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I'm going to try to change the perspective and make an analogy. Maybe it's not a question, it's rather a need to put forth a request to you to once again explain this phrase "plural pre-reflective self-awareness". I know your different texts, but in this text, in the context of collective responsibility, as I understood, your main effort was to show us that someone is responsible if there exists some kind of pre-reflective self-awareness. This is the condition, unconditional condition. First of all, when I prepared for our meeting today and tomorrow, I read a little Waldenfels, on *Aufnehmung*, and you remember there is nothing about collective awareness, but in Natalie Depraz, in her book from two years ago, *Attention e Vigilance*, she speaks of conjoined intersubjective attention. And as you know, as phenomenologists we can say this is always an object that implies attention. There is no attention without object, and in your case this object could be a situation. For example, the collective responsibility involved with any random collection of strangers in situations that demand a multilateral action, I am interested in the relation of this plural pre-reflective self-awareness. Yesterday I found in Nida-Rümelin, he is using this *Korporativverantwortung* and *Kooperativverantwortung*, but you know that for him there is only individual responsibility. *Kolektivverantwortung* is figurative. Plural pre-reflective self-awareness and the relation of this to time or temporality of the existence of a group - I'm interested in responsibility that constitutes a group. That's why I use the analogy. I hope you remember the text of Moritz Schlick from 1930, "Wann ist der Mensch Verantwortlich?" (When is the Man Responsible?), and one of the main conditions is consciousness. Much more importantly, the question when a man is said to be responsible, is that of when he himself *feels* responsible. I think this is a bit of a challenge that there is no responsibility if someone does not have consciousness of responsibility, but only if the individual feels responsible. In that case, it would be good to explain whether there exists some kind of a *cogito* of the group, not just an analogy individual-collective, because that could be an awareness of responsibility.

And the other example is also a complete change of perspective. This summer, one evening in one restaurant in Greece, a young American was beaten to death by some 12 persons in a span of some 20 seconds. They, perpetrators, have all been apprehended. Some of them knew each other, while others joined when the situation, or object in that case, arose. Since there is no more object, there is no group either. When, then, does the responsibility of the group exist? Does the fact that they were all Serbian nationals in that case, satisfy this plural pre-reflective self-awareness? And is that enough? Or is the object, in that case, that American, enough for the constitution of

the group? They will confirm that they acted at the same time, but are they a group or not? And, where can you find this plural pre-reflective self-awareness in that case? Because, they acted. This is a completely different example: they were very active, and we could still not say that they were a group.

H. B. Schmid

The way I imagine this American case is this: clearly they were a group and they knew what they were doing. So then, the knowledge involved, the knowing what it was they were doing, the form of that self-knowledge is plural. The object is the victim on which harm is inflicted by means of their beating up that person together. And the feature in virtue of which this is an intentional joint action is the plural pre-reflective self-knowledge of the agent, and the agent is the individuals together, a plural subject. So they together knew what they were doing, and knew it in the right way, and that's the feature in virtue of which they did it intentionally. So the subject of the act is *them*. Not an extra entity, not an additional subject, but they together. They as one. That would be my description of the situation. Of course, it has nothing to do with nationality, background, just the intention, the feature in virtue of which the act is intentional, that's plural. Let me state the ontological claim. This knowledge is what groups are. This is an ontological claim about subjectivity, that groups are plural pre-reflective self-awareness in the very way in which individual subjects are singular pre-reflective self-awareness. That's how you are a subject, you are a subject in virtue of your being self-aware of your attitudes as yours, under suitable circumstances. I want to argue that there is plural pre-reflective self-awareness, and I would claim there is no awareness without self-awareness. If you are aware of a cup of coffee, there is something inbuilt, and some people say that in deep meditation there is awareness without self-awareness. Maybe experiences of depersonalization are similar, but apart from such phenomena I would say that self-awareness is a feature of any awareness. And if it's plural, it is a group's. Have I understood you and Moritz Schlick correctly, that the claim is that there is no responsibility without feeling responsible? Because that strikes me as a rather untenable claim. I have plenty of examples where there is responsibility without the subject, the perpetrator, feeling responsible.

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Ok, zu Heidegger. Ich möchte diese Gelegenheit nicht so vergehen, um Sie diese Frage zu stellen, die ich auch zu Dan Zahavi gestellt hat. Die betrifft