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APPAWARE: A MODEL FOR PRIVACY POLICY VISUALIZATION FOR MOBILE APPLICATIONS

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Abstract

Privacy policies emerge as the main mechanism to inform users on the way their information is managed by online service providers, and still remain the dominant approach for this purpose. Literature notes that users find difficulties in understanding privacy policies because they are usually written in technical or legal language even, although most users are unfamiliar with them. These difficulties have led most users to skip reading privacy policies and blindly accept them. In an effort to address this challenge this paper presents AppWare, a multiplatform tool that intends to improve the visualization of privacy policies for mobile applications. AppWare formulates a visualized report with the permission set of an application, which is easily understandable by a common user. AppWare aims to bridge the difficulty to read privacy policies and android's obscure permission set with a new privacy policy visualization model. To validate AppAware we conducted a survey through questionnaire aiming to evaluate AppAware in terms of installability, usability, and viability-purpose. The results demonstrate that AppAware is assessed above average by the users in all categories.

Keywords: Awareness, Privacy policies, Mobile application permissions, Android.

1 Introduction

The great increase of smartphone users' in just 10 years from 85.000 users in 2010 to 2.5 billion in 2017 (Statista, 2017a) has led many computer program developers to turn to mobile application (apps) developers. In March 2017, Google Play Android Store had available for downloading nearly 3 billion mobile applications (apps) (Statista, 2017b) and the Apple store had more than 2.2 billion (Statista, 2017c) while just a decade ago these two webstores had almost 65.000 apps in total (Statista, 2018). A user who wants to install an app from the application store markets needs to read and accept its relevant privacy policy, commonly presented in a textual form. Cranor et al. (2008) concluded that it is unrealistic to believe that users would ever be capable to read every single privacy policy because of the length of such documents, the time that a user needs to spend and the legal language these policies are written in.

Our research objective is to demonstrate an alternate approach to represent a privacy policy, compared to the traditional textual approach. We introduce AppAware, a new visualization model for representing privacy policies for mobile apps. We show that AppAware can create a representative visualized privacy policy for a mobile app which is easy to read for the common user, enhances their privacy awareness and informs them for the threats they may encounter.

Many researchers have suggested alternate models of privacy policies representation by transforming them to more readable policies such as PPVM (Albalawi and Ghazinour, 2009) and RSLingo4Privacy (Da Silva et al., 2016). The main disadvantage of these models is that they transform a given policy, making it simpler and easier to understand, but they do not make more understandable the privacy threats deriving from a particular mobile application. Another disadvantage is that the above models didn't present any automation in transforming the privacy policies but it was necessary a human interaction for the transformation to get complete and validated. Contrary to the above models our approach does not focus on transforming a given privacy policy, but instead on creating a visualized privacy-threating report regarding the specific permission set of a given mobile app. Our approach has many advantages over the traditional privacy policies and the existing privacy models, such as PPVM, in terms of efficiency and privacy accuracy. Moreover, the application of AppAware does not require any additional actions from mobile app developers. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to propose a privacy threat visualization report deriving from the permission set of given mobile app. AppAware works both proactively and reactively by helping mobile app users to understand the threats they may encounter by accepting the terms and conditions of a given mobile app.

The paper is structured as follows. In section two we present the related work. Section three presents the methodology we followed and the preparation we made in order to develop AppAware. In section four, we demonstrate the steps we followed to evaluate AppAware through survey and we present our empirical questionnaire results (see Appendix). Finally, in section five presents the contribution of the paper and future work.

2 Privacy risks, awareness and policy visualization

In order to examine scholar disquisition associated to our research objective, we reviewed the literature on privacy policies as well as the available literature and resources on mobile apps' features and vulnerabilities. Our literature review analysis consists of three parts: potential risks/threats that mobile app users encounter, user privacy awareness, privacy policies' reading cost, and new visualization approaches. We narrow our efforts on Androids OS's and exclude IOS from our research because only Android's security and privacy settings can be changed by the user without any special expertise (Benenson & Reinfelder, 2013). In IOS users have limited capabilities of changing the security and privacy settings of an app. Apple (the Company providing IOS) claims that any app that

is available through the official App store is reviewed by Apple's review process system for security and privacy issues. This feature does not allow users to change apps' settings.

2.1 Users' privacy concerns

Bandyopadhyay (2009) investigated the antecedents and consequences of consumer's online privacy concerns. He identified the main factors that influence consumers' privacy concerns such as vulnerability to information misuse, perceived ability to control the disclosure and use of private information, and characteristics of the consumer's cultural background. He also found that consumer's privacy concerns lead to limited willingness to disclose personal data online, to abandonment of e-commerce services or even to the total unwillingness to use the internet. Several studies had come to the same conclusions, that privacy concerns are determined by factors as awareness of information collection, perceived vulnerability to information misuse, experience with Internet use and cultural background of consumers (Sheehan and Hoy, 2000; Dinev and Hart, 2004; Bellman et al., 2004).

Buchenscheit et al. (2014) investigated if the use of the WhatsApp app could reveal users' behavior patterns and activities. Through an experiment they collected information on intended and actual behaviors (e.g., typical activities, typical sleeping hours), which they correlated with automatically obtained information from the usage of WhatsApp app. The participants, who didn't have significant privacy concerns for using the app, were surprised by the results highlighting that users do not fully realize the privacy implications of their online behaviors. Paspatis et al. (2017) used a pseudorandom dataset of 2000 telephone numbers and try to de-anonymize Viber users'. They found 682 users who had Viber installed and de-anonymized the 75% of them, revealing their full name, address and in about half of the cases their profile picture and occupation. After the de-anonymization process, authors conducted an empirical questionnaire and habits monitoring with 20 participants of the de-anonymization set. Most participants didn't have significant privacy concerns as they did not know that their data can be exposed and considered as public data or that someone can monitor their habits.

2.2 Users' privacy awareness and the cost of reading privacy policies

McDonald and Cranor (2008) tried to calculate the time and cost of users reading the privacy policies of each online service they visit. Through their empirical study they found out that every website user visit at least 1354 unique websites and that the average cost for the time they spend is 4.48 dollars per hour (if a Privacy Policy is read at home) or 35.86 dollars per hour (if the Privacy Policy should be read in office). They calculated that every website user would need 40 minutes per day for reading Privacy Polices when the average time of web surfing is 72 minutes per day. The total financial cost for all website users would be almost 781 billion dollars per year.

Kritzinger and von Solms (2010) state that the most important factor for home users being vulnerable to security threats is their lack of awareness about risks of using the Internet. Karavaras et al. (2016) conducted an empirical survey with 190 participants to explore Facebook users' awareness regarding malicious link threats, revealing that their low awareness can make them vulnerable to such attacks. Church and Oliveira (2013) researched what users are concerned at most when they are using mobile apps such as WhatsApp. They found that most users were more concerned about the "last seen feature" wherewith someone can see at what exact time a user was read a message. Using this feature a user is capable to understand someone's habits such sleep routine. Almuhimedi et al. (2014) demonstrated that users low awareness regarding location data -among others by mobile apps and suggest a permission manager to protect their privacy. Graeef and Harmon (2002) found that privacy concerns vary by age, income and gender. In addition, they saw that younger users are more aware of their information leak while older users are concerned more about their financial privacy. To raise web

users' awareness, Malandrino et al. (2013) produces NoTrace, a mozilla firefox add-on that monitor users' browsing activity and inform them what personal and sensitive information they leak towards third-party such as advertising companies. NoTrace is also capable to block or or alter the browser fingerprint information. Hazari and Brown (2013) conducted a questionnaire-based survey with 157 business students enrolling regarding privacy behavior, trust policies and technology and correlate their results with others researchers' previous studies. His results showed that individuals are concerned about their privacy and would like to control their digital reputation as it can directly impact their business relationships and/or employment prospects. He also suggested the importance of awareness training providing by institutions to make students aware of privacy issues.

2.3 Privacy policy visualization approaches

Barker et al. (2009) described purpose, visibility, granularity, retention and constraints as the key elements that form a privacy policy and categorized their research around a conceptual framework for data privacy. Ghazinour et al. (2009) presented a framework for visualizing privacy policies called Privacy Policy Visualization Model (PPVM). They suggested a graphical tool that combines Entity Relationship Modeling, Entity Relationship diagramming and the elements described by Barker et al. (2009) to show the association between the data provider, the collector and the data they collected. Albalawi and Ghazinour (2009) have evaluated PPVM using Jensen's (2014) Structured Analysis of Privacy (STARP) heuristics evaluation framework to inspect privacy usability and vulnerabilities and suggested solutions to improve usability issues encountered during evaluation. Domiongo-Ferrer (2009) suggested a three-dimensional conceptual framework for privacy policies. His proposal identifies privacy issues in a privacy policy that relate to the data provider, house and third-parties with every issue is grouped to one these categories. Anwar et al (2009) described an access control model of assessing privacy policies through visualization. Da Silva et al (2016) suggested a multilanguage framework tool based on Lingo programming language called RSLingo4Privacy which intends to improve the specification and analysis of a privacy policy. Their tool automatically classifies extracted text statements and text snippets from a policy into five classes: Collection -which data are collected; Disclosure -which data is disclosed and to whom; Retention -how long data will be available: Usage -why are they collecting users' data: and Informative -which is a general purposes class and after the conversion provides an improved version of the policy in a natural language. Kelley et al (2009) conducted a survey testing the readability, accuracy and comprehension of five different format privacy policies: full text policy in natural language, standardized table format, short standardized table, short natural language and layered notices. They concluded that the best results in all categories were provided by the two table-type policies. Micallef et al. (2017) conducted an empirical study to investigate users' preferences on multiple types of privacy policies such as combinations of visual nudges, vibration, audio and speech on mobile apps. They revealed that users are annoved when low priority notification nudges use audio or speech to alert them and developers should prefer non – salient privacy nudges to inform them. Keith et al (2018) examined an approach to improve privacy policies through the design and usage of mediated content, such as video instead of textual privacy policies. They aimed to explore if design factors such as gender, animation style, music tone or color scheme affect users' perceived risk, perceived benefits and disclosure decisions. Their results indicate that the most effective video privacy policies are those that use female narrators with vibrant color palettes and light musical tones.

Research shows that users have low privacy awareness and privacy concerns which are raised when understanding the actual privacy threats. Studies also show that users facedifficulties on reading privacy policies, such as the difficult legal language they are written in. All the above, do not create the appropriate conditions for conscious consent for the disclosure of personal information. Additionally, the users are confronted with a fragmented approach, since they need to read and understand the different privacy policies of the million mobile apps that are available. Therefore, there is a challenge on creating a single approach that can assist users and resolve the problem of the million privacy policies the users need to read. AppAware target to address this issue by using as a foundation for user awareness the permission set of the mobile apps (which is what they do and not what they state they do) and not the privacy policy. This gives the opportunity to automatically transform a privacy policy to a visualized privacy report, with representative pictures and easy to read for the common user.

3 Methodology

In this section, we analyze our methodology for developing AppAware and for validating its effect on users' privacy awareness.

3.1 Technical Methodology

We developed AppAware with Java JDK. We chose to use java instead of other programming languages because of its compatibility with different operating systems such as Windows, Linux, IOS and because it is easily modified to be used for android mobile devices (Android OS and its applications are written in a version of Java). To store our data, AppAware's global database is based on MySQL while there is a standalone version of AppAware that is using SQLite DB. We chose MySQL because its freeware, supports more than 10 million records per table while it supports and performs fast enough with many users simultaneously. The local version of AppAware is using SOLite db to store data. We chose SOLite to release users of the requirement of a local database installation such as MySQL or SQL Server. AppAware is following a different approach than the new models we referred in the related work section. Instead of trying to transform a given mobile app privacy policy into more comprehensive forms, AppAware creates a visualized report with images and privacy descriptions in natural language of the permissions that are obtained from an App during installation or use. In particular, we have matched every permission from the Android's permission set with a representative image, a permission description and a possible threat. We obtained permissions' descriptions from Pew Research (Olmstead and Atkinson, 2015) and we chose the associated images and possible threats based on google's image matching. We believe that the descriptive images of the visualized report will catch the eye of users and increase their privacy awareness. In this way, users may read the description of the permission they are giving access as well as the possible threat(s) they may encounter. Our module is consisted of four java classes: a) Dataset, b) AppData, c) AppHandling and d) AppPerms which cooperate as follows:

Dataset Class. This class includes all Android's Permissions. It is consisted of 3 fields: android's permission name, permission privacy description and potential theat. As we mentioned before permission privacy descriptions obtained from Pew Research (Olmstead and Atkinson, 2015) previous work. We chose these descriptions because of the natural language they used which is easy understandable for the common user.

AppData. This is AppAware's main class. From this class users can see which android applications are stored in the database as well as which permissions can be obtained during installation. Also, they can export the visualized report (figure 2, 3). For the purposes of our experiment we include to AppAware the twenty most famous applications for the 2017 (Hartmans, 2017).

AppHandling. From this class a user can add a new app that does not included to AppAware's database and send it for evaluation and permission matching. In order to add a new app, user must update AppAware's database to it latest version. Thus, users can also see stored apps with minimum details. After the app's evaluation and permission matching, AppAware's user is ready to create the new visualized report.

Figure 1 below shows AppAware's Schema:





AppPerms. This is the class where more advanced users and administration team can match a new application with the permissions it gains upon install/use. After the matching, app's permissions are uploading to AppAware's web database in order to update AppAware's users. To avoid spam or false permissions matching, AppAware's Server will wait for a non-specified number of users to send permissions matching for the same app. After this step server will correlate the results and if there is a specific number of permissions matching will send an updated data set to AppAware's clients.



Figure 2. Representative picture and description and threat from the visualized report

Permission : Directly call phone numbers Threat : Overcharge



Description : Allows the app to call any phone number including emergency numbers without your intervention. Malicious apps may place unnecessary and illegal calls to emergency services

Figure 3. Representative picture and description and threat from the visualized report

d	application	description	id	permission	description	Allows access to	Threat
)	null	null	2	Full network acc	Allows the app t	Hardware	none
	Facebook	facebook desc	3	View network co	Allows the app t	Hardware	Location
	Linkedin	Linkedin data	4	Test access to p	Allows the app t	Hardware	none
	Instagram	Instagram App	5	Modify or delete t	Allows the app t	User Info	Data Loss
	Adobe Reader	Adobe Reader	6	Read phone stat	Allows the app t	User Info	Location
	Amazon Kindle	Amazon Kindle	7	Prevent device fr	Allows the app t	Hardware	Power Abuse
	Dropbox		8	Precise location	Allows the app t	User Info	Location
	ebay		9	View Wi_Fi conn	Allows the app t	User Info	Triangulation
0	Evernote		10	Control vibration	Allows the app t	Hardware	None
1	WatchESPN		11	Approximate loc	Allows the app t	User Info	Location
2	Gmail		12	Receive data fro	Allows apps to a	Hardware	Overcharge
3	Chrome		13	Find accounts o	Allows the app t	User Info	Link Data
4	Google Maps		14	Take pictures an	Allows the app t	User Info	Privacy
5	Pandora		15	Run at startup	Allows the app t	Hardware	Abuse
6	Shazam		16	Directly call phon	Allows the app t	User Info	Overcharge
7	Skype		17	Read your conta	Allows the app t	User Info	Privacy
3	Spotify		18	Record audio	Allows the app t	User Info	Privacy
9	Twitter		19	Retrieve running	Allows the app t	User Info	Link Data
0	WhatsApp		20	Read Google se	Allows this app t	Hardware	Statistics
1	YouTube		21	Read call log	Allows the app t	User Info	Privacy
2	Viber		22	Google Play lice	Can check if you	Hardware	None
3	Hotmail	Hotmail Client	23	Send SMS mess	Allows the app t	User Info	Overcharge
			24	Access extra loc	Allows the app t	User Info	Location
			25	Set wallpaper	Allows the app t	Hardware	None
			26	Modify your conta	Allows the app t	User Info	Corrupt File Sys

All AppAware classes are been showed to the Figures 4, 5, 6, 7 below.

Figure 4. Class AppPerms

pplication : 8	Search :			This app has a	ccess to:	
id	application	description		Description	Threat	
ъ	Adope Reader	Adobe Reader		Allows the app to perform operations like adding	Data Loss	
7	Amazon Kindle	Amazon Kindle		Allows the app to perform operations like adding	Data Loss	
8	Dropbox		_	Allows the app to get your approximate location, T	Location	
9	ebay		_	Allows the app to modify global audio settings su	Abuse	
10	Evernote			Allows the app to connect to and discconect from	Location	
11	WatchESPN		- 1	Allows the app to control the vibrator.	None	
12	Gmail			Allows the app to use the account authenticator c	Forge	
13	Chrome			Allows the app to call any phone number includin	Overcharge	
14	Google Maps			Allows the app to get the list of accounts known b	Link Data	
15	Pandora			Allows the app to create network sockets and use	none	
16	Shazam			Allows an appliaction to add Homescreen shortc	Abuse	
17	Skype			Allows the app to write to the USB storage. Allows	Data Loss	
18	Spotify			Allows the app to modify the system settings data	Corrupt File System	
19	Twitter			Allows the app to modify the data about your cont	Corrupt File System	
20	WhatsApp			Allows the app to get your precise location using t	Location	
21	YouTube			Allows the app to prevent the tablet from going to	Power Abuse	
22	Viber			Allows this app to read Google service configurati	Statistics	
23	Hotmail	Hotmail Client	•	Allows the ann to access the nhone features of th	Location	
				Allows the app to get your approximate location. Th ork location sources such as cell towers and WL_F lable to your device for the app to use them. Ap	is location is derived by location services t . These location services must be turned	ising netw on and av

Figure 5. Class AppData

p Name :		0 1	null Facebook	null faceback dosp	
p Name :		1	Facebook	facebook dooc	
				Iacebook desc	
an Departmention :		3	Linkedin	Linkedin data	
		5	Instagram	Instagram App	
op Description.		6	Adobe Reader	Adobe Reader	
		7	Amazon Kindle	Amazon Kindle	
		8	Dropbox		
		9	ebay		
		10	Evernote		
		11	WatchESPN		
		12	Gmail		
		13	Chrome		
		14	Google Maps		
new app	delete app	15	Pandora		
		16	Shazam		
update app	save	17	Skype		
· · · · · · ·		18	Spotify		
cancel	exit	refresh apps			

Figure 6. Class AppHandling

Load Data Set a permission description Allows access to Threat a Full network access Allows the app to cr Hardware none View network conne Allows the app to tr Hardware none Modify or delete the Allows the app to tr Hardware none Modify or delete the Allows the app to ac User Info Data Loss Read phone status Allows the app to ac User Info Location Prevent device from Allows the app to ac User Info Location Prevent device from Allows the app to ge User Info Location O Control vibration Allows the app to co Hardware None 1 Approximate locatio Allows the app to co Hardware Overcharge 3 Find accounts on th Allows the app to co Hardware Overcharge 4 Take pictures and vi Allows the app to ca User Info Link Data 5 Run at startup Allows the app to ca User Info Privacy 6 Directl					— Г	L L
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AppAware is support database update function for future implementation. In case of a ready Appspermission dataset be available in public, it will be capable to support as many apps there are in the dataset. Thus, AppAware users can create and export their dataset that created with AppData class and send it to AppAware's team for evaluation and import to the web database. Until now, Playstore does not giving public and massive access to their apps database and their permission set. In case of Playstore give in public an app-permission set in public, AppAware will automatically update its global database.

3.2 Evaluation methodology

In order to evaluate AppAware, we conducted a survey using a questionnaire. The purpose of the survey was to investigate how mobile app users evaluate AppAware's Visualized Report in terms of installability, usability, and viability-purpose compared to the traditional privacy policy of WhatsApp. The criteria and questions -except demographics- derived from ISO/IEC 9126-1 Software engineering — Product quality. All questions were Likert type and mandatory. To design and distribute the questionnaire (Appendix) we used Google Forms due to its popularity and characteristics, such as provision of real-time statistical results, the security and anonymity protection that it offers.

A requirement for participation to our survey was to install AppAware and use it for a trial period before answering the questionnaire. For this purpose, we did not target the general population, but instead we distributed the designed questionnaire to colleagues and undergraduate students of various disciplines. In order to test the effect of computer science knowledge on the AppAware evaluation we included a question about the profession or studies of the participants to maintain control over this characteristic of the sample. To complete the questionnaire, participants should first read WhatsApp's privacy policy and then install AppAware and export the WhatsApp's Visualized Report using it. The survey was running for 40 consecutive days and we received 73 answers. We consider that this number of responses is sufficient, especially given the obstacles caused by the requirement to install an unknown application or the refusal to participate because of installation problems. The 73 participants were equally distributed in terms of gender (36 Males, 35 Females, 2 unknown), were mainly aged between 18 - 34 years and most of them had at least bachelor degree. The demographics of the questionnaire are analyzed in detail in Table 1.

Demographics (n=73)					
	Male	36 (49.3%)			
Gender	Female	35 (47.9)			
	Other/Unknown	2 (2.7%)			
	18-	1 (1.4%)			
Age	18-34	54 (74%)			
	35-44	10 (13.7%)			
	44+	8 (11%)			
	High School	4 (5.5%)			
	Associate Degree	4 (5.5%)			
Level of education	Bachelor Degree	32 (43.8%)			
	Master's Degree	28 (38.4%)			
	PhD Graduate Degree	5 (6.8%)			
	Economics	14 (19.2%)			
	Political Science	7 (9.6%)			
Profession	Social Science	9 (12.4%)			
	Computer Science	31 (42.5%)			
	Educational Science	4 (5.5%)			
	Other	8 (11%)			

Table 1: Sample Demographics

4 AppAware users' evaluation

The questionnaire intended to collect users' opinion regarding aspects of AppAware installability, usability, and viability/purpose.

AppAware scored in all categories above average with mean values varying from 3.07 to 4.01 (scale 1 – 5). Our results in the category Viability and Purpose reveal that participants would prefer to use AppAware's Visualized Report than read the traditional privacy policy. In terms of installability, participants didn't confront any difficulties to install or understand how to use AppAware since the mean values in this aspect range from 3.48 to 4.04. Regarding usability and purpose, AppAware scored lower mean values ranging from 3.07 to 3.75.

The results are analyzed in Table 2, that includes three columns with column one demonstrating total mean values with all professions calculated, in column 2 we exclude participants with computer related degree and finally in column three we demonstrate the mean values only of participants with computer related degree.

Question	Total	Mean values of
	mean	participants
	values	
I believe It was easy to install AppAware to my		
system	3,81	4,02
I believe that I understand what the software does	4,01	4,29
and its purpose		
I believe that It was easy to learn how to use	3,93	4,21
AppAware's basic functions		
I believe that It was easy to learn how to use	3,48	3,69
AppAware's advanced		
characteristics/functions/features		
I believe that AppAware's Visualized report	3,64	4,05
helped me to understand better the WhatsApp's		
privacy policy.		
I believe AppAware's Visualized Report helped	3,68	4,05
me to find the potential threats I		
may be confronted with using WhatsApp		
I believe AppAware's Visualized Report was easy	3,47	3,83
to read		
I believe that AppAware's Visualized Report was	3,38	3,74
easy to understand		
I believe that the descriptions of AppAware's	3,75	4,10
permission set are accurate.		
I believe that the actual threat of AppAware's	3,74	4,10
permission set is accurate.		
I believe that AppAware is a stable Application	3,64	4,10
I believe that AppAware is a useful Application	3,53	3,88
	2.62	4.00
I believe that AppAware is appropriate for its	3,03	4,00
purpose		

It was faster to read AppAware's Visualized	3,71	4,07
Report than WhatsApp's privacy policy.		
I prefer to use AppAware than to read the privacy	3,53	3,81
policy of an App.		
I believe that AppAware is a unique software tool	3,30	3,48
I believe that AppAware will be helpful to me	3,07	3,19

Table 2. Questionnaire results

5 Conclusions and future work

In this paper, we suggested a visualized model for representing privacy policies for mobile apps and the permissions they obtain upon installation. We processed android's permission set and we matched all permissions with a potential threat and a representative picture. We included in AppAware the 20 most popular applications for 2017 and then we evaluated AppAware using a survey with 73 participants. We focused our evaluation on installability, usability, and viability/purpose of AppAware. AppAware was evaluated above average in all categories especially in the usability category.

To the best of our knowledge, there is no other approach like AppAware. There are several approaches to visualize the text of a privacy policy, but there is no approach that enhances user understanding by creating a permission visualization model. The advantage of our approach is that a user does not need necessary to read all privacy policies of all mobile apps to visualize them but only to import the mobile apps and their permission set to AppAware's database. At the time of this paper we have included the 20 most popular mobile apps for the 2017. Unfortunately, we can't automatically import all available applications because Google Play store does not allow the use of crawlers or parsers.

AppAware provides significant implications for mobile app developers as well as marketplaces. Our findings show that app users would prefer to use a visualized report instead of the privacy policy of an app. App developers could provide the permission dataset they use in their apps. Researchers could use instantly and with ease their dataset to update public databases such as AppAware's. In this way, applications that target to mitigate users' privacy concerns and raise users' awareness could be up to date and help users to understand privacy threats and protect their data equally. For the same reason, we recommend app marketplaces to provide publicly the permission dataset for the apps they are hosting to assist transparency and give control to the users over their data. At the moment, AppAware is only a client-server application created in java due to its multiplatform capabilities. In the future, we envision to develop AppAware into a web-accessible database as well as a web browser add-on.

6 Appendix

A. Demographics

1.What is your gender? Male\Female

2. What is your age?

18-\18-34\35-44\30-39\40-49\50-59\60+

3. What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?

Less than high school degree\High school degree or equivalent (e.g., GED) \Some college but no degree\Associate degree\Bachelor degree\Master's degree\P.H.D. Graduate degree

4. What is your profession?

Economics/Political Science/Social Science/Computer Science/Educational Science/Other

B. AppAware Evaluation (Likert Scale 1-5)

Installability

1. I believe It was easy to install AppAware to my system

Learnability

1. I believe that I understand what the software does and its purpose

2. I believe that it was easy to learn how to use AppAware's basic functions

3. I believe that it was easy to learn how to use AppAware's advanced characteristics/functions/features

4. I believe that AppAware's Visualized report helped me to understand better the WhatsApp's privacy policy.

Usability

1. I believe AppAware's Visualized Report helped me to find the potential threats I may be confronted with using WhatsApp.

- 2. I believe AppAware's Visualized Report was easy to read.
- 3. I believe that AppAware's Visualized Report was easy to understand.
- 4. I believe that the descriptions of AppAware's permission set are accurate.
- 5. I believe that the actual threat of AppAware's permission set is accurate.

Viability-Purpose

- 1. I believe that AppAware is a stable Application.
- 2. I believe that AppAware is a useful Application.
- 3. I believe that AppAware is appropriate for its purpose.
- 4. It was faster to read AppAware's Visualized Report than WhatsApp's privacy policy.
- 5. I prefer to use AppAware than to read the privacy policy of an App.
- 6. I believe that AppAware is a unique software tool.
- 7. I believe that AppAware will be helpful to me.

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