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A Call to Peace: How Third-Party Actors and Frameworks Impacted the Peace Processes of Northern Ireland and Colombia

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Abstract

Northern Ireland and Colombia both serve as excellent case studies on how the end of the Cold War impacted peace processes. Both countries experienced conflicts that begun in the Cold War era and underwent peace processes in the post-Cold War era. As such, studying them reveals characteristics of post-Cold War peace processes. For example, both Northern Ireland and Colombia showcase the important role that third-party actors play in modern conflict mediation. Both countries benefited greatly from mediation conducted by international organization, other countries, and individuals. Furthermore, both countries demonstrate the importance of frameworks in any successful peace negotiation. This paper argues that third-party actors greatly benefit peace processes and that a detailed framework is imperative to a successful peace process.

Keywords

peace processes, third party actors, mediation, frameworks, Northern Ireland, Colombia, FARC, IRA

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Esther Holm

History and Government

Introduction

I t is undeniable that the end of the Cold War ushered in a new era. During the Cold War, the world was bound in a West versus East paradigm. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union also signaled the collapse of this paradigm. The world was no longer bipolar. [1] The end of the bipolar system impacted how peace processes occurred across the world. Many of the conflicts that occurred during the Cold War were largely proxy battles between the Soviet Union and the United States (Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 1999). Thus, the post-Cold War era conflicts were largely local wars and intra-state conflicts. In fact, today, nearly four out of every five conflicts are predominantly internal (Tonge, 2014).

The change in the world system also ushered in changes in how peace processes occurred. For instance, the end of the Cold War freed international organizations and small and medium powers from the bipolar restraints.[2] As such, these organizations and countries have become more involved in mediation and peace processes (Crocker et al., 1999).

In the most basic sense, a peace process is, "A process aimed at bringing violence and armed struggle to an end" (Armengol, 2013). However, as with most cases, it is much more

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[1] In International relations, polarity is a way to describe the distribution of power. A unipolar system describes a world or a region where one state is described as a great power and has more influence than any other state. A bipolar system is a world or system where there two great powers (such as the Cold War system where the United States and the Soviet Union were the two great powers.) Finally, a multipolar world describes a world or system where there are multiple great powers. For more information on polarity see *The Tragedy of Great Powers* by John Mearscheimer.

[2] An innovation that has occurred in mediation since the end of the Cold War is a concept known as the group of "Friends." These "Friends" are essentially friends of the peace process. They are an informal mini coalition of states and/or intergovernmental organizations that have an interest in seeing peace accomplished. United Nations' peacekeeping organizations often benefits from having groups of "Friends" working alongside and supporting them; between 1990 and 2009, "Friends, "contact groups, and "core groups" grew from four to more than thirty. For more on groups of "Friends" see *Working with Groups of Friends* by Teresa Whitfield.

complex than this simple definition. In *Comparative Peace Processes,* international relations scholar, Jonathan Tonge, defines a peace process as,

> The active attempt at the prevention and management of conflict between and within states, a remit covering the treatment of inter-state, inter-communal and intra-communal violence. The term peace process requires the following: the involvement of most combatants; the cessation of conflict (peace); the formulation and implementation of political arrangements, whether interim or comprehensive accords; the prevention of the re-ignition of conflict (process) and the attempted political management of differences (Tonge, 2014).

Guns and Government further clarifies the criteria needed for a peace process to qualify as a peace process. These criteria are that the protagonists are willing to negotiate in good faith, the key actors are included in the process, the negotiations address the central issues in dispute, the negotiators do not use force to achieve their objectives, and the negotiators are committed to a sustained process. Within these criteria, there are a variety of roles that third-party actors can play in the peace process (Mac Ginty, & Darby 2002).

Once a peace process has begun there are three basic stages: the pre-negotiation, the negotiation, and the implementation of the agreement (Fisas, 2013). The pre-negotiation stage is crucial as it helps determine whether the parties involved in the discussions are committed to a peace process; it is also where the safety of the negotiators is guaranteed. This is an important step, since no party will enter into a peace negotiation without their safety being guaranteed. The pre-negotiation stage also lays out the "oadmap that will guide the rest of the peace process. Furthermore, the pre-negotiation stage determines the role that third-party actors will play in the peace process. The next stage, the negotiation stage, is typically the longest stage. This is where the parties will actually negotiate the peace process. In this stage it is important that key players negotiate the peace deal, although this may mean inviting difficult personalities to the negotiating table. If all goes well in the negotiating stage, the peace process will move to the final stage, which is the implementation of the peace deal (Fisas, 2013).

Figure 1: The stages of a peace negotiation

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                                                    ┌──────────────────────┐
                                                    │  Exploratory phase    │
                                                    │  (sounding out the    │
                                                    │       sides)          │
                                                    └──────────┬───────────┘
                                                               ↓
 ┌──────────────────────┐                           ┌──────────────────────┐
 │    Truce/ceasefire    │                           │ Preliminary agreement │
 │ (unilateral or        │                           │  (agreement to agree) │
 │   bilateral)          │                           └──────────┬───────────┘
 └──────────┬───────────┘                                       ↓
            │                               ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
            │                               │   Prenegotiation agreement         │
            │                               │ (agreement on "how" it should be   │
            │                               │              done)                 │
            │                               └────────────────┬───────────────────┘
            │                                                ↓
            │                               ┌──────────────────────┐
            │                               │      Framework         │
            │                               │  agreement/roadmap     │
            │                               │  (general steps in the │
            │                               │       agenda)          │
            │                               └──────────┬───────────┘
            ↓                                          ↓
 ┌──────────────────────┐                   ┌──────────────────────┐
 │ Cessation of hostilities│                 │   Partial agreements   │
 │ (unilateral or         │                  │           +            │
 │   bilateral)           │                  │       Protocols        │
 └──────────────────────┘                   └──────────┬───────────┘
                                                        ↓
                                            ┌──────────────────────┐
   *Ceasefire agreements or*                │   General agreement    │
   *cessation of hostilities are*           │ (how, what and who are │
   *variable and are part of the*           │       defined)         │
   *negotiation process*                    └──────────┬───────────┘
                                                        ↓
                                            ┌──────────────────────┐
                                            │ Implementation agreement│
                                            │           +            │
                                            │      Verification      │
                                            │           +            │
                                            │ Resolution of disputes │
                                            └──────────────────────┘
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Source: Fisas (2013: 15)

When discussing peace processes, it is important to remember that peace should not be thought of as *culminating* in a peace deal. Rather, it should be thought of as a long process, which is why this paper focuses on processes rather than deals. In fact, in some cases it can be detrimental to a peace process to focus on the deal, because it can cause the neglect of other areas. Additionally, peace *processes* carry on after peace *deals* are signed and are crucial to implementing the deals. A peace deal is by no means a guarantee of peace. There have been numerous peace deals signed that ended in violence (Tonge, 2014).

I became interested in studying peace processes because I grew up as a missionary kid in Panama. Two years before I was born, coworkers of my parents were kidnapped by FARC guerillas. While I was not around for the kidnapping, I experienced the aftermath. Although

the bodies were never found, in 2001, they declared the missionaries to be dead, an event that I do remember. Furthermore, I remember my parents having to do training in case they were ever kidnapped. As an eight-year-old in boarding school, I had a small bag packed so I was ready to leave at a moment's notice. Overall, I remember being terrified that either my parents or I would get kidnapped by FARC. Because of my background, I was especially interested when the Colombian government signed a peace deal with FARC in 2016. As I did further research, I realized that both the Colombian peace process and the Northern Irish peace process made excellent case studies to help better understand how peace processes occur.

There are two peace processes that well exemplify the peace processes following the Cold-War. The first is the peace process between the Irish Republic Army and the English government in Northern Ireland. The tensions in Ireland stretch back centuries. The modern conflict began in 1921 with the creation of Northern Ireland. However, the conflict began in earnest in the 1960s during a period known as the Troubles. It wasn't until the 1980s that the peace process led to the Good Friday agreement in 1998 (Mac Ginty, & Darby 2002). The second is the peace process in Colombia between the Left-Wing guerrilla groups and the Colombian government. The conflict between the two groups began in the 1960s and produced the largest number of internally displaced people in the world at that time (Maldonado, 2017). Peace talks began in 2012, and the peace deal was ratified in 2016. Both peace processes began in the post-Cold War era (For statistical analysis see Figure 1). As such, they benefited from the involvement of third-party actors. Additionally, the Colombian and Northern Ireland peace processes were connected via Juan Manuel Santos, who was the President of Colombia during their peace process. When he was a young man, President Santos spent time in the United Kingdom. While there, he experienced an IRA bombing. While he escaped uninjured, he was still greatly impacted by the experience. Santos credits the Good Friday Agreement with inspiring him to push for the peace process in Colombia. He also credits the Northern Irish peace process for many elements of the Colombian peace process ("Colombia's President Juan Manuel Santos recalls IRA bomb while student in London," 2016). Comparing the peace processes of Northern Ireland and Colombia showcases the importance of third-party actors and demonstrates the necessity of having a framework for a successful peace process, prior to beginning the official talks.

Literature Review

Since the Cold War ended, there has been an increase in peace deals and peace processes across the world. Because of this, there have been ample opportunities for scholars to study and examine how peace processes work. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a shift in how peace deals are carried out. Notably, third-party mediators have become much more involved in peacekeeping and peacemaking. Additionally, organizations, such as the United Nations have taken a huge role in conflict mediation (Crocker et al., 1999). It is critical to the understanding of conflict mediation to think of peace as a process rather than an event that culminates in a peace deal. *Guns and Government* defines a peace process as needing to meet five criteria. These criteria are that the protagonists are willing to negotiate in good faith, the key actors are included in the

process, the negotiations address the central issues in dispute, the negotiators do not use force to achieve their objectives, and the negotiators are committed to a sustained process. Within these criteria, there are plenty of roles that third-party actors can play in the peace process (Mac Ginty, & Darby 2002).

In their book *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World,* Crocker, Hampson, and Aall discuss two basic paradigms that are used when discussing third-party mediation. These paradigms are the structuralist and the social-psychological. The structuralist paradigm is held by those who have a rational view of the world. The mediators in this paradigm are very active in the negotiation process. They coax the participants to the negotiating table through a method of "carrots" and "sticks." Essentially, in this paradigm the third-party mediators lead the parties to the conflict through the negotiation process. The idea of "ripeness" is very important to the structuralist paradigm. Essentially, ripeness is the idea that timing is important to peace processes. For example, if war weariness has settled in and people are tired of the conflict, third-party mediators may have an easier time leading parties involved in a conflict to the negotiating table (Crocker et al., 1999).

In contrast, the social-psychological paradigm has the third-party actors playing a much less involved role. This paradigm focuses heavily on the communication aspect of peace processes. In this paradigm, third-party actors facilitate communication. They provide forums for the conflicting parties to dialogue with each other. This school of thought holds a much less realist view of the world than the structuralist school; the social-psychological paradigm sees conflict as subjective. Because of this, it is important to understand the perspective that both sides of the conflict have. In this approach, the third-party mediators' job is simply to facilitate the negotiations to help both sides better understand one another, which is a goal they often accomplish through the hosting of workshops. This school of thought allows the parties of the conflict to have total ownership over whatever peace process occurs. Unlike in the structuralist approach, the third-party actors are not leading the parties through the negotiations (Crocker et al., 1999).

The idea of "ripeness", as discussed in the structuralist paradigm, is well illustrated by the Good Friday Agreement. The Good Friday Agreement ended twenty-five years of violence and eight centuries of conflict in Northern Ireland (Mac Ginty, & Darby 2002). After eight centuries of conflict, many people living in Northern Ireland were ready for peace. Often peace processes take place when the idea of continuing with violence is unthinkable. Sadly, as in the case of Northern Ireland, getting to this place can take centuries. The background to this conflict is complex. Northern Ireland has a Protestant majority and a Catholic minority. (See Figure 1) These two groups of people tended to see the conflict through different lenses. The Protestants largely tended to view it in constitutional and security terms. Their main goal for any peace deal was to preserve Northern Ireland's relationship with Great Britain (See Figure 2). In contrast, Catholics viewed it either an issue of nationalist struggle for self-determination or as a problem of corruption or unfair practices by Unionist governments (Mac Ginty, & Darby 2002).

Although this conflict stretches back for centuries, for the purpose of this discussion, 1921 is a good place to start. In 1921, the island of Ireland was divided. The southern twenty-six

counties became independent of Great Britain, whereas the six north-eastern counties remained part of the United Kingdom and became Northern Ireland. From its creation, Northern Ireland contained a Protestant majority and a Catholic minority. Because of this, tension between the two groups was never far off. This tension culminated in the late 1960s, in a period that became known as the Troubles. The Catholic minority began campaigning through demonstrations. Protestants, in turn, responded with counter-demonstrations. The unrest did not stop here. London sent in the army to keep the peace. However, the Catholic minority, who viewed the army as a symbol of oppression, responded with the paramilitary group the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA/IRA) (Mac Ginty, & Darby 2002).

However, during the years of violence the seeds for the peace process were being sown. In 1985, the Anglo-Irish agreement made a working relationship between the United Kingdom and Ireland on the issue of Northern Ireland feasible. In the 1990s an important shift occurred, which strengthened the possibility of a peace process. This shift was the inclusion of political parties connected to paramilitary groups in the peace process (Mac Ginty, & Darby 2002). With this inclusion, the talks met the definition of a peace process, as defined in the introduction, by including the key actors in the talks.

An important aspect of the Northern Ireland Peace Process was the concept of the three-strand framework. Each strand, in this framework, represented a different relationship within the British Isles. The first strand represented the relationship between the two communities in Northern Ireland, while the second strand represented the relationship between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The third strand represented the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Each of these would be essential to the peace process, since every peace deal would have to address each strand (Mac Ginty, & Darby 2002).

After lengthy negotiations, the Good Friday Agreement was reached on April 10, 1998, Good Friday.[3] Five constitutional provisions were essential to the agreement as outlined in *Guns and Government:*

> First, Northern Ireland's future constitutional status was to be in the hands of its citizens. Second, if the people of Ireland, north and south, wanted a united Ireland, they could have one by voting for it. Third, Northern Ireland's current constitutional position would remain within the United Kingdom. Fourth, Northern Ireland's citizens would have the right to 'identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both.' Fifth, the Irish state would drop its territorial claim on Northern Ireland and instead define the Irish nation in terms of people rather than land (Mac Ginty, & Darby 2002).

As can be seen in these constitutional provisions, the Good Friday Agreement addressed each strand in the three-strand framework. Additionally, the agreement was given the democratic seal of approval through a referendum. A copy of it was delivered to every home in Northern Ireland, giving every citizen of Northern Ireland a chance to read it

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[3] The Good Friday Agreement is also referred to as the Belfast Agreement (Elliott, M. 2007).

before the referendum, which would decide the fate of the agreement. On May 22, 1998 two referendums were held simultaneously in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to decide upon the agreement. In Northern Ireland, seventy-one percent of the population voted in favor of the agreement, while in the Republic of Ireland, ninety-four percent backed the agreement (Mac Ginty, & Darby 2002)

In *The Conflict Resolution Quarterly* article, Hancock, Weiss, and Duerr, discuss how the peace deal in Northern Ireland was framed. Political leaders utilized prospect theory, which says, "Individuals overvalue losses, the certainty effect means that people will engage in more risk to avoid losses viewed as certain than to secure gains viewed as merely probably" (Hancock, Wiess, & Duerr, 2010). The framers of the Good Friday Agreement essentially took advantage of human nature. Since people are risk adverse, they framed the Good Friday Agreement as the best way to avoid continued violence (Hancock et al., 2010). Northern Ireland was experiencing a type of war weariness. Thus, they were able to use the idea of "ripeness", an idea that is central to the structuralist paradigm mentioned in *Herding Cats (*Crocker et al., 1999).

Third-party actors also played an important role in the Northern Irish peace process. One of the actors was United States' President Bill Clinton. In his article "The United States, Irish Americans and Northern Ireland Peace", Guelke provides a thorough background on the United States' involvement in the peace process in Northern Ireland. He examines how Irish Americans lobbied for peace in Northern Ireland. He discusses various groups of Irish Americans that formed during those years and how those groups were able to get President Clinton involved in the peace process (Guelke, 1996). This article gives some concrete examples of what third-party mediation, as discussed in *Herding Cats,* looks like in a peace process. It helped prove the point that third-party actors are important to modern day peace processes, which is what *Herding Cats* is all about.

When thinking of long, violent wars, Colombia does not immediately spring to mind. Sadly, for decades Colombia was the location of a bloody conflict between Left-Wing armies and the Colombian government (See Figure 3). The major Left-wing armies were Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People's Army (FARC-EP) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). In their article "Colombia's Civil Conflict", Claire Felter and Danielle Renwick give a detailed background on this conflict. The roots of this conflict trace back to a time known as *La Violencia*, which is Spanish for violence. This period lasted from 1948-58—eventually coming to an end with a power sharing agreement. However, those who embraced a left-leaning political ideology were completely left out of the power-sharing. For this reason, the FARC and the ELN were founded. From the start, both groups were essentially guerilla groups; however, their composition was slightly different. FARC was dominated by militant communists and peasant self-defense groups. ELN, on the other hand, tended to be more elitist, composed of students, Catholic radicals, and Left-wing intellectuals. While the ideology and composition of the two groups varied, both were opposed to the privatization of natural resources, and both claimed to represent the poor of Colombia. Notably, both groups were classified as terrorists by the United States Department of State. In response to the creation of FARC and ELN, the 1980s saw the creation of the right-leaning groups. These Right-wing groups had ties to the state military. The largest of these groups was the

United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). Largely, these groups were composed of landowners who organized to protect themselves from the guerilla groups. The AUC, like FARC and ELN, was also listed as a terrorist group by the State Department. The group officially disbanded in 2006, yet to this day, splinter groups remain (Felter & Renwick, 2017).

At the end of 2014, Colombia had six million internally displaced people. Nearly 14% of Colombia's population were victims of this conflict. In 2011, Colombia registered 7.7 million victims of forced displacement, murder, torture, sexual violence, forced disappearance, and kidnapping, among other grave violations of human rights. Another staggering statistic is that between 1970 and 2010 Colombia registered 39,058 kidnappings. FARC was even so bold as to kidnap a presidential candidate. This translates into someone being kidnapped every twelve hours during those years. The Colombian government was unfortunately not blameless; it is estimated that the military carried out 5,000 extrajudicial killings (Maldonado, 2017).

With so much violence, at times it seemed unlikely that Colombia would ever be able to achieve peace. However, the two sides were eventually able to reach a peace deal. Similar, to the Northern Irish peace process, Colombia benefited from the idea of "ripeness". After five decades of violence, the Colombian people were ready for peace. Both sides had too much to lose from more violence. Another part of what helped the Colombian peace process was its organized framework, which will be discussed at length later in the paper.

In the "talks about the talks" the two sides agreed to three essential elements. The first element outlined that the aim of the peace talks was to put an end to armed conflict, rather than to bring about peace in a positive way. In this way, they were extremely realistic about what they wanted the peace talks to accomplish, and they were able to manage external and internal expectations: their goal was simply to end the violence, not promise peace-dividends. This is like the discussion in *Conflict Resolution Quarterly* on how to frame a peace process. One of the most difficult parts of a peace process is managing the public's expectations. Colombia tried to do this by being extremely practical in what they wanted to achieve. The second element that the two sides agreed to was a discussion agenda of six points. The points related to things such as agrarian policy, the transitional justice mechanisms for state military forces, and the national policy in the fight against drugs. The third element that they agreed to was confidentiality. Through this element, both sides came to an agreement on how they would interact with the media (Maldonado, 2017). One of the most difficult topics in the Colombian peace process was victims' rights. The framers of the Colombian peace process were determined that victim's rights should be central to the entire process, and they created three mechanisms to facilitate this goal. The first mechanism was the creation of a channel for victims to send proposals to both delegations. The second mechanism was the appointment of the United Nations, the Universidad Nacional, and the Catholic Church to create events, which victims could attend, to express their views and concerns. The final mechanism was allowing the victims to go to Havana, Cuba, where the talks were taking place, and share their stories. In this way, Colombia was the first peace process to incorporate victims from the start (Maldonado, 2017).

It is clear through his writing that Maldonado is convinced that the Colombian peace process handled the issue of victims' rights well. However, it remains to be seen whether this can transition from the theoretical to the practical. Maldonado was a part of the process, so he does not have an objective view.

Colombia has already started to experience the difficulty in implementing a peace deal. Recently, FARC experienced serious backlashes in their attempts to run for government in the 2018 election. According to the peace deal, they are guaranteed ten seats in parliament if they campaign for the seats. However, when the former head of FARC, Timochenko, attempted to run for president, he was forced to withdraw his bid due to numerous death threats, as well as his ill health. While on the campaign trail he was pelted with eggs and tomatoes. This reaction by the Colombian people could show that Colombians are not entirely satisfied with the peace deal and are not ready for FARC to become a legitimate political party. Many Colombians believe that the peace deal was too soft on FARC. ("Colombia's Farc suspends election campaigning over 'threats' to candidates" 2018). The trouble that FARC met in campaigning for government is most likely just the beginning of the difficulty that Colombia will have in implementing their peace deal.

Like the Northern Irish Peace Process, Colombia also utilized third-party actors. In his article Maldonado discusses how this worked. He is quick to say that the Colombian peace process was entirely led by Colombians; however, the international community did play an important role. This fact is well illustrated in Maldonado's article. For one, he notes that Cuba hosted the talks. Additionally, the United States, the Union of South American Nations, the European Union, Germany, the Vatican, and the United Nations all sent envoys to the peace process, and Colombia also utilized international advisers. Both parties to the talks had access to an advisory team of international experts who contributed their knowledge of other peace processes. As such, they were able to help both sides work through difficulties using lessons that had been learned in other peace processes. Finally, Colombia also utilized guarantors and observing countries. The guarantors, Norway and Cuba, ensured that both sides followed the rules agreed to in the framework (Maldonado, 2017). Both Norway and Cuba had become guarantors because they were committed to the Colombian peace process. Norway especially provided much of the financial support that was needed in order for the peace process to be successful ("Norway's peace and reconciliation efforts to be stepped up," 2018). *Herding Cats* discussed the two paradigms when it comes to third-party mediators, and the Colombian peace process would seem to largely adhere to the social-psychological paradigm. The third-party actors were observers: their role was simply to facilitate the peace process, not to lead the two parties through the process.

At first glance, the Colombian peace process and the Northern Ireland peace process do not seem to have much in common. However, as case studies, they make an excellent comparison. Both countries experienced extended periods of violence, and had active paramilitary groups. The differences are interesting to note as well. Northern Ireland was a developed country, whereas Colombia is developing. The Northern Irish Peace Process was between two legitimate governments, whereas the Colombian peace process was between

a corrupt government and a guerilla group. Finally, the Colombian peace process is still very much in its beginning stages. Due to the similarities, the Northern Irish peace process may be used as an example to predict the factors influencing the outcome of the Colombian peace process.

Third-Party Actors

The involvement of third-party actors has characterized the post-Cold War peace processes. Almost eighty percent of all modern peace negotiations utilize third parties to some degree (Fisas, 2015). *Herding Cats* discusses some of the developments in international politics that have allowed for this change. The first being the end of the Cold War, which allowed international organizations to operate free of bipolar constraints. The second development was the rise of non-governmental organizations (NGOS). The third development was the recognition of mediation as a relatively cheap option compared to the use of force, tribunals, etc. Finally, changing international norms have made the use of mediation a more popular option (Crocker et al., 1999).

The Northern Ireland peace process came to characterize peace processes of the 20th century because it did the seemingly impossible in ending eight centuries of conflict. The role that third-party actors played in the process cannot be overemphasized. From individuals to interest groups, the Northern Irish peace process would probably not have been successful without these third-party actors.

Groups that had the biggest impact on the Northern Irish peace process were Irish-American interest groups. This is hardly surprising given that a 1980 census showed that eighteen percent of Americans claim Irish heritage (Guelke, 1996). There were various Irish-American interest groups that attempted to sway the U.S government. The first major ones were the Irish Northern Aid (NORAID), the Irish National Caucus, and the Friends of Ireland. From its inception, NORAID was closely linked to the IRA. NORAID was founded in the early 1970s. Its primary role was fundraising in the United States for the IRA. Gradually, the Irish National Caucus (INC) came to replace NORAID in the 1980s. The Irish National Office had offices in Washington D.C. and was much more focused on lobbying. Its lobbying efforts paid off, as evidenced by the fact that they persuaded Democratic presidential candidate Jimmy Carter to call for Irish Unity. The INC's main goal was to convince the United States to put pressure on the British government over their violation of human rights in Northern Ireland. Specifically, they were concerned with police interrogation methods, prison condition, the use of rubber bullets, and the discrimination against Catholics. Gradually, these interest groups were able to lobby the United States until President Clinton became invested in the Northern Irish Peace Process (Guelke,1996).

The work of Irish-American interest groups led the United States to become heavily involved in the Northern Irish peace process. Within this involvement, two individuals stand out. This first is President Bill Clinton; in 1994, President Clinton gave Sinn Fein Republican Leader, Gerry Adams, a visa to the United States. This was a risky move for Clinton, as it risked angering the United Kingdom, an important ally. However, Clinton was convinced it would be beneficial for the peace process, as it showed the republicans in

Ireland that there could be benefits for cooperating politically rather than acting out violently (Mason, 2017). Furthermore, President Clinton visited Northern Ireland three times during his presidency, making him the first United States president to visit Northern Ireland while in office. His visits were extremely beneficial in encouraging the people of Northern Ireland in their attempts at peace. Clinton never considered himself a guarantor in the peace process, rather he was an enabler. He pressured and encouraged the negotiators until they reached an agreement ("Northern Ireland," 2000).

Another individual who was hugely influential in the Northern Irish peace process was Senator George Mitchell. On November 28, 1995 the British and Irish governments established an International Body, whose role was to advise on the topic of decommissioning. They determined that this body would be composed of an American, a Scandinavian, and a person from the Commonwealth. Senator George Mitchell was chosen as the American, tasked with chairing the body. Because of their investigations, the body wrote a report, which contained six principles known as the "Mitchell Principles." These principles stated that all parties involved in the negotiations had to affirm their commitment to democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations, and to agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission. They also required them to renounce for themselves and to oppose any effort by others to use force or threaten to use force to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations; to agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations, and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree. Lastly, they must urge that "punishment" killings and beatings stop and take effective steps to prevent such actions (Crocker et al., 1999). Unfortunately however, after the report was delivered, the IRA bombed Canary Wharf in London.[4] The peace process, although halted, did not stop, and in some ways the bombing showed how necessary a peace process was. Senator Mitchell was asked to chair a Plenary Committee. Through much negotiation and debate, the Plenary Committee decided on an agenda, which acted as a roadmap for the rest of the negotiations. Thanks in large part to Senator Mitchell's leadership and structured agenda items, these negotiations eventually lead to the Good Friday Agreement (Crocker et al., 1999).

Like Northern Ireland, Colombia also endured years of violence followed by a peace process that contained many false starts. Also, like the Northern Irish peace process, the Colombian peace process was impacted by various interest groups. Women's organizations lobbied the government vigorously until they were also included in the peace process. This lobbying led the Colombian government and FARC to create a Gender Subcommission. The commission invited delegations from various interest groups, including Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex (LGBTI) groups, to weigh in on gender issues. According to Kristian Herbolzheimer, director of Colombia and Philippines programmes at

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[4] Canary Wharf was a financial district in London. The IRA announced the end of the ceasefire on February 9, 1996. Hours after this announcement, they detonated a 1,500-pound fertilizer bomb. The bomb killed two storekeepers and injured over 100 civilians. Furthermore, it caused at least $140 million in damages (Stevenson, 1996).

Conciliation Resources, the fact that Colombia recognized LGBTI citizen as valid stakeholders in the peace process probably made Colombia the first country to address the rights of the LGBTI community in peace negotiations (Herbolzheimer, 2016).

Another interest group that was heavily involved in the Colombian peace process was the Catholic Church. In the years 1998-2001, 2003, and 2006, local Colombian priests mediated between the various guerilla groups and the Colombian government. In 1998, some German Catholic priests helped mediate the conflict. Pope John Paul II himself was heavily invested in the peace process, as exemplified by his visit in 1986 and his continual calls for peace (Johnstone, & Svensson, 2013). The Bishops Conference, known as Caritas, has developed various documents as well as peace initiatives. One of their most visible initiative was the Week for Peace (Henao, G. & Fabio, H. 2015). Launched in 1987 and continuing through the peace process, this initiative sought to draw the public's attention to the issues facing peace in Colombia and create a period for both sides to make progress in their peace discussions (Henao, G. & Fabio, H. 2015). Additionally, the Catholic Church, as well as the United Nations and Universidad Nacional, was appointed to organize regional events, that allowed victims to have an input on the peace negotiations. These events were attended by 3,162 victims and 4,617 victims' organizations, and the parties received 22,146 proposals from them (Maldonado, 2017).

The Colombian peace process benefited from the involvement of various other countries. Cuba acted as the neutral host of the peace talks and a guarantor country. Norway also acted as a guarantor country, meaning its job was to ensure that the rules established in the framework were followed. Chile and Venezuela played the role of observing countries. Furthermore, the United States, Germany, and the Vatican appointed special envoys to the peace process (Maldonado, 2017).

The individuals most involved in the Colombian peace process were members of the conflicting parties. Each side of the conflict could appoint up to ten delegates. FARC's delegation was led by its second-in-command, Ivan Marquez, and was entirely composed of combatants. The Colombian government's delegation was chosen to reflect the two key stakeholders: the private and security sectors. As such, the delegation contained one retired general from the armed forces, and one from the police, one prominent business leader, who accompanied the chief negotiator, Humberto de la Calle, and the peace commissioner, Sergio Jaramillo (Herbolzheimer, 2016).

At first glance, the Northern Irish peace process and the Colombian peace process may not seem to have much in common. The following table shows a statistical comparison of the two countries.

Comparison of the Conflicts and Peace Deals in Northern Ireland and Colombia

	Northern Ireland	Colombia
Country Population (2017)	1.862,000[5]	49,292,000[6]
Years of Conflict	1968-1998	1964-2016
Total Casualties:	50,000[7]	218,094[10]
Killed:	3,532[8]	177,307[11]
Abducted:	17[9]	39,058[12]
Displaced Persons	11,000[13]	4,744,046 – 5,712,506[14]
Victims of Sexual Violence	Unknown[15]	489,687[16]
Date of Peace Agreement	April 10, 1998	November 29-30, 2016

However, both peace processes depended heavily upon third-party actors. As discussed in the review of the literature, there are two paradigms of third-party mediation in conflicts. In reality, there is often overlap between these two views. However, the Northern Ireland peace process overall took a more structuralist approach. An American, Senator George Mitchell, took a very active role in the process, developing much of the structure and framework of the negotiations. In many ways he led the two parties through the process. In

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[5] United Kingdom, Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency. (2017). 2016 Mid-year Population Estimates for Northern Ireland. http://www.nisra.gov.uk/sites/nisra.gov.uk/files/publications/MYE16-Bulletin.pdf

[6] Colombia, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística. (2018). La población proyectada de Colombia. Retrieved http://www.dane.gov.co/reloj/

[7] Kelters, S. (2013, February). Violence in the Troubles. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/topics/troubles_violence

[8] Sutton, M. (2002, October). An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland. Retrieved from http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Status_Summary.html

[9] Cobain, I. (2014, May 10). Disappeared but not Forgotten: The Grim Secrets the IRA could not Bury. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/may/10/disappeared-ira-troubles-northern-ireland

[10] Colombia, Centro de Memoria Histórica. (2012). Estadísticas del conflicto armado en Colombia. Retrieved http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/informeGeneral/estadisticas.html

[11] Civilians - Colombia, Centro de Memoria Histórica. (2012). Estadísticas del conflicto armado en Colombia.

[12] Maldonado, A. U. (2017). What is the Colombian peace process teaching the world? New England Journal of Public Policy, 29(1), 1-7.

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[15] O'Keefe, T. (2017). Policing unruly women: The state and sexual violence during the Northern Irish Troubles. Women's Studies International Forum, 62, 69-77. doi:10.1016/j.wsif.2017.03.003

[16] *Colombia: Women, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and the Peace Process* (Rep.). (2013, November). Retrieved https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ABColombia_Conflict_related_sexual _violence_report.pdf

contrast, the Colombian peace process took a more social-psychological approach. The third-party actors involved in this conflict provided forums for the conflicting parties to discuss their grievances. The third-party actors involved facilitated the negotiations, but they did not lead them.

There was also a significant difference in the role religion played within the peace process. The Catholic Church was able to act more as a third-party mediator in Colombia than it was in Northern Ireland. According to Naomi Johnstone and Isak Svensson in *Belligerents and Believers: Exploring Faith-based Mediation in Internal Armed Conflicts*, "Faith-based mediation primarily occurs in situations where religion is not part of the conflict itself, in terms of the incompatibility or in terms of distinguishing the parties' identities." In Northern Ireland, religion was very much at the center of the conflict, thus the Catholic Church was in no way an impartial third-party, whereas in Colombia they were able to be so (Johnstone & Svensson, 2013).

Frameworks

When discussing peace processes the importance of frameworks cannot be overemphasized. The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre defines a negotiation as, "Being the process by which two or more opposing parties (either countries or internal actors within a country) decide to discuss their differences within an agreed framework in order to find a satisfactory solution to their demands" (Fisas, 2015). Thus, without a framework a peace process is impossible.

The clearest example of the importance of frameworks in the Northern Irish peace process is the 1995 *Framework Documents* (Crocker et al., 1999), which laid out the blueprint for the ensuing peace process that led to the Good Friday Agreement. While the Good Friday Agreement was open to a referendum, the framework document notably was not. Thus, it was protected from the politics of anger that existed in the Northern Ireland at the time. This document institutionalized the three-stranded framework. Strand one referred to relations within Northern Ireland, strand two referred to relations between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, and strand three referred to the relations between both islands. This framework made sense of the difficult number of relationships that impacted the Northern Irish peace process, acknowledging the interconnectedness of the British Isles by denoting each relationship with a strand. As mentioned in the introduction, the pre-negotiation stage is imperative to a peace process as it provides the roadmap that will be used. This concept is illustrated by the following quote from an Irish government official, who said that:

> We did not think it would serve a useful purpose for everyone to simply show up on day one [of talks] and that agreement would somehow percolate up from the bottom. Rather we thought that it was up to the two governments to give guidance. That's the background to the *Frameworks* Document (Ginty, & Darby 2002).

The original framework for the Northern Irish peace process was integral to the peace process, exhibited by the fact that much of it was incorporated into the Good Friday

Agreement. It does an excellent job of showing how important it is to come up with a good framework during the pre-negotiation stage is. Without a good framework, it is highly unlikely that a peace process will be successful (Mac Ginty, & Darby 2002).

Similar to the Northern Irish peace process, the Colombian peace process also relied heavily on a good framework. Previous peace processes in Colombia had failed due to the lack of a realistic framework, as shown in the following figure:

Table 1: Differences in the design of the two latest peace negotiations with the FARC

	Caguán process (1999-2002)	Havana process (2012-16)
Goal	Political, economic and social transformations to build a new state based on social justice	To put an end to the armed conflict
Assumptions	Negotiations will lead to an agreement that will address all the root causes of the conflict.	Negotiations will stop the war and enable a new phase that will allow for inclusive, transparent deliberation and decision-making on the root causes of the conflict and additional challenges that have developed over the past years.
Agenda	Broad, including economic, legislative, justice and security reforms	Narrow, focusing on rural development and guarantees of political participation
Actors	The government and the FARC saw themselves as the true representatives of society.	The government and the FARC understand the need for public participation and democratic decision-making.
Ceasefire	Yes, but only in the demilitarised zone. Violence by all actors increased during the talks.	No. The FARC has declared unilateral ceasefires and the government has responded with conflict "de-escalation". Battle-related deaths virtually stopped in early 2016.
Public participation	Symbolic. The parties organised public hearings, but people's inputs were never seriously analysed and considered.	Fundamental, especially in the post-agreement phase. Multiple formats for direct and indirect participation
Role of victims	Absent in the negotiating agenda and in the peace talks	Fundamental in the negotiating agenda. The parties have jointly invited five delegations of victims (60 people in total).
Role of women		A Gender Subcommission has invited three delegations from women's organisations (18 people in total).
Time frame and frequency	Open-ended (extending over years), with on/off talks	Urgency to complete the negotiations. Frequent and intense sessions interrupted by short periods of consultations
Developments	The parties became bogged down in procedural issues and never discussed the substance of the agenda.	The parties have almost completed the agenda they set out to discuss (although this has taken them longer than they initially envisioned).

Taking the lessons learned from previous peace processes, the two conflicting parties were much more realistic during the Havana negotiations. During the pre-negotiation stage, the

Colombian government and FARC decided that the main objective was the ending of armed conflict, significantly narrowing their objectives from previous attempts at peace. At this time, they also decided the peace process would contain three phases: preparation, conflict termination, and conflict transformation. Additionally, they decided upon six substantive issues, which were as follows: rural development, political participation, illicit crops, victims, conflict termination, and the implementation of the eventual peace process. This pre-negotiation stage, which took place in secret, resulted in the 2012 Global Agreement for the Termination of the Armed Conflict, providing the framework for the entire peace process. Additionally, during this stage, the two parties agreed on the schedule for the negotiations—the sessions in Havana would last eleven days and would be followed by short periods intended for internal consultations and preparations for the next round. They also agreed to release a joint statement providing updates on the peace process after each round (Herbolzheimer, 2016).

In many ways, the framework for the Colombian peace process was innovative. For example, it distinguished between conflict termination and transformation. The negotiators realized that their role, realistically, was to end the conflict. The broader peace-building process would occur only after the conflict ended and would include every Colombian (Herbolzheimer, 2016).

The framework was not the only innovative part of the Colombian peace process. Building upon previous peace process, including the Northern Irish peace process, Colombia was able to contribute various innovations to peacebuilding. For example, the Colombian peace process widely utilized international advisers. Each party had access to a team of international experts. Furthermore, the Colombian peace process was the first peace process to put victims' rights front and center. In fact, they devised three mechanisms to do so. First, was the creation of channels allowing victims to send proposals to both delegations electronically or through conventional mail. Second, through the help of the United Nations, the Catholic Church, and the Universidad Nacional, they created forums to allow victims to express their views. Third, victims were invited to public hearings in Havana where they could engage with both delegations (Maldonado, 2017). In "What the Colombian Peace Process is Teaching the Word," Maldonado, a member of the Colombian government's delegation to Havana, said the following:

> The design and preparation of the Colombian peace process is setting a new standard for future peace talks around the world. The Colombian case has shown that a well-thought-out process can be advantageous to both parties. Most crises can be solved on the basis of the rules and mechanisms established in the framework agenda, because this initial agreement gives stability and provides a common ground and a sense of predictability to the whole negotiation (Maldonado, 2017).

This quote shows the importance of having a good framework for a peace process. Both Northern Ireland and Colombia benefited from having a clear roadmap for their peace processes; the framework helped the negotiators understand exactly what they needed to accomplish. The Northern Irish peace process benefited from the three-strand framework as it acknowledged the interconnectedness of the people of British Isles. In the same way,

the framework for the Colombian peace process incorporated six issues that were vital to both parties. Both frameworks also recognized the goal of the peace process, which was to end decades of fighting and violence. Peace processes do not occur in a vacuum. The Colombian peace process benefited greatly from the success of the Northern Irish peace process, to the extent that it was able to build upon and innovate the idea of a peace process.

Conclusion

Peace processes are incredibly complex: successful ones are the work of years of hard work. Today, many peace processes utilize third-party actors and clear frameworks in order to maximize their chances of success. It is hard to imagine a Northern Irish peace process without Senator Mitchell, as he played such a crucial role in the mediation. However, Senator Mitchell would probably not have gotten involved if President Clinton had not become involved in the Northern Irish peace process, which he did partly as a result from the tireless lobbying efforts of Irish-Americans. In the same way, without the supporting countries, it is highly unlikely that the Colombian government and FARC could have even met. Modern peace processes benefit greatly from mediation from third-party actors. As in the case of Colombia, these third-party actors can be other countries. Cuba hosted the peace talks, and Norway acted as a guarantor country, an important role when tensions rose. Similarly, without clear frameworks both peace processes probably would have failed.

As the title suggests, peace is a process. As such, a peace deal should not be thought of as the end of the peace process. In many ways, the peace deal is still the beginning stages. Often, the most difficult part is the implementation as a peace deal inherently excludes those most affected and are typically negotiated by a select group. In *Comparative Peace Processes, Jonathan* Tonge acknowledges this by saying the following:

> The achievement of a peace deal is merely one step towards managing a Conflict. Resolution of the conditions or divisions which yielded violence requires a much longer-term effort. Peace processes are thus sustained, non-linear constructions, beset by regular reversals, given that, at their most comprehensive, they cover decades of shifts from violence to constitutional politics; the management of division and ultimately, the resolution of the underlying problems which precipitated violence (Tonge, 2014).

Bearing this quote in mind, no peace process should be thought of as non-reversible. For example, factors such as Brexit could impact Northern Ireland and reawaken tensions between various groups (Connely, 2018). The Colombian peace process is still in its early stages. It remains to be seen how the presidential elections in May will impact the peace process. With the disarmament of FARC there is the possibility that other guerilla groups will simply take their place. Notably, the peace deal was with FARC, not ELN. However, since peace processes are non-linear, setbacks and difficulties do not equate to failure. In both of these cases, the parties involved have taken significant strides towards the

actualization of these agreements. Even if these peace processes experience setbacks, both cases benefited from invested third-party actors and from clear frameworks that laid out a blueprint for the peace process.

Figure 1 - Religious Map of Northern Ireland

Source: Sunil Prasannan, 2003

Figure 2: Map of Great Britain and Ireland

Source: Denver Public Library

Figure 3: Map of Colombia including areas of control by actors within the peace process.

Source: Al Jazeera

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