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2000

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### Recommended Citation

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<http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2000/286>

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# Political Games of Users and MIS Professionals in the Information System Development Process

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## Abstract

Information System Development (ISD) necessarily involves resource reallocation in the organization. Resistance to the development process often arises as a result of disagreements stemming from differing goals among various parties within the organization. Resistance usually appears in political forms, which means that users or the MIS professionals may exhibit some unnecessary, irrational behaviors purely out of self-interest. Such political behavior distorts resource allocations, misguides project goals, and plays havoc with schedules and budgets. This study focuses on the following areas. (1) In ISD, which political behavior typically takes place in which development stage, and by whom it is caused? (2) What kind of business characteristics, such as the organizational culture, would affect political behavior and to what degree? And (3) how do different political behavior, such as deviation from goals, dissipation of energies, and diversion of resources, affect the whole organization? By this detailed discussion, the study seeks to make system developers aware of what irrational behavior might appear in the course of development, so that they can reduce or prevent any negative consequences.

**Keywords: Information System Development (ISD), political behavior.**

## INTRODUCTION

Beenman (1987) believes that in anything involving humans, political behavior will arise, and rational expectations, directions, and goals may be distorted. Organization members interpreted politics as being deleterious to morale, as indirectly related to inferior organizational performance outcomes, and as a source of organizational control in the form of negative feedback loops (Voyer, 1994). In these complicated human interactions, political behavior might occur just to protect self-interest at the expense of business goals. However, most of the studies on MIS are based on theories of Rational School and try to find out what is the best methodology for ISD. There are few studies, especially about political behavior, based on theories of Behavioral School. Recently, the political view of organizations has assumed greater stature in organization theory. This perspective interprets organizational events not only from the rational standpoint, but also in terms of negotiation and conflicting goals (Robey, 1984).

Although Grover et al. (1988) have done empirical research on political behavior in ISD, it was limited to the behavior of users, and without taking into consideration the character of organizations; neither did they make structural classifications. Among the many questions to be explored, the organizational culture must be a key issue affecting political behavior. This kind of research is scarce, especially in Taiwan. The purpose of this paper is to find out: in ISD, what political behavior will take place in which stage, and by whom it is caused. What kind of business characters would affect political behavior and to what degree? And how different political behavior, such as deviation of goals, dissipation of energies, and diversion of resources, would affect the whole organization. This paper expects to offer some guidelines to the practices in ISD.

## PRIOR RESEARCH

Kreitner and Kinicki (1997) believe that political maneuvering is triggered primarily by uncertainty. Five common sources of uncertainty within organizations are: (1) unclear objectives, (2) vague performance measuring, (3) ill-defined decision processes, (4) strong individual or group competition, and (5) any type of change. Whenever change is attempted, the political subsystem becomes active. (Raia, 1985).

There is legitimate and illegitimate political behavior, the legitimate behavior can inhibit unreasonable policies (Robbins, 1979; Moberg, 1978; Madison et al, 1980), but people in general focus their attention on the adverse effect of the political behavior. Patricia (1995) finds that political behavior is typically divisive and conflictive, often pitting individuals or groups against formal authority, or else against each other. Mintzberg (1984) believe that it has a negative effect on interpersonal relationships, performance and productivity.

But what factors affect political behavior? Robbins (1979) finds that the personal characters (such as high degree locus of control etc.) and organization characters (such as relocation of resource, low trust, etc.) can encourage political behavior. The political behavior process framework is developed through antecedent conditions, operating mechanisms, and outcomes (Verdenburgh & Maurer, 1984).

The development of information systems brings representatives of user and data processing departments together under conditions of resource pressure and time

constraints. These departments may differ considerably in formal structure, training, cognitive orientation of members, career paths, and departmental mission. The potential for conflict in ISD is therefore great, and potential disagreements are likely to become manifest under conditions of high interdependence among group members in project meetings (Robey, 1989). The political campaigns can continue throughout the life of ISD and that they are equally critical in maintaining and shifting balances of power (Robey, 1989).

Lucas (1974) believes that the real problem from the design of IS at the organizational level is associated with an intangible variable, power. The information analyst must therefore recognize that the ISD process within an organization might be accompanied by a dynamic shift in power and power-dependence relations (Swanson, 1985). Dickson & Wetherbe (1985) find that “the change of power and politics” is one of the key issues of the successful IS implementation. Building a new system and changing the existing system are a political process; both could cause disorder in the power of an organization and social structure. According to Markus (1983), deliberate resistance to information system implementation occurs when the power distribution implied by a proposed system is incongruous with that determined by other sources of power. In other words, those who expect to gain power support implementation while those who expect to lose power resist it.

Treating ISD as a political process appears to disregard legitimate superordinate goals that may have guided initial system proposals. The most skeptical position is to mistrust all appeals to superordinate goals and to suspect that individuals are motivated only by their own interests (Robey, 1993). Hence the technical system analysis must be augmented with a social or political analysis. A political analysis focuses on processes of control, influence, and the use of power in organization life. The political campaigns can continue throughout the life of ISD and that they are equally critical in maintaining and shifting balances of power. (Kling, 1984).

Keen (1981) has analyzed the political games in ISD, and using the classification of Bardach (1977), divided these games into four categories: (1) Deflection of goals: the originally stated goals of an MIS project might be ambiguous and therefore subject to change. (2) Dilemmas of administration: the MIS implementation process requires the assembly of a number of diverse resources from various parties. The parties might take advantage of this dependence by threatening to withhold their support and thus forcing the managers to either meet their demands or to proceed without their resources. (3) Dissipation of energies: individuals and groups waste considerable energy either by avoiding responsibility or by attempting to gain power and control. These games lead to project delays and poor performance. (4) Diversion of resources: the games in this category result in deflection of resources away from useful

causes and towards the achievement of the parochial objectives of the individual parties involved.

Keen (1981) finds that the resistances of users are due to perceived threats to their political interests. Keen (1981) suggests that MIS professionals raise their political awareness. But he also finds MIS professionals are the protagonists in several games. Recognition of hidden motives and devious strategies can be a first step before applying techniques to prevent future games or favorably resolving current games.

## METHOD OF RESEARCH

There is little research on political games and their effect on ISD. We need therefore to further explore the key issues and their interactions in the complicated MIS development process. So this paper uses the methodology of a case study to figure out and analyze the questions of “why,” “how,” “what,” “when” and “who”.

The purpose of this article is to find the political behaviors in ISD, to classify the games and to analyze how they affect the IS. Here six organizations are chosen for study. These cases have had MIS departments for more than ten years. They include different kinds of manufacturing and service industries, both large and small-scale, government and private enterprises, and commercial and nonprofit businesses. We can expect to find many political games from these cases. (Table 1.)

Table 1 Introduction of the cases

<i>Case code</i>	<i>Organization type</i>	<i>Individuals in MIS dept.</i>	<i>Public/ Private business</i>
A	Company - Food manufacturer	70-80	Private enterprise
B	Company - Financier	30-40	Private enterprise
C	Company - Steel manufacturer	20-30	Private enterprise
D	Company - Common carrier	30-40	Government enterprise
E	Government agency	40-50	Government enterprise
F	Company - Manufacturer	60-70	Government enterprise

Our research, based on the Robbins (1979), Verdenburgh and Maurer (1984) political behavior process framework, introduces three constructs to the semi-structured interview questionnaire. These are (1) organization factors, (2) political behavior and (3) the affects on the IS project.

In using the Content Analysis method to analyze the data, prior research has shown the categorization and analysis steps to be the most critical. Therefore we defined each category very clearly to avoid misclassification. And we

analyzed interview data using thematic units. These were introduced from the respondents' description of the relevant events in the IS project development process. After selecting the relevant sentences, the themes could be analyzed. This the researchers did by collecting these themes, and coding and categorizing them. Since coding is subjective, it is necessary that all coding persons agree about the code data. Then the researchers calculate the reliability of the code and judge the explanation of the category.

The researchers selected the themes in the respondents' descriptions and highlighted them. Three persons (graduate students) independently collected these themes, coding and categorizing them based on the interview record, after which they compared and analyzed the results. Agreed-upon

results were accepted and disagreed-upon parts were discussed in more detail. If at least two persons agreed on a conclusion t, then it was accepted. Otherwise it was discussed with the MIS expert (professor of MIS). If there was still not agreement, then the conclusion was eliminated. By this procedure the themes selected and the reliability of the analysis unit should be acceptable.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### *Identification of The Political Games*

After interviews, we have found 31 political games that occur in IS planning, development and implementation processes (Table 2); for the details of these games, please refer to Chang (1997).

Table 2 Classification of political games and their effects

<i>Political game</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Effect</i>	<i>Classification of effect</i>
1. Up for grabs	Grab control before the project goal becomes concrete, then change project direction.	Turn the goal to a different purpose and miss the original intent.	Deflection of Goals
2. Keeping others on the trot	When the project is ongoing, put forward many unnecessary requests.	Keep the project from achieving the goal on time, resulting in failure.	Dilemmas of Administration, Dissipation of Energies
3. Leaving others in the lurch	Don't wish to see the success of the project and do not give necessary support.	Deter the execution of the project, and try to cancel it.	Dilemmas of Administration
4. Leading an easy life	Object to or delay any change, just to avoid work or responsibility. The pretext is: it doesn't pay to utilize a lot of resources and give the organization too great a shock but bring in no benefits.	Deter the implementation of the project.	Dilemmas of Administration
5. Providing lip service	Pretend to support the project, but actually contribute little.	Deter the implementation of the project.	Dilemmas of Administration
6. Protecting one's territory	Toward the end, when the project proves successful, departments contend with each other for resources, thus self-consuming energies without regard to the goals of the company.	Seize information resources to get self-interest, delay the project and waste energies.	Diversion of Resources
7. Over-icing the cake	Exaggerate the efforts and contributions of one's own department so as to earn merits and demand more resources or insist it's time for others to contribute.	Seize resources to protect oneself and benefit, while distorting the project resource allocation.	Diversion of Resources
8. Boycotting	Reject the project until some particular interests are satisfied.	To seize resources, waste energy in negotiation, communication, competition, and pacification. Then the project can't go smoothly.	Dissipation of Energies, Diversion of Resources
9. Passing the buck	Pass the hot potatoes on to others; put one's own duty onto others and force others to take the responsibility for failure.	Pervert the design and job allocation of the project, and deter the implementation.	Dilemmas of Administration

10. Tying two strings to one bow	Do not work with all their energy when the project is ongoing. Escape the responsibility if something goes wrong.	Deter the implementation of the project and pervert the goal of the project.	Deflection of Goals, Dilemmas of Administration
11. Taking a share	Not be available when help is needed, but be eager to take a share when there is benefit.	To attain self-interest and achievement, turn the resources to one's purpose rather than use them in the right way.	Diversion of Resources
12. Being hypocritical	Pretend to be a good guy so as not to draw complaints, but never do what one should.	To protect self-power and interest, pervert the goal of the project.	Deflection of Goals
13. Playing the cards close to one's chest	Refuse to provide or deliberately conceal important information.	Deter the project to protect self-power and interest.	Dilemmas of Administration
14. Being a tell-tale	Defame others' images to get benefit and take advantage of the power of the authorities in order to take control of the best situation.	Deter the implementation of the project and seize resources.	Dilemmas of Administration, Diversion of Resources
15. Setting terms	Set terms to swap benefits for offered cooperation, whether or not it is good for the company.	Deflect the use of resources to attain self-interest and achievements.	Deflection of Goals, Diversion of Resources
16. Keeping within the letter of the law	Obey the rules, policy or codes in every particular way but actually make it difficult to implement the project.	Deter the implementation of the project.	Dilemmas of Administration
17. Playing dumb	Pretend to be ignorant or incompetent so as to avoid what they do not want to do.	Deter the implementation of the project.	Dilemmas of Administration
18. Prolonging	Deliberately prolong the work on hand and appear to be so occupied that they cannot contribute to the project.	Deter the implementation of the project to prevent it from finishing on time.	Dilemmas of Administration
19. Stretching and smoothing	Divide the work on hand into several parts, do one at a time, keep busy and refuse to cooperate.	Deter the implementation of the project to prevent it from finishing on time.	Dilemmas of Administration
20. Stalling	Find every pretext possible to put off support. (Try to do as little as possible.)	Waste resources, and then delay the project.	Dilemmas of Administration, Dissipation of Energies
21. Setting up a buffer (Red tape)	Pay excessive attention to formal documents to protect oneself. (Unless formal documents are provided in each step, no information will be offered.)	Deter the implementation of the project and prevent it from finishing on time.	Dilemmas of Administration
22. Playing safe	Avoid any unfavorable conditions. Whether it is reasonable, work only for the projects that are most likely to be successful. Self-protection is the first priority.	Deter the effective allocation of project resources.	Diversion of Resource
23. White-washing	To exonerate a defected policy or a failing action, show more commitment than necessary and keep flinging in resources to appear confident and consistent with the previous actions.	Seize resources to gain self-achievement, and then waste resources.	Dissipation of Energies, Diversion of Resource
24. Staying aloof	Hold the attitude: "It is none of my business whether the project is successful or not. After all, other people have responsibility for the project."	Deter the implementation of the project to prevent it from finishing on time.	Dilemmas of Administration

25. Hiding the facts	Try to hide the facts and do nothing if possible, since the boss is not familiar with the actual situations.	Pervert the system goal, deter the implementation of the system and then delay the project.	Deflection of Goals, Dilemmas of Administration
26. Old soldiers vs. new boys	Assign the difficult parts of the job to the juniors and wait to enjoy the outcome.	Deter the reasonable allocation of the project and delay the project.	Dilemmas of Administration
27. Change leader, everything is changed	Stall the system they don't like. Wait until the leader is changed, then they are relieved of the duty.	Prevent the project from going on, and waste the resources that have already been put in.	Dissipation of Energies
28. Laying siege	If anyone disagrees, rightfully or not, ally with the key men around him and try to persuade him.	Include out-group members, to justify the unreasonable system and pervert the project direction.	Deflection of Goals
29. Finding a scapegoat	Try to find someone else to take the blame if anything goes wrong with the system.	To protect self-interest, consume energies in communication, competition, and negotiation. Then the project can't go smoothly.	Dissipation of Energies
30. Keeping out of the gray areas	Nobody is willing to take care of the job in the gray areas.	Nobody accepts the job, for fear that it will threaten their benefit, with the result that the implementation of the project is deterred.	Deflection of Goals, Dilemmas of Administration
31. No benefit no effort	If the system doesn't appear personally beneficial, deflect the job to others with the pretext of insufficient manpower.	Deflect the resource allocation to attain one's own benefit and achievement.	Diversion of Resources

**The Classification of Political Game Effects on Projects**

According to the research of Bardach (1977) we classify the 31 political games into four categories depending on their major adverse effects. (Table 2)

**We find that** the effects the same game has may fall into different categories, which means a political game could have more than one effect on the project.

**The Relationships among Political Games, Stages of ISD, and the Roles of Game Players.**

There are three stages in ISD (Dickson & Wetherbe, 1985): IS planning stage, IS development stage and IS implementation stage. In the different stages of ISD, what incentives and roles do the individuals of different departments adopt? What political games do they play? This study has obtained the following findings. (See Table 3. "U" in the table represents political games played by users; "M" represents the political games played by MIS professionals.)

**1. IS Planning Stage: The players include MIS professionals and users, but we find that in this stage MIS professionals play more games than users.**

In the IS planning stage, when projects are just beginning, all the roles, targets, and responsibilities are not clearly defined, and both sides want to grab the power of the project. When they get in contact with each other, the political games begin. In this stage, the MIS department has the greater professional power, so it can easily play games on a large scale.

**2. IS Development Stage • A great number of political games appear; both users and MIS professionals play the games.**

In the IS development stage, the MIS department and users interact with increasing frequency. The MIS department needs users' cooperation; otherwise they cannot decide on the requirements and specification of users. So users learn about the details of the system, and also how to take care of their own benefit; then both of them set to work playing many political games. **But MIS professionals are more passive instead of being active.**

**3. IS Implementation Stage Both MIS professionals and users play the games, and the scores are tied.**

In the IS implementation stage, which is the end of the system development, it is getting clear who wins and who loses as a result of implementation, who should take the responsibility for problems, etc. And it is this second time that users and MIS professionals come into contact that reward and punishment is going to be distributed. So the political games arise again.

Table 3 ISD stage & political games [M: MIS professional; U: user]

<i>Political game</i>	<i>Plannin g stage</i>	<i>Developm ent stage</i>	<i>Impleme ntation stage</i>
1. Up for grabs	UM		
2. Keeping others on the trot		U	
3. Leaving others in the lurch		U	U
4. Leading an easy life	UM	M	
5. Providing lip service		UM	U
6. Protecting one's territory		UM	UM
7. Over-egging the cake			UM
8. Boycotting		U	U
9. Passing the buck		M	UM
10. Tying two strings to one bow		UM	
11. Taking a share			U
12. Being hypocritical	M	M	
13. Playing the cards close to one's chest		UM	
14. Being a tell-tale		UM	M
15. Setting terms		M	M
16. Keeping within the letter of the law		U	
17. Playing dumb		UM	
18. Prolonging		U	U
19. Stretching and smoothing		U	U
20. Stalling		U	U
21. Setting up a buffer (Red tape)		U	
22. Playing safe	M		
23. White-washing		M	M
24. Staying aloof		U	UM
25. Hiding the facts	UM	M	
26. Old soldiers vs. new boys	M		
27. Change Leader, everything is change		M	M
28. Laying siege			M
29. Finding a scapegoat			UM
30. Keeping out of the gray areas		M	M
31.No benefit no effort	M		

**The Organizational Factors that Affect Political Games**

Kreitner & Kinicki (1997), Robbins (1979) and Verdenburg & Maurer (1984) all point out that under certain kinds of organizational culture, more political games will be introduced, for instance, when power resources are relocated,

or there is low level of trust placed in individuals. Here we try to discover the organizational factors that can induce political games.

**1. Relocation of resources:** To improve efficiency, the organization changes the allocation of power and resources. Ezzamel (1994) finds that in ISD the relocation of power would induce political contests among different departments. **We find that** the more the resource relocation, the more political games are induced.

For example, when the **D Company** develops an auto-operation system, this threatens many individuals' positions, for the system might deprive them of power. So during the interview, many odd requirements emerge and they ask for unnecessary check-up in the system (**Keeping others on the trot**), which in turn causes adverse effects on the system.

**2. Trust placed in individuals:** Johnson (1995) and Stever (1990) point out that without trust, individuals and their organizations cannot function effectively.

**We find that** the higher the degree of trust in individuals, the fewer political games are induced.

For example, interviewees of the **B Company** say that since they are a financier, morality and integrity are the indispensable qualities of new employees; hence, the organization has placed a high degree of trust in individuals. Individuals enjoy high levels of autonomy and authorization. Thus in the process of ISD, there is sufficient trust between MIS professionals and users, and relatively fewer political games arise.

**3. Role ambiguity:** Rizzo et al. (1970), Chenhall and Brownell (1988), Harris (1983), Dubinsky et al. (1988) and Liou (1995) find that role ambiguity influences job satisfaction and performance too.

**We find that** the higher degree of role ambiguity, the more political games are induced.

For instance: the network maintenance of the **F Company** involves three departments: MIS, communication and user departments (and network manufacturer). When users have any problems, the ambiguity arises. And since these three departments are interdependent on each other, the coverage of ambiguity is very large, but nobody will help others. They play the **keeping out of the gray areas** game even at the expense of the mission. Hence role ambiguity could reduce organizational efficiency and effectiveness, and it could be a good pretext to play the political game.

**4. Unclear performance evaluation system:** The organization evaluates performance in a subjective way and emphasizes a single standard for evaluation.

**We find that** the more unclear the performance evaluation system, the more political games arise.

For instance, when **D Company** develops an auto-operation system, in the planning and implementation stage, some MIS professionals do not tell user departments how to achieve the optimal performance on the grounds. That their organization always "evaluates performance in a subjective way" and individuals take turns getting "grade A" for their performance. So they become less and less

committed to their jobs. The **leading an easy life** game appears and has an adverse influence on the system.

**5. Zero-sum reward practices:** The total amount of reward is fixed; if you get it, then I lose it.

**We find that** the more zero-sum reward practices increase, the more political games arise.

For instance, interviewees of the **F Company** say that in driving EUC process, some of the users do not like to learn the new ways of operation and do not want to take the responsibility. All of these result from the high degree of zero-sum. The total amount of reward and workload are fixed; the reward is given in order of seniority; it is fruitless to do more or better. That is why they do not like to do more jobs--"if I don't shirk, then they shirk."--The **leading an easy life** and **stalling** games appear and bring adverse effects on the system. These situations take place when the organization encourage individuals to use political games in order to get the better of colleagues and show off their own performance.

**6. Democratic decision-making:** Individuals are empowered to do more decision-making.

**We find that** the higher the degree of democratic decision-making, the fewer political games arise.

For instance, when controversies in **B Company** happen, users will exaggerate trifles, and the MIS department will report to the higher level or the rationalization team, and after they discuss it together, they will do anything desirable. The whole process of decision-making is always done on the table and democratically. Thus, political games are inhibited.

**7. Self-serving senior managers (or MIS/user department managers):** Individuals will learn the political games from the senior managers. The ambience for political games is thus developed.

**We find that** the greater degree to which senior managers are self-serving, the more political games arise.

For example, the directors of **B Company** (the superiors in management) will form factions through the voting process. Different factions have different opinions about purchase of hardware. Seemingly, all of them are good for the company, but they are actually playing **providing lip service** and **Boycotting** games. Hence, they make a huge obstacle in the adoption of ISD.

**8. Member identity:** Members identify with the organization, rather than merely with their type of job.

Hofstede (1990), O'Reilly III (1991) and Boulian (1974) point out that the more an individual identifies with the organization, the more he will contribute and more satisfaction he will get from his job. And in this situation fewer political games will arise.

**We find that** the more an individual identifies with the organization, the fewer political games arise.

For example, in **B company**, the budget for MIS is always made by the headquarter management, but each department can make their own evaluation in purchasing certain software. As they have a strong sense of belonging, they will always take the side of the organization and will not make surreptitious budget. And no **taking a share** game.

**9. Emphasis on team-work:** Job activities are mainly evaluated in terms of team-work rather than of individual performance.

**We find that** the more emphasis on team-work, the fewer political games arise.

For example, individuals of **A Company** always emphasize the company's benefit in advancing IS. Job activities are always centered on team-work and performance is evaluated in terms of team-work, too. Thus norm could be generated easily. So MIS professionals and users can cooperate well, and have no chance to operate political games.

**10. Risk tolerance:** The organization encourages individuals to endeavor, innovate and venture.

**We find that** the lower the degree of risk tolerance, the more political games arise.

For instance, as **D Company** is a government enterprise, the norm doesn't encourage members to venture or make innovations, so when they develop the auto-operation system, individuals will do as little as possible. They can't take the risk and don't encourage individuals to engage in the system; hence, every individual avoids the responsibility and play **Passing the buck** and **leading an easy life** games.

**11. Means-ends orientation:** The organization appreciates the result but not the processes.

**We find that** the more ends oriented, the more political games are played.

For instance: the superior agency assigns **D Company** to develop the auto-operation system and it is technically feasible, but D Company doesn't want to take trouble (**leading an easy life**) and delays developing it. Now the superior agency asks them to finish the system in five months, so they develop a superficial auto-operation system interface only and do not integrate all of related systems indeed. Anyway the superior agency will not know the detailed situation (**Hiding the facts**).

**12. Performance pressure:** The more pressure, the more political behavior.

**We find that** the effect of a higher degree of performance pressure is conditional: (1) The more ends oriented, the more political games. (2) If both means and ends oriented, the fewer political games are played.

## CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

In every organization or activity there will surely be political behavior, and it is difficult to controlled. Unlike politics, sociology and organizational behavior, there is little research on behaviors relative to MIS or ISD, which seems to focus on technology. From the viewpoint of the Socio-Technical School of thought, we need to integrate the social and technical plans so as to reach the optimal consequence and make the success of IS possible. Therefore, behind the political behavior there exist many cognitive factors, such as complex motivations, intentions, attitudes, cultures and expectations. This means that political behavior



is a sign, which is a key issue to be explored, understood and analyzed by the management.

This article is an exploratory study focused on political behavior that occurs in the process of ISD in Taiwan. With six cases, we have achieved the following contributions to MIS practice and research: **(1) We find thirty-one types of political games; (2) the organizational culture is really an antecedent condition of the political games; (3) these 31 political games in six cases can be divided into four categories depending on the games' major adverse effects, and the same game could have more than one effect on the project; (4) we find the interrelationships among political games, stages of ISD, and roles of game players.**

So we assert that when an organization needs to develop an IS project, the following organizational culture factors can be highly effectual at reducing political behavior: (1) If the IS project will have a high degree of resource relocation, senior management can prevent political behavior before development by putting in place the proper organizational culture. (2) Reducing role ambiguity, unclear performance evaluation, zero-sum reward practices and solely end-oriented performance pressure in the organization will prevent political behavior. (3) Increasing the trust placed in individuals, democratic decision-making, member identity with the organization, emphasis on team-work, risk tolerance, creating a balanced means-ends orientation and emphasizing good project procedure will result in political behavior having no chance to breed. In the IS planning stage, the manager should prevent MIS professionals from playing games. In the IS development stage, the manager should notice users playing political games, and in the IS implementation stage, the manager should prevent both MIS professionals and users from playing games.

As this article is merely an exploratory study, could not generalize the results, future research is expected to be attempted using more rigorous methods to justify these findings. Further analyses are expected to be performed concerning such antecedent conditions as personal factors, and the management's response to the game.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Mr. Marvis White (Senior Research Scientist in MicroCoating Technologies, Inc.) and Miss Yung-hsien Ting (English Teacher in Hsin-Chu Senior Girls' High School) revised the English written for us.

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