June 2018

A Comparison of the Models and Methods of Surveillance in East Germany and Northern Ireland and Their Relevance to Modern-day Securitization of Society

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A comparison of the models and methods of surveillance in East Germany and Northern Ireland and their relevance to modern-day securitization of society

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Abstract

Despite increasing awareness of the rise in societal surveillance as a result of leaks by former NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden and subsequent revelations from Wikileaks, the damage of pervasive surveillance practices on the individual and on communities has yet to be measured. As John Gilliom has argued, 'until we are able to generate sufficient research to make plausible sense of how differently situated people – welfare mothers, prisoners, students, middle-class professionals – speak of and respond to their various surveillance settings, we will be unable to devise a meaningful account of what surveillance is' (2006, 126). Before we can examine the impact and influence of surveillance on these or other segments of society, we must examine the pervasive nature of general surveillance techniques. The objective of this paper is to consider in detail the historical techniques of government surveillance on communities in Northern Ireland (NI) and the former East Germany (GDR). By looking at these two models of surveillance societies, we can begin to compare and contrast the differences in strategies used in a democracy and a dictatorship. Using these two examples of two heavily surveilled communities, taking a detailed look at five techniques in particular, we gain insight into the implantation of surveillance practices used by

different political model structures. The aim is to explore the similarities and differences in strategies used in both states, allowing us to assess the trajectory of future surveillance tactics and its relevance in the securitization of society today.

Introduction: Surveillance, power and risk-based profiling

> Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers – *Article 19, The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 10, 1948*

As historic and biblical narratives make plain, the idea of surveillance and the need for it are not new. Links between surveillance power and control has roots in biblical texts for example, the notion of the all-seeing, omnipresent God creates the perception that our behaviour is constantly monitored. We may therefore modify our actions in an effort to please the Almighty with virtuous behaviour.

Today, most surveillance theory is focused on governmental use of surveillance and its impact on shifting power dynamics resulting from the surveillance state. In their thesis *Imagining Security 2007*, Wood and Sheering argue, 'Power is understood as being everywhere, not because it is exercised everywhere, but because it is viewed as coming from everywhere' (2007: 9).Foucault takes this observation a step further, suggesting that power is a tool for modifying our actions, making us compliant with states' expectations of our behaviour: 'Power is not a thing but rather an anonymous strategy that is exercised via tactics and techniques in concrete practices. The anonymity indicates power exists in action' (2004: 14).

In light of the post 9/11 world and the rise of groups such as the Islamic State, the need for proactive surveillance measures appears to outweigh our ability to self-determine how our information is used. As Pfaff suggests: 'Proactive surveillance seeks out potentially dangerous individuals, conspiracies and deviant opinions, before they act, are publicly expressed or put into action. A sphere of privacy or right of personal conviction is not recognized or respected' (Pfaff, 2001: 387).

The securitisation of surveillance centred on enforcing rules and regulations has overtaken its original function of protection. Our understanding of public discourse, freedom of expression and boundaries between the individual citizen and the State has fundamentally changed. Autonomy and existential action are subject to hostile scrutiny and compliance has been redefined as 'non suspicious' behaviour. This new approach enables the state to justify forcing these rules on its citizens so they can live a safer life. As Marc Schuilenburg points out: 'Security is an ordering concept. We order our lives in the hope of a safe existence' (2015: 9).

The contemporary role of surveillance in preventing terrorist attacks must be taken into account. Various stakeholders see risk-based profiling as an essential component of the new strategy of preventative policing as, for example, Pat O'Malley, quoting Colquhoun, maintains 'the prevention of crimes and misdemeanours is the true essence of police' (O'Malley, 2010: 168). However, Castel takes an alternative view, seeing this position as a two-dimensional approach that does not take into account the full picture of the individual targeted: 'In the case of risk, the subject is deconstructed, so to speak, through the use of statistical techniques. Thus, 'surveillance is practiced without any contact, or any immediate representation of the subjects under scrutiny' (Castel, 1991: 288).

Given ongoing threats of violence posed by sectarian groups such as the Provisional IRA and the Ulster Volunteer Force, who carried out indiscriminate bomb and gun attacks, the surveillance techniques and risk-based profiling used in Northern Ireland arguably became an indispensable tool for preventing possible terrorist threats. However the Catholic population were perceived as the greater threat to security and became the main targets for surveillance operations. In the case of East Germany (German Democratic Republic or GDR), surveillance helped identify threats to the state apparatus; however, as nearly everyone was seen as a risk, the task became so monumental that it also became unsustainable. In light of the new risk-based policing strategy, the state powers must ensure a balanced approach. Surveillance must be carried out in way that is seen to be just, fair and proportionate if it is to be deemed legitimate in the eyes of those under surveillance, often the general public at large.

There are growing concerns among critics about the levels of intrusion by surveillance stakeholders into the everyday lives of ordinary citizens. Much of the work currently undertaken in the area of surveillance studies suggests that, while there have been many positive policing results from the new surveillance techniques, disadvantaged groups are often disproportionately targeted. In McCahill and Finns' work on risk-based profiling, they point out that '[i]n the context of policing and criminal justice, surveillance powers continue to be disproportionately directed towards those shorn of economic and cultural capital in a way that reinforces existing social divisions' (2014: 175).

With security services' use of criminal profiling, this form of social sorting is leading to people often becoming targets of surveillance because of their background or how they look, regardless of how they behave. Many academics such David Lyon in his work on *Everyday Surveillance* also argue that this form of profiling, reinforces stereotypes, creating social divisions in many communities.

Conservative critiques suggest that surveillance is not sinister or coordinated but that it is an inevitable and organic consequence of the manner in which the threat presents itself. Radical critique by contrast would argue that in fact this further alienates and divides society, acting as a threat multiplier however unintentional. As Neman and Hayman note,

> 'social sorting' highlights the classifying drive of contemporary surveillance. It also defuses some of the more potentially sinister aspects of surveillance processes (i.e. it's not a conspiracy of evil intentions or a relentless and inexorable process). Surveillance is always ambiguous (2013: 167).

In the case of Northern Ireland, the minority Catholic populations was seen as the greater risk to security and, as a result, was disproportionately targeted, further fuelling community division. In the GDR, however, everyone was seen as a risk to the state, and no one was exempt from coming under the scrutiny of the Stasi.

It must be noted, however, that modern surveillance is all encompassing in nature, which sees all citizens as being enemy of the state or the 'Other'. As David Lyon suggests, this allows for little trust by the government in its own citizens: 'Those in positions of authority do not trust or are seeking grounds to trust those below them' (2002: 37). It can be said that in Northern Ireland and

East Germany under the Stasi, the state chose not to trust its citizens and as a result normalized surveillance states emerged.

Background

To compare surveillance strategies used in GDR and Northern Ireland, the history of and rationale for surveillance operations in these two states must be taken into account. Both cases can be examined and analysed through Foucault's model of surveillance outlined below.

> In traditional models of surveillance power flows from the surveyors (government or corporate actors) to the surveyed. In this concept, power is something possessed by an authority that is 'exerted over things', which can 'modify use, consume or destroy' (1982, p.786).

The East German State Security Service, commonly known as the Stasi, implemented a frightening regime of surveillance, infiltration and terror for over 40 years. Its sole objective was to control citizens and prevent the growing tide of emigration to West Germany that nearly caused the economic collapse of the East German communist state. By creating an atmosphere of fear, disharmony and mistrust, it hampered spontaneous communication and social cohesion critical for change.

Many people believe this omnipresent surveillance by state actors in the GDR contributed to the collective compliance of citizens in this repressive system. Solove, in his book *Ubiquitous and Pervasive Computing*, quotes Justice Cohen to the effect that our individuality is lost in the idea of persistence state of monitoring: '[P]ervasive monitoring of every first move or false start will, at the margin, incline choices toward the bland and the main-stream' losing as she describes 'the expression of eccentric individuality' (Solove, 1972, p. 156).

In contrast, the Northern Ireland surveillance state was the result of civil rights protests by the Catholic minority looking to end discriminatory voting, housing and employment policies. Their demands led to intensifying political tension and intercommunity violence between the Protestant/unionist and Catholic/nationalist communities. This, in turn, resulted in the deployment of the British Army to quell the waves of violence, terrorist attacks and street protests that gripped the region. Its aim was to end violence and restore order through on-the-ground tactical surveillance strategies. The British establishment

however, based on past colonial experience, chose a coercive militarised response to what was a civil liberties and rights-based issues to begin with. This provocative and militarised policing exacerbated the roubles essentially becoming a threat multiplier. Many similarities can be drawn with today's police forces facing increasing threats from radical elements of society, as O'Malley and Hutchinson imply when they note that 'the development of police as a quasi-military form of organization and the growth of a police culture … emphasizes[] a form of masculine heroism' (2007: 385).

An analysis of five surveillance techniques

The following section will consist of a detailed analysis of five common surveillance techniques used in both Northern Ireland and East Germany. These techniques will be discussed and categorised using Johnston and Shearing's five characteristics of the securitisation of the state, as mentioned in *Governing Security* and outlined below:

> Order: the way citizens ought to be, set of explicit and implicit norms about acceptable public behaviour.

> At least one willing actor active in the programme ensuring supervision, control and order maintenance. Formal or informal organisation.

> Personal instruments of the actor: communication skills, intelligence and charisma.

> Tools and technologies: a whole range of innovative inventions or discoveries.

> Physical instruments: eavesdropping, searching premises and inspecting posts.

If the surveillance techniques of these states and their implementation are examined in detail, it can be seen that the methods used in both cases are strikingly similar despite differences in their underlying rationales.

1. Order: technique – internment and imprisonment

The threat of jail as a result of information gathered through pervasive surveillance practices has been used by regimes for decades with great success. In many cases, within the strategy of a zero-tolerance policy, the threat of jail is often used as a deterrent to criminal activity. Schuilenburg observes that in the scenarios where zero-tolerance policies are implemented 'directions of problem

resolution such as prevention and extensive control mandates are regarded as being more effective in preventing evil than those classic control methods of criminal justice' (2015: 33).

Foucault also observed that 'to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility … assures the automatic functioning of power' (Foucault, 1977: 201). Many commentators raise concerns about the encroachment of private firms in the criminal justice system and see this as the beginning of the commodification of surveillance and security. Private security sees it operational focus in terms of profit and loss, not with regard to the benefit of society as a whole. As Shearing and Stenning note, there has been an 'emergence in the private sector of a more instrumental form of control in which environments [are] being constructed in order to minimize opportunities for unwanted behaviour' (Shearing & Stenning, 1985: 301).

In East Germany, this tactic evolved after the region's post–Second World War annexation by the Soviet Union. In the beginning of the 1950s, the focus was on violent repression of the opposition, which led to the imprisonment and torture of political activists. From the 1970s to the fall of the GDR, the focus moved away from physical torture to psychological intimidation. This often led to much-publicised show trials that, for many, ended in convictions and jail without any legal representation. According to research undertaken by Maercker and Schützwohl, 'By recent estimates, approximately 180,000 individuals were imprisoned for political reasons in the former GDR' (1997: 436).

In Northern Ireland, the threat of jail as a means of restoring social order was introduced with the policy of internment without trial. This policy saw the minority Catholic population targeted through surveillance; this resulted in many of its community members subjected to long periods of indefinite incarceration without any legal protections. Although some of those interned had terrorist connections, many innocent citizens endured similar torturous techniques as those used in the GDR state security, and as a result, they became radicalised. Ed Moloney states that a staggering two percent of Derry City's 50,000 Catholic population was imprisoned for IRA activities in the years between 1971 and 1986' (2007: 20).

2. Active player: technique – citizen surveillance

Alongside the increased securitisation of streets across the UK and Europe, the use of innovative collaborations, such as community watch programmes, are being actively promoted by local police forces. We are increasingly encouraged to be the eyes and ears of police patrols, who urge us to flag potential suspect behaviour. In conjunction with these community-based initiatives, the media also calls on the public to help track down possible targets suspected of criminal behaviour through what many consider citizen surveillance.

Marc Schuilenburg, whose work has developed many of the surveillance assemblages that dominate today's urban landscapes, cites 'the input of knowledge and experience by concerned inhabitants in order to enable a more distributive and more effective form of security observance' (2015: 48). Tops in his 2007 paper analysing local political environment in Rotterdam takes this increased securitisation of society one step further, suggesting there is now an increasing intertwining of community, policy and crime prevention: 'There are no project managers but rather urban marines, no goals but rather target, no neighbourhood teams but rather intervention teams no security policy but security approach' (Tops, 2007: 293).

Many see this citizen surveillance approach as divisive in nature because it enforces societal stereotyping and does not take the context of the suspicious behaviour into account. As Feeley and Simon argue in their comparison of old and new constructs in penology (a section of criminology that deals with the philosophical and practical): 'While the Old Penology tried to identify criminals to ascribe guilt and blame and to impose punishment and treatment, the New Penology seeks techniques for identifying, classifying, and managing groups sorted by levels of dangerousness' (1994: 180). Lee and Stenson add, that public spaces today, 'consist of the myriad ways in which populations and spaces are investigated, classified and formulated as objects and concerns for government' (2007: 4).

It can be said that this creates division within communities as it establishes the idea of 'them' versus 'us'. 'Within the articles themselves, the targets of surveillance were specifically Othered; through linguistic strategies that separate them; from the rest of us'(McCahill & Flynn, 2014: 32).

Similarly, the Stasi co-opted, forced and encouraged its citizens to watch each other on an unprecedented scale. By 1988, the Stasi had over 90,000 full-time Stasi operatives and a further 105,000 informers. Its extensive network of agents permeated all spheres and institutions of daily life, from psychiatric clinics to the judicial system. This sense of an all-seeing, all-watching surveillance state acted as an instrument of control over its citizens. Department V oversaw these operations; its main function was to identify dissension, halt resistance activities and expel or jail political opponents. The mandatory denunciation law, which had its roots in the statutes of the Socialist Unity Party, made failure to denounce fellow citizens a crime that could result in a jail term of up to five years.

Gathering intelligence in Northern Ireland was more challenging than it was in GDR. This was due to the inherent suspicion of close-knit communities about those conducting surveillance activities. The bulk of intelligence information was obtained through on the ground visible, overt sources, such as stop and searches, indiscriminate house raids, and curfews. This enabled the British Army to compile profiles of people's familial and political associations. It was also able to identify 'visitors' and those who appeared out of place.

As, Zurawski has noted, 'citizens of Northern Ireland have been far more conscious of the presence of surveillance cameras for longer than those in the rest of the United Kingdom' (2005: 499).

3. Personal instrument: technique – infiltration

The infiltration of civic groups has been used extensively for centuries as governments sought to control dissent and restore order. In the case of both Northern Ireland and East Germany, this tactic was used frequently both to gather information and to identify targets. The infiltration of civic communities became so great in Eastern Germany that it had the effect of inflating dissident groups' membership base: 'The issue is further complicated by the paradox that there were so many IM's (Informal Collaborators) it actually helped the opposition movement, partly simply by swelling its ranks, but also by actively working on opposition activities'. (Miller, 1997:194).

In his book *The Firm*, Bruce interviews Matthias Piekert, a former Stasi informant, who provides an insider perspective into this fixation with IMs: '[T]his

obsession with informants and their reports was the greatest weakness of the Stasi: it led to poor quality reports on the population and distracted from duties of safeguarding economic and military sites' (2010:63).

In Northern Ireland, the practice of infiltration was more targeted and tactical as opposed to a wide spread invasive strategy used in East Germany. Nonetheless, the techniques for coercing people into becoming informants and the undercover operations that took place within terrorist organisations were similar to those used in the GDR. That said, during The Troubles infiltration and surveillance techniques were used by all sides. The PIRA (Provisional Irish Republican Army) and UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force) used surveillance to determine potential targets for terrorist operations and to obtain tactical knowledge of the enemy. For the British Army, surveillance was a necessary technique to identify imminent terrorist threats; however, the surveillance operations were primarily focused on the Catholic community. As Bamford remarks:

> In some cases, the security forces recruited young Catholic males in their early teens and persuaded them to join the PIRA (Provisional Irish Republican Army). Urban estimated that between 1976 and 1987, the security forces received information from approximately 50 informers. Penetrating the group at a number of levels had several benefits, the most important being that if one agent was compromised, others (unknown to him or her) would remain in place. (2005:592)

British Security forces also allowed attacks to go ahead and even mounted terror attacks themselves, the Miami Showband massacre being one high profile example. This raises huge ethical questions about the role the army played in instigating terrorist campaigns, which further ignited violence on both sides. Writing in 1977, Paul Wilkinson observed that a 'dangerous consequence of a large and ill-controlled secret intelligence and subversion apparatus is that it may end up recruiting assassins and 'dirty tricks' operators for special assignments', adding that the danger was that the organisation could get 'out of control' (Wilkinson, 1977:136).

4. Tools and technologies: technique – a. innovative technologies

We are more aware today than ever before of how the use of innovative surveillance technologies has infiltrated our daily lives, from the

commodification of our web searches that lead us to online purchases that algorithms 'think' we should make, to tracking devices on our phones that can reunite us with them with a click of a button. This surveillance has bled into our streets with the evolution of CCTV cameras. Many of us are unaware that we are under the constant watch of security forces as soon as we enter our city centres.

As Pat O'Malley and Steven Hutchinson suggest, 'In a host of mundane ways using innocuous or covert devices such as railings, cameras, gates and signposts, authorities were 'invisibly' channelling people into orderly and conforming behaviour, focusing not so much on disciplining individuals but on regulating mass distributions and flows' (2007: 373).

In their study *Surveillance, Capital and Resistance*, McCahill and Flynn imply that media reporting reaffirms the belief that through innovative new technologies we are being watched in a similar fashion to people living in East Germany and Northern Ireland during the 1970s and '80s: 'Within these articles surveillance technologies act as tools to reveal that they are among us'(2014: 30).

The technological innovations used by the Stasi in East Germany have been well documented, ranging from breaking into and bugging the apartments of opposition leaders to the use of sophisticated listening and recording devices planted in obscure places. As Anna Funder describes in *Stasiland*, the Stasi deployed technical innovations with great success:

> A flower pot, a watering can, a petrol canister, and a car door, all with cameras of varying sizes hidden in them. Examples of these include a thermos with a microphone in its lid, a hiking jacket with a camera sewn into the lapel pocket, and an apparatus like a television antenna that could pick up conversations 50 meters away in other buildings or while you were in your car stopped at lights.(Funder, 2003: 71)

These tactics were subtle and often implemented 'under the radar' so that the community remained largely unaware of them. Despite rumours of mass surveillance, they remained difficult to prove. The constant perception of being watched acted as a deliberate psychological strategy designed to instill fear and mobilise control.

This situation differed considerably from the strategy used in Northern Ireland, where the main purpose of surveillance was allegedly to restore social order in the face of increasing violence. However, for many it was seen as a bold

statement of 'you are occupied', 'we are in control'. By making technology visible to the civilian population, such as with CCTV cameras and patrol cars, people were very much aware that they were being observed. They were, therefore, less willing to risk punishment by causing trouble in those areas that were obviously being watched. It should be noted that, at the beginning of the Troubles, the focus of surveillance was on predominantly Catholic communities with nationalist leanings, thus further inflamed tensions.

In a study on the use of intelligence in Northern Ireland, Bamford gives a detailed picture of the technologies used:

> The system included: the use of helicopters for border surveillance; the introduction of the Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) to patrol and to man covert observation posts in South Armagh; the use of 'Listeners' and 'Watchers' along with 'bugging' devices in most public places; as well as the capability of more intrusive methods, such as planting 'bugging' devices in specified targets' homes and vehicles. (2005: 594)

4. Tools and technologies: technique – b. data collection

With the advent of the digital age, we are now at a crossroads in terms of surveillance. Governments now have the ability to access our information through a variety of technological innovations, with little or no protection or transparency for citizens in terms of how this information is used. As Parsons maintains, 'intersubjective-based privacy model registers that aggregated metadata can be deeply harmful to a given person's or community's interests and even provoke individuals to retreat based on fears of potential discrimination' (2015: 6).

However, O'Malley and Hutchinson see this new 'data-veillance' as an important innovation from a crime-prevention perspective:

> Whereas the collection of crime data had previously been linked primarily to issues of the social causes of crime, in new developments they were being used to inform the identification of risk factors, typified by the practice of situational crime prevention. In place of evidence on 'broken homes', 'anomie' or 'zones of transition' – with their implications for social justice concerns – the new statistical evidence related to security, to the identification of criminogenic situations. (2007: 374)

Similar traits of this new move towards modern data collection practices can be seen in methods used to accumulate the notorious Stasi files. The pervasive

nature and extent of the data collection resulted in a paper legacy of 178 kilometres of filed material. The information contained in these files came from reports, direct contacts with targets and mail interception practices. Since 1991, Stasi victims have had access to their files, which has led to their discovery that close personal friends and family had been Stasi informants. By allowing access to these files, victims of Stasi now have full discloser of any surveillance operation carried out on them or their families by the orders of the state. This has had a beneficial impact in helping unified Germany move forward in the process of truth and reconciliation. In Northern Ireland by contrast, lack of transparency and accountability has seen many family's awaiting justice for their loved ones for decades.

Much of the information gathered in the Stasi files detailed the banal, day-to-day lives of targeted individuals. The sheer volume of information often led to inaccurate and incompetent analysis of the targets, as Barbara Miller suggests: 'IM's were engaged in the amassing of vast amounts of often seemingly trivial pieces of information which could potentially be used in the operative Zersetzung (decomposition, corrosion, undermining) of the enemy' (1997:18).

In Northern Ireland, data collection methods of surveillance can be understood from Bamford's analysis of the British Army's land operations, heavily influenced by Britain's colonial past: 'good observation, constant patrolling and the quick passage of information' were considered relatively simple ways to acquire background information. According to Keith Maguire, those activities enabled the army to build 'a street-by-street and family-by-family analysis of the no-go areas' (2005: 587). It is interesting to note that the document Bamford used for his analysis was intended for military operations but the tactics were applied to policing strategy used against the citizens of Northern Ireland.

Solove argues that this intrusion into the personal sphere through bulk data collection leads people to become virtual prisoners: 'Such supportive relations, networks, and forms of life are denied to persons and populations subject to persistent and pervasive surveillance; the collection and retention of personal information can cause people to become prisoners of their recorded pasts and lead to deliberate attempts to shape how their pasts will be remembered' (2008: 746). Unlike the days of literal wiretapping, when authorities needed human agents to listen in, digital intelligence is today an agent in its own right.

5. Physical instruments: technique – border security

There is no more comprehensive way of keeping people under surveillance than by controlling and restricting their movements. With the current influx of refugees and migrant workers, there is increasing pressure on government agencies to control borders. Border control is fast becoming a tool to control the flow of citizens while marking out others for surveillance. Schuilenburg highlights the significant role that space and flow represents to current policing strategy: 'The increased significance of "the space of flows" advocates… a different organisation of police function. Now taking the disappearance of borders and high mobility as a starting point, the police will have to pay more attention to flows and locations where flows converge, the so called nodes.' (2015: 34). It can be argued that, given the importance placed on this aspect of securitisation, instead of disappearing, borders are remerging not only as a political tool such as with the Brexit negotiations but also one used to combat potential terrorist threats. The Trump election campaign for example, clearly demonstrated how rhetoric focused on terrorism can be used to mobilise discourses around the issue of border security. It ignores the fact that most terror threats are internal not external.

Zizek suggests that this type of control disproportionally affects those individuals seen as a risk due to the increased use of profiling by security forces. Those with both economic and cultural capital are thus oblivious to the impact this has on those targeted. Profiling like surveillance leaves vulnerable citizens open to hostile scrutiny.

> On the one hand the cosmopolitan upper and middle class academic, always with the proper visa enabling him to cross borders without any problems in order to carry out his (financial academic…….) business and thus able to 'enjoy the difference'; on the other hand, the poor (im)migrant worker driven from his home by poverty or (ethnic religious) violence for whom the celebrated hybridality designates a very tangible traumatic experience never being able to settle down properly and legalize his status (Zizek, 1999: 220).

In East Germany (GDR) during the 1950s, one-quarter of the population decided to emigrate to West Germany. In response, the Berlin Wall was erected to stop this enormous flow, which was proving catastrophic to the fragile economy.

Special restrictions were imposed along the East German–West German border, which regulated the movements of those living in the GDR. Through visas, passports and other difficult-to-navigate documentation, the border police could track citizens' movements, whom they were visiting and the purposes of their visits. The state security used maximum force along the border wall, which resulted in the deaths of 825 people killed trying to flee: 'East Germany had become a giant prison. Those still trying to get out risked being blown to bits by landmines and automatic artillery devices along the western border. Border guards had orders to fire on anyone trying to scale the wall' (O' Koehler, 1999: 374). Similar parallels can be seen today as borders are increasingly closed in order to curb what many refer to as the emerging migrant crisis in Europe.

In Northern Ireland, the building of walls was subtler, completed over a longer period with the main purpose of separating the two polarised communities. However, the walls had the added benefit of controlling people's movements into and out of certain areas. This control of movement helped the army build profiles of suspect individuals augmenting the intelligence that had already been gathered. The ironically named 'peace walls' have come to be seen as a symbol of the Troubles, a barrier to integration and a contentious issue that further fuelled suspicion on both sides.

Conclusion

While the era of the modern surveillance state provides many with a sense of security, some fear that the danger lies in the potential for local communities to be exclusively governed in the name of security. Marc Schuilenburg suggests that '[t]he punishment of harmful behaviour is only important when it leads to a reduction of risk' (2015: 37).

The two kinds of techniques have been identified by Von Hirsch and Shearing. The first is based on personal profiling where '[i]t is assumed that certain individuals have specific characteristics that indicate a heightened risk of criminal behaviour. The second technique, based on exclusion, 'is directed towards rebuffing of people who have been already convicted of violating certain rules' (Hirsch & Shearing, 2000: 162). These two techniques hold within them the possibility of creating a disenfranchised population due to increased use of police profiling. It can be argued this was the case in Northern Ireland, where the

Catholic population was seen as the potential threat. In East Germany, on the other hand, every citizen who spoke out in defiance of the state was seen and looked on with suspicion; in other words, everyone was a potential target.

When looking at the context in Northern Ireland and East Germany, surveillance had the same aim of rooting out all opposition and controlling dissent and dissonance by voluntary or forced compliance: 'The function of the secret police in such regimes is not only to root out opposition and discourage dissent but to regulate the political and moral conduct of both ordinary citizens and functionaries of the state' (Pfaff, 2001:400). While in Northern Ireland secret police were not prevalent, the British Army carried out a similar function.

In both cases, Northern Ireland and East Germany, surveillance became part of day-to-day life. Its presence became a normalised and accepted intrusion into the private sphere of its citizens. However, as Stephen Pfaff suggests in his piece on the limits of surveillance, this acceptance of surveillance is not guaranteed long-term, as can be seen in the historical experiences of Northern Ireland and Eastern Germany: 'Such a regime may secure compliance so long as its power seems unassailable, but once its authority is threatened it may suddenly experience a revolt that is a more accurate reflection of the popular sentiments' (2001: 21). Pfaff also provides a stark warning to governing powers, noting that '[f]or the most part, policymakers should focus on past examples of harm, but they should not ignore undeniable indicators of future harm' (Pfaff, 2001: 21).

As Christopher Parsons emphasises in *Beyond Privacy*, in a world where all our communications have the possibility of coming under surveillance, 'The crux of the argument is that pervasive mass surveillance erodes essential boundaries between public and private spheres by compromising populations' abilities to freely communicate with one another and, in the process, erodes the integrity of democratic processes and institutions' (2015: 1).

Taking these case studies as examples, we can gain insight into how modern-day surveillance techniques can impact our society. It is worth noting that the chairwoman of the US Federal Trade Commission Edith Ramirez warned in her keynote speech at the Consumer Electronics Show that, in the near future, 'Many, if not most, aspects of our everyday lives will leave a digital trail [that] will present a deeply personal and startlingly complete picture of each of us –

one that includes details about our financial circumstances, our health, our religious preferences and our family and friends' (Ramirez, 2015).

We must be cognizant in a world that is overwhelmed by the perception of the imminent terrorist attack this fear is not exploited by the state to exert its control over citizens. As David Lyons warns, 'the idea of exploiting uncertainty in the observed as a way of ensuring their subordination has obvious resonance with current electronic technologies that permit highly unobtrusive monitoring of data subjects in a variety of social contexts' (Lyon, 1993: 655).

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