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WINNING PUBLIC HEARTS AND MINDS: SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT AID  
IN THE 21ST CENTURY

by

Mohammad Ashraf

A Dissertation  
Submitted to the Graduate School,  
the College of Arts and Sciences  
and the School of Social Science and Global Studies  
at The University of Southern Mississippi  
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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December 2019

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## ABSTRACT

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States, foreign aid has focused on winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient states as a hedge against insecurity and means to achieve progress in the “war on terror.” Western donors, especially the United States, argue foreign aid is an effective tool to expand government capacity and control over territory, win public hearts and minds, and ultimately mitigate the need and significant military costs of deployment to counter insecurity, extremism, and terrorism in weak, fragile and failing states.

This dissertation uses case studies to explore the unique relationship between foreign aid and winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries of Afghanistan (2001-2017), Iraq (2003-2017), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-2017), and Kosovo (1999-2017). This research uses data from surveys and public opinion polls conducted by reliable national and international organizations in the four cases under consideration in order to address two research questions. First, does foreign aid increase positive public attitudes toward the donor(s) of the foreign aid in an aid recipient country? Second, does foreign aid increase positive public attitudes toward the state in an aid recipient country? The research findings suggest foreign aid is not positively associated with an increase in positive public attitudes toward the donors and the aid recipient states and has fallen short of winning public hearts and minds in these four cases. These findings, however, do not suggest that foreign aid is not a viable tool in winning public hearts and minds toward the state, donors and the “war on terror” in the aid recipient states, but should be seen rather as an evaluation of the current state of knowledge, peace and state building measures and should guide scholarly debate and

policy on exploring alternative approaches to state and peacebuilding outside the existing top-down approaches. Implications for policymakers and development practitioners are that state legitimacy, service delivery, winning post-conflict peace, and political corruption influence public positive and negative attitudes and winning public hearts and minds toward the state and donors in aid recipient states.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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I am extremely grateful to Susan, my wife, and my three beautiful children, Hamza, Bilal, and Zaid, who provide unending inspiration and always cheer me up. Thank you so very much for all the love and support and for being so understanding during the course of this project, especially when things looked difficult. My success and the completion of this dissertation may not have been possible without the love, unfailing support, and continues encouragement and nurturing of Susan. Your unconditional love

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I owe a lot to my parents, who helped me and believed in me throughout my personal and academic life and installed in me early on the love of learning, hard work, and patience during hardships, all of which made my success and the completion of this dissertation possible. They taught me to study hard and give priority in my life to the quest for knowledge. I deeply miss my parents, who are not with me to share this joy and accomplishment.

Above all, I am thankful to Almighty God for guiding me to the right path and granting me the talent, wisdom, health, and strength to undertake this research and complete it. Without His blessings, my success and the completion of this dissertation would not have been possible.

## DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Haji Mohammad Naim Khan and Haji Bibi Hajira, for their unwavering love, support, and encouragement over the years.

نورھیش را سره نشته ستا یا دونه راسره دی    راشه واوره د زره چیغی فریا دونه را سره دی



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## CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION

Donors provide aid to underdeveloped nations for a variety of reasons. The reasons could be wholly altruistic (Berthelemy 2006; Hoeffler and Outram 2011), to advance foreign policy objectives (Dreher et al. 2008; Dreher et al. 2011; Vreeland 2011) and/or a combination of need-based objectives to alleviate poverty, underdevelopment, and human sufferings and interest-based objectives driven by the donors' foreign policy concerns and motivations (McKinley and Little 1979; Claessens et al. 2009; Hoeffler and Outram 2011). However, since the Al Qaeda terrorist organization's attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, national security and fighting terrorism have been the major driving forces of foreign aid by Western donors, in general, and the United States, in particular (Woods 2005; Owusu 2007; Azam and Thelen 2010; Bandyopadhyay et al. 2011; Boutton 2014). Donors use foreign aid as a tool to address the economic, political, institutional, and demographic factors that underlay inequality, state weakness (lack of capacity or will to provide effective and efficient public goods) and state failure (an inability to provide public goods). Inequality, be it political, economic, social, or ethnic, leads to grievances, which fosters insurgency, civil war, extremism, and terrorism (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013). As Burgoon (2006, 177) notes,

...social welfare policies—including social security, unemployment, and health and education spending—affect preferences and capacities of social actors in ways that, on balance, discourage terrorism: by reducing poverty, inequality, and socioeconomic insecurity, thereby diminishing incentives to commit or tolerate terrorism, and by weakening extremist political and religious organizations and practice that provide economic and cognitive security where public safety nets are lacking.

Howard (2016, 4) writes that “bad neighbors often makes for bad neighborhoods.” He argues that extremist and terrorist organizations find weak, fragile, failing, and failed states attractive not only because of the absence of a functioning government and security forces, but also because of the recruitment potential. Since such states lack the ability or political will to project power or enforce law and order, they provide opportunity for warlords, insurgents, extremists, and terrorist organizations and/or leaders to set up their bases of operations, generate revenue, recruit and train insurgents and/or terrorists, and offer false promises and logic to justify violence against their own people and the international community. As Reinold (2011, 249) writes, “the most striking feature of the failed state is the virtual absence of effective government. State failure signifies a return to the conditions of the state of nature—in which the security dilemma arises anew. Physical security becomes a commodity that is traded on a market run by private actors such as mercenaries, warlords, and militias.” With respect to the case of Syria in particular, President Barack H. Obama on March 22, 2013, stated,

I am very concerned about Syria becoming an enclave for extremists, because extremists thrive in chaos. They thrive in failed states. They thrive in power vacuums. They don't have much to offer when it comes to actually building things, but they're very good about exploiting situations that are no longer functioning. They fill that gap...And that's why I think it's so important for us to work as an international community to accelerate a political transition that is viable so that a Syrian state continues to function, so that the basic institutions can be rebuilt, that they're not destroyed beyond recognition, that we are avoiding what inevitably becomes sectarian divisions, because by definition if you're an extremist, then you don't have a lot of tolerance for people who don't share your beliefs (Lucas, CNS News, March 22, 2013).

Since the 9/11 attacks, Western donors in general and the United States in particular have used foreign aid to not only address the underlying conditions that may lead to insurgencies driven by Islamist extremism but also to win public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries by publicizing foreign aid based on their established aid branding and publicity mandates. For example, the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 641, requires that all foreign aid and programs under the Foreign Assistance Act be identified overseas as “American Aid” and all foreign assistance activities branded in the host countries as “From the American People” (USAID, Branding 2016). Similarly, the U.K. government and Department for International Development (DFID) require that all U.K. assistance be identified in aid recipient countries as “UK Aid” and branded as “From the British People.” Recent experiences from Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and other countries have resulted in consensus among Western policymakers and practitioners that greater synergy between defense, diplomacy, and development (3D) is required for sustainable development and counterinsurgency in conflict societies. As a result, terms such as “3D approach,” “whole of government approach,” “comprehensive approach,” “holistic approach” and others are used to acknowledge security and development efforts are intertwined and cannot be approached separately (Hrychuk 2009). The 3D approach is “the *method* of combining varying assets [of defense, diplomacy, and development] to be used in dealing with failed and failing states” (Hrychuk 2009, 830). Constantinou and Opondo (2015, 9) writes, “...the integrated use of diplomacy, development and defense, along with intelligence, law enforcement,

and economic tools of statecraft are essential for advancing national and common interests, and for maintaining US stewardship of the international system.”

Donors argue publicizing foreign aid (disseminating information to public in the aid recipient country about the identity, financial commitment, sponsorship, and implementation of development programs and projects in coordination with local state and institutions by a donor) improves their image and leads to feelings of appreciation, gratitude, and positive attitudes and behaviors among the public in the aid recipient country toward the donor and their own state, which makes it easy to implement the development programs and defeat insurgency and terrorism (USAID 2016). The main argument regarding the relationship between foreign aid and winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient country revolves around the fact that individuals and societies recognize and reward positive acts with positive attitudes and behaviors consistent with *gift exchange* and *social exchange* theories, which argue that individual behaviors are contingent on the behaviors and actions of others (Falk 2007; Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005). Fehr and Gächter (2000, 159) write, “a man ought to be a friend to his friend and repay gift with gift. People should meet smiles with smiles and lie with treachery. There is considerable evidence that a substantial fraction of people behave according to this dictum: people repay gifts and take revenge even in interaction with complete strangers and even if it is costly for them and *yields neither present nor future material rewards.*” Foreign aid wins hearts and minds by reciprocally changing attitudes and behaviors among members of the public toward their own state and donors in the aid recipient country. Positive attitudes and behaviors among the public in the aid recipient country toward a donor(s) lead to greater security and stronger political, economic, and social

relations between the donor(s) and the aid recipient nation(s), resulting in a win-win situation. Positive attitudes and behaviors among the public in the aid recipient country toward their own state lead to greater public confidence in the state and participation in and support for the development programs and projects, resulting in greater state legitimacy and control of society, both of which are important for sustainable development (Banfield 1958; Migdal 1988; Huntington 1993; Putnam et al. 1993; Kohli 2004; Huntington 2006) and fighting terrorism (Schneider 2015).

The purpose of this dissertation is to explore whether or not foreign aid wins public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries. More precisely, it addresses the following research questions and assesses the extent of the validity of the corresponding central arguments:

- 1) Does foreign aid increase positive public attitudes toward the donor(s) of the foreign aid in the aid recipient country?

In the aftermath of the 9/11 events, the United States and the rest of the Western donors have emphasized that winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries is a key to winning the war against extremism and terrorism and defeating insurgencies. Donors argue foreign aid wins public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries toward the donor(s) of the aid and branding is an effective tool in these efforts. The channel through which foreign aid is argued to win public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries is threefold:

1. Behavior follows attitudes—by changing attitudes, we can change behavior.
2. People are rationale calculating actors-- they support whatever side provides them more benefits—goods and services that they need and improve their lives.

3. Thus, foreign aid wins public hearts and minds through the delivery of reconstruction and development programs and projects, the provision of the public goods and services, which raises positive public attitudes and behaviors toward the donor of the aid and the opportunity cost of engaging in, participating in, or supporting insurgency and extremism in the aid recipient countries--in appreciation for the goods and services delivered through the implementation of foreign-funded development programs and projects, citizens in the aid recipient countries demonstrate support for, trust in, and positive attitudes and behaviors toward the donor(s), which makes recruiting difficult and drives extremist and terrorist organizations out of business.

2) Does foreign aid increase positive public attitudes toward the state in the aid recipient country?

Donors also argue by working closely with the government(s) or working through the government(s) in the design and delivery of reconstruction and development programs and projects, foreign aid wins public hearts and minds and boosts the trust and confidence of citizens in their government and the capacity and legitimacy of the state in the aid recipient countries. When people see their government works closely with a foreign donor(s), seen as a benevolent partner, in the delivery of goods and services that they need and positively change their day-today life, they demonstrate positive attitudes and behaviors toward their own government and the foreign donor, which raises the opportunity cost of supporting of and/or engaging in insurgency and extremism against their own government

and the foreign donor for lasting security, peace and prosperity in the developing and developed nations.

For the purpose of this dissertation, foreign aid is taken to mean humanitarian and/or development aid given by a donor to a recipient nation(s). Winning hearts and minds is taken to mean a positive change in the attitudes of the public in the aid recipient countries toward the donor of the aid and their own state.

The dissertation assesses the extent of the validity of the above two hypotheses and their corresponding central arguments by examining the cases of Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo. Some characteristics that link all four cases are the U.S. and broader Western military intervention and continuing military and institutional presences and roles in the provision and distribution of foreign aid and the development of economic and political institutions. Such factors often reflect American and Western European values as much or more than local and national domestic ones. These four cases provide an opportunity to examine the link between foreign aid and winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries, which has a major policy implication on how foreign aid is allocated, implemented, and securitized by the donor nations. This study is important for the following reasons:

1. In the aftermath of 9/11, Western nations generally and the United States specifically have focused foreign aid on promoting development, democracy and winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries in its fight against extremism and terrorism, whether rooted in economic, ethnic, ideological and/or religious factors (Aldrich 2014). The fight against extremism and terrorism have

also involved expensive military interventions and preemptive wars and state-building operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as extensive efforts to instill liberal democratic practices, values, and norms among nations that are seen to be lacking in these and posing security threat to the United States and the international system. As a result, new policy choices, alliances, and foreign aid need and assessment policies and practices are put in place to ensure security and the global war against terrorism is won. However, winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries is at the heart of winning the war against extremism and terrorism. This is due to the fact that grievances lead to insurgency, extremism, and terrorism, which, in turn, produce insecurity (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013). Extremist and terrorist organizations and networks exploit the existing economic factors and political grievances in the Muslim world against the West, in general, and against the United States, in particular, (especially, the US foreign policy toward the Muslim nations) to promote their ideology and views, justify hatred and intolerance, and to recruit and justify the use of violence (Allan et al. 2015; Cherney and Hartley 2015; Selim 2016; Mirahmadi 2016). Thus, assessing the link between foreign aid and winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries is important both from policy and practical point of view. Testing the validity of the foreign aid in winning public hearts and minds hypothesis would inform policymakers and development practitioners to make the necessary changes in policy and practice to ensure the effectiveness of foreign aid in



winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries and the global war against extremism and terrorism is on target.

2. Local support and perception are crucial for the success of sustainable peacebuilding and development efforts, in general, but more so in post-conflict societies, which are highly polarized and citizens within these societies are highly critical, distrustful, and suspicious of foreign driven reforms. In post-conflict societies, divisions within societies mean that public perceptions of marginalization, victimization, preference, and merit are heightened so that a reform that a foreign donor and the local state see as an effective solution might be seen by local citizens or groups in the society as a case of prejudice, aggression, interference, or and inequality. Such perceptions, in turn, can lead to violence and insurgency against the foreign-led efforts, reforms, donor nations, and the local state. The Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan is an excellent example. The U.S.-led development efforts in Afghanistan since 2001 have contributed to the Taliban insurgency, resulting in insecurity, human loss, and failure of the desired outcome. The Taliban sees the U.S.-led broader Western efforts of state-building in Afghanistan as an act of foreign invasion, hegemony and interference in the domestic affairs of the country. Thus, perception defines reality and contending realities define the success of sustainable peace and public reaction to foreign-led efforts and aid. Sustainable development cannot be achieved without full support and participation of the local citizens at the local level, which is essential for linking aid and development, strengthening governance, improving livelihoods, and fighting extremism and terrorism

(Mansuri and Rao 2013; Ghai and Vivian 2014; Curini and et al. 2014). Onuoha (2014, 1) writes "...poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and weak family structures make or contribute to making young men vulnerable to radicalization. Itinerant preachers capitalize on the situation by preaching an extreme version of religious teachings and conveying a narrative of the government as weak and corrupt. Armed groups such as Boko Haram can then recruit and train youth for activities ranging from errand running to suicide bombings." By understanding the link and role of foreign aid in winning public perceptions, hearts, and minds, we would be able to better understand the cycle of action and response to counter the causes of underdevelopment and violence.

3. The United States and its Western allies have invested considerable blood and treasure in overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the regime of President Saddam Hussein in Iraq and replacing them with new regimes and political, economic, and social systems that promote the rule of law, equality, economic development, and respect for international order and system. The goal in both cases has been to create sustainable democracies and stable states free from Islamist extremism. However, how a political system comes into existence or how the development and democratization process is initiated and perceived by citizens have an important implication for the legitimacy of the political system as well as the development and the democratization process (Boix and Stokes 2007). Sustainable economic, political, and social development requires a positive link between state and society—state provides public goods to society (such as legitimate rule, economic opportunity, welfare, and security, to name a few) and

society, in return, accepts state's rules and provides feedback for improving the quality and functionality of the state consistent with the needs and aspirations of the society (Banfield 1958). In other words, state legitimacy, defined here to mean that citizens accept the rule and authority of the state as true and right out of conviction, not fear or personal advantage (Migdal 1988), is derived from the interaction of the state with society, as an active and organized social group, allows the state to control and mobilize citizens on behalf of the public cause. Tadjbakhsh and Schoiswohl (265, 2008) write, "legitimacy is key to building sustainable peace, and this legitimacy comes not from the timetable of donors with blueprints of postconflict reconstruction, but from the points of view of the population." Specifically, whether or not citizens perceive the state as legitimate and accept its authority and rules determine not only the success and sustainability of the state and the democracy and development initiatives, but it also determines the success of the war on extremism. Assessing the link between foreign aid and winning public hearts and minds in aid recipient countries toward the foreign donors and the local state would have important policy and practical implications for the allocation of foreign aid, implementation of development and democratization initiatives, state legitimacy, and winning the "war on terror."

Western donors also use foreign aid to counter the powerful *narratives* promoted and presented by extremist organizations and networks to promote their ideology and particular view of the world by presenting the world events in such a way to portray that the West is in ongoing war with Islam and Muslims, which has made some headway among younger generations of Muslims (Khan 2013). Narratives are not the

presentation of facts, but the explanation and presentation of circumstances that tell how facts came into existence (Al Raffie 2012; Briggs and Sebastien 2013; Schmid 2014).

The extremist organizations and networks have masterfully built and based their narratives on the persistent existence of pitiful political and socioeconomic inequality and injustice, lack of direction and hope in daily life for ordinary citizens, and underdevelopment that exist in most Muslim countries to blame the West and its support for abusive authoritarian regimes and leaders. The narrative that West is against Islam and Muslims has a long history. However, it came to the forefront after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in the aftermath of the 9/11 events. While various ideological, economic, political, and social factors lead a young man, for example in Iraq, Afghanistan or Nigeria, to engage in extremist behaviors and activities, extremist organizations and networks use *narratives* to advance their ideology and influence the attitudes and behaviors of young men and women, to join their ranks and engage in violent actions. Terrorist and extremist organizations ingrain narratives with cultural, historical, social, and religious aspects of a society to make them more appealing, an essential part of an individual's identity, and to win the support, hearts and minds of people. Since the 9/11 political, military, and development scholars, policymakers and practitioners have advanced a sophisticated analytical framework of terrorism. The counter-terrorism strategy of the West, in general, and the United States's, in particular, has been to defeat extremists and terrorists in the battlefield, destroy their safe heavens, financial means and training camps, and to take away their *lifeline*—public support—by winning public hearts and minds through the development aid. After the death of Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011, the counter-terrorism strategy of the West and the United

States clearly understands that the global war on terror cannot be won only by defeating or killing the leaders of the extremist and terrorist organizations, but winning the public hearts and minds in the nations where extremists and terrorists operate. Since 9/11 foreign aid has been used as a policy tool to counter the opportunity costs and benefits of engaging in terrorist and/or extremist activities and behaviors around the world. The argument is that foreign aid provides adequate incentives for governments to aggressively fight terrorism and extremism within their territories and for public to withdraw their support for terrorism and extremism in order to maximize the benefits of foreign aid and development programs and projects (Azam and Delcroix 2006; Azam and Thelen 2008; Fearon James D. and et al. 2009; Azam and Thelen 2010; Steinwand 2015).

Complex Ideological, economics, and sociopolitical factors make or contribute to extremism and terrorism (Williams et al. 2016). While military and law enforcement has a role to play in fighting extremism and terrorism home and abroad, winning public hearts and minds plays a prominent role in winning the “war on terror” (Rajapaksa and Dundes 2006; Beath et al. 2016; USAID 2016). As a first study of its kind, examining the link and role of foreign aid in winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient nations would provide potential learning points about structuring or re-structuring foreign aid and development programs and projects to reflect prevailing local development and security needs and confronting insecurity, extremism, and terrorism consistent with donor’s policy and military objectives. Examining the validity of the widely held hypothesis that foreign aid, as a soft power, wins public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries, which, in turn, wins consent for the presence of foreign troops,

support for local government, and development and security measures is important given the securitization of foreign aid in the aftermath of the 9/11 events.

Chapter 1 provided a very basic introduction as to why developed countries provide foreign aid to underdeveloped nations and discussed the conditionality of foreign aid to winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries as a hedge against insecurity, extremism, and terrorism in the aftermath of the 9/11 events. By way of introduction, Chapter 2 provides a review of the related literature and Chapter 3 discusses the design and methodology of the study. Chapter 4 presents the data and findings and Chapter 5 provides data analysis and discussion. Chapter 6 presents the analysis of survey results and examines the link between foreign aid and positive public attitudes toward foreign donors and the state in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo and answers the research questions. Concluding remarks are presented in Chapter 7.

## CHAPTER II – REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE

By far, the most common causes of civil wars and terrorism are state weakness, fragile, and, ultimately, failure. Weak and fragile states (states that lack capacity or will to provide effective and efficient public services) and failing and failed states (states that can no longer provide public services) are the breeding ground for human sufferings, crimes, drugs, disease, environmental degradation, insecurity, civil wars, and terrorism (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2007; Coggins 2014; Hendrix and Young 2014; Rolandsen 2015). While there are disagreement and debate among scholars regarding the definitions of weak, fragile, failing, and failed states, there is a consensus among scholars that such entities are the single most important problem facing the international order and community in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Fukuyama 2004; Patrick 2006; Newman 2009). The most recent cases of state failure growing out of intrastate conflicts are Yemen (2015-present), Syria (2011-present), Libya (2011-present), Iraq (2003-present), Afghanistan (2001-present), Kosovo (1998-1999), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995).

This literature review is organized as follows. First, the literature review defines and discusses weak, fragile, and failing states in general and focuses on Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, and Iraq in particular and presents the challenges and responses of the international community and the United States to state weakness, fragility and failure in the aftermath of the 9/11 events. Against this background, the review discusses foreign aid and changes in its focus and objectives, who gets what and why, and the United States' approach to state failure, development, and security—typically characterized as a “with us vs. against us” approach. Finally, the review

discusses donors' emphasis on winning public hearts and minds in aid recipient nations and the overall effects of foreign aid on governance and public in the four cases of Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo. In doing so, the review identifies the critical shift toward securitization of foreign aid and donors' emphasis on winning public hearts and minds in aid recipient nations as a hedge against insecurity, extremism, and terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 and gaps in extant research.

### *Weak, Fragile, and Failing States*

Burnell and Randall (2005, 391) define “weak states” as “...states lacking the capability to penetrate society fully, regulate social relations, extract and distribute resources, or implement policies and plans” and “failed states” as states that can no longer perform these essential functions, which are the foundation of legitimacy and success of a state. Fragile states are “ineffective” or “poor performing” states—states that are unable or unwilling to effectively utilize both domestic and international resources to deliver essential public goods and services to their citizens (Stewart and Brown 2010; Patrick 2011).

For development practitioners and policymakers, the state plays a central role in the delivery of essential public goods and services defined here as the rule of law, security, economic opportunity, basic human services, and political participation either directly or indirectly by setting rules. Security, especially human security, is by far the most important public good, of all other goods and services, that a state provides, which according to Tilly (1992) was the reason for the emergence of the modern state in the 16th and 17th century Europe. The Peace Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 not only ended



the 30-year war between Protestants and Catholics and put Europe on the path to peace and prosperity, but it also (especially the three core points of the Treaty—the principle of state sovereignty, the principle of equality of states, and the principle of non-intervention of one state in the affairs of another state) placed state sovereignty at the forefront of international relations and has continued to serve as a foundation for the international system and the system of modern nation-state that we have today (Croxtton 1999). Olson (1993) argues that the provision of internal and external security is the very foundation for the emergence of popular state and democracy; and Wantchekon and Neeman (2002) write that citizens accept state’s monopoly of power and control of society in return for providing sociopolitical order that protects them against “banditry” and expropriation to realize the full fruits of their investment. It is therefore not surprising that the rise and fall of a state and its legitimacy in the minds and hearts of its citizens and the international community is based on its ability and will to deliver public services to its citizens. Many scholars argue that for establishing security, the rule of law, economic, political, and social development, and democratic political institutions, a legitimate and functioning state is the prerequisite (Fukuyama 2004; Kohli 2004; Kraxberger 2007; Zoellick 2008; Collmer 2013). Failure to deliver public services, especially security, leads to a loss of legitimacy, civil war, and international conflict, which can destabilize the state, neighbors, and the international community (Feil 2002; Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg, and Dunn 2012; Arslan et al. 2015). The most recent examples of weak, fragile, and failing states are Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, all of which have had regional and international security and destabilization implications requiring the United States and the international community

to not only act and invest in state-building, political and economic development in these cases, but, more importantly, to rethink the policy and practice of dealing with state failure and weakness in the aftermath of 9/11. Rotberg (2003, 1) writes, “nation-state fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their government lose legitimacy, and the very nature of the particular nation-state itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes and in the hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens.” Fukuyama (2004) and Hamre and Sullivan (2002) argue that failing and failed states matter not because of the widespread human sufferings and abuse that occur in these states, but because such states pose serious security threats to the United States and the international community.

Donald Henry Rumsfeld, the United States’ Secretary of Defense (2001-2006), stated that “in several regions, the inability of some states to govern their societies, safeguard their military armaments, and prevent their territories from serving as sanctuary to terrorists and criminal organizations poses a threat to stability and places demands on U.S. forces. Afghanistan is but one example of the security implications for the U.S. of such weak or ungoverned areas. Conditions in some states, including some with nuclear weapons, demonstrate that threats can grow out of the weakness of governments as much as out of their strength” (Dorff 2005, 28).

The most significant threats posed by weak, fragile, and failed states to the international community are security threats. Extremist and terrorist organizations and leaders use fragile, failing, and failed states as a base to launch acts of terrorism against the West in general and the United States in particular. The tragic events of September 11, 2001 underscore the point that fragile, failing and failed states provide the terrorists

and extremist organizations and leaders with opportunities to establish their base, acquire resources and weapon of mass destruction, and recruit and train terrorists to carry out acts of terrorism in the United States and elsewhere in the world.

Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, it is widely believed in the West that religion, particularly the Islamic religion, is the base for the most conflicts and extremist views. Samuel Huntington (1996) in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* argues that Islam has “bloody borders” and conflicts in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century will be between civilizations, in particular between Islamic and Western civilizations, not states. However, Fox (2004, 59) states that between 1950 and 1996 conflicts were “...caused by economic, national, political, cultural, psychological, postcolonial, modernity, and strategic issues,” not a religion, particularly the Islamic religion. Loza (2007, 142) writes, “Middle-Eastern terrorism rests upon more than religion. It is based upon current and historical cultural experiences within the Islamic world. These experiences include political and racial conflicts both within and between these nations, and the historical relationships between the Islamic world and the West. It is maintained through several ideologies, environmental pressures, and its adherents are never lacking in justifications.” Aly and Striegher (2012, 852) write that “...radicalization models that give primacy to religion conflate a range of motivations, issues, and historically specific contexts into a single interpretation and treat the political agenda of Al Qaeda and affiliated groups, Islamist ideology, Arab–Western historical relations and *jihadist* objectives as one.” They argue that “...it is imperative to consider that evidence confirms that there is no single pathway to radicalization and no distinct

pattern to profile an individual throughout any of the stages of radicalization” (Aly and Striegher 2012, 860).

Extremism and Terrorism are complex phenomena and anti-terrorism policies are based on a web of military, social, political, and economic interventions and education. To counter the risk and problems of security and the revengeful plots of misguided terrorists, the United States and the international community promote economic, political and social developments in weak, fragile, and failing states so that the environment and conditions for the activities and the ideology of extremism and terrorism are permanently put to rest.

#### *Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina*

In 1913 Kosovo was integrated into the Kingdom of Serbia, which in 1918 became part of Yugoslavia. Josip Broz Tito, the President of Yugoslavia (1943-1980), granted autonomy to Kosovo in 1963, which it lost after Slobodan Milosevic became President of Serbia (1989-1997). Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed to the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes on October 26, 1918. At the end of World War II, Bosnia and Herzegovina were reunited as a single state and became one of the six republics of the new established Yugoslavia. Post-World War II Yugoslavia consisted of six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia) and two autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo). The death of President Josip Broz Tito (1943-1980), who had kept Yugoslavia together as a revolutionary leader, statesman and dictator, ignited the deep mistrust and ethnic hatred and rivalry between different ethnic communities that lived together in Yugoslavia,

resulting in economic collapse, state failure, and, eventually, the Bosnia and Kosovo civil wars of 1992-95 and 1998-99, respectively (Arman 2012; Yarashevich and Karneyeva 2013; Zejnullahi 2014), both of which prompted military and development interventions from Europe and the United States to address insecurity, human suffering, and the spread of extremism and terrorism to Europe and the rest of the international community.

Kosovo's and Bosnia and Herzegovina's wars had a crippling effect on the infrastructures, governance, and people of both nations. Foreign aid is used by the United States, European Union, and the international community to address the humanitarian, economic, political, and social crises and security challenges as a hedge against extremism and terrorism.

### *Afghanistan and Iraq*

The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan on 27 December 1979, which resulted in the installation of a Soviet-backed Marxist-Leninist government (The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan), led to a series of intrastate conflicts that have taken a heavy toll on the country since. The collapse of security, economy, law and order, and state not only threatened the wellbeing of the Afghan people, but also posed serious problems to the international community, from security to illegal drugs to terrorism. Al Qaeda and its late mastermind and leader, Osama bin Laden, seized the opportunity and established terrorist training camps in Afghanistan after their expulsion from a safe haven in Sudan in 1996. On 11 September 2001, Al Qaeda carried terrorist attacks against the United States by flying hijacked passenger airliners into the World Trade Center in New York and Pentagon in Arlington, VA. The events of 9/11 changed

everything in the United States and beyond, in general, but it has had more profound effects on foreign policy and its focus, in particular (Huddy and Feldman 2011; Woods 2011).

In the aftermath of 9/11 and subsequent removal of the Taliban regime from power in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, the United States invaded Iraq in March 2003. The Saddam Hussein regime (1979-2003) posed security threats to the United States, the international community, and neighboring states by developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (Monteiro and Debs 2014). With little or no respect for the laws of conventional warfare that prohibits the use of chemical weapons, Saddam extensively used chemical weapons, especially mustard gas, against Iran during the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran war, which resulted in high deaths, morbidity, and irreversible health problems in military and civilians (Bijani and Moghadamnia 2002). On 2 August 1990, Saddam invaded and annexed Kuwait against the international legal order that prohibits the use of force by a state against the territorial integrity of another state (Green Wood 1992). In addition, Saddam's regime was abusive and had little respect for human rights. Saddam used the weapon of mass destruction not only against Iran, but also against his own people (the Kurds) in March 1989, which is widely known and condemned as the Halabja chemical attack or the Halabja massacre (O'Leary 2002). For these reasons and also for the fear of that Saddam would use weapons of mass destruction again or hand them over to terrorist organizations for use against the United States and the international community, the George W. Bush administration launched Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003 to forcefully remove Saddam's regime from power and replace it with a democratic, peace-loving, and progressive regime (Cremer and Thrall 2013). However,

civil war followed the U.S.-led invasion and removal of Saddam from power in Iraq, which destabilized and posed serious security threats to the region and the international community.

To counter the threats to the international security and order posed by weak, fragile, and failed states, developed countries have been providing aid to underdeveloped nations to build state capacity, empower and engage civil society, create liberal democratic institutions and the rule of law, control corruption, and promote economic development and transparency (Minoiu and Reddy 2010; Younas and Bandyopadhyay 2011; Savun and Tirone 2012; Krasner and Weinstein 2014; Gibson, Hoffman and Jablonski 2015). Forty-five years ago, in a 1970 General Assembly Resolution, the United Nations specified that developed countries should give 0.7% of their Gross National Product (GNP), as official development assistance, to underdeveloped countries. The following figure depicts net official development assistance (ODA) from members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to underdeveloped countries, in millions of U.S. dollars, 2000-2016.




Figure 1. Official Development Assistance (ODA) From Members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to Underdeveloped Countries, in Millions of U.S. Dollars, 2000-2016

Source: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline.htm>.

The OECD has 34 member states, and only five (Denmark, Luxemburg, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom) met or exceeded the 0.7 % ODA/GNI target in 2016 (OECD 2018). According to OECD (2018), Afghanistan received \$3,206.63 million, Iraq \$1,333.10 million, Bosnia and Herzegovina \$155.87 million, and Kosovo \$156.71 million in official development assistant (ODA) from DAC countries in 2016. The United States and the international community have been involved in Afghanistan since 2001, in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995, in Iraq since 2003, and in Kosovo since 1999 to help those states become stable, democratic, and economically viable nations that do not pose security threats to the United States, its allies and the broader international community. The roles and support of the European Union and member states in Balkan,



Iraq, and Afghanistan have been vital for the success of the peace and development projects in these countries. In particular, after the September 11 attacks against the United States, the European Union, and member states have been fully engaged in supporting the U.S.-led war on terror. The 9/11 attacks were perceived by the European Union and member states as attacks on Western values of freedom, tolerance, and openness and NATO invoked its collective defense provision, Article 5, for the first time in its history to openly support the U.S.-led military and development operations in Afghanistan (Bensahel 2003). The European Union and member states have provided 8 billion Euros in assistance to Afghanistan from 2002 to 2010; and for the 2011 to 2013 period, the EU alone has pledged 200 million Euros a year to the country (European Union 2011). At the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan (2016), which was co-chaired by the European Union and Afghanistan, the European Union and its member states pledged €5 billion (USD 5.6 billion) in development aid to Afghanistan from 2016 to 2020 (European Union 2018).

A large and increasing share of international humanitarian and development aid is provided through private donations, which are mainly raised and allocated by international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Buthe, Major and Souza 2012). Since the 1960s, there has been a steady increase in private foreign aid from developed to developing countries. In 1964, private volunteer organizations (PVOs) or Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) sent \$2.8 billion in foreign aid to developing countries; by 1980 that figure had risen to \$4.7 billion, a 68% increase, in just 16 years (Smith 1990). In 1979 there were only 137 private voluntary organizations registered with USAID, but by December 2013, their number was 593 (Nikolova 2015). In 2010,

the revenue for the U.S.-based private voluntary organizations was \$27.8 billion. According to the Center for Global Prosperity (2013), 80% of the total financial flow from developed to developing countries is private and government aid accounts for less than 20%. The total amount of U.S. charitable private aid to the developing nations is three and a half times larger than the U.S. government's foreign aid (Center for Global Prosperity 2006). The boom in American NGOs came in the aftermath of World War II as an alternative for dealing directly with foreign governments and as a mean to establish Western democracy and free market economy in the former Soviet bloc in the early 1990s (Schnable 2015). Since then, NGOs have been playing a major role in distributing humanitarian aids, fighting poverty, and promoting the rule of law, development, and democracy in developing countries. In 2014, 617 NGOs were active in Afghanistan (347 local and 263 international NGOs) (Mitchell 2017). The rise in the number and role of NGOs, as political agents, is also due to a shift in the development paradigm from state-based interventions to non-state actors, such as NGOs. In the later part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (especially in 1960s and 1970s) policymakers in developed countries have questioned whether states in developing countries have authority over their territory to deliver public goods and services and implement development programs and projects, and even if they do, whether elites in charge of the state functions were concerned with addressing social, economic and political inequalities within their territories, resulting in a shaft in development paradigm from state-led to market-led (Adam Smith's notion of free market) model of development that give rise to the number and role of NGOs in development (Jeffrey 2016). However, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, sustainable development is neither a state-led process nor as a market-led process, which cannot be a top-down

prescriptive initiatives dictated by foreign experts based on a blueprint of liberal Western institutions or experience, but a process that is indigenous and collectively led by a healthy and balanced interplay between state, market, technology, and civil society in which both Western donors and NGOs have a role to play.

*Foreign Aid: Who Gets What and Why?*

Is the flow of foreign aid from a developed country to an underdeveloped country dictated by political and strategic considerations of the donor, or economic needs and policy performance of the recipient country, or a combination of the two? Alesina and Dollar (2000) argue that it is the political and strategic considerations of the donor country that dictate the flow of foreign aid to underdeveloped countries. According to Alesina and Dollar (2000, 33), “an inefficient, economically closed, mismanaged non-democratic former colony politically friendly to its former colonizer, receives more foreign aid than another country with similar level of poverty, a superior policy stance, but without a past as a colony.” Dreher, Minasyan, and Nunnenkamp (2015) note that political misalignment and ideological distance between the donor and aid recipient countries influence the flow and effectiveness of aid. During the Cold War period (1945-1991), the flow of aid from Western donors and Soviet bloc states was influenced by the grand strategies of the two opposing economic and political systems, democracy and capitalism for the former and autocracy and communism for the latter (Dunning 2004). During the Cold War, Western donors ignored human rights abuses and corruption to create clients to counter the spread of communism, while the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact surrogates emphasized promoting communism and revolutionary communist parties

and/or leaders in disbursing foreign aid (Zanger 2000; Neumayer 2003). Fleck and Kilby (2010, 185) contend that “during the Cold War, short term foreign policy decisions driven by the State Department strongly influenced the U.S. aid program. Anti-communist dictators such as Suharto in Indonesia, Marcos in the Philippines, and Mobutu in Zaire could count on substantial U.S. funding despite widespread corruption, human rights abuses, and often counterproductive domestic policies.” The 1948-1952 Marshall Plan, the \$13 billion Europe economic recovery plan (\$130 billion in 2015 U.S. dollar value), was the first U.S. major foreign aid program that came as part of a major effort to provide humanitarian aid and helping hand to those in dire need, to promote stability, peace, prosperity, trade, and economic cooperation, and to counter the spread of communism and the expansion of Soviet Union in Europe (Gimbel 1976; Radelet 2003). Given the tremendous success of the Marshall Plan, President Harry S. Truman (1945-1953) proposed the creation of an international development program in 1949 with the focus of creating market for the United States by reducing poverty and increasing productivity in developing countries and countering the spread and threat of communism by helping nations to prosper under capitalism (USAID 2015). U.S. aid in the 1950s was designed to provide capital and technical assistance, in the 1960s to promote development, in the 1970s to provide basic human needs, in the 1980s to promote market-led development and stabilization of currency and financial systems, in the 1990s to promote sustainable development and democracy, and in the 2000s to promote security and good governance to counter-terrorism (USAID 2015).

In the aftermath of 9/11, national security and war on terror are the driving force of foreign aid (Miles 2012). Boutton and Carter (2014, 1160) write that “...both the

number of attacks on U.S. targets within a recipient's borders and the severity of those attacks significantly increase the level of aid it receives from the United States." The Al Qaeda terrorist organization's attacks brought national security and war on terror to the forefront of foreign aid. As Young and Findley (2011, 365) note,

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Bush Administration elevated foreign aid as a key instrument in the "War on Terror." Aid was repeatedly identified as a necessary policy option. In the 2002 State of the Union Address, for example, Bush argued that "[w]e have a great opportunity during the time of war to lead the world toward the values that will bring lasting peace." His subsequent budget reflected this claim by including a nearly \$750 million increase in foreign aid spending.

In March 2002, President George W. Bush proposed a dramatic increase of 50% in foreign aid, over the ensuing three years, through the creation of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)—an account to provide \$5 billion per year to selected countries whose governments were ruling justly, investing in their people, and establishing economic freedom (Radelet 2003). In his State of the Union address two months earlier, President Bush called for \$10 billion additional funds, over the ensuing five years, to counter the problem of AIDS in the most distressed nations of Africa and the Caribbean. In 2008, in the U.S. Congressional hearings, before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, Committee on Foreign Affairs, and House of Representatives, experts highlighted the importance of foreign aid and ways to make foreign aid more effective in the fight against terrorism (U.S. Congress 2008). Congressman Howard L. Berman (California) chaired the hearing and stated in his opening statement:

Foreign assistance, including humanitarian development assistance, plays a critical role in our foreign policy. While I would support them simply because they are the right thing to do, I also support foreign aid because

foreign assistance programs can effectively alleviate many of the foreign policy problems of the United States. Foreign aid is a powerful weapon in the war of ideas. Nothing burnishes our image abroad better than saving lives, improving health care, providing education and infrastructure to developing countries. It is in our national security interest to provide foreign aid.

Congressman David Scott (Georgia) stated:

This is indeed a very timely and extraordinarily important hearing. There is no higher priority for us than fighting terrorism, being successful in winning the war on terror, and perhaps the most effective tool that we have is leveraging our foreign aid to achieve these goals. We are all aware of the importance of a multi-faceted national security and foreign policy. We are often told that these consist of a combined approach of what I call the three Ds—defense, diplomacy and development. But we are here today to discuss how these three elements have been intertwined, particularly in recent years, as well as possibilities for the future.

Dell L. Dailey, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, in his testimony, stated:

Since September 11, 2001, we have employed all elements of national power, including military force, to confront threats posed by terrorism. International community has captured or killed numerous senior operatives in al-Qaeda and its network. It has thus degraded ability of terrorists to plan and mount attacks. But I would like to make one thing clear. Capture and kill efforts, while are essential, are just one part of a much broader U.S. and global endeavor focused on accomplishing our long-term goals of countering terrorism.

Douglas Farah, Senior Investigator, Nine Eleven Finding Answers Foundation, Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center, in his testimony stated:

The changes across the globe have been swift and dramatic. As Mr. Scott noted earlier, in 1996, the World Bank judged 11 states to be failing across the world. By 2003, the number had risen to 17, and by 2006, the number is 26 and growing. These changes are important because they give rise to new hybrids that make the traditional distinction between terrorism and organized crime, particularly drug trafficking impossible to sustain. What draws these groups together is overt state sponsorship for terrorism has been curtailed or the shadow facilitators who understand how to exploit the seams in the international legal and economic structures and who work with both

terrorist and criminal groups. Both groups use the same pipelines, the same illicit structures, and exploit the same state weaknesses...One cannot fight terrorism without fighting the financing that brings social and economic collapse and without cutting off the revenue sources of terrorist and criminal groups now often drawn from the same pool. Our approach to combating terrorism, and the aid we give, is often limited by our confinement to dealing with individual states one at a time, an increasing number that are classified as failing...The fact is that on the ground we are still lacking a holistic approach that looks beyond single countries to regions into the crippling weaknesses of the international regimes that were designed to combat crime in bygone eras. Where a country wants to bring order to its ungoverned spaces, the traditional types of aid are viable. Colombia and Mexico in this hemisphere are clear examples of states making heroic and costly efforts to contain non-state narco actors and terrorists. In criminal states, such aid is neither wanted nor useful. It simply serves to strengthen corrupt and brutal regimes, unless it is on such a small scale and so specifically targeted that it escapes the predatory state...There is no single answer to the question that this subcommittee asked as to whether U.S. aid should be contingent on a country's counterterrorism efforts given the variety of interests in any particular state. However, I think the Bout case offers some guidelines for saying yes as a general rule.

In 2010, Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi cited foreign aid as vital in preventing the victims of floods that had submerged 17 million acres of farmland from engaging in or supporting terrorism (Varner 2010). Since 9/11, foreign aid has become one of the most vital tools in countering security threats and fighting terrorism. As a result, the focus of foreign aid has been on the following two areas—with the United States or against it and winning public hearts and minds in aid recipient countries. Since 2001, countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, and others that have been at the forefront of the war on terror have been the top U.S. foreign aid recipients in the world, which punctuates the point.

*With The U.S. or Against The U.S.*

After the 9/11 attacks, the United States invaded Afghanistan and Iraq and overthrew the regimes of the Taliban (1996-2001) and Saddam Hussein (1979-2003) in those respective countries. President George W. Bush justified the removal of the Taliban from power for that regime allowing the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization to establish safe haven and plan the 9/11 attacks from its bases in the country, refusing to hand over Osama bin Laden, the group's leader and the master mind of the 9/11 attacks, abusing human and women's rights, and using terrorism as a tactic to further its military, political and ideological goals. The removal of Saddam from power was based on the reasons that Iraq was abusing human rights, had little or no respect for international legal order, territorial integrity of the neighboring states, and laws of conventional warfare; and Saddam was developing weapon of mass destruction, which Iraq had used in the past against Iran and its own people, the Kurds, and he might use these weapons again against another nation or supply them to terrorists (Green wood 1992; Bijani and Moghadamnia 2002; Wedgwood 2003). Since the removal of Taliban (2001) and Saddam (2003) from power, the United States and the international community have poured billions of foreign aid dollars into these countries to promote security, the rule of law, and economic, political, and social development to foster peace and counter the environment and condition that lead to terrorism and/or tyranny. In his June 2002 speech in West Point, President Bush adopted "preemption" as a national security and development/foreign aid strategy in dealing with rogue and/or failed states, stressing,

...America was attacked by a ruthless and resourceful enemy. We will defend the peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants...the war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the



enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge...the only path to safety is the path of action...our security will require transforming the military you will lead -- a military that must be ready to strike at a moment's notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives...as we defend the peace, we also have an historic opportunity to preserve the peace...we have a great opportunity to extend a just peace, by replacing poverty, repression, and resentment around the world with hope of a better day...the 20th century ended with a single surviving model of human progress, based on non-negotiable demands of human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women and private property and free speech and equal justice and religious tolerance. America cannot impose this vision -- yet we can support and reward governments that make the right choices for their own people. In our development aid, in our diplomatic efforts, in our international broadcasting, and in our educational assistance, the United States will promote moderation and tolerance and human rights (White House 2002).

In the aftermath of 9/11, Bush also demanded that all nations must choose whether they are with the United States in its war on terror or they are with the enemy—the terrorists. The message was that terrorism is a global phenomenon and the “war on terror” cannot be won alone by the United States, developed and developing countries must be engaged as well. The response from the developed and developing countries was positive that they stand with the United States in its “war on terror.” Donors have since conditioned foreign aid and have emphasized that aid recipient nations must take actions to eradicate the environment and condition that encourage extremism and terrorism—lack of education, economic opportunity, security, justice, the rule of law, and grievances to name a few. In September 2001, Bush enlisted Pakistan as a pivotal ally in the U.S.-led “war on terror” and offered a \$600 million aid package. In his 2004 budget, Bush called for \$4.7 billion aid for key states in the war on terror, including \$657 million for Afghanistan, \$460 million for Jordan, \$395 million for Pakistan, and \$255 million for

Turkey (Buckley and Singh 2006). In closing of the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism on 18 February 2015, President Barak H. Obama stated,

...so if we're going to prevent people from being susceptible to the false promises of extremism, then the international community has to offer something better. And the United States intends to do its part...countries have to truly invest in the education and skills and job training that our extraordinary young people need...just as we address economic grievances, we need to face a third challenge -- and that's addressing the political grievances that are exploited by terrorists. When governments oppress their people, deny human rights, stifle dissent, or marginalize ethnic and religious groups, or favor certain religious groups over others, it sows the seeds of extremism and violence...so the essential ingredient to real and lasting stability and progress is not less democracy; it's more democracy...so these terrorists are a threat, first and foremost, to the communities that they target, which means communities have to take the lead in protecting themselves. And that is true here in America, as it's true anywhere else (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary 2015).

In short, foreign aid and the war on terror have been intimately linked since the Al Qaeda terrorist organization's attacks of 9/11 against the United States. Aid is conditioned to and aid receipts countries are asked to do more in solidarity with the United States and the international community in their war on terror by addressing the environment and conditions that may lead to grievances, resentments, extremism, and/or terrorism against the West. Howell (2006, 121) notes,

In the field of development, the global war on terror has highlighted the strategic relevance of foreign aid to both national interests and global security at a time when its ideological rationale in the post-Cold War era had almost disappeared. Aware of the perceived threat to global security and global markets, a melee of actors including leaders of low-income countries, U.S. and European politicians, UN leaders and many developmental NGOs have for diverse reasons lobbied for an increase in aid. However, the introduction of repressive measures coupled with the increasingly explicit subordination of foreign aid to the military, foreign

policy, and economic interests has altered the context in which foreign aid is framed and implemented.

### *Winning Hearts and Minds*

According to Dixon (2009), the phrase *winning hearts and minds* is associated with the British Counterinsurgency tactics in Malaya (1948–1960) and the U.S. counterinsurgency tactics against the communist insurgents in Vietnam (1955-1975). These tactics emphasize that the use of less coercive force against the insurgents is essential to winning the hearts and minds of the general public within a given country under reconstruction. The logic is that the success of counterinsurgency or any other intervention be it military, political, economic, or social, rests on the support, attitude, behavior, and perception of the public toward that intervention. Perception is everything. Perception plays a central role in decision making and the choices that one makes in any situation (Holsti 1967; Jervis 1976; Betts 1978). Perception shapes our belief, worldview, and how one perceives the actions, interests, and motivations of others. For example, welfare spending by a state shapes a positive perception among the public that the government “cares” about citizens and “shares” their feelings and needs, which leads to increased legitimacy of the state and decreased support among the public for violence against the state (Taydas and Pksen 2012). Sides and Gross (2013, 596) write, “perceptions of Muslims as violent and untrustworthy are a key ingredient in support for several aspects of the War on Terror.” The perceptions among Muslims of Western interference, in general, and American interference, in particular, in the political and

economic affairs of Muslims are associated with engaging in and supporting terrorism among Muslims (Li and Schaub 2004; Moghaddam 2005; Gupta 2005).

However, perceptions and misperceptions alike are shaped by information received in any situation and time. Since the 9/11 attacks, donors not only focus more on using foreign aid as a tool to address the economic and political conditions that might lead to extremism and terrorism, but they also put more emphasis on publicizing foreign aid as a tool to generate positive perception, attitude, and behavior toward the donor nation(s) by winning the hearts and minds of the public in the aid recipient countries. Donors demand that foreign aid be branded in accordance with their branding policies, publicized, and well communicated with the aid recipient citizens. According to the U.S Agency for International Development (2018), “USAID's framework legislation, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, section 641, requires that all programs under the Foreign Assistance Act be identified appropriately overseas as ‘American Aid’.” Similarly, the U.K. branding guidelines mandate that all foreign aid should be branded as “from the British people.”

Donor states see foreign aid as being integral to their national security and the success of their foreign policies and argue that informed local beneficiaries of foreign aid will reciprocate and reward the donor(s) with their support and positive hearts and minds. The argument is that publicity of foreign aid wins the hearts and minds of citizens in the aid recipient country, leading to positive attitude, perception, and behavior among the public, which not only make the implementation of humanitarian, development, and/or social change programs and projects easy, but it also counters extremist attitudes, feelings and behaviors toward the donor country that terrorists usually exploit. At the core of the

“winning hearts and minds” is the theory of social exchange, which is deeply rooted in sociology, psychology, anthropology, and economic and is concerned with understanding exchange of resources and rewards between individuals and groups in social interactions (Emerson 1976; Fiske 1992). The social exchange theory states that social interactions and/or relations are based on the perception of relative costs and benefits, which provides the foundation and standard for future interactions and relationships (Ward and Berno 2011). This theory is based on the assumption of *self-interest*--actors participate in a social exchange to accomplish an individual goal that neither party can accomplish alone (Lawler and Thye 1999)—and the rationality and logic of *reciprocity*. Falk and Fischbacher (2006, 294) define reciprocity as “... a behavioral response to perceived kindness and unkindness, where kindness comprises both distributional fairness as well as fairness intentions” and argue that reciprocity is “...a powerful determinant of human behavior.” According to Falk and Fischbacher (2006), people evaluate the *kindness* or *unkindness* of an action based on the evaluation of the *consequence* of the action and the *underlying intention* of the actor of the given action. Therefore, the first action of kindness or unkindness reciprocates the second or subsequent action of kindness or unkindness. More pointedly, each party evaluates each interaction and it is the balance of the past interactions that determines the perception of the relationship and the rule of the future exchanges (Ballinger and Rockmann 2010). According to the social exchange theory, social interactions and exchanges between individuals and groups based on reciprocity over a period of time lead to a feeling of personal obligations, gratitude, and trust (Blau 1964; Honeycutt 1981; Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005). However, critics of the social exchange theory argue that all social interactions are not based on immediate

cost-benefit analysis and the cost-benefit analysis itself is contingent on the context. Winschniewski et al. (2009, 306), for instance, argue that "...contextual information is vital for an individual's benefit-cost evaluation in a given situation." Trivers (1971) and Hammerstein and Leimer (2006) suggest that in direct reciprocity interactions between two individuals or groups are repeated based on the exchange of resources that both have, value, and benefit from the exchange. However, in indirect reciprocity the benefit or payoff of social interactions lies in the distant future (Nowak 2006). An example of indirect reciprocity is helping strangers, which may not result in immediate direct reward, but may yield one in the long-run improved social status, recognition, and approval. In addition to the social exchange theory, the contact theory and the integrated threat theory are also applied to analyze social interactions and relationships between individuals and groups. The integrated threat theory, which is deeply rooted in psychology and sociology, argues that four types of threats--realistic threats (threats to the very existence), symbolic threats (threats based on perceived differences in moral, values, standards, and beliefs), intergroup anxiety (threats out of concern for being embarrassed, ridiculed, or rejected), and negative stereotypes (threats for fear of negative consequences) are operative in any given social interaction situations between individuals and groups that result in perceived stereotypes and prejudices (Stephan and Stephan 2000). Contact theory contends that frequent and satisfying intercultural contacts between individuals and groups result in a lower perception of threat, reduced prejudice, and higher positive attitudes toward members of the out-group (Ward and Berno 2011; Alperin, Hornsey, Hayward, Diedrichs and Barlow 2014). According to these two theories, individual traits, cultural differences, social values and standards, and frequency

of contact play a vital role in social interactions, cost-benefit analysis, and the decision to defect or continue with social exchange and interactions. However, overall, the social exchange theory provides the theoretical foundation to analyze social interactions between individuals and groups, and it has been applied widely to business, social, and political contexts (Coulson et al. 2014).

Donors argue that humanitarian and development aid and projects can win hearts and minds by communicating information about the identity, generosity, engagement, and commitment of a donor to the cause and wellbeing of local communities and citizens in the aid recipient country resulting in feelings of appreciation, gratitude, positive attitude, and behavior among citizens toward their own state and the foreign donor (Zhang 2008; Bradbury and Kleinman 2010; USAID 2018). Positive attitudes and behavior of citizens toward their state lead to greater compliance with and participation in governmental policies and programs, which, in turn, leads to improved state capacity and legitimacy (Brinkerhoff et al. 2012). Positive attitudes and perception among citizens in the aid recipient country toward a donor result in a decline in negative perceptions and hostile behavior toward the donor country, which, in turn, leads to greater acceptance of its peacekeeping forces, political and development programs, and social change projects in the short term. Over the long term, positive and favorable attitudes toward a donor country among local citizens are expected to materialize in the form of greater security and influence of the donor country on the political, economic, and military affairs of the aid recipient country. Cosmides and Tooby (1989, 52) write, “human beings live in groups, and their behavior is affected by information derived from the other individuals with whom they live... The behavior elicited by this information reverberates throughout

the individual's social group, as information that other individuals may act on in turn. The ongoing cycle that results is the generation of culture.” According to USAID (2018), in many Muslim countries favorable opinions of the United States were very low in 2004. However, in early 2005 favorable opinions of the United States nearly doubled among Indonesians, from 37% to 66%, due to effective branding, communicating, and visibility of foreign aid delivery in the aftermath of the U.S. 2004/2005 tsunami efforts. In December 2004, the U.S. government and citizens pledged \$1 billion in aid to tsunami-affected countries of Indonesia, where 107,000 people died, and Sri Lanka, where 30,000 people died (Becker 2005; VanRooyen and Leaning 2005). The Pew Global Attitude Project (2005), which conducted a large country study in Indonesia in understanding anti-Americanism, reported that positive opinions of the U.S. in Indonesia increased from 15% in 2003 (pre-tsunami aid efforts) to 38% in May 2005 (post-tsunami aid efforts) (Rajapaksa and Dundes 2006). Furthermore, Pew researchers also reported that 79% of the Indonesians stated that they feel more favorable toward the U.S. due to its tsunami aid efforts in the country. In addition, Rajapaksa and Dundes (2006) also assessed whether the U.S. 2004/2005 tsunami aid efforts in Sri Lanka resulted in positive views of the United States in the country. They reported, that 84% of the respondents stated that the U.S. tsunami aid was generous, and 60% stated that it was granted altruistically without the American self-benefits (Rajapaksa and Dundes 2006). They also compared post-9/11 with post-tsunami attitudes in Sri Lanka toward the United States and found that 73% of the post-9/11 respondents were anti-American, believing that Washington interfered in other countries’ affairs for its own benefits vs. 50% of the post-tsunami respondents reporting positive views of the United States and 60% believing that American aid is



granted altruistically without self-benefits. However, Berman et al. (2009), Beath, Christia and Enikolopov (2013), Crost, Felter and Johnston (2014), and Renard (2015) have investigated, the effects of aid on reducing insurgent violence by winning the “hearts and minds” of the public in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines and have reported mixed results. Furthermore, Fishstein (2010), Zurcher et al. (2010), U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (2011), Gompelman (2011), and Gordon (2011) have also investigated the effects of development activities on security in winning hearts and minds in Afghanistan and reported mixed results.

#### *Effects of Foreign Aid on Government and Public*

The effects of foreign aid on political and economic development are hotly debated. Moss et al. (2006) and Young and Sheehan (2014) argue that aid inversely affects political institutions. Moyo (2009), Easterly (2006), and Morrison (2012) contend that foreign aid enables elites to buy votes, build security apparatus to suppress citizens and enrich themselves and their cronies through corruption. In this view, foreign aid does not help the citizens for whom it is intended, but instead gives rise to corruption and consolidates the grip and continuity of repressive regimes and elites (Ross 2004; Busse and Groning 2009). However, others argue that foreign aid improves government capacity and promotes civil society, resulting in better governance, delivery of services to the poor, accountability, and state-society relationship (Wright and Winters 2010; Bermeo 2017). In this view, it is argued that donors have strong control over the aid and a final say on how and for what purpose the aid funds can be used. Therefore, foreign aid bypasses corrupt elites and it is put to work consistent with donors’ guidelines,

conditions, priorities, and assessments. Boutton (2014) argues that foreign aid provided to states that host terrorism to increase their capacity and willingness to disarm terrorist groups is counterproductive in some situations. States with ongoing interstate rivalry or intrastate rivalry use the aid to arm against their rival rather than to counter the threat of terrorism. According to Boutton (2014), such states have less incentive to disarm terrorist groups, but rather to play-up the threat from terrorism to secure the continuation of foreign aid. For example, in the past 18 years, Pakistan has used a good portion of the U.S. military aid to build up its military and arms in anticipation of a possible confrontation with its arch-rival—India rather than fighting terrorism and disarming Taliban for which the aid has been intended. The Pakistan military secret service (ISI) has been linked to and accused of supporting extremist and terrorist groups, such as the Haqqani network, in Afghanistan as a cash cow. Boutton (2014, 741) writes, “despite billions of dollars in aid over the past 15 years, Pakistan remains host to many terrorist groups and is still quite unstable.” After the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, President Nouri al-Maliki did little to improve the deteriorating security situation in the country, but he appeared in times to intentionally fuel conflicts by randomly arresting Sunni opponents, removing Sunni political figures and military officers from their positions, and using the U.S.-funded counter-terrorism force against his rivals and peaceful demonstrators (Boutton 2016). In general, aid effectiveness is country specific and depends in large on the aid recipient state’s priorities, political structure and quality of governance--institutions, the rule of law, accountability, corruption (Herzer and Morrissey 2013; Fosu 2013; Boutton 2014; Boutton 2016). Aid is more effective in promoting economic growth, countering terrorism, and winning public hearts and minds

in states that are accountable to their citizens and align their priorities more closely with the priorities of the donor.

The international community, especially the United States and the member states of the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have invested a lot of blood and gold in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo to strengthen the rule of law, improve infrastructure, stabilize communities, foster economic growth and political development, and help the various levels of government to better represent and respond to the needs and aspirations of their citizens and to fight insecurity, terrorism, and extremism. To this end, the USAID alone invested \$ 1.05 billion in Afghanistan in 2017--\$294 million in governance, \$175 million in health, \$167 million in administrative costs, \$140 million in infrastructure, \$95 million in agriculture, and \$ 85 million in humanitarian and economic growth, just to name a few. The same year, the USAID invested \$321 million in Iraq, \$50 million in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and \$42 million in Kosovo to promote democracy and good governance, economic development, education and social services, and peace and security (USAID 2018). The overall effects of foreign aid on governance and public in the four cases of Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo are mixed. For example, according to the Corruption Perceptions Index 2017, Afghanistan is ranked 177, Iraq 169, Kosovo 85, and Bosnia and Herzegovina 91 out of 180 countries. Higher scores mean higher levels of corruption in the country. However, according to World Bank (2017), in the past decade or so, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo have made significant gains in term of per capita Gross National Income (GNI), a useful measure of development — in 2004 GNI per capita for Afghanistan was \$210 in 2016 it

is \$580; in 1996 GNI for Bosnia and Herzegovina was \$760 in 2016 it is \$4,940; in 2006 GNI for Iraq was \$2,020 in 2016 it is \$5,420; in 2006 GNI for Kosovo was \$2,510 in 2016 it is \$3,850. On the Fragile States Index (2017), which measures the level of stability, Afghanistan scored 107.3, Iraq 105.4, Bosnia and Herzegovina 73.0, and no score was reported for Kosovo. The Fragile States Index is based on 12 socio-economic indicators and the lower the score, the better. The high scores for Afghanistan and Iraq are a reflection of the challenges that both nations face in terms of increased insecurity and insurgency that have affected their overall performance of political, economic, and social developments since the removal of Taliban and Saddam Hussein from power in the fall of 2001 and the spring of 2003, respectively. The Democracy Index 2017, which provides a snapshot of the state of democracy worldwide and is based on five categories of electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of government, political participation, and political culture, places countries within one of the four types of regimes based on their index score—full democracy regimes, flawed democracy regimes, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian regimes. Democracy Index 2017 ranks Afghanistan 149 out of 167 countries covered by the Index as an authoritarian regime, Iraq 112 as a hybrid regime, Bosnia and Hercegovina 101 as a hybrid regime, and no scores are reported for Kosovo. An authoritarian regime, according to Democracy Index 2017, is a regime that lacks political pluralism, some formal institutions of democracy may exist, but lacks substance, elections are not free and fair, media is state-owned or controlled, civil liberties are abused or disregarded, judiciary is not independent, and government criticism is repressed; a hybrid regime is defined as a regime in which elections have substantial irregularities, opposition political parties and leaders are pressured by

government, corruption is widespread, the rule of law is weak, civil society is weak, journalists are harassed, judiciary system is not independent, and there is serious weakness in the functioning of government and political participation. Human Development Index, which is a composite index of life expectancy, education, and income per capita (GNI/capita), measures a country's level of human development and places countries within one of the four types of human developments—very high human development, high human development, medium human development, and low human development. The longer the life expectancy at birth, the longer the education period, and the higher the income per capita, the higher the score and ranking of a country on the Human Development Index. The Human Development Index 2017, ranks Afghanistan 169 out of 188 countries with low human development, Iraq 121 with medium human development, Bosnia and Herzegovina 81 with high human development, and no scores are reported for Kosovo.

### *Contribution to Existing Literature*

Development aid and projects have long been used to promote economic, political, and social development. Since 9/11, however, they are also required to enhance security in weak, fragile, and failing states such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria to name a few, that are fighting insurgency to counter the threat and spread of extremism and terrorism. The strategy contends that humanitarian and development aid and projects commonly implemented by local government and foreign donors to provide basic services in aid recipient countries can win public hearts and minds and build support for the local government and the foreign donors and ultimately reduce violence,

extremist attitudes and behaviors, and terrorism (USAID 2016). Despite the on-going use of this approach, there is conflicting empirical evidence on the effectiveness of this strategy in winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient nations (Berman et al. 2009; Fishstein 2010; Zurcher et al. 2010; U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee 2011; Gompelman 2011; Gordon 2011; Wilder 2012; Beath, Christia and Enikolopov 2011; Crost, Felter and Johnston 2014).

The conflicting findings from previous studies are the motivation for this dissertation, which is intended to add to the existing body of knowledge and literature and make theoretical and empirical contributions to the question of whether or not foreign aid wins public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries. Previous studies have, predominantly, taken a project-based approach in assessing the effects of foreign aid on public perceptions and attitudes in aid recipient nations. In contrast, this research assesses the effects of foreign aid and development projects on the national level. Since development projects, in general, are implemented in areas that are relatively secure and have less insurgent activities, such project-based approaches might suffer from selection bias and control for preexisting local conditions, both of which could contribute to conflicting findings reported by previous studies. The outcome of a project-based study (a specific project implemented in a given time and place) depends on the selection of the project and the pre-existing local conditions, which is often the case. In addition, project-based studies are usually conducted either during or immediately after the implementation of the project when the effects of the project are the strongest. Such data might be useful for collecting intelligence or conducting military operations in a given insurgency context, but inference based on such data about winning public hearts and

minds, which requires a longer time to build trust and confidence and to shape attitudes and perceptions, might be less accurate. Also, a project-based approach may not give us a full picture of the public attitudes, perceptions, and hearts and minds in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Libya, Syria and others where society is divided along the ethnic, religious, and linguistic fault lines. In these societies, a project-based approach may not capture the effects of a project on the attitudes and perceptions of neighboring villages or provinces, which may feel discriminated against, marginalized, or unfairly treated for not receiving similar or equal aid and development projects resulting in losing hearts and minds one project at a time. Wilder (2012), Research Director of Feinstein International Center at Tufts University, writes that given the zero-sum nature of the Afghan society, where one group's gain is often perceived as another's loss, development projects generated numerous complaints that "they got more than we did." Therefore, we believe the national level approach should be more theoretically and empirically sound approach in assessing the effects of development aid and projects in winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient nations. Consequently, this research, as the first research of its kind, will make a positive contribution to the existing body of knowledge and literature.

### CHAPTER III – METHODOLOGY

While altruism (the moral obligation of rich to the poor) has always been part of the foreign assistance equation, since the end of World War II foreign aid has been shaped primarily by two factors—geopolitics and security. A key geopolitical factor that determined and drove foreign aid from 1945 to 1991 was the Cold War (Alesina and Dollar 2000). During this period, foreign aid was widely used by the liberal democratic West, in general, and the United States, in particular, as a weapon in their ideological war against the communist autocracy of the Soviet Union to ensure a level of economic development that was necessary for the existence and continuity of pro-Western underdeveloped nations and to win over the uncommitted or neutral underdeveloped nations (Gimbel 1976; Radelet 2003). One of the main objectives of foreign aid during the Cold War period was to combat the spread of communist ideology, which the West saw as a major threat to its ideals (Zanger 2000; Dunning 2004). However, in the aftermath of Al Qaeda's terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, the war on terror and security objectives have been the driving forces of foreign aid (Miles 2012). Western donors, in general, and the United States, in particular, have used foreign aid as a tool to not only alleviate poverty, but also to combat extremism and terrorism by winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient nations (Young and Findley 2011). Fishstein and Wilder (2012, 41) write “one of the most powerful assumptions underpinning the belief in the stabilizing effects of aid projects is that these projects are popular and contribute to winning the support—or “hearts and minds”—of local communities.” Since perception matters a great deal in international relations, peacebuilding, and security, Western donors and the United States has used foreign aid as



an instrument of not only economic and political development in underdeveloped nations, but also to win public hearts and minds in the aid recipient nations as a weapon against insurgency, extremism, terrorism, and insecurity in the aftermath of the events of 9/11. Donors believe that the provision of the public goods and services wins public “hearts and minds” by generating goodwill and positive perceptions and attitudes among public in aid recipient nations, which can win public over to the donors’ and local government’s sides (Berman and et al. 2011; Beath and et al. 2017). Since social behavior is contingent on the behaviors of others—people respond to kindness with kindness, smile with smile, and lie with treachery (Fehr and Gächter 2000; Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005), it is argued that foreign aid wins public hearts and minds in aid recipient countries, which leads to positive attitudes and behaviors toward donors and local governments in the aid recipient nations that not only makes the implementation of development programs and projects easy, but also counters extremist feelings, attitudes, and behaviors toward donor nations and local government that extremist and terrorist organizations and leaders usually want to exploit (Dupont, Grabosky and Shearing 2003; Lyengar, Monten, and Hanson 2011).

The purpose of this dissertation is to assess whether or not foreign aid wins public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries by examining the cases of Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo, in which the United States and the international community have been involved and providing state-building, humanitarian, development and reconstruction aid to since 2001, 1995, 2003, and 1999, respectively. The research for this dissertation was designed in two parts, with the research methodology employing two types of survey approaches in a complementary fashion.

Part I of the research was designed to use the existing data from national surveys and public opinion polls conducted by reliable national and international organizations in Afghanistan (2001-2017), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-2017), Iraq (2003-2017), and Kosovo (1999-2017) that address any issues associated with receiver country perspectives on foreign aid. Part II of the research was designed to conduct a national survey in Afghanistan, with an estimated sample size of 2,500, to address the gaps in existing data from Part I. However, Afghanistan is a war zone with a very volatile war, violence and security situations and one of the most dangerous countries in the world for conducting national surveys. Due to deteriorations of the security situations in the country, which was posing potential risks and harm to both survey administrators and survey participants, the survey management team had no choice but to scale back the planned scope of the national survey in Afghanistan consistent with the University of Southern Mississippi's Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Human Subjects Protection Review Committee's research guidelines.

After the survey instrument was approved by the University of Southern Mississippi's Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Human Subjects Protection Review Committee and the research project approval letter was received, we traveled to Kabul City, the capital of Afghanistan, to put together the survey management team and to gather security information about the 34 provinces to conduct a safe and successful national survey in the country. Extensive meetings and discussions were conducted with locals with security knowledge, telephone calls were placed to contacts living in provincial capitals around the country, and informal inputs were solicited from government security personals regarding the security situation in the country and the

feasibility of conducting a safe and successful national survey in the country. The survey management team also looked into the safety and security of roads and highways that connect provincial capitals, the risk to survey administrators for physically carrying survey questioners and materials to and from provincial capitals, safety and security in provincial capitals for the survey administrators to live in and conduct surveys and for the survey participants, the presence of Taliban, Al Qaeda, Daesh, warlords, and any other warring factions and groups that oppose the government and its foreign supporters that may pose serious security threat to anyone working for or associated with the survey, government, the United States, and the international community. The data and findings indicated that not only the Taliban, Al Qaeda, Daesh, warlords and other anti-government warring factions that oppose the government and the international community in Afghanistan, but also government militias, warlords associated with government, and rogue government security forces and administrators could arrest, kidnap, imprison, and even kill survey administrators and participants for being part of a survey that is for a foreign country or institution or an individual associated with their arch-enemy--the United States. Not only unsafe provinces, roads, and highways posed serious problems for conducting a national survey in the country, but also government provincial security forces and administrators did not like the idea of surveys and collecting public information and opinions for the fear that such information would bring to light public complaints and voices and expose their shortcomings in performing their jobs, corruption, nepotism, bribery, or any other schemes or issues that they may be involved in which they fear would jeopardize their job, reputation, public image, or political careers. The security situation in the country has greatly deteriorated since 2014, after

the provision of security was transferred from foreign to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and the government has very little practical control in Kabul City, the capital, and beyond. The 2018 reports state that Taliban has presence in over 70% of the country and according to the Pew Research Center analysis of the U.S. Department of State data (2017) more Afghans than Iraqis, who worked for the U.S. government, have received the Special Immigration Visa to the United States (Radford and Krogstad 2017). The Special Immigration visa, which started for Iraq in 2007 and for Afghanistan in 2009, is for Afghans and Iraqis who worked as translators, interpreters, or performed any other jobs in Afghanistan and Iraq for the U.S. government, putting themselves and their families in danger. The United States has accepted over 70,000 Iraqis and Afghans from 2007 to 2017 on the Special Immigration visas, but two third of these visas are given to Afghans and only one third to Iraqis (Radford and Krogstad 2017). The majority of the Iraqis (68%) issued the Special Immigration visa entered the United States prior to 2014, but the majority of the Afghans (92%) issued the Special Immigration visa entered the United States after 2014—the year the provision of security was transferred from foreign troops to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Against this background and based on our own findings and in puts from locals and government officials about the potential risk and harm to survey administrators and participants in conducting a national survey in the country, the survey management team had no choice but to scale back the planned scope of the national survey in Afghanistan consistent with the University of Southern Mississippi’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Human Subjects Protection Review Committee’s research guidelines. Regrettably, we will use secondary survey data, as the only alternative, for the Afghan case, as we are doing with other cases.

### *Survey Research Method*

Forza (202, 155) writes, "...a survey involves the collection of information from individuals (through mailed questionnaires, telephone calls and personal interviews) about themselves or about social units to which they belong." Fink (2003, 1) defines a survey as a "...collection [of] information from or about people to describe, compare, or explain their knowledge, attitudes, and behavior." The survey method is one of the oldest and the most widely used existing methods of data collection about the feelings, attitudes, views, and perceptions of people in social science research (Rubin and Babbie 2016). According to Marsden and Wright (2010, 4), "...surveys have been conducted ever since people realized they needed information on the distribution and size of human communities and their social characteristics" and Charles Booth is credited for conducting the first surveys of modern form in the 1890s in London. Blair, Czaja, and Blair (2014, 1) write, "surveys are used by academic researchers, governments, businesses, political parties, media, and anyone who wants insight into what people are thinking and doing." Vus (2014, 1) states, "many criticisms of surveys are based on misunderstandings of what surveys can be and are based on examples of poor surveys and the inappropriate use of survey research."

Little or no observer subjectivity, good response rate, high representation, greater flexibility and convenience to participants, low researcher bias, better capability to collect a broad range of data (e.g., opinions, beliefs, values, attitudes, behaviors, etc.), extensive flexibility in data analysis, and high reliability are some of the most significant benefits of surveys. In addition, since in face-to-face survey respondents can ask questions for clarity, their answers, in most cases, are complete, accurate, and reflect their true feelings,

views, opinions, and/or habits. As a result, face-to-face survey data is closer to truth and highly reliable compared to data collected through mailed questionnaires or online surveys. However, compared to telephone or online surveys, in-person surveys are expensive and time-consuming (McNabb 2015). Furthermore, a poorly constructed survey instrument such as a badly designed questionnaire, vaguely phrased questions, and improper answer choices can result in misinterpretation of questions and misleading answers, which may undermine the validity and reliability of the survey findings (Bourque and Fielder 2003). Fowler (2014) writes that the design of the survey instrument and the procedure used to conduct a survey have a major effect on the quality and accuracy of the data collected, which we take both points serious for this research.

A sample survey is defined as a study that involves the study of a well-defined subset (or a sample) of a large population (Levy and Lemeshow 2009). The validity and reliability of inference from a sample to a finite population depends on the selection and measurement of the sample (Bryman 2016). Sampling methods are classified as probability and nonprobability. Probability samples are defined as samples in which every member of the targeted population has a known, non-zero probability of selection and members are selected randomly. However, nonprobability samples are defined as samples in which each member of the targeted population does not have known, non-zero probability of selection and members are selected in a nonrandom manner—based on availability, accessibility, or convenience. Unlike in probability sampling, in nonprobability sampling, the framework (selection of members and procedures of estimates) is different in each case. Callegaro et al. (2014) write that probability samples compared to nonprobability samples have lower bias levels. Probability sampling

methods include random sampling, systematic sampling, and stratified sampling. Random sampling is the purest form of probability sampling, through which each member of the population has an equal chance of selection. Systematic sampling, which is also known as the Nth order selection, is based on selecting the Nth order member of a given finite population. If all members of the population are known, systematic sampling is as effective as random sampling. However, if the population is large and the total number of members is unknown, systematic sampling cannot be used. Stratified sampling is used when the population under consideration has subsets that share one or more common characteristics. In such a case (when a population has subsets that share at least one or more characteristics), stratified sampling is superior to a random sampling method.

Yet, in general, random sampling is the purest form of probability sampling and the most commonly used sampling strategies in social science, in general, and in survey research, in particular, due to its high degree of representativeness, reduced sampling error, and greater generalizability, validity, and reliability compared to other forms of sampling (Levy and Lemeshow 2009). This dissertation uses random sampling, which is the most appropriate and widely used and accepted sampling method in survey research and making inferences from a sample to a finite population (Rossi et al. 2013). Because of their unknown representation of the population, nonprobability samples have limited potential for generalization beyond the sample. It is the norm and widely accepted to use probability samples if the goal is to generalize one's findings (Brown and Coombe 2015).

This dissertation gathers the data from a range of surveys and public opinion polls conducted by reliable national and international organizations in Afghanistan since 2001,

Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995, Iraq since 2003, and Kosovo since 1999, which address any concerns associated with receiver country perspectives on foreign aid. The Asia Foundation, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Pew Research Center, the Afghan Center for Socio-economic and Opinion Research, Democracy International, ABC News, and Gallup International have all conducted public surveys and opinion polls in Afghanistan, which cover public opinions and views on foreign aid, security, and economic and political development in the country. USAID, Pew Research Center, ORB International, the Iraqi Center for Research and Strategic Studies, and the D3 Systems of Vienna and KA Research Ltd. of Istanbul, Turkey have all conducted public opinion surveys and polls in Iraq. The Office of the UN Resident Coordinator in Bosnia and Herzegovina, National Democratic Institute, Balkan Barometer, and Center for Security Studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina have conducted surveys and public opinion polls in Bosnia and Herzegovina that cover general attitudes on the direction of the country, security, main problems and challenges facing public, economic growth, development and employment, confidence in domestic and international institutions and organizations, political participation, and the role of the international community and European Union in the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Kosovo Security Barometer, USAID, Pew Research Center, and Balkan Barometer have conducted public opinion surveys and polls in Kosovo, which cover national mood and attitudes on security, major problems facing the people and country, political and economic development, and social issues. These surveys and public polls are scientifically sound, nationally representative, ethnically balanced, and reliable in understanding and assessing public perspectives on foreign aid, the direction of the



country, and political and economic development. In addition, these surveys and public opinion polls allow us to collect, analyze, compare and contrast public opinions and perceptions data on foreign aid from a range of surveys and public opinion polls conducted by different reliable organizations and institutions in these countries. There are at least two advantages associated with this approach:

1. Data from different samples and different surveys and public opinion polls on the same topic are collectively more reliable, due to a larger sample size and fewer sampling errors, as the weaknesses of one sample are covered by the strength of other samples. Bartlett et al. (2001) argue that the sample size influences the detection of significant differences, relationships, and/or interactions. This is due to the fact that as the size of a sample increases, statistical power (defined as the probability of correctly rejecting a false null hypothesis or the ability to correctly detect an effect, if the effect truly exists (Button et al. 2013; Suresh and Chandrashekara 2012)) also proportionally increases and the margin of error proportionally decreases—an inverse relationship between sample size and margin of error. Collectively, rich and reliable data from a range of different samples and surveys and public opinion polls should lead to in-depth analysis, scientifically sound findings, and reliable conclusions (Levy & Lemeshow 2009; Borowiak & Shapiro 2014).
2. Gathering, assessing, and analyzing data from multiple surveys should result in large-scale and comprehensive sample size, both in terms of individual participants and cases, which should give the researcher more power to properly assess, analyze and answer research questions. Since there is an inverse relation

between standard error and sample size—standard error decreases as sample size increases—and a positive relation between sample size and power, other things being equal, a large sample should be more representative of the population, limiting the influence of outliers or extreme observations, and giving us higher confidence to interpret significant results and avoid errors.

## The Data

### *Afghanistan*

For Afghanistan, the study uses the Asia Foundation’s annual national survey data for the period of 2004-2017, Zogby Research Services 2011 survey data, and ABC News’s data of five national surveys’ conducted in Afghanistan in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, and 2010. The Asia Foundation, with financial support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other Western donors, has been conducting public opinion surveys in Afghanistan, *A Survey of the Afghan People*, since 2004. The annual survey, *A Survey of the Afghan People*, has gathered the views of more than 97,000 adult Afghan men and women, 18 years of age or older, representing more than 400 districts and all 34 provinces of the country since 2004. The *Survey* is the most comprehensive, reliable, and long-running nationwide survey of the attitudes and opinions of adult Afghan men and women. The data is publically available and free for download at <http://asiafoundation.org/afghansurvey>.

In December 2011, Zogby Research Services conducted surveys in Afghanistan, the United States, six Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates) and Iran in an effort to measure public attitudes toward the war in

Afghanistan, future of the country, and how Afghans see the world, the impact of war on their country, and their future. The surveys were conducted through face-to-face interviews as well as online collecting the opinions and views of more than 9,246 adult men and women. The data is public and free for download at <http://www.zogbyresearchservices.com>.

As part of its award-winning series, *Where Things Stands*, ABC News in partnership with BBC/ BBC World Service, German network ARD, and the Washington Post has sponsored five national opinion polls in Afghanistan (*Afghanistan: Where Things Stand* 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010). These surveys were conducted through face-to-face interviews by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR), Kabul, Afghanistan and have gathered the opinion and views of more than 6,520 adult Afghan men and women. The data is public and free for download at <http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/afghanistan-iraq-polls-things-stand/story?id=6627152>.

### *Iraq*

For Iraq, the study uses the 2018 Public Opinion Survey data, 2017 Arab Attitudes Survey data, 2017 National Survey on Iraq, 2016 Arab Opinion Index data, 2016 Arab Youth Survey data, the International Republic Institute's annual surveys for the period of 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 data, the Zogby Research Services 2011 survey data, the ABC News in partnership with the German network ARD, the Japanese network NHK, Time magazine, USA Today and the German newsmagazine

Der Spiegel surveys for the period of 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009, World Public Opinion.org 2006 survey data, and the 2004 National Survey of Iraq .

The 2018 public opinion survey was conducted by 1001IRAQITHOUGHTS.COM. The survey is based on a random sample of 1066 Iraqi men and women across all 18 provinces in the country. The data is public and can be downloaded at 1001IRAQITHOUGHTS.COM.

The 2017 Arab Attitudes Survey, which measures Arab attitudes toward the United States, U.S foreign policies toward the Middle East, and the American people is conducted by the Arab Center in Washington DC and is based on a random sample size of 3,200 men and women. The data is public and can be downloaded at arabcenterdc.org.

The 2017 National Survey on Iraq was conducted by the National Democratic Institute. The survey is based on the face-to-face interviews and gathered the opinions and attitudes of 1,338 respondents. The data is public and can be downloaded at [www.ndi.org](http://www.ndi.org).

The 2016 Arab Opinion Index, which measures public opinion across the Arab World, is conducted by the Washington, DC Arab Center's office of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS) in Doha, Qatar in 12 countries: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Tunisia. The data is based on face-to-face interviews with a random sample of 18,310 respondents equally divided between men and women and can be downloaded at [arabcenterdc.org](http://arabcenterdc.org).

The 2016 Arab Youth Survey was conducted by the International Polling Firm PSB in 16 countries in the Middle East and Africa—Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq,

Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirate (UAE), and Yemen. The data is based on face-to-face interviews with 3,500 Arab men and women, age 18 to 24, and can be download at [arabyouthsurvey.com](http://arabyouthsurvey.com).

The International Republic Institute's annual surveys of Iraqi people are conducted in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, which have gathered the opinions and views of more than 26,631 adult Iraqi men and women, 18 years of age or older. The data is public and free for download at [www.iri.org](http://www.iri.org).

In September 2011, Zogby Research Services conducted surveys in Iraq, the United States, six Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates) and Iran in an effort to measure public attitudes toward the war in Iraq, future of the country and people, and the aftermath of a U.S withdrawal. The surveys were conducted through face-to-face interviews as well as online collecting the opinions and views of more than 9,246 adult men and women. The data is public and free for download at <http://www.zogbyresearchservices.com>.

The ABC News in partnership with the German network ARD, the Japanese network NHK, Time magazine, USA Today and the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel has conducted annual surveys in Iraq in 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, and 2009. These surveys are conducted through face-to-face interviews by the D3 Systems of Vienna, Va., and KA Research Ltd. of Istanbul, Turkey and have gathered the opinion and views of more than 11,088 adult Iraqi men and women. The data is public and free for download at <http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/afghanistan-iraq-polls-things-stand/story?id=6627152>.

The World Public Opinion.org has conducted a public opinion survey in Iraq, *The Iraqi Public on the U.S. Presence and the Future of Iraq* in 2006. The data for the 2006 World Public Opinion.org survey, *The Iraqi Public on the U.S. Presence and the Future of Iraq*, is based on a face-to-face interviews with a random sample of 1,150 Iraqi adult men and women, 18 years of age or older and can be downloaded at WorldPublicOpinion.org.

The 2004 National Survey of Iraq was conducted by Oxford Research International with a sample size of 2,652, which measured public opinions and attitudes about major social, political and economic issues in the country. The data is public and can be downloaded at [www.oxfordresearch.com](http://www.oxfordresearch.com).

### *Bosnia and Herzegovina*

The data for Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on the 2017 public opinion survey conducted by the Center for Security Studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 2017, 2015, and 2013 socio-economic survey conducted by Prism Research & Consulting, the 2017 survey commissioned by the International Republic Institute's Center for Insights and Survey Research, the 2017, 2016, and 2015 Balkan Barometer surveys, the 2016 national survey conducted by IMPAQ International LLC, the 2015 public opinion polls conducted by the United Nations Resident Coordinator Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the 2000 World Bank Survey.

The 2017 public opinion survey conducted by the Center for Security Studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on face-to-face interviews with 1,000 randomly

selected adult citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, aged 18 and over. The data is public and can be downloaded at [WWW.POINTPULSE.NET](http://WWW.POINTPULSE.NET).

The 2017 socio-economic survey, *Socio-economic Perception of Young People in Bosnia and Herzegovina* and the 2015 and 2013 public opinion polls were conducted by Prism Research and Consulting and the data is based on face-to-face interviews with 4,200 randomly selected respondents age 15 to 35. The data is public and can be downloaded at [www.ba.undp.org](http://www.ba.undp.org).

The 2017 survey commissioned by the International Republic Institute's Center for Insights and Survey Research is based on face-to-face interviews with a randomly selected sample of 1,537 respondents, age 18 and older. The data is public and can be downloaded at [www.IRI.org](http://www.IRI.org).

The Balkan Barometer public opinion surveys of 2017, 2016, and 2015 were conducted in seven countries-- Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, and The Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia. The data is based on face-to-face interviews with a randomly selected sample of adult men and women aged 18 and older and gathers the views and opinions of more than 23,000 respondents. The data is public and can be downloaded at [www.rcc.int](http://www.rcc.int).

The 2016 national survey was sponsored by USAID and conducted by IMPAQ International, LLC. The data is based on 3,004 face-to-face interviews with a randomly selected sample of adult men and women aged 18 and older. The data is public and can be downloaded at [www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov).

The World Bank 2000 survey, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Diagnostic Surveys of Corruption*, is based on face-to-face interviews with 2,250 respondents (700 public

officials, 350 enterprise managers, 1,200 general public individuals), aged 18 and over. The data is public and can be downloaded at [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org).

### *Kosovo*

The data for Kosovo is based on the 2018 and 2016 Public pulse, 2018 survey on Challenges and Perspectives of Youth in Kosovo, 2018 and 2017 Kosovo Security Barometer, the August 2017 Kosovo public opinion poll, the 2017, 2016, and 2015 Balkan Barometer survey.

The 2018 and 2016 public pulse, which were supported by USAID and UNDP, is based on an opinion poll that surveyed 2,612 randomly selected Kosovo citizens over the age of 18. The data is public and can be downloaded at [www.ks.undp.org](http://www.ks.undp.org).

The 2018 survey on Challenges and Perspectives of Youth in Kosovo, which was supported by USAID and UNDP, is based on a random sample of 452 Kosovo youths age 14 to 35. The data is based on a survey and focused groups and can be downloaded at [www.ks.undp.org](http://www.ks.undp.org).

The 2018 and 2017 Kosovo Security Barometer is based on face-to-face interviews with a randomly selected sample of 2,218 respondents above 18 years of age. The data is public and can be downloaded at [www.QKSS.ORG](http://www.QKSS.ORG).

The August 2017 Kosovo public opinion poll, which was supported by USAID and conducted by National Democratic Institute, is based on face-to-face interviews with a nationally representative sample of 1,200 respondents. The data is public and can be downloaded at [www.ndi.org](http://www.ndi.org).



The Balkan Barometer public opinion surveys of 2017, 2016, and 2015 were conducted in seven countries-- Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, and The Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia. The data is based on face-to-face interviews with a randomly selected sample of adult men and women age 18 and older and gathers the views and opinions of more than 23,000 respondents. The data is public and can be downloaded at [www.rcc.int](http://www.rcc.int).

The 2015, 2013, and 2012 public opinion polls were sponsored by UNDP and USAID and conducted by Index Kosovo. The data is based on face-to-face interviews with a randomly selected sample of adult men and women age 18 and older and gathers the view and opinion of more than 3,876 respondents. The data is public and can be downloaded at [www.ks.undp.org](http://www.ks.undp.org).

## CHAPTER IV – DATA PRESENTATION

The international community in general and the United States and the European Union, in particular, have invested billions of aid dollars since 2001 in Afghanistan, since 2003 in Iraq, since 1995 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and since 1999 in Kosovo to win public hearts and minds as a hedge against insecurity, extremism, and terrorism through the provision of political, economic, and social development and change programs and projects. Chapter 4 presents data collected from national surveys and public opinion polls conducted by reliable national and international organizations in each of the four cases that address any issues associated with receiver country perspectives on foreign aid. The purpose of the chapter is to explore whether or not foreign aid is positively associated with an increase in positive public attitudes toward the donors of the foreign aid and the aid recipient state in these four cases. Data for Afghanistan is presented first. Data for Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo are presented next.

### *Afghanistan*

To gauge the perceptions and opinions of Afghans on the major problems facing their country, respondents were asked by the Asia Foundation survey in 2006, *In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole? And after that, what is the next biggest problem?* Unemployment (31%), insecurity (27%), poor economy (24%), corruption (18%), presence of Taliban (18%), and lack of education/schools/literacy (10%) were mentioned first or second (Qa & Qb combined) as the biggest problems facing the nation as a whole. In the 2015 Asia Foundation survey, insecurity (43%), corruption (24%), unemployment (22%), poor economy (13%), lack of

education/schools/literacy (6%), and presence of Taliban (6%) were specified first or second (Qa & Qb combined) as the biggest problems facing the country as a whole. Table 1 provides a more detailed longitudinal trend of the perceived biggest problems facing Afghanistan as a whole from 2006 to 2015. In addition, respondents were asked, *Generally speaking, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?* In the 2004 Asia Foundation survey, 64% of respondents indicated that generally speaking things in Afghanistan are moving in the right direction and only 11% said that things in the country are moving in the wrong direction. Peace/end of war (53%) was mentioned as the first reason and disarmament (35%) as the second reason for their optimism. Bad government (40%) and bad economy (30%) were mentioned by the respondents as the first and second reasons for their pessimism. However, in the 2017 Asia Foundation survey, only 33% of respondents said that things in Afghanistan were moving in the right direction and 61% of respondents said that things were moving in the wrong direction in the country. Reconstruction/rebuilding (34%) and good security (24%) were mentioned by the respondents as the first and second reason for their optimism. Insecurity (50%) and unemployment (27%) were identified by the respondents as their first and second reason for their pessimism. Age wise, in the same 2017 survey, Afghans over the age of 55 were less optimistic (27.7%) about the direction of the country compared to Afghans between the age of 18 to 25 (34.3%).

*Table 1 Biggest Problems Facing Afghanistan, 2006-2015*

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Insecurity	27%	46%	36%	36%	37%	38%	28%	30%	34%	43%
Unemployment	31%	27%	31%	35%	28%	23%	27%	25%	26%	22%
Corruption	18%	16%	14%	17%	27%	21%	25%	26%	28%	24%
Poor Economy	24%	19%	17%	20%	11%	10%	11%	10%	18%	13%
Lack of Education / schools / literacy	10%	5%	9%	11%	11%	10%	10%	9%	8%	6%
Presence of Taliban	18%	13%	13%	8%	8%	8%	8%	7%	7%	6%

Question-a: *In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole?*

Question-b *And after that, what is the next biggest problem?*

Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015.

Ethnically speaking, Pashtuns were more optimistic about the direction of the country (40.6%) compared to Tajiks (29.3%), Hazaras (26.2%), and other minority groups (including Turkmens, Aimaqs and others) (29.8%). Figure 2 provides the trend in public perception about the direction of the country from 2004 to 2017.




Figure 2. Public Perception of the Direction of Afghanistan, 2004-2017

Question: *Generally speaking, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?*

Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, *Afghanistan in 2004*, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.

To gauge public awareness of the development/reconstruction programs/projects implemented with foreign aid, respondents were asked by the Asian Foundation surveys (2006-2017), *Speaking of the past 12 months, do you know of, or have heard of any project or program, implemented with the foreign aid in this area, district, in the following fields?* [reconstruction/building roads/bridges, water supply, electricity supply, healthcare, education, de-mining, demilitarization/disarmament, reconstruction/programs

in agriculture, reconstruction programs in industry, building new mosques, humanitarian programs]. Fifty-nine percent of respondents in 2006, 2007, and 2008 stated that they were aware of one or more foreign-funded development/reconstruction projects/programs implemented in their area or district. In 2016 and 2017, only 34% of respondents said that they were aware of one or more foreign-funded development/reconstruction project(s) implemented in their area or district. Figure 3 provides the trend in public awareness of the development/reconstruction projects/programs implemented with foreign aid in the country from 2006 to 2017.




Figure 3. Public Awareness of Development/Reconstruction Projects/Programs Implemented With Foreign Aid, 2006-2017

Question: *Speaking of the past 12 months, do you know of, or have heard of any project or program, implemented with the foreign aid in this area, district, in the following fields? [reconstruction/building roads/bridges, water supply, electricity supply, healthcare, education, de-mining, demilitarization/disarmament, reconstruction/programs in agriculture, reconstruction programs in industry, building new mosques, humanitarian programs]*

Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, *Afghanistan in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017*.

Furthermore, in the same surveys, respondents were also asked, *Which country do you think has provided the most aid for the projects you mentioned to have been implemented in this area, district?* The United States was consistently identified by the majority of the respondents as the country that has provided the most aid for the reconstruction and development projects and programs that have been implemented in their area or district, followed by Japan, Germany, India, China, United Kingdom/Britain, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Canada, respectively. Table 2 provides a more comprehensive view of the top 10 donor nations in the order the respondents believe those states have provided aid for the development and reconstruction projects and programs in Afghanistan from 2006 to 2015.

*Table 2 Top 10 Donor Nations that Have Provided the Most Funding for the Reconstruction and Development Projects and Programs in Afghanistan, 2006-2015*

	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>
USA	69%	65%	66%	61%	42%	55%	40%	46%	39%
Japan	43%	35%	27%	24%	17%	25%	19%	20%	18%
Germany	36%	31%	27%	25%	16%	20%	14%	13%	11%
India	32%	24%	20%	19%	11%	17%	11%	16%	16%
China	15%	11%	11%	6%	5%	9%	5%	7%	7%
United Kingdom	18%	14%	11%	6%	5%	6%	4%	4%	3%
Iran	18%	13%	9%	6%	5%	6%	4%	4%	5%
Turkey	1%	11%	6%	5%	5%	9%	4%	7%	8%
Saudi Arabia	8%	7%	5%	5%	5%	6%	4%	4%	5%
Canada	0%	8%	6%	4%	4%	5%	3%	3%	4%

Question: *Which country do you think has provided the most funding for these types of projects in your area [reconstruction and development projects]? Is there another country that you believe has funded these projects?*

Source: The Asia Foundation, Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015.

In order to measure public opinion about the role of the Afghan government in providing aid for development and reconstruction programs and projects in the country since 2002, respondents were asked by the Asian Foundation 2008 survey, *Has the Afghan government or foreign sponsors been primarily responsible for providing most of the aid for the projects?* The Afghan government is viewed as the primary agency for



providing public amenities such as water supply for irrigation (49%), electricity (51%), education (49%), reconstruction and development programs in agriculture (48%), industry (42%), healthcare (39%), and building new mosques (73%). Foreign donors are believed to play a leading role in funding and delivering humanitarian projects and programs (45%), de-mining programs (45%), and large scale infrastructure programs and projects such as the development and reconstruction of roads, highways, and bridges (37%). Both the Afghan Government and foreign donors are believed (35%) to have a prominent role in demilitarization/disarmament initiatives in the country.

In the 2015 survey conducted by the Asia Foundation, respondents were also asked which country is responsible for implementing the reconstruction and development programs and projects in your area or district? Forty-four percent of respondents indicated they did not know who was responsible for implementing development programs and projects in their areas, but among those who knew, the most common answer was the Afghan government (including ministries of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, and the National Solidarity Program (NSP) ) (24.5%), followed by the United States (22.6%), Japan (11.9%), India (11.1%), German (6.7%), China (5.0%), and Turkey (4.6%). In the 2010 surveys conducted by ABC News/BBC/ARD/ and the Washington Post, respondents were asked, *Overall, please say if you think each of these countries is playing a positive, neutral, or negative role in Afghanistan now?* Thirty-six percent of respondents indicated they believed the United States was playing a positive role in Afghanistan, 76% of respondents said that Pakistan was playing a negative role in Afghanistan, and 51% of respondents said that India was playing a neutral role in Afghanistan. Figure 4 provides the list of donor nations

that respondents in 2010 said were playing positive, negative, and neutral roles in Afghanistan.




Figure 4. Countries that Play Positive, Negative, and Neutral Role in Afghanistan, 2010

Question: Overall, please say if you think each of these countries is playing a positive, neutral, or negative role in Afghanistan now?

Source: ABC News/BBC/ARD/ Washington Post Poll, *Afghanistan: Where Things Stand*, 2010.

To gauge public attitudes toward the United States, respondents were asked by the Asia Foundation survey of 2004 and the ABC News/BBC/ARD/ and the Washington Post surveys of 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, and 2010, *Is your opinion of the United States very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable?* Sixty-four percent of respondents in 2004 stated that they have a very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion toward the United States and 24% of respondents stated that they have

very unfavorable or somewhat unfavorable opinion of the United States. However, in 2010, 43% of respondents stated that they have a very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion toward the United States and 56% of respondents stated that they have very unfavorable or somewhat unfavorable opinion of the United States—a 21% decline in favorable opinion and a 32% increase in unfavorable opinion toward the United States.

Figure 5 provides a more detailed picture of the public opinions and attitudes toward the United States from 2004 to 2010.




Figure 5. Public Opinions and Attitudes Toward the United States in Afghanistan, 2004-2010

Question: *Is your opinion of the United States very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable?*

Source: The Asia Foundation, *A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2004*. ABC News/BBC/ARD/ Washington Post Poll, *Afghanistan: Where Things Stand*, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010.

Furthermore, respondents were also asked by both the Asian Foundation surveys and the ABC News/BBC/ARD/ Washington Post Polls, *I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all?* Eighty percent of respondents stated in 2005 that they have confidence in the present government to do its job. Sixty-five percent of respondents in 2007 stated that they have confidence in the international NGOs in Afghanistan to do their jobs. However, in 2017, 36% of respondents said that they have confidence in the present government and 42% of the respondents said that they have confidence in the international NGOs in the country to do their jobs—a 44% decline in public confidence in the government and a 23% decline in public confidence in international NGOs in the country to do their jobs. As for the United States, 68% of respondents in 2005 stated that they have confidence in the United States to do its job in the country, but in 2010 only 32% of respondents said that they have confidence in the United States to do its job in the country—a 36% decline in public confidence in the United States to do its job in the country. Figure 6 provides more details on public confidence in the present government, the United States, and the foreign-funded international NGOs to do their jobs in the country.




Figure 6. Public Confidence in the Present Government, the United States, and the International NGOs in Afghanistan to Do Their Jobs, 2005-2017

Question: *I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all?*

Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, *Afghanistan in 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.*

ABC News/BBC/ARD/ Washington Post Poll, *Afghanistan: Where Things Stand, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010.*

In term of security, majority of the survey respondents in 2006 in response to the question, *How would you rate the security situation in your area: excellent, good, fair, or poor?*, rated their security situation as excellent (17%), good (49%) and fair (26%). Only a small percentage of respondents (8%) rated their security situation as poor.

Comparatively, 76% of respondents from urban areas rated their security situation as either excellent or good compared to 63% of respondents from rural areas. Only 4% of respondents from urban areas and 9% of respondents from rural areas rated their security situations as poor. However, the security situation in Afghanistan has steadily

deteriorated over the past decade or so. In particular, since 2014, after the provision of security was transferred from foreign to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the country has witnessed a steady rise in insecurity, violence, and civilian and ANSF casualties. In 2017, survey participants were asked, *How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? Would you say you always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you and your family's safety?* Seventy-one percent of respondents stated that they always, often or sometimes fear for their own personal safety or security or that of their family. Regionally, 74% of respondents from the South West and East regions, 67% of respondents from the South East region, and 80% of respondents from the West region stated that they always, often or sometimes fear for their own or their family safety and security. Respondents from provinces with strong Taliban presence and activities such as Uruzgan (94%), Farah (90%), Kunduz (89%), Badghis (83%), Ghor (83%), and Herat (76%) reported a much higher level of fear for personal or family safety and security in 2017.

To gauge the effects of development and reconstruction projects and programs on the economic prosperity since 2001 in the country, respondents were asked, *If you think about your family, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less prosperous, or about as prosperous as under the Taliban government? Now, going even farther back to the period of the Soviet occupation, if you think about your family then and now, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less prosperous, or about as prosperous as under the Soviet occupation government?* Overall, fifty-four percent of respondents said that their family was more economically prosperous now than under the Taliban government and 26% said that their family was less prosperous now

than under the Taliban. Twelve percent reported no change in their family economic status compared to that of under the Taliban government. Fifty-nine percent of urban and 52% of rural reported improvement in their family economic situation compared to the Taliban era. Ethnically, 66% of Uzbeks, 61% of Tajiks, and 42% of Pashtuns said that they were more prosperous now than the period under the Taliban. As for the period under the Soviet occupation, 50% of respondents (47% in urban, 51% in rural) said that they were more prosperous now than the period under the Soviet occupation. Fifty-five percent of Hazaras, 55% of Uzbeks, 54% of Tajiks, and 44% of Pashtuns said that they were more prosperous now than the period under the Soviet occupation. Figure 7 provides a more complete view of the improvement in economic prosperity at present verses the Taliban period.




Figure 7. Household Economic Prosperity at Present Verses the Taliban Period, 2006-2012

Question: *If you think about your family, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less prosperous, or about as prosperous as under the Taliban government?, Now, going even farther back to the period of the Soviet occupation, if you think about your family then and now, would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less prosperous, or about as prosperous as under the Soviet occupation government?*

Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, *Afghanistan in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012.*

In addition, to further gauge the economic situation of the country, respondents were asked, *Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? a) Financial situation of your household, b) Employment opportunities, c) Availability of products in the market.* In 2007, 10% of respondents said that their household financial situation got worse compared to last year, 40% of the respondents said that job opportunity got worse compared to one year ago and 41% of the respondents



said that availability of products in the Market got worse compared to last year. However, in 2017, 33% of respondents said that their household financial situation got worse compared to last year, 58% of respondents stated that job opportunity got worse compared to last year and 36% of respondents said that the availability of products in the market got worse compared to one year ago. Over all, since 2007, more and more respondents are stating that their households are worse off in terms of financial wellbeing, employment opportunity, and availability of products in the markets. Figure 8 below provides more information about the three household's economic indicators in the country from 2007 to 2017.




Figure 8. Economic Indicators Worse Compared to One Year Ago, 2007-2017

Question: *Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? a) Financial situation of your household, b) Employment opportunities, c) Availability of products in the market.*

Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2007 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2015, 2016, 2017.

In the 2011 survey conducted by the Zogby Research Services, respondents were asked, *In your opinion, are the Afghani people better off/worse off than they were before NATO entered?* Seventy-eight percent of respondents said that the Afghan people are worse off than they were before NATO entered the country; 22% of respondents said that the Afghan people are the same. In response to the same question, 27% of Americans said that the Afghan people are better off and 17% of Americans said that the Afghan people are worse off than they were before NATO entered Afghanistan; 38% of Americans said that the Afghan people are the same. In response to the question, *Since NATO forces entered Afghanistan, how do you feel the following areas of life have been impacted?* Eighty-six percent of respondents said political freedom, 36% said economic development and employment, 42% said education, 50% said health care, and 72% said personal safety and security of Afghans are negatively affected since NATO entered Afghanistan. Respondents were asked, *Who do you feel benefited most from the war in Afghanistan?* The overwhelming majority (76%) said the United States, 50% said Pakistan, 40% said Iran, 26% said warlords, 3% said Al-Qaeda, 3% said India, and 2% said Taliban benefited most from the war in Afghanistan. In response to the same question, 33% of Americans said the Afghan people, 26% said the United States, 19% said warlords, 8% said Pakistan, 8% said Taliban, 7% said Al-Qaeda, 3% said Iran, and 1% said India benefited most from the war in Afghanistan. In response to the question, *When NATO leaves your country, do you feel that each of these neighboring or interested countries will make a positive or negative contribution to your country's security and economic development?* Eighty-four percent said the United States will make a negative contribution, 46% said India will make a negative contribution, and 60% said Iran will

make a negative contribution to the security and economic development of Afghanistan after NATO leaves the country. But 98% said Pakistan, 46% said Turkmenistan, 51% said Tajikistan, 47% said Uzbekistan, 50% said China, 67% said Saudi Arabia, and 66% said United Arab Emirate will make positive contributions to the security and economic development of Afghanistan after NATO leaves the country. In response to the question, *indicate your attitude towards these leaders*. Eighty-seven percent said that they have very unfavorable attitudes toward Hamid Karzai, 97% said that they have very unfavorable attitudes toward George W. Bush and Barak Obama, but 77% said that they have a very favorable attitudes toward Taliban. In response to the question, *Indicate your attitude—favorable/unfavorable—toward each of the following countries?* Ninety-seven percent said that they have very unfavorable attitudes toward the United States, 57% said that they have very unfavorable attitudes toward Iran, 34% said that they have very unfavorable attitudes toward India, and 15% said that they have very unfavorable attitudes toward China.

### *Iraq*

To gauge public views on the overall direction of Iraq since the U.S.-led coalition invasion of the country in Spring of 2003, respondents were asked, *Do you think that Iraq is generally heading in the right direction or the wrong direction?* In 2004, 50.73% of respondents said that Iraq is moving in the right direction and 39.32% said that Iraq is moving in the wrong direction. However, in 2012, a year after the complete withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq, 35% of respondents said that Iraq is moving in the right direction and 55% of respondents said that Iraq is moving in the wrong direction. In

2017, 59% of Iraqi said that things are moving in the wrong direction in the country.

Lacks of security, services, government corruption, and unemployment have been the key issues for their pessimism. Figure 9 provides more details on the public perceived direction of the country from 2004 to 2017.




Figure 9. Public Attitudes About How Things Are Going in Iraq, 2004-2017

Question: *Do you think that Iraq is generally heading in the right direction or the wrong direction?*

Source: International Republican Institute, *Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion*, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012.

Question: *Generally speaking, do you think that things in Iraq are going in the right direction, or do you think things are going in the wrong direction?*

Source: National Democratic Institute, *National Survey on Iraq*, March – April 2017.

To get a sense of how things are going in Iraqis’ daily life, respondents were asked, *Overall, how would you say things are going in your life these days – very good, quite good, quite bad, or very bad?* In February 2004, 70% of respondents said that things are going good (very good or quite good) in their lives and only 29% of

respondents said that things are going bad (very bad or quite bad) in their lives. But in 2007, 39% of respondents said that things are going good—a 31- point decline from 2004, and 61% of respondents said that things are going bad in their lives—a 32-point increase from 2004. In 2009, respondents were asked whether foreign aid organizations were doing a great deal, some, a little or nothing at all to provide service in their community. Seventy-seven percent of respondents said that foreign aid organizations are doing very little to nothing to provide services in their community. Twenty-one percent of respondents said that foreign aid organizations are doing a great deal or some work in providing services in their community. Figure 10 provides comparative public views about the national government, the provincial government, and foreign aid organizations in providing service in 2009.




Figure 10. How Each Group is Doing in Providing Services in Your Community, 2009

Question: *For each group I name, please tell me how much that group is doing to provide services in your community – a great deal, some, a little or nothing at all?*

Source: ABC/BBC/NHK Poll, Iraq: Where Things Stand 2009.

In 2004, respondents were asked, *Which countries/organizations should play a role in the rebuilding of Iraq?* Japan (35.9%) and the United States (35.70%) were the top two countries that respondents said should play a role in the rebuilding of Iraq followed by France (21.60%), the United Kingdom (21.50%), and Germany (16.70%). Figure 11 provides a view of the countries that Iraqis in 2004 said should play a role in the rebuilding of their country.




Figure 11. Countries that Should Play a Role in The Rebuilding of Iraq, 2004

Question: *Which countries/organizations should play a role in the rebuilding of Iraq?*  
 Source: Oxford Research International, *National Survey of Iraq 2004*.

However, to gauge public views on which country(s) should not play a role in the rebuilding of Iraq, respondents were asked in 2004, *Which countries/organizations should not play a role in the rebuilding of Iraq?* Israel (37%) and Iran (19%) were sated as the top two countries that should not play a role in the rebuilding of Iraq followed by

Kuwait (17%) and the United States (14%). Figure 12 provides a view of the countries that Iraqis in 2004 said should not play a role in the rebuilding of their country.




Figure 12. Countries that Should Not Play a Role in the Rebuilding of Iraq, 2004

Question: *Which countries/organizations should not play a role in the rebuilding of Iraq?*  
Source: Oxford Research International, *National Survey of Iraq 2004*.

To get a sense of the public perception on the effects of U.S. military presence on the security situation of the country, respondents were asked, *Do you think the US military presence in Iraq is currently a stabilizing force or that it is provoking more conflict than it is preventing?* Twenty-one percent of respondents in 2006 said that the U.S. military force in the country is a stabilizing force. However, the overwhelming majority (78%) of respondents said that the U.S. military force is provoking more conflicts than it is preventing in the country. Figure 13 provides more details. To measure public confidence in the U.S. and UK forces, respondents were asked in 2003, *How much confidence do you have in [U.S. and UK forces] - is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?* The

results indicate that Iraqis did not have much confidence in the U.S. and UK forces in their country. Seventy-one percent of respondents in 2003, 66% of respondents in 2004, 78% of respondents in 2005, 82% of respondents in 2007, 79% of respondents in 2008, and 73% of respondents in 2009 said that they have no confidence (not very much or none at all) in the U.S. and UK forces in the country. Only nineteen percent of respondents in 2003 and 27% of respondents in 2009 said that they have confidence (a great deal or quite a lot) in the U.S. and UK forces in the country. Figure 14 provides public confidence in the U.S. and UK forces in Iraq from 2003 to 2009.




Figure 13. Effects of the U.S. Military Presence on Security in Iraq, September 2006

Question: *Do you think the US military presence in Iraq is currently a stabilizing force or that it is provoking more conflict than it is preventing?*

Source: World Public Opinion.ORG, *The Iraqi Public on the U.S. Presence and the Future of Iraq*, 2006.

Compared to confidence in the U.S. and UK forces in the country, Iraqis have more confidence in their national government. Thirty-nine percent of respondents in



2004 and 61% of respondents in 2009 said that they have a great deal of confidence or a lot of confidence in their government. Figure 15 provides more details on public confidence in the Iraqi government from 2004 to 2009. But in a most recent survey conducted in 2018, 79% of Iraqis said that they have low or no confidence in their government. Lack of security, services, government corruption, and employment opportunities were the main reasons for their lack of confidence in the government.




Figure 14. Public Confidence in the U.S. and U.K. Forces in Iraq, 2003-2009

Question: *How much confidence do you have in [U.S. and UK occupation forces] - is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?*

Source: ABC/BBC/NHK Poll, Iraq: Where Things Stand 2009.




Figure 15. Public Confidence in the Iraqi Government/Governing Council, 2004-2009

Question: *How much confidence do you have in [national government of Iraq] - is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?*

Source: ABC/BBC/NHK Poll, Iraq: Where Things Stand 2009.

To gauge the trend in the provision of basic services in the country, respondents were asked, *Now I am going to read a list of issues. For each one please tell me whether you feel that the situation has gotten better or gotten worse over the last year.* Sixty percent of respondents said that security got better, but 60% of respondents said that the provision of electricity, 63% of respondents said that unemployment, 62% of respondents said that government corruption, 19% of respondents said that wages and salaries, and 52% of respondents said that basic services such as water, sewage, got worse over the last year. Figure 16 provides more details on the provision of basic services in the country in 2010.




Figure 16. Provision of Basic Services Compared to One Year Ago in Iraq, 2010

Question: *Now I am going to read a list of issues. For each one please tell me whether you feel that the situation has gotten better or gotten worse over the last year.*

Source: International Republican Institute, *Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion*, June 3-July 3, 2010.

In August 2010, a year before the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq, respondents were asked, *I am going to read you a list of issues. Please tell me for each one whether you think it is a significant problem, somewhat of a problem, not really a problem or not a problem at all in Baghdad.* Ninety-six percent of respondents said that bribes and kick-backs, 96% of respondents said that not implementing the laws, 95% of respondents said that wrong person in the wrong position, 95% of respondents said nepotism, 93% of respondents said no accountability in the government, and 78% of respondents said lack

of transparency in the government were problems with the central government. Figure 17 depicts public perceived major issues with the Iraqi government in 2010.




Figure 17. Iraqi's Attitudes Toward Issues/Problems in Baghdad, 2010

Question: *I am going to read you a list of issues. Please tell me for each one whether you think it is a significant problem, somewhat of a problem, not really a problem or not a problem at all in Baghdad.*

Source: International Republic Institute, Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion, August 30, 2010.

To gauge Iraqis' attitudes toward the U.S.-led invasion of their country in Spring of 2003, respondents were asked in 2004, *From today's perspective and all things considered, was it absolutely right, somewhat right, somewhat wrong or absolutely wrong that U.S.-led coalition forces invaded Iraq in spring 2003?* In February 2004, 48% of respondents said that it was absolutely or somewhat right that U.S.-led coalition forces invaded Iraq and 39% of respondents said that it was absolutely or somewhat

wrong that the U.S.-led coalition forces invaded Iraq in Spring of 2003. However, in 2009, only 42% of respondents said that it was absolutely or somewhat right, a 6 point decline, that the U.S.-led forces invaded Iraq and 56% of respondents said that it was absolutely or somewhat wrong, a 17 point increase, that the U.S.-led forces invaded Iraq in Spring of 2003. Figure 18 provides more details on the attitudes of Iraqis toward the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of their country.




Figure 18. Iraqis' Attitudes Toward the U.S.-led Invasion of Their Country in Spring of 2003, 2004-2009

Question: *From today's perspective and all things considered, was it absolutely right, somewhat right, somewhat wrong or absolutely wrong that U.S.-led coalition forces invaded Iraq in spring 2003?*

Source: ABC/BBC/NHK Poll, Iraq: Where Things Stand 2009.

Furthermore, in terms of ethnicity, the overwhelming majority of Sunnis (89%), about half of the Shi'a (49%), and 19% of Kurds in 2009 said that it was absolutely or somewhat wrong for the U.S.-led coalition forces to invade Iraq in the spring of 2003. In the 2011 survey conducted by Zogby Research Services, respondents were asked, *Do you*

*think that the Iraqi people are better off/worse off than they were before the American forces entered their country?* Thirty percent of Iraqis, 37% of Egyptians, 25% of Jordanians, 16% of Saudis, 22% of Lebanese, 31% of Tunisians, 30% of United Arab Emiratis, and 25% of Iranians said that the people of Iraq are better off and 42% of Iraqis, 41% of Egyptians, 61 % of Jordanians, 66% of Saudis, 58% of Lebanese, 20% of Tunisians, 48% of United Arab Emiratis, and 52% of Iranians said that the people of Iraq are worse off than they were before the American forces entered their country. However, 39% of Americans said that the people of Iraq are better off and only 18% of Americans said that the people of Iraq are worse off than they were before the U.S. forces entered their country.

Iraqis were also asked, in the same survey, *since U.S. forces entered Iraq, how do you feel the following areas of life have been affected?* Forty-eight percent of Iraqis said political freedom, 66% of Iraqis said economic development and employment, 47% of Iraqis said education, 48% of Iraqis said health care, 72% of Iraqis said personal safety and security, 52% of Iraqis said relations with neighboring countries, 59% of Iraqis said government, 37% of Iraqis said women's right, and 36% of Iraqis said religious freedom have been negatively impacted since the United States entered Iraq. In response to a question, *Who benefited the most from the war in Iraq?*, the overwhelming majority in Iraq (48%), Egypt (88%), Jordan (66%), Saudi Arabia (58%), Lebanon (86%), Tunisia (81%), the United Arab Emirates (47%), and Iran (50%) said that the United States, not the people of Iraq, benefited the most from the war in Iraq. However, 39% of Americans said that the Iraqi people and 22% said that the United States benefited the most from the war in Iraq.

In the same survey, to measure Iraqi attitudes toward the United States and neighboring countries, Iraqis were asked in 2011, *Indicate your attitude towards the following countries*. Majority of Iraqis (67%) said that they have an unfavorable attitude toward the United States. Only 26% of respondents expressed positive attitudes toward the United States. Figure 19 provides a complete picture of the Iraqis' attitudes toward the United States and neighboring countries.




Figure 19. Iraqis' Attitudes Toward the United States and Neighboring Countries, 2011

Question: *Indicate your attitude towards the following countries [U.S, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, UAE, China].*

Source: Zogby Research Services, Iraq: The War, Its Consequences and the Future, 2011.

Looking forward to the future, Iraqis were asked, *Which of the following roles do you see the United States playing in your country's future?* Thirty-three percent of Iraqis said that the United States would be a source of foreign interference in the

future of their country. Figure 20 depicts Iraqis perceived future role of the United States in their country.




Figure 20. Role of the United States in the Future of Iraq, 2011

Question: *Which of the following roles do you see the United States playing in your country's future?*

Source: Zogby Research Services, Iraq: The War, Its Consequences and the Future, 2011.

In the same survey, U.S respondents were asked, *Do you feel the war in Iraq was worth it?* Twenty-six percent of respondents (17% of Democrats and 42% of Republicans) said yes, the war in Iraq was worth it, but 56% of respondents (75% of Democrats and 32% of Republicans) said no, the war in Iraq was not worth it.

Furthermore, in the 2016 Arab Youth Survey, respondents were asked, *do you consider [U.S.] a strong ally, somewhat of an ally, somewhat of an enemy, or a strong enemy of your country?* The overwhelming majority (93%) of the Iraqis aged 18-24 said that they consider the United States as an enemy of their country and only 6% said that they consider the United States as an ally of their country. In the 2017 Arab attitudes survey,



which measures Arab attitudes toward the United States, American foreign policies toward the Middle East, and the American people, 42% of Arabs expressed negative attitudes toward the United States, 61% of Arabs expressed negative attitudes toward the U.S foreign policies toward the Arab world, and only 25% of Arabs expressed negative attitudes toward the American people.

### *Bosnia and Herzegovina*

In the 2015 survey, commissioned by the Office of U.N. Inspector in Bosnia and Herzegovina, respondents were asked, *Who do you find mostly responsible for the Bosnia and Herzegovina war from 1992 to 1995?* In general, 39.5% of respondents stated that they hold the international community responsible for the war followed by Serbia (23.3%), Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina (11.4%), politicians (4.9%), and Bosniaks (4.4%). Ethnically, 33% of Bosnians and 41.7% of Croats blame Serbs for the war, but the overwhelming majority of Serbs (74.8%) blame the international community for the 1992-1995 war. Respondents were also asked, *In your opinion, what are the biggest problems and challenges that Bosnia and Herzegovina is currently facing?* Corruption, economy, and politicians were listed as the major problems facing the nation. Figure 21 depicts the public perception of the top three major problems facing the nation.




Figure 21. Top Three Major Problems Facing Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2015

Question: *In your opinion, what are the biggest problems and challenges that Bosnia and Herzegovina is currently facing?*

Source: The United Nations Resident Coordinator Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Public Opinion Poll Results: Analytical Report*, 2015.

According to the World Bank Survey (2000), 60% of the general public, 54% of the public officials, and 52% of enterprise managers stated that corruption is widespread in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the 2017 public opinion survey conducted by the Center for Security Studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the majority of respondents (60%) stated that corruption is widespread in government institutions. Seventy-four percent of respondents stated that inspections/inspectionates are the most corrupt in the country. Health care institutions and Parliament are in second place (72%) when it comes to corruption, according to the survey. Four institutions, which should be a barrier to corruption, share the third place when it comes to corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina—the Police, the Judiciary, the Prosecutor’s Office, and the customs service

(71%). The fourth place is shared by municipal/city authority (68%), the education system (64%), the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption and the Coordination of the Fight Against Corruption and the media (60%). None-governmental organizations (NGOs) are placed in fifth place (54%), when it comes to corruption in the country. In the Balkan Barometer 2017 survey, respondents were asked, *Did your household face the following problems (even at least once) during the past 12 months?* Respondents said that they were unable (at least once in the past 12 months) to pay rent or utility bills (14%), to pay instalment on a loan (11%), to keep their home adequately warm (11%), to afford food, clothes and other basic supplies (10%), and to afford at least one week of holiday away from home (if wanted to) (38%).

According to the 2017 Survey, Socio-economic Perceptions of Young People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the majority of young people, aged 15 to 30, (61.1%) believed that their quality of life is worse than the quality of life of their parents when they were young. The overwhelming majority of respondents (76.8%) believed that development in Bosnia and Herzegovina is stagnant and government authority does not properly address the economic (87%), social (86.7%), and political (80.3%) problems in the country. Furthermore, 75.2% of respondents said that the Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities and leading political parties do not have the will and capacity to take part in constructive politics and social dialogue. About two-third of respondents (67.3%) said that they would participate in peaceful protests for a goal that they care for but 24% among respondents who would not participate in peaceful protests said that they believe such protests would not change things for the better. Unemployment 96.8%, increased poverty 96.4%, and employment insecurity 95.2% are the top three socio-economic

problems facing the society in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Figure 22 presents youth perception of the alarming problems facing the country in 2017




Figure 22. Top Five Major Socio-economic Problems Facing Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017

Question: *In your view, how alarming are the following problems for the society in Bosnia and Herzegovina?*

Source: Prism Research & Consulting, *Socio-econ Perception of Young People in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 2017.

In response to the question, *Who do you hold most accountable for those problems*, respondents in the 2015 survey, commissioned by the Office of U.N. Coordinator in Bosnia and Herzegovina, stated that authorities (87.40%), politicians (87.20%), the international community (43.90%), citizens (23.00%), media (8.80%), and European Union (8.30%) are responsible for the problems in the country. As for confidence in domestic and international institutions, respondents said that they have more confidence in their police force (60.80%), followed by religious leaders (55.20%),

European Union (48.70%), the army (48.70%), and the U.N. (47.20%) respectively. The lowest level of confidence was reported for the political parties (14.30%) in the country.

Figure 23 provides details about public trust in public institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2017.




Figure 23. Trust in Public Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017

Question: *How much do you trust the following institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina?*

Source: Public Opinion Survey, Center for Security Studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2017.

In the 2015 survey, commissioned by the Office of the U.N. Resident Coordinator in Bosnia and Herzegovina, respondents were asked, *Which countries and organizations [do] you believe provide the majority of financial aid for Bosnia and Herzegovina?* The E.U. (51.7%), followed by Turkey (51.2%), the United States (44%), U.N. (32.80%), and Saudi Arabia (27.90%) were stated by respondents as the top five countries and organizations that provide the majority of foreign aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Figure

24 provides the public perception of the top five countries and organizations that provide the majority of foreign aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015.




Figure 24. Countries and Organizations that Provide the Majority of Foreign Aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2015

Question: *Which countries and organizations you believe provide the majority of financial aid for Bosnia and Herzegovina?*

Source: The United Nations Resident Coordinator Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Public Opinion Poll Results: Analytical Report, 2015.*

In the same survey, respondents were also asked, *In your opinion, what are the three most important priorities of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina?* The overwhelming majority of respondents (94.6%) stated economic development followed by the development of certain sectors such as education and health care (65.2%), and institutional development (39.5%) as the three most important priorities of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, respondents were asked, *What would most likely happen if all international*

*representatives would give up on the engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina?* Thirty-six point seven percent of respondents said that domestic leaders would be forced to take the responsibility and move forward, 25.8% of respondents said that the situation would get worse, but it would not cause a breakup or conflict in the country, 14.1% of respondents said that Bosnia and Herzegovina would fall apart, 11.3% said that Bosnia and Herzegovina would stagnate, but nothing would happen, 7.2% of respondents said that eventually the war would break out again. In the same survey, respondents were asked, *Which of the following groups has the most power in Bosnia and Herzegovina?* Forty-three point one percent of respondents said that leaders of major political parties have more power in the country, followed by leaders chosen in the elections (19.1%), the United States (14.3%), criminals' underground (8.3%), and the E.U. (7.2%).

In the 2017 survey, commissioned by the International Republic Institute's Center for Insights and Survey Research, respondents were asked, *What is your opinion of the role of the United States, Russia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia in Bosnia? Is it mostly positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative or mostly negative?* Thirty-nine percent of respondents said that the United States play mostly or somewhat positive role in the country, but 45% of respondents believed that the United States play mostly or somewhat negative role in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As for the role of Russia in the country, 51% of respondents said that Russia plays mostly or somewhat positive role and 42% of respondents said that it plays mostly or somewhat negative role in the country. Fifty-five percent of respondents said that Turkey plays mostly or somewhat positive role in the country and 37% of respondents said it plays mostly or somewhat negative role in the country. As for the role of Saudi Arabia in the country, 38% of respondents stated that it

plays mostly or somewhat positive role in the country, but 48% of respondents said that Saudi Arabia plays mostly or somewhat negative role in the country. In the same survey, in response to the question, *Do you agree or disagree that maintaining strong relations with the United States, Russia, Turkey, the European Union, Germany, and United Kingdom is in Bosnia and Herzegovina's national interest*, the majority of respondents agreed that maintaining strong relations with the United States (72%), Russia (69%), Turkey (73%), the E.U. (86%), Germany (86%), and the United Kingdom (72%) were in the national interest of the country. Furthermore, survey respondents were asked in the same survey, *In your opinion which of the listed countries is Bosnia and Herzegovina's greatest ally*, Turkey (26%), Germany (24%), Russia (16%), U.S (9%), China (3%), and UK (1%) were listed as the greatest ally of the country. As for the role of NATO, respondents were asked, *How do you view the role of NATO in the world: mostly positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative, or mostly negative?* Fifty-four percent of respondents said that they view the role of NATO in the world mostly or somewhat positive and 40% of respondents said that they view it as somewhat or mostly negative. Furthermore, 53% of respondents said that NATO is most closely associated with stability and security in the world, but 40% of respondents said that NATO is most closely associated with conflict and instability in the world.

In the 2017 Balkan Barometer survey, in response to the question, *In your opinion which two assets are most important for finding a job today*, personal contact (57%) and Network of family and friends in high places (36%) were listed as the two most important assets to find a job in the country. Only 24% of respondents stated the level of one's qualification/education and 15% of respondents stated professional experience as two of



the most important assets for finding a job. Respondents were also asked, *What are the two main obstacles to those in your household who do not work, to get a good job?*

Again, the majority of respondents (56%) said that not knowing the right people and lack of jobs (35%) were the two most important obstacles to get a job. In response to another question, *Would you consider leaving and working abroad*, 50% of respondents said yes they would be willing to move and work abroad, but 45% of respondents said no. Figure 25 provides more details.




Figure 25. Public Attitudes Toward Leaving Bosnia and Herzegovina to Live and Work Abroad, 2015-2017

Question: *Would you consider living and working abroad?*

Source: Balkan Barometer, 2015, 2016, 2017.

In the 2015 survey, commissioned by the Office of the U.N. Resident Coordinator in Bosnia and Herzegovina, respondents were asked, *To what extent are you willing to take part in the following activities?* Thirty-seven point three percent said that they would participate in demonstrations or protests, 2.6% said that they would use violence or force

in demonstrations or protests, and 36.7% said that they are ready to leave Bosnia and Herzegovina. Figure 26 provides a complete picture.




Figure 26. Public Willingness in Bosnia and Herzegovina to Take Part in the Following Activities, 2015

Question: *To what extent are you willing to take part in the following activities?*  
 Source: The United Nations Resident Coordinator Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Public Opinion Poll Results: Analytical Report, 2015.*

In the 2017 survey, commissioned by the International Republic Institute’s Center for Insights and Survey Research, respondents were asked, *If you could only have one or the other, which is more important to you: a democratic system of government or prosperous economy?* Fifty-one percent of respondents said that prosperity is definitely

or somewhat more important to them than democracy, but 41% of respondents said that democracy is definitely or somewhat more important to them than economic prosperity. Also, in the same survey, respondents were asked, *If you had a choice between a secular state or a religious state, which would you prefer to live in?* The overwhelming majority of respondents (80%) stated that they absolutely or somewhat prefer to live in a secular state, but 14% of respondents said that they somewhat or absolutely prefer to live in a religious state.

### *Kosovo*

In the August 2017 Public Opinion Poll respondents were asked, *Are things in Kosovo going in the right direction or wrong direction?* Only 16% of respondents said that things in Kosovo are going in the right direction. Thirty-nine percent of respondents said that things are going neither in the right nor in the wrong direction and 39% of respondents said that things were moving in the wrong direction in the country. Corruption (74%), unemployment (64%), nepotism in employment (26%), illegal migration (6%), political violence (6%), and terrorism (5%) were listed as the major problems and reasons for their pessimism.

As for corruption, political institutions (executive, parliament, mayors, presidency and local government officials) are perceived as the most corrupted followed by the judiciary branch in the country. Eighty-four percent of respondents believe that politicians have no real interest in fighting corruption in the country because they benefit from it. According to the Kosovo Security Barometer (2018), which measures public trust in security and justice institutions, only 14% of Kosovars trust the government and

65% of Kosovars do not trust the government. In addition, 47% of Kosovars do not trust courts and 40% do not trust prosecution in the country. However, 66% of Kosovars trust NATO-led Kosovo Force and NATO missions in the country. In the same survey, respondents were asked how safe they feel at home, in their neighborhoods, in their villages or towns, and in Kosovo as a whole. Eight-five percent of respondents said that they feel safe at home and only 14% of respondents said that they do not feel safe at home. In addition, 82% of respondents said that they feel safe in their neighborhoods and 75% said that they feel safe in their villages/towns. In contrast, 17% of respondents and 25% of respondents said that they feel unsafe in their neighborhoods and villages/towns, respectively. As for the country as a whole, 54% of respondents said that they feel safe and 46% of respondents said that they do not feel safe, in general, in Kosovo.

To gauge the household financial situation, in the 2017 Balkan Barometer survey, respondents were asked, *How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?* Forty-three percent of respondents said that they were completely or mostly satisfied with their household financial situation, but 57% of respondents stated that they were completely or mostly unsatisfied with their household financial situation. Respondents were also asked, *What do you think are the two most important problems facing your economy?* Unemployment (67%) and corruption (62%) were the two perceived most important problems facing the economy in the country. In the same survey, respondents were asked, *Did your household face the following problems (even at least once) during the past 12 months?* Twenty-two percent of respondents said that they were unable to pay rent or utility bills, 16% of respondents said that they were unable to pay installment on a loan, 8% said that they were unable to keep home adequately warm,

7% said they were unable to afford food, clothes and other basic supplies, and 35% of respondents said that they could not afford one week holiday away from home (if wanted to) at least once in the past 12 months.

In the 2017 public opinion poll, conducted by the National Democratic Institute, respondents were asked, *Do you expect that the general economic and political situation in Kosovo will improve, worsen or remain the same as it is today?* Forty-five percent of respondents said that the general economic and political situation in Kosovo will improve, 38% of respondents said that they do not expect any changes, and 10% of respondents said that it will worsen. Kosovars are divided on whether or not the country is a democracy. In the same 2017 public opinion poll, 36% of respondents stated that Kosovo is a democracy, but there is still room for improvement, 22% said that Kosovo is not a democracy, as it only delivers for a small group of individuals, 15% said that Kosovo is not a stable democracy, and country risks moving toward autocracy.

There is optimism among the Kosovars that the Brussels Dialogue can improve the quality of life for average citizens in the country. In response to the question, *Regarding the Dialogue, how confident are you that discussions between the governments of Kosovo and Serbia have the ability to improve conditions in the lives of average citizens?* Forty-three percent of respondents said that they are very or somewhat confident that discussions between the governments of Kosovo and Serbia have the ability to improve conditions in the lives of average citizens. As for looking ahead, 51% of respondents believe that ethnic relations within Kosovo will improve.

In conclusion, the data presented in this chapter reveal interesting patterns and empirical associations between foreign aid and public attitudes toward the donors of the

foreign aid and the aid recipient states in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the data indicate that initially there was more optimism and positive attitudes toward the direction of the country, the international community, and the aid recipient states. However, insecurity, state weakness, corruption, lack of the rule of law, transparency and accountability, and poor economy and services have eroded aid effectiveness and positive public attitudes toward foreign donors and the aid recipient states in both countries. In 2004, 64% of respondents in Afghanistan and 50.73% of respondents in Iraq stated that their countries were moving in the right direction. However, in 2017, only 33% of respondents in Afghanistan and 39% of respondents in Iraq said that their country was moving in the right direction. Furthermore, in 2005, 80% of respondents in Afghanistan expressed positive attitudes and confidence in the state and 68% expressed positive attitudes and confidence in the United States to do their job in the country. In 2007, 65% of respondents expressed positive attitudes and confidence in foreign-funded international NGOs to do their job in the country. However, in 2011, 86% of respondents said political freedom, 36% said economic development and employment, 42% said education, 50% said health care, and 72% said personal safety and security of Afghans are negatively affected since NATO entered Afghanistan. In the same survey, 76% of respondents said the United States, 50% said Pakistan, 40% said Iran, 26% said warlords, 3% said Al-Qaeda, 3% said India, and 2% said Taliban benefited most from the war in Afghanistan, not the Afghan people. In 2017 only 36% of respondents in Afghanistan expressed confidence in their government and 42% expressed confidence in the donors and foreign-funded NGOs to do their job in the country.

In Iraq, in 2006, 78% of respondents said that the U.S. military is provoking more conflicts than it is preventing; 77% of respondents in 2009 said that foreign aid organizations were doing little to nothing in providing services in their communities. In 2010, 96% of respondents said that bribes and kick-backs, 96% of respondents said that not implementing the laws, 95% of respondents said wrong person in the wrong position, 95% of respondents said nepotism, 93% of respondents said no accountability, and 78% of respondents said lack of transparency were major problems with the central government in Iraq. In 2011, eight years after the U.S.-led invasion, occupation and rebuilding of the country and billions in foreign aid, the overwhelming majority of Iraqis (96%) said that the U.S.-led invasion, occupation, and the rebuilding of Iraq did not benefit the people of Iraq, which punctuates our findings. In 2011, 67% of Iraqis expressed unfavorable attitudes toward the United States and in 2016, 93% of the Iraqis aged 18-24 said that they consider the United States as an enemy of their country. However, the data for the Middle East, as a whole, show that Arab public anti-American sentiment targets American foreign policies in the Arab region, not the American people or the United States as a country. In 2017, 65% of Arabs expressed positive attitudes toward the American people, 48% of Arabs expressed positive attitudes toward the United States, and only 29% of Arabs expressed positive attitudes toward the U.S. policies in the Middle East, which clearly punctuates the findings.

The Bosnians blame the International community, Serbia and the Serbs living in the country for the Bosnian war (1992-1195). Both the Bosnians and Kosovars are not happy with the direction of their countries. In 2017, only 16% of Kosovars said that things were going in the right direction. Corruption, unemployment, nepotism, and poor

economy were the major problems facing both nations. In 2017, over 50% of Bosnians said that they would consider living and working abroad if given the opportunity. Both Bosnians and Kosovars have low trust in public institutions, state, and donors. In 2017, 70% of Bosnians said that they do not trust parliament, 65% said that they do not trust prosecutors, 64% said that they do not trust the judiciary, 58% said that they do not trust customs, and 49% said that they do not trust the police in the country. As for Kosovo, only 14% of Kosovars trust the government. However, 66% of Kosovars trust NATO-led Kosovo Force and NATO mission in the country. As for the role of the donors in the country, 39% of Bosnians said in 2017 that the United States, 51% said Russia, 51% said Turkey, and 38% said Saudi Arabia are playing mostly or somewhat positive roles in the country. However, 45% believed that the United States, 42% said Russia, 37% said Turkey, and 48% said Saudi Arabia plays mostly or somewhat negative role in the country.

Compared to Iraq, initially, there was more optimism and positive public attitudes and perceptions toward foreign donors, the international community and the aid recipient state in Afghanistan. Compared to Afghanistan and Iraq, foreign aid and foreign donors have achieved some level of security and improved provision of services in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo since 1995 and 1999 respectively. However, the key issues facing foreign aid and foreign donors in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are state weakness, rampant corruption, and poor economy, especially lack of income and employment. Overall, state weakness, lack of security, especially human security in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, poor economy and services, lack of transparency and accountability, the rule of law, and high-level corruption are the main themes across the



four cases. The data for Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo show that in the court of the public opinions, foreign aid, foreign donors, the international community and the aid recipient states have underperformed in the delivery of state-building, economic and political development, and the provision of basic services across the four cases.

## CHAPTER V – DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The breakup of the Yugoslavian state led to the Bosnian Civil War (1992-1995) and the Kosovo War (1998-1999), which left both countries devastated and dependent on foreign aid to rebuild. The European Union with support from the United States and other Western donors has played a significant role in the rebuilding and development of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo to provide the much-needed services to their citizens and to fight poverty, crimes, corruption, and extremism. The overthrowing of the Taliban regime in the fall of 2001 and the Saddam Hussein regime in the spring of 2003 by the U.S.-led coalition forces compelled the United States to take a leading role and shoulder the largest portion of the military and economic costs of rebuilding and reintegrating both countries into the international community. Western donors in general and the United States and member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union alike have provided billions of dollars of aid and funded and implemented thousands of development, reconstruction, and welfare programs and projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The principal objective of foreign aid for the United States, its European allies and the European Union more broadly, and the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995, in Kosovo since 1999, in Afghanistan since 2001, and in Iraq since 2003 has been to win the hearts and minds of citizens in these countries, as a hedge against extremism and terrorism, through the provision of improved services and establishment of a legitimate and functioning state based on liberal democratic principles of governance. Since social behavior is contingent on the behaviors of others (Fehr and Gächter 2000; Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005), donors argue foreign aid wins public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries,

which leads to positive attitudes and behaviors toward donors and the local state and combats grievances that extremist and terrorist organizations and leaders usually exploit. Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013), Hafez and Mullins (2015), and Bhatia and Hafez (2017) argue that grievances are the leading cause of insurgency, extremism and terrorism.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, foreign aid has made a range of accomplishments in the areas of poverty reduction, democratic governance, human security, and sustainable environment in a post-conflict political, economic, and human development context. Under the guidance of donors (especially the European Union and the United States) policy reforms are underway to stabilize administrative, political, economic, and legal institutions in an effort to align Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo with the European standards. Donors are supporting economic structural changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo to skew public policies and incentives from the public to the private sector, from consumption to investment and production, and from import to export to create an environment conducive for private investment and to generate the much-needed private sector employment. In Afghanistan and Iraq, foreign aid and foreign donors have made some political, economic, and social progress compared to the past periods under regimes controlled by the Taliban and President Saddam Hussein, respectively. Today, between them, Afghanistan and Iraq have new constitutions, publicly elected presidents, a chief executive, prime ministers and parliaments, and they are fully integrated into the international community, which are remarkable accomplishments given not too long ago they were both autocratic states, isolated from the rest of the world. In spite of the remarkable political, economic, and

social transitions and achievements that the United States, the European Union and the rest of the donor states and inter-governmental organizations have accomplished in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, these states are all far from the finish line--critical security, especially human security, administrative reforms, state capacity and legitimacy, political, economic, and social development and reconstruction challenges still remain in these countries. However, where donors stand in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo as far as winning public hearts and minds is concerned? Has foreign aid increased positive public attitudes toward the donors and their own states in these four cases? Answering these questions requires an appraisal of the opinions and attitudes of the Afghans, Iraqis, Bosnians, and Kosovars at present and over time toward foreign donors in general and the United States and the European Union in particular, as the leading donors in Afghanistan and Iraq and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo respectively.

### *Afghanistan*

The data clearly indicate that respondents who are aware of the development programs and projects implemented with foreign aid in the country also consistently identify the top 10 donor nations in the country as the United States, Japan, Germany, India, China, the United Kingdom, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Canada, respectively. Since 2001, survey respondents in Afghanistan have consistently identified the United States as a leading donor that has provided more foreign aid and has funded more humanitarian, development and reconstruction projects and programs in the country compared to any other foreign donor nation(s). Also, the data reveal that the Afghan

people see their government (24.5%) not the United States (22.6%) or any other foreign donor nation(s) as an agency primarily responsible for the implementation of reconstruction and development programs and projects in the country. This means that the Afghan government has successfully coordinated the implementation of foreign-funded humanitarian, reconstruction and development projects with foreign donors, by working closely with them, to brand these projects as its own in order to garner public confidence and build the much-needed image and legitimacy of the state. Building legitimacy of the Afghan state has been one of the key objectives of the United States, other foreign donors, and the government of Afghanistan alike since 2001. While, overall, the government of Afghanistan is perceived as a top implementer of the foreign-funded programs and projects in the country, the United States is still perceived as the top implementer, among all foreign donors, of the foreign-funded humanitarian, development and reconstruction programs and projects in the country. Furthermore, in the 2004 survey, 64% of respondents stated that they have a favorable opinion toward the United States, unheard of it in any Muslim country. In the 2005 survey, 68% of respondents said that they have confidence in the United States and 80% of respondents said that they have confidence in the Afghan Government to do their job in the country. In the 2007 survey, 65% of respondents indicated they had confidence in the international NGOs to do their job in the country. These findings give support to the United States' and other donors' claims that "branding" of foreign aid programs and projects improve the image of donors in the aid recipient country. The findings also give support to donors' claim that foreign aid improves the legitimacy and image of the aid recipient state and builds public confidence in and positive attitudes toward the donor(s).

However, while the United States is identified consistently as the top donor in the country and the Afghan government as the top implementer of the humanitarian, development and reconstruction programs and projects in the country, public confidence in both those actors has been declining since 2005. In 2005, for example, 68% of the public indicated that they have confidence in the United States and 80% said that they have confidence in the Afghan government to do their jobs in the country. But in 2010, only 32% of respondents said that they have confidence in the United States and in 2017 only 36% of respondents said that they have confidence in the Afghan government to do their jobs in the country. In addition, the data show that 64% of respondents in 2004 and 83% of respondents in 2005 had a favorable opinion toward the United States, unheard of it in any other Muslim country. Only 24% of respondents in 2004 said that they have an unfavorable opinion toward the United States, again unheard of it in any other Muslim country. However, in 2010 only 43% of the respondents said that they have a favorable opinion of the United States—a 21 point decline in a favorable opinion, and 56% of respondents said that they have an unfavorable opinion toward the United States—a 32-point increase in unfavorable opinion in the country. Surprisingly, the United States has provided \$707 million in economic aid to Afghanistan in 2004 (USAID, 2018) and \$3.058 billion in economic aid to the country in 2010 (USAID, 2018)—an over threefold increase in foreign aid from 2004 to 2010. Figure 27 provides a complete picture of U.S. economic aid to Afghanistan from 2001 to 2017.

If one compares the data for American economic aid to Afghanistan from 2001 to 2017 (Figure 27) below with data on public opinions and attitudes toward the United

States in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2010 (Figure 28) below, the following observations are reasonable:




Figure 27. U. S. Economic Aid to Afghanistan, 2001-2017

Source: United States Agency for International Development (USAID)  
[https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/AFG?fiscal\\_year=2001&measure=Disbursements.](https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/AFG?fiscal_year=2001&measure=Disbursements)




Figure 28. Public Opinions and Attitudes Toward the United States In Afghanistan, 2004-2010

Question: *Is your opinion of the United States very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable?*

Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2004. ABC News/BBC/ARD/ Washington Post Poll, Afghanistan: Where Things Stand, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010.

1. From 2001 to 2011, the United States' economic aid (humanitarian and development aid) to Afghanistan steadily increased from \$41 million in 2001 to \$3.315 billion in 2011. In fact, the United States' aid to Afghan reached its peak in 2011—over 80% increase in foreign aid compared to 2001.
2. In response to a steady increase in the United States' economic aid (humanitarian and development aid) to Afghanistan, favorable public opinions of the United States in Afghanistan steadily declined from 64% in 2004 to 42% in 2010—a 21-point decline in favorable opinion compared to 2004.



3. Interestingly, 54% of respondents in 2010 said that they are aware of one or more foreign-funded development and/or reconstruction programs or projects implemented in their area or district.

Surprisingly, a steady increase in foreign aid (humanitarian and development aid) from the United States to Afghanistan, public awareness and acknowledgement of the United States as a top donor, implementer and foreign aid provider to the country, and public knowledge and awareness of foreign-funded humanitarian, development and/or reconstruction programs or projects implemented in the country did not result in a steady increase in public confidence and positive attitudes toward the United States. An increase in foreign aid resulted in an increase in unfavorable opinions toward the United States in Afghanistan from 24% in 2004 to 56% in 2010—a 32 point increase in unfavorable opinions compared to 2004.

Further, when considering public confidence in the United States, international NGOs, and the government of Afghanistan to do their jobs, one can clearly see a negative trend in public attitudes toward the United States, NGOs, and the Afghan government to do its job in the country from 2005 to 2017.




Figure 29. Confidence in the Present Government, the United States in Afghanistan, and the International NGOs in Afghanistan to Do Their Jobs, 2005-2017

Question: *I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all?*

Source: The Asia Foundation, *A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017*

ABC News/BBC/ARD/ Washington Post Poll, *Afghanistan: Where Things Stand, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010.*

By comparing the data for the United States' economic aid to Afghanistan (figure 27), public attitudes toward the United States and the Afghan government in the country (Figure 28), and public confidence in the United States, the foreign-funded international NGOs, and the Afghan government to do their jobs in the country (Figure 29), it is clear that the increase in American foreign aid to Afghanistan, in spite of the public awareness of the United States as a top donor and public awareness of the implementation of foreign-funded development and/or reconstruction programs and projects in their areas or districts, has not increased public confidence and favorable opinions and positive

attitudes toward the United States, as a top donor, the government of Afghanistan, or foreign-funded international NGOs in Afghanistan since 2001. Furthermore, in 2004, 64% of respondents said that Afghanistan was moving in the right direction and only 11% of respondents said that Afghanistan was moving in the wrong direction. However, in 2017, the majority of Afghans surveyed (61.2%) said their country was moving in the wrong direction and only 32.8% of respondents said that their country was moving in the right direction, which is a clear indication of a downward trend in public confidence and positive attitudes toward the country and its foreign supporters.

### *Iraq*

In 2004, a year after the U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq in March 2003, 51% of Iraqis believed that their country was going in the right direction and only 39% of Iraqis felt their country was moving in the wrong direction. Initially, the Iraqis, like the Afghans, had high expectations from the U.S.-led coalition for the reconstruction and development of their country. However, in 2006, 30%, and in 2012, a year after the U.S. forces completely withdrew from Iraq, 35% of respondents said that their country was moving in the right direction—a 16-point decline in positive public attitudes/perception toward the direction of the country since 2004. In addition, in 2006, 52% of Iraqis and in 2012, 55% of Iraqis said that their country was moving in the wrong direction—a 16-point increase in negative perceptions about the direction of the country since 2004. This 32 points change in public perception and confidence in the direction of their country means that after a decade of U.S. aid, presence, and contribution to the rebuilding of Iraq, the people of Iraq believe that the U.S.-led coalition has put Iraq on a path that is not

consistent with their aspirations and expectations. This is in spite of the fact that in 2004 the United States was one of the top two countries (the other country was Japan 36%) that the Iraqis said should play a major role in the rebuilding of their country.

In terms of the U.S. military presence and the provision of security, peace and stability, the Iraqi people do not see the U.S. and U.K. forces having a positive impact on the situation in their country. In September 2006, three years after the U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq, only 21% of Iraqis surveyed said that the U.S. military forces were a stabilizing force in the country. But the overwhelming majority of Iraqis (78%) said that the U.S. military forces were not a stabilizing force, but one that provoked more conflicts in the country than it prevented. Also, in 2006, the overwhelming majority of Iraqis (79%) said that the United States had had a mostly negative effects on the situation in Iraq and only 14% said such effects were mostly positive ones. Ethnically speaking, 96% of Sunnis, 87% of Shi'a, and 34% of Kurds surveyed said the United States had a mostly negative influence on the situation in Iraq. Figure 30 below punctuates the point.




Figure 30. Influence of Iran, Syria, and The United States on Situation in Iraq, September 2006

Source: WorldOpinion.Org, *The Iraqi Public on the US Presence and the Future of Iraq*, September 2006.

Furthermore, since 2003, Iraqis' confidence in the U.S. and U.K. forces remained low. In 2003, only 19% of respondents said that they had confidence in the U.S. and U.K. forces and in 2009, 27% of Iraqis surveyed said that they had confidence in the U.S. and U.K. forces in the country. Surprisingly, in 2004, 56%, in 2007, 61% and in 2009, 73% of Iraqis said that they had confidence in the Iraqi military force, which has been put together, equipped and trained by U.S. and U.K. forces and heavily relied on the support of U.S. and U.K. forces in the battlefields. In 2011, eight years after the U.S. occupation and the rebuilding of Iraq, 72% of Iraqis said that their personal safety and security were negatively affected since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. This again means that the Iraqi people do not believe that the U.S. and U.K. forces have positively contributed to the overall security situation in the country since 2003, leave alone bringing peace, stability and safety to their country and daily lives. Figure 31 provides Iraqis attitudes and confidence toward the U.S. and U.K. forces in Iraq from 2003 to 2009.




Figure 31. Public Confidence in the U.S. and U.K. Forces in Iraq, 2003-2009

Question: *How much confidence do you have in [U.S. and U.K. forces] - is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?*

Source: ABC/BBC/NHK Poll, Iraq: Where Things Stand 2009.

In terms of the provision of basic services, in December 2010, a year before the U.S. military's complete withdrawal of all combat forces from Iraq, 60% of Iraqis said that the provision of electricity, 60% unemployment, 62% government corruption, 52% basic services such as water and sewage, etc., and 19% wages and salaries had worsened over the previous year. In addition, in 2011, 48% of Iraqis said political freedom, 66% economic development and employment, 47% education, 48% health care, 72% personal safety and security, 52% relations with neighboring countries, 59% government, 37% women's right, and 36% of religious freedom had been negatively affected since the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. In 2009, 77% of Iraqis said that foreign aid organizations were doing little or nothing in providing services in their communities. Overall, the Iraqi people do not believe the U.S.-led invasion has benefited them in any way. In 2011, in response to the question of who benefited the most from the war in Iraq, only 4% of Iraqis said the people of Iraq, but 51% said Iran and 48% said the United States benefited the most from the war in Iraq. In response to the same question in 2011, 40% of Americans said no one had benefited from the war in Iraq. In addition, that year, 56% of Americans (75% of Democrats and 32% of Republicans) in 2011 said that the war in Iraq was not worth it.

In terms of Iraqis' perceptions and attitudes toward the United States, in 2007, 77% of Iraqis said that the United States was playing a negative role in Iraq compared to only 12% who stated that the United States is playing a positive role in Iraq. In 2009, 64% of Iraqis said that the United States is playing a negative role and 18% of Iraqis said that the United States is playing a positive role in Iraq. Looking to the future in 2011, 33% of Iraqis said they expected the United States to be a source of

interference in their country. The overwhelming majority of Iraqis (67%) in 2011, eight years after the U.S. presence in (and rebuilding of) Iraq commenced, said that they had unfavorable attitudes toward the United States. Only 26% of Iraqis said that they have favorable attitudes toward the United States. Figure 32 provides more details.




Figure 32. Iraqis' Attitudes Toward the United States and Neighboring Countries, 2011

Question: *Indicate your attitude towards the following countries.*

Source: Zogby Research Services, Iraq: The War, Its Consequences and the Future, 2011.

Like in Afghanistan, the United States, as a leading donor and player, has invested billions of dollars in aid and thousands of American lives, both members of the military and civilians, in Iraq since 2003. Figure 33 provides a view of the U.S. economic aid to Iraq from 2004 to 2017.



Figure 33. United States' Economic Aid to Iraq, 2004-2017

Source: USAID, 2004-2017.

In 2004, the United States provided \$1.4 billion, in 2006, \$1.2 billion, and in 2009, \$922 million in foreign economic aid to Iraq. However, by comparing data in Figure 31, Figure 32, and Figure 33 above, it is clear that there is no positive link between Iraqis' attitudes toward the United States and American economic aid to Iraq—low confidence in American and British military forces and low favorable and high unfavorable attitudes toward the United States. This conclusion is further punctuated by the fact that in 2009, 56% of Iraqis surveyed (89% of Sunnis, 49% of Shi'a, and 19% of Kurds) said that it was wrong for the United States to invade their country in the spring of 2003. Furthermore, in 2010, a year before the United States completely withdrew its forces from Iraq, the overwhelming majority of Iraqis surveyed had negative attitudes toward the United States' backed government in Baghdad. Ninety-six percent (96%) of the Iraqis surveyed said that the government in Baghdad was undermined by bribery and



kickbacks, not implementing laws (96%), wrong people in the wrong positions (95%), nepotism (95%), no accountability (93%), and lack of transparency (78%). In September 2006, 62% of Iraqis (85% Sunnis, 66% Shi'a, 17% Kurds) surveyed said they had no confidence in the U.S. military forces to provide them security. As a sign of growing Iraqi people's impatience with the presence of U.S. forces in the country, in September 2006, 37% (57% Sunnis, 36% Shi'a, 11% Kurds) said that they would like for the Iraqi government to ask the United States to withdraw its military forces from Iraq within six months. Only, 9% of Iraqis (2% Sunnis, 5% Shi'a, 31% Kurds) surveyed said that their government should ask the United States to reduce the U.S.-led security forces in the country after the security situation improves in the country. In spite of the billions of dollars in foreign aid and the loss of thousands of military and civilian lives, the majority of Iraqis have negative attitudes and feelings toward the United States, the American-led security forces in that country, and label negative charges of rampant corruption, unaccountability, nepotism, lack of transparency, lack of merit-based appointments, and not fairly and effectively implementing and upholding the laws of the country against the central government of Iraq that the United States has installed, backed, and supported since 2003. Like in Afghanistan, foreign aid has not increased positive public attitudes toward foreign donors and the Iraqi government in Iraq since 2003.

### *Bosnia and Herzegovina*

The data for Bosnia and Herzegovina indicate that, on balance, Bosnians blame the international community for the 1992-1995 civil war devastated the country. Like in Afghanistan and Iraq, corruption is a major problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the

2000 World Bank survey, 60% of the general public, 54% of the public officials, and 52% of enterprise managers stated that corruption was widespread in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the same survey, 36% of the public officials admitted that they had been offered money or expensive presents by their clients in the previous two years in return for the service delivered. All respondents said that corruption endangers government security and public confidence in the state, limits foreign investment, and increases crimes and inequality in the country. In 2015, corruption was stated by Bosnians as one of the major problems facing the country (69.4%), followed by a bad economy (48.3%), and bad politicians (47.3%). Seventy-one percent of respondents in 2017 stated that the judiciary, the prosecutor's office, and the customs, which should be fighting corruption in the country, are really corrupt. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are ranked fifth overall (54%), when it comes to corruption in the country. As a result, the majority of respondents in 2017 said that personal contact (57%) and network of family and friends in high positions (36%) are the two most important assets in finding a job in the country. Only 24% of respondents in the same 2017 survey said that one's level of education and 15% of respondents said that one's professional experience are important assets in landing a job. This clearly indicates that the international community and donors, especially the European Union and the United States, need to push for more governance reforms, check and balance, and state-building initiatives to improve the delivery of services, the image of the state, and positive public attitudes toward the state and foreign donors.

As for the socio-economic situation in the country, the majority of Bosnian youths (61.1%), age 15 to 24, believe that their quality of life is worse compared to the quality of

life of their parents when they were young. The five major socio-economic problems facing the country in 2017 were unemployment (87.3%), increased poverty (81.9%), and employment insecurity (79.6%), an ineffective fight against corruption (70.2%), and inadequate implementation of the rule of law. Figure 34 presents very alarming problems facing the country in 2017.




Figure 34. Very Alarming Problems Facing Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017

Question: *In your view, how alarming are the following problems for the society in Bosnia and Herzegovina?*

Source: Prism Research & Consulting, Socio-econ Perception of Young People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017.

Furthermore, in 2017, Bosnians said that their household was unable (at least once in the past 12 months) to pay rent or utility bills (14%), pay an installment on a loan

(11%), keep their home adequately warm (11%), afford food, clothes and other basic supplies (10%), and afford at least one week of holiday away from home (if wanted) (38%), which again indicate that in spite of some gains in economic development and prosperity, more work on poverty reduction and raising household employment and income are needed. As for who the Bosnians think is responsible for the country's problems, blame in 2015 fell on the governmental authorities (87.40%), politicians (87.20%), the international community (43.90%), citizens (23%), media (8.80%), and the European Union (8.30%). This means Bosnians, like the Afghans and Iraqis, have high expectations of the Bosnian government, the international community, donors, and foreign-funded non-governmental organizations for the delivery of services and blame them for any shortcomings.

As for confidence in domestic and international institutions, Bosnians in 2017 said that they had more confidence in their police force (60.80%), followed by religious leaders (55.20%), European Union (48.70%), army (48.70%), and the United Nations (47.20%) respectively. The lowest level of confidence was reported for political parties (14.30%) in the country. In 2016, only one in 10 Bosnians said that things are moving in the right direction in the country. The overwhelming majority of respondents (86%) in 2016 said that things are not moving in the right direction. When asked to state their overall level of satisfaction with public service delivery, less than half of citizens (45%) stated some level of satisfaction with government services in the country. In 2016, a very small percentage of citizens said that they are represented by local government (12%), represented by political parties (6%) represented by state parliament (5%), and state government (5%). This is consistent with the 2017 survey findings that the

overwhelming majority of the Bosnia and Herzegovina citizens said that they did not trust their institutions—including parliament (70%), the prosecutor’s office (65%), judicial system overall (64%), or the police (49.2%). Overall, Bosnians have very low favorable attitudes (6%) toward the state-level government and institutions for the work and services that they provide.

In response to the question of which countries and organizations should have most influence on the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, European Union (66.90%), United States (62.30%), United Nations (40.30%), Turkey (14.80%), and Saudi Arabia (3.40%), respectively, were stated in 2013.




Figure 35. Countries and Organizations that Should Have Most Influence on the Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013

Question: *Which of the following countries and organizations should have most influence on the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina?*

Source: The United Nations Resident Coordinator Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Public Opinion Poll Results: Analytical Report*, 2013.

Furthermore, in response to the question of which country or organization provides the most financial aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Union (51.7%), followed by Turkey (51.2%), the United States (44%), the United Nations (32.80%), and Saudi Arabia (27.90%) were stated in 2015 as the top five countries and organizations that provide the majority of foreign aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina.




Figure 36. Countries and Organizations that Provide the Majority of Foreign Aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2015

Question: *Which countries and organizations you believe provide the majority of financial aid for Bosnia and Herzegovina?*

Source: The United Nations Resident Coordinator Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Public Opinion Poll Results: Analytical Report, 2015.*

In the same survey, the overwhelming majority of Bosnians said that economic development (94.6%), development of certain sectors such as education and health care (65.2%), and institutional development (39.5%) were the three most important priorities of the international community in the country. Surprisingly, while Bosnians believe that

the European Union (51.7%) provides more financial aid than the United States (44%), they perceive the United States (14.3%) to have more relative power in the country than the European Union (7.2%). However, in spite of the fact that the overwhelming majority of Bosnians in 2013 stated that the United States should play a major role in the future of the country (62.3%) and in 2015 the United States was rated as the third top donor to the country (44%), close to half of the Bosnians in 2015 stated that overall the United States was playing a negative role (45%) rather than a positive role (39%) in the country. More surprisingly, the majority of Bosnians in 2017 did not perceive the United States and the European Union, the top perceived donors to the country, as their country's most significant allies, but they agreed that maintaining strong relations with the United States (72%), Russia (69%), Turkey (73%), European Union (86%), Germany (86%), and the United Kingdom (72%) are in the national interest of the country.




Figure 37. Public Perception of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Greatest Allies, 2017

Question: *In your opinion which of the listed countries is Bosnia and Herzegovina's greatest ally?*

Source: International Republic Institute's Center for Insights and Survey Research, 2017.

In short, like the Afghans and Iraqis, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina blame their state, the international community and donors for their economic, political, and social struggles and shortcoming of the state in the delivery of services--rampant corruption, nepotism, lack of accountability and meritocracy in employment, ineffective implementation of laws, and inadequate fight against corruption. Foreign aid has not resulted in an increase in positive public attitude toward the state and foreign donors, especially the European Union and the United States, in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995.

#### *Kosovo*

Kosovars are not happy with the overall direction of the country. In the 2017 survey, only 16% of respondents said they believed Kosovo was moving in the right direction and 39% of respondents said that things were going in the wrong direction in the country. The main reasons for their pessimism were the presence of corruption (74%), unemployment (64%), nepotism in employment (26%), illegal migration (6%), political violence (6%), and terrorism (5%).






Figure 38. Biggest Risks/Threats Facing Kosovo, August 2017

Question: *What is the biggest risk/threat for Kosovo in the near future?*

Source: Kosovo Public Opinion poll, August 2017.

As for the political and economic direction of the country, over 50% of Kosovars in 2018 stated that they were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the political and economic direction of the country. In regards to the current political direction, only 15.2% of Kosovars are satisfied or very satisfied with the political direction of the country. In contrast, more than half (50.5%) of citizens were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the political direction of Kosovo. As for the current economic direction, only 12% of respondents in 2018 said that they were satisfied or very satisfied with the economic direction of the country. However, more than half (50.1%) of respondents in

2018 stated that they were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the economic direction of the country. This means that in spite of the billions of dollars in foreign aid in economic and political development in the country, more work and challenges remain to win public hearts and minds in the country.

With respect to the household financial situation, 43% of Kosovars in 2017 said that they were completely or mostly satisfied and 57% said that they were completely or most unsatisfied with their household financial situation. Unemployment (67%) and corruption (62%) were stated as the two main problems facing the economy in the country. Twenty-two percent (22%) of Kosovars said that they were unable to pay rent or utility bills, 16% said that they were unable to pay a loan installment, 8% said that they were unable to keep home adequately warm, 7% said they were unable to afford food, clothes and other basic supplies, and 35% said that they could not afford one week holiday away from home (if wanted to) at least once in the past 12 months.

In 2018, 60% of Kosovo youths age 14 to 35 stated that they would consider leaving the country in the next three years. They said the lack of job opportunities (60%), poverty (49.3%), and corruption/nepotism (43%) were the reasons for their pessimism. Further, the 2018 youth survey data also show that only 45% of younger Kosovars (age 18 to 24) compared to 59% of older Kosovars (age 25 to 35) are currently employed. In total, 48% of all respondents surveyed in 2018 stated that they were unemployed. More than half of the respondents (55%) stated that they received financial support from parents and close to half (46%) of respondents stated that they received financial support from other family members to make ends meet. Respondents stated that lack of available jobs (43%), corruption (42%), and the lack of required professional qualifications (41%)

make it difficult to get a job in the country. Eighty percent of the respondents who said that they were employed stated that they were satisfied with their jobs, but 30% also indicated that a low level of income is the major challenge of their current jobs.

With respect to public safety and security in Kosovo, 67% of respondents in 2018 stated that they felt safe and 33% of respondents said that they did not feel safe while out on the street. More importantly, since October 2008, more and more Kosovars indicated feeling unsafe while out on the street. In October 2008, 18.3% of respondents stated that they felt unsafe while out on the street. However, in April 2018, 33.1% of respondents stated that they feel unsafe while out on the street—a 15-point decrease in public attitude toward safety and security in the country. Regarding the interethnic relation, 28% of respondents stated the relation between Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb ethnic groups has improved in recent years, but 27% of respondents stated that the relation between the two groups is still very intense and will remain intense for a long time. Forty-five percent of respondents (age 18 to 35) stated that the impact of conflict memories is that the interethnic relation between the Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs is intense.

As for trust in public and international institutions and foreign-funded organizations and donors, Kosovars believe that political institutions (executive, parliament, mayors, the presidency, and local government officials) are the most corrupted in the country. Since 2007 public satisfaction with central institutions in Kosovo is very low. In 2007, 30.5% of citizens stated that they were satisfied with central institutions, but the public satisfaction dropped to 30% in 2018. In 2007, more than half (52%) were satisfied with the work of the president, but in 2018 only 39.1% expressed their satisfaction—a 13-point decline in public perception and attitude toward

the president. Satisfaction with courts and prosecutor’s office in 2007 was 20% and 22.7% respectively, but 31.2% of respondents in 2018 stated that they were satisfied with courts and 29.2% of respondents said that they were satisfied with the work of the prosecutor’s office in the country. However, in spite of a slight increase in the level of satisfaction and positive attitudes toward the courts and prosecutor’s office, the overall public satisfaction and positive attitudes toward the judiciary branch of the country is low. As a result, only 14% of Kosovar in the 2018 survey said that they trust the government and the overwhelming majority (65%) said that they do not trust the government. Also, 47% of Kosovars said they did not trust courts and 40% did not trust prosecution in the country. This means that the decline in public attitudes and satisfaction with the rule of law and governance have influenced public attitudes and overall satisfaction with all other institutions, including the international organizations and donors in the country. Figure 39 provides more details on public satisfaction with central institutions in Kosovo 2007-2018.




Figure 39. Satisfaction with Central Institutions in Kosovo, 2007-2018

Source: Public Pulse XIV, June 2018.

In 2018, public perceptions of the prevalence of corruption in different Kosovo government institutions varied with the highest level of corruption (39%) reported for the customs and the lowest level of corruption (24.5%) reported for the international organizations. However, Kosovars attitudes and confidence in international organizations and donors are on a steady and sharp decline since 2010. In 2010, only 14.7% of respondents said large-scale corruption existed in international organizations. However, in 2018, 24.5% of respondents stated that a large-scale corruption existed in international organizations in the country—a 10-point decline in public attitudes and confidence in international organizations and donors. This means that the low level of the public satisfaction with domestic institutions and the Kosovo state has also affected public confidence and positive attitudes toward the international organizations and donors in the country—guilty by association. It is therefore not surprising that 38% of Kosovars in 2018 said that they were willing to join public protest for political reasons. This speaks volumes about the effectiveness of foreign aid in winning public hearts and minds toward the state and its foreign donors and supporters in the country.

In general, the data for Kosovo show a decreasing attitudes and satisfaction with the government, foreign donors, national and international institutions since 1999. Furthermore, the data also show public dissatisfaction with the effects of large scale corruption in national and international organizations, meritocracy in gaining employment in public and private scores, the provision of the rule of law and public safety and security, and the overall economic and political direction of Kosovo.

## *Conclusions*

The United States with support from the rest of the international community and donors has played a leading and significant role in the rebuilding of Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001 and 2003 respectively. As a leading donor and player, the United States alone has provided billions of dollars in foreign aid and has implemented hundreds of reconstruction and development programs and projects in Afghanistan and Iraq. Initially (2001-2005) foreign aid contributed to an increase in positive public attitudes and opinions toward the state, the United States and the rest of the donors and players in the country. Like the Afghans, the Iraqis also initially (2004) had positive attitudes and opinions about the United States, as a leading donor and player, and wanted the U.S. to play a major role in the rebuilding and reconstruction of their country. However, public favorable attitudes and opinions in Afghanistan and Iraq toward the state, the United States as a leading donor and player and the rest of the international community and donors that have been involved in the rebuilding of these countries have been on the decline since 2005 and 2004 respectively. In 2011, nine years after the U.S.-led state-building and development, Iraqis said that their personal safety and security (72%), political freedom (48%), economic wellbeing and employment (66%), education (47%), relations with neighboring countries (52%), women rights (37%), religious freedom (36%), and government (59%) were all negatively affected since the U.S.-led invasion of their country in 2003. In 2017, the majority of Afghans (61%) and Iraqis (59%) said that their country was moving in the wrong direction. This means that the U.S.-led state-building and development in Afghanistan since 2001 and in Iraq since 2003 have not lived up to public expectations and needs to win their hearts, minds and positive attitudes.

Similarly, the European Union with support from the rest of the international community and donors has played a significant and leading role in the rebuilding of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo since 1995 and 1999 respectively. Although the European Union, the United States, and the rest of the donors have provided billions of dollars in foreign aid and implemented hundreds of development and reconstruction programs and projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, the overwhelming majority of the public in both countries have unfavorable opinions and attitudes toward the state, the European Union and the United States, two of the top perceived donors to both countries. In 2017, the majority of Bosnians did not perceive the European Union and the United States as the most significant allies of their country. Also, Bosnians believe, overall, the United States is playing a negative role rather than a positive role in the country. In 2018, over 50% of Kosovars stated that they were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the political and economic direction of their country. The same year, over 60% of Kosovo youths age 14 to 35 stated that they would consider leaving the country in the next three years.

In general, the data for Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo show that foreign aid has not contributed to an increase in positive public attitudes and opinions toward the state and foreign donors. State weakness, lack of security, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq, bad economy, ethnic hostility and tension, and rampant corruption have deteriorated public confidence and positive attitudes toward the aid recipient state and its foreign supporters and donors. In the court of the public opinion, the international community in general and foreign aid and donors, in particular, have not put Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo on a path of state-building,

reconstruction and development consistent with the aspirations and expectations of citizens in these countries. More pointedly, citizens in these four cases do not perceive foreign aid to be making a consistent improvement in their daily lives and wellbeing. This could be due to citizens' high expectations, donors' top-down approach to state-building and development, and/or the need for longer time frame for foreign aid and donors to address state weakness, underdevelopment, and deficiencies in service delivery consistent with public expectations and needs to win positive public attitudes toward the state and donors. Chapter 6 examines the link between foreign aid and positive public attitudes toward foreign donors and the state in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo and answers the research questions.



## CHAPTER VI – ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS

Foreign aid plays a central role in the United States', European Union's, and other donors' foreign policies. Since Al Qaeda's terrorist attacks against America on 11 September 2001, more emphasis has been placed on foreign aid to fight state weakness, poverty, underdevelopment, and political, economic, and social inequalities as a hedge to address the condition and attitudes that may lead to insecurity, extremism, and terrorism. Donors argue foreign aid is an effective tool in winning public hearts, minds, and positive attitudes and influencing behavior in the aid recipient states toward the state and donor(s) and the fight against extremism and terrorism compared to military deployments and/or invasions to fight insecurity, extremism, and terrorism around the world. This chapter assesses the extent of the validity of this argument by specifying and then explaining in-depth answers to the research questions that are the basis for the dissertation. It builds on the analysis put forward in Chapter V.

The first research question under consideration was as follows: *Does foreign aid increase positive public attitudes toward the donor(s) of foreign aid in the aid recipient country?* The data and findings for Afghanistan indicate that, initially, the people of Afghanistan had high hopes, confidence and positive attitudes and perceptions toward the United States, as a major donor and player, in the country. In Afghanistan, from 2001-2005, foreign aid did increase positive public attitudes toward the United States—from 64% in 2004 to 83% in 2005. However, 2005 was the turning point in terms of positive public perceptions and attitudes toward the United States, as a major donor, in Afghanistan. In 2010, only 43% of the public had positive attitudes toward the United States in the country—a 40-point decline in public favorable attitudes toward Washington

compared to 83% in 2005. Furthermore, if one considers unfavorable Afghan public attitudes toward the United States, the evidence indicates that such attitudes steadily increased from 14% in 2005 to 56% in 2010--a 42-point increase. In addition, positive public attitudes toward foreign international organizations, funded by and representing various foreign donors, also steadily declined in the country from 2005-2017. In 2005, 80% of the public had positive attitudes and confidence in foreign-funded international organizations in the country. However, in 2017, public confidence in foreign-funded international organizations dropped to 36%-- a 44-point decline in public confidence and positive attitudes toward foreign aid organizations since 2005. The answer to research question one, based on the data, is that foreign aid is not positively associated with an increase in positive public attitudes toward the donor(s) of the foreign aid to Afghanistan from 2001-2017.

With respect to the second research question, *does foreign aid increase positive public attitudes toward the state in the aid recipient country?*, the data for Afghanistan indicate that initially there were high levels of the public trust, confident and positive attitudes toward the state in Afghanistan, but over time public confidence in and attitudes toward the state gradually declined. In 2005, the overwhelming majority of the public (80%) expressed confidence and positive attitudes toward the central government in Kabul. However, public attitudes and confidence in the central government gradually declined from 80% in 2005 to 36% in 2017—a 44-point decline in public confidence over that period. Figure 40 depicts trends in public attitudes and confidence in the government in Afghanistan from 2005-2017.




Figure 40. Public Confidence and Attitudes Toward Government in Afghanistan, 2005 - 2017

Source: ABC News/BBC/ARD/ Washington Post Poll, *Afghanistan: Where Things Stand*, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010.

The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, *Afghanistan in 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017*.

The answer to the second research question, based on the data, is that foreign aid is not positively associated with an increase in positive public attitudes toward the state in Afghanistan from 2001-2017.

As with Afghanistan, the data and findings for Iraq indicate that foreign aid did not increase positive public attitudes toward the United States, as a major donor and player, and the international community and range of other donors in the country. In 2011, eight years after the U.S. intervention and subsequent conduct of American-led nation- and state-building efforts in Iraq, with the assistance of billions of dollars in foreign aid, only 26% of Iraqis said that they have positive attitudes toward the United

States. This number is very low, if compared with attitudes toward other donors in the country. In the same survey, 39% of Iraqis said they had positive attitudes toward Saudi Arabia, 43% said that they had positive attitudes toward Turkey, 46% said they had positive attitudes toward China, and 65% said that they had positive attitudes toward the United Arab Emirates. Surprisingly, in the same survey, 26% of Iraqis said they had positive attitudes toward Iran--a country that has provided little to nothing in foreign aid to Iraq compared to the United States and a country that in 2004 Iraqis said should not play a role in the rebuilding of their country. Ethnically speaking, Shi'a are more likely to state favorable attitudes toward the United Arab Emirates (58%), Turkey (53%), China (45%), Iran (41%), Saudi Arabia (39%), and the United States (26%). However, Kurds are more likely to state favorable attitudes toward the United Arab Emirates (88%), China (71%), the United States (63%), Saudi Arabia (49%), Iran (5%), and Turkey (5%). Sunnis, on the other hand, are more likely to state favorable attitudes toward the United Arab Emirates (67%), Saudi Arabia (59%), China (36%), Turkey (40%), the United States (7%), and Iran (2%). This division in opinion is fueled by competition for power, resources, status, and disagreement on the political direction and national identity of Iraq between Shi'a, Sunnis, and Kurds. The Iraq war is seen as a liberation from tyranny and an opportunity to seek and consolidate significant political power by Shi'a and Kurds, but the Sunnis see it as loss of power, marginalization, victimization, sectarian polarization, and de-Baathification. In post-Saddam Iraq, the Kurds demand a high degree of independence and control over the northern region and support a secular federalist government that grants them full autonomy. The Shi'a and Sunnis are engaged in a bitter rivalry over the control of the state and want a geopolitical, cultural and social

transformation of Iraq in line with their own theologies—Shi'a-centric vs Sunny-centric. State weakness, political Islam, and geopolitical rivalries have molded competing and contradicting perceptions of state-building, direction, ownership, identity, and power between the Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurd elites and masses in Iraq, which are reflected in public perceptions toward foreign donors and aid.

In terms of the international community, 77% of Iraqis in 2009 said they believe foreign-funded international organizations do little to nothing in providing services in the country. In addition, in 2011, the overwhelming majority of Iraqis (96%) indicated that the U.S.-led invasion and the rebuilding of Iraq did not benefit the people of Iraq. Furthermore, in the 2017 survey, which measures Arb attitudes toward the American people, the United States, and the American policies toward the Middle East, 42% of Arabs expressed negative attitudes toward the United States, 61% of Arabs expressed negative attitudes regarding the U.S. foreign policies toward the Arab world, and only 25% of Arabs expressed negative attitudes toward the American people. This means that Arabs have negative attitudes toward the United States, mainly due to its policies toward the Middle East, but have mostly positive attitudes toward the American people. In the 2016 Arab youth survey, 93% of Iraqi youths (age 18-24) expressed extreme negative attitudes toward the United States, perceiving it as the enemy of the Iraqi people and country. The answer based on the data in regard to the research question one (*Does foreign aid increase positive public attitudes toward the donor(s) of the foreign aid in the aid recipient country?*) is that foreign aid is not positively associated with an increase in positive public attitudes toward the donor(s) of foreign aid to Iraq from 2003-2017.

As for the second research question (*Does foreign aid increase positive public attitudes toward the state in the aid recipient country?*), the data for Iraq indicate that initially foreign aid increased positive public attitudes toward and confidence in the Iraqi government from 2004-2009, but since 2010 public attitudes toward and confidence in the Iraqi state have declined in spite of the continued foreign aid and the U.S. support. In 2004, 39% of Iraqis said that they had a great deal or a lot of confidence in the Iraqi government, which steadily increased over time. In 2009, 61% of Iraqis said that they had confidence in the central government of Iraq—a 22-point increase in positive public attitudes toward and confidence in the state compared to 2004. Figure 41 depicts trends in Iraqis attitudes toward and confidence in the government of Iraq from 2004-2009.




Figure 41. Public Confidence in Iraqi Government, 2004-2009

Question: *How much confidence do you have in [national government] - is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?*

Source: ABC/BBC/NHK Poll, Iraq: Where Things Stand 2009.

However, since 2010, Iraqis have grown more concerned about the problems in the central government of Iraq and the direction of the country as a whole. In November 2010, 45% of Iraqis said that events in Iraq were moving in the right direction and 44% indicated that they were moving in the wrong direction. In 2011, the public approval rate for the Iraqi national government was 49% and Iraqis labelled charges of high-level of corruption, bribery, nepotism, and mismanagement of foreign aid against the central government in Baghdad. In September 2011, 50% of Iraqis said that Iraq was moving in the wrong direction versus 37% who said the opposite. In 2017, 59% of Iraqis said events were going in the wrong direction in Iraq versus only 39% who indicated they were moving in the right direction. Figure 42 depicts public attitudes with respect to how things are going in Iraq from 2010-2017.




Figure 42. Public Attitudes about How Things Are Going in Iraq, 2010-2017

Question, *do you think things in Iraq are going in the right/wrong direction?*  
 Source: Almustakilla for Research, 2017.

In addition, based on the results of the 2018 nationwide public opinion polls in Iraq, 79% of Iraqis said they had low or no confidence at all in the national government in Baghdad. Lack of security, provision of services and job opportunities were the three major public concerns. The answer to research question two, based on the data, is that foreign aid was not positively associated with an increase in positive public attitudes toward the state in Iraq from 2003-2017.

With respect to the first research question for Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Does foreign aid increase positive public attitudes toward the donor(s) of the foreign aid in the aid recipient country?*), results and findings are consistent with those for the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. The European Union, Turkey, United States, United Nations and Saudi Arabia are perceived as the top foreign aid donors to the country, which clearly indicate that Bosnians are well aware and informed about the financial contributions of foreign donors to the rebuilding and economic and political development of their country. However, overall, Bosnians see Turkey, Germany, Russia, the United States, and China as their greatest allies, which is not consistent with their perception of the top donors to their country. Surprisingly, the United States, which is the second perceived top donor to the country, after the European Union, is not perceived by Bosnians as one of the top three most significant allies to their country. Even more surprisingly, the European Union, which is the top perceived donor to the country, is not considered by Bosnians as the top ally of their country. Instead, Russia, which is not a perceived top donor, is perceived as the top ally to the country. Furthermore, close to half of Bosnians (45%) in 2017 stated that, overall, the United States was playing a negative role in the country.



Ethnically speaking, 69% of Serbs, 36% of Croats, and 30% of Bosniaks said that the United States was playing a negative role in the country. Figure 43 provides more details.




Figure 43. Public Perception About the Role of the United States, Russia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia in Bosnia and Herzegovina by Ethnicity, 2017

Question: *What is your opinion of the role of the United States, Russia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia in Bosnia?*

Source: International Republic Institute, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Attitudes on Violent Extremism and Foreign Influence*, January 4 – February 3, 2017.

Overall, Bosnians see Turkey (55%) and Russia (51%) to be making more positive contributions to their country compared to the United States (49%) and Saudi Arabia (38%). Both the United States and Saudi Arabia, which are two of the top five perceived donors to the country, are perceived by Bosnians to be making more negative than positive contributions to the country. Ethnically speaking, Bosniaks are more likely to state Turkey (80%), the United States (64%), Saudi Arabia (57%), and Russia (29%) are making a positive contribution to their country. Croats, on the other hand, are more likely to state the United States (56%), Russia (43%), Turkey (41%), and Saudi Arabia

(27%) are making a positive contribution to their country. Serbs are more likely to state Russia (89%), the United States (26%), Turkey (24%), and Saudi Arabia (15%) are making a positive contribution to their country. State weakness, nationalism, ethnic, and geopolitical rivalries have contributed to differences in public perceptions and attitudes toward foreign aid and donors in the country. The answer to research question one, based on the data, is that foreign aid is not positively associated with an increase in positive public attitudes toward the donor(s) of foreign aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1995 to 2017.

With respect to the second research question, (*Does foreign aid increase positive public attitudes toward the state in the aid recipient country?*), the data indicate that Bosnians have very little trust and confidence in the state. In fact, the overwhelming majority of Bosnians (87.4%) blame the state authorities for all of the country's problems and 60% of Bosnians in 2017 said that corruption was widespread in government institutions at that juncture. The overwhelming majority of Bosnians (76.8%) believe that development in Bosnia and Herzegovina is stagnant and government authority has failed to properly address the country's economic (87%), social (86.7%), and political (80.3%) problems. In the 2017 survey, the overwhelming majority of the Bosnia's citizens said that they did not trust their institutions, including parliament (70%), the prosecutor's office (65%), judiciary system (64%), and police (49.2%). Overall, Bosnians have very low favorable attitudes (6%) toward the state-level government and institutions for the work and services they provide. It is therefore not surprising that in 2017, 50% of Bosnians said that they would be willing to leave the country, if given the opportunity to live and work abroad. The answer to research question two, based on the

data, is that foreign aid is not positively associated with an increase in positive public attitudes toward the state in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period of 1995 to 2017.

With respect to the first research question for Kosovo (*Does foreign aid increase positive public attitudes toward the donor(s) of the foreign aid in the aid recipient country?*), the research findings are consistent with those in Afghanistan, Iraq and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2017, only 16% of respondents said that things in Kosovo were going in the right direction. Furthermore, more than half of the respondents in 2018 stated they were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the economic (50.1%) and political (50.5%) direction of the country. In 2018, 60% of Kosovo youths age 14 to 35 stated that they would consider leaving the country in the next three years. Lack of employment opportunity (60%), increased poverty (49.3%), and rampant corruption (43%) were the reasons for their pessimism. As a result, Kosovars attitudes toward and confidence in international organizations and donors is on a steady and sharp decline. In 2010, for example, only 14.7% of respondents said large-scale corruption existed in international organizations. However, in 2018, 24.5% of respondents indicated that a large-scale corruption existed in international organizations in the country—a 10-point decline in positive public attitudes toward and confidence in the international organizations and donors.




Figure 44. Perceived Prevalence of Large-scale Corruption in National and International Organizations and Institutions in Kosovo, 2010-2018.

Source: UNDP Kosovo, *Public Pulse XIV*, June 2018.

The low level of the public satisfaction with and confidence in domestic institutions and the state in Kosovo has led to a steady decline in public confidence and attitudes toward the international organizations and donors in the country. Essentially, such actors are deemed guilty by association, in spite of the fact that the international community and donors have provided and continue to provide billions in aid to improve state, political, economic, and social institutions and organizations in the country. This not only means that the international community and donors have not put Kosovo on a path of post-conflict reconstruction and development that is consistent with the aspirations and expectations of Kosovars, but it also means more work needs to be done to address government weakness, political and economic direction, rampant corruption,

and the delivery of services that Kosovars want and expect from their state and the international community and donors in order to win public confidence, satisfaction, and attitudes toward the state and foreign donors. The answer to research question one, based on the data, is that foreign aid is not positively associated with an increase in positive public attitudes toward the donor(s) of the foreign aid to Kosovo from 1999-2018.

As for the answer to research question two (*Does foreign aid increase positive public attitudes toward the state in the aid recipient country?*), since 2007 public satisfaction with central institutions in Kosovo has been very low. In 2007, 30.5% of citizens stated they were satisfied with central governmental institutions, but public satisfaction had dropped to 30% by 2018. In 2007, more than half (52%) of citizens were satisfied with the work of the president, but in 2018 only 39.1% expressed their satisfaction—a 13-point decline in public perception and attitude toward the president. Satisfaction with courts and prosecutor's office in 2007 was 20% and 22.7%, respectively, but 31.2% of respondents in 2018 stated that they were satisfied with courts and 29.2% indicated they were satisfied with the work of the prosecutor's office in the country. However, in spite of a slight increase in the level of satisfaction and positive attitudes toward the courts and prosecutor's office, the overall public satisfaction and positive attitudes toward the judiciary branch of the country is low. As a result, only 14% of Kosovar in 2018 said that they trust the government and the overwhelming majority (65%) said that they do not trust the government. The answer to research question two, based on the data, is that foreign aid is not positively associated with an increase in positive public attitudes toward the state in Kosovo for the period of 1999-2018.

In sum, the data for Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo do not indicate a positive association between foreign aid and positive public attitudes toward the donors of the foreign aid, the foreign-funded international organizations and the aid recipient states. Nevertheless, the data reveal an inverse relationship between foreign aid and positive public attitudes toward the donors of the foreign aid, the foreign-funded international organizations, and the aid recipient states in these four cases. The data indicate that the overwhelming majority of Afghans, Iraqis, Bosnians, and Kosovars have very low favorable attitudes toward the foreign donors and their own states in spite of the billions of dollars in foreign aid and human lives that the international community and donors have invested and continue to invest in these states.

However, these findings are contrary to the expectations and arguments of foreign donors—who contend that foreign aid wins public hearts and minds in the aid recipient state(s)—and the theory of Social Exchange (Emerson 1976), which asserts that an action of kindness leads to positive attitudes and gratitude, and reciprocates a response of kindness in terms of attitudes and behaviors (Blau 1964; Lawler 2001; Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005). To explain this contradiction between the theory of Social Exchange and the findings in these four cases, one needs to consider the origin of the public trust and attitudes toward the state. Since 2000, policymakers and practitioners have argued that state legitimacy, understood as citizens accepting state monopoly over the use of violence and regulating social transactions in exchange for providing public services, has a prominent place in state-society relationship, public loyalty and attitudes toward the state, international development, and post-conflict peace-building (Olson 1993; Kohli 2004; Fukuyama 2004; Kooy, Wild and Mason 2015). The legitimacy deficit of the state is

seen, in the post-conflict state-building, development and peace-building literature, as a wedge between state and society and a key driver of state fragility, weakness, violence and civil war (Gravingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum 2015). There are many theoretical explanations for the origin of individual trust and positive attitudes toward the state—the proximity theory, the social capital theory, the rational choice theory, and the performance theory in particular. The proximity theory (Schneider and Jacoby 2003; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995) and the social capital theory (Boix and Posner 1998; Putnam 1993) argue that close relation between citizens and state yields higher public trust and positive attitudes toward the state—close interactions between government or public institutions and people enable the government to deliver programs and projects that are specific and produce the greatest impacts on the day-to-day lives of the citizens resulting in greater public trust, confidence, and positive attitudes toward the state. The rational choice theory (Satz and Ferejohn 1994; Roelofsma 1999) and the performance theory (Evans and Whitefield 1995; Citrin 1974) see public trust and positive public attitudes toward the state as citizens' rational response based on their evaluation of the performance of the state institutions in providing services that citizens need and expect from their government—more pointedly, the fact that the state is an institution created by citizens to serve them. The proximity theory, the social capital theory, the rational choice theory, and the performance theory link public trust and positive public attitudes toward state to government performance--the delivery of services that citizens need and expect. Consequently, government performance (delivery of services that citizens need and expect) not only defines public trust and positive public attitudes toward the state and its foreign supporters by virtue of association, but it also greatly influences the relationship

between the governor and the governed and the critical derivatives such as state control of the society and citizens loyalty and attitudes toward the state. Lee et al. (2014), Wantchekon (2004), Olson (1993), Tilly (1992), and North (1977) argue that the provision of services is the very foundation for the emergence and legitimacy of the modern state and public loyalty and confidence in the state.

This dissertation tests these theories in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo by assessing the provision of services, in particular, security, economic prosperity, and the presence of rampant corruption, which have trumped aid effectiveness, state legitimacy and positive public attitudes toward the state and foreign donors in these four cases.

### *Security*

Since 2001, the United States, the international community, and the Afghan government have been less than successful in providing security to all of Afghanistan's citizens, whether in the cities or rural areas. Security means that citizens feel safe and warlords, militias, extremist and terrorist organizations, and state and non-state actors are not able to intimidate, mistreat, or violate their constitutional rights. In Afghanistan, respondents were asked, *how often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? Would you say you always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you and your family's safety?* Since 2006, fear for personal or family safety and security has been on the rise across Afghanistan. In 2006, 40% of respondents stated that they fear always, often or sometimes for their personal safety or security or for that of their families. However, by 2017, this number had almost doubled,



with 71% of respondents indicating that they feared for their personal or their family safety and security—a 31-point increase in fear for personal or family safety and security across the country since 2006. Figure 45 provides a longitudinal trend in public fear for personal safety and security in the country from 2006 to 2017.




Figure 45. Fear for Personal or Family Safety and Security in Afghanistan, 2006-2017

Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, *Afghanistan in 2006*, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.

Since 2001, the Taliban has waged a violent insurgency against the Afghan state and its foreign supporters in the country. The Taliban and more recently Daesh (an offshoot of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS]) have been able to carry out the most devastating suicide bombings, at well, at any time, any day and anywhere in Afghanistan, including in Kabul City—the well-guarded and protected capital of the country—on a daily basis, which has created insecurity, fear, and pain among the citizens and shaken their confidence, trust and positive attitudes toward donors, the United States,

the international community, and the Afghan government in the process. In addition, all roads and highways in Afghanistan and the majority of those in the rural parts of the country are either under the direct control of government opponents (i.e., Taliban, Daesh, or warlords) or battlefields, which has made the life of citizens and the presence and delivery of government services very difficult, if not impossible. In 2010 surveys conducted by ABC News/BBC/ARD/ and the *Washington Post*, support for the presence of US forces was 74% among those who blamed the Taliban, Al Qaeda, or other Jihadi groups, not the U.S. or NATO forces or the Afghan government, for the violence in the country, but was down 19 points where coalition air strikes were reported, down 17 points where Taliban forces were active, down 16 points where local security rated negatively, and down 15 points where local casualties occurred. Coalition casualties of war are a good measure of the intensity of war and violence in Afghanistan, which has had a heavy toll on the country since 2001. If one plots favorable attitudes toward the United States against the coalition casualties, one can clearly see an inverse relationship between the two—as the war and violence intensified, claiming more and more coalition and civilian lives and creating collateral damages, public confidence and positive attitudes toward the United States and the international community declined in the country. Figure 46 depicts this relationship.




Figure 46. Favorable Attitudes Toward the United States Verses Coalition Casualties in Afghanistan, 2004-2010

Question: *Is your opinion of the United States very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable?*

Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, *Afghanistan in 2004*. ABC News/BBC/ARD/ Washington Post Poll, *Afghanistan: Where Things Stand*, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010.

<http://www.icasualties.org/>

Furthermore, if one plots the civilian war deaths against the unfavorable attitudes toward the United States in Afghanistan, a positive relationship between the two is evident, which clearly indicates that the inability of the United States, the international community and the Afghan government to provide security has contributed to a decline in positive public attitudes toward all of those actors. Further, as the civilian casualties of war continue to rise, unfavorable attitudes toward the United States, seen by Afghans as a leading player, donor and development partner of the Afghan government, also rises in the country. The blame for the inability of the coalition forces and the Afghan

government to put an end to insurgency, violence and insecurity in the country is placed squarely on the shoulders of the United States. Figure 47 demonstrates the relationship between the civilian war deaths and unfavorable attitudes toward the United States.




Figure 47. Civilian War Deaths Verses Unfavorable Opinion Toward the United States in Afghanistan, 2004-2010

Question: *Is your opinion of the United States very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable?*

Source: The Asia Foundation, *A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2004*. ABC News/BBC/ARD/ Washington Post Poll, *Afghanistan: Where Things Stand*, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010.

The Washington Post, June 3, 2015.

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/06/03/149000-people-have-died-in-war-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan-since-2001-report-says/?utm\\_term=.1170a85c3532](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/06/03/149000-people-have-died-in-war-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan-since-2001-report-says/?utm_term=.1170a85c3532)

It is not only the United States that is blamed for the civilian casualties in the country, but also the Afghan government. Confidence in the government to do its job has declined over time as the war and violence has claimed more and more civilian lives in the country. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, in

2004, only 413 civilian deaths were reported, but in 2017 10,453 casualties of war were reported (3,438 deaths and 7015 injuries). Figure 48 demonstrates the inverse relationship between civilian war deaths and public confidence and positive attitudes toward the government of Afghanistan to do its job effectively.




Figure 48. Civilian War Deaths Verses Public Confidence in Government to Do Its Job in Afghanistan, 2005-2017

Question: *I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all?*

Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, *Afghanistan in 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.*

ABC News/BBC/ARD/ Washington Post Poll, *Afghanistan: Where Things Stand*, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Reports on the Protection of Civilian in Armed Conflicts. <https://unama.unmissions.org/protection-of-civilians-reports>

The Washington Post, June 3, 2015.

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/06/03/149000-people-have-died-in-war-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan-since-2001-report-says/?utm\\_term=.1170a85c3532](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/06/03/149000-people-have-died-in-war-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan-since-2001-report-says/?utm_term=.1170a85c3532)

In Iraq, the U.S.-led invasion of March 2003 resulted in a bitter sectarian, ethnic and religious rivalries and hostilities that led to insecurity and civil war in the country and presented serious challenges to the U.S. policies and interest in Iraq and peace and stabilities in the Middle East. The overthrowing of the Saddam Hussein regime unleashed chaos, ethnic hostility and division, and civil war in the country. The Kurds have been involved in bitter territorial and political disputes with Baghdad since establishing the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in 2005. The Sunnis have resented the Shi'a-dominated and American backed central government in Iraq, which has translated itself into the rise of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the country. The Islamic State has terrorized the Iraqi people by carrying out public executions, kidnapping for ransoms, forcing women into marriage or selling them for sex slaves, looting banks and museums, destroying and looting ancient sights, and engaging in an unconventional warfare with the Iraqi government and the rest of the civilized world, especially the United States and Europe, by carrying out devastating suicide bombings and sponsoring terrorism. Although in December 2017, the Iraqi government announced that ISIS was defeated and the Iraqi military has "fully liberated" all of Iraqi's territory from the "ISIS terrorist gangs," the return of security, peace and prosperity in Iraq is still a farfetched conclusion. Iraq remains today a nation devastated by civil war, bitter ethnic and religious hostility and mistrust, and with little hope or economic optimism for the future. According to the Gallup International's 41<sup>st</sup> Annual Global End of the Year Survey (2017), which measures happiness, hope, and economic optimism, Iraq is the second least happy country in the world after Iran. In the 2018 nationwide survey, security was the number one major concern for the Iraqi people.

The return of peace and stability in Iraq cannot be achieved only by defeating ISIS and/or the Al Qaeda terrorist organizations in the country, but until and unless the conflicting and contradicting views of Shi'a-centric and Sunni-centric state-building, ownership, and legitimacy are addressed and ironed out. After the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the rise of Al Qaeda organization and ISIS was fueled by the Sunnis, Baathists, and other powerful actors who were left out of the state-building project in the country. The return of peace and security and the end of political violence in Iraq require addressing the dynamics of intensely violent political conflicts and the balance of power between the Kurds, Shi'a, and Sunnis to collectively define and rebuild Iraq according to the views and aspirations of both Iraqi elites and masses. It is only then that security will return to Iraq and the Iraqi state will be able to provide the much-needed services to its citizens in return for public loyalty, trust and positive attitudes toward the Iraqi State and its foreign donors and supporters, especially the United States.

Security, stability and social protection are also problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. In 2017, the overwhelming majority of Bosnians (61%) said that they were mostly or completely dissatisfied with the security situation in the country. Only a small number of Bosnians (14%) stated that they were mostly or completely satisfied with the security situation. In 2017, the majority of Bosnian youths (age 15 - 35) said that street crimes (73.7%) and terrorist threats (58.3%) were the most alarming security issues facing the country. In the same survey, 77.4% of Bosnian youths indicated they believed European Union membership would result in better human and minority rights (80%) and increased safety and security in the country. In response to the question in 2017, *In your opinion, what is the biggest security threat facing our country today?*,

respondents identified organized crime (31%), the conflict between ethnic groups (21%), and conflict between religious groups (11%) as the top three threats facing the country.

Figure 49 presents more details about the security situation in the country.




Figure 49. Perceived Biggest Security Threats Facing Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017

Question: *In your opinion, what is the biggest security threat facing our country today?*

Source: Center for Insight for Survey Research, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Attitudes on Violent Extremism and Foreign Influence, January 4 – February 3, 2017.

In response to another security question, *How would you evaluation the work of the government security agencies in preventing Bosnia and Herzegovina citizens from leaving the country to fight in foreign conflicts?*, more than half of the respondents in 2017 said that they evaluated the work of the government security agencies mostly or somewhat negatively (55%). Only 32% of respondents stated that they consider the work of the government security agencies in preventing Bosnia and Herzegovina citizens from leaving the country to fight in foreign conflicts somewhat or mostly positive. In the same



survey, in response to the question, *Do you believe that Bosnia and Herzegovina citizens who are returning from fighting in foreign conflicts represent a security threat?*, 66% of respondents said yes and only 12% of respondents said no. This means that public safety and security remain a work in progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As for safety and security in Kosovo, in 2017, only 26% of respondents said that they were mostly or completely satisfied with the security situation in the country, but 40% of respondents said that they were mostly or completely dissatisfied with the security situation in the country. Furthermore, one in four (25.3%) Kosovars said that they felt very or somewhat unsafe at their workplace, going out (24.4%), at school (15.7%), and their neighborhoods (24.3%). In the same 2017 survey, respondents said that Kosovo's security institutions were not doing enough to provide safety and security on the streets (28.1%), at their workplaces (31%), at schools (30.8%), and in neighborhoods (28.5%). Furthermore, in the 2018 survey, one in three Kosovars (33%) said that they did not feel safe while out on the street. More importantly, public safety and security are on a decline since 2008 in the country. In October 2008, 18.3% of respondents stated that they felt unsafe while out on the street. However, in April 2018, 33.1% of respondents stated that they felt unsafe while out on the street—a 15-point decrease in public attitude toward safety and security in the country.

In conclusion, the delivery of the public safety and security that the international community have supported and funded in the four cases have not been effective in winning positive public attitudes toward the donors and the aid recipient states. Whether citizens credit or blame the state and its foreign supporters is conditioned on their expectations of what the state should provide, a subjective assessment of security. The

delivery of the public safety and security in the four cases under consideration at best remain “unfinished business” that demonstrates the difficulty of delivering security and the rule of law in post-conflict societies, which are vital for state legitimacy, post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction process, and winning public hearts and minds toward the state and its foreign supporters.

### *Economic Prosperity*

Economic development, in the context of post-conflict peace-building and development, is closely linked to improving household income, employment and reducing poverty. As the security situation since 2001 continued to deteriorate in Afghanistan, so did household financial wellbeing, job opportunities, and availability of products in the markets—key economic indicators of household prosperity in the country. Respondents were asked, *compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following: a) Financial situation of your household, b) Employment opportunities, c) Availability of products in the market?* In 2007, 10% of respondents reported that their household financial situation got worse compared to last year, 40% reported that job opportunity got worse compared to last year, and 23% of respondents reported that the availability of products in the market worsened compared to one year ago. However, in 2017, 33% of respondents reported that their household financial situation got worse compared to a year ago, 58% of respondents reported that job opportunities got worse compared to a year ago, and 36% of respondents reported worsening of availabilities of

products in the market compared to a year ago. Figure 50 provides a complete view of the three economic indicators in the country from 2007 to 2017.




Figure 50. Economic Indicators Worse Compared to One Year Ago in Afghanistan, 2007-2017

Question: *Compared to one year ago, would you say that the situation for your household has gotten better, remained the same, or gotten worse with respect to the following? a) Financial situation of your household, b) Employment opportunities, c) Availability of products in the market.*

Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2007 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2015, 2016, 2017.

In 2011, for the first time, the survey asked Afghans, *tell me, if given the opportunity, would you leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else, or not?* At that time, 33.8% of respondents said that they would leave Afghanistan and live somewhere else if given the opportunity. Lack of security and unemployment were two of the main reasons for their desire to leave Afghanistan. However, since 2011, as the security and household economic situations continued to deteriorate in the country, more and more Afghans indicate that they would leave the country if afforded the opportunity to do so—38.4% in

2012, 39.9% in 2015, and 38.8% in 2017. Reflecting on the overall worsening of security, living and economic conditions in the country, there was no province in the country in 2017 where at least 20% of respondents did not express their willingness to leave Afghanistan if given opportunity. This speaks volumes about the Afghan government and its foreign supporters in providing security, employment, household economic prosperity, and delivering the very basic services that define the link between the governor and the governed and the effectiveness of foreign aid in the country since 2001.

Economic prosperity is a problem in the Greater Middle East as a whole, but it is even a bigger problem in Iraq. According to the Arab Opinion Index 2016, only 69% of Arabs surveyed said that their income is sufficient for living, 49% indicated that they cannot save money, 29% said that they cannot cover their expenses and rely on handouts and family and friends to make ends meet. In Iraq, over 90% of Iraqis surveyed in 2016 said that economic conditions are poor or very poor in the country. According to the Arab Youth Survey 2016, 18% of Arab youths said that lack of jobs and economic opportunities are the main reasons that people join Daesh (an offshoot of Al Qaeda). In the 2012 survey conducted by the International Republic Institute, Iraqis were asked, *not personally, but in terms of your province, what is the single biggest problem facing it as a whole?* Unemployment was stated (22%) to be the second major problem on the provincial level, after lack of water and electricity (27%), and the fourth biggest problem (15%) on a national level, after water and electricity (21%), security (19%), and corruption (19%) respectively. On the individual level, 54% of respondents said that unemployment got worse in the country compared to a year ago. The civil war,

insecurity, and violence since 2003 in Iraq have not only contributed to destruction, brain drain, and capital flight in the country, but they have also contributed to increased poverty, ethnic and religious tensions and inequality, and corruption, which have reduced the opportunity cost of terrorism. The government of Iraq and its foreign supporters are faced with a daunting challenge, greater than defeating the ISIS, to provide the much-needed services, economic opportunities, and security in the country to win the trust, hearts and minds of Iraqi citizens in the country.

As for economic prosperity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, close to half of the respondents in 2015 stated that a bad economy (48.3%) was the second major problem facing the country after corruption (69.4%). Furthermore, the majority of Bosnian youths (61.1%), age 15 to 24, in 2017 stated that their quality of life is worse compared to the quality of life of their parents when they were young. The top five problems facing the country, according to Bosnian youths, are unemployment (87.3%), increased poverty (81.9%), employment insecurity (79.6%), ineffective measures to mitigate corruption (70.20%), and inadequate implementation of the rule of law. In addition in 2017, Bosnians said that their household was unable (at least once in the past 12 months) to pay rent or utility bills (14%), to pay an installment on a loan (11%), keep their home adequately warm (11%), afford food, clothes and other basic supplies (10%), and afford at least one week of holiday away from home (if wanted to) (38%).

In 2018, 60% of Kosovo youths aged 14-35 stated they would consider leaving the country in the next three years. Lack of job opportunities (60%), poverty (49.3%), and corruption/nepotism (43%) were the key reasons for their pessimism. The 2018 youth survey data show that only 45% of younger Kosovars (age 18-24) compared to 59% of

older Kosovars (age 25 - 35) are currently employed. In total, 48% of all respondents surveyed in 2018 stated that they were unemployed. More than half of the respondents (55%) stated that they receive financial support from parents and close to half (46%) admitted that they receive financial support from other family members to make ends meet. Respondents stated that the lack of available jobs (43%), corruption (42%), and lack of required professional qualifications (41%) make it difficult to get a job in the country. Eighty percent of the respondents who said they were employed stated that they were satisfied with their jobs, but 30% said that a low level of income is the major challenge of their current jobs. As for the household financial situation, 43% of Kosovars in 2017 said that they were completely or mostly satisfied and 57% said that they were completely or most unsatisfied with their household financial situation. Unemployment (67%) and corruption (62%) were stated as two of the main problems facing the economy in the country. In addition, 22% of Kosovars said that they were unable to pay rent or utility bills, 16% said that they were unable to pay an installment on a loan, 8% said that they were unable to keep home adequately warm, 7% said they were unable to afford food, clothes and other basic supplies, and 35% said that they could not afford one week holiday away from home (if wanted to) at least once in the past 12 months. In general, only 12% of respondents in 2018 said that they were satisfied or very satisfied with the economic direction of the country. However, more than half (50.1%) of respondents in 2018 stated that they were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the economic direction of the country.

In short, economic prosperity, poverty, lack of jobs and gainful employment are the central issues facing the citizens and their households in the four cases. As a result,

more work needs to be done by the state, the international community, and foreign donors on the economic development, employment and service deliveries in these four countries consistent with public expectations and needs in order to win positive public attitudes, hearts and minds toward the state and foreign donors.

### *Corruption*

Corruption undermines the public sector's ability to deliver services fairly and effectively, leads to mismanagement, is an obstacle to the implementation of the rule of law, undermines reform and development agendas, diverts foreign aid funds into private pockets and bank accounts, breeds instability and renews violence in post-conflict societies, is destructive of state functionality and legitimacy, and erodes the effectiveness of foreign aid and public confidence in the state and its foreign supporters. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index for 2017 ranked Afghanistan 177th out of 180 countries as one of the most corrupt nations in the world. Corruption is a big problem and it is getting bigger in the country. In answer to the question, *please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following areas. (a) In your daily life. (b) In Afghanistan as a whole*, 77% of respondents in 2006 reported that corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan as a whole and 42% of respondents said that corruption is a major problem in their daily lives. However, in 2017, 84% of respondents said that corruption is a major problem in the country as a whole and 70% of respondents said that corruption is a major problem in their daily lives—a 7-point increase in corruption as a major problem in the country as a

whole and a 28-point increase in corruption as a major problem in citizens' daily life.

Figure 51 depicts a public perception of corruption in the country from 2006-2017.




Figure 51. Corruption as a Major Problem in Daily Life and in Afghanistan as a Whole, 2006-2017

Question: *Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following areas. a) In your daily life; b) In your neighborhood; c) In your local authorities; d) In your provincial government; e) In Afghanistan as a whole.*

Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.

Corruption, like lack of security and economic prosperity, is negatively associated with state legitimacy, delivery of the public goods, implementation of the rule of law and the provision of justice, and erodes public confidence and trust in the Afghan government and its foreign supporters. In 2006, 64% of respondents said that they have confidence in the government to do its job and 77% of respondents said that corruption was a major problem in the country as a whole. However, in 2017, 36% of respondents said that they have confidence in the government to do its job, a 28-point decline in public confidence



in the government, and 84% of respondents said that corruption was a major problem in the country as a whole, a 7-point increase in public perception of corruption as a major problem in the country as a whole. Figure 52 depicts the relationship between corruption and public confidence in the government in Afghanistan to do its job.




Figure 52. Public Confidence in the Government to Do Its Job Verses Corruption as a Major Problem in Afghanistan as a Whole, 2006-2017

Question: *Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following areas. a) In your daily life; b) In your neighborhood; c) In your local authorities; d) In your provincial government; e) In Afghanistan as a whole.*

Question: *I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all?*

Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.

In Iraq, like in Afghanistan, corruption is a major problem. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2017 ranked Iraq 169th out of 180 nations as one of the corrupt countries in the world. In 2016, Arabs from 16 Arab countries of

Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Tunisia were asked, *how prevalent is corruption in your home country?* Seventy-nine percent of respondents said that corruption was widespread in their home countries. In response to the question, *how is the rule of law applied in your home country,* 54% of respondents said that state applies the rule of law, but favors some groups of citizens over the others and 20% of respondents said that the state does not apply the rule of law, at all. Iraqis were asked in 2010, *Would you say that the issue of corruption in Iraq is a significant problem, somewhat of a problem, not really a problem or not a problem at all?* Ninety-six percent of respondents said that corruption is a significant or somewhat a problem in the country. In 2011 and 2012 respondents were asked, *has the situation regarding government corruption gotten better, gotten worse or stayed the same over the last year?* Sixty-six percent of respondents in 2011 and 61% of respondents in 2012 said that government corruption got worse over the last year.

The Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index for 2017 ranked Bosnia and Herzegovina 91<sup>st</sup> and Kosovo 85<sup>th</sup> out of 180 countries in the world. Corruption is a major problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 60% of the general public, 54% of the public officials, and 52% of enterprise managers in 2000 stated that corruption is widespread in the country. In the same survey, 36% of the public officials have admitted that they have been offered money or expensive presents by their clients in the past two years in return for the service delivered. A full 100% of respondents said that corruption endangers government security and public confidence in the state, limits foreign investment, and increases crimes and inequality in the country. In 2015, the overwhelming majority of Bosnians

(69.4%) stated that corruption was the top major problem facing the country. Seventy-one percent of respondents in 2017 stated that the judiciary, the prosecutor's office, and the customs, which should be fighting corruption in the country, are really corrupt. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were ranked fifth overall (54%), when it comes to corruption in the country. As a result, the majority of respondents in 2017 said that personal contact (57%) and network of family and friends in high positions (36%) are the two most important assets in finding a job in the country. Only 24% of respondents in the same 2017 survey said that one's level of education and 15% indicated that one's professional experience are important assets in landing a job in the country.

As for corruption in Kosovo, in the 2017 survey, only 16% of respondents said that the country is moving in the right direction and 39% of respondents said that things are going in the wrong direction in the country. The top three reasons for their pessimism were the presence of corruption (74%), unemployment (64%), and nepotism in employment (26%). In 2018, public perception of the prevalence of corruption in different Kosovo government institutions varied with the highest level of corruption (39%) reported for the customs and the lowest level of corruption (24.5%) reported for the international organizations. Kosovars believe that political institutions (executive, parliament, mayors, presidency and local government officials) are the most corrupted in the country. As a result, only 14% of Kosovar in the 2018 survey said that they trust the government and the overwhelming majority (65%) said that they do not trust the government. In addition, 47% of Kosovars do not trust the courts and 40% do not trust the country's prosecutors.

In short, corruption is a major problem in all areas of lives in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (2017) ranked all of the four countries as highly corrupt. Corruption has negatively affected the image and legitimacy of the state, effectiveness of the foreign aid, delivery of services, and goodwill of the international community and donors to win positive public attitudes toward the state and foreign donors in Afghanistan since 2001, in Iraq since 2003, in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995, and in Kosovo since 1999.

### *Conclusions*

Survey analysis and data for Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo do not indicate a positive association between foreign aid and positive public attitudes toward foreign donors, foreign-funded international organizations and the aid recipient states. The data indicate that the overwhelming majority of Afghans, Iraqis, Bosnians, and Kosovars have very low favorable attitudes toward foreign donors and their own states in spite of the billions of dollars in foreign aid and thousands of human lives that the international community and donors have invested and continue to invest in these states, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, these findings are contrary to the theory of Social Exchange and the expectations and arguments of foreign donors that foreign aid wins public hearts and minds in the aid recipient states. To explain these contradictions, this dissertation tested the proximity theory, the social capital theory, the rational choice theory, and the performance theory, which link public trust and positive public attitudes toward state and donors to government performance (the delivery of services that citizens need and expect) in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and

Kosovo by assessing the provision of services, in particular, security, economic prosperity, and the fight against rampant corruption. The results indicated that the international community, donors and the aid recipient states in these four cases have been less than successful in building a legitimate state to deliver public services, especially, safety and security, economic opportunity and income, and an effective fight against rampant corruption that have tramped aid effectiveness and positive public attitudes toward the state and foreign donors.

The weakness of the state in these four cases has contributed to deficits in state legitimacy due to lack of visibility in terms of service delivery and enforcement of law and order, which has allowed internal and external agents of violence and extremism, especially in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, to perpetuate insecurity as a cash cow at the cost of the Afghan and Iraqi people, the United States and the international community and donors. Pakistan's continued support and finance of extremist networks and proxy war in Afghanistan, which have had a heavy toll on the Afghan society and the United States and the international community involved in the reconstruction and development of the country since 2001, and Iran's support for the Shi'a Iraqi government as an avenue for regional dominance, weakening of Sunni influence, and reducing the effects of international sanctions, which has fueled ethnic violence and rivalry and confronted American policies and interests in the country and region, are good examples of the consequences of state weakness and lack of legitimacy.

A resilient state not only provides public goods and services, but also claims a monopoly over the use of legitimate force, regulates social transactions, and commands public loyalty and compliance. Successful delivery of services is not only a measure of

internal and external legitimacy of the state, but also a mechanism through which state connects with its citizens, deliver services based on their needs and expectations, and garners public trust, confidence and positive attitudes toward itself and its foreign supporters and donors. A deficit in the provision of the public services results in disconnect between the state and citizens, which erodes public confidence in the state authority and its foreign supporters, leading to public distrust and negative perceptions and attitudes toward the state, its institutions, and foreign supporters, as evident in Afghanistan since 2001, in Iraq since 2003, in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995, and in Kosovo since 1999. The lack of economic opportunities and gainful employment, coupled with rampant corruption and insecurity, have eroded public confidence in aid effectiveness and positive public attitudes toward the state and its foreign supporters and donors in these four cases. More pointedly, successful delivery of the public services in post-conflict societies depends on two interrelated key principles: the international community's and donors' understanding of the local context in which they support change and development and the ability of the aid recipient state to take ownership of the foreign-funded initiatives and reforms and deliver them in a dynamic political, economic, and social contexts, without fear or favor, consistent with public definitions, expectations and needs. Whether citizens credit or blame the state and its foreign supporters is conditioned on their expectations of what the state and foreign donors should provide, which constitutes a subjective assessment of services. When in the court of the public opinion, foreign aid does not amount to an improvement in citizens' wellbeing; instead, it falls short of winning public hearts and minds toward the aid recipient state and its foreign donors.

## CHAPTER VII – CONCLUSIONS

Donors see foreign aid as a policy tool and soft power measure to address the human suffering, insecurity, insurgency, and extremist attitudes and behaviors in weak, fragile, and failing states. After Al Qaeda's terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, foreign aid is exclusively focused on defeating the threat and countering the conditions and ideology of extremism and terrorism. Foreign aid funds a wide range of resources, services, development and/or reconstruction programs and projects in unstable, weak, failing, failed, and otherwise conflict-affected states to address the economic, political, social, religious, and demographic factors that underlay inequality, grievances, extremism, conflicts, and state weakness and/or failure.

Donor states see foreign aid as being integral to their national security, the success of their foreign policies and countering the political and/or economic grievances in the aid recipient state(s) toward them and the local actors that the extremist and terrorist organizations and leaders usually exploit. The argument is that foreign aid improves state capacity, service delivery, standard of living, and wins public hearts and minds in the aid recipient country leading to public positive attitudes and perception toward the donor(s) of the foreign aid and the aid recipient state(s). Positive public attitudes toward the aid recipient state and foreign donor(s) lead to greater acceptance and support for the peacekeeping forces and successful implementation of foreign-funded political, economic and social development programs and projects in the weak, fragile, and failing states in the short term. Over the long term, positive and favorable attitudes toward the aid recipient state(s) and the donor nation(s) among the local citizens are expected to materialize in the form of greater security and influence of the donor state(s) on the

political, economic, and military affairs of the aid recipient state. In short, winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient state(s) is intimately linked to security and winning the “war on terror” and foreign aid is used by policy and development practitioners as an important “soft power” tool for this purpose, especially in the aftermath of the Al Qaeda terrorist organization’s attacks of 9/11 against the United States.

The flow of official development assistance (ODA) from members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to underdeveloped countries more than tripled from 2000 to 2017, which reflects the increasingly important position of foreign aid in the counterinsurgency efforts. Donors argue aid is an effective way to expand government capacity and control over its territory and to win the hearts and minds, loyalty, and support of local population toward the donors and the aid recipient state compared to enduring the massive military costs of deployment to counterinsurgency, extremism, and terrorism in weak, failing, and failed states. Since 9/11, the aid provision has become an essential component of the international community’s response, in general, and the United States’ response, in particular, to state weakness, insecurity, extremism, and violent conflicts and terrorism around the world.

Given the human costs associated with conflicts and terrorism, the security threats they pose, and the billions of dollars annually devoted to humanitarian, development, and reconstruction programs and projects in unstable, weak, failing, and failed states, it is important to understand the effects of foreign aid on winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient state(s). This dissertation has undertaken a first cut at assessing the relationship between foreign aid and winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient



countries of Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo. More pointedly, does foreign aid increase positive public attitudes toward the donor(s) of the foreign aid in the aid recipient country? Does foreign aid increase positive public attitudes toward the state in the aid recipient country?

Using data collected from surveys conducted by reliable national and international organizations in Afghanistan (2001 - 20017), Iraq (2003 - 2017), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995 - 2017), and Kosovo (1999 - 2018), the research findings show that foreign aid is not positively associated with an increasing positive public attitudes toward the aid recipient state and foreign donor(s) in Afghanistan (2001 - 2017), Iraq (2003 - 2017), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995 - 2017), and Kosovo (1999 - 2018).

The data and findings for Afghanistan and Iraq reveal that initially the Afghans (2001 - 2005) and Iraqis had positive attitudes and feelings toward foreign donors (2003 – 2004) and the state (2003 – 2009), but the inability of the Afghan and Iraqi states and their foreign supporters and donors to end conflicts, violence and civil wars and to provide public services, especially human security, gainful employment, and economic prosperity, have led to decline in positive public attitudes toward the international community, foreign donors and the aid recipient states. Furthermore, the data and findings for the Middle East as a whole show that Arabs have positive attitudes toward the American people and the United States as a country. However, anti-American sentiment in the region, based on the data, is provoked by the American foreign policies toward the Arab world. Despite close cooperation between the United States and most Middle Eastern states, Arabs blame the United States for the lack of economic and political development in the region due to its support for regimes that are perceived as

corrupt, oppressive, and/or un-Islamic, and its bias toward Israel. Figure 53 depicts Arab attitudes toward the United States' Middle Eastern policies, country and people in 2017.




Figure 53. Arab Attitudes Toward the United States' Middle Eastern Policies, Country and People in 2017

Source: Arab Attitudes Toward President Trump and His Middle Eastern Policies and Positions, *Arab Center Washington DC.*, 2017.

The data also reveal that corruption is a major problem not only in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo that have affected aid effectiveness, service delivery, and public trust in aid recipient states and their foreign donors across the four cases. The data show that the overwhelming majority of citizens in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo perceive their states as highly corrupt, detached from the public, and weak in service delivery. In addition, the data show that while a level of security, especially human security, political, and economic development, compared to Afghanistan and Iraq, are achieved in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, low public confidence in the political and economic directions of the

country, lack of meritocracy in employment, implementation of the rule of law, and improvement in household income, gainful employment and economic prosperity are major issues in both countries that have negatively affected public trust and confidence in the state and its foreign donors. This means that donor-driven state-building and development initiatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have the support of the state executive elites, but are detached from the daily lives, needs, and expectations of citizens in these countries. The low level of confidence in and support for the state and its foreign donors in both countries also mean that public voices are not fully integrated into the political, economic, and state-building framework in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, which is essential for the local legitimacy of the development framework, state and the democratic process. The challenge for the international community and donors, especially the European Union and the United States, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo is to adopt a state-building and development framework that is more locally legitimate and takes serious local ownership, voices, and needs, rather than relying on consultation with and support of the state executive elites that are not well connected with the people on the ground. The ability of post-conflict state-building and development to win public hearts and minds toward the state and foreign donors in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo depends in large on its provision of political, economic, and social services that meet the needs and expectations of citizens. Despite of the focus and emphasis of peace and state-building on European standards, the state in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo is neither capable of effectively responding to local needs nor sufficiently compatible with European Standards. The lack of progress toward EU standards and membership in both countries is a good indication that more work needs to

be done on the current development framework and approaches, fragmented structure of the state, and mainstreaming local ownership and voices in both countries. The disconnect between the current state-building and development framework and public voices, ownership, and support has also forced the international community and donors in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo to tolerate illiberal practices, for example, rampant corruption perpetuated by powerful state and non-state actors in these countries.

State-building and development in Afghanistan and Iraq in particular have not lived up to their promises. Continued civil war and violence have forced millions of Afghans and Iraqis to live as internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees. According to the UN Refugee Agency (2018), 2.1 million Iraqis are displaced and over 360,000 Iraqis are living in informal settlements such as unfinished, abandoned and/or damaged buildings. There are 2.5 million registered refugees from Afghanistan with over one million IDPs, which makes the largest refugee population in Asia and the second largest, after Syria, in the world. Despite spending billions of aid dollars on state formation in Afghanistan and Iraq and creating new or rebuilding the existing institutions, weak and corrupt governance in both countries have failed the Afghan and Iraqi people and have contributed to insecurity and antigovernment insurgency. The Iraqi and Afghan people are quick to point out that the inclusion of certain ethnic groups, warlords with questionable past, tribal, and/or religious leaders and the exclusion of other ethnic groups and/or leaders in the state formation from the start have created winners and losers and have pitted the government against those who rebelled against it. Corrupt (in some cases incompetent) government administrators and leaders with serious lack of technical knowledge or experience, but employed based on political deals or nepotism, have

resulted in weak governance, abuse of power, and widespread corruption that have shaken public trust in government, democracy, and the commitment and intention of the international community in general and the United States in particular to state-building and development in Afghanistan and Iraq. State weakness and corruption have allowed the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Islamic State in Iraq to rise and get the support of the disillusioned, disappointed and stranded citizens with little support or services from their governments. The international community in general and the United States in particular in partnership with the Afghan and Iraqi governments have injected massive foreign aid to win public hearts and minds through the provision of humanitarian, development, and reconstruction and peacebuilding projects and programs with the hope of improved state legitimacy, service delivery, and defeating insurgencies in both countries. However, the data show that in the court of the public opinion the U.S.-led state-building, peace and development initiatives in Afghanistan and Iraq delivered neither peace nor prosperity for most of the citizens and did not win their hearts and minds since 2001 and 2003 in these countries respectively.

In the context of post-conflict state-building and development, solutions to problems in aid recipient state(s) should be developed in consultations with local citizens, for whom the changes are intended and who are going to live with them, not just the state elites who are in power or foreign donors and Western experts. In 2017, Syrian, Afghan, and Iraqi refugees accounted for one-third of the total of 705,000 first-time asylum seekers in Europe. The same year, over 50% of Bosnian and 60% of Kosovar youth said that they want to leave the country if given an opportunity. Citizens from Afghanistan and Iraq leave their countries mostly to flee conflict, political persecution and lack of

safety and security, but citizens from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo leave their countries to flee poverty, bad economy, unemployment, and rampant corruption. In 2016, family members (brother, nephews, and nieces) of Kosovo's Prime Minister, Isa Mustafa, applied for political asylum in Europe. Prime Minister, Isa Mustafa, said that his family was faced with and left the country for the same problems as other Kosovars. Winning public hearts and minds in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo hinges on the ability of the state and the international community and donors, especially the United States and the European Union, to deliver public services in line with public needs and expectations consistent with the proximity theory, the social capital theory, the rational choice theory, and the performance theory, which link public trust and positive public attitudes toward the state and its foreign supporter(s) to government performance--the delivery of services that citizens need and expect. The main challenge for foreign aid and donors, in the context of winning public hearts and minds, in these four cases is to take local needs, voices and diversity serious as a foundation and measure of aid effectiveness, local ownership of the development and peacebuilding initiatives, empowering local institutions, and improving local legitimacy of the state—state is an institution created by citizens to serve them. While the international community and donors have worked on state-building and improving its capacity and legitimacy, over a decade, in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, the policy and practice of state-building, however, have not improved the delivery of basic services consistent with the needs, definitions and expectations of citizens in these countries. In the court of the public opinion, it is the delivery of the public services such as security, political participation, equality, justice, economic opportunities, gainful employment, and

the implementation of laws and orders without fear or favor by the state to improve daily life on the street that wins public hearts and minds toward the state and its foreign supporters. From a policy perspective, there are at least three main implications of these findings.

First, a key task for the international development policymakers and practitioners and foreign donors, in post-conflict societies, is to build a credible state capable of mending political, economic, religious, and social grievances and delivering public services, especially, security, the rule of law, economic opportunities, gainful employment, and political participation, which are the foundation of a healthy state-society relations, aid effectiveness, sustainable peace and development, and winning public hearts and minds. If foreign intervention and development aid are to have any hope of winning public hearts and minds and effectively countering insecurity and extremism in weak, failing, failed, or conflict-affected societies, they must be able to build a state that can provide security, uphold the rule of law without fear or favor, deliver public services effectively, and implement development and social change projects and programs that cut across ethnic, regional, and social boundaries—a legitimate state (antithesis of a *fragile state*) is pre-requisite for sustainable peace and stability in conflict-affected societies, which can win public hearts and minds toward the state and its foreign supporter(s). State-building means (re)establishing and strengthening of the public structure and institutions to deliver public goods in accordance with the needs and expectations of citizens. One should be under no illusions to think that building a legitimate state in weak, failing, failed, or conflict-affected societies to deliver the much-needed services is an easy task. However, experience and data from over a decade

from Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo clearly dictate that aid effectiveness and winning public hearts and minds in war against extremism and terrorism are intimately linked to state legitimacy, strength and capacity to deliver services that relate to and improve daily life on the street.

Second, “winning post-conflict peace” is a prerequisite for security, state-building and legitimacy, aid effectiveness, and winning public hearts and minds in fragile, failed, and/or conflict-affected societies. Winning post-conflict peace in this discourse is taken to mean that foreign driven policies, practices and approaches designed to change a regime, end a war, form and build a post-conflict state, or promote development and democracy are sensitive to local dynamics and do not compromise social order.

Sustainable post-conflict peace is not simply a function of the implementation of foreign-funded development and reconstruction programs, projects, agreements, and roadmaps, but a function of social order, which cannot be imposed from outside or generated through foreign aid or public policy. The data and experience from over a decade of state-building and development from Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are a good testament to the role of local dynamics and social order in establishing post-conflict peace, stability, good governance, development, and democracy.

War and violence lead to winners and losers, grievances, loss of welfare to the public, and divide society along the fault lines, which lays the foundation for rivalry, animosity, mistrust, and competing and contradicting visions, perceptions and attitudes. The legitimacy of the state, the effectiveness of the foreign aid in winning public hearts and minds toward the state and foreign donors in the aid recipient state, and winning the peace in post-conflict societies are shaped by the interplay between the local dynamics



and the state formation and building projects, programs and initiatives. Therefore, greater awareness and attention to local dynamics from the start of the peace negotiations to end the war, the design and implementation of regime change and the road map to (re)building and development are key to ensure long term peace and stability are not compromised by short term solutions to end the war or change a regime. The experience and data from Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo show that divisive peace, political solutions, and top-down state-building interventions and framework that are less sensitive to local dynamics and social order are counterproductive to winning the peace, state legitimacy, aid effectiveness, and winning public hearts and minds. The United States and European Union have demonstrated overconfidence in the applicability of military and technical solutions to the very complex process of state-building and transferability of the Western liberal institutions, values and experiences to the very complex social, political, and economic problems in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo to the point of ignoring local dynamics and social order, which have challenged winning the peace, (re)building the state, and winning public hearts and minds in these countries.

The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 in Bonn, Germany, put in motion a post-Taliban political transition in Afghanistan that divided the Afghan society along the ethnolinguistic fault line, pitting the ethnic Tajiks (approximately 25% of the population) against the ethnic Pashtuns (approximately 45% of the population). Giving the Northern Alliance, a loose coalition of Tajik ethnic groups, especially members of the Shura-e-Nezar, an arch rival of the Taliban, a leading role to dictate the Bonn Agreement and the subsequent government formation in Afghanistan and leaving out the Taliban from this

process created winners and losers, which set in motion bitter ethnic rivalry, division, and hostility between the Tajiks and Pashtuns from the start to this day. The Pashtuns in general and the Taliban in particular saw the reinstatement of the Northern Alliance, which was overthrown by Taliban in 1996, in a dominant role in the Afghan government by the United States and the international community not due to its past record or character, but as a reward for its cooperation with the United States and support in overthrowing the Taliban regime. Haji Abdul Qadir, a prominent Pashtun politician, protested and bitterly complained during the Bonn Agreement in Bonn, Germany, that the over representation of Northern Alliance and under-representation of Pashtuns were inconsistent with Afghan history and unacceptable to Pashtuns. Pamela Constable, in the July 13, 2002 edition of the *Washington Post*, wrote that Pashtuns are unhappy with the ethnic makeup of the post-Bonn government and the rise to power of warlords and Northern Alliance. She quoted an ethnic Pashtun cabinet minister bluntly stating, “The Americans made them [Northern Alliance] strong, and only the Americans can make them weak again.” Johnson (2006, 8) writes, “Padsha Khan Zadran, a powerful Pashtun warlord who reportedly controlled the three southeast provinces of Khost, Paktia, and Paktika in Spring/Summer 2002 summed up the sentiments of many Pashtuns when he asked, ‘Why are they [the Americans] humiliating Pashtuns? We’re the majority. They [the Americans] placed Hamid Karzai at the top as representative of Pashtuns. But in reality he’s no longer a Pashtun. He’s sold himself out. He is a traitor. Pashtuns cannot sit around waiting. They will react and will claim their rights.’”

The Taliban have not only rejected the U.S.-led political transition in Afghanistan from the start and called it unfair, one-sided, and politically motivated, but, more

importantly, they have used it as a reason and a rallying point to regroup and fight the Tajik dominated Afghan government and its foreign supporters. As a result, the United States, the international community and the government of Afghanistan have been fighting a resilient Taliban insurgency for the past 17 years with heavy civilian, military and economic costs and casualties. The 17-year war and violence, which are still going on, have not only destroyed ethnic cooperation and social cohesion, but they have also, more importantly, destroyed public trust and positive attitudes toward the state, foreign donors and the international community. The rivalry, division, and tension between the ethnic Tajik and the ethnic Pashtun were on full display when at the end of the 2014 second round of Presidential elections (run-off between front runner Dr. Ashraf Ghani, Pashtun vs. Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, Tajik) the Independent Election Commission named Dr. Ashraf Ghani the winner. Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, who was nominated by the National Coalition Party (a predominant Tajik coalition) refused to accept the defeat and accused Dr. Ashraf Ghani and the Independent Election Commission of fraud and ethnic bias. The international community and the United States had to step in to pressure both sides to create a coalition government and avoid ethnic conflict and confrontation in the country. The United States' ex-President Barak H. Obama had to place direct calls and his Secretary of State, John Kerry, had to travel to Afghanistan to personally meet with both sides (more than once) to avert major ethnic confrontation and civil war. A new position of Chief Executive was created for Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. However, to this day, the mistrust, disagreement, tension, and ethnic division between the President Dr. Ashraf Ghani and his Chief Executive, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, continues, which is one of

the key reasons for state weakness, corruption, insecurity, and ethnic division and rivalry in the country.

In Iraq, the U.S. –led invasion has divided the country across the religion fault line, pitting Shias against the Sunnis. First, regime change in Iraq was welcomed by Shias as an opportunity, which makes up about 60% of the society, but resented and rejected by Sunnis, which make up about 40% of the country. Second, regime change in Iraq not only toppled Saddam Hussein from power, but it also, more importantly, toppled the Sunni political dominance and the Iraqi Socialist Baath Party that have ruled the country for decades, which empowered the Shias to turn the tides against the Sunnis by creating the first Arab Shia government. Third, the U.S. support for the rise of Shia and the Shia dominant government in Iraq directly challenged the Sunni socio-political identity, concept of sectarian balance, and vision of statehood, which set in motion bitter sectarian rivalry, angry Sunni insurgency, and bitter sectarian warfare leading to ethnic division, the rise of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq, and civil war in the country.

The Tajiks political ascendancy in Afghanistan and the Shias political ascendancy in Iraq will continue to define and shape the Afghan and Iraqi political landscapes for a foreseeable future. To win peace and public hearts and minds in Afghanistan and Iraq, ending sect-centric warfare is the key for social order, aid effectiveness, stability, and state-building in both countries—aid is more effective in promoting economic growth, countering terrorism and/or insurgency, and winning public hearts and minds in states that are accountable to their citizens with less internal rivalry and political divisions. In states with internal political rivalry and divisions aid is counterproductive in winning

public hearts and minds toward the donors and the aid recipient state because aid is used by elites for priorities other than serving the public, such as arming against rivals.

Post war Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are characterized by ethno-political rivalries, segregation, polarization and nationalist interests and policies that run contrary to social order and the development and democratization process funded by foreign donors and the international community, especially the European Union and the United States. Identification and institutionalization of ethnicity, by the international community, while may have been necessary to protect the rights of minorities and end the war, have divided ethnic groups and instead of encouraging cooperation to rebuild their common homeland have given rise to nationalism, territorial and inter-ethnic rivalry and conflicts in both countries. Political elites, leaders, and parties in both countries since independence have been unable or unwilling to abandon ethno-nationalist campaigns and policies to engage in a democratic political process, negotiations, compromise, and cooperation to reunite and rebuild their war-torn countries. Unable to reconcile the legacy of war and violence, Kosovo Serbs and Bosnian Croats and Serbs have sought connections with neighbors outside the country. The Kosovo Serbs, especially in the north, do not recognize Kosovo's independence from the start and rigorously resist governance by the Kosovo state. The Serb community, especially in the North, has been asking for territorial autonomy, separation and unification with Serbia, a move that would encourage Serbs in Bosnian and Albanians in Macedonia to follow in the footsteps. Furthermore, the inter-ethnic relation between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo is heavily burdened by nationalism and dictated by the inter-state relation between Kosovo and Serbia, which does not recognize Kosovo as an independent republic. In fact Serbia still

considers Kosovo as an integral part of its territory. Although the international community, especially the European Union and the United States, has been trying to facilitate dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia to peacefully resolve their differences, the relation between the two countries remains intense and burdened with deep mistrust and animosity. The international community and donors have used a two-pronged approach to state-building and peacebuilding in Kosovo. They have used state-building to address the needs and aspirations of the Albanian majority and peacebuilding to address the needs and demands of other minorities, especially the Serbs, in the country. However, this policy has failed to engineer a multi-ethnic collective identity to resolve state ownership, ethnic and territorial conflict and loyalty, and divided political agendas in the country. As a result of territorial and ethno-nationalist rivalries and animosity between the two countries and the two ethnic groups, Albanian and Serb elites, parties, and leaders in Kosovo have used fear to justify nationalist discourse and policies that are pulling the country apart and run contrary to foreign-funded state-building and democratic process. Peaceful resolution of territorial and ethnic segregation, division and disputes are prerequisite for social order and winning peace and aid effectiveness in Kosovo.

With two entities (Federation of Bosnian and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska) and three national ethnic identities (Bosniak, Serb, and Croat), Bosnia and Herzegovina is stuck in its democratic transition process—lack of a common vision for ethnic unification and consensus regarding the reform and building of the state and country ravaged by three years of bloody war, a bad economy, and rampant corruption. Although the international community and donors, compared to the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, have achieved a level of peace, development, and democratic transition in Bosnia and

Herzegovina, the effectiveness of foreign aid in building social cohesion (positive connectedness to country, solidarity with and trust in fellow citizens regardless of ethnic, political or religious orientations, and civil participation for the common good) and winning peace and stability are work in progress. As a compromise between a unitary state and secession, the international community imposed federalism on political parties representing the people of Bosnia in the 1995 peace negotiation. As a result, post-war political parties have been unwilling to accept or identify with imposed federalism that has resulted in a very complex institutional structure and conflicts between ethno-nationalist parties. Political parties have continued to obstruct concrete progress toward democratic political process needed to end ethnic division, polarization and conflicts by exclusively focusing on ethno-nationalist interests and politics that have pulled away the country and people from a national vision of state-building and service delivery consistent with the needs and expectations of citizens and foreign donors in the country. For example, in the 2018 presidential elections, political parties aggressively focused their campaigns on nationalist interests, fear and rhetoric, which the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo in a press release called “very poisonous atmosphere” and “entirely dominated by fear-based rhetoric” (The U. S. Embassy in Sarajevo, press release, 27 September, 2018). In response, some political parties and media outlets in the country accused the United States of interfering in the 2018 presidential elections. The United States Embassy in Sarajevo, in response, released the following statement to defend and clear its position in the country.

The U.S. Embassy in BiH roundly rejects the completely ridiculous conspiracy theories being disseminated by certain politicians and media outlets in their service. It is shocking that these individuals would stand at

a podium and deliver outright lies, especially when their unfounded allegations are so easily disproved. Such rhetoric is irresponsible, inflammatory, and out of line with democratic norms. Certain political groups in BiH obviously fear that their illegal and corrupt activities will be investigated and prosecuted. Instead of focusing on issues of actual importance to the citizens of BiH, their selfish logic is to try to delude citizens by creating false enemies. The United States will not allow itself to be portrayed as an enemy of the people of BiH when it is clearly others who are actively working against citizens' interests. In keeping with our longstanding commitment to Bosnia and Herzegovina's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and stability and the well-being of its citizens, we will continue to press for measures to build a justice sector to fight terrorism and counter corruption, as well as improve the credibility and transparency of elections, including by calling out electoral fraud when we see it (The U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo, press release, 19 October, 2018. <https://ba.usembassy.gov/>).

Ethnic segregation, rivalry, and animosity and territorial disputes have allowed political elites and parties (Muslim, Serb, and Croat alike) to escape accountability and to use fear and nationalism to further their political agendas and grip on power, which have resulted in elite predation and negative effects on aid effectiveness and foreign-led state-building and democratization in the country. As a result, Bosnia and Herzegovina is characterized by a bad economy, rampant corruption, high unemployment, and very low public confidence and trust in the state and its foreign supporters. Although the 1995 U.S.-led NATO intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended the war, killings, ethnic cleansing, and violence against women and minorities, the conflicting and contradicting agendas between the local and foreign actors in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina have undermined social order, winning the peace and fragmented the state-building and development project in the country.

Third, ignoring corruption to buy peace, safeguard the state-building process, and/or attend to “more pressing issues” is storing problems for the future. Corruption



should be a focus of attention from the start of the peace agreement, regime change and/or state-building initiatives. Corruption erodes state legitimacy, public trust and confidence in the state institutions and foreign donors, aid effectiveness and donors' goodwill. Corruption has economic, social, and cultural reasons, but the political reason is the critical reason for the epidemic of corruption in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo.

The cost of corruption is not the bribes themselves, but the distractive consequences to the state, donors and society. In weak, fragile, failing, or conflict-affected societies foreign actors usually negotiate a role in the formation of the state with political leaders, warlords, ethnic groups or leaders, and powerbrokers (in some cases with questionable past) to end violence, achieve peace, and kick start the state-building process. However, in most cases, political or ethnic leaders, warlords and powerbrokers not only influence the political structure of the state and balance of power, but they also resist changes that weaken their power base and position themselves and their loyal right-hand men to top political and military posts to forward their individual or group interest and carefully stream foreign funds to themselves rather than adopting policies and practices that are in the best interest of the country and people. With the little capacity to deliver public services and meaningful check and balance, post-conflict states in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo have been a pawn for corrupt officials, warlords, and powerbrokers from the start.

The Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index ranks countries from 0 (perceived to be highly corrupt) to 100 (perceived to be the least corrupt) according to public opinion surveys and expert assessments. The 2017 Corruption

Perception score for Afghanistan was 15/100, for Iraq 18/100, for Bosnia and Herzegovina 38/100, and for Kosovo 39/100, indicating a high-level of corruption. In 2017, 84% of Afghans, 60% of Bosnians, 79% of Iraqi, and 74% of Kosovars said that corruption in the government is a major problem in the country. In response to a request by the U.S. Congress, the watchdog charged with tracking government spending in Afghanistan (The Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, SIGAR 2018) estimates that a staggering total of \$15.5 billion is wasted over the last 11 years in Afghanistan, which it said as “likely...only a portion of the total waste, fraud, abuse and failed efforts.” According to the Iraq corruption watchdog (2018), \$320 billion is stolen over 15 years. Figure 54 depicts the average amounts of bribes by institutions in Afghanistan for 2017.




Figure 54. Average Amount of Bribes in Afghani and their Approximate Value in the U.S. Dollar by Institution in Afghanistan in 2017

Source: The Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan People, Afghanistan in 2017.

For foreign aid to be effective in winning public hearts and minds and the war on terror in the aid recipient countries, foreign actors and donors should use adequate time to prepare for peace agreements, regime change, and/or the design and development of programs and projects in consultation with local government and the people most directly concerned. Overconfidence in military or technical solutions to complex socio-political problems to the point of ignoring social order, local knowledge and cultural values or assuming local people are uninformed to know their own interest is a recipe for disaster. Since in a weak, failing, failed, and/or conflict-affected society, the transfer, allocation, and distribution of aid materials, the design and delivery of development projects and programs, and aid itself are a source of socio-political influence and power, effective check and balance is required to ensure government officials, ethnic or local leaders, and warlords are not abusing power and/or benefiting themselves from foreign aid. State weakness or fragility, overconfidence in military or technical solutions to the point of ignoring local dynamics and social order, and corruption are as much enemy in winning public hearts and minds and the war on “terror” in the aid recipient states as are the extremist organizations, leaders, and ideology. The data and analysis from the four cases suggest that local politics, state strength and legitimacy, level of corruption in the government, and how foreign actors and/or powers initiate, design, and implement the regime change and/or the state-building process from the start greatly shape local attitudes and behaviors and their “buy in” in these initiatives and aid effectiveness in winning public hearts and minds in weak, failing, failed, or conflict-affected societies. In this light, future counterinsurgency, regime change, and/or state-building projects and initiatives should be more informed from the start about social order, local dynamics,

ownership and needs, more selective in choosing local partners, and placing more meaningful check and balance to win peace and public hearts and minds and the fight against extremism and terrorism in weak, failing, failed, and/or conflict-affected societies. The performance of the Afghan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraqi, and Kosovo states and their foreign donors and supporters to date provides a valuable insight into the application of the development aid theory and practice in winning public hearts and minds toward the aid recipient state and foreign donor(s).

In short, weak and failed states have long been a problem and responsibility of the international community, but given the greater globalized security threat that they pose today, weak and failed states are even a greater problem and responsibility of the international community in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Terrorists and criminals use weak and failed states to lay the foundation of their networks, hatch plots and commit crimes all over the world, from human abuse and trafficking to drugs to terrorism. Winning the fight against insecurity, extremism, and terrorism is intimately linked to winning public hearts and minds through the provision of humanitarian and development aid. The argument is that aid is an effective way to build state capacity, expand state control over its territory and to win the war against insecurity, extremism and terrorism compared to enduring the massive military costs of deployment to fight insurgency, extremism, and terrorism in weak, failing, and failed states, all over the world. Although the United States and the international community have undertaken nation building, over a century, the data and results from the most recent cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo indicate that in the court of the public opinion, foreign aid has fallen short of winning public hearts and minds in these four causes.

With heavy emphasis on engineering post-conflict state, institutions and society based on Western political and economic models and experience, the international community has neglected local dynamics, social order, and to take effective action against strong men, leaders and stakeholders, in or outside the government, whose economic and political malpractices are clearly contrary to the very principles of Western liberal democracy and state legitimacy, which has given rise to rampant corruption, ethnic rivalries and divisions, and political and economic challenges in these four cases. One reason for this negligence may be that the international community and donors understand that Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are not only making a difficult transition from a bloody war to peace, but also from a communist, authoritarian, and/or dictatorship to a democratic system. However, whatever the reason, winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient states and the war on terror are intimately linked to aid effectiveness in delivering public services consistent with the needs and expectations of citizens. The data and findings from Afghanistan (2001 – 2017), Iraq (2003 – 2017), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995 – 2017), and Kosovo (1999 – 2017) indicate that in the court of the public opinion foreign aid has fallen short of winning public hearts and minds toward the state and its foreign donors in these four aid recipient countries. These findings, however, should not be seen as suggesting that foreign aid is not a potentially viable tool in winning public hearts and minds toward the state, donors, and the war against insecurity, extremism, and terrorism in the aid recipient states, but they should be rather seen as an evaluation of the current state of knowledge, peace and state-building measures and should guide scholarly debate and policy on

exploring alternative approaches to state and peacebuilding outside the existing top-down blueprints and practices.

### Limitations of the Study

The research for this dissertation was designed in two parts, with the research methodology employing two types of survey approaches in a complementary fashion. Part I of the research was designed to use the existing data from national surveys and public opinion polls conducted by reliable national and international organizations in Afghanistan (2001-2017), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-2017), Iraq (2003-2017), and Kosovo (1999-2017) that address any issues associated with receiver country perspectives on foreign aid. Part II of the research was designed to conduct a national survey in Afghanistan to address the gaps in existing data in Part I.

However, Afghanistan is a war zone with a very volatile security situations and one of the most dangerous countries in the world for conducting national surveys. After widely consulting with locals and government officials, it quickly became clear that not only the Taliban, Al Qaeda, Daesh, warlords and other anti-government warring factions that oppose the government and the international community in Afghanistan, but also government militias, warlords associated with government, and rogue government security forces and administrators could arrest, kidnap, imprison, and even kill survey administrators and participants for being part of a survey that is for a foreign country or institution or an individual associated with their arch-enemy--the United States. Due to deterioration of the security situations in the country, which was posing potential risks

and harm to both survey administrators and survey participants, the survey management team had no choice but to scale back the planned scope of the national survey in Afghanistan consistent with the University of Southern Mississippi's Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Human Subjects Protection Review Committee's research guidelines. As a result, the research had to use secondary survey data, as the only alternative, for the Afghan case, as it was doing with other cases.

### Recommendations for Future Research

This research undertook a first cut at assessing the relationship between foreign aid and winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries of Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo. Assessing the link between foreign aid and winning public hearts and minds in aid recipient countries is important given the human costs associated with conflicts and terrorism, the security threat that they pose, and the billions of dollars annually devoted to humanitarian, development, and reconstruction programs and projects in unstable, weak, failing, failed, and/or conflict-affected states. Case studies of Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo indicate that for aid to win public hearts and minds toward the donor(s) and the aid recipient state and the war on terror, the state and its foreign supporters must deliver peace, stability and development at the individual level consist with public needs and expectations. The findings and data from Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo indicate that state weakness, divisive initiatives to peace or state-building, and political corruption are counterproductive to aid effectiveness in winning public hearts and minds and the war

on terror. Future research with larger sample size of cases and data should look into how foreign actors and aid recipient state can introduce better check and balance to effectively deliver public services from the start of the peace and/or state-building initiatives to make sure aid is effective in winning public hearts and minds and bringing about favorable counter-terrorism outcome. This will discourage elites in the aid recipient state to engage in systematic rent-seeking, abuse of power, corruption, and actively sponsoring terrorism in hopes of continued aid.

Lessons learned or unlearned from the United States' and the international community's involvement over a decade in peace and state-building in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Kosovo is a clear and depressing reminder that more research is needed to assess better and understand the link between foreign aid and winning public hearts and minds, foreign aid and counterinsurgency and terrorism, foreign aid and state legitimacy, foreign aid and political structure, and foreign aid and political corruption. The data and findings indicate that public perceptions of aid and foreign actors are overwhelmingly negative in the cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. The overwhelming majority of the public believe that little or nothing has been done, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. Future research should look into why in spite of the billions of dollars in aid, humanitarian, development, and reconstruction projects and programs, the public still does not believe that enough or a lot have been done in these countries. More pointedly, what level(s) of development, security, reconstruction and/or state-building is needed for foreign aid to win public hearts and minds in the aid recipient country toward the donors of the foreign aid and the aid recipient state?



## Policy Recommendations

State weakness, political corruption, insecurity, and criminality have undermined aid effectiveness, state legitimacy, and winning public hearts and minds toward the state and donors and the war against insurgency, extremism, and terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. To reverse this trend in these four cases and beyond, the following policy measures, which should be of interest to foreign donors and policymakers involved in international security and development, are suggested:

First, *build a legitimate state that can deliver services without fear or favor and stand up to insurgency, extremism, and terrorism in weak, fragile, and failing states.* A strategy of winning the war on terror, demands winning public hearts and minds in the aid recipient countries, which in turn demands aid effectiveness. Therefore, foreign aid, donors and policy practitioners should pay more attention to building a legitimate state that can win public confidence and support and stand up to insurgency, extremism, and terrorism in weak, fragile, and failing states. This policy should involve long term approach and commitment to state-building, especially building state security and government institutions and capacity to stand on their own in defeating insurgency and extremism and delivering the much-needed services without fear or favor to win public hearts and minds.

Second, *avoid ignoring corruption to buy peace, safeguard the state building process, and/or attend to “more pressing issues.”* Ignoring corruption is storing problems for the future. Building a legitimate and capable state requires concessions and commitment from government and people to promote the rule of law, accountability, and transparency and to confront corruption, patronage, and political rivalry and infighting.

Therefore, corruption should be a focus of attention from the start of the peace agreement, regime change, and/or state-building initiatives to ensure aid effectiveness, state legitimacy, and service delivery consistent with public needs and demands and winning public hearts and minds toward the state and donors.

Third, *harmonize foreign-led interference and state building initiatives with local institutions, culture, dynamics, ownership, needs, and social order to contend with public skepticism about the motives and objectives of foreign aid, foreign-led interference and public negative sentiments toward donors and state.* One of the key issues for foreign donors and foreign interference in general and the United States in particular in the Muslim world and the Middle East, in particular, is to contend with public skepticism about the motives of foreign aid and foreign-led interference. Therefore, foreign-led interference and state-building initiatives should be well informed from the start about local dynamics, ownership, needs, and social order and more selective in choosing and supporting local partners and leaders to subdue public criticism and ethnic and/or religious rivalry, balance, and competitions that terrorist and extremist organizations and leaders usually exploit. Half-hearted public diplomacy, top-down state-building approaches and initiatives, working outside the state, and working with local leaders and organizations with questionable past are counterproductive in aid effectiveness, winning public hearts and minds, war on terror and insurgency, and state legitimacy.

Fourth, *avoid over confidence in the applicability of military and technical solutions to the very complex process of state building and transferability of the Western liberal institutions, values, and experiences to the very complex social, political, and economic problems in weak, fragile, and failing states.* Foreign donors and policymakers

should avoid overconfidence in the applicability of military and technical solutions to the very complex process of state-building and transferability of the Western liberal institutions, values, and experiences to the very complex social, political, and economic problems in weak, fragile, and failing states. Overconfidence in military or technical solutions to complex economic, political, and/or social problems to the point of ignoring social order, local knowledge, and cultural values or assuming local people are uninformed to know their own interest is counterproductive in building legitimate state, aid effectiveness, local ownership, public confidence and support, and winning public hearts and minds toward the state and donors and the war on insecurity, insurgency, and extremism.

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