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# Determinants of the Generalized Trust Radius in Scripted Fragile Sub-Saharan African States

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# DETERMINANTS OF THE GENERALIZED TRUST RADIUS IN SCRIPTED FRAGILE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN STATES

by

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ABSTRACT

DETERMINANTS OF THE GENERALIZED TRUST RADIUS IN SCRIPTED FRAGILE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN STATES

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Trust between strangers does not come easily in collectivist societies governed by coercive institutions and subject to unstable market forces. More than one-third of all states are fragile, yet the trust literature has shown little interest in explaining the variability of generalized trust among them; instead fixating on social capital, the consequence of the expansion of generalized trust, putting the cart before the horse and leaving unexamined many of its causes. The enhanced accuracy of the reconfigured World Values Survey trust question has generated new research opportunities to address this concern. This dissertation advances the trust literature through identifying, measuring, and explaining the full social effect on generalized trust in fragile states through group proximity and civil society power differential. Sociological institutionalism and social capital theory provide the theoretical framework for modeling and explaining structural social effects leading to the improbable expansion of generalized trust in the highly scripted fragile sub-Saharan African states of Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria. These purposefully deviant and least likely test cases are examined using within- and cross-case analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions through most similar multiple comparative case analysis, affirming or confirming most hypotheses. The expansion of generalized trust requires sustained and usually incentivized positive inter-group interaction. In fragile states, most inter-group

interaction is conflictual and occurs through civil society because individuals have little capital with which to engage in the market and the state is dysfunctional. The generalized trust radius is likely to widen the more proximate and consociational its civil society is, regardless of how fragile the state is. This dissertation enlarges and strengthens the social explanation for generalized trust variability in fragile states, filling a significant gap in the literature and establishing a research design and model for future research to replicate in other fragile regions.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The inspiration for this dissertation comes from my life experience working and researching in a variety of different academic and development professions with people from around the world. These experiences have taught me to become more aware of the "Other," and cherish generalized trust where it can be found. I owe thanks to Dr. Robert Pauly, my dissertation committee chair, for his always prompt, professional, and congenial feedback. Thank you, Alicia, for your patience with me as I rolled this boulder up and down the hill like Sisyphus.

# DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to the memory of Mike O'Rear who guided me in my early vocation as an international researcher. He inspires me still to perseverance and excellence in seeking goals beyond my self-interest.

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| | |
|---|---|
| *ACLED* | Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project |
| *AIC* | African Initiated Churches |
| *APC* | All Progressives Congress |
| *AU* | African Union |
| *BBC* | British Broadcasting Company |
| *CDP* | Congress for Democracy and Progress |
| *DRC* | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| *EFP* | Ethiopian Federal Police |
| *ELF* | Ethno Linguistic Fractionalization atlas project |
| *ENDF* | Ethiopian National Defense Force |
| *EPRDF* | Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front |
| *EPRP* | Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Party |
| *ESAP* | Economic and Structural Adjustment Program |
| *EU* | European Union |
| *FATF* | Financial Action Task Force on money laundering |
| *FDI* | Foreign Direct Investment |
| *FPI* | Foreign Portfolio Investment |
| *FSI* | Fragile States Index |
| *GDP* | Gross Domestic Product |
| *GDP, PPP* | Gross Domestic Product, Purchasing Power Parity |

| | |
|---|---|
| *GLOBE* | Global Leadership & Organizational Behavior Effectiveness |
| *GNI* | Gross National Income |
| *GTR* | Generalized Trust Radius |
| *HDI* | Human Development Index |
| *HFS* | Harmonized List of Fragile Situations |
| *HIV/AIDS* | Human immunodeficiency virus infection and acquired immune deficiency syndrome |
| *IDP* | Internally Displaced Persons |
| *IoT* | Internet of Things |
| *IMF* | International Monetary Fund |
| *IR* | International Relations |
| *ISW* | Index of State Weakness |
| *LGA* | Local Government Area |
| *MDC* | Movement for Democratic Change |
| *MDSD* | Most Different Systems Design |
| *MENA* | Middle East and North Africa |
| *MID* | Militarized Interstate Disputes |
| *MMD* | Bemba Democratic Socialist Movement for Multi-Party Democracy |
| *MSSD* | Most Similar Systems Design |
| *NATO* | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |

| | |
|---|---|
| *NGO* | Non-Governmental Organization |
| *NIC* | National Intelligence Council |
| *NP* | Nigerian Police |
| *NSCT* | National Strategy for Combating Terrorism |
| *ODA* | Official Development Assistance |
| *OECD* | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| *OIC* | Organization of the Islamic Conference |
| *PDP* | People's Democratic Party |
| *PF* | Bemba Democratic Socialist Patriotic Front |
| *PLAN* | People's Liberation Army of Namibia |
| *PREG* | Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups |
| *RF* | Rhodesian Front |
| *SADF* | South African Defence Force |
| *SCAD* | Social Conflict Analysis Database |
| *SD* | Standard Deviation |
| *SFI* | State Fragility Index |
| *SNC* | Social Network Composition |
| *SSA* | Sub-Saharan Africa |
| *TPLF* | Tigreyan People's Liberation Front |
| *UN* | United Nations |
| *UNAIDS* | Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS |

| | |
|---|---|
| *UNCHR* | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| *UNCTAD* | United Nations Conference on Trade and Development |
| *UNDP* | United Nations Development Programme |
| *UNESCO* | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
| *UNIDO* | United Nations Industrial Development Organization |
| *UNIP* | United National Independence Party |
| *UPDN* | Tonga Liberal United Party for National Development |
| *US* | United States |
| *USAID* | United States Agency for International Development |
| *WHO* | World Health Organization |
| *WVS* | World Values Survey |
| *ZANLA* | Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army |
| *ZANU* | Zimbabwe Africa National Union |
| *ZANU-PF* | Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front |
| *ZAPU* | Zimbabwe African People's Union |
| *ZIPRA* | Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army |
| *ZRP* | Zimbabwe Republic Police |

# CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

Dine with a stranger but save your love for your family.

—Ethiopian proverb

Is it possible for strangers to trust each other in highly collectivist societies governed by fragile state institutions and unstable market forces? Many in the trust and fragile states literature say no (see Bratton 1989, 428; Lowenkopf 1995, 104; Posner 2004, 246). This dissertation, in agreement with Kaplan (2008, 4), challenges this assumption and claims a society's social network composition determines much of the extent of generalized trust between strangers in fragile states.

*Trust*, having confidence one's expectations will be met (Hardin 1992, 152-3), is the fuel that, along with incentivized or coerced self-interest, drives social interaction. While individuals may credit trust to institutions, physical matter, or unobserved forces, this research is concerned with the determinants of the extent of generalized social trust. Social trust requires human interaction, which is dependent on close physical, technological, or social proximity. Social proximity occurs in two phases: initial and sustained. Self-interest prompts initial interaction (Miller 1999, 1057), consisting of a mixture of basic human needs, cultural attraction, selective incentives, and capital exchange, while *generalized trust*: shared co-operative norms (Fukuyama 2001, 8), based on non-cultural intrinsic and instrumental interests, drives sustained interaction.

The *fragile state* is a socio-political organism established by a social contract which has diminished "control over its territory" (Di John 2010, 10) and contested "monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber 2015, 136). Its social contract has eroded, though not to the point of collapse or failure, nor

irreparably. It suffers from capacity, security, and legitimacy gaps (Eizenstat et al., 2005, 134–146) and is either "unable or unwilling to provide core services to its people" (Vallings and Moreno-Torres 2005, 24), leaving many interests unmet. Fragile states lack many of the necessary preconditions for the production of generalized trust; this is of concern because state fragility levels are high and relatively stable (Bandura 2008, 17, 85; Marshall and Cole 2008, 12) particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), ensuring their perpetuation.

Much of the trust and fragile states literature fails to recognize that fragile states come in many complex varieties with some types providing more optimal generalized trust conditions than others (Call 2010, 316). Some in the trust literature (see Delhey et al. 2011; van Hoorn 2015) recognize this diversity; however, focus their analysis on cultural, economic, and political factors, while subordinating social effects. This dissertation extends and strengthens this line of inquiry by producing an enhanced model for examining the function of generalized trust in fragile states through the effects of a society's *social network composition*, defined as the configuration of and relationship between social inputs that produce social network structures.

Sociological institutionalism and social capital theory together provide the most suitable theoretical framework for analyzing the determinants of the *generalized trust radius (GTR):* the extent that shared co-operative norms (Fukuyama 2001, 8) based on non-community intrinsic and instrumental interests permeate society. *Institutional isomorphism* is the homogeneity of social structures and processes between organizational units under similar constraints (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 157), and *institutional scripts* are protocols for seeking interests (Shweder 1991, 98). Within this

theoretical framework, institutional isomorphism and scripts explain how social networks form, are composed and persist to affect the GTR in fragile states.

A society's social network composition, as much as its state security and contract institutions, individualism-collectivism levels, and inter-state market forces, determines whether groups are forced or incentivized to interact to meet interests and whether the outcome is increased or decreased generalized trust (Posner 2004, 242). The trust and fragile states literature rightly assume *most* fragile states produce narrow GTR, yet has not pursued an explanation for fragile states that deviate from this typical outcome. The test case of interest is subject to the same negative environmental factors as typical fragile states and results in some of the same expected adverse outcomes, yet exhibits a relatively wide GTR. No region has more fragile states than sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Goldstone 2004, 454; Herbst 2004, 302). This dissertation employs a deviant, least likely case selection method and most similar, multiple, and comparative case analysis method to address how social network composition affects the GTR in the test cases of Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria and control cases of Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The examination of fragile states matters because, in a globalizing world, one state's problems readily become other states' problems, destabilizing regions in the process. The GTR matters because trust's outward expansion, more than its intensity level, determines access to the positive externalities of expanding social networks and increased access to physical, human, and social capital (Fukuyama 2001, 13; Morrone et al. 2009, 5), and the avoidance of the negative externalities of information asymmetry and moral hazard associated with a narrow GTR (Harrison 1985, 7).

## Research Questions and Hypotheses

This research builds upon Fukuyama's (2002) principal operational question for fragile states: How fragile must states become and in what configurations, before generalized trust is no longer able to expand (2002, 32). The state constrains much of what is possible in society—if the state is fragile, so too should be the society…most of the time. However, statist theories emphasizing security and contract institutions, alone, do not explain all that constrains the GTR. The literature requires distinct theory and models for fragile states on the verge of collapse or failure from those that are reasonably functional (Posner 2003, 239; Rotberg 2004, 1-2). The examination of social determinants, in addition to the statist, cultural, and market variables, has the potential to close a significant gap in the literature.

The intersection of trust and fragile states provides fertile ground for many pertinent research questions. This research is limited to questions addressing the structural determinants of the GTR in fragile states, leaving the balance of agent-centered and non-fragile state questions to future research. The four related research questions are as follows:

1. *How does social network composition affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?*
2. *How do institutions affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?*
3. *How does culture affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?*
4. *How do inter-state market forces affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?*

The hypotheses for each research question are as follows:

$H_1$: Increasing fractionalization, proximity, and power differential widen the generalized trust radius in fragile states.

$H_2$: Increasing state security and contract institutions widens the generalized trust radius in fragile states.
$H_3$: Increasing individualism widens the generalized trust radius in fragile states.
$H_{4a}$: Increasing trade, FDI, and FPI widen the generalized trust radius in fragile states.
$H_{4b}$: Decreasing remittances, non-military aid, and military aid widen the generalized trust radius in fragile states.

The hypotheses are operationalized for measurement and testing as follows and are defined and clarified later:

- Dependent Variable: [Generalized Trust Radius]
- Test Variable: Social Network Composition [Fractionalization], [Proximity] and [Power Differential]
- Control Variable: Institutions [State Security and Contract Institutions]
- Control Variable: Culture [Individualism]
- Control Variable: Inter-State Market Forces [Trade], [FDI], [FPI], [Remittances], [Non-Military Aid], and [Military Aid]

This research produces four contributions to the trust and fragile states literature. First, it confirms and enhances control variable arguments and confirms the inclusion of the test variable through the sociological institutionalism and social capital theory theoretical framework, which produces an enhanced theoretically generalizable model for analyzing structural determinants of the GTR in highly scripted fragile SSA states. Second, it validates and advances the World Values Survey new trust question battery and Delhey et al. (2011) generalized trust radius measurement through the development of two concepts. The trust composition models the optimal balance of in-group, generalized, and institutional trust for creating environments conducive to the widening of the GTR. The trust differential demonstrates the variability of GTR potential and realization among fragile states. Third, by identifying, modeling, and measuring a fuller social effect on the GTR, it reveals generalized trust patterns across test cases, explains

fragile states' transition from unipolarity to multipolarity, and describes incentivization structures present in fragile state civil society networks. This dissertation is a unique and original contribution at the intersection of the state, society, institutions, and trust, which fills a critical gap in the trust and fragile states literature.

## Theoretical Framework

The analysis of trust in the social sciences has been a *multi-disciplinary* effort with economics, political science, psychology, and sociology each cutting different paths through the trust literature, resulting in inefficiency and duplication of efforts. For a concept with substantial explanatory power, the literature is quite disappointing (Delhey et al. 2011, 800). The advancement of this literature requires, where permissible, an *inter-disciplinary* integration of theories, data, and findings. Synthesis is beginning to occur at the intersection of political science and sociology where the sub-disciplines of political sociology, comparative politics, and social organization converge. Bridging this gap in the literature are several related theories under the umbrella of sociological institutionalism and social capital theory that together posit there is predictability within complex systems of interaction.

Institutions have been defined as "the underlying rules of the game" (North 1990, 3) and "formal and informal rules and norms that organize social, political, and economic relations" (1990, 3).

> Institutions are durable, socially constructed "cognitive and symbolic schemes" (Bevir 2006, 374), that shape (North 1990, 3) and constrain thought, interest, and behavior through formal and informal sanctions and incentives (Voigt 2013, 7).

While individual behavior is usually rational, institutional outcomes are often unintentional, regulating products of recurring social interaction; repeated interactions produce institutions. Therefore, formal and informal institutions are by definition, enduring. To combat deinstitutionalizing forces, they must be adaptive. Effective institutions delineate social expectations, while weak institutions are enforced capriciously. Individuals desire clear expectations as they seek to meet their interests and perpetually—usually tacitly—assess their environments to ascertain formal and informal institutional jurisdictions, to determine and weigh incentives and sanctions for various behaviors.

The majority of the social sciences was not convinced that institutions mattered—*again*—until Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) advanced theory on the isomorphic transfer of institutions. Following this theoretical innovation, many in the institutionalism literature increasingly—and rightly—assume institutions governing inter-group interactions are highly scripted. Institutional theories, particularly the sociological institutionalism branch of neo-institutionalism, have become standard analytical lenses in comparative politics and public policy (Radaelli et al. 2012, 539). Sociological institutionalism examines how the social structures of rules and norms, which govern behavior, develop and become embedded in society (Scott 2004, 18) as scripts, attempting to describe and explain when, how much, and under what conditions institutions matter.

Social capital theory, advanced by Putnam (1995), Lin (2002) and Fukuyama (2002) on the foundations of Granovetter (1973), Bourdieu (1986), and Coleman (1988), has convinced the social sciences that social networks and trust matter because

institutions are embedded in social networks. Social capital is one form of capital. Modern conceptions of capital originate from the natural law tradition as advanced by Locke and Smith. Locke's (2014 [1690], Chapter V, Paragraph 33) labor theory of property aligns with natural law's assertion of the human right to own that other than oneself, claiming a person's labor, when mixed with material, creates property. *Capital* is "that part of a man's stock which he expects to afford him revenue" (Smith 1977 [1776], Book II, Chapter I) and surplus value (Marx and Engels 2012 [1867], 84) created by human investment in resources of value to society (Lin 2005, 3). It may take various forms embodied in material elements, finances, cultural embeddedness, knowledge, skills, and social connectivity.

The social capital theory explains the emergence of generalized trust and the social capital creation processes. *Social capital* is the surplus stock of network-embedded (Son and Lin 2008, 330) wealth, power, and reputation (Marsden and Lin 1982, 132, 205) that may be accessed, captured, and mobilized by network agents for collective action (Lin et al. 2001, 29, 185) through investment in and promotion of uncoerced cooperative social relations (Fukuyama 2001, 7). It is "a capability *that arises from the prevalence of trust in society…" (Fukuyama 1996, 26).* While the creation of social capital is vital for realizing the full array of positive externalities, the widening of the GTR, resulting from reciprocated trust between strangers, is a *precondition* for its creation (Fukuyama 2000, 99), and therefore the focus of this research.

Following these advances in sociological institutionalism and social capital theory, the fragile states literature, advanced by Posner (2003) and Rotberg (2004), has made initial progress in disaggregating fragile states. Delhey et al. (2011), through their

new GTR measurement based on the World Values Survey (WVS) new 6-question trust battery, has made possible the alignment of the literature at the intersection of trust and fragile states. The reactivation of this discourse has provided the needed intellectual space for modeling the function of the GTR in fragile states.

## Methodology

A recent methodological debate has reinvigorated, yet divided the trust literature: how generalizable across countries are the WVS trust questions. Because past trust research has been prone to overgeneralization (Delhey et al. 2001, 787), this dissertation delimits its case selection and analysis to a single socio-culturally similar region (SSA) where there is a concentration of fragile states and where the concept of trust is likely to be interpreted similarly.

The selected dependent, test, and control variables are defined and operationalized here. The dependent variable [Generalized Trust Radius] is an outcome of social network composition, state security and contract institutions, individualism, and inter-state market forces. It is operationalized using the Delhey et al. (2011) derivative and transcendent trust procedure for isolating the extension of in-group trust (derivative) from the GTR (transcendent) and aggregating its measurement from the individual to the country level. Transcendent trust is the most accurate proxy for the GTR. The difference between in-group and generalized trust (trust differential) represents a society's unrealized generalized trust potential. Control variables may mitigate this gap through strong institutions, individualism, and high trade and investment, as may the test variable through increasing fractionalization, proximity, and multipolarity. Other related mechanisms that increase inter-group interaction and possibly mitigate the gap include

unmet interests, selective incentives, opportunities for capital exchange, and external coercion.

1. This research introduces the test variable Social Network Composition, operationalized and measured by [Fractionalization], [Proximity] and [Power Differential]. A society's social network composition includes its ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization, physical, technological, and social proximity, and power differential polarity.

*Social Network Composition is the configuration of and relationship between social inputs that produce social network structure.*

*Fractionalization is the likelihood that two people chosen at random will be from different (ethnic, linguistic, or religious) groups.*

*Proximity is the aggregate physical, technological, and social distance between nodes in a network or across networks.*

*Power Differential is the difference in parity between nodes in a network or across networks.*

*The product of social network composition, social network structure, is defined as "influential and persistent sets of interrelationships" (Spillman 1995, 132) and flows between actors (Wasserman and Faust 1994).*

This dissertation employs a 2x2 case selection typology to separate the control and test cases of interest and utilizes several descriptive network measures (transitivity, propinquity, and cohesion) to provide an analytical language (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994, 1447) for explaining the effect SNC has on the GTR.

The literature-supported control variables include:

2. Institutions, operationalized and measured by [State Security & Contract Institutions]

*Security Institutions are state-established rules for providing protection from real and imagined, internal and external threats achieved by socially appropriate means, which enables the free exercise of societal values and the activation of social goods for all populations residing within the territorial and political jurisdiction of the state.*

*Contract institutions are state-established legal statutes, bureaucratic rules, and social conventions purposed to manage assets, real property, and legal relationships through the penalization or incentivization of appropriate behavior.*

State security and contract institutions are measured using a combination of World Bank quantitative data on state stability, violence, the rule of law, and corruption and Voigt's (2013, 17) qualitative procedure for assessing institution size, embeddedness, strength, effectiveness, and duration.

3. Culture, operationalized and measured by [Individualism]

*Culture is "collective programming of the mind" (Hofstede 2001, 9) that guides the outworking of personal values held by a common identity group through "inherited ethical habit" (Fukuyama 1995, 34) and "community-specific ideas about what is true, good, beautiful, and efficient" (Shweder 2000, 163).*

*Individualism is the community preference for autonomy, self-determination, and a "loosely-knit social framework in which individuals are expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate families" (Hofstede 1984, 83).*

*In-group collectivism is the community preference for dependence, interconnectivity, and attachment and "the degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness in their organizations or families" (House et al. 2004, 30).*

Individualism and collectivism are the cultural components that most affect the GTR. They are psychologically internalized feelings that are enacted and experienced through one's group(s) and society and are measured at the societal level most accurately

along an individualism-collectivism continuum by comparing Hofstede (2001) and GLOBE (2004) country-level data.

4. Inter-State Market Forces, operationalized and measured by [Trade], [FDI], [FPI], [Remittances], [Military Aid], and [Non-Military Aid]

*Inter-state Market Forces are uni- and bi-directional transfers of financial and manufactured capital between states and societies.*

*Trade is the bi-directional transfer of financial and manufactured capital, goods, and services between states and societies.*

*Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is the active uni-directional investment of financial or manufactured capital in another country's market.*

*Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) is the passive uni-directional investment of financial capital in another country's market.*

*Remittance is the uni-directional transfer of financial capital from individuals in a country's diaspora to individuals in its home country.*

*Aid is the uni-directional transfer of military or non-military financial or manufactured capital from one state or non-state actor to another for non-commercial purposes.*

Inter-state market forces are measured by qualitative description and a combination of annualized quantitative World Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) data.

These three control variables constitute the largest effects the trust literature has found to have on the GTR. Additionally, since fractionalization alone is an insufficient explanation for the social effects on the GTR, proximity and power differential are needed additions to the social variable. This dissertation claims that even when security and contract institutions are weak, society is collectivist, and remittances and aid exceed

trade and investment, increased fractionalization, proximity, and power differential may widen the GTR. Therefore, an analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions in the most unfavorable environments is conducted to isolate the effects of SNC on the GTR.

Due to the disconfirmatory purpose of this research, the complexity of the GTR concept and the limited number of fragile states with relatively wide GTR, the inference is limited to the deterministic generalization of theoretical propositions related to well-defined and tightly bound most similar types of cases rather than probabilistic generalization to a population. While one cannot draw big *empirical* conclusions from this small-N examination incorporating a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) (Lieberson 1994, 311), one may infer appropriate *theoretical* inference because this research design ensures reliability and construct, internal, and external validity are high.

## Structure

This introductory chapter has presented the relevant research questions, claims, theoretical framework, research context, and methodology for examining the determinants of the GTR in fragile states. Chapter II organizes and synthesizes the relevant trust and fragile states literature. Themes include:

- Defining, disaggregating, and classifying fragile states.
- Proxy measures for the GTR.
- Theoretical frameworks and methods for analyzing generalized trust.
- Independent variable rationales.

Chapter III presents the logic and suitability of the selected methodology and cases and presents a detailed framework for its implementation. Chapter IV reports the literature's most pertinent quantitative and qualitative findings organized thematically by each variable. Chapter V tests the research hypotheses through within- and cross-case

analyses of each variable and comparative analysis and synthesis of all variables across all cases. Finally, Chapter VI provides conclusions and research and policy recommendations for future research.

# CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW

> Happy families [states] are all alike; every unhappy family [state] is unhappy in its own way.
>
> —Leo Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*

Since the emergence of the modern state initiated by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, states have existed in increasingly complex configurations, each producing a unique trust environment. During this period, societies have transitioned from disconnected feudal fiefdoms embedded in loosely knit empires into a relatively consolidated inter-dependent global system of states.

The number of states has increased substantially due primarily to rapid decolonization and the break-up of the former Soviet Union. The number of states has nearly doubled since the end of World War II in August 1945 (Rotberg 2003, 2). There were 55 states at the beginning of the twentieth century (Herbst 2004, 304) increasing to 195 (U.S. Department of State) in 2018. Many of the newest states resulting from decolonization are the most dysfunctional (Rotberg 2004, 1). Fragile, collapsed, and failed states, primarily concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Goldstone 2004, 454; Herbst 2004, 302; Puddington and Roylance 2017, 11), will continue to be a concern for the foreseeable future.

A state's primary purpose is the provision of stability for its population. To what or whom is trust credited in states where basic needs of water, food, shelter, and security are consistently met, and violations of the rule of law are sanctioned fairly and transparently? Trustworthy institutions underwrite the risk inherent in inter-group interaction. Groups may lean on strong state institutions to seek interests with potentially untrustworthy groups. Besides minimally effective security and contract institutions,

which are essential for the widening of the generalized trust radius (GTR), non-fragile states also have functioning infrastructure, social service delivery, and economic regulation institutions. Such institutions serve as a capable second- and third-party contract agent for their populations. This type of state is stable because it has strong institutions and has struck a satisfactory balance of generalized and in-group trust. However, this type of state is susceptible to overdependence on formal institutions, rendering its generalized trust less able to fill gaps in the rare occurrence of institutional weakening.

It is a mischaracterization that predatory tyrants lead most fragile states (Di John 2011, 6). Each fragile state has a unique mixture of weak institutions and contexts that bound what is politically possible for leaders, which requires different coercion and incentivization strategies to realize developmental goals and produce a congruence of norms and stability. While coercive strategies may successfully produce minimally secure environments, they often have the unintended consequence of increasing in-group trust (Widner 1995, 148) and decreasing generalized trust.

At its logical extreme, societal congruence entails the total loss of group cohesion; the desired end of totalitarian political systems. To what or whom then is trust credited in fragile states where many interests go unmet, and the state is unwilling or unable to meet all of its population's expectations? In this type of state, elites either benefit from the state—likely to the detriment of others—or avoid the state, through access to foreign capital. Individuals prefer to have their interests met by their own group due to the power of cultural attraction. However, because groups are rarely able to meet all of their members' interests in this context, inter-group interaction occurs, even if not desired.

Where low levels of generalized trust exist, inter-group cooperation requires easily monitored and enforceable institutions (Chan 2007, 734). Void of a moderate-high functioning state worthy of institutional trust (Plattner and Diamond 1994, 3) and able to moderate inter-group interaction, these societies rarely benefit from the positive externalities of increasing generalized trust. While this is true of the *typical* fragile state, there are types of fragile states that have realized more of their generalized trust potential than the literature recognizes.

This review of the pertinent trust and fragile states literatures is organized thematically into four sections. The first section provides an extensive background discussion on the dynamics of trust, interests, inter-group interaction, and the GTR in fragile states. The second section introduces the joint sociological institutionalism and social capital theory theoretical framework. The third section delineates the independent variables: social network composition, security and contract institutions, individualism, and inter-state market forces. Finally, the fourth section clarifies this dissertation's contribution to the literature.

## Background

> Human development is thus about much more than the rise or fall of average national incomes; it is about creating an environment in which people can develop their full potential and lead productive, creative lives in accord with their needs and interests.
>
> —Damien Kingsbury, *Political Development*

The social world is best understood through interactions. Individuals expect a return on their social investments when interacting (Lin et al. 2001, 8), though a form of capital, be it financial, physical, human, or social. *Self-interest* is the desire to advance one's perceived well-being; this requires regular social interaction within and sometimes

between groups. The primary drivers of *initial* inter-group interaction—because groups do not share cultural attraction—are either incentivized instrumental interests or external coercion. Even in non-fragile states, where many preconditions exist for positive inter-group interaction, generalized trust is required to *sustain* positive interaction (Miller 1999, 1057).

The trust literature has developed *multi-disciplinarily*, segmented between psychology, sociology, political science, and economics (see Ahn and Esarey 2008; Bauer 2015; Delhey et al. 2011; Fukuyama 2001; Granovetter 1973; Hardin 1992; Harrison 1985; Lin et al. 2001; Lundmark et al. 2016; Realo et al. 2008; Torpe and Lolle 2011; van Hoorn 2014; Uslaner 2002; Welzel and Delhey 2015). It has concentrated on the examination of institutional trust, generalized trust level, and aggregated trustingness and trustworthiness in non-fragile states while paying less attention to the GTR in fragile states because developed contexts are more easily accessible. As developing world data has become more trustworthy, reliable, and available, these literature have begun to converge.

The fragile states literature has been driven by the international relations (IR) sub-discipline (Büger and Bethke 2011, 28-9) (see Bratton 1989; Call and Cousens 2008; Chauvet et al. 2007; Coleman 1988; Di John 2010; Easterly 2008; Goldstone et al. 2004; Kaplan 2008; Lin 2005; Lowenkopf 1995; Migdal 1988; Ncube et al. 2014; Posner 2003, 2004; Rotberg 2004; Vallings and Torres 2005; Woolcock 1998). It has focused on democratization, institutional failure, and political regimes in developing states, rather than on trust. Except for Zartman (1995) and Fukuyama (2001), the dearth of comparative politics literature on state fragility is puzzling since its theories are better

equipped to address states' inability "to implement rules, collect taxes and enforce monopolies of violence" (Lambach 2007, 33). This dissertation returns the examination of state fragility to the sub-discipline of comparative politics, where the discourse is best advanced.

The trust and fragile states literature have struggled to agree on conceptual boundaries, definitions, and measurement criteria, producing disorganized and stunted discourses (Vallings and Moreno-Torres 2005, 4). The trust literature has long recognized the need for the objective, universal measurement of its concepts (Morrone and Ranuzzi 2009, 7), yet has been unable to agree on the boundary between in-group and generalized trust (Beugelsdijk and Smulders 2004, 2-3; Portes 1998, 7; Sztompka 1999, 42). While the fragile states literature has wrestled with the criteria for distinguishing between non-fragile, fragile, collapsed, and failed states, entertaining many competing and overlapping terms to describe similar phenomena.

*State Fragility*

This dissertation adheres to the Weberian definition of *state* based on the Lockean view of the social contract. Weber defines "a state [as] a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory" (Weber 2015, 136). Much of the fragile states literature agrees there are broad indicators of stateness that determine a state's legitimacy and condition. Rotberg (2003, 3) provides the following hierarchy of positive state functions: security; regulatory and enforcement institutions; political participation; social service delivery; infrastructure; and regulation of the economy. Two of these variables (security and regulatory and enforcement institutions) serve as control variables for this dissertation.

The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933) drafted, signed, and ratified by seventeen western hemisphere states defines the state in relation to an equal community of states. Claims of statehood are legitimate as long as they do not violate the harm principle and infringe upon the rights of other states (Article 3). Peer-recognition is central to this definition, only when there are competing claims of statehood and sovereignty over the same geographic territory (e.g., Israel-Palestine) (Article 6). It considers the criteria of a permanent population, a defined territory and government, and capacity to enter into relations with other states (Article 1), to assess claims. This method is undoubtedly democratic in theory, although, is vulnerable to political motivation by the community of states.

States that violate Weber, Rotberg, or Montevideo Convention stateness criteria, may slide lower on the state fragility continuum; however, the international community of states is divided over at what point a state is no longer sovereign. Dysfunctional states that fall below these, admittedly nebulous standards, have been described in the IR-led fragile states literature as "weak," "fragile," or "poorly performing," with more extreme and rare cases labeled "failed" or "collapsed" (Torres and Anderson 2004, 5). These competing definitions over this conceptual territory have confused the literature leading to misunderstanding of how the GTR functions in dysfunctional states. The once popular term, "weak state," has diminished in influence. In 2003, the White House's *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (*NSCT) report defined "weak states" as lacking the "capacity to fulfill their sovereign responsibilities" (White House 2006, 78), but since the 2006 report, it has no longer used the term "weak states" (2006, 76).

When most researchers consider dysfunctional states, they think first of SSA because it is the most uniformly fragile region (Herbst 2004, 302; Ncube et al. 2014, 2; Vallings and Torres 2005, 7), having the "most inhospitable conditions for stability and democracy" (Goldstone 2004, 454). The widening of the GTR requires a minimally functional state. Collapsed and failed states' security and contract institutions are so damaged (Wyler 2008, 4) they require external intervention, often through a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation or Mission. In failed states such as Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, the state exists but is not in sufficient control. They are unable to, without assistance, control their territory and are "tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions" (Rotberg 2003, 5). Collapsed states such as Somalia are rare; the state no longer exists, producing "a vacuum of authority (2003, 9) and groups take on functions of the state such as security and contract enforcement.

The state type of interest for this research is fragile, rather than non-fragile, collapsed, or failed because the research question requires a context where the widening of the GTR is unlikely, yet possible. The majority of the state literature and development practitioners embrace the concept of state fragility while a minority avoid it. They use it to describe, weigh, and measure multifaceted state dysfunction, while some claim donors use it to "legitimize their strategic objectives in foreign policy" (Grimm et al. 2014, 205). The desire to avoid it arises from the potential political fallout from labeling states as fragile; this position has led the European Union to refrain from its use (Grimm 2014, 262). Some fragile, failed, and collapsed states embrace the concept. Twenty self-declared fragile states formed the g7+ in an attempt to influence international

development donors and the fragile states discourse (Hughes et al., 2014, 2). However, more than one-third of member states are failed (e.g., Yemen) or collapsed (e.g., Somalia), rather than fragile states.

The state literature has had difficulty agreeing on a definition for state fragility (Kaplan 2014, 15), with some favoring the OECD or World Bank definitions.

> A fragile state has "weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society. Fragile states are also more vulnerable to internal and external shocks such as economic crises or natural disasters" (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2012, 85).

> A fragile state is one "facing particularly severe development challenges: weak institutional capacity, poor governance, and political instability. Often these countries experience ongoing violence as the residue of past severe conflict" (World Bank 2012).

While this dissertation appreciates the succinctness of these definitions, both are ultimately unsatisfying alone because they use static categories to describe dynamic environments where some state institutions are becoming more fragile and others less so.

> The factors predisposing a country to fragility and conflict may be many and varied, and a very different set of factors—i.e., not merely the same factors working in the opposite direction— may shape that country's pathways into and out of fragility (Woolcock 2014, 11).

This dissertation defines fragile states by building on these definitions and additional insights from the Fragile States Index (Fund for Peace 2018). A *fragile state* has a net diminished capacity to provide stability for its population and interact as an equal in the international community through a combination of decreased: institutional functionality, territorial control, legitimate use of force, and provision of essential public services, rendering it overall more vulnerable to shocks.

Even this definition is necessarily limited in that it does not indicate which institutions are diminished, nor how much or if the state as a whole is becoming more or less fragile. While fragile states may have specific areas of fragility, they are not fragile across all institutions. Notably, their security and contract institutions are at least minimally functional; otherwise, they would be considered failed or collapsed. While no single geopolitical region is culturally, economically, or politically homogenous, many (30 of 45) SSA states are uniformly fragile, as opposed to non-fragile, collapsed, or failed. Sub-Saharan Africa has the most similar geopolitical context, institutional conditions, and developmental constraints. The pan-African experience is relatable across countries and is, therefore, the most suitable geo-political region for this examination of generalized trust. This is not to say that SSA lacks diversity; this research agrees with Allen (1995, 318) who disputes Kaplan's (1994) overgeneralization of a single African political culture.

The states literature has made greater advances explaining non-fragile, collapsed, and failed states than fragile states. These opposing state types clearly violate or adhere to stateness criteria, while fragile states come in complex varieties. It is therefore understandable that the literature has opted to examine these easier research targets, while leaving the fragile states literature in a fragile state itself, with unclear definitions and measurement criteria. The state literature and development industry have produced numerous indices of state dysfunction that measure overlapping economic, political, social, and security factors. None, to date, explain sub-state variation in capacity across state sectors (Di John 2009, 16), which is essential for assessing trust environments. Of the four most popular state dysfunction indices—each claiming to measure something

different—there is a 75 percent overlap of the top 16 most dysfunctional states (Wyler 2008, 32). The Brookings Institution "Index of State Weakness" (ISW) (2008) focuses more on standard economic measurements of GNI, GDP, inequality, and inflation, while the other three share a legitimacy, policy, and poverty focus. The World Bank's "Harmonized List of Fragile Situations" (HFS) (2016) primarily documents the locations of UN has Peacekeeping or Political and Peacebuilding Missions, an indication that the state is likely collapsed or failed rather than fragile. It focuses more on political institutions while the other three share a political legitimacy and human rights focus. The Fund for Peace "Fragile States Index" (FSI) (2016) and Systemic Peace "State Fragility Index" (SFI) (2015), when measuring social factors, share a focus on spillover effects while the other two focus domestically. Also, the FSI and ISW focus on conflict in their security measures while the HFS does not include conflict measures at all. *Alone*, these indices are less useful for this research, but *together*, they provide valuable triangulation of data sources claiming to measure aspects of state fragility.

Table 1

*State Dysfunction Indices*

| Country | Fragile States Index 2017 (higher = more fragile) (N=178) | Index of State Weakness 2008 (lower = weaker) (N=141) | State Fragility Index 2016 (higher = more fragile) (N=167) | Global Peace Index 2017 (higher = less peaceful) (N=163) | Fragile Situations 2017 (lower = more fragile) (N=35) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Most Dysfunctional | 113.9 (South Sudan) | 0.52 (Somalia) | 24 (Congo, DRC) | 3.814 (Syria) | 1.11 (Somalia) |
| **Ethiopia** | 101.1 | 4.46 | 19 | 2.477 | - |
| **Nigeria** | 101.6 | 4.88 | 18 | 2.849 | - |
| **Zimbabwe** | 101.6 | 3.44 | 17 | 2.352 | 2.76 |
| Mali | 92.9 | 5.85 | 16 | 2.596 | 3.53 |
| Rwanda | 90.8 | 4.68 | 16 | 2.227 | - |

Table Continued

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Burkina Faso** | 88.0 | 5.51 | 16 | 2.07 | - |
| **Zambia** | 87.8 | 5.23 | 12 | 1.786 | - |
| South Africa | 72.3 | 7.50 | 8 | 2.324 | - |
| Ghana | 69.7 | 6.72 | 11 | 1.793 | - |
| Least Dysfunctional | 18.7 (Finland) | 9.41 (Slovakia) | 0 (UK) | 1.111 (Iceland) | N/A |

*Note:* Most recent data from each source is used.

"Fragile Situations" have: either a) a harmonized average CPIA country rating of 3.2 or less, or b) the presence of a UN regional peacekeeping or peace-building mission during the preceding three years.

Sources: The Fund for Peace "Fragile States Index" (FSI) (2017); The Brookings Institute "Index of State Weakness" (2008); The Systemic Peace "State Fragility Index" (2016); Institute for Economics & Peace Global Peace Index (2017); World Bank's "Harmonized List of Fragile Situations" (2017)

Data extracted from sources on 12/02/17.

While fragile states are unstable, they appear to be stably so, with their relative FSI index rankings remaining static from 2005 to 2016 (Fund for Peace 2016). For the minority of states that did fluctuate during this period, more decreased in fragility, but those that increased in fragility did so more intensely (Fund for Peace 2016). Zimbabwe dropped ten places from 15$^{th}$ to fifth; Pakistan dropped 25 places from 34$^{th}$ to ninth; Nepal dropped 15 places from 35$^{th}$ to 20$^{th}$; and Kenya dropped 12 places from 26$^{th}$ to 14$^{th}$, all of which worsened following severe currency, electoral, and security crises. Each of these cases also had an endemic structural fragility that allowed a series of agent-driven economic and political events to plunge them into greater fragility.

*Trust*

How does trust function in these complex environments with chronically fragile institutions, rendering them incapable of fulfilling their gap-filling purpose (Plattner and Diamond 1994, 3)? The trust and state literature claim successful societies have increasing trust (see Almond and Verba 1963; Arrow 1972; Delhey et al. 2011; Freitag and Bühlmann 2009; Gambetta 1988; Herreros 2004; Kramer 1999; Stolle 2002;

Sztompka 1999; Uslaner 2002). However, there are multiple types of trust, and the literature disagrees from where they arise and what causes them. Some in the trust literature claim trust is primarily a learned behavior gained through cooperative experiences with others (see Delhey and Welzel 2012; Hardin 2002; Seligman 1999; Sztompka 1999), rather than an invariable socio-cultural antecedent. This view of trust does not give sufficient weight to the institutional effects that tacitly shape actor behavior, though it does challenge the incorrect assumption that there is little to be done to increase generalized trust in fragile states.

*Trust* is the confidence a human (truster) has in a physical object, formal or informal institution, unobserved force, or another human (trustee) (Hardin 1992, 152). It has an instrumental purpose in all societies, to manage the risk involved with cooperation and avoidance (Hardin 1993, 362; Luhmann 1988, 95). Trusters choose to credit trust to trustees because they have a cultural or instrumental interest in continuing the relationship (Cook et al. 2005, 5) and deem them worthy based on their public reputation. Reputation, however, is more easily monitored within groups than between groups where greater information asymmetry makes verification more costly. Without sufficient verification, groups form myths about out-groups that members adopt uncritically (Mealy et al. 2015, 394). While it is possible to credit trust to someone not physically proximate, as consumers and voters regularly do, generalized trust is generated most effectively through inter-personal interaction (Cook and Hardin 2001, 327; Couch et al. 1996, 305).

Trust is a relatively stable feature of societies. The components of trust, *trustingness* of the truster and *trustworthiness* of the trustee and the structural forces that drive them, vary greatly between and within societies at the individual level, however,

when aggregated to the group or society, are relatively stable over time. Individual antecedent trustingness is a composite of inborn trustingness disposition and formative developmental context. Poverty and instability are generators of mistrust; the more a population perceives valued resources to be scarce, the less trustworthy they perceive others to be (Mealy et al. 2015, 414). From this foundation, individuals rationally calculate trust choices, limited by their capacity and available information in specific contexts. Mutual trust reduces uncertainty and ambiguity (McFarlin et al. 1999, 64) and "increases efficiency in human interactions" (Buskens and Raub 2002, 168 quoting Arrow 1974). With each mutually-positive self-interest-driven interaction, a truster's trustingness of a trustee's trustworthiness increases, decreasing transaction costs (Helliwell and Putnam 2004, 1442) and increasing positive externalities and the probability of future interactions.

*Self-Interest*

The trust literature often misconstrues interests, positions, and motivations. Groups avoid interaction unless there is potential to meet an interest that cannot be satisfied within the group. Although Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs requires revision (Trigg 2004, 397), it serves as an appropriate rough template to model interest seeking in fragile states. While individuals may experience less self-interested motives (e.g., fairness and aversion to inequality) (Chan 2007, 739), more common self-interests include:

- Requirements to sustain life (e.g., air, water, food, health, sex, shelter, and security).
- That which improves life (e.g., freedom, capital, employment, power, and services).

- That which denotes humanness (e.g., humor, justice, aesthetics, spirituality, abstract thought, future planning, and conscience).
- That which imbues purpose (e.g., identity, love, solidarity, reputation, and community.

Humans, being subject to the physiological constraints of thirst, hunger, fear, sexual desire, and thermoregulation (Godsil et al. 2003, 34), are first-and-foremost motivated by their instincts (Forgas et al. 2005, 2) of pain and punishment avoidance and pleasure and reward-seeking followed by the desire for community, belonging, and love. However, because humans are complex sentient social actors that are neither perfect nor entirely rational homo-economicus, a greater understanding of how different types of trust interplay with interests is required (Miller 1999, 1053).

*Contact Hypothesis*

> The Stranger is close to us, insofar as we feel between him and ourselves common features of a national, social, occupational, or generally human, nature. He is far from us, insofar as these common features extend beyond him or us, and connect us only because they connect a great many people.
>
> —Simmel and Wolff, *The Stranger*

Allport's (1954) contact hypothesis claims that interaction between strangers reduces prejudice (Mutz 2002, 113). "Contact, under certain specified conditions, will bring about positive attitude changes; the more people learn about each other, the less prejudice and the more positive interactions there will be" (Svensson and Brouneus 2013, 565). This theory gets it partially right. Inter-group interaction may lead to either the strengthening hostile feelings (Forbes 1997, 203) or the reduction of stereotyping and greater tolerance (Mutz 2006, 164). Interaction, driven by a high tolerance for risk-taking and the need for met interests outside of one's group, can either lead to conflict and violence or cooperation and tolerance; avoidance can lead only to myth-based

stereotyping of groups based on information asymmetry which results in violent conflict when interaction does occur. The most positive inter-group interaction outcomes occur when opposing group members are unaware of the other's group membership status when initiating contact (Pettigrew 1997, 174). State policies driven by the contact hypothesis are likened to prescribed forest management burns, aimed at reducing fuel loads over time to decrease the likelihood of uncontrollable fires in the future. While there may be initial tension and conflict by incentivizing or coercing inter-group interaction, done correctly, it acts as a pressure valve; applying small periodic doses of conflictual inter-group interaction to prevent future violence can be a sound strategy.

*Types of Trust*

In-group and generalized trusts are two discrete and separately measurable types of *social* trust present in and essential to all societies. They have been subject to ongoing definitional variance among competing alternatives (see Beugelsdijk and Smulders 2004; Portes 1998; Sztompka 1999). *In-group trust*—that which is credited *within* groups—is contingent on the interest of cultural and ideological solidarity and attraction. Even when a group fails to provide for its members' instrumental interests, they are likely to continue to value in-group relationships as long as their cultural self-interest is met. *Generalized trust*—that which is credited *between* groups—is contingent on the interest of mutual economic and political benefit (see Freitag and Traunmüller 2009; Newton and Zmerli 2011; Oskarsson et al. 2009; Stolle 2002; Uslaner 2002; Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994). This dissertation also employs the terms *in-group* and *out-group* to distinguish between individuals' self-identified group(s) and all other groups respectively. The term *trust level* signifies its intensity, while *trust radius* its outward extension.

Table 2

*Types of Social Trust*

| **Definition** | **Preferred Terms** | **Alternate Sources/Terms** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) | Putnam (1995) (2000) | Knack and Keefer (1997) | Uslaner (2002) | Delhey et al. (2011) |
| Trust in own group | **In-group** | Knowledge-based or Particularized | Bonding or Thick | Specific | Moralist | Derivative or In-Group |
| Trust in other groups | **Generalized** | General or Generalized | Bridging or Thin | Anonymous | Strategic | Transcendent or Generalized |

Each trust type has a discrete level of intensity and radius of extent, and in-group trust level is always more intense than generalized trust level because there are limitations to the extent of feelings of solidarity between groups (Arnett 2002, 776) as well as the state's ability to manage pluralism (Yeates 2002, 647). A society that theoretically had a higher generalized than in-group trust level would risk social atomization.

Homogeneous groups have many advantages over heterogeneous groups in that their high in-group trust and reciprocity serve to efficiently limit free-riding (Paldam and Svendsen 2000, 344) through the mechanism of social sanction (Olson 1965, 62). As well, their greater network solidarity and cohesion provides greater options for collective action (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004, 19), particularly when engaging in the market (Ruben and Heras 2012, 463). Increasing in-group trust produces direct positive externalities and efficiencies for the involved parties and indirectly for the whole group, but may contribute to either negative or positive externalities for other groups. When groups

pursue collective action through seeking "prestige, respect, standing in the community, and even the avoidance of social disapproval" (Bratton 1989, 427-8), it regularly results in negative externalities for other groups (Olson 1982, 23).

The trust literature has long agreed that homogeneous environments predict trustworthiness and trustingness, but studies often fail to disaggregate in-group, generalized, and institutional trusts for analysis. Every inter-group interaction is composed of part in-group, generalized, and institutional trust. The presence of cultural attraction makes principles more willing to forego instrumental interests. Oppositely, in the absence of cultural attraction, generalized trust may increase if principles perceive their interaction to be mutually beneficial. Because institutions make interaction possible, principles credit some trust to the institutions managing the interaction; the amount depends on how trustworthy the principles perceive the institution to be. Glaeser et al. make claims on the positive correlation between homogeneity and trust, stating, "when individuals are closer socially, both trust and trustworthiness rise" (Glaeser et al. 2000, 811).

> …social connection strongly predicts trustworthiness and weakly predicts trust. In particular, national and racial differences between partners strongly predict a tendency to cheat one another – Glaeser et al. (2000, 840)

They claim trusting people are *trustworthy* people and trusting behavior and trustworthiness are stable individual characteristics. "To determine whether someone is trustworthy, ask him if he trusts others" (2000, 840). The assertion that it is easier to credit trust to someone who looks, smells, and sounds like oneself, transfers well from this research site, Harvard undergraduate classrooms, to SSA. The more dissimilar and

disconnected individuals and groups are from one another, the less likely they are to give the "Other" the *initial* benefit of the doubt.

This study provides strong support for the joint use of experiments and surveys in the examination of trust as it finds trustworthiness is "strongly predicted by attitudinal survey questions about trust" (not trustworthiness), as well as by respondents having siblings (2000, 840). However, experiments are rarely possible in the examination of national-level or cross-country political phenomena. The authors' claims leave open the possibility of some types of homogeneous environments having low generalized trust and some heterogeneous environments having highly *trusting* populations and high generalized trust, although highly *trustworthy* populations are less likely. This study provides support for this dissertation's examination of how trustingness, generalized trust, and even trustworthiness may increase in heterogeneous fragile states, through greater inter-group interaction opportunities—by force, but preferably incentive—to meet groups' interests.

*Limitations of In-Group Trust*

Most individuals' interests are met through their identity group(s) or the state. Cultural attraction, driven by "shared norms and values" (Fukuyama 2002, 27), solidarity, and community self-interest, serve as a powerful social force drawing similar individuals together to meet interests. Guiding appropriate thought and behavior within groups are informal institutional scripts consisting of culturally organized common codes (Parsons 1971, 5), which aid individuals in making efficient judgments about others' suitability for meeting their interests (DiMaggio 1992, 125), whether it be marriage, business, or friendship. Within these bounded systems of meaning, values operate rather

tacitly, where people are unaware of why they value what they do, "they just 'know' or 'feel' how to do the right thing" (Hofstede 2010, 20).

*Goal contagion*, the scripted adoption of others' goals to meet one's self-interest of community, strengthens in-group trust. Self-interest drives individual behavior, but scripts incentivize and reward group members for inferring the goals from other members' actions (Aarts et al. 2004, 23-4), providing an efficient template for appropriate ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving in the pursuit of self-interest. This social intercourse and resulting positive recognition results in the spreading and strengthening of community self-interest, ideas, and goals. However, due to information asymmetry and capacity limits, group members do not perfectly perceive, evaluate, and adopt others' goals. Together, cultural attraction and goal contagion ensure in-group trust intensity is always stronger than generalized trust (see Brewer 1981; Kramer 1999, 581-3) and are sufficient to create strong bonds within groups, resulting in a limited form of social capital and relatively narrow trust radii (Harrison 1985, 7; Uslaner 2012, 194) across society.

While in-group trust may stimulate social capital between members, for it to increase further, positive inter-group interaction is required. The more different groups are, the more they lack cultural attraction, leaving the only drivers of social interaction to be non-cultural intrinsic and instrumental interests or external force. Groups' inability or unwillingness to meet members' instrumental interests provides a potential *sharing context* (Boisot 1995, 119) between groups, though this does not guarantee sustained cooperation. Selective incentives, including prestige, respect, financial remuneration (Posner 2004, 241), status, social contacts, and access (Clark and Wilson 1961, 172), may

serve to motivate collective action and limit free riding within and between groups. Public goods theory and critical mass theory may also have utility in explaining collective action spurned by self-interest, and physical, technological, and social proximity theories may have value in explaining group proximity, which is required for inter-group interaction to occur (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 1994, 29).

*Social Capital*

Social capital's generation requires instrumentally intentioned agents to be positioned advantageously in networks (Lin 2001, 11). It is challenging to measure directly because its analysis requires measurable trust, reciprocity, networks, and institutions (Ostrom 1994, 323-7). Further, proving causal direction is difficult, which is why the trust literature has debated the most appropriate proxy measures for it (see Bauer 2015, 2; Dasgupta and Serageldin 2001; Portes 2000, 33; Robinson 2002) and treated it as both a dependent variable and independent variable. Past inadequate proxies for social trust and social capital have included "ethnic homogeneity, income inequality, or religious composition" (Knack 2001, 14).

*Generalized Trust Radius*

Again, the *generalized trust radius* is the extent that shared co-operative norms (Fukuyama 2001, 8) based on non-community intrinsic and instrumental interests permeate society. It represents a societies' network connectivity between groups. The GTR literature subsequent to the release of the 2011 Delhey et al. (2011) new generalized trust measure (see Bauer 2015; Torpe and Lolle 2011; Van der Veld and Saris 2011; van Hoorn 2014; Welzel and Delhey 2015) has made improvements to the literature prior to it (see Ahn and Esarey 2008; Bankston and Zhou 2002, 285; Fukuyama 2001; Granovetter

1973; Hardin 1992; Harrison 1985; Realo et al. 2008; Reeskens and Hooghe 2008). Delhey and Welzel (2012) extend and refine the Delhey et al. (2011) argument for the use of the new trust measure, conducting "the first broadly cross-national study of how outgroup-trust is generated relative to ingroup-trust" (Delhey and Welzel 2012, 65). They claim generalized trust is conceptually distinct from in-group trust rather than an extension of it (see Beugelsdijk and Smulders 2004; Portes 1998; Sztompka 1999) and ask under what conditions generalized trust emerges independent of in-group trust. They conclude that the Prerequisite version of Alliance Theory, which considers in-group trust to be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of generalized trust (Delhey and Welzel 2012, 46), explains the GTR best.

The trust literature agrees that the widening of the GTR is the foremost prerequisite and mechanism for the creation of social capital and the positive externalities associated with it, and is, therefore, its most accurate proxy measure (Fukuyama 2002, 32; Uslaner 2002, 7). Often, when widening, "the [generalized] radius of trust can be thought of as a type of positive externality because it is a benefit that accrues to the group [or society] independently of the collective action that the group [or society] formally seeks to achieve" (Fukuyama 2001, 13). However, generalized trust is only "a very specific component of social capital" (Hooghe 2007, 711). What is missing in these claims is actor agency through the mechanisms of reputation and interests. It is more accurate to measure the GTR through its structural causes (social network composition, security and contract institutions, individualism and collectivism, and inter-state market forces) than by its outputs (decreased information asymmetry and increased access to physical, human, and social capital) (Fukuyama 2001, 13; Morrone et al. 2009, 5).

The GTR and social capital are amoral (Foley and Edwards 1997, 671), and the crediting of trust to out-groups does not guarantee the trustworthiness of the out-group trustee, nor that participants enter into the interaction honestly communicating their intentions. In fragile states, where many interests go unmet, and the state serves as a weak intermediary, this is a concern. "Even if trust improves social and political interactions between dissimilar groups, it is not always good or necessary" (Morrone et al. 2009, 5). Inter-group interaction does not guarantee the advancement of the social good, as is evidenced in highly interactive fragile conflict-ridden states where increased inter-group interaction often produces conflict and violence.

## Theoretical Framework

The need for a unified body of theory able to explain trust in fragile states is considerable. Most theories explain *typical* cases where fragile states produce fragile societies (see Caparini 2005; Ikelegbe 2013, 36; Posner 2005, 247) with narrow GTR (see Bratton 1989, 428; Kaplan 2008, 4; Lowenkopf 1995, 104; Posner 2004, 246). Undeniably, the trust-fragile states literature's assumption that the GTR cannot be wide or widen in *collapsed* and *failed* states is sound, although this claim requires extensive revision for the theoretically rich conceptual space occupied by fragile states.

There is predictability within complex systems of interaction. The joint theoretical framework of sociological institutionalism and social capital theory enables the construction of an enhanced theoretically generalizable model for explaining how institutions embedded in social networks form, constrain behavior, and shape trust environments through the GTR in fragile states.

*Sociological Institutionalism*

The social sciences literature has wavered back and forth and back again from classical institutionalism to behaviorism to neo-institutionalism, as to how much institutions matter for the production of trust. Sociological institutionalism explains how institutions function through the concepts of institutional isomorphism and institutional scripts. "Sociological institutionalists focus on values and identities, and the ways in which these shape actors' perceptions of their interests" (Bevir 2006, 374). Institutional configurations within states "affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group formation and collective political actions (but not others), and make possible the raising of certain political issues (but not others)" (Goodwin and Skocpol 1989, 489).

To follow social scripts is to be human. Institutions govern and shape all social interaction through scripted practices that are "embedded in structures of meaning and resources" (March and Olsen 2006, 3). They are also mostly unintentional and enduring, providing tacit guidance for appropriate thought and behavior. Nonetheless, not all rules and social conventions are institutions. Institutions are embedded in the group, state/society, and international levels. Rules that govern one's self are not institutions because institutions are social (Voigt 2013, 8) and rules that govern particular families are rarely institutions because institutions have broad reach throughout a group or society.

The literature categorizes institutions as formal and informal based on their legal status. Formal institutions derive from the state in the form of officially sanctioned laws, while informal institutions derive from identity groups in the form of longstanding cultural preferences. While formal rules are evident to all, informal "rules may be almost

invisible to outsiders" (Ostrom 1998, 208) and taken for granted by insiders. Informal institutions tacitly shape and constrain intra-group expectations, thought, and behavior through social pressure, while formal institutions conspicuously shape and constrain inter-group expectations, thought, and behavior through coercion and incentive. In-group trust allows groups to forego rigid encoding of institutions, but societies—because they are always more heterogeneous than groups—require more formal, clearly defined, and inelastic institutions. Formal and informal institutions may complement, compete, or overlap (Jutting et al. 2007, 9; Leftwich and Sen 2010, 17); though in fragile states, they are often in conflict. The enforcement of formal institutions is dependent on the coercive ability and perceived legitimacy of the state.

*Competing Non-Institutionalist Theories*

Many competing theories claim to explain why post-colonial states tend to transition into fragile "gatekeeper" states (Cooper 2002, 5) with patrimonial, clientelist, and rent-seeking political cultures, resulting in institutional instability and weak bureaucratic capacity (Lockwood 2005, 776), rather than developmental states. These are categorized as institutional and non-institutional theories for analysis.

The idea of the resource curse has gained support in the non-institutionalist literature for explaining state fragility (see Frankel 2012; Sachs and Warner 1995; Venables 2016). However, "it has significant shortcomings in terms of theory and evidence" (Di John 2011, 167) and is not an appropriate theoretical lens for this dissertation. Many states, fragile and not, have abundant natural resources, which account for a large percentage of their exports. The two states with the largest total percentage of natural resource rents per GDP are Liberia (46.4 percent) and Kuwait (39.1

percent) (World Bank 2015), each having very different contexts and developmental outcomes. It is not because economies have sizeable natural resource extraction and exportation sectors that they are anti-developmental, as the theory claims; petroleum-dominated economies are not more prone to state breakdown (Smith 2004, 242). Instead, global market volatility (see Cavalcanti et al. 2011; Leong and Mohaddes 2011) affects all *non-diversified* economies, rendering them vulnerable to shocks in the global economy. Weak institutions are unable to weather global economic shocks. Brunnschweiler and Butle (2008) claim that weak institutional configurations that cause dependence on single export sectors, specifically natural resource extraction and exportation, are to blame. Uneven development, which some claim originates from an abundance of natural resources or a natural resource-dominated economy, is instead caused primarily by institutional dysfunction. Uneven growth is disruptive in that it increases incidences, intensity, and duration of conflict in the market, state, and civil society. Some in the literature (see Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Ross 2004) claim uneven growth alone is sufficient to produce state failure.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) found in a study of 48 non-renewable commodity exporters[1] (1970-2014) that unless a state already had stable political institutions, its adoption of fiscal rules and savings or stabilization funds did not have a significant effect on its ability to withstand market shocks and reduce procyclicality (Bova 2016, 4). When measuring natural resources as *per capita*, only a dozen of this study's countries qualify as resource-rich, of which only two, Botswana and Equatorial

[1] Non-renewable commodity exporters are resource-rich countries with at least 20 percent of total exports being non-renewable commodities or making up at least 15 percent of fiscal revenues.

Guinea, are in SSA. For example, Nigeria's petroleum export sector, valued at USD 28 billion per annum in 2016, looks less dominant when compared to its population of 177 million (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 2017). Another study by Haber and Menaldo (2011) claims the resource curse literature suffers from an omitted variable curse; states with increasing natural resource reliance do not become more authoritarian but rather more democratic and almost twice as many of them become more prosperous (e.g., Australia, Mexico, and Trinidad and Tobago). Cavalcanti et al. (2011) find that as petroleum reserves increase, short-term and long-term income levels increase.

Several other non-institutional theories deserve mention and critique. Democratic instability (see Karl 2000; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972) and democratic transition (see Acemoglu and Robinson 2001; Lijphart 1999; Linz and Stepan 1996) theories are useful for explaining challenges experienced in some types of fragile states, although they are limited in their ability to explain variation across all types of non-democratizing states. While some argue that global technological and transportation advances have changed the nature of warfare, the war-based new war theory (see Duffield 2001; Kaldor 1999) has limited explanatory power for states that are not primarily fragile due to conflict, violence, and war (e.g., Burkina Faso, Haiti, and Zambia). Post-colonial states have many institutional design flaws with many founded on a system of boundaries with little regard for future self-governance (Herbst 2000, 94) or the possible repercussions of ethnic and religious compositions. Even so, dependency theory (see Herbst 2000; Nkrumah 1965), closely associated with new war theory, wrongly assumes post-colonial Africa is a monolithic body politic of weak cookie cutter states with peripheral economies suffering at the hand of core capitalist countries. Sub-Saharan Africa is not

homogeneous nor geo-politically and economically powerless; there are 48 unique states with a variety of institutional compositions.

*Competing Institutionalist Theories*

Sociological institutionalism offers a more thorough and credible explanation of trust in fragile states than do other institutionalist theories. It serves as a corrective to behaviorism's overemphasis of individual agency (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 156; Meyer and Rowan 1977, 340) and redresses classical institutionalism's descriptive restrictions and lack of objective analysis of institutional and social interactions. Where historical institutionalism fails to do so, it explains the gap between macro-level events and "policy outcomes that are characterized by major breaks and that evolve in a non-linear fashion" (Uygur and Martinsen 2015, 2). It provides a more comprehensive framework for examining institution-society interactions than rational choice institutionalism, which tends to over-aggregate groups for analysis. Finally, it provides a useful framework for weighing the balance between agency and determinism and captures the distinctiveness of individual, group, field, society, and institutional interactions.

The normative, descriptive, and prescriptive emphasis of classical institutionalism is useful for constructing policy modifications limited to fixed properties of formal government institutions (see McCloskey 2016; Rorty 1990; Sen 1986), but as positivism and neo-institutionalism have revealed, this is of limited value when not also considering individual agency and institutional and social interactions. For example, in fragile states, where there are many institutional dysfunctions, it is critical to understand how informal

markets and civil society institutions rise to fill capacity gaps left by the state. Classical institutionalism is unable to provide this analysis.

Rational choice institutionalism (see Bates et al. 1998; North 1993; Ostrom 1998; Weingast 1996) oppositely, overemphasizes the utility maximization and agency of individuals, leaving less room for institutional effects on individual and group behavior. Instead, much of the capacity of human agents derives from their position in society (Mahoney 2001, 142, 215; McAdam et al. 2003, 119, 211). Individuals and groups attempting to behave rationally within the bounds of institutional scripts are more predictable in market-dominated environments (Kugler et al. 2012, 25), although the more fragile the state is, the less behavior aligns with rational choice assumptions. Therefore, rational choice institutionalism is best suited to the limited examination of strong market-environments, rather than fragile states.

Historical institutionalism (see Huntington 1968; Katznelson and Weingast 2005; Lieberman 2002; Marcussen 2000; McNamara 1998; Polanyi 1945; Skocpol 1979; Steinmo 2008; Thelen 2004) is a comparative case study methodology as much as a theory, one that attempts to measure and trace institutional patterns, "big structures, large processes, and huge comparisons" (Tilly 1984, 15). Its assumption of an institutionally determined environment based on historical path dependencies greatly discounts individual agency. Historical institutionalists claim, "The 'path not taken' or the political alternatives that were once quite plausible may become irretrievably lost" (Pierson and Skocpol 2002, 6). What the historical institutionalist neglects is that institutional longevity is dependent on societal legitimacy, which is rooted in script-executing agents rather than impersonal historical forces.

*Institutional Change*

Neo-institutionalism broadly, and sociological institutionalism specifically (see DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Jepperson 2001; March and Olsen 1984; 1989; Meyer et al. 1997), provides an analytical lens for explaining institutional change in fragile states. Formal and informal institutions are conservative in that they encourage the status quo, but they are also susceptible to influence and change, albeit it rarely occurs rapidly. Formal and informal institutions shape agent choices through the scripting process. Historical events, such as revolutions, do not occur spontaneously or in a vacuum, instead agents, often acting through groups following scripts, make choices in particular institutional environments, which alters future institutional compositions, expanding or limiting future agent choices in not wholly predictable ways. The more culturally-, economically-, and politically-embedded institutions become in society, the more difficult they are to change because, over time, they become interwoven into a web of interdependent and legitimized institutions. The more developed, modern, and heterogeneous society is, the more complex its formal and informal institutional configurations tend to be. In democratic-leaning societies, the presence of many competing institutions makes large institutional change in any particular direction difficult; however the more that formal and informal institutions overlap, the easier change becomes (Piotti et al. 2006, 94). For example, through the legislative process of the state, society may choose to develop a new formal speed limit statute for cultural, economic, or political reasons. However, it is the executive bureaucracy that fine-tunes and implements the statute; law enforcement agencies that enforce it; the judiciary that interprets it; and society that provides it with continued legitimacy. Institutions are

endogenous and overlapping, so the development of a new speed limit statute likely affects other related institutions such as traffic management protocols, automotive safety regulations, automotive insurance formulas, automotive industry production, law enforcement hiring, and fuel cost.

The ability to influence institutions takes the form of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization and varies across fragile states. Individuals, organizations, firms, and government agencies with varying capacities and competing and divergent interests, leverage their capital resources, in authoritarian and democratic states alike, to sustain, transform, or discard existing institutions (Phillips et al. 2004, 657). Through these processes, formal and informal institutions are continually reconstituting, in part, through agent inputs (Giddens 1984, 25), although, agent behavior is never entirely predictable (Leftwich and Sen 2010, 9). Deinstitutionalization is the process of purposefully weakening institutions and requires greater momentum. The more isomorphism influences an institution and the more cultural legitimacy it has, the more difficult it is to deinstitutionalize. Deinstitutionalization takes hold when dominant groups take for granted their advantaged position and fail to sufficiently reproduce and reinforce their previously legitimated institutions (Oliver 1992, 564), leading to atrophy and vulnerability to change. Concurrently, subordinate groups work to delegitimize prevailing institutions through eroding established laws, cultural practices, and material artifacts associated with them. Through both mechanisms, prevailing institutions erode and new institutional forms, incrementally, take their place. Newly prevailing institutions shape the behavior of agents (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 147), and institution-driven

actor behavior reinforces these prevailing institutions (see Thornton 2002), and the cycle continues.

*Isomorphism*

The isomorphic principle states that despite myriad social configurations influenced by economic, political, and cultural inputs, organizational sub-units sharing similar environments and having similar goals, converge, adopting similar forms, rather than differentiating themselves. Formal and informal institutions vary in their isomorphic properties (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 149) with the former being subjected to greater isomorphic effects. Informal institutions driven by ideological and cultural uniformity are affected less, especially when the in-group adhering to them meets its members' interests.

Isomorphism has three sub-types: coercive, normative, and mimetic. *Coercive Isomorphism* states organizations operating within similar domains will be subject to regulatory forces to which they will be compelled to conform (1983, 150). *Normative isomorphism* states that as the interaction of organizations with similar goals increase, expectations for interaction and standards of practice develop, which aligns the internal structure and behavior of their similar sub-units. *Mimetic isomorphism* states that when organizational environments are uncertain, organizations will imitate efficient, effective, and legitimate organizations in their respective organizational fields.

Informal institutions are a powerful secondary influencer of formal institutions in fragile states through shaping local response and adherence to them (Jutting et al. 2007, 7; Migdal 2001, 127, 58). At the societal level, informal institutions are "collective representations" that define desirable types of social systems (Parsons 1971, 9).

Societies, through their informal institutions, provide formal institutions meaning and legitimacy. Formal institutions' long-term viability is dependent on their sensitivity to societies' cultural preferences, moral conceptions, norms, and rules (Scott 1995, 33; 2001, 48). The more incongruent isomorphic forces are from a society's cultural values, the less effective and enduring formal institutions will likely be.

Due to increasing global isomorphism, "social, political, and economic institutions have become larger, considerably more complex and resourceful, and *prima facie* more important to collective life" (March and Olsen 1984, 734), yet, fragile states continue to exhibit strong traditional institutions, which the majority of the fragile states literature consider detrimental to development (Unsworth 2010, 49). The historic isomorphic transfer of colonial institutions must be considered when examining the development of fragile states' formal institutions, specifically those affecting contract and legal systems (La Porta et al. 1998, 1126). Political modernization, the movement from a traditional polity to a modern polity involving the hyper-specialization and "differentiation of new political functions and the development of specialized structures to perform those functions" (Huntington 1968, 34), has developed unevenly due to colonialization and decolonization. As far as institutional cycles are concerned, decolonization did not occur that long ago. Political modernization can be confusing and exhausting to those in traditional societies who are not conditioned to having multiple competing identities and role specialization (Breuilly 1994, 415). Groups once able to avoid each other are forced to compete for position, legitimacy, interests, and opportunities to influence the institutional structure of the state to serve their interests (Mann 1993, 118-9). When measuring modern formal institutional outcomes in fragile

states, it matters whether the colonizing power was British, Portuguese, Spanish, German, or Dutch, with British colonies faring better (Landes 1998, 437). However, the claim that colonial legacy is a strong determinant of modern African underdevelopment is unsound (Bhattacharyya 2008, 106).

*Social Capital Theory*

Social networks are worthy of examination, in part, because institutions are embedded in them, and collective action is generated through them. Social capital accumulation is "a slow, long-term, internal process of gradual accumulation of the capacity and the willingness to negotiate, compromise, and shape the political arena" (Uvin 1989, 171). Putnam (1995) claims, "For political stability, for government effectiveness, and even for economic progress social capital may be even more important than physical or human capital" and Lin (2002, 142) asserts, "concepts of power, dependence, solidarity, social contracts, and multilevel systems do not make sense until social capital is brought into consideration". Also, Collier (2002) and Saegert et al. (2002) go so far as to claim that where all other capital is lacking—which is the case in most fragile states—social capital becomes a more important currency. This makes the examination of environments where social capital is created vital.

A widening GTR increases the diversity of the pool of individuals, through which social capital may be created and exchanged. The potential higher quantity and quality of social interaction produces the positive externality of expanded social networks, providing access to further human and physical capital, the foundation for development (Fukuyama 2002, 34; Morrone et al. 2009, 5). Social capital is somewhat fungible in that it may be exchanged for other types of capital and political access and may indirectly

benefit participants' shared social networks through trust by association, though it is not entirely transferable between actors.

## Empirical Literature

Fragile states have considerable barriers to widening their GTR. The primary task of this dissertation is to test the independent effects of social network composition on the GTR in fragile states. The majority of the trust literature recognizes the necessary, though not sufficient, structural control variables of security and contract institutions, individualism, and inter-state market forces, as most effective in shaping environments where individuals interact to meet their interests. These control variables are structural in that they are persistent and difficult to change without a great deal of social momentum and time. However, some in the literature (see Welzel and Delhey 2015) curiously move away from identifying and explaining the *causes* of the GTR to hypothesize on the *effects* of the GTR, as if the trust literature has accepted their human empowerment variable as the primary, all-encompassing cause of the GTR along with secondary causes of associational activities and religious pluralism. This claim is a premature assumption. Delhey and Welzel (2012) downplay the effects of associational activities on the GTR and claim religious *fractionalization*, rather than religious *pluralism* widens the GTR, whereas Welzel and Delhey (2015) reverse this claim. This internal discourse reveals a rush to identify the *causes* of the GTR so that the trust literature may return to focusing on the *consequences* of the GTR. Further examination is required to identify under what conditions social network composition, state security and contract institutions,

individualism, and inter-state market forces affect the GTR before attempting to explain its causes.

It is valuable to identify related cultural, economic, and political background factors even though they do not have a sufficient effect on the GTR for inclusion in this dissertation. Delhey et al. (2011) incorporate most of the control variables selected for this dissertation as well as find that Protestant societies, economic modernization, cognitive mobilization through education and access, social diversity, and quality of institutions, affect the GTR in some measurable way. They claim the causal relationship between social heterogeneity and ethnic diversity on generalized trust remains widely disputed in the literature (2011, 801). Background factors related to generalized trust—though not sufficiently to its radius—include the following: institutional trust (see Rothstein and Stolle 2008); satisfaction with democracy and trust in politicians (see Zmerli and Newton 2008); life satisfaction (see Sønderskov 2010); education (see Huang et al. 2011); regime type (see Goldstone et al. 2004, 449); and spillover (see Chauvet et al. 2007, 6). Rotberg (2003) and Dobbins (2007) offer multiple economic and political background factors that affect generalized trust in fragile states but may exist at low-moderate levels without affecting the GTR. These include state institutions related to political participation, social service delivery, infrastructure, economic regulation and stability, governance, democratization, and development. Hall (1966), Hofstede (2001), Lingenfelter (2003), Strodtbeck and Kluckhohn (1961), and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2011), have developed many competing and overlapping cultural orientation continuums of phenomena that affect society broadly but not generalized trust sufficiently. These include goal-relational awareness, spontaneous-strategic interaction,

compartmentalized-relativistic ethics, ascribed-achieved prestige, vulnerable-risk-averse, nomadism-sedentism, and limited-unlimited good. Lastly, while inter-state market forces affect the GTR in all fragile states, inter-state conflict flows affect it only when security institutions are weakened to the point of state failure or collapse.

*Social Network Composition*

The trust literature lacks a social variable that can capture stratification and network effects to explain the GTR. The closest it has come is through the limited concepts of social distance, polarization, social segregation, and ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization. A combination of social distance and polarization is the most appropriate measure for capturing "the intensity of disagreements across groups" (Alesina et al. 2003, 164), however, "whether societal conflict is the result of fractionalization or polarization is largely an unresolved question…" (2003, 178). Social segregation "refers to the degree to which the various groups of a population actually interact or not, and under what circumstances. While diversity is a community characteristic, segregation is a network characteristic" (Hooghe 2007, 719). However, social segregation has not received much support in the trust literature, which has instead focused on ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization (see Alesina et al. 2003; Fearon 2003; Posner 2004; Roeder 2001), favoring the Alesina et al. (2003) ethnic fractionalization measure as a proxy for social heterogeneity. Most of the trust literature assumes a negative relationship between generalized trust and fractionalization (see Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006; Delhey and Newton 2005; Hero 2003), while a minority (see Bjørnskov 2008, 271) rightly challenge this in particular contexts.

*Fractionalization* is measured by the likelihood that two people chosen at random will be from different groups (Posner 2004, 849), whereas "…polarization is typically maximized when there are two groups of equal size" (Alesina et al. 2003, 177), producing a parity and possibly a bipolar power differential. All societies have different and overlapping ethnic, religious, and linguistic compositions. "The boundaries around and the meanings attached to ethnic groups reflect pure social constructions" (Nagel 1994, 168) and "ethnicity is constructed out of the material of language, religion, culture, appearance, ancestry, or regionality" (1994, 152). There are 7,099 living languages (Simons and Fennig 2017), and as of 2003, there were 819 ethnic groups larger than 1 percent of a given country's population (Fearon 2003, 36), with thousands more not meeting that threshold. However, few states (e.g., South Korea and Japan) are considered nation-states (United Nations 1987) where the nation and state's boundaries align to form a relatively homogenous ethnopolitical community. The line between fact and fiction concerning ethnic groups is often blurred (Davis 1999, 26), making it a difficult concept to measure. Language is often the glue that helps to hold minority ethnic groups together amid centrifugal cultural pressure from dominant groups (Luo and Shenkar 2006, 336). Linguistic separation creates a space for unity, symbolism, identity formation, and exclusion of the "Other."

Most fragile states have highly religious populations. Therefore, distinctions between religious and secular demarcate an essential division in the trust and fragile states literature (An-Na'im 2002, 60). Olson and Li (2016, 756) and Manglos-Weber (2016, 18) claim highly religious and heterogeneous societies produce narrow GTR in SSA, while Putnam (2000) and Putnam and Campbell (2010) contend voluntary

membership in religious organizations widens the GTR. However, the majority of this research has been conducted in non-fragile states, "where generalized trust tends to be higher and active religious membership is less prevalent" than in SSA (Manglos-Weber 2016, 18). The convergence of disparate religious groups in fragile state urban centers has produced diverse populations but has not guaranteed a more plural-minded citizenry (Juergensmeyer 2017, 154). Without the aid of strong institutions, highly competitive, politicized, and polarizing strategies for religious dominance heighten the perceived value of shared public space (see Hassner 2009).

Bjørnskov (2007) introduces the claim that social polarization, income inequality, and ethnic fractionalization as measured by Alesina et al. (2003) reduce trust and religion and political systems affect the formation of trust, clarifying and improving these assertions in Bjørnskov (2008). The religious composition of a population matters for the formation of social trust, with many in the literature claiming high population Catholic- and Islamic-majority countries are less trusting (Berggren and Jordahl 2005, 13) (see La Porta et al. 1999; Zak and Knack 2001). Bjørnskov finds that monarchic societies are seven percentage points more trusting (2008, 276), while post-communist societies are less trusting (2007, 16).

Bjørnskov claims determinants of social trust fall into two categories: those affecting the trust radius and those affecting social polarization (2008, 271). He also agrees with the consensus in the trust literature that fractionalization and social distance are the most important determinants of social trust (see Bjørnskov 2007; Delhey and Newton 2005; Knack and Keefer 1997; Knack 2002; Uslaner 2002; Zak and Knack 2001). This claim is sound, yet incomplete. While these concepts intersect with this

dissertation's conception of social network composition, they are not inclusive of it, omitting locational distance (physical proximity), technological proximity, social proximity, and power differential. Whereas fractionalization measures various types of diversity, social distance measures *how* different. He also neglects that a society's level of trustingness and the human desire for reputation and interests affect social trust.

The trust literature most often proxies fractionalization via income inequality and ethnolinguistic diversity, assuming both negatively affect social trust. While rarely actualized in fragile states, highly fractionalized environments have greater *potential* generalized trust than homogenous environments because the likelihood of encountering a stranger is greater. Bjørnskov claims income inequality is the strongest determinant of the social trust *level* (2008, 271). He also rightly suggests political diversity, through a society's fractionalized weltanschauung (see Rokeach 1960), negatively affects social trust, but he mistakenly operationalizes it through measuring which political parties are in power. He correctly recognizes generalized trust and inequality to be stable over time. Although he appropriately includes the Kaufmann et al. (2003) Rule of Law variable, he does not find it significant. He recognizes and attempts to address the possibility of endogeneity between inequality (Bjørnskov 2007, 16) and education (2007, 7) and reverse causation of democracy, rule of law, and education, claiming, "…most of the variables proposed in the literature as determinants of such trust are either spuriously related to trust or more likely caused by trust" (2007, 15). He also claims democracy, the rule of law, and education are *results* of generalized trust, not its *cause* (2007, 16). While he concedes that a minimal level of education and the rule of law are required for generalized trust to exist (2007, 17), he does not find education to be significant. He

agrees with Knack and Keefer (1997) and Knack (2002), "that trust is created in the educational system by making individuals better informed and better at interpreting perceived information" (2007, 7).

Delhey and Welzel (2012) counter to the majority of the trust literature, claim inequality and *ethnic* fractionalization do not affect the GTR, and that *religious* fractionalization *widens* it, in agreement with Allport's (1954) contact hypothesis. In this view, since a primary byproduct of modernity is broader circles of cooperation (see Blau 1977; Coser 1975; Granovetter 1973; Simmel 1984 [1908]), "dissimilar others are viewed as a potential source of mutual benefit" (Delhey and Welzel 2012, 51). They claim the "literature over-estimates the role of voluntary associations and underestimates that of human empowerment and open-access activities in the generalization of trust" (2012, 65). They appear justified in downplaying the effects of associational activity since groups associate for purposes that may decrease generalized trust (e.g., terrorism) as well as increase it (e.g., inter-faith dialogue). Their argument for the positive effects of human empowerment on the GTR is interesting but only moderately convincing. They overstate their claim that religious fractionalization widens the GTR, though it does have the potential to do so under specific favorable conditions.

Fractionalization measures explain the *content* of ethnic, linguistic, and religious group identity, but provide an incomplete explanation of a society's social network composition and its effect on the GTR. To advance the trust and fragile states literature, this dissertation supplements fractionalization with measures of proximity, which defines the physical, technological, and social distance between groups; and power differential, which defines the fractionalization of power in society and groups' relative access to

power and resources. There has been little quantitative discourse on physical, technological, and social proximity and power differential individually and none comprehensively interacting with all of these concepts, leaving a gap in the literature. Thus, the unique contribution of this dissertation is to join these concepts together into a single test variable for explaining the social effect on the GTR.

*State Institutions*

The state is a "spatially defined territory under a single political authority which claims the compliance of its citizens for its laws up to the extent of its sovereign boundaries" (Kingsbury 2007, 58). Weak political institutions are the central driver of state fragility (Vallings and Moreno-Torres 2005, 7) and low institutional trust. Generalized trust differs from institutional trust in that, people, not institutions, are the source of trust. A society's confidence in institutions is not affected by its generalized trust radius (Delhey et al. 2011, 798), demonstrating that institutional trust is a separately measurable phenomenon. Although, oppositely, increasing state security and contract institutions widens the GTR in fragile states. When security and contract institutions perform below a certain level, the GTR cannot widen, regardless of how positive social network composition, individualism, and inter-state market forces may be. Rotberg's (2003, 3) nine-part hierarchy of positive state functions and Dobbins' (2007, xxiii) six-part nation-building process, rightly elevate the socially legitimated provision of the public goods of security and enforcement of laws as its principal mandate (Caparini 2005, 73). When a critical mass of society does not consider its state to enforce institutions flexibly and fairly, providing it with clear expectations for appropriate behavior, then the state's sovereignty may be at risk (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002, 210; Rosenblum and

Post 2001, 12). Minimally functional security institutions (e.g., police, portions of the military, bureaucratic agencies, and the courts) and contract institutions (e.g., bureaucratic agencies and the courts)—products of the executive and judicial branches of government—can alleviate most problems inherent in governance related to the GTR.

Welzel and Delhey (2015) initially support the inclusion of state institutions variables in agreement with the majority of the trust literature, but then claim, security, institutions, social separations, and cultural legacies each become insignificant when controlling for their human empowerment variable (2015, 893). They agree with Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) and Axelrod (1986) that when there is a stable order, rule of law, and low corruption, social interactions become more predictable and agreements reliable. However, they claim all of these benefits are accomplished through human empowerment rather than state institutions, leaving only associational activities and religious pluralism as separately significant variables in their regressions. They do not recognize that the rule of law, one factor rendered insignificant in their regressions, may widen the circle of generalized trust because enforcement of contracts reduces the risk of cooperation (Nguyen and Rose 2009, 166).

*Security Institutions*

> If we are only half secure, we are not secure at all.
> —Bernard Brodie, *National Security Policy and Economic Stability*

National security is an often misunderstood and misused social science concept (Baldwin 1997, 26). Various overly parsimonious definitions of security have been proposed such as "the absence of threats to acquired values" (Wolfers 1949, 485) or updated to "a low probability of damage to acquired values" (Baldwin 1997, 13). A

minimally secure environment is one where the state has "effective control over its territory" (Di John 2010, 10) and has a "monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber 2015, 136).

A fully developed definition of security must consider security for whom, from what threats, protecting which values, by what means, and at what cost (Baldwin 1997, 23) and must be defined in reference to what it is not: insecurity. Since insecurity emerges from inter-state (see Gleditsch et al. 2002; Raleigh et al. 2010; Sarkees and Wayman 2010) and intra-state (see Salehyan et al. 2012) sources, this dissertation's state security institutions variable measures fragile states' effectiveness in managing both in regards to their effects on the GTR. Intra-state insecurity: civil war, military coup, revolution, armed conflict, social conflict and even environmental stress and human rights abuses, originate from uni-, bi-, or multi-directional hostilities involving two or more domestic groups, one of which may be the state. Intra-state conflict is increasing globally, particularly social conflict (Salehyan et al. 2012), while inter-state conflict is decreasing (Lacina et al. 2006, 674). Inter-state insecurity: inter-state war, militarized interstate disputes (MID), territorial dispute, conflict spillover, and cross-border terrorism, originate from uni-, bi-, or multi-directional hostilities involving the state and at least one other state or non-state actor. Because inter-state insecurity is external to the state and society, its sources must first circumvent or pass through a state's security institutions before affecting society and its GTR. Therefore, security institutions serve as an intervening variable for inter-state sources of insecurity, while intra-state sources of insecurity are *outcomes* of the independent variables, rather than their causes.

Security must be measurable to know if it, or how much of it, has been achieved. Fragile states' security institutions vary in their effectiveness, efficiency, and legitimacy of means used for providing a minimally secure environment. For states to have legitimacy, they must be the responsible entity providing the secure environment rather than an occupying or intervening inter-state military force such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), African Union (AU), or United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operation or Mission. Security is measurable as a dichotomous, ordinal, or continuous variable. However, because states have multiple security objectives, it is most profitable to analyze it as an ordinal or continuous variable where societies may be more or less secure in specific areas of concern along a continuum.

While "absolute security is unattainable" (Baldwin 1997, 15) in any state, the state-provided establishment of a minimally secure environment is the most important factor affecting inter-group interaction and the widening of the GTR. "The literature reflects this position. Again and again, authors stress that a functioning state that provides basic public order and security is a prerequisite for the existence of civil society" (Posner 2003, 247). Security institutions act as an intervening variable upon which all other social goods are dependent (Dobbins 2007, xxiv); without a minimum level of security, little else is possible in society. At the same time, security is "one of many policy objectives competing for scarce resources and subject to the law of diminishing returns" (Baldwin 1997, 19). Regarding all institutions, "…up to a certain level, the strength of a rule might have positive returns, but once past that level, the returns may be marginal or even negative" (Voigt 2013, 11). Spending resources on

security far beyond what is required to meet security goals, limits resources available for other social goods.

*Contract Institutions*

Once the prerequisite of a minimally secure environment is established, minimally encoded and enforced contract institutions that govern access and rights, especially to land and zoning, are required for a wide GTR (Knack 2001, 1). Regarding contract institutions, "in many African countries, fundamentals of constitutional order and state character are at stake" (Boone 2007, 558). *Contracts* are agreements between individuals for managing interests including universal requirements for sustaining human life and security for pursuing the instrumental intentions (Lin 2002, 58) of wealth, power, reputation, and solidarity. They may take the form of formal regulations, such as zoning for low-income housing, marriage licensing, and business incorporation or informal norms regulating community expectations on the treatment of the poor, appropriate bride prices and dowries, and who has authority to speak on behalf of the group. Contract enforcement constitutes the foundation of the rule of law (Kaufmann et al. 2009, 4). Merely being labeled democratic does not attract foreign investment, increase economic output, prevent military rule, or stop corruption (Schedler et al. 1999, 2), but strengthening the rule of law (de Mesquita and Root 2000, 230) by increasing horizontal accountability between institutions, signals to the global community a state's readiness for increased responsibility (Schedler et al. 1999, 3).

Global isomorphism shapes the *structure* of fragile states' contract institutions, which tend to persist even when unproductive or a poor fit with the culture and informal institutions. Increasing global communications and trade increases the isomorphic

transmission of institutional regimes from non-fragile to fragile states. However, because these institutions are largely disconnected from—rather than an outgrowth of—indigenous norms, they rarely embed deeply into or adhere strongly to society.

Contract institutions are effective to the degree that "agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts" (Kaufmann et al. (2007: 4). Fragile political institutions that produce insecure property rights and capriciously enforce the rule of law, increase transaction costs and information asymmetry (Bates 2006, 715; Gwenhamo 2012, 593). Functional contract institutions embody legal sanctions that reduce "incentives to cheat, thereby enhancing trust that agreements will be faithfully executed by both parties" (Knack 2001, 8). When contract institutions are unclearly encoded, chronically unenforced, or unevenly and unfairly applied, society's expectations go unmet, which incentivizes lawbreaking through vigilantism, corruption, and black markets, all of which narrow the GTR. Professional and trade associations that crosscut groups may institutionalize commonly held ethical codes and standards, which can serve to widen the GTR and reduce transaction costs by efficiently communicating information about the identity of cheaters (Bernstein 1992, 138).

A primary function of the state is to serve as an efficient and neutral contract enacting and enforcing agent between self-interested principles. The principle-agent relationship influences inter-group interaction through defining legal responsibilities and privileges of principles and agents over resources in society. Functional contract institutions mitigate the harm principle by providing a limited but common language for interaction between groups that reside in disconnected networks and may have little in

common. They also encode for society who may own what (real property and tangible and intangible personal property) and its legal uses. Properly functioning property rights provide owners the right to possess, use, manage, and transmit their land; provide access to capital and security; and protect from state confiscation (Honoré 1961). In their absence, investments in human and physical capital are often wasted (Gwenhamo et al. 2012, 594). When contract institutions function optimally, the state can force—or preferably, incentivize—inter-group interaction by reducing the negative externalities of cost, effort (Hart and Moore 1988, 755), moral hazard (Holmstrom 1979, 74), and adverse selection (Laffont and Martimort 2002) related to the principle-agent relationship.

Fragile and non-fragile states alike face contracting challenges, and the more heterogeneous they are, the more complex. For example, how does the Canadian government reconcile its Sikh community's religious duty to wear the Dastar headdress with legal statutes and industry requirements regulating safety headgear? Should it be illegal for Sikhs to ride motorcycles without helmets or work on construction sites or should accommodations be made for their religious convictions? In another example, the Israeli government has had the complicated task of weighing, not just domestic, but also international, claims by Jewish, Christian, and Muslim principles, to access the Temple Mount, also known as Haram esh-Sharif to Muslims. Non-fungible contested sacred space such as this produces indivisible interests and extreme positioning, where parties believe there is no substitution or economic or political side payments possible to offset their potential loss (Hassner 2003, 12-3). In a final example, how should the Nigerian government weigh the competing claims over access to petroleum revenues? Should

priority be given to indigenous ethnic groups with historical claims to the producing lands which are also suffering the majority of the related environmental degradation or should the revenue be distributed differently throughout Nigerian states?

The cases of principle-agent interactions and possible solutions are numerous. Fragile states face unique challenges in establishing and maintaining contract institutions and the rule of law. Because desired resources are scarcer in fragile states and the state's capacity to serve as an agent is limited, negative contracting externalities regularly produce unequal and unexpected contract outcomes. In this context, principles become more risk-averse, and agents become more concerned with maintaining their power and legitimacy. In this environment, a moral hazard may occur when one party to a contract increases its risk, resulting in another party bearing it (Holmstrom 1979, 74). Adverse selection may occur when unmonitored agents—whose interests deviate from the principles'—provide asymmetrical information or establish bureaucratic hoops to favor the state, oneself, or one principle over another (Laffont and Martimort 2002, 29, 33). To decrease the adverse selection problem, fragile states may, but rarely do successfully, introduce competition among government agencies, incentivizing them to differentiate themselves from competing agencies when seeking desirable contracts through signaling their comparative legitimacy (see Spence 1973). First-, second-, and third-party contract enforcement mechanisms are present in heterogeneous fragile states, although first-party mechanisms of cultural pressure are strongest; second-party mechanisms of multiple contracts between groups are rare and weakly enforced, and third-party institutions are enforced unevenly. This combination of factors usually produces weak contract institutions where principles unknowingly agree to inequitable terms because the state

either fails to fulfill its agentic duties or it takes advantage of its agentic position, both of which breaks down society's confidence in its contract institutions.

*Individualism*

Culture, driven by ethical habit, changes more slowly than ideas (Fukuyama 1995, 40) and much slower than political and economic processes. Rapid political and economic upheaval does not often quickly change durable cultural values of a group or society. Culture is the product of groups' rationality. Individualism encourages all individuals to exercise their rationality while collectivism specifies bounds of agency to predefined roles within groups. Culture is the outworking of personal values held by a community and is primarily the mechanism through which cues for meaningful action are transmitted (Eriksen 1991, 142). It provides group members with answers—right or wrong, practical or not—to fundamental questions about the nature of the human condition (see Shweder 1991) and scripts proper protocols for seeking interests.

> We are, in sum, incomplete or unfinished animals who complete or finish ourselves through culture…Becoming human is becoming individual, and we become individual under the guidance of cultural patterns, historically created systems of meaning. – Geertz (2000, 12, 13)

The culture literature better explains collectivism than individualism, in part, because collectivist cultures, those that are composed of more tribal[2] and insular groups, have been around longer to examine. As well, due to rapid modernization, anthropologists have dedicated much of the 20th century to the focused examination of collectivist cultures. The cultural psychology literature has advanced the measurement of

[2] The terms "tribal" and "tribalism" have been discarded by the social anthropology sub-discipline and replaced with "ethnic group" (see Ekeh 1990: 660-1).

individualism and collectivism; however, there is debate whether they are equally opposite phenomena on a continuum (Fiske 2002, 87). Individualistic and collectivistic behavior at the individual level is context dependent, but in aggregate, a culture is consistently more one than the other. There are also varieties of individualism and collectivism. The Libertarian impulse is wholly different from that of hermitism or urban isolationism (Douglas 1978, 41), and Familism and institutional collectivism vary on the unit of analysis to which one is behaving collectively. Nevertheless, individualism and collectivism are the best measures the literature has produced of the tendency of cultures in aggregate towards prioritizing in-group interests over those of individuals.

Individualism and collectivism are relatively stable cultural preferences that affect trust. Trustworthiness and trustingness are separate phenomena. Regardless how trustworthy a group or society is in aggregate, its level of trustingness remains relatively stable (Delhey and Newton 2004, 3; Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 255). This is due mainly to the stability of its position along the individualism-collectivism continuum (see Fukuyama 1995; Hofstede 1992; Realo et al. 2008; Triandis 2005; van Hoorn 2015; Yamagishi et al. 1998).

Globalization, through the isomorphic mechanism, is spreading and increasing the cultural value of individualism (Welzel 2010, 152-3), although, fragile states remain relatively collectivist. Collectivism promotes bonding within groups and draws a relatively narrow boundary around those who are deemed desirable to meet one's interests, producing higher in-group trust levels and narrower GTR. Oppositely, individualism promotes bridging between groups and encourages looking beyond one's

family and group to meet one's interests, producing lower in-group trust levels and a wider GTR (van Hoorn 2015, 270) in fragile states.

Globalization is pushing collectivist societies towards individualism, yet "in fundamental ways, the world is becoming more modern and less Western" (Huntington 1996, 78). Some key influencers of this trend are participation in the global market, formal education, and urbanization. The trust literature recognizes individualism's effect on the GTR, even though much of the social sciences avoids cultural factors for more parsimonious economic and political explanations (see Hirshleifer 1985; Lazear 2000). This is understandable since "the same cultural attribute can have vastly different implications for economic progress in different societies or even in the same society at different times" (Porter 2000, 15), leaving researchers asking if it is even possible to compare cultural factors across countries.

Individualistic and collectivistic behavior may be context-dependent (Realo and Allik 2008, 449) as individuals differ in how they perceive themselves, relate to in- and out-groups, pursue goals, and interests driving their behavior (Triandis 1995, xiv). Collectivists tend to "attribute events to external causes" (Carpenter 2000, 42) and have low perceived agency, relying on in-group inputs to assess appropriate behavior (Oettingen 1995, 153; Triandis et al. 1993, 410). The more one is proximate to culturally similar people, the more collectivist one's behavior tends to be, while the more one interacts positively with strangers, the more one will tend to behave individualistically because the collectivistic impulse is absent between those members of society.

*Inter-State Market Forces*

> The advantage to mankind of being able to trust one another, penetrates into every crevice and cranny of human life: the economical is perhaps the smallest part of it, yet even this is incalculable.
>
> —John Stuart Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*

Inter-state market forces permeate increasingly porous modern states, affecting generalized trust in fragile and non-fragile states alike. International political and economic governing bodies such as the UN, World Trade Organization, World Bank, and the IMF, along with multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations, will continue to affect the domestic affairs of states. Fragile states are more sensitive to external shocks, making them more susceptible to external control. They repel the GTR-widening market forces of trade, FDI, and FPI and attract the GTR-narrowing market forces of remittances, military aid, and non-military aid. They can survive but not thrive, with minimally functional economic institutions. Nonetheless, the GTR can widen in some fragile states with the right SNC configuration even if each control variable is having a narrowing effect on the GTR.

Globalization has been a mixed blessing for fragile states; it has enhanced the individual citizen's absolute, and sometimes relative, access to resources, while at the same time diminishing the state's sovereignty. Sub-Saharan Africa's globalization experience has been substantially different from that of the West. It does not have the benefit of industrial and technological advancement built on 400 years of Enlightenment reasoning; rather it has borrowed models of "Cold War politics and Keynesian-style economics" (Moore 2001, 910) that are overlaid onto a collectivist foundation.

Those groups less able to meet their members' instrumental interests are affected most by globalization, while dominant groups have greater access to market resources through connections to government power. Potential gains from globalization require domestic adjustments of social values and practices (Chan 2007, 751), and skillful calculated risk-taking. Low-income fragile states are at a disadvantage and necessarily take on more risk than middle- and high-income states, though they are usually not as calculated. Neo-capital theories that appreciate the importance of culture on globalization, rightly "stress the interplay of individual actions and structural positions in the capitalization process" (Lin 2002, 18).

External actors who choose to engage in fragile state markets expect a positive return on investment. Trade partners expect better terms of trade and consistent access to quality products; investors expect to increase their capital; remitters expect increased quality of life for their in-country friends and family; non-military donors expect influence in shaping policy in the receiving state; and military donors expect the protection of their military, economic, and political interests in the region. How fragile states interact with these actors as competitors or collaborators, determines differentiated group access to capital, which affects the GTR.

Together, trade, FDI, and FPI proxies a state's connection to the global market. Trade indicates what productive capabilities a state owns; FDI and FPI reflect the global market's opinion of a state's potential. However, official trade data is unable to capture unrecorded capital flight and illicit financial flows, in the form of trade misinvoicing and same invoice faking because illegal activity is more difficult to track and measure in fragile states. Trade affects the GTR by spreading values that are economically

beneficial (Bhagwati 2004; Serionne 1766, 384). Relatively equal distribution of globalization gains across a society, increase social stability (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996, 62), and generally widens the GTR. Oppositely, if social inequality rises above a certain level, trade, along with all other market forces, will narrow the GTR (Chan 2007, 738; Polanyi 1945, 163; Rodrik 1997, 20-1).

Trade requires fragile states have something the market values; however, it does not have to be raw material, physical or financial products or services. Trade partners often find related value in human and social capital or in establishing trade partnerships for political or competitive advantage. The decentralization of global value chains has provided opportunities for fragile states to engage the global market through labor and trade. States that do not have balanced trade, beneficial terms of trade, the ability to tax trade, or diversified exports are more susceptible to market volatility, global economic crises, and uneven economic development. Institutional gaps in these areas are detrimental to exports (Mold and Prizzon 2010).

Foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment (FPI) increase productivity and growth (Havranek and Irsova 2011, 21), but global market isomorphism determines that they flow primarily between high-income countries. Foreign investors guided by global economic institutions are loath to risk capital in fragile states if the return on investment is not high and sure (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2013, 69) and if strong security and contract institutions do not exist to protect their investment. Therefore, because investors are hesitant to engage in fragile states, FDI and FPI do not have the opportunity to affect the GTR as much as does trade.

In practice, they add additional growth to already strong economies, rather than sparking growth in fragile economies.

Remittances are a critical lifeline in collapsed and failed states where basic needs regularly go unmet. While they also reduce development volatility in fragile states for *some*, they also reduce potential inter-group interaction. When receiving groups have their needs met externally by their diaspora, they may forego inter-group interaction, inhibiting the potential widening (or narrowing) of the GTR. Globally, trackable formal remittances received are more than double that of official development assistance (ODA) (World Bank 2011), only second to FDI (Zanamwe and Devillard 2009, 73). However, remittances are primarily sent through informal channels (2009, 73), making reporting of total amounts difficult. The better educated and wealthiest of fragile state citizens often seek better opportunities in higher GDP countries where they form a diaspora from which they transfer currency to their home country friends and family. Because of this, remittances are not spread equitably throughout the receiving population. Remittance sending is a collectivist behavior driven by the remitter's desire to strengthen in-group bonds by investing in and increasing the absolute and *relative* (financial, physical, human, and social) capitals and well-being of non-proximate culturally similar people. Oppositely, FDI investing is an individualist behavior driven by the desire to receive a financial return and increase one's well-being. "Remittances are not profit-driven, but are compensatory transfers" Chami et al. 2005, 55). Dependence on remittances may reduce recipient motivation to participate in wage labor, and where remittances are highest, they may disrupt the economy through increased inflation (Zanamwe and Devillard 2009, 73).

The more extensive a diaspora, the more remittance inflows are likely to increase. Remittance flows indicate the stability and growth of the sending country's economy and volatility and decline of the receiver's. Because they are countercyclical, relatively stable (Frankel 2009, 5), and usually flow from high to low GDP economies, it is not surprising that "there is a robust negative correlation between remittances and GDP growth" (Chami et al. 2005, 55). High remittance flows lull receiving governments into a false sense of security, relying on them to buffer external economic shocks (Ratha 2005, 168) without prompting them to improve their services (Ebeke 2011, 90). "When remittances exceed 6% of GDP, they fully absorb the positive effect of trade openness on government consumption" (2011, 110). Further, if remittances reduce the recipient's labor supply or labor market participation, they have not only a negative correlation with GDP growth but also a direct adverse effect (Chami et al. 2005, 77).

Most developed countries had the time and space to build up their economies while protecting critical industries until they were globally competitive (Stiglitz 2003, 16). This has not been the case for most fragile states, which have been subject to premature capital market without adequate social safety nets, resulting in reversed stability, poor terms of trade, and reliance on bilateral, multilateral, tied, project, and military aid.

High-income states disburse military and non-military aid to high conflict fragile states in strategic regions to protect their economic and geopolitical interests. Since the end of the Cold War, most military aid has originated from the United States with the purpose of protecting its economic and political interests in fragile states and strategic regions (e.g., Israel). Non-military aid in the form of grants, low-interest loans, aid for

trade, and debt forgiveness has two purposes, to ensure a compliant government and protect neighboring countries from potential spillover, which can disrupt global markets if in a strategic region. However, humanitarian disasters occurring in non-strategic regions are often left to fester longer (e.g., Rwandan genocide).

When fragile states' primary connection to the global economy is through aid, global politics gains greater influence over domestic politics (Beck 2006, 249), potentially weakening their already fragile sovereignty. Aid is often inconsistent from year-to-year as donor states reallocate funds as their interests change. This inconsistency, resulting in neoliberal shock therapy in receiving countries, may unevenly distribute aid, increasing domestic inequality. This trend was evident in the 2000s, where every fragile state experienced at least one aid shock (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2013, 62). As with remittances, when group interests are met through external aid, incentives for inter-group interaction decrease, inhibiting the potential widening (or narrowing) of the GTR. As well, "…the empirical evidence suggests that civil society groups sponsored by resources from outside the community tend to be unreliable vehicles for generating trust among their members" (Posner 2003, 244). Beyond a point, as state conditions improve, there are diminishing returns and eventually negative returns on aid. Fifty years and 2.3 trillion dollars of aid later, the literature is unsure of aid's positive effect (Easterly 2006, 4).

## Contributions to the Literature

Fragile states have not been high on the trust literature's research agenda. Delhey et al. (2011) have dislodged this literature from a decade of relative dormancy through

the development of the more accurate and theoretically sound transcendent out-group measurement of the GTR, which has made available new research opportunities. This dissertation continues their momentum by presenting a new sociological institutionalism-social capital theory theoretical framework and model for explaining variation, patterns, and limitations of the GTR in different types of fragile states. While the statist variables (security and contract institutions) are essential for the explanation of the GTR, individualism and inter-state market forces, deserve increased attention and social network composition warrants inclusion. This gap in knowledge is filled through challenging existing theoretical assumptions about the function of the GTR in fragile states, developing the trust differential measure, and constructing the SNC, a causal variable the literature has incompletely formed thus far, leaving it susceptible to omitted variable bias. This framework differentiates between institutional rules, norms, scripts, and isomorphism associated with fractionalization, proximity, and power differentials and their effects on reciprocity and transitivity within and between group networks to produce variation in the GTR.

Table 3

*Contribution to the Department Variable Literature*

<table>
<tr><td colspan="6">Trust<br>Conceptual Development<br>Hardin (1992)<br>Fukuyama (2001)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">In-Group Trust</td><td colspan="2">Generalized Trust<br>Measurement<br>Welzel and Delhey (2011)</td><td colspan="2">Institutional Trust</td></tr>
<tr><td>Level</td><td>Radius</td><td>Level</td><td>Radius</td><td>Level</td><td>Radius</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3"></td><td>Explaining the Effects on the Generalized Trust Radius</td><td colspan="2"></td></tr>
</table>

Table 4

*Contribution to the Theoretical Framework Literature*

| **Theoretical Framework** | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Institutionalism** | | | | **Social Capital Theory** |
| Classical<br>Sen (1986)<br>Rorty (1990) | Historical<br>Skocpol (1995)<br>Thelen (1999) | Rational Choice<br>North (1990)<br>Ostrom (2003) | **Sociological**<br>Meyer & Rowan (1977)<br>DiMaggio & Powell (1983)<br>March & Olsen (1984) | **Social Capital-Networks**<br>Granovetter (1973)<br>Putnam (1995)<br>Fukuyama (1999)<br>Lin (2001) |
| | | | **Development of a Joint Theoretical Framework** | |

Table 5

*Contribution to the Independent Variable Literature*

| **Test Variable** | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Social Network Composition (Caito 2018)** | | | | | | | |
| **Fractionalization**<br>Roeder (2001)<br>Alesina et al. (2003)<br>Fearon (2003)<br>Posner (2004) | | | **Proximity**<br>Collier (1998)<br>Diamond (2000)<br>Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1994) | | **Power Differential**<br>Lijphart (1969)<br>Horowitz (1985) | | |
| **Ethnic** | **Linguistic** | **Religious** | **Physical** | **Technological** | **Unipolar** | **Bipolar** | **Multipolar** |
| | | | **Social** | | | | |
| **Explaining the Full Social Effect on the Generalized Trust Radius** | | | | | | | |

This chapter synthesizes the trust, fragile states, institutionalism, and social capital theory literature, explaining how they have thus far viewed, defined, and categorized state fragility and the GTR. It assesses the claims of rival theoretical frameworks, methodologies, and variables for modeling trust in fragile states. The subsequent Methodology Chapter constructs the most suitable methodology and model based on the foundational literature presented here.

# CHAPTER III - METHODOLOGY

> Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!
>
> —Lewis Carroll, *Through the Looking Glass*

It is time for the trust literature to turn its focus towards the examination of the generalized trust radius (GTR) in fragile sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) states. Fragile states (e.g., Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) are more productively examined separately from non-fragile (e.g., Botswana), failed (e.g., Chad), and collapsed (e.g., Somalia) states, as their institutional, cultural, market and social environments differ greatly.

This dissertation demonstrates how it is possible for trust to increase between strangers in highly collectivist societies governed by fragile, yet functional state institutions and unstable inter-state market forces. An enhanced theoretically generalizable model founded on sociological institutionalism and social capital theory provides explanatory power through testing of the new social network composition variable.

The four related research questions of interest are as follows:

1. *How does social network composition affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?*
2. *How do institutions affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?*
3. *How does culture affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?*
4. *How do inter-state market forces affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?*

The hypotheses for each research question are as follows:

$H_1$: Increasing fractionalization, proximity, and power differential widen the generalized trust radius in fragile states.

$H_2$: Increasing state security and contract institutions widens the generalized trust radius in fragile states.

$H_3$: Increasing individualism widens the generalized trust radius in fragile states.

$H_{4a}$: Increasing trade, FDI, and FPI widen the generalized trust radius in fragile states.

$H_{4b}$: Decreasing remittances, non-military aid, and military aid widen the generalized trust radius in fragile states.

The hypotheses are operationalized for measurement and testing as follows:

- Dependent Variable: [Generalized Trust Radius]
- Test Variable: Social Network Composition [Fractionalization], [Proximity], and [Power Differential]
- Control Variable: Institutions [State Security and Contract Institutions]
- Control Variable: Culture [Individualism]
- Control Variable: Inter-State Market Forces [Trade], [FDI], [FPI], [Remittances], [Non-Military Aid], and [Military Aid]

The balance of this chapter provides a rationale for the selected mixed methodological framework, which includes deviant, least likely case selection, most similar multiple comparative case analysis, control, test, and dependent variables, boundary specification, and data selection.

## Research Design

### *Method Selection*

This dissertation does not claim to resolve the ongoing probabilistic-deterministic methodology debate in the social sciences sparked by King et al. (1994). The subsequent works of Beach and Pederson (2016), Bennett and Checkel (2014), Collier (2011), Fairfield (2015), Goertz and Mahoney (2012), Goertz (2017), Ragin (2013), and Seawright (2016) provide an extension of this debate and inform the methodological choices for this dissertation.

The broader a theory's domain is the less detailed analysis of it is possible (Keohane 1986, 188). This research advances the trust and fragile states literature through middle-range theorizing, which is recognized as the most fruitful approach for theory, methods, and policy development (see Boynton 1982, 29-68; Jentleson 2000, 133-135; Ragin 1992; 2000). The mixed methods literature has wrestled over when a probabilistic or deterministic methodology is most appropriate. Many social phenomena are only measurable in probabilistic terms due to the difficulty of directly observing their outcomes (Lieberson 2000, 209-10). This is not a concern for the analysis of the GTR and its causes as fractionalization, proximity, power differential, security and contract institutions, individualism and collectivism, trade, investment, remittances, and aid are each observable and measurable. When making claims on human populations, "law-like generalizations" (Gomm et al. 2000, 98) are rarely possible; when phenomena are rare, as wide GTR is in fragile states, the sample of available cases is reduced, making probabilistic generalization less likely. The "danger of error in drawing general conclusions [to populations] from a small number of cases must not be underestimated" (2000, 98). Further limiting the number of cases is a requirement of the dependent variable. Accurate analysis of generalized trust requires that populations interpret the concept of trust similarly, limiting this research to a single socio-culturally similar region; a regional study of SSA retains the highest number of potential country-level observations. The most suitable research design within these constraints is to infer deterministic generalizations to theoretical propositions through deviant, least likely case selection and most similar multiple comparative case analysis. This approach is well suited to manage complex causal relations and avoid the methodological pitfalls that

afflict case-based researchers who commonly overgeneralize their findings (George and Bennett 2005, 261).

Among political scientists and political sociologists (see Collier 1991; Eckstein 1975; George and Bennett 2005; Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Goldstone 1991; Hall, 2000; Laitin 1995; Lijphart 1968; 1984; Lipset 1959; and McAdam et al. 2003), the comparative method has become a widely used and respected method.

> …we emphatically believe they [case studies] are essential to the development and testing of social science theory…because they are simultaneously sensitive to data and theory…case studies are more useful for these purposes than any other methodological tool. – Achen and Snidal (1989, 167-8)

However, some methodologists claim the most similar version of controlled comparison should be abandoned as a stand-alone research method because it fails to eliminate rival explanations (Teune and Przeworski 1970, 34). Some counter this claim stating, "The value of Mill's methods is in their capacity to *eliminate* a limited set of alternative causal statements" (Savolainen 1994, 1217). Reliable small-N causal inference is most likely to occur when the (Plümper et al. 2010, 3, 5):

- sample size from which cases are selected is large;
- variation of the test variable is *maximized;*
- variation of the control variables are *minimized;*
- test variable has a stronger effect on the dependent variable than do control variables;
- correlation between the test and control variables is minimized;
- dependent variable is not dichotomous.

The methodological literature referenced for the dissertation recognizes that a mixed-methods research design combining within- and cross-case analysis provides the most comprehensive necessary and sufficient explanations of social phenomena (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 87, 230) (see also Beach and Pedersen 2013; Blatter and Blume

2008; Blatter and Haverland 2012; Mahoney 2008). *Necessary*, meaning causes must be present for an outcome to occur, but the outcome does not always occur when it is present and *sufficient*, meaning an outcome always occurs when it is present but can also occur in its absence. "If measurement error is low, even a single case can falsify a hypothesis that posits necessary or sufficient conditions" (Levy 2008, 9). "While some leverage can be gained by increasing the N of qualitative studies, if the total number of cases remains small, the main basis for causal inference must derive from within-case analysis" (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 87). This research design moves back and forth between theory and data, as dictated by the available evidence, combining within- and cross-case analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions for the hypothesized dependent variable outcome. It provides strong construct and internal validity (George and Bennett 2005, 254) and moderate external validity, which many in the literature recognize as the most rigorous means of drawing inferences from case studies (2005, 18).

For complex social phenomena such as the GTR, it is uncommon for hypotheses on typical cases to meet both necessary and sufficient conditions and far rarer for deviant cases (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 92-3). This more stringent deviant, least likely case selection design makes it more difficult for cases to pass hoop and smoking gun tests, making claims stronger when passed. Hoop and smoking gun tests, when used jointly, are the most reliable techniques for testing necessary and sufficient conditions (Van Evera 1997, 32); the more *certain* and *unique* the claim, the stronger (1997, 76). While passing a hoop test adds moderate support to a hypothesis, depending on how restrictively it is designed, failing a hoop test falsifies and discredits the hypothesis (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 93). By contrast, passing a smoking gun test gives

substantial support to a hypothesis, while failing it does not eliminate it. Increasingly tightening hoop tests work to eliminate competing explanations, proving the evidence of interest is a necessary condition of the outcome. The more restrictive the hoop, the more validated the evidence.

This research design ensures strong construct validity through use of multiple data sources, and the potential concern of a proxy gap is avoided by clearly defining and operationalizing the relevant concepts into variables during the first phase of the research design. The combination of a least likely and deviant case design increases internal validity by tightening the claims on the hypotheses (George 1979, 57; Levy 2008, 14). The theory development phase strengthens internal validity by openly weighing competing explanations for effects on the GTR. Through this design process, "alternative explanations are considered and found to be less consistent with data" (George 1979, 57). Clearly delineating the bounds of theoretical generalization to fragile states sharing similar socio-cultural contexts enhances external validity. Finally, comparative research replication requires the researcher to provide detailed information on the sample (boundary scope specification) from which cases were selected, variables used to select cases, and case selection process and logic, as this dissertation does. This research design is reliable; "By using the same information and the same methods one should arrive at the same results" (Plümper et al. 2010, 43). This reliably constructed research design is transferable and reproducible to other socio-culturally homogenous regions.

While MSSD case analysis cannot infer big empirical conclusions (Lieberson 1994, 311) or determine if a variable increases the *likelihood* of a specified outcome within a population, it is valuable for theory-building (Eckstein 2000, 119) and theory

disconfirming. Most similar systems design is preferred to the most different systems design (MDSD) because it can determine causality, while most different analysis is only useful for ruling out necessary causes (Fauer 1994, 314; George 1979, 210; Van Deth 2009, 93). Case studies also serve the heuristic purpose of identifying variables and generating hypotheses (Eckstein 1975, 79-138). "Indeed, one of the most visible and important contributions of case study methods has been to identify causal variables left out of earlier analyses" (George and Bennett 2005, 254). It can also determine if a theorized outcome is present in the cases under analysis and provides "falsifiable and generalizable explanations of empirical phenomena" (Burroway 1998, 6), to theoretical propositions (Bennett 2004, 43).

**Most Similar Systems Design** selects cases similar on all control variable outcomes (George and Bennett 2005, 152) and many background factors—though these are less important—differing only on the dependent variable outcome and test variable hypothesized to cause the variation (Levy 2008, 10). Because this research design compares cross-regional cultural, economic, political, and social phenomena at a nuanced level of analysis, the close matching of control variables across cases is challenging (Plümper et al. 2010, 14), and their perfect matching is impossible (Seawright and Gerring (2008, 305). However, this does not expose a serious flaw in the research design; instead, it is a confirmation that all research methods entail tradeoffs.

> …deviant case analysis can, and should, play a positive role in empirical research, rather than being merely the 'tidying-up' process through which exceptions to the empirical rule are given some plausibility and thus disposed of. – Kendall and Wolf (1949, 153)

**Deviant** research design identifies and selects outlier cases that deviate as far as possible from explanations of typical (control) cases (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 302), differing on the dependent variable outcome and test variable's independent effect. Control and test cases are separated for analysis (2008, 304-5). This design is useful for disconfirming (Smelser 1973, 56) or confirming (Creswell 1998, 119), refining (Kendall and Wolf 1949, 153), or replacing (Levy 2008, 3) theory about country-level observations that appear to have "outcomes not predicted or explained adequately by existing theories" (George and Bennett 2005, 215). While the physical sciences value analysis of "seeming exceptions to laws" (Molnar 1967, 1), the social sciences routinely discard deviant observations without attempting to explain them (George and Bennett 2005, 215; Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 92).

The deviant case selection design is one of the most suitable methods for identifying:

- Boundary scope conditions (Bennett and Elman 2006, 467-8; Collier and Mahoney 1996, 66-9).
- Measurement error (Coppedge 1999, 470; George and Bennett 2005, 220; King et al. 1994, 152-83).
- Omitted variables (Collier et al. 2004, 47, 73, 78; Fearon and Laitin 2008, 8).
- Underlying causes (Kazancigil 1994, 214).

> For deviant cases, that is, cases that do not follow the causal pattern predicted by the theory, within-case analysis gives qualitative researchers an opportunity to discover the process that caused the case to diverge from the hypothesized outcome. – Collier et al. (2004, 118)

**Least Likely** design serves to rectify the omission of the social network composition variable in the trust and fragile states literature by analyzing its independent effects on the GTR under the most unfavorable control variable conditions of fragile

states, where its effects are more isolated and therefore more clearly measurable (Gerring 2007, 233; King et al. 1994, 209). When state security and contract institutions are fragile, the culture is collectivist, and the inter-state market forces of trade, FDI, and FPI are absent, but remittances and military and non-military aid are present, the independent positive effects of SNC on the GTR are more clearly recognizable. Isolating its effects in unfavorable conditions establishes the conditional boundaries in which variables are likely to function as hypothesized (Beach and Pedersen 2016, 23). The "evidentiary support for a theory from a least likely case…provides substantial theoretical leverage, and induces a significant shift in our confidence in the theory" (Levy 2008, 12). Nevertheless, because context matters greatly in mixed method case analysis, it is not sound to assume an unlikely occurrence in one context is likely to occur in a very different context. The claim of the popularized '"Sinatra inference'—if I can make it there I can make it anywhere" (Levy 2002, 442), is misplaced for small-N case analysis (Beach and Pedersen 2016, 49).

This dissertation claims the fragile state test cases of interest deviate from current explanations for the GTR in typical fragile states. Typical case analysis is less useful at this time in the trust and fragile states literature as it only serves to confirm, rather than challenge existing theoretical assumptions (Seawright 2016, 502), which contributes less to advancing the literature than deviant and least-likely analysis (Flyvbjerg 2006, 13). If a researcher is interested in disconfirming a deterministic proposition, any deviant case within the specified population of the inference will suffice (Dion 1998 quoted in Seawright and Gerring 2008, 302), while ensuring test cases are both deviant and least likely, makes their hypothesis tests much stronger.

*Procedure*

This dissertation employs George's (1979, 210) commonly used three-phase case study research design updated with procedural modifications suggested by Beach and Pedersen (2016), Plumper et al. (2010), and Seawright (2016). The **first** phase, accomplished in Chapters I-III, entails *construction* of the research design, which clarifies the research problem and question. It also identifies the class of events and related theories of interest, specifies the dependent and independent variables, selects appropriate cases, hypothesizes the causal relationships between the independent and dependent variables for test cases, and formulates standardized questions asked of all cases. The **second** phase, accomplished in Chapters III and IV, entails *implementation* of the research design, beginning with the articulation of variable scoring criteria and finishing with the presentation of case findings generated from systematic questions for all cases. The **third** phase, accomplished in Chapters V and VI, entails *synthesis* of the research design, demonstrating the superiority of sociological institutionalism and social capital theory as a theoretical framework for explaining social network composition's effect on the GTR through comparing, analyzing, and interpreting the theoretical and empirical implications of the Chapter IV findings.

*Case Selection*

The quantitative and much of the qualitative methodological literature have long agreed that more observations produce more valid research results (see Eckstein 2000; Flyvbjerg 2006; Herriott and Firestone 1983; Seawright and Gerring 2008). However, every research has to balance the number of observations with the depth required to answer the research question. This dissertation retains as many country cases as the case

selection criteria, theoretical framework, and data availability allow and as much detail as is required to answer the research questions.

Case selection is the most crucial component of research design for providing reliability and "validity of causal inference" (Plümper et al. 2010, 42). Research design may apply different case selection criteria, depending on if its purpose is to analyze typical, deviant, most-similar, or most-different cases that favor extreme values on the dependent (Y) or test ($X_1$) variable, minimizing or maximizing the difference between case environments (Z), or some combination thereof. The qualitative literature's "imprecise description of their case selection method" (2010, 14) has led to the "I know it when I see it" (Stewart 1964, 378 U.S. 184) approach to case identification and classification being arbitrarily applied across the empirical literature. This has resulted in rival qualitative case selection techniques that affect boundary specification and reliability differently—none of which have gained full support in the literature (Seawright 2016, 500). Selecting the right method is of concern because if scope conditions are applied too broadly or narrowly, the range of cases where the hypotheses should theoretically hold will be inaccurate.

This dissertation's research design adheres to the specific recommendations of Plümper et al. (2010, 29) and Seawright (2016, 501), built on advances in the methodological literature by Collier et al. (2004); Flyvbjerg (2006, 13); Gerring (2007, 87–8); King et al. (1994, 124–8); and Levy (2008: 8) and empirical studies by Ragin (1992) and Rosch (1978). They claim theory-guided *non-random* case selection, and extreme values on the test variable ($X_1$) provide the most reliable results, while smaller gains are made with extreme values on the dependent variable (Y) and minimizing the

difference between case environments (Z). Therefore, to draw the most sound boundary specification and maximize the reliability and quantity and quality of cases, selection ensures SNC measures differ greatly between test and control cases.

This dissertation utilizes a high-low 2x2 case selection typology based on the new GTR score and hypothesized SNC values. It partitions cases into discrete types sharing common traits of interest (Stinchcombe 1968, 43-5). Cases populating this typology and those selected for analysis are limited to those SSA states that are fragile, rather than non-fragile, collapsed, or failed. Selected cases represent SSA broadly, providing a laboratory for comparing parallel background characteristics (Van Evera 1997, 84) of fragile SSA states. The deviant test cases of Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria have positive dependent (Y), and test ($X_1$) variable values and typical control cases of Zambia and Zimbabwe have negative dependent (Y) and test ($X_1$) variable values. Uniformly negative control variable outcomes in control and test cases provide a most-similar research environment where there is little reason to think test cases would have wide GTR, making them analytically interesting and meaningful.

Table 6

*2x2 Case Selection Typology*

| | **↓Hypothesized Social Network Composition (X = 0)** | **↑Hypothesized Social Network Composition (X = 1)** |
|---|---|---|
| **↑Generalized Trust Radius (Y = 1)** | (0,1)<br>**Mali** (0.5330)<br>**Rwanda** (0.4381) | Deviant Test Cases (1,1)<br>**Burkina Faso** (0.4408)<br>**Ethiopia** (0.3998)<br>**Nigeria** (0.3693) |
| **↓Generalized Trust Radius (Y = 0)** | Typical Control Cases (0,0)<br>**Zambia** (0.3280)<br>**Zimbabwe** (0.3064) | (1,0)<br>**Benin** (N/A)<br>**Cote d'Ivoire** (N/A**)** |

Table Continued

*Note:* Global low GTR score: Peru (0.1979).

Global high GTR score: Sweden (0.6272).

## Variables & Data

The literature on the *consequences* of generalized trust has grown, while the examination of its *causes* has lagged. This dissertation examines the structural causes of generalized trust as Bjørnskov (2007), and Bjørnskov (2008) suggest. The trust and fragile states literature provide strong support for security and contract institutions, individualism, and inter-state market forces as control variables affecting the GTR. This dissertation advances the literature by fine-tuning these claims and introducing a new social test variable, Social Network Composition, composed of fractionalization, proximity, and power differential, measuring how the size, strength, connectivity, and interaction of groups affect society's GTR. Analyzing the structural constraints that collectively lead to self-reported trusting *feelings* between groups, more so than trustworthy *behavior* between groups, is the most accurate measure of the GTR. This research design tests hypotheses on the optimal balance of in-group, generalized, and institutional trust levels and radii for creating environments conducive to the widening of the GTR and associated positive externalities. These variables, along with how well groups provide for their members' interests, determine inter-group interaction and if outcomes are positive or negative; the GTR only widens through mutually positive interaction.

### *Generalized Trust Radius*

The precise measurement of the GTR is essential (see Dinesen 2011; Glaeser et al. 2000; Reeskens and Hooghe 2008), particularly for assessing functions of democracy

(see Nannestad 2008; Putnam 1993; Uslaner 2002). While some of the literature claim experiments accomplish this most effectively, others favor surveys. The trust and conflict experimental literature have more of a selection bias problem, as human subjects willing to participate are likely to be skewed positively towards the value of the study subject (see Pettigrew 1997). It is clear that social surveys are the most feasible mechanism for collecting trust data at the group and society levels and the analysis of survey data within case studies, as this dissertation does, is an accepted and common practice. There is a consensus among trust surveyors that it is preferable to measure attitudes and values, such as generalized trust, by multi-point scales rather than dichotomously (see Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Krosnick and Fabrigar 1997; Schuman and Presser 1981).

A widening GTR is the chief vehicle for the creation of social capital, "but its origins remain uncertain and its consequences are yet to be clearly established" (Delhey et al. 2011, 800), in part, due to the literature favoring the examination of trust *level* over trust *radius*. The vaguely constructed old "standard" trust question measures generalized trust *level* (Bauer et al. 2015, 59) rather than its *radius*. For the new GTR measurement, "…out-group trust measures the level of trust in remote others, while the trust radius measures how strongly remote others are in people's minds when answering questions about unspecified trust" (Delhey et al. 2011, 800). This reveals that "…when trust in remote others is high, a wide circle of people is included in the notion of 'most people' " (2011, 800).

This dissertation uses the Delhey et al. (2011) out-group trust calculation of the GTR from the new World Values Survey (WVS) 6-question trust battery, available in the

WVS Wave 5 (2005-2009) and Wave 6 (2010-2014) surveys and is expected to be expanded in future waves. Delhey et al. (2011) and Delhey and Welzel (2012) utilize the Wave 5 (51 countries) data, eventually combining Wave 5 and 6 data (76 countries) in the subsequent Delhey et al. (2014) and Welzel and Delhey (2015) articles. These four articles encompass a pioneering effort to measure the GTR with greater precision. The WVS has established itself as the most credible, enduring, and utilized global survey instrument on social issues, including trust (Knack 2001, 19). There is a consensus among the trust literature (see Bauer 2015, 21; Dekker 2011; Lundmark et al. 2016; Sturgis and Smith 2010; Torpe and Lolle 2011; van Hoorn 2015) that this new trust question battery and out-group trust measurement have inaugurated a new era in the trust literature. Together, they accurately define, isolate, and measure the concept of "the stranger," surpassing all competing social survey research programs in this goal.

Table 7

*Welzel's Item Battery on Trust*

| I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much, or not at all? *(Read out and code one answer each)* | |
|---|---|
| Your family | |
| Your neighborhood | In-group trust |
| People you know personally | |
| People you meet for the first time | |
| People of another religion | Out-group trust |
| People of another nationality | |

Source: Delhey and Welzel (2012)

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*Miscalculating the Generalized Trust Radius*

The new trust question is an improvement on the old "standard" trust question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be

too careful in dealing with people?" that served as the foundation for much of the trust literature's findings from 1981-2005. Much of the trust literature agrees, the old "standard" trust question is invalid for cross-country analysis at the global scale (Delhey et al. 2001, 787; Reeskens and Hooghe 2008, 530) because the concept of trust is interpreted so differently between socio-cultural regions. Torpe and Lolle (2011) and Helliwell and Putnam (2004) convincingly support this claim, shedding light on the vagueness of the old "standard" trust question. It "is formulated with such a lack of precision that it is unclear what 'most people' covers" (Torpe and Lolle 2011, 484), to the point that its "capacity to measure trust across cultural divides is questionable (2011, 493). It "is perceived differently in different countries" (2011, 489), varying by region, making cross-country comparison problematic. They call into question the validity of research using the old "standard" trust question for cross-country analysis, particularly in Asia and Africa (2011, 493) as it overestimates Asian GTR and underestimates Africa GTR.

Table 8

*Social Trust in Five Country Clusters (Percent Trusters)*

| | Most people can be trusted | Trust people you meet for the first time (somewhat or completely) | Number of countries |
|---|---|---|---|
| West | 40.4 | 41.2 | 15 |
| Former East Bloc | 20.9 | 16.3 | 10 |
| Latin America | 12.9 | 17.8 | 8 |
| Asia | 32.3 | 18.7 | 10 |
| Africa | 15.4 | 27.8 | 9 |
| Total | 25.7 | 25.8 | 52 |

Note: Only countries which have included both questions in the questionnaire are included in this analysis. *N* is in all clusters above 10,000 respondents.

Source: Torpe and Lolle (2011, 486)

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*A New and Improved Generalized Trust Radius Measure*

While this question appears resolved for the old "standard" trust question, it is a live debate for the new trust question. Delhey et al. (2011) agree with Bjørnskov (2008, 279) that the old question is subject to "…systematic variation in the radius of 'most people,'" (Delhey et al. 2011, 787) making it incomparable across countries. They also agree with Torpe and Lolle (2011) that the new 6-question trust battery and its measurement provide improved clarity and validity for cross-country comparison in Africa and Asia. When comparing the measurement of "Confucian and developing countries" (2011, 801)—specifically Burkina Faso and Ethiopia—the measurements change dramatically when the old question is replaced by the new question (2011, 786). For this dissertation, the GTR scores for Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe increase substantially when using the new trust question and measurement, while the score for Zambia remains unchanged.

While some in the trust literature have proceeded with cross-country statistical analysis using the new measurement, many realize further vetting is required. Delhey et al. (2014) claim the new trust question battery and measurement correct the issues that plague the old question through calculating the difference between derivative in-group and transcendent out-group trust to measure how far beyond one's group, trust extends. Welzel and Delhey (2015) claim the Delhey et al. (2011) multigroup confirmatory factor analysis makes the new trust measure valid for cross-country comparison on a global scale, with Dinesen (2011), Torpe and Lolle (2011), Nannestad (2008), van Hoorn (2014), Welzel (2011), and Welzel and Inglehart (2016) arriving at similar conclusions.

Others in the trust literature caution this assumption (see Aleman and Woods 2016; Banerjee 2016; Davidov et al. 2014; Donnelly and Pol-Eleches 2012; Mellon 2011). While "the radius of trust problem remains resolved" (Delhey et al. 2014, 1260) and it does appear "to measure the same latent constructs across groups and countries" (Nannestad 2008, 418-9), the concern over the validity of its cross-country measurement and comparison continues.

*Refining the Generalized Trust Radius Measurement*

This advancement of the literature has touched off a productive volley of critique, defense, and improvement, resulting in a persuasive call to "discontinue using unspecified trust, at face value, as a measure of general trust—at least in worldwide comparisons" (Delhey et al. 2011, 801). It has also prompted a call to reexamine the findings of studies that depend on the old "standard" trust question (see Adam 2008; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Pichler and Wallace 2007). Van Hoorn (2014) presents several valid methodological critiques of the Delhey et al. (2011) trust measure, which has prompted modifications. In response, Delhey et al. (2014) concede they had a statistical reporting error on correlation ($r = .94$), rather than the correct ($r = .381$), which encouraged them to mistakenly claim out-group trust *level* (intensity of the feeling of trust) proxies trust *radius* (extent of feelings of trust) (Delhey and Welzel 2014, 1261; van Hoorn 2014, 1256-7).

Further, Welzel and Delhey (2015) make two updated claims. First, derivative and transcendent out-group trust have different *consequences,* with the later correlated with "a friendly orientation toward strangers" (2015, 893). Second, individual human empowerment in the form of "emancipation from in-group control opens new

opportunities to engage in beneficial exchange with out-group members" (2015, 876) and is, therefore, the most critical omitted variable affecting the GTR.

*Limitations on Measuring the Generalized Trust Radius*

Promising research avenues have emerged in the trust literature as a result of the new World Values Survey (WVS) 6-question trust battery and related Delhey et al. (2011) GTR measure's improved ability to isolate a society's GTR from its generalized trust level, in-group trust, and institutional trust. While the new trust question and its technically sophisticated aggregate measure (Delhey et al. 2011, 798) are superior to the old "standard" trust question (Lundmark et al. 2016, 39), because determinants of social trust vary systematically across both countries and stages of economic and political development (Bjørnskov 2008, 279), cross-country comparison is difficult. Consequently, this dissertation agrees with those in the trust literature who encourage a cautious approach to cross-country generalization of social phenomena, claiming it is necessary to isolate the examination of trust to theoretically justified contexts. The cases selected for this dissertation come from similar socio-cultural contexts and are at similar stages of economic and political development, so social trust will not vary systematically between them, as Bjørnskov (2008, 279) established is a problem for non-similar cases.

Another limitation of the new trust measure is that it is not useful to measure the GTR longitudinally at this time. While measuring trust over time and at multiple sub-levels has the potential to expose dynamic societal trends, longitudinal analysis requires several decades of observations because normative cultural attitudes such as trust, aggregated to the country- and group-levels, do not change measurably annually and even change little over the course of a decade (Delhey and Newton 2005, 319). Since the new

trust question has only existed for a decade over two survey cycles, longitudinal analysis will not be possible until at least the release of the WVS Wave 7 (2015-2019) survey.

*Social Network Composition*

Fractionalization is the literature's standard measure of country-level social diversity. It provides the foundation for the Social Network Composition test variable, yet it is inadequate alone to explain the social effects on the GTR, as it is limited to measuring social homogeneity and heterogeneity in the areas of ethnicity, language, religion, and culture. This requires the addition of physical, technological, and social proximity and power differential measures.

The global measurement of fractionalization began in earnest with the Ethno Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) atlas project, which as of 2004, was more than 40 years out of date (Posner 2004, 850). It was not until 2001 that Roeder (2001) attempted a serious reconceptualization of fractionalization, though as Fearon (2003) and Alesina et al. (2003) rightly claim and then subsequently improve upon, it provides an incomplete view of the concept. Following this flurry of productive fractionalization activity, Posner (2004) aligned these competing voices in the discourse, while adding his own interesting, though not substantially improved, PREG fractionalization measure. The most suitable fractionalization concepts for this research include the Alesina et al. (2003) ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization measures. Fearon's (2003) cultural diversity measure is less suitable because the social network composition variable measures a social phenomenon, rather than a cultural one. While Posner's (2004) PREG index claims to measure something conceptually different from the other indices, the literature continues to favor the Alesina et al. (2003) measures, as does this dissertation.

Social effects on the GTR may be examined via descriptive network measures, which are commonly used in the case study method (Martinez et al. 2003, 5). Network descriptors provide an analytical language and metrics employed at the node and network levels that are useful for describing and explaining social network composition (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994, 1447). Fractionalization may be examined using network cliques, which measure ultimate homogeneity, where all nodes are directly tied to every other node in the group. As this is rare, structurally cohesive blocks—where most, but not all nodes are directly tied to every other node in the group—are more commonly observable. Related to this measure, the clustering coefficient assesses how likely two nodes that are directly tied to the same node are also directly tied to each other. Burt's (1992) constraint measure is valuable for assessing tie strength and cohesion within groups. Tie strength explains tie duration (homophily), intensity (propinquity), and reciprocity (transitivity). In-group trust level (homophily), measures positive intensity between group members, though it does not differentiate on what basis a group identifies (ethnicity, language, religion, gender, race, age, occupation, education, achievement, status, ideology, or values). As transitivity (perceived mutuality), defined as connectivity between actors in a network (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 165) approaches network closure (actual reciprocity), more expectations are met in social interactions. Multiplexity (relational strength) is a measure of the variety of types of ties a node has.

In addition to fractionalization, physical, technological, and social proximity and power differential may be examined using descriptive network measures at the group and societal levels. Physical proximity may be described and measured by network density,

propinquity, and urban and rural ratios. Network density measures the ratio of how many connections exist between nodes in a group or society compared to how many are possible. In fragile states, where many groups are geographically constrained, their propinquity (likelihood of proximity of tied nodes), should be high. Structural cohesion and equivalence may serve as a measure of social proximity. Cohesion indicates network interconnectedness, measuring how many nodes may be removed from a network before it becomes disconnected. Technological proximity is measured by groups' access to communications (mobile and landline telephone, radio, television, and internet) and transportation (road, rail, and air) networks. Some in the literature have hastily used technological proximity measures alone to proxy social capital; Collier (1998) uses the density of telephone networks, and Diamond (2000, 202) suggests radio networks may be suitable. Power differential measures the fractionalization of power in society and groups' relative access to and ability to obtain desired resources, which is affected by size, influence over government, military and the market, ownership of territory, and ability to meet group members' interests. The trust literature has yet to answer whether many small groups of relatively equal size and power (multipolarity), two equally sized and powerful groups (bipolarity), or a single dominant group (unipolarity) produces the most conducive environment for an increasing GTR. This dissertation addresses this question.

*A More Complete Model of Social Network Composition*

> Two roads diverged in a wood and I - I took the one less traveled by, and that has made all the difference.
>
> —Robert Frost, *The Road Not Taken*

Each sub-component of the SNC variable affects inter-group interaction, the only path to wider or narrower GTR. Presented here are three models of possible SNC effects on the GTR; however, each entails substantial nuance requiring greater explanation.

Table 9

*Social Network Composition Effect on Generalized Trust Radius*

| Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
|---|---|---|
| Fractionalized (Ethnic, Linguistic, Religious) | Fractionalized (Ethnic, Linguistic, Religious) | Non-Fractionalized (Ethnic, Linguistic, Religious) |
| ↓ | ↓ | ↓ |
| Multipolar Power Differential | Unipolar or Bipolar Power Differential | Unipolar or Bipolar Power Differential |
| ↓ | ↓ | ↓ |
| Proximate (Physical, Technological) | Proximate (Physical, Technological) | Non-Proximate (Physical, Technological) |
| ↓ | ↓ | ↓ |
| Initial Incentivization Socially Proximate | Initial Coercion Socially Proximate | Non-Incentivized or Coerced Socially Non-proximate |
| ↓ | ↓ | ↓ |
| Sustained Incentivization Socially Proximate | Sustained Coercion Socially Proximate | Non-Incentivized or Coerced Socially Non-Proximate |
| ↓ | ↓ | ↓ |
| Positive Interaction | Negative Interaction | No Interaction |
| ↓ | ↓ | ↓ |
| ↑GTR | ↓GTR | ↓GTR |

1. In model 1, mutually positive inter-group interaction occurs in fractionalized, proximate, most often multipolar, societies where groups are more so incentivized than coerced to interact, widening the GTR.
2. In model 2, mutually negative inter-group interaction occurs in fractionalized, proximate, most often unipolar or bipolar, societies where groups are more so coerced than incentivized to interact, narrowing the GTR.
3. In model 3, little interaction occurs in non-fractionalized, non-proximate, most often unipolar or bipolar, societies, where groups are neither incentivized nor coerced to interact, ensuring the GTR does not widen.

As globalization is increasing, most societies are becoming more fractionalized and proximate. Therefore, negative and positive inter-group interaction is increasing. The more interaction is incentivized and mutually beneficial, the more it is positive and

widening the GTR; whereas, the more it is coerced and lopsided, the more negative it is, narrowing the GTR. Societies' ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization changes most slowly, followed by the power differential, while proximities change more rapidly, though not uniformly.

Not all fractionalizations are equal in their ability to produce inter-group interaction. The more ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups there are in a society, the more likely one is to run into a stranger, increasing the chances of negative or positive inter-group interaction. However, high ethnic heterogeneity has different societal effects than does high linguistic or religious fractionalization. Ethnic and linguistic identity often overlap, but groups feel less intensely about linguistic identity; they rarely have a visceral hatred for speakers of other languages. Without the presence of a bridging trade language, it is more difficult for linguistic groups to interact. Oppositely, different ethnic and religious groups may be able to communicate through a common language, but depending on how different they are and in what ways, they may feel more or less distance from the other group. Groups identify more often by ethnicity, but more intensely by religion. As the intensity of religious identity increases, the social distance felt between groups makes positive inter-group interaction more challenging.

Fractionalization is no guarantee of inter-group interaction in the absence of proximity and either incentivization or coercion. All types of proximity increase negative and positive inter-group interaction, while types of power differential differ. Physical proximity is the most explicit driver of negative and positive inter-group interaction. When diverse groups are in physical proximity and sharing resources, it may either turn conflictual or cooperative (Ostrom 2015, 183). Most communications and transportation

technologies increase proximity and therefore increase the likelihood of inter-group interaction; however, there is variation among types of media and transportation infrastructure. A society's power differential reflects the fractionalization of power in society, group political relations, and the type of interaction that is likely, yet when strong enough fractionalization and proximity drivers are present, even a society with a uniplar or bipolar power differential may increase interaction. Groups may be either coerced or incentivized to interact by the state, external forces, or other groups; most often, coerced relationships become conflictual. Once initial interaction has occurred and depending if it is negative or positive, further effort is required to sustain social proximity.

Societies' power differential greatly affects whether inter-group interaction is negative or positive.

*Unipolar*: Groups' place in society is established and not easily changed, which increases stability and may ease competitive tensions. The dominant group's ability to enforce the status quo tends to limit incentivized and even coerced inter-group interaction. Because the dominant group does not need to interact with minority groups, minorities that are usually unable to meet all of their interests must initiate engagement with the dominant group on its terms.

*Bipolar*: Dominant groups are self-sufficient enough that they do not need nor want to have interests met by other dominant groups. This produces a tense political environment where dominant groups constantly vie for advantage over other dominant groups, tending to produce insular societies within a society that interact negatively unless a balance of power can be established.

*Multipolar*: Most groups are unable to meet all of their interests, therefore, inter-group interaction increases. If groups have unmet interests that other groups can meet, there is the opportunity for a symbiotic, rather than conflictual, relationship. Mutually positive interaction depends on what resources groups have access to and what resources other groups need.

*State Security and Contract Institutions*

Complex concepts such as the rule of law are composed of numerous differently weighted and interdependent institutions (Voigt 2013, 16); therefore, measuring them in aggregate sacrifices considerable precision and detail (2013, 3). As such, this research examines security and contract institutions separately. The control variables (Security and Contract Institutions) are measured using a combination of literature favored World Bank quantitative global data complemented by Voigt's (2013, 17) procedure for assessing institutions. Although Voigt (2013, 22) raises the concern of omitted variable bias with their use, the World Bank – Worldwide Governance Indicators for Political Stability and Absence of Violence (2016) proxy security institutions and Rule of Law (2016) and Control of Corruption (2016) proxy contract institutions sufficiently.

Voigt's (2013) procedure is as follows:

- Step 1: identify and specify the effective institution;
- Step 2: predict *de jure* behavior expected from institutional compliance;
- Step 3: measure *de facto* observed behavior.

It is useful to analyze conditions and patterns of institutionalization through multiple units of analysis, including the group, field, and society, as each faces different constraints. Size, embeddedness, strength, effectiveness, and duration are related but separately measurable characteristics of all types of institutions. The size of an institution

indicates the number of other institutions it likely intersects, while its embeddedness indicates the societal depth to which an institution penetrates. The de jure-de facto gap may measure institutional strength and effectiveness, and the longitudinal stability of an institution may represent its duration. The *de jure* intention of formal rules and regulations and the *de facto* social reality of compliance in fragile states are often worlds apart (Voigt 2013, 5). The difference between the two must be measured (2013, 11) to assess conducive environments for the widening of the GTR.

*Individualism*

The control variable (Individualism), which favors loose-knit social ties over cohesive inward-looking local loyalties, is measured quantitatively, as suggested by van Hoorn (2015, 275), using a combination of Hofstede's (2001) Individualism cultural dimension and the House et al. (2004) Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) measure for In-Group Collectivism. While the trust and fragile states literature recognize these sources as having the best quality and reliability, they lack global coverage, which drops several potential cases from this study. The trust literature has also evaluated individualism qualitatively, primarily through ethnographic studies of local cultures and comparative studies of primarily *developed* societies (see Buss 2000; Kitayama et al. 1997; Lukes 1971; Realo et al. 2002; Vandello and Cohen 1999). What the literature lacks are adequate focused and comparative studies of *developing* societies, particularly in SSA.

While some in the quantitative cross-cultural literature challenge collectivism's validity as a construct for differentiating cultures (see Brewer and Chen 2007, 147; Oyserman et al. 2002; Schimmack et al. 2005), the majority agree individualism and

collectivism are both meaningful and measurable cultural characteristics of societies. The individualism-collectivism continuum has been used to this end to explain cultural differences (see Hofstede 2001; Kagitcibasi 1997; Kim et al. 1994; Oyserman 2002; Triandis 1995). More than a third of the cross-cultural literature claims it provides at least a partial explanation for cross-cultural variation (Hui and Yee 1994, 410). What remains under debate is which variants of individualism and collectivism provide meaningful and measurable distinctions of cultural dynamics affecting the GTR. Contending explanations include:

- Vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism (Triandis et al. 1993, 410).
- Self-expression values (Welzel 2010, 157-8).
- Universalism and exclusionism (Minkov 2011, 191).
- Individualism, relational collectivism, and group collectivism (Brewer and Chen 2007, 147).
- Familism and institutional collectivism (Gelfand et al. 2004).
- Inclusive collectivism (Mbigi 1997).
- Corporate collectivism (Jackson 2004, 158).

Combining cultural traits such as universalism, power, or achievement with assessments of individualism and collectivism produce entirely different varieties (Triandis et al. 1993, 410). Familism and institutional collectivism are distinct measurable concepts (Realo et al. 1997, 459) that differ in scale and intensity. Some mistakenly claim they are equal opposite types of collectivism (see Gelfand et al. 2004). The former encourages and rewards collective actions within the family, while the later at the societal level. Intense loyalty to family leaves more people outside one's in-group than when broadened to neighbors or co-workers and much more so than when broadened to a whole culture or society. Exclusionist collectivists weigh personal relationships when assessing appropriate behaviors towards others, whereas universalists

rely on formal institutions to manage interactions (Minkov 2011, 239). Whole society collectivism (present in homogeneous societies) may exhibit nationalist, totalitarian, or even fascist tendencies. It is at this point where a society's ethnic fractionalization affects its individualism-collectivism.

*Inter-State Market Forces*

The control variable (Inter-State Market Forces) is composed of six related yet separately measurable factors: trade, FDI, FPI, remittances, military aid, non-military aid. These facets of economic globalization enable groups, to varying degrees, have interests met without the risk or reward of interacting with other domestic groups. Literature favored data include the World Bank's 2015 Trade (Percent of GDP), Trade Balance (Percent of GDP), Foreign Direct Investment (net inflows), Net Portfolio Equity Inflows, Personal Remittances (received); the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2015 Non-Military Aid (net development assistance); and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 2016 US Military Aid.

Trade as a percentage of GDP is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of the gross domestic product. Current Account Balance as a percentage of GDP is the sum of net exports of goods and services, net primary income, and net secondary income. Also, the Net Barter Terms of Trade Index is calculated as the percentage ratio of the export unit value indexes to the import unit value indexes, measured relative to the base year 2000 (World Bank 2017). The foreign direct investment (FDI) measurement is a valuable indicator of foreign influence in an economy. The World Bank considers "ownership of 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares of voting stock" (2017) to qualify as FDI. Portfolio equity records passive

investment in a country, generally through the stock and bond market. It provides countries and publically traded corporations "a direct way to access financial markets, and thus it can provide liquidity and flexibility" (World Bank 2017). Personal remittances are person-to-person financial transfers from one country to another or compensation from an employer where the two reside in different countries. Official Development Assistance (ODA) is non-military aid provided to developing countries (incomes below $12,267 in 2010 USD) by developed OECD member governments designed to promote economic development and welfare (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2017). U.S. military aid, the most given by any country, is provided to countries to enhance their military capability, defense provision, and protecting their sovereignty.

*Standardized Questions*

These questions guide the data collection process in the subsequent findings chapter.

Generalized Trust Radius

- What are differences in in-group and generalized trust by sub-state region, age, sex, urban-rural location, vocation, education, and wealth?

State Security Institutions

- What is the colonial history?
- What types of insecurity events have occurred and what were their outcomes?
- Does violence or poverty drive its fragility?

State Contract Institutions

- How do colonial institutions affect modern contract institutions?
- What is the quality of the state as a contract agent?
- How has the state managed land tenure?

Individualism-Collectivism

- How wealthy and urban is the population?
- What type of collectivism does the population exhibit?

Inter-State Market Forces

- What is the market configuration?
- How quickly and deeply has it adopted neo-liberal policies?
- Does the West consider it a geo-politically strategic state?

Social Network Composition

- What is the fractionalized composition?
- Is there a unifying trade language?
- What is the proximity composition?
- How knowledgeable is the population of other groups in the country?
- How mobile in the population?
- How strong and pervasive are network ties between groups?
- What type of power differential exists and has existed in the past?
- Is there a history of violence?
- Does it or has it had a "strongman" leader?
- What are regional differences in fractionalization, proximity, and power differential?

## Limitations

Every research is bound by limitations of time, resources, effort, knowledge, and access. The empirical reality, the current theoretical sophistication of the literature, and available data limit the types of questions asked, hypotheses claimed, and methods employed. It does not follow that just because the trust and fragile states literature have mostly overlooked the effects on the GTR in fragile states, that there are not important questions to be asked about them. This dissertation delimits its focus to effects on the GTR in deviant fragile states. "Case(s) are studied in depth, and over time rather than at

a single point" (Hammersley and Gomm 2000, 5) making the temporal and sequential (Becker 2000, 225) analysis richer.

A valid critique of GTR analyses in fragile states is the difficulty in isolating state, interstate, and social effects from each other. It is rare for a social outcome to have a single measurable causal factor, and it is possible there are different sets of conditions that may lead to the same outcome (Lieberson 1991, 308; Ragin 1987, xxviii). Thus, GTR analyses contend with concerns of equifinality, collinearity, endogeneity, over specification, and reverse causation. Past GTR studies were susceptible to endogeneity due to the omitted Social Network Composition variable; this dissertation's primary contribution is rectifying that error. There are no omitted confounding variables present affecting the dependent or independent variables. While it is difficult to avoid collinearity and endogeneity of independent variables in the examination of trust, the trust literature has adequately isolated these variables, ensuring each is measuring a distinctly different social factor.

Three concerns remain. First, contract institutions may interact with inter-state market forces through foreign capital management policies. Second, individualism (a cultural factor) may interact with groups' social network composition (a social factor), affecting how willing one is to interact with strangers. Third, trust is a possible cause and consequence of a wide range of social and political phenomena (Zmerli et al. 2007, 41-2), which raises the concern that causation may run both directions between dependent and independent variables. Reverse causality does not appear to be a valid concern for the GTR because individualism is nearly an antecedent condition of societies and the extension of generalized trust does not usually cause strong security and contract

institutions in fragile states and has a mixed and weak effect on the various inter-state market forces.

Over specification is a concern for statistical research models. Qualitative methodologists once claimed that small-N analysis must adhere to the limitations of degrees of freedom (see Campbell 1975; Lijphart 1971), but more recent literature claims, "…it is not helpful to think about qualitative methodology in terms of a degrees of freedom problem" (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 10). Instead, the chief methods of inference for small-N analysis are through theoretical propositions and within-case analysis. This research addresses each of these methodological concerns and constructs a model that is transferable to other most similar research contexts.

## Conclusion

The primary goal of this chapter is to construct a valid, reliable, and replicable analytical framework for explaining the GTR in fragile states. Three theoretical models are presented to explain the GTR under different fractionalization, incentivization, proximity, and power differentiated conditions. These models account for variations in economic, political, cultural, and social pushing and pulling forces acting on in-group, generalized, and institutional trust to produce societies' GTR, trust differential, and trust composition. Within this analytical framework, the two control and three test cases are evaluated for their model fit through a series of standardized questions asked of each case to produce easily measurable and comparable quantitative and qualitative findings.

This methodology chapter has provided support for the relevancy of the research questions, the reasonableness of claims, transparency of its limitations, and rationale for the chosen mixed method analytical framework and process for examining the

determinants of the GTR in fragile states, implemented through subsequent chapters. Chapter IV presents the trust-fragile states literature's quantitative and qualitative findings on the GTR and its determinants for the five test and control cases. Chapter V tests the research hypotheses for each variable through within- and cross-case analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions. Finally, Chapter VI provides conclusions and policy suggestions flowing from the analysis, comparison, and synthesis.

# CHAPTER IV – FINDINGS

This dissertation focuses on trust; trust in environments where mutually positive inter-group interaction does not come easily. This chapter reports quantitative and qualitative findings separately and organizes them thematically by dependent, control, and test variables for each case, providing a sound foundation for subsequent comparative analysis and synthesis.

## Quantitative Findings

### *Dependent Variable*

Trust is the foundation of a healthy society. Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) recognize a country's colonial legacy is not the primary cause of underdevelopment, although they claim it has lasting effects on intragroup (in-group) and institutional trust. Interestingly, however, they do not address its effects on intergroup (generalized) trust. The four hundred years long pre-colonial and colonial transatlantic and Indian Ocean slave trades, which ended over a century ago, have left a legacy of mistrust between the modern African descendants of those ethnic groups targeted by it and their governing institutions (2011, 3221). The institutions formed subsequently in these insecure and untrusting environments weakly constrain untrustworthy behavior (2011, 3249), making it challenging to increase all types of trust. The authors claim a spatial correlation exists between Atlantic and Indian Ocean coastal regions of Africa, where the slave trade was more prevalent and increased modern mistrust. They test this claim in SSA successfully against an Asian sample of countries with similar colonial legacies, which return an opposite result.

It is difficult to claim that a single institution (the African slave trade) that has not formally existed for over 100 years still affects trust in contemporary African coastal societies. Nunn and Wantchekon do so compellingly, although not without methodological concerns. Their research combines "contemporary individual-level survey data with historical data on slave shipments by ethnic group" (2011, 3221). They produce theory-supported correlations between the slave trade and modern trustingness in SSA, advancing the growing literature seeking to explain how cultural factors such as trust, affect decision making (2011, 3249) in this context.

Their trust data comes from the Afrobarometer, a survey which "asks respondents how much they trust their relatives, neighbors, and their locally elected government council" (2011, 3228). These questions directly address intragroup (in-group) and institutional trust, though they resort to indirect means to obtain the measurement of intergroup (generalized) trust.

> …we control directly for the impact of the slave trade on the other ethnic groups living in the same location as the respondent. Our estimates show that ethnic groups whose ancestors were heavily enslaved in the past are less trusted today – Nunn and Wantchekon (2011, 3223)

They claim it is not problematic to merge Afrobarometer, Asiabarometer, and World Values Survey data into the same regressions, claiming that any error produced in the analysis is "not the result of differences in the underlying surveys" (2011, 3243). However, assuming each survey is measuring the same concepts of intragroup (in-group) and intergroup (generalized) trust is tenuous.

Finally, their assumption of immobile SSA coastal populations is unwarranted. While SSA remains the most rural region globally, its urban percentage has increased

from 27 percent in 1990 to 37 percent in 2014 and is projected to increase to 55 percent in 2050 (United Nations 2014, 20). Moreover, its coastal cities have some of the highest urbanization rates in the world, Lagos, Nigeria, Kinshasa, Congo (DRC), and Luanda, Angola, each exhibiting over four percent annual growth between 1990 and 2014. Even though there are recognized ethnic homelands throughout SSA, many do not live in the same area (town, district, or province) that their slave-traded ethnic ancestors did a century to half a millennia ago.

These findings suggest that analyses of in-group and institutional trust—and less convincingly, generalized trust—should include slave trade legacy—and less convincingly, coastal proximity—as background factors, if not as independent variables.

The remainder of this first section presents the quantitative case findings on the dependent variable from the WVS new 6-question trust battery data, which is available from the WVS Wave 5 (2005-2009) for the cases of Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Zambia and from Wave 6 (2010-2014) for Nigeria and Zimbabwe. Case findings, presented separately here, isolate the GTR from institutional and in-group trust as well as report findings by class, regional, educational, and age effects on the GTR. The categories of "Trust completely," "Somewhat," "Not very much," and "No trust at all" are used to report on the three levels of in-group trust ("Your family," "Your neighborhood," and "People you know personally") and the three levels of generalized trust ("People you meet for the first time," People of another religion," and "People of another nationality").

Table 10

*New World Values Survey Trust Measure*

Table Continued

| Country | Out-Group Trust | In-Group Trust | Trust Differential |
|---|---|---|---|
| Peru (global low) | 0.1979 | 0.5581 | 0.3602 |
| Japan (outlier) | 0.2980 | 0.6947 | 0.3967 |
| **Zimbabwe (SSA low)** | 0.3064 | 0.6825 | 0.3761 |
| **Zambia** | 0.3280 | 0.6098 | 0.2818 |
| Ghana | 0.3690 | 0.6296 | 0.2606 |
| **Nigeria** | 0.3693 | 0.7179 | 0.3486 |
| **Ethiopia** | 0.3998 | 0.7310 | 0.3312 |
| Rwanda | 0.4381 | 0.7611 | 0.3230 |
| **Burkina Faso** | 0.4408 | 0.6840 | 0.2432 |
| South Africa | 0.4649 | 0.7079 | 0.2430 |
| Mali (SSA high) | 0.5330 | 0.7842 | 0.2512 |
| Sweden (global high) | 0.6272 | 0.8292 | 0.2020 |
| Mean (global) | 0.3862 | 0.7288 | 0.3425 |
| SD (global) | 0.0989 | 0.0638 | 0.0938 |

*Note:* Data from World Values Survey Waves 5 and 6.

Trust Differential = In-group – Out-group Trust

Mean and SD reported for all country observations in both waves.

Source: Welzel and Delhey (2015)

Data extracted from Online Appendix OA-Table 4 on 07/14/17.




*Figure 1.* Social Trust by Country.

*Note:* Data from World Values Survey Waves 5 and 6.

Source: Delhey et al. (2011)

Data extracted from Online Appendix OA-Table 4 on 07/14/17.

The GTR scores for the three test cases are considerably higher than the control cases. If they were not, the research design would be "vulnerable to selection bias" (Collier and Mahoney 1996, 89-90). Of the combined N=76 of country observations available from Waves 5 and 6 of the WVS survey, the test cases populate the middle 50 percentile of GTR scores, when the trust-fragile states literature suggests fragile SSA states should have much narrower GTR. The surveys' observations follow a relatively normal distribution with 68 percent of values falling within one SD from the mean, 95 percent within 2 SD, and 99.7 percent within 3 SD. Burkina Faso and Ethiopia's GTR scores are considerably higher than the trust-fragile states literature suggests and Nigeria's is moderately higher. Zimbabwe and Zambia's GTR scores are as the trust-

fragile states literature suggests they should be, thus their control case status. Burkina Faso (0.4408), scoring higher than 75 percent of the global sample, is more than one standard deviation higher than Zimbabwe (0.3064), which scores higher than 25 percent of the global sample. The other three cases are evenly spaced between these with Ethiopia (0.3998) scoring higher than 55 percent of the sample; Nigeria (0.3693) scoring higher than 46 percent of the sample, and Zambia (0.328) scoring higher than 34 percent of the sample.

Development and fragility do not always predict the GTR. Recent literature (Delhey and Welzel 2012, 61; Fukuyama 1995, 28; Yamagishi & Yamagishi 1994, 130) claims East Asian societies are prone to narrow GTR, even though many have developed economies. All test and control case score higher than Japan (0.298), which should not be surprising since its society is highly homogenous, producing high in-group trust and low generalized trust. There are also several moderately developed non-East Asian states whose GTR scores fall below the *test* cases (Brazil (0.3273) and Slovenia (0.3281)) and a few developed western states whose GTR scores fall below Burkina Faso (Italy (0.3885), Uruguay (0.4214), and Netherlands (0.4221)).

*Case #1: Burkina Faso.* Burkina Faso's in-group (0.684) and generalized (0.4408) trust radii perpetuate trust environments with regional differences. Those regions bordering Cote d'Ivoire and Mali, in particular, have lower in-group and generalized trust. Specifically, the transient Cascades Region bordering Cote d'Ivoire has a trust problem as it ranks lowest of all Burkinabé regions for trust in family, neighborhoods, and people met for the first time. Its population even trusts their own family completely (69 percent) the least of all regions compared to all other regions

averaging 83.9 percent, a difference of 14.9 percent. Over a quarter of its population (26.2 percent) have no trust in their neighborhoods compared to all other regions averaging 5.4 percent, a difference of 20.8 percent. They do not trust at all people they meet for the first time at 52.4 percent compared to all other regions averaging 26 percent.

The Mali-bordered Boucle du Mouhoun and Sahel regions also have a trust problem, but it is primarily one of mistrust of those having different religions and nationalities. Half of those in the Boucle du Mouhoun Region (50 percent) do not trust at all people they meet for the first time. More than a third of the Sahel Region (36.9 percent) and a quarter of the Boucle du Mouhoun Region (29.7 percent) do not trust people of another religion at all, this compared to the rest of the regions averaging 9.5 percent. They also have fewer people that trust people from another religion completely, Sahel (3.9 percent) and Boucle du Mouhoun (3.8 percent), compared to the rest of the regions averaging 14.3 percent. Finally, the Boucle du Mouhoun (36.1 percent) and Sahel (35 percent) regions do not trust other nationalities at all more than all other regions, which average 12.8 percent.

Table 11

*Trust: People You Meet for the First Time (Burkina Faso)*

| **Base=1534; Weighted results** | **Number of cases** | **Percent Total** |
|---|---|---|
| Trust completely | 47 | 3.1 |
| Somewhat | 375 | 24.4 |
| Not very much | 598 | 39 |
| No trust at all | 456 | 29.7 |
| Missing; Not asked by the interviewer | 13 | 0.8 |
| No answer | 12 | 0.8 |
| Don´t know | 33 | 2.2 |
| **(N)** | **1.534** | **100** |

Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009

Table Continued

Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

Table 12

*Trust: People of Another Religion (Burkina Faso)*

| **Base=1534; Weighted results** | **Number of cases** | **Percent Total** |
|---|---|---|
| Trust completely | 196 | 12.8 |
| Somewhat | 606 | 39.5 |
| Not very much | 437 | 28.5 |
| No trust at all | 209 | 13.6 |
| Missing; Not asked by the interviewer | 17 | 1.1 |
| No answer | 18 | 1.2 |
| Don´t know | 51 | 3.3 |
| **(N)** | **1.534** | **100** |

Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009

Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

Table 13

*Trust: People of Another Nationality (Burkina Faso)*

| **Base=1534; Weighted results** | **Number of cases** | **Percent Total** |
|---|---|---|
| Trust completely | 138 | 9 |
| Somewhat | 575 | 37.5 |
| Not very much | 471 | 30.7 |
| No trust at all | 253 | 16.5 |
| Missing; Not asked by the interviewer | 24 | 1.6 |
| No answer | 20 | 1.3 |
| Don´t know | 53 | 3.5 |
| **(N)** | **1.534** | **100** |

Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009

Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

*Case #2: Ethiopia.* Ethiopia's in-group (0.731) and generalized (0.3998) trust radii perpetuate trust environments with regional and age differences. While all

Ethiopians trust their families greatly (85-95 percent), young, urban, wealthy, and educated Ethiopians have a trust problem. Trust among the young (under 29 in 2007) and the old (over 49 years old in 2007) differ significantly. The young spent their formative years suffering from famine under the rule of the communist regime. They have the most trouble trusting those from their neighborhoods; people they know personally; and people they meet for the first time.

Table 14

*Ethiopian Trust Young v. Old*

| | Know Personally | Neighborhood | Met for the First Time |
|---|---|---|---|
| Young | 15.5 | 32.7 | 18.8 |
| Old | 35.3 | 52.9 | 31.4 |
| Difference | 19.8 | 20.2 | 12.6 |

Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009

Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

One-third of Ethiopian urbanites, nearly one-fourth living in the capital, Addis Ababa, do not trust people at all that they meet for the first time or that are of a different religion, or nationality. Oppositely, only 12.4 percent of the people of Tigray State bordering Eritrea do not trust people at all that they meet for the first time, with all other states averaging only 11.9 percent and 15.6 percent respectively for not trusting people at all of other religions and nationalities.

Members of the upper class (39.6 percent) and the university educated (39.8 percent) are the most mistrusting of people they meet for the first time, while the lower middle class (16.3 percent) is the least mistrusting with all other educational attainment levels average 20.8 percent. By contrast, the university educated (28 percent) are the

most completely trusting of people of another religion, while those who failed to attain their secondary college-preparatory diploma (2.3 percent) are the least.

Table 15

*Trust: People You Meet for the First Time (Ethiopia)*

| **Base=1500; Weighted results** | **Number of cases** | **Percent Total** |
|---|---|---|
| Trust completely | 41 | 2.7 |
| Somewhat | 349 | 23.3 |
| Not very much | 726 | 48.4 |
| No trust at all | 315 | 21 |
| No answer | 27 | 1.8 |
| Don´t know | 42 | 2.8 |
| **(N)** | **1.5** | **100** |

Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009

Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

Table 16

*Trust: People of Another Religion (Ethiopia)*

| **Base=1500; Weighted results** | **Number of cases** | **Percent Total** |
|---|---|---|
| Trust completely | 164 | 10.9 |
| Somewhat | 379 | 25.3 |
| Not very much | 609 | 40.6 |
| No trust at all | 217 | 14.5 |
| No answer | 60 | 4 |
| Don´t know | 71 | 4.7 |
| **(N)** | **1.5** | **100** |

Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009

Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

Table 17

*Trust: People of Another Nationality (Ethiopia)*

Table Continued

| Base=1500; Weighted results | Number of cases | Percent Total |
|---|---|---|
| Trust completely | 73 | 4.9 |
| Somewhat | 294 | 19.6 |
| Not very much | 698 | 46.5 |
| No trust at all | 272 | 18.1 |
| No answer | 81 | 5.4 |
| Don´t know | 82 | 5.5 |
| **(N)** | **1.5** | **100** |

Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009

Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

*Case #3: Nigeria.* Nigeria's relatively high mobility, uneven development, in-group (0.7179), and generalized (0.3693) trust radii produce trust environments with class and regional differences. Wealthy Nigerians are nearly as suspicious of their own families as they are of their wealthy neighbors and are divided on the extent of their trust of those from other religions and nationalities. They (77.1 percent) trust their own families completely 11.8 percentage points less than all other classes (88.9 percent). The transient lower middle class (16.3 percent) trusts its neighborhoods completely 17.9 percentage points less than all other classes do, which average 34.2 percent, while 43.8 percent of the upper class does. The wealthy are also divided regarding their trust in people of other religions, as they are nearly equally split and the most polarized of all classes with 28.3 percent trusting them completely and 35 percent not at all. While all Nigerian classes average 25.8 percent in their total mistrust of other nationalities, the upper class (25.6 percent) trust them completely the most, while the lower class (5.4 percent) trust them the least with a 20.2 percent difference.

Many of the wealthiest Nigerians reside in Lagos, SSA's largest and the world's sixth largest city when measuring the city proper rather than urban area or metropolitan

area (United Nations 2016). Of those residing in Lagos, only 67 percent trust their families completely, 22 percentage points less than in all other areas of the country, which average 89 percent. There are also several regional differences for in-group and generalized trust. Only 8.2 percent of residents of the Middle Belt states in the North Central Region trust their neighborhoods completely compared to all other regions averaging 28.1 percent. The Igbo of the South East Region distrust people at all of another religion the most (35.4 percent) compared to the rest of the regions at 18.7 percent, which is a difference of 16.7 percent.

Table 18

*How Much You Trust: People You Meet for the First Time (Nigeria)*

| **Base=1759; Weighted results** | **Number of cases** | **Percent Total** |
|---|---|---|
| Trust completely | 80 | 4.5 |
| Trust somewhat | 302 | 17.2 |
| Do not trust very much | 756 | 43 |
| Do not trust at all | 621 | 35.3 |
| **(N)** | **1.759** | **100** |

Source: World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014

Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

Table 19

*How Much You Trust: People of Another Religion (Nigeria)*

| **Base=1759; Weighted results** | **Number of cases** | **Percent Total** |
|---|---|---|
| Trust completely | 181 | 10.3 |
| Trust somewhat | 625 | 35.5 |
| Do not trust very much | 577 | 32.8 |
| Do not trust at all | 376 | 21.4 |
| **(N)** | **1.759** | **100** |

Source: World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014

Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

Table 20

*How Much You Trust: People of Another Nationality (Nigeria)*

| **Base=1759; Weighted results** | **Number of cases** | **Percent Total** |
|---|---|---|
| Trust completely | 138 | 7.9 |
| Trust somewhat | 493 | 28 |
| Do not trust very much | 674 | 38.3 |
| Do not trust at all | 454 | 25.8 |
| **(N)** | **1.759** | **100** |

Source: World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014

Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

*Case #4: Zambia.* Zambia's in-group (0.6098) and generalized (0.328) trust radii produce trust environments with regional differences, primarily regarding in-group trust. Zambia's Central, Western, and Copperbelt provinces are most trusting, while its Eastern, Lusaka, North Western, and Southern provinces have various trust problems. Zambia's Central Province trusts most completely their neighborhoods (35.4 percent), people they know personally (36 percent), and those of another religion (27.3 percent). Those in Western and Copperbelt provinces (1.1 percent) distrust their neighborhoods the least.

Zambia's Eastern (33.8 percent) and Western (86.2 percent) provinces differ the greatest (54.2 percentage point difference) in how much they completely trust their family with the average of all provinces being 64.8 percent. In Lusaka, complete trust in one's neighborhoods is lowest (6.9 percent), while its level of no trust at all is highest (12 percent), excluding North Western Province (12.1 percent). Only 3.8 percent of those in Southern Province trust completely people they know personally and 2.9 percent average for those of other religions.

Table 21

*Trust: People You Meet for the First Time (Zambia)*

| Base=1500; Weighted results | Number of cases | Percent Total |
|---|---|---|
| Trust completely | 23 | 1.5 |
| Somewhat | 214 | 14.3 |
| Not very much | 594 | 39.6 |
| No trust at all | 624 | 41.6 |
| No answer | 24 | 1.6 |
| Don´t know | 21 | 1.4 |
| **(N)** | **1.5** | **100** |

Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009

Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

Table 22

*Trust: People of Another Religion (Zambia)*

| Base=1500; Weighted results | Number of cases | Percent Total |
|---|---|---|
| Trust completely | 124 | 8.3 |
| Somewhat | 438 | 29.2 |
| Not very much | 546 | 36.4 |
| No trust at all | 316 | 21.1 |
| No answer | 34 | 2.3 |
| Don´t know | 42 | 2.8 |
| **(N)** | **1.5** | **100** |

Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009

Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

Table 23

*Trust: People of Another Nationality (Zambia)*

| Base=1500; Weighted results | Number of cases | Percent Total |
|---|---|---|
| Trust completely | 48 | 3.2 |
| Somewhat | 276 | 18.4 |
| Not very much | 649 | 43.3 |

Table Continued

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| No trust at all | 453 | 30.2 |
| Missing; Not asked by the interviewer | 2 | 0.1 |
| No answer | 33 | 2.2 |
| Don´t know | 39 | 2.6 |
| **(N)** | **1.5** | **100** |

Source: World Values Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009

Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

*Case #5: Zimbabwe.* Zimbabwe's in-group (0.6825) and generalized (0.3064) trust radii produce trust environments with class and regional differences. Zimbabwe's upper class places more trust in more groups than its lower classes. They (91.8 percent) trust their families completely 12.4 percentage points more than all other lower classes averaged at 79.4 percent and people they meet for the first time (11.6 percent), which is eight percent higher than the lower classes averaged at 3.6 percent. Oddly, the upper class is divided over complete (28.3 percent) and total lack of (35 percent) trust in persons of another religion. While all classes average 25.8 percent in total lack of trust in other nationalities, their complete trust in other nationalities is class-dependent, with the upper class (25.6 percent) trusting most and the lower class (5.4 percent) trusting least, a 20.2 percentage point gap.

Regionally, minority areas of Midlands (59.9 percent), Masvingo (68.3 percent), and Manicaland (71.9 percent) provinces trust their own families completely the least, while Shona and Northern Ndebele majority areas average 91 percent. Masvingo Province (1.9 percent) also trusts neighborhoods completely least compared to all other provinces that average 17.6 percent. Those in Mashonaland East Province (35.4 percent) do not trust at all people of another religion the most, compared to the rest of the provinces' average (18.7 percent), which is a difference of 16.7 percent.

Table 24

*How Much You Trust: People You Meet for the First Time (Zimbabwe)*

| **Base=1499; Weighted results** | **Number of cases** | **Percent Total** |
|---|---|---|
| Trust completely | 20 | 1.3 |
| Trust somewhat | 183 | 12.2 |
| Do not trust very much | 640 | 42.7 |
| Do not trust at all | 656 | 43.8 |
| **(N)** | **1.499** | **100** |

Source: World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014

Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

Table 25

*How Much You Trust: People of Another Religion (Zimbabwe)*

| **Base=1499; Weighted results** | **Number of cases** | **Percent Total** |
|---|---|---|
| Trust completely | 54 | 3.6 |
| Trust somewhat | 508 | 33.9 |
| Do not trust very much | 656 | 43.8 |
| Do not trust at all | 280 | 18.7 |
| **(N)** | **1.499** | **100** |

Source: World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014

Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

Table 26

*How Much You Trust: People of Another Nationality (Zimbabwe)*

| **Base=1499; Weighted results** | **Number of cases** | **Percent Total** |
|---|---|---|
| Trust completely | 31 | 2.1 |
| Trust somewhat | 325 | 21.7 |
| Do not trust very much | 681 | 45.4 |
| Do not trust at all | 462 | 30.8 |
| **(N)** | **1.499** | **100** |

Source: World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014

Data extracted from WVS Database on 12/28/17.

## Independent Variables

### *State Security & Contract Institutions*

There is a consensus in the *state* literature that security and contract institutions determine the majority of state fragility, yet how much they affect the GTR remains under debate in the *trust* literature. This dissertation addresses this debate by constructing a hybrid sociological institutionalism and social capital theory theoretical framework; unfortunately, their research agendas have remained largely disconnected (Thelen 1999, 371, 386-7). The limited research at their intersection claims social capital needs to be embedded in formal institutions to increase (see Berman 1997; Hall 1999; Levi 1998; Stolle 2002; Tarrow 1996). If this is the case, it is imperative to identify which formal institutions affect the GTR most.

Table 27

*Security Institutions*

| Country | Political Stability and the Absence of Violence/Terrorism (2016) | |
|---|---|---|
| | Percentile Rank (0-100) | Estimate of Governance |
| Most Stable | 100 (Greenland) | 1.96 (Greenland) |
| **Zambia** | 52.86 | 0.18 |
| Rwanda | 45.71 | -0.05 |
| S. Africa | 42.38 | -0.13 |
| Ghana | 40.00 | -0.16 |
| **Zimbabwe** | 24.29 | -0.61 |
| **Burkina Faso** | 15.24 | -0.95 |
| Mali | 8.57 | -1.55 |

Table Continued

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Ethiopia** | 7.62 | -1.57 |
| **Nigeria** | 6.67 | -1.85 |
| Least Stable | 0.00 (Syria) | -2.91 (Syria) |

*Note:* Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance).

Source: World Bank – Worldwide Governance Indicators: Political Stability and Absence of Violence (2016) (N=215)

Data extracted from source on 09/25/17.

Table 28

*Contract Institutions*

| Country | Rule of Law (2016) | | Control of Corruption (2016) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Percentile Rank (0-100) | Estimate of Governance | Percentile Rank (0-100) | Estimate of Governance |
| Most Effective | 100 (Sweden) | 2.04 (Sweden) | 100 (New Zealand) | 2.30 (New Zealand) |
| S. Africa | 58.17 | 0.07 | 60.10 | 0.05 |
| Rwanda | 57.69 | 0.07 | 74.52 | 0.69 |
| Ghana | 54.81 | 0.00 | 50.96 | -0.17 |
| **Zambia** | 43.27 | -0.30 | 42.31 | -0.40 |
| **Ethiopia** | 37.02 | -0.39 | 39.90 | -0.44 |
| **Burkina Faso** | 34.13 | -0.45 | 53.37 | -0.13 |
| Mali | 22.60 | -0.78 | 29.81 | -0.67 |
| **Nigeria** | 13.94 | -1.05 | 13.46 | -1.04 |
| **Zimbabwe** | 8.17 | -1.32 | 8.65 | -1.28 |
| Least Effective | 0 (Somalia) | -2.37 (Somalia) | 0 (Equatorial Guinea) | -1.81 (Equatorial Guinea) |

*Note:* Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance).

Sources: World Bank – Worldwide Governance Indicators: Control of Corruption (2016) (N=215); World Bank – Worldwide Governance Indicators: Rule of Law (2016) (N=215)

Data extracted from source on 09/25/17.

Rothstein and Stolle (2008) claim legal, law enforcement, and military "order" institutions bear a greater societal expectation of impartiality than other institutions (2008, 445) and are therefore most likely to affect the GTR and social capital. Institutions may be arranged in an infinite number of configurations (Rothstein 1996, 572); the literature has left most of them unexplored (2008, 441), and it is unclear whether trust in political institutions causes generalized trust or vice versa (2008, 443). Together, analysis of order institutions and social mechanisms that trigger individual behavior provide the fullest explanation of generalized trust (Hedström and Swedberg 1998, 12, 23).

Many in the trust literature assume generalized and institutional trust cannot be separated entirely for analysis (see Crepaz 2008; Rothstein 2005; Rothstein and Stolle 2003, 199-200; You 2005). Within this presumed constraint, Freitag and Bühlmann propose there is a "top-down approach to producing generalized trust through political institutions" (2009, 1556). However, because their findings are based on the old "standard" trust question, they merit reexamination using the new trust question. Further, they claim institutional configurations with low corruption, and income inequality and proportional representation may *produce* generalized trust (Freitag and Bühlmann 2009, 1554) rather than only institutional trust. They also claim that

> …the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, health care spending, institutional and executive power-sharing, and prominence of democratic-pluralistic rules do not exhibit any statistically significant influence on the development of trust – Freitag and Bühlmann (2009, 1554)

Rothstein and Stolle (2008) provide strong support for state security and contract institutions affecting the GTR. However, Freitag and Bühlmann's (2009) claim of

institutions creating generalized trust requires further critique. The question of how separable institutional and generalized trust is from the other remains unanswered. Most of the trust literature claim them to be two separate phenomena, yet there is not a consensus on where institutional designers end and institutions begin, nor where institutions end and institutional administrators begin. Fragile states have weak institutions, so even if institutions can elicit generalized trust, it is not possible in fragile states. Therefore, *strong* security and contract institutions may serve (Smith 2003, 119) as a limited and temporary alternate source of the positive externalities associated with the widening of the GTR (Chan 2007, 734), although this is rarely realized in fragile states. These quantitative findings present a compelling case for the effects of state security and contract institutions on the GTR.

*Individualism & Collectivism*

> The most consistent finding is that industrialized, wealthy, and urban societies tend to become increasingly individualistic, whereas more traditional, poorer, and more rural societies tend to remain collectivistic.
>
> —Geert Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations*

A society's aggregate individualism-collectivism level is expressed through the degree of independence (Hofstede 2001, 93), pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness (House et al. 2004, 30) within and between its groups. This level affects social behavior and is mostly antecedent to all other factors affecting the GTR. Rights, personal interests, rationality, and fluidity of group boundaries, rather than duties and obligations to one's group(s), drive individualism, which is associated with a wider trust radius and collectivism with a narrower one (van Hoorn 2015, 269). Hofstede's (2001)

Individualism and House's (2004) In-Group Collectivism dimensions provide the quantitative foundation for the qualitative findings and analysis in subsequent chapters.

Table 29

*Individualism-Collectivism*

| Country | Hofstede Individualism (higher = more individualist) (N=76) | GLOBE In-Group Collectivism (practices) (lower = more individualist) (N=62) | GLOBE In-Group Collectivism (values) (lower = more individualist) (N=62) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Most Individualist | 91 (United States) | 3.18 (Czech Republic) | 4.06 (Czech Republic) |
| S. Africa | 65 | 4.80 | 5.45 |
| **Zambia** | 35 | 5.84 | 5.77 |
| **Nigeria** | 30 | 5.55 | 5.48 |
| **Ethiopia** | 20 | - | - |
| **Burkina Faso** | 15 | - | - |
| Ghana | 15 | - | - |
| **Zimbabwe** | - | 5.57 | 5.85 |
| Mali | - | - | - |
| Rwanda | - | - | - |
| Least Individualist | 6 (Guatemala) | 6.36 (Philippines) | 6.52 (El Salvador) |

*Note:* N=52 countries common between Hofstede and GLOBE studies.

Sources: Hofstede (2001); House et al. (2004)

Data extracted from VSM 2013 08 25 Database and GLOBE Phase 2 Aggregated Societal Level Data: May 17, 2004, on 06/04/17.




*Figure 2.* Individualism Dimension.

Source: Hofstede (2001)

No Data available for Zimbabwe.

Data extracted from VSM 2013 08 25 Database on 06/04/17.

The Hofstede (2001) Individualism dimension is measured on a scale of zero (low) to 100 (high). The range represented across the five country cases span a low score of 15 (Burkina Faso) to a high score of 35 (Zambia). Each of the cases scores below the global average of 45 and much closer to the global low score of six (Guatemala) compared to the global high score of 91 (United States).




*Figure 3.* In-Group Collectivism.

Source: House (2004)

No Data are available for Burkina Faso and Ethiopia.

Data extracted from GLOBE Phase 2 Aggregated Societal Level Data: May 17, 2004, on 06/04/17.

The House et al. (2004) In-Group Collectivism dimension is measured on a scale of one (low) to seven (high), taking account of internalized values and actual behavior. Each of the five cases scores highly for In-Group Collectivism in their practices. Only Nigeria's In-Group Collectivism (values) are below the global average. Only Zimbabwe has a moderate difference between its expressed values and actual behavior; therefore, Zimbabweans claim to be more collectivist (5.85) than they behave (5.57). Oppositely, globally, countries claim to be less collectivist (5.13) than they behave (5.66).

Together, Hofstede's (2001) individualism indicator and House's (2004) *practices* scale, measure individualism-collectivism along a continuum with a correlation measure of −.765 (n = 25) (van Hoorn 2015, 275).

> A one standard deviation increase in individualism implies an increase in the outgroup connotation of trust of almost 40% (.0357/.0896) and a one standard deviation increase in collectivism implies a decrease in the outgroup connotation of trust exceeding 50% (−.0486/.0944), ceteris paribus – van Hoorn (2015, 273)

Some in the literature disagree (Allik and Realo 2004, 31), claiming individualism and collectivism are not opposite ends of a continuum (see Triandis and Suh 2002) that are stable over time (see Fontaine et al. 2008), and whose "meaning is not constant across contexts within the culture" (Fiske 2002, 83-4). Van Hoorn (2014) further claims the rule of law, democracy, income per capita, and income inequality affects how individualists and collectivists understand the meaning of "trust in most people" as framed in the WVS old "standard" trust question (2015, 274). There is an ongoing debate, not if individualism and collectivism affect the GTR, but how much and in what ways. The quantitative findings on individualist and collectivist cultural traits present a strong case for individualism as a nearly antecedent, yet still variable, social condition that positively affects a society's GTR.

*Inter-State Market Forces*

Does generalized trust produce positive market outcomes or vice versa? Some in the literature (see Beugelsdijk and Smulders 2004; Knack and Keefer 1997; La Porta et al. 1997; Putnam 1993; and Zak and Knack 2001) "have argued that the causality goes from generalized trust to GDP per capita (or GDP-per-capita growth rate), although the causality can easily be argued to go both ways" (Chan 2007, 741). Chan (2007) and Polillo (2012) synthesize the pertinent quantitative discourse related to globalization's multifaceted effects on the GTR through the separately measurable sub-factors of trade,

foreign direct investment (FDI, foreign portfolio investment (FPI), remittances, military aid, and non-military aid.

The literature is unresolved as to "whether global economic integration can lead to national social disintegration, as proclaimed by Rodrik (1997)" (Chan 2007, 733).

> ...on the one hand, globalization is understood to be integrative and civilizing, increasing people's mutual dependence on others, and leading to greater social trust; on the other hand, globalization is perceived as destructive and threatening, making people vulnerable to forces beyond their control, and thus affecting social trust negatively – Polillo (2012, 45) referencing Guillén (2001); Kaya and Karakoc (2012); and Lizardo (2008)

What is certain is that increasing globalization exposes societies to additional external factors such as trade, investment, remittances, and aid that potentially affect its GTR. Non-fragile states are better equipped to take advantage of globalization's effects while fragile states are more susceptible to its adverse effects. For those states that already have extensive capital, infrastructure, patents, and knowledge, it is exponentially easier to produce more through the global market. Another struggle for fragile states is that "global integration requires nations to make adjustments in some of their social values and practices or be left behind economically" (Chan 2007, 751). However, if a society is already "civil" and homogenous, Bhagwati (2004) and Sen (1999) argue "that the transmission of foreign values from globalization benefits national values" (Chan 2007, 751). Unfortunately, most fragile states of SSA do not meet these criteria.

Economic inequality has an intervening relationship with, and non-linear effect on, trade and generalized trust. Chan (2007) argues that a country's openness to globalization increases generalized trust and strengthens informal institutions, "the 'civic glue' that holds together and governs the society" (2007, 751). He does not, however,

make this claim without qualification, stating, “Economic inequality weakens this positive effect” (2007, 751). The World Bank’s *World Development Indicators* national economic inequality scores he references are estimated by unit-record consumption data for all cases except Zimbabwe, which is estimated by grouped consumption data, range from 23.1 to 59.3 with a mean of 37.58 and SD of 10.72 over various years. Zambia has the highest economic inequality of the cases with a Gini score of 57.1 in 2010 and Ethiopia the lowest at 29.8 in 2005; Ethiopia’s Gini score is 2.6 SD lower than Zambia’s.

Table 30

*Inequality by Country (selected cases)*

| Country | Gini Coefficient | Year |
|---|---|---|
| Zambia | 57.1 | 2010 |
| Zimbabwe | 47 | 1995 |
| Nigeria | 46.8 | 2010 |
| Burkina Faso | 39.8 | 2009 |
| Ethiopia | 29.8 | 2005 |

*Note:* Gini Coefficient is composite of nine separate inequality indicators.

Source: World Bank (various years).

Data extracted from World Bank Data Catalog on 11/19/17.

He hypothesizes that at some, yet to be identified, tipping point along this continuum, increasing economic inequality, and openness to trade will negatively affect generalized trust (Chan 2007, 751). The Zimbabwean and Zambian control cases support this hypothesis, as they have high trade as percent of GDP, high inequality, and a low GTR. Under these conditions, mutually beneficial inter-group interaction is dependent on increased institutional trust through easily monitored and enforced institutions (2007, 734). Unfortunately, institutional trust is hard to come by in fragile states.




*Figure 4.* Trade as Percent of GDP by Year.

*Note:* High and low all-time recorded annual scores per country.

Source: World Bank 2017.

Data extracted from World Bank Data Catalog on 11/19/17.

Table 31

*Inter-State Market Forces: Trade*

| Country | Trade (Percent of GDP) (2016) (N=217) | Current Account Balance (Percent of GDP) (2015) (N=217) | Net Barter Terms of Trade Index 2015 (2000=100) (N=217) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Global High | 419 (Luxembourg) | 25.45 (Macao SAR, China) | 192.64 (United Arab Emirates) |
| Ghana | 89 | -7.48 | 174.50 |
| **Zambia** | 84 | -3.63 | 165.10 |
| **Burkina Faso** | 63 | -8.05 | 113.80 |
| South Africa | 60 | -3.21 | 133.10 |
| **Zimbabwe** | 60 | -9.46 | 113.50 |
| Rwanda | 48 | -13.30 | 156.90 |
| Mali | 47 | -4.83 | 148.80 |

Table Continued

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Ethiopia** | 36 | -6.89 | 134.50 |
| **Nigeria** | 21 | -3.28 | 131.50 |
| Global Low | 22 (Sudan) | -42.26 (Liberia) | 44.09 (Sierra Leone) |

*Note:* Most recent data from each source.

Trade (Percent of GDP): Nigeria and Zambia are 2015.

Current Account Balance (Percent of GDP): Ethiopia is 2012, Mali and Burkina Faso are 2014, and South Africa is 2016

Sources: World Bank – Trade (Percent of GDP); Current Account Balance (Percent of GDP; Net Barter Terms of Trade Index

Data extracted from sources on 09/25/17.

Table 32

*Inter-State Market Forces: Investment*

| Country | Foreign direct investment, net inflows (Percent of GDP) (2015) (N=217) | Portfolio Equity, net inflows (BoP, current US$) (2015) (N=217) |
|---|---|---|
| Highest Investment | 71.7 (Ireland) | 350,945,538,584 (Luxembourg) |
| Ghana | 8.5 | 18,140,000 |
| **Zambia** | 7.5 | 182,760 |
| Rwanda | 4.0 | 1,395,122 |
| **Ethiopia** | 3.5 | - |
| **Zimbabwe** | 2.8 | 122,800,000 |
| **Burkina Faso** | 1.6 | 65,580,541 |
| Mali | 1.2 | 2,466,956 |
| **Nigeria** | 0.7 | -486,640,211 |
| South Africa | 0.5 | 1,639,686,877 |
| Lowest Investment | -29.9 (Marshall Islands) | -178,267,000,000 (United States) |

*Note:* Most recent data from each source.

Sources: World Bank – Foreign direct investment, net inflows (Percent of GDP); World Bank –

Portfolio equity, net inflows (BoP, current US$)

Portfolio equity, net inflows (BoP, current US$): Ghana is 2010, Burkina Faso and Mali is 2014,

South Africa is 2016 data.

Data extracted from sources on 09/25/17.

Table 33

*Inter-State Market Forces: Remittances*

| Country | Remittances (Personal remittances, received (Percent of GDP) (2016) (N=217) | Remittances (Personal remittances, received (current US$) (2016) (N=217) |
|---|---|---|
| Highest Receiving | 30.6 (Liberia) | 62,745,000 (India) |
| **Zimbabwe** | 12.7 | 2,046,580 |
| Mali | 5.7 | 802,655 |
| Ghana | 4.8 | 2,041,692 |
| **Nigeria** | 4.7 | 18,956,000 |
| **Burkina Faso** | 3.3 | 397,309 |
| Rwanda | 1.9 | 163,313 |
| **Ethiopia** | 0.9 | 641,939 |
| South Africa | 0.3 | 755,434 |
| **Zambia** | 0.2 | 44,321 |
| Lowest Receiving | 0.0 | 1,494 (Suriname) |

*Note:* Most recent data from each source.

Personal remittances, received (Percent of GDP) and Remittances (Personal remittances, received (current US$): Zimbabwe is 2015.

Personal remittances, received (Percent of GDP): Angola, Congo, DRC, Turkmenistan, United States, Suriname, Chile, and Saudi Arabia = 0.

Source: World Bank (2015)

Data extracted from sources on 09/25/17.

Table 34

*Inter-State Market Forces: Aid*

Table Continued

| Country | Net ODA (non-military) received per capita 10 Year Average Disbursement (2005-2014) (N=218) | US Aid (military) 10 Year Average Disbursement (2006-2015) (N=222) |
|---|---|---|
| Most Received | 2576.11 (Nauru) | 2,841,356,291 (Israel) |
| Rwanda | 88.48 | 709,711 |
| **Zambia** | 81.47 | 408,376 |
| Mali | 70.08 | 2,559,140 |
| **Burkina Faso** | 64.42 | 932,342 |
| Ghana | 59.04 | 2,896,107 |
| **Zimbabwe** | 46.02 | 0 |
| **Ethiopia** | 35.87 | 4,106,991 |
| **Nigeria** | 22.17 | 6,433,980 |
| South Africa | 20.22 | 1,707,197 |
| Least Received | 0 | 0 |

*Note:* Most recent data from each source.

Net ODA (non-military) received per capita 10 Year Average Disbursement (2005-2014): multiple = 0.

US Aid (military) 10 Year Average Disbursement (2006-2015): multiple = 0.

Sources: OECD (2015); USAID (2015)

Data extracted from sources on 09/27/17.

Polillo (2012) comes to a similar, but more far-reaching conclusion than Chan (2007) for the same question. He claims globalized competition and resulting economic inequality have "deleterious effects on social trust" (2012, 60), "decreasing generalized trust in the countries most exposed to it" (2012, 45). He also claims democracies are almost certainly more effective incubators of social trust than authoritarian regimes, though this is difficult to prove due to the endogenous relationship between democracy and social trust (2012, 61); the trust literature is unsure how to identify and prove the causal direction with clear empirical evidence. Confusingly, he qualifies his claims stating, "the degree to which a country contributes to global scientific knowledge is

positively associated with the probability that its citizens will trust unknown others" (Polillo 2012, 59). Assuming the accumulation of scientific knowledge is a reasonable proxy for development, he is claiming the most productive countries in the global market, regardless of their level of economic inequality, will increase in generalized trust.

These quantitative findings on inter-state market forces, centered on trade, present a case for their bi-directional effects on the GTR, prompting subsequent analysis of the qualitative findings on trade, FDI, FPI, remittances, military aid, and non-military aid.

*Social Network Composition*

Alesina et al. (2003) calculate ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization, leaving out the cultural fractionalization that Fearon (2003) includes. This study increases the number of observations and consistency of measurement criteria over all other previous research (Alesina et al. 2003, 182).

> However, it is difficult to evaluate precisely the size of these effects because of the strong correlation of ethnolinguistic fractionalization variables with other potential explanatory variables, especially geographical ones. In the end one has to use theory and priors to interpret our partial correlations – Alesina et al. (2003, 183)

Table 35

*Fractionalization (sub-Saharan African Sample)*

| Country | Ethnic (N=180) M:0.385 | Linguistic (N=185) M:0.435 | Religious (N=198) M:0.439 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Most Fractionalized (global) | 0.9302 (Uganda) | 0.9227 (Uganda) | 0.8603 (S. Africa) |
| **Nigeria** | 0.8505 | 0.8503 | 0.7421 |
| **Zambia** | 0.7808 | 0.8734 | 0.7359 |
| South Africa | 0.7517 | 0.8652 | 0.8603 |
| **Burkina Faso** | 0.7377 | 0.7228 | 0.5798 |
| **Ethiopia** | 0.7235 | 0.8073 | 0.6249 |
| Mali | 0.6906 | 0.8388 | 0.1820 |
| Ghana | 0.6733 | 0.6731 | 0.7987 |
| **Zimbabwe** | 0.3874 | 0.4472 | 0.7363 |

Table Continued

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rwanda | 0.3238 | 0.0000 | 0.5066 |
| Least Fractionalized (global) | 0.0000 (Bermuda) | 0.0000 (Isle of Man) | 0.0028 (Somalia) |

*Notes:* Higher values = more fractionalization.

Source: Alesina et al. (2003)

Data extracted from appendix table (184-9) on 10/11/17.

There are regional differences in fractionalization. While non-European Western countries tend towards moderate-low ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and high religious fractionalization, East Asian and European (mainly Scandinavian) countries tend towards low fractionalization in all three areas. Sub-Saharan African countries tend towards high fractionalization in all three areas except for Muslim-majority countries, which lack the denominational diversity of Christian-majority countries. The 13 least religiously fractionalized countries are all Muslim majority and located in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) and SSA. In SSA, high religious fractionalization indicates a highly religious population or a high percentage of syncretism and the presence of African Initiated Churches (AICs), most of which are independent and widely vary in belief and practice. Low religious fractionalization in SSA may indicate a spatially small country, one that is Muslim-majority, religion's lack of importance in the society, or the presence of a large, unified religion or denomination (e.g., Roman Catholic or Sunni Muslim).

Nigeria is the most comprehensively fractionalized of the cases when considering all of the indices from each source followed by Zambia, which is only low in Fearon's (2003) cultural fractionalization measure and does not make the ELF list of the ten most fractionalized Africa countries. Ethiopia is only considered more fractionalized than Zambia in Fearon's (2003) measures; all others favor Zambia. Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe make the list of the ten least fractionalized African countries for PREG and ELF respectively. Zimbabwe is the least comprehensively fractionalized of the cases

when considering all of the indices from each source, except the Alesina et al. (2003) religious fractionalization measure, while Burkina Faso comes in middle of the pack in all measures except the Alesina et al. (2003) religious fractionalization measure, for which it is the lowest of the cases. Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe each have a unipolar configuration with a single large and powerful majority group, but they differ in their minority group composition with the former having many small minorities and the later having a single large minority group.

These quantitative fractionalization findings present a strong, yet incomplete, case for social effects on the GTR. Societies with the greatest GTR *potential* are the most fractionalized, yet this is only one of several meaningful effects along with proximity and power differential, which the quantitative literature pays little attention. The test cases of Ethiopia and Nigeria are highly fractionalized, while Burkina Faso is not and the control case of Zambia is highly fractionalized, while Zimbabwe is not.

## Qualitative Findings

### *Independent Variables*

The quantitative findings presented in the preceding section suggest the balance between in-group, generalized, and institutional trust affects the economic, political, and socio-cultural composition of societies. These findings also suggest the measurement of the GTR has been inaccurate for SSA, with the Delhey et al. (2011) new trust measure providing promise for the advancement of the trust literature in this region. George's (1979, 210) second phase of case study examination (research design implementation)

continues through this chapter's presentation of qualitative case findings for each control and test variable.

*State Security Institutions*

> As a dog returns to its vomit, so fools repeat their folly.
>
> —Prov. 26:11, *NIV*

*Case #1: Burkina Faso.* Burkina Faso, colonized by France, having gained its independence in 1960 as Upper Volta, is not widely recognized as having a history of state fragility, but it does. Even though it has one of the more peaceful post-colonial histories in SSA, it has experienced other forms of fragility, including poverty, weak political legitimacy leading to peacefully resolved coup d'états, uneven development, and cross-border migration. In the 2010s it experienced increased conflict and violence resulting from the spillover of Islamist extremism from Mali and political unrest in the form of multiple successful and failed military coup d'états. Its culture of strongman leadership, common across SSA, has held political leaders in power long after their constitutional-democratic terms have expired.

The Burkinabé have fallen into a cycle of non-procedural, non-violent, power transitions that have effectively short-circuited attempted power grabs. They have experienced seven *successful* post-independence coup d'états (the highest of all SSA) (Dwyer 2015, 98), due in part, to a chaotic and vigorous protest culture and undisciplined military with one of the highest mutiny rates in SSA (Dwyer 2017, 220). Each regime established by a successive coup d'état has quickly collapsed under the pressure of the next one, indicating an active political culture in a weak institutional environment.

Protest has served as a relatively peaceful political pressure valve for a society that has few trustworthy security institutions.

Table 36

*Burkinabé Insecurity*

| Type | Year(s) | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Military coup d'état | 1966-1980 | Long-term success |
| Civilian power struggle | 1974 | Parliament dissolved |
| Military coup d'état | 1980-1982 | Short-term success |
| Military coup d'état | 1982-1983 | Short-term success |
| Military coup d'état | 1983 | Failed |
| Military coup d'état | 1983-1987 | Moderate-term success |
| Military coup d'état | 1987-2014 | Long-term success |
| Military coup d'état plot | 1989 | Failed |
| Military coup d'état | 2003 | Failed |
| Military coup d'état | 2014- | Short-term success |
| Military coup d'état | 2015 | Failed |
| Military coup d'état | 2016 | Failed |

Sources: McGowan 2003; Raleigh et al. 2010; Sarkees and Wayman 2010

Data extracted from sources on 11/18/17.

An increasingly active and emboldened Burkinabé civil society has helped to pressure the military-led government to remain within its constitutional bounds but has been unable or unwilling to generate sufficient electoral pressure until 2015 to elect a stable non-military leader (President Kaboré). Before this, it repeatedly allowed a return to the source of the government's poor leadership—the military—to replace embattled civilian leaders via coup d'état. The same solution to a recurring problem has produced identical results: state fragility. Burkinabé security institutions do not positively affect the GTR, as they are fragile and minimally functional.

*Case #2: Ethiopia.* Ethiopia, with the longest political history of any SSA country, dating back 3,000 years, successfully resisted Italian colonization; it is one of only two SSA states (Ethiopia and Liberia) never to be colonized. However, freedom

from colonial influence has not spared it from insecurity. Ethiopian insecurity stems from a combination of civil war, secession, spillover, and famine. It has experienced fewer coup d'états than the average SSA state, in part because its military has been busy managing more severe forms of conflict, such as secession and interstate war with Eritrea (McGowan 2003, 357). However, for the few coup d'états that have occurred, the military contributed to their manifestation (Wang 1998, 664). A Marxist military coup d'état in 1974, for example, triggered a protracted civil war lasting 16 years. Following this was a lengthy and costly stalemate resulting in the secession of Eritrea, freeing it from an uncomfortable federation with Ethiopia, eventually leading to the Ethiopian-Eritrean War 1998-2000, which killed an estimated 50,000-100,000 people (U.S. Congressional Research Service 2000). This secession was born of two politically separate cultures that valued "absolute victory and zero-sum calculations over compromise and joint gains" (Lyons 2009, 168).

Table 37

*Ethiopian Insecurity*

| Type | Year(s) | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Civilian coup d'état | 1928 | Long-term success |
| Military coup d'état | 1960 | Failed |
| Military coup d'état/Civil war | 1974-1991 | Long-term success |
| Military coup d'état | 1977 | Successful |
| Military coup d'état | 1977 | Successful |
| Military coup d'état | 1989 | Failed |
| Secession | 1993 | Eritrea secedes |
| War | 1998-2000 | Eritrean-Ethiopian War |

Only McGowan (2003) includes the two 1977 events.

Sources: McGowan 2003; Raleigh et al. 2010; Sarkees and Wayman 2010

Data extracted from sources on 11/18/17.

More recently, Ethiopia experienced the eighth worst global decline in freedom between 2006-2016 due primarily to land rights conflicts, the state's use of force against its citizens, and proxy conflicts and spillover from Somalia (Puddington and Roylance 2017, 10), resulting in a highly militarized border (Lyons 2009, 167). One long-term consequence of these conflicts has been food insecurity. The United Nations estimated that 12 percent of Ethiopians were in need of food assistance in July of 2008 (Benequista 2008). For all of these reasons, Ethiopian security institutions do not positively affect the GTR, as they are fragile and minimally functional, yet the state is not failed or collapsed.

*Case #3: Nigeria.* If the Nigerian state remains intact, it may provide a model of constitutional governance for ethnically fractionalized societies (Suberu 2001, 205). A 2005 U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) report outlined a possible *worst-case* scenario for Nigeria, estimating that within fifteen years, Nigeria may not survive as a country (Population Council 2006, 192). While there have been some scares, it remains a sovereign state, a regional military leader, and a major global petrol economy.

Britain colonized Nigeria by compelling an uncomfortable union between northern Hausa Muslims, southern Yoruba and Igbo Christians, and hundreds of minority ethnolinguistic groups residing in their spheres of influence. This fragmented country gained its independence in 1960 peacefully (Sampson 1994, 88), yet this was not a foreshadowing of things to come. Like many post-colonial African states, Nigeria has a civil war story. The Christian Igbo coup d'état and secession attempt in 1966 to establish the Republic of Biafra and the northern Muslim counter coup d'état later that year in response triggered the Biafra War (1967-1970) (1994, 90). In the immediate fallout of this failed secession attempt, an estimated 1.5 million Igbo fled the North of Nigeria and

another 6,000-8,000 died (De St. Jorre 1972, 91). While the result of the Biafra War was a widely disputed 500,000 to 6 million casualties (Wiseberg 1975, 54), 1 million from starvation and disease (United States Congressional Record 1969, S1977). While its military considers itself a regional power and substantiates this by providing the majority of African Union troops, Nigeria is also one of the most unstable states domestically. Even though it has a *national* police force, local communities often take responsibility for their security through vigilantism (Paden 2008, 126). Some state governments have gone a step further to enlist the services of vigilante groups and ethnic militias to maintain law and order (Akinyele 2001, 628; Ukiwo 2002, 40). The federal government's consistent answer to domestic chaos has been a military response to return stability (Paden 2005, 219). In this way, the military sees itself as the savior of incompetent civilian leaders; however, the military has been less capable than the civilian government of being a catalyst for democratic transition and civil society (Ojo 2000, 2). Military Heads of State Babangida (1985-1993) and Abacha (1993-1998) demonstrate that "military rulers 'govern' no better than elected civilians in Africa, and often much worse" (McGowan 2003, 340).

Table 38

*Nigerian Insecurity*

| Type | Year(s) | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Military coup d'état | 1966 | Short-term success |
| Military coup d'état response | 1966 | Long-term success |
| Civil War | 1967-1970 | Failed Igbo Secession |
| Military coup d'état | 1975 | Short-term success |
| Military coup d'état | 1976 | Failed |
| Military coup d'état | 1983-1985 | Moderate-term success |
| Military coup d'état | 1985-1993 | Long-term success |
| Military coup d'état | 1990 | Failed |
| Military coup d'état | 1993-1998 | Long-term success |

Table Continued

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Religious Violence | 2000- | Ongoing social conflict |
| Boko Haram Insurgency | 2009- | Ongoing armed conflict |

Sources: McGowan 2003; Raleigh et al. 2010; Sarkees and Wayman 2010

Data extracted from sources on 11/18/17.

Nigeria's hybrid form of federalism is a product of its civil war and several constitutional alterations via "military fiat rather than by constitutional amendment and popular ratification" (Suberu 2001, 15). Some considered Nigeria a collapsed state in the 1990s (Rotberg 2004, 9). There have been six major state realignments between its independence and the Fourth Nigerian Republic, established in 1999 (Suberu 2001, 15). Since the sudden death of President Abacha in 1998, the federal government has become more stable and democratic, yet there has been widespread Christian-Muslim social violence, petrol conflict, and the Boko Haram insurgency concentrated in the Northeastern Region. Since independence, ethnoreligious conflict has taken an estimated three million lives (Fawole and Bello 2011, 217), and there were 17,402 politically motivated deaths (only second to Congo DRC) recorded between 1990 and 2009, resulting from ethnic rioting, religious extremism, and disruption of oil supplies (Salehyan et al. 2012, 503). Nigerian security institutions do not positively affect the GTR because they are fragile and minimally functional, yet the state is not failed or collapsed.

*Case #4: Zambia.* At independence, "the scarcity of educated manpower was extreme" (Lusaka 1968, 709). The British colonized Zambia as Northern Rhodesia, with it gaining its independence peacefully on October 24, 1964. While it is known to have one of the most peaceful histories of all post-colonial states, it is surrounded by states whose violent fights for independence (e.g., Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Congo (DRC),

Angola, and Namibia) paired with Cold War proxy conflicts, have spilled over its borders. Therefore, its insecurity has mainly been a function of its location in a bad neighborhood of states. The Mozabeze Civil War brought border raids and village bombing by Portuguese troops (McKay 1971, 18). Zambia was the staging ground for conflicts of the Rhodesian Bush War and South African Border War. During the Rhodesian Bush War, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) set up base camps in Zambia to conduct operations against the white minority-led Rhodesian government. While the South African Border War consisted of conflict between the South African Defence Force (SADF) and the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), which spilled over into Zambia.

Table 39

*Zambian Insecurity*

| Type | Year(s) | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Spillover of Rhodesian Bush War | 1965-1979 | Spillover |
| Military coup d'état | 1980 | Failed |
| Spillover of South African Border War | 1966-1990 | Spillover |
| Military coup d'état | 1990 | Failed |
| Military coup d'état | 1997 | Failed |

*Note:* Only McGowan (2003) includes the 1980 and 1990 events.

Sources: McGowan 2003; Raleigh et al. 2010; Sarkees and Wayman 2010

Data extracted from sources on 11/18/17.

Zambia's domestic politics has been relatively stable except for two unsuccessful coup d'état attempts. The first one was civilian-led in 1980, led by the civil service bureaucracy that was disillusioned by the establishment of a one-party state in 1972 (Larmer 2010, 391). The second one was military-led in 1997 that was quickly put down. Even so, Zambian security institutions do not positively affect the GTR. They are fragile

and minimally functional as is evidenced by their inability to prevent violent conflicts from periodically spilling over their borders, yet the state is not failed or collapsed.

*Case #5: Zimbabwe.* Sub-Saharan Africa has not experienced a unified pattern of decolonization. The relatively peaceful "consensual decolonization" present in many British and French colonies was not present in Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, where the "entrenched settler regimes had no intention of voluntarily liquidating their control" (Weitzer 1984, 329). The decolonization-fatigued Britain was unable to negotiate an independence settlement between the white minority-led Rhodesian government and rival factions of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). This resulted in Southern Rhodesia unilaterally declared its independence on November 11, 1965, causing Britain to impose sanctions and withdraw its support for the government, producing a power vacuum and triggering the Rhodesian Bush War, which lasted 14 years (1964-1979) and cost 30,000 lives. The Rhodesian Bush War was not only a fight for independence; it was also part Cold War proxy conflict. Zimbabwe has been one of the bad actors in a troubled neighborhood of states, with its internal conflicts spilling over into surrounding states.

On April 18, 1980, Zimbabwe became one of the last four states in SSA, along with Eritrea, Namibia, and South Africa, to gain its independence and be majority ruled (McGowan 2003, 347). Its history of insecurity is due to the struggle between white Rhodesians resisting decolonization and blacks' seeking independence, which is not unique to Zimbabwe, while its modern insecurity is due to a combination of authoritarianism and domestic maladministration. During its post-independence years, it

went from having one of the most prosperous economies in SSA to one of the most fragile in a few years, due to overextension of the military and capricious land tenure policies.

Table 40

*Zimbabwean Insecurity*

| Type | Year(s) | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Rhodesian Bush War (civil war) | 1965-1979 | Post-colonial independence won |
| Entumbane I (civil war aftershock) | 1980 | Government victory |
| Entumbane II (civil war aftershock) | 1981 | Government victory |
| Military coup d'état plot | 1982 | Failed |
| Mozambican Civil War | 1982-1992 | Stalemate |
| Gukurahundi | 1984-1987 | Government crackdown on opposition |
| Second Congo War | 1998-2003 | Stalemate |
| Congo, DRC Kivu Conflict | 2004-2009 | Played both sides/government victory |
| Military coup d'état | 2007 | Failed |

Sources: McGowan 2003; Raleigh et al 2010; Sarkees and Wayman 2010

Only McGowan (2003) includes the 1982 military coup d'état plot

Data extracted from sources on 11/18/17.

The Zimbabwean military has a long history of involvement in domestic politics (Williamson 2010, 410), yet Zimbabwe has experienced fewer coup d'états than the average SSA state. This is in part due to the military's preoccupation with the long civil war, and after that, the civilian government keeping the military preoccupied in external conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique, by allowing it to share in the spoils of those conflicts (McGowan 2003, 357). This strategy allowed President Mugabe to harness the military's support to further his domestic agenda and lengthen his tenure. The provision of military support to the Congolese government during the Second Congo War (1998-2003), proved popular with the military elite, but drained Zimbabwe's finances, making it perhaps the most unpopular decisions of the regime (MacLean 2002, 522). In 2000, President Mugabe issued the Zimbabwean version of the

American Homestead Act of 1862, which seized white Zimbabwean farmers' lands and redistributed them primarily among non-farming black elites. These two events touched off a major depression, hyperinflation, and food scarcity.

The coercive patterns of the colonial regime transferred readily to the independent regime (Weitzer 1984, 530). The Shona ethnic-majority elite, who have access to plenty of capital, maintain power and control by employing the same inequitable tactics of the former colonial regime (Moore 2001, 912). To extend his tenure, President Mugabe has employed guerrilla tactics of intimidation and indoctrination against his political opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), through the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) (Blair 2002, supra note 35, 149). He honed these skills as a leader in the Rhodesian Bush War (Williamson 2010, 394). Opposition candidates and their supporters have even been tortured.

> Fainos Zhou, who nominated the MDC candidate for Mberengwa West, was kidnapped and tortured for four days…He was bludgeoned with iron bars, and boiling, melting plastic was dripped all over his body…His wife was gang-raped and sodomized with an iron bar – Blair (2002, 146)

A further two hundred MDC officials and supporters died, and 200,000 others were displaced (see Amnesty International 2008; Human Rights Watch 2008; Impunity Watch 2008; Solidarity Peace Trust 2008). Movement for Democratic Change supporters, primarily ethnic Northern Ndebele minorities, did not believe justice was possible as long as Mugabe was in power. "As long as Mugabe is there, they [the perpetrators] will be sentenced today and tomorrow he will pronounce an amnesty and they will be free again" (Bratton 2011, 376 quoting a focus group respondent). Even the November 14, 2017, coup d'état that removed President Mugabe from power, is little

comfort for opposition supporters as there are other Shona "heroes of the revolution" waiting in the wings to take his place to perpetuate his institutions. For all of these reasons, Zimbabwean security institutions do not positively affect the GTR. They are fragile and minimally functional, yet the state is not failed or collapsed.

*State Contract Institutions*

> If two brothers fight over their father's land, it is a stranger who will enjoy there sweat and labour.
>
> —African proverb

*Case #1: Burkina Faso.* While there are worse things than being colonized by the French, as the Congolese experience with Belgium can attest, one negative legacy of French colonialism in Burkina Faso is its contract institutions. Weak military institutions have perpetuated a culture of strongman political leaders—common in SSA—who attempt to extend their tenures unconstitutionally, as was the case with the 27 years of semi-authoritarian rule by President Compaoré, ending in 2014. Even though an active grassroots non-violent protest culture has thrived during his tenure, it has not been sufficient to improve the state's quality as a contract agent.

A minority voice in the land tenure literature claims government programs aimed at modernizing and individualizing land tenure for the sake of consistency, may have the opposite effect (de Zeeuw 1997, 583). Still, others claim to increase FDI in the agricultural sector will make farmers lives less secure unless land tenure institutions move from traditional to "better-defined and enforceable private forms of property rights" (Bourdet and Persson 2001, 197). In 1983, the Burkinabé government nationalized all customary lands, though it has been mostly unsuccessful in its goal of

displacing powerful chiefs as the regulators of land tenure and transfer (Williams 1996, 217). In 1997, it again updated its land tenure policies to manage increasing urbanization through the Reforme Agraire Fonciere. Due to its late entrance into the global market, Burkina Faso remains one of Africa's least urbanized countries, yet with a high urbanization growth rate, which has caused uncertainty, competition, and conflict regarding the management of urban land titles and fraudulent land-titling schemes (Harsch 2009, 265). For these reasons, Burkinabé contract institutions do not positively affect the GTR but are instead fragile and minimally functional.

*Case #2: Ethiopia.* Because Ethiopia was never colonized, it ironically did not have the opportunity to benefit from colonial institutional isomorphism that other, now more prosperous, former colonies (e.g., India, Brazil, Nigeria) had. This is not to argue that colonial isomorphism occurred uniformly or positively in most cases. When Ethiopia reformed its land tenure policies in 1991, following the Ethiopian Civil War and the fall of the Marxist derg, it abolished all preexisting customary and Marxist forms of land tenure, rapidly privatized farm collectives (Crewett and Korf 2008, 203), and granted rights to occupants "who were able to demonstrate productive use of land" (Williams 1996, 218). This dramatic shift did not last long and quickly reverted to previous derg land policies, because the government prohibited land sales, producing a more feudal than capitalist arrangement. In doing this, the government's distribution of land deeds became politicized by the more dominant Tigray ethnic group following elections (Young 1996, 540), where officials would use promises of land as an electoral strategy. Subsequent, Western-influenced, policy changes instituting land certification have "resulted in a significant reduction of tenure insecurity and increase in land-related

investment" (Deininger et al. 2011, 330). However, western-modeled land tenure systems often prove unsustainable in other SSA contexts (e.g., Madagascar) because the cost of maintaining the titling infrastructure outweighs that of the benefits to landholders (Jacoby and Minten 2007, 23). For these reasons, Ethiopian contract institutions do not positively affect the GTR but are instead fragile and minimally functional.

*Case #3: Nigeria.* Nigeria's diverse ethnolinguistic, religious, and cultural character has presented the state with many interesting contracting challenges. It emerged from colonialism with a "bizarre version of federalism" (Diamond 1988, 155) "designed in such a way as to virtually guarantee its failure" (Lijphart 1977, 163). The governing philosophy that created Nigeria's latest Constitution in 1999 recognizes that people are naturally corruptible and that "ambition must be made to counteract ambition" (Madison 1788). However, it has only managed to produce minimally functional contract institutions at the federal, state, and local government area (LGA) levels, making the state an inadequate agent for mediating contract disputes.

Nigerian contract institutions are shaped by centralizing tendencies of the federal government, conflict-inducing indigene-settler laws, and the regional adoption of Shari 'a. Any one of these is a challenge in itself, but all three converge to shape the political environment of Nigeria's Middle Belt states. The federal government—as many do—uses control of the purse strings to leverage behavior of its states. Nigerian states are hyper-dependent on the federal government to sustain even basic services, giving the central government outsized influence. These centralizing tendencies have turned Nigeria into a "unitary state in federal disguise" with states "following the money" (Williams 1980, 100). States have even been sub-divided multiple times in relation to

changing federal budget allocation policies (see Mackintosh 1962; Osaghae 1992, 189-90), increasing from 10 percent in 1991 to 20 percent in 1997, which therein increased the number of LGAs from 593 to 774 (Suberu 2001, 108).

Nigeria's Land Use Act of 1978 nationalized land ownership and management while granting states control over land decisions of their urban areas and LGAs over rural areas, which appears to align well with the goals of federalism. However, this has produced a disorganized patchwork of competing homeland claims (Williams 1996, 217). A single dominant ethnoreligious group usually drives rural LGA-level indigene-settler policy; therefore, each LGA's policies are unique to and deeply ingrained in each area (United States Department of State 2010). To exacerbate this situation, during the 1991 LGA reorganization and expansion, Hausa federal legislators pulled off a Texas-style redistricting strategy that favored the Babangida administration's elite supporters (Suberu 2001, 9). Following this, the 1999 Nigerian Constitution has allowed indigene groups to discriminate further against non-indigenes living in "their" lands, over education, employment, and property ownership through the issuance of certificates of indigeneship. These policies are centripetal in that they disincentivize migration outside of one's ethnoreligious home area, which limits social, cultural, economic, political, and religious inter-group interaction and all of the benefits that come with it.

While less frequent, religious conflicts have increased between 1950 and 1996 globally, and are more intense than nonreligious conflicts (Fox 2004, 55). Nigeria is the epicenter of religious conflict in Africa (Salehyan et al. 2012, 504). Because Nigerian's are highly religious, ethnic territorial and land tenure claims quickly become infused with religious significance. In Plateau State surrounding the city of Jos, at the dividing line

between the mostly Muslim north and mostly Christian south, the indigenous, primarily Christian Afizere, Anaguta and Berom minority ethnic groups, have pushed back against the incursion of northern Muslim Hausa settlers (Ostien 2009, 2). The Berom threated to build a large church to rival the central mosque down the street and claimed the mosque's land is theirs (Suberu 2001, 25). In another case, the Ife and Modakeke ethnic minority groups have fought over land tenure rights with over 3,000 killed in 1998.

There has been a resurgent demand in northern Nigerian states for Shari 'a in reaction to several decades of capriciously enforced military rule. Many Nigerian Muslims have long been dissatisfied with the secular common law judicial system; besides being mired in corruption and delayed justice, it is not rooted in their norms and beliefs (Hodkinson 1984, 739). As the 1999 Nigerian Constitution does not prohibit dual legal systems, it is left to the states to decide what combination of common, customary, and Shari 'a legal systems work in their context. Most of the Muslim-majority northern states have opted for full or partial Shari 'a: the fuller version typically banning alcohol and prostitution for the whole population (Paden 2006, 147), while the partial version of it limits these statutes to only Muslims. Rabo, the secretary of the Independent Shariah Implementation support Committee in Kano, Nigeria says, Shari 'a is "a total way of life" (Rabo 2003); non-Muslims "should conduct their ceremonies in their private environments and they shouldn't disturb peace in the society" (Rabo 2003). This majoritarian attitude has made some non-Muslim minorities feel trapped, surrounded by and sometimes subject to, an unfamiliar legal system.

When any one of these three contract challenges is present (centralizing tendencies of the federal government, conflict-inducing indigene-settler laws, and the

adoption of Shari ‘a) it is difficult for contract institutions to have a widening effect on the GTR, but when two or all three are intertwined as they are in Nigeria, it is much more difficult. Therefore, Nigerian contract institutions do not positively affect the GTR but are instead fragile and minimally functional.

*Case #4: Zambia.* In 1970, the Zambian government began appropriating expatriates’ unutilized land and by 1975 abolished customary freehold land tenure and nationalized it (Williams 1996, 217), replacing it with 100-year leases (Tordoff 1977, 65). Twenty years later, Zambia’s Land Act of 1995 was the most publicly deliberated piece of legislation (Kaunda 1995, 87). Its logic was that introducing flexibility and choice into the old customary land tenure system through “mechanisms for transferring customary land to individually titled state land” (Sitko 2010, 39) would reduce title uncertainty and free up land to be used as collateral for credit (Kaunda 1995, 92). However, what has emerged instead is a clandestine land market that remains controlled by chiefdoms (Roth 1994, 61, 193), which denies woman access and keeps Southern Zambian Nkandanzovus’ lands continuously cultivated, reducing its fertility (Sitko 2010, 36) and causing land shortages and food insecurity. The HIV/AIDS epidemic has exacerbated this situation by often leaving HIV-positive women divorced and without land title (2010, 36). These “measures to accelerate privatization of land have encountered strong protest from defenders of peasants’ land rights” (Boone 2007, 581) and went under review in 2006. The amended 2016 Constitution began to address sustainable land management practices and transparency in land transactions (Constitution of Zambia 2016, Part XIX). For these reasons, Zambian contract

institutions do not positively affect the GTR but are instead fragile and minimally functional.

*Case #5: Zimbabwe*

> Our party must continue to strike fear in the heart of the white man, our real enemy!
>
> —Robert Mugabe

There are four types of property rights in Zimbabwe: freehold (private), state land, communal, and leasehold (resettlement system) (Gwenhamo et al. 2012, 597) as a result of highly visible and contested (Boone 2007, 558) land tenure policy reforms, including the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 and Land Acquisition Amendment Act of 2000.

Following independence, the Zimbabwean government resisted taking white farmers' lands because it realized its productive value in their hands. Since 1980, it only led a modest populist resettlement program for a half million citizens who were displaced by the civil war by forcibly purchasing millions of acres of land from white farmers (Williams 1996, 215). Only in 2000, out of fear of losing the 2000 parliamentary elections (Moore 2001, 916), did President Mugabe, in a fit of kleptocracy, take white farms and distribute them to his political base, primarily his inner circle and relatives (Power 2003, 4) more so than landless peasants (Howard-Hassmann 2010, 900). The little land the poor did receive was bound by a thirty-day cancelation clause that rendered it unsuitable collateral for financing, so owners were unable to make productive use of it (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2008, 38). This land distribution disorder has resulted in "overlapping and even multiple entitlements to the same plots and widespread disputed claims" (Bracking and Cliffe 2009, 111). Formerly productive farmland became barren, and by October 2003, half of Zimbabweans were food-insecure, many dependent

on remittances (Howard-Hassmann 2010, 901); by 2005, unemployment was at 80 percent; and by 2007, GDP growth rate was negative at -6.1 percent (World Factbook 2008). During this period, average life expectancy dropped from 56.4 years (1990-1995) to 37.3 years (2005-2010) (World Bank 2017).

Many Zimbabweans are resigned to the fact that "there will be no magical date on which 'The Old Man' will die and good governance will be restored" (Bracking and Cliffe 2009, 104). Mugabe-created contract institutions and their effects will endure long after his November 14, 2017, removal from office because his regime has created informal institutions and networks that shadow formal government institutions to ensure their longevity (MacLean 2002, 520). For these reasons, Zimbabwean contract institutions do not positively affect the GTR but are instead fragile and minimally functional.

*Individualism & Collectivism*

A thumb, although it is strong, cannot kill aphids on its own.

—African proverb

*Case #1: Burkina Faso.* Few in the trust literature dispute Hofstede's claim that the more poor, rural, and traditional a society is, the more collectivist it will remain (2010, 127). Burkina Faso is one of the poorest countries globally, ranking 121 out of 196 for its 2016 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of $32 billion (international dollars) and it remains poor when considering its 2016 GDP PPP of $1,595 per capita (constant 2011 international dollars) (World Bank 2017). It is also one

of the least urbanized countries globally (31.5 percent), ranked 167 out of 196 (World Factbook 2017).

Burkinabé society is highly collectivist. Its people value Familism and tend towards a broad institutional, vertical, exclusionist collectivism, in part, because their identity revolves around the dominant Mossi ethnic group, which composes a slight majority (52.2 percent) of the population. The Mossi exhibit a rather broad institutional collectivism, whereas the many smaller ethnic groups tend to be narrower. This difference may help explain Presidents' Lamizana (1966-1980) and Compaoré's (1987-2014) ease in extending their tenures. Notwithstanding its religious and cultural homogeneity and ethnolinguistic heterogeneity, its groups preference the values of honor, loyalty (Akkus et al. 2017), survival, solidarity, compassion, and conservatism (Jackson 2004, 31). Interestingly, even though East Asian corporate collectivism (2004, 158)—which may be characterized by what Bellah (1967) would call a Confucianist-Buddhist civic religion—is also based on homogeneity, they result in entirely different societies. For these reasons, Burkinabé culture is highly collectivist and is therefore not in a position to widen the GTR.

*Case #2: Ethiopia.* Ethiopia meets Hofstede's (2010, 90) criteria for a highly collectivist society. It is considered a moderate wealth country, ranking 67 out of 196 globally when measured by its 2016 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of $178 billion (international dollars). However, when considering its 2016 GDP PPP of $1,608 per capita (constant 2011 international dollars) (World Bank 2017), its wealthy drops substantially. Ethiopia is one of the least urbanized countries globally (20.4 percent), ranked 184 out of 196 (World Factbook 2017). It is also one of the least

industrialized countries globally with an industrialization intensity index score of 0.16 (United Nations Industrial Development Organization 2014). Its society is collectivist as is evidenced by its groups' preference for Familism and social organization around small villages composed of a dozen or so families (Ben-Ezer 1992, 138). Despite being exposed to Western values in Israel, emigrating Ethiopian Jews remain more collectivist than the Israeli-born population (Kurman 2003, 498). Ethiopian society adheres to a moderately institutional (see Mbigi 1997), vertical, and exclusionist collectivism. Its three largest ethnic groups (Oromo, Amhara, and Tigray), do not have a history of politicizing along ethnic lines (Mengisteab 2001, 22), yet they still have substantial conflict. The Oromo constitute nearly half of the population and are spread throughout the country, yet being the largest ethnic group has not secured its dominance. While smaller, the Amhara are more hierarchically individualist and the Oromo more egalitarian collectivist (Levine 2000, 148). The former tend to look down on the later, and the smaller Tigray have found a way to gain political advantage over both.

Ethiopia has a collectivist identity crisis with "too many heroes and too few innovators" (Gudina 1994, 929). Ethiopian nationalists insist they have a unified identity that reaches back thousands of years to the ancient Axum (Sorenson 1992, 247) and they rest on this ethnonational legacy and pride in never having been colonized (Ekeh 1990, 679), rather than working to produce developmental innovations. There was a short time when western progressivism reigned in the 1950s to 1970s, but it did not last long, nor did it have a lasting effect. Pre-civil war Ethiopian collectivism was driven by competing horizontal and vertical "themes of equality, self-reliance, the indivisibility of the nation, state control of the economy, and the elimination of landlordism" (Donham, 1999, 16).

At that time, "there were many voluntary, loosely organized, semi-autonomous organizations"…"such as Edir (self-help associations in time of death), Ikub (rotating saving and credit associations), and Mahber (associations based on kinship or religion)"…"but they were too apolitical and not strong enough to form a cohesive civil society" (Kebede 2010, 307) as a democratic protection from the communist derg. The civil war resulted in the rule of the communist derg dictatorship in the 1980s (Sorenson 1992, 231), strengthening collectivism by providing groups with a common cause, fate, and identity, severely restricted resources, strengthened cultural homogeneity, and isolating society from external influences (Triandis 1989, 511). Even after the eventual fall of the communist derg in 1987, there remained an absence of attachment to western positivism and the rule of law (Brietzke 1995, 37). Social divisions and identity formation continued to be structured along ethnic and class lines, a consequence of the derg's scientific socialism policies. An eclectic cultural and political history has shaped Ethiopia into a unique and collectivist modern society. For these reasons, Ethiopian culture is highly collectivist and is therefore not in a position to widen the GTR.

*Case #3: Nigeria.* The means by which Nigerian society organizes itself have changed rapidly since its colonization in 1901, having gone from highly tribal[3] to more aggregated ethnic groups, and more atomized in urban areas. Nigerian individualism, where present, is best characterized as a relational individualism (see Adams and Dzokoto 2003) such that individuals consider their network connections to others when choosing whether to trust them or not. "The Igbo are individualistic and egalitarian,

[3] While the term "tribal" is considered derogatory in the literature today, it accurately describes this context in 1901.

every man considered himself as good as everyone else" (Boahen and Webster 1970, 166). In aggregate though, Nigeria is a highly collectivist society; there is variation within its extreme diversity, ranging from highly segmented (less rigid) to highly structured, the latter being slower to change (Akiwowo 1964, 155). However, this is not always the case; for example, both Pakot and Igbo ethnic groups are segmentary, yet only the former has resisted Western influences (Schneider 1962, 144). Nigeria's moderately institutional (see Mbigi 1997), vertical, and exclusionist collectivism has produced a hyper-divided society along ethnolinguistic and religious lines. In highly collectivist and heterogeneous democratizing societies such as Nigeria, politicians are incentivized to appeal to communal loyalties.

> …a vicious circle ensures the perpetuation of communal conflict in a participant political system: aspirant politicians make communal appeals and communal demands which exacerbate communal tensions; these tensions, in turn, encourage the recruitment of leaders who will make communal appeals and demands – Melson and Wolpe (1970, 1122)

Some in the trust literature may question Nigeria's inclusion as a case based on Hofstede's (2010, 90) collectivist criteria however even though it is a wealthy, moderately industrialized, and rapidly urbanizing country, most Nigerians are poor. It is the wealthiest country in SSA, ranked 21 out of 196 globally when measured by its 2016 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of $1,091 billion (international dollars). However, when considering its 2016 GDP PPP of $5,439 per capita (constant 2011 international dollars) (World Bank 2017), it is less wealthy than seven other SSA countries. Nigeria remains more rural than urban, but that is quickly changing, ranked 126 out of 196 at 49.4 percent (World Factbook 2017). It is a moderately industrialized country with an industrialization intensity index of 0.35

(United Nations Industrial Development Organization 2014) that is unable to refine its petroleum. While its rural areas remain more rigidly structured along age, sex, clan, or birth, its urban populations increasingly identify along vocational, educational, and income lines. Nigerian culture is collectivist, yet its urban populations are becoming more individualist. Culture changes slowly, therefore, it will be a long time before individualism overtakes collectivism, if ever. For these reasons, Nigerian culture is collectivist and is therefore not in a position to widen the GTR.

*Case #4: Zambia.* Zambia is a moderately poor, rural majority, and non-industrialized country, meeting all of Hofstede's (2010, 90) collectivism criteria. It ranks 94 out of 196 globally when measured by its 2016 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of $65 billion (international dollars) and remains moderately poor when considering its 2016 GDP PPP of $3,636 per capita (constant 2011 international dollars) (World Bank 2017). It has a rural majority, ranked 138 out of 196 at 41.8 percent (World Factbook 2017) and is one of the least industrialized countries globally with an industrialization intensity index of 0.25 (United Nations Industrial Development Organization 2014).

As the Zambian state has executed formal democratic and capitalist institutional modifications, social divisions have uncomfortably formed along class lines, yet its people continue to have a low level of class-consciousness (Dresang 1974, 1608). They instead, through a moderately institutional (see Mbigi 1997), vertical, and exclusionist collectivism, continue to value rigid social hierarchies, adherence to Familism, and a preference for the values of solidarity, compassion, respect, and dignity (Edwards et al.

2004, 18). Zambian social identity remains centered on ethnicity, making it highly collectivist and is therefore not in a position to widen the GTR.

*Case #5: Zimbabwe.* Zimbabwe was formerly wealthy, but is now destitute and remains highly rural. It ranks 120 out of 196 globally when measured by its 2016 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of $32 billion (international dollars) and becomes even poorer when considering its 2016 GDP PPP of $1,860 per capita (constant 2011 international dollars) (World Bank 2017). It is also one of the least urbanized countries globally, ranked 162 out of 196 at 32.2 percent (World Factbook 2017).

Further, it is somewhat surprising that Zimbabwean society is highly collectivist because it is not a uniformly, nor highly, fractionalized society. Zimbabwean collectivism rejects Welzel's (2010) self-expression values and instead values ascribed family roles, status (see Bourdillon 1987), and Familism, and tends towards a broad institutional, vertical, and exclusionist collectivism, in part, because the Shona ethnic group is so large (70 percent of the population) and dominant. This may also help explain President Mugabe's (1980-2017) ability to have sustained such a long tenure. Its mixture of cultural and ethnolinguistic homogeneity and religious heterogeneity still produce rather rigid social hierarchies. However, its exclusionist collectivism (see Mbigi 1997) differs from East Asian corporate collectivism (Jackson 2004, 158), even though both are found in homogeneous societies. Zimbabwean culture is highly collectivist and is therefore not in a position to widen the GTR.

*Inter-State Market Forces*

Much wealth brings many enemies.

—African proverb

*Case #1: Burkina Faso.* Burkina Faso has long been a sleepy backwater pre-colonially, colonially, and now as an independent state. Not much changed politically and economically in the years following Upper Volta's independence from France in 1960, as Burkinabé leaders retained much of the semi-authoritarian tendencies of the French colonizers. The state has purposefully been a late adopter of modern institutions and engagement in the global economy. Its largest and most influential ethnic group, the Mossi, work to rebuff the adoption of modern institutions that would erode its own cultural and political control. President Sankara's (1983-1987) refusal to submit to the imperialist domination of the global market (Wilkins 1989, 385) typifies this long-held attitude.

> The Burkinabé revolution will provide a method of combating hunger, thirst and ignorance, but most of all, it will fight against the forces of neo-colonialism and imperialist domination – Sankara (1984, 143)

He and likeminded leaders believed that accepting foreign aid and investment "would spell an end to the Popular Revolution" (Wilkins 1989, 388). Regardless of its anti-globalization rhetoric, since independence, Burkina Faso has attracted neither trade, investment, remittances, or aid. At one time, remittances flowed through the Burkinabé diaspora, primarily from Côte d'Ivoire (9.41 percent of GDP in 1986), but has dried up since that country fell into civil war in the early 2000s. Remittances dropped to a low of 0.918 percent of GDP in 2004 and leveled out at 3.348 percent of GDP in 2016 (World Bank 2017). Burkina Faso's developmental challenges are attributable, in part, to the fact

that it is a landlocked country with an arid climate in a historically non-geo-politically strategic and relatively peaceful region.

Burkina Faso has begun to make strides to politically decentralize and engage its meager economy in global trade since a military coup d'état led by Blaise Compaoré, overthrew and killed President Sankara on October 15, 1987. Since then, it has been a World Bank model reformer in its development of neo-liberal policies, which has improved its economy absolutely, yet it remains relatively one of SSA's most undeveloped countries (Harsch 1998, 625). In 1991, it adopted its first IMF and World Bank structural adjustment program, which pushed for political decentralization and lower social spending (Harsch 2009, 269). It made a drastic move from Marxist isolation to deregulation and privatization of formerly state-owned entities to attract foreign investment. Between 1988 and 1993, this resulted in an increase from three to 13 million dollars annually of FDI (World Bank 2017), which is substantial for the Burkinabé economy, yet nearly unmeasurable globally.

Before the 1980s, Burkina Faso was quite peaceful, but due to this rapid development, there has been an increase in social conflict. More than 200 public demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, strikes, and riots railing against police violence, corruption, and displacement from urban modernization (Harsch 2009, 265) took place in 30 urban municipalities from 1995 to 2007. The most prevalent of these was 50 local labor disputes in 15 different cities (2009, 278). Because it had so long been off the radar of global traders, investors, and donors, Burkinabé society is behind the development curve, even for SSA standards. Therefore, the potential GTR widening effect that consistent trade, FDI, and FPI could have on Burkinabé society is absent.

*Case #2: Ethiopia.* Non-military aid and remittances subsidize nearly 50 percent of Ethiopia's federal budget (World Bank 2017), while there is a paucity of trade and investment. Ethiopia has little petroleum; therefore, it exports coffee in trade for oil, producing a massive trade deficit. Bilateral economic relations between Ethiopia and China increased considerably in the 2000s, where the latter began providing aid and trade, in exchange the Ethiopian government has given "unabashed diplomatic support for deeper Chinese involvement in Africa" (Adem 2012, 155).

Ethiopia is the second most populous country in SSA and has a growing diaspora, but is consistently in the bottom 10 percent of countries regarding economic development (United Nations Development Programme 2018). Investment is more sustainable for income generation, job creation, and development than remittances, so creating and fostering an environment conducive to investment, particularly outside of the capital, Addis Ababa (Chacko and Gebre 2013, 504), is critical. However, the government does not make it easy for investors to obtain land and financing and there is substantial information asymmetry, weak contract enforcement, and capriciously changing policies (2013, 495), making investing laborious and risky.

Therefore, the Ethiopian diaspora is consigned to sending remittances rather than investment capital to support family and in-groups, but the results have been mixed. Between 1994 and 1997, Ethiopian households relied heavily on remittances in the wake of the civil war (see Bigsten et al. 2005), yet they only amounted to 0.107 to 0.355 percent of GDP. Since 2000, the Oromo diaspora has funded political activities through remittances, donated primarily to opposition parties (Fransen and Kuschminder 2009, 21). Remittances received were minimal until 2004, when they increased to 1.32 percent

of GDP and have since then varied between 0.806 and 3.23 percent of GDP, figures that are still small compared to other SSA states (Klugman 2009: 161). Knowing remittances' full effect in SSA is difficult since informal remittances average between 35 and 75 percent of formal remittances in the region (Freund and Spatafora 2005, 22).

Ethiopia has long been on the receiving end of military and non-military aid as a heavily contested Cold War proxy site. During the Cold War, the communist derg and its opposition funneled aid strategically to build domestic political support, resulting in aid dependence (Kissi 2005, 128). Post Cold War, as Ethiopia's political value waned, it received consistently below $1 billion in non-military official development assistance (ODA) annually. Not until 2001, due to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) debt reduction program, did it began to increase, whereby 2009 it rose to $3.8 billion, subsidizing 44.7 percent of Ethiopia's GDP, and has remained at that level since (World Bank 2017). It received $3.2 billion in 2015, the largest in SSA and fourth most globally following Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (World Bank 2017).

Famine has also made Ethiopia dependent on international food aid. Many in the development literature have assumed that agricultural food aid disincentivizes domestic food production in receiving countries (see Gelan 2007; Schultz 1960), but they have been unable to pinpoint at what threshold and in what contexts this occurs. Food aid accounted for nine percent of Ethiopia's cereal budget from 1994 to 2006, rising to as much as 16 percent in 2003 (Tadesse and Shively 2009, 942). When limited to only those foods that are domestically produced, as food aid rises above 10 percent of domestic production, prices for those same domestic products decrease, which is the point at which domestic production begins to be disincentivized (2009, 942).

Ethiopia has fallen into an aid trap and cannot get out. Its best minds have left the country for better opportunities, and while its diaspora provides remittances, its attempts at investment are rebuffed by maladaptive government policies. An environment of weak investment, outsized Chinese market influence, and extensive non-military aid has produced a rather non-competitive market where non-military aid has become a crutch. For these reasons, the potential GTR widening effect that trade, FDI, and FPI could have on Ethiopian society is absent.

*Case #3: Nigeria.* Nigeria is a petrol-federation deeply integrated into the global economy; therefore, its success is central to global stability (Paden 2005, 3). "Crude oil production accounts for 90-95 percent of Nigerian export revenues, over 90 percent of foreign exchange earnings, and 80 percent of government revenues" (Paden 2008, 12). The overdependence on centralized oil revenues and the global petroleum market has produced a volatile trade swing from a surplus of $63.7 billion in 2012 to a deficit of -$6.2 billion in 2016 (Rimmer 1985, 444).

The negative relationship between economic development and civil conflict is the most robust finding to emerge from the conflict literature (Hegre and Sambanis 2006, 533), yet it does not appear to hold in Nigeria. Weak state security institutions scare away plenty of potential foreign investment (Fawole and Bello 2011, 217), yet many more are willing to brave the insecure environment for economic gain, in the oil-rich Niger Delta region (Ostien 2009, 3), making Nigeria the largest recipient of FDI in SSA.

Nigeria has a sizable diaspora because it has the seventh largest population globally. In 2000, its diaspora was over four million (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2012), and in 2016 it had risen to wide-ranging estimates of

five to 15 million. The Nigerian government actively encourages investment of its diaspora (Adepoju 2008, 40) as a way of filling gaps left by uneven economic development. However, this occurs more often through remittances than FDI or FPI. Remaining well below one percent of GDP until 1993, Nigerian remittances increased to five percent of GDP and then dropped to 2.6 percent of GDP ($2.3 billion) in 2004, fluctuating from thereon between 1.6 and 13 percent of GDP, to an all-time high amount of $21.1 billion, yet only a moderate 4.4 percent of its GDP in 2015 (World Bank 2017).

A pervasive culture of dependence on the federal government's oil revenues has developed where Nigerian states have little incentive to generate internal revenue or create an investing and contracting environment that is safe and conducive to entrepreneurial activity. Its people have developed a "cake-sharing psychosis" (Babangida 1992, ii) where they expect to consume without producing. To fill the gaps during volatile trade and investment cycles, Nigeria has also received a substantial amount of military and non-military aid, which has made it vulnerable to aid shocks. Steadily below $1 billion until 2005, net ODA spiked to $11.4 billion in 2006, only to return to fluctuate between $1 and $3 billion from there forward (World Bank 2017). In 2005, it experienced a 963 percent increase in aid, the third largest aid shock of any country in the 2000s (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2013, 63). It has also been destabilizing to have too few major donor sources, with only two in Nigeria (2013, 63). Neo-liberal structural adjustment policies attached to this aid aim to diversify exports, stabilize trade balance, and reduce the excessive public sector, yet

> High rates of recidivism, low rates of completion, and an insignificant catalytic effect on other capital flows are presented as evidence that IMF

> programs and the related conditionality do not work in the way intended; or more accurately, often do not work – Bird (2001, 1862)

With many potential traders and investors vying for access to its unrefined petroleum, Nigeria has many viable options for engaging with inter-state market forces, yet its trade, investment, remittance, and aid policies have produced uneven economic development rather than consistent growth. Its outsized remittances and non-military aid overshadow the positive benefits of high trade and investment in its petroleum sector. For these reasons, the potential GTR widening effect that trade, FDI, and FPI could have on Nigerian society is absent.

*Case #4: Zambia.* For half a century, copper mining and sales composed the majority of the Zambian economy, making it wealthy by SSA standards (Tordoff 1977, 60). In the 1960s alone, the copper industry made up 60-70 percent of its GDP and 90-95 percent of government revenue (Larmer 2005, 32). While the overreliance on this single non-renewable resource as an export has influenced uneven cycles of development and increased foreign debt, it does not appear to have produced a lasting "resource curse." However, the recent fluctuation of the copper market from a spike up to $3.5/lb. in 2006—nearly tripling in value—dropping down to $1.3/lb. temporarily in 2009 as a result of the global recession, and rebounding back up to $4.5/lb. in 2011, has tested this.

Zambia has been subject to structural adjustment programs through tied aid, their primary purpose to service donor repayments (2005, 44). Some programs have removed food subsidies on staple crops, while others have weakened trade unions' ability to protect wages and jobs (Simutanyi 1996, 837) and the government has shown little concern with providing a social safety net or correcting resulting poverty. Zambia struck

a trade deal of Chinese oil for Zambian copper. Even though large amounts of FDI and FPI have not flowed into Zambia by opening its markets in the 1990s, the Chinese have been active investors. Zambia ranks third in SSA and nineteenth globally for Chinese foreign investment (United National Conference on Trade and Development 2008). As early as 1971, China had begun investing in Zambia through the Tan-Zam railway, financed by a 401 million dollar interest-free loan (McKay 1971, 25). Some claim this new era of Chinese investment is a more humane and inclusive one than the past Western era of tied aid (Carmody and Hampwaye 2010, 86). Indeed, many SSA economies, including Zambia's, developed rapidly from 2004 to 2008 under Chinese trade and investment influence. However, market openness since the mid-1990s has decreased average tariff rates globally and in SSA to around 10 percent to attract trade (World Bank 2016), which has placed Zambia (4 percent) in a weak bargaining position, leaving it vulnerable to becoming entrenched in a mercantilist relationship with China (Kurlantzick 2007, 140).

With few options for trade partners and a minimal amount of remittances (0.2 percent of GDP) (World Bank 2017), the Zambian economy hangs somewhat precariously between the West and China. Most significantly, China's overwhelming influence in Zambia has produced a less competitive market, and its non-diversified, copper-rich economy does not always attract well-intentioned investors and donors. For all these reasons, the potential GTR widening effect that trade, FDI, and FPI could have on Zambian society is absent.

*Case #5: Zimbabwe.* The effect of inter-state market forces on Zimbabwe hinge on Chinese influence and the Land Acquisition Amendment Act of 2000, where President

Mugabe chose autonomy and isolationism over prosperity and global engagement. Regardless of potential justifications for doing so, President Mugabe's seizure of white Zimbabwean farmers' lands in the name of returning them to the original inhabitants, turned out to be a foreign policy and agricultural disaster, prompting global condemnation and domestic chaos. It caused a decade of distress and isolationism where Zimbabwe's relatively strong $2,577 GDP per capita, PPP (in constant 2011 international $) in 2001, dropped to $1,209 in 2008 and eventually leveled out at $1,860 in 2016. Annual GDP growth rates for the years 2002 to 2008 were all negative, reaching double digits in 2003 and 2008, prompting the rejection of its currency in favor of the U.S. dollar and South African rand. To counter the effects of hyperinflation, lost trade and investment, and food insecurity, remittances from its diaspora rose to 14.2 percent of GDP in 2010 (Howard-Hassmann 2010, 901) and 15.9 percent of GDP in 2011 (World Bank 2017). However, remittances also carry the risk of exacerbating inflation.

Zimbabwe has few trade partners and a large trade deficit of $2.37 billion in 2016, up from $534 million in 1995 (United Nations Comtrade 2016). It has a long-suffering trade and investment relationship with China that has endured through good and bad times. In 2016, Zimbabwe purchased 13.4 percent of its imports from China in trade for Zimbabwean tobacco. While not large by international standards, in 2013, Zimbabwe received $600 million in FDI from China, the third highest amount in SSA (World Bank 2013). However, this investment relationship was threatened by President Mugabe's unexpected 2016 enforcement of the dormant 2008 indigenization law requiring foreign and white-owned companies to surrender or sell a majority control to black Zimbabwean's or the government (Xinsong 2016).

Zimbabwe's history with tied aid and structural adjustment is mixed. The Economic and Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) implemented in the early 1990s failed to meet many of its stated goals. Requisite removal of social safety nets hit the working poor hardest, which provided President Mugabe with an enraged and ready voting block to keep him in power. Because of its censured status among the global community, sans China, in 2010, Zimbabwe received a rather small amount of ODA non-military aid ($758 million) (World Bank 2010) to help pull it out of its economic tailspin. Zimbabwe, once a flourishing economy, has, since the Land Acquisition Amendment Act of 2000, slid deep into economic isolation; therefore, the potential GTR widening effect that trade, FDI, and FPI could have on Zimbabwean society is absent.

*Social Network Composition*

> The friends of our friends are our friends.
>
> —African proverb

*Case #1: Burkina Faso*

*Fractionalization*

Burkina Faso is ethnolinguistically heterogeneous, but only moderately religiously so, and is culturally homogeneous. Burkinabé have a strong oral tradition rather than a written one; thus their low adult literacy rate of 36 percent (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2015) is not surprising. There are 81 languages (66 indigenous) spoken (Simons and Fennig 2017) in a country the size of New Zealand or Ecuador. This extreme linguistic diversity has the potential to cloister groups, yet the French language instituted during colonialism serves as a trade language

that has been able to bridge some of this diversity, most easily in urban areas. Also, even though there are many languages, most derive from the same language family.

The dominant, Mooré-speaking (Gur language family) Mossi ethnic group composes over half of the Burkinabé population and is the geographic, cultural, economic, and political heart of Burkinabé society. The Mossi have a strong sense of identity and confidence because they have resided in the Sahel region for over half a millennium, yet this pride has been tempered with humility by the French colonial experience. Mossi communities are surrounded by a conglomeration of smaller, more rural, localized native (Bobo and Senufo), transplanted (Gurunsi and Lobi), and regionally spread (Fulani, Gurma, Mandé, and Tuareg) ethnic groups that are rarely able to garner sufficient political cooperation to oppose the Mossi. Most of these groups have resided in the region for many centuries, resulting in an isomorphic melding of their cultural practices.

Burkinabé are religiously mixed, with a Sunni Muslim majority and a Catholic Christian minority. Both are highly syncretistic, with traditional spiritualism remaining a strong identity driver, which dampens the expansionistic tendencies of these global religions. This syncretism is apparent in the Mossi's deep need for "privacy about personal affairs and plans because disclosure makes one vulnerable to fatal attacks by sorcerers and witches" (Fiske 2002, 83). Religious adherence does not mirror ethnolinguistic or political allegiances; there has not been a serious attempt to institute Shari 'a, even in majority Muslim areas.

Table 41

*Burkinabé Ethnic Groups*

Table Continued

| Name | Percent Pop. | Origin | Religion |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mossi | 50.2 | Native | Sunni Muslim Majority/Christian Minority |
| Fulani | 9.4 | Regionally Spread | Sunni Muslim |
| Bobo | 5.9 | Native | Sunni Muslim |
| Gurma | 5.8 | Regionally Spread | Sunni Muslim |
| Mandé | 5.3 | Regionally Spread | Sunni Muslim |
| Senufo | 4.9 | Native | Non-Religious |
| Gurunsi | 4.8 | Transplant | Traditional Spiritualism Majority/Sunni Muslim Minority |
| Lobi | 4.7 | Transplant | Traditional Spiritualism |
| Tuareg | 2.5 | Regionally Spread | Sunni Muslim |
| Other | 6.5 | Mixed | Mixed |

Sources: Simons and Fennig 2017; WorldAtlas.com 2017

Data extracted from sources on 09/21/17.




*Figure 5.* Upper Volta Ethnic Groups.

Source: University of Texas Libraries 1968

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### *Physical Proximity*

Physical proximity measures how closely strangers live, work, shop, and play to one another, indicating the potential for inter-group interaction if an effective incentivization or coercive driving force is present. Burkina Faso is not an expansive country, and its people are moderately mobile, which increases the likelihood of inter-group interaction; yet, having a highly rural and poor population (Wouterse and Van Den Berg 2011, 357) with many small geographically bounded dense network ethnolinguistic groups, increases its propinquity, reducing inter-group interaction.

Migration comes in two forms: continental and intercontinental. Most Burkinabé migration is continental and primarily internal, rural-to-urban and urban-to-urban (Harsch 2009, 287), which increases physical proximity and inter-group interaction. The Mossi, concentrated in the middle third of the country surrounding the capital, Ouagadougou, are more self-sufficient than other ethnic groups, which does not provide it an incentive for inter-group interaction. However, smaller rural groups must have some interests met outside the group, which drives them toward regional urban centers such as Bobo-Dioulasso and the capital.



*Figure 6.* Burkina Faso Population Density.

Source: LandScan 2000

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### *Technological Proximity*

Technological proximity measures how technology makes it easier or harder for strangers to access, learn about, and communicate with each other; findings are categorized into communications and transportation technologies for reporting. Members of Burkinabé communities communicate face-to-face most often and when not in physical proximity, via mobile phone. They receive news and information via radio rather than television or internet, as there are only two television stations and only 14 percent of its population has internet access (World Factbook 2017). However, access to

cellular networks and radio coverage is not equal, but instead is concentrated in urban areas and along major road networks, with greater access among the Mossi and Bobo ethnic groups.

Regarding transportation technology, Air Burkina, the only commercial carrier, has but three planes operated out of Burkina Faso's *lone* paved airport in the capital city of Ouagadougou. Thus its domestic air transport system does little to increase technological proximity. The only passenger rail line cuts through the country east to west, connecting the Mossi with several of the western ethnic groups and Cote d'Ivoire, but little else. Even though its road network is mostly unpaved, wealthy and poor Burkinabé's travel via bus, rather than air, rail, or private vehicle, which increases technological proximity since public transportation increases the likelihood that strangers will interact.

Burkina Faso largely skipped the landline telephone revolution and went straight to mobile as evidenced by its landline system's rank of 141 out of 196 and mobile of 74 out of 196 (World Factbook 2017). Mobile phone usage has increased rapidly throughout SSA (Elegbeleye 2005, 197), especially in Burkina Faso, where districts only a few years prior had little to no mobile phone access. As of 2007, Burkina Faso exceeded 50 percent Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) coverage (International Telecommunications Union 2016). Much of the literature on technology and culture assumes mobile phones are "best understood as an expression of the increasing 'individualisation of society" (Hahn and Kibora 2008, 90). However, in the West African context, random strangers do not regularly communicate via mobile phone except for business purposes. Instead, mobile networks are highly insular in the SSA context (Slater

and Kwami 2005, 3). Increasing domestic migration has spread many ethnic groups between villages and cities; the mobile phone provides a tie that sustains their networks. Instead of atomizing collectivist Burkinabé society, mobile phones serve as a tie mechanism for maintaining and strengthening in-group trust within non-physically proximate groups (Hahn and Kibora 2008, 90).

*Social Proximity*

The active Burkinabé protest culture regularly places different ethnic, linguistic, cultural, class, and religious groups in physical proximity and their shared purpose of protest often places them in sustained social proximity where they develop lasting network ties across groups. Because the Mossi have such outsized influence over all areas of Burkinabé society, they often serve as the hub for network connections between the other smaller ethnic groups. This is what occurred through the progressive development and spread of 50 local labor protests in 15 different cities in 2008 (Harsch 2009, 278). Once groups begin to have their interest of vocational solidarity met by other groups, they tend to be open to having other interests met by them, which further strengthens their network ties.

Religious expansionism that is present in many other highly religious SSA countries is not as present in Burkina Faso, perhaps due to the absence of large numbers of Pentecostal Christians and Muslims advocating Shari ‘a. Being a highly syncretistic society also makes Burkinabé Christian and Muslim divisions less intense. This, in itself, does not necessarily incentivize religious groups to interact more frequently or intensely, strengthening their network ties, but when they do interact, there is less conflict and demonization of the “Other.”

Burkinabé political parties tend to form based on physical region more than along class, ethnic, or religious lines, which keeps party interests more localized and allows increasing physical and technological proximity, when present, to strengthen network ties between groups. There is not a clear relationship between the Mossi majority and the strength of the Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (CDP) party (Stroh 2010, 16). Instead, one's geographic home area explains party affiliation better than one's ethnic affiliation (Basedau and Stroh 2009, 7). However, ethnicity does serve as a driving force *within* parties (Stroh 2010, 1). When this occurs, party social structure tends to fractionalize, weakening party network ties and strengthening intra-ethnic ties within the party. The more a strongman model of governance is present, the more likely a party is concentrated in that leader's home region, which allows him to "control the network and protect his self-interest" (2010, 24).

### *Power Differential*

Burkina Faso's former unipolar power differential was evidenced by minority groups' inability and even strong collective desire, to mount a challenge to Mossi cultural, economic, political, and social dominance. The Mossi have greater access to market and state resources, although this has not resulted in extreme inequality and deprivation of minority groups; instead, all ethnic groups are relatively poor, including the Mossi, because Burkina Faso does not have many resources over which groups may compete.

While one might assume 72.6 percent of a country's exports coming from gold (United Nations Comtrade 2015) would sow discord and uneven development, it has not done so. Burkina Faso does not have a history of ethnic, political, or religious violence.

The Mossi's long, relatively peaceful, if not prosperous, post-colonial hold on power has come, in part, through the political dominance of the Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP) party, which has been able to pull a sufficient number minority groups into its coalition. Its long-time leader, President Compaoré (1987-2014), turned Burkina Faso into a de facto single-party state from 1996-2014. Only after his push to remove his term limits, claiming, "What I'm doing is legal" (British Broadcasting Company 2014), was sufficient protest sparked, setting off the Burkinabé uprising of 2014 that resulted in his removal and a reordering of the CDP-stacked Parliament and a push for a multipolar power differential.

The composite effect social network composition has on the Burkinabé GTR, through ethnolinguistic fractionalization, moderate-high physical, moderate technological, and high social proximity, and a multipolar power differential has the potential to widen the GTR.

*Case #2: Ethiopia*

*Fractionalization*

There is no single cultural, economic, political, or religious heart of Ethiopian society, but instead many; the government has seen fit to institutionalize this reality through ethnic-based federalism. Ethiopians are ethnolinguistically heterogeneous and moderately religiously and culturally so. Only 49.1 percent (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2015) are literate as they have a long oral tradition that has inhibited literacy. There are 90 languages (85 indigenous) spoken in Ethiopia (Simons and Fennig 2017), yet urbanized populations and the education system utilize English, which bridges some of the linguistic diversity. Ethiopia's many languages are

clustered into four language families (Semitic (13), Cushitic (24) Omotic (28), and Nilo-Saharan (19) (Hudson 1999, 94). Within each of these families, there are subtle differences, yet when comparing across them, there are many. Most ethnolinguistic groups are native to the region, with only the largest, the Oromo, being regionally spread throughout the Horn of Africa.

Ethiopians are a highly religious, non-syncretistic people with 77.2 percent claiming to attend weekly religious services (World Values Survey 2007) and only 3.3 percent (World Factbook 2016) practicing traditional religions. There is a slight Ethiopian Orthodox Christian majority (50-55 percent) (Adogla 2010) and a significant Sunni Muslim minority. While the Oromo and many of the smaller ethnolinguistic groups are religiously mixed, Christian and Muslim, the Amhara and Tigray are primarily Ethiopian Orthodox. Both faiths have formed uniquely over many centuries from the more recognizable Western and Middle Eastern variants of their respective faiths, with Ethiopian Orthodox considered an African Independent Church (AIC). These groups seem different, though less so when compared to other world religions such as Hinduism or Buddhism. Both are Abrahamic faiths that have been shaped by the other over many centuries.

Religion is not the only identity driver for Ethiopians; instead, ethnicity and historical nationalistic pride are also important. Many Ethiopians, regardless of ethnicity or religion, are proud to be Ethiopian because of its long-held autonomous existence, notwithstanding being a Cold War proxy site and having extensive aid influence. This nationalistic drive has held a diverse assortment of Ethiopians together under the extreme duress of the Ethiopian Civil War, the Ethiopian-Eritrean War, and the rule of the

communist derg. Even though the Tigray have outsized political influence, each ethnic and religious group feels it has a role to play in the state and perpetuation of nationalistic pride; the institution of ethnic-based federalism attempts to accommodate this desire.

Table 42

*Ethiopian Ethnic Groups*

| Name | Percent Pop. | Origin | Religion |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oromo | 34.5 | Regionally Spread | Mixed (non-Orthodox Christian/Muslim) |
| Amhara | 26.9 | Native | Orthodox |
| Tigray | 6.1 | Native | Orthodox |
| Somali | 6.0 | Regionally Spread | Muslim |
| Sidama | 4.0 | Native | Protestant |
| Gurage | 2.5 | Native | Mixed (Muslim/Orthodox) |
| Welayta | 2.3 | Native | Protestant Majority/Orthodox Minority |
| Hadiya | 1.7 | Native | Protestant Majority/Orthodox and Muslim Minority |
| Afar | 1.7 | Regionally Spread | Muslim |
| Gamo | 1.5 | Native | Protestant Majority/Orthodox Minority |

*Note:* Ethnic groups over 1 million.

Sources: Ethiopian Central Statistical Authority 2007; Simons and Fennig 2017; WorldAtlas.com 2017

Data extracted from sources on 09/21/17.




*Figure 7.* Ethiopian Religion by Region.

Source: GeoCurrents 2013

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### *Physical Proximity*

Ethiopia is a densely populated, rural, and rugged country, which serves to increase and decrease its propinquity and likelihood that its many small ethnic and linguistic groups will interact. Increasing Ethiopian physical proximity is driven by migration for economic opportunity and internal displacement due to conflict. Ethiopians are a mobile population, due to the Ethiopian Civil War, as well as "overpopulation, famine, poverty, land scarcity, governmental agricultural policies, and a lack of agricultural resources" (Fransen and Kuschminder 2009, 13), which have *forced* its many

ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups to interact to meet many of their unmet interests. In 2009, there were 300,000 internally displaced persons due to violence and famine (IDPs) (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2010, 57). An estimated 50 to 70 percent of Ethiopians have migrated either temporarily or permanently (Mberu 2006, 522-3), primarily from rural to urban areas, because cities provide jobs, attracting members of all ethnic and religious groups. However, rural-to-urban migration decreased significantly during the rule of the derg (Berhanu and White 2000, 92). While the modern context is not ideal for increasing generalized trust, it does produce inter-group interaction, the first step to that end.



*Figure 8.* Ethiopian Population Density.

Source: LandScan 2000

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*Technological Proximity*

The Ethiopian government owns and regulates most of the 36 radio and six television stations that serve as Ethiopians' primary sources for news and information about other Ethiopians. Because most Ethiopians live in small villages, they communicate most often face-to-face with others in physical and social proximity and when not in physical proximity, those in urban areas, along major transportation corridors, and the wealthy, communicate via mobile phone. Only 51 percent of Ethiopians have mobile subscriptions (World Bank 2016), and the internet is not highly utilized as only 15.4 percent of its population have access to it (World Factbook 2017). What access there is to cellular networks and radio coverage is higher in the center of the country, where most live, with better access among the larger Amhara, Oromo, and Tigray ethnic groups. Often left out of communications technological proximity are the Afar and Somali ethnic groups in the more sparsely populated eastern region.

Ethiopia's transportation infrastructure is fragmented. The quality of road networks are spotty, and there exists little passenger rail service. However, recently, desiring to get its coffee exports to the global market more effectively—though not having a seaport of its own—it has set out on a massive rail infrastructure project, the Chinese-financed and -built Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway—to gain access to Djibouti's seaport. Realizing its overly ambitious goal, it has scaled back its rail development in other areas. Therefore, Ethiopians do not ride the rails because there are very few of them unless one lives in Addis Ababa where SSA's first light-rail system is located.

Ethiopian roads are unsafe. Ethiopia has the fifth highest number of road fatalities per motor vehicle globally (World Health Organization 2015), yet it has one of the fewest vehicles per capita (Ethiopian Ministry of Transport 2017). Therefore, not many Ethiopians own and drive private vehicles, yet when they do, people die at high rates. The few wealthy utilize the state-owned Ethiopian Airlines, the only commercial carrier, which has seventy-five planes operating out of Ethiopia's 17 paved airports. The air transport system is helpful for increasing technological proximity among the wealthy, yet most Ethiopians are poor and therefore travel via public bus, which increases technological proximity.

### *Social Proximity*

Class identity is not a strong deterrent to establishing network ties between modern Ethiopians. While there is more wealth in Addis Ababa, most Ethiopians are rural and equally poor, having the third lowest GINI (33.2) (World Bank 2010) in SSA. While the defeated communist Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Party (EPRP) recognized the right of self-determination, it viewed class as the primary concern of Ethiopian society (Aaron 2005, 57). However, the victorious Tigreyan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) believed the primary cleavage is along ethnic lines (Markakis 1994, 254) as is evidenced by its selection of an ethnic-based model of federalism. While Amharan culture is most pervasive and the Tigray dominate politics, there also exists a strong pan-Ethiopian nationalism.

War, overpopulation, and famine have forced ethnic and religious groups into closer physical proximity, which increases their potential for social proximity through sustained network ties. However, long before the communist derg ruled, Orthodox

Christians and Sunni Muslims were in relatively close, albeit, somewhat static, physical and social proximity. Ethiopian Orthodox and Muslim communities are unique among their global counterparts. Neither are highly expansionistic in the way that many Pentecostal Christians and Muslim advocates of Shari ‘a tend to be; there has been no serious attempt to establish Shari ‘a except in the Afar Region, which is administered by the federal government through the Proclamation no. 188 of the Ethiopian Constitution (Ethiopian Constitution 1999, 1185). Being the dominant religious groups, they tend to honor the religious institutions in the status quo, rather than challenge them. Religion has not been the conflict intensifier that it is in many other highly religious SSA countries. Instead, inter-group conflict is driven by ethno-nationalistic competition, as is evidenced by the Eritrean secession and the establishment of an ethno-federation, which has provided a buffer between groups. This model of federalism, through its goal to mitigate potential conflict, has served to decrease network ties between ethnic groups; it is but one barrier in a society with many drivers of social proximity.

### *Power Differential*

Ethiopians have traded freedom in favor of development. The Ethiopian multipolar ethnic power differential is driven by the power politics of the dominant Tigray minority group. The two largest—though not dominant—groups, the Oromo and Amhara, each composes about one-third of the population and are surrounded by a conglomeration of much smaller ethnic groups, including the Tigray. Both groups have strong nationalistic identities, as they have inhabited the region for over two thousand years, yet their refusal to share power, rooted in their collectivist fear of compromise leading to dilution of their distinctiveness (Handler 1988, 49), has left open this

opportunity for the Tigray. "The ideological, ethnic and political differences of these groups have made it a monumental task to develop a long-lasting political framework" (Engedayehu 1993, 29). The answer to this dilemma in 1991 was establishing a federation of ten ethnic-based states "designed to enhance popular participation in governmental and political affairs at the grassroots level" (Keller 2002, 27), the most-fully ethnic-based federalism of any country (see Turton 2006). This may appear democratic because it provides ethnic groups *de jure* autonomy and control over their regions and has even empowered them to secede if so desired (Selassie 2003, 64), but has not afforded all groups a meaningful voice in national politics. Also, enhancement of "group rights do not at all entail the respect of individual rights" (Vestal 1999, 165). The Tigray have been able to dominate the political and military elite through the leadership of Meles Zenawi for the last quarter century by gaming this system of ethnic federalism and playing the Amhara, Oromo, and Southern Nations off each other.

Since the Amhara, Oromo, and Southern Nations have not been able to cooperate to mount an opposition to the Tigray, they have joined them instead to form an uncomfortable alliance through the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The remaining 19 regional parties, 12 national parties, and ten parliamentary party coalitions representing smaller ethnic groups have not been able to mount a challenge to this alliance to the extent that in 2015, the EPRDF won all 547 seats in parliament, making Ethiopia a *de facto* one-party state. This precarious centralized political arrangement disguised as a federation (Keller 2002, 46) has not reduced violent conflict. Instead, it has reduced institutional trust (Brietzke 1995, 35) and has provided groups space to "reassert their cultural identity and revitalize their culture, which was

suppressed for generations" (Mengisteab 2001, 20). It has produced ethnic-based conflict, in the form of protest, riots, and violence, to the point that the government shut down internet access following the August 6, 2016, #OromoProtests that took place across more than 200 cities.

The composite effect social network composition has on the Ethiopian GTR, through ethnolinguistic fractionalization, high physical, moderate technological, and high social proximity, and a multipolar power differential has the potential to widen the GTR.

*Case #3: Nigeria*

*Fractionalization*

Answering the Nigerian social network composition question requires a religious lens. Nigeria's old "ethnic problem," expressed through the Biafra War, has morphed into primarily a "religious problem" (Paden 2005, 203). This has occurred, in part, because Nigerians are likely the most religious population globally, having the highest service attendance (World Values Survey 2014) and from the state strategically bisecting ethnic homelands with new political divisions to weaken ethnic dominance to promote state-based identities (Suberu 2001, 5). This policy is based on the theory that the most "successful multi-ethnic federal systems are those in which there is at least a certain level of divergence between the constituent units and their ethnic divisions" (Elazar 1993, 194). In theory, state-based identities should increase, empowering ethnic minorities and placing them on a level playing field to pursue their political agendas (Rothchild 1991, 39); however, in reality, Nigerian religious identities have grown stronger.

Nigeria is one of the most ethnolinguistically, religiously, and culturally fractionalized countries globally. Its tremendous linguistic diversity comes primarily from the Niger-Congo language family, while a minority come from the Afro-Asiatic language family (e.g., Hausa). Its overall literacy rate is a low 60 percent (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2016) in keeping with many oral societies of West Africa. Many of its hundreds of small ethnolinguistic groups, composing 32 percent of the population, are native to the region while many larger ones, Hausa-Fulani (29 percent), Yoruba (21 percent), and Igbo (18 percent) together composing 68 percent of the population, are regionally spread throughout West Africa. Even though there are 527 spoken languages (510 indigenous) (Simons and Fennig 2017), urbanized populations and the education system utilize English, bridging some of the extreme linguistic diversity.

Since the first recorded settlements in the 9th Century A.D. (Falola and Heaton 2008, 23), the region has been highly fractionalized. Had not the British joined the northern and southern regions together into a single colony, they would likely be two or more separate Yoruba-Igbo Christian-majority, and Hausa-Fulani Muslim-majority states today. The Hausa Muslim culture is more hierarchical while the mixed Christian and Muslim Yoruba culture is more representational (Paden 2005, 204), and the Christian Igbo culture is more equity-oriented and participatory (Njaka 1974, 139). This has led to widespread misunderstanding about group representation, communication, and coordination.

Table 43

*Nigerian Ethnic Groups*

Table Continued

| Name | Percent Pop. | Origin | Religion |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hausa-Fulani | 29 | Regionally Spread | Sunni Muslim |
| Yoruba | 21 | Regionally Spread | Christian Majority/Sunni Muslim Minority |
| Igbo | 18 | Native | Christian |
| Ijaw | 10 | Regionally Spread | Christian |
| Kanuri | 4 | Regionally Spread | Muslim |
| Ibibio | 3.5 | Native | Christian |
| Tiv | 2.5 | Native | Mixed |

Sources: Simons and Fennig 2017; WorldAtlas.com 2017

Data extracted from sources on 09/21/17.




*Figure 9.* Nigerian Linguistic Groups.

Source: University of Texas Libraries 1979

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The isolated institutionalization histories of the north and south are the driving force of modern religious identity formation in Nigeria (see Tajfel and Turner 1979, 35).

British colonial administrators' sensitivity to the importance of religion in northern Nigeria (Hansen and Twaddle 2002, 136) and resulting "Indirect Rule" of the region allowed Islam to strengthen (Ojo 2007, 177), as northern Muslims and southern Christians were kept apart. The Nigerian population is a near-religious parity with 46.45 percent Christian and 45.53 percent Muslim (Johnson and Grim 2013). There are Christian majorities in the South South and South East regions, Muslim majorities in the North West and North East regions, and mixed populations in the North Central and South West regions. The current Nigerian model of governance, "may not be as well suited to balancing Muslim and Christian religious communities as expected" (Paden 2005, 208), particularly those in the Middle Belt states.

Table 44

*Nigeria – Religion by Region*

| Region | Percent Christian | Percent Muslim |
|---|---|---|
| | Christian Majority | |
| South East | 96.71 | 0.30 |
| South South | 93.86 | 3.36 |
| | Mixed Populations | |
| North Central | 59.44 | 38.7 |
| South West | 62.74 | 36.49 |
| | Muslim Majority | |
| North West | 8.94 | 90.02 |
| North East | 20.79 | 78.39 |

Source: Johnson and Grim (2013)

Data extracted from source on 03/06/17.

### *Physical Proximity*

Nigeria is a relatively expansive and moderately rugged country, which decreases physical proximity. However, because it has the seventh largest population globally (186 million) (World Bank 2016) and only the 32$^{nd}$ largest landmass, it is one of the most

densely populated SSA countries, increasing physical proximity. Having a relatively large urban population (49.4 percent) decreases its propinquity in urban areas, yet its hundreds of small geographically bound, dense network ethnolinguistic groups, increases it in rural areas.

Nigeria has an urban-rural and north-south divide. While it has a sizable diaspora, because it has a large population, most migration is internal, from rural to urban and south to north and is typically incentivized by economic opportunity rather than coerced by violence. In the late 1920s and again in the late 1960s there were significant population migrations from the south to the north, increasing its share of the population from a parity to 57.03 percent in 1931 and 64.42 percent in 1973, respectively (Udo 1998, 356). Between 1963 and 1973, the annual intercensal growth rate in the mostly rural and less mobile north was as high as 6.8 percent and in the more urban and mobile south as low as -0.62 (Adepoju 1981, 33; Campbell 1976, 247; Suberu 2001, 151). Since the 1970s, it has had one of the highest urbanization rates in the world (Paden 2008, 10). The population growth rate remains high in 2017, with an estimated 4.3 percent between 2015 and 2020 (World Factbook 2017). Therefore, while many members of small ethnic groups interact in urban areas, there is a nesting effect for those remaining in ethnic homelands, leaving them triply insulated from urban populations and other small ethnic groups with whom they are not physically, technologically, or socially proximate.



*Figure 10.* Nigerian Population Density.

Source: LandScan 2000

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### *Technological Proximity*

Nigerians are highly mobile with moderate communications and transportation options; however, in rural areas, whom one interacts with depends mostly on religious affiliation. Nigerians communicate face-to-face and via mobile phone when not in physical proximity and receive news and information via sixty radio and 106 television stations. The internet is not highly utilized as only 25.7 percent of its population has access (World Factbook 2017). Access to mobile networks and radio and television

coverage is widespread. However, left out of communications technological proximity are some rural Muslim-majority states in the North West and North East regions. An active media drives religious expansionism as an estimated 40 percent of state and private television and radio station revenues come from religious broadcasting (Ihejirika 2004; Ojo 1999, 8). It is also often the culprit of disseminating misinformation nationally about localized conflict events, which triggers subsequent violent events in more distant locations (Weidmann 2011, 13).

Nigeria's transportation infrastructure is unevenly developed. It has an extensive road network, but most are in poor condition. Its rail network connects many of its most populous cities, but is primarily for cargo and does not connect to the capital, Abuja; as well, Lagos is the largest city in the world without a metro rail system. Domestic air travel is relatively inexpensive in Nigeria through one of its 16 commercial carriers operating 73 aircraft out of 40 paved airports (World Factbook 2017); at least three of these carriers fly domestic routes. Therefore, poor Nigerians travel via bus and the wealthy via air, which is useful for increasing technological proximity between groups.

*Social Proximity*

Physical proximity increases the likelihood of increasing social proximity and stronger network ties between groups. Nigerian Christians and Muslims, neither very syncretistic[4], have remained mostly separate due to tribal and British colonial alignments until acute post-independence institutional failures unintentionally seeded civil society growth by providing opportunities for expansionistic Christian and Muslim groups to fill

[4] Only 1.7 percent of Nigerians adhere to traditional religions (World Factbook 2016).

basic needs, security, and service gaps for their adherents. This has resulted in the development of two active and separate religious-based civil societies that choose not to link their networks for greater effectiveness in filling gaps left by the state (Juergensmeyer 2005, 152). Further, this has grown into a competitive enterprise and sustained violent turf war between disparate ethnoreligious civil society groups (Agbese 1996, 139), where they may choose to extend services to other groups with the purpose of increasing political power (Juergensmeyer 2005, 153) or securing conversions (2005, 157).

Religious violence is less frequent but more intense. Non-religiously-motivated social conflict related to elections, economic markets, and the environment is more widespread in Nigeria but rarely threatens one's ontological and epistemological foundation as religious conflict does. One example of religious conflict is the fallout from the 2002 Miss World pageant that was supposed to be held in Kaduna, Nigeria. Provocative marketing angered Muslims to the point of rioting, shutting down the event, and the death of over 200 people, exposing Nigeria's fractured public sphere (Obadare 2004, 192). There has also been widespread conflict on university campuses over religious symbolism (Paden 2008, 62), proselytizing, and claims on sacred space. One rare counterexample to this trend comes from the city of Kaduna where the inter-religious collaboration of Imam Muhammad Ashafa and Pastor James Wuye has been successful in connecting Christian and Muslim civil societies for conflict resolution dialogue.

Nigerian religious civil societies are in closest physical, technological, and social proximity in Middle Belt states and the Southwest Region; however, their interaction regularly results in religious or ethnoreligious conflict in the former via indigene-settler

disputes (Hansen and Twaddle 2002, 130). In the Christian-dominated Niger Delta, civil society effort is focused on environmental sustainability, and in southern urban centers, a focus on micro-credit programs. "Conflicts are unique events and must be understood within their own contexts" (Druckman 2005, 9). The Middle Belt states provide a unique environment where religious parity, land conflict, and Shari' a law intersect to produce a religiously polarized civil society. Poorly constructed and unevenly adjudicated indigene-settler policies that reminiscent of rent controls in gentrifying urban centers, restrict citizens' free movement and stagnate the market. Added to this, conflict triads involving Christians, Muslims, and government officials, further complicate relations (Roniger 1994, 76). State officials often view civil society as competitors of power, influence, and legitimacy (McGowan 2003, 340).

The social tie that binds these groups together is often conflict over sacred space (Gambo and Omirin 2012, 522). Both are expansionist religions that are prone to buying into demonizing myths of the "Other." Christian proselytism, particularly the more assertive Pentecostal version (Ihejirika 2009, 12, 20), differs greatly from Islamic Shari 'a and Da' wah. Their intentions are similar, but their means to that end are not (Krings 2008, 64). Aggressive Renewalist Christian preaching and the unthoughtful construction of churches in Muslim-majority areas has escalated conflict, as has the implementation of Shari 'a (Islamic Law)—which does not separate religion from the political and economic (Hoexter et al. 2002, 115). Both of these cause religion to spill out from the private sphere into the semi-public and public spheres (Ojo 2007, 176). Muslims consider Nigeria overly influenced by western education, symbols, and legal codes (Gbadamosi 1978, 536). Because Nigerians have experienced numerous regime changes, "some say,

military and civilian political rule have failed Nigeria, why not try a Islamic theocracy" (1978, 528). The federal government has thereby taken a flexible approach to its constitutional separation of religion and state, allowing Muslim religious symbolism to adorn public buildings (e.g., bus stops and post offices) (Osaghae 1994, 129). The implementation of Shari' a criminal code in mixed religious populations throughout most northern and some Middle Belt states has caused conflict (Obadare 2004, 178). Even if non-Muslims are not adjudicated under Shari 'a, it alters the cultural, economic, political, and social environment for all citizens. Further, Hisba (local voluntary vigilante enforcers of Shari 'a), attempt to close bars and hotels, even in non-Muslim areas (Paden 2005, 164). Social conflict increases when non-Muslim minorities are willing to fight back.

Social conflict is most intense in the religiously-mixed Middle Belt and northern cities of Kano, Kaduna, Jos, and Bauchi, where settlement patterns fall along religious lines (Gambo and Omirin 2012, 133) and highly dense Christian and Muslim communities share few network ties. Kaduna and Jos have gone so far as to zone Christian and Muslim neighborhoods in an attempt to control inter-group interaction. "By 2002, residents were describing particular areas of Kaduna town as '100 percent Christian' or '100 percent Muslim" (Human Rights Watch 2003, 5). The rule of law is weak throughout Nigeria, but because these groups are mobile, competing over limited resources, highly religious, and physically, but not socially proximate, routine land tenure, indigene-settler, and property disputes become spiritualized resulting in indivisible sacred space conflict. Therefore, conflict often serves as the first network tie

between these communities and subsequent information asymmetry and miscommunication lead to further conflict and strengthening of negative network ties.

### *Power Differential*

The bipolar Nigerian power differential occurs along religious and geographic divisions. However, this does not mean ethic, class, and resource-based conflict does not occur. Religious majorities in each of Nigeria's 36 states have autonomy to shape political institutions to their advantage and to the detriment of local religious minorities; this is most pronounced in Middle Belt states. One-third of Nigeria's 36 states have a religious parity (primarily Middle Belt), while 13 are Christian-majority (all southern), and 12 are Muslim-majority (all northern). Moreover, the more states and LGAs there are, the weaker each one is alone, encouraging the formation of alliances between like-minded political units along religious lines, resulting in "the bipolar cleavages of North versus South and Muslim versus Christian" (Diamond 2001, xv). Religious parity among substantial ethnolinguistic diversity (see Igwara 2001) makes Nigeria an excellent test case for analyzing power struggles common to federations (Paden 2005, 4) (e.g., colonial independence, civil war, resource conflict, religious extremism, and social conflict), where there are often no clear winners or losers, leaving all sides hopeful they will prevail.

The Nigerian Constitution forbids the adoption (1999, Ch. I, Part II, Section 10), support, or discrimination (1999, Ch. IV, Section 38) based on religion by the federal or state governments and protects the freedom of religion for all (Nmehielle 2004, 730), however, this has not happened consistently in practice. Modern religious conflict in Nigeria can be traced to the national debate on Shari 'a at the Constituent Assembly in

1977-78 (Osaghae 1994, 123). Also, since the General Babangida administration upgraded Nigeria's membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1986, "Nigeria appears to have degenerated from a religiously peaceable to a religiously polarized federation" (Suberu 2001, 17). The Nigerian Christian-majority south has dominated the economy, while the Muslim-majority north has been successful in achieving political dominance (Kukah 1993, 259). From 1979 to 1999—minus the 84-day Ernest Shonekan Interim National Government—no Christian had led Nigeria (Obadare 2006, 669 citing Agbaje et al. 2005). Modern Nigerian politics under the Fourth Republic is quite active with several dozen political parties, 14 of them active, with two highly relevant: the left-leaning All Progressives Congress (APC) and the right-leaning People's Democratic Party (PDP). The PDP dominated the first decade of the Fourth Republic, so much so that within the party, it struck an informal power-sharing agreement for alternating the nomination of its presidential candidates between a Christian and a Muslim (Suberu 2001, 16). The APC was cobbled together by several smaller Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba parties to challenge this PDP dominance and was successful in doing so with President Buhari's 2015 win.

Nigeria is not all conflict and violence. The appearance of widespread conflict due to the chaotic arrangement of informal and formal Nigerian institutions is often mistaken for actual violence (see Fearon and Laitin 1996). Social conflict tends to be concentrated in areas of religious parity, while religion is often not the root cause of conflict. Because religion is quickly becoming the primary means of Nigerian identity, economic and political disputes become imbued with religious significance. When Nigerian Christians and Muslims are physically proximate, equally powerful, and

governed by an inconsistent rule of law, the intensity of conflict increases (see Ojo 2007). In this uncertain and highly competitive political environment, religious groups feel a sense of urgency to stake out their claim and ensure the "Other" does not have greater access to state resources, land, markets, and public spaces than they do, thus rendering some of these disputes indivisible and subject to intensified conflict. However, religiously intensified conflict over land and public space (sacred space conflict), erupts in short, intense, localized bursts (Salehyan et al. 2012, 507) and does not often spread. It has altered settlement patterns and land use in the Middle Belt, particularly in Kaduna and Plateau states (2012, 509) where each group is large and powerful enough to think it can eventually prevail against the "Other." What aggravates this type of conflict further is when law enforcement sides with either Christian or Muslim communities, which produces complex triadic conflict, enemy alliances, and damaging political behavior (see Saperstein 2004). Oppositely, clear religious majorities are present in Christian-majority southeastern states and Muslim-majority northwestern states. In Nigeria's most populous city, Lagos (9 million), which is three times larger than the next two largest cities, Kano (3 million) and Ibadan (3 million), there is a diverse mixture of ethnicities, languages, classes, and religions.

The composite effect social network composition has on the Nigerian GTR, through ethnolinguistic and religious fractionalization, high physical, high technological and moderate social proximity, and a bipolar power differential has the potential to widen the GTR.

*Case #4: Zambia*

### *Fractionalization*

Zambia's population is ethnolinguistically and religiously heterogeneous, but culturally homogenous. It is more ethnically diverse than linguistically, as most of its languages proceed from the common Bantu language family. There are almost double the number of ethnic groups (73) as there are languages (46, with 37 being indigenous) (Simons and Fennig 2017). Zambians have a low literacy rate at 63.4 percent (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2015), and their official language is English, which bridges some of the linguistic diversity between groups. Just four ethnic groups (Bemba, Tonga, Nyanja-Chewa, and Loiz) compose 48 percent of the population (Simons and Fennig 2017), the first two being the larger and native to the area, while the latter two, smaller and regionally spread throughout southern Africa.

Zambia's official religion is Christianity, with 97.6 percent claiming that faith (Pew Research Center 2010). However, Zambian Christianity is not a cohesive body as demonstrated by its high religious fractionalization, substantial syncretism, and many small and widespread evangelical and African Independent Church (AIC) sects. The remainder of Zambian Christians are the more formally institutionalized Catholic Church and mainline Protestant denominations. The Catholic Church has dioceses represented in each province and is more involved in public life as a voice of social justice, while evangelical denominations and AICs focus more on church growth and proselytism.

Table 45

*Zambian Ethnic Groups*

| Name | Percent Pop. | Origin | Religion |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bemba | 21 | Native | Christian |
| Tonga | 14 | Native | Christian |

Table Continued

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nyanja-Chewa | 7 | Regionally Spread | Christian |
| Lozi | 6 | Regionally Spread | Christian |

Sources: Simons and Fennig 2017; WorldAtlas.com 2017

Data extracted from sources on 09/21/17.




*Figure 11.* Zambian Linguistic Groups.

Source: Zambian Translators International 2017

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


*Figure 12.* Zambian Ethnolinguistic Groups.

Source: Muturzikin.com 2007a

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### *Physical Proximity*

The Zambian population is sparse and spread out, which decreases its physical proximity, yet it is not a particularly rugged terrain, increasing its potential for physical proximity in the presence of effective incentives or coercion. It has a moderately urbanized (44 percent) population, which grew at a rate of 4.2 percent between 2000 and 2010 (Zambian Central Statistical Office 2013, 25). Because it is a highly mobile society, there is the potential for domestic isomorphism between ethnic regions, which is evident by its homogeneous culture.

Zambian rural to urban migration patterns are driven by economic development and opportunity (2013, 1) more than conflict and violence. The many smaller geographically concentrated ethnic groups do not migrate from their home regions to other ethnic home regions, but instead to urban areas in their region and eventually on to where the most jobs are located in the Copperbelt and Lusaka provinces. Between 2000 and 2010 rural eastern and western provinces have lost population to the more urban Copperbelt and the Copperbelt has subsequently lost population to neighboring Lusaka, the capital region, rising as high as 10.4 percent of the Copperbelt's population in 2010 (2013, 10). This migration pattern does not place ethnic groups in proximity to each other except in the few large urban centers. Therefore, home area ethnic populations are not in physical proximity.



*Figure 13.* Zambian Population Density.

Source: LandScan 2000

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### *Technological Proximity*

The Zambian state built an extensive—by SSA standards—landline telecommunications infrastructure, but it is mostly idle as only one percent of the population utilize it while 75 percent have mobile subscriptions (World Bank 2016). The rapid diffusion of mobile technologies has made its landline infrastructure unsustainable to develop further; such is the state of many of its industries and infrastructure. While Zambians primarily receive domestic news and information via sixty-eight radio stations,

their access to other southern African societies through electronic communications is quite limited. The internet is not highly utilized as only 25.5 percent (World Factbook 2017) of its population has access to it, severely decreasing its ability to benefit from the experiences of other societies facing similar challenges (Larmer 2005, 43).

What exists of Zambia's transportation infrastructure is relatively sound thanks to Chinese investment and trade of Zambian copper for development of its transportation sector (see Brautigam 2009). This deal has primarily worked because China is the world's largest consumer of copper (Carmody and Hampwaye 2010, 87) and Zambia requires the increased reliability of its transportation network to bring its copper and other exports to market. As a result, the Zambian national government has awarded many Chinese companies contracts for road, railway, and airport infrastructure building and maintenance (2010, 88). Traders, investors, and donors have mustered sufficient buy-in from Zambians to launch infrastructural projects, but once off the ground, maintaining them has proven difficult. As a result, much of its road network has gone through cycles of growth and deterioration, to the point that by 1980, it was valued at US$2.3 billion, shrinking to US$1.5 billion by 2000 (World Bank 2010).

Zambia does not have the most extensive rail network in SSA, but because it has relatively forgiving terrain, access to external financing, the incentive to get its copper to market, and a relatively peaceful post-colonial development period, its rail system is in better condition than many of its neighbors. Because Zambians do not own many private vehicles and domestic air travel is almost non-existent and prohibitively expensive with only one carrier, they ride the rails and public buses. The more urban and centralized Lusaka and Copperbelt provinces have the best access to all of these communications

technologies and transportation infrastructure and are therefore the most technologically proximate. Mostly left out of technological proximity are the more sparsely populated Western, North-Western, and Northern provinces.

*Social Proximity*

An HIV/AIDS prevalence of 12.4 percent (UNAIDS 2014), rising as high as 16.2 percent in 1998 (World Bank 2017), directly affecting over one million people and much more indirectly, has made even the most straightforward decisions complicated. The Zambian cultural, economic, political, and social structure has been altered by individuals' purposefully planning daily activities so to avoid contact with particular people or groups for health or taboo reasons, choosing whom to consider for marriage, and means for how to care for infected group members (Frank 2009, 34). This has resulted in an added layer of network separation between ethnic groups.

Zambia's economic growth has been primarily limited to urban areas, increasing economic inequality to the sixth highest Gini (57.1) globally (World Bank 2015), which has produced an extensive urban-rural divide and network separation. The government has perpetuated this growing divide since independence by subsidizing maize meal consumption "to benefit urban constituencies, particularly the unionized workers in Lusaka and the Copperbelt" (Simutanyi 1996, 833). Linguistic diversity does not serve as a barrier to social proximity since English is the official and primary trade language. The highly syncretistic nature of Zambian Protestantism and Catholicism (12 percent prevalence of traditional spiritualism) (World Factbook 2016) and the lack of competing global religions reduces the expansionistic nature of Christianity in this context, which both decreases inter-group interaction and conflict.

*Power Differential*

While Zambia is not an ethnic-based federation, its administrative divisions are predicated mainly on Zambia's four major politically cohesive ethnolinguistic groups (Bemba, Nyanja, Lozi, and Tonga) (Dresang 1974, 1606). The Zambian economy is concentrated in Bemba and Tonga areas (Copperbelt and Lusaka provinces), leaving all other areas dependent on them. Its post-colonial multipolar power differential has been kept in balance by strongman President Kaunda and the socialist United National Independence Party (UNIP) from 1964 to 1991. His strategic management of competing ethnic groups through the distribution of copper wealth, allowed him to establish a unipolar *de jure* and *de facto* single-party state. However, under sustained pressure, he eventually allowed multiple competitive parties, which promptly unseated him. This has spurred an active democratic society with competitive elections, though not free from corruption.

The Zambian civilian government has strategically managed the military through recruitment. As well, recruitment of Northern Rhodesian and eventually Zambian law enforcement officers expanded from five ethnic groups to twelve (Haantobolo 2008, 92) representing all regions, with most posted outside their home region. Consequently, no single ethnic group could dominate the military or law enforcement institutions (Lindemann 2010, 10). Later, during the Second Republic, the fruits of this strategy shown in that each major ethnolinguistic group has cycled through top military leadership positions (2010, 13).

The composite effect social network composition has on the Zambian GTR, through ethnolinguistic and religious fractionalization and cultural homogeneity,

moderate physical, moderate technological, and low social proximity, and vacillation between a multipolar and unipolar power differential does not have the potential to widen the GTR.

*Case #5: Zimbabwe*

*Fractionalization*

Zimbabwe is moderately ethnolinguistically homogeneous, highly cultural homogenous, and religiously heterogeneous. Zimbabweans are highly literate (87 percent) (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2016), and their languages usually align with their ethnic groups. There are 21 languages (16 being indigenous) spoken in Zimbabwe (Simons and Fennig 2017), with all of them receiving official state language status, which tends to reinforce divisions between groups. However, English, commonly spoken in urban areas, relieves some of this tension. The most dominant ethnolinguistic group, the Shona, compose 70 percent of the population, while the largest minority, the Northern Ndebele, make up 16 percent. There are also a dozen much smaller ethnic groups, half native and the other half regionally spread. Zimbabweans are highly Christian (85 percent) with a Protestant (Anglican and Methodist) majority and Roman Catholic minority.

Table 46

*Zimbabwean Ethnic Groups*

| Name | Percent Pop. | Origin | Religion |
|---|---|---|---|
| Shona | 70 | Regionally Spread | Protestant Christian |
| Northern Ndebele | 16 | Regionally Spread | Protestant Christian |
| Tswa | 1 | Native | Protestant Christian |
| Kunda | 1 | Native | Protestant Christian |
| Nsenga | 1 | Native | Protestant Christian |
| Manyika | 1 | Native | Protestant Christian |
| Ndau | 1 | Regionally Spread | Protestant Christian |

Table Continued

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Venda | 1 | Regionally Spread | Protestant Christian |
| Kalanga | 1 | Regionally Spread | Protestant Christian |
| Tswana | 1 | Native | Protestant Christian |
| Lozi | 1 | Native | Protestant Christian |
| Nambya | 1 | Native | Protestant Christian |
| Tsoa | 1 | Native | Protestant Christian |
| Tonga | 1 | Regionally Spread | Protestant Christian |

Sources: Simons and Fennig 2017; WorldAtlas.com 2017

Data extracted from sources on 09/21/17.




*Figure 14.* Zimbabwean Ethnolinguistic Groups.

Source: Muturzikin.com 2007b

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*Physical Proximity*

Zimbabwe is a relatively compact country with a forgiving terrain, which increases the likelihood of physical proximity. Zimbabweans are a highly mobile population, though this does not result in close physical proximity between ethnic groups. Being a highly rural population (67.8 percent) (World Factbook 2017), concentrates its urban populations in the cities of Harare and Bulawayo. Much of Zimbabwe's lack of physical proximity is explained by the history of the Shona and Northern Ndebele ethnolinguistic groups, which are two strong nations contained in one state. The Shona occupy the northeastern and central Mashonaland provinces surrounding the capital Harare, deeply rooted in the area for over a millennium, while the Northern Ndebele have resided primarily in the Matabeleland provinces in the southwest of the country surrounding Bulawayo for nearly 200 years. During the Rhodesian Bush War, violence was the most common driver of internal migration and in the years following, economic deprivation and political turmoil. Nearly a quarter of Zimbabweans of all ethnic groups, but more so Northern Ndebele, fled to South Africa and Botswana in the mid-2000s due to food insecurity and hyperinflation (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2008, 21) resulting from President Mugabe's land policies. Many others remain internally displaced because of Mugabe's gentrification plan, Operation Murambatsvina, which uprooted over half a million of Zimbabwe's most impoverished citizens (United Nations Human Settlements Programme 2005).



*Figure 15.* Zimbabwean Population Density.

Source: LandScan 2000

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


*Figure 16.* Zimbabwean Food Insecurity – June 2008.

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World Food Program (WFP) 2008

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### *Technological Proximity*

The Shona-led government controls the few radio and television stations through which Zimbabweans receive their news and information. The internet is not highly utilized, as only 23.1 percent of its population have access (World Factbook 2017). Cellular subscription rates are 83 percent (World Bank 2016) therefore when group

members are not physically proximate, they can remain technologically proximate, though this does not increase technologically proximity between groups. The Shona and Northern Ndebele have greater access to these communications technologies than do smaller ethnic groups.

Zimbabwe's rail and road networks are adequate. There are nearly 200 airports (17 paved) indicating its developing past and yet few travel by air via the only carrier, the government-owned, Air Zimbabwe, which has been in and out of business during the 2010s due to financial difficulties. Zimbabwe's terrain and physical size do not necessitate air transport, and thus its air transport network does little to increase technological proximity. Oppositely, its 3,427 km rail network and extensive road system connect much of the country. Therefore, Zimbabweans travel via "chicken bus," rail, and because they have the third most vehicles per capita in SSA, the wealthy travel by private vehicle.

*Social Proximity*

The Shona and Northern Ndebele have an almost religious adherence to their ethnic identities and homelands. Their shared British colonial experience did not unify them nor produce many strong network ties even though they fought against a common enemy in the white settler regime. When the threat of their common enemy was removed, hostile feelings between them returned and increased—every group needs an enemy to define itself (see Volkan 1988). In the absence of social proximity, isomorphism has not caused their informal institutions to converge, but they have instead developed separately and differently.

The HIV/AIDS epidemic has ravaged and restructured Zimbabwe's already complex society. Multiple layers of social complexity ensure that those infected from one ethnic group are doubly or triply isolated from those in other groups. It has resulted in a substantial drop in average life expectancy for Zimbabweans, from 61.92 years in 1986 to a low of 40.68 years in 2002 and rebounding back up to 59.61 in 2015 (World Bank 2015). Its national HIV/AIDS prevalence rate rose to a high of 28 percent in 1997 and has since come down to 13.5 percent in 2016 (UNAIDS 2016), which is still over 1 million infected and many more millions affected.

Not even this common, potentially network-tying, experience has produced isomorphism between Shona and Northern Ndebele institutions. The infection rates vary significantly between these groups; Northern Ndebele areas (Matabeleland South at 21 percent) are almost double that of Shona and other ethnic minorities (Manicaland at 10.5 percent) (Zimbabwe Health and Child Care Ministry 2016). The reality of potential physical proximity, yet deep social separation between these groups is evident in the two districts with the highest (27.6 percent in the Bubi District of Matabeleland North Province) and lowest (6.6 percent in Gokwe North District of Midlands Province) infection rates (UNAIDS 2014, 11), being separated by only two districts and a span of 170 miles. HIV/AIDS spread so rapidly throughout the Northern Ndebele because they are highly mobile within their home region. The more mobile populations are more vulnerable to HIV/AIDS than settled populations (International Organization for Migration 2002, 1).

*Power Differential*

Modern Zimbabwean administrative divisions are predicated mostly on pre-colonial Shona and Northern Ndebele territories, which the British eventually codified. Its post-colonial unipolar power differential has been cemented for 37 years by Shona strongman, President Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front Party (ZANU-PF). His status as the hero of the independence movement was established through the Rhodesian Bush War victory over the white minority rule of Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front (RF). The eventual merger of Nkomo's competing Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) with his own Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) to form ZANU-PF during the Third Chimurenga, afforded him legitimacy among the Shona and proper fear among the Northern Ndebele. Additionally, his symbiotic relationship with the military elite has secured its long-term allegiance until on November 14, 2017, when President Mugabe was removed from power through the Zimbabwean military's *progressive* coup d'état, writ, "national democratic project" (Chiwenga 2017).

> As the president's authoritarian grip on the state has been gradually slipping in the face of growing opposition, the military has grown more and more involved in politics – LeBas and Mangongera (2014, 68)

Former Vice President Mnangagwa replaced Mugabe, but the Zimbabwean military wanted to make "it abundantly clear that this is not a military takeover" (Moyo 2017). However, some outside observers claim, "If it looks like a coup, walks like a coup and quacks like a coup, then it's a coup" (Onyango-Obbo 2017).




*Figure 17.* Zimbabwe Election Results – First Round (Parliamentary Seats) – 2008.

Source: Zimbabwe Electoral Commission 2008

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


*Figure 18.* Zimbabwe Parliamentary Seats – 2017.

Source: Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) 2017

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The composite effect social network composition has on the Zimbabwean GTR, through ethnolinguistic and cultural homogeneity and religious fractionalization, low physical, moderate technological, and low social proximity, and a unipolar power differential, does not have the potential to widen the GTR.

## Conclusion

These findings provide insight into where the GTR discourse has been, its current state, and ideas for the direction it may go, revealing there is broad support for the

comprehensive examination of a social cause of the GTR. While the literature is justified in focusing first on state security and contract institutions and their well-documented effects on the GTR and giving secondary attention to the cultural effects of individualism-collectivism and market effects of globalization, a social focus extending beyond fractionalization is overdue. Fractionalization suffers from collinearity; the literature is unsure how ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization affect each other and which has the greatest effect on the GTR. Democracy presents another collinearity concern; the literature is unsure if it causes generalized trust or vice versa. Nonetheless, fractionalization has provided the literature a valuable base upon which to build a social explanation for the GTR. When including findings on proximity and power differential in addition to fractionalization, the size and quality of the literature on the social effects on the GTR grows substantially.

The time has also come for the trust literature to focus on the GTR rather than generalized trust level and to focus on its social causes, rather than its consequences. Generalized trust is a discrete phenomenon from in-group trust, yet it is less conceptually separable from institutional trust. This complexity arises because "people" legislate, execute, enforce, and interpret institutions. This overlap makes each substitutable for the other on a limited basis for achieving similar positive externalities. A high level of inequality is not as much of a problem in non-fragile states because a high level of institutional trust can substitute for low generalized trust. However, when examining theories of trust in fragile states, it is essential to know in what context one may substitute one for the other.

These findings reveal that each case's security and contract institutions are weak, yet minimally functional, rendering the state fragile, but not collapsed or failed. Each of their cultures is highly collectivist and economic relations tend towards export dependence and concentration and aid rather than balanced and diversified trade. While control cases exhibit common fractionalization, proximity, and power differential patterns, deviant test cases exhibit different patterns.

The trust literature suggests a wide GTR is a *necessary*, though not *sufficient* condition of a non-fragile state. Narrow GTR are possible in non-fragile states, and wide GTR are possible in fragile states. It also finds social diversity and state fragility are not sufficient conditions to produce an untrusting population; instead, a SSA society's slave trade legacy may explain its in-group and institutional trust compositions. While not all fragile states are highly fractionalized, many are; though this does not mean they are conflict-ridden, untrusting, and untrustworthy societies.

Chapter V follows by interpreting, comparing, analyzing, and synthesizing within- and cross-case findings through a most similar least likely multiple comparative deviant case analysis of the findings for each of the five selected cases, testing social network composition's effects on the GTR.

# CHAPTER V – COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS & SYNTHESIS

> Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.
>
> —Lewis Carroll, *Through the Looking Glass*

The third and final phase of George's (1979, 210) case study design (synthesis of findings) is implemented here through a most similar least likely multiple comparative deviant case analysis. The most similar, least likely, and deviant parts are accomplished through the case selection process, where control variables affect the dependent variable as negatively as possible, making necessary and sufficient claims very difficult to achieve. The two control and three test cases are *most similar* on control variable inputs and background factors, while they differ on the test independent variable input and resulting dependent variable outcomes. The two control cases are typical cases, while the three test cases are *deviant* outliers in that their dependent variable outcomes are unexpected and are *least likely* in that their control variable inputs negatively affect the dependent variable. The analysis is *comparative* in that case inputs and outcomes are compared, and research hypotheses are tested across all cases for each control and test variable (cross-case analysis) and variable interrelations are compared and synthesized per case (within-case analysis).

The hypotheses for the control cases (Zambia and Zimbabwe) claim all independent control and test variables have a GTR narrowing effect. The hypotheses for the test cases (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria) claim all independent control variables have a GTR narrowing effect, while the independent test variable has a GTR widening effect. Most hypothesis claims are either confirmed or affirmed. Control variable findings suggest, as hypothesized that all test and control cases are highly

collectivist societies governed by fragile, yet functional state security and contract institutions and unstable inter-state market forces, having a narrowing effect on the GTR. Test variable findings suggest, as hypothesized that the test cases have highly fractionalized and proximate societies with large power differentials, producing a widening effect on the GTR despite the GTR narrowing effect of the control variables.

There is predictability within complex systems of interaction. Sociological institutionalism and social capital theory provide the theoretical framework through which analysis of findings is conducted, where competing explanations for case outcomes are compared and tested using hoop and smoking gun tests through within-case and cross-case analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions in unfavorable fragile SSA state environments. This framework explains how institutions and social networks constrain behavior and how regional differences in fractionalization, proximity, and power differentials shape different trust environments. Voigt's (2013) three-step process for examining the de jure-de facto gap of formal and informal institutional conditions (size, embeddedness, strength, effectiveness, and duration), patterns (coercive, normative, and memetic isomorphism and institutionalization or deinstitutionalization), and structures (rules, norms, and scripts) is used for institutional analysis at group and societal levels. Collective action is made possible by embedding institutions in social networks; therefore, measuring and describing social network structures matter. Descriptive social network measures explain how strong and pervasive network ties are between groups by describing connectivity between groups within a society. One category of network measurement is social cohesion, which measures "the number, length, and strength of paths that connect actors in networks" (Galaskiewicz and

Wasserman 1994, 7). Greater social cohesion leads to shared views and behavior (Burt 1987, 1289). Cohesion measures: cliques, density, and structurally cohesive blocks describe the strength of in-group trust. Tie measures: homophily, propinquity, transitivity, and multiplexity describe the environments within and between groups that make bridging ties more or less likely. These measures are essential to examine because it is through weakly tied structurally equivalent nodes that networks connect through inter-group interaction and where the GTR may widen.

## Cross-Case Analysis

This section first examines how the control variables affect the GTR across all cases; and finally the primary focus, the testing of SNC's effects on GTR across all cases.

### *Control Variables*

Each case's security and contract institutions are weak, yet minimally functional, rendering the state fragile, but not collapsed or failed, and their cultures are highly collectivist, both producing a GTR narrowing effect. There is variation present in how trade, investment, remittances, and aid affect the GTR that must be explained. While all test and control cases have low investment, their trade, remittances, and aid measures vary. Zambia has relatively high trade and low remittances, and Zimbabwe has moderate trade, which could have a GTR widening effect, but they have not. This indicates that these control cases have a good fit but prompts the question of how much trade, remittances, and aid affect the GTR, at least in these cases. Of the test cases, Burkina Faso has moderate trade, Ethiopia has only moderate remittances, and Nigeria has only moderate non-military aid, which suggests minor weaknesses in test case selection.

These potential GTR widening effects are examined thoroughly to ensure they do not have a substantial GTR widening effect.

*State Security Institutions*

*How do institutions affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?*

$H_2$: Increasing state security and contract institutions widens the generalized trust radius in fragile states.

State security institutions is the first control criterion for widening or narrowing the GTR. State security institutions are minimally functional in all test and control cases, ensuring it is not what is causing wide GTR in the test cases. This passes a smoking-gun test and rejects the null hypothesis, confirming that security institutions have a negative effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all cases. This also passes a hoop test, disproving the state security institutions alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis. Both control cases also have minimally functional security institutions and a narrow GTR as hypothesized, suggesting a good control case fit.

When highly functional, state security institutions (e.g., military and law enforcement) provide society with an institutional trust-rich environment, where fear of internal and external threats of violence from states, non-state actors, other groups, or one's group are minimized. Institutional trust removes barriers to inter-group interaction and offers opportunities to widen the GTR. Low-security environments, oppositely, encourage groups to close ranks to protect group interests or when very low, force or incentivize groups to take their security interests into their own hands through vigilantism and seeking interests outside the group through violence. A secure interest-seeking

environment is one of the most important factors required for groups to feel safe having their interests met by other groups.

Social conflict is increasing across SSA and in each of the five cases in particular. There were 141 social conflict events recorded in SSA in 1990, increasing to 422 in 2010 (Salehyan 2012, 506). The increasing trend of protest and conflict is a byproduct of the early stages of democratization (Scarritt et al. 2001, 801) resulting from increasing inter-group interaction in fragile environments characterized by low legitimacy and weak capacity (see Herbst 2000; Obioha 2008; Van de Walle 2001). Some military and law enforcement standard protocols have transferred from the West to these cases through coercive, normative, and mimetic isomorphism; however, this has been insufficient to produce secure environments. Law enforcement institutions in each case suffer from the competing goods of selecting officers from local communities, which increases legitimacy but also increases the likelihood of corruption and favoritism. Even in Zambia (52.86), the most peaceful of the cases according to the World Bank's 2016 Political Stability and Absence of Violence and Terrorism measure, security institutions are fragile and not widening the GTR. The small and poorly trained and educated Zambian Defence Force has had few coup d'état attempts and has had difficulty managing conflict spillover from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Congo, DRC. One would then expect it to have a much wider GTR with such a politically stable environment, but it does not.

Even though the Burkinabé (15.24) have developed a relatively peaceful protest culture that has served as a needed pressure valve, recent Islamic spillover has occurred from Mali, and unstable leadership transitions have kept entrenched military leaders in power, perpetuating security institutions that sow mistrust between society and the

military. A desertion problem weakens the relatively small and undersupplied military; therefore, it is not surprising that many Burkinabé consider it illegitimate and ineffective. While it has carried out many coup d'états and supplied political leaders, Burkinabe norms, behaviors, and scripts do not take their cues from the military. Even more fragile security institutions persist in Ethiopia (7.62) and Nigeria (6.67) where specific regions are perpetually violent environments indicating highly negative inter-group interaction and narrower GTR in those areas. Civil war, secession, and food insecurity have dominated Ethiopia since the 1970s and freedom has declined since 2006 due to land rights conflicts, state use of force against citizens, proxy conflicts, and spillover from Somalia. The strong Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) is saturated with Tigray leaders, which makes the isomorphic transfer of high-quality western protocols unevenly implemented, whereas the centrally controlled Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP) fails to provide standard operating procedures across very different regional contexts. Local populations view them as outsiders, and many engage in vigilantism to take care of their own security needs. The Nigerian Armed Forces are deeply embedded in society, affecting many other state institutions and has a far reach, providing the most troops for the African Union (AU). It is so strong that it has developed a habit of stepping in to relieve the citizenry of ineffective civilian leaders. Even so, Nigerian domestic security institutions are minimally functional and struggle to manage intense ethnic, religious, and petroleum conflict. While improving since the nationalist-induced Biafra War (1967-1970) that killed upwards of six million people, the large, but ill-equipped Nigerian Police (NP) that handles law enforcement at the federal level fails to provide consistent enforcement across diverse contexts. This encourages many communities to pursue their

security needs through vigilantism. Because there are rarely mutually understood scripts shared between Christian and Muslim groups, information asymmetry increases while each seeks to meet its interests. Further, when the military has periodically overtaken the civilian government to restore stability, it has weakened institutional trust.

Finally, one might also expect Zimbabwe (24.29) to reside near Ethiopia and Nigeria, but because it has a unipolar power differential, the government has been able to keep a tight rein on its population's behavior. Its security institutions were born out of the disjointed and violent Rhodesian Bush War for independence against an entrenched settler regime that was also permeated with Cold War proxy conflicts, making it a source of spillover for neighboring countries. Built on this security foundation, authoritarian maladministration of the military produced a major depression, and Mugabe has employed guerrilla tactics to intimidate political opponents. The powerful Zimbabwean military has not attempted many coup d'états but has instead served as a tool of Mugabe to build political support among his base and instigate fear among ethnic minority groups, narrowing the GTR. Corruption and Shona favoritism are concerns in the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP). In-group trust suffers among Zimbabwean ethnic minorities who, because of severe upheaval, have difficulty even trusting their family members and neighbors.

*State Contract Institutions*

*How do institutions affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?*

$H_2$: Increasing state security and contract institutions widens the generalized trust radius in fragile states.

State contract institutions is the second control criterion for widening or narrowing the GTR. State contract institutions are minimally functional in all test and control cases, ensuring they are not causing wide GTR in the test cases. This passes a smoking-gun test and rejects the null hypothesis, confirming that contract institutions have a negative effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all cases. This also passes a hoop test, disproving the state contract institutions alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis. Both control cases also have minimally functional contract institutions and a narrow GTR as hypothesized, suggesting a good control case fit.

Formal contract institutions are initially shaped through the legislative process, find fuller meaning through the judiciary, and are legitimized by the citizenry. When highly functional, state contract institutions provide society with an institutional trust-rich environment with less information asymmetry and more fairly adjudicated contracts. Greater institutional trust often leads to increased opportunities to widen the GTR. This context also lacks common barriers to positive inter-group interaction. By contrast, poor contracting environments encourage adverse selection leading to moral hazard and increased transaction costs and conflict over competing claims. Groups may choose to take what they claim is theirs by force rather than rely on slow, unfair, and corrupt justice institutions. With these barriers removed, groups feel greater confidence having their interests met by other groups.

Contracting in SSA is centered on the rule of law, controlling corruption, and land tenure policy. Similar to their security institutions, as per the World Bank's Rule of Law and Control of Corruption measures for 2016, all cases score below the global mean. Also similar to security institutions, Zambia has the most functional rule of law (43.27)

and second most effective control of corruption (42.31) of the cases reflected in its relatively progressive, though varying regionally in its success. The Ethiopian rule of law (37.02) and control of corruption (39.90) are not much worse. While the Burkinabé rule of law (34.13) is on par with Ethiopia, its control of corruption (53.37) is the most effective of the cases because of the implementation of recent structural adjustment anti-corruption policies. As with security institutions, Nigeria's rule of law (13.94) and control of corruption (13.46) are some of the worst globally. Finally, while Zimbabwe may not be a highly violent environment, its terrible rule of law (8.17) and control of corruption (8.65) create an unpredictable contracting environment for agents, which decreases institutional trust and narrows the GTR.

When it comes to land, the cases manage the principle-agent problem poorly as they lack the specialization required to maintain a Western-style land tenure system. The coercive isomorphic transfer of colonial contract institutions has affected the development of land tenure regimes in four of the five cases, sans Ethiopia. Pervasive authoritarian strongman executive leadership has stunted legislative and judicial branches where contracts are written and adjudicated. A massive wave of land tenure policy modernization occurred in the 1990s and 2000s prompted by a donor-led second wave of structural adjustment. More than 20 countries accounting for more than 80 percent of arable land in SSA (Boone 2007, 566) including Burkina Faso in 1997, Zambia in 1995 and 2006, and Zimbabwe in 1992 and 2000, sought to modernize, individualize, and capitalize their longstanding customary land tenure regimes based on birthplace and tribal affiliation with the purpose of increasing land registration and titling to make it more productive and profitable. These productivity-driven policy adjustments put many

subsistence farmers at risk of losing their land titles. These governments have had difficulty wresting control of land rights from tribal leaders because the former often have less legitimacy than the latter. However, if market forces prevail, the privatization of land holdings is likely to increase as land values are driven higher by population growth and growing land scarcity (Boserup 1965, 77).

The fragile Burkinabé state has not been able to wrest full control of its land tenure regime from tribal leaders, making it a weakened and ineffective contract agent. Tribal leaders still have great legitimacy, which has made it difficult for the government to embed modern land tenure policies. Merely codifying formal land institutions has not provided the government legitimacy when behavior and scripts remain anchored to legitimized informal Burkinabé norms.

During the Cold War, Ethiopian contract institutions were subject to competing Western and communist coercive isomorphic forces. Its rapid cycling of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization between communism and privatization produced disjointed and weakly institutionalized land tenure policy and land insecurity. The weakness of their encoding and enforcement alike have allowed land titles to be misused by Tigray politicians as political favors within their political networks to ensure electoral victories. Through this means, the Tigray, an ethnic minority, has been able to game and shape the political system and institutions to its benefit. The state has realized that it is expensive to maintain a Western-style land titling infrastructure and has been mostly unwilling to prioritize it.

As with all federations, Nigerian contract institutions struggle to find the balance of power between the central state and political sub-units. It has erred on the side of

exerting enormous influence over states through a land tenure regime. When effective, contract institutions penalize or incentivize behavior, but the incentivization structure for Nigerian state agents to serve principles impartially is broken. It begins with the imperfect Constitution, which allows indigene discrimination against settlers regarding education, employment, and property ownership, which disincentivizes migration outside one's ethnic home area. As well, because Nigerian's are highly religious, indigene-settler disputes easily become infused with religious significance.

The Zambian government was relatively well-intentioned in its attempt at making the land market more stable and productive through a far-reaching Western model, Zambia's Land Act of 1995, which was updated in 2006 and embedded in the Constitution in 2016. However, this has produced the unintended consequence of a clandestine land market controlled by chiefdoms, which regularly deny women access to land title and abuse most fertile lands, producing land shortages and food insecurity. Many have lost confidence in the Zambian "rules of the game" due to continually unmet expectations. Land tenure disparity adds to growing economic inequality and affects means of capital exchange and effective scripts for meeting interests.

The Zimbabwean government has tried hard to avoid having its land tenure policies affected by western coercive, normative, and mimetic isomorphism. To combat this magnetic pull, President Mugabe needed an equal and opposite force, which required him to forego serving as a neutral agent in land adjudications. He enacted sweeping seizures of white farmers' productive farmlands to give to non-farming blacks, many of whom were his sycophants. The Land Acquisition Amendment Act of 2000 created a vast and embedded contract institution that affects institutions as far ranging as the

finance industry and commodity pricing and constructed new social norms and scripts. An unintended consequence of this rapid deinstitutionalization was a black market that emerged for not only luxury imports but also basic needs. These new landowners could not use the land as collateral for financing due to statutes limiting its use. Most were not skilled farmers, which caused food insecurity and eventually hyperinflation and major economic depression. The haphazard way in which this occurred produced many overlapping land entitlements and ensuing conflicts over claims.

*Individualism*

Cross the river in a crowd and the crocodile won't eat you.

—African proverb

*How does culture affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?*

$H_3$: Increasing individualism widens the generalized trust radius in fragile states.

Individualism-Collectivism is the third control criterion for widening or narrowing the GTR. All test and control cases have collectivist societies, ensuring it is not what is causing wide GTR in the test cases. This passes a smoking-gun test and rejects the null hypothesis, confirming that collectivism has a negative effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all cases. This also passes a hoop test, disproving the individualism alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis. Both control cases have collectivist societies and a narrow GTR as hypothesized, suggesting a good control case fit.

Individualism and collectivism are but two of many cultural traits these cases' populations exhibit, yet they are the ones that most affect the GTR. Pragmatically, individualism and collectivism are strategies for controlling norms, scripts, and behaviors

in a given space (Mitchell et al. 2000, 980). Prior to the implementation of modernizing policies first through colonialism in most of the cases and then through structural adjustment programs for all, collectivism served as an effective means of organizing their groups and societies. Because their groups tend to be highly dense actual small-world networks (see Milgram 1967), sustained transitivity is difficult to achieve between groups. However, when a society values individualism, in-group ties and biases weaken, which tends to reduce information asymmetry of other groups, increasing the possibility of inter-group interaction and having interests met outside the group, which widens the GTR.

These cases did not experience the Enlightenment in the same way Western Europe did. Martin Luther's 95 Theses served as the sparking event to diminish the Catholic Church as the institutional intermediary between God and man. John Calvin subsequently removed collective dualism from its cultural prominence, putting in its place less restricted individual agents (Buss 2000, 13). Made possible from this de- and re-institutionalization, were the French *Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen* (1789) and the American *Bill of Rights* (1774), which have served as isomorphic templates for so many subsequent constitutions. Mostly free of Enlightenment institutions, children in these cases and across SSA are taught collectivist scripts that subordinate the individual to the community, so they do not even imagine it is in the realm of possibility that they as individuals can solve problems alone (Poovan et al. 2006, 18). They have an unknown unknown problem.

> There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we

don't know we don't know – Donald Rumsfeld (2002)

All cases are highly collectivist and exhibit a broad or moderately institutional, vertical exclusionist collectivism. While they have high urbanization rates, they are some of the least industrialized and least wealthy countries globally. When comparing available data for the Hofstede (2001) individualism and House et al. (2004) collectivism measures, Nigeria, followed by Zambia, the two cases that entered globalization earliest, are also the least collectivist; this is not to say they are individualist societies as they are still quite collectivist. Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, and Zimbabwe, the three cases with stronger socialist histories, remain more collectivist.

Burkinabé society, most being poor and rural, revolves around the dominant Mossi culture, which has a strong preference for the values of honor, loyalty, solidarity, compassion, and Familism. Universalists require trustworthy institutions; these are not present in fragile states. Thus Burkina Faso and the other cases are institutional exclusionist collectivists that weigh and preference personal relationships when making behavioral choices.

Ethiopia appears only moderately poor when consulting standard economic measures, but most of its population is very poor. It is also one of the most rural populations with most living in small villages. Some of its ethnic groups are more collectivist than others are. Of its two largest ethnic groups, the Amhara are more hierarchically individualist and the Oromo more egalitarian collectivist. The Tigray has played off these cultural differences to shape political institutions to its benefit. Ethiopia is often measured pre-derg and post-derg. Pre-derg Ethiopian society was shaped by competing horizontal (equality and nationalism) and vertical (self-reliance and

centralized economy) collectivism. The derg oddly strengthened vertical collectivism by isolating society from western influences; providing a common cause, fate, and identity; and severely restricting resources. The derg's scientific socialism continues to influence modern ethnic and class structures.

Nigeria is one of the more industrialized countries in SSA and is wealthy, but most of its people are not. While most of the population is highly collectivist, there are pockets of individualism that are increasing. Nigeria exhibits extreme diversity from group to group along the individualism-collectivism continuum. Christians and Muslims tend to remain loyal to their members regardless of merit. There is widespread miscommunication between hierarchical Nigerian Hausa, representational Yoruba, and equity-oriented egalitarian and participatory individualist Igbo. Urban populations are less collectivist than rural ones. As urbanization increases, ethnic groups move gradually from collectivism towards individualism and tend to feel less solidarity within their group and greater solidarity with multiple other groups. However, while Nigeria is rapidly urbanizing, nearly half its people remain rural.

Zambia's moderately poor, non-industrialized, rural-majority population remains centered on collectivist ethnic identity; as much of society claims some variation of Christian identity, there is less need for religious positioning between groups. There is growing tension between the state's individualism-driven policies and entrenched highly collectivist ethnic and religious leaders. Zambia's extremely high inequality stems from a combination of its higher vertical, rather than horizontal collectivism and increasingly capitalistic policies. The privilege of shaping culture and institutions is reserved for the

elite in this highly collectivist and unequal context. While Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe are moderately vertical, Zambia is exceptionally so and Ethiopia, mildly so.

Zimbabwe, the once relatively prosperous breadbasket of Southern Africa, is now mired in maladministration-induced poverty. Zimbabweans value ascribed family roles, status, and Familism, which make their rigid social hierarchies change slowly. The highly collectivist Zimbabwean environment encourages the perpetuation of flawed scripts about the "Other" between Shona and Northern Ndebele, which tend to remain loyal to their members regardless of merit.

*Inter-State Market Forces*

> It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence.
>
> —Kenneth J. Arrow, *Gifts and Exchanges*

*How do inter-state market forces affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?*

$H_{4a}$: Increasing trade, FDI, and FPI widen the generalized trust radius in fragile states.

$H_{4b}$: Decreasing remittances, non-military aid, and military aid widen the generalized trust radius in fragile states.

Inter-state market forces is the fourth and final control criterion for widening or narrowing the GTR. While state security and contract institutions and individualism are long-standing and well-supported hypotheses in the trust literature, inter-state market forces is multifaceted and, therefore, more complicated. Trade, investment (FDI and FPI), remittances, and aid (military and non-military) compose the majority of financial and physical capital that flows between countries; varying combinations of these inputs affect the GTR differently. A state's economic model (command, mixed, or market) affects how it integrates into the global market and how readily coercive and normative isomorphic influences affect the trajectory of its economic institutions. While most

developed economies are market/mixed hybrids, four of the five cases, excluding Nigeria, have experienced extensive vacillations in economic policy between command (Marxist/socialist) and market (neo-liberal structural adjustment) and all cases have lingering, strongly embedded and pervasive traditional economies that they have found challenging to reduce. The below tables sort the hypotheses, results, and level of support for each facet of this control variable. The low investment hypothesis is the strongest in all test and control cases, followed by high aid, low trade, and finally high remittances.

Table 47

*Inter-State Market Forces: Trade*

| Country | | Hypothesis | Result | Support |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Burkina Faso | Test Cases | Low | Moderate | Strong |
| Ethiopia | | Low | Low | Strong |
| Nigeria | | Low | Low | Strong |
| | | | | |
| Zambia | Control Cases | Low | High | Weak |
| Zimbabwe | | Low | Moderate | Moderate |

The majority of the trust literature agrees that low trade produces narrow GTR and high trade produces wide GTR; however, not all types of trade have an equal or even positive effect. Increasing trade increases economic growth, but growth is not a sufficient proxy measure for the GTR. Trade diversification provides greater macroeconomic stability, a more competitive market environment forces greater efficiency, and low labor costs increase competitiveness. However, there are some potential negative externalities. All types of trust may diminish in the short-term when an economy opens itself to the global market before rebounding in the long-term after a critical mass of its population *feels* the benefits of trade and growth. Increasing trade increases exposure to external shocks and in the short-term, structural adjustments in

uncompetitive sectors hurt the poor the most. While absolute poverty is decreasing in these cases, relative wealth is not catching up so quickly to rising global averages.

Two of the three test cases (Ethiopia and Nigeria) have low trade, ensuring it is not what is causing wide GTR in those cases. The remaining test case (Burkina Faso) has moderate trade; however, due to subsequent detailed analysis, it is also clear that trade is not what is causing its wide GTR. The majority of Burkinabé are poor. Burkina Faso lacks quality economic institutions, which affects how increasing trade translates into increasing growth and the positive externalities associated with it (see Rodriguez and Rodrik 2000). For its increasing economic growth to benefit the poor and widen the GTR, low tariffs, infrastructure, and access to technology and finance are required (World Bank and the World Trade Organization 2015, 7), all things Burkina Faso still lacks. Therefore, a smoking-gun test is passed and the null hypothesis rejected, confirming that low trade has a negative effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all test cases. This also passes a hoop test, disproving the trade alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis.

Zimbabwe's moderate and Zambia's high trade and a narrow GTR means trade is present but is not having a GTR widening effect. This indicates either that there is a control case misfit or that not all forms of trade are equal in their ability to widen the GTR, requiring further analysis. The latter is more plausible because high trade as percent of GDP does not indicate how well a country fares in the trade relationship, only that it is deeply connected to the global market. Zambia (84 percent), Burkina Faso (63 percent), and Zimbabwe (60 percent) get more than half their GDP from trade, while Ethiopia (36 percent) and Nigeria (21 percent) much less. For Zimbabwe, this measure

does not indicate how *broadly* connected it is to the global market because it is heavily dependent on only two countries, South Africa to purchase the majority of its gold and tobacco and secondarily, China its iron ore in exchange for petroleum. The World Bank's Net Barter Terms of Trade Index (2015) suggests none of the cases is being taken advantage of in the global market as they have positive terms of trade between 113.50 and 165.10; whereas another SSA country, the global low, Sierra Leone, is much lower (44.09). However, all cases have a negative Current Account Balance between -3.28 and -9.46, whereas another SSA country, the global low, Liberia, is much lower (-42.26). Zimbabwe (5.0) and Zambia (4.0) have low tariffs, which provide a stronger trade environment than the test cases of Burkina Faso (7.4), Nigeria (11.3), and Ethiopia (12.4), yet they have narrow GTRs. Zambia's economic growth rate has been high and relatively stable, along with Burkina Faso and Ethiopia's, while Zimbabwe's has been erratic and Nigeria's negative. Uneven growth may have more detrimental effects on a society's generalized trust than negative growth that is spread relatively evenly throughout society. Therefore, these control cases have a weak to moderate case fit. It is more likely that the type of trade present in Zambia and Zimbabwe serve to narrow rather than widen the GTR, rejecting alternative hypotheses claiming all types of trade have the same effect on the GTR. Also weakened are neo-colonial (e.g., dependency and to a lesser degree, world-systems theory), claims that high trade produces greater negative (e.g., inequality, poverty, and uneven development) than positive externalities. Increasing trade and resulting economic growth does not increase inequality (Dollar and Kraay 2004, 47). Trade is but one facet of inter-state market forces. When other inter-state market forces have a GTR narrowing effect as they do in most of these cases,

increasing trade alone may not be sufficient to produce positive externalities (e.g., reduce poverty or widen the GTR). Therefore, both control cases support the trade hypothesis through a straw-in-the-wind test. This does not affect the strength of the test case hypotheses, only their control case fit.

Table 48

*Inter-State Market Forces: Investment*

| Country | | Hypothesis | Result | Support |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Burkina Faso | Test Cases | Low | Low | Strong |
| Ethiopia | | Low | Low | Strong |
| Nigeria | | Low | Low | Strong |
| | | | | |
| Zambia | Control Cases | Low | Low | Strong |
| Zimbabwe | | Low | Low | Strong |

The majority of the trust literature agrees that low investment (FDI and FPI) produces narrow GTR and high investment produces wide GTR. Increasing investment increases economic growth. All test and control cases have low investment, ensuring it is not what is causing wide GTR in the test cases. The World Bank's Foreign Direct Investment (2015) and Portfolio Equity (2015) scores reveal that none of these cases is a corporate or personal investment destination. All cases have single digit FDI and little FPI. Having a large Portfolio Equity deficit is not detrimental to Nigeria. It means that Nigerians have financial capital to play in the global market, but the rest of the world is not betting on Nigeria. Neither are corporations betting on Nigeria because it is not a low-corruption investment-friendly environment. This passes a smoking-gun test and rejects the null hypothesis, confirming that low investment has a negative effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all cases. This also passes a hoop test, disproving the investment alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis. Both control cases

have low investment and a narrow GTR as hypothesized, suggesting a good control case fit.

Table 49

*Inter-State Market Forces: Remittances*

| Country | | Hypothesis | Result | Support |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Burkina Faso | Test Cases | High | Low | Weak |
| Ethiopia | | High | Low | Weak |
| Nigeria | | High | High | Strong |
| | | | | |
| Zambia | Control Cases | High | Low | Weak |
| Zimbabwe | | High | High | Strong |

Much of the trust literature agrees that high remittances produce a narrow GTR and low remittances produce a wide GTR in fragile states. Increasing remittances does not increase economic growth in fragile states; only in environments where trade and investment are not available and basic needs go unmet regularly (collapsed and failed states), may remittances have temporary economic growth and GTR widening effect. Some in the trust literature and many development practitioners claim remittances are holistically good for society (International Monetary Fund 2005, 6). However, the long-term costs of remittances far exceed the benefits. While a country's balance of payments may enlarge, and the receiving community may consume more (Cattaneo 2005, 2) and enhance their job prospects (Woodruff and Zenteno, 2001, 6), remittances increase inequality for the rural segment of the population (see Capistrano and Santa Maria, 2007, 9) and "create incentives that lead to moral hazard problems…they have negative effects on economic growth" (Chami et al. (2003, 21). Narrowly allocated, large remittance infusions to particular communities or groups have the potential to increase inequality, disrupt the labor market, and weaken the economy. The IMF's 2005 Financial Action

Task Force on money laundering (FATF) recommendations for regulating remittance transfer services may restrict illicit transfers, but do little to correct these problems.

One test case (Nigeria) has high remittances, ensuring it is not what is causing a wide GTR. This passes a smoking-gun test and rejects the null hypothesis, confirming that high remittances have a negative effect on the GTR as hypothesized for Nigeria. This also passes a hoop test, disproving the alternative remittances hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis. The other two test cases (Burkina Faso and Ethiopia) have low remittances; however, when analyzing in detail, this does not appear to have a substantial positive effect on their GTR. These cases fail to pass a smoking-gun test in neither case having high remittances; this weakens the hypotheses but does not disprove it. One control case (Zimbabwe) has very high remittances and a narrow GTR as hypothesized, suggesting a good control case fit. The other control case (Zambia) has very low remittances and a narrow GTR, suggesting a control case misfit. However, this does not affect the test case hypothesis. Instead, it indicates that of the inter-state market forces, high remittances is often, but not always, a necessary condition for a narrow GTR.

The intention of receiving communities and their diaspora may be to invest their community's human capital in stronger markets to live off the dividends produced (Chami et al. 2003, 22). This may produce positive externalities for the receiving community but often produces negative externalities for other groups. This does not indicate that all receiving communities are inherently lazy as Schapiro et al. (2013, 57) explore, but the institutions that form around communities receiving large remittance allocations tend to create a script of entitlement and inter-group inequality. Therefore,

there is variation in remittance effectiveness, but most often, it has a narrowing effect on the GTR.

A community's dependence on its diaspora's remittances is not an indicator of a stable home economy. A country like Liberia (30.6 percent of GDP) is highly dependent on remittances and has an inactive economy. The World Bank's Personal Remittances Received (2016) indicator shows Zimbabwe (12.7 percent of GDP) to be the only of the cases with substantial per capita remittances. While Nigeria has nine times more absolute remittance inflows than Zimbabwe, it is only 4.7 percent of its GDP—still high globally. For each of the other three cases, remittances make up a relatively small percentage of GDP, particularly Zambia (0.2 percent of GDP), yet this is an indicator that their populations have less ability to migrate to developed economies to produce human capital dividends for their home country communities than populations in other regions.

Table 50

*Inter-State Market Forces: Aid*

| Country | | Hypothesis | Result | Support |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Burkina Faso | Test Cases | High | High | Strong |
| Ethiopia | | High | High | Strong |
| Nigeria | | High | Moderate | Moderate |
| | | | | |
| Zambia | Control Cases | High | High | Strong |
| Zimbabwe | | High | High | Strong |

> Of the seeming and real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy, none has proven more baffling to both understanding and action than foreign aid – Morgenthau (1962, 301)

There is variation in aid effectiveness, but most often, it has a narrowing effect on the GTR. Much of the trust literature agrees that high aid (military and non-military) produces narrow GTR and low aid produces wide GTR in fragile states. Increasing aid

does not increase economic growth in fragile states; only in environments where trade and investment are not available and basic needs go unmet regularly (collapsed and failed states), may aid have a temporary positive economic and trust effect. This is not to discount the postive effects of aid as there have been major advancements in the eradication of diseases. This does not excuse the fact that most often, massive aid infusions increase currency fluctuations, encourage corruption without sufficient accountability and transparency, and are often mismanaged. So much of the 100 billion dollars allocated annually in aid is untraceable (Easterly and Pfutze 2008, 23). The aid industry too easily makes the causal leap from capital and technology to peaceful regimes without fully considering the many potential causal paths of economic development, social stability, and democratic institutions intervening variables (Morgenthau 1962, 304-5). It is unlikely that a program constructed for Dire Dawa, Ethiopia will be effective in Choma, Zambia because of these many potential differences. Aid data quality and availability are sub-par because there are too many donors and practitioners seeking short-term returns on their time, energy, and capital investments in fragile state markets that are unlikely to provide anything but long-term dividends.

Two of the three test cases (Burkina Faso and Ethiopia) have high aid and wide GTR as hypothesized; ensuring aid is not what is causing a wide GTR in those cases. The remaining test case (Nigeria) has only moderate aid; however, due to subsequent detailed analysis, it is also ensured that its lower aid is not what is causing a wider GTR. While Nigeria's aid as a percentage of its GDP is smaller than the other cases, the absolute amount of aid it receives is quite large. Therefore, a smoking-gun test is passed for all test cases, rejecting the null hypothesis and confirming that high-moderate aid has

a negative effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all test cases. All test cases also pass a hoop test, disproving the high aid alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis. All control cases have high aid and a narrow GTR, meaning aid's presence is not having a GTR widening effect. This indicates a good control case fit.

There is a minority voice in the trust literature and among practitioners in the development industry claiming aid widens the GTR in fragile states (see D'Onofrio and Maggio 2015). While strong claims may be made for increasing inequality narrowing the GTR (see Uslaner and Brown 2005), there is less evidence that increasing aid decreases inequality, not that it is impossible. In cases where aid is effective in reducing economic inequality, it could widen the GTR (D'Onofrio and Maggio 2015, 25). However, donors are attracted to "invest" in low-income countries that demonstrate relatively wide GTR where there is a higher likelihood of a return on investment; therefore, they self-select trusting populations. It is unlikely that aid has much of a GTR widening effect on a society that is already relatively trusting. Therefore, reverse causality is a problem when claiming increasing aid widens the GTR. This alternative hypothesis may be rejected.

Israel is the majority recipient of US military aid as measured by the USAID 10-Year Average Disbursement (2006-2015). Ethiopia and Nigeria, being strategic states, have received the most of the cases, while Zambia and Burkina Faso, relatively non-strategic states, have received little, and Zimbabwe, being under EU and US sanctions, has received none recently. Aid and its effects are complicated to measure; measuring absolute versus per capita makes a substantial difference in these cases. Nigeria is more than 11 times the size of Zimbabwe's population, and all of the other cases populations together are less than Nigeria alone. While Nigeria, as measured by the OECD (2014)

Net ODA 10-Year Average Disbursement (2005-2014), has received an extensive absolute amount of aid, when measuring per capita and as a percentage of its economy (0.5 percent of GNI), it is quite small. The other four cases, exhibit a history of aid dependence with it composing between 4.6 and 11 percent of GNI).

Burkina Faso came to embrace neo-liberal structural adjustment later than most SSA countries. This is because, on the supply side, it has never been high on the west's priority list as it is not highly geo-politically strategic. On the demand side, the Burkinabé have an anti-imperialist Marxist isolationist history that has resisted all types of isomorphic reach of the global market. The politically motivated Mossi, benefiting from their isolationist status quo, had an interest in not globalizing too rapidly. During President Sankara's administration, he resisted capitalist influences longer than many other countries. However, this anti-globalization script must not have been embedded too deeply in Burkinabé society, because it only took the assassination of President Sankara to rewrite it. With the President Sankara-Compaoré leadership transition, Burkina Faso rapidly deregulated and privatized its economy, becoming a structural adjustment model reformer, which produced more FDI and social conflict. The Burkinabé are only now beginning to embrace globalization norms, behaviors, and scripts because of reaping the positive effects that a mixed economy and increased trade and investment have begun to bring.

Ethiopia is among the top 10 percent of least-developed countries, in part, because its government economic institutions make investing and obtaining land and financing laborious and risky. Many potential investors have concluded that the risk-reward proposition is not worth it. Its economic institutions produce insufficient incentives to

trigger and embed neo-liberal behavior and norm changes. It retains some institutional remnants of a command economy from its communist derg legacy when it was caught in an ideological tug-of-war between the former Soviet Union and the west. It has resisted deinstitutionalizing and structurally adjusting its economy but has been glad to accept aid, which has produced a deeply embedded culture of aid dependence. Excessive food aid disincentivizes domestic food production among the Oromo and Somali regions. Thus, the Ethiopian state is held together by non-military aid and remittances, which subsidize nearly 50 percent of the federal budget.

Nigeria has a different economic development pattern than the other four cases as fluctuating petroleum revenues compose a large part of its economy, which along with large remittances and some aid has produced economic shocks and uneven development. It is an insecure place to do business, yet that does not dissuade many western petroleum investors. The West considers Nigeria one of the most geo-politically important states in SSA for its petroleum, its massive population, and its global reach. The Nigerian economy is 21$^{st}$ largest globally and largest in SSA when measured by GDP, PPP, and 3.5 times larger than all the other four cases' economies combined. However, because it is also a highly populated country, its per capita economy (GDP, per capita PPP) is only a little over half the size of the other four economies combined—still, a large economy that faces different constraints and opportunities than the other cases. Economic institutions governing natural resources are deeply embedded but not very agile, making it difficult for other sectors to adjust when the global oil market shifts. The federal government's dependence on petroleum revenue has bred state- and LGA-level dependence, which has isomorphically transferred flawed economic institutions throughout Nigeria, providing

little incentive for productivity in other sectors. As state and LGA governments rely on federal petroleum revenues to meet basic needs, norms, behaviors, and scripts are being rewritten.

Zambia was one of the earliest and most successful SSA post-colonial states to pursue democratic governance and a mixed market economy. It has the highest Polity IV democratic ranking (Marshall et al. 2016) and human development index (HDI) score (hdr.undp.org 2015) of the cases. However, democratization and high trade as a percentage of GDP have not produced the norms and behaviors that lead to a wide GTR. Due to a paucity of bureaucratic expertise, the Zambian state has found itself in a borderline mercantilist relationship with China, depending on its copper exports to fund the government. This has weakened its other sectors of the economy. Paired with high inequality, an ineffective social safety net, fragile security and contract institutions, and a collectivist society, this has produced a narrow GTR.

Zimbabwe is not necessarily geo-politically significant, but it initially garnered the global community's attention due to its conflict spillover into neighboring states and subsequently due to its self-destructive pattern. Former President Mugabe was—is—a Zimbabwean institution. Over 37 years he shaped its formal institutions, which have affected Shona and countrywide norms, which will make them difficult to change. Even in his absence, the Mugabe political network remains mostly intact embedded in the ZANU-PF party. Mugabe institutions have not only produced many unintended economic consequences but have produced an institutional and generalized trust poor environment. As Mugabe did not take queues from the west; therefore, Zimbabwean institutions have been largely shielded from those coercive and normative isomorphic

pressures, producing unique, though not particularly effective institutions. It has tried to insulate itself from the global market through isolationism and a command economy, which has made it less prosperous. Zimbabwe's Land Acquisition Amendment Act of 2000 damaged the economy. Trade, investment, and aid all decreased sharply and remittances, food insecurity, hyperinflation and sanctions increased. China has been one of Zimbabwe's only trade and investment partners through these tough times as Mugabe drove its economy into the ground. Zimbabwe's Indigenization Law (2016) amended in 2017, has threatened even that relationship, requiring large foreign-owned natural resource companies to sell majority ownership to the government or indigenous Zimbabweans.

Disrupted economies and uneven development can hurt institutional and generalized trust. Economic shocks, even by wide trade swings, may increase volatility; the smaller the economy or sector, the more shocking (Giovanni and Levchenko 2009, 562; Easterly and Kraay 2000). Volatility triggered by years of violent conflict and socialist leanings has encouraged the small economies of Ethiopia and Zimbabwe to insulate their economies against external shocks by growing or retaining large public sectors (see Ebeke 2011, 89; Rodrik 1998, 1011). Public sector employment statistics are notoriously inaccurate for SSA (Hoffmann 2003, 1); particularly for Burkina Faso that does not report them plainly anywhere and Nigeria that reports an obviously underreported 1.6 percent (Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics 2010). Ethiopia (29.5 percent) and Zimbabwe (20.9 percent) have the most extensive public sectors of the cases, and Zambia (9.7 percent) possibly the smallest, having more so liberalized its economy (International Labour Organization 2017). Nigeria, once rid of military

regimes, has grown its economy steadily. Ethiopia and Burkina Faso the smallest of the economies when measuring GDP, per capita PPP, have had modest growth since instituting select market reforms, doubling their economies over the last quarter century, while Zimbabwe, avoiding most reforms has lost half its economy. The bloated Ethiopian and Zimbabwean bureaucracies paired with their weak economies is a repellant to GTR widening forces of trade and investment and a magnet for the GTR narrowing forces of remittances and aid, as these cases demonstrate. Therefore, many economic model changes can be made in each of these cases, particularly Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, to make inter-state market forces a more positive force on the GTR.

*Social Network Composition*

> For we are by nature social, before we are political or economic, beings.
> —Michael Walzer, *The Civil Society Argument*

*How does social network composition affect the generalized trust radius in fragile states?*

$H_1$: Increasing fractionalization, proximity, and power differential widen the generalized trust radius in fragile states.

The most fractionalized, proximate, and power differentiated societies have the most *potential* generalized trust. However, this potential often goes unrealized in fragile SSA states and has gone mostly unrealized in these control cases. Most fragile SSA states are highly ethnically, linguistically, and religiously fractionalized (Alesina et al. 2003, 183), to the point that many have no ethnic, linguistic, or religious majority (multipolar) (Fearon 2003, 207). Colonial divisions increased African states' already high ethnic fragmentation of tribal divisions (Scarritt 2008). The trust literature has relied too heavily on fractionalization to explain social effects on the GTR, ignoring

alternative social explanations. The fractionalization measure alone is limited in its ability to capture highly fragmented, bipolar, multipolar and balanced, dominant majority, or dominant minority (Reilly 2000, 163) social network compositions. As well, temporal variability of ethnic, linguistic, and religious identity produces potential collinearity and endogeneity of fractionalization indices.

Advancement of the trust literature requires explaining how incentivization and coercion increase inter-group interaction to widen the GTR. This explanation requires the addition of measuring groups' physical, technological, and social proximity and power differential. Fractionalization and proximity increase inter-group interaction, while power differential and incentivization structure determine if it is positive or negative. The test variable, Social Network Composition, is an improved and well-rounded social variable adding physical, technological, and social proximity, and power differential to fractionalization, which broadens the social effect being measured, reducing omitted variable bias of fractionalization alone. This section answers the social research question by interpreting, comparing, and analyzing each component's configurational effect on the GTR across the five cases, demonstrating what set of conditions is required to produce the hypothesized outcome. Analysis either confirms, affirms, weakens, or rejects the hypothesis through straw-in-the-wind, hoop, smoking gun, or doubly decisive tests of necessity and sufficiency. This analysis is limited to the five SSA fragile state cases, with an emphasis on the test cases. Generalizations are made to theoretical types of cases rather than specific empirical cases.

## *Fractionalization*

The more fractionalized a fragile state, the more likely strangers are to interact and therefore, the more potential GTR variability exists, whether negative or positive. The level and combination of types of fractionalization have only a small effect on whether the outcome is negative or positive, instead, that is more a function of the combination of a society's power differential and whether interaction is incentivized or coerced. The fractionalization hypothesis is strongly supported overall when considering each of the ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization indicators.

Table 51

*Social Network Composition: Fractionalization*

| Country | | Ethnic | | | Linguistic | | | Religious | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Hyp | Result | Support | Hyp | Result | Support | Hyp | Result | Support |
| Burkina Faso | Test Cases | High | High | Strong | High | High | Strong | High | High | Strong |
| Ethiopia | | High | High | Strong | High | High | Strong | High | High | Strong |
| Nigeria | | High | High | Strong | High | High | Strong | High | High | Strong |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| Zambia | Control Cases | Low | High | Reject | Low | High | Reject | Low | Mod | Weak |
| Zimbabwe | | Low | Low | Strong | Low | Low | Strong | Low | Mod | Weak |

## *Ethnic Fractionalization*

Ethnic fractionalization is the first test criterion for increasing inter-group interaction and widening or narrowing the GTR. All test cases are highly ethnically fractionalized according to Alesina et al. (2003); each case is in the top 32nd most ethnically fractionalized countries globally (Nigeria 9th; Burkina Faso 28th; and Ethiopia 32nd) and has a wide GTR as hypothesized. Ethnic fractionalization does not determine whether the interaction is negative or positive. Therefore, a smoking-gun test is passed for all test cases, rejecting the null hypothesis and confirming that ethnic fractionalization

has a positive effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all test cases. All test cases also pass a hoop test, disproving the homogenization alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis. One control case (Zimbabwe) has low ethnic fractionalization and a narrow GTR as hypothesized, while the other one (Zambia) has high ethnic fractionalization (21$^{st}$) (Alesina et al. 2003) and a narrow GTR. This does not affect the test case hypothesis, but instead suggests an imperfect, yet expected, control case fit.

There is no doubt in the fractionalization literature that Nigeria is one of the most holistically fractionalized countries globally. There are many ways to describe Nigeria, but regarding ethnic fractionalization, dividing the country into three types of regions is instructive. The first type is rural Muslim regions. The northeastern and northwestern corners of the country characterize this type, where its large and insular Muslim-majority Hausa, Fulani, and Kanuri ethnic groups have high homophily, propinquity, transitivity, and reciprocity. These areas are not highly fractionalized, but are more homogenous; since these are highly rural regions, they compose only a small percentage of the total population. The second type is home areas of Nigeria's hundreds of small ethnic minority groups, most being concentrated in the Middle Belt region. Besides rising urbanization and ethnic groups converging on each other, another primary driver of high ethnic fractionalization is the government's bifurcation of ethnic home areas to reduce the cohesion and tie strength of politically engaged ethnic networks. The state purposed to promote state-based identities over ethnic but has had limited success. State-based identities have not formed; instead politicized ethnoreligious identities have formed. Paired with indigene-settler policies that incentivize protecting one's ethnic home area, these policies have increased inter-group interaction in already highly fractionalized

regions, producing intense social conflict, which has overshadowed the GTR widening occurring in the third type of region. The third type, and making up the largest population, is highly dense and ethnically diverse southern urban centers such as Lagos, Ibadan, Ogbomosho, Benin City, Warri, Aba, and Port Harcourt, where urban life requires inter-group interaction, toleration, and compromise, which widens the GTR. From an etic perspective, the high levels of inter-group interaction in these urban centers may appear conflictual, but urban Nigerians view this chaos positively.

The Mossi have long represented the geographic, cultural, economic, and political heart of Burkinabé society and institutions and therefore, exert a centripetal force on the many much smaller surrounding ethnic groups, drawing them into its network orbit. This serves to increase inter-group interaction and multiplexity and transitivity of network ties between groups. Because the Mossi have not been a heavily coercive force, increased inter-group interaction has resulted in a wider GTR.

Ethiopia's ethnic-based federal system, a response to its high ethnic fractionalization, has produced some unintended consequences. In some ways, this system is the antithesis of Nigerian federalism, yet it has produced some of the same results. This system is not built to cannibalize ethnic groups as Nigeria's does, but instead provide greater regional autonomy and opportunities for coalition building for smaller, less powerful ethnic groups that rarely have a voice in parliament. What has become institutionalized instead is a four-way ethnopolitical tug-of-war between the Amhara, Oromo, Southern Nations, and Tigray, leading to an unusual and fragile alliance between them that has strengthened their ties and increased institutional gridlock, leaving smaller ethnic groups regionally isolated without the means or venue for expressing their

political interests to obtain a piece of the federal pie. The Tigray ethnic minority's highly active and unusual political role has generated much political agitation among Ethiopia's many smaller ethnic groups, but it has not turned into violent conflict. Atomization of political interest seeking based on ethnic, regional, and national interests has developed rather than a coalition-building atmosphere, which has made inter-group interaction uneven and less predictable. The result is relatively positive, yet fragile high inter-group interaction based on a variety of ethnopolitical interests.

It is evident that Zambia has high ethnic fractionalization, given the existence of 73 ethnic groups in a country a little larger than the state of Texas. It is difficult to find an SSA country with low ethnic fractionalization, thus compromises on control case selection are necessary. The Bemba and Tonga do not possess the cultural magnetism of the Mossi of Burkina Faso; however, the pull of the promise of wealth and the push of rural poverty have drawn Zambia's 71 smaller ethnic groups into the Bemba's Copperbelt Province and subsequently to the Tonga's Lusaka Province and consequently to a small degree, into their social networks. However, the extremely high economic inequality that has resulted from development policies has served to decrease in-group trust, but not increase generalized trust, producing a narrow GTR.

Zimbabwe is not ethnically fractionalized, ranking 109$^{th}$ of 190 countries with the dominant Shona far outnumbering the next largest Northern Ndebele and twelve much smaller ethnic minorities, each making up less than 1 percent of the population. The Shona social network dominates Zimbabwean economic and political institutions and has a repellant centrifugal effect on surrounding ethnic groups, resulting in weak inter-ethnic

network ties and strongly rooted regional ethnic identities. In this environment, the GTR is much more likely to narrow or remain stable than to widen.

### *Linguistic Fractionalization*

Ethnicities and languages often share the same boundaries, but not always. Linguistic fractionalization is the second test criterion for increasing inter-group interaction and widening or narrowing the GTR. Linguistic fractionalization may serve as a barrier to inter-group interaction in the absence of an institutionalized unifying trade language through which groups may easily communicate while retaining their linguistic distinctiveness. Therefore, the presence of a trade language weakens this variable's claim on affecting the GTR. All test cases are highly linguistically fractionalized according to Alesina et al. (2003); each being in the top 32$^{nd}$ most linguistically fractionalized countries globally (Nigeria 11$^{th}$; Ethiopia 18$^{th}$; and Burkina Faso 32$^{nd}$) and have a wide GTR as hypothesized. Groups are more likely to interact if there is a common trade language tying their networks together, but as a result become less linguistically diverse. As with ethnic fractionalization, linguistic fractionalization does not determine whether the interaction is negative or positive. Therefore, a smoking-gun test is passed for all test cases, rejecting the null hypothesis and confirming that linguistic fractionalization has a positive effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all test cases, yet its effect is weaker than ethnic and fractionalization. All test cases also pass a hoop test, disproving the homogenization alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis. While Burkina Faso confirms the hypothesis more strongly, its lack of a widespread trade language is an interesting issue that may have adverse repercussions for future positive inter-group interaction. One control case (Zimbabwe) has low linguistic fractionalization

and a narrow GTR as hypothesized, while the other one (Zambia) has high linguistic fractionalization ($7^{th}$) (Alesina et al. 2003) and a narrow GTR. This does not affect the test case hypothesis, but instead suggests an imperfect, yet expected, control case fit.

The mimetic isomorphic transfer and resulting institutionalization of the English language in Ethiopian and Nigerian urban centers and educational institutions bridges their high linguistic fractionalization, increasing network transitivity between those social networks, but less so in rural areas. English produces greater inter-group interaction in Nigeria than Ethiopia because its population is more highly urbanized and educated. Having a common language for market exchanges eases tensions between groups that have myriad other differences; therefore, a common trade language serves to widen the GTR in these cases. While the Mossi draws smaller ethnolinguistic groups into its orbit and social networks, communication is more challenging because Burkina Faso lacks a widespread unifying and institutionalized trade language to tie its many ethnic and ethnolinguistic groups' networks together. The Mossi compose half the population and speak *Mòoré,* but the smaller ethnic groups do not. Moreover, while French may be the official language, its normative isomorphic colonial transfer adhered weakly to society and is only spoken regularly by 15 percent of the population (Kone 2010, 9). While increased positive inter-group interaction occurs because of increased multiplexity and transitivity of network ties between groups, the quality of communication without a common trade language may be questionable.

While Zambia has 73 ethnic groups, it has about half that number of linguistic groups. Bemba is such a dominant language that nearly half the population speaks it while the Bemba ethnic group only comprises 21 percent of the population. While

English is not the first language of many, it serves as a bridge between linguistic group networks. Zimbabwe, the one exception again, ranks at 85 of 102 countries for linguistic fractionalization with the dominant Shona far outnumbering all other ethnolinguistic groups. While having little linguistic fractionalization has the potential to increase communication quality within the Shona ethnolinguistic group, it also means there is less generalized trust potential between groups. In this environment, the GTR is much more likely to narrow or remain stable than to widen.

### *Religious Fractionalization*

Religious fractionalization is the third test criterion for increasing inter-group interaction and widening or narrowing the GTR. The trust literature is divided on how religious fractionalization affects the GTR producing a rival hypothesis that must be addressed. Like linguistic fractionalization, religious fractionalization may serve as a barrier to inter-group interaction when two conditions are present. If religious groups are incredibly different (e.g., Buddhist and Muslim), sharing very little ideological common ground and have few other drivers of inter-group interaction, their members will be insulated from other religious groups and unprepared to interact when it does occur. In this situation, the barriers produced by information asymmetry and demonizing myths are too pronounced for the GTR to widen. This occurs in the Middle Belt states of Nigeria where Christian and Muslim groups do not realize the ideological commonality that exists. However, outside of this region, this is not the case. While all three test cases have mixed Christian-Muslim populations, Burkina Faso and Ethiopia's have been integrated longer. French colonialism did so for Burkina Faso in the 19$^{th}$ and 20$^{th}$ Centuries and for Ethiopia, their Christian and Muslim populations have been mixed for

many centuries, allowing them to build some common ideological language to ease communication. Nigeria does not have an extensive inter-religious history, but there are many modern drivers of inter-group interaction, hence, there is intense social conflict. Therefore, religious fractionalization increases inter-group interaction in all test cases, widening it more in Burkina Faso and Ethiopia than in Nigeria where the incentive structure differs.

One test case (Nigeria) is highly religious fractionalized according to Alesina et al. (2003), being the 15th most religiously fractionalized country globally and has a wide GTR as hypothesized. The remaining two test cases, Ethiopia 56th and Burkina Faso 72nd, out of 214 countries, are still moderately religiously fractionalized, ranking in the top 34 percent of countries globally, meaning their religious groups are more likely to interact and much more so if they share some ideological commonalities. As with ethnic and linguistic fractionalization, this does not determine whether the interaction is negative or positive. Therefore, a wide GTR always occurs when high religious fractionalization is present in all three test cases. Religious fractionalization is readily observable in Nigeria, and in Ethiopia, due to its unique inter-religious history and Burkina Faso due to its cross-cutting of ethnic and religious adherence. Therefore, a smoking-gun test is passed for all test cases, rejecting the null hypothesis and confirming that religious fractionalization has a positive effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all test cases. All test cases also pass a hoop test, disproving the homogenization alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis. According to the Alesina et al. (2003) fractionalization measure, the two control cases are religiously fractionalized at 16th (Zimbabwe) and 17th (Zambia) globally; however, when factoring *how* different religious

groups are from each other, these cases become only moderately fractionalized. Still, because they were hypothesized to have low religious fractionalization and a narrow GTR, they both have a slight control case misfit. This does not affect the test case hypothesis.

Religious fractionalization does not sufficiently account for *how* different religious groups are from each other; instead, it focuses on *how many* different groups there are. One society may be 97.6 percent Christian (Zambia), but because there are numerous relatively similar evangelical sects and African Initiated Churches (AICs), the measure considers it as religiously fractionalized as a country (Nigeria) that has a parity of much more different Christian and Muslim sects. Zambian and Zimbabwean religious fractionalization is primarily based on Christian denominationalism, so most share a common Christian ideological language. Ethiopian Orthodox Christians and Muslims, because they have resided in proximity for centuries, have also cultivated a common Abrahamic ideological language, while the Burkinabé have a little less so and Nigerian Christians and Muslims have much less so. Therefore, the quality of religious difference matters, not only the quantity of the groups.

Christian- and Muslim-majority countries also differ systematically in their religious fractionalization with the latter being the least religiously fractionalized globally. The cases include two clear Christian-majorities (Zambia and Zimbabwe), one slight Christian-majority (Ethiopia), one Christian-Muslim parity (Nigeria), and one slight Muslim-majority (Burkina Faso). In SSA, the presence of AICs and high overall syncretism is an indicator of high religious fractionalization; however, some are more

different than others are. While Burkina Faso is Muslim-majority, it is one of the more religiously syncretistic Muslim populations globally, influenced heavily by Sufism.

Religious fractionalization varies widely by region in Nigeria. While there are many different Christian sects in the Niger Delta and surrounding states, there are very few Muslims, lowering its actual religious diversity. Similarly, in northern regions, Christian populations range between only 10-20 percent, lowering their religious fractionalization. Oppositely, in Middle Belt states and the South West Region, there is higher religious, ethnic, and linguistic fractionalization. The strongly felt presence of AICs in Nigeria indicate the normative isomorphic transfer of colonial Christian institutions had difficulty sticking. Although, its relatively low level of syncretism indicates the opposite may be true. What is certain is Nigerians *feel* they are the most religious people on earth (Christians and Muslims alike) and prove it by their global highest self-reported weekly religious service attendance (World Values Survey 2014). Nigerian Christians and Muslims imbue all things with religious significance. Therefore, when there are indigene-settler conflicts in Middle Belt states, religion often escalates the conflict into violence. Because Nigerians identify most readily by religion, network transitivity increases within Christian and Muslim networks but less so between them, as there are few weakly tied nodes. Separate Christian and Muslim civil societies take care of their own first, providing little incentive for Christians to have their interests met by Muslims and vice versa. However, substantial centripetal coercive forces are pushing them together in this region, producing extreme social conflict and a narrower GTR, opposite of those incentivizing forces in southern urban centers producing a wider GTR. Ethiopia is highly religiously fractionalized, and its people identify religiously, but more

so ethnically. The large and deeply embedded Ethiopian Orthodox Church and slightly smaller and less embedded Muslims have a long and unique shared religious history that goes back millennia, producing connected networks with high homophily and multiplexity, but low propinquity, which results in a wider GTR. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church is an institutional marvel as it is not the result of coercive or memetic isomorphic pressures as are so many modern SSA religious institutions. Instead, its norms, behaviors, and scripts are largely emically produced and sustained. The Burkinabé population is also highly religiously fractionalized with a Muslim majority and a Catholic minority. Its people are highly syncretistic with many of its ethnic groups crosscut by religious adherence. It is a small enough and religiously mixed enough country that there has not been an attempt to institute Shari ʻa, even in Muslim majority areas, which is a sign of peaceful inter-religious relations and a wider GTR.

Zambia's moderate religious fractionalization is due primarily to highly religious and syncretistic Christian (Protestant majority and Catholic minority) populations. There are many small evangelical and AIC sects, but a tiny non-Christian population, meaning there are few religious differences across the population. While colonial Christian institutions have affected Zambia's religious trajectory, AICs have had such a strong and atomizing effect that there has not been an isomorphic convergence of Zambian religious institutions. Zimbabwe's moderate religious fractionalization is also due primarily to highly religious and syncretistic Christian (Protestant majority and Catholic minority) populations. Their AICs differ from their Protestant and Catholic religious groups, but not nearly as much as from other world religions, therefore, the spectrum of religious difference is quite small across the society. Colonial Christian institutions have weakly

transferred to Zimbabwe—the Rhodesian Bush War served to sever ties with many outside influences. Zimbabwean AICs are also quite independent, producing little network transitivity between religious social networks. There are regional differences in religious fractionalization and trust between religious groups. Populations in Zimbabwe's heavily Shona Mashonaland East Province do not trust those of other religions the most. There is no single religious center of gravity for these populations. Therefore, Zimbabwean and Zambian populations occupy a narrow band on the religious spectrum and are less religiously fractionalized than the Alesina et al. (2003) measure suggests.

### *Proximity*

The Proximity Principle states that humans assume proximate objects are of the same type. Therefore, groups with increasing physical, technological, and social proximity are perceived by all as more similar, deeming interaction to be more appropriate and likely, increasing social ties and social cohesion. The proximity hypothesis is strongly supported overall when considering all of the physical, technological, and social proximity indicators.

Table 52

*Social Network Composition: Proximity*

| Country | | Physical | | | Technological | | | Social | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Hyp | Result | Support | Hyp | Result | Support | Hyp | Result | Support |
| Burkina Faso | Test Cases | High | High | Strong | High | Low | Reject | High | High | Strong |
| Ethiopia | | High | High | Strong | High | Low | Reject | High | High | Strong |
| Nigeria | | High | High | Strong | High | Mod | Mod | High | Mod | Mod |

Table Continued

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zambia | Control Cases | Low | Low | Strong | Low | Low | Strong | Low | Low | Strong |
| Zimbabwe | | Low | Low | Strong | Low | Low | Strong | Low | Low | Strong |

*Physical Proximity*

Physical proximity, also termed geographic or spatial proximity in other literature, is the fourth test criterion for increasing inter-group interaction and widening or narrowing the GTR. Whole society or group physical proximity may be measured using a combination of population density, urbanization, terrain, and mobility and migration patterns. All three of the test cases are highly physically proximate as hypothesized. While SSA societies are urbanizing at a high rate, they remain the most rural region globally. All three of the test cases are in the top 14 for highest urbanization rates globally (Burkina Faso 3rd, Ethiopia 10th, and Nigeria 14th), meaning their ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups are increasingly likely to interact. Therefore, a wide GTR always occurs when high physical proximity is present in all three test cases. A smoking-gun test is passed for all test cases, rejecting the null hypothesis and confirming that physical proximity has a positive effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all test cases. All test cases also pass a hoop test, disproving the non-proximate alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis. Both control cases have low physical proximity because they are highly rural. Zimbabwe is 108th out of 231 for urban growth. While Zambia has the 22nd highest urbanization rate, it remains highly rural. This does not affect the test case hypothesis but instead suggests a good control case fit for Zimbabwe and a little less so for Zambia.

Science fiction and perhaps e-commerce, the stock market, online education, or the drone industry can imagine a future where little physical proximity is required to meet interests. However, fragile state institutions are ill-equipped to provide sufficient

safeguards for non-proximate interaction to produce generalized trust. There are too many negative externalities present for agents to ensure compliance with contracts between principles, the primary one being information asymmetry. Principles are unable to use their full assortment of senses to collect and process information about other principles and potential cost and effort required of them, to arrive at sound decisions. Inadequately monitored agents may take advantage of information asymmetry through adverse selection, producing a moral hazard by taking on more risk than principles were expecting, negatively influencing future interactions.

In the cases of Ethiopia and Nigeria, the high physical proximity between their ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups is a mixture of incentivization and coercion, due to high population density, urbanization growth, and a history of war and famine. The few young, urban, wealthy, and educated Ethiopians have a deficiency of generalized trust with other ethnic and linguistic groups, but not religious groups. Ethiopia has an overpopulation problem even though it is highly rural and rugged. Due to its high urbanization rate of 4.8 percent (World Bank 2016) and its population's concentration in the center of the country, there is less of a chance of in-group network cliques and structurally cohesive blocks forming, meaning inter-group interaction will be higher. Although it has a history of war, famine, and ethnic division, its low inequality has produced a relatively more trusting environment where the GTR may widen.

Nigeria has a highly dense population and a high urbanization rate of 4.3 percent (World Bank 2016) concentrated in seven cities with over 1 million highly mobile residents spread throughout the country, which has increased competition intensity without the required institutions to manage it. Past conflictual relations can affect

modern relations, such as the intense mistrust Christian Igbo continue to have for Hausa-Fulani Muslims stemming from the Biafra War. Ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups that were once able to keep their distance are finding themselves incentivized or coerced into greater inter-group interaction. Often one group is incentivized while another is coerced. In moderately urbanized Middle Belt states, inter-ethnic and inter-religious interaction is perceived as incentivized for settler groups seeking better economic opportunity and perceived as coerced for indigene groups, which feel trespassed. In southern urban centers, populations are becoming more socially atomized, lowering in-group trust, which produces incentives for inter-group interaction. Because state institutions are fragile, this has, however, not resulted in increased institutional trust.

Highly rural Burkina Faso lacks a history of violence; however, rapidly rising urbanization to Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso by young people incentivized by the promise of jobs, independence, and a life that is not possible in their ethnic home areas, is producing uneven trust development. Its border regions that do experience conflict spillover and intense migration have trust problems. Regions bordering Mali where spillover conflict is most prevalent, have a deficiency in generalized trust, while regions bordering Cote d'Ivoire, where there is a history of heavy migration, have a deficiency of in-group and generalized trust. Burkina Faso's high physical proximity is incentivized by recent economic opportunity, being a geographically small country with gentle terrain, and its 5.7 percent urban growth rate (World Bank 2016). When Burkinabé contract institutions do not function well—which is often—physical proximity makes norms and behaviors more easily monitored, enhancing inter-group knowledge, which keeps principles more honest and reduces myth building about other groups. Principles are also

more predictable because they can observe multiple interactions of other principles, thereby better understanding the scripts they follow. This environment made it easier for disparate groups to build sufficient momentum for the collective action that resulted in the 2014 Burkinabé Uprising, which was a sign of growing generalized trust throughout its civil society rather than its decrease. A reorganization of social networks through the moving from in-group trust to generalized trust can be a conflictual process in the short-term that results in long-term stability.

Zambia has low physical proximity due primarily to having one of the lowest population densities in SSA—half the density of the next lowest case (Zimbabwe) and ten times less than the highest case (Nigeria). Its incredibly high economic inequality and high urban growth rate (4.1 percent) (World Bank 2016) from rural areas to the Copperbelt Province and from there to Lusaka Province, incentivized by economic opportunity, has driven a divide between urban and rural populations, even between those of the same ethnic and/or religious group. Those remaining in ethnic home areas have high propinquity and are doubly or triply isolated from interaction with other groups. As urban Copperbelt and Lusaka continue to grow and as capitalist and democratic competition continues to increase, class instability will increase, producing a narrower GTR.

Zimbabwe's low physical proximity is a product of having a low urban growth rate and two strongly independent, but highly rural nations residing in one state. Even in Shona and Northern Ndebele ethnic regions, there is only a modest urban growth rate (2.4 percent) (World Bank 2016). Its people have a history of violence, deprivation, turmoil, and mistrust, which has increased ethnic groups' regional entrenchment rather than

mobilizing them to interact to meet their interests. This physical distance and disconnected networks increase the creation of demonizing and dehumanizing myths about other groups, particularly between the Shona and Northern Ndebele.

### *Technological Proximity*

Technological proximity (communications and transportation) is the fifth test criterion for increasing inter-group interaction and widening or narrowing the GTR. Finding highly technologically proximate states in SSA is difficult. Technological proximity is measured through the prevalence and strength of communications and transportation infrastructures, technologies, and institutions that govern their use and constrain populations' behavior. While most communications technology and transportation services increase inter-group interaction, mobile phones actually increase in-group communication and trust more so.

Only one of the three test cases (Nigeria) is moderately technologically proximate. It passes a smoking-gun test, rejecting the null hypothesis and confirming that technological proximity has a GTR widening effect in Nigeria as is hypothesized. It also passes a hoop test, disproving the non-proximate alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis. Burkina Faso has low technological proximity because of its weak infrastructure, while Ethiopia because of the state's authoritarian control of technology. Neither pass a smoking-gun test, so are not able to reject the null hypothesis and confirm the hypothesis. They also do not pass a hoop test, unable to disprove the non-proximate alternative hypothesis. Zambia and Zimbabwe have a good control case fit. Zambia, like Burkina Faso, has low technological proximity because of its weak

infrastructure, while Zimbabwe, like Ethiopia, has low technological proximity because of the state's authoritarian control of technology.

Technological proximity adds to the multiplexity of ties throughout society, but each type does so differently. Increased availability of mobile technology may increase the proximity of non-proximate nodes in an existing network but is rarely used to create new ties between networks. Radio and television are one-way communication technologies that have the potential to connect a large segment of society indirectly. Increased availability of private vehicle transport may increase the physical proximity of non-proximate nodes in a network, but strangers are not interacting during the process of transportation, whereas public forms of transportation place strangers in proximity to generate new network ties as well as strengthen ties in existing networks.

Increasing transportation technological proximity (roads, rails, and ports) also increases *physical* proximity. When roads do not wash out during the rainy season, and public transportation runs on time, proximity is increased between communities, reducing the effort and time required to interact, making inter-group interaction more likely. Unaccompanied by physical proximity, communications technological proximity via radio, media, internet, and television, is a recipe for miscommunication and exploitation. However, as globalization increases, it provides additional means for monitoring agents and principles that were once unavailable or unnecessary. These technologies serve as a one-way conduit between groups that may either enhance existing out-group myths or discredit them. With the increasing globalization of capitalism and democracy and the emergence of big data, the internet of things (IoT) has the potential to change how communication, monitoring, and transactions occur. This has already begun to transform

the principle-agent relationship in developed countries and will slowly, but eventually do so in developing countries. When the principle-agent relationship becomes better monitored through technological proximity, researchers must decipher how much is generalized trust shared between principles and how much is institutional trust credited to the monitoring institutions.

Communications and transportation innovations disseminate isomorphically, but unevenly. Mobile telecommunications technology—and there are many types (e.g., voice, text, social media)—may have a GTR narrowing or widening effect. Maintaining strong in-group ties with non-physically proximate group members via technology makes it more difficult to establish new network ties with other *physically* proximate groups. While there are cases where social media has served to produce collective action among a wide diversity of people (e.g., Arab Spring), when used by tightly bounded groups, there are not weakly tied nodes to serve as a communications bridge between groups. While the democratization of information through the internet has not developed strongly in SSA, mobile telecommunications networks have become a lifeline between non-proximate group members separated by urbanization, serving to perpetuate and strengthen group norms, scripts, and in-group trust. In all cases but Ethiopia, which is much lower, around 80 percent of populations have mobile subscriptions, and many of their neighboring countries (e.g., Botswana, South Africa, and Ghana) have nearly 1.5 mobile subscriptions per resident. This indicates that Botswana, South Africa, and Ghana are more economically developed and that Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have the technological means for keeping non-physically proximate group members' networks tied. Even though Nigeria is equally industrialized as South Africa

and much more so than Botswana, Ghana, and the other cases, because such a high percentage of its people are poor, they are not able to utilize mobile technology as readily, which suggests Nigerians also may have slightly reduced in-group trust. A high percentage of Ethiopians are also poor. Ethiopia has one of the lowest per capita mobile phone usage rates in SSA at 50 percent (World Factbook 2017), with only wealthy urbanites in Addis Ababa using mobile technology regularly. Therefore, Ethiopians are more likely to have lower in-group trust as well.

Large and deeply embedded radio and television networks play a unique role in Nigerian society. Wealthy expansionist religious groups are permitted to spread their message and misinformation about other religious groups freely through these technologies because they keep these media institutions in business. This has shaped a hostile one-way communications environment between religious groups, perpetuating religious conflict. The Ethiopian and Zimbabwean governments attempt to control information about groups through their ownership of the few radio and television stations, which instead of producing stability, has the unintended consequence of reducing institutional trust and fomenting out-group myths in the absence of accurate information. The more free-market oriented Burkinabé and Zambians—at least more so than Ethiopians and Zimbabweans—have relatively free and accurate one-way communication through private radio networks.

Many Nigerians are poor, but the state is not. The government funds many poorly managed urban transportation infrastructure projects, which makes some regions more technologically proximate than others are. Lagos is the most technologically proximate, while rural North West and North East Muslim populations are mostly left out of

technological proximity. Because there are many relatively inexpensive domestic air carriers, an extensive airport infrastructure, and poor road and rail networks, the wealthy tend to fly domestically, while the poor utilize more interactive public transportation such as busses. Many Ethiopians are poor, and so is the state. Regional differences in technological proximity are also urban-rural. While Addis Ababa residents and surrounding areas enjoy access to greater communications and transportation infrastructure, including SSA's first light-rail system, the more rural eastern and western regions have reduced technological proximity. Because Ethiopian roads are some of the most deadly in the world and most are too poor to own private vehicles, the wealthy take advantage of the state-owned airlines, while the poor utilize more interactive public transportation such as busses. Burkina Faso has little communications or transportation infrastructure because it is a late developer. Road, rail, and air transportation infrastructures are meager, and most Burkinabé remain poor, so all utilize more interactive forms of public transportation such as busses. Similar to Lagos and Addis Ababa, Zambian residents of Lusaka and Copperbelt provinces are more technologically proximate, while their rural Western, North-Western, and Northern provinces are much less so. Boom and bust road infrastructural development has produced a fragmented transportation network, but years of peace have enabled the construction of a decent rail network. Therefore, all Zambians travel by the more interactive public transportation of trains and buses. Zimbabwe's prosperous history allowed it to build decent road and rail networks that are now in disrepair. The poor travel by public rail and bus within their home regions and the few wealthy by private vehicle as the state-owned Air Zimbabwe airline is now defunct, being replaced by the Mugabe-owned Zimbabwe Airways.

### *Social Proximity*

Social proximity is an indicator of *sustained* negative or positive network connectivity and the sixth test criterion for narrowing or widening the GTR respectively. Two of the three test cases (Burkina Faso and Ethiopia) have high social proximity and wide GTR as hypothesized; ensuring social proximity is one of the causes affecting a wide GTR in those cases. The remaining test case (Nigeria) has moderate social proximity due to its unique religious parity. Therefore, a smoking-gun test is passed for all test cases, rejecting the null hypothesis and confirming that high-moderate social proximity has a positive effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all test cases. All test cases also pass a hoop test, disproving the socially non-proximate alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis. All control cases have low social proximity and a narrow GTR as hypothesized. This indicates a good control case fit.

Social proximity occurs in two phases: *initial* interaction and *sustained* interaction and is measurable through a variety of descriptive network measures. Initial interaction may occur between strangers, but if the incentivized or coercive force is removed, future interaction is less likely. While sustained interaction is a requirement for a narrower or wider GTR, a wider GTR is dependent on sustained *positive* interaction. Inter-group interaction is driven by either incentivization or coercion, tools for getting someone to do what one wants.

> An incentive is an offer of something of value, sometimes with a cash equivalent and sometimes not, meant to influence the payoff structure of a utility calculation so as to alter a person's course of action – Ruth W. Grant (2006, 29)

Sociological institutionalism and social capital theory provide a framework for explaining how incentives and coercion are applied through institutions within and across networks and how network structure affects how it flows to affect inter-group interaction through bridging ties. Incentivized and coerced inter-group interaction establish or strengthen negative or positive ties between networks. These may take the form of pushing or pulling forces. A pushing force may be a group not meeting its members' instrumental interests, while a pulling force may be if another group can meet a group member's instrumental interest more efficiently or effectively. These forces influence whether group members seek to have their interests met within or outside the group. Communal magnetism is a pulling force attracting group members to the group. In individualist societies, communal magnetism is weak, because other groups can provide similar positive communal externalities. However, in collectivist societies (all of the cases), communal magnetism and in-group trust are strong, requiring greater force to produce inter-group interaction. Fragile states provide plenty of coercive pushing force; what is lacking in the typical control cases is greater incentivized pulling forces. This dissertation explains how there are greater incentivized pulling forces in the test cases than in the control cases, producing a wider GTR.

Every inter-group interaction consists of part in-group, generalized, and institutional trust, which require separation for analysis. While the interest of community and solidarity drives in-group trust and derivative out-group trust, this is not true of generalized trust. The amount of cultural attraction between principles and trust credited to strong institutions responsible for managing the interaction, limit the amount of generalized trust. When principles perceive their sustained interaction as mutually

positive, the GTR widens; how much it widens depends on how much the positive interaction is credited to cultural attraction and institutions.

Coercive interactions limit one or more principles' choices, resulting in unbalanced interest outcomes, while incentivized interactions are more often balanced. Principles behave differently when the source is external to the principles (e.g., the state, and agent, external intervention, sanction) than when the source is one of the principles. This can lead to dynamic enemy-of-my-enemy triadic relations.

Incentivization and coercion are best understood as a continuum, where most often the more coercive the environment, the narrower the GTR; however, coercion is conditional. At the coercive end of the continuum are unbalanced, violent zero-sum interactions between untrusting and untrustworthy powerful and powerless principles governed by incompetent or corrupt agents and inflexible and untrustworthy institutions. A little less coercive are proscriptive and prescriptive state laws that provide few options for adherence and where penalties far outweigh the crimes (e.g., Wilson and Kelling's (1982) broken windows theory). At the incentivization end are mutually positive interactions between trusting and trustworthy free, well-resourced, and equally powerful principles governed by competent agents and flexible and trustworthy institutions. A little less incentivized are relatively peaceful, yet imbalanced interactions between slightly bounded principles governed by decent agents in a competitive institutional environment.




*Figure 19.* Inter-Group Interaction Continuum.

The longer mutually positive inter-group interaction is sustained, the more generalized trust is created, and the fewer negative externalities associated with agent and principle monitoring are present because expectations are regularly met, and scripts are better understood. The homophily, propinquity, and transitivity of principles' ties strengthen, serving as a bridge between group networks. Fractionalized, proximate, and *incentivized* societies *usually, but not always*, produce wider GTR and fractionalized, proximate, and *coercive* societies often produce narrower GTR, while the less fractionalized, proximate, and incentivized or coerced societies are, the less they interact.

All cases, being fragile states, have more coercive than incentivized environments. However, this does not preclude the widening of the GTR, as it is possible for generalized trust to increase in coercive environments. Fragile states utilize coercion

more than incentivization because it is more effective for meeting short-term, though not long-term, interests[5]. Since these cases are fragile, the state is not the only source of coercion and incentivization for their populations. Depending on a state's fragility composition, a dominant group may exert sufficient coercive or incentivizing influence as it seeks its interests or the international community may employ coercion and incentivization through structural adjustment, sanctions, and military pressure. Some, but not all, of these meaningful nuances are observable through the security and contract institutions and inter-state market forces control variables. There is broad variation among the cases' social proximity. Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe have the most coercive environments of the cases, while Burkina Faso has recently moved from a rather non-coercive and non-incentivized environment to one that is more incentive-rich and Zambia tends towards policies that do not highly incentivize nor coerce inter-group interaction.

Ethiopia's history is full of many coercive and incentivized institutions, which have produced a socially proximate environment. The deeply embedded Ethiopian Orthodox and Muslim religious groups, together composing more than three-fourths of the population, have a long shared history that has established a multiplexity of relatively weak, but peaceable network ties over many centuries. The Ethiopian derg (1974-87) established many coercive institutions that forced physical proximity and negative inter-group interaction. The Ethiopian government had a difficult time rebounding from the derg-induced economic depression of the 1980s, but from 1991-2004, it finally regained

[5] This is not to say that non-fragile states do not also give preference to short-term implications when making policy choices. The Achilles heel of all statecraft is the short-term incentivization of politics that produces moral hazard for subsequent administrations.

traction and began to develop on an above global average trajectory. China has shown some interest in Ethiopia by investing in Ethiopian water supply, wastewater, and hydroelectric supply and the state has responded by developing military collaborations with China. While the derg legacy has produced many negative externalities for modern Ethiopians, one positive effect is the lower-than-average inequality, which eases positive network ties between groups and classes. Following the fall of the derg, the Eritrean secession in 1991, strengthened some and weakened other social networks. That which remains has been restructured through the institution of ethnic-based federalism designed to decrease ethnic tension through making ethnic groups more regionally autonomous and less physically, technologically, and socially proximate. What has happened instead is the Tigray minority group has manipulated this institution to embed itself in state institutions and use the military to both coerce and incentivize the Amhara, Oromo, and Southern Nations ethnic groups into a coalition to sustain the political status quo. This has served to disconnect smaller regional ethnic groups from federal political networks, though not social ones, relegating them to concentrate their political efforts and network building regionally and through extrajudicial means than through the stacked parliament where they do not have a voice. This constant political and social upheaval has weakened the homophily, propinquity, and cohesion of both ethnic and nationwide networks and strengthened multi-ethnic regional ones.

China has courted Nigeria, and it has reciprocated by exporting large amounts of petroleum and developing military collaborations with China. As of 2010, Nigeria and Zambia had the most Chinese investment offerings of the cases (China Business Review 2010). This trade relationship is valuable enough to China to have sent the Chinese

National People's Congress Chairman, Wu Bangguo, to visit in 2004. The primary means by which Nigerians identify has shifted since independence from ethnic to religious. The Nigerian military's many successful coup d'états and the state's attempt to manage increasing inter-group interaction inherent to modernization through an increasingly granulated federal power structure purposed to weaken ethnic identities and strengthen state-based identity has had the unintended consequence of strengthening religious identities instead. Nigerians have always been religiously bifurcated Christian and Muslim, south and north respectively, but the British, during their colonial rule, purposefully isolated their networks and institutions, leaving them unpracticed in the art of living peaceably together. As a result, modern Christian and Muslim networks often lack ties and difficulty locating structurally equivalent nodes between them. The federal government's attempted monopolization of the provision of public goods by controlling so many of the resources groups require has made state governments overly dependent, creating a "climate of passive clientelism" (Gray 1993, 157) as they follow the government gravy train rather than seek to have their interests met through other groups in the market or civil society. The federal and state governments, however, are not effective in meeting groups' interests. They often distribute goods unevenly, producing a sense of inequality between groups (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972, 82). Gaps in government services create unintended opportunities for inter-group interaction; however, religious groups attempt to fill these gaps for their members only, unless sufficient incentivization or coercive force prompts engagement. Religious identity touches every other area of life: cultural, economic, familial, political, spatial, and social. Neighborhoods in the Middle Belt cities of Jos and Kaduna have become institutionalized

as nearly 100 percent Christian or Muslim. This combination of deeply embedded homogenous ethnoreligious indigene communities and mobile settler communities, fragile land tenure policies, and deficiency of resources has pitted these religious groups operating on very different scripts against each other in a competitive race for a piece of the LGA, state, and federal resource pies. This has resulted in perceived indivisibility and spiritualization of land disputes, what the literature calls sacred space conflicts (see Hassner 2003). Each of these ethnoreligious networks is highly dense, structurally cohesive blocks with strong homophily and propinquity. This has served to tie expansionist Christian and Muslim social networks together temporarily and sporadically through negative ties. Rapidly urbanizing Lagos, nine percent of the Nigerian population and other southern urban centers, are a different context, one that is religiously mixed, but where religion is not the only important identity of its residents. These cities are chaotic, but not violent. Their residents have learned better than most how to manage a plurality of interests in a weak institutional environment, which has produced a wider GTR.

Burkina Faso has a less coercive history of state maladministration, sanctions, structural adjustment, and military pressure than Ethiopia or Nigeria. The Burkinabé lack deeply embedded ethnic and religious animosities, which has allowed their social networks to build ties. The 27 years of President Compaoré's strongman rule served to keep group networks reasonably connected rather than isolated. The active Burkinabé protest culture resulting in recent social upheaval has created positive network ties between allied groups, increasing homophily and propinquity between their social networks, however, decreasing institutional trust in the government, producing negative

ties with groups tied to the government. It may have benefited Burkina Faso delaying the opening its economy to inter-state market forces longer than many other SSA states. Since 1991, Burkina Faso has been a model neo-liberal structural adjustment reformer in partnership with the IMF and the World Bank and has been rewarded by a relatively consistent and even development path, following a nearly identical trajectory as the global GDP per capita, PPP average (World Bank 2016). It has not engaged with China as the other cases have; even going so far as to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Zambia has also not experienced as coercive of an environment as Ethiopia and Nigeria through internal pressures of dominant groups and the state or external pressures of sanctions and military intervention. It does though share a similar economic history with these states, one where the 1990s was a severe economic decline, which has affected its groups' social proximity. It was an early casualty of flawed IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programs in the 1980s (Dollar and Svensson 2000, 895) that were more coercive than incentivizing. They did not realize Zambia did not have embedded political institutions conducive to economic and political reform (Van de Walle and Johnston 1996)—conditions such as a democratically elected government with regular term limits (Dollar and Svensson 2000, 911). The Zambian economy, therefore, stagnated in the 1990s under these coercive external forces, until 1998, when it began having consistent incremental improvements in development. Some of this growth was due to its increased trade relationship with China rather than successful structural

adjustment[6], where it exports large amounts of copper for petroleum[7]. This trade relationship is valuable enough to China to have also sent the Chinese National People's Congress Chairman, Wu Bangguo, to visit in 2004. Many in Zambia consider modern Chinese influence to be kinder and gentler than Western structural adjustment (Afrobarometer 2016). Even more than its burgeoning relationship with China, Zambia's social network structure and resulting social proximity has shifted greatly due to the more coercive than incentivizing forces of economic inequality, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, regional differences, and religious syncretism. Rapidly rising economic inequality has driven a class rift within and between ethnic groups, so that high-income and low-income Bemba and Tonga social networks are doubly isolated, now also by class. HIV/AIDS has taken a physical and social toll on Zambians, isolating the infected from some in their groups and doubly so from other groups. These three factors together make some segments of groups triply isolated from each other. Another factor is regional differences. Zambian in-group trust varies and is affected greatly by economic inequality between provinces. Zambia's Eastern Province populated by Nsenga, Senga, Nyanja, and Tubuka ethnic minority groups, has a deficiency of familial trust, while its Southern Province, almost totally populated by the Tonga ethnic group, has a deficiency of trust for those known personally. Coercive and incentivizing development forces have produced a modernization path from the ethnic home areas to the Copperbelt, and finally to Lusaka. In this way, it is also driving a further urban-wealthy/rural-poor social divide. Zambia's

[6] In the late 1990s, the IMF and World Bank did begin restructuring their incentivization structures, which did have some effect on Zambia's economic reversal.

[7] Switzerland is the largest recipient of Zambian copper exports, three times more than China, the next largest.

highly religiously syncretistic Christian populations tend to reduce societal conflict because religious expansionism is lessened and because they share similar ideological foundations; however, it consequently decreases inter-group interaction. Tie strength and duration (homophily) and intensity (propinquity) are breaking down within religious groups that once had high in-group trust, but this is not resulting in more weakly tied nodes that may connect group networks.

Zimbabwe has a very different economic story than the other cases. From 2001-2008, the Zimbabwean economy severely declined and only regained less than half its size over the next eight years. To maintain the post-independence Mugabe-Shona status quo, the Zimbabwean state coerced, isolated, and disempowered white farmers and their Northern Ndebele ethnic rivals. As a result, many in the international community have heavily sanctioned Zimbabwe to coerce policy changes, leaving it with few allies. China, however, has been an economic lifeline during this time being the recipient of large amounts of Zimbabwe's iron exports (Watts and Meldrum 2005)[8]. China values this trade relationship sufficiently to send the Chinese National People's Congress Chairman, Wu Bangguo, to visit in 2004 in addition to Nigeria and Zambia. However, more than half of Zimbabweans regret modern Chinese influence, feeling it borders on a coercive mercantilist system (Afrobarometer 2016). Zimbabwean development and innovation have suffered, not only due to coercive bureaucratic maladministration but also because ethnic groups are relatively closed networks. Zimbabwean society is not a structurally

[8] China is not Zimbabwe's only or greatest trade partner. South Africa has been a long-time trade partner, exchanging Zimbabwean tobacco and gold for South African petroleum. Zimbabwe's trade volume is almost six times greater with South Africa than with China.

cohesive network; instead the Shona and Northern Ndebele form relatively large disconnected networks. While they are not so separate and insular that they are dense network cliques, they instead resemble structurally cohesive blocks. HIV/AIDS has ravaged Zimbabwe over the last three decades, ranging between the third and sixth highest infection rate globally[9]. Zimbabwe welcomed the new millennium with a quarter of its adult population HIV positive (Burkett 2000, 471) and "unemployment, inflation, poverty rates, and interest rates all running above 50 percent" (MacLean 2002, 513). This has taken a physical and social toll, particularly on the Northern Ndebele where infection rates are highest. All Zimbabweans have altered their scripts to be more cautious of inter-group interaction, due to the stigma and not knowing who is infected, making the infected doubly or triply isolated from other groups. Even if ethnic or religious groups are physically proximate (living in the same district or village), inter-group interaction is less likely, decreasing their physical proximity's effect. In the absence of inter-group interaction, groups tend to devalue the lives of other group members they do not understand, leading to an ethical double standard, which is the case between the Shona and Northern Ndebele.

*Power Differential*

Table 53

*Social Network Composition: Power Differential*

| Country | | Hypothesis | Result | Support |
|---|---|---|---|---|

[9] Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, currently have the highest HIV/AIDS infection rates globally.

Table Continued

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Burkina Faso | Test Cases | High | Multipolar | Strong |
| Ethiopia | | High | Multipolar | Mod |
| Nigeria | | High | Bipolar | Mod |
| | | | | |
| Zambia | Control Cases | Low | Multipolar | Weak |
| Zimbabwe | | Low | Unipolar | Strong |

Power differential is the seventh test criterion for narrowing or widening the GTR; its hypothesis is moderately supported. Power differential explains the relative competitiveness of groups within a society assessing the distribution of power and relative access to and ability to obtain desired interests. It is measured by groups' size, duration, embeddedness, access to government, military, and the market, capital ownership, and overall ability to meet group interests. This dissertation advances the trust literature's understanding of how unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar societies affect the GTR. Inter-group interaction (negative and positive) occurs most in multipolar societies and least in unipolar societies. When inter-group interaction does occur in unipolar societies, it is at the command of the dominant group, and when inter-group inter-action occurs in bipolar societies, it is often more intense and conflictual.

One test case (Burkina Faso) has a high power differential (multipolar) as hypothesized and the other two (Ethiopia and Nigeria) have moderate power differentials (multipolar and bipolar respectively), ensuring it is one of the factors affecting their wide GTR. Therefore, a smoking-gun test is passed for all test cases, rejecting the null hypothesis and confirming that high-moderate power differential has a positive effect on the GTR as hypothesized for all test cases. All test cases also pass a hoop test, disproving the low power differential alternative hypothesis, which affirms the SNC hypothesis. One control case (Zimbabwe) has a low power differential (unipolar) and a narrow GTR

as hypothesized, while the other one (Zambia) has a moderate power differential (multipolar) and a narrow GTR, suggesting a control case misfit for Zambia.

Multipolar societies such as Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Zambia, which lack a dominant group, have the largest power differentials because there are many small groups of varying power, while bipolar societies such as Nigeria (parity of dominant groups) exhibit the next largest power differentials. In the absence of a unipole in these states, groups may enter into either a fruitless competitive race for dominance (most common in bipolar societies) or pragmatic coalition building relationships (most common in multipolar societies). Diffusion of power in these societies does not guarantee democracy. To deal with high ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization and a vast territory, Ethiopia and Nigeria have chosen different types of federal models of governance. Both systems are *intended* to accommodate divergent interests through multiple parties, which enhance federal decision-making power of groups and provide increased regional autonomy. Achievement of these goals is measurable by the presence of viable competing parties in both cases. The presence of national parties crosscut by ethnicity and religion indicates the beginning of successful coalition building in Nigeria.

Unipolar societies produce less inter-group interaction than bipolar and multipolar societies. While the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is the most intensely authoritarian region, SSA is the second most and has the largest number of authoritarian regimes (Kaufmann et al. 2009). However, many SSA states are transitioning from unipolar and authoritarian to multipolar and democratic. Unipolar societies such as Zimbabwe with a single dominant group are relatively stable and have the smallest power differential because minority groups are unable to challenge the unipole's dominance.

Most authoritarian societies are unipolar, but not all unipolar societies are authoritarian. Unipolarity indicates that a society may be more homogenous where there is less opportunity to widen the GTR. A centralized political system or a one-party state indicates a more homogenous society or unipolar power differential, which makes it easier and more efficient for the unipole to maintain the status quo. Strongman leader longevity in all cases except Nigeria (e.g., President's Mugabe, Compaoré, Zenawi, and Kaunda) results from the insufficient political will to establish term limits. In this environment, the unipole may further sustain the status quo if it has support from an external state or non-state actor.

Table 54

*Power Differentials*

| Country | Diff | Identity | Political System | Party Structure | Group(s) | Political Longevity | Enhanced Access |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Burkina Faso | Multi | Ethnic | Unitary Semi-Presidential Republic | Single-Party turned Multi-Party | Mossi | 35 Years | Military |
| Ethiopia | Multi | Ethnic | Federal Parliamentary Republic | Multi-Party | Tigray, Amhara, Oromo, Southern Nations | 17 Years | Military and Market |
| Nigeria | Bi | Religion | Federal Presidential Republic | Multi-Party (two dominant) | Christian | 5 Years | Market |
| | | | | | Muslim | 34 Years | Military |
| Zambia | Multi | Ethnic/ Class | Unitary Presidential Republic | Single-Party turned Multi-Party (three dominant) | Bemba/ Tonga Socialist/ Liberal | 27 Years | Market |
| Zimbabwe | Uni | Ethnic | Unitary Presidential Republic | Dominant Party | Shona | 37 Years | Military |

Indicators of unipolarity include if a single ethnic or religious group: a) controls a one-party state; b) has held the highest civilian political office for more than 75 percent (22.5 non-consecutive yrs.) in the last 30 years; c) has held the highest military office for

Table Continued

more than 75 percent (22.5 non-consecutive yrs.) in the last 30 years; d) controls over 50 percent of trade; or e) has another state or non-state actor willing to intervene on its behalf if its power is challenged.

Table 55

*Changing Power Differentials over Five Decades*

| Country | 1970s | 1980s | 1990s | 2000s | 2010s |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Burkina Faso | Unipolar | Unipolar | Unipolar | Unipolar | Multipolar |
| Ethiopia | Unipolar | Unipolar | Transitional | Multipolar | Multipolar |
| Nigeria | Unipolar | Unipolar | Unipolar | Bipolar | Bipolar |
| Zambia | Unipolar | Unipolar | Multipolar | Multipolar | Multipolar |
| Zimbabwe | Civil War | Unipolar | Unipolar | Unipolar | Unipolar |

All cases' histories (sans Ethiopia) are not their own because of their colonial experience. The two types of leaders that have emerged from these cases are socialist revolutionaries who rail against neo-colonial intervention and pragmatic structural adjustment apologists who want to make the best of a bad situation. Burkina Faso has produced both. The most powerful of them, Presidents Sankara and Compaoré, both Christian Mossi military leaders, differed greatly in their ideology, Sankara a Mossi Christian Marxist and Compaoré a mixed Mossi-Fulani capitalist. President Compaoré constructed a de facto single-party state through the unitary semi-presidential republican governance model from 1996-2014 to enact neo-liberal market reforms that President Sankara had opposed. President Kaboré, also a Mossi Christian, is the first elected civilian leader in 50 years since President Yaméogo was deposed in a 1966 military coup d'état. He has overseen the transition to a multi-party system and further market liberalization.

Burkina Faso had been isolated and autonomous for a long time after its independence from France. In a similar way that the United States benefited from

relative non-intervention in the years following the War of 1812, Burkina Faso has had time and space to choose its developmental path, albeit, not a highly growth-oriented one—nonetheless, its own path. For most of its post-colonial history, it chose a unipolar power differential along with an assortment of military and civilian strongman leaders—more of the former than latter—but even Burkina Faso's authoritarianism has not been very coercive. Even so, no minority groups alone or together were able to mount a strong opposition to Mossi dominance, so they did not try to do so, which produced a relatively static and peaceful Mossi ethnic unipolar power differential since independence. During this time, Mossi institutions have isomorphically transferred to surrounding minorities, in part, due to its dominance and status as one of the only ethnic groups that are native to the region, which has afforded it creditability and respect from surrounding groups.

Jumping into market liberalization full force, late in the game, has begun developing state institutions and the economy and has transitioned the Mossi unipolarity into a multipolarity, reconfiguring group incentives for interaction. Now, with a multipolar power differential, there are competing Mossi, Fulani, Bobo, Gurma, Mandé, Senufo, Gurunsi, Lobi, and Tuareg scripts. This has increased opportunities to form ties between networks, making the likelihood of cooperative ties higher. For sure, structural adjustment has been a difficult transition, yet the Burkinabé have benefited from watching neighboring countries inter into globalization first. Recent structural adjustment tensions have served to unite more so than divide social networks, widening the GTR.

Ethiopia has had an assortment of civilian leaders interrupted by a coercive Marxist military government, producing swings between multipolar and unipolar ethnic

power differentials for much of its history. The most powerful of Ethiopian leaders, President Meles Zenawi (1995-2012), a Tigray, was both a Marxist revolutionary and a western reformer. Since the fall of the derg in 1991, there were four years of Worker's Party leadership followed by four years of transitional government led by the Amhara National Democratic Movement. Since its ethnic-based federation was established in 1995, Meles Zenawi of the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front was reelected Prime Minister three times, dying in office, followed in leadership by his Deputy Prime Minister, Hailemariam Desalegn of the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement.

Following the derg, Ethiopians wanted a decentralized system that would provide minority groups greater regional autonomy because there are competing Oromo, Amhara, Tigray, Somali, Sidama, Gurage, Welayta, Hadiya, Afar, and Gamo ethnic scripts. The result was a de jure multipolar power differential and ethnic-based federalism with a parliament and multiple parties, but that allowed the four most powerful ethnic groups (Amhara, Oromo, Southern Nations, and Tigray) to form a relatively coercive coalition, essentially locking out all other groups from federal decision-making processes. This variation of ethnic-based federalism has allowed regional ethnic scripts to strengthen, enhancing ethnic identities, but none has taken on national significance, meeting one goal of the system. The closest any one group has gotten is the Tigray that has locked in its place in the political structure by building a deeply connected social network throughout the military. Although the Tigray ethnic group make up about six percent of the population, it constitutes 95 percent of the command posts in the military (Ginbot 7 Report 2009).

The economic and conflict stakes are higher in Nigeria than the other cases. It is a complex state composed of populations with competing religious, ethnic, and regional identities. The strongest of these was ethnic but is now religious and only relatively recently has its power differential shifted from a strongly coercive unipolar military state to a highly tense bipolar federation based on politicized religious identities, where Christians and Muslims are hopeful they will each prevail to control the Nigerian script. Nigerian Christians and Muslims have two strong and opposing scripts and sets of norms and behaviors. Their deeply embedded religious institutions have developed mostly in isolation from each other. Therefore, isomorphic forces have not historically transferred between groups, instead have circulated within each group, strengthening institutional similarity, homophily, and propinquity within groups but not between them. This is not to say there is not possible institutional likeness. Christians and Muslims share the foundations of Abrahamic faith, which makes them substantially more similar than other world religions. However, they have not proactively capitalized on this similarity to build inter-network ties until recently.

Nigeria has had an assortment of military and civilian leaders, but more years under coercive military dictatorships. In most cases, this would produce a unipolar power differential; however, in Nigeria the northern Muslim Hausa-Fulani have controlled politics and the military while the southern Christian Yoruba, Igbo, and many other minority ethnolinguistic groups have controlled the economy, producing a religious bipolar power differential. A Muslim head of state has led Nigeria since the Second Republic in 1979 for 34 of 39 years. Its history is one of numerous strongman military generals taking over “incompetent” civilian governments, but since the Fourth Republic,

civilian rule has been unbroken for 19 years. Its current political party configuration has produced two religiously mixed parties. Time will tell if the informal Christian-Muslim power-sharing agreement within the People's Democratic Party (PDP) where the candidacy for president alternates between Christian and Muslim will hold if/when they regain the presidency.

Nigeria's federal system reflects extreme ethnolinguistic, religious, cultural, and regional diversity and differences and its presidential system reflects its culture's desire for strongman leadership. The Constitution prohibits the establishment of a state religion or parties that restrict ethnic and religious membership (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, Part III, Chapter VI, D. 222). Its de jure multi-party structure and de facto two-party system reflect the complexity of aligning sufficient inter-faith and -ethnic political agreement to form cohesive and sustainable national political parties. While the Hausa-Fulani are highly Muslim and the Igbo and Ijaw highly Christian, the Yoruba are religiously mixed. These majorities heavily influence the Nigerian political landscape and shape political institutions to their favor, coercing minority groups to cluster by religious allegiances. With the expansion of federal sub-units (states and LGAs), states have been incentivized to form political alliances with religiously-similar states. Nigeria has reached a near religious saturation point with its bipolar parity. Nigerians strongly identify as either Christian or Muslim. For each to enlarge its network in this context, it must interact with and build ties with members of other religious groups. This has resulted in differences in inter-group interaction across regions where these groups are driven together by economic incentives in southern urban centers, by coercive land policies in Middle Belt states, and lack any strong driving force in northern

rural Muslim regions where these groups are not in physical proximity. Therefore, the GTR is narrowing in the Middle Belt, remaining the same in northern rural areas, and widening in southern urban centers.

For much of Zambia's unipolar post-colonial history, Bemba institutions have coercively isomorphically transferred to surrounding minorities. Now with a multipolar ethnic and class-based power differential due to high inequality, there are Bemba, Tonga, Nyanja-Chewa, Lozi, and many more competing scripts. Having so many relatively small, dense, and cohesive ethnic groups provides many opportunities to form ties between ethnic networks, but this has not occurred. Zambia's extremely high inequality is primarily a product of the difference between its large agricultural sector, employing over 50 percent of the population and its small but profitable industrial and service sectors. University educated Zambians (only 1 percent of the population) employed in the industrial and service sectors earn six times more than those with only a primary education (World Bank 2016); only they have access to banks and credit. As agriculture continues to bring less value to countries' GDPs and industry and service sectors increase, Zambian inequality may increase, further narrowing its GTR.

This whole process formed under the watchful eye of strongman-unifier multi-ethnic Protestant Christian and socialist President Kaunda (1964-1991). Zambia was a one-party state from 1972-1990 under his leadership of the United National Independence Party (UNIP). He was as much the Alexander Hamilton of Zambia (a man without a home) as he was known to be the "Gandhi of Africa," for his non-violent strategies. President Kaunda was not satisfied with the status quo of ethnic politics, so he instituted ethnic-based power sharing of military leadership so that no single ethnic group

could wrest power from the civilian government, hence its low instance of coup d'états. He was a son of a Malawian Tongas, meaning he should have been affiliated with the Zambian Nyanja ethnic group; instead, he grew up Bemba in Zambia. Eventually, his political convictions put him at odds with Bemba leadership; he from there forward associated with the Nyanja of the Eastern Province (Posner 2005, 98). Kaunda's multi-ethnic, syncretistic, and socialist Protestant Christian Zambian nationalism served him well in unifying a highly diverse society. However, one leader does not often dictate the trajectory of a whole country.

Modern Zambian politics under a unitary presidential republic is relatively competitive, yet this has not served to widen the GTR. The only three parties to muster at least 10 percent of parliamentary seats include: the Bemba Democratic Socialist Patriotic Front (PF), which is critical of Chinese investment and intervention; the Bemba Democratic Socialist Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD); and the Tonga Liberal United Party for National Development (UPND). Of twenty total parties, one-third of them are newly formed. These three dominant parties have settled into a competitive electoral convergence where bounds of each group are sufficiently broad to attract more voters if need be, but not so broad that the base's core interests are at risk. Since 1991 when Zambia initiated its multi-party system, the MMD won the first five elections (1991-2011) until the PF split off from it and won the 2011 general election. Prior to the PF victory, the MMD margins of victory were in the 70s the first two election cycles, but as happens in multi-party systems, the people yearn for change, and in the subsequent two election cycles, the MMD retained the presidency with victory margins only in the 40s (Doorenspleet and Nijzink 2013, 9).

The Shona script drives Zimbabwe's deeply embedded and widely disseminated coercive institutions. In this context, isomorphic forces flow from the dominant Shona to the Northern Ndebele, Tswa, Kunda, Nsenga, Manyika, Ndau, Venda, Kalanga, Tswana, Lozi, Nambya, Tsoa, and Tonga ethnic minority groups. These groups need the Shona to meet some of their interests, but the Shona do not. Zimbabwe's unipolar Shona ethnic power differential was established by the closure of the Rhodesian Bush War with a Mugabe-led Zimbabwe Africa National Union (ZANU) victory and Zimbabwean independence. Robert Mugabe was Zimbabwe's only leader under a unitary presidential republican, dominant party model of governance until he was pushed out in 2017. He was a socialist revolutionary and a war hero and was one of the loudest African voices opposing neo-colonial intervention, which produced reverence among the Shona and fear among other ethnic groups. His idealism and coercive tactics cost Zimbabwe dearly in the form of food insecurity and hyperinflation but were more hurtful to the Northern Ndebele and smaller ethnic minorities. Mugabe was able to sustain his rule by entering into a symbiotic relationship with the military elite, ensuring they had conflicts to engage in and resources to expend. The long-time hatred between Shona and Northern Ndebele has served to strengthen ethnic identities. If the later were larger and more powerful, it could produce an explosive bipolar power differential, but it is not.

## Cross-Variable Comparative Analysis and Synthesis

Theoretical generalizations gleaned from the analysis, comparison, and synthesis of these case findings suggest that individualistic multipolar societies in states with strong security and contract institutions, having greater trade and investment than remittances

and aid and that are highly ethnically, linguistically, and religiously fractionalized and physically, technologically, and socially proximate, have wider GTRs. This archetype society only exists theoretically as no past or current empirically observable society, least of all the control cases, meets all these requirements, not even developed Western states do. However, some come closer than others. While the empirical analysis of non-SSA states is not the focus of this dissertation, some conjecture on the theoretically optimal case type is useful for understanding trust development patterns in non-fragile states compared to fragile states.

The societies with the top 10 widest GTRs globally (Sweden, Norway, France, United Kingdom, Finland, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, Mali, and the United States) are all highly *incentivized* Western European and North American representative democracies, except Mali.[10] Most also have effective security and contract institutions, are individualistic, have large inflows of trade and investment and small inflows of remittance and aid, have little ethnolinguistic fractionalization, appear to be physically, technologically, and socially proximate, and are multipolar, as would be hypothesized. The Scandinavian cases share a more *consociational* multipolarity, and the non-Scandinavian ones are highly individualistic and have some of the most religiously fractionalized societies. Fractionalization forms differently in non-fragile and fragile states environments. All test and control cases are more ethnolinguistically fractionalized than any non-fragile states and nearly the opposite is true for their religious fractionalization. Canada is the most ethnically fractionalized developed country—still

[10] Mali would make an excellent follow-up study if reliable variable data can be found (it is not currently available).

less so than these cases—followed by Belgium and Switzerland, and the United States, which are only moderately so. Canada, Israel, Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands are the most linguistically fractionalized developed countries but are only moderately so and all less so than these cases. The United States, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Canada, and United Kingdom are the most religiously fractionalized developed countries, on par with Nigeria and more so than Burkina Faso and Ethiopia. This indicates that non-fragile states allow for greater ideological diversity because of having trustworthy institutions for dealing with competing ideologically driven interests, a benefit fragile states do not have.

The themes of incentivization and consociationalism have arisen in non-fragile state contexts that are transferable to fragile state environments. Further, the theme of trust differential has arisen as a fragile state advantage for widening the GTR. The above listed non-fragile states have also come closest to reaching their generalized *trust differential* saturation point, meaning they are close to reaching their potential, so any effort made to widen their GTR has diminishing returns, similar to the difference of economic growth rates between fragile and non-fragile states. The ten narrowest GTRs globally are mostly North African countries (Peru, Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen, Palestine, Uzbekistan, Libya, Armenia, Mexico, and Morocco) with fragile security and contract institutions, collectivist societies, low trade and investment, and some of the lowest ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization. They also appear to have low physical, technological, and social proximity and lean unipolar. These countries have some of the largest trust differentials, indicating unmet potential—potential nonetheless. Adjustments made to widen the GTR in these societies have a higher return on investment, yet are

more difficult to implement. The most collectivist societies (Guatemala, Ecuador, Panama, Venezuela, and Colombia) do not overlap with the narrowest GTR countries somewhat unexpectedly and are some of the least linguistically (e.g., Spanish) and religiously (e.g., Catholic) fractionalized societies and have moderate trust differentials. The SSA cases reside between these two extremes and share some of their features and not others. They share many of the same GTR narrowing factors as the narrow GTR states and have similar trust differentials, yet have realized more of their potential.

*Control Cases*

This dissertation has established that all control and test cases have poor GTR widening environments, as was intended through the high bar set by the least likely deviant case selection design. All cases' security and contract institutions are only minimally functional, their societies are heavily collectivist, and the combination of their trade, investment, remittances, and aid flows negatively affect their economies and societies as the trust literature claims they should. Also by design, the control cases reflect the typical case environment further where the SNC also has a GTR narrowing effect. Further explanation is required for inconsistencies in control cases' control and test variables.

Ethnically, linguistically, and religiously low fractionalized country cases are difficult to find in SSA; therefore, minimal control case selection trade-offs were made to broaden the fractionalization boundary scope conditions. While few trade-offs were required for Zimbabwe because its good control case fit, Zambia required more due to its high ethnic and linguistic fractionalization. This dissertation claims fractionalization captures only part of the social effect on the GTR; therefore, small inconsistencies in the

fractionalization measures are not as concerning as ones are in proximity or power differential. The high ethnic and linguistic fractionalization of Zambia is insufficient to widen the GTR in the presence the GTR narrowing effects of all the control variables and physical, technological, and social proximity. Zambia and Zimbabwe's generation-long HIV/AIDS epidemic has reconfigured their physical and social proximities and both societies being homogenously Christian, even though there is sect and denominational differences, has decreased the likelihood of inter-group interaction. Further, in Zimbabwe, Mugabe's history of coercive governance and in Zambia, its extremely high economic inequality, also decrease the likelihood of inter-group interaction.

*Hypothesis Challenges.* Subsequent analysis synthesizes revealed variable patterns, and ambiguities and inconsistencies of case findings through the emergent incentivization, consociationalism, and trust differential themes. Presented separately are within-case conclusions, theoretical inference from cross-case conclusions, and policy suggestions.

Some hypotheses are better supported than others. Having appropriate expectations set in the design of this study helps to weigh and interpret the findings accurately. An intentionally high bar is set by employing a deviant, least likely case selection; however, this dissertation does not claim these test cases are critical cases (see Eckstein 2000, 119). There is no expectation of the test variable passing a doubly decisive test for any or all test cases, nor that any would have exceedingly wide GTR.

Smoking gun and hoop support for all cases and variables, excluding technological proximity either confirm or affirm the hypotheses. All test cases have moderately wide GTR when compared across a global sample—which is not

recommended—and high when compared across SSA, a single socio-culturally similar region—which is a best practice. There is little reason to assume these test cases would have high GTR compared to a global sample when facing so many institutional, cultural, and market challenges. Therefore, achieving a moderate GTR in these complex trust environments with only fractionalization, proximity (sans technological), and power differential having a GTR widening effect, is a research accomplishment. However, because technological proximity and power differential perform weaker than the other criteria, further explanation is required.

Technological proximity increases inter-group interaction, but these test cases were unable to assess this empirically. Infrastructure building is expensive, and communications and transportation infrastructures are more dependent on reliable state security and contract institutions than was initially assumed. Even if these test cases build communications and transportation infrastructure, many projects fail over time due to inability or unwillingness to maintain them. Even Nigeria, the most technologically proximate of all cases, has been unable to bring electricity to much of its rural regions. There are pockets of technological proximity in each case, generally in urban areas. As the cases' continue to urbanize, more of their populations will become technologically proximate, but they are not yet. However, technological proximity is not simply a function of the *level* of development, but rather for Burkina Faso, it is also due to the *timing* of its development, as it began on its development path much later than other cases. It may be that in another decade because its terrain is flat and size is small, that infrastructure will proliferate if there is a will, budget, and institutions to do so. For Ethiopia, its fragile communications and transportation infrastructures are largely due to

the controlling nature of the federal government, which has hampered innovation. As it becomes more de facto federal, rather than only de jure, its infrastructure will also grow, but not as rapidly, since its terrain is much more uneven and expansive making infrastructure projects much more expensive. Communications technology, less dependent on physical infrastructure than transportation, has grown more in these cases. Mobile technology in Burkina Faso and Nigeria have increase in-group trust, while this is less a factor in Ethiopia. Radio and television are uni-directional script enhancing technologies, that without the presence of physical proximity or principle monitoring systems increase miscommunication. In Nigeria, script competition is high, and the radio and television market has grown to support it, extending religious conflict. In Burkina Faso and Ethiopia, by contrast, their infrastructures are much smaller and more rigidly controlled by the government, especially in Ethiopia. Therefore, it is most likely that Nigeria and Burkina Faso's communications and transportation technological proximity will increase in the mid-term.

The power differential hypothesis claims test cases should have multipolar and control cases unipolar societies. Therefore, Nigeria's bipolar and Zambia's multipolar societies are not quite as hypothesized. With a bipolar power differential and a coercive environment, Nigeria produces a wider than expected GTR. The complexity of Nigeria has incentivized and coerced religious networks to form bipolarly and political networks multipolarly. Nigerian Christian outsized access to economic resources and outsized Muslim access to the political system and military is diminishing. The federal system is distributing petroleum revenues nationally, yet still unevenly. This has increased resource conflict among Niger Delta ethnic minorities that feel they are subject to moral

hazard, deserving greater access to those revenues since they bear the majority of the environmental harms.

The hypothesis for Zambia claims its narrow GTR should be associated with a unipolar power differential; however, it is a multipolar society and has been for longer than any other case. Zambia's early adoption of capitalism made it a guinea pig for unproven structural adjustment programs, which have institutionalized inequality[11] that has established a unipolar class divide. This suggests a combination of factors are converging in these two cases to form their power differentials. Because they have the most enduring development paths of the cases, their power differentials are becoming more culturally, economically, politically, and socially segmented. Nigeria features religious bipolarity and political multipolarity, while Zambia features political multipolarity and class unipolarity. This suggests that as fragile states develop, they are more prone to power differential segmentation across their cultures, economies, political systems, and societies. These findings suggest Nigeria is more multipolar than its apparent religious bipolarity suggests and Zambia is more unipolar than its political multipolarity suggests.

*Themes.* The most apparent patterns across test cases that explain their wider GTR include trust differential potential, multipolar consociationalism, and civil society incentivization and network structures. These patterns do not occur in isolation but are instead interconnected. Just as societies vary by all sorts of demographic measures (e.g., physical and population size, natural resources, human capital, and technology), so too

[11] Zambia has the highest economic inequality (57.1) globally as measured by the World Bank's GINI Index estimates for 2015.

trust composition, potential, and realization differ. The trust differential measures these differences. States may drive multipolarity through formal institutions, which is necessary, but not sufficient alone to produce wider GTR. In some cases, even in the absence of a multipolar state, civil society incentivization and network structures are sufficient to widen the GTR. The more autonomous a civil society is from its state and external forces, the less isomorphic forces affect its network structure and the freer it is to develop consociational informal institutions.

### *Trust Differential Potential*

While the test cases are moving away from a unipolar power differential, this does not explain how or which of their formal and informal institutions are strengthening—they have mixed records. Institutional trust is a product of a society's aggregate trustingness and the trustworthiness of its institutions. The less trusting a society is and the more the state violates the principle-agent agreement, the less trust it credits to institutions. Because fragile state institutions are less trustworthy, the isolation of generalized from institutional trust is more straightforward in that context, but because in-group trust remains high, it is more difficult. In-group trust has a high and narrow global range (0.56 Peru to 0.86 Egypt) and case range (0.61 Zambia to 0.73 Ethiopia). Out-group trust has a low and broad global range with twice as much variation (0.20 Peru to 0.63 Sweden) and case range (0.31 Zimbabwe to 0.44 Burkina Faso) (Welzel and Delhey 2015, 885-6). Descriptive network analysis is useful for separating in-group from generalized trust. The more isolated group networks are from each other, the more in-group trust and the more connected they are, the more generalized trust.

Out-group trust (an unweighted average of the WVS three stranger questions) is the trust literature's best proxy measure for the GTR; however, two improvements are possible. First, in its current form, it does not recognize that some strangers are stranger than others are, giving equal weight to the three sub-categories composing out-group trust: "People you meet for the first time," "People of another religion," and "People of another nationality." Weighting these measures differently to reflect the relationship between religion, ethnicity, and initial versus sustained inter-group interaction may provide a more accurate measure. Second, in out-group trust's current form, in-group trust is not entirely separated from it. Identifying and isolating derivative trust based on cultural attraction from transcendent trust based on instrumental interests produces a more analytically pure measure of generalized trust. Transcendent out-group trust is what widens the GTR (Welzel and Delhey 2015, 883). The more socio-culturally similar groups are, the more derivative and the less transcendent out-group trust they generate when interacting. Therefore, inter-group interaction is easier the more similar groups are, but there is more GTR widening potential between more different groups. Welzel and Delhey (2015) recognize this limitation of the current measure and attempt a sweeping quantitative separation of derivative and transcendent out-group trusts through their highly aggregated Human Empowerment proxy measure. They rightly identify derivative out-group trust capturing social separation and transcendent out-group trust capturing religious pluralism, yet they confuse derivative out-group trust with institutional trust when claiming strong security institutions are captured by derivative and the absence of a repressive state is captured by transcendent. They claim their findings are preliminary and that further work in this area should be a trust literature

research priority (Welzel and Delhey 2015, 893). This dissertation's theoretical framework identifies and separates cultural attractors qualitatively on a case-by-case basis. Once derivative and transcendent out-group trusts are separated, the GTR and trust differential may be analyzed more accurately.

Every society has an upper and lower range of *experienced* in-group, generalized, and institutional trust measurable at different times and units of analysis. Predicting a society's *potential* trust levels is more complicated. In-group trust is always higher than generalized trust, lest a society atomizes and institutional trust is a function of a society's legitimization of its institutions, sometimes regardless of their merit. The most fractionalized, proximate, and power differentiated societies have the highest *potential* transcendent generalized trust and GTR; non-fragile states have reached more of their GTR trust potential than fragile states; therefore, fragile states have the most *unrealized* GTR potential. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Western Europe have the highest in-group trust levels globally, while the former has the lowest out-group trust levels and the later have the highest. This means MENA has the most unrealized GTR widening potential of all regions and Western Europe is closer to its generalized trust saturation point. The trust differential and GTR are usefully analyzed together; the former identifies states' GTR widening potential and the GTR identifies states' actualized potential. Cases with high trust differentials and high GTR are of most interest as archetype cases that may provide a model for GTR widening in low GTR cases. The cases perform as follows:

- Burkina Faso has above average realized out-group trust (0.4408) $20^{th}$ 76 globally and highest of the cases and in-group trust (0.6840) $59^{th}$ of 76, that is average for SSA, but below the global mean. This makes its trust differential (0.2432) $66^{th}$ of

76, the lowest of the cases, and second lowest in SSA, meaning it has the most realized GTR potential of the cases and lowest potential growth.

- Ethiopia has above average realized out-group trust (0.3998) 35th of 76 globally and above average in-group trust (0.7310) 40th of 76 globally and highest of the cases. This makes its trust differential (0.3312) 39th of 76, average, meaning it has an average amount of realized GTR potential and growth.

- Nigeria has average realized out-group trust (0.3693) 42nd of 76 globally and average in-group trust (0.7179) 51st of 76 for SSA and globally. This makes its trust differential (0.3486) 31st of 76, average, meaning it has an average amount of realized GTR potential and growth.

- Zambia also has low realized out-group trust (0.3280) 51st of 76 globally and the lowest in-group trust (0.6098) 73rd of 76, of the cases and in SSA. This makes its trust differential (0.2818) 54th of 76, the second lowest of the cases, meaning it has the second most realized GTR potential of the cases and the second lowest growth potential.

- Zimbabwe has the lowest realized out-group trust (0.3064) 58th of 76 globally and lowest in SSA, while its in-group trust (0.6825) 60th of 76, is average for SSA and below the global mean. This makes its trust differential (0.3761) 22nd of 76, the highest of the cases, meaning it has the least realized GTR potential of the cases and the highest potential growth.




*Figure 20.* Trust Differential.

Note: High potential (over 0.7); Low potential (under 0.7); High realized (over 0.4); Low realized (under 0.4).

Source: Delhey et al. (2011)




*Figure 21.* Trust Differential: Potential versus Realized.

Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe form the bookends of the five cases. The top of each bar represents the society's in-group trust level and the bottom its out-group trust level. In-group and out-group trust levels are higher for each test case than for each control case. The length of the bar represents its trust differential. The shorter the bar is, the more of its GTR potential has been reached (Burkina Faso), which makes it an excellent example for other cases, but also the less GTR potential remains because it is closer to its generalized trust saturation point. Oppositely, the longer the bar is less of its GTR potential has been reached (Zimbabwe), which makes it a poor example for other cases, but means it has more potential to be reached. Zambia has the least absolute GTR potential. Its in-group trust level (0.6098) is so low—nearly two SD below the global mean (0.7288)—that it will reach its generalized trust saturation point much sooner than the other cases. Ethiopia and Nigeria's in-group, generalized, and trust differential scores are average-above average and similar. They have realized more of their GTR potential than the trust literature suggests they should and have plenty of room for growth.

### *Multipolar Consociationalism*

Institutional structures differ between unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar societies, with multipolar institutions, generally being more flexible, responsive, and equitable. Institutions are purposed to reduce uncertainty in the social contract (North 1988, 15). Their primary function in multipolar societies is not efficiency, but instead the weighing of competing interests—they are therefore consociational compromises (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 4). The extension of co-operative norms does not come easily in any of these highly fractionalized test cases. They are not like Botswana where reciprocity,

social sanction, contracts, and collective action come more easily due to a homogenous society. Instead, they require greater effort as there are many competing scripts in the absence of a unipole. However, in this environment, the values of compromise and coalition building are more likely to embed as social scripts than in unipolar societies.

The post-independence political models constructed in these test cases reflect some of Lijphart's consociationalism *goals*, such as multiple balances of power, socioeconomic equality, flexible and accommodating elites that can rise above group allegiances (1969, 216), small population, nationalism stronger than regionalism, isolation of ethnic groups, and the presence of a common external threat (Kerr 2006, 27). In all cases, the implementation of these goals has been flawed. Burkina Faso reflects typical ethnic consociationalism, Nigeria, more of a religious confessionalism, and Ethiopia, in its goal to produce segmental autonomy for ethnic minority groups, has produced consociationalism bordering on corporatism. In Ethiopia, Horowitz's (1985, 575) nightmare is being realized in the strengthening of ethnic identities when the goal was regional ethnic autonomy, and in Nigeria, the fragile states literature is surprised by its strong transition from ethnic to religious identity formation.

Table 56

*Achievement of Consociational Goals*

| Country | Multiple Balances of Power | Socio-economic Equality | Flexible Elites | Small Population | Nationalism Valued over Regionalism | Isolation of Ethnic Groups | External Threat |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Burkina Faso | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Mod | Mod (Malian spillover) |
| Ethiopia | Mod | Yes | Mod | No | No | Mod | Mod (Somalian spillover) |
| Nigeria | Yes | Mod | Mod | No | No | Mod | No |

Table Continued

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zambia | Mod | No | Mod | Yes | Mod | Mod | No |
| Zimbabwe | No | Mod | No | Yes | No | No | Mod (Sanctions) |

Note: Goals come from Lijphart (1969, 216).

The test cases share many similarities. Burkina Faso and Ethiopia have a multipolar ethnic system; Ethiopia and Nigeria have a federal system; Burkina Faso and Nigeria have a presidential system and share a slave trade and colonial history, and structural adjustment has shaped all of them. Even though Burkina Faso is a multipolar society, the Mossi ethnic group remains dominant, though not coercive. Nigeria is divided Christian and Muslim, but because religious political parties are made illegal in the Constitution, a couple of dominant Christian-Muslim coalition parties have formed. This has allowed isomorphic forces to begin to flow between these groups, serving to increase their network transitivity slowly. Urban Christians and Muslims involved in Nigerian party politics are diversifying their religious identities with other slightly less intense identities (e.g., regional, ethnic, and linguistic) or much less intense (e.g., professional associations and economic interests). Perhaps this could begin breaking the stronghold that religious identity has on Nigerians. Ethiopia has two tiers of ethnic groups, the Tigray, Amhara, Oromo, and Southern Nations who form a coalition and then all the rest. Balance theory provides a way to understand the triadic relations of Ethiopian ethnopolitics. Ethiopian politics has transitioned into a three-cycles relationship where one majority ethnic group favors one group over the other. The fall of the derg placed the Amhara in a weakened position due to its association with it, which allowed the Tigray to subsume some of its political capital to gain a position where it could play the Oromo and Amhara off each other to its advantage. This has set off a chain reaction throughout ethno political networks forming a closed cycle of reciprocity

(see Salehyan et al. 2012; Snijders 2009) between the Amhara, Oromo, and Tigray. What has not fully formed is an "enemy of my enemy is my friend" (Strogatz 2010) temporary coalition between the Amhara and Oromo against the Tigray. The Tigray have instead been able to institutionalize its political position through an alliance with the Southern Nations.

The more connected multipolar societies are to other multipolar societies, the greater the isomorphic effect on their institutions is. Institutions growing out of structural adjustment will share some similarities because they were formed in similar coercive and incentivized isomorphic environments. Structural adjustment has a mixed record; while many SSA economies have grown absolutely, most are also more unstable. Therefore, the more Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria integrate into the global community of states, the more their formal institutions will reflect others. If these cases become more integrated as equals into the global community, their institutions will become more aligned with peer institutions through normative isomorphism. Instead, what occurs most often in fragile states is memetic isomorphism where their institutional environments are so uncertain, that they seek successful models to mimic, not always transferring well to their unique local conditions. Isomorphic forces may induce inter-group interaction prematurely causing conflict, between groups that do not typically interact where structurally equivalent nodes could have formed ties. There are often unparalleled hierarchies (one vertical and the other horizontal) between interacting groups making the selection of structurally equivalent agents more difficult (Gopin 2000, 200). In this environment, powerful agents can shape networks to their advantage and sabotage cooperative opportunities if they stand to gain little from them (Druckman 2005, 297).

This is particularly a problem between Christian and Muslim groups. Christians and Muslims are often portrayed and often buy into scripts and behave as if they have little in common. However, they share some commonalities that are rarely capitalized on for building positive network ties: Abrahamic monotheism, absolute truth, religious expansionism, treatment of the poor (17:26 – 27 Quran; Bukhari, Hadith; Luke 3:10-11; Mark 10:21). They also have some differences in how their religious texts encourage or command adherents to treat the "other" that has often been capitalized on to generate conflict (5:51 Quran; Matthew 25:35-40; Romans 12:13).

Transitioning away from a unipolar power differential is necessary, but not sufficient to widen the GTR. This transition has not occurred quickly or cleanly in these cases. The longevity of strongman military leadership sustained unipolar power differentials in each test case. However, none of the test cases remains unipolar today, in part, because these leaders were also market reformers. How dominant a unipole is may influence its transition away from unipolarity. The Mossi are a long-time dominant ethnic group that is not so dominant that it does not have to consider minority interests, nor is it so wealthy that it does not need to interact with them. In Ethiopia, since the fall of the derg, it has benefited from having a leader that was not from one of the two largest ethnic groups (Amhara and Oromo)—not from the Amhara because of its association with the derg and not from the Oromo because of its Muslim majority status in a non-Muslim majority country. Each test case has a sparking event that marks its transition away from unipolarity—yet they are only sparking events, and the transitions have begun long before and will continue long after them. For Burkina Faso, the most recent transition, it was the 2014 Burkinabé uprising and subsequent removal of President

Compaoré from office and reordering of the CDP-stacked Parliament. Because Burkina Faso's transition is the most recent, there is concern that it has yet to experience the full adverse effect in these early stages. Nigeria's transition occurred in 1999 with the sudden death of military dictator President Abacha in 1998 and subsequent revision of the Constitution. While many of its institutions are fragile, its Constitution is reasonably well crafted, safeguarding from unipolar reemergence. Because of this, Nigeria has a living generation that has not experienced military leadership. Ethiopia's transition occurred in 1991 when it rid itself of the derg. In subsequent years, its civil society has grown in uneven spurts as the federal government seeks to contain it.

*Civil Society Incentivization through Network Structures*

Many of the cases' formal institutions are the result of global isomorphism but have not been legitimized by the culture, producing a misalignment of de jure encoding of laws and de facto enforcement; this is true for unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar cases. It produces a corruption-rich environment and zombie institutions that outlive the original purpose of their creators (see Zucker 1986). These institutions can become so embedded in the formal structure of a state that the cost of changing them substantially or quickly is too high (see North 1988). In this institutional environment, there is a threshold of institutional dysfunction that when crossed, civil societies may decide to disengage from formal institutions to go it alone; this has occurred in many regions of Nigeria.

Incentivization structures differ between the state, the market, and civil society, yet the trust literature rarely distinguishes between them for analysis. Individuals are rarely incentivized to seek the common good in any state type, but rather seek rents from and loopholes around competitors (Putnam 1993, 176 quoting Olson 1971, 28). Because

fractionalized non-fragile states have strong security and contract institutions, information asymmetry, adverse selection, and moral hazard are reduced. In these cases, there are not trustworthy institutions, but the more socially proximate their civil society is, the shorter network distance exists between nodes of different groups and the easier it is to transmit information between them for collaboration.

Fragile state government and market behavior are better understood than that of civil society. The state uses coercion more often than market or civil society actors do because it has a monopoly on the use of force and security stakes are higher than those of economic growth or social cohesion. In heavily coercive environments (e.g., the Soviet Union and Zimbabwe), the market and civil society contract. These tend to be fragile states with a strong authoritarian veneer where there is little institutional trust. Civil society is most often the mechanism through which individuals enact their agency in fragile states since they are usually passive recipients (e.g., remittances and aid) rather than active exchangers (e.g., trade and investment) in the market and can do little to change coercive state institutions. Typical fragile state civil societies are segmented along ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural, or class lines due to their higher than average in-group trust and lower than average generalized trust. The test cases are low institutional trust environments that exhibit greater network connectivity and wider GTR than typical fragile states. The choices civil society actors make in these cases are affected by their location within their networks (Hanneman and Riddle 2011, 367) and by the number of nodes between them and other nodes (geodesic distance) (2011, 343). Even if states remain coercive and markets weak, there may be consociational forces acting within civil society. This is mostly a function of civil society's network structure.

Burkinabé, Ethiopian, and Nigerian civil society environments are more incentivized than the trust literature assumes. Burkina Faso and Ethiopia are some of the poorest countries globally; therefore, many individuals do not have all of their basic needs met. This makes these civil societies inter-group interaction rich environments due to this pushing force, leading to conflict or cooperation and more clearly narrower or wider GTR. Because the Burkinabé have so many interests unmet by their groups, it is the easiest case to demonstrate that incentivized inter-group interaction produces civil society cooperation despite a fragile state. Burkinabé civil society, emerging most recently of the cases from a unipolar power differential, is young, but active. Ethiopia and Nigeria's high conflict societies make it more challenging to isolate incentivizing forces from coercive. Ethiopian civil society was nearly non-existent because of derg policies until 1991, so it is also young, but less active. In 2009, the Charities and Society Proclamation Act prohibited NGOs from political engagement and created extraneous bureaucratic hoops with the purpose of thinning the large number of NGOs that had become unrestrained, channeling large amounts of capital while producing very little development. Ethiopia remains a violent place. Ethiopian civil society is learning how to push back against government coercion through peaceful protest, but the government is slow to respond through incentives rather than coercion. Nigerian civil society is active, yet chaotic and largely religiously segmented (Rosenblum and Post 2001, 15), creating many service inefficiencies and miscommunication. Nigerians think highly of their civil society, but it is likely they have only either Christian or Muslim segments of civil society in mind. Nigeria and Burkina Faso are becoming more urbanized than Ethiopia. Having a greater diversity of identity formation in urban areas increases initial conflict as

has been observed in Nigeria, but leads to more incentivized and diversified inter-group interaction based on civil society coalition forming in the mid- and long-term.

Incentivization and coercion are dependent on proximity. Because these cases are not highly technologically proximate, physical and social proximity have a greater effect on the GTR. Each case has strong incentivizing and coercive forces centripetally pulling ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups into greater physical and social proximity, producing greater multiplexity and transitivity of network ties between groups. For Burkinabé it is the long-time Mossi, for Ethiopians, it is the ambitious Tigray, and for Nigerians, it is the two-pronged ambitiousness of Christians and Muslims forming a bipolar parity. Each of these cases has highly religious Christian and Muslim civil societies, which are different from each other, but not nearly as different as many other world religions. Many drivers of inter-group interaction push and pull Christian and Muslim civil societies together into greater proximity. Ethiopian Orthodox Christians and Muslims have a relatively peaceful shared inter-religious history, while a similar parity has stoked religious competition in Nigeria. Burkina Faso's peaceful history has allowed its many highly syncretistic religiously mixed ethnic groups to form weak network ties through which information may flow, helping to deinstitutionalize out-group myths (Varshney 2002, 21). Sustained network connections rather than temporary are more effective in information transmittal that combats inter-group myths and alters behavior and scripts (Svensson and Brouneus 2013, 573). Christian and Muslim civil societies in Nigeria's Middle Belt have high physical proximity, but low social proximity with few sustained network connections and fewer options for backchanneling to dissipate violence when interaction does occur. It is much easier to anticipate and

dissipate conflict in civil society when religion is not highly associated with the interaction (see Varshney 2000, 266).

Nigerian Middle Belt states, Ethiopian Oromo and Amhara farming areas, and Burkina Faso's Malian and Ivoirian border areas are subject to high fractionalization and fragile institutions, while urban centers tend to be more physically and socially proximate with stronger multipolar institutions. Pluralized identities and many weak ties rather than few strong ones in urban centers help civil societies to reduce in-group trust in these highly religious societies. Urban civil society interaction is more incentivized than rural. It is a good sign that these cases have some of the highest urbanization rates globally, meaning their physical proximity will only increase in the short- and mid-term. The increase of physical and social proximity is essential for managing inter-group interaction in these fragile state environments where institutions are ill-equipped to monitor principles and manage moral hazard. Past coercive forces of war and famine have driven Ethiopians and Nigerians together physically, while Burkina Faso has been subjected to fewer of these coercive forces. While unipolar societies (e.g., Zimbabwe) exhibit an obvious coercive power differential between dominant and minority groups, in multipolar and bipolar societies (our test cases), there is regional or sectoral variation of incentivization and coercion on civil society.

> The social networks of the poor are one of the primary resources they have for managing risk and vulnerability, and outside agents therefore need to find ways to complement these resources, rather than substitute for them – Woolcock and Narayan (2000, 17)

Sociological institutionalism and social capital theory together explain how civil society principles and agents embedded in thick webs of social relations (Borgatti et al.

2009, 892) apply incentivizing and coercive pushing and pulling forces to meet their interests. These forces are applied through the levers of formal and informal institutions within and across dynamic networks, which influences their outcomes, often different from what was intended (Marin and Wellman 2011, 17). Fragile states tend to rely on coercive force while coercion and incentivization are utilized in inter-state market forces and civil society. Social capital is a much more critical incentivization tool in these cases' civil societies because other forms of capital are less available. Civil societies must expand their social networks and become more socially proximate to gain access to their human and physical capital interests. Social proximity indicates *sustained* inter-group interaction and sustained positive inter-group interaction indicates mutual interests are being met between civil societies. The more different their scripts are, and the more coercive forces, the more conflictual and violent the interaction will be. Oppositely, the better structurally equivalent nodes understand their civil society counterparts' scripted behavior and expectations, the more likely positive inter-group interaction is to result (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006, 571).

In these heterogeneous societies, civil society actors have to adapt to changing institutional configurations. As they do this, nodes from other civil societies with similar structural environments learn similar coping mechanisms (Erickson 1988, 175) making them more structurally equivalent and accessible (see Lorrain and White 1971; Burt, 1976). With sufficient understanding of fragile state civil society network structures, it may be possible to map out potential network paths per society to anticipate fragile state behavior or even induce isomorphism across very different religious or ethnic-based civil society segments to produce connections between structurally equivalent bridging nodes

(Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006, 581). This dissertation is the first step in that direction.

## Conclusions

> It seems plausible, therefore, that the secret of the economic and political success of small and open countries, like Switzerland, Austria, Denmark or the Netherlands, lies precisely in their ability to conduct policy discourses that are based on a realistic understanding of their own capabilities and constraints…
>
> —Visser and Hemerijck, *A Dutch Miracle*

Trust is the fuel and the glue of society. In-group trust drives communal solidarity; institutional trust drives state legitimacy and national cohesion, and generalized trust unlocks new network connections through which interests may be met. This research asks what most affects the GTR in fragile states, which has proved to be a critical question. The trust literature's answer to this question has included the control variables and fractionalization. This dissertation has demonstrated that there are more social pushing and pulling forces acting on the GTR than the trust literature assumes. These forces come in the form of groups' physical, technological, and social proximity and society's power differential. Together, the control and test variables provide greater explanatory power for how the GTR functions in fragile states broadly, more specifically in SSA, and clearly in the five cases analyzed. This dissertation has demonstrated the value of SNC's effect on the GTR and has explained in detail how each control variable affects the GTR.

This dissertation has produced an enhanced theoretically generalizable model that captures narrowing and widening forces on the GTR in five fragile SSA states. The three

GTR models presented simulate societies with increasing, decreasing, and static inter-group interaction, incentivization, and coercion leading to narrower or wider GTR. They also are flexible to allow changes in society's trust composition through increasing or decreasing in-group and institutional trust. Moving from model two or three to one requires changes in these inputs and time. Outside of post-World War II Germany and Japan, post-Cold War South Korea, the Asian Tigers, and perhaps Botswana and South Africa, there are few examples of short- to mid-term development success. Most developed non-fragile countries have been so for many decades or centuries and exhibit long-term economic and political development models. Most fragile states will remain so; therefore, their pragmatic goals and models and processes should differ from those of non-fragile states. There is not only one development trajectory for all states at all times, but instead many depending on their history and potential. Therefore, an archetype model for non-fragile states' trust composition differs from that for fragile states as follows:

*Non-Fragile States*

- Strong, trustworthy, and legitimated formal state institutions
- Individualist society, though not at risk of social atomization
- Diversified imports and exports and trade partners with fair terms of trade
- Large bi-directional flows of FDI and FPI and minimal amounts of remittances and aid
- Increasing religious fractionalization and decreasing ethnic and linguistic fractionalization
- Communications and transportation infrastructures place the whole society in greater proximity

*Fragile States*

- State security institutions provide a safe environment for diverse civil society groups to interact

- The state does not take advantage of principles when managing principle-agent transactions
- Land tenure institutions designate ownership and are legitimated by society
- Collectivist society learns how to build network ties through civil society interaction
- Diversified imports and exports and trade partners with fair terms of trade
- Increasing FDI inflows and evenly spread remittances and aid
- Static religious fractionalization and decreasing ethnic and linguistic fractionalization
- Increasing honest messaging through uni-directional radio, television, and internet media
- Increasing whole society proximity through access to affordable public transportation
- Groups meet members' basic needs in the absence of a strong state, but not other interests

These goals may be categorized as economic, political, or cultural. Economic goals are more quickly addressed and achieved; therefore, the one goal fragile and non-fragile states have in common is diversifying imports and exports and trade partners with fair terms of trade. They nearly share a fractionalization goal, but since many fragile states are already highly religiously fractionalized, increasing it further would only serve to increase conflict in an insecure environment. Since cultural institutions change slowly, it is unlikely fragile state societies will quickly transition from highly collectivist to individualist, and if they did, it would likely be highly conflictual and disruptive. These societies will remain collectivist for the foreseeable future; therefore, the best that can be achieved is for collectivist groups to gain skills for connecting their civil societies. Fragile states are not going to strengthen their institutions quickly; therefore, effort should concentrate on increasing safe environments for groups to interact and minimizing agent corruption, so at least the state is not the cause of conflict between groups. The most pragmatic solution to managing land tenure conflict is through the establishment of

an enforceable bureaucratic process. This may take the form of a coercive institution that forces all stakeholders into a standardized system of land transactions based on market value. This, however, risks angering ethnic leaders and hurting poor landowners and the landless. Many rural populations are not physically proximate; therefore, increasing the truthfulness of the media they use will serve to reduce myth building and demonizing of other groups. Fragile states rarely have sufficient financial and human capital to produce a well-integrated transportation infrastructure, which results in many poorly constructed and maintained projects. Fragile states should concentrate efforts on the least expensive and easily maintainable public transportation options, which will increase groups' proximity. The overreaching under-resourced state is a typical fragile state model that does not widen the GTR. Limiting state goals to ensuring all groups' basic needs are met gives fragile states an achievable goal that does not invite additional corruption of the principle-agent relationship. With basic needs met, groups are more likely to work out their additional interests within and between groups.

# CHAPTER VI – CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

> The purpose of government is to enable the people of a nation to live in safety and happiness. Government exists for the interests of the governed, not for the governors.
>
> —Thomas Jefferson

More than one-third of all states are fragile, yet the trust literature has shown little interest in explaining the variability of generalized trust in this context and still less interest in determining its social causes. Instead, it has been more motivated to explain the consequences of the expansion of generalized trust, namely social capital, in non-fragile states. This oversight has led to a poor understanding of the social causes of generalized trust in states where institutions are untrustworthy, populations collectivist, and market forces unstable. This dissertation addresses this gap in the literature by presenting a model for the analysis of the GTR in fragile states, which includes group proximity and power differential.

The trust and fragile states literature agree, for fragile states to become less so, they must trade some of their high in-group trust for more generalized and institutional trust, to balance their trust compositions. The development of institutional trust in fragile states is resource-intensive, yet these literature and development practitioners have chosen to focus their efforts there. Prioritizing the development of generalized trust is a more pragmatic approach in fragile states. The case analysis in this dissertation has explained which incentivization and coercion mechanisms and structural configurations are most effective in producing wider GTR in fragile states.

Fragile states require unique development models for infrastructure, economic growth, the rule of law, and trust compositions. These literature assume correctly that

most fragile states have narrow GTR; however, they have not attempted to explain generalized trust variation among fragile states. This dissertation agrees with the literature that has attempted to explain generalized trust variation that state security and contract institutions, individualism-collectivism, inter-state market forces, and social fractionalization have substantial influence. However, fractionalization is only part of the social effect on generalized trust.

This dissertation's principal objective is to demonstrate that a society's social network composition is the missing component for explaining how trust between strangers increases in highly collectivist societies governed by fragile state institutions and unstable markets. This dissertation's social explanation begins with the fractionalization hypothesis to construct a more holistic social cause of the GTR that includes proximity and power differential and considers a society's incentivization-coercion structure. This dissertation advances the trust literature through an enhanced theoretically generalizable model for examining structural determinants of the GTR in scripted fragile SSA states, specifically Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria. It is a unique and original contribution at the intersection of the state, society, institutions, and trust, which fills a crucial gap in the trust literature.

## Findings

These findings provide strong support for the control claims found in the trust literature as well as the SNC test variable proposed in this dissertation. Rival institutionalist and non-institutionalist explanations do not sufficiently account for isomorphism's ability to institutionalize state fragility or the dedication with which groups adhere to their scripts. Further, they misunderstand the function of in-group,

institutional, and generalized trust and do not address the difference between derivative and transcendent out-group trust nor the trust differential. The sociological institutionalism-social capital theory theoretical framework makes clear that each control variable narrows the GTR, ensuring the SNC effects are what is causing wider GTR in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria. The aggregate hypothesized effects of fractionalization, proximity, and power differentials of the test cases widen their GTR while narrowing it in control cases. Technological proximity is the lone SNC indicator that performs poorly in Burkina Faso and Ethiopia and moderately in Nigeria because it is challenging to test variation in communications and transportation infrastructures in fragile states that lack them. These test and control cases represent all fragile states well, sharing weakened security and contract institutions that are minimally functional; societies that are highly collectivist; and common roles as attractors of remittances and aid rather than trade and investment. There are plenty of control cases to be found but are also likely other deviant cases in SSA and other regions from which to learn.

No state, not even the United States or Scandinavian countries, exhibits an archetype trust composition; instead, each has unique limitations. The surest way to transition typical fragile states to the archetype fragile state model is by applying the lessons learned from the interlinked patterns of trust differentials, multipolar consociationalism, and civil society incentivization found in deviant test cases. The United States is the ultimate deviant case in its unexpected democratic development and rise to global prominence, and yet many other countries have learned from its unique experiment. So, too, these test cases' deviance from the typical fragile state offer lessons for coping with fragility. Since independence, these test cases have exhibited a pattern of

revolutionary strongman leaders who are also structural reformers. While this has extended the longevity of unipolarity in Burkina Faso and does little to improve institutional fragility in the short-term, it has eventually resulted in modest market reforms, unexpected civil society strengthening, and trust composition balancing in all test cases, which allows their civil societies to function within a context of dysfunction. These chaotic, yet relatively civil society-friendly environments have allowed their civil societies to make a fuller transition from coercive unipolar authoritarianism to incentivized multipolar consociationalism than have their states or the control cases' states and civil societies.

## Limitations

This dissertation has addressed the inherent bounding limitations, self-imposed delimitations, and methodological concerns related to this research. Knowing the current sophistication of the trust and fragile states literature has allowed for the appropriate limitation of the research questions asked to ensure this dissertation fills a crucial gap in the literature. It was deemed most appropriate at this early stage of working with the WVS new trust battery question and related generalized trust measurement to delimit the bounds to SSA, which has ensured claims are not overgeneralized as past trust research did with the old "standard" trust question. This results in the limitation of appropriate methods. This research is also limited by data availability, a common feature of fragile states. Fragile states have a poor record of producing reliable and trustworthy data; hence, the reliance on global data sources such as the WVS and the World Bank. With the eventual emergence of more reliable fragile states data, there will be future research opportunities to expand the available methodologies. This research is limited to the

theoretical generalization of types of fragile states and empirical generalization across the five cases analyzed. However, it is reasonable to assume these fragile state types exist globally and therefore may be examined using the theoretical framework and model presented here.

The potential omitted variable bias, endogeneity, and reverse causation concerns identified in the methodology chapter are addressed satisfactorily. First, the construction of the SNC variable improves the long-standing omitted social variable bias in the trust literature. Second, the several valid endogeneity concerns do not *positively* measurably affect the dependent variable and, therefore, do not weaken the test variable claims. Contract institutions and investment through FDI and FPI are endogenous through states' foreign capital management policies. However, because the test cases have little investment inflow and their contract institutions are fragile, there is little positive interaction between these independent variables affecting the dependent variable. Additionally, collectivism and social proximity are endogenous through highly collectivist groups having high network density, which decreases groups' social proximity. However, because this does not affect the hypothesis *positively*, it does not weaken the test variable claim. Third, because in-group, generalized, and institutional trust are also causes of social and political phenomena, reverse causation is a concern. Fragile states have untrustworthy institutions and resulting low institutional trust; therefore, the tests cases' wider GTR is not positively affecting state institutions. Their wide GTR may also have a small effect on their societies' movement from collectivism to individualism. Once again, these societies are all highly collectivist, and this does not change quickly, so there is no measurable effect. Wider GTR could also have a positive

effect on making states more attractive trade partners and investment magnets. This does not appear to affect the test cases strongly enough for investment, as they all remain quite low and not the case for trade in Ethiopia and Nigeria, as they also remain quite low. Wide GTR may have a small positive effect on Burkina Faso's increasing attractiveness as a trade partner.

## Implications of Findings

The findings validate the selection the research question, hypotheses, variables, theoretical framework, and method. The fragile states literature has long assumed there is variation among fragile states but has struggled to agree on typologies to categorize them. This dissertation successfully categorizes and then models different trust environments in fragile states. By inter-connecting the trust, fragile states, institutionalism, and social capital literature, this dissertation has helped them move closer to sharing a common analytical language and unified theoretical framework through which to examine trust in fragile states.

The narrowing or widening of the GTR largely hinges on whether groups are forced or incentivized to interact to meet their interests. Identifying and understanding a society's incentivization and coercion environment, trust differential, and GTR makes explaining its likely trust trajectory more possible. Societies with many unmet interests (fragile states) have different trust needs than societies with trustworthy institutions (non-fragile states) or few to no functioning institutions (failed and collapsed states). Generalized trust cannot expand in failed or collapsed states because groups never move beyond their preoccupation with survival. Oppositely, when societies credit trustworthy

institutions in non-fragile states with *too* much trust, it breeds dependence on institutions and reduces opportunities for generalized trust.

The transition from in-group to generalized trust in fragile states is complicated. It is human to take the *perceived* path of least resistance; however, fragile state populations rarely choose the most efficient path. The benefits of inter-group interaction are not readily apparent in fragile states because it requires vulnerability and the ability to monitor principles. The monitoring of group members is much easier than strangers, especially when the state is not an honest agent; therefore, the interest a stranger can meet must overcome the additional effort it takes to ensure mutually positive inter-group interaction. Without inter-group interaction, group members rarely question their strong preference for intra-group meeting of interests. However, windows of opportunity open for inter-group interaction in civil society when groups cannot meet all of their members' interests. In fragile states, civil society is most often the mechanism through which individuals enact their agency since they are usually passive recipients (e.g., remittances and aid) rather than active exchangers (e.g., trade and investment) in the market and can do little to change coercive state institutions.

The trust differential and the GTR are useful conceptual tools when used jointly to assess societies' trust compositions. Every fragile state has an optimal, yet unrealized, trust composition; the methodology presented here provides a process for examining it and hypothesizing on its structural effects. Because in-group trust is always greater than generalized trust, there exists a generalized trust ceiling, resulting in a measurable trust differential, a measurement introduced in this dissertation for understanding the difference between potential and realized generalized trust. The four categories of trust

differential measurement include low potential/high realized, low potential/low realized, high potential/high realized, and high potential/low realized. The trust differential is an important measure because societies with large and small trust differentials function differently than ones with high and low generalized trust and ones with high and low in-group trust. This research makes it easier to isolate in-group, institutional, and generalized trust in fragile states for this analysis. Knowing societies and even sub-regions' trust differentials, GTR, and generalized trust saturation points will help craft more effective policies for managing civil society, market, and the state and for widening the GTR. Civil society is the underestimated conduit for widening the GTR in fragile states.

## Recommendations

The three trust composition models presented capture all theoretically possible types of fragile states, making this research design replicable in other socio-culturally similar regions of the developing world where sufficient fragile states exist (e.g., Latin America, Middle East, and Asia). This dissertation set a high standard of reliability for its data. Replicating this research design in other regions or expanding it in SSA requires further data. Several ways of accomplishing this include proxy measures and waiting for improved data. The individualism-collectivism variable presents the tightest restriction of all independent variables. Future research could loosen these requirements marginally to expand the case selection. Instead of limiting individualism-collectivism data to the literature standard Hofstede (2003) and House (2004) data, the aggregation of several WVS individualism and collectivism related questions may be able to serve as a lesser proxy. However, this would reduce the construct validity since this data would come

from the same source as the dependent variable. Future releases of the WVS will provide more cases and questions related to the dependent variable. The WVS Wave 7 survey (available in early 2020) increases its emphasis on the topics of social capital, trust and organizational membership (49 of 290 questions) (World Values Survey 2018), which is the most of any thematic category in the WVS. The survey will expand from 76 to 80 countries; expand its presence in 11 SSA countries (including four of this dissertation's five cases); add six new SSA countries and 16 globally.[12] Using additional available data may address related research questions. For future research in SSA and Latin America, additional data on social conflict events using the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) and Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) datasets would be useful for examining the relationship between violent conflict and generalized trust.

Cookie cutter structural adjustment programs implemented prior to the Washington Consensus have proven largely unsuccessful, wasteful, and even hurtful. Modern development policies increasingly recognize that states have unique combinations of dysfunctions requiring specifically tailored policy solutions. This dissertation identifies common trust composition patterns across the test cases and suggests specific policy solutions for improving their trust environments. Fragile state leaders and the development industry need to realize that these states do not have the same development nor trust potential as most non-fragile states and likely never will.

[12] The World Values Survey Wave 7 will provide greater detail for the SSA countries of Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, Rwanda; Latin American countries of Guatemala, Panama, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela; Central Asian countries of Mongolia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; North African/Middle East countries of Algeria, Libya, Israel, Lebanon, and Iran; and Southeast Asian countries of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Indonesia.

There are too many isomorphic forces keeping fragile states' institutions fragile. Therefore, fragile states should scale down their development goals to providing basic needs and simple security and contract gains that provide their segmented civil societies a place to have mutually positive interaction. It is a broad enough goal for fragile states to ensure the state is not its own worst enemy when it comes to building its trust composition.

When considering fragility-reversing policy solutions that affect the GTR, one may address cultural, economic, or political institutions. While economic solutions are not as effective in widening the GTR as providing stable security and contract institutions, moving from collectivism to individualism, and increasing the SNC, they are easier and quicker to implement and so should be prioritized in the short-term, while also making progress on cultural and political policy solutions. Economically, increasing trade and investment and lowering remittances and aid, widen the GTR. This dissertation has demonstrated that these five cases are fragile, but they are not only fragile, they are also poorly developed. All but Zambia reside in the UN Human Development Index (HDI) "Low Human Development" category (United Nations Development Programme 2018). Fragile state institutions are the primary determinant of economic decline for fragile states and their neighbors. Fragile institutions drop initial GDP by five times and 0.65 times due to violence. "Neighbours lose around 0.6 percentage points of growth each year" (Chauvet et al. 2007, 6). Others claim fragile SSA states "lose an opportunity to double their initial GDP per capita after a period of 20 years" (Ncube et al. 2014, 2).

Two economic issues that may be addressed by fragile states and the global community jointly is ensuring fair terms of trade for fragile states and the diversification

of their exports. Some, but not all fragile states suffer from unbalanced and unfair terms of trade. Making terms of trade fairer may be addressed through the World Trade Organization, perhaps in partnership with the IMF or World Bank. Diversifying a country's exports is more challenging. While most fragile states have high ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization, many do not have diversity in the areas of natural resources, industry, education, innovation, and agricultural products; instead, many have become single commodity exporters. Modern structural adjustment programs that have learned from mistakes of the past may appropriately leverage some of the dysfunctional institutions in these areas to expand into industries that are a good fit and will diversify tradable products. Finding niches where fragile states have and can keep a competitive advantage is no easy task in a dynamic global market. For these cases and others like them to become more than single product raw material exporters, policies must focus on reorganizing the Clientist cycle of Western product design and ownership, African mineral extraction, and Asian manufacture. The first step to doing this is attracting FDI, which may establish an innovation-friendly environment. However, innovation is wasted if these populations' are not educated to receive and translate it into production and further innovation. Keeping their educated populations from being swept away in the brain drain to join the diaspora or incentivizing them to return after receiving their education requires an innovation-friendly environment that most fragile states lack. Therefore, policy should also focus on security and contract institutions providing innovation-friendly environments for the market and civil society.

Security will always remain the preeminent concern of fragile states; therefore, immediate political policy solutions should focus on ensuring state security and contract

institutions do not drop below their current minimally functional status to slip into failure or collapse. Incremental gains are possible to ensure their segmented civil societies have a safe enough environment and understood rules for engagement to produce mutually positive interactions. Civil society can be quite resilient and has the potential to advance in effectiveness and connectedness in a minimally secure contracting environment. Inter-group myths and demonizing diminish when groups are proximate in a safe contract environment. However, in fragile states, resources spent over-and-above what it requires to produce minimally functional security and contract institutions risk waste and corruption. The policy-budget question is how fragile states allocate more of their severely limited resources to GTR widening policies without becoming more fragile in other areas. Moving fragile states from coercive to incentivized policies requires substantial effort. In the short-term, it may be pragmatic to identify currently institutionalized coercive policy solutions that have the potential to lead to wider GTR. The state's coercive force may be useful as it has in other places (e.g., Singapore) to produce understandable and enforceable principle-agent relationships. Through coercion fragile states may enforce land tenure systems that can capitalize on its second and first most valuable resources respectively, placing *land* in the hands of its most productive and responsible *citizens* without hurting their most vulnerable populations.

Cultural policy solutions—the slowest moving, but most effective—should focus on the diversification of highly religious identities and the slow transition from collectivism to individualism. States' attempts to social engineer massive culture shifts quickly usually fail (e.g., Soviet Union and China). Coercing a rapid shift from collectivism to individualism would be detrimental to fragile states. In-group trust serves

an essential stabilizing function in highly fractionalized fragile states and should only be decreased slowly. Fragile states civil societies will remain collectivist, but this does not mean it is impossible to incentivize positive network connections between ethnic and religious groups. Rather than focusing on policy that weakens the core foundations of in-group trust, which would likely destabilize groups in an already dysfunctional environment, they should focus on increasing transcendent out-group trust, which entails incrementally and strategically increasing the difference of groups interacting.

Since fragile states are dysfunctional, who then implements effective policy solutions? There is a place for external engagement of the international community in the specific policy areas addressed here. The international business community, for example, may help establish industry associations that cross ethnic, religious, and political lines. This is needed because many fragile state populations are highly religious; this may help to diversify their identities to include market- and trade-based vocational identities. Indigenous civil society leaders that can leverage international civil society to locate what Fox (1992) calls "pockets of efficiency in the state" may construct limited iron triangles to attempt policy reform (Woolcock and Narayan 2000, 236).

## Contribution

The growing generalized trust research program initiated by the new WVS trust question battery and advanced by Delhey et al. (2011) to Welzel and Delhey (2015) and many in between, has made possible many new research avenues and produced a framework for accurately measuring, defining, and conceptualizing generalized trust. This dissertation builds on this progress and advances it further through identifying, measuring, and explaining the full social effect on the GTR in the fragile SSA states of

Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Nigeria. Progress is most needed on this question in SSA because it is the region most negatively affected by the old "standard" trust question's misassumption about cultural perceptions of trust. Due to this inaccuracy, a whole generation of SSA and Asian generalized trust literature findings warrant reexamination and should make those who conducted global analysis using the old "standard" trust question reconsider doing so with the new trust question.

This dissertation has embarked on the first of many regional analyses using the new GTR measure. Sociological institutionalism and social capital theory together provide a holistic, well defined, and flexible theoretical framework for explaining the GTR in fragile states, revealing clear consociationalism and civil society incentivization trends among the test cases that may apply to other fragile states. This is accomplished through a mixed methodology that considers and weighs quantitative and qualitative findings, selects clear boundary conditions, produces strong construct and internal validity and moderate external validity, addresses rival explanations, and transparently reveals limitations and concerns. Framing the bounds of the study to a specific type of state in a single region increases its external validity. Selecting cases that are least likely and deviant increases its internal validity because hypothesis claims are more difficult to confirm. The use of multiple data sources for variables gives it strong construct validity. The well-specified and defined boundary conditions for cases and variables allows for reliable replication of this research design. Future research using this design may be conducted in SSA using additional cases as data allows to enhance theoretical generalizability or in other regions of socio-culturally similar states where there exist

sufficient fragile states present. Subsequent analyses in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East are the best candidates.

The development industry has been asking, how much institutional re-engineering is required to reverse fragile states. Some development optimists claim much is needed and much is possible for increasing their stability and prosperity (see Kaplan 2008, 11). However, state security and contract institution and market composition fixes are difficult to implement, and those tried have a mixed record. While institution-building efforts should continue—to cut them off now would be detrimental—this dissertation suggests there are opportunities to address the internal condition of fragile state civil societies through better understanding their complex trust environments. Even while fragile state security and contract institutions and high remittances and aid persist in these highly collectivist societies, gains are possible in bridging network divides through appropriate incentivization structures, for increasing positive inter-group interaction leading to a wider GTR. In this way, civil societies may develop wider GTR even while their states remain fragile. States such as Burkina Faso with greater realized GTR may have less potential growth remaining but may serve as a model for states with little realized GTR potential like Zimbabwe. Cases with higher than expected GTR potential and growth (Ethiopia and Nigeria) are of most interest for proposing and implementing policy solutions.

This dissertation has woven together the interrelated concepts of trust, self-interest, incentivization, strangers, inter-group interaction, and generalized trust in fragile states to produce a unique and original contribution to the trust and fragile states literature. It has addressed the research questions regarding the effects on the GTR in

deviant, least likely fragile SSA states by thoroughly testing research hypotheses for each variable through within- and cross-case analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions through most similar multiple comparative case analysis, confirming or affirming most hypotheses. The successful testing of the SNC test variable should provide optimism for the application of this model elsewhere.

# APPENDIX A – COPYRIGHT PERMISSIONS

## A. Table 8. Social Trust in Five Country Clusters (Percent Trusters)



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| **Title of the article or chapter the portion is from** | Identifying Social Trust in Cross-Country Analysis: Do We Really Measure the Same? |

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| **Institution name** | University of Southern Mississippi |
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B. *Figure 11*. Zambian Linguistic Groups

**Caito, Tony**

**From:** Zambian Translators International <zamtrans.intl@gmail.com>
**Sent:** Sunday, March 4, 2018 9:15 PM
**To:** Caito, Tony
**Cc:** zamtransintl@gmail.com
**Subject:** Re: Use of Zambian map for research paper

Good morning Sir,
Kindly go ahead and use it.

Have a blessed day.
Regards,

Joseph Mwila Bwembya
Chief Executive Officer
Zambian Translators International
Website: http://www.zamtransinternational.weebly.com
Cell: +260975297862/+260965297862/+260955297862
Email: jomwiby@gmail.com / zamtrans.intl@yahoo.com
Skype: jomwiby1

On 5 Mar 2018 06:50, "Caito, Tony" <TCaito@corban.edu> wrote:

> Please respond letting me know if I have your permission to use this below map located on your Zambian languages web page https://zamtransinternational.weebly.com/zambianlanguages.html. I would like to put it in my doctoral dissertation for the section on Zambia.
>
> Thank you for a quick response.
>
> Professor Caito

1

C. *Figure 12*. Zambian Ethnolinguistic Groups

**Caito, Tony**

**From:** Mutur Zikin <muturzikin@hotmail.com>
**Sent:** Friday, December 29, 2017 12:04 PM
**To:** Caito, Tony
**Subject:** RE: Request to use map from muturzikin

go head Tony, regards
Mutur

---

**De :** Caito, Tony <TCaito@corban.edu>
**Envoyé :** 24 décembre 2017 10:02
**À :** Mutur Zikin
**Objet :** RE: Request to use map from muturzikin

Thank you for your permission to use the Botwana eta Zimbabwe linguistic map for my dissertation. I would also like to use the Zambia eta Malawi languages map in the same dissertation. Do I have your permission to use that one as well? Those are probably the only two maps I will need.

Thanks.

Tony

-----Original Message-----
From: Mutur Zikin [mailto:muturzikin@hotmail.com]
Sent: Friday, November 24, 2017 6:47 AM
To: Caito, Tony <TCaito@corban.edu>
Subject: RE:Request to use map from muturzikin

Hi Tony
As long as you use it for educational porposes, you got my permission to use the map cited below Regards, Mutur

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De : Caito, Tony [TCaito@corban.edu]
Envoyé : 21 novembre 2017 09:48
À : muturzikin@hotmail.com
Objet : Request to use map from muturzikin

Hello, I would like to request permission to use your Botwana eta Zimbabwe linguistic map found at http://www.muturzikin.com/cartesafrique/4.htm in my doctoral dissertation titled: Determinants of the Generalized Trust Radius in Scripted Fragile sub-Saharan African States. This is for educational purposes only and I would provide an in-text citation and bibliographic entry for Muturzikin 2007.

Tony

.

1

D. *Figure 14*. Zimbabwean Ethnolinguistic Groups

**Caito, Tony**

**From:** Mutur Zikin <muturzikin@hotmail.com>
**Sent:** Friday, December 29, 2017 12:04 PM
**To:** Caito, Tony
**Subject:** RE: Request to use map from muturzikin

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Mutur

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**Envoyé :** 24 décembre 2017 10:02
**À :** Mutur Zikin
**Objet :** RE: Request to use map from muturzikin

Thank you for your permission to use the Botwana eta Zimbabwe linguistic map for my dissertation. I would also like to use the Zambia eta Malawi languages map in the same dissertation. Do I have your permission to use that one as well? Those are probably the only two maps I will need.

Thanks.

Tony

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De : Caito, Tony [TCaito@corban.edu]
Envoyé : 21 novembre 2017 09:48
À : muturzikin@hotmail.com
Objet : Request to use map from muturzikin

Hello, I would like to request permission to use your Botwana eta Zimbabwe linguistic map found at http://www.muturzikin.com/cartesafrique/4.htm in my doctoral dissertation titled: Determinants of the Generalized Trust Radius in Scripted Fragile sub-Saharan African States. This is for educational purposes only and I would provide an in-text citation and bibliographic entry for Muturzikin 2007.

Tony

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E. *Figure 16.* Zimbabwean Food Insecurity – June 2008

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F. *Figure 18*. Zimbabwe Parliamentary Seats - 2017

**Caito, Tony**

**From:** ZESN Director <zesn2011@zesn.net>
**Sent:** Friday, February 16, 2018 4:18 AM
**To:** Caito, Tony; Ellen Dingani
**Cc:** info@zesn.net
**Subject:** Re: Permission to use map from your website

**Follow Up Flag:** FollowUp
**Flag Status:** Flagged

Dear Tony

Please go ahead.

kind regards

Rindai Chipfunde Vava
National Director
Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN)
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Tel: +263 (4) 250735, 791443, 798193, 791803
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