspapers	Ch.3	Ch.5	Ch.8	Ch.19
PercentVote	Pearson Correlation	1	-.162	-.195	-.092	-.200	-.314	-.126	-.026
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.520	.438	.717	.427	.205	.618	.918
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
AllNews	Pearson Correlation	-.162	1	.933**	.904**	.932**	.931**	.844**	.896**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.520		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
TVNews	Pearson Correlation	-.195	.933**	1	.702**	.971**	.943**	.964**	.920**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.438	.000		.001	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18

	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Newspapers	Pearson Correlation	-.092	.904**	.702**	1	.729**	.774**	.549*	.730**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.717	.000	.001		.001	.000	.018	.001
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Ch.3	Pearson Correlation	-.200	.932**	.971**	.729**	1	.926**	.938**	.835**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.427	.000	.000	.001		.000	.000	.000
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Ch.5	Pearson Correlation	-.314	.931**	.943**	.774**	.926**	1	.836**	.848**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.205	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Ch.8	Pearson Correlation	-.126	.844**	.964**	.549*	.938**	.836**	1	.860**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.618	.000	.000	.018	.000	.000		.000
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Ch.19	Pearson Correlation	-.026	.896**	.920**	.730**	.835**	.848**	.860**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.918	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000	

N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
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** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Media-Public, Candidate-Public

Correlations

	UNCalls ws	UNCTvne ws	UNCnew spapers	UNCch3	UNCch5	UNCch8	UNCch19	UNCCan dPub
UNCalls ws Pearson Correlation	1	.946**	.899**	.951**	.978**	.844**	.806**	.684**
Sig. (2- tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.002
N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
UNCTvne ws Pearson Correlation	.946**	1	.725**	.944**	.935**	.963**	.903**	.657**
Sig. (2- tailed)	.000		.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.003
N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
UNCnew spapers Pearson Correlation	.899**	.725**	1	.798**	.870**	.550*	.577*	.723**
Sig. (2- tailed)	.000	.001		.000	.000	.018	.012	.001
N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
UNCch3 Pearson Correlation	.951**	.944**	.798**	1	.967**	.863**	.716**	.611**
Sig. (2- tailed)	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.001	.007
N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18

UNCch5	Pearson Correlation	.978**	.935**	.870**	.967**	1	.809**	.750**	.632**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.005
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
UNCch8	Pearson Correlation	.844**	.963**	.550*	.863**	.809**	1	.915**	.590**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.018	.000	.000		.000	.010
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
UNCch19	Pearson Correlation	.806**	.903**	.577*	.716**	.750**	.915**	1	.667**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.012	.001	.000	.000		.002
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
UNCCandPub	Pearson Correlation	.684**	.657**	.723**	.611**	.632**	.590**	.667**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.002	.003	.001	.007	.005	.010	.002	
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Media-Public, Candidate-Media

		Correlations														
		MPAllnews	MPTVnews	MPNewspaper	MPCh.3	MPCh.5	MPCh.8	MPCh.19	CMAAllnews	CMTVnews	CMNewspaper	CMCh.3	CMCh.5	CMCh.8	CMCh.19	
MPAllnews	Pearson	1	.946**	.899**	.951**	.978**	.844**	.806**	.531*	.389	.628**	.363	.385	.303	.572	
	Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.023	.111	.005	.139	.115	.221	.013	
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	
MPTVnews	Pearson	.946**	1	.725**	.944**	.935**	.963**	.903**	.554*	.465	.596**	.423	.387	.411	.661**	
	Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.017	.052	.009	.081	.113	.091	.003	
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	
MPNewspaper	Pearson	.899**	.725**	1	.798**	.870**	.550*	.577*	.413	.193	.603**	.178	.278	.075	.365	
	Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.001		.000	.000	.018	.012	.089	.443	.008	.479	.263	.769	.136	
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	
MPCh.3	Pearson	.951**	.944**	.798**	1	.967**	.863**	.716**	.593**	.448	.668**	.454	.413	.378	.580**	
	Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.001	.010	.062	.002	.058	.088	.122	.012	
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	
MPCh.5	Pearson	.978**	.935**	.870**	.967**	1	.809**	.750**	.567**	.406	.676**	.391	.412	.304	.569**	
	Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.014	.094	.002	.108	.089	.220	.014	
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	
MPCh.8	Pearson	.844**	.963**	.550*	.863**	.809**	1	.915**	.508*	.484*	.485*	.437	.349	.476*	.671**	
	Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.018	.000	.000		.000	.031	.042	.041	.069	.156	.046	.002	
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	
MPCh.19	Pearson	.806**	.903**	.577*	.716**	.750**	.915**	1	.401	.377	.417	.277	.272	.346	.639**	
	Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.012	.001	.000	.000		.099	.123	.085	.266	.275	.160	.004	
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	
CMAAllnews	Pearson	.531*	.554*	.413	.593**	.567**	.508*	.401	1	.933**	.904**	.932**	.931**	.844**	.896**	
	Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)	.023	.017	.089	.010	.014	.031	.099		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	
CMTVnews	Pearson	.389	.465	.193	.448	.406	.484*	.377	.933**	1	.702**	.971**	.943**	.964**	.920**	
	Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)	.111	.052	.443	.062	.094	.042	.123	.000		.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	
CMNewspaper	Pearson	.628**	.596**	.603**	.668**	.676**	.485*	.417	.904**	.702**	1	.729**	.774**	.549*	.730**	
	Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)	.005	.009	.008	.002	.002	.041	.085	.000	.001		.001	.000	.018	.001	
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	
CMCh.3	Pearson	.363	.423	.178	.454	.391	.437	.277	.932**	.971**	.729**	1	.926**	.938**	.835**	
	Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)	.139	.081	.479	.058	.108	.069	.266	.000	.000	.001		.000	.000	.000	
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	
CMCh.5	Pearson	.385	.387	.278	.413	.412	.349	.272	.931**	.943**	.774**	.926**	1	.836**	.848**	
	Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)	.115	.113	.263	.088	.089	.156	.275	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	
CMCh.8	Pearson	.303	.411	.075	.378	.304	.476*	.346	.844**	.964**	.549*	.938**	.836**	1	.860**	
	Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)	.221	.091	.769	.122	.220	.046	.160	.000	.000	.018	.000	.000		.000	
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	
CMCh.19	Pearson	.572*	.661**	.365	.580**	.569**	.671**	.639**	.896**	.920**	.730**	.835**	.848**	.860**	1	
	Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)	.013	.003	.136	.012	.014	.002	.004	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000		
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Condition 2: Television Candidate Agenda, Total Public Agenda

Hypothesis 2 Test

Paired Samples Statistics

		Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Pair 1	MPAllNews	64.80	15	7.173	1.852
	CMAIINews	43.00	15	11.625	3.002
Pair 2	MPTVNews	59.13	15	8.400	2.169
	CMTVNews	38.93	15	13.220	3.414
Pair 3	MPNewspapers	68.00	15	7.964	2.056
	CMNewspapers	47.13	15	10.921	2.820
Pair 4	MPCh.3	59.47	15	9.576	2.472
	CMCh.3	38.53	15	13.071	3.375
Pair 5	MPCh.5	57.33	15	9.912	2.559
	CMCh.5	38.73	15	12.470	3.220
Pair 6	MPCh.8	57.20	15	7.757	2.003
	CMCh.8	37.73	15	14.270	3.685
Pair 7	MPCh.19	60.87	15	8.651	2.234
	CMCh.19	39.60	15	12.614	3.257

Paired Samples Test

		Paired Differences					t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
		Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference				
					Lower	Upper			
Pair 1	MPAllNews - CMAAllNews	21.800	13.754	3.551	14.183	29.417	6.139	14	.000
Pair 2	MPTVNews - CMTVNews	20.200	15.195	3.923	11.785	28.615	5.149	14	.000
Pair 3	MPNewspapers - CMNewspapers	20.867	13.574	3.505	13.349	28.384	5.954	14	.000
Pair 4	MPCh.3 - CMCh.3	20.933	16.455	4.249	11.821	30.046	4.927	14	.000
Pair 5	MPCh.5 - CMCh.5	18.600	15.788	4.076	9.857	27.343	4.563	14	.000
Pair 6	MPCh.8 - CMCh.8	19.467	14.322	3.698	11.535	27.398	5.264	14	.000
Pair 7	MPCh.19 - CMCh.19	21.267	12.970	3.349	14.084	28.449	6.351	14	.000

Research Question 1

Correlations

		PublicCa ndidate	AllNews	TVNews	Newspap ers	Ch.3	Ch.5	Ch.8	Ch.19
PublicCa ndidate	Pearson Correlatio n	1	.095	.053	.106	.099	-.066	.060	.062
	Sig. (2- tailed)		.736	.852	.706	.726	.815	.831	.825
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
AllNews	Pearson Correlatio n	.095	1	.939**	.932**	.959**	.941**	.881**	.891**
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.736		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
TVNews	Pearson Correlatio n	.053	.939**	1	.761**	.984**	.935**	.983**	.964**
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.852	.000		.001	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Newspap ers	Pearson Correlatio n	.106	.932**	.761**	1	.808**	.842**	.662**	.715**
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.706	.000	.001		.000	.000	.007	.003
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Ch.3	Pearson Correlatio n	.099	.959**	.984**	.808**	1	.927**	.962**	.909**
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.726	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15

Ch.5	Pearson Correlation	-.066	.941**	.935**	.842**	.927**	1	.863**	.911**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.815	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Ch.8	Pearson Correlation	.060	.881**	.983**	.662**	.962**	.863**	1	.941**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.831	.000	.000	.007	.000	.000		.000
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Ch.19	Pearson Correlation	.062	.891**	.964**	.715**	.909**	.911**	.941**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.825	.000	.000	.003	.000	.000	.000	
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Hypothesis 3 Test (Excluding non-televised candidates)

Correlations

		Public	PercentVote
Public	Pearson Correlation	1	.377
	Sig. (1-tailed)		.083
	N	15	15
PercentVote	Pearson Correlation	.377	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.083	
	N	15	18

Hypothesis 3 Test (Including non-televised candidates)

Correlations

		Public	PercentVote
Public	Pearson Correlation	1	.658**
	Sig. (1-tailed)		.001
	N	18	18
PercentVote	Pearson Correlation	.658**	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.001	
	N	18	18

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

Research Question 2 Test

Correlations

		PublicCa ndidate	AllNews	TVNews	Newspap ers	Ch.3	Ch.5	Ch.8	Ch.19
PublicCa ndidate	Pearson	1	.239	.230	.185	.267	.167	.248	.157
	Correlatio n								
	Sig. (2- tailed)		.390	.410	.510	.337	.551	.372	.575
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
AllNews	Pearson	.239	1	.939**	.932**	.959**	.941**	.881**	.891**
	Correlatio n								
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.390		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
TVNews	Pearson	.230	.939**	1	.761**	.984**	.935**	.983**	.964**
	Correlatio n								
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.410	.000		.001	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Newspap ers	Pearson	.185	.932**	.761**	1	.808**	.842**	.662**	.715**
	Correlatio n								
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.510	.000	.001		.000	.000	.007	.003
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Ch.3	Pearson	.267	.959**	.984**	.808**	1	.927**	.962**	.909**
	Correlatio n								
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.337	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000

	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Ch.5	Pearson Correlation	.167	.941**	.935**	.842**	.927**	1	.863**	.911**
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.551	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Ch.8	Pearson Correlation	.248	.881**	.983**	.662**	.962**	.863**	1	.941**
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.372	.000	.000	.007	.000	.000		.000
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Ch.19	Pearson Correlation	.157	.891**	.964**	.715**	.909**	.911**	.941**	1
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.575	.000	.000	.003	.000	.000	.000	
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Media-Public, Candidate-Public

Correlations

		allnews	tvnews	newspapers	ch3	ch5	ch8	ch19	CandPub
allnews	Pearson Correlation	1	.939**	.905**	.947**	.979**	.821**	.778**	.014
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.961
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
tvnews	Pearson Correlation	.939**	1	.724**	.948**	.940**	.956**	.879**	.033
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.002	.000	.000	.000	.000	.907
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
newspapers	Pearson Correlation	.905**	.724**	1	.789**	.865**	.530*	.568*	.106
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.002		.000	.000	.042	.027	.706
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
ch3	Pearson Correlation	.947**	.948**	.789**	1	.964**	.863**	.687**	.012
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.005	.968
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
ch5	Pearson Correlation	.979**	.940**	.865**	.964**	1	.803**	.737**	-.023
	Sig. (2-tailed)								
	N								

	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.002	.936
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
ch8	Pearson Correlation	.821 **	.956 **	.530 *	.863 **	.803 **	1	.882 **	.052
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.042	.000	.000		.000	.853
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
ch19	Pearson Correlation	.778 **	.879 **	.568 *	.687 **	.737 **	.882 **	1	.104
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.000	.027	.005	.002	.000		.712
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
CandPub	Pearson Correlation	.014	.033	.106	.012	-.023	.052	.104	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.961	.907	.706	.968	.936	.853	.712	
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Media-Public, Candidate-Media

		Correlations													
		MPAll News	MPTV News	MPNews papers	MPCh.3	MPCh.5	MPCh.8	MPCh.19	CMAI News	CMTV News	CMNews papers	CMCh.3	CMCh.5	CMCh.8	CMCh.19
MPAll News	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	1	.939**	.905**	.947**	.979**	.821**	.778**	-.015	-.078	-.011	.056	-.120	-.152	-.062
		15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
MPTV News	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	.939**	1	.724**	.948**	.940**	.956**	.879**	.064	.065	-.013	.065	.197	.023	.079
		15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
MPNews papers	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	.905**	.724**	1	.789**	.865**	.530*	.568*	-.137	-.286	-.009	.240	.037	-.396	-.260
		15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
MPCh.3	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	.947**	.948**	.789**	1	.964**	.863**	.687**	-.056	-.069	-.106	.033	-.079	-.113	-.099
		15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
MPCh.5	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	.979**	.940**	.865**	.964**	1	.803*	.737**	-.138	-.179	-.136	.158	-.018	-.237	-.168
		15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
MPCh.8	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	.821**	.956**	.530*	.863**	.803*	1	.882**	.238	.284	.087	.273	.340	.265	.285
		15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
MPCh.19	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	.778**	.879**	.568*	.687**	.737**	.882**	1	.227	.216	.159	.169	.321	.169	.301
		15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
CMAI News	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.015	.064	-.137	.056	.138	-.238	.227	1	.939**	.932**	.959**	.941**	.881**	.891**
		15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
CMTV News	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.078	.065	-.286	.069	.179	-.284	.216	.939**	1	.761**	.984**	.935**	.983**	.964**
		15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
CMNews papers	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.011	-.013	-.009	.106	.136	-.087	.159	.932**	.761**	1	.808**	.842**	.662**	.715**
		15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
CMCh.3	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.056	.065	-.240	.033	.158	-.273	.169	.959**	.984**	.808**	1	.927**	.962**	.909**
		15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
CMCh.5	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	.120	.197	-.037	.079	.018	.340	.321	.941**	.935**	.842**	.927**	1	.863**	.911**
		15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
CMCh.8	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.152	.023	-.396	-.113	.237	-.265	.169	.881**	.983**	.662**	.962**	.863**	1	.941**
		15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
CMCh.19	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.062	.079	-.260	.099	.168	-.285	.301	.891**	.964**	.715**	.909**	.911**	.941**	1
		15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Condition 3: Total Candidate Agenda, Independent Public Agenda

Hypothesis 2 Test

Paired Samples Statistics

		Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Pair 1	MPAllNews	63.22	18	8.186	1.929
	CMNewspapers	70.61	18	9.733	2.294
Pair 2	MPTVNews	58.11	18	9.273	2.186
	CMTVNews	63.50	18	11.633	2.742
Pair 3	MPNewspapers	67.00	18	8.772	2.067
	CMNewspapers	70.61	18	9.733	2.294
Pair 4	MPCh.3	58.78	18	9.564	2.254
	CMCh.3	63.56	18	11.947	2.816
Pair 5	MPCh.5	56.67	18	10.152	2.393
	CMCh.5	63.22	18	11.835	2.790
Pair 6	MPCh.8	56.11	18	8.560	2.018
	CMCh.8	61.06	18	11.180	2.635
Pair 7	MPCh.19	59.00	18	9.665	2.278
	CMCh.19	63.56	18	12.373	2.916

Paired Samples Test

	Paired Differences					t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference				
				Lower	Upper			
Pair 1 MPAllNews - CMNewspapers	-7.389	7.845	1.849	-11.290	-3.488	-3.996	17	.001
Pair 2 MPTVNews - CMTVNews	-5.389	11.142	2.626	-10.929	.152	-2.052	17	.056
Pair 3 MPNewspapers - CMNewspapers	-3.611	8.332	1.964	-7.755	.532	-1.839	17	.083
Pair 4 MPCh.3 - CMCh.3	-4.778	11.700	2.758	-10.596	1.040	-1.733	17	.101
Pair 5 MPCh.5 - CMCh.5	-6.556	12.084	2.848	-12.565	-.546	-2.302	17	.034
Pair 6 MPCh.8 - CMCh.8	-4.944	10.440	2.461	-10.136	.247	-2.009	17	.061
Pair 7 MPCh.19 - CMCh.19	-4.556	9.666	2.278	-9.363	.251	-1.999	17	.062

Research Question 1 Test

Correlations

		Public	AllNews	TVNews	Newspapers	Ch.3	Ch.5	Ch.8	Ch.19
Public	Pearson Correlation	1	.297	.109	.474 [*]	.034	.044	.060	.388
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.231	.666	.047	.893	.861	.813	.112
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
AllNews	Pearson Correlation	.297	1	.933 ^{**}	.904 ^{**}	.932 ^{**}	.931 ^{**}	.844 ^{**}	.896 ^{**}
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.231		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
TVNews	Pearson Correlation	.109	.933 ^{**}	1	.702 ^{**}	.971 ^{**}	.943 ^{**}	.964 ^{**}	.920 ^{**}
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.666	.000		.001	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Newspapers	Pearson Correlation	.474 [*]	.904 ^{**}	.702 ^{**}	1	.729 ^{**}	.774 ^{**}	.549 [*]	.730 ^{**}
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.047	.000	.001		.001	.000	.018	.001
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Ch.3	Pearson Correlation	.034	.932 ^{**}	.971 ^{**}	.729 ^{**}	1	.926 ^{**}	.938 ^{**}	.835 ^{**}
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.893	.000	.000	.001		.000	.000	.000
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18

Ch.5	Pearson Correlation	.044	.931**	.943**	.774**	.926**	1	.836**	.848**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.861	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Ch.8	Pearson Correlation	.060	.844**	.964**	.549*	.938**	.836**	1	.860**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.813	.000	.000	.018	.000	.000		.000
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Ch.19	Pearson Correlation	.388	.896**	.920**	.730**	.835**	.848**	.860**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.112	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000	
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Hypothesis 3 Test

Correlations

		Public	VotePercent
Public	Pearson Correlation	1	.466*
	Sig. (1-tailed)		.026
	N	18	18
VotePercent	Pearson Correlation	.466*	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.026	
	N	18	18

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).

Research Question 2 Test

Correlations

		PercentV ote	AllNews	TVNews	Newspap ers	Ch.3	Ch.5	Ch.8	Ch.19
PercentV ote	Pearson Correlatio n	1	-.072	-.080	-.049	-.113	-.210	-.011	.132
	Sig. (2- tailed)		.778	.753	.847	.655	.402	.966	.602
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
AllNews	Pearson Correlatio n	-.072	1	.933**	.904**	.932**	.931**	.844**	.896**
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.778		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
TVNews	Pearson Correlatio n	-.080	.933**	1	.702**	.971**	.943**	.964**	.920**
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.753	.000		.001	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Newspap ers	Pearson Correlatio n	-.049	.904**	.702**	1	.729**	.774**	.549*	.730**
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.847	.000	.001		.001	.000	.018	.001
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Ch.3	Pearson Correlatio n	-.113	.932**	.971**	.729**	1	.926**	.938**	.835**
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.655	.000	.000	.001		.000	.000	.000
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18

Ch.5	Pearson	-.210	.931**	.943**	.774**	.926**	1	.836**	.848**
	Correlation								
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.402	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Ch.8	Pearson	-.011	.844**	.964**	.549*	.938**	.836**	1	.860**
	Correlation								
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.966	.000	.000	.018	.000	.000		.000
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
Ch.19	Pearson	.132	.896**	.920**	.730**	.835**	.848**	.860**	1
	Correlation								
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.602	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000	
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Media-Public, Candidate-Public

Correlations

		INDAllnews	INDtvnews	INDnews papers	INDch3	INDch5	INDch8	INDch19	INDcandidate
INDAllnews	Pearson Correlation	1	.953**	.927**	.946**	.964**	.851**	.846**	.715**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
INDtvnews	Pearson Correlation	.953**	1	.780**	.957**	.955**	.954**	.906**	.669**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.002
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
INDnews papers	Pearson Correlation	.927**	.780**	1	.830**	.873**	.605**	.662**	.731**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.000	.000	.008	.003	.001
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
INDch3	Pearson Correlation	.946**	.957**	.830**	1	.976**	.868**	.755**	.640**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.004
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
INDch5	Pearson Correlation	.964**	.955**	.873**	.976**	1	.828**	.785**	.647**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.004
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18

INDch8	Pearson Correlation	.851**	.954**	.605**	.868**	.828**	1	.917**	.614**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.008	.000	.000		.000	.007
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
INDch19	Pearson Correlation	.846**	.906**	.662**	.755**	.785**	.917**	1	.721**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.003	.000	.000	.000		.001
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
INDcand pub	Pearson Correlation	.715**	.669**	.731**	.640**	.647**	.614**	.721**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.002	.001	.004	.004	.007	.001	
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Media-Public, Candidate-Media

Correlations

	MPAllNews	MPTVNews	MPNews papers	MPCh.3	MPCh.5	MPCh.8	MPCh.19	CMAIINews	CMTVNews	CMNews papers	CMCh.3	CMCh.5	CMCh.8	CMCh.19
MPAllNews Pearson Correlation	1	.953**	.927**	.946**	.964**	.851**	.846**	.509	.353	.629**	.317	.373	.251	.550
Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.031	.150	.005	.199	.128	.315	.018
N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
MPTVNews Pearson Correlation	.953**	1	.780**	.957**	.955**	.954**	.906**	.561	.450	.626**	.411	.402	.374	.646**
Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.015	.061	.005	.090	.098	.126	.004
N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
MPNews papers Pearson Correlation	.927**	.780**	1	.830**	.873**	.605**	.662**	.401	.182	.599**	.154	.279	.051	.365
Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.000	.000	.008	.003	.099	.471	.009	.541	.263	.841	.137
N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
MPCh.3 Pearson Correlation	.946**	.957**	.830**	1	.976**	.868**	.755**	.591**	.426	.692**	.426	.414	.335	.570**
Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.010	.078	.001	.078	.088	.175	.013
N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
MPCh.5 Pearson Correlation	.964**	.955**	.873**	.976**	1	.828**	.785**	.560	.387	.685**	.368	.404	.272	.554**
Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.016	.113	.002	.133	.096	.275	.017
N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
MPCh.8 Pearson Correlation	.851**	.954**	.605**	.868**	.828**	1	.917**	.532	.491	.526*	.447	.374	.466	.682**
Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.008	.000	.000		.000	.023	.039	.025	.063	.127	.051	.002
N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
MPCh.19 Pearson Correlation	.846**	.906**	.662**	.755**	.785**	.917**	1	.422	.374	.462	.278	.286	.326	.640**
Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.003	.000	.000	.000		.081	.127	.054	.265	.249	.187	.004
N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
CMAIINews Pearson Correlation	.509	.561	.401	.591**	.560	.532	.422	1	.933**	.904**	.932**	.931**	.844**	.896**
Sig. (2-tailed)	.031	.015	.099	.010	.016	.023	.081		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
CMTVNews Pearson Correlation	.353	.450	.182	.426	.387	.491	.374	.933**	1	.702**	.971**	.943**	.964**	.920**
Sig. (2-tailed)	.150	.061	.471	.078	.113	.039	.127	.000		.001	.000	.000	.000	.000
N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
CMNews papers Pearson Correlation	.629**	.626**	.599**	.692**	.685**	.526*	.462	.904**	.702**	1	.729**	.774**	.549*	.730**
Sig. (2-tailed)	.005	.005	.009	.001	.002	.025	.054	.000	.001		.001	.000	.018	.001
N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
CMCh.3 Pearson Correlation	.317	.411	.154	.426	.368	.447	.278	.932**	.971**	.729**	1	.926**	.938**	.835**
Sig. (2-tailed)	.199	.090	.541	.078	.133	.063	.265	.000	.000	.001		.000	.000	.000
N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
CMCh.5 Pearson Correlation	.373	.402	.279	.414	.404	.374	.286	.931**	.943**	.774**	.926**	1	.836**	.848**
Sig. (2-tailed)	.128	.098	.263	.088	.096	.127	.249	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000
N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
CMCh.8 Pearson Correlation	.251	.374	.051	.335	.272	.466	.326	.844**	.964**	.549*	.938**	.836**	1	.860**
Sig. (2-tailed)	.315	.126	.841	.175	.275	.051	.187	.000	.000	.018	.000	.000		.000
N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
CMCh.19 Pearson Correlation	.550	.646**	.365	.570**	.554	.682**	.640**	.896**	.920**	.730**	.835**	.848**	.860**	1
Sig. (2-tailed)	.018	.004	.137	.013	.017	.002	.004	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000	
N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Condition 4: Television Candidate Agenda, Independent Public Agenda

Hypothesis 2 Test

Paired Samples Statistics

	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Pair 1 MPAllNews	64.47	15	8.450	2.182
CMAllNews	46.00	15	10.764	2.779
Pair 2 MPTVNews	59.73	15	9.354	2.415
CMTVNews	42.00	15	11.784	3.043
Pair 3 MPNewspapers	67.80	15	9.451	2.440
CMNewspapers	49.93	15	10.773	2.782
Pair 4 MPCh.3	59.93	15	10.124	2.614
CMCh.3	41.67	15	12.111	3.127
Pair 5 MPCh.5	57.80	15	10.811	2.791
CMCh.5	42.00	15	11.019	2.845
Pair 6 MPCh.8	57.93	15	8.224	2.123
CMCh.8	40.60	15	12.993	3.355
Pair 7 MPCh.19	61.20	15	9.073	2.343
CMCh.19	42.47	15	10.623	2.743

Paired Samples Test

	Paired Differences					t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference				
				Lower	Upper			
Pair 1 MPAllNews - CMAllNews	18.467	15.784	4.075	9.726	27.207	4.531	14	.000
Pair 2 MPTVNews - CMTVNews	17.733	17.327	4.474	8.138	27.328	3.964	14	.001
Pair 3 MPNewspapers - CMNewspapers	17.867	15.482	3.997	9.293	26.440	4.470	14	.001
Pair 4 MPCh.3 - CMCh.3	18.267	18.164	4.690	8.208	28.325	3.895	14	.002
Pair 5 MPCh.5 - CMCh.5	15.800	17.259	4.456	6.242	25.358	3.546	14	.003
Pair 6 MPCh.8 - CMCh.8	17.333	16.145	4.169	8.392	26.274	4.158	14	.001
Pair 7 MPCh.19 - CMCh.19	18.733	15.069	3.891	10.389	27.078	4.815	14	.000

Research Question 1 Test

Correlations

		Public	AllNews	TvNews	Newspapers	Ch.3	Ch.5	Ch.8	Ch.19
Public	Pearson Correlation	1	.083	.045	.083	.088	-.078	.055	.056
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.768	.872	.768	.755	.783	.846	.843
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
AllNews	Pearson Correlation	.083	1	.939**	.932**	.959**	.941**	.881**	.891**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.768		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
TvNews	Pearson Correlation	.045	.939**	1	.761**	.984**	.935**	.983**	.964**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.872	.000		.001	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Newspapers	Pearson Correlation	.083	.932**	.761**	1	.808**	.842**	.662**	.715**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.768	.000	.001		.000	.000	.007	.003
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Ch.3	Pearson Correlation	.088	.959**	.984**	.808**	1	.927**	.962**	.909**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.755	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15

Ch.5	Pearson Correlation	-.078	.941**	.935**	.842**	.927**	1	.863**	.911**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.783	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Ch.8	Pearson Correlation	.055	.881**	.983**	.662**	.962**	.863**	1	.941**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.846	.000	.000	.007	.000	.000		.000
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Ch.19	Pearson Correlation	.056	.891**	.964**	.715**	.909**	.911**	.941**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.843	.000	.000	.003	.000	.000	.000	
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Hypothesis 3 Test (without non-televised candidates)

Correlations

		Public	PercentVote
Public	Pearson Correlation	1	.436
	Sig. (1-tailed)		.052
	N	15	15
PercentVote	Pearson Correlation	.436	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.052	
	N	15	18

Hypothesis 3 Test (with non-televised candidates)

Correlations

		Public	PercentVote
Public	Pearson Correlation	1	.738**
	Sig. (1-tailed)		.000
	N	18	18
PercentVote	Pearson Correlation	.738**	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.000	
	N	18	18

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

Research Question 2

Correlations

		PercentVote	AllNews	TVNews	Newspapers	Ch.3	Ch.5	Ch.8	Ch.19
PercentVote	Pearson Correlation	1	.161	.152	.089	.150	.045	.181	.157
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.567	.589	.753	.593	.874	.519	.576
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
AllNews	Pearson Correlation	.161	1	.939**	.932**	.959**	.941**	.881**	.891**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.567		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
TVNews	Pearson Correlation	.152	.939**	1	.761**	.984**	.935**	.983**	.964**
	Sig. (2-tailed)								
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15

	Sig. (2-tailed)	.589	.000		.001	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Newspapers	Pearson Correlation	.089	.932**	.761**	1	.808**	.842**	.662**	.715**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.753	.000	.001		.000	.000	.007	.003
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Ch.3	Pearson Correlation	.150	.959**	.984**	.808**	1	.927**	.962**	.909**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.593	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Ch.5	Pearson Correlation	.045	.941**	.935**	.842**	.927**	1	.863**	.911**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.874	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Ch.8	Pearson Correlation	.181	.881**	.983**	.662**	.962**	.863**	1	.941**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.519	.000	.000	.007	.000	.000		.000
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Ch.19	Pearson Correlation	.157	.891**	.964**	.715**	.909**	.911**	.941**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.576	.000	.000	.003	.000	.000	.000	
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Media-Public, Candidate-Public

Correlations

	INDtvAlln ews	INDtvtn ews	INDtvnew spapers	INDtvch3	INDtvch5	INDtvch8	INDtvch1 9	candpubli c
INDtvAlln ews	1	.947**	.932**	.943**	.965**	.832**	.831**	.087
Pearson Correlation								
Sig. (2- tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.758
N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
INDtvtn ews	.947**	1	.777**	.961**	.963**	.949**	.891**	.087
Pearson Correlation								
Sig. (2- tailed)	.000		.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.758
N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
INDtvnew spapers	.932**	.777**	1	.822**	.867**	.589*	.663**	.124
Pearson Correlation								
Sig. (2- tailed)	.000	.001		.000	.000	.021	.007	.660
N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
INDtvch3	.943**	.961**	.822**	1	.974**	.874**	.744**	.075
Pearson Correlation								
Sig. (2- tailed)	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.001	.792
N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
INDtvch5	.965**	.963**	.867**	.974**	1	.833**	.791**	.043
Pearson Correlation								
Sig. (2- tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.880
N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15

INDtvch8	Pearson	.832**	.949**	.589*	.874**	.833**	1	.890**	.128
	Correlation								
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.021	.000	.000	.000	.000	.649
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
INDtvch19	Pearson	.831**	.891**	.663**	.744**	.791**	.890**	1	.198
	Correlation								
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.007	.001	.000	.000	.000	.479
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Candpubl ic	Pearson	.087	.087	.124	.075	.043	.128	.198	1
	Correlation								
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.758	.758	.660	.792	.880	.649	.479	
	N	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Media-Public, Candidate-Media

		Correlations													
		MPAllNews	MPTVNews	MPNews papers	MPCh .3	MPCh .5	MPCh .8	MPCh .9	CMAI News	CMTV News	CMNews papers	CMCh .3	CMCh .5	CMCh .8	CMCh .19
MPAllNews	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2- tailed) N	1 15	.947** .000 15	.932** .000 15	.943** .000 15	.965** .000 15	.832** .000 15	.831** .000 15	-.340 .215 15	-.415 .124 15	-.279 .314 15	-.390 .151 15	-.201 .473 15	-.463 .082 15	-.391 .150 15
MPTVNews	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2- tailed) N	.947** .000 15	1 .000 15	.777** .001 15	.961** .000 15	.963** .000 15	.949** .000 15	.891** .000 15	-.345 .208 15	-.335 .222 15	-.372 .172 15	-.334 .223 15	-.195 .485 15	-.338 .217 15	-.316 .252 15
MPNews papers	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2- tailed) N	.932** .000 15	.777** .001 15	1 .000 15	.822** .000 15	.867** .000 15	.589** .021 15	.663** .007 15	-.337 .219 15	-.506 .054 15	-.169 .548 15	-.452 .091 15	-.231 .407 15	-.599** .018 15	-.482 .069 15
MPCh.3	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2- tailed) N	.943** .000 15	.961** .000 15	.822** .000 15	1 .000 15	.974** .000 15	.874** .000 15	.744** .001 15	-.349 .203 15	-.369 .175 15	-.348 .204 15	-.329 .231 15	-.201 .472 15	-.391 .150 15	-.400 .140 15
MPCh.5	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2- tailed) N	.965** .000 15	.963** .000 15	.867** .000 15	.974** .000 15	1 .000 15	.833** .000 15	.791** .000 15	-.412 .127 15	-.454 .089 15	-.369 .176 15	-.428 .112 15	-.250 .369 15	-.482 .069 15	-.447 .095 15
MPCh.8	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2- tailed) N	.832** .000 15	.949** .000 15	.589** .021 15	.874** .000 15	.833** .000 15	1 .000 15	.890** .000 15	-.221 .428 15	-.142 .613 15	-.344 .209 15	-.163 .562 15	-.099 .725 15	-.113 .688 15	-.127 .652 15
MPCh.19	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2- tailed) N	.831** .000 15	.891** .000 15	.663** .007 15	.744** .001 15	.791** .000 15	.890** .000 15	1 .000 15	-.279 .313 15	-.268 .334 15	-.308 .264 15	-.318 .248 15	-.177 .528 15	-.263 .343 15	-.166 .555 15
CMAI News	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2- tailed) N	-.340 .215 15	-.345 .208 15	-.337 .219 15	-.349 .203 15	-.412 .127 15	-.221 .428 15	-.279 .313 15	1 .000 15	.922** .000 15	.928** .000 15	.952** .000 15	.930** .000 15	.849** .000 15	.850** .000 15
CMTV News	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2- tailed) N	-.415 .124 15	-.335 .222 15	-.506 .054 15	-.369 .175 15	-.454 .089 15	-.142 .613 15	-.268 .334 15	.922** .000 15	1 .000 15	.722** .002 15	.980** .000 15	.916** .000 15	.980** .000 15	.953** .000 15
CMNews papers	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2- tailed) N	-.279 .314 15	-.372 .172 15	-.169 .548 15	-.348 .204 15	-.369 .176 15	-.344 .209 15	-.308 .264 15	.928** .000 15	.722** .002 15	1 .000 15	.788** .000 15	.827** .000 15	.604** .017 15	.649** .009 15
CMCh.3	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2- tailed) N	-.390 .151 15	-.334 .223 15	-.452 .091 15	-.329 .231 15	-.428 .112 15	-.163 .562 15	-.318 .248 15	.952** .000 15	.980** .000 15	.788** .000 15	1 .000 15	.915** .000 15	.949** .000 15	.883** .000 15
CMCh.5	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2- tailed) N	-.201 .473 15	-.195 .485 15	-.231 .407 15	-.201 .472 15	-.250 .369 15	-.099 .725 15	-.177 .528 15	.930** .000 15	.916** .000 15	.827** .000 15	.915** .000 15	1 .000 15	.829** .000 15	.871** .000 15
CMCh.8	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2- tailed) N	-.463 .082 15	-.338 .217 15	-.599** .018 15	-.391 .150 15	-.482 .069 15	-.113 .688 15	-.263 .343 15	.849** .000 15	.980** .000 15	.604** .017 15	.949** .000 15	.829** .000 15	1 .000 15	.933** .000 15
CMCh.19	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2- tailed) N	-.391 .150 15	-.316 .252 15	-.482 .069 15	-.400 .140 15	-.447 .095 15	-.127 .652 15	-.166 .555 15	.850** .000 15	.953** .000 15	.649** .009 15	.883** .000 15	.871** .000 15	.933** .000 15	1 15

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

APPENDIX F

DICTIONARIES

Attorney General:

Abortion: abortion, right to life, sanctity of life

Corruption: bill mason, bribe*, corrupt*, di mora, dimora, fraud*, kick back, kickback, public official, russo, scheme

Crime/Law Enforcement: Criminal justice, law, murder, rape, robb*

Education: classroom, college*, educat*, school*, student*, teacher*, tuition, universities

Experience: congress, experience, politic*, proven, senator, tested, washington

Gun Rights: 2nd amendment, concealed carry, gun, hunt*, national rifle association, nra, second amendment, sportsm*n

Jobs: busines*, econom*, great depression, industr*, job, jobless*, labor, manufactur*, nafta, out sourc*, outsourc*, over seas, overseas, recession, unemploy*,

Reform: change, re-district*, reapportion*, redistrict*, reform,

Wall Street: bail out, bailout, bank*, bonus*, corporat*, lehman, wall street

Auditor:

Corruption: Bill Mason, Di mora, Dimora, bribe*, corrupt*, fraud*, kick back, kickback, public official, russo, scheme

Crime: crime, criminal, fraud, justice

Experience: city council, experience, politic*, proven, public service, record, served, tested

Independence: across party line*, bi-partisan*, bipartisan*, democrat* and republican, independent, republican and democrat*

Infrastructure: infrastructure, transportation

Jobs: busines*, econom*, great depression, industr*, job, jobless*, jobs, labor,
manufactur*, nafta, outsourc*, over seas, overseas, recession, unemploy*

Reform: change, re-district*, reapportion*, redistrict*, reform, reformer

Taxes: burden, tax*

Wasteful Spending: big* government, bureaucra*, can't afford, cant afford,
effective*, efficien*, redundant, regulat*, small* government, spend*, spent,
stimulus, waste*

County Executive:

Corruption: Bill Mason, bribe*, corrupt*, di mora, dimora, federal investigator*,
fraud*, kick back, kickback, public official, russo, scheme

Education: classroom, college*, education, school*, student*, teacher*, tri-c, tuition,
universities

Foreclosures: foreclos*, lost * home*

Health and Human Services: Clinic, HHS, Health * Human Service*, Metro Health,
MetroHealth, social work*, socialwork*

Independence: across party line*, bi-partisan*, bipartisan*, democrat* and republican,
independent, republican and democrat*

Jobs: busines*, econom*, great depression, industr*, job, jobless*, jobs, labor,
manufactur*, nafta, outsourc*, over seas, overseas, recession, unemploy*

Leadership/Experience: experience, leader*, politic*, proven, public service, record,
served

Medical Mart: LMN, MMPI, Med Mart, convention center, medical mart

Public Safety: crime, criminal, fire fighter*, firefighter*, justice, law, murder, police,
rape, robb*

Reform: change, progress, reform, reformer

Governor:

3C Train: 3 C, 3C, high speed, high-speed, rail

Education: classroom, college*, education, school*, student*, teacher*, tuition,
universities

Government Efficiency/Size: big government, bureaucra*, can't afford, cant afford,
effective*, efficien*, redundant, regulat*, small* government, spend*, spent,
waste

Gun Rights: 2nd amendment, concealed carry, gun, hunt*, national rifle association,
nra, second amendment, sportsm*n

Health Care: *existing condition, disease*, doctor*, frivolous lawsuit*, health*,
hospital*, medica*, obama care, obamacare

Jobs: busines*, depression, econom*, industr*, job, jobless*, jobs, labor,
manufactur*, nafta, outsourc*, over seas, overseas, recession, unemploy*

State Budget: bi-ennium, biennium, budget, cutback*, cuts, debt, deficit, short fall,
shortfall, spending

Taxes: burden, tax*

Veterans Affairs: Afghanistan, Air Force, Army, Iraq, Marine*, Military, National
Guard, Navy, Troops, Veteran

Wall Street: bail out, bailout, bank*, bonus*, corporat*, lehman, wall street

Senate:

Budget Deficit: budget, debt, deficit*, live within * means, spend*

Education: classroom, college*, education, school*, student*, teacher*, tuition,
universities

Energy: bio-fuel*, cap * trade, coal, energy, foreign oil, natural gas, nuclear power, sustainability

Foreign Trade: foreign trade, nafta, outsourc*, over seas, overseas, trade deficit, trade lobb*

Health Care: *existing condition, disease*, doctor*, frivolous lawsuit*, health*, hospital*, medica*, obama care, obamacare

Jobs: Busines*, econom*, great depression, industr*, job, jobless*, jobs, labor, manufactur*, recession, unemploy*

Military Issues: Afghanistan, Air Force, Army, Defense, Iraq, Marine*, Military, National Guard, Navy, Troops, Veteran, Veterans

Reform: change, re-district*, reapportion*, redistrict*, reform, reformer

Taxes: burden, tax*

Secretary of State:

Election Participation: disenfranchise*, registered voter*, turn out, turnout, voter registration

Experience: experience*, proven, record, tested

Fair Elections: fair, fairness, open election*, trust

Free Speech Issues: 1st amendment, first amendment, free speech

Government Size/Cost: big* government, bureaucra*, can't afford, cant afford, effective*, efficien*, redundant, regulat*, small* government, spend*, spent, stimulus, waste

Jobs: busines*, econom*, great depression, industr*, job, jobless*, jobs, labor, manufactur*, nafta, out sourc*, outsourc*, over seas, overseas, recession, unemploy*

Political Background: city council, clerk, elected, Ohio house, Ohio senate, politic*,
ran for office, represent*, serves, state senate

Redistricting/Reform: change, re-district*, reapportion*, redistrict*, reform

Taxes: burden, tax*

Treasurer:

Corruption: Bill Mason, Bribe*, Corrupt*, Di mora, Dimora, Russo, fraud*, kick
back, kickback, public official, scheme

Experience: politician*, proven, record, representative, tested

Financial Education: Financial Education

Fiscal Responsibility: responsib*, trust*

Jobs: busines*, econom*, great depression, industr*, job, jobless*, jobs, labor,
manufactur*, nafta, outsourc*, over seas, overseas, recession, unemploy*

Race/Religion: African American, Arab, bigot*, Christian, mosque, Muslim

Terrorism: Terror*, middle east

Veterans Affairs: Afghanistan, Air Force, Army, Iraq, Marine*, Military, National
Guard, Navy, Troops, Veteran

APPENDIX G
CONTEXT OF THE ELECTION

The 2010 general election in Cuyahoga County was marked a myriad of issues that impacted the context of the election. A brief description of these contextual issues follows:

Global Economic Recession: The global economic recession that began in 2007 was still having a strong effect on the population of Cuyahoga County. Joblessness was at very high levels and the local economy was stagnant. As a result of this recession, economic issues – especially jobs – were a dominant issue in the campaign.

Tea Party: In 2009, spurred on by large budget deficits, bank bailouts and other government spending which was perceived as wasteful, a group of vocal, fiscally conservative voters emerged as the “Tea Party.” This loosely organized group, which tends towards the conservative extremes of the Republican Party, did play a major role in this election nationwide. Their impact and focus varied greatly across the country however they were generally considered deficit hawks with a strong, ideological viewpoint. Many of “Tea Partiers” considered themselves to be more independent, because of a general dissatisfaction with both the Democratic and Republican parties; however, these groups do tend to self-identify as very conservative.

Budget Deficits: Nationally, the budget deficit in 2010 was several times larger than the previous historic high as a result of various spending measures passed by a Democratically controlled Congress and President, this issue heavily favored Republicans going into the election. In Ohio, the state was projected to have an \$8 billion budget deficit in the next 2-year budget cycle and the incumbent Governor Ted Strickland had

balanced the previous budget using Federal Stimulus funds and by reallocating funds from dedicated state trust funds in the previous biennium.

Corruption: In late July 2008, the FBI raided the homes and offices of dozens of elected officials and holders of public contracts related to the Cuyahoga County Commissioners office. The investigation focused on a racketeering operation led by County Commissioner Jimmy Dimora and County Auditor Frank Russo. As a result of this corruption, a new county charter was passed in 2009 and the 2010 election marked the formation of a new county government structure including a new County Executive and County Council, neither of these positions had previously existed. The electorate was notably weary of corruption in certain areas; however, this concern did not translate across all races. A judicial candidate who had been arrested and indicted by the FBI in September 2010 still managed to receive 47% of the countywide vote.

Additional Contextual Notes

Nationally, 2010 was a strong Republican year; it marked one of the largest partisan power shifts in the U.S. House of Representatives in history. That shift in partisan power was also felt nationally in state elections where several incumbent Democrats lost re-election bids to challenging Republicans. This is likely a result of Democratic victories in 2006 and 2008, which were based on the promises of more jobs, a higher quality of life and strong anti-George Bush sentiment. With the failure of incumbent policies to deal create jobs and a higher quality of life and the impact of the global economic recession, the balance rapidly shifted to Republicans.

Description of Individual Elections

Governor's Race: Ted Strickland (D) (incumbent) vs. John Kasich (R)

Incumbent Governor Ted Strickland was elected to an open seat in 2006, defeating Republican Kenneth Blackwell on the premise of his "Turnaround Ohio" campaign. This message was based on several years of Republican control of the Ohio's Governorship, mounting economic difficulties and anti-Republican sentiment brought on nationally by anti-George W. Bush sentiment. Upon election, Strickland ran into budget problems in the 2007-2008 biennium which were brought on by the global economic recession; Strickland balanced this budget by taking funds from the state tobacco settlement fund and other dedicated state trusts. Facing additional deficits in the 2009-2010 biennium, Strickland relied heavily of Federal Stimulus funds to close the budget gap. During his first term, the state of Ohio lost over 400,000 jobs including several major employers relocating their headquarters and significant field operations from Ohio to other states.

The challenger John Kasich was a former U.S. Congressman who was chairman of the House Budget Committee in 1997 and was credited as a primary architect of the last balanced federal budget. After leaving Congress, Kasich took a job as the managing director at Lehman Brothers, a Wall Street bank which collapsed early in the recession causing economic turmoil. Kasich was also well known as a contributor to the conservative cable news network Fox News.

Ohio Secretary of State: Jon Husted (R) vs. Maryellen O'Shaughnessey (D)

This race was for an open seat, the incumbent Democrat Jennifer Brunner did not run for re-election in order to pursue a failed bid for the Democratic nomination for U.S.

Senate. Maryellen O'Shaughnessey was the Democratic selection to run for the seat to replace Brunner, the highest office she had held was Clerk of Courts for Franklin County and had previously served as a city councilwoman in Columbus and ran an unsuccessful bid for the U.S. House of Representatives in 2000.

Jon Husted was considered an up-and-coming Republican who had served as a member of the Ohio House of Representatives, where he served as Speaker of the House two terms before moving up to the Ohio Senate.

Attorney General Race: Richard Cordray (D) (Incumbent) vs. Mike Dewine (R)

Incumbent Richard Cordray was elected the State Treasurer's office in 2006; however when the seat for Attorney General was vacated in 2008 due to a sex scandal involving Marc Dann, Cordray ran for and was elected to fill the remaining two years of the term. Cordray had widespread support of police and firefighters and built a strong, but not very vocal, image of having restored integrity to the office.

Mike Dewine was a former U.S. Senator, Lt. Governor of Ohio, member of the U.S. House of Representatives and a State Senator with a combined 26 years of service in an elected office. Dewine's brother, Kevin Dewine, was the chairman of the Ohio Republican Party. During the primary, Kevin negotiated a deal with Dave Yost to end a primary challenge to Mike's candidacy in exchange for party support for Yost in the Auditor race.

Treasurer race: Kevin Boyce (D) (Incumbent) vs. Josh Mandel (R)

After Richard Cordray was elected to take the office of Attorney General, Governor Ted Strickland appointed Kevin Boyce, an African-American to fill the remaining term in the Treasurer's office. Prior to his appointment as Treasurer, Boyce had been a Columbus City Councilman for nine years. His opponent, Josh Mandel a Jewish Republican from Cuyahoga County had served in the Ohio House of Representatives for two terms, as a Lyndhurst City Councilman and he was a decorated Marine veteran who served two tours of duty in Iraq. During this election, Mandel ran a series of ads accusing Boyce of giving a job with access to sensitive information to the wife of a political ally and further accusing Boyce of only advertising that job at the mosque that the eventual hire and her husband belonged to. This resulted in accusations that Mandel, a Jewish Marine, was trying to portray Boyce as a Muslim. This forced Boyce to run a series of ads in self-defense, portraying himself as a Christian and attacking Mandel over the allegations.

Auditor Race: Dave Yost (R) vs. David Pepper (D)

The incumbent in this race was Mary Taylor, who had pulled out of the Auditor race to run for Lt. Governor. Dave Yost had previously been an aggressive candidate in the Attorney General race, who had gained early support of the Tea Party, who disliked Mike Dewine. After the deal was struck to push Yost into the Auditor race, the Tea Party revolted against Yost throwing their support behind Seth Morgan, despite this Yost easily won the nomination. Yost had previously served as Delaware County Auditor and prosecuting attorney.

David Pepper is a former Cincinnati City Councilman and Hamilton County Commissioner. Pepper had also run unsuccessfully for Cincinnati Mayor. Pepper relied heavily on wordplay surrounding his last name in branding his campaign, although his advertisements did pepper in several various issue mentions.

United States Senate: Rob Portman (R) vs. Lee Fisher (D)

This race was for the seat held by retiring Republican Senator George Voinovich. Rob Portman was a former member of the U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Trade Representative and a Director of the Office of Management and Budget under George W. Bush. Lee Fisher was the sitting Lt. Governor of Ohio where he had been placed directly in charge of job creation efforts by Ted Strickland. Fisher had also previously served in the Ohio State Legislature and as Attorney General; however he had not held elective office since 1995. In 1998, Fisher ran unsuccessfully for Ohio Governor. Fisher's campaign was not well funded in the final weeks of the election, resulting in a low quantity of ads coming from his camp.

Cuyahoga County Executive race: Matt Dolan (R) vs. David Ellison (G) vs. Ed Fitzgerald (D) vs. Ken Lanci (I) vs. Tim McCormack (I) vs. Don Scipione (I)

As mentioned earlier, this race was for a newly created position in Cuyahoga County that was created as a result of a charter amendment in response to an FBI investigation of County Commissioner Jimmy Dimora and County Auditor Frank Russo. Both Dimora and Russo were leaders in the Cuyahoga County Democratic Party.

Matt Dolan was a sitting member of the Ohio House of Representatives whose district covered only a very small corner of Cuyahoga County, he is also the son of the

owners of the Cleveland Indians. Dolan was widely considered a moderate Republican and an outsider to Cuyahoga County politics. David Ellison is an architect and member of the Green Party, Ellison lacked any political experience waged an aggressive campaign with limited resources.

Ed Fitzgerald was the sitting Mayor of Lakewood, a large, liberal suburb of Cleveland and he was a former FBI agent. Fitzgerald was named in the FBI probe of Cuyahoga County government as Public Official #14, though he was not accused of any crime. He relied heavily on his experience as a former FBI agent to deflect concerns about corruption while relying heavily on the remains of the Cuyahoga County Democratic Party's political machine and grassroots network to deliver votes.

Ken Lanci was businessman and self-described turnaround expert who owned several printing businesses in Cleveland. A self-made millionaire, Lanci ran on the premise of being a total independent with no ties to either political party and on his business experience. Lanci vowed to work for a salary of \$1 and spent incredible sums of money putting his name and orange face on every bus and billboard in the county. While he quietly spent a lot of time learning about the key issues in the race, he did not communicate adequately on those issues, instead focusing on his independence.

Tim McCormack was a former County Commissioner and a long time moderate Democrat. McCormack did not run an aggressive campaign and appeared to be attempting to win on name recognition alone. Lastly, Don Scipione was a scientist and small business owner who was involved in developing the charter amendment that created the position of County Executive. Scipione did not run an aggressive campaign,

though he did buy some billboards and radio spots on niche channels in the last few weeks of the campaign.

This race was tinged with several interesting contextual elements, first it was for a new position with undefined yet lofty expectations. The county was a financial mess after decades of mismanagement, kickbacks and schemes at the hands of Dimora and Russo. In addition, Cuyahoga County was one of the hardest hit areas in the nation by the foreclosure crisis of 2008-2011, the county had the highest sales tax rate in Ohio and it had the largest number of municipalities (59) in any single county in the state. These inefficiencies, corruption and patronage hiring resulted in a state of financial and operational crisis for Cuyahoga County.

APPENDIX H

GLOSSARY OF CONVERGENCE TERMS

Convergence Score: The degree to which two agendas, measured in terms of percentage of salience, are similar. Convergence is expressed as a number between 0 and 100, where a score of 100 indicates that the agendas are identical and 0 indicates that the agendas are entirely different.

Media-Public Convergence: The convergence score between the media agenda and the public agenda. This convergence score can be considered a measurement of traditional agenda setting effects. In other words, the relative weight for given issues in the media as determined by content analyses is matched by the relative importance attributed to issues in the general public as measured by the survey in which voters indicated the importance of issues. In this analysis, the media-public convergence was analyzed on a race-by-race basis due to the fact that the issues, the media's agenda and the public's agenda remained constant within the context of any one given race.

Candidate-Media Convergence: The convergence score between the candidate agenda and the media agenda. This convergence score can be considered a measurement of candidate-media agenda setting effects. In this analysis, the candidate-media convergence was analyzed on a candidate-by-candidate basis due to the fact that while the media agenda remained constant through a given race, each candidate's agenda was unique.

Candidate-Public Convergence: The convergence score between the candidate agenda and the public agenda. This convergence score can be considered a measurement of candidate-public agenda setting effects. In this analysis candidate-public convergence was analyzed on a candidate-by-candidate basis due to the fact that while the public agenda remained constant through a given race, each candidate's agenda was unique.