

Summer 8-2013

## **The Limitations of Democratic Peace**

Anthony Glenn Jordan  
*University of Southern Mississippi*

Follow this and additional works at: [https://aquila.usm.edu/masters\\_theses](https://aquila.usm.edu/masters_theses)

---

### **Recommended Citation**

Jordan, Anthony Glenn, "The Limitations of Democratic Peace" (2013). *Master's Theses*. 534.  
[https://aquila.usm.edu/masters\\_theses/534](https://aquila.usm.edu/masters_theses/534)

This Masters Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by The Aquila Digital Community. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of The Aquila Digital Community. For more information, please contact [Joshua.Cromwell@usm.edu](mailto:Joshua.Cromwell@usm.edu).

The University of Southern Mississippi

THE LIMITATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC PEACE


by

Anthony Glenn Jordan

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate School  
of The University of Southern Mississippi  
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of Master of Arts

Approved:



Dean of the Graduate School

August 2013

## ABSTRACT

### THE LIMITATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC PEACE

by Anthony Glenn Jordan

August 2013

The theory of Democratic Peace suggests that democracies are unlikely to wage war on one another, yet it spends little time actually defining what democracies are. Research on the theory of Democratic Peace suggests that the theory only applies to mature democracies, but how is maturity determined? The criteria used by multiple scholars is needed to defend the theory from particular challenges such as the Cenepa Valley War, but even with such defenses, the criteria omits how a state treats women and racial minorities. These omissions become clear when one examines how scholars treat the United States of America. This thesis will assert that the criteria for determining a democracy's maturity is incomplete and requires revision.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer would like to thank the thesis committee chairman, Dr. Robert Pauly, and the other thesis committee members, Dr. Tom Lansford and Dr. Joseph St. Marie for their advice and support throughout the duration of this project.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	iii
CHAPTER	
I. INTRODUCTION .....	1
Conflicts within Literature	
Research Questions	
Thesis Outline	
II. LITERATURE REVIEW.....	5
Origin of Democratic Peace	
Michael Doyle's Contributions to Democratic Peace	
Capitalist Peace	
A Temporary Democratic Peace?	
Defining "Democracy"	
Democratizing States Versus Democracies	
Another Measurement for Maturity	
Defining "War"	
Contribution to Democratic Peace	
III. METHODOLOGY .....	26
Defense of Method Selected	
Measurements for Maturity and War	
The Selected Cases	
IV. THE KARGIL WAR.....	32
Regime Type of Belligerents	
History of Hostility	
The Kargil War Begins	
Operation Vijay	
Effects of the Kargil War	
V. ANALYSIS OF THE KARGIL WAR.....	38
Qualifications as a War	
Maturity of Indian and Pakistani Democracies	
Implications for Democratic Peace	

VI. THE WAR OF 1812.....	42
Regime Type of Belligerents	
The American Case for War	
Description of the Conflict	
VII.....	A
ANALYSIS OF THE WAR OF 1812 .....	48
Qualifications as a War	
Maturity of British and American Democracies	
Implications for Democratic Peace	
VIII. ....	T
THE CENEPA VALLEY WAR .....	53
Regime Type of Belligerents	
Historical Context of the War	
The Cenepa Valley War	
IX. ANALYSIS OF THE CENEPA VALLEY WAR .....	59
Qualifications as a War	
Maturity of Peruvian and Ecuadorian Democracies	
Implications for Democratic Peace	
X. RESULTS .....	63
Measuring Maturity	
Summary	
XI. CONCLUSION.....	68
Implications for Democratic Peace	
Future Research	
Policy Implications	
REFERENCES .....	73

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The theory of Democratic Peace has existed for decades with few challenges. While its origins can be traced to Kant, the notion of Democratic Peace laid dormant until Dean Babst (Gaubatz 1999, 3) performed statistical analysis on it in 1972. The theory of Democratic Peace has become readily accepted in the Political Science field of International Relations with few challenges emerging since its resurgence. While the degree of acceptance varies (realists view it as an anomaly while liberals use it to legitimize their positions), few have come forward and outright denied the theory's validity. It is a very difficult theory to challenge, but part of that difficulty comes from a lack of clarity within the definition of the theory. Stating that "Democracies do not go to war with one another" does not simplify matters. There are criteria for a state to become a "full" or "mature" democracy, yet does one ignore it and count democratizing states and democracies as one? While most scholars do not count democratizing states when examining Democratic Peace, they are not in complete agreement on what constitutes a mature democracy. Such disagreements raise a range of questions, including the following ones. Which classification should be used? What if scholars cannot agree on the classification of states in a war? Should Democratic Peace emerge unscathed due to a disagreement in classification? If that happens to be the case, then the theory would never face any scrutiny.

#### Conflicts within Literature

Wars such as the War of 1812 between the United States and Great Britain and the Kargil War between India and Pakistan in May-July 1999 appear to challenge Democratic Peace. All of the combatants employed democracy to select their leaders to various

extents. Such examples could challenge Democratic Peace, but scholars such as Michael Doyle (2012) and Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder (2007) would suggest that Great Britain and Pakistan, respectively, were not mature democracies at the time of these wars. Despite the fact that all of the belligerents had democratic regimes, scholars require more from states than fair elections as far as Democratic Peace is concerned.

In creating his Liberal Peace, Michael Doyle (2012) set his own criteria for labeling a regime as "liberal." The name change was not made purely for aesthetics. Doyle required more from a regime than the election of its leaders. Should a regime be able to meet the four criteria set by Doyle, then it could be called "liberal." Doyle's work suggests that liberal states would not go to war with one another. While Doyle could defend his Liberal Peace from the challenges of the War of 1812 and the Kargil War, he would have trouble with the challenge of the Cenepa Valley War, which pitted Ecuador against Peru in January and February 1995. In the Cenepa Valley War, both combatants were states Doyle classified as liberal.

The work of Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr (2011) can be used to address the challenges of the Falkland Islands War and the Cenepa Valley War. Using their criteria for what makes a mature democracy, one can argue that Argentina and Ecuador and Peru, respectively, are not mature democracies. As suggested by other scholars, not all democracies qualify for coverage by Democratic Peace. This time, however, the criteria for defining a mature democracy had to change to address two different challenges.

In addition to requiring different criteria to define liberal regimes or mature democracies, scholars are not all in agreement over the source of this peace. Erik Gartzke (2007) argues that similar regime types do not explain the peaceful nature



between liberal states/mature democracies. While addressing these arguments is important, Democratic Peace cannot begin to defend itself until it can figure out how to qualify the states it is supposed to explain.

Of all the scholars who defined mature democracies/liberal regimes, only Michael Doyle (2012) argued for Democratic Peace. The cases selected, particularly the Cenepa Valley War, will be used to argue that Doyle's criteria for a liberal regime need revisiting. His criteria are not adequate to address all challenges to Democratic Peace let alone competing theories to explain the peace between the democratic/liberal states. While Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder (2007) add another wrinkle in terms of defining a mature democracy, the criteria set forth by Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr (2011) is an even more precise measure for a democracy's maturity. Their qualifications for a mature democracy are much more restrictive than Doyle's.

#### Research Questions

In particular this thesis addresses the following research question. Do more restrictive measurements on a democracy's maturity damage Democratic Peace's ability to explain the peace among the states whose behavior it explains? Borrowing from arguments made by Erik Gartzke and Alex Weisiger (2013), this thesis presents and assesses the extent of the validity of the following hypothesis. Placing more restrictive measures on a democracy's maturity lower the total number of mature democracies to a level where Democratic Peace cannot maintain its monopoly on the explanation for peace among these states. The cases of the War of 1812 and the Kargil War will demonstrate how Doyle's criteria can successfully defend Liberal Peace, but not without major questions emerging in regard to his measurement of a state's liberalness. In particular Doyle's labeling of the United States as liberal from its inception. The case of the Cenepa

Valley War will demonstrate that liberal regimes can go to war with one another, which suggests a need for more restrictive measurements of liberalness/maturity.

### Thesis Outline

This argument will begin with a literature review of Democratic Peace, the nature of democracies, an examination of mature democracies, the contrast of democracies versus democratizing states, an examination of the different definitions of mature democracies, an examination of arguments against Democratic Peace and an examination of how war is classified. The thesis will transition to the methodology chapter where the use of case studies will be explained and defended. Following the methodology chapter, the three cases will be detailed and analyzed. There will be a conclusion chapter then the final chapter will discuss the importance of the findings and suggest ways in which the research may be built upon and continued.

## CHAPTER II

### LITERATURE REVIEW

The simplest way to define Democratic Peace Theory is to declare that democracies do not wage war on one another. The potential importance of this theory cannot be overstated. The desire to pay the costs of implementing democracy in other states would be slower to wane if it were accepted and true that such costs were investments in a future world peace. Public feelings on military action are just one way in which such a simple theory can have such a significant effect. Studying literature on the subject, however, expands that simple theory and suggests it may not be as powerful as it appears from the outset. This chapter will begin with a literature review of Democratic Peace, the nature of democracies, an examination of mature democracies, the contrast of democracies versus democratizing states, an examination of the different definitions of mature democracies, an examination of arguments against Democratic Peace and an examination of how war is classified.

#### Origin of Democratic Peace

Democratic Peace can trace its roots back to Immanuel Kant's Perpetual Peace. Kant's argument for his Perpetual Peace rested mostly upon two sections and the articles within those two sections. In his First Section (the Preliminary Articles for Perpetual Peace), Kant had six articles:

1. "No treaty of peace that tacitly reserves issues for a future war shall be held valid" (Humphrey 1983, 107).
2. "No independent nation, be it large or small, may be acquired by another nation by inheritance, exchange, purchase, or gift" (Humphrey 1983, 108).
3. "Standing armies (*miles perpetuus*) shall be gradually abolished" (Humphrey

1983, 108).

4. "No national debt shall be contracted in connection with the foreign affairs of the nation" (Humphrey 1983, 109).

5. "No nation shall forcibly interfere with the constitution and government of another" (Humphrey 1983, 109).

6. "No nation at war with another shall permit such acts of war as shall make mutual trust impossible during some future time of peace: Such acts include the use of *Assassins (percussores) Poisoners (venefici) breach of surrender, instigation of treason (perduellio)* in the opposing nation, etc." (Humphrey 1983, 109-110).

These articles mostly covered interstate relations. They detailed how states should act toward one another. Kant argued that these articles, if applied by all states, would create his Perpetual Peace. However, he took things a step forward by detailing the type of government the states need to have in his Second Section. His Definitive Articles are:

1. "The civil constitution of every nation should be republican" (Humphrey 1983, 112).

2. "The right of nations shall be based on a federation of free states" (Humphrey 1983, 115).

3. "Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal *hospitality*" (Humphrey 1983, 118).

Kant argued that the natural state of man is war and that "the state of peace must therefore be *established*, for the suspension of hostilities does not provide the security of peace" (Humphrey 1983, 111). Kant continues by arguing "Although a *treaty of peace* can put an end to some particular war, it cannot end the state of war (the tendency always

to find a new pretext for war)” (Humphrey 1983, 116). Kant's choice to list the articles of interstate action before articles that address the states themselves as well as the individual is perplexing. He makes it clear that states must be republican for Perpetual Peace, so it stands to reason that the states must reform before the nature of interstate relations reform.

Kant does make it clear that a republican government is necessary for Perpetual Peace. He argues that “So far as [the matter of] right is concerned, republicanism is the original foundation of all forms of civil constitution” (Humphrey 1983, 112-113). Kant reasons that “if the form of government is to cohere with the concept of right, it must include the representative system, which is possible only in a republican form of government” (Humphrey 1983, 115). Among the qualities Kant gives republicanism are its ability to accord with “the principles of the *freedom* of the members of a society (as men), second, it accords with the principles of the *dependence* of everyone on a single, common [source of] legislation (as subjects), and, third, it accords with the law of the equality of them all (as citizens)” (Humphrey 1983, 112). Kant argues that citizens of a republican state will consider all the calamities of war before committing to it while non-republican states find that “the easiest thing to do is to declare war” (Humphrey 1983, 113). Among the costs that republican states will consider (and non-republican states will not) are “doing the fighting themselves, paying the costs of war from their own resources, having to repair at great sacrifice the war's devastation, and, finally, the ultimate evil that would make peace itself better, never being able—because of new and constant wars—to expunge the burden of debt” (Humphrey 1983, 113).

Kant also makes a distinction between a republican state and a democratic state. Kant allows government to be classified into two categories: republican and despotic. He

defines republicanism as “that political principle whereby executive power (the government) is separated from legislative power” (Humphrey 1983, 114). He defines despotism as when “the ruler independently executes all laws that it has itself made” (Humphrey 1983, 114) and where “rulers have taken hold of the public will and treated it as their own private will” (Humphrey 1983, 114). He argues that democracy is a form of despotism “because it sets up an executive power in which all citizens make decisions about and, if need be, against one (who therefore does not agree); consequently, all, who are not quite all, decide, so that the general will contradicts both itself and freedom” (Humphrey 1983, 114). Kant adds that “every form of government that is not *representative* is properly speaking *without form*, because one and the same person can no more be at one and the same time legislator and executor of his will” (Humphrey 1983, 114).

Kant argues that there are three kinds of sovereignty. The first form is where there is one ruler, an autocracy. The second form is where some rule, an aristocracy. The third form is where all rule, which is a democracy (Humphrey 1983, 113). Kant concedes that the first two “forms of political constitution are defective inasmuch as they always leave room for a democratic form of government, it is nonetheless possible that they assume a form of government that accords with the *spirit* of a representative system” (Humphrey 1983, 114). Kant argues that the democratic form makes such an end impossible due to the fact that everyone wants to rule in a democratic state. Kant goes on to reason that “the smaller the number of persons who exercise the power of a nation (the number of rulers), the more they represent and the closer the political constitution approximates the possibility of republicanism...and the constitution can hope through gradual reforms finally to become republican” (Humphrey 1983, 114).

Kant's latter two Definitive Article do not address the individual governments of the states themselves, but are concerned with protecting the rights of the individual. The Second Definitive Article called upon other states to ensure the freedoms and republican governments of their neighbors are preserved and protected. Kant argued that "each nation and should demand that the others enter into a contract resembling the civil one and guaranteeing the rights of each" (Humphrey 1983, 115). Kant made it clear that this must be federation of free states and not a new government that supersedes the existing governments when he viewed "many nations in a single nation would constitute only a single nation" (Humphrey 1983, 115). Kant recommended that states form a "league of peace" (Humphrey 1983, 117). He argues that a key difference between a "league of peace" and a treaty of peace is that the treaties are created to stop one war while the league would be focused on ending all wars.

Kant's Third Definitive Article addressed the right of the individual or, as he said, "the right of an alien not to be treated as an enemy upon his arrival in another's country" (Humphrey 1983, 118). Kant does not advocate open borders as he acknowledges the state's right to turn away citizens of another country, but the state must do it without killing the alien nor is it allowed to treat the alien as an enemy if he or she acts peacefully (Humphrey 1983, 118). Kant finds the conduct of commercial states inhospitable to foreign people and lands. He cites the commercial states' treatment toward "the lands occupied by the blacks, the Spice Islands, the Cape, etc." (Humphrey 1983, 119). He specifically notes that "foreign soldiers were imported in East India under the pretext of merely establishing economic relations, and with them came subjection of the natives, incitement of various nations to widespread wars among themselves, famine, rebellion, treachery, and the entire litany of evils that can afflict the human race" (Humphrey 1983,

119). To further his argument, Kant notes the Sugar Islands, which he argues is “the seat of the cruellest [*SIC*] and most ingenious slavery, yield no true profit, but serve only the indirect and not very profitable purpose of training sailors for ships of war, which in turn aids the pursuit of wars in Europe” (Humphrey 1983, 119). Kant closed his argument with “because a (narrower or wider) community widely prevails among the Earth's peoples, a transgression of rights in *one* place in the world is felt *everywhere*; consequently, the idea of cosmopolitan right is not fantastic and exaggerated, but rather an amendment to the unwritten code of national and international rights” (Humphrey 1983, 119).

Democratic Peace sprouted from Perpetual Peace, but particularly from the First Definitive Article. Before states were to follow the other articles, they had to be republican. Kant created a clear link between peace and republicanism. Though he did not directly say it, Kant suggested that republican regimes are more likely to be peaceful with one another if for other reason than the fact that they are the only states that are qualified to follow the other articles of Perpetual Peace.

Another article that has a smaller link to Democratic Peace is the Fifth Preliminary Article. States will not achieve Perpetual Peace if they interfere with the constitution and government of another state. Kant suggests that war is not the only hurdle to peace. States may not declare war on one another, but interfering with another state's government or constitution certainly is not peaceful.

#### Michael Doyle's Contributions to Democratic Peace

Michael Doyle argues that liberal international theory holds that states have the right to be free from foreign intervention and, since citizens possess moral autonomy and the right to liberty, their democratic states have a right to exercise political independence



(2012, 18). He goes so far as to argue that “mutual respect for these rights then becomes the touchstone of international liberal theory” (2012, 18). Within the framework of international liberal theory, Doyle found that “these conventions of mutual respect have formed a cooperative foundation for relations among liberal democracies of a remarkably effective kind” (2012, 18). That leads him to conclude that “even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with nonliberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another” (2012, 18). Doyle accepts that such war is possible, but his evidence suggests that these liberal democratic states possess a predisposition against war with one another (2012, 18). His evidence also suggests that even threats of war have come to be viewed as illegitimate. He identifies a “liberal zone of peace” or a “pacific union” (2012, 18) that has been created with liberal regimes/states and exists with them.

In defining “liberal regimes” Doyle used four institutions that he suggested are essential to the classification: “market and private property economies; politics that are externally sovereign; citizens who possess juridical rights; and 'republican' (whether republican or monarchical), representative, government” (2012, 17). The final requirement assumes that the “legislative branch have an effective role in public policy and be formally and competitively, either potentially or actually, elected” (2012, 17). Another requirement is that government is internally sovereign with Doyle's primary examples being foreign affairs and the military (2012, 17).

#### Capitalist Peace

Even among the liberal scholars, there was not a universal acceptance for regime type as the explanation of Liberal Peace. Erik Gartzke argued that Liberal Peace could be the result of “capitalism and common interstate interests” (2007, 166). His study in 2007

offered “evidence suggesting that capitalism, and not democracy, leads to peace” (2007, 180). The same study left Gartzke to conclude “Democratization, paradoxically, implies increasing tensions among democracies. Free markets and development, in contrast, lead nations closer together, or...down grade historic territorial animosities” (2007, 182). He saw his argument as an extension of scholars such as Montesquieu, Paine, Bastiat, Cobden and Angell who all suggested in one form or another that market forces could end war (2007, 167). John Stuart Mill, in particular, argued that market forces could render war obsolete (1902, 390).

Gartzke argued that peace could be the result of three attributes of mature capitalist economies (2007, 166). The first attribute was that “territorial expansion is tempered by the rising importance of intellectual and financial capital” (2007, 166). Gartzke argued that acquiring land offers too small of a financial incentive for capitalistic economies to go to war. He was suggested that resources could be more cheaply acquired on the market instead of through military occupation (2007, 166). Gartzke also argued that development does not increase the likelihood of war, but only affects what states fight over and with whom they fight (2007, 166).

The second attribute of mature capitalistic economies that could explain peace is the foreign policy goals of developed nations after World War II (2007, 166). Gartzke argued that the absence of territorial tensions as well as a consensus regarding how the international system should be ordered “has allowed liberal states to cooperate and to accommodate minor differences” (2007, 166). Gartzke, however, does question if this cooperation will last (2007, 166).

The third attribute of mature capitalistic economies that could explain peace is the mechanism created by global capital markets that allows communication as an alternative

to war (2007, 166). Gartzke argues that these three attributes can individually “influence patterns of warfare in the modern world” (2007, 166). He also argues that when these attributes are combined they “explain the absence of war among states in the developed world and account for the dyadic observation of the democratic peace” (2007, 166).

Maoz and Russett (1992) examined trade in goods and services in relation to Democratic Peace, but Gartzke argues that they failed to include capital markets and offer “only a cursory assessment of economic development” (2007, 167). In modern times trade has been evaluated quite often by scholars such as Bliss and Russett (1998), Oneal and Ray (1997) and Polachek (1997) among others. Gartzke argues that “trade is arguably the least important in terms of mitigating warfare” (2007, 170). Gartzke and Li (2003) argued that financial markets, monetary policy and economic development all play a more important role in promoting peace than trade.

#### A Temporary Democratic Peace?

Erik Gartzke and Alex Weisiger argue that Democratic Peace may only be a temporary condition for the international community. They argue that similarities and differences between states can “orient and propagate conflict” (2013, 171). They “offer a simple explanation for interstate conflict in which the salience of similarity or difference varies with the prevalence or capabilities of groups” (2013, 171). They suggest that when autocracies significantly outnumber democracies and pose a threat, the bonds among democratic states will strengthen; however, as the threat disappears, so will the bonds (2013, 171). Building upon that point, they argue that “difference *is* most likely an important proximate determinant of conflict” (2013, 182).

Gartzke and Weisiger note the theory of Autocratic Peace to support dynamic difference (2013, 171), the theory and the debate about in scholarly circles suggests that a

mature democracy may not be the only regime type that can enjoy peace with other similar regimes. That does not mean that Autocratic Peace is thought to work exactly like Democratic Peace. The theory suggests that “jointly autocratic dyads are more peaceful than heterogeneous dyads” (2013, 171), yet “remaining somewhat less peaceful than paired democracies” (2013, 171). They suggest that “logical elegance and the empirical similarities inherent in shared regime type provide cause to explore theoretical arguments that spring from regime similarity in general” (2013, 173).

Gleditsch and Ward (2006) suggest the regional mix of regime types may influence whether or not a state democratizes. Gartzke and Weisiger (2013) argue that the clustering of similar states aids Democratic Peace (2013, 173). Those similarities may have as much to do with the peaceful nature of democratic states as democracy does. They stop short of suggesting that difference causes disputes. They acknowledge that states or other opponents will forge bargains by mutual consent. “Difference provides the basis for conflict and serves to define the realm where force becomes an option” (2013, 182). Gartzke and Weisiger conclude their research by suggesting that Democratic Peace may be conditional. They argue that regime type difference is only one difference among many that could create groups with different interests. They identify other potential differences as religious, ethnic, ideological, linguistic and cultural (2013, 182). This research suggests a world full of democratic states may be much different than what Kant and Doyle envisioned. If there is an absence of an autocratic threat, democracies lose an incentive for peaceful behavior and may begin to be divided by their differences.

#### Defining “Democracy”

While Doyle offers a detailed definition for what a liberal regime is, Kant is less detailed on the particular aspects of a republic. That leads one to assume that any form of

a republic would qualify in Kant's eyes. Even with Democratic Peace, there is an assumption of what a democracy is, but that could be used rather liberally.

Understanding forms of democracy and the characteristics of democracy aid in examining Democratic Peace.

Defining "democracy" is not a particularly tricky task, nor is classifying a government as "democratic." Theoretically, any government that permits its citizens to vote one time (regardless of how insignificant the election or referendum may be) may be classified as "democratic." To build further upon that, a dictator may allow the citizens to vote on trivial issues or there may be elections at the local level in an autocracy, but Democratic Peace would not include either instance. That is enough to make a distinction between a state being a democracy and a state employing democratic elements.

Gaubatz noted that there were 117 formally democratic states (1999, 1) in the world (1999, 173). Those numbers are reduced when Gaubatz further qualifies the data by citing *Freedom Review* rating of "76 as states in which the citizens enjoy a broad range of political rights and civil liberties" (1999, 173). The remain formal democratic states had some constraints on political rights and civil liberties (1999, 173). There are already a couple of problems with Gaubatz's data. The first problem is that Gaubatz did not include *Freedom Review's* definition of what constitutes a "formal democracy." It can be inferred that a formal democracy is likely a state where its legislature and/or executive leader are democratically elected, but that is still not enough. Even if this inference is correct, 35% of the formally democratic states have some constraints on political rights and civil liberties. How does one make the distinction between a state having high levels of political rights and civil liberties and one that places constraints

upon them? Is there a state (let alone a democracy) that places no constraints on political rights and civil liberties? It is doubtful that such an anarchical state exists, so it is fair to say that all democracies place some constraints on political rights and civil liberties. That makes the distinction arbitrary, but either *Freedom Review* does not make it or Gaubatz fails to include it. This broad view of what constitutes a democracy can be conveniently used to forgive unexpected results in experiments, which is not academically sound. It could also allow for radically different takes on Democratic Peace to appear correct as each experiment could freely define a “democracy” however it likes and technically be correct.

Mansfield and Snyder offer little aid in the quest to define democracy as their take on Democratic Peace involves “mature” democracies (2007, 1). They again address mature democracies in discussing states paths to democratization (2007, 21), but fail to define what a “mature democracy” is. Ravlo, Gleditsch and Dorussen (2003) do not even choose to qualify democracies to that extent, nor does Zinnes (2004).

Some hope for a definition can be found in the qualities that researchers expect forms of governance who qualify as democracies (as covered by Democratic Peace) to possess. Mansfield and Snyder argue that “democratic power rests especially on the distinctive ability of democratic institutions and ideology to align private interests with collective purposes” (2007, 49). They contrast mature democracies and autocracy when they suggest that “repression plays a far smaller role in strategies of rule in mature democracies than it does in autocracies” (2007, 49). A miniscule amount of information is given about the nature of democracies and what they do not do.

Mansfield and Snyder pay special attention to the roles of institutions in democracies. They argue that democratic institutions provide checks for patronage with

the risk of publicity and electoral accountability checking interests with special access to policy-makers (2007, 50). They also argue that democratic institutions “make government authorities accountable to the average voter” (2007, 51). Institutions in mature democracies are more predictable and provide greater continuity than institutions in non-democracies (2007, 51). Mansfield and Snyder suggest that democratic institutions “ceaselessly scrutinize the government's foreign policies and make public the information that is needed to weigh the likely consequences of military actions in a credible way” (2007, 52). This does not directly define what a “mature democracy” is, but it provides a litmus test for determining if a democracy qualifies for the label. If the institutions of a democracy cannot achieve what Mansfield and Snyder suggest, then the democracy in question likely cannot be labeled as “mature.”

Mansfield and Snyder also shed some light on what the elements of a “mature democracy” should provide. They define voting as “a decision-making system that tends to empower diffuse interests, such as those of taxpayers or of consumers, rather than concentrated interests, such as recipients of subsidies or producers” (2007, 50). They suggest that “political systems that empower diffuse interests should be less war-prone than those that empower narrowly parochial interests” (2007, 50). The application of inductive reasoning would suggest that a voting system that empowers diffuse interests is the characteristic of a “mature democracy.” For the purposes of Democratic Peace, the democratic element of voting is not in itself enough to qualify a democracy as “mature,” which would leave that democracy ineligible to be covered by the theory.

In one of their many statements on Democratic Peace, Mansfield and Snyder interestingly argue that “fully democratic regimes have never fought wars against other democracies” (2007, 49). Qualifying a state's leadership as a “fully democratic regime”

is different than declaring a state to be a “mature democracy.” With this statement, Mansfield and Snyder again go further than other researchers in creating some parameters for which kind of democracies are included in Democratic Peace Theory. One can infer that a “fully democratic regime” is a regime that has been elected by a fully democratic process.

With the available material, it can be said that a “mature democracy” is distinct from any state that is labeled a “democracy” or that is in the process of democratizing. Mature democracies reach their status by possessing democratic institutions that check and scrutinize all foreign policies. These institutions will also decrease or prevent repression of certain groups and check patronage of special interests. Mature democracies also possess a voting system that successfully empowers diffuse interests. They are also governed by regimes that come to power via a fully democratic process. These are all qualities that are possessed by “mature democracies” that are eligible to be represented by the notion of Democratic Peace. States that lack these qualities (yet consider themselves to be democracies) are likely in the process of democratization. State that is a democracy (more specifically, a “mature democracy”) and a state that is democratizing are not the same.

#### Democratizing States Versus Democracies

While a definition of “democracy” is lacking, there is a strong belief that there is a point at which “democratization” gives way to “democracy.” Mansfield and Snyder suggested that democratization is a two phase process: from an autocracy to a partially democratic regime and from a partially democratic regime to a fully institutionalized democracy (2007, 69). They characterize the former as “cases in which elites conclude bargains involving limited political liberalization, as well as cases in which elites allow



voting but merely as a temporary expedient” (2007, 70) and argue that hostilities are more likely during that phase. They characterized the second phase as a time when “the regime moves to adopt a system of unfettered political competition and full governmental accountability to a broad electorate” (2007, 70). They also characterize democracy as a rare event and argue that “incomplete democratic transitions have tended to occur more frequently than complete democratic shifts” (2007, 80).

Mansfield and Snyder also describe states that are transitioning to democracy as “quite war-prone toward regimes of all types” (2007, 21). They describe the attitude of the public in a mature democracy as a prudent constraint on the desire of the elites to declare war, but describe the public in democratizing states as reckless. The two questions that need to be asked are: Why do citizens in democratizing states (and the states themselves) appear to be more belligerent and is there a clear, identifiable point at which the process of democratizing concludes and mature democracy can be observed?

In addressing the first question, one could answer it by claiming that citizens in democratizing states possess warlike sensibilities and support hawkish candidates. Completely changing a style of government can be a violent affair, and it could be theorized that hawkish policies could be normalized and/or psychologically comforting. Citizens and states may also become vulnerable after the civil strife that allowed the tides of democracy to wash over the state. Becoming a weakened state could make it easy prey for neighboring states. The warlike attitude could also be explained by simply saying that transitions from any regime increases belligerence. Mansfield and Snyder examine all these rationales and find little evidence to support them. They suggest the hostility of democratizing states are likely not the result of “voters...with warlike preferences” (2007, 21) and “weakened states make attractive targets for neighboring

states” (2007, 21) and that “transitions from any regime type to any other cause war” (2007, 21). Their experiment refuted “the view that transitional democracies are simply inviting targets of attack due to their temporary weakness” (2007, 95) and “the view that any regime change is likely to precipitate the outbreak of war” (2007, 95). If those reasons, despite their theoretical appeal, are not the causes of the belligerence in democratizing states, then what is?

Mansfield and Snyder supply the exact same answer to this question as which is inferred when one wonders how they would explain what a “mature democracy” is: political institutions (2007, 21). They argue that “democratizing states are disproportionately war-prone when they lack the coherent political institutions needed to manage intensified domestic political competition and to prevent it from provoking foreign conflicts” (2007, 21). They expand on this by saying, “incomplete democratization occurring in a context of weak governmental institutions undermines the state's ability to manage elite interest groups and newly politicized mass groups” (2007, 87). In the previous section, it was the inference of institutions as a regulating force that turned a democracy into a “mature democracy.” Now institutions are suggested to be peace-promoting elements of a democracy, and something that democratizing states are missing and need to be working toward obtaining.

This suggestion by Mansfield and Snyder is important because it could successfully answer both questions. It could now be argued that democratizing states and their citizens are more belligerent because they lack the political institutions that scrutinize foreign policies, represent minority interests, as well as provide alternatives to violence for a minority that feels ignored, and place checks on government activity and its officials. It could also be argued that the establishment and presence of coherent

political institutions signifies the end of the democratization process and the emergence of a mature democracy.

There are some issues that arise with this suggestion. The first one is how strong is Mansfield and Snyder's data. Should their experiment and subsequent data be trusted? Was their experiment sound? Another issue comes with the idea of a "democracy" and a "mature democracy." There were inferences made on the differences between the two, but the rationale in making those inferences wound up being used by Mansfield and Snyder to juxtapose a democratizing state from a "mature democracy." These issues must be addressed and settled, especially the former. The latter can be thought of as an issue of semantics because concepts for democracies covered by Democratic Peace have been established and dubbing a state with strong political institutions that promote peace a "mature democracy" or a "democracy" does not affect the quality of the argument. The first issue could affect the quality of the argument and cannot be easily dismissed.

Mansfield and Snyder tested their argument with a combination of narrative case studies and quantitative techniques (2007, 69). For their analysis they obtained measures of "democratization, the strength of domestic institutions, and war" (2007, 69). They distinguish between the two phases of a democratic transition as "when mass groups are initially being politically mobilized; and later, when the impending completion of the democratization process may foreclose options for threatened elites" (2007, 72). They measure regime type and regime change with Polity III data, which was developed by Ted Robert Gurr and colleagues (2007, 73). Polity III "furnishes longitudinal indicators of domestic institutions for 177 countries during the period 1800-1994" (2007, 73). In their study they deem administrative institutions (such as non-corrupt bureaucracies, professional news media, the police force (that follows the law) and institutions that

regulate political competition) to be the most important (2007, 87). Though measures are scarce for these institution, Mansfield and Snyder use an 11-point index created by Gurr and his colleagues that measures how much domestic authority is concentrated in a state's central government (2007, 88). To measure war they relied upon the Correlates of War Project's definition of war and used its data on war (2007, 91).

Using these measures, their subsequent analyses and a monadic research design (2007, 139), Mansfield and Snyder produced results that supported their argument of "incomplete democratic transitions are especially likely to promote wars in countries where government institutions are weak and where little power is concentrated in the hands of national officials" (2007, 124). The results also found that states in the initial stages of democratization are more likely to become involved in wars (2007, 129). Another consequence of these results was support for Mansfield and Snyder's argument that "incomplete democratization is a potent impetus to war when domestic institutions are fragmented and weak" (2007, 139).

The research behind and design of Mansfield and Snyder's experiment is sound enough to allow one to take their argument seriously. They presented compelling evidence to support their argument that democratizing states are more prone to war. Their main argument, the role of coherent political institutions in encouraging peace in mature democracies, is also well-supported by their research. Their most serious flaw was the lack of concern in identifying the possibility of a state finishing the democratization process and becoming a democracy, but not a "mature democracy" or are the only options available to states either be a democratizing state or be a "mature democracy?" As earlier stated, this may merely be an argument about semantics, and it does not affect the quality of Mansfield and Snyder's argument.

### Another Measurement for Maturity

The Polity III Project was followed by Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr's (2011) *Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2011*. Marshall, Jagers and Gurr's Polity IV Project (2011) selects states with populations greater than 500,000 in 2011 for their annual, cross-national, time series that tracks and codes regime type and regime change. They use an eleven point scale (0-10) to indicate how democratic a state is. They suggest that a mature democracy would have three characteristics: open and fully competitive political participation, elective executive recruitment and substantial constraints on the chief executive. Open and fully competitive political participation is measured by the variable Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP). A state viewed as "Competitive" would be coded as "5." A state coded with any other number is unlikely to have open and fully competitive political participation. Open executive recruitment is measured by the variable Competitiveness Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP). A state that would satisfy the open executive recruitment characteristic would have elections for their executives, which would be coded as "3" for the XRCOMP variable. Finally, restraints on the chief executive are measured with the Constraint on the Chief Executive (XCONST) variable. Chief executives with substantial limitations are coded with "5;" however, there are measures above "5" that would satisfy the characteristic, too. An intermediate category coded as "6" and "Executive parity or subordination," coded as "7," would both satisfy the characteristic of chief executives with substantial limitations. States coded with "5" in PARCOMP, "3" in XRCOMP and "5," "6" or "7" in XCONST could be considered mature democracies.

Marshall, Jagers and Gurr's (2011) measurement for maturity is much more restrictive than Doyle's (2012). As of 1991 Doyle's liberal community totaled 54 states (2012, 147-149). At the same point in time, Marshall, Jagers and Gurr would have only classified 26 states as mature. Even with another 20 years, Marshall, Jagers and Gurr do not close the gap much. In 2011 they only considered 36 states to be mature democracies. Considering the fact that Doyle constructed his list before the fall of the Soviet Union, one could argue that the gap would not have shrank at all. It may have even grown had Doyle constructed his own list of liberal regimes in 2011.

#### Defining "War"

One must also examine the nature of "war." Ray notes that "controversies also arise about the categorization of conflicts as international or interstate war" (1995, 102). Ray accepts the Correlates of War criteria for determining if a conflict is a war (1995, 102). The most recent criteria was published in Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman's (2010) *Resort to War: 1816-2007*, which considers a military conflict that involves 1,000 battle deaths within a twelve month period to be a war. Ray notes that this criteria is "almost universally accepted by those engaged in quantitative research on international war" (1995, 103).

In addition to the 1,000 battle death requirement, Sarkees and Wayman (2010) also suggest that a war must include sustained combat involving organized armed forces and that those armed forces must be capable of effective resistance. The effective resistance criteria was designed to prevent massacres and violence from unorganized individuals from qualifying as a war (2010). For a state to qualify as a war participant, it must either commit 1,000 troops to the war or suffer 100 battle deaths (2010).

### *Defense of 1,000 Battle Death Criteria*

While war may seem self-explanatory, adding the 1,000 battle death criteria makes a conflict easier to diagnose versus attempting to find proof of states declaring war on each other. There may be instances where states do not declare war, yet a military conflict results that kills 1,000 troops. There may be cases of a chief executive possessing the authority to deploy troops and initiate a conflict regardless of any legislative concerns. This accepted classification proves to be more useful than a state's classification.

Ray acknowledges that there is some professional discomfort from those who disagree with the 1,000 battle death criteria (1995, 103). Ray accepts that the 1,000 battle death criteria is arbitrary, but argues that lowering the number of battle deaths would “risk categorizing as 'wars' extremely minor incidents of no real consequence” (1995, 103). Ray also argues that lowering the threshold of battle deaths would create a large demand for specific battle death counts (1995, 103). Ray argues that a 1,000 battle death criteria prevents “phantom wars” from being counted (1995, 103).

### Contribution to Democratic Peace

This thesis will build upon the literature by examining how liberal states/mature democracies are classified and critiquing the criteria used by Michael Doyle (2012) and Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr (2011) to classify states as liberal or democracies as mature. This thesis will show how the criteria of both Doyle and Marshall, Jagers and Gurr work successfully and where they can be criticized. The criticism will come in how Doyle and Marshall, Jagers and Gurr appear to pay little attention to the treatment of women and racial minorities by liberal states/mature democracies.

## CHAPTER III

### METHODOLOGY

#### Defense of Method Selected

Selecting a case study as the methodology for this thesis was an easy decision. While other qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods research may challenge particular facets of Democratic Peace, a case study provides the most direct challenge to the core of the theory and could have the greatest effect. Finding a case where two democracies waged war on one another challenges the theory. While not enough to fully discredit the theory, it could restrict the theory's areas of applicable use. It would further strip the theory's ability to generalize even further that the exclusion of democratizing states from the application. On the other hand, if this case study diffuses a potential challenge, then the theory is strengthened and is more apt to stand against future challenges.

George and Bennett identify the case study approach as “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events” (2005, 5). They admit that case studies “have come in and out of favor over the past five decades as researchers have explored the possibilities of statistical methods...and formal models” (2005, 5), but blame that on scholars more than any inherent defects in the methodology. They argue that “scholars' understanding of case studies is often distorted by critiques based on the assumptions of statistical methods” (2005, 6). George and Bennett note that only in the past three decades have scholars “formalized case study methods more completely and linked them to underlying arguments in the philosophy of science” (2005, 6).



The initial definition of the case study approach fits the argument well.

Democratic Peace can be examined best at a practical level with real actions from states supporting or discrediting the theory. The defense of the method is crucial, too. Had case studies become antiquated and viewed as insufficient by modern scholars, then more time would have to be devoted to the choice of method and defense of the method. That would make it more difficult to create respect for the findings as they could take a backseat to the methodology used in obtaining them. The refinement of the method and continued use of it suggests a scholarly acceptance of its validity, which would eliminate a potentially massive problem.

Yin identifies case studies as “the preferred strategy when 'how' or 'why' questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context” (1994, 1). He disagrees with the hierarchy that dictates that “case studies were appropriate for the exploratory phase of an investigation, that surveys and histories were appropriate for the descriptive phase, and that experiments were the only way of doing explanatory or causal inquiries” (1994, 3). Yin argues that case studies may be used for all three phases, but remains aware of the criticisms when he also warns investigators to “exercise great care in designing and doing case studies to overcome traditional criticisms of the method” (1994, 1).

Yin, too, is aware of the criticisms that case studies face, but he believes the method is unfairly limited by scholars and, that with proper caution in regard to the design and application of the method, it provides a valid approach. His arguments strengthen the method as well as broaden its range, which was noted by George and Bennett. The lengthy defense of the method by both books as well as the suggestions that

case studies have been limited by their current uses is enough to make me confident about using this particular method.

A case study of Democratic Peace is legitimate research. The method is acceptable and can be defended by contemporary scholars. The case study itself has received little attention when it comes to Democratic Peace due to the fact that the war rarely finds itself studied by international relations scholars. A case study of Democratic Peace could provide a viable challenge to the theory.

#### Measurements for Maturity and War

Michael Doyle created a list of his liberal regimes in 1983 (2012, 15-17). He also updated it eight years later (2012, 147-149). His later list only adds Honduras, Papua New Guinea, Argentina, South Korea and Taiwan. He does not downgrade any regimes from liberal to non-liberal over this time period. This list will be applied to each case to determine if the combatants qualify as liberal regimes.

In addition to Doyle's list of liberal regimes, two data sets will be used in examining the cases. They are the Correlates of War's Inter-State War Data version 4.0 and Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr's (2011) *Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2011*. The COW's Inter-State War Data can be found in Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman's (2010) *Resort to War: 1816-2007*. Their Inter-State War data set classifies a "war" as a conflict with sustained fighting that accumulates 1,000 battle deaths in a twelve month period. Marshall, Jagers and Gurr's Polity IV Project selects states with populations greater than 500,000 in 2011 for their annual, cross-national, time series that tracks regime change.

Marshall, Jagers and Gurr (2011) use an eleven point scale (0-10) to indicate how democratic a state is. They suggest that a mature democracy would have three

characteristics: open and fully competitive political participation, elective executive recruitment and substantial constraints on the chief executive. Open and fully competitive political participation is measured by the variable Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP). A state viewed as "Competitive" would be coded as "5." A state coded with any other number is unlikely to have open and fully competitive political participation. Open executive recruitment is measured by the variable Competitiveness Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP). A state that would satisfy the open executive recruitment characteristic would have elections for their executives, which would be coded as "3" for the XRCOMP variable. Finally, restraints on the chief executive are measured with the Constraint on the Chief Executive (XCONST) variable. Chief executives with substantial limitations are coded with "5;" however, there are measures above "5" that would satisfy the characteristic, too. An intermediate category coded as "6" and "Executive parity or subordination," coded as "7," would both satisfy the characteristic of chief executives with substantial limitations. States coded with "5" in PARCOMP, "3" in XRCOMP and "5," "6" or "7" in XCONST could be considered mature democracies.

The Polity IV Project divides a state's existence into time periods that signify different regimes leading the state. One must take the time period of each state that possessed a mature democracy and find out active the state was in wars over that period of time using the data from the Correlates of War.

#### The Selected Cases

Three cases were selected for this study, and each one serves a unique purpose. The cases are the Kargil War, the War of 1812 and the Cenepa Valley War. The order in which the cases are listed is the order in which they will be presented. Chronological

order was not used because of what each case contributes to this study. The order of the cases demonstrates how Democratic Peace can optimally defended then progresses to challenges to the theory made by the latter cases.

#### *Defense of the Inclusion of the Kargil War*

The purpose of the Kargil War's inclusion is to demonstrate the optimal way in which Democratic Peace is to be defended. India and Pakistan both have democratic regimes, but are those regimes mature? This is the question that dismisses many challenges to Democratic Peace due to the fact that one or both combatants will not be considered liberal by Michael Doyle. The Falkland Islands War could have been used to make this demonstration, too. The conflict featured two states that were democratic, but it has received much more scholarly attention than the Kargil War. The Kargil War was selected because it received less attention than the Falkland Islands War, and there is a higher likelihood of it offering some new to Democratic Peace.

#### *Defense of the Inclusion of the War of 1812*

The purpose of the War of 1812's inclusion, at first glance, appears to be the same as the Kargil War. Michael Doyle's list of liberal regimes will be able to fend off this potential challenge to Democratic Peace. The purpose of this case, however, is not how one of the combatants is deemed not to be liberal. The Kargil War will handle that. The War of 1812 offers an opportunity to further examine Doyle's criteria for classifying a state as liberal. While it would be possible to debate his criteria, his classification of the United States is most perplexing and damaging to his method of determining liberalness.

#### *Defense of the Inclusion of the Cenepa Valley War*

The purpose of the Cenepa Valley War is to demonstrate a conflict where two apparently liberal regimes went to war. When Doyle's liberal regimes list is used to code

states on the Sarkees and Wayman's (2010) data, this conflict between Ecuador and Peru appeared to violate Liberal Peace. Doyle's method of classifying states as liberal can be scrutinized even further with the case. Marshall, Jagers and Gurr's (2011) method to qualify states as mature democracies will need to be used.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE KARGIL WAR

Regardless of the Kargil War's effect on Democratic Peace, one cannot discuss the conflict without expressing a sense of relief that the fighting did not escalate between the two nuclear powers. Both states had successfully tested nuclear weapons in May 1998 and participated in the Kargil War only a year later (Chari 2008, 12). Chari notes three specific events that could have led to a much more gruesome end to the fighting. The first was a report in the *Washington Times* that claimed the Indian Army was making defensive preparations on the border between the two states as armored units left their garrisons in Rajasthan (Chari 2008, 11). This led to the Pakistanis doing the same. However, given the much larger size of the Indian forces,, there was speculation that having such smaller forces could lead Pakistan to use nuclear weapons (Chari 2008, 11). The second event was when Indian custom officials searched a North Korean flagged ship bound for Pakistan (Chari 2008, 11). Instead of carrying 148 containers full of water purification equipment, the ship contained "missile parts, machine tools, and blueprints of a Scud missile (Chari 2008, 11)." The third event came weeks after the conflict and was when an Indian fighter aircraft shot down a Pakistani maritime reconnaissance aircraft (Chari 2008, 11). Both states argued over whether the act violated the bilateral agreement on Prevention of Airspace Violations and for Permitting Over flights and Landings by Military Aircraft (Chari 2008, 12).

#### Regime Type of Belligerents

##### *Pakistan*

Chandran (2008) notes Pakistan's National Assembly and the parliamentary system of democracy in place that produces a prime minister (2008, 30). Chandran

argues that fundamentalism in Pakistan has been declining and supports his argument by noting that the fundamentalist parties, Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamait-e-Ulema-Islam, only won 7 seats each in the 1988 election (2008, 30). Chandran argues that fundamentalist forces cannot be blamed for Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's actions that led to the Kargil War. This argument suggests that the government could act independently of the desires of fundamental forces and that these fundamental forces did not greatly interfere with the democratic process. The quality of the Pakistani democracy will be examined in the next chapter.

### *India*

As a former colony of Great Britain, India adopted a parliamentary system of democracy. Rajain notes the upper house of the Indian legislature, Rajya Sabha, the lower house, Lok Sabha, a prime minister and president (2008, 196-197, 201). The history of this form of democracy created a political atmosphere strong enough to announce elections while Pakistani forces were retreating (Rajain 2008, 196). The quality of the Indian democracy will be examined in the next chapter.

### History of Hostility

The Kargil War was not an isolated act of aggression between the states. Chari notes that there had been a pattern of hostilities since the Line of Control was established in 1972 (2008, 13). This pattern is seasonal and "occurs each year with the onset of spring and the melting of snows, allowing infiltration through the mountain passes (Chari 2008, 13)." Chari suggests the pattern could be a result of boundary markers shifting during the winter or a result of troops deployed along the Line of Control who are attempting to improve their positioning and/or assisting intelligence operations (2008, 13). Chari argued that the Kargil War was unique because it was marked by the

“surreptitious intrusion of regular Pakistani troops across the LoC, interspersed with mujahideen of both Pakistani and foreign origin (2008, 13). It was also unique in that the Pakistanis “succeeded in occupying and fortifying a large number of posts on the Indian side of the LoC” (Chari 2008, 13).

#### *Fighting in Jammu and Kashmir*

The fighting did not come as a surprise to the international community. Warring in Jammu and Kashmir was a frequent occurrence. “Kashmir has been either the prescient reason or the major theater of operations in all past Indo-Pak conflicts, and the Kargil sector has always been the scene of fierce engagements” (Chari 2008, 16). Fighting in this region became advantageous to the Pakistanis after the 1947-48 conflict. The ceasefire left the Pakistanis with a tactical advantage as they retain the heights that “could threaten Kargil town and disrupt the Srinagar-Leh highway” (Chari 2008, 16). In an attempt to shame its vulnerabilities, the Indians seized areas north of the Kargil-Dras sector during the 1965 Indo-Pak war, but had to return it to Pakistan as stipulated in the Tashkent Agreement (Chari 2008, 16). The two states went to war again in 1971. The Indians captured several Pakistani posts across the cease-fire line. This time, however, the Indians retained the posts as the Simla Agreement declared: “the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side” (Chari 2008, 16). These areas would become the theater of conflict during the Kargil War (Chari 2008, 16).

#### *Inability to Stabilize Region*

The ceasefire did little to stop hostilities. India and Pakistan continued to fire across the Line of Control even after the ceasefire. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) classified the collective violence as an interstate conflict



starting in 1996 (Chari 2008, 16). India saw the artillery exchanges and firings as an affirmation of the distinction between of the temporary Line of Control and the permanent international border (Chari 2008, 17). Pakistan chose this area to capitalize on public sentiment that had grown frustrated with Srinagar's and New Delhi's refusals to grant autonomy to the Ladakh region, yet they granted an autonomous council to a Buddhist-dominated district, Leh (Chari 2008, 17). "This converted the Shia-Muslim-dominated Kargil district into a separate region; it included a Sunni-Muslim pocket in Dras that had cultural and linguistic affinities across the LoC in the Skardu region of Pakistani-held Kashmir" (Chari 2008, 17).

#### *Pakistan's Reasons for War*

Chari argues that Pakistan's anti-India internal polity came from the four pillars of Punjab's dominance over Pakistan's governance; the steady Islamization of the country's polity; the control of the Army over its governance processes; and the influences of the United States, Saudi Arabia and China over its governments (2008, 17). Chari argues that the Kargil War highlights Pakistan's deep-rooted hatred of India "whilst sustaining the *raison d'etre* for Pakistan's creation and existence" (2008, 17).

#### The Kargil War Begins

"When the news of infiltration around Kargil by Pakistan-supported forces broke in the second week of May 1999, many in India thought it was part of the perpetual border clashes between the two countries" (Chandran 2008, 23). The action itself was puzzling given the improvement in relations between the two states with the Lahore Declaration (Chandran 2008, 23). Krishna lists six objectives the Pakistanis had when they began with their aggression. The first was to choke the strategic road linking Srinagar with Leh and prevent vital supplies for the ensuing winter reaching Indian

troops in Ladakh. The second was to occupy Dras and Kargil and open up the LoC issue. The third was to capture heights in the Batalik and Turtok areas to initially sever the southern Siachen Glacier, and later, choke access to both the northern and southern glaciers along the Nubra river, and force India to back down on Siachen. The fourth was to control the Mushkoh valley near Dras and use it as a major route for fresh infiltration. The fifth was to spread insurgency in Kargil district of Ladakh to ease the heat unleashed on militant groups in the Valley. The final objective was to bury the Simla Agreement by altering the LoC and bring Kashmir issue back on the international stage (2008, 98).

### Operation Vijay

Between May 29 and June 2, the Indian armed forces retaliated (Krishna 2008, 107). "Initial attacks [were] launched against enemy positions and special missions and patrols sent out from firm bases encountered stiff opposition and suffered some reverses" (Krishna 2008, 107). The Indian priorities in terms of which objectives to acquire was (in order): Dras sector, Mushkoh valley sector, Batalik sector and Kaksar area (Krishna 2008, 109). Operation Vijay was now underway.

Operation Vijay ended almost as quickly as it began. Indian forces captured positions at Mushkoh, Dras and Batalik by July 25, and Operation Vijay was terminated (Krishna 2008, 131). The success of Operation Vijay came on the heels of the failure in peace talks between Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and United States President Bill Clinton. The two met on July 4, and Clinton urged Sharif to withdraw from the Indian side of the Line of Control (Krishna 2008, 131). Pakistan would announce the withdrawal of its troops on July 11, but only removed them from Kaksar (Krishna 2008, 131). Pakistan left troops in Mushkoh, at a height called "Zulu;" in Dras, at location called "Saddle;" and at Batalik near the Line of Control (Krishna 2008, 131). The

Indians resumed military operations on July 16 to forcibly remove Pakistani forces from those three areas (Krishna 2008, 131).

#### *Impact of Operation Vijay*

Operation Vijay resulted in the deaths of 524 Indian soldiers (519 from the Army and 5 from the Air Force) as well as leaving 1,365 wounded (Krishna 2008, 137). There are various estimates on Pakistani casualties, but the low-end estimate, based on Pakistani and Indian calculations, is that 737 members of the Pakistani Army died (Krishna 2008, 137).

#### Effects of the Kargil War

The Kargil War did little to create stability within the region. It was not the military conflict that could effectively end the power struggle in the region. It did, however, produce change in the region. The failure of the Kargil War effectively ended the regime in Pakistan as a military coup that took place in October 1999 (Chandran 2008, 23).

## CHAPTER V

### ANALYSIS OF THE KARGIL WAR

#### Qualifications as a War

The Kargil War will first need to be examined to determine whether or not Democratic Peace can apply to the conflict before its effect on the theory can be assessed. The easier determination to make is whether or not this conflict was an actual war or if the term was loosely applied. The best way to make this determination is to apply the 1,000 battle death benchmark used by Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman (2010). The numbers used by Krishna (2008, 137) claim that 524 members of the Indian Army and Air Force died in the conflict while the low-end estimate for the Pakistanis is 737 personnel were killed. Combining those two figures leaves a total of 1,261 battle deaths during the Kargil War. Sarkees and Wayman are slightly more conservative as they say India had 474 battle deaths and Pakistan had 698 battle deaths for a total of 1,172 battle deaths. The 1,000 battle death criterion is satisfied regardless of which numbers are used. Given that the battle deaths from the Pakistani side were low-end estimates, one also ensures that no other estimation would drop the battle death total under 1,000. While one could also examine whether or not the states formally declared war, it is not as steady as the battle death criteria as different states are likely to have different means of declaring war. The battle death criterion is less relative, thus more reliable. One must not forget that these states constantly fired upon one another across the Line of Control, and the Kargil War could have been seen as a continuation of that fighting, which would have decreased the chances of formal war being declared. There appeared to be little about the war that separated itself from past border conflicts between the states of India and Pakistan.

## Maturity of Indian and Pakistani Democracies

### *India*

Much more difficulty is found as one attempts to qualify the belligerents as mature democracies or even liberal regimes. Michael Doyle (2012, 16) classifies India as a liberal regime from 1947 to 1975, then again from 1977 until the study's publication in 1983. India was still a liberal regime when Doyle updated his list in 1991 (2012, 147-149). While Doyle's research was done before the Kargil War, there were not enough functional or structural changes in India from 1991 to 1999 to lead one to believe that India would have lost its status as a liberal regime. Nothing happened over that time to change India's status as a democracy, either. Therefore, India, in 1999, appears to qualify for scrutiny under Democratic Peace according to the criteria created by Doyle.

Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr (2011) are not convinced of India's status. Their data suggests the last political change in India was in 1995 and, from that point, India scores a "3" in Executive Recruitment, a "4" in Competitiveness of Political Participation and a "7" in Constraint on Chief Executive. India was quite close to being a mature democracy as it needed a "5" in Competitiveness of Political Participation, which would mean their political participation was competitive. A "4" means Marshall, Jagers and Gurr found India's political participation to be transitional.

### *Pakistan*

Pakistan's classification is even more difficult to determine. Through 1991 Doyle does not classify Pakistan as possessing a liberal regime. Marshall, Jagers and Gurr's (2011) measurement for maturity finds that Pakistan was not a mature democracy during the Kargil War. Their research suggests that Pakistan has never been a mature democracy. During the Kargil War, Pakistan did score a "3" in Executive Recruitment, a

“3” in Competitiveness of Political Participation and a “6” in Constraint on Chief Executive. Like India Pakistan failed on Competitiveness of Political Participation in terms of being a mature democracy.

One may not even need to consult scholars to make a judgment on Pakistan's status as a mature democracy. The most significant piece of evidence is the military coup that took place in Pakistan in October 1999 (Chandran 2008, 23). A state unstable enough that could have a regime change through a coup was probably not a mature democracy or liberal regime. The regime change did not aid democracy in Pakistan as Marshall, Jagers and Gurr (2011) rate the new regime as a “0” in Executive Recruitment, a “2” in Competitiveness of Political Participation and a “1” in Constraint on Chief Executive.

While democratic elements may have been in play in Pakistan, the state appears to lack the institutions necessary to classify it as a mature democracy. One could even make an argument that by harboring terrorists Pakistan also fails to qualify for Kant's Perpetual Peace as his Preliminary Articles would be violated by a state harboring terrorists. These arguments create an enormous challenge to one who wanted to identify Pakistan as a mature democracy or liberal regime. Based upon the weakness (or absence) of their institutions to prevent a coup, Pakistan does not qualify as a state that can be scrutinized by Democratic Peace.

#### Implications for Democratic Peace

This case fails to challenge Democratic Peace because Pakistan cannot be classified as a mature democracy or liberal regime. The volatility of the state of Pakistan suggests it lacked the institutions of a mature democracy. India did not possess this

problem and even went so far as to qualify as a liberal regime. The conflict itself could have challenged Democratic Peace by virtue of meeting the 1,000 battle death criteria. This case serves to demonstrate how the criteria set by Michael Doyle would be used to evaluate a potential challenger to Democratic Peace.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE WAR OF 1812

#### Regime Type of Belligerents

##### *United States of America*

The United States of America was a republic at the time of the War of 1812. Michael Doyle (2012) classifies the states above the Mason-Dixon Line as liberal. Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr (2011) do not consider the United States to be a mature democracy until 1871. The United States presents a complex case in terms of becoming a liberal state/mature democracy, and it will be further evaluated in the next chapter.

##### *Great Britain*

Great Britain was a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system of democracy at the time of the War of 1812. Doyle (2012) does not consider Great Britain to be liberal until 1832 when the Reform Act was passed by Parliament. Marshall, Jagers and Gurr do not consider Great Britain to be a mature democracy until 1922. Great Britain's status will be further examined in the next chapter.

#### The American Case for War

The United States of America and Great Britain did not have a particularly good relationship after the American Revolution concluded in 1783. Some could argue that relations were improved by the Jay Treaty in 1794, but, in drafting a war message to Congress in May 1812, President James Madison found it difficult not to accuse the British of unjustifiably hostile behavior since the American Revolution (Stagg 2012, 18). Madison argued that Great Britain had made it difficult for the United States to establish trade and diplomatic relations with its former mother country (2012, 18). Madison also



accused the British of violating American neutral rights during its wars with France as he worked on his appeal to Congress to declare war (2012, 18).

For reasons unknown President Madison decided to change his argument for war and began a second draft (Stagg 2012, 18). He believed that it was not necessary to go “back beyond the renewal in 1803 of the war in which Great Britain is engaged” (2012, 19). His new draft accused Great Britain of “a series of acts, hostile to the United States, as an Independent and neutral nation” (2012, 19). A list of grievances followed in chronological order. Madison noted in 1803, when the Anglo-French war resumed, the United States and Great Britain were engaged in “negotiations that might have ended the British practice of impressing seamen, especially Americans, from neutral vessels on the high seas a way of conscripting crews for the Royal Navy” (2012, 19). While the British ministry appeared genuine in its willingness to compromise, they did not follow through with an agreement (2012, 19). Madison further noted that the British violated American territorial waters even to the point of entering American harbors and “want only spilling American blood” (2012, 19).” J. C. A. Stagg notes that President Madison was alluding to April 1806 “when HMS *Leander* had sailed into New York Harbor and delivered a broadside that killed an American seaman named John Pierce” (2012, 19). Stagg suggests that Madison may have also reminded his intended audience of an incident in June 1807 “when HMS *Leopard* had attacked the USS *Chesapeake* off the Virginia coast, disabling it, killing several members of its crew, and seizing four more for service in the Royal Navy” (2012, 19).

President Madison continued on to the “most serious dispute in Anglo-American relations” (Stagg 2012, 19). Madison condemned Great Britain's practice of blockading French ports as well as the ports of French allies, which kept resources from the United

States that they would have received through neutral trade (2012, 19). Madison did not dispute Great Britain's right to blockade an enemy, but argued that the British did not administer the blockades through "the presence of an adequate force" (2012, 19).

Madison noted that after 1806 the British resorted to a system that "permitted British naval vessels to seize and confiscate neutral shipping and cargoes virtually at will and almost anywhere on the high seas" (2012, 19). The British would not discontinue these practices until the United States convinced France to accept British goods as neutral property in French ports (2012, 20). Madison took this demand as proof that the British were not concerned with denying France with access to goods, but, rather, concerned with destroying "legitimate trade by neutral nations to promote illegitimate trade between belligerents" (2012, 20).

President Madison would remind Congress that the United States did not passively accept the actions of the British. He noted the passage of multiple acts such as Non-Importation Law of 1806, the Embargo of 1807-1809 and the Non-Intercourse Laws of 1809 and 1811, which were all passed in hopes of improving British treatment of American trade (Stagg 2012, 20). Madison also mentioned the willingness of previous administrations to diplomatically resolve the issues between the states only to have the British rebuff the initiatives or deal with the United States in bad faith (2012, 20). The president would also note that he uncovered that the British had a secret agent in the United States in 1809 for the purpose of a "subversion of our Government, and a dismemberment of our happy union" (2012, 20).

President Madison's final argument was based upon the "recent outbreak of hostilities on the northwestern frontiers of the republic between the local Indian nations and the westward-moving American settlers" (Stagg 2012, 20). Madison blamed the

hostilities of the Native Americans on British traders and garrisons in Canada (2012, 20). Stagg considers this an allusion to the Battle of Tippecanoe (2012, 20). The battle was fought on November 7, 1811, between the forces of the territory of Indiana's governor, William Henry Harrison, and a loose confederation of Native American warriors led by "the Shawnee brothers Tenskwatawa...and Tecumseh" (2012, 20). Madison claimed to have evidence of a British influence on the Native Americans to fight the Americans (2012, 21).

President Madison concluded his argument by summarizing that the "British actions that had harmed the United States, actions he believed could be undertaken only by a belligerent power and not by one that was supposed to be at peace with a neutral" (Stagg 2012, 21). Madison would stop short of requesting that Congress declare war because he felt that Section 8 in Article 1 of the Constitution prevented him from making such a request. Respect for the Constitution also led to Madison rejecting Treasury comptroller Richard Rush that the president and his cabinet appear before Congress to deliver the message (2012, 21).

#### *American Requirements for Peace*

President Madison's message to Congress on June 1. By June 17 war resolutions had passed both chambers (Stagg 2012, 46). Immediately after the resolutions passed, Secretary of State James Monroe summoned British minister in Washington D.C., Augustus John Foster, to the State Department (2012, 47). Monroe informed Foster of the American requirements for peace. The first requirement was a treaty signed by Great Britain containing a definition of blockades that copies the definition set by the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1801 (2012, 47). The second requirement would be placed into American and British law and would declare "that the two nations would forgo the

employment of each other's nationals in their merchant marines" (2012, 47). President Madison and Congress were convinced that American force could coerce the British into meeting these requirements.

#### Description of the Conflict

Stagg notes that despite the fact that Great Britain was preoccupied with fighting Napoleon Bonaparte's France, the American efforts was marked "more by military fiascoes than successes on land and interspersed with occasional naval victories at sea that, though gratifying to the nation's tender sense of pride, were inconsequential in terms of its larger outcomes" (2012, 48). Stagg credits the ending of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe for ending the War of 1812 more than any American effort (2012, 48). Stagg suggests that the ability of the United States to emerge without any significant damage was enough for Americans to claim a victory (2012, 48).

The war itself would last from June 18, 1812, to February 17, 1815 (Stagg 2012, 154). The fighting would continue until the news of peace made to New Orleans on March 18, 1815 (2012, 153). Despite the fall of Washington D.C. in October 1814 (2012, 145), the Duke of Wellington believed the British did not have adequate naval vessels in the Great Lakes to protect their gains nor did he believe the gains were large enough to warrant any more fighting or attempts to receive more in negotiations (2012, 146). Stagg suggests that the duke effectively told his superiors to settle for *status quo ante bellum* (2012, 146). The British ministry agreed as the mounting costs of war were creating difficulties with Parliament in late 1814 (2012, 146).

#### Peace

Delegations from both states met in the Flemish city of Ghent in August 1814 to attempt to negotiate a peace. Despite British victories and further victories during

negotiations, both sides agreed to *status quo ante bellum* in December 1814 (Stagg 2012, 147). Stagg credits the skills of the American diplomats to achieve such an outcome (2012, 48). The British prince regent ratified the treaty on December 28, 1814. The United States Congress ratified the treaty on February 17, 1815.

#### *Future Work to Maintain Peace*

Stagg credits the atmosphere created by a largely peaceful (by the end of the war) Europe for the ability of the United States, Canada and Great Britain to resolved their differences (2012, 167). A convention in July 1815 restored commercial relations between the states (2012, 147). Matters such as boundary disputes, impressment, fishing rights and naval armaments on the Great Lakes “were taken up in negotiations that culminated in a more comprehensive convention in October 1818” (2012, 147). Stagg notes that a potential arms race along the Great Lakes was avoided by the Rush-Bagot agreement, named for United States Secretary of State Richard Rush and British minister Charles Bagot, in April 1817.

CHAPTER VII  
ANALYSIS OF THE WAR OF 1812

Qualifications as a War

*Formal Declaration*

There are two ways in which the War of 1812 can be qualified as a war for the purposes of challenging Democratic Peace. The first way is to look at state declarations. The United States Senate, with the House of Representatives already approving a war resolution almost two weeks earlier, voted to declare war on Great Britain on June 17, 1812 (Stagg 2012, 46).

*1,000 Battle Death Criteria*

While one could argue that a formal declaration is sufficient, the 1,000 battle death criteria set forth by Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman (2010) is much more uniform than seeking a formal declaration of war. The 1,000 battle death criteria is almost universally accepted in international war research (Ray 1995, 103). The formal declaration of war needs only to be used should one not be able to find battle death counts.

*American battle death count.*

The War of 1812 occurred before Sarkees and Wayman (2010) data set began recording interstate wars. That creates a need to find the battle death count elsewhere. Donald R. Hickey (2006) provides battle death counts. Hickey found that 2,260 American troops were killed in action the War of 1812 (2006, 297). J. C. A. Stagg cites the number, but notes sickness and primitive medical care could have pushed the death total of American regulars to 5,200 (2012, 156). Stagg notes that "one historian has estimated that somewhere in the region of 15,000 Americans of all descriptions, including

regulars, militia, naval personnel, and civilians, might have died from causes that were directly related to the conflict” (2012, 156).

#### *British battle death count.*

While there are varying casualty numbers on the British side, Stagg suggests that is possible 2,700 British and Canadian troops were killed in action during the war (2012, 156). Stagg notes, however, that “British and Canadian losses have never been calculated with any comparable precision” (2012, 156). He also finds it possible 10,000 Britons and Canadians, including those on naval vessels and privateers, could have died as a result of the war (2012, 156).

#### *War of 1812's War Status*

With the statistics provided by Hickey (2006) and Stagg (2012), the War of 1812 met the 1,000 battle death criteria of Sarkees and Wayman (2010). In addition to the battle death criteria, both the United States and Great Britain met the participant requirement of committing 1,000 combat troops or suffering 100 battle deaths. Both states surpassed both requirements.

### Maturity of British and American Democracies

#### *Great Britain*

Michael Doyle does not consider Great Britain to be liberal until 1832 (2012, 15). He credits the Reform Bill of 1832 for Great Britain's emergence as a liberal state and for its ability to be more peaceful toward other liberal regimes (2012, 146). He argues that the Reform Bill of 1832 “defined actual representation as the formal source of sovereignty of the British Parliament” (2012, 146) and that it allowed the states to negotiate “their disputes despite, for example, severe British grievances against the Northern blockade of the South, with which Britain had close economic ties” (2012, 146).

Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr (2011) are not so quick to classify Great Britain as a mature democracy. They do not view the United Kingdom as a mature democracy until 1922. The difference of almost a century does not affect the status of the War of 1812's challenge to Democratic Peace, but it does demonstrate the stricter requirements of Marshall, Jagers and Gurr. Marshall, Jagers and Gurr considered the British democracy to be mature after the first election after the creation of the Irish Free State. Marshall, Jagers and Gurr considered that event enough to increase the United Kingdom's scores in Executive Recruitment and Competitiveness of Political Participation to mature levels.

#### *United States*

Great Britain's inability to qualify as a liberal regime during the War of 1812 effectively ends this conflict's challenge to Democratic Peace, but that does not mean the status of the United States should be ignored. Doyle, as well as, Marshall, Jagers and Gurr possess a view of the United States that needs to be questioned. Their views on the United States' liberalness suggest that their criteria for determining which states are liberal or possess mature democracies is incomplete.

Doyle has the United States listed as a liberal regime from its inception in 1776 (2012, 147), but he does so with a footnote. He argues that the "United States was liberal only north of the Mason-Dixon line until 1865, when it became liberal throughout" (2012, 149). Doyle also makes this distinction for certain Swiss cantons in the 18<sup>th</sup> century (2012, 149).

Doyle apparently believes the institution of slavery can keep a state, or part of a state, from being liberal. It would be difficult for anyone to classify a state that permits slavery to be liberal. Even with the abolition of slavery, a large part of the United States



disenfranchised African-Americans until the Voting Rights Act of 1965. It could be argued that the passage of the 15<sup>th</sup> Amendment, which prohibited the denial of suffrage based on race, established those rights and that is enough to make the United States liberal. Doyle appears to make this argument by stating that he takes into account if male suffrage is wide, which he defines as 30 percent (2012, 149). He argues that this criteria meets Kant's open to "achievement" by inhabitants criteria (2012, 149). Even if that is the case, it was not enacted until 1870, yet Doyle classifies the United States as liberal in 1865. One must also consider the fact that women were not granted suffrage until 1920, and they constitute half the population. Doyle argues that his liberal regimes grant female suffrage within a generation it being "demanded by an extensive female suffrage movement" (2012, 149). When the United States became completely liberal, by Doyle's standards, in 1865, a majority of adults were not allowed to vote. Given the fact that the northern states only permitted white, landowning males to vote at the inception of the United States, it can be argued that Doyle does not consider disenfranchisement and the granting of suffrage to all adults to be crucial to a state's liberalness.

Marshall, Jagers and Gurr (2011) appear to dismiss the issues of disenfranchisement and the granting of suffrage to all adults, too. There are two times in their data set where the United States is classified as a mature democracy. The first time was from 1845 to 1850, then the United States became a mature democracy again in 1871 and has retained the classification to the present (2011). Their criteria for mature democracies comes from their measures of Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment, Competitiveness of Political Participation and Constraints on the Chief Executive. From the beginning of the study to the present day, the United States satisfies the requirements for a mature democracy on the Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment and

Constraints on the Chief Executive. Competitiveness of Political Participation is the only one of the three variables that fluctuates. Marshall, Jagers and Gurr (2011) rate the United States' political participation as "Competitive" from 1845 to 1850 and 1871 to the present day, but one must wonder how competitive political participation can be if the electoral system ignores racial minorities and women. It could also be argued that the rating on Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment was too high due to the racial and sexual restraints on voting and, thus, racial and sexual restraints on holding elected office.

#### Implications for Democratic Peace

Much like the case of the Kargil War, the War of 1812 fails to challenge Democratic Peace. Great Britain was not a liberal state and, despite Doyle's classification, it is difficult to make a case for the United States as a liberal regime. This case's contribution to this study is to demonstrate possible incomplete criteria for Doyle's liberal regimes and Marshall, Jagers and Gurr's mature democracies. Neither criteria appears to factor in whether portions of the populace are kept from the ballot box or even allowed to vote at all. Can a state be liberal or claim to possess a mature democracy if adults are kept from voting on basis of race and sex? Doyle attempts to tackle this argument with his 30 percent threshold for male suffrage as well as arguing that his liberal regimes grant female suffrage within a generation of it being demanded. These criteria suggest that Doyle's threshold for being liberal is rather liberal itself. Doyle admits as much when he notes "this list of liberal regimes is thus more inclusive than a list of democratic regimes, or polyarchies" (2012, 149). From Kant to Doyle, the importance of a state being a republic is listed many times, yet the process of a republic electing its leader and selecting who is eligible to vote has not received enough scrutiny.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE CENEPA VALLEY WAR

#### Regime Type of the Belligerents

##### *Peru*

Peru was a republican democracy at the time of the Cenepa Valley War. Michael Doyle lists Peru as a liberal state from 1950 to 1962, 1963 to 1968 and 1980 through the publishing of his list on liberal states in 1991 (2012, 148). Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr (2011) never classified Peru as a mature democracy from its creation until the publishing of the Polity IV Project. The maturity of Peru's democracy will be further examined in the following chapter.

##### *Ecuador*

Ecuador was a republican democracy at the time of the Cenepa Valley War. Doyle lists Ecuador as a liberal state from 1948 to 1963 and from 1979 through the publishing of his list in 1991 (2012, 149). Much like with Peru, Marshall, Jagers and Gurr (2011) did not find Ecuador to be a mature democracy at any point in its history through the publishing of the Polity IV Project. The maturity of Ecuador's democracy will be further examined in the following chapter.

#### Historical Context of the War

##### *In Latin America*

When Peru and Ecuador began the Cenepa Valley War on January 26, 1995, it was hardly an isolated event between the two states. It was the continuation of a border dispute that had been going on for over 165 years (Elbow 1996, 93). In fact such border disputes are hardly new in the Americas. During the 300 years of Spanish colonial rule, the Spaniards gave little attention to delimiting borders between different administrative

divisions of their empire (1996, 94). Elbow suggests that the Spanish's lack of interest in establishing these borders has led to "virtually every Latin American country [having] disputes with one or another of its neighbors" (1996, 94). Elbow cites specific cases such as "Venezuelan claims to the western two-thirds of the Guyana and its dispute with Colombia over Caribbean territorial waters" (1996, 94-95) and Argentina's claims to the Falkland Islands (1996, 95).

#### *Between Peru and Ecuador*

The territorial dispute between Peru and Ecuador begins with Ecuador's claim to "Amazonian territories that lie between the Río Amazonas...and the drainage divide separating the Río Napo from the Putumayo" (Elbow 1996, 95). If all Ecuadorian claims were honored, the state's size would increase by 70,000 square miles (1996, 95). Ecuador bases its claims on three historical arguments. The first argument centers around the expedition of Gonzalo Pizarro and Francisco de Orellana in 1541 from Quito (1996, 95). The expedition split up at the Napo River with Orellana and his men following the Napo downstream to the Amazon River (1996, 95). Ecuadorians argue that Orellana's departure from Quito establishes their claim to the disputed lands while Peruvians claim that Orellana was acting under orders from Pizarro, whose authority issued from Lima (1996, 95). The second historical argument centers around King Philip II of Spain granting missionaries from Quito the right to evangelize the natives of the Amazon basin in 1563 (1996, 96). Ecuadorians assert their claim to the disputed lands because the missions were located in the disputed area were administered from the Audiencia of Quito with a royal edict (1996, 96). The third historical argument centers around the Treaty of Guayaquil (1996, 96). The treaty was signed by Gran Colombia and Peru after a Gran Colombia victory in the Battle of Tarqui (1996, 96). Peru agreed to a northern

border beginning at the Tumbes River and following the Amazon River from the mouth of the Chinchipe River to where it entered Brazil (1996, 96). The Treaty of Guayaquil was signed and ratified in 1829, but was never enacted due to Gran Colombia breaking up into Ecuador, Venezuela and Colombia in 1830 (1996, 96). Ecuador claims the border agreed upon in the treaty while Peru argues Ecuador was not a sovereign state at the time and that the treaty was signed with Gran Colombia is invalid due to the dissolution of Gran Colombia.

The border conflict was considered a diplomatic matter until Peru began military incursions into the disputed area in 1935 (Elbow 1996, 96). War broke out in 1941, and the result was Peru advancing war into Ecuadorian territory (1996, 96). Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States mediated and brokered the "Protocol of Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries of Rio de Janeiro" (Palmer 1997, 111), which both states signed in January 1942. While the powers for the resolution were ultimately in the hands of Ecuador and Peru per the Rio Protocol, there were clear obligations for the guarantors: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States (1997, 112). With respect to future conflicts, Peru argued that the Rio Protocol effectively ended any rights claimed by Ecuador (1997, 111). Ecuador would argue that its sovereign rights are based upon legal and historical precedents, on their claim that the Rio Protocol was signed under duress, and that it was impossible to execute the Rio Protocol because of certain anomalies of geography (1997, 111).

From 1942 to 1948 the Ecuador-Peru Boundary Commission reached definitive demarcation of over 95% of the border without incident and in accordance to the Rio Protocol's stipulations (Palmer 1997, 112). The harmony did not last as a United States Army Air Corps aerial survey in 1946 revealed that the "height of the land that was to

determine the border was not where the agreement had stipulated in one small section because of the presence of a previously uncharted river and a mountain spur" (1997, 113). This section of the border was not marked and the Ecuadorian government ordered its demarcation team to cease activities in 1948 around the Cordillera del Cóndor and Cenepa River area (1997, 113).

Some suggest that Ecuador knew of the existence of the Cordillera del Cóndor and Cenepa River area as early as 1943, but chose to delay the Ecuador-Peru Demarcation Commission as Ecuador attempted to find a way to maintain access to the Amazon River in this sector (Palmer 1997, 114). Ecuador also had declared from 1960 onward that the Rio Protocol was null in international juridical terms due to the "inexecutability" of an essential segment of the agreement (1997, 114). Palmer suggests that the firmness of these positions complicated the possibility of finding any final resolution to the border issues (1997, 114).

In 1980 Ecuador deployed forces into the small section of disputed boundary which was claimed by Peru (Palmer 1997, 114). This led to the Paquisha conflict during January 1981, when a series of serious events took place, culminating in the removal of Ecuadorian forces from their outposts in the disputed area (1997, 114). Ecuador called upon the Organization of American States to mediate while Peru insisted on the guarantor states of the Rio Protocol (1997, 114). A compromise was reached where the OAS mediated the case, but selected four agents, the guarantors of the Rio Protocol, to act on its behalf (1997, 114). Peace was restored, but the dispute was not resolved.

#### The Cenepa Valley War

Palmer argues that the precipitant factor for the Cenepa Valley War was "Ecuador's gradual redeployment of military units, beginning in 1991, into the dispute

territory east of the Cordillera del Cóndor along the Cenepa River” (1997, 119). Three heavily fortified bases were constructed on high ground at Tiwintza, Cueva de los Tayos and Base Sur (1997, 119). Peru appeared to be aware of Ecuador's redeployment, but took no action until 1994 when Peruvian patrols warned the Ecuadorians to withdraw (1997, 119). Palmer suggested that little diplomatic activity “preceded the outbreak of large-scale hostilities on this occasion, which suggests that the militaries of both countries played a more significant role in the 1995 developments than had been the case heretofore” (1997, 119).

Once Ecuador did not respond to the warnings issued by Peruvian patrols, local Peruvian forces probed the area in December 1994 and January 1995, then rushed into a confrontation (Palmer 1997, 119). Peruvian local forces were soon forced to withdraw, which caused Peru to mobilize its military (1997, 119). The forces met in the Upper Cenepa Valley and limited their fighting specifically to that area (1997, 119). Published reports claimed that over the next five weeks, Peru lost nine aircraft and both governments spent an estimated \$500 million between them (1997, 119). Ecuador appeared to retain two of the forward outposts despite Peruvian announcements claiming there were no more Ecuadorian soldiers on Peruvian soil (1997, 119).

### *Peace*

Palmer suggests that due to Peru's inability to achieve victory militarily or to even force a stalemate, Peru “went on the diplomatic offensive to remove Ecuador's forces, via the guarantor countries, by declaring (13 February) a 'unilateral' cease-fire and invoking...their good offices” (1997, 121). Palmer notes that Peru almost immediately broke its own cease-fire as it continued to attempt to push Ecuadorian forces back into Ecuador (1997, 121).

To the surprise of Peru, Ecuador requested an emergency meeting of the Rio Protocol guarantors in January 1995 (Palmer 1997, 121). Peru quickly agreed and a meeting was held in Brasilia (1997, 122). The Itamaraty Peace Declaration was signed by Peru and Ecuador on February 17, 1995 (1997, 122). As noted above the fighting continued through the end of February. Another meeting was called in Montevideo, Uruguay, on February 28, 1995, during the inauguration of the president of Uruguay (1997, 123). A second declaration was enough to cease hostilities and to allow the guarantors to organize and carry out the proposed Ecuador-Peru Military Observer Mission (1997, 123). The separation of Peruvian and Ecuadorian forces began by the end of March. The withdrawal of military units from the disputed area was completed in mid-May (1997, 123).



## CHAPTER IX

## ANALYSIS OF THE CENEPA VALLEY WAR

## Qualifications as a War

Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman (2010) qualify the 1995 conflict between Peru and Ecuador as a war. Their data notes that Peru suffered 950 battle deaths and that Ecuador suffered 550 battle deaths during the two month conflict. The 1,500 combined battle deaths qualifies the conflict as a war. Palmer (1997) cites published reports that claimed there were 100 to 300 casualties during the conflict, but Sarkees and Wayman's data is more recent. Palmer's article argued about the peacekeeping procedures, which suggested that accruing battle death statistics was not a focus of his research. Sarkees and Wayman specifically sought accurate battle death counts. Combined with the fact that their report is more recent than Palmer's, their battle death count should be treated as more accurate.

## Maturity of Peruvian and Ecuadorian Democracies

*Peru*

According to Michael Doyle (2012) Peru has an interesting history in regard to its liberalness. He lists Peru as a liberal state from 1950 to 1962, 1963 to 1968 and 1980 through the publishing of his list on liberal states in 1991 (2012, 148). It is possible that Peru could have lost its liberal states in those four years. Palmer notes that the political climate in Peru in 1990, which was marred by "a totally bankrupt bureaucracy; an overall inflation rate, accumulated over the 5-year course of the preceding Alan García government (1985-1990), of 2 million percent, which impoverished much of the population; and an ongoing guerilla war that had been destroying Peru's infrastructure" (1997, 115). It is interesting to note that Doyle did not disqualify Peru as a liberal regime

at that point. Given the fact that Peru was organized and stable enough to make Ecuador call to the guarantors of the Rio Protocol despite winning the Cenepa Valley War at that point in time (1997, 121), it can be argued that Peru did not devolve enough to lose its liberal status.

Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr (2011) give a more definitive answer in regard to Peru's status as a liberal state or maturity democracy. They do not list Peru as a mature democracy in 1995. In fact, they do not classify Peru as a mature democracy at any point in its existence. In 1995 Peru received a "2" in Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment, which indicates that it was transitional and not done via an election. Peru received a "3" in Constraints on Chief Executive, which indicates the constraints were slight or moderate and not substantial or greater. Peru also received a "3" in Competitiveness of Political Participation, which indicates that political participation was factional at the time and not competitive. These scores are significantly lower than the scores Marshall, Jagers and Gurr gave Peru in 1992, which suggests that Peru became less mature and less liberal over those three years. Peru could be considered liberal by Michael Doyle's standards, but it does not come close to reaching the criteria set by Marshall, Jagers and Gurr.

### *Ecuador*

With respect to Michael Doyle's list of liberal states, Ecuador is in the same state Peru found itself. Doyle lists Ecuador as a liberal state from 1948 to 1963 and from 1979 through the publishing of his list in 1991 (2012, 149). Palmer (1997) does not say anything about the state of Ecuador's government during the Cenepa Valley War, but Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr's (2011) data notes that Ecuador had the same regime from 1988 to 1997. This suggests that Ecuador would have been

unlikely to be disqualified as a liberal state by Doyle by the time that the Cenepa Valley War began.

Much like with Peru, Marshall, Jagers and Gurr (2011) suggest that Ecuador was not a mature democracy during the Cenepa Valley War. They also suggest that Ecuador has never had a mature democracy or been a liberal state. Ecuador was much closer to being a mature democracy than Peru during the Cenepa Valley War according to Marshall, Jagers and Gurr. Ecuador received a "3" in Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment, which indicates that Ecuador satisfied this requirement of Marshall, Jagers and Gurr to be a mature democracy. Ecuador received a "7" on Constraints on Chief Executive, which indicates that there was executive parity or subordination. That also satisfies the requirement for a mature democracy. Ecuador received a "4" in Competitiveness of Political Participation, which indicates that participation was transitional and not competitive. This is where Ecuador failed to be a mature democracy in the eyes of Marshall, Jagers and Gurr.

#### Implications for Democratic Peace

The case of Cenepa Valley War could challenge Michael Doyle's Liberal Peace. Doyle did have Peru and Ecuador listed as liberal regimes as late as 1991, and the work of Marshall, Jagers and Gurr suggests that it is unlikely that Ecuador changed enough over those four years to lose its classification as a liberal state. There is doubt regarding Peru. Peru underwent a regime change in 1992 that lowered its score in Competitiveness in Executive Recruitment, Competitiveness of Political Participation and Constraints on Chief Executive. One could argue that Peru would have lost its liberal status by the Cenepa Valley War. The standards of Marshall, Jagers and Gurr suggest that Peru may have never been a mature democracy.

One can argue that the Cenepa Valley War does not challenge Democratic Peace by the criteria set by Marshall, Jagers and Gurr. The fact that this newer criteria must be used suggests that Doyle's criteria may not be an accurate measure of liberalness or maturity. Even if one did the work and discovered that Peru was not a liberal regime during the Cenepa Valley War using the criteria of Doyle, there still exists a large gap between two measures of liberalness/maturity. There are periods of time where Doyle finds both states to be liberal while Marshall, Jagers and Gurr never find either state to have a mature democracy.

## CHAPTER X

### RESULTS

The preceding cases served as examples in which the criteria could work as well as provide example of their flaws. Their flaws will be detailed and examined in this chapter. The chapter will examine Michael Doyle's criteria for classifying states a liberal, then it will examine Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr's criteria for measuring maturity in democracies with suggestions which areas to improve.

#### Measuring Maturity

##### *Michael Doyle*

Michael Doyle's measurements for liberalness are adequate to defend Democratic Peace from most cases that could challenge the theory. His criteria is "market and private property economies; polities that are externally sovereign; citizens who possess juridical rights; and 'republican' (whether republican or monarchical), representative, government" (2012, 17). In the case of the Kargil War and War of 1812, these criteria were enough to disqualify Pakistan and Great Britain, respectively, as liberal states. These criteria, however, may not be able to disqualify either Ecuador or Peru in the case of the Cenepa Valley War. Ecuador's political consistency from 1988 to 1997 (Marshall, Jagers and Gurr 2011) suggests that Doyle's classifying of Ecuador as a liberal state in 1991 is likely to have been unchanged by 1995. Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr (2011) note a volatile political climate in Peru during the 1990s and lowered scores in categories they used to measure maturity. This volatility could lead one to doubt whether Peru would have still been a liberal regime by the start of the Cenepa Valley War.

Even if one could find Peru not to be a liberal state in the Cenepa Valley War or could claim that the Cenepa Valley War is an isolated incident, Doyle's criteria for

measuring liberalness appears to have some curious omissions. These particularly affect the classification of the United States. The first omission is female suffrage. Doyle argues that a state can be classified as liberal if “female suffrage is granted within a generation of it being demanded” (2012, 17). Would a liberal state deny suffrage to half of its citizens until they requested that right? More curious, however, is the assertion by Doyle that the United States granted women suffrage within a generation. One could argue that women requested suffrage with the Seneca Falls Convention in 1848 and the Declaration of Sentiments it produced. Suffrage was among the demands, and the 19<sup>th</sup> Amendment was not ratified until 70 years later. That is much longer than the generation specified by Doyle.

The second omission is suffrage of racial minorities. It is obvious that Doyle does not consider a state that permits slavery to be liberal as he only classifies the northern United States as liberal until 1865. Doyle does not appear, however, to be concerned with whether or not a state attempts to prevent the disenfranchisement of certain groups. The first piece of evidence to support to support this claim is that Doyle selected the end of the American Civil War in 1865 as the point at which the whole United States became liberal despite the fact that the freed slaves were not granted the right to vote until 1870 with the ratification of the 15<sup>th</sup> Amendment. One also could argue that the United States was not liberal until the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as the 15<sup>th</sup> Amendment did not stop state level or local level disenfranchisement of African-Americans. Doyle appears to take none of this into consideration despite claiming that liberal states have republican, representative governments (2012, 17). Slavery and the disenfranchisement of African-American voters may not have affected the system of republican, representative government in place, but it could be argue that both institutions created a government that

was not truly representative of all Americans. How liberal is a state that employs these institutions?

*Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr*

Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr (2011) created criteria for measuring mature democracies that appear to better defend Democratic Peace from potential challenges than the criteria of Michael Doyle. They suggest that a mature democracy would have three characteristics: open and fully competitive political participation, elective executive recruitment and substantial constraints on the chief executive. Open and fully competitive political participation is measured by the variable Competitiveness of Political Participation. A state viewed as "Competitive" would be coded as "5." A state coded with any other number is unlikely to have open and fully competitive political participation. Open executive recruitment is measured by the variable Competitiveness Executive Recruitment. A state that would satisfy the open executive recruitment characteristic would have elections for their executives, which would be coded as "3" for the Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment variable. A state coded with any other number is unlikely to have open executive recruitment. Finally, restraints on the chief executive are measured with the Constraint on the Chief Executive variable. Chief executives with substantial limitations are coded with "5;" however, there are measures above "5" that would satisfy the characteristic, too. An intermediate category coded as "6" and "Executive parity or subordination," coded as "7," would both satisfy the characteristic of chief executives with substantial limitations. States coded with "5" in Competitiveness of Political Participation, "3" in Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment and "5," "6" or "7" in Constraint on Chief Executive could be considered mature democracies.

These criteria appears to be more restrictive than Doyle's criteria. The criteria of Marshall, Jagers and Gurr do not find any of the combatants in any of the three cases to have mature democracies while Doyle's criteria suggests that four of the six combatants were liberal at the time of their respective cases. By the year 2011, Marshall, Jagers and Gurr find 36 mature democracies in the world. By 1991 Doyle found 54 liberal regimes.

Despite appearing to be more restrictive than Doyle, Marshall, Jagers and Gurr show no more consideration to female suffrage than Doyle. They classify the United States as a mature democracy in 1871 and do not evaluate the United States again. They do not seem to worry about the fact that the United States denied half of its citizens the right to vote for almost 50 more years after it reached maturity.

Marshall, Jagers and Gurr appear to take racial suffrage into consideration slightly more than Doyle. They find the United States to have a mature democracy in 1871 and keep it through the publishing of their work. While this appears to value Reconstruction over the 15<sup>th</sup> Amendment, this classification appears to be more restrictive than Doyle's classification of the United States. The issue regarding the Voting Rights Act is still there, which suggests that Marshall, Jagers and Gurr's evaluations could be revised.

### Summary

The analyses of the cases provided suggest Michael Doyle's criteria may not be restrictive enough to adequately defend Democratic Peace from certain challenges. While the application of Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr's criteria could defend Democratic Peace from the challenge of the Cenepa Valley War, their criteria made the same omissions regarding liberal states/mature democracies' treatment of women and racial minorities. Both Doyle, much earlier in fact, and Marshall, Jagers



and Gurr would agree that the United States was a liberal state/mature democracy from 1871 to the present day. That classification ignores the inability of women to vote at that time as well as the widespread efforts to disenfranchise African-Americans. That creates an appearance of the opinion that the state's treatment of women and racial minorities does not affect whether or not it is liberal or its democracy mature. If the state's treatment of these groups does not affect its status as liberal or mature, then defense of this stance will be required. If a democracy refuses the participation of its citizens on the basis of sex or race, its status as a democracy much be called into question. It does not appear to be mature, yet there is a scenario in which Doyle and Marshall, Jagers or Gurr would disagree. Revision of their criteria for determining whether or not a state is liberal or its democracy mature appears to be necessary.

## CHAPTER XI

### CONCLUSION

What does the examination of these cases mean for Democratic Peace? The more restrictive measurements appear to strengthen a competing explanation for peace among mature democracies. This chapter will examine the implications of this research for Democratic Peace and competing theories. The chapter will close by suggesting future research and by exploring the policy implications of this research.

#### Implications for Democratic Peace

Do more restrictive measurements on a democracy's maturity damage Democratic Peace's ability to explain the peace among the states whose behavior it explains? This research question was proposed at the beginning of the thesis. With the analyses of the selected cases, more restrictive measurements appeared to be necessary. These different measurements affect regarding Democratic Peace will now be examined.

#### *Reduction of Applicable States*

Michael Doyle's (2012) classification of liberal states is challenged by the Cenepa Valley War. Democratic Peace is not directly harmed by the challenge because the classifications of Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr (2011) disqualifies Ecuador and Peru as mature democracies. This reliance upon Marshall, Jagers and Gurr shrinks the number of states covered by Democratic Peace. In 1991 Doyle finds 54 liberal states. In 2011 Marshall, Jagers and Gurr only find 36 mature democracies.

#### *Strengthening of Other Explanations of Peace Among Democracies*

This reduction in liberal states/mature democracies supports the argument of Erik Gartzke and Alex Weisiger (2013) that "when democracies are scarce or

weak...democracies face a common threat (2013, 171).” They argue that similarities in regime type cause states to band together in the face of a common threat of different regimes. This argument is strengthened by Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr only finding 36 mature democracies in 2011. More restrictive measures of liberalness/maturity lead to the classification of fewer liberal states/mature democracies. The theory of Democratic Peace could still explain the peace among liberal states/mature democracies, but Gartzke and Weisiger's (2013) argument of peace between similar states with regimes that are scarce in the world.

The argument of Gartzke and Weisiger appears to apply more to past cases that challenged Democratic Peace than to explain the peace among democracies today. Their argument specified that democracies would band together when the world contained more autocracies. That could explain peace among democratic states in the 1800s and 1900s when there were fewer democracies, but it may not be as accurate today. Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr's 21-point polity scale accumulates the score of the variables it measures. States with negative scores tend to be more autocratic while states with positive scores tend to be more democratic. In 2011 a majority of states measured had positive scores. Similarities may not be enough to explain the peace among democratic states today. It should be noted that Gartzke and Weisiger make no differentiation between democracies and mature democracies. Even if mature democracies are still scarce by the classification of Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, Gartzke and Weisiger appear to group them together with immature democracies.

#### *Explanations not Mutually Exclusive*

Only time will tell which explanation is more correct. Democratic Peace suggests the increase in democracies, especially mature democracies, will create a higher

likelihood of peace in the world. Gartzke and Weisiger (2013) argue that the increase in democracies, whether mature or not, will result in states dividing and possibly warring because of the differences among the states. If the number of mature democracies continue to rise, then there will be an opportunity to examine the interactions between those states. Even if differences between the states lead to wars between immature democracies, mature democracies may still be peaceful toward one another. Due to Gartzke and Weisiger grouping all democracies together, Democratic Peace and their argument could both explain future interactions between states.

#### Future Research

The cases examined displayed omissions in classifying liberal states/mature democracies from Doyle (2012) and Marshall, Jagers and Gurr (2011). Regardless of the criteria used, there appears to be little consideration for female suffrage and the disenfranchisement of racial minorities. Doyle considers male suffrage to be wide when it is 30% or greater and believes that a liberal state will grant female suffrage within a generation of it being requested. Marshall, Jagers and Gurr do not directly measure either potential variable, but do supply the variable Competitiveness of Political Participation. Given their classification of the United States as a mature democracy in 1871, suggest that female suffrage and the disenfranchisement of racial minorities did not play a large role in that variable.

The role of female suffrage and racial disenfranchisement will need to be examined in future classification of states. Michael Doyle and Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr provide a satisfactory starting point for future research, but one would have to incorporate the omitted criteria. The result of this incorporation could lower the number of liberal regimes/mature democracies classified in the world, which

could strengthen the argument of Gartzke and Weisiger (2013) that minority regime types are more likely to be more peaceful in their interactions with each other.

That strengthening, however, would not necessarily come at the expense of Democratic Peace. As suggested above both explanations are not mutually exclusive. Future research may show that the Perpetual Peace of Kant and the Liberal Peace of Doyle may not yet have an environment in which to grow. The true test of Democratic Peace would come when a majority, or even a plurality, of states in the world are mature democracies. Current research, however, does not appear to adequately define what a mature democracy is. Further examination of the role of states and their treatment of women and racial minorities will need to be factored into determining a democracy's maturity.

#### Policy Implications

This research suggest that leaders of a state be mindful of the long path to maturity when contemplating invading a state to install a more peaceful regime. While states that qualify as mature democracies under more restrictive measurements appear to be peaceful toward one another, the path to maturity was a difficult one. The application of a representative government does not make a state liberal nor does it make the new democracy mature. Even states such as the United States and United Kingdom did not gain their maturity quickly or easily. It can be argued that the United States did not gain maturity until 1965, which was the result of a long struggle by racial minorities. One must also take into account the struggles of women to gain suffrage and the struggle of abolitionists to free the slaves. In the United Kingdom, there was a struggle to break from the Crown and create a government that was more representative of the people. Michael Doyle suggests that did not happen until 1832 while Monty G. Marshall, Keith

Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr suggest it did not happen until the creation of the Irish Free State and the subsequent British elections in 1922. Maturity for these two states came at the end of a process that last hundreds of years. While the creation of mature democracies could make the world a more peaceful place, would any state want to dedicate decades and billions of their own currency, at minimum, to take that chance?

## References

- Bliss, Harry and Bruce Russett. 1998. "Democratic Trading Partners: The Liberal Connection." *Journal of Politics*. 60:1126-1147.
- Chandran, D. Suba. 2008. "Why Kargil? Pakistan's Objectives and Motivation." In *Kargil: The Tables Turned*. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors.
- Chari, P.R. 2008. "Introduction: Some Preliminary Observations." In *Kargil: The Tables Turned*. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors.
- Doyle, Michael W. 2012. *Liberal Peace: Selected Essays*. London: Routledge.
- Doyle, Michael W. 1983. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs: Part 1." In *Liberal Peace: Selected Essays*. London: Routledge.
- Elbow, Gary S. 1996. "Territorial Loss and National Image: The Case of Ecuador." *Yearbook. Conference of Latin American Geographers*. 22:93-105.
- Gartzke, Erik. 2007. "The Capitalist Peace." *American Journal of Political Science*. 51:166-191.
- Gartzke, Erik and Alex Weisiger. 2013. "Permanent Friends? Dynamic Difference and the Democratic Peace." *International Studies Quarterly*. 57:171-185.
- Gartzke, Erik and Quan Li. 2003. "War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of Economic Globalization." *International Studies Quarterly*. 47:561-586.
- Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor. 1999. *Elections and War: The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic Politics of War and Peace*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Boston: MIT Press.
- Gleditsch, Kristian S. and Michael D. Ward. 2006. "Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization." *International Organization*. 60:911-933.
- Hickey, Donald R. 2006. *Don't Give Up the Ship! Myths of the War of 1812*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Humphrey, Ted, trans. 1983. *Immanuel Kant: Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
- Krishna, Ashok. 2008. "The Kargil War." In *Kargil: The Tables Turned*. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors.

- Mansfield, Edward D. and Jack Snyder. 2007. *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett. 1992. "Alliances, Contiguity, Distance, Wealth, and Political Stability: Is the Lack of Conflict Among Democracies a Statistical Artifact?" *International Interactions*. 17:245-268.
- Marshall, Monty G., Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr. 2011. *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2011*. Accessed February 17, 2013. <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm>.
- Mill, John Stuart. 1902. *Principles of Political Economy*. New York: Appleton.
- Oneal, John R. and James Lee Ray. 1997. "New Tests of the Democratic Peace: Controlling for Economic Interdependence, 1950-85." *Political Research Quarterly*. 50:751-775.
- Palmer, David Scott. 1997. "Peru-Ecuador Border Conflict: Missed Opportunities, Misplaced Nationalism, and Multilateral Peacekeeping." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*. 39:109-148.
- Polachek, Solomon W. 1997. "Why Democracies Cooperate More and Fight Less: The Relationship Between International Trade and Cooperation." *Review of International Economics*. 5:295-309.
- Rajain, Arpit.. 2008. "India's Political and Diplomatic Responses to the Kargil Crisis." In *Kargil: The Tables Turned*. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors.
- Ravlo, Hilde; Nils Petter Gleditsch; and Han Dorussen. 2003. "Colonial War and the Democratic Peace." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 47:520-548.
- Ray, James Lee. 1995. *Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman. 2010. *Resort to War: 1816-2007*. Thousand Oaks: CQ Press.
- Stagg, J. C. A. 2012. *The War of 1812: Conflict for a Continent*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Yin, Robert K. 1994. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. London: Sage Publications.
- Zinnes, Dina A. 2004. "Constructing Political Logic: The Democratic Peace Puzzle." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 48:430-454.



