



Tiina Seppälä

# GLOBALIZING RESISTANCE AGAINST WAR?

A Critical Analysis of the Theoretical Debate  
through a Case Study of the 'New' Anti-War  
Movement in Britain

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## Abstract

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The study engages with a controversial theoretical debate on 'global resistance' in the context of the anti-war movement. Through an empirical case study of four anti-war organizations in Britain, the thesis critically evaluates dominant globalist theoretical discourses and their state-centric critiques from the perspective of 'critical theory in political practice' and seeks to develop the theoretical debate further. Acting as a critical mediator in between the metatheories and micropolitics of resistance, the author examines how the theoretical discourses 'resonate' with the premises of the current anti-war movement; what the theories fail to consider in terms of political practice; and to which extent the values and normative visions embedded in their broader political projects relate to the movement.

The research demonstrates that the connection between the theories and the political practice is not only inadequate but also problematic in many regards. The divergences between the globalist frameworks and the premises of the movement are particularly substantial; convergence with the state-centric approach is found more often. Although it also succeeds in illustrating serious problems in the globalist frameworks, the thesis argues that the state-centric approach is not without problems either. All three theoretical approaches have a problematic tendency to resort to a dualistic 'either-or' logic in conceptualizing power, effective strategies and the primary context of resistance which represents a clear diversion from the understandings held within the movement where analyses and conceptions are overlapping and mixed, echoing often a 'both-and' approach. The globalist frameworks are problematic also because in conceptualizing the multitude and global civil society as consensual global political collectives, they fail to take into account political conflicts and power struggles within the movement. The study shows that below the surface there are many political conflicts and struggles going on. Transforming the movement into something more permanent and global is an extremely challenging endeavor, one that cannot be established 'from above'.

Instead of defining their political projects of resistance in a way which enables their conceptualizations to be detached from practice and their normative visions and suggestions to diverge from the premises of the movement, the theories must closely engage with the movement in order to establish an emancipatory dialogue in the true sense of critical theory. The study contributes insights for developing the theoretical debate further, suggesting that a 'both-and' approach instead of an 'either-or' would not only reflect more accurately how the relationship between the local and global – and many other concepts as well – are conceived within the movement, but would also provide a more productive and comprehensive perspective for conceptualizing power and resistance in the context of social movements generally. While revealing many ongoing political conflicts and power struggles between the organizations studied, the thesis brings forward problems and tensions also within the movement and suggests it would benefit from a more open discussion about the complex relationship between unity and diversity.

Key words: Global resistance, power, critical theory, Iraq War, anti-war movement, unity, diversity

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## List of Abbreviations

BMI	British Muslim Initiative
CND	Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
CO	Conscientious Objector
DAC	Direct Action Committee
END	European Nuclear Disarmament
ESF	European Social Forum
EU	European Union
G8	Group of Eight
GR	Globalise Resistance
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
MAB	Muslim Association of Britain
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NLF	National Liberation Front
NPC	National Peace Council
PPU	Peace Pledge Union
SMO	Social Movement Organization
StWC	Stop the War Coalition
SWP	Socialist Workers' Party
TSMO	Transnational Social Movement Organization
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
VSC	Vietnam Solidarity Campaign
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WRI	War Resisters' International
WSF	World Social Forum
WTO	World Trade Organization



## PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Made the scene / Week to week / Day to day / Hour to hour  
 The gate is straight / Deep and wide  
 Break on through to the other side  
 Break on through to the other side

*The Doors*

Years ago, when people said that only after finishing a PhD is it possible to understand completely what it was all about, I was skeptical. As a young and naïve scholar, I strongly resisted this view – how ridiculous it would be not knowing what one is doing! Looking back at my own process now, it is obvious that I was the one who was ridiculous, not foreseeing that I would redefine and even change my research subject many times.

This thesis born out of somewhat idealistic interest in how to resist war more effectively in a constantly changing, but deeply unjust world. This move ‘to the other side’ – starting to study resistance against war instead of concentrating on war itself – was a long process involving many phases. It all started with an MA thesis on the media and the Kosovo War, moving on to the propaganda and image management strategies of the United States in the War on Terror in my licentiate thesis. First, this PhD thesis was supposed to analyze how the virtual anti-war movement resisted war on the Internet. This, too, changed along the way. I started to study resistance to war by analyzing concretely, not just virtually, operating anti-war organizations in Britain.

Changing the subject might sound like too dramatic a turn if not properly put in context. That the concept of ‘global resistance’ and the movement against the Iraq War became the primary subjects of my research was the result of both theoretical considerations and empirical observations. The inspiration had much to do with theoretical dilemmas I was confronted with when completing my licentiate thesis, which reflected on, among other issues, the role and power of the US in the changing international system (Seppälä 2006). The ambivalence manifested in theoretical discourses concerning possible challengers to US power was striking. While some scholars argued that no state could (ever) challenge the US military might, others stressed that it could be



challenged by undermining its ‘soft power’, especially in a situation where the superpower was in the process of losing much of its prestige due to the Iraq War. The anti-war movement seemed to represent an interesting ‘challenger’, fighting not only against the war but also against US hegemony in more general terms. This led me to the concept of resistance, which then led me to the theoretical approaches analyzed in this study, which led me to the movement and the activists in London, and so the story continues...

Undeniably, this research process has been long and complex but also an exciting and transforming experience. I have tried to learn from the comments and critiques of my distinguished and extremely patient supervisors and colleagues. I have learned not to bang my head against the (same) wall too many times. I have learned to let go sometimes. I have learned that there are wonderful people in academia with whom it is a delight to work, as they always bring up new perspectives. In all of these respects, the process of writing this thesis has certainly changed me. After this it is now time, once again, to break on through to the other side.

\*\*\*

I dedicate this thesis to the memory of Jeff Taylor (1948–2007). Jeff was a dear friend, an innovative media scholar, an excellent songwriter, and a devoted anti-war activist. A man who lived fully. Freedom, Jeff, freedom!

\*\*\*

I want to thank first and foremost my supervisor Professor Vilho Harle (University of Tampere) from the bottom of my heart for encouraging me to pursue, and helping me to establish, an academic career but, more importantly, for not losing faith in me. Ville must be the most patient person on this planet. There are simply not enough words to describe my humble gratitude. The same goes for my second longstanding supervisor, Lecturer Aini Linjakumpu, who has an incredible sense of comprehensiveness – always seeing the ‘big picture’ – and an ability to be strict but very encouraging at the same time. She has posed many difficult but important questions that I have not always been able to answer. I thank her for all our seemingly endless conversations on those countless days. Her support and friendship have been truly sincere.

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My gratitude also belongs to the 'sponsors' of this research: the University of Lapland, Kone Foundation and the Ella and Georg Ehrnroot Foundation, which have made it economically possible to study a subject that does not result in any kind of sexy 'innovations' to be applied directly or utilized in economical terms. I deeply appreciate the fact that I have been extremely lucky to have my research funded full time without any breaks, unlike so many others who would have deserved the same. To emphasize the importance of this, I express my appreciation to the people

with whom I had the pleasure of working with for five years when actively involved in the local association of the Finnish Researchers' Union.

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My family is small but all the more spicy. I want to thank my mother for teaching me not to care about stupid rules, and my sister Sirpa for taking care of our mother after she forgot not only all rules but everything else as well. Aunt Jenny is no longer with us, but continues to have an enormous influence on all of our lives. Thanks also go to all the males in the family – my brother Lasse, nephew Jyrki and his father Veikko. From my extended family I want to mention Saara who has turned into an amazing, clever and beautiful young woman while I have been writing this thesis.

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Rovaniemi, September 2010,  
Tiina Seppälä



# 1 INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Global War, Global Resistance?

On 15 February 2003, less than five weeks before the US launch of the military attack on Iraq, there was a chain of anti-war demonstrations taking place simultaneously across the world. The massive spectacle of anti-war demonstrations, orchestrated internationally to oppose the Iraq War, was a clear manifestation that the anti-war movement had experienced a political revival. The demonstrations gathered over ten million people in the streets of major cities in Europe, the US, Asia and the Middle East. In the following three months, other, similar demonstrations were organized around the globe, and it has been estimated that around thirty million people participated in these. Anti-war activism on such a scale took many by surprise, because the anti-war movement had lived rather a quiet life since the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, there had been some opposition to the first Gulf War, and later on to the wars in the Balkans, but nothing to measure up to the kind of opposition that had now formed to resist the US military invasion of Iraq.

The anti-war movement experienced its political revival in a very specific political situation, that of the early twenty-first century, which was strongly characterized and shaped by the foreign policy of the US after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The movement clearly both reflected and inspired more opposition, not only to the war on Iraq, but also US hegemony and foreign policy in more general terms. Indeed, for many – although not all – peace and anti-war activists, the ‘Global War on Terror’, and especially the Iraq War, illustrated a new kind of oil-driven imperialism by the US that should be fiercely opposed. In this regard, it was maintained that the declaration of a ‘global war’ required a global response: resistance, too, was to be globalized. In other words, it was suggested that there should be a new political strategy of global opposition to the war, a strategy to be carried out by a new kind of anti-war movement.

Struggling intensely against one of the most controversial wars of our times, the new anti-war movement certainly provided an interesting context for the idea of ‘global resistance’, which was not, however, a concept invented by the anti-war movement or in the context of the Iraq

War. It was a slogan used and made popular first by the anti-capitalist movement, also known as the anti- or alter-globalization movement, which had advocated a political strategy of global resistance in its struggle against neoliberal globalization, global capitalism and corporate power since the mid-1990s. The movement brought together a broad array of organizations and groups from all over the world to protest in Seattle in 1999 against the World Trade Organization (WTO) and on many different occasions thereafter under the umbrella of the World Social Forum (WSF). During the first years of the new millennium, the imperative to 'globalize resistance' surfaced in many social movements, which started to use the slogan in their own political campaigning. The political strategy of global resistance has also been debated within the new anti-war movement and, at the same time, become enormously popular in the academic literature dealing with social movements.

Although the internationally coordinated anti-war demonstrations did partly 'echo the form of the 'global days of action' against economic globalization' (Gillan et. al 2008: 113), in the academic literature the anti-war and the anti-capitalist movements have often been bundled together without taking seriously into account the important differences between the two. As some scholars suggest, analyses that tend to see the anti-war movement as a characteristically transnational movement 'have developed from study of the 'anti-globalization' demonstrations that have targeted a range of international political and economic institutions' (ibid: 103, also Tarrow 2005a). These analyses often fail to recognize that the primary targets of resistance and forms of political organization for the anti-war movement have traditionally been quite different from those which characterize the anti-capitalist movement (e.g. Gillan et al. 2008: 103, 112–113, 119).

There is a second important difference that has not been critically reflected on in the academic literature. While advocating a strategy of global resistance, the alter-globalization movement has become well known for arguing that it seeks no power. However, this seems not to be the case with the new anti-war movement. The discourse of global resistance was soon accompanied by that of global power, originating from the often-cited piece 'New Power in the Streets', published in the *New York Times* two days after the demonstrations in February 2003. The article argued that anti-war demonstrations taking place all over the

world proved that there are ‘two superpowers on the planet: the United States and world public opinion’ (*New York Times* 17.2.2003).<sup>1</sup> Later on, the phrase ‘world’s second superpower’ was used increasingly often when referring to the anti-war movement, especially within the movement itself. In addition, many scholars started to argue that the new anti-war movement must be regarded as a noteworthy challenger to the global hegemony of the US due to its ‘soft power’ and its ability to influence public opinion on a world scale (e.g. Chomsky 2003; Kahn & Kellner 2004; Corright 2007b). It was thus suggested that the anti-war movement had become a global political counterforce to the US, a global movement whose *power* should also be conceptualized in globalized terms<sup>2</sup>.

As exaggerated as the above interpretations may first sound, especially for political realists, they become less surprising when viewed in the light of the current state of theorization in International Relations (IR). As David Chandler (2009a: 1) points out, it is now commonly maintained that ‘politics, power and resistance make themselves felt at the global level rather than primarily at the level of nation states – the traditional subjects of international relations’. In the currently dominant theories, the global is generally viewed ‘as the key site for power, policy and resistance’ (ibid: 3). For Chandler (2009b: 532), this uniformity represents ‘Global Ideology’, that is, ‘the globalisation of political discourse’, which he finds problematic because it subsumes the globalization of politics, power and resistance under the title of globalization as a mere reaction to external changes and social and economic transformations. Thus, in the mainstream the global level is regarded as ‘the explanatory one and the domestic level as secondary, responding to these changes’ (ibid).

In his critical analysis, Chandler (2009b: 532) does not argue that politics, power and resistance merely operate at local, national or regional

<sup>1</sup> The *New York Times* (17.2.2003) was highly optimistic about the political significance of this new phenomenon: ‘For the moment, an exceptional phenomenon has appeared on the streets of world cities. It may not be as profound as the people’s revolutions across Eastern Europe in 1989 or in Europe’s class struggles of 1848, but politicians and leaders are unlikely to ignore it.’

<sup>2</sup> Interestingly, the discussion about the anti-war movement as the world’s second superpower coincided with a very heated debate concerning the hegemony and power of the ‘first’ superpower, the US (e.g. Cox 2004; Dunne 2003; Ikenberry 2004; Fergusson 2004; Kagan 2004; Kaldor 2003b; 2004; Mann 2004; Nye 2004b; Posen 2003; Waltz 2000; Wendt 2003).

levels. Rather, he aims at ‘conceptually unpacking what is meant when we talk about global politics, power and resistance’ (ibid: 530). What is called ‘a more subjectivist or constructivist approach’ does not take it for granted that the globalization of politics is ‘a secondary political effect of primary social and economic transformations’, but enables critical evaluation of how the global is actually being constructed (ibid: 532; cf. Risse 2007). Indeed, it is interesting that only very few scholars critically explore ‘why it is that our conceptualisation of politics and power has been transformed, or globalised, so rapidly’ (Chandler 2009a: 1). Chandler (2009b: 533) criticizes IR especially, where analyzing global interactions is currently considered as relevant as, if not more relevant than, state-level interaction in the international system, the traditional focus of the discipline.<sup>3</sup>

When the starting assumption is that the world has become increasingly globalized, the view that politics, too, is, and should be, taking place primarily at the global level becomes inevitable and those resisting this view are considered ‘unable to engage progressively with the world we live in and unable to understand the impact of external changes on the creation of new global threats and possibilities for social transformation’ (ibid: 533). Chandler (2009a: 5) argues that when the globalization of politics is understood ‘as a response to processes of social and economic change’, ‘the shift towards the global’ becomes ‘essentialised or reified’:

Rather than the shift from national to global conceptions of politics, power and resistance being a question for investigation, it has been understood as natural or inevitable, as a process driven by forces external to us and out of our control.

Chandler’s critical analysis is extremely interesting and important from the perspective of this thesis, because it succeeds in revealing the essentialized nature of the globalized conceptualizations of politics, power and resistance found in the currently dominant theoretical discourses. This in

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<sup>3</sup> Indeed, IR is currently very much characterized by the study of different kinds of global phenomena that have become increasingly popular objects of research and conceptualization within the discipline. It is almost impossible to read a textbook in IR without confronting a whole cavalcade of different sorts of ‘globals’: global politics, global political economy, global environmental problems, global networks, global movements, and so forth. On global resistance, see e.g. Amoore 2005.



turn helps to explain why political strategies of resistance, as well as the power of the new anti-war movement, have been conceptualized in highly globalized and idealistic terms. Although the political significance of the movement should not be downplayed nor its increasingly transnational character denied, it must nevertheless be admitted that some of the interpretations are way out of proportion<sup>4</sup>. Indeed, many empirical studies have already shown that in practical terms the new movement is not as globally oriented as many wish to believe when it comes to, for example, political action and coordination<sup>5</sup> or the use of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) in mobilization (e.g. Pickerill & Webster 2006; Gillan & Pickerill 2008; Gillan et al. 2008).<sup>6</sup>

Moreover, the fact that the Iraq War continues – over seven years after the proclaimed birth of the ‘world’s second superpower’ – indicates that, generally speaking, there has not been too much critical discussion about the movement’s power and effectiveness, that is, how and with what criteria it should be evaluated<sup>7</sup>. Surprisingly few scholars have reflected on whether it is even realistic to expect that a social movement such as the anti-war movement could influence world politics to such an extent that wars could be prevented or stopped on the spot. Quite the contrary, despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that many of the most optimistic

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<sup>4</sup> Although international mobilization as such is not anything new, transnational elements of the new movement have been emphasized to such an extent that, as Gillan et al. (2008: 103) point out, transnationalism is regarded as its ‘defining feature’. On internationalization of movements, cross-national diffusion and scale shifts, see e.g. Tilly 2004: 63–64; Tilly & Tarrow 2007: 96–97, 170–172, 174–181; della Porta & Diani 2006: 186–188.

<sup>5</sup> Gillan et al. (2008: 128) argue that although international demonstrations have illustrated the movement’s ability ‘to act on the world stage’, in terms of concrete political action the movement has yet remained ‘predominantly affixed to place and to the political context of the nation’ (ibid: 102, 113, also 117–118, 128).

<sup>6</sup> In theory the Internet would be able to ‘offer the possibility of having detailed, regular meetings across borders without long-distance travel’ but in practice this possibility is not yet ‘utilized to any great extent’ (Gillan et al. 2008: 117, also 101).

<sup>7</sup> However, there has been also critical discussion. For example, the former UN weapon inspector Scott Ritter (2007: 5) regards the anti-war movement as ‘a poorly organized, chaotic, and ... often anarchic conglomeration of egos, pet projects, and idealism that barely constitutes a ‘movement’, let alone a winning cause’. He argues that the movement ‘lacks any notion of strategic thinking, operational planning, or sense of sound tactics’, not to mention central leadership, and that it rationalizes its failures (ibid: 5, 7, 13).

as well as globalized interpretations made in regard to the *existing* anti-war movement can be easily challenged, some theorists have expressed even more optimistic and globalized views in regard to *future* resistance against war.

A particularly interesting development has been the way in which social movements and other non-state actors are conceptualized as an ‘answer to war’ in recent theoretical debate<sup>8</sup>. Very clearly, this debate has been dominated by two theoretical discourses, which can be labelled the *liberal cosmopolitan* approach and the *radical poststructuralist* approach<sup>9</sup> and whose adherents can be described as belonging to the category of *academic globalists*<sup>10</sup>. Both have argued that resisting war and/or transforming the ‘war system’ must take place ‘from below’, which requires transnational political engagement in global advocacy networks transcending the boundaries of nation states. While liberal cosmopolitans suggest that ‘global civil society’ can become an important challenger of state power, contesting the status quo ‘from below’ (e.g. Beck 2000; 2005; Castells 2008) and resisting war (e.g. Kaldor 2003a), radical poststructuralists argue that the current ‘global state of war’ can be challenged by the oppressed people of the world, who together form a ‘Multitude’<sup>11</sup> which would wage a ‘war against war’ (Hardt & Negri 2000; 2004).

Both of the above-mentioned approaches – or, rather, visions – can be criticized on many grounds. From the perspective of concrete political practice, they seem to be very abstract and future-oriented, even utopian, in that they talk about global struggles and global political subjects that do not yet exist. As Chandler (2009b: 537) points out, ‘these struggles remain immanent ones, in which global political social forces of progress

<sup>8</sup> This kind of a debate has deep roots in the history of IR, especially in the traditions of communitarism and peace research. For example, Johan Galtung (1975: 158) has called transnational non-state actors the ‘sixth continent’ of the world order, arguing that they have not only advanced international cooperation but also helped to prevent inter-state conflicts. Although these kinds of views have always existed within the discipline, they have never quite represented the mainstream.

<sup>9</sup> For example, Chandler (2009a; 2009b) and Mouffe (2005) use these or similar categories in their work.

<sup>10</sup> These theoretical approaches are defined and discussed in detail in chapter 2.

<sup>11</sup> ‘Multitude’ is a concept originally used in Machiavelli’s *Discorsi*, later also by Hobbes, Spinoza and most recently by Hardt and Negri. The term is used by other political thinkers as well, such as Lotringer and Virno.

are intimidated but are yet to fully develop'. In other words, there is no collective political subject that could 'give content to the theorising of global struggle articulated by academic theorists' (ibid). This means that theorizing actually 'becomes a political act or statement in itself regardless of any link to social agency' (ibid: 535; also Chandler 2009a: 125). Provocatively, Chandler (2009b: 537) goes on to argue that 'politics has become globalised in the absence of political struggle rather than as a result of the expanded nature of collective political engagement'.

Despite these obvious problems, it must be acknowledged that there is something very interesting indeed going on here, since many political theorists clearly invite us to take a closer look at the anti-war movement as an integral part of either global civil society (liberal cosmopolitans) or the Multitude (radical poststructuralists). Obviously, the debate has been taken far beyond the current anti-war movement when speculating on the possibility of establishing a global collective political subject dedicated to resistance against war. This does not mean, however, that the existing anti-war movement should or even could be totally left out of the debate. Although the movement is not conceived as being the forthcoming global collective political subject as such<sup>12</sup>, it is extremely difficult to imagine a global collective dedicated to resistance against war that would exclude the existing anti-war movement.

Yet, the present anti-war movement seems to be essentially ignored by both liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists in their theorizations. In fantasizing about global struggles, suggesting global strategies of resistance and even constructing visions of a global collective political subject dedicated to resistance against war, the theorists in both camps are not engaging empirically with the current anti-war movement but 'jumping' directly into the future. In other words, their suggestions and visions are mainly based on what they assume about the anti-war movement and/or what they want it to become in the future. Taking place as it does on such a highly abstract and future-oriented level, the debate invites four critical questions, which together provide the overall rationale for this thesis.

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<sup>12</sup> Although liberal cosmopolitans such as Mary Kaldor (2003a) often talk about the peace movement and radical poststructuralists (Hardt & Negri 2004) about the anti-war movement, they do not consider either of these movements to be the forthcoming global collective political subject *as such*.

Firstly, the lack of empirical engagement with the current anti-war movement invites the question of the extent to which the globalized interpretations made by academic globalists in regard to the nature of new anti-war movement and its political strategies can be considered accurate. Secondly, one might ask whether their globalized normative assumptions and visions are even compatible with the values, beliefs and political premises of the current movement. This question directly relates to a third one – whether the kind of global political collective both liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists are dreaming of can be regarded as a possible, or even desirable, political project from the perspective of the existing movement. Fourthly, the lack of empirical engagement with the movement prompts one to ask whether academic globalists are able to provide any practical suggestions on how to organize resistance against war more effectively.

The first question can be regarded as relevant especially from the perspective of traditional social movement research, which is characterized by its descriptive, usually non-normative methods of analysis. Any critical questions in such terms would address possible errors and shortcomings in existing interpretations, amounting to an assessment of the accuracy of the globalized interpretations made by academic globalists regarding the extent of global elements evident in the new movement and its strategies. This would require empirical analysis of the concrete political practices and processes of the movement, that is, observing actual political practice and thereby possibly challenging previous interpretations. Although this perspective is important and will be taken up in the study (but from a different point of view than would be the case in traditional social movement research), the three other questions are more fundamental.

The second and third questions are significant because academic globalists clearly assume that the forthcoming global collective political subject will share their own normative ideals. For liberal cosmopolitans, the ideal towards which global civil society should be moving is based on liberal and social democratic values, regarded as international, if not universal – hence, the term ‘cosmopolitan’<sup>13</sup>. Indeed, radical poststructuralists accuse liberal cosmopolitans of normative universalism and imposing western

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<sup>13</sup> As Chandler (2009a: 129) points out: ‘Whatever the agency, the ideal outcome is already established: grounding liberal claims without political subjects’.

values and liberal governance on the rest of the world. For them, the ideal towards which the Multitude should lead the rest of world is based on a vision of a communistic, yet diverse and autonomous political collective. Regardless of the character of the normative ideal, however, the problem remains. As Chandler (2009a: 155) rightly puts it, both approaches ‘seek to ground their position on abstract framings of political struggle, rather than on concrete movements or practices’.

This brings us directly to the fourth question, or problem. If academic globalists were to provide any practical suggestions for the anti-war (or any other) movement as to how they might organize resistance in a more effective and meaningful way, they should be communicating closely with the existing movement(s). At the moment, this takes place only at a very abstract level. If one considers IR, this is hardly surprising: it is not the most empirically oriented discipline in the first place and social movements have not been very popular subjects of research, given the discipline’s primary focus on interactions between nation states within the territorial and state-based international system<sup>14</sup>. Not even the anti-war movement has been a major subject of research within the discipline<sup>15</sup>, although in light of the movement’s fundamental commitment to the questions of war and peace<sup>16</sup>, it could be argued that no other social movement is nearly as significant from the perspective of IR.

In this regard, the problem is that unless political theorists engage

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<sup>14</sup> It has been argued that ‘the preoccupation of political scientists with the state, particularly those concerned with interstate relations – usually less precisely labeled as “international” relations – has inhibited their capacity to perceive realistically other actors crossing state boundaries’ (Alger 1997: 260–261). However, this is to put things a bit too simplistically. Already in the early 1970s Keohane and Nye showed that international relations models were ‘contaminated’ by transnational actors to such an extent that international policy outcomes could not be explained without taking them into account (Smith et al. 1997: 74). Since then there has been a wide range of studies and research literature on the matter. However, social movements as subjects of empirical studies are still not very popular in IR.

<sup>15</sup> However, IR is not the only discipline that can be blamed for a lack of research in regard to the anti-war movement. Overall, there have not been too many studies related to the movement after the late 1980s (see chapter 3).

<sup>16</sup> It can also be argued that there is not a more appropriate discipline to provide a proper context for analysis than IR when it comes to the anti-war movement. Although sociology surely can, due to its long-term engagement with social movement research, provide important insights to social movement activity in general, the substance of the anti-war movement is more closely related to IR theory.

in a dialogue with social movements, they risk rendering their own conceptualizations useless in terms of political practice; in other words, their contributions are likely to remain merely utopian. Furthermore, the theorists are not capitalizing on the experience that social movements have of political practices of resistance; they may totally overlook opportunities to benefit from the ‘knowledge of the field’. Despite being objects of contradicting theorizations and criticisms, social movements are continuously engaged in many sorts of political struggles and their experiences could offer some insights for developing theories further.

Moreover, when social movements are studied empirically, which usually takes place only in the field of social movement research, the main focus seems to be on their concrete processes and practices, with ideological factors and the movements’ self-understandings often regarded as secondary. Although it should be obvious that the political practice of social movements is directly shaped by their understandings, it is a small mystery why many scholars view empirical studies of the self-understandings of social movements very skeptically.

As Kevin Gillan (2006: 38–39) explains, it is more common to study the processes and practices of social movements than the understandings, beliefs and values that underlie them. That is, it is more common to study *how*-questions than *why*-questions,<sup>17</sup> although analyzing the understandings that guide the political practice of social movements would clearly ‘offer reflections on the organisation of social, political and economic life which are of value to all those for whom a normative appraisal of current political and social structures is necessary’ (ibid: 38–39). As Gillan points out, ‘understanding the various bases of the political projects in which movements engage’ can also help to understand their processes (ibid: 39). This in turn, I wish to add, would help social scientists and political theorists to offer more enlightened (reflective) and practical suggestions for social movements – which is in fact their main aim if their work is regarded from the perspective of critical theory.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> The distinction between these two approaches is generally characterized as a difference between American and European traditions, with American sociology and political theory considered more interested in processes and European in how certain socio-political contexts effect social movement activity (Gillan 2006: 23–24).

An intimate link between theory and political practice has always been the basis of critical theory<sup>19</sup>, by definition. As Stephen Leonard (1990: 3) puts it, ‘a critical theory without a practical dimension would be bankrupt on its own terms’. When struggling for emancipation and social change, critical theory needs to have a practical element, because otherwise ‘the promise of a truly emancipatory social theory will remain hopelessly utopian’ (ibid: xxiv). In his analysis, Leonard criticizes both modern critical theorists (from Karl Marx to the Frankfurt School and Jürgen Habermas) and postmodern thinkers (mainly Michel Foucault) for not seriously pursuing their own stated aims – social and political emancipation (ibid: xiii). Interestingly, he argues that the problems in realizing their aims may partly ‘derive from the desire to avoid seeing critique lose its critical edge by becoming the ideology of *any particular social movement*’, leading them to define ‘the requirements for emancipation in a way that enabled critique to be autonomous from practice’ (ibid: 91, emphasis added).

Leonard (1990: xiv–xv) explicitly asserts that although critical theory has succeeded in its criticism of prevailing disciplinary orthodoxies, in both its modern and postmodern versions it has ‘simply failed to make clear its own political implications and how it is to be related to concrete political practices’.<sup>20</sup> Thus, it has lost its politically engaged and

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<sup>18</sup> The approach adopted here is partly, but not totally, at odds with that of Chandler (2009a: 88), as he explicitly criticizes, although in a different context, ‘constructivist assumptions’ for taking discourses and ideas as ‘the ontological focus of study’ and regarding them as ‘explanatory of the practices and interactions of the subjects themselves’. He also warns against ‘critical theorising which starts from the level of policy rhetoric and abstract assertions of the nature of political struggle, rather than from a study of concrete practices’ (ibid: 25).

<sup>19</sup> Critical theory is a very broad category that includes many different established approaches which all share one important element: they are normative by definition. Whereas so-called ‘normal science’ aims at ‘objectively’ describing and explaining social and political phenomena, critical social science ‘wants to explain a social order in such a way that it becomes itself the catalyst which leads to the transformation of this social order’ (Fay 1987: 27; also Harle 2004: 36–38). Critical social science must nevertheless also be ‘scientific’ ‘in the sense of providing comprehensive explanations of wide areas of human life in terms of a few basic principles, explanations subject to public, empirical evidence’ (Fay 1987: 23).

<sup>20</sup> In IR, the approach has been manifested in the works of a great number of scholars during its history. Recently it has been, for example, referred to as ‘emancipatory international relations’ (Spegele 2002: 383).

emancipatory forms of critique along with ‘an ever growing preoccupation with what might be called a radical “metacritique” of modernity’, which has made critical theory ‘look more like a form of academic, intellectual introspection’ (ibid: 6). However, unlike many other scholars who have criticized critical theory for losing its connection with practice, Leonard does not blame the metatheoretical turn from modern to postmodern as such for this. He regards it as ‘not in itself problematic for critical theory’ but argues that ‘critical theorists fail to heed the lessons they learn from the critique of scientism, thereby relegating questions of political practice to secondary status’ (ibid: 26, also 7).

As Leonard (1990: xiii) argues, advocates of critical theory ‘must play a role in changing the world’ and in a way which can help ‘emancipate’ its addressees ‘by providing them with insights and intellectual tools they can use to empower themselves’. Or, as Brian Fay (1987: 2) puts it, critical theory must be ‘explicitly constructed’ for social theories to have ‘practical political impact’.<sup>21</sup> In this kind of context, the term ‘critique’ is to be understood as a synthesis of theory and practice, one criticizing all possible forms of exploitation and oppression and simultaneously struggling for a better and more just society (Leonard 1990: 14; also Fay 1987: 4, 22, 29).<sup>22</sup> For Leonard, feministic theory, dependency theory and critical pedagogy are examples of truly emancipatory critical theories, as they have been directed to and adopted by certain social movements.

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<sup>21</sup> For example, *peace research* aims at building a more peaceful world and minimizing the amount of human suffering caused by wars and conflicts (e.g. Galtung 1969; 1996). It must ‘act consistently to prevent a transformation from world politics to violence and to promote a transformation towards peaceful, democratic world politics instead’ (Patomäki 2008: 159). Peace research differs from traditional political science in being ‘less neutral’ as it aims at obtaining knowledge on how a certain objective (peace) can be best pursued (Galtung 1969: 14–15).

<sup>22</sup> This is what ‘critique’ was all about for Marx, often regarded as one of the ‘founding fathers’ of critical theory – a project with a practical intent: to ‘overthrow all those conditions in which man is an abased, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible being’ (Leonard 1990: 13). The class of persons suffering from enslavement to be freed was the proletariat, and the role of a critique was to become a part of the ‘material force’ of revolutionary change (ibid: 14). As we well know, these aspirations never materialized and when Marx’s theory was ‘scientized’, it was used to provide ‘the ideological justification for the domination of human beings by an “enlightened” avant garde party’ (ibid: 25). This does not, however, discredit the fact that Marx clearly articulated the idea that critical theory must have a practical intent.



A recent example of creating a close linkage between political theory and a particular social movement is Jeremy Gilbert's (2008) attempt to construct a bridge between cultural studies and the anti-capitalist movement. According to Gilbert, cultural studies and radical politics should be regarded as intimately connected by definition since 'those conceptual resources which are most useful for analyzing power relationships in culture should also be of potential use in orienting political action, and *vice versa*' (ibid: 135, emphasis in original). Hence, political theories can actually be read as strategies (of resistance) put forward to social movements (Massumi 1992: 103, quoted in Gilbert 2008: 212):

"Strategies" is the best word for ways of becoming: they are less theories about becoming than practical guidelines serving as landmarks to future movement. They have no value unless they are immanent for their "object": they must be verified by the collectivity concerned, in other words submitted to experimental evaluation and remapped as needed.

According to Gilbert (2008: 213), political theories must have 'an emphasis on pragmatics – on the question 'what is to be done' – and an orientation towards at least partially determinant imagined future'.<sup>23</sup> Similarly, Cardoso and Faletto (1979: xiv, quoted in Leonard 1990: xix) argue that 'verification' of a theory as a critical theory depends on its ability to 'show socio-political actors the possible solutions to contradictory situations' and in this way help them to 'implement what are perceived as structural possibilities'. In the same vein, I argue in this thesis that currently popular and dominant theoretical discourses can be understood as 'proposals' for certain types of political strategies of resistance and therefore should be immanent for their objects – social movements, in this case the anti-war movement. The problem is that there have been no serious attempts to engage with the existing anti-war movement; without understanding its political and normative premises, it is as easy to make wrong interpretations as it is difficult to offer concrete suggestions on how to organize resistance more effectively.

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<sup>23</sup> However, Gilbert (2008: 213) points out that 'strategies must always be experimental and therefore provisional: that's the difference between strategy and dogma'. This does not, however, lead to abandonment of a concept of strategy 'because politics cannot be fought effectively without it' (ibid).

Of course, it must be noted that not all scholars even aim to be critical theorists in the above sense. Many of them merely aim at analyzing and describing social movements rather than providing them with any suggestions on, for example, how to organize resistance more effectively. Yet, this is not an excuse for their failure to engage more intimately and empirically with the objects of their analyses and conceptualizations. Moreover, although many theorists who reflect upon social movements suggest that they do so from an ‘objective’ and value-free perspective, this is not quite true. In fact, no social theory can be politically neutral. If this is accepted as an epistemological tenet of the social sciences in more general terms<sup>24</sup>, **it must be admitted that the understandings and values** of any social scientist are influenced by numerous different factors<sup>25</sup> that they can never totally escape. For example, defining a research subject is always connected to understandings of the kinds of political phenomena that are regarded as important and worth studying in a certain context and at a certain historical moment by the researcher as well as the broader epistemic community. Choosing theories, empirical cases or methods is not a neutral process, either, because such choices always involve some sort of value judgements. (Harle 2003: 36–37; also Fay 1987; 1998.)

On balance, it is not possible to merely ‘describe’ social movements or objectively explain their practices. Accordingly, one must deliberate what kinds of political choices are made in the course of research and what kinds of values are advanced by conducting a certain type of research. Understanding the intimate relationship between power and knowledge imposes clear responsibilities on a researcher. The ‘minimum’ requirement is that she should at least avoid exacerbating inequality and oppression. However, this passive definition leaves much to be desired where the ultimate aim is active struggle against injustices (Leonard 1990: 268–269, emphasis added):

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<sup>24</sup> As one peace researcher states, ‘insofar as all social science is involved in the extended use of reason in society the social function of social science is linked to the conduct of politics and against the violence of conduct’ (Horowitz 1970: 113).

<sup>25</sup> The fact that a researcher herself is member of a certain society and specific academic discipline necessarily influences her own understandings in various ways, for example, due to historical and contextual factors, the epistemological premises of the discipline, values and ideologies embedded in the contemporary society, personal beliefs, historical experiences, and the like.

The real question is whether we will allow ourselves to recognize our own roles in the perpetuation of unredeemed suffering, or retreat from the world of that suffering by seeing ourselves as merely innocent bystanders. In either case, *we are not now innocent, nor can we ever really be innocent – as social agents or social theorists.*<sup>26</sup>

Hence, it is necessary for social scientists to acknowledge and openly bring out their own premises as well as to reflect upon their role and responsibilities as scholars. And indeed, since all political practices are socially constructed and conventional, they can be changed, including those which produce violence, poverty and suffering. None of these has to be viewed as inevitable or acceptable facts as such: society becomes what we make of it<sup>27</sup>. This is exactly where critical social science, as a vehicle for social change and emancipation, should step in. Therefore, not only would it be more honest for many theorists to acknowledge and openly bring out their own premises when analyzing social movements, but it might prove more productive for developing the theoretical debate further in connection with political practice. For this to take place, however, there should also be more direct engagement with social movements on the part of theorists.

The present study undertakes a concrete effort to engage with a particular movement, that is, the anti-war movement. I argue that in the context of the theoretical debate where academic globalists introduce concepts such as the ‘war against war’ or ‘global civil society’ as ‘an answer to war’, it is absolutely necessary to study the understandings and premises within the current anti-war movement empirically. Only by engaging with the actual movement will it be possible to improve and develop the theories further – in terms of *both* reflecting the movement’s political practice better *and* providing practical suggestions for organizing resistance against war more effectively.

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<sup>26</sup> Or, as Fay (1998: 241–245) puts it, hiding behind the mask of neutrality is not only useless but potentially dangerous as it allows structural violence and all sorts of injustices to continue undisrupted.

<sup>27</sup> Therefore, it has been suggested that the term ‘society’ should be regarded as a *verb* instead of a noun, a process rather than a thing (Fay 1998: 65).

## 1.2 Aims and Research Questions

The above introduction illustrated many problems in the ongoing theoretical debate. The different theoretical approaches are not only contradictory in terms of their claims and interpretations but are also, more or less explicitly, normative in nature – a feature which can be regarded as an open invitation to evaluate them from the perspective of critical theory. Normativity in itself does not, however, make a theory critical and emancipatory. As was argued with reference to the work of Leonard and Fay, for a political theory to be critical it must involve a practical intent and be able to address its ‘objects’ in their own terms in order to become adopted by them.

In an attempt to address the *problematique* described above, this thesis seeks to develop the theoretical debate further by critically evaluating it from the standpoint of what, using Leonard’s (1990) terms, will be called here ‘critical theory in political practice’. Only by first demonstrating where and how the theories fall short – revealing their main failures and shortcomings – does it become possible to discuss how they can be improved. Such critical evaluation is a prerequisite for discussing the conditions under which the theories may not only become more reflective of the current political practice but also more practical in the sense of truly critical theory.

Hence, the aim of this thesis is to critically reflect on the ongoing theoretical debate dealing with the concept of resistance in the context of social movements – and especially the anti-war movement – from the above-mentioned perspective and thereby to develop the theoretical debate further. In order to accomplish this, it is necessary to engage with *both* the theories *and* the anti-war movement.

Before introducing the research questions, certain crucial details need to be presented regarding how the political practice of the movement is approached here as an object of study. As explained in the introduction, in social movement research it is common to study social movements by analyzing their concrete political practices and processes. In contrast to this approach, another perspective is adopted here (for the reasons explained in introduction): the movement is studied from the perspective of the *premises* and *self-understandings* which guide its political practice. In this sense, this study does not represent an ideological analysis either,

which would be a different and distinctive approach (e.g. Gillan 2006), likely to limit the range of possible interpretations. If the movement were understood only in terms of ideologies, the author would be ‘forced’ to rely on related analytical frameworks, which would not be useful from the perspective of this thesis.

The thesis is based on the idea that analyzing how the premises and self-understandings of the existing anti-war movement ‘resonate’ with the theoretical debate makes it possible to see what the theories ignore or fail to take into account. In this way, the theoretical debate can be developed further and opportunities can be explored for establishing a more intimate dialogue between the recently popular theories of resistance and the current anti-war movement. In light of this context, the main research questions addressed are the following:

1. How much common ground there is between the theoretical realm and the anti-war movement at the moment? More specifically, how do the dominant theoretical approaches and their critiques currently relate to the political practice of the movement?
2. What do the theoretical approaches fail to consider in terms of the political practice of the movement?
3. To what extent are the values and beliefs embedded in the normative political projects and visions proposed by dominant theoretical approaches similar, or at least compatible, with those of the current movement?

### 1.3 Methodology

Due to the nature of the main research questions, the methodology employed must be based on *interplay* between the theoretical and empirical levels. Answering the research questions requires two different analyses – a *theoretical* and an *empirical* one. Since the specific units of analysis to be studied in both theoretical and empirical terms need to be same in order to see how much they ‘resonate’, the theoretical debate must be analyzed first in order to determine the questions to be asked when examining the empirical material.

This kind of methodology, as well as the relationship between the theories and empirical material, is different from that used in studies where theories are used as research theories in the traditional sense for interpretation of empirical findings. Here, the theories are themselves analyzed, which constitutes an analysis in its own right. In the empirical analysis the findings of the theoretical analysis are utilized when looking for convergences and divergences between the theoretical and the empirical realms. In other words, the findings of the empirical analysis are considered in light of those obtained through the theoretical analysis. The approach thus echoes the notion that empirical studies are ‘crucial’ when developing ‘theoretical arguments over concepts and approaches’ (Patomäki 2008: 222).

The methodology for analyzing the theoretical debate has already been discussed above when outlining the ‘critical theory in political practice’ approach and the research questions. How then is one to study empirically the premises and understandings espoused by the anti-war movement, which is an extremely broad forum that includes thousands of groups in different countries across the world? Instead of trying to study them all, which would be impossible, the more constrained perspective of an empirical study has to be taken. In this regard, there are at least two possible approaches available. The first one would be to study anti-war groups in several different countries, which would definitely enable a broad understanding of the phenomenon and also bring in comparative perspectives. The second approach, which will be that used in this study, is to concentrate on a single country. In the present case, the object of empirical analysis is the British anti-war movement and, more specifically, four anti-war organizations. The case study, its justifications and limitations as well as the organizations under investigation are presented in detail later when, importantly, addressing also the danger of equating organizations with a movement (see chapter 3).

It is obvious that this kind of an analysis will not provide as broad an understanding as a study where movements in several countries are studied. However, in some respects it may well enable a deeper understanding. By looking closely not only at the premises of the anti-war groups but also analyzing them in relation to a specific national framework, domestic politics and local concerns, it might be possible to make more enlightened interpretations. Concentrating on one country and on a certain socio-

political context may thus facilitate a more holistic understanding.<sup>28</sup> Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that this approach does limit the scope of generalizations to be made in regard to the relationship between theoretical and empirical materials. This dilemma is difficult to avoid in this kind of a research setting, but it can be to some extent alleviated by openly bringing it up and reflecting on it in the course of the study.

One further remark needs to be made in regard to the methodology or, rather, the research orientation. Much as the analysis of the theoretical debate must do, the empirical analysis need recognize the political nature and political aspects of the object. Since the anti-war movement is clearly a political agent, resistance against war needs to be understood inherently as a political endeavour and phenomenon (Rochon 1988: 216), a fact which I, as a political scientist, need to accommodate in my analysis<sup>29</sup>. Political theorists must also always engage in critical evaluation of the political motives of the actors that are studied as well as critically reflect on the issue of power in the relationship between different political actors.

In sum, this is simultaneously a study about recent and popular theoretical discourses of resistance *and* a study of politics of resistance in the context of the anti-war movement. My aim as a researcher is to act as a critical mediator between the metatheories and micropolitics of resistance. To be sure, the aim is not to propose a new political theory of resistance for the anti-war movement but to evaluate, and thereby develop further, certain aspects of the currently dominant theoretical approaches and their critiques in relation to the anti-war movement.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Obviously, the most comprehensive approach would be to combine both of the above-mentioned perspectives and to study many anti-war groups in many different countries while also analyzing their local contexts in depth. However, it would be a very demanding, almost impossible, task to carry out in one thesis and by one researcher, as it would require collecting data from many countries.

<sup>29</sup> Here, the subjectivity of the researcher needs to be greatly emphasized. However, although it is impossible to be objective or totally neutral, subjectivity in this context should not mean outright political advocacy of any particular perspective.

<sup>30</sup> Cannot the researcher herself then be criticized for not 'talking to the movement' due to her being more concerned with analyzing the theoretical debate? This certainly is a relevant question since the thesis does not directly aim to inform practice through theory. However, as the study seeks to develop theories further by making them engage with an empirical case (informing theory through practice), it may be possible to indirectly inform practice through theory: as a result of improved theories, practice can be better informed through the theories.

At first glance, the present research setting, whose main aim has been translated into several research questions to be answered through two different sets of analysis, a theoretical and an empirical, may seem a complex one, but, as will be shown, all of the above-mentioned aspects are intimately connected to each other. To restrict the perspective to something less would mean that the approach adopted here would either follow the same logic as the theories under critical investigation or that it would represent more of a traditional kind of social movement research – a direction of scholarship that this thesis clearly diverges from, although social movement theory and related studies will be used for explaining and contextualizing certain findings<sup>31</sup>.

## 1.4 Structure

Chapter 2 constitutes the theoretical analysis in relation to which the empirical analysis will be conducted. The chapter analyzes the ongoing contradictory theoretical debate first by evaluating two dominant theoretical discourses, the liberal cosmopolitan and the radical poststructuralist approach, and then the critique of them presented by the critical state-centric approach. The aim of the chapter is twofold.

Firstly, by discussing each approach in detail the chapter seeks to outline the main differences between their conceptualizations and suggestions while also reflecting upon their normative premises. The chapter demonstrates that the approaches differ substantially in their conceptualizations of resistance, power and politics. For example, the approaches differ in how they generally regard the effectiveness and power of social movements (as well as the power of their primary opponents) in the international system; this then leads them to define political strategies of resistance either in terms of state-based or global strategies. In the context of the Iraq War, their interpretations of the main causes of the war and the extent of exceptionality of the US hegemony are also divergent.

<sup>31</sup> In this regard, the study draws on both general social movement theory (e.g. Tilly 2004; Tilly & Tarrow 2007; della Porta & Diani 2006; Walker 1988) and on a wide variety of literature on the anti-war/peace movement (e.g. Chatfield 1992;1997; DeBenedetti & Chatfield 1990; Cortright 2006; 2007a; 2008; Gillan et al. 2008; Gillan 2006; Hinton 1989; Overly 1982; Rochon 1988; Taylor & Young 1987a).



Secondly, drawing on the theoretical analysis, an outline of and a specific technique for the empirical analysis are formulated. These are presented in detail in chapter 3, which also introduces the case study, research materials and method of the empirical part. A short review of the history of the anti-war/peace movement is also provided in order to better illustrate the broader international and national context in which the organizations studied operate.

The rest of the thesis consists of five empirical analysis chapters, each of which considers one major aspect of the theoretical debate in light of the empirical material, and a concluding chapter. Chapter 4 addresses the *who*-question of resistance, chapter 5 the *what*- and *why*-questions (aims, targets and causes of resistance), chapter 6 the *how*-question (strategies and tactics of resistance); chapter 7 discusses the question of *power* (elements and definitions of power) and chapter 8 that of *effects* (successes and failures of the movement). In each of the chapters, the findings based on the theoretical material are discussed in terms of the empirical material, with a summing up of the main convergences and divergences between the two perspectives, and concluding remarks on the extent to which the two seem to 'resonate' with each other.

Chapter 4 reflects on the theoretical debate on the character and ascendance of the movement against the Iraq War in which the movement is described with increasing frequency as a new kind of a global movement, thus emphasizing its political agency from that particular perspective. It analyzes how the the political agency of the movement, its ascendance as well as the new and global elements proclaimed by academic globalists are conceived within the movement itself. The chapter demonstrates that the organizations studied regard the movement more often from a national or international than a global perspective and that it is also common to regard the movement as a continuation of the 'old' movement, not something completely new and extraordinary. It also shows that the ascendance of the movement was not as easy or consensual process as academic globalists assume. Moreover, the chapter reveals internal disagreements and conflicts between the organizations in regard to leadership issues, cooperation, the preferred extent of centralization of the movement and its connection to other movements.

Chapter 5 reflects on the theoretical debate concerning the aims, targets of resistance and causes of the war in its broader political context

by analyzing how these are defined and articulated within the movement. It is demonstrated that instead of citing the abstract global opponents of the radical poststructuralist approach, most of the organizations define the main targets of resistance in quite traditional terms, that is, nation states and governments, which locates them closest to the state-centric approach. In regard to the long-term aims, there is, however, also some resonance with the two other discourses. The fact that the results are mixed shows that the movement has simultaneously clearly articulated state-level opponents but also more abstract targets of resistance. In regard to the causes of the war and the role of the US, the analysis discovers that many organizations hold views that differ substantially from those put forward by the theoretical approaches. Moreover, the chapter illustrates divisions and tensions between the organizations in regard to how they consider the relationship between the short- and long-term aims of the movement as well as to which broader struggles they link the movement.

In chapter 6 the theoretical debate concerning effective strategies as well as the primary context of resistance is reflected on by analyzing how these are understood within the movement. The chapter discovers most resonance with the state-centric approach but finds also some common ground with the globalist frameworks in regard to long-term struggles of the movement. These mixed results illustrate that instead of defining strategies in either nationally or globally oriented terms, as the theoretical approaches do, most of the organizations advocate a 'both-and' approach: they consider both state-based and global strategies important for the movement, although for different purposes. However, the organizations differ from each other in what they consider the primary context of resistance and there is also considerable disagreement regarding which strategies and, even more so, which tactics they regard as the most effective. Of all the internal divisions, that relating to main strategies and tactics seems to cause the most controversy.

Chapters 7 and 8 are closely interrelated, as they consider the issue of the effects and the power of the movement. Chapter 7 reflects on the theoretical debate dealing with the power of social movements by analyzing how the organizations articulate the power of the current anti-war movement. It shows that it is common to articulate it in relation to the national context in which the movement can seek to pressure those in power. Thus, the analysis shows most resonance with the state-centric

approach. This does not, however, exclude the view that also symbolic power at the global level is important. When compared to the theoretical debate, the chapter concludes that each of the organizations has generally a broader and more multifaceted understanding of power than any of the three theoretical approaches. While the theoretical debate is based on a clear 'either-or' logic, where power is conceptualized either in purely instrumental or purely symbolic terms, most organizations combine these two perspectives and consider both important in the struggle against (the) war. However, the chapter shows some tensions within the movement, regarding, for example, the celebration of diversity as a power resource. It is also problematic that hardly ever power of the organizations themselves, and even more rarely, power struggles between them are discussed openly or power of the movement is evaluated from a critical perspective.

Broadening the discussion above, chapter 8 helps to contextualize the observations made in regard to the question of power by examining how the main achievements and failures are viewed within the movement in the context of the Iraq War. It demonstrates that in contrast to the 'either-or' logic of the theoretical debate, the organizations usually conceive the successes in both instrumental and symbolic as well as in both global and national terms. Yet there are substantial differences between the organizations in regard to what they consider the most important successes of the movement and what they expect it to be able to achieve.

Chapter 9 summarizes the conclusions of the thesis and discusses their relevance from a broader perspective. The findings of each analytical chapter are first presented separately, after which their implications for the theoretical debate are discussed. It is concluded that the theoretical approaches are based on an excessively simple 'either-or' logic in almost every possible respect, that is, regardless of whether the theory is conceptualizing aims, agency, opponents, primary context of political engagement, strategies, effects or the power of the movement. While this is to a large extent due to a lack of engagement with the existing anti-war movement, more clearly the 'either-or' logic derives from the tendency to emphasize either symbolic power (academic globalists) or instrumental power (critical state-centric approach), which in turn stems from their differing normative and political premises. Academic globalists view state-based representational politics in highly negative terms, suggesting that democracy in the context of traditional political institutions can no

longer serve the interests of the people. They believe that rather than trying to change specific policies of nation states and governments, social movements such as the anti-war movement should seek to challenge the whole traditional political system. In contrast, the state-centric approach strongly criticizes the idea of global forms of political engagement, which are regarded as not only undermining the democratic representational system but also escaping power due to the abstract, global and non-strategic nature of 'post-political' struggle.

It is suggested that the 'either-or' logic embedded in all three theoretical approaches is problematic from the perspective of the existing anti-war movement, because the organizations within the movement themselves conceptualize most of the issues covered in the thesis in mixed and overlapping terms, that is, they deploy a 'both-and' approach instead. Furthermore, the concluding chapter shows that the theoretical debate fails entirely to take into account internal divisions, political conflicts and power struggles within the anti-war movement. This is especially problematic for the academic globalists, who conceptualize the Multitude and global civil society as essentially consensual global political collectives. Although it may seem that there is a widespread consensus within the movement, below the surface there are many ongoing political conflicts and struggles. It is difficult to accommodate all these in one (inter)national movement, not to mention a global one. In a word, transforming the movement into something more permanent and global is an extremely challenging endeavor which cannot be established 'from above'.

From the perspective of 'normal' political theory, it is unfortunate that a lack of engagement with the existing movement leads theorists to make inadequate interpretations. More importantly, however, from the perspective of critical theory it is problematic that theorists define political projects of resistance in a way that renders their conceptualizations autonomous from practice and their normative suggestions and visions in many respects different from the values and beliefs within the movement. Therefore, it is suggested that the theories to can be developed further by adopting a 'both-and' approach which not better reflects the way in which the relationship between the local and global as well as many other issues are conceived within the movement and also provides a more productive and comprehensive perspective for discussing power and resistance in the context of social movements generally.

## 2 ANALYSIS OF THE THEORETICAL DEBATE

### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter analyzes theoretical discourses that have recently engaged in a debate concerning resistance in the context of social movements in the global era. This debate is ongoing and multifaceted and it is not possible or necessary to consider all the discussion it comprises. The aim here, as noted in the introduction, is to analyze those ‘globally oriented’ theoretical discourses that can be regarded as currently popular and even dominant in IR. Criticism of the dominant discourses presented by certain scholars is introduced and assessed as well. The analysis conducted here constitutes the theoretical part of the thesis, although not in the most traditional sense.

Since the aim is to critically analyze the theoretical debate in order to develop it further, there must be an intimate interplay between the theoretical analysis conducted in this chapter and the empirical analysis to follow in later chapters, which aims to determine how much common ground there is between the theoretical and practical realms at the moment. In practical terms, this means that the ‘findings’ or ‘conclusions’ of the theoretical analysis in this chapter are used later on for evaluating empirical findings to ascertain possible convergences and divergences with the theoretical debate. The aim of this chapter is thus twofold: to first analyze the theoretical debate and then, on that basis, to design a research outline for the empirical analysis. The latter will include formulating the units of analysis, that is, the questions that need to be asked in light of the empirical material to be able to reflect upon the theoretical debate; in other words, the units of empirical analysis must derive from theory.

Before proceeding to the analysis, it is necessary to shortly reflect upon how ‘resistance’ is defined in the context of this study, as it is such a central concept<sup>1</sup>. Here, resistance is understood quite broadly as a conscious process of trying to change unwanted practices, a process

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<sup>1</sup> The term ‘resistance movement’, although used before the Second World War, is often connected to that particular context, and especially to the French resistance movement; and has been later used to signify basically any (underground) resistance movement in any country.

which takes place in the form of certain political strategies of oppositional action against something<sup>2</sup>. Resistance can thus be regarded as a form of, or way of organizing, power which aims at transforming unwanted political practices and/or existing power. As a concept it is intimately linked to the concept of power, which has been – and continues to be – the most fundamental concept in IR and Political Science. Until recently, however, resistance has been mainly understood in terms of resistance movements, usually defined as organized movements committed to resisting (trying to change) the policies of a government (or an occupying power) by either violent or nonviolent means. To be sure, a resistance movement in its common meaning is regarded as an organized effort that aims at changing the nature of current power, not overthrowing it<sup>3</sup>.

In postmodern and especially Foucauldian conceptualizations, power and resistance, as well as their relationship, are defined quite differently; the main argument is that they are intimately interrelated and cannot exist without each other (e.g. Foucault 1984: 93–95; 1980). This kind of an understanding of power and resistance is especially common in poststructuralist theoretical discourses, but with the ever-increasing popularity of Foucault, it has become popular in the social sciences and political theory also more generally. Indeed, it can be argued that these developments have had a significant influence on how the concept of resistance has recently been used in new and varying contexts: as a concept it is no longer linked only to traditionally defined resistance

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<sup>2</sup> In the context of the anti-war movement the concept of resistance refers to oppositional political action which aims at resisting war – either a particular war or war in general. It is important to note that within the field of anti-war studies there already exists a specific concept of ‘war resistance’ which is widely used in the research literature (e.g. Young 1987b: 23–48). However, in this study ‘war resistance’ is not a central concept due the fact that the theoretical framework to which the thesis seeks to contribute is not located in either the traditional social movement research (on anti-war/peace movement) or the field of traditional peace studies.

<sup>3</sup> If its aim is to overthrow a government, a movement is usually regarded as ‘revolutionary’, potentially dangerous and destabilizing. The term ‘insurgency’ is often used in such cases by state and military officials. However, even resistance movements are sometimes defined in the above-mentioned way. For example, the US Department of Defense defines a resistance movement as an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms).

movements, but is also associated with new social movements that are operating in liberal and democratic western societies. Indeed, it seems that postmodern theory has made it common to conceptualize basically any social movement as some sort of ‘resistance movement’, which is an extremely interesting phenomenon in itself. Moreover, with increasingly many social movements conceptualized as global movements, the idea of ‘global resistance movements’ has become popular. However, as this thesis demonstrates, these conceptualizations are not without problems and it is necessary to acknowledge that accepting (or rejecting) them always has certain political implications.

## 2.2 Three Theoretical Approaches to Resistance

The theoretical approaches to be analyzed here are divided into two broader categories – those theoretical discourses which emphasize the transformative character of globalization, especially from the perspective of the role and power of social movements, and those which challenge these interpretations. These are not to be regarded as diametric opposites and, as will be demonstrated later, some of them may even share certain premises – a fact which is important when discussing the findings of the empirical analysis.<sup>4</sup> For the purposes of this thesis, the theoretical discourses studied are referred to as ‘academic globalists’ and ‘academic globalization skeptics’. The emphasis on the term *academic* is intended to distinguish these theoretical thinkers from political actors and activists who, for example, David Held and Anthony McGrew (2002) have described as ‘globalists’ and ‘globalization skeptics’. The academic globalists are further divided into two groups, *liberal cosmopolitans* and *radical poststructuralists*. To be sure, it is not argued that these are the only possible groups within the category of academic globalists, but they are the most relevant in this context as they have recently and very actively engaged in debates on how the problem of war can be tackled by social movements in the twenty-first century. In contrast to the academic globalists, the second category

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<sup>4</sup> It should be noted that some sort of simplification through categorization is required in highlighting the main differences between theoretical approaches. Any sort of categorization always risks losing some nuances but is nonetheless necessary when the aim is to illustrate main points of difference and similarity.

can be called ‘academic globalization skeptics’, which in this study refers to an approach I have chosen to call the *critical state-centric approach*, which very well captures the main points of criticism directed towards theoretical discourses advocating globalism.

These three theoretical approaches are studied through an analysis of works by certain central scholars. The liberal cosmopolitan approach is examined mainly through the work of IR theorists such as Mary Kaldor and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and sociologists such as Ulrich Beck and Manuel Castells. The poststructuralist approach is studied as it is reflected in theorizations by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, and the state-centric approach in light of the critique by David Chandler. These are by no means the only scholars taking part in the debate,<sup>5</sup> but are here taken as *examples*, since it would be impossible to analyze all the related discussion. In sum, the theorizations of the scholars are treated here as illustrative examples of current political theories describing and conceptualizing the role and power of social movements from different perspectives.<sup>6</sup>

Why then is it important and relevant to study precisely these three theoretical approaches and not some others? It can be argued that the first two approaches mentioned are currently *dominant* in the theoretical discourse and the third is a recent – and essentially the only comprehensive – *critique* of the two, although it fails to address some important aspects of the academic globalists which will be taken up in this thesis. The argument put forward here is that since they are all influential discourses that suggest more or less explicitly certain types of political strategies of resistance for social movements, it is important to study them from the perspective of ‘critical theory in political practice’. This necessarily requires analyzing their premises in relation to those espoused by social movements, the anti-war movement in the present case. Although these theoretical approaches are not ‘designed’ especially for the anti-war

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<sup>5</sup> Just to give a few examples, IR scholars such as David Held and Martin Shaw can be labelled as liberal cosmopolitans and Chantal Mouffe as a critical state-centric.

<sup>6</sup> It is not an unusual approach to limit the number of scholars whose work is analyzed in a thesis and to treat them as examples of certain political traditions or approaches. In this case, it is also necessary due to the fact that there are two sets of analysis (theoretical and empirical) in one thesis, both of which include several categories. The theoretical analysis encompasses three different approaches, and the empirical the premises of four anti-war organizations.



movement, they do have many elements which concern it in particular.

Firstly, as explained in the introduction, liberal cosmopolitans conceptualize global civil society as an 'answer to war', thus representing social movements (including the anti-war movement) as an integral element in resistance (political action) against war. In their analytical description of social movements, liberal cosmopolitans suggest – either in implicit or explicit terms – that movements should concentrate their efforts on global rather than state-based political strategies of opposition since liberal cosmopolitans are highly skeptical of working through or with established political institutions of representative democracy at a national level. Secondly, the radical poststructuralist approach, although it does not explicitly address the anti-war movement either, nevertheless talks about 'a war against war'. This struggle against a 'global state of war' is supposedly taking place in the form of the Multitude, which consists of a diverse collection of social movements. In this regard, radical poststructuralists suggest that social movements should 'globalize resistance', that is, rely on a global strategy of resistance instead of favoring state-based political strategies.

Thirdly, although the critical state-centric approach is not directly concerned with the anti-war movement, as a theoretical discourse it must be regarded as important and relevant in this context, for it straightforwardly challenges the two global approaches. In criticizing heavily global strategies of resistance, the approach suggests that social movements should rather invest in state-based political action (or resistance) and work together with, rather than in opposition to, democratic representative institutions.

Importantly, it must be acknowledged that these three theoretical approaches differ in the extent as well as the nature of normativity embedded in them, which means that criticism of them stems from different perspectives of the 'critical theory in practice' approach used to evaluate them. Liberal cosmopolitans mostly *describe* social movements and their activities rather than aim at providing clear suggestions for political strategies. However, it is possible and necessary to analyze their conceptualizations from the perspective of critical theory, because in analyzing social movements in a certain way the scholars cannot avoid producing guidelines for social movements and thus at least implicitly promote a certain normative framework for the movements. In fact,

some liberal cosmopolitans explicitly argue that social movements should globalize political action. Liberal cosmopolitans also explicitly advocate the ideal of a globally oriented liberal cosmopolitan political regime. Thus, it can be argued that they do not merely describe and analyze social movements, although they often wish to give the impression that they are doing only that, and in an 'objective' and value-free manner.

Radical poststructuralists clearly aim at providing suggestions for social movements and are very open about the normative character of their suggestions. They candidly promote increasingly global strategies for social movements from their own normative perspective based on the Multitude's 'war against war', which is believed to be leading to a communistic revolution and global socialist regime. The difference when compared to the liberal cosmopolitans is that radical poststructuralists have an explicitly normative political project. On the one hand, this can be regarded as a positive element, because that is obviously what any critical theory should have; on the other hand, it can be also be regarded as problematic if it turns out that they are suggesting (or even imposing) a political project that does not resonate with the normative premises of social movements themselves.

The state-centric approach does not so much describe or suggest as criticize, the object of its critique being not only both globalist theoretical discourses, but also the practices of certain globally oriented social movements. Nevertheless, the approach can also be regarded as open to evaluation from the perspective of 'critical theory in political practice'. Firstly, it can be argued that although it strongly criticizes the two other approaches for lacking a political subject/movement to which they might direct their suggestions, it does not have one itself either. Secondly, while it criticizes global approaches for imposing their normative ideals on (yet non-existent) movements, it inevitably promotes a certain normative framework itself in suggesting that social movements should concentrate their resistance at the state level and work with the political establishment in the context of representative democracy.

The logic of the analysis is the following. Each theoretical approach is analyzed separately in a dedicated section. Firstly, each is examined from the perspective of how it conceptualizes the Iraq War, and thus the role and power of the US in the current international system. Secondly, each is assessed from the perspective of the kind of strategies of resistance it offers

and suggests to social movements. In this connection, it is explored how the proposals are justified and the kinds of conceptualizations of power they are based on. With regard to both of these questions, the theoretical approaches are also analyzed in terms of the kinds of normative premises they base their conceptualizations and suggestions on.<sup>7</sup>

## 2.3 The Liberal Cosmopolitan Approach

### 2.3.1 The Iraq War and the Exceptionalism of US Hegemony

The liberal cosmopolitan approach is characterized by its firm trust in international institutions, agreements and cooperation between states as means to prevent and stop wars. After the end of the Cold War, liberal cosmopolitans were very optimistic, for the immediate threat posed by the Cold War was removed, and they put a great deal of hope in international institutions, especially the UN. It was believed that there were going to be fewer conflicts and wars, because liberal democracy, as a peaceful form of government, was now spreading all over the world while economic interdependence was growing as well. These views were put to the test by several international crises and conflicts during the 1990s, not least the Kosovo War in 1999. However, it was not until the US War on Terror that different realities started to appear. Since then, many of the most optimistic views of liberal cosmopolitans have been challenged, as the US unilaterally bypassed international law by 'pre-emptively' attacking Iraq militarily without authorization of the UN Security Council.

However, it seems that not even these developments have eroded liberal cosmopolitans' belief in liberal values and cosmopolitanism as such; rather, they have interpreted the war in terms of the exceptional role and power of the US. Indeed, in regard to the War on Terror and especially the Iraq War, many liberal cosmopolitans have stressed that the

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<sup>7</sup> Although the theoretical approaches are here linked to the particular context of the Iraq War, the approaches as such are not 'fixed' to a specific context of any particular war. In this thesis, attention is paid especially to their views in regard to the Iraq War as intimately connected to the War on Terror, because in this way it is possible to confine and direct the perspective to the same context that the organizations studied concentrate on in the new anti-war movement.

problem of war in the current international system is intimately connected to the exceptional character of the US hegemony. Mary Kaldor, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Ulrich Beck, among others, have criticized the US for acting unilaterally instead of promoting a multilateral approach including all liberal and democratic western states and the broader international community. In this regard, some liberal cosmopolitans have gone even so far as to criticize the US for constructing a 'permanent state of exception' that serves its national interest by making it more sovereign than other states (Kaldor 2003b: 12; also 2004).

For example, Kaldor (2003b: 12; also 2004) has argued that this permanent state of (international) exception has made the US sovereign in absolute terms. According to this logic, all nations have to unite with the US to fight against rogue states threatening all of humanity; otherwise, they themselves risk being categorized as enemies of humankind. In this view, the failure or unwillingness of the US to recognize the need for a multilateral and cosmopolitan approach is regarded as a major threat to the proper working of the international system as well as a threat to international stability. The unilateralism of the US is regarded as diminishing the significance of international law, whose importance the liberal cosmopolitans strongly emphasize.

The fact that the national (the US) perspective clashes increasingly often with the cosmopolitan is regarded as one of the main problems. As Beck (2006: 123) puts it: 'The two images of world society clash, the one beholden to the national outlook, the other to the cosmopolitan outlook – on the one hand, world society viewed as a patchwork of nation-states (hence the sum of the sovereign states) and, on the other, an at once individualized and globalized world society as a cosmopolitan human rights regime'. A similar concern is presented, for example, by Tim Dunne (2003: 306), who is worried about the universalistic domination of the US over international society. Dunne sees two major threats here, the absence of a balance of power and a lack of consensus between the major powers in world politics (*ibid*):

[W]hile [Hedley] Bull thought the primary challenge to international society was the 'revolt' against the West by newly decolonized states and peoples, the main threat today would appear to be a revolt against the institutions of international society by the US.

Although some liberal cosmopolitans use the concept ‘permanent exception’, it seems that more generally the approach nonetheless believes that the exceptional situation is not going to last for long. Indeed, many adherents maintain that in the long run it will become impossible for the US to act unilaterally and violate international norms without sanctions. (E.g. Dunne 2003: 303–304, 315–316.) For example, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2004a: 66) argues that the fact that unilateralism was transformed ‘from an occasional tactic to a full-fledged strategy’ in the case of Iraq has been very costly to the US in terms of soft power. Accordingly, he suggests that the US should ‘invest more in its own soft-power resources, and learn to wield its soft power more effectively’ (ibid: 98).

Nye believes that soft power, related to persuading and tempting others, is challenging the role of military-related hard power. In his view, soft power is an ability of an actor to reach its goal in such a way that it can convince others to do as it wishes of their own ‘free’ will. As soft power denotes the ability to attract others and shape their preferences, it is based on persuasion and not on direct influence. (Nye 2004a: 2–5; 2004b: 124–125; also Nye 1990; Keohane & Nye 2001.) According to Nye (2004a: 17), soft power is extremely important in the promotion of ‘democracy, human rights, and open markets’ since it is easier ‘to attract people to democracy than to coerce them to be democratic’. In a word, he is very explicit about the core values held in liberalism generally. He stresses that these values may be challenged by unpopular foreign policy, which in the case of Iraq has resulted in the declining attractiveness of the US ‘as measured by the global opinion polls’ (ibid: 14, 38).

Similarly, Beck (2006: 123) refers to world opinion in arguing that the ‘hybrid illegal-legitimate’ Iraq War ‘both alarmed and individualized world opinion’. To him, it seemed as if ‘each individual was confronted with the existential choice between war and peace’ while being ‘drawn into a maelstrom of moral and political dilemmas or appealed to the available positions to take a clear stance for or against it’ (ibid: 123–124). This, in turn, showed ‘how US military unilateralism set in train an unintended and unwelcome cosmopolitanism of side effects’ (ibid: 124).<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Suggestions by soft-power theorists such as Nye that the US should invest more in public diplomacy to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of Muslims and other ‘dissatisfied’ groups have been criticized widely (e.g. Islam 2006: 83–85; Chiddick 2006).

The arguments by Nye and Beck illustrate the commonly shared view within the liberal cosmopolitan approach that war is a common problem which can be solved by states acting on shared values and principles, adhering to international law and seeking approval from the international community, which reflects as well as produces the norms of the world political society. Because liberal cosmopolitans believe that the norms and values which guide state level decision-making are constituted inside the international community and/or global civil society, they regard non-state actors as very important.

One of the shortcomings of this approach, however, is that it assumes that there really exist commonly shared cosmopolitan, that is, universal, values that can be rationally discussed; indeed, it has not always been possible to find reasonable and peaceful solutions to political conflicts by negotiating. A further weakness is that liberal cosmopolitans do not usually problematize their own perspective insofar as they seem not to find anything wrong with the 'liberal way of war'<sup>9</sup>.

Although typically uncritical of the humanitarian justifications of the liberal interventionism of western states generally, in regard to the War on Terror liberal cosmopolitans have taken a more critical stance. They strongly criticize the US and even argue that the Iraq War illustrates that the US has gained too much power in the international system. On the surface, the emphasis on the exceptionalism of US power and hegemony bears some resemblance to the criticism voiced by more radical approaches, as we will see later on. However, the difference is that radical poststructuralists not only point their finger at the US, but also emphasize broader ideological factors and power structures behind the problem of war, whereby they frame their proposed solutions in different terms. While criticizing the role and power of western states and the premises of liberalism more generally, radical approaches usually regard liberal cosmopolitanism as part (and sometimes even as a cause) of the problem rather than as a solution.

In contrast, liberal cosmopolitans do not believe that radical structural changes are necessary; rather, they suggest that all that is needed is to put the US 'back on track' with the 'rest of the world'. In this sense, the

<sup>9</sup> For a critique of the 'liberal way of war', see e.g. Reid 2006; Dillon & Reid 2009.

approach more or less explicitly ends up favoring the current status quo, although in the long run the aim is the creation of a global cosmopolitan society, which, it is thought, will make the world more peaceful and secure. In other words, a liberal order is equated with peace and justice, although at the same time such an order is tantamount to violence and poverty for many outside the western world.

Moreover, liberal cosmopolitans believe that this global political regime, a global society (and later a world government), can and should be constructed consensually, gradually and non-radically. Similarly, they think that global problems in general are best tackled by enhancements of global civil society together with more contracts and institutions; that is, peace can be achieved with more governance constituted at the global level.<sup>10</sup> In this regard, the difference vis-à-vis critical approaches is quite substantial. While liberal cosmopolitans speak, for example, of 'a new form of *consensual* global governance' (Castells 2008: 91, emphasis added), the radical approaches regard precisely the increasing extent of governance by liberal states and institutions as one of the main problems.

### 2.3.2 State (US) Power Challenged: Global Civil Society

As regards the possibilities of political action against war (liberal cosmopolitans hardly ever use the term 'resistance'; it does not seem to belong to their conceptual vocabulary), after the end of the Cold War the view that international institutions, legal agreements and cooperation between states are the best means to prevent and stop wars was especially strong. However, the events of 9/11, the consequent US War on Terror, and particularly the Iraq War have resulted in liberal cosmopolitans not only demanding more governance on the part of the (liberal) society of states, but also increasingly emphasizing the role of global civil society and non-state actors in this regard. Global civil society has even been characterized as 'an answer to war'. For example, Kaldor (2003a: 3) argues that global civil society should be understood as 'a way of addressing the

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<sup>10</sup> On liberal global governance, see e.g. Held 1995; 2007; Held & McGrew 2002.

problem of war, of debating, arguing about, discussing and pressing for possible solutions or alternatives<sup>11</sup>.

What then is meant by ‘global civil society’ here? In describing *Global Civil Society – An Answer to War* as a book ‘about a political idea’, Kaldor (2003a: 3) argues that the term ‘expresses a real phenomenon, even if the boundaries of the phenomenon vary according to different definitions, and even if the shape and direction of the phenomenon are constantly changing’. In other words, global civil society is characterized as a real phenomenon that is nevertheless difficult to define or to describe. Indeed, the idea of global civil society is a very broad one and there is no single definition of it<sup>12</sup>. Yet, there are some commonly held understandings within the liberal cosmopolitan approach that help to explain why it is that global civil society can be conceptualized as ‘an answer to war’.

First of all, the term itself makes it clear that global civil society refers to something regarded as being beyond the boundaries of nation states. Kaldor (2003a: 79; also 2002; 2003c) very explicitly points out that ‘the central thrust’ of her argument is that ‘a strict distinction’ between ‘national’ and ‘global’ cannot be drawn, because ‘those distinctions no longer make sense’. Her argumentation is very similar to that of sociologists such as Manuel Castells and Ulrich Beck. Castells (2008: 84, emphasis in original) argues that social movements and other non-state actors constitute global civil society in the sense that they have ‘*a global frame of reference in their action and goals*’. It is suggested that new transnational communities are creating a basis for social coexistence, cooperation and bonding (ibid: 49–50) as citizens-voters realize there are forces operating beyond the state and problems that national governments cannot solve on their own (Kriesberg 1997: 9; Smith et al. 1997: 60). For Castells (2008: 81), globalization represents a process constituting ‘a social system with the capacity to work as a unit on a planetary scale’. While it is not that ‘everything or everyone is globalized’, he argues that global networks ‘structure the whole planet’, affecting ‘everything and everyone’ (ibid).

Convinced of the break-up of ‘the nation-state orthodoxy of politics and society’, Beck (2000: 65) talks about ‘the emergence of new power

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<sup>11</sup> Kaldor presented similar views already in the 1980s when she was actively taking part in British anti-nuclear campaigns (e.g. Kaldor 1987).

<sup>12</sup> Kaldor (2003a: 6–12) herself differentiates between five civil societies: *societas civilis*, bourgeois society, and activist, neoliberal and postmodern societies.



opportunities and new social spaces for action, living and perception'. Suggesting that these developments may lead people to demand 'direct democracy—on a world scale', he speaks of a 'global nexus of responsibility', where people take part in political decision-making directly, not via representatives (ibid: 70). As Beck himself notes, this bears a resemblance to the utopia of a cosmopolitan society outlined by Immanuel Kant two hundred years ago in *Perpetual Peace*.<sup>13</sup> Kant contrasted cosmopolitan society with representative democracy, which he opposed as 'despotic', preferring global responsibility in which individuals would take part in decision-making directly. In that view, cosmopolitan society is regarded as a condition precedent to democracy. However, it presupposes some universally valid legal relationships and some form of a self-experience of global civil society. (Ibid: 70, 88–89.)

What then could be regarded as a self-experience of global civil society? How does the world society prove itself to *itself*, that is how can it come into being, become something of a subject? Beck (2000: 89) argues that negative experiences of conflict and repression not only divide but also *unite* people of the world. In his view, people are experiencing 'a common global destiny' which 'first appears as an *experience of danger*', this being most evident in the debate about climate change as people recognize that environmental problems affect everyone (ibid: 90–91). More than a matter of growing environmental consciousness, he argues that globalization itself generates this kind of bonding (ibid: 49) which exceeds national boundaries (ibid: 67, emphasis in original):

Just like poverty or profits, *compassion is also becoming global*. Whereas the *citoyen* is still trapped in the framework of the national state, the *bourgeois* acts in a cosmopolitan manner – which means that when his democratic heart throbs, his action no longer has to obey the imperatives of national loyalty.

Similar argumentation is common more generally in the liberal cosmopolitan approach (e.g. Kaldor 2003a: 112) characterized by the belief that 'the human species increasingly recognizes that its members

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<sup>13</sup> Kaldor (2003a: 37–38), too, argues that 'the spread of democracy, increased global economic interconnectedness, and the emergence of a global public sphere based on global media and transnational social movements' illustrate that 'the factors which Kant believed would lead to a universal civil society are still in existence'.

share a common fate, whatever that may be' (Kriesberg 1997: 7–8). In other words, non-state actors and their global networks are thought to form a collective political force operating outside of nation states, a situation which Beck describes as a transition from the 'first' to the 'second modernity'. While the first modernity was characterized by 'methodological nationalism', state and society being conceived and organized as coextensive, Beck (2000: 102) argues that due to globalization the 'unity of state, society and individual underpinning the first modernity is in the course of dissolution', leading to an emergence of the second modernity. Alongside the world society of nation states there now exists, according to Beck, 'a powerful *non-state world society*', constituted by 'transnational players of the most diverse kinds' (ibid: 103, emphasis added). The most significant development here is that in this non-state world society the rules of publicly legitimated politics are said to be losing 'their binding character' (ibid: 102). In other words, these changes are seen as challenging the authority, control and legitimacy of nation states both in external and internal terms. Transnational non-state actors are even regarded as 'more effective than the authorities of nation states' in creating 'inclusive sovereignty' of their own (ibid: 103).

Interestingly, the above-mentioned process is described as a 'politicization through depoliticization of states' that gives more scope for political action within world society (Beck 2000: 103, 107). Although social movements and other non-state actors are very different in their organization, goals and strategies, they are regarded as a link between the interests of people across borders of nation states, providing an interface between the more formal elements of politics (Smith et al. 1997: xiii–xiv; also Alger 1997: 260; Kriesberg 1997: 14; Mittelman 2000; Mittelman & Chin 2000). They are described as something of a 'global conscience' when representing public interests. Transnational interaction and links to non-state actors are considered significant, as they 'multiply the channels of access to the international system' and therefore help 'to transform the practice of national sovereignty' (Keck & Sikkink 1998: 1–2). This is regarded as a positive direction, as it makes it possible 'to draw up a legal and institutional framework that will legitimate and permanently establish this important extension of democracy' (Beck 2000: 99). However, transnational social movements are not a new phenomenon, for they have played an active part in the very construction of the international system

(Chatfield 1997: 21–22). Yet, since the mid-1900s there has been an enormous increase in their number. Growth has been particularly rapid in the issue areas of human rights, environment, economic justice, peace and development. (Smith 1997: 42, 48.)

Many social movements work for multiple goals and regard themselves as increasingly interrelated, a development believed to make them stronger. Accordingly, Castells (2001: 143) wants to reverse ‘the popular motto of twenty-five years ago’ by arguing that ‘social movements must think local (relating to their own concerns and identity) and act global – at the level where it really matters today’. In this regard, a leading social movement theorist, Sidney Tarrow (2004: 4–5) argues that globalization offers ‘incentives and causes of resistance for many (although not all) transnational activists’, bringing new characteristics to collective action: ‘there is more of it, that it involves a broader spectrum of ordinary people and elites, and that it extends to a wider range of domestic and international concerns’. Its most important feature he considers its relation to ‘the current wave of globalization’ and ‘the changing structure of international politics’ (ibid: 5).

These transformations are often viewed in similar terms in IR. Whereas sociologists talk about a ‘quiet revolution’ that has become visible after the end of the Cold War (e.g. Chatfield 1997: 19–20) or about a shift from the first to second modernity (Beck 2000), in IR the transformation has been described, among other things, in terms of denationalization or multidimensionality (Nye 2004a; also 1990a; Keohane & Nye 2001). For example, Nye argues that changes on the agenda of world politics can be viewed in terms of a transformation from a one- to three-dimensional chess game, which has a top, middle and bottom board. Whereas the top board represents classic interstate military issues and the middle board economic issues, the bottom board stands for transnational issues such as terrorism, international crime or climate change. The division of power between different players in this three-dimensional system is considered to be multidimensional. With its global military reach, the US is the only superpower on the top board, but the distribution of power is less clear on the other two. (Nye 2004a: 4–5, 137.) Whereas the distribution of power on the middle board is multipolar, on the bottom board it is more complex, being widely and ‘chaotically organized’ among state and non-state actors alike (ibid: 4).

According to Nye (2004a: 90, 31–32, 106), non-state actors can challenge state power on the bottom board by developing their own soft-power resources for challenging official foreign policy goals. The information revolution has made states ‘more porous’ as they now share the stage with many other actors who use information as a power resource (ibid: 91; also 90, 97–98, 106). Regarding these ‘private sources of soft power’ as highly important, Nye argues that ‘[i]nformation is power, and today a much larger part of the world’s population has access to that power’ (ibid: 105, 137).<sup>14</sup> While in the traditional view power is connected to military or economic might, politics in the Information Age ‘may ultimately be about whose story wins’, argues Nye, quoting other scholars (ibid: 106). This makes politics basically a competition for attractiveness (ibid: 31). In fact, Nye argues that politics has become a struggle over credibility – creation and destruction of it (ibid: 106).

For Castells, too, information is power. He maintains that ‘shaping global views’ is ‘the new, and *most effective, frontier of the exercise of power* on the world stage’ (Castells 2001: 161, emphasis added). When politics is primarily practiced and played out in the media, image-making equals power (Castells 2002: 507). In this regard, liberal cosmopolitans are highly enthusiastic about the role of the Internet. It is thought to provide ‘the material basis for social movements’ that reconstructs ‘the world from the bottom up’ (Castells 2001: 143).

For Castells (2008: 90, emphasis added), exercise of ‘the power of the world’s public opinion through global media and Internet networks is *the most effective* form of broadening political participation on a global scale’. He argues that ‘global civil society now has the technological means to exist independently from political institutions and from the mass media’, referring to ‘the new global public sphere’ (ibid: 86, 90). Indeed, the connection between global civil society and the new information technology is usually discussed by liberal cosmopolitans in terms of the global public sphere. The need for this kind of a concept seems to arise from the fact that in order to be able to speak of global civil society, there must be some kind of self-experience of it.

The concept of the global public sphere has been defined in many

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<sup>14</sup> Nye (2004a: 6) suggests that which resources are soft-power resources can be ‘measured by asking people through polls or focus groups’.

ways, but Castells seems to be referring to a definition by Ingrid Volkmer, for whom the political system of a society no longer rests on the public and public opinion.<sup>15</sup> Rather, she speaks of ‘a more or less autonomous global public sphere which can be considered not as a space between the ‘public’ and the state but between the state and an extra-societal global community’ (Volkmer 2003). This notion of an autonomous global public sphere represents quite a substantial departure from the modernist, Habermasian idea of the public sphere, which was inseparably connected to the system of nation states and citizens with ‘rational’ political opinions. While for Habermas there is only one public sphere, in the new definition there are multiple public spheres, which increasingly often cross national boundaries. According to Volkmer, the global public sphere is a ‘multi-discursive political space’ and a ‘sphere of mediation’ that has no center or periphery (ibid).

It seems that it is impossible for liberal cosmopolitans to overstate the significance of the Internet, as it is regarded as much more than just a tool for social and political protest. It is believed to not only facilitate and enhance global civil society (e.g. Warkentin 2001: 32, 35–36), but also change the rules of the ‘socio-political game in cyberspace’, affecting also ‘the game itself – namely, the forms and goals of movements and political actors’ (Castells 2001: 137; also Beck 2000: 105). For Castells (2001: 139, 141; also Warkentin 2001: 35–36), the Internet has become *the instrument* for social movements of the network society in expressing and organizing manifestos that can influence political institutions by influencing public opinion. Very similarly, Nye (2004a: 31–32) argues that actors which have multiple channels of communication for framing issues and whose dominant culture and values are compatible with prevailing global norms will succeed.

Indeed, ‘global’ values and norms seem to lie at the heart of the discussion about global civil society and the global public sphere. For Castells (2001: 140), the essential purpose of social movements is communicating values, encouraging ‘mobilization around meaning’ and reaching out to ‘those who would adhere to their values, and from there to affect the consciousness of society as a whole’. Since transformed

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<sup>15</sup> For different definitions, see e.g. Olesen 2007; Thörn 2007; Conway & Singh 2009; Linjakumpu 2009: 110–118.

consciousness has impacts ‘on political behavior, on voting patterns, and on decisions of governments’, state power becomes undermined by ‘the counterpower strategies of the global civil society’ (Castells 2008: 82). It is maintained that through their ‘horizontal networks of communication’ non-state actors ‘foster social change’ (ibid: 90) at the global level, meaning that state institutions can be largely bypassed (Castells 2001: 142). This is justified on the basis of the ‘decreased ability of nationally based political systems to manage the world’s problems on a global scale’ (Castells 2008: 83). Hence, global civil society and nation states seem actually to be competitive entities. A description of non-state actors as ‘the advocates of the needs, interests, and values of people at large’ (ibid: 83) implies that states do not or cannot represent these.

To sum up, liberal cosmopolitans regard the power of social movements and other non-state actors as depending on their ability to mobilize broad public support at the global level with their informational and soft-power resources. By communicating global norms and values in the global public sphere, social movements are said to help to build global civil society and ‘transnational solidarity’ beyond the nation state, with these even being able to give people a global identity with a higher loyalty. Moreover, it is argued that social movements enhance political participation and even new forms of democracy at the global level. Where movements are said to ‘help’, ‘foster’, ‘provide’, ‘facilitate’, or ‘generate’ opportunities for human progress and emancipation, states and democratically elected governments ‘restrict’, ‘manage’, or ‘control’ them. On balance, liberal cosmopolitanism quite clearly defines itself in opposition to states, governments and thus state-based representational democratic politics as well.

## 2.4 The Radical Poststructuralist Approach

From a theoretical point of view, it is very interesting that some arguments and conceptualizations of the liberal cosmopolitan approach seem to bear a clear resemblance to those presented within another, quite different theoretical approach, namely that of radical poststructuralism. Both stress that the power of nation states has radically diminished and the role and power of non-state actors has greatly increased. In both approaches,

the main framework for political action and resistance is regarded as global. However, these two approaches also have clear differences. In this section, the ‘basics’ of the theoretical thinking by the best-known poststructuralists of the decade, the post-Marxists thinkers Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, are presented and analyzed in comparison to the liberal cosmopolitan approach.

The two main works of Hardt and Negri, *Empire* (published in 2000) and *Multitude* (2004), have inspired an extensive amount of acclaim as well as criticism<sup>16</sup>. They are referred to continuously in academic journals and publications in disciplines ranging from IR to sociology and from cultural to media studies. In *Empire*, Hardt and Negri mainly concentrate on the constitution of Empire and its implications for state sovereignty. In the second book, the theme of resistance is more central and also the concept of ‘global war’ is discussed there in great detail. As suggested in the introduction to this thesis, Hardt and Negri’s conceptualizations are extremely interesting from the perspective of the anti-war movement for many different reasons. Firstly, they conceptualize resistance against war as the most important task of current political life. Secondly, they aim at outlining a global political project in which the people of the world would wage a ‘war against war’ in the form of the Multitude. Thirdly, they refer to social movements as the most relevant actors in resistance against Empire and the ‘global state of war’, and provide some suggestions as to how such how resistance should be organized. The sections to follow first discuss their main concepts – Empire, biopower and ‘global war’ – then take up the concepts of resistance and the Multitude.

#### 2.4.1 Empire, Biopower and Global War

Whereas the liberal cosmopolitan approach can be characterized as being highly optimistic about the possibilities brought by globalization, the poststructuralist approach regards the process very critically on the whole. For liberal cosmopolitans, globalization means that the power of nation states has significantly eroded, and while poststructuralists agree that

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<sup>16</sup> *Empire* and *Multitude* are the first two volumes of a trilogy. The third, *Commonwealth* (2009), is not included in the analysis here.

globalization has diminished state power, they maintain that this power has devolved mainly to global corporations and economic elites instead of global civil society. Hardt and Negri (2004: 163) actually criticize the recent theoretical debate for maintaining that ‘either nation-states are still important or there has been a globalization of the figures of authority’, because for them globalization does not mean that nation states are no longer important or powerful but that ‘their powers and functions are being transformed in a new global framework’. Although states still have important roles in determining and maintaining legal and economic functions, they are simultaneously being ‘transformed by the emerging global power they tend increasingly to serve’ (ibid; also 168–169).

This global power Hardt and Negri describe as an economic and decentralized Empire. For them, power in Empire is globally divided between different actors in a pyramid-like model. The hierarchic ‘Pyramid of Global Constitution’ consists of three tiers with several levels each. On the top of the pyramid, the very first level of the first tier, the US is holding ‘hegemony over the global use of force’<sup>17</sup>, followed on the second level by the G7 states, which ‘control the primary global monetary instruments and thus have the ability to regulate international exchanges’ (Hardt & Negri 2000: 309). On the third level of the first tier, cultural and biopolitical power is deployed by ‘a heterogeneous set of associations’ that, it is claimed, include ‘more or less the same powers that exercise hegemony on the military and monetary levels’ (ibid: 310).

The second tier in the pyramid consists of transnational capitalist corporations and networks, below which are located the sovereign states that have some regional power. The role of nation states is reduced to serving as ‘filters of the flow of global circulation’, which mainly means distributing ‘the flows of wealth to and from the global power’ although states also ‘discipline their own populations as much this is still possible’ (Hardt & Negri 2000: 310). Where liberal cosmopolitans believe that despite difficulties in the international system led economically, culturally and politically by liberal and democratic western states, the system should not be regarded as subordinating or coercive by definition, this is exactly

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<sup>17</sup> Although Hardt and Negri argue that the US is on the top the pyramid, their view has been criticized by those who think that they do not sufficiently take into consideration the role of the US as a motor of globalization (e.g. Abu-Manneh 2004; Harle & Moisis 2007).



the position Hardt and Negri take. They maintain that the liberal world order is being imposed on everyone whether they like it or not.

On the third, or lowest, tier of the pyramid, lies the Multitude which represents 'popular interests in the global power arrangement' (Hardt & Negri 2000: 311). This is the 'People', who are represented either by small (subordinate) nation states, NGOs, the media, and social or religious movements that are 'at least relatively independent of nation-states and capital' (ibid). Together they provide the structure of global civil society in 'channeling the needs and desires of the multitude into forms that can be represented within the functioning of the global power structures' (ibid). In other words, the Multitude of the radical poststructuralists is a counterpart of sorts to the global civil society of the liberal cosmopolitans, although its character and functions are defined differently.

In Hardt and Negri's *Empire*, capital holds the power, but *Empire* is dependent on the work of the people 'renewing' the capital. By 'proletariat' Hardt and Negri do not refer only to workers, but to all those who are deprived by global capitalism. As 'an open, inclusive concept', the Multitude is not the same as 'the working class', which they regard as an excessively exclusive concept that separates the workers from 'the poor, unpaid domestic laborers, and all others who do not receive a wage' (Hardt & Negri 2004: xiv).<sup>18</sup> In contrast, the Multitude is described as something of a creative power that invents new and innovative solutions, a power which in turn provides it with the ability to resist *Empire*.

When it comes to the relationship between war and power, there are interesting parallels between the liberal cosmopolitan and the radical poststructuralist approaches. Liberal cosmopolitans regard the Iraq War in terms of the exceptionalism of the current situation, in which one nation state has temporarily gained so much power that it can act unilaterally without the consent of the international community. This interpretation as such is not in conflict with the views of Hardt and Negri. However, they do not concentrate as much on the role of the US, stressing instead much

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<sup>18</sup> The Multitude can be viewed from a socio-economic perspective, but it is also 'a concept of race, gender, and sexuality differences' (Hardt & Negri 2004: 100–101). Hardt and Negri point out that 'something like a concept of the multitude has long been part of powerful streams of feminist and antiracist politics' where instead of trying to transform the world into 'a world without racial or gender difference', the aim is to create a world 'in which race and gender do not matter' (ibid: 101).

broader structural aspects when describing Empire as something that ‘cuts diagonally across the debates that pose unilateralism and multilateralism or pro-Americanism and anti-Americanism as the only global political alternatives’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: xii). They regard unilateralism and multilateralism not just as undesirable, but as impossible in current conditions and argue that ‘attempts to pursue them will not succeed in maintaining the current global order’ (ibid: xiii). Indeed, Hardt and Negri introduced their concept of Empire and biopower *before* 9/11 and the US War on Terror. The analysis in their first book was not influenced by these events, but rather reflected the realities of the 1990s, the decade after the end of the Cold War. In their second book, they develop their insights further, especially in regard to the War on Terror.

For Hardt and Negri (2004: xiii), war is not a continuation of politics by other means but an essential instrument of rule in Empire for governing the global order. They argue that war has become ‘the basis of the internal politics of the global order, the politics of Empire’ as the concept of legalized war has collapsed (ibid: 22). In this regard, they draw on the work of Michel Foucault, applying it to IR while also invoking Giorgio Agamben’s reinterpretation of Carl Schmitt’s concept of the ‘state of exception’, in which law is to be regarded as an inseparable part of the hegemonic power of the US. The resulting concept, the ‘global state of war’, is very central in Hardt and Negri’s theory. They claim that ‘war has become a general condition’ in Empire, where ‘lethal violence is present as a constant potentiality, ready always and everywhere to erupt’ (ibid: 4). Any conflict or war going on in the world today is regarded not as a manifestation of war but of civil war (ibid: 3). Hence, we are witnessing a ‘*general global state of war*’, which is eroding the difference between war and peace (ibid: 5, emphasis in original). Hardt and Negri explain this by drawing a clear distinction between traditional wars, which were conflicts between sovereign states, and the new war being waged between ‘sovereign and/or nonsovereign combatants *within a single sovereign territory*’ (ibid: 3, emphasis in original). Importantly, this ‘sovereign territory’ is not a national but a global one, a conceptual position entailing an imperative to regard all possible conflicts as ‘imperial civil wars’, as they are taking place within Empire (ibid: 3–4).

While war in the modern era was ‘a limited state of exception’, Hardt and Negri (2004: 6–7) argue that now ‘the exception has become the

rule, pervading both foreign relations and the homeland', which makes the state of exception general as well as permanent. They emphasize that the global situation was not fundamentally changed by 9/11 although the terror attacks forced people to recognize the generality of the phenomenon of the global state of war (ibid: 4). Nonetheless, they argue that the legal concept of a state of exception has to be linked with the exceptionalism of the US, because only 'the intersection between these two exceptions' helps to understand the concept of global war (ibid: 8).

Since Empire is characterized by a never-ceasing exercise of power, as well as violence, war must be regarded as an instrument for the creation and maintenance of social order, a role which makes it 'virtually indistinguishable from police activity' (Hardt & Negri 2004: 14). As such, these views resemble those of liberal cosmopolitans, for whom it is also commonplace to emphasize the exceptionalism of the US in the current world order. However, Hardt and Negri are more critical in this regard, as pointing out that the manner in which the new imperial system constructs and maintains global hierarchies resembles that in which 'international law served in the twentieth century merely to legitimate and support the violence of the strong over the weak' (ibid: 29). However, they admit that the growing inability of states to justify their violence partly explains the use of 'increasingly strident and confused accusations of terrorism' (ibid: 27). Hence, difficulties in producing a clear definition of terrorism can be 'intimately linked to the problem of establishing an adequate notion of legitimate violence' (ibid).

In terms of other similarities and differences between the approaches, Hardt and Negri's (2004: 14) view that the global state of war means that 'international relations and domestic politics become increasingly similar and intermingled' is reminiscent of the liberal cosmopolitan approach, which also maintains that politics has been globalized, blurring the distinction between the national and the global. Furthermore, both approaches emphasize that one consequence of the War on Terror has been the return of the concept of a *just war*. According to the radical poststructuralists, the concept serves to 'universalize war beyond any particular interests toward the interest of humanity as a whole' (ibid: 1; cf. Kaldor 2003b: 12). When an enemy is defined in terms of 'evil', as 'the enemy of all humanity', it is regarded as operating outside the sphere of politics, which in effect enables the struggle against it to be defined

in absolute terms (Hardt & Negri 2004: 16). Defining the enemy in highly abstract terms ‘serves to prop up legitimation where legitimation has declined’ and thus becomes a ‘constitutive function of legitimacy’ for imperial violence (ibid: 30). The enemies are not ‘real’ enemies but should be regarded as ‘as symptoms of a disordered reality that poses a threat to security and the functioning of discipline and control’ (ibid: 31):

The enemy must serve as a schema of reason in the Kantian sense, but in the opposite direction: it must demonstrate not what power is but what power saves us from. The presence of the enemy demonstrates the need for security.

The quotation illustrates the point at which the liberal cosmopolitan and the radical poststructuralist approaches diverge. Whereas the first regards the problem of war (on terror as well as on Iraq) in more limited terms due to the exceptionalism of the US and does not criticize the premises of the liberal order, the second sees war as a defining characteristic of the system. For radical poststructuralists, at issue is not only the US and the current situation but something more fundamental about the way violence is being legitimated. While the first Gulf War was legitimated on the basis of international law as an effort to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait, and the Kosovo War similarly justified on humanitarian grounds, the Iraq War was represented as a pre-emptive war that sought its legitimation ‘primarily on the basis of its results’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: 30). It was justified ‘not on any a priori framework, moral or legal, but only a posteriori, based on its results’ (ibid).

Where the divergence between the liberal and the radical approaches manifests itself most clearly is in Hardt and Negri’s (2004: 13) Foucauldian interpretation of Empire as a form of biopower that aims ‘not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life’.<sup>19</sup> They argue that war ‘becomes the general matrix for all relations of power and techniques of domination, whether or not

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<sup>19</sup> Whereas the concept of biopower explains ‘how the current war regime not only threatens us with death but also rules over life, producing and reproducing all aspects of society’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: 94), biopolitical production relates to the Multitude. While biopower, as a sovereign authority, ‘imposes its order’ on society, the biopolitical production of the Multitude ‘is immanent to society and creates social relationships and forms through collaborative forms of labor’ (ibid: 94–95).

bloodshed is involved' (ibid). War is thus not an effort to bring peace but to maintain order (ibid: 30). Hardt and Negri argue that sovereign political power can only live by preserving the life of its subjects and therefore global war needs to 'not only bring death but also produce and regulate life' (ibid: 20). Although not regarding global war as a product of the US but of Empire, they stress that the US policy shift from 'defense' to 'security' is an 'index of the new, active, constituent character of war' (ibid). Here, their views come close to those of scholars emphasizing the strong relationship between biopower and the discourse of security, drawing on the notion that the world can be secure only if actively shaped (e.g. Reid 2006; Dillon & Reid 2009). Empire is a 'regime of disciplinary administration and political control' where war is 'an active mechanism' which 'reinforces the present global order' (Hardt & Negri 2004: 21).

When viewed from this perspective, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq become examples of 'the productive project of biopower and war' imposed militarily with the help of rhetoric of 'nation building' or 'regime change' (Hardt & Negri 2004: 23). Hence, the aim is to not only create stable and peaceful regimes, but also establish regimes suited and adaptable to the global economic-political system and capable of acting as 'an organ of the global body politic' (ibid: 179). According to Hardt and Negri, these mechanisms lead to a suspension of democracy since 'armed globalization' makes democracy 'entirely irretrievable, buried deep beneath the weapons and security regimes of our constant state of conflict' (ibid: xi–xii). However, at the same time they are very explicit about the impossibility of Empire gaining total control over its subjects: 'Dominance, no matter how multidimensional, can never be complete and is always contradicted by resistance' (ibid: 54). This is where they turn to resistance by the Multitude.

#### 2.4.2 Empire Challenged: The Multitude and the Politics of Resistance

In regard to the main subjects of resistance, that is, political actors capable of challenging the power of Empire, the views of radical poststructuralists bear a striking resemblance to those of liberal cosmopolitans, although they differ with respect to some of the causalities between different

developments and their political implications. Liberal cosmopolitans argue that globalization has given global civil society and non-state actors more power at the expense of nation states. Radical poststructuralists agree that globalization has eroded state power but maintain that this power has devolved mainly to global corporations and economic elites instead of global civil society. They believe that it is possible to resist unwanted practices and phenomena, but only if the resistance is organized in a correct manner – if it is globalized. Just like liberal cosmopolitans, they point to social movements as the most relevant political subjects in this regard. It is even argued that gaining an understanding of the development of the global state of war requires understanding the importance and ‘the genealogy of social and political movements of resistance’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: 65).<sup>20</sup>

In their first book, Hardt and Negri do not discuss the theme of resistance as much as in the second. In *Empire* they develop the idea that as there is no outside, only an inside in Empire, resistance can only arise from within it, in the form of a counter-Empire (Hardt & Negri 2000: 206–207). One of the most interesting contradictions in their theory is that on the one hand Empire is regarded as extremely powerful, yet on the other as quite vulnerable. Although an extremely powerful global regime of biopower, it is dependent on moral legitimation, which is also where and why it can be challenged (ibid: 35). The Multitude cannot challenge the military might of Empire as such, but can resist it with instruments of soft power, characterized as ‘moral intervention’ by various non-state actors (ibid: 35–36):

What we are calling moral intervention is practiced today by a variety of bodies, including the news media and religious organizations, but the most important may be some of the so-called non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which, precisely because they are not run directly by governments, are assumed to act on the basis of ethical or moral imperatives.

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<sup>20</sup> Hardt and Negri (2004: 72–81) provide a detailed genealogy of resistance movements. It suffices to note here that resistance movements have developed from authoritarian and hierarchic forms (such as popular armies) to more decentralized guerrilla organizations, and then to plural, decentralized and networked forms of resistance movements. An important point they make is that postmodern resistance movements do not distinguish between the social and the political (ibid: 78).

In other words, just like liberal cosmopolitans (especially Kaldor, Beck and Castells), radical poststructuralists believe it is possible to challenge hard power through soft power. However, the broader context is quite different: for poststructuralists, the struggle is against Empire, not nation states. What also makes Hardt and Negri's (2000: 313) perspective more critical is their understanding that non-state actors are not immune to distractions of power. They argue that many humanitarian organizations are 'the most powerful pacific weapons of the new world order', as they are involved in conducting 'just wars' although they do so 'without arms, without violence, without borders' (ibid: 36). At the same time, the organizations are regarded as 'completely immersed in the biopolitical context of the constitution of the Empire', anticipating 'the power of its pacifying and productive intervention of justice' (ibid).

Hardt and Negri thus invest their hopes in non-state actors of global civil society while simultaneously acknowledging that they might become satellites or instruments of Empire, re-enforcing its power. Generally, however, they seem to be more optimistic than pessimistic in this regard. They anticipate new figures and new subjectivities of struggle against the 'imperial biopolitical machine' to 'express, nourish, and develop positively their own constituent projects' as well as to 'work toward the liberation of living labor, creating constellations of powerful singularities' (Hardt & Negri 2000: 61). Again, this view is quite similar to that expressed by liberal cosmopolitans in emphasizing the role of global civic actors in constructing global civil society 'from below'. Thus, the idea of global political action by non-state actors emphasized by liberal cosmopolitans is quite similar to Hardt and Negri's idea of global resistance. Their basic argument is that the Multitude must form 'one big union' to challenge Empire from *within* and they are very explicit about the impossibility of resisting Empire in any other way (ibid: 206–207, emphasis added):

Empire cannot be resisted by a project aimed at a limited, local autonomy. We cannot move back to any previous social form, nor move forward in isolation. Rather, we must push through Empire to come out the other side ... Empire *can be effectively contested only on its own level of generality* and by pushing the processes that it offers past their present limitations. We have to accept that challenge and learn to *think globally and act globally*. Globalization must be met with a counter-globalization, *Empire with a counter-Empire*.

The imperative to ‘think globally and act globally’ derives directly from the definition of Empire as a decentralized form of global power. Hardt and Negri strongly criticize traditional strategies and methods of leftist resistance, which still take the local as the most important level. In their view, the leftist strategy of local resistance is not only ineffective but dangerous, as it ‘misidentifies and thus masks the enemy’ against which the Multitude should be fighting (Hardt & Negri 2000: 45). In other words, local resistance is regarded as an old-fashioned and inefficient strategy for challenging Empire.<sup>21</sup> Thus, there should be a new strategy: resistance should be globalized. It makes more sense ‘both theoretically and practically to enter the terrain of Empire and confront its homogenizing and heterogenizing flows in all their complexity, grounding our analysis in the power of the global multitude’ (ibid: 46).

Although they use the word ‘practically’, Hardt and Negri do not have much to offer in concrete terms. In their first book, when considering how the Multitude could become a global political subject and organize itself against the repression of Empire, they openly admit they cannot offer simple answers (Hardt & Negri 2000: 399–400). They seem to believe that the Multitude will somehow automatically become political and its resistance more practical when confronting and becoming conscious of the dominating practices of Empire. In this regard, they talk of the necessity of ‘global citizenship’ (ibid: 396–400) (a concept sometimes used also by liberal cosmopolitans), which they nevertheless hardly discuss in their second book. There, too, they do not promise any direct answers or propositions for ‘a concrete program of action’, although they claim to give ‘numerous examples of how people are working today to put an end to war and make the world more democratic’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: xvi–xvii). Although Hardt and Negri do stress that their main purpose is to ‘work out the conceptual bases on which a new project of democracy can stand’, it is problematic that their abstract conceptual approach provides no real connection between theory and political practice (ibid: xvii). It means that their theory cannot easily become immanent for its ‘objects’.

<sup>21</sup> By no means are these kinds of views typical only of radical poststructuralists such as Hardt and Negri. Many other scholars have argued that the ‘conventional left lacks the theoretical and analytical tools to position itself’ in regard to new social movements and, even more seriously, ‘does not understand the importance of doing so’ (Santos 2008: 252).



The abstractness of Hardt and Negri's theory of resistance partly derives from their refusal to define against whom or what resistance should be directed. They admit that identifying the enemy is difficult because 'exploitation tends no longer to have a specific place' (Hardt & Negri 2000: 211). Yet for them this does not pose a problem; in fact, they seem to celebrate the absence of a clearly defined enemy. Although it is not known where 'the production of oppression' is located, Hardt and Negri believe it is possible to 'resist and struggle' (ibid). This is a clear illustration of their rationale of *the will to be against, to resist* which comes very close to Foucault's notion of permanent resistance, often criticized for not providing any particular motivation to resist (ibid: 210)<sup>22</sup>. However, all this becomes even more problematic when located in the global context (e.g. Selby 2007). Incorporating Foucault's notions of agency and subjectivity, quite challenging in their own right, with Hardt and Negri's desire for global agency and subjectivity makes the concept of resistance a daunting one when evaluated from a practical perspective. Nevertheless, this is the abstract formulation they put forward (Hardt & Negri 2000: 211, emphasis added):

If there is no longer a place that can be recognized as outside, *we must be against in every place. This being-against becomes the essential key to every active political position* in the world, every desire that is effective – perhaps of democracy itself.

Since no concrete objectives or targets of resistance are identified, the problem is that basically nothing is offered in practical terms for those opposing and resisting. As such, the problem does not concern only the radical poststructuralist approach, since many liberal cosmopolitans also celebrate 'global networks of opposition', which are regarded as 'essentially democratic' (Castells 2008: 85–86). The difference is that liberal cosmopolitans do not aim at a revolution or anything else

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<sup>22</sup> Simon (1995: 86) argues that since the Foucauldian motivation to resist derives from subjugation to power (in whatever form it takes place) rather than proposing a better alternative, it is important to show 'frustration with and resentment of the present'. This kind of resistance needs to be permanent because it is not known if 'the state of affairs brought about by resistance will be better than the present, as any social arrangement or definition of community may become oppressive even if it is instituted by acts of resistance against a previous regime' (ibid: 87).

particularly radical but, rather, advocate a consensual, gradual approach to social change. Ontologically poststructuralists have also a very different understanding of political subjectivity, as they believe that resistance actually precedes power. Hardt and Negri (2004: 64, emphasis in original) challenge the whole idea of resistance as ‘a response or reaction’ and suggest that ‘*resistance is primary with respect to power*’. They argue that only by acknowledging ‘the primacy of resistance’ is it possible to view ‘history from below’ and to create new subjectivities (ibid: 64–65).<sup>23</sup>

A critical question remains, however: How can resistance be successful and effective when it rests only on the very act of resisting and there are no defined and articulated goals or targets? In this sense, Hardt and Negri resemble, to some extent, Foucault, who does not offer direct answers to these kinds of questions. What makes Hardt and Negri’s theory more challenging is that they take it to the global level. It is very difficult to grasp the idea of this abstract yet global resistance, which is supposedly evident everywhere although it has no other common ‘banner’ than that of being against. In their second book, Hardt and Negri (2004: 212) point out that the Multitude ‘needs a political project to bring it to existence’. They dedicate a chapter to this issue, in which they seek to ‘address the most important task for resistance today, that is, resisting war’ (ibid: 63). They often talk about the movement against the Iraq War as some sort of a preliminary example (ibid: 264), although more commonly refer to ‘movements of resistance against the permanent, global state of war’ (ibid: 66–67). The strong emphasis put on resistance against war is understandable in light of their view that war has become the foundation of politics.

Peace then, quite logically, for Hardt and Negri (2004: 67) is ‘the necessary condition for any liberation’. They stress, that it is ‘too simple’, however, ‘to identify the interests of the multitude immediately and exclusively with peace’ since resistance movements have always been forced to ‘confront war and the violence it imposes, sometimes with and sometimes without violent means’ (ibid). Hence, they argue that if ‘democracy of the multitude’ is ever to be realized, there needs to be

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<sup>23</sup> They emphasize that just as ‘Marx’s exposition begins with capital, then, his research must begin with labor’ which is always primary, and argue that this is similarly true of resistance, although the term is usually used in precisely the opposite meaning (Hardt & Negri 2004: 64).

a 'war against war' that must actively aim at destroying 'the regime of violence' supporting 'the systems of inequality and oppression' (ibid). In other words, democracy which opposes war is represented as 'an absolute democracy' and resistance against war becomes associated with resistance against the legitimation of the global order as 'a common ethical task' (ibid: 90–91). Struggle against war is regarded as 'the summary of all the grievances' as war prevents solutions to other problems such as global poverty and inequality (ibid: 284). When all forms of inequality and injustice are equated with the problem of war in this way, resistance against war necessarily means resistance against the regime of biopower. It is extremely interesting how closely linked Empire and the Multitude are: they are described as 'hand-to-hand' struggling 'on the biopolitical field that pulls them together', with Empire calling 'on war for its legitimation' and the Multitude 'on democracy as its political foundation' (ibid: 90).

What also makes Hardt and Negri's vision problematic is that they suppose that the Multitude consists of people who all want democracy and peace on similar terms. When they describe the Multitude as a subject 'which acts on the basis of what the singularities share in common' (Hardt & Negri 2004: 100), they do not discuss any possible internal contradictions or political struggles within it, although it must be clear that all singularities can have goals of their own which can be contradictory<sup>24</sup>. Who is to define what goals are better than others? It is unclear how it can be guaranteed that there is freedom to express distinctions and contradictions in the context of this global collective political subject. Hardt and Negri also fail to consider the possibility that the Multitude might misuse its power once in power. Moreover, instead of giving practical suggestions or describing how different acts of resistance relate to each other in concrete terms, these radical poststructuralists talk about an 'accumulation of struggles' almost in a romantic vein.

In this context, Hardt and Negri often point to the role of networks and communication within them. They argue that networks are democratic when they are 'completely horizontal and deterritorialized' (Hardt & Negri 2000: 299). While regarded as 'neither an identity (like the people), nor uniform (like the masses)', the Multitude is 'based fundamentally on communication' (Hardt & Negri 2004: xv, 91, 100).

<sup>24</sup> Consider, for example, the efforts of feminists vs. those of Islamists.

The singularities of which it consists ‘must discover the *common* that allows them to communicate and act together’ (ibid: xv, emphasis in original) and thus become a new form of collective intelligence (ibid: 91–93). Using almost the exact words of liberal cosmopolitans such as Castells and Beck, Hardt and Negri argue that social movements not only ‘employ techniques such as the Internet as organizing tools, they also begin to adopt these technologies as models for their organizational structures’ (ibid: 82). Similarly, they suggest that a ‘network has become a common form that tends to define our ways of understanding the world and acting in it’ (ibid: 142). The Internet is regarded as an ideal model for the Multitude, representing a democratic network structure (Hardt & Negri 2000: 299; 2004: xv.)

## 2.5 The Critical State-Centric Approach

The theoretical approaches analyzed above, both of which emphasize the primacy of global-level resistance by social movements, are strongly criticized by an approach which can be labelled ‘critical state-centric’. It can be characterized as a critique of the above-mentioned approaches by definition. Instead of taking the globalization of politics and transformation of the role and power of nation states in the international system as a given, the critical state-centric approach explicitly challenges understanding of politics, power and resistance in globalized terms. As explained in the beginning of this chapter, liberal cosmopolitanism and radical poststructuralism have been challenged by many scholars and it is not possible or necessary to analyze all the related debate here. The aim is to concentrate on recent criticisms that can be regarded as relevant from the perspective of the main theme, the anti-war movement. The focus is not so much on the concepts of global power and resistance on a general level as on the particular context of social movements.

In this regard, the most recent and important critique is that advanced by David Chandler, who criticizes liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists for maintaining that the primary framework for political engagement and resistance should be global. Chandler (2009a; 2009b) presents the approaches as currently dominant frameworks in IR while straightforwardly questioning their ontological premises. For

him, uniformity of the liberal cosmopolitan and radical poststructuralist approaches represents ‘Global Ideology’, that is, ‘the globalisation of political discourse: the understanding of the world in globalised terms’ (Chandler 2009b: 532). It can be regarded as ‘an ideological framework which naturalises and reifies its subject matter’ because it takes the globalization of politics ‘as a matter of imposed necessity rather than a social construct which is open to critique’ (ibid: 536). Chandler convincingly illustrates that dominant frameworks take the globalization of politics as an inevitable fact while positing ‘changes at the global level as the explanatory factor for the breakdown of state-based forms of political identification and collective engagement, understanding these as marking the birth of global politics’ (ibid: 530).<sup>25</sup>

For Chandler (2009a: 2), the ‘pre-eminence of the global’ actually ‘highlights a lack rather than a presence’ whether the issue is sites and articulations of power, security threats, policy-making or political programs of resistance by social movements. In this sense, ‘Global Ideology’ can be regarded as a reflection of reality ‘where political relations have become much less focused on the strategic and instrumental aspects of representational politics’ (Chandler 2009b: 532). Liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists are criticized for turning ‘reality on its head’ (Chandler 2009a: 3) or inverting ‘the relationship of cause and effect’ (Chandler 2009b: 539) as they mistakenly conceptualize the lack of political engagement and contestation as the globalization of politics (ibid: 542). Instead, the globalization of politics should be understood as ‘a product of political disconnection between state elites and popular disengagement from politics’ (ibid: 531). According to Chandler, the

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<sup>25</sup> Similarly, Chantal Mouffe (2005: 107) speaks of the ‘unexpected convergence’ between poststructural and liberal cosmopolitan approaches manifested in the lack of a ‘properly political dimension’. She argues that Hardt and Negri represent ‘no more than an ultra-left version of the cosmopolitan perspective’ which, instead of providing an empowering perspective, ‘contributes to reinforcing the current incapacity to think and act politically’ (ibid). She explains ‘the success of such a flawed book’ which has been ‘hailed as ‘The Communist Manifesto for the Twenty-first Century’ by arguing that its ‘messianic rhetoric has fired the imagination of many people eager to find in the ‘multitude’ a new revolutionary subject’ in the post-political period where neo-liberal globalization is perceived as ‘the unique horizon’ (ibid: 107–108). For Mouffe, the main problem is that ‘instead of contributing to working towards an alternative to the current neo-liberal hegemony, *Empire* is in fact likely to produce the opposite effect’ (ibid: 108).

world has not so much become global but ‘rather the breakdown in social connections framed through the political process of representation means that we have become increasingly ‘deterritorialized’” (ibid: 540). He thus argues that when political engagement becomes less socially and collectively mediated, the global starts to seem like the primary framework (ibid: 530).

Where, then, does the popular disengagement from politics stem from? Chandler (2009b: 539, referring to Laidi 1998) explains it as partly due to the end of the Cold War revealing ‘the weakness of political frameworks shaped by the articulation of politics on the axis of Left and Right’, which had institutionalized the meaning of political life during the Cold War despite the fact that people’s relation to them had already started to weaken. When the Cold War ended, it revealed the lack of a social basis and thus caused ‘a fundamental crisis of political meaning and the implosion of party-based social connections’ (ibid). This political context, argues Chandler, is ‘vital for the understanding of globalisation of politics’ (ibid). As such, this view is not dramatically different from those expressed within the liberal and radical theoretical frameworks stressing the social and political changes brought by the end of the Cold War. The difference lies in the way the changes are interpreted in terms of their consequences. According to Chandler, these developments do not lead to globalization of politics but rather demonstrate that ‘the limits of domestic politics’, as well as ‘the inability to create new collective frameworks of meaning’, have now been ‘projected into the global sphere’ (ibid: 540).

The reason why Chandler’s alternative interpretation is so important from the perspective of this thesis is that deconstructing the ontological premises of the dominant theoretical approaches makes it possible to critically evaluate their conceptualizations of war, power and resistance. It is precisely these conceptualizations that form the basis of the suggestions made by each approach as to how social movements (such as the anti-war movement) should organize their resistance in the so-called ‘global era’. The section to follow analyzes Chandler’s criticism of the main conceptualizations of the academic globalists in more detail, starting with his critique of the concepts of global war and Empire, and then moving on to the concept of resistance in the context of social movements.

### 2.5.1 The Concepts of Global War and Empire Challenged

In his critique of the radical poststructuralist approach, Chandler (2009a: 157) questions the very concept of global war currently 'advocated as much by governing elites as by their academic policy-supporters and their radical critics'. He argues that critical theorists have taken 'the political claims of global policymaking and intervention at face value' and thus are themselves reinforcing the idea of globalization of security (Chandler 2009c: 244). This results in 'cohering the globalised perspective that the stakes of the international sphere today are at least as much 'life and death' as they were in the middle of the last century' (Chandler 2009a: 157). Although IR scholars do not regard a war between the major powers as 'a pressing threat' or view international stability as threatened by 'class struggle and revolutionary or nationalist movements', Chandler (2009c: 244) shows that the concept of global war is nevertheless 'back at the forefront of academic and policy thinking'. He argues that in particular it has been the current reinterpretations of the works of 'historically-grounded political theorists' such as Foucault and Schmitt that have led to 'highly abstract frameworks of all encompassing global conflict, without territorial or legal bounds' (ibid: 245).<sup>26</sup>

Being extremely skeptical of claims of 'new universalising hegemony fighting a war of annihilation against alternative ways of life', Chandler (2009a: 182) proposes an alternative reading of global war, interpreting it rather as 'a product of social dislocation and disconnection'. Although stressing that wars fought in an abstract and deterritorialized fashion do lack 'clear relationship between means and ends' and can thus gain 'a destabilizing and irrational character', he argues it is mistaken to interpret them as 'a heightened desire for control' (Chandler 2009c: 260). In other words, Chandler (2009a: 21) is very critical of claims of an emerging new order as 'such a politically coherent and militarised framework of western hegemony that it makes nineteenth-century imperialism (hamstrung by inter-imperialist rivalries) appear weak in comparison'. As an example, he brings up Agamben's notion of the War on Terror as a 'permanent state of exception', where 'a global war machine' constructs 'the world in the image of the camp' while reducing 'its enemies to bare life' (ibid:

<sup>26</sup> On the revival of Schmitt in IR, see Chandler 2008.

180–181). Chandler himself interprets Guantanamo Bay, for example, as a US attempt ‘to create a more coherent and potent image of the vaguely-defined security threat’ because ‘far from criminalising fundamentalist terrorists, the US has politically glorified them, talking up their political importance’ (ibid: 181). For him, Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib Prison ‘stem from the western inability to cohere a clear view of who the enemy is or of how they should be treated’, the status of ‘illegal combatants’ sacralizing enemies instead of reducing them to the status of ‘bare life’ (ibid: 181). He regards the framework in which current wars are fought by western powers as ‘non-strategic’, ‘non-instrumental’, lacking ‘a clear relationship between means and ends’ (Chandler 2009c: 260).

While providing a very interesting alternative reading of the War on Terror as essentially a weakness of the West, Chandler’s approach has some shortcomings as well. In concentrating on how IR scholars have started to uncritically repeat policy-makers’ rhetoric of a global war, which they then interpret as a manifestation of global biopower, he does not discuss other kinds of consequences that this political rhetoric may have. The fact that a concept such as the War on Terror has been accepted and circulated all over the world has had concrete political consequences. For instance, not only the US, but also other states, such as Russia and Israel, have started hunting terrorists; in the process there have been changes in laws in various countries, with civil rights becoming more tightly regulated and like changes. Thus, although Chandler was right in arguing that the rhetoric and concept of global war originates from a western failure to define and fight its enemies, the discourse of the War on Terror began to have concrete consequences when it became accepted in the political mainstream. Some of the consequences may indeed be interpreted as a desire for more control, as radical poststructuralists have suggested.

It also seems that Chandler does not regard the concept of biopower in the same way as Hardt and Negri do, because if he did, he would probably notice that his view is not drastically different from theirs. Chandler’s claim that the War on Terror reflects the weakness of the West, which it tries to conceal, is actually not very far from Hardt and Negri’s argument that Empire has to fight all the time to secure itself (the global order), because it is by definition vulnerable to networked enemies such as suicide bombers. The difference is that while Empire is also vulnerable to resistance by organized labor and global social movements, Chandler



does not believe these can pose any significant challenge to state power, at least in their current forms. In regard to nation-states more generally, Chandler's (2009a: 6) views differ markedly from those of the academic globalists, because he is extremely troubled by the fact that 'the nation state is increasingly seen to be a barrier to progressive political movements rather than the object of political struggle'. He explicitly criticizes both approaches of the academic globalists for maintaining 'that nation states restrict and constrain the possibilities for political progress' (Chandler 2009b: 534), representing them as 'the central barrier to emancipatory political practice' (Chandler 2004: 314).

### 2.5.2 State Power Unchallenged: The Illusions of Global Resistance

When it comes to global political action and resistance, Chandler straightforwardly challenges two of the main arguments of the liberal cosmopolitans and the radical poststructuralists. Firstly, he challenges the idea that scaling political action (or resistance) to the global level is a necessary reaction to external changes and, secondly, that political action (or resistance) is more effective at the global than at the national level. In addition to these criticisms, he argues that taking the global level as the primary context for political engagement has serious consequences which the dominant frameworks ignore or fail to recognize.

In regard to the first point, Chandler suggests that rather than being a reaction to external changes such as transformations in the nature of politics or power brought by globalization, the popular view that resistance should be globalized has more to do with discourses emphasizing the globalization of politics and/or power. For him, the discursive shift from national to global politics or resistance 'reflects the decline of strategic, instrumental, engagement concerned with transforming the external world, and the rise of a more atomised politics of self-expression – of awareness, of identity and of values' (Chandler 2009a: 2). In other words, politics becomes globalized 'when political actors experience a loss of social connection and political aspirations are expressed in increasingly abstract and unmediated forms' (ibid). For Chandler, global political action and global activism represent thus an escape from political responsibility

since the state and state-based democratic accountability are no longer used as a reference point. Accordingly, he regards global activism as a ‘refusal to play by the rules laid down by state-based territorial politics’ (Chandler 2004: 314). Moreover, he argues that ‘[w]ith the decline of representational forms of politics – which involved winning people over to ideas or political platforms rather than just expressing one’s own awareness – political practice becomes much more immediate and unmediated’ (Chandler 2009a: 17).

Although all three theoretical approaches agree that some kind of a popular disengagement from traditional politics is evident, the difference is that while academic globalists regard this development as a positive one (since they strongly advocate global forms of political engagement), the critical state-centric approach views it as an extremely negative change. Scaling political action towards the global level is believed to do more harm than good for democracy, whether in terms of accountability or offering real political alternatives. Whereas Hardt and Negri, for example, suggest that the system of representative democracy presents a move away from real, ‘absolute democracy’, for Chandler the exact opposite is true: the effort to break up the traditional representational system by aiming at a similar system on a global scale should be understood as a dangerous endeavor. Instead of helping people to transform their societies and tackle their problems through the democratic political system, academic globalists are provoking even more distrust towards representative democracy and its political institutions.

Basically, it seems that Chandler is concerned about the impacts of globalized forms of political engagement for the proper working of the democratic system. Arguments that there are new forms of political activity which are no longer linked to political parties or the parliamentary system ultimately reinforce the crisis of democracy, for they assert that problems cannot be addressed via the traditional political system anymore. This, in turn, decreases political engagement at the level where it would be most effective – the level of the nation state. All this also relates directly to the second critique and counter-argument by Chandler. In addition to questioning the necessity of global resistance, he challenges the belief that globalized resistance would be more effective. This view derives from his conceptualization of politics as a struggle for power, and instrumental power in particular. According to Chandler (2009a: 20), political

engagement or resistance is nothing 'without the strategic, instrumental, struggle for power'. In other words, Chandler's definition of politics as well as power is quite different from that of the liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists: both seem to define politics as more of an abstract exchange of opinions than a concrete struggle for power. And where they talk about the power of people or social movements, it is mainly in terms of soft or symbolic power, not instrumental power strategically focused for making a direct impact.

From the perspective of this thesis, one of the most interesting arguments put forward by Chandler is that adopting a strategy of global resistance ultimately leaves social movements less powerful while directing political action away from the level where it can have a real political impact – the representational and democratic system of a nation state. He argues in explicit terms that 'operating outside the formal political sphere of electoral representation' does not facilitate 'a radical challenge to political power and existing hierarchies of control' (Chandler 2004: 334). In other words, a global orientation of resistance is tantamount to ineffectiveness: social movements scaling their political action to the global level are likely to be less influential in that they will fail to target the genuine subjects of power: nation states, their governments and other political institutions.

Chandler (2004: 334) is convinced that new social movements based on advocacy 'pose much less of a threat to the status quo' than 'genuinely 'political' social movements did in the past. He argues that the idea of global civil society originates from 'the politics of the left, whose lack of support within their own societies was historically softened by the illusion of being part of an international movement' (ibid: 330). Therefore, groups working for issues such as peace and the environment have 'sought legitimacy more in their international connections than their capacity to engage in a political struggle of ideas with a domestic audience' (ibid). Chandler is critical of globally oriented symbolic struggles, because demonstrating, for example against WTO or G8 meetings, 'does not involve winning any arguments' but is rather 'a matter of courtier politics and elite lobbying, shortcutting any attempt to win popular representative support' (ibid: 331). This kind of global activism does not involve a 'struggle to win the argument with people in a genuine debate' but rather illustrates how 'isolated activists' are engaging with 'international financial and inter-

state institutions where there is no democratic discussion and they have no formal rights or responsibilities' (ibid). Importantly, Chandler does not deny the deterritorialized character of ideas, values and beliefs which lie behind any political act by social movements or other actors. He explicitly points to the deterritorialized nature of struggles such as those for women's rights or national independence 'in terms of the aspirational content of political demands' (Chandler 2009a: 16). However, when it comes to more concrete terms, politics must be regarded as 'necessarily territorialised in terms of the specific strategies and articulations of those demands, with a view to influencing or gaining political power to put those demands into practice' (ibid: 17).

Chandler is also very critical of the idea of an accumulation of struggles, which Hardt and Negri regard as taking place. Many liberal advocates of global civil society also believe that there is some kind of a global common denominator in many actions and events taking place locally around the world. However, not everything local can be automatically and unproblematically connected to the global. This is one of the reasons why Chandler (2004: 325) claims 'that the decline of traditional international social movements capable of generating mass support has led radical theorists to see a new importance in increasingly disparate and isolated struggles'. He uses the Mexican Zapatista case as an example where western academics have 'turned the limited success of the Chiapas rising into a revolutionary 'postmodern social movement'' (ibid: 326). Radical poststructuralists have argued that their struggle is not so much local as a part of the global civil society's struggle against global capitalism and neo-liberalism. However, after ten years of rebellion that has not, Chandler argues, provided the Chiapas with any significant improvement, it seems that the 'rhetoric of global resistance coexists with a remarkable failure of the struggle to achieve any relief from abject poverty for the indigenous villagers of the area' (ibid: 327). The case illustrates a clear 'contrast between the claims made for global civic actors and the reality of their marginal influence' (ibid).

Clearly, Chandler does not 'believe' in global resistance, as he regards its political significance and effects as very limited. Global resistance and political struggles advocated by radical poststructuralists are regarded as utopian, since they lack 'a clear focal point or political project capable of cohering theoretical ideas or of creating collective political subjects'

(Chandler 2009a: 18). The idea of global resistance is problematic also because there is no global government in the form of an institutionalized political authority to claim ‘responsibility for formulating policy or for its implementation’ (Chandler 2009b: 541). Hence, there is nothing that could ‘become a strategic object of global resistance’ (Chandler 2009a: 18)<sup>27</sup>. Similarly, with regard to the liberal cosmopolitans, Chandler (2004: 338–339) argues that ‘celebration of global civil society ‘from the bottom up’ appears to be based on ‘the desire of Western activists and commentators to justify their avoidance of accountability to any collective source of political community and elected authority’. He calls into question much of the discourse in which new movements are seen as influential despite their marginality and/or because of their new characteristics (ibid: 328, emphasis added):

One might wonder whether there is an inverse relationship between the amount of progressive ‘new characteristics’ these struggles have and their strength and influence. A sceptical observer would no doubt suggest that *the more marginal an opposition movement is, the more able are academic commentators to invest it with their own ideas and aspirations*. These normative claims can then be used by any institution or individual to promote their own importance and moral legitimacy. If this is the case, it seems possible that if global civil society did not exist it would have had to be invented.

Furthermore, Chandler points to the elitist nature of social movements which claim to represent and speak on the behalf of the oppressed and exploited. He argues that ‘rather than expanding the sphere of inclusiveness, global civic activism tends to undermine community connections’ because ‘the political ethics it advocates are deeply corrosive of social engagement and prone to elitist rather than inclusive consequences’ (Chandler 2004: 313). Indeed, he considers problematic the notion embedded in the global approaches that it is no longer necessary for individuals to be politically active in political parties and other forms of traditional politics but that they should instead engage globally, and thus more individualistically. As Chandler puts it: ‘The argument that the individual should have no higher

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<sup>27</sup> Also some social movement scholars have pointed out that ‘in world politics there is no stable focal point like a government around which to organize contention’ (Tilly & Tarrow 2007: 178; also Gillan et. al 2008: 112).

political allegiance beyond their own moral conscience merely reflects and legitimates the radical rejection of collective political engagement and its replacement by elite advocacy and personal solipsism' (ibid).

On the whole, Chandler's (2009a: 18) critical analysis illustrates that 'beneath the rhetoric of global values and global struggles we find a remarkable absence of strategic clarity and political engagement'. If it is maintained that global resistance can consist of any form of protesting 'from ethical shopping to protests against free trade or the destruction of the rain forests' (Chandler 2009b: 536), it lacks strategic engagement and thus also escapes power. In other words, when 'symbolic manifestations of political protest and resistance' become ends in themselves 'in the form of awareness-raising', action in itself becomes defined as 'valuable, regardless of its consequences' (ibid: 541). Chandler is worried about political engagement and politics becoming more of a self-expression than a struggle for power: 'Never in the history of political modernity have we been as alienated from the social power of humanity' (ibid: 542). In his view, the increasing level of abstraction in global theorizations simply reflects 'a lack of engagement' (ibid: 545). The shift towards the global is, then, 'a retreat from social engagement and political struggle' (Chandler 2009a: 207):

The freedom of action provided by escaping the frameworks of representation and the demands of territorial control is the freedom of disengagement. It is a flight from the concrete to the abstract.

*We, in fact, act much less as political subjects, capable of shaping our circumstances, when we engage 'globally'. Global politics has nothing to do with space or geography but with social relations: when we engage 'globally' we engage with less social connection, with less social mediation, making our actions less strategic or instrumental, less clearly goal-orientated. (Chandler 2009a: 208, emphasis added.)*

It is remarkable how exceptional a view Chandler actually represents in comparison to currently dominant theoretical discourses by academic globalists. Indeed, his main concept, the 'Global Ideology', very well describes the mainstream of theorizing based on uniform ontological premises and leading to very abstract and globalized conceptualizations of politics, war, power and resistance. However, Chandler's approach is not totally without problems, either. Even if he is right in his interpretation that

the explosive increase in global discourses is due to ‘political disconnection between state elites and societies, and a popular disengagement from mass politics’ (Chandler 2009a: 2), it is questionable whether this can be regarded as the *only* explanatory factor. Moreover, he does not seem to consider seriously the possibility that states might no longer be the only or primary frameworks for political identification and human community. Moreover, although it is necessary to be critical towards the theoretical shift from state-based to globalized politics, it would be as pointless to argue that there is nothing global about politics today as to claim that everything is now global. It definitely needs to be realized that the extent of ‘globality’ is more often than not overemphasized, but although global frameworks for politics are not as important as currently assumed, it would be problematic to suggest that there is nothing to be regarded as global in politics, and the same applies to resistance as well.

Chandler is absolutely right to argue that there is considerable overemphasis in theoretical discourses on the global aspect. The solution, however, is not to return to studying interaction only between states, as used to be the case, and thus to deny or ignore the effects produced by the very discourse of globalization of politics. The discourse of the globalization of politics is transforming – and has already transformed – understandings of political processes and thus has also influenced the behavior of political actors in their concrete political practices. Discourses are not only descriptive and rhetorical; they have impacts beyond the level of language, for they influence how politicians, states and other political actors behave in actuality. When discourses create a common belief that politics has gone global, whether true or not, the belief has effects on the behavior of political actors. It seems that Chandler does not consider the impacts and transformational aspects of the discourse of globalization of politics seriously or broadly enough<sup>28</sup>.

To sum up, Chandler emphasizes state-based political engagement and is very critical of anything outside it. Much of his criticism is based on the belief that states are still the most important and powerful actors

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<sup>28</sup> One of his arguments is that the shift from national to global in political discourses has given rise to the academic discourse of globalized politics. In other words, he acknowledges that discourses can have concrete impacts but does not seem to consider how these discourses may also transform the political practices of different political actors.

in the world political system. In its skepticism regarding the power of current non-state actors and their proclaimed 'globality', the critical state-centric approach is totally at odds with that of radical poststructuralists and liberal cosmopolitans. Instead of trying to construct global civil society as a response to the changing political structures or to globalize the resistance of the Multitude, the critical state-centric approach seems to imply that strengthening state-based political engagement within the representational political system would be more effective. However, this would require that citizens become more interested, for example, in traditional party politics, which seems not very likely at the moment. In other words, although criticizing academic globalists for being utopian, the state-centric approach does not present many realistic alternatives either. As Chandler (2009a: 222) himself admits when discussing 'Marx's consideration of a similar crisis of political subjectivity', in the current situation it is 'difficult to see an emerging political subject which can give renewed content to political concepts and reconstitute the political as a concrete sphere of contestation'. However, what he seems to have in mind are the traditional kinds of political subjects; the possibility of thinking about new kinds of political subjects is categorically ruled out in much the same way as academic globalists rule out the traditional political subjects and traditional forms of political action in their theorizations.

## 2.6 Summary

The purpose of this chapter has been to introduce and analyze the currently popular and dominant theoretical frameworks related to the main theme of the thesis, that is, resistance against war. From the perspective of the anti-war movement, the lively theoretical debate is extremely interesting, because social movements and other non-state actors are granted a highly important role in current theorizations. For example, it is suggested that global civil society is an 'answer to war' due to its ability to challenge state power, or that the oppressed people of the world can wage a war against (the global state of) war in the form of the revolutionary subjects of the Multitude. However, the problem with these conceptualizations is that they have remained at a very abstract and future-oriented (even utopian) level in referring to global collective political subject and struggles that



do not yet actually exist. Indeed, this has been one of the main criticisms directed against the dominant globally oriented frameworks.

In this chapter the conceptualizations, premises and suggestions of three different theoretical approaches have been analyzed in detail. The research has explored the kinds of conceptualizations of war, power and political engagement on which they base their understandings of effective strategies of resistance and has, to some extent, also reflected on their ontological and broader normative premises. The liberal cosmopolitan approach was examined first, after which the radical poststructuralist approach and its convergences and divergences in regard to the liberal cosmopolitan approach were discussed. In the third part, criticism of both approaches by the critical state-centric approach was presented, with this approach then analyzed critically as well.

As regards the political context of the resistance against the Iraq War, liberal cosmopolitans are inclined to interpret the war as evidence of an *exceptionally dominant* but transitory role of the US in world politics which has enabled it to act unilaterally while trying to secure its national interests. Although the liberal cosmopolitan approach strongly criticizes the US for ignoring both international law and the international community, it regards the situation as transitory. Liberal cosmopolitans believe that the US cannot continue to promote its foreign policy by military force, because the pressure from the international community and global public opinion will constrain the country's behavior. They do not consider radical structural changes in the existing global power structure necessary, because they think that convincing the US to return to the same path as the rest of the world (the other liberal democratic states) will solve the problem. In more general terms, such an interpretation of the political situation reflects a liberal understanding of war as a problem to be solved by enhancing global (liberal) norms and global (liberal) governance by strengthening the role of international institutions and by concluding legal agreements between nation states. It is also common to highlight the benefits of increasing economic interdependency between (liberal) states, as it is expected to generate peace and stability for the whole international system.

Quite on the contrary, in the radical poststructuralist approach it is precisely the increasing governance by liberal states and institutions that is regarded as one of the main problems. Radical poststructuralists interpret

the Iraq War as a logical continuation – and one of the most obvious manifestations – of the global neoliberal governance that they believe has brought the entire international system into a *permanent state of exception*. The war is not conceived as stemming solely from US exceptionalism but as serving other purposes as well, since war as such is regarded as an essential instrument of rule in governance of the global order. Although the leading role of the US is regarded as highly important in the process of constructing and maintaining a global regime of biopower (Empire), the US role *as such* is not seen as explaining the transformation from a system led by nation states to a complex system of decentralized forms of power and governance.

A significant difference between the liberal and radical approaches is reflected in their definition of war in more general terms. Being quite uncritical of the ‘liberal way of war’ in the first place, liberal cosmopolitans do not share the idea of a ‘global state of war’ with radical poststructuralists. For the latter, the Iraq War is merely one example of great variety of structural violence and suffering taking place continuously within Empire, where mechanisms of global neoliberal capitalism have started to control all forms of life, accelerating and deepening inequality and injustice in the world. In this interpretation, the problems to be tackled are much more profound than just the War on Terror or the Iraq War, which are viewed from a broader, structural perspective.

Both liberal and radical analyses have been questioned by the critical state-centric approach, which challenges the whole idea of a global state of war as well as the argument that the international system or the power of nation states has been fundamentally transformed. The critical state-centric approach also questions the interpretation that the Iraq War manifests a heightened desire for control by a neoliberal Empire. Rather, it stresses that both the Iraq War and the War on Terror should be conceived as resulting from a lack of coherent, strategic foreign policy goals and an inability of the US and other western states to respond to new kinds of security threats.

In regard to conceptualizations of political action and resistance, liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists are somewhat closer to each other than in their analyses of war and power. They both maintain that non-state actors have become important and influential political actors in the global era. For liberal cosmopolitans, the project against

war is not, however, based on the struggle against decentralized forms of governance of Empire; rather, it is non-state actors that are regarded as struggling against state power. In fact, liberal cosmopolitans seem increasingly often to regard nation states and governments as opponents of global civil society, as they are believed to constrain human progress towards a cosmopolitan society. This leads liberal cosmopolitans also to regard traditional forms of political participation in representational democratic system as old-fashioned and ineffective ways to produce social and political change. They suggest that the primary context for political engagement should now be global and that non-state actors and their networks should adjust their political action to fit that scale. It is also stressed that globalization and the information revolution have increased the possibilities of non-state actors substantially.

On balance, the liberal cosmopolitan approach maintains that non-state actors such as social movements should bypass territorialized nation state boundaries altogether. It stresses that it is not only hard, instrumental power that counts in the global era, but that soft power, based on persuasion and tempting, has now become increasingly important. However, the approach can be criticized for not contemplating seriously enough whether it really is possible to challenge hard power with soft power and how this can be accomplished in practical terms. On the whole, it seems that the liberal cosmopolitan approach does not take the issue of power or power structures into account sufficiently in the context of social movements.

The poststructuralist approach resembles the liberal cosmopolitan in its advocacy of the global context as the primary context for political action (explicitly conceptualized as *resistance*). Radical poststructuralists, however, explain the rationale behind this in very different terms, for they believe that power has become decentralized in migrating from nation states to the deterritorialized regime of biopower (Empire). Believing that that power in the international system has become deterritorialized, they go on to argue that resistance must take on a similar, deterritorialized and global form in order to be effective. Although their approach is based on a very different kind of analysis of power, radical poststructuralists end up defining the role of social movements in terms quite similar to those used by the liberal cosmopolitans, ones that also reinforce a very negative view of traditional forms of political engagement while often also citing

the crisis of democracy.

In addition, both approaches speak highly of the global public sphere, which is thought to be based on a similar logic but on a different scale than the public sphere in the context of nation states. They also praise global networks of opposition and regard the role of new ICTs as very important for political engagement as well as democracy. In fact, radical poststructuralists regard diffuse, global and networked forms of resistance as crucial in challenging global power structures. They stress that social movements, unlike states, have a capacity for this kind of action as they are organized in a non-hierarchical fashion. The main problem of the radical approach is that it offers basically no practical suggestions whereby social movements might organize their resistance effectively and it thus remains unclear how problems and injustices of the world can be tackled concretely. In sum, the approach can be criticized for conceptualizing the role, power and strategies of social movements in highly abstract terms.

Both of the theoretical discourses discussed above are strongly criticized by the critical state-centric approach, whose very point of departure is to challenge the very belief that politics has become globalized. It argues that both liberal and radical approaches are based on 'Global Ideology', which instead of empirically studying whether politics has been globalized, takes this as a starting assumption, leading to a vicious circle of misinterpretations in which everything is regarded as becoming increasingly globalized. From the perspective of social movements, the discourse of globalized politics is regarded as not only misleading but also counter-productive in that social movements which scale their resistance to the global level as a result of the discourses are likely to become less influential, because they will fail to target the genuine subjects of power, that is, nation states.

The critical state-centric approach also emphasizes the negative impacts of globally oriented political action for the working of the democratic system as regards, for example, accountability and offering real political alternatives for people. In other words, by provoking even more distrust towards representative democracy, the academic globalists lead people away from collective power, a form of power that is crucial when the aim is to affect politics in concrete terms. The approach suggests that global and merely symbolic forms of political action (or resistance) are prone to elitism and are likely to result in even more radical disengagement

from politics. The belief that the global public sphere constitutes a public sphere similar to that at the national level also becomes challenged. It is maintained that global communication as such, in the form of expressing one's own ideas, cannot be regarded as sufficient because political communication needs to be based on the aim of persuading people to agree with one's own position. Engaging in a political dialogue and debate is necessary when attempting to gain broad support for one's political views, which can then be utilized in political struggles (for power) within the representational and democratic political system.

The analysis of three theoretical approaches indicates that their main differences stem from their different understandings of power and different interpretations of the impact of globalization on power relations between different political actors. The liberal cosmopolitan approach is characterized by its understanding of the process of globalization in mostly positive terms, emphasizing the possibilities for new and global forms of political action brought by globalization. It also maintains that social movements and other non-state actors are gaining more power at the expense of nation states. In this regard, power is mainly conceptualized in terms of symbolic or soft power. In contrast, radical poststructuralists regard economic globalization very critically, stressing that it is serving the unjust global power structure, which can, however, be challenged by social movements if they adapt their political strategies to suit the changing circumstances. In other words, the approach stresses the need to globalize resistance in order to be able to fight global power structures, which are regarded as beyond the power of nation states. Power is regarded as decentralized and networked, whether the issue is the global power structures to be resisted or the non-state actors engaging in resistance. Rather than an ability to exert direct influence, power is viewed in terms of soft or symbolic power, just like in the liberal cosmopolitan approach.

The critical state-centric approach challenges both approaches, regarding the globalization of politics in highly skeptical terms and denying that there has been any serious transition from national to global in terms of political action (resistance) or power. Power in this approach is defined in more traditional terms as a struggle for instrumental power. A summary of these findings illustrating the main similarities and differences between the three different theoretical approaches is presented in the Appendix 1.

On the whole, the liberal cosmopolitan approach can be criticized for not taking the issue of power seriously or critically enough into consideration, and the radical poststructuralist approach for emphasizing global power structures too strongly. As it simultaneously has a very broad and somewhat idealistic view of the possibilities of global resistance to challenge the global power regime, the radical approach actually represents a strange mixture of unwarranted optimism and omnipotence, resulting in a sort of determinism. Another problem in the idea of globalized, generalized and being-against strategies of resistance is that they do not yield many concrete suggestions for political engagement and resistance. From the perspective of critical theory, these kinds of conceptualizations should always be integrated into political practice at least on some level.

The critical state-centric approach, which maintains that political action and resistance should stay primarily at the national level for the sake of effectiveness and political accountability, succeeds convincingly in illustrating many serious problems in the theoretical approaches that advocate globalism. Nevertheless, the critical state-centric approach perhaps has too strong a focus on the national context despite the fact that – as the approach itself acknowledges – most social movements are characteristically deterritorialized in ideological terms, this being case especially with the anti-war movement. Accordingly, there should be more reflection on this particular issue, which might also compel the critical state-centric approach to articulate more openly how it regards the power of social movements more generally and the difference between symbolic (or soft) power and instrumental power in particular.

### 3 OUTLINE OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In the previous chapter, three different theoretical approaches were examined, with the findings providing a particular framework for the empirical analysis to follow. Specifically, the theoretical inquiry makes it possible to design a particular technique to determine the *units of analysis* for the empirical part, that is, the questions to be asked. As explained in the introduction, answering the main research questions requires ascertaining how much common ground there is between theory and political practice at the moment, in other words, how the understandings and premises of the current anti-war movement ‘resonate’ with those of the three theoretical approaches. After analyzing the main convergences and divergences between the theoretical and empirical results, it becomes possible to move on to discuss what the theories can and fail to offer to the anti-war movement, which advances the overall aim of developing the theories further, especially in terms of their connection to the political practice of resistance.

The premises of the anti-war movement need to be investigated in terms similar to those used in analyzing the premises of the theoretical discourses. The theoretical analysis has revealed clearly that several different aspects of any approach or movement must be examined in order to get a comprehensive view. Firstly, given that the anti-war movement has been conceptualized in the theoretical debate as an increasingly global political subject – at least there are visions of it as becoming such – it is valuable to see how the movement regards itself in this regard as an ‘agent’ of resistance and a political subject. Secondly, to be able to reflect on the theoretical debate concerning the primary opponents of social movements and thus the targets of their resistance, it is necessary to analyze how these are defined within the anti-war movement, and why. In a word, one has to study *what is resisted* and *why it is resisted*.

Thirdly, in order to examine the theoretical discussion concerning the most effective political strategies and the primary context of resistance for social movements, it is necessary to study how these are understood within the anti-war movement; that is, the views on to *how to resist* need to be dissected. Fourthly, since the effectiveness of resistance, as well as the power of the movement, is conceptualized in various ways in the

theoretical debate, these, too, must be assessed in the context of the movement. What needs to be analyzed is how power of the movement as well as its achievements, successes and failures are understood within the movement, that is, how *power* as well as *effects* are conceptualized.

In order to address the main research questions and thereby inform the theoretical debate, the empirical analysis will query the premises and understandings of selected *organizations* within the anti-war movement in terms of the following issues:

1. *Who is / who are the main agent(s)?* This requires an analysis of how the movement and the organizations themselves are conceptualized as political subjects of resistance, and whether their political agency is regarded mainly from a national or a global perspective. (Chapter 4)
2. *What to resist and why?* This question will be addressed through an analysis of how the main aims, targets of resistance are defined and causes of (the) war articulated. (Chapter 5)
3. *How to resist?* This question pertains to how effective strategies and tactics of resistance are conceptualized. (Chapter 6)
4. *What is power?* Addressing this question illuminates how and from what perspective the power of the movement is conceptualized. (Chapter 7)
5. *What are effects?* This analysis highlights what are regarded as the main achievements, successes and failures of the new anti-war movement. (Chapter 8)

To comprehensively analyze the organizations' understanding of these quite broad issues, additional detailed questions need to be asked. These specific units of analysis are introduced in the beginning of each chapter dedicated to a specific issue.



What exactly is meant here by ‘the anti-war movement’? Quite often the term is used as a synonym for the peace movement, especially in the media, but sometimes also in academic literature. However, it is possible to regard the two as separate movements that have a different emphasis in their political aims and their activities. Indeed, some researchers argue that it would be more appropriate to speak of ‘the anti-war *and* peace movements’, as this would encompass ‘the range of activists, from those wanting to see one side defeated to those who abhor all forms of violence’ (Gillan et al. 2008: 73; emphasis in original, also 188)<sup>1</sup>. Although some strongly emphasize that the anti-war and peace movements should not be equated with each other, many scholars have nevertheless used the term ‘anti-war’ to describe them both, a choice usually justified on the basis of brevity (ibid: 73, also Pickerill & Webster 2006; Scherer 2004: 3). This is the choice here as well, although the movement consists of a mixture of both ‘branches’, the more traditional peace branch and the somewhat newer anti-war branch. Sometimes I also use the term ‘movement against the Iraq War’, which better accommodates both branches of the movement, but, as quite a long expression, is not very convenient to use all the time.

It is extremely difficult to force a strict definition on whatever term is chosen, because we are dealing with a highly diverse social movement that has a very long and rich history<sup>2</sup>. Moreover, it should be noted that the movement is not a centrally led or strictly territorialized movement, but a heterogeneous network encompassing various political groups and participants from all over the world. As Taylor and Young (1987: 9) point out, it consists of ‘various strands and traditions, immensely diverse in character and often contradictory in their stances’. Therefore, instead of trying to impose a unified and clear definition, I opt to define the movement as a loose political community – an umbrella organization of sorts under which there is a broad spectrum of actors that may share some views but not others<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> For ‘narrow’ and ‘wider’ definitions of the peace movement, see e.g. Overy 1982: 4–6, 55–57.

<sup>2</sup> The anti-war/peace movement is regarded as ‘the oldest continuously organized social movement’ and ‘one of the most diverse’ (Chatfield 1992: xxv).

<sup>3</sup> Many scholars stress that the diversity within the movement makes it difficult to speak of ‘the existence of a single peace movement’ (Chatfield 1973b: vii).

The British anti-war movement, which functions here as the context of the case study of four anti-war organizations, is introduced following a short historical review providing some historical and political context to illustrate the broader international and national framework in which the anti-war movement is currently operating<sup>4</sup>. Although the history of the movement definitely warrants a much more detailed examination, limitations of space preclude a more comprehensive treatment. Moreover, in this kind of research setting it unnecessary to replicate or repeat the whole history of the movement. There are many excellent textbooks and studies by distinguished scholars which cover these issues in a much more profound way than the present author ever could. Hence, the following review attempts to provide as many references as possible to relevant research literature for those who wish to find out more about certain historical events, particular campaigns or other points of interest.

### 3.1 A Brief History of the Anti-War/Peace Movement

The history of the peace movement dates back to the beginning of the nineteenth century. The first peace societies were formed in the US and Europe simultaneously in 1815. (Chatfield 1997: 23; Cortright 2008: 16, 27.) In the US, the peace movement was first constituted by small religious societies, after which broader associations, such as the American Peace Society, were formed (Chatfield 1973b: x–xii; Boyer 2001; Cortright 2008: 28).<sup>5</sup> In Europe, Britain was the first country in which peace groups and associations were founded. From 1815 onwards, the number of peace-related associations started to grow steadily. The European peace movement was active, for example, in organizing international peace congresses, which first took place sporadically but later in a more systematic fashion until 1914 (Chatfield 1997: 23). By that time, there were already peace associations in most European states.

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<sup>4</sup> As Shaw (1987: 51) importantly notes: ‘If peace activism meant certain things in the 1900s, it meant others in the First World War, others in the 1920s and early 1930s, yet others in the later 1930s and during the Second World War’.

<sup>5</sup> The history and development of the American peace movement is not covered here in detail (see e.g. Chatfield 1973a–d; 1992; Cortright 2007a; 2008; DeBenedetti 1973; Patterson 1973; Scherer 2004; Stassen & Wittner 2007).

According to social movement scholars, the first peace movements worked independently of one another and arose mainly from essentially temporary political coalitions that typically concentrated on specific national issues (Boyer 2001). Sometimes they also tried to tackle intergovernmental disputes in opposing militarism-nationalism as well as mobilizing people for the cause of peace (Chatfield 1997: 23; also 1973b: xii–xiv; Cortright 2008: 45). It has been noted that from the very beginning there were significant differences in terms of ‘constituency, philosophy, and emphasis’, as some groups ‘worked for international exchanges and understanding; one for a universal language; others against imperialism, and arms races, or for international law’ (Chatfield 1997: 23; also 1992: 1–27)<sup>6</sup>. Pacifism as a philosophical standpoint was especially common within the early peace groups in Britain and the US,<sup>7</sup> which have remained the most active regions in this regard ever since (Prasad 2005: 103). Although the main priorities varied between different groups within the peace movement, it has been argued that they shared ‘the goal of replacing warfare with the peaceful resolution of conflict’ (Boyer 2001). However, they ‘rarely engaged in extensive debate over their different viewpoints’ and when they did, it was usually believed that they ‘were more complementary than conflicting’ (Patterson 1973: 25–26).

In the beginning of the twentieth century, peace associations mushroomed. Public pressure in Britain, France and the US, for example, ‘provided the impetus for the Second Hague Conference of 1907’ (Chatfield 1997, 24; also Cortright 2008: 42–43). In Britain, the National Peace Council (NPC) was founded after the 17th Universal Peace Congress in London in 1908, which brought together representatives from different national organizations working for peace and disarmament. As a coalition of mainly pacifist groups calling on the government to renounce war and to promote the idea of a world government (Hudson 2005: 26), the NPC was to become a long-term association<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>6</sup> For example, there were many internal divisions within the American movement during the First World War (Patterson 1973: 21, 24). While differing ‘fundamentally on the specific details for the realization of their goal’, pacifists, legalists and federationists ‘disagreed on the proper means to the idealistic end’ (ibid: 33).

<sup>7</sup> Pacifism was brought to the US by Christian groups that moved there from Europe (Prasad 2005: 103).

<sup>8</sup> The NPC was discontinued almost a hundred years after its foundation, replaced in 2001 by the Network for Peace was set up to continue its networking role.

Due to the First World War, peace became an issue of utmost importance. Peace organizations of the time often believed that peace would be established ‘through making appeals to governments and organising conferences to declare their opposition to war’ (Prasad 2005: 103; also Cortright 2008: 52–61).<sup>9</sup> After the war, many started to doubt whether nation states could any longer fulfill their functions and protect their citizens. Hence, liberal internationalism gained more transnational characteristics (Chatfield 1992: 168; also 1973a) and many put their hopes into the newly founded League of Nations, which, it was believed, would become a ‘peace-maker’ and arbitrator of conflicts between nation states (e.g. Cortright 2008: 53). It was thought to effectively control ‘the unreasonable and self-righteous behavior of the winning governments towards the defeated nations’ of the war (Prasad 2005: 262)<sup>10</sup>. However, the League of Nations turned out to be a disappointment to many, as it was ‘helpless in a climate of distrust toward power centres created by the winning nations’ (ibid: 262; also Cortright 2008: 58, 64–65).

Ultimately, the belief that the First World War was a war to end all wars proved to be an illusion (Prasad 2005: 262) and there was a growing recognition that it had in fact solved nothing (Hinton 1989: 75). Instead, it essentially paved the way for the Second World War. Between the world wars, pacifism gained more ground as an ideology of the peace movement. In Britain, for example, the Peace Pledge Union (PPU), which adhered to pacifist principles, was established. It is considered the oldest ‘secular pacifist’ organization (Miles 2008: 50) and the largest pacifist organization in Britain (Hinton 1989: 102)<sup>11</sup>. It was a section of War Resisters’ International (WRI), an international organization founded already in 1921<sup>12</sup>. According to Miles (2008: 50; also Cortright 2008: 74–75), the PPU was founded ‘as a response to the failure of the 1919 Peace Treaty and growing anxiety that Europe was drifting into another

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<sup>9</sup> On the history of the British peace movement, see e.g. Byrd 1985; Hinton 1989; Taylor 1983; 1988; Taylor & Young 1987a.

<sup>10</sup> As Hinton (1989: 70) notes, ‘a victor’s peace, as pacifists had always understood, could be nothing but a temporary truce, setting the scene for new wars of revenge once the defeated powers had recovered their strength’.

<sup>11</sup> For more detail on the PPU, see e.g. Ceadel 1987: 91–92; Overy 1982: 10–12; Hinton 1989: 102–104; Cortright 2008: 74–75.

<sup>12</sup> WRI is one of the organizations studied here. Its history is presented in more detail in chapter 3.3.

war'. Prior to the Second World War, the Union had 150,000 members, but with the outbreak of war in 1939 its support decreased dramatically (Hudson 2005: 29; also Cortright 2008: 75).

The Second World War left 55 million people dead. Where the First World War inspired a strong anti-war atmosphere and helped, for example, the anti-conscription movement, the Second World War created a sense of apathy and skepticism towards pacifism (Prasad 2005: 255, 261; Cortright 2008: 110). In Britain, the peace movement was even accused of being responsible for its government's policy of appeasement (Hinton 1989: 91–92). From the pacifist perspective, it was problematic that the Second World War 'caused a very large number of people to believe that forces like Hitler's Nazism and Mussolini's Fascism were the real enemies of humanity rather than the institutions of war and militarism' (Prasad 2005: 262). After the war, it was a common view that 'evil' forces 'had to be defeated by whatever means available or conceivable', which meant that 'militarism itself could be accepted as an essential tool for building peace' (ibid). It has been argued that the most horrific result of this view becoming accepted was the use of atom bombs to destroy Hiroshima and Nagasaki although the Japanese were ready to surrender (ibid).

After the Second World War, many hopes were invested in international organizations, mainly the United Nations, to maintain peace and security in the world (Cortright 2008: 111–115). There was also a quite active movement for establishing a 'world government' (ibid: 115–117; also Chatfield 1992: 162). For example, organizations such as the Federal Union and the Crusade for World Government worked towards this goal (Hudson 2005: 26; Cortright 2008: 117). In Britain, the philosopher Bertrand Russell was a central figure in the movement (he was later appointed president of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) (Hudson 2005: 26; Cortright 2008: 134).

After the Second World War, the British peace movement concentrated on the dissolution of the British Empire as well as the rejection of imperialism by both the US and the Soviet Union<sup>13</sup>. Together with these efforts, in the 1950s, there grew up within the broader movement

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<sup>13</sup> James Hinton (1989: 2) has interestingly observed that Britain's imperial role in the nineteenth century resulted, on the one hand, 'in a stronger peace movement than anywhere else in the Europe' but which was, on the other hand, deeply influenced 'by often unrecognized imperialist assumptions'.

a specific anti-nuclear branch around the Direct Action Committee (DAC). It organized the first Aldermaston March in 1958. Later on, the small DAC merged into the Committee of 100, and over the decades the march 'became synonymous with CND' (Hudson 2005: 55; also Hinton 1989: 161–170; Day 1986: 171–172), the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, which was founded in 1958.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was a great deal of fear in regard to nuclear weapons due to the development of the first hydrogen bomb. The CND managed to channel popular opposition to nuclear weapons into anti-nuclear marches, of which the most famous was the annual Aldermaston March. The anti-nuclear campaigning continuously reflected changing developments, from the time when US air bases were accepted in Britain (after the founding of NATO) to the start of the nuclear arms race after the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear weapon (1949) and the beginning of the Korean War in 1950 (Hudson 2005: 30–32). As the Soviet Union became enemy number one within the liberal western hemisphere during the Cold War, the peace movement was often challenged by accusing it of communist leanings. For many, it was 'difficult to accept that British communists wanted peace and disarmament and were not just working in the interests of the Soviet Union' (ibid: 33).<sup>14</sup> Anti-communism was also common within the British peace movement; initially it caused problems, but later it became accepted that the movement would 'welcome dedicated peace activists whatever their personal convictions' (ibid).

Due to popular opposition to nuclear weapons, the Labour Party produced a resolution for unilateral nuclear disarmament in 1960. However, the resolution did not receive enough support, which disappointed many anti-nuclear activists who had put their trust in the party.<sup>15</sup> This caused a strong anti-parliamentary climate within the peace movement and subsequently enhanced the ideology of anarchism, which later had concrete consequences for some organizations in the movement<sup>16</sup>. For example, philosopher Bertrand Russell resigned as

<sup>14</sup> On peace and communism, see e.g. Cortright 2008: 119–120.

<sup>15</sup> E.g. Cortright 2008: 135; Hinton 1989: 160–161; Rochon 1988: 157; Taylor 1987a: 112–117.

<sup>16</sup> Since then, it has been a widespread view within the British peace movement that it should not depend too heavily on political parties (Rochon 1988: 157).

a president of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and formed a new organization, the Committee of 100. This was to become more radical as well as more direct-action oriented, organizing campaigns of civil disobedience, for instance, in the form of protests and sit-downs in different locations near nuclear bases. This strategy can be characterized basically as mass-oriented direct action and civil obedience. At first, it was a very popular strategy, but its popularity faded quite quickly when arrests and imprisonment of demonstrators, as well as violence used by the police, started to increase. (E.g. Hudson 2005; Day 1986: 171–172; Overy 1982: 31–32.)

Later in the 1960s, the Vietnam War became a major issue within the peace movement (e.g. Cortright 2008: 157–167). The first demonstration against the war was organized in 1965 in front of the American Embassy in London. In 1967 and 1968, there were large demonstrations against the war, which were organized by the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (VSC), led by Tariq Ali. Some of these demonstrations became quite violent. It is a commonly acknowledged fact that during the Vietnam War there were many controversies and rivalries inside the anti-war movements in both the US (e.g. Chatfield 1973b: xxvii; DeBenedetti & Chatfield 1990) and Britain (e.g. Young 1987a: 18; Taylor & Young 1987b: 295).<sup>17</sup>

During the 1980s, the anti-nuclear campaigns brought increasingly transnational aspects to anti-war and peace activism, and the European peace movement in particular was active in its opposition to the Cold War and to nuclear weapons. The period between 1981 and 1983 saw continuous and massive demonstrations against nuclear weapons all over Europe as hundreds of thousands of people took part in anti-nuclear campaigns (Rochon 1988: xvi). This ‘fanned out of the Netherlands to Germany and Britain, to Belgium to Italy; it elicited the first signs of an independent mood in Eastern Europe; it steadily expanded through Scandinavia and the Mediterranean; it reached the United States; and, last of all, France’ (Taylor & Young 1987b: 287).<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> On opposition to the Vietnam War in Britain, see e.g. Minnion 1989; Miller 2008. On the American anti-war movement during the Vietnam War, see e.g. Boyer 2001; Chatfield 1992: 117–145; Chatfield 1997: 23–25; DeBenedetti & Chatfield 1990; Dumbrell 1989; Garfinkle 1995; Finn 1985; Klein 1989; Kronenwetter 1994: 101–119; Hixson 2000; Horowitz 1970: 14–17; Small 2002.

The 1980s was also a time when human rights issues surfaced as a central theme and one increasingly often linked to the issue of peace. In addition, environmental and women's rights movements started to play an important role (*ibid*: 288). The European Nuclear Disarmament (END) movement originated from Britain, helping to organize European Peace Conventions while also managing to attract activists from Eastern Europe (*ibid*: 291).

One of the most significant forms of anti-nuclear campaigning in Britain has been the Women's Peace Camp near the Greenham Common Air Base. It lasted for a remarkable 19 years (1981–2000). The campaign was a reaction to US plans to install cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe. The Women's Peace Camp aimed at preventing the construction of silos for the missiles at the base through nonviolent direct action. Various methods were used, but the highlight was in December 1982, when over 30,000 women gathered at the base and joined hands around its perimeter fence. The action was called 'Embrace the Base'.<sup>19</sup> There was a peace camp in Molesworth and at least ten in other locations in Britain, and in other countries as well, such as Germany, France and Italy.

Generally, the 1980s clearly marked an increase in extra-parliamentary politics in the peace movement, as well as growing skepticism towards politicians and political parties in society more broadly. (Taylor & Young 1987b: 290.) During the 1990s, there was opposition to the Gulf War as well as the wars in the Balkans, but as has been already pointed out, the movement experienced a clear political revival only after 9/11 and the War on Terror that followed it.

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<sup>18</sup> On the movement against nuclear weapons in the US, see e.g. Chatfield 1992: 146–164; Davis 1985; McCullough 2007), in Europe and Britain, see e.g. Hinton 1989: 182–194; Rochon 1988, and more generally e.g. Cortright 2008: 139–146).

<sup>19</sup> On Greenham Common, see e.g. Eglin 1987; Cortright 2008: 147–148; Hinton 1989: 183, 191–193; Miles 2008: 202, 208, 221; Rochon 1988: 7, 82, 92, 102–104, 110–113.



### 3.2 Case Study: The Anti-War Movement in Britain

Why would one study the British anti-war movement? It can be argued that it is a very interesting and relevant case for many reasons. First of all, as an influential member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the closest partner of the US in the War on Terror as well as the War on Iraq, the United Kingdom (UK) represents a very important national context for analyzing the premises of resistance within the anti-war movement. Secondly, the fact that Britain went to war against the will of its citizens – the majority of British citizens opposed their country's involvement – makes it a very compelling case. Indeed, this is one obvious explanation for the popularity of the anti-war movement in Britain. Thirdly, many British anti-war organizations have been very active in organizing and promoting international campaigns and events during the Iraq War, which adds the 'global' element to the case. The headquarters of an important international organization, War Resisters' International, is also located in Britain. Fourthly, historically Britain has been a very important place for anti-war and peace activism over the past two hundred years. Lastly, another aspect of interest is that the British peace movement has been heavily influenced by the country's colonial and imperialist history (e.g. Hinton 1989).

The choice of case study obviously has a clear bearing on the kinds of interpretations and conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis. I am well aware that the case study makes the perspective of the study western and, more specifically, European, which potentially gives room for criticism on grounds of Euro-centrism. However, the perspective provides an opportunity to critically analyze the premises of the European anti-war movement, which seems to have been the most active in opposing the Iraq War, together with the American anti-war movement of course. The European anti-war movement has gained a great deal of international publicity particularly due to the European Social Forum (ESF), a 'home base' of sorts for many anti-war groups and organizations. Indeed, the Forum was where the idea of a worldwide demonstration against the Iraq War was first introduced and discussed among different groups in 2002. Accordingly, it is reasonable to suggest that by empirically studying the premises of British anti-war organizations one might be able to say something that applies beyond the national framework and to reflect on

related theoretical debates on a more general, at least European, level.

When it comes to research in regard to the anti-war movement<sup>20</sup>, during the past few decades, there has not generally been particularly much research on the peace or anti-war movements. One obvious explanation is that the peace movement was 'out of fashion' for a long time after the 1980s; there was not that much to study. The end of the Cold War was probably one of the reasons why the anti-war movement was not a popular subject of research during the 1990s<sup>21</sup>. Another reason for the limited interest in studying the anti-war movement may be that it is often considered mainly from a historical perspective, as if nothing has changed. Especially those scholars who regard the anti-war movement as strongly international by definition might not see the need to study the supposedly new and/or global elements in it. At the same time, there has been a dramatic rise in social movements and NGOs related to other issues, especially environmental problems and human rights (Keck & Sikkink 1998: 10–11). The present decade has witnessed a very dynamic period of political activism, ranging from environmental, religious and human rights related movements to the alter-globalization movement.

There has recently been growing interest in the anti-war movement and some interesting studies have been published. For example, the new American anti-war movement has inspired many studies (e.g. Anstead & Chadwick 2006; Heaney & Rojas 2007)<sup>22</sup>. European and especially British anti-war activism has been analyzed in several studies, for instance, from the perspective of anti-imperialism and critical geopolitics (Phillips 2009) as well as from the perspective of its relationship to ICTs, which are increasingly used by all social movements. The role of the Internet for anti-war activism has been a particularly popular subject, and research has also often focused on the extent of the transnational characteristics

<sup>20</sup> Instead of a separate and detailed literature review of previous studies on the movement, the thesis draws on relevant and important research literature throughout the text. This can be seen in the chapters of empirical analysis in particular when discussing the findings of the analysis, much in the same way as was done in the historical review (see chapter 3.1).

<sup>21</sup> It has been argued that the European peace movement, as a part of a wider civil society, was one of the factors contributing to the end of the Cold War in 1989 (Kaldor 2003a: 69–71; also Cortright 2008: 149–152).

<sup>22</sup> For popular literature on the current anti-war movement in the US, see e.g. Benjamin & Evans 2005; Hayden 2007; Ritter 2007; Robbins 2008.

of the movement (Pickerill & Webster 2006; Gillan & Pickerill 2008; Gillan et al. 2008; also Gillan 2008). In his PhD thesis, Kevin Gillan (2006) analyzes ideational frameworks of Sheffield-based protests groups belonging to three different social movements – the alter-globalization movement, the anti-war movement and the social forum movement – which he regards as together constituting a particular type of a cycle of protest contesting globalization and war. Although this study differs from those mentioned above empirically and especially theoretically, all the research cited provides extremely valuable background material and can be used in many ways as a point of reference and comparison.

### 3.3 The Anti-War Organizations Studied

The selection of anti-war organizations to study empirically was admittedly quite a challenging process. In the UK, there are dozens of anti-war groups and there is as much variation within the anti-war movement domestically as there is internationally. As Pickerill and Webster (2006: 415) point out, some organizations ‘link their resistance to war or broader anti-imperialist struggles or to a pacifist ideology, while others believe in the necessity of war but that the specific war against Iraq was not justified’. Thus, one can see the field as a continuum ranging from ‘an ideological *pacifism through to opposition to one side’s involvement in a specific conflict*’ (ibid: 415, emphasis in original). Often anti-war/peace groups are categorized according to their primary ideologies and traditions (Young 1987a: 7) or their aims and objectives (Overy 1982: 2–9), which is quite challenging, since most organizations have many goals and their premises may also reflect different traditions. All of these aspects also vary to some extent at different times and in different contexts.

Interestingly, some scholars define the movement ‘with reference not to policies but to theories’ because ‘defence policy is itself the expression of a theory – indeed the most popular theory – about international relations’ (Ceadel 1987: 73). Others may distinguish between anti-war groups linked with political programs, feminist-inspired or religious-oriented organizations, and activist/performance groups (Pickerill & Webster 2006: 415–417). For the purposes of this study, it is not necessary to go into such a detailed categorization.

However, when selecting the organizations to study, different types were chosen in order to get a broad enough view and to be able to explore internal unity (diversity) within the movement. Hence, four organizations that each represent different approaches were chosen for closer examination. Two of them are established, long-standing organizations, while the other two have been founded quite recently. All four have engaged in resistance against the Iraq War in one way or another, and some have even worked closely together. The *Stop the War Coalition* (StWC) has been one of the most active organizations in the new movement, cooperating with the *Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament* (CND), a well-known long-standing anti-nuclear organization. *Globalise Resistance* (GR) is a quite recently founded organization involved in a broader scale of issues such as promotion of anti-capitalism and global economic justice. *War Resisters' International* (WRI) is a well-recognized pacifist organization that was founded back in 1921.<sup>23</sup>

The fact that only a limited number of organizations are studied might raise some critical questions in regard to the extent to which it is possible to talk about the 'movement' in the first place and whether it is admissible to study the movement through the perceptions of only a few organizations. Indeed, the fact is that 'social movement organizations (SMOs) and social movements are by no means identical', since movements are 'interactive campaigns' and not organizations (Tilly 2004: 48). Organizations do play a part in these campaigns but they are always mixed with other kinds of groups, networks, individuals, traditions and solidarities that sustain the campaign activities (Tilly & Tarrow 2007: 8). The difference between organizations and a movement is also manifested in the simple fact that many organizations often pre-date or outlive the movement (Rochon 1988: 77). Some scholars further differentiate between social movement bases (where organizations are important) and campaigns in order to 'sort

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<sup>23</sup> The difficulty in defining organizations in terms of typologies and traditions is illustrated by the fact that during its history the CND has been characterized as a pressure group, a mass movement of protest (Overy 1982: 7), a single-issue peace campaign trying to eliminate a particular aspect of war (ibid: 2, 22; Young 1987a: 13) and a nuclear pacifist organization (e.g. Eglin 1987: 236). Similarly, WRI has been described as a revolutionary movement to end all wars (Overy 1982: 8–9), an anti-conscription movement, a socialist war resistance organization (Young 1987a: 12), and a radical (secular) pacifist organization (ibid: 13).

out the organizations, networks, participants, and traditions that make up a social movement and constitute a movement campaign (Tilly & Tarrow 2007: 115, also 114, 119).<sup>24</sup>

Bearing these different definitions of a social movement in mind<sup>25</sup>, it is important to stress that it is not suggested in this study that the premises of four anti-war organizations could be equated with those of the British anti-war movement as a whole. These four organizations are understood as constituting only *a part* of the movement. Clearly, an analysis of their views does not provide a comprehensive picture of the movement in general terms. It can only be argued that an examination of the organizations' views can constitute an understanding of how they regard the movement and their own roles as a part of it. Therefore, qualifying expressions such as 'within the movement' or 'some organizations of the movement' are used in the analysis chapters.

Although social movement organizations cannot be equated with a movement, many social movement scholars have nevertheless analyzed organizations when studying movements. One peace movement scholar explicitly argues that for certain purposes 'there are analytic gains to be had from adopting a more restrictive definition of a political movement, for example by looking only at the major organizations or at the local activists' (Rochon 1988: 23). In other words, the choice of focus depends on the research aim and the context. Here, the analysis focuses to a large extent on certain leading anti-war organizations that are in a position to heavily influence the overall strategies and activities of the movement. Although they certainly cannot dictate or even steer the

<sup>24</sup> The role of social movement organizations (SMOs) is a controversial and debated issue among social movement scholars. While some scholars view SMOs very skeptically, arguing that they are irrelevant or even counterproductive from the perspective of movements since they may weaken their extent of radicalism, some regard SMOs as the only agents able to bring about change in a politically effective way (for discussion, see e.g. Rochon 1988: 79).

<sup>25</sup> Generally speaking, there are many different kinds of definitions of a movement, some of which are more and some less restrictive (e.g. Tilly 2004: 3–7; Tilly & Tarrow 2007: 8; della Porta & Diani 2006: 20–22; Rochon 1988: xv). Walker (1988: 62) points out that some of the biggest and most well-known movements often resemble political parties, while smaller movements are not very different 'from the normal groupings of everyday social life'. However, he is quite skeptical of any kind of categorizations, as there is a risk 'of imposing premature classifications onto political processes that have not yet run their course (ibid).

whole movement<sup>26</sup>, these organizations are very influential in defining how the movement is constructed. In the present research setting, it is not necessary to study what all the organizations and groups and individuals within the movement believe, nor is it relevant to analyze the views of the adherents of the movement, although it definitely could help obtain a more holistic view on a more general level; the main focus of analysis is on the major organizations which lead the way, using their power to define the main goals and strategies for the movement. In fact, when taking part in different events and campaigns organizations and groups within the movement, many adherents probably do not even know (or care) what the main strategies of the movement are<sup>27</sup>.

It is clearly justified to study three of the selected organizations (the StWC, the CND and GR) from the above-mentioned perspective, as they can be essentially regarded as the leading organizations within the current British anti-war movement. As they are in a better position to define the overall political strategies of the movement than some other organizations, they can be expected to be quite influential inside the broader movement. This is the reason why they have been selected for the study. The fourth organization, War Resisters' International, was selected because it represents a very different kind of perspective than the other three. Next, all of the organizations are introduced in more detail.

### *The Stop the War Coalition*

The London-based Stop the War Coalition (StWC) is a relatively new organization within the British anti-war movement. It has been one of the leading organizations during the Iraq War and is regarded as a wide umbrella organization for the new anti-war movement. It was founded ten days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, on 21 September 2001, in a

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<sup>26</sup> As the definition of strategies by social movements 'depends on permanent negotiations between the individuals and the organizations involved in collective action', it is impossible for any single actor to 'claim to represent a movement as a whole' (della Porta & Diani 2006: 21).

<sup>27</sup> Moreover, not even all members of one organization have similar views. As a survey of CND members revealed, adherents 'found little agreement on the most important tactics for the movement' (Rochon 1988: 125).

public meeting in London. A commonly acknowledged fact is that the major driving force behind the StWC is the Trotskyite Socialist Workers' Party (SWP). Some scholars have argued that the StWC has greatly benefited from its 'Socialist dominated centre', because the SWP has a history of 30 years on the British Marxist Left as well as three thousand members (Gillan et al. 2008: xii–xiii). It has also played a significant part historically in the peace movement, especially from the late 1970s onwards (Taylor 1987b: 162).

The SWP's key role in the new movement has meant that the StWC has accommodated a strange 'assortment of bedfellows', of which the combination of secular Marxists from the SWP and Muslims from the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) has been regarded as 'the most unlikely partnership of all' (Gillan et al. 2008: 5).

When organizing mass demonstrations against the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the StWC has cooperated very closely with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and the British Muslim Initiative (BMI, formerly MAB), of which the former is studied in this thesis. Together with the CND and the BMI, the StWC was a major organizer of the national demonstration against the Iraq War in London on 15 February 2003. The demonstration mobilized over a million protesters onto the streets of London. It has been described as 'not merely the country's biggest political protest' but a protest 'Britain had never seen before, all-embracing in its diversity and imposing in its unity of purpose' (Murray 2008; also Murray & German 2005; Rees 2006).

Since then, the StWC has organized well over 20 demonstrations in Britain. While I was in London conducting the interviews for the present research, the StWC, again and with the CND and BMI, organized a big demonstration, gathering over 50,000 people to mark the fifth anniversary of the War on Iraq in March 2008.

The StWC also contributed to the coordination of demonstrations in a total of 58 cities in 24 countries across the world between 15 and 22 March 2008 under the title 'The World Against the War'. There were demonstrations, for example, in Turkey, Poland, Pakistan, Iceland, and the US (World Against War 2008b). The StWC took part in the coordination effort by setting up a website which was used for orchestrating the

demonstrations (Interview 4/StWC).<sup>28</sup>

The office of the StWC is described as ‘the organizational hub of a group that arranges regular demonstrations and protests round the country’ (Gillan et al. 2008: 134). Some scholars are impressed with the amount of information ‘such an office can produce and process’ as it ‘answers a huge number of queries, maintains a current website, fixes speakers for meetings at local venues, produces a host of posters and flyers and regular news bulletins, plans demonstrations and campaigns as well as develops and implements strategies and goals for the group’ (ibid: 134). When I visited the office in March 2008, it was indeed evident that an enormous amount of work is done with just a few staff members.

### *The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament*

The CND is a long-standing organization dedicated to opposing nuclear weapons, but it also engages in many sorts of more general anti-war activities. While concentrating ‘first and foremost on British nuclear weapons’, it opposes ‘all nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction: their development, manufacture, testing, deployment and use or threatened use by any country’, working with anti-nuclear groups in other countries ‘to eliminate the global threat’ (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 2008a). It defines its aims very concisely (ibid):

*Change* Government policies to bring about the elimination of British nuclear weapons as a major contribution to global abolition. *Stimulate* wide public debate on the need for alternatives both to the nuclear cycle and to military attempts to resolve conflict. *Empower* people to engage actively in the political process and to work for a nuclear-free and peaceful future. *Co-operate* with other groups in the UK and internationally to ensure the development of greater mutual security.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> The idea for a series of international anti-war demonstrations was put forward by a World Against War conference in London in 2007, which had delegates from around the world. The conference agreed to ‘launch global demonstrations’ on the fifth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq (World Against War 2008a).

<sup>29</sup> In relation to the aims, there are four external strategic objectives. Moreover, each of the strategic objectives includes several sub-objectives (not discussed here).



The original aims decided on when the organization was founded in 1958 were quite similar to those described above (Hudson 2005: 45–46; also Miles 2008: 60; Day 1986: 171). The already 50-year-old organization has its national office in London and many regional offices in major English cities. Its network consists of regional organizations, local groups and individual members<sup>30</sup>, thus ‘covering the whole of Britain’ (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 2008a). In this sense, it is a good example of a network organization. At the same time, it can be regarded as quite institutionalized since it has close relationships with trade unions and many established political parties on the left, especially the Labour Party (e.g. Hinton 1989: 153–170; Overy 1982: 22–24). In Britain, the CND is probably best known for organizing the annual Aldermaston March, and internationally it is famous for the universally recognized peace symbol produced by artist Gerald Holtom for the first march in 1958 (Hudson 2005: 56; Hudson in Miles 2008: 8; Miles 2008: 12, 63). The peace symbol, first used by the CND, became popular in the late 1960s when the hippies started to use the logo ‘to represent ‘peace’ rather than just nuclear disarmament’ (Miles 2008, 15; also DeBenedetti & Chatfield 1990: 29).

During its half-century history, the CND has had a very broad agenda: it has ‘opposed all nuclear weapons from Polaris to Trident and before and beyond’ but also campaigned against wars where nuclear weapons may be used as well as ‘illegal wars that destroy the framework of international law’ (Hudson 2005: 3).<sup>31</sup> It has also opposed ‘conventional wars’ such as the Vietnam War<sup>32</sup>, the first Gulf War<sup>33</sup>, the NATO bombing of Bosnian Serbs in 1995, and the NATO bombings in Kosovo in 1999 (ibid: 211–216). The CND’s current campaigns are ‘Global Abolition’ (of nuclear weapons), ‘No to Trident’ (Britain’s nuclear weapon system), ‘No to US Missile Defence’, ‘No to NATO’, ‘Troops Out of Iraq’, ‘Don’t Attack

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<sup>30</sup> There are independent Scottish, Irish and Cymru CND organizations, as well as specialist groups such as Student, Christian, and Labour CND.

<sup>31</sup> Moreover, the CND has campaigned ‘against weapons in space, NATO, illegal pre-emptive attacks; nuclear power, nuclear waste transportation, the militarization of Europe, the use of radio-active ‘depleted’ uranium in conventional weapons; the waste of spending on arms’ (Hudson 2005: 3).

<sup>32</sup> On the CND’s opposition to Vietnam War, see e.g. Hudson 2005: 87–102; Minion 1989: 166–171.

<sup>33</sup> On the CND’s opposition to the Gulf War, see e.g. Hudson 2005: 176–182.

Iraq', as well as campaigns aiming at banning the use of depleted uranium and uranium weapons (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 2008c). In other words, although originally an anti-nuclear organization, the CND has expanded its aims substantially over the years. Nevertheless, the current chair, Kate Hudson (2005: 46), argues that the 'original aims remain just as valid today'.

Internationally, the CND is part of a global network known as 'Abolition 2000', which aims at elimination of nuclear weapons. It also supports other campaigning organizations, such as the Campaign Against Arms Trade and Landmine Action, and anti-nuclear weapons campaigns around the world, especially in countries such as France, India, Pakistan and the US. (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 2008b.)<sup>34</sup> The CND also takes part in the UN and other international disarmament conferences. In the context of the new anti-war movement, the CND has worked closely with the StWC. In fact, many of the members of its steering group are also active in the StWC.

Especially in the 1980s, the CND was regarded as a leading organization within the British anti-war movement, on which account it has been both praised and criticized. Typically, social movement scholars describe the CND as a centralized and hierarchical organization that values political effectiveness more than direct participation while nevertheless remaining able to maintain certain 'movement-type aspects' (Rochon 1988: 89).

### *Globalise Resistance*

A fairly new London-based organization, Globalise Resistance (GR), founded in 2001, can be characterized as more of an anti-globalization than anti-war organization, although it does have a clear anti-war stance in its campaigning. Its explicit objective to 'globalize resistance' is what drew my attention to the organization in the first place. The activities of GR have been closely connected to those of the European Social Forum. In Britain, it has a very close relationship to socialist groups. In fact, some

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<sup>34</sup> Gillan et al. (2008: 114) argue that although the CND chair 'considers international links to be 'extremely important', it is clear that domestic priorities may override such considerations'.

have described it as a 'SWP front group' (Gillan 2006: 137). On the GR website, a list of the steering group members and their political affiliation shows that six of the sixteen members are also members of the Socialist Workers' Party, the rest being labeled as 'Independents'.

The website also states that the steering group was 'elected at the National Conference of GR' and that it meets on a monthly basis to organize 'the general running of GR'. Furthermore, the site points out that there are specific working groups which concentrate on 'different aspects of the work of GR, such as finance, specific protests and mobilisations and other issues as they come up'. (Globalise Resistance 2008b.)

### *War Resisters' International*

War Resisters' International (WRI) is an international pacifist organization with its headquarters in London<sup>35</sup>. WRI was founded first under the name *Paco*<sup>36</sup> in Bilthoven, Holland, in 1921 after the First World War (Prasad 2005: 20). The WRI history tells that it was founded due to the unimaginable amount of suffering and destruction caused by the First World War, which 'motivated sensitive people to organise themselves to prevent anything like it happening again' (ibid: 23). The first meeting formulated a declaration for the organization which still remains its main principle: war is regarded as 'a crime against humanity' and therefore WRI works for 'removal of all causes of war' (ibid). Members of the organization are expected to be 'determined not to support any kind of war' (War Resisters' International 2009a).<sup>37</sup> WRI says it will 'never endorse any kind of war' whether waged by a particular state, a liberation army, or in the form of a 'humanitarian' intervention authorized by the UN (ibid). The organization aims 'to build a world inspired and motivated by the dynamics of nonviolence, a world free from war, all varieties of

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<sup>35</sup> WRI headquarters was moved from London to Brussels in 1974 and then back to London in the early 1980s.

<sup>36</sup> *Paco* means 'peace' in Esperanto. The name was changed to War Resisters' International in 1923 when the headquarters of the organization was moved to London (Prasad 2005: 91).

<sup>37</sup> Prasad (2005: 449) considers WRI a privileged organization, as it has a declaration which is 'meaningful and of permanent nature'.

dictatorship – right or left, exploitation, inequalities – economic as well as social’ (Prasad 2005: 449).

In addition to the above-mentioned broad and quite abstract objective of removing all causes of war, WRI strictly opposes *conscription*, compulsory national military service. Conscription is seen as injecting ‘compulsory militarisation into the social structure’ (Prasad 2005: 82) while conditioning young men ‘to accept war as a legitimate method of social behaviour’ which, in turn, makes it ‘a psychological cause of war as well as a technical preparation for it’ (Draft presented at the WRI Council meeting in 1947, quoted in Prasad 2005: 256). WRI gives its support to individual war resisters<sup>38</sup> in order ‘to advocate and to work for the elimination of the war institution as a policy and practice of the nation state’ (Willoughby in Prasad 2005: 19).

As a very long-established pacifist organization, WRI represents more of a traditional kind of a peace organization than the other three organizations studied in this thesis. Its work is based on the principle of nonviolence and promotes direct action in particular, in which regard it collaborates with like-minded groups in Britain and elsewhere in the world. Actually, WRI is a network of independent organizations from around the world. As far back as in 1923, it was decided that the organization should try to ‘gather together as many active and concerned pacifists as it could at one place and *launch* itself on a global level’ (Prasad 2005: 96). Currently, it consists of 90 groups in as many as 43 countries (Sheehan in Prasad 2005: 18). Many of them are Western European,<sup>39</sup> but there are also WRI sections in Angola, Australia, Canada, Chile, Georgia, India, Japan, New Zealand, Sri Lanka, and the US (Prasad 2005: 469–475). Moreover, WRI has associate organizations in countries such as Chad, Georgia, Nigeria and Zimbabwe<sup>40</sup>.

International seminars constitute an important part of the networking of WRI (Prasad 2005: 97). These usually focus on a particular theme important to the organization and can bring together two to three hundred

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<sup>38</sup> Conscientious objectors, or COs.

<sup>39</sup> In Europe, there are WRI sections in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden (Prasad 2005: 469–475).

<sup>40</sup> The first International Conference was held in 1925 (Prasad 2005: 469–475).

activists worldwide<sup>41</sup>. Moreover, WRI coordinates two international days of action annually in support of peace activists and conscientious objectors. May 15th is *International Conscientious Objectors' Day*, organized since 1982, and December 1st *Prisoners for Peace Day*. In more general terms, WRI has two main program areas, the Nonviolence Programme and the Right to Refuse to Kill Project. (War Resisters' International 2009a). The organization stresses that during the past few of decades its activities have included 'the incorporation of a feminist perspective and gender lens into our work, the movement against nuclear power which WRI helped to spread internationally, and the continual expanding of our global network' (Sheehan in Prasad 2005: 18).

### 3.4 Empirical Research Materials

The primary empirical research material of the thesis consists of two different sets of data. The first comprises information that the organizations studied have produced themselves while describing their organization and its activities, especially in regard to the Iraq War. These mainly consist of statements, commentaries, pamphlets and books. All the organizations also have websites, and some of the material has been gathered from those sources. However, since three of the organizations have recently published their histories, it was only natural to use these as primary research material. Andrew Murray (the chair) and Lindsay German (the convenor) have together written the history of the StWC, titled *Stop the War – The Story of Britain's Biggest Mass Movement* (278 pages). Similarly, the CND has recently published its history: *CND – Now More Than Ever: The Story of a Peace Movement* (278 pages), written by Kate Hudson (the chair). The history of WRI, *War is a Crime Against Humanity – The Story of War Resisters' International* (557 pages), was written by Devi Prasad (former general secretary).

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<sup>41</sup> WRI has organized conferences, for example, in Brazil: 'To Live is to Resist: undoing the chain of violence' (1994), in Croatia: 'Choosing Peace Together' (1998), in Ireland 'Stories and Strategies: nonviolent resistance and social change' (2002) and in Germany: 'Globalising Nonviolence' (2006).

Interestingly, all of these three histories were published in 2005. The fact that three different organizations published their histories in the same year cannot be regarded as a mere coincidence. Rather, it can be considered as a sign of a political revival of the anti-war movement after 9/11. From the perspective of the two long-standing organizations, the CND and WRI, it can also be interpreted as an effort to restate their aims in a changing political situation and communicate their continuing importance within the movement, which now includes increasingly popular newer organizations. For the book *Peace – 50 years of Protest 1958-2008* (256 pages) the timing of publishing (2008) was predictable, as it came out to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the peace sign and the foundation of the CND. It was written by Barry Miles, chairman of the Youth CND in the early 1960s. Also used in this thesis as research material are *Imperialism and Resistance* (2006, 265 pages) written by John Rees, the co-founder of StWC, and *Nonviolence and Social Empowerment*, a publication edited by Chris Ney (2005) for WRI.

However, it was quite difficult to find information in these sources concerning some issues relevant to this study. There is not much material in the histories or on the websites that would, for example, describe how the organizations concretely engage in international activities or what kind of difficulties they face while working together with other groups and organizations either at the national or international level. It thus became necessary to gain some first-hand information from people working in these organizations, whereby, in addition to the material described, personal in-depth interviews were used as a method of collecting research material. The purpose of interviewing was to gain an understanding of how the representatives of the anti-war organizations themselves define and articulate the issues, concepts and phenomena that are relevant for this thesis. Since the focus here lies in studying the premises of the *organizations*, in designing the interviews, I concentrated mostly on the organizational, level leaving aside many interesting questions regarding the more personal 'lived experience' of the anti-war activists.

I conducted thematic in-depth interviews with seven representatives of the four selected anti-war organizations in London in March 2008, just a few days before and after the World Against War demonstration, which was organized on March 15 to mark the 5th anniversary of the

War on Iraq<sup>42</sup>. I also took part in a demonstration organized by the StWC on 20 March in front of 10 Downing Street. One of the seven interviews was conducted during this particular demonstration when an unexpected opportunity to interview a leading StWC figure emerged<sup>43</sup>. This interview was the shortest of all, lasting only about ten minutes.<sup>44</sup>

The other six interviews were in-depth interviews which lasted from thirty minutes to almost three hours. They were conducted as semi-structured interviews, meaning in practical terms that they were carried out as conversations but nevertheless had a pre-structured framework. The framework included ten thematic areas,<sup>45</sup> each comprising several (from five to ten) questions. In most cases, I was in contact with the interviewees beforehand by e-mail and sent them the list of themes in advance. The specific questions were not delivered to them beforehand. During the interviews, the themes were presented in a logical order, although the questions were not necessarily asked in the same order. I also came up with new questions in the course of the interviews. This kind of a setting allowed the interviews to be flexible yet organized at the same time. Due to time limitations and the ad hoc nature of several of the interviews, not all themes were discussed to the same extent with everyone.

Before (and in some cases during) the interview I gave a short introduction to my research and explained how the information gained through the interviews would be helpful to the study. The interviewees were mainly from the steering committees<sup>46</sup> of the organizations: two interviewees from the StWC, two from the CND, two from GR and one

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<sup>42</sup> The interviews took place between 15 and 20 March 2008. I also interviewed some people taking part in the two demonstrations, but these interviews are not used as research material in this study.

<sup>43</sup> I would like to extend warm thanks to Linda from the CND for helping me to arrange the interview.

<sup>44</sup> The interview was short, because the person was to be interviewed also by several journalists and hence there was not much time. However, as the interviewee has written a book which is used here as a research material, I believe that I have been able to obtain enough information in this regard.

<sup>45</sup> The thematic areas of the in-depth interviews are presented in Appendix 2.

<sup>46</sup> The second interviewee from the StWC is not a member of the steering committee but a staff member of the office. Since he has been working for the organization since its inception in 2001, he can be regarded as a very good informant.

from WRI<sup>47</sup>. In the analysis, the interviewees are referred to by number (Interviews 1–7) and their organization. When the organization is explicitly brought up in the context or sentence preceding the reference, only the number of the interview is mentioned. The decision not to refer to the interviewees by name was not compulsory, because the interviewees did not request that they remain anonymous. However, in social movement research it is not common to reveal the identities of interviewees and this is also the stance adopted here.

In quantitative terms, the number of interviews, seven, cannot be regarded as high<sup>48</sup>. However, it was sufficient to obtain quite a good understanding of the premises of the organizations. The fact that I had familiarized myself with the main objectives and statements of the organizations beforehand by regularly visiting their websites enabled me to formulate the themes and questions of quite cogently<sup>49</sup>. However, a certain level of improvisation also played a part in the process. Several of the agreed interviews were cancelled while I was already in London and, on the other hand, I gained an opportunity to interview two people unexpectedly. Altogether, I believe that the in-depth interviews, together with other primary material, provide the requisite amount of research material for the qualitative research approach used here.

### 3.5 Empirical Method

In the social sciences, four different methodological approaches to research are generally distinguished: positivist, post-positivist, interpretivist and humanistic. Whereas positivist and post-positivist approaches to methodology are based on empiricism, which aims at 'knowing the reality' and essentially imitates the methods used in the natural sciences,

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<sup>47</sup> Originally, the plan was to interview two representatives from each organization, but due to the timing of my trip to London it was unfortunately not possible to get two interviewees from WRI; the staff of the organization was going to travel to Brussels for 'No to NATO' demonstration on 18 March 2008.

<sup>48</sup> For example, Gillan et al. conducted over 60 interviews for their study, published in 2008.

<sup>49</sup> As a point of critical self-reflection, it has to be admitted that the theoretical framework of the thesis was not completely clear at that time. Later, this caused certain problems in engaging with the empirical material.



the interpretivist and humanistic approaches focus on studying meanings and values in a certain context. Interpretivist studies usually have a clear emphasis on empirical cases while simultaneously stressing the significance of context. (della Porta & Keating 2008: 28–38.) The methodological approach of this study is clearly interpretivist, because it aims at a holistic understanding of the research subject, with questions of cause and effect as well as generalizability of the results being secondary, as there is, in any case, an ‘assumption of mutual influence among the many factors at work’ (ibid: 30). While humanistic approaches study meanings and values on the basis of concrete interactions between the researcher and her ‘objects’, the interpretivist approach usually seeks meaning through a textual analysis of some kind (ibid: 25–32; also Fay 1998). This is the case in the present study, which uses qualitative content analysis.

Qualitative content analysis is regarded as a suitable method especially for analyzing material obtained through theme interviews, as it enables the researcher to form a general description of the object of the study in a somewhat concise form. It is a textual analysis method like discourse analysis, but the main focus lies in studying what kind of meanings there are in a text rather than studying in detail how these meanings are constructed. (E.g. Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002: 105–106, 110–115.) However, when analyzing the content by abstracting meanings and themes from the material, I did pay some attention to the textual construction of meaning. Instead of focusing on discourses, however, I found the concept of articulation more fruitful, because ideas are given meanings not only in relation to how they are linguistically represented but also on the basis of the other ideas, concepts and phenomena to which they are connected (e.g. Hall 1992: 368–369; Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 105).

In concrete terms, the analysis of all material was conducted systematically in similar terms<sup>50</sup>. The first phase was the categorization of the content, which meant that the material was divided into shorter text excerpts of from one to ten sentences according to what the main topic was. Some of excerpts could fit into several theme categories. The interview material suggested a total of twenty-three themes, not all of

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<sup>50</sup> Naturally, the analysis of the interviews was different in the sense that the digitally recorded interviews had to be transcribed first. Since the transcribed interview material comprises 107 pages, it is not possible to include it in the appendix of the thesis. Instead, there are rather many quotations from the interviews in the text.

which were relevant or interesting from the point of view of the research questions. Therefore, some of the themes were combined with others, and some were left out completely<sup>51</sup>.<sup>52</sup> In the second phase of the analysis, the units of analysis, designed on the basis of the theoretical analysis, took the form of direct questions to be in consideration of the research material. The findings were then categorized again, with meanings and themes being abstracted from the material.

When it comes to information acquired through interviews, it is important to note the historicity as well as the context-relatedness of the views expressed by the interviewees. Interpretations that activists make of the present 'are always coloured by their past experiences and their understanding of the history of current processes' (Gillan 2006: 88). Hence, it is very likely that between organizations and individuals within the anti-war movement there are multiple understandings and interpretations about the strategies, methods and effects of resistance, and like issues. The fact that the research material of this study consists of public material (which can be essentially regarded as 'official' views of the organizations), as well as material obtained through in-depth interviews with individuals, makes interpretation complicated in the sense that in the case of the interview material there is a risk of reading one (or two) individual's opinions as an official position of the organization.

However, it is not assumed here that there could even be a clear and unified collective understanding about any issue within any organization, and even less so between them. In other words, the concept of collective action frames, which is often used in the analysis of social movements to obtain an understanding of ideas that all members of a group agree upon, is not deployed as such here. The problem with that approach is that the 'production of position papers and policies is taken as an indication of agreement within the group and the assumption is that individual members should all express these same ideas when the opportunity arises' (Gillan 2006: 88).

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<sup>51</sup> In the analysis of the non-interview material, this phase was not necessary, since the preset units of analysis guided the selection of relevant parts of text in advance; ultimately, little material was gathered that was not useful for the study.

<sup>52</sup> Some of the themes were presented as questions in the interviews (and were thus actually *preset* units of analysis), while some were brought up independently by one or more interviewees.

However, in reality there is very much heterogeneity within any group or organization and it must therefore be understood that ‘members of the group all share a particular set of ideas’ only in regard to ‘a particular set of topics’ (ibid: 88). I agree with Gillan when he points out that the ‘Meluccian challenge’ in analyzing any social movement is to be able to do it ‘without starting from an assumption of unity’ (ibid: 68). Nonetheless, as the purpose here is to discuss differences between the studied organizations, some generalizations and categorizations must be necessarily made. Although ‘there can be multiple collective action frames as no one organization cannot present the whole movement’ (ibid: 27; also della Porta & Diani 2006: 21), the fact is that some ideas are more popular than others and some organizations are somewhat more influential and powerful than others. These issues are reflected upon in this thesis.

As regards the presentation of the findings of the empirical analysis, I will adhere to the typical style of the interpretivist approach, in which the data are presented ‘in the form of thick narratives, with excerpts from texts (interviews, documents and ethnographic notes) presented as illustrations’ (della Porta & Keating 2008: 30). Italics are used in the excerpts to highlight particularly important words or phrases.

## 4 A NEW AND GLOBAL ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT?

### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the *who* of resistance. It reflects on the theoretical debate about the political agency of resistance against war – the current anti-war movement, its ascendance and central characteristics – by empirically analyzing how these three aspects are understood within the movement itself. The aim is to determine the extent to which the understandings within the movement ‘resonate’ with those of the theoretical approaches presented earlier and what the main convergences and divergences are in this regard.

In the theoretical debate, the political agent of resistance – the movement against the Iraq War – has been conceptualized in highly global terms by both liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists. In particular, they have celebrated the political meaning of the worldwide demonstration day on 15 February 2003, which also seems to be a source of inspiration for their conceptualizations of a more permanent kind of global political subject dedicated to resistance against war. For liberal cosmopolitans, the February 2003 demonstration day was as a manifestation of global civil society consensually united in its opposition to the war. They argue, for example, that the demonstration showed that ‘each individual was confronted with the existential choice between war and peace’ while being drawn ‘into a maelstrom of moral and political dilemmas or appealed to the available positions to take a clear stance for or against’ (Beck 2006: 123–124). Representing a particular type of expression of global civil society, the February 2003 demonstration is described as ‘*the movement of public opinion*’ at the global level ‘full of political meaning’ (Castells 2008: 86, emphasis in original).

While liberal cosmopolitans concentrate on the global civil society perspective, radical poststructuralists have referred to the anti-war movement and its worldwide demonstration as an example of the ‘becoming’ Multitude, which in the form of a consensual yet diversified global body of opposition can ‘wage a war’ against the global state of war (Hardt & Negri 2004: 67, 215, 284). In this context, the ‘becoming’ or

'birth' of this new political subject has been described in quite similar terms by both schools of the academic globalists. Liberal cosmopolitans tend to explain the ascendance of the anti-war movement in the same way as that of the alter-globalization movement (e.g. Castells 2008: 85–86). Radical poststructuralists even suggest that the anti-war movement should be regarded as a *continuation* of the alter-globalization movement. The movements are represented as being part of the same 'new global cycle', which has not only a common enemy, but also 'common practices, languages, conduct, habits, forms of life, and desires for a better future' (Hardt & Negri 2004: 215, also 284). Radical poststructuralists argue that communication between these different struggles 'reinforces the power and augments the wealth of each single one' (ibid: 216).

The anti-war movement has not only been conceptualized as a new kind of a global political subject, thus emphasizing its political agency from that particular perspective, but also many other aspects of it seem to have had the labels 'new' or 'global' put on them by academic globalists. While regarded as an increasingly transnational or even global movement in terms of its political campaigning and mobilization, the anti-war movement has been attributed 'new' characteristics previously used to describe the alter-globalization movement or certain other new social movements (e.g. Hardt & Negri 2004: 67, 215). Although the critical state-centric approach has not analyzed or addressed the anti-war movement directly, on a more general level it has suggested that there might be 'an inverse relationship between the amount of progressive 'new characteristics' argued to characterize global struggles by social movements and their proclaimed influence (Chandler 2004: 328). In other words, academic globalists may have a tendency to characterize social movements not only in excessively global, but also in overly 'new' terms.

Indeed, academic globalists often explicitly stress that they are analyzing or describing 'tendencies' and processes of 'becoming' (e.g. Hardt & Negri 2004: xii–xiii; 103–114). While it is important to pay attention to tendencies, it is easy to interpret them such that they support any argument one wishes to make, because tendencies obviously go beyond what can be regarded as empirically true at the moment. In the case of the anti-war movement, academic globalists seem to base both their interpretations (descriptive) and visions (normative) mainly on

observations that they have drawn from the February 2003 demonstration day. In other words, instead of studying the 'what, why and how' of the anti-war movement, academic globalists have considered it more or less from above, examining it mainly in the form of concrete and visible political actions or processes and drawing conclusions on that basis.

To shed light on the theoretical debate referred to above, this chapter empirically analyzes how the questions of political agency of the movement, its ascendance and its central characteristics are understood within the movement itself. This inquiry poses the following questions: How is the political agency of the anti-war movement understood? How are the roles of different movement organizations and their relationship described? How is the ascendance of the movement described and explained; why and how has it happened? How is the role of the alter-globalization movement regarded in the process? How is the political meaning of the February 2003 demonstration articulated? What kinds of new characteristics is the movement considered as having? What historical references and comparisons are made?

The chapter will demonstrate that the interpretations made by academic globalists are in many respects quite different from the understandings among the anti-war organizations studied. Both liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists tend to emphasize the global aspects and new characteristics of the movement substantially more than is the case within the movement itself. While there is some resonance, with some organizations conceiving certain characteristics of the movement in the above-mentioned way, it is nevertheless more common to regard the movement from a national or international than a global perspective. Moreover, rather than being seen as something completely new and extraordinary, the movement is usually characterized as a continuation of the long-term peace movement. The chapter will also show that the movement's ascendance was not as consensual nor its relationship to the alter-globalization movement as harmonious, as academic globalists assume. While there were many internal contradictions already at the time of the movement's ascendance, there are continuing disagreements within it, for example, in regard to leadership issues, cooperation between organizations, the preferred extent of centralization, and its connection to other movements.

## 4.2 The Ascendance of the Movement against the War

### 4.2.1 Political Context and 'Birth' of the Movement

The most common argument put forward by the organizations studied is that the 'new' anti-war movement was born as a reaction to War on Terror, proclaimed by the US after 9/11. This is emphasized especially by the StWC. Referring to 9/11, the chair and the convenor of the organization explain that 'The Stop the War Coalition was born out of one of the most remarkable historical events any of us has witnessed' and it aims to 'prevent still worse events taking place' (Murray & German 2005: 3–4; also Rees 2006: 224–225). It is submitted that the very first meeting of the StWC, held in London shortly after 9/11, created a broad platform for opposition to the war in Afghanistan, and later against the Iraq War (Interview 4; Murray & German 2005: 47–50). The first meeting is described as an event 'which was to shape the anti-war movement that has thrived to this day' (ibid: 47). It is emphasized that it was organized by three members of the Socialist Workers' Party (SWP), namely Lindsay German, John Rees and Chris Nineham (ibid: 48).

In this interpretation, the birth of the new British anti-war movement is closely connected to the founding of the StWC. This view is shared by some other groups, mainly those that have collaborated with the StWC and taken part in its demonstrations. For example, GR says it is 'proud to be one of the founder organisations' of the StWC, which it defines as 'the biggest peace movement' in the country (Globalise Resistance 2008i; also 2008h). The CND also celebrates 'the dynamism and good judgement of the leaders of the Stop the War Coalition' when describing their close relationship (Hudson in Murray & German 2005: 68). Despite its collaboration with StWC, the CND emphasizes that it has not joined the StWC on the national level, although many of its local and regional groups have (Hudson 2005: 242). It shares the StWC's understandings of the birth of the movement, pointing out that after 9/11 a 'new' movement was 'initiated by the left – including a number of far-left organisations' (ibid: 241). Simultaneously, the CND stresses, however, that during its fifty years of history, political circumstances have changed continuously and that it has always adapted to changing contexts 'from the Cuban

Missile Crisis to the war on Vietnam, from the height of the Cold War to détente, from the ‘evil empire’ of Ronald Reagan to the end of the Cold War, through to the new nuclear aggression of Bush and Blair’ (ibid: 3).

The CND thus clearly articulates that it not only is part of the new movement, but also belongs to the long-term peace movement and to the more specific movement against nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the role of the StWC is considered central in the new movement, both on the national and international level. Indeed, the British movement and London as its main ‘headquarters’ is ascribed highly important roles in the public material of both organizations. The CND chair argues that ‘Britain is famous throughout the world for having a huge anti-war movement, and people watch our demos on television as far afield as Japan and the Philippines’ (Hudson 2005: 241). A CND interviewee characterizes London as ‘a good place to start the anti-war movement’ (Interview 6):

London is a good place *to start the anti-war movement* because it’s so *central* to many people’s lives and identity. And Britain clearly, as a very *close ally* of the US is an *important place* to oppose the madness of the Iraq War. When we formed the Stop the War Coalition ... we helped or *supported the formation of similar movements elsewhere*.

The argument that the British movement has helped to create anti-war movements in other countries is commonly found elsewhere in the research material as well. Although this assertion occurs most often in the interviews, public material, too, contains references to the British movement as a model used elsewhere in the world (especially Murray & German 2005).<sup>1</sup> While the StWC maintains that the British movement has inspired anti-war activism in other countries, it also recognizes that it has adopted some ideas from movements elsewhere. However, the latter view is not nearly as common as the former, an observation attributable at least in part to the common understanding that Britain has historically been such a central place for the movement, with ideas, strategies and tactics often originating in Britain and spreading elsewhere. All this becomes

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<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the StWC argues that the model it has provided has been adapted elsewhere in the world for ‘uniting left across Communist, nationalist and socialist lineage with Muslims facing persecution’ (Rees in Murray & German 2005: 209).



more interesting when one considers that a particular organization, the StWC, is accorded an extraordinarily significant role in the creation of the new movement. It is emphasized to such an extent that one could get the impression that the movement against the Iraq War was more or less born in the city of London and initiated by the Stop the War Coalition (e.g. Benn 2005; Murray & German 2005: 1, 5.) The organization is said to have ‘helped to build a movement in Britain which has become one of the most significant in the world’ (ibid: 7). Its exceptional character is brought up in many other ways as well. For instance, the StWC describes itself as ‘the *only* organization that is dedicated to changing the destructive policies of the Bush-Blair axis’ (ibid: 15, emphasis added).

However, not all organizations regard the ascendance of the movement or the StWC’s role in that process to be in keeping with this description. Even organizations which have been involved in joint campaigns with the StWC may disagree on these issues. The ‘newness’ of the movement is questioned especially by the CND and WRI. With their long histories, it is not surprising that they view the anti-war movement in different terms than the newer organizations. The issue as such is not a subject of great controversy, but it becomes more politicized when recent forms of anti-war activism are explicitly contrasted with long-term peace activities in a normative way. For example, the WRI interviewee draws a clear distinction between the old and new organizations (Interview 3):

Of course we are reacting to the present wars going on but our work is *much more deeply* against militarism. So, it’s *much more long-term* ongoing work ... It’s *less visible* but it’s long-term work which tries to go *more into* the root causes of war, and it doesn’t *jump from* one war to the next war to the next war.

In this interpretation, long-term peace activism is portrayed as ‘more deeply’ against militarism, and hence it is implied that new activism is somehow ‘less deeply’ against it. The assertion that long-term peace activism is ‘less visible’ but tries ‘to go more into the root causes of war’, indicates that the new activism is more visible but not analytical enough where the causes of war are concerned. It is also stressed that long-term peace activism does not ‘jump from one war to the next war’, suggesting that this is what the new movement does. Moreover, the new anti-war movement is characterized as a single-issue campaign that is likely to disappear

(Interview 3): ‘The problematic thing would be that organizations like my organization would just give up all their ongoing work and just focus on one issue. We need to have long-term work and when the movement disappears or it gets smaller again, the peace movement continues its ongoing work.’ The interviewee’s remark that, as a whole, the movement has ‘to be able to respond to the immediate crises’, acknowledges that traditional peace organizations do not always have enough resources for immediate responses. This is an implicit admission that the sort of work which the StWC does is also important. (Ibid.)

Those organizations that maintain that there is something that can be called a ‘new’ anti-war movement usually have two main temporal reference points. The first is 9/11 and the War on Terror, which are usually articulated as the main factors contributing to the ‘birth’ of a new movement and the founding of the StWC. The second principal reference point is 15 February 2003, the worldwide demonstration day. Its being mentioned countless times in the public material of three organizations (the StWC, CND and GR) as well as in all the interviews, reflects the very important role it is accorded. For some, it seems to be sort of the ‘birthday’ of the new anti-war movement, both nationally as well as internationally. Especially the StWC and CND<sup>2</sup> emphasize its political meaning, referring to it as the biggest demonstration to have ever taken place. The StWC is also said to be mentioned in the Guinness Book of World Records for organizing ‘the largest ever demonstration in British political history and the largest ever global demonstration’ (Interview 5).<sup>3</sup>

The February 2003 demonstration is imputed a somewhat different political meaning in the domestic context than in the international. In

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<sup>2</sup> E.g. Murray & German 2005: 2, 99; Rees 2006: 221; Nineham in Murray & German 2005: 106; German 2007: 10; Nineham & Burgin 2008: 3; Hudson 2005: 239–240; Miles 2008: 239, 241; Interview 1/CND; Interview 2/GR; Interview 4/StWC; Interview 5/StWC; Interview 6/CND.

<sup>3</sup> The estimates of the number of people taking part in the February 2003 demonstrations vary significantly among different sources. While the estimate for London varies from one to two million, it is argued that internationally there were from six to ten million (Miles 2008: 239), thirty million (Nineham & Burgin 2008: 3) or even thirty-five million people taking part in the demonstrations (Nineham in Murray & German 2005: 106).

a commentary marking the fifth anniversary of the demonstration, the StWC chair argues that its main lesson was ‘that it embodied the failure of representative democracy’ in Britain (Murray 2008). In his view, it proved that people were ‘smarter’ than political decision-makers, thus, it ‘highlighted a gap between the electorate and the elected, a gap several hundred thousand lives have slipped down as a result’ (ibid). Elsewhere, too, it is stressed that the demonstration illustrated ‘the democratic aspect of the war crisis’ as people were ‘marching in their millions for one policy, while their representatives supported another’ (Murray & German 2005: 177; also Interview 4).

The crisis of democracy is articulated in other ways as well. Rees (2006: 119) argues, for example, that ‘there could be no greater contrast between the political commitment’ of two million demonstrators and ‘the fact that the previous election had seen the lowest turnout in Britain’s modern democratic history’. For the StWC, the demonstration proved that there is no ‘political apathy’ but ‘plenty of appetite for extra-parliamentary politics’ (ibid; also Interview 4). Furthermore, it is argued that British politics still ‘remains in the shadow of that extraordinary day of protest, and what it is has meant for democracy’ (Murray & German 2005: 151; also Interview 4).

In the broader context, the demonstrations in February 2003 are often seen as illustrating the increasingly global character of the anti-war movement. This ‘globality’ is usually articulated either by referring to different *localities* where demonstrations took place – cities, countries, continents<sup>4</sup> – or citing the different kinds of collective *subjects* which the demonstration activated, reflected or formed. Often these subjects are quite abstract, such as ‘global opinion’, ‘world public opinion’, ‘the majority of the world’s citizens’, or ‘most of the world’s people’. These references are especially common in the public material of the StWC (e.g. Murray & German 2005: 6, 10, 20; German 2007: 8; Nineham & Burgin 2008: 23). The global dimension is also emphasized by speaking of *numbers* such as ‘millions of people’ (ibid; also Interview 4; Interview 5). Sometimes it is even suggested that either the movement

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<sup>4</sup> For instance, it is pointed out that demonstrations took place ‘in 600 towns and cities on every continent’ (Rees 2006: 221) or ‘all over the world in America, Europe and Asia, representing an unparalleled expression of hostility to American aggression’ (Benn in Murray & German 2005).

or its component organizations somehow represent *the majority of people*, not just in Britain, but all over the world<sup>5</sup>. One implication is that the crisis of democracy does not concern Britain only, where the government ignored the opinion of the majority of its citizen-voters, but that the phenomenon is more widespread. In these respects, some organizations clearly resemble academic globalists, especially liberal cosmopolitans, in their argumentation (e.g. Castells 2008: 82–86; also Beck 2006).

It can be concluded that many organizations within the British anti-war movement view the February 2003 demonstration not only as a manifestation of globally united opposition against the war, but also as an indication of growing mistrust towards representational democracy in the domestic context as well as more broadly. In other words, this particular demonstration is given a highly important symbolic value by both activists and academic globalists. The event seems to bear some resemblance to the celebration of the ‘Battle for Seattle’ in the alter-globalization movement (e.g. Gill 2000). Since different kinds of anniversaries can help to produce a collective history and ‘key experiences’ for activists, they constitute important symbols, especially for revolutionary social movements. Indeed, symbolism in the form of celebration of anniversaries ‘has always been a consistent element of the anti-war protest’ (Horowitz 1970: 43).

Interestingly, in the public material of WRI mention of the February 2003 demonstration is extremely rare. The interviewee proves to be very skeptical of any sort of a mass demonstration due to his divergent conception of effective strategies against war, which reflects a different notion of power of the movement (Interview 3). Nonetheless, the understanding that the StWC played an instrumental role in the process of organizing demonstration is commonly shared by all the organizations, including WRI. Most often the major role of the StWC is brought up, not surprisingly, in material it has produced itself (e.g. Murray & German 2005: 2, 158; Benn in Murray & German 2005). The StWC interviewees strongly promote the key role of their organization by indicating that it also has a global element to it (Interview 5):

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<sup>5</sup> There are also many references to ‘humankind’, ‘humanity’, ‘future of humanity’ and even ‘survival of the human race’ (e.g. Benn in Murray & German 2005; Shayler in Murray & German 2005: 15; German 2007: 9; Hudson 2005: 2).

I think you have to understand that we had *a global role* to play when you hear that marchers in Egypt described their demonstration as their Hyde Park. So, they clearly had seen what was happening in Britain and tried to recreate it. I think we *led* on a very important marker on the 15th of February 2003.

Although other organizations do not often challenge this view directly, many stress that the demonstration was not something that one or two organizations invented or organized, emphasizing that it had originally been discussed and decided upon in late 2002 during the European Social Forum (ESF) in Florence (e.g. Hudson 2005: 240; Interview 2/GR; Interview 4/StWC; Interview 7/GR). According to a GR interviewee, there was a debate at an assembly of social movements in Florence to determine whether the ESF should call people to action against the war. Since there had been a demonstration of one million people in Florence the day before, there was growing confidence that a large demonstration against the Iraq War could be organized. In December 2002, there was another European Summit in Brussels, and when the movement met again in Denmark, a decision was made ‘to call a worldwide demonstration’<sup>6</sup>. Although often described as ‘a snowball process’, many organizations emphasize strongly their own roles in it. For example, a GR interviewee argues that representatives of his own organization were ‘quite instrumental to win the argument together with some Italians comrades and some French leftist smaller cross-type parties that took part in the argument’ about organizing a very big, even a global, demonstration. (Interview 2.)

The above-mentioned description is not challenged by the StWC as such, but the organization does not put as much emphasis on the role of the ESF as many other organizations do<sup>7</sup>. The StWC also underscores its own role in the planning of the demonstration at the Florence 2002 meeting (Murray & German 2005: 99; also Nineham in Murray & German 2005: 106–107). The organization in fact asserts that when the date for internationally coordinated anti-war action was decided upon, a

<sup>6</sup> After it became evident that there was more than just European-level interest in organizing demonstrations, further planning took place at the World Social Forum in January 2003 (Gillan et al. 2008: 113).

<sup>7</sup> The StWC refers to its own demonstration in London on 18 November 2001 as test case for the February 2003 demonstration (Murray & German 2005: 70).

significant factor was that the StWC ‘had already fixed on 15 February as our protest day’, which then everybody eventually agreed upon with the result that ‘the European-wide demos would be centred on 15 February’ (Murray & German 2005: 99; also Nineham in Murray & German 2005: 106–107). In other words, both the StWC and GR describe the process as rather strongly influenced by their particular deliberations. A GR interviewee makes additional interesting arguments in this regard (Interview 2):

It was a snowball that started in Florence but really built up ... and I don't want to say we organized it because we were just sort of a tipping point across this. But I'm quite proud to say that we were quite instrumental to winning this argument inside the anti-capitalist movement ... Let's say if anyone will write *a history of the left, the Globalise Resistance was very much part of it*. I'm really lucky to be part of it, by almost accidentally, but I'm very proud of being part of it.

Here, it is stressed that GR contributed to something which can be considered part of the ‘history of the left’. The StWC and CND often emphasize in explicit terms their belonging to the general context of the left. Indeed, many organizations within the new anti-war movement in Britain regard the left and even the ‘far left’ as their political haven. The importance of the SWP, or of the Labour Party, cannot be overemphasized in this context, for they are both closely related to the movement via three of the organizations studied (the StWC, CND and GR). The relationship between them is discussed later on in the thesis (see chapter 6).

Although GR regards the process behind the February 2003 demonstration in somewhat different terms than the StWC, it does share the interpretation of the event's highly extraordinary character as ‘the biggest demonstration that ever existed’ (Interview 2). However, for GR the movement against the Iraq War more generally represents something quite different. The ascendance of the movement is described as a *continuum* of the anti-capitalist movement rather than the birth of an independent movement, an account which clearly resonates with the interpretation of radical poststructuralists (e.g. Hardt & Negri 2004: 215, 284). In connecting the new wave of anti-war activism directly to the ESF, GR indicates that it was the primary context where the movement started to rise in political terms. (Interview 2.) It is emphasized that there

had been ‘a lot of cynicism about left-wing activism’ but that the situation changed due to a new political awakening brought by the events of 9/11 and the War on Terror (ibid):

Suddenly, a huge demonstration and it was all caught with the 9/11 ... The war in Afghanistan started, the first group of Stop the War Coalition started to organize themselves ... So, the movement was starting to gear up to stopping the war in Iraq before it even started ... My involvement was ... generally socialist and anti-capitalist in this sense. It was just *natural to take further the effort* into this anti-war movement.

In this interpretation, the connection between other ‘anti-movements’ and the anti-war movement is represented as self-evident, as seen in the remark that it was ‘just natural to take further the effort into the anti-war movement’. GR also suggests more explicitly that the broad character of the anti-war movement ‘takes its tradition from another global movement, the anti-globalization, the anti-capitalist, or alter-globalization, how you want to call it’. In other words, the alter-globalization movement ‘fed into the anti-war movement’. (Interview 2.) Similar views are presented on the GR website, which contains several reports on protests against the G8 and European Union summits as well as other gatherings of the alter-globalization movement in the context of the ESF and WSF.

The StWC acknowledges an intimate connection between the alter-globalization and the anti-war movements. For instance, the ‘great gatherings of the global justice movement’ are said to have laid the basis for new anti-war activism (Nineham in Murray & German 2005: 106). Some StWC leaders even argue that the February 2003 demonstration should not be regarded as ‘a single moment of protest’ but as ‘a part of a longer and continuing radical movement’ (Rees 2006: 221). The connection between the two movements is articulated, for example, by stating that since the Battle of Seattle ‘the entire landscape of politics has been transformed by the growth of a worldwide anti-globalisation and anti-war movement’ (ibid). This interpretation clearly echoes that of radical poststructuralists and of those liberal cosmopolitans who connect the two movements in their analyses (e.g. Hardt & Negri 2004; 215, 284; Castells 2008: 85–86).

Additionally, some interviewees from other organizations note that many activists ‘moved’ from the alter-globalization to the anti-war

movement, taking their analysis of the root causes of war and social injustice with them (Interview 2/GR; Interview 4/StWC; Interview 7/GR). This realignment will be an important point for discussion when analyzing these views in more detail (see chapter 5). For example, an StWC representative says that the anti-capitalist movement preceded the anti-war movement and suggests that it has now been ‘subsumed’ into it. Interestingly, he describes the anti-capitalist movement as ‘much more critical at the system’ than the StWC or any of the other anti-war groups. While the anti-war movement is regarded not as representing ‘a critique of the system as a whole’, it is characterized as a ‘much broader movement’ than other movements. Hence, the interviewee indicates that a movement which does not advocate ‘too’ radical a perspective can more easily acquire popular support. Some of the critiques developed within the anti-capitalist movement are regarded as ‘very relevant’, although it is admitted that some of them have experienced inflation when ‘subsumed’ into the anti-war movement: ‘What was called anti-capitalism has gone into kind of a decline because much bigger issues confront the people on the left, or on the socially active kind of wing of politics’. (Interview 4.)

In this interpretation, the anti-war movement is again situated in the more general framework of the left, thereby giving an impression of common goals and also a solidarity between their goals. It is explicitly argued that ‘most activists now take it for granted that war and globalisation are linked’ (Nineham in Murray & German 2005: 107) and hence resistance against them is considered linked as well. Suggestions that there is ‘a particular form of popular resistance which combines protest at the effects of globalisation with a movement against war’ (Rees 2006: 200) also regard the globalized nature of both movements as a common denominator (Nineham in Murray & German 2005: 107). In the words of an StWC representative (Interview 4):

The anti-globalization and anti-capitalist movements were themselves very *globalized*. So, when the anti-war movement took off, there were networks that already existed ... So, the two were very *closely connected*. *One grew out of the other* but of course the anti-war movement is very broad. Probably *the broadest* what *the left* has been involved with since ... the apartheid in the 1980s, or even Suez in the 1950s. It’s a very very broad movement.



By pointing out that the anti-war movement was able to utilize the networks of the alter-globalization movement, the interviewee admits that the former has greatly benefited from this relationship while the latter has suffered from it. Moreover, it is implied that this relationship has contributed to a common political project for the left, portrayed as very unique in its broadness. Hence, the premises of the StWC and GR clearly resonate with the radical poststructuralist approach, which emphasizes the interconnectedness of the struggle against war and the negative effects of globalization (e.g. Hardt & Negri 2004: 67, 215, 284).

Interestingly, whereas neither radical poststructuralists nor liberal cosmopolitans ever seem to question the notion of a harmonious relationship between the alter-globalization and the anti-war movements<sup>8</sup>, the empirical analysis reveals a different reality. Despite the description of events discussed above that conveys a smooth transition from the anti-capitalist movement to the anti-war movement, the development is not considered as consensual and positive by all organizations. Among the negative effects that are pointed out is that the growth of the anti-war movement resulted in certain other causes being downplayed, and especially in decreased interest in the alter-globalization movement. This criticism does not show in the public material of the organizations, but comes up in the interviews. A GR interviewee, for example, reveals that many activists strongly resisted the view that the anti-capitalist struggle should have any attachment to the anti-war movement. It was justified mainly on the basis that there were already various struggles going on within the anti-capitalist movement. Some activists also feared that 'the diversion' of the anti-capitalist struggle into the anti-war movement would alienate trade unions. (Interview 2.)

Despite these concerns, many interviewees do not see much difficulty in combining the aims and efforts of these two movements – the struggle for social justice and that against war – under a common struggle, at least in ideological perspective (it seems, though, that the ideology must be left-oriented). However, when it comes to the more practical level, the idea of a common struggle is not without its problems, as already manifested in the criticism expressed of the role of the StWC. In this context, the StWC

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<sup>8</sup> Even more generally, there is hardly any research literature on competition and rivalries between different social movements (however, see e.g. Rose 2000).

is regarded as such a strong group that many anti-capitalist activists put ‘all their energy’ into the anti-war movement instead (Interview 2/GR; Interview 7/GR). In other words, the popularity of the StWC in the anti-war movement is regarded as a cause of declining interest in the anti-capitalist movement (Interview 2/GR):

And then suddenly there was *a decline* and we didn’t know what had happened ... no anti-capitalist event but there was many *many Stop the War groups* and then we were told that a lot of the people [went] locally to these Stop the War groups ... So, then it was a bit *disappointing* not to have anti-capitalist activity.

According to another GR interviewee, many anti-capitalist activists have ‘put in quite a lot of time’ working for the StWC, and therefore ‘their energy is sort of split’ (Interview 7).<sup>9</sup> The StWC does not deny this; it openly admits that the growth of the new anti-war movement may have had some negative effects on other causes (Interview 4):

The critique that was developed by the anti-capitalist movement has been *blunted* somewhat because we’re now talking about war ... You can’t talk about global capitalism when you’re discussing this with trade unions or even with the right-wingers. It means you have to think very differently about how your approach is.

In other words, it is acknowledged that the increasing popularity of the anti-war movement has influenced other movements that may share some – but not necessarily all – of its goals. According to the StWC, its leading role has nevertheless had positive effects, for it has succeeded in creating a new kind of a movement. One interviewee emphasizes that the StWC has contributed to the formation of a very broad front of resistance in the form of a ‘majority movement’. (Interview 4.) This is underlined by the CND as well when explaining the StWC’s ‘massive and broad support’ due to the broadest possible call for action and efforts to be ‘as inclusive as possible’, which the CND helped to ‘ensure’ (Hudson 2005: 242).

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<sup>9</sup> However, it is not argued that the anti-war movement has put a total end to the anti-capitalist movement: ‘I know there has been a lot of stuff being said ... that anti-capitalist movement is dead, but it isn’t dead, it’s just that it carved up, and it’s carved up in another way’ (Interview 7/GR).

From the StWC's perspective, it is understandable that it would describe itself as a leader of the new anti-war movement in Britain. Leadership suggests power and influence when it comes to defining primary goals, main opponents, preferred strategies, suitable partners and forms of cooperation. The StWC's 'leadership' is constructed clearly in its public material and by its interviewees, but also by some interviewees from other organizations (yet only very rarely in their public material). Although the StWC's role is often discussed in relatively neutral terms by the other three organizations, this is not always the case. WRI is especially critical of the StWC's strong position in the movement. According to the WRI representative, there have been problems right from the beginning, since there was not a serious enough effort to build a broad steering committee for the Coalition: 'There was no attempt to get other people on board. It was not possible at all. They were quite undemocratic.' (Interview 3.)

This same process is described very differently by the StWC, which argues, on the contrary, that by adopting 'the straightforward demand "Stop the War", without piling any other baggage on top', it ensured that the campaign remained 'genuinely open to all who shared that aim' (Murray & German 2005: 56). Somewhat paradoxically, it is simultaneously admitted that, especially in the beginning, the StWC 'was overwhelmingly a left organisation in conventional terms', which was 'reflected in the membership of its first steering committee' consisting mostly of people active in the SWP (Murray & German 2005: 55). Yet the organization does not seem to realize, or at least it does not publicly acknowledge, that such a strong orientation might have led some groups to believe that they were not welcome to join the Coalition despite much talk about diversity and accommodating everyone in the movement. Instead of reflecting upon these problems, the StWC points a finger at 'a minority who simply wanted to make their own points rather than build a united campaign' (ibid: 48, emphasis added):

Every small political sect in London was represented by its most argumentative cadre. The fact that the bombing of Afghanistan was only days away *failed to impose the slightest self-discipline* on that minority, who *heckled* and *barracked* repeatedly.

Here, the StWC criticizes some groups for wanting to draw up their own agenda. More explicitly, it claims that the attempt 'to demand that all

those who oppose the war also oppose imperialism was defeated, as was a call by the peace group Arrow to campaign against terrorism as well as against war, and to adopt *a whole series of pacifist demands*' (Murray & German 2005: 49, emphasis added).<sup>10</sup> These kinds of arguments could easily be read as hostility towards pacifist groups. Alternatively, it can be understood as a reflection of difficult circumstances in which it became clear that incorporating a wide range of political and ideological views is not as easy in practical terms as it is symbolically in speeches and statements. In fact, the StWC stresses that it had to make special efforts geared to 'ensuring a stable collaboration' with the CND (ibid: 52, 56). Although the StWC regards the CND as the best-established peace organization in the country, it was not self-evident that they would become close partners. Indeed, the CND chair discloses that many of its members opposed involvement with the StWC, as they feared that its 'left-wing leadership' might 'take extreme positions' and end up alienating the broad support of the CND (Hudson 2005: 242). Eventually, though, 'the overwhelming majority' of CND members supported cooperation with the StWC (ibid).

The CND explains that it has had some 'areas of disagreement' with the StWC that have been 'resolved through discussion' (Hudson 2005: 243). One of these occasions was when the StWC wanted to have 'Blair must go' as the official slogan of the demonstration following the invasion of Iraq. The CND disagreed because it was concerned that this 'would make it difficult for trade unions and many Labour party members who opposed the war to participate' (ibid: 244). According to the StWC, this issue caused 'more controversy within the anti-war movement than any other tactical decision' (Murray & German 2005: 196). While some groups considered 'removing Blair' as irrelevant, others feared problems with trade unions and some believed that 'an extra-parliamentary movement calling for the replacement of the prime minister was an act of constitutional *lese majeste*' (ibid). From the StWC's perspective, the slogan was not 'a call for overturning the government (still less parliament)', because it

<sup>10</sup> Rees (2006: 225) describes this process in more neutral terms: 'Attempts to narrow the campaign so that it adopted specifically anti-imperialist objectives, thus potentially excluding pacifists or those simply opposed to this war for particular reasons or, most importantly, those just coming into the movement who had not had the opportunity to become anti-imperialists on principle, were rejected'.

emphasized that ‘any replacement premier would, of course, rest on the existing parliamentary majority’ (ibid). The issue was negotiated between different groups with the result that in the end ‘Blair must go’ did not become an official slogan (Hudson 2005: 244) although StWC members did use it in the demonstration. Generally, this can be regarded as a good example of how organizations with contradicting perspectives can, if they openly communicate these differences in a trusting relationship, resolve differences that might otherwise lead to a more serious conflict.

However, there are also many contrary examples that need to be discussed in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the challenges in the relationship between different anti-war organizations. The StWC, for example, publicly claims that the CND was not able to ‘give leadership to the united movement’ because its connection ‘to the political left has always had a touch of ambivalence’ which could have resulted in internal divisions (Murray & German 2005: 56–57). It also argues that during the anti-nuclear campaigning in the 1980s the CND members ‘were united more by the understandable desire to avert nuclear war than any more general perspective on humanity’s future’ (ibid: 52, 54). Here, CND policies and the future of humanity are contrasted in quite a powerful way. A very strong emphasis on unity by the StWC also becomes evident when it disparages the CND for not always aspiring ‘to unite those who marched under its banner around a common view of global political issues’ (ibid: 56). On the one hand, the StWC criticizes its close partner strongly for not seeking and valuing *unity* enough; on the other hand, it admits that without the CND’s ‘prestige, name recognition and national network of committed supporters’, it would not have been possible to make the movement as united as it became (ibid: 57).

The StWC’s criticism does not pertain only to the CND. The StWC argues more generally that its founding proved to be problematic due to ‘familiar vices of the British left’ (Murray & German 2005: 48). Paradoxically, elsewhere in the same material it is claimed that ‘the unity of purpose’ was developed ‘almost instantly’ by transcending ‘many ancient animosities on the left’ (ibid: 6; also Rees 2006: 225–226). Even if the political left is described in terms of ‘familiar vices’ and ‘ancient animosities’, the emphasis on its unity is strong. Revealingly, the StWC publicly states that right from the beginning one of its main aims was to align ‘the left around a single campaign against the war, rather than

allowing several organisations to emerge in competition' (Murray & German 2005: 49, 52). Viewed in this context, the rhetorical celebration of diversity by the StWC becomes somewhat questionable. It seems that, after all, unity is what the organization is striving for, so much so that it starts to seem some sort of 'imposing'. Especially the argument that the CND should have a 'more general perspective on humanity's future' (ibid: 49, 52) underlines the fact that the StWC wants a unified approach to the problem of war, preferably the one it advocates itself.

These examples show that the StWC regards not only unity but also centralized leadership as important qualities for the anti-war movement. They are legitimized, for example, by pointing out that a major problem with left-wing campaigns in Britain is that they 'tend to commence on a united basis and then proceed swiftly to a split' (Murray & German 2005: 48), which can be a negative development as regards the effectiveness of resistance. Hence, the StWC seems to subscribe to a traditional Marxist approach with a classical input/output orientation in which clear strategies and strong unity are regarded as necessary for the sake of efficacy. As Gillan (2006: 115) points out, in revolutionary socialist organizations, 'centralism is justified on the basis of effectiveness' but what is not publicly articulated is their 'commitment to hierarchy'.

Although clarity and simplicity are good qualities where the aim is to create a unified mass movement that can become convincing and more powerful in its political demands, this approach is not without problems. A very strong emphasis on unity and consensus is especially problematic in the beginning, when a movement is starting to grow. It can make it difficult, and even totally undesirable, for some groups to get involved in the first place. Furthermore, it can easily lead to misunderstandings that would not necessarily take place if there were more open communication between different organizations and continuous as well as practical efforts to accommodate diversity. For example, an interview with the WRI representative shows that some groups feel that there is unnecessary competition within the movement. He argues that in the beginning, when there was still 'more independent activism', the StWC organized an event on the very same day as his organization did. Due to negative experiences of the founding of the StWC, he is inclined to conclude that the competing event was planned on purpose, which is, however, likely to be a misinterpretation. (Interview 3.) The WRI interviewee regards the

StWC and its leading role as problematic also more generally – a point which he makes very explicitly (ibid):

The problem is to the movement that one organization such as the Stop the War Coalition is *one organization ... claims to represent the whole movement*. That ... becomes then difficult. Movements are normally much more *diffuse* and there's not really one spokesperson or organization claiming to be the movement which also makes it more difficult to see what the movement stands for but ... at least you don't have the same accountability problem. We have *one self-acclaimed spokes-organization* for the movement and you, I guess, you could call it *a party*.

According to this interpretation, other organizations have not had enough opportunities to engage in the new anti-war movement led by the StWC. The unfortunate result is that ever since the founding of the StWC there has been friction between some organizations. Nevertheless, it seems that some of these contradictions could not have been easily avoided. When the WRI representative is explicitly asked whether he believes it would have been possible to make the movement genuinely broader had more people from various groups been invited to the StWC Steering Committee, his reply is categorically skeptical (Interview 3):

The Stop the War Coalition is clearly *undemocratic*. So, I don't know if there would have been a chance to get a real impact on the political agenda they are trying to set ... I find it very problematic and I wouldn't be sure it's possible ... to have any impact ... The history of Socialist Workers' Party in this country is Stop the War Coalitions'. They *always try to dominate* ... it's very difficult to counter that.

Here, the interviewee detaches the organization he represents from the general framework of the left, thus representing a departure from the other three organizations. Moreover, his views clearly illustrate the difficulty of having a unified and diversified movement simultaneously. When viewed from the perspective of the theoretical debate, this invites many critical questions, in particular with regard to the concept of the Multitude, which radical poststructuralists conceptualize as a consensual and unified, yet diverse collection of singularities (Hardt & Negri 2000; 2004).

#### 4.2.2 Historical Contextualization and New Characteristics

Views regarding to the ascendance of the ‘new’ movement are closely linked to those pertaining to the general history of the anti-war movement. Here, too, there are differences between the organizations, for example, in terms of what are regarded as most important historical points of reference and how the current movement is considered to qualitatively differ from its predecessors. Unsurprisingly, the most common case of comparison for most organizations is the Vietnam War, which radically shaped the politics of a whole generation of young people and inspired new forms of political activism and new models for political organization (e.g. DeBenedetti & Chatfield 1990; Chatfield 1992).

The movement against the Vietnam War is mentioned particularly often by the StWC (e.g. Murray & German 2005: 21; Rees 2006: 231–232) but also by other organizations. In the CND history, the Vietnam War is discussed in great detail due to the organization’s involvement in campaigns against it, ones that were especially active from 1965 onwards (Hudson 2005: 87–102). For the newer organizations, the StWC and GR, which do not have first-hand organizational experience of the Vietnam era, the war is often a point of comparison that prompts an emphasis on differences rather than similarities between the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ movements. For the CND and WRI, which were active during the Vietnam War, the conflict serves as more of a contextualization of the current movement: they tend to understand resistance towards the wars in Iraq and Vietnam in similar terms.

Bearing in mind the internal problems discussed in the previous section, it is interesting to learn that for the older organizations the Vietnam War posed a challenge similar to the difficulties the new movement has faced in deciding consensually on a clear strategy. There was a heated debate about whether the CND, as an organization which ‘had been set up as a single-issue organisation to achieve nuclear disarmament’, should get involved in anti-war activism at all (Hudson 2005: 92).<sup>11</sup> Although many supporters regarded the war as a ‘conventional war’ that had no direct relevance for the CND, the organization ended up playing ‘a significant role in

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<sup>11</sup> On internal struggles inside the CND during the Vietnam War, see e.g. Minnion 1989: 167–168; Young 1987a: 18.



campaigning against the Vietnam War, although the degree of priority given to this varied' (ibid: 93–94). WRI confronted similar problems although they were more closely related to the question of pacifism, these emerging when it had to take a stance in regard to liberation movements resorting to violent means, as in the case of the National Liberation Front (NLF) of Vietnam. As a pacifist organization, WRI had not approved the use of violence, but had decided not be 'hostile to revolutionary movements' even if it disagreed on 'certain fundamental issues' (Prasad 2005: 385; also 498). In other words, WRI indirectly supported the NLF while also actively campaigning against the Vietnam War<sup>12</sup>.

Another frequent historical point of reference is the Cold War, which served as the broader political backdrop to the Vietnam War. Comparisons to the Cold War era are made by the StWC especially when discussing the political framework of the new movement or explaining the transformation of imperialism to new imperialism (e.g. Rees 2006: 10–13, 17, 44–47, 81–83, 89–90, 200–201; Murray & German 2005: 13). In fact, the co-founder of the StWC, John Rees (2006: 222), argues that the most important social process behind the revival of the anti-war movement is the advancement of 'the 25 year long neo-liberal offensive that has resulted in greater inequality, cutbacks in welfare provision, privatisation, deregulation, an increase in corporate power and an assault on trade unions'. He refers to the end of the Cold War and the 'Moscow dominated vision of socialism' that have, in his estimation, helped the left to re-unite while making opposition to neo-liberalism the most urgent issue on its agenda (ibid: 223–224).

Rees suggests that after the fall of the Soviet Union 'the dividing line in society as well as on the left was between those who were in favour and those who were against resurgent global capitalism' (ibid: 224). He is convinced that this directly relates to the third social process that explains the birth of a new kind of an anti-war movement – the rise of *new imperialism* after the end of the Cold War (ibid). Although neither the first Gulf War nor the wars in the Balkans<sup>13</sup> managed to 'break beyond

<sup>12</sup> WRI organized several campaigns against the war, including direct action, leafleting and support for conscientious objectors (e.g. Prasad 2005: 371–381).

<sup>13</sup> For the StWC, both wars are common points of reference when talking about the movement in historical terms (e.g. Murray & German 2005: 37–39; Rees 2006: 16–19, 20–25, 28, 50, 83–85, 224).

the limits of the traditional left and peace movements', they nevertheless 'drew together a core of people who would be central to the opposition to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq' (ibid).

The Cold War is a common point of reference for the CND as well. This is due, to a large extent, to the life cycle of the organization: it was founded in the late 1950s. During the first decades of the Cold War, it organized many anti-nuclear campaigns (e.g. Hudson 2005: 120–153, 154–182), for example during the Berlin crisis (ibid: 75–81) and the Cuban missile crisis (ibid: 82–86). Often it is stressed that the power structures and political motives behind the Iraq War are similar to those which kept the Cold War going on for so long. Sometimes it is suggested that the current political situation, with its focus on the War on Terror, is even more dangerous than the Cold War ever was. (Interview 1; Interview 6.) It is maintained that the Cold War was more rational as 'both sides needed the other and were prepared to negotiate', whereas the current situation is much more complex and potentially explosive (Interview 6). Nevertheless, the present political atmosphere is regarded as similar, with the exception that the 'communist' label has now been replaced by the 'terrorist' label: 'Throughout the Cold War it used to be called communism or communist, the most evil person in the world ... now everything that is undesirable is terrorism.' (Interview 2/GR.)

In regard to the changes taken place in the movement since the Vietnam War, three new characteristics are usually mentioned: *the speed of mobilization* (large demonstrations held even before the war started), *the sustained nature of opposition* (from 2001 onwards) and *the size and broadness* ('globality') of the movement. The central argument regarding the growing speed of mobilization is that the new movement managed to organize massive demonstrations against the war before it even started, whereas it took 'four years before there were any serious demonstrations against the Vietnam War' (Interview 6/CND; Interview 4/StWC)<sup>14</sup>.

The StWC regards the current movement also as a much broader and more popular type of movement (Rees 2006: 222–223; Interview 5). As a StWC interviewee puts it (Interview 4):

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<sup>14</sup> This has also been a common argument within the US anti-war movement (e.g. Hayden 2007: 127).

Now of course we've gone on *better* because ... *significantly larger protests*, and we had them *before the war* ... after six years ... our demonstrations are generally *bigger* than their demonstrations were at the height of the Vietnam War.

GR, too, stresses that the anti-war movement of the Vietnam era 'never had demos of the size we've had' (Globalise Resistance 2008f). The size and broadness of the new movement is mainly articulated by referring to the February 2003 demonstration as the largest demonstration ever organized. It is also emphasized as a positive new development that the number of young people interested in politics is continuously increasing (Murray & German 2005: 4; Interview 1/CND; Interview 2/GR; Interview 6/CND). One interviewee, for example, stresses that the movement and demonstrations are now 'bigger than ever'. He is especially impressed by the fact that people from different age groups and 'from hugely different political backgrounds just stay together'. (Interview 6/CND.) Another interviewee points out that while in the 1960-70s people were more ideological 'about the possibilities of change', today they are 'more cynical, much more pragmatic' (Interview 7/GR).

Where the sustained nature of the new movement is concerned, it is mainly the StWC that stresses this aspect. However, its arguments are somewhat confusing. On the one hand, the StWC notes that it was unclear 'whether [it] would be a shortlived, ad hoc body that would protest briefly, gloriously and unsuccessfully, and then die, or whether it would evolve into something more permanent', which resulted in decisions made 'with no more than half an eye on the longer term' (Murray & German 2005: 48-49). On the other hand, the StWC argues that it 'was always unlikely to be a short-lived or one-off movement' but that it 'has become much more of a permanent movement than was perhaps envisaged when it was set up' (ibid: 6). Hence, it is unclear what kind of a life cycle was originally expected from the organization. It is clear, however, that when the StWC refers to the sustained nature of the movement from 2001 onwards, it is invoking a time scale very different from that used by the CND and WRI, which have been involved in the movement for decades.

The broadness of resistance is often articulated as a 'globality' of the movement, which some regard as a new characteristic (e.g. Nineham in Murray & German 2005: 106-107; Rees 2006: 222-223). Not all organizations emphasize this aspect equally much, which becomes evident

especially in the interviews. While some maintain that the ‘global reach’ of the movement is something characteristically new, others point out that the movement has always been international. An StWC interviewee, for example, says that ‘these movements have always been global and they have been getting more global as time goes on’. Referring to new political circumstances, he suggests that the ‘regrouping of the left after the collapse of the Soviet Union’ has resulted in people recognizing that ‘we are all confronting the same issue’. As a point of comparison, he brings up the events of 1968. Hence, for him, the relevant time period for comparison is longer than for some others. (Interview 4.)

Although a member of a much older organization, the WRI interviewee refers to the 1980s when linking the anti-war struggle to struggles for women’s, gay and other minority rights. Whereas the other organizations are more eager to underscore changes which have taken place, the interviewee maintains that the anti-war movement and its strategies have basically remained the same: ‘Since the 70s and 80s ... the peace movement of the early 80s ... the socialist groups had the same approach, big demonstrations, working through the trade unions, but not direct action. It didn’t change.’ (Interview 3.)

### 4.3 Conclusions

This chapter has reflected upon the theoretical debate on the political agency of resistance in which the current anti-war movement, its ascendancy and central characteristics have been interpreted in highly globalized terms by academic globalists. The analysis has proceeded by examining empirically how the above-mentioned aspects are understood within the current anti-war movement. The aim has been to determine the extent to which the understandings within the anti-war movement ‘resonate’ with those of the three theoretical approaches, and what the main convergences and divergences are in this regard.

The chapter has shown that the four organizations studied contextualize the movement and define its central characteristics in quite different terms each of them. For example, there are several different accounts of how, where and when the movement was born and how it differs qualitatively from its predecessors. Some organizations even

question the very interpretation that there is something to be described as a ‘new’ movement. In regard to the political circumstances and political opportunities whereby the movement is regarded as either being ‘born’ or having experienced a political revival, at least four different explanations were found. Most often it is described as a reaction to the developments of world politics, especially 9/11 and the War on Terror, and as such it is regarded as something new and independent of previous movements. Alternatively, the movement is understood as a continuation of the alter-globalization movement of the late 1990s. While some regard it as the latest manifestation of the long-term traditional peace movement, for others it represents a new phase in the long-term struggle against imperialism.

The recently founded organizations – the StWC and GR – tell a rather uniform story of the ‘birth’ of the new anti-war movement, whereas the long-term organizations – the CND and WRI – contextualize the current movement in a different way. They tend to emphasize long-term traditions and the history of the movement and are less willing to accept recent anti-war activities as evidence of something new. Moreover, as organizations they emphasize being part of the long-term peace movement fighting against war and militarism in more general terms (WRI) while opposing nuclear weapons in particular (CND). The StWC, although it describes itself as a leading organization of the new anti-war movement in Britain, often refers to a long-standing struggle against imperialism, while GR stresses its close relationship with the alter-globalization movement.

In point of fact, the organizations do not always even refer to the anti-war movement when representing themselves as a part of ‘the movement’.<sup>15</sup> Bearing in mind that these four organizations constitute only a small part of the broader movement, the situation at large must be even more complex. Thus, the current British anti-war movement can be regarded as a mixture of not only a wide variety of different organizations with varying views about anti-war politics, but also of elements from many different movements – the traditional peace movement, anti-militaristic,

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<sup>15</sup> Moreover, the organizations primarily refer to themselves as ‘organizations’, but also occasionally as ‘movements’ (especially the StWC), which makes it challenging to analytically distinguish when they are referring to themselves *as a movement* and when they consider themselves *as an organization that is part of a movement*.

anti-nuclear, anti-imperialist and environmental movements, as well as the alter-globalization movement. While obviously very rich indeed in terms of diversity, these complex relationships with other movements, as well as political and ideological differences between the organizations, are also a source of contradictions within the movement. Even in its ascendance, the movement faced many difficulties at the national level when trying to make collective decisions and to define its underlying goals, strategies and preferable forms of action. One of the main problems seems to have been that the StWC strongly articulated the political purpose of the new movement as an effort to 'unite the left', which was not a position supported by all. Its effort to frame the movement in terms of a struggle against imperialism also caused some friction.

The organizations contextualize the anti-war movement differently in terms of historical references and analogies, for example when making comparisons to the Vietnam War and the Cold War, which served as its political context. While the long-standing organizations – the CND and WRI – look to the wars for points of *similarity* with the current movement, the newer organizations typically seek points of divergence. In other words, they prefer to underline *differences* between the current movement and those of the Vietnam era, bringing up new characteristics of the movement to illustrate how it is 'better' than its predecessors. New elements that are cited in particular are the speed of mobilization and the size and broadness of the movement, with the growing number of active young people and the increasing diversity of the movement also frequently mentioned in the same connection. These characteristics are viewed in quite similar terms also by the long-standing organizations.

When it comes to the 'globality' of the movement, three organizations (all except WRI) bring up the same evidence: the demonstration on 15 February 2003. It seems to be a kind of a 'norm answer'. Much of the 'globality' talk concentrates on this one issue. There are, however, differences in how the organizations interpret the demonstration's political meaning. Those organizations that were actively involved in coordinating the demonstration – the StWC and CND – refer to it repeatedly, constructing an exceptional role for it in terms of both size (the largest demonstration ever) and timing (prior to the war). Domestically, the political meaning of the demonstration is articulated as an embodiment of the failure of representative democracy, manifesting the gap between

the electorate and the elected. Internationally, the February 2003 demonstration is usually portrayed as having produced different kinds of collective *subjects* or described in terms of the numbers of people whom it activated. Sometimes it is even explicitly argued that the anti-war movement and/or the organizations involved in it somehow represent *the majority of people* not just in Britain, but all over the world. The British movement is not exceptional in this regard, because other studies have found that the February 2003 demonstration has inspired movements all over Europe to argue that they have been 'able to gain consensus across all countries in the world' (Ruzza & Bozzini 2006: 123).

Those organizations which were not as actively involved in organizing the demonstration have a somewhat different understanding of its political meaning. For example, GR regards it as a sign of collective anti-war politics on the European level while strongly underscoring the role of the alter-globalization movement and the ESF. In WRI material, the demonstration is barely mentioned. The WRI interviewee questions the overall rationale of mass demonstrations, and shows particular skepticism where the political significance of the February 2003 demonstration is concerned. On the whole, it can be concluded that most of organizations share the interpretation of academic globalists (e.g. Castells 2008: 86; Hardt & Negri 2004: 215, 284) regarding the demonstration's extraordinary character, sometimes even celebrating it as a manifestation of an example of 'new kind of democracy' taking place at the global level. Nevertheless, it is clear that both liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists emphasize the global aspects and new characteristics of the movement substantially more than is the case within the movement itself. It is more common for all of the organizations studied to regard the movement from a national or international than a global perspective.

The theoretical literature often suggests that the anti-war movement represents some sort of a continuation of the alter-globalization movement (e.g. Hardt & Negri 2004: 215, 284). Only one organization, GR, shares this view clearly. The StWC and CND occasionally refer to the alter-globalization movement but more often frame the movement against the Iraq War as an independent movement of its own. Interestingly, the relationship between the anti-war and the alter-globalization movements is not as harmonious as usually assumed. The rise of the anti-war movement is believed to have decreased interest in the alter-globalization movement,

a development which has caused some friction and criticism.

How can the similarities and differences between the organizations discussed above be explained? Apart from their political and ideological differences (to be discussed in more detail in following chapters), one important factor seems to be that the organizations are in different phases in their life cycles. Obviously, the older organizations have much more experience than the newer ones and hence their perspective on both anti-war politics and movement activities is more comprehensive and multifaceted; significant changes in society, the state and social movements have taken place since their founding. The predecessor of the CND, the DAC, organized the first Aldermaston March over fifty years ago, and WRI was founded shortly after the First World War. It is only natural that these organizations contextualize the new movement differently than the more recently established ones.

One particularly important characteristic of the older organizations is their relative openness about internal debates and conflicts, which are brought up, for example, when reflecting upon the history of the movement. There are always certain power structures and political struggles going on *inside* any organization, a fact that the older organizations disclose at least to some extent, whereas the newer organizations do not discuss such conflicts at all. What the analysis reveals more clearly is that there are power struggles and competition taking place *between* certain organizations within the movement. Although there is hardly anything about past, current or potential contradictions in the organizations' public material, the interviews reveal that beneath the surface there is less unity than might appear to prevail on the outside.

In this regard, the arguments of the interviewees can at least partly be interpreted as revealing an attempt on the part of the organizations to portray the movement on the surface (publicly) as being as united as possible. Indeed, an emphasis on unity seems to be one of the central characteristics of the StWC. While its leading role is more or less accepted by some organizations (the CND and GR), others (WRI) are less enthusiastic in this regard. Here, it has to be noted that since only four organizations have been studied, critical views of the StWC are probably more widespread among the movement at large.

Inside any social movement there are bound to be differences and contradictions, although this is not necessarily serious. Often a movement



can act on a common goal even if there are some internal differences and minor conflicts (e.g. Rochon 1998: 97). To put it in Leonard's (1990: 261) terms, it is possible to have commitment to both solidarity and plurality at the same time. However, it is not always possible to reach a consensus. When some groups feel that their views are not heard or regarded as important, even a minor question can become extremely politicized and cause severe internal conflicts and splits within a movement<sup>16</sup>. The fact that some organizations are always a bit more powerful and better positioned to make decisions that affect the whole movement can cause problems. In dealing with these issues it is important to recognize that many kinds of power relations exist whenever political actors come and work together, even if they are 'on the same side'.

Summing up the findings of this chapter, it can be concluded that the interpretations made by academic globalists are in many regards quite different from the understandings of the anti-war organizations studied. The interpretations made in regard to the 'globality' of the movement and the significance of the February 2003 demonstration seem to be to some extent overstated. Many organizations do celebrate its political significance, sharing the idea that the movement has become increasingly international. Some even speak of a global movement that has new some characteristics. However, these are not the only or necessarily the dominant understandings. The new wave of anti-war activism is often contextualized in more historical and national terms, with the current movement regarded as continuing the long-term work of the international peace movement. It has been maintained that, due to somewhat exceptional political circumstances, national movements have managed to cooperate more closely than is usually the case.<sup>17</sup> Accordingly, international coordination in the context of the Iraq War is not regarded as evidence of a permanent phenomenon or the start of a totally new kind of political project in the context of the anti-war movement. As one activist puts it, although 'increased mobilization and some coordination

<sup>16</sup> This was the case, for example, within the US anti-war movement during the Vietnam War (Chatfield 1973b: xxvii; DeBenedetti & Chatfield 1990). The British movement has also historically had its share of internal rivalries and divisions (e.g. Taylor & Young 1987b: 295–296; Young 1987a: 5–10, 18).

<sup>17</sup> Similar kinds of observations have been made in other studies as well (see especially Gillan et al. 2008: 96–98, 102–103, 112–117, 128–129, 189).

offer hopeful signs', a 'renewed movement has not yet firmly established itself' (Speck 2005: 27).

Indeed, as some social movement scholars have noted, since the February 2003 demonstration, the movement has not 'reproduced' anything on a similar scale (Gillan et al. 2008: 186). Moreover, rather than merely celebrating the global perspective, many organizations locate the February 2003 demonstration's primary political meaning more closely to the national context<sup>18</sup>, describing it as a reaction to the failure of representative democracy in Britain. For many of the organizations, the new phase of anti-war activism has also proven that the left is finally in the process of uniting both nationally and internationally<sup>19</sup>. In this regard, some organizations also subscribe to the interpretation of radical poststructuralists whereby the anti-war movement is not a single moment of protest but part of a longer and continuing radical movement against imperialism and neo-liberal capitalism. Some organizations (mainly GR) hope that even more struggles will be incorporated into the context of the anti-war movement, thus echoing the idea of the Multitude espoused by the radical poststructuralist approach.

Although some resonance with the radical poststructuralist approach was found, there are also many contrary and more skeptical views. The chapter also showed that, contrary to the common narrative by radical poststructuralists<sup>20</sup>, the transformation from the alter-globalization to the anti-war movement is not always considered a smooth and unproblematic process. Neither can the 'birth' of the new anti-war movement at the national level be regarded as a very easy or consensual process, for there have been many difficulties. One of the leading organizations is often criticized for not having an open enough attitude towards groups with different political and ideological views while itself attempting to frame the whole movement in characteristically anti-imperialistic terms. Although these differences were mainly put aside in order to create a mass movement against the war, certain elements have made it difficult

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<sup>18</sup> See also Gillan et al. 2008: 97, 104, 112, 115, 118–120, 124, 128–129, 190.

<sup>19</sup> For discussion on the 'global left', see e.g. Santos 2008.

<sup>20</sup> Radical poststructuralists, or liberal cosmopolitans for that matter, never seem to question the harmonious relationship between the alter-globalization and anti-war movement. There is no discussion about possible contradictions between the two; rather, it is taken for granted that their relationship is one of peaceful co-existence.

ever since for some organizations to take part in the movement.

On the whole, the fact that many organizations have divergent views in regard to the movement and its central characteristics and that there have been problems and even some conflicts in this regard, shows that the kind of consensus that academic globalists believe is taking place at the global level is a highly idealistic assumption. Consensus seems to be quite difficult even at the national level, let alone the global level. The relationship between the alter-globalization and the anti-war movement is not either as harmonious as academic globalists assume by dint of their idea of growing global consciousness and solidarity between different struggles and movements. In other words, there seems to be at least some sort of a gap between the political reality experienced within the anti-war movement and the interpretations made by academic globalists. This preliminary analysis seems to confirm the argument by the critical state-centric approach that academic globalists tend to project ungrounded utopias into social movements in conceptualizing the struggles of the movement in highly globalized and consensual terms.

Usually the processes in which social movements are born are explained in social movement theory in terms of political opportunity structures. In other words, movements do not 'pop' unexpectedly out of nowhere: as social and political phenomena they are constructed and produced by certain actors in certain political situations. It is not uncommon that political situations and opportunities brought by them are interpreted in different ways by various actors, producing thus competing views about preferred forms of action that may even result in conflicts and power struggles between the actors. This is not surprising, since there are always many sorts of political struggles and competition within any movement in different phases of its life cycle. Particularly interesting and important are, however, those struggle that take place at the very beginning of a campaign, when the main goals, principles and strategies are discussed and decided upon. These will have a great influence on the movement's overall strategy and the relationships between different groups within the movement. Therefore, it has been very useful to gain a first glimpse of how different groups view the movement in general and how they articulate their own roles in that context. It furnishes a salient backdrop to the more detailed analysis in the following chapters of the organizations' views concerning the main aims, targets and strategies of resistance.



'Something big is happening. But something big is happening because the thing we are opposing is also very big, and that's the trouble.'  
Walter Wolfgang (CND), 'The World against War' Demonstration, 15 March 2008, London








'Troops Out' Demonstration in front of Downing Street 10, the Stop the War Coalition, 20 March 2008, London



'The World against War' Demonstration, 15 March 2008, London

PHOTOS: Tiina Seppälä

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## 5 ANTI-WHAT? AIMS AND TARGETS OF RESISTANCE

### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter reflects on the theoretical debate by analyzing empirically how the *what* and *why* of resistance are understood within the current anti-war movement. The first question encompasses the aims and targets of resistance (*what is resisted*), the definition of which relies on the focus of the second – the causes of the war and its broader political context (*why there is resistance*). The aim of the chapter is to determine the extent to which the understandings within the anti-war movement ‘resonate’ with those of the three focal theoretical approaches, that is, to ascertain what the main convergences and divergences are in this regard.

In the theoretical debate the more general question of *what* (the definition of the main aims and targets of resistance) and the more specific question of *why* (the causes of the Iraq War and its broader political context) have been conceptualized in various and often contradictory ways. Liberal cosmopolitans are inclined to regard the Iraq War as an evidence of an *exceptionally dominant*, but transitory role of the hegemonic US in world politics. Although strongly criticizing the US for ignoring international law, they consider the situation exceptional and ephemeral. It is thought that the US behavior will be constrained by pressure from the international community (of states) and global civil society (e.g. Dunne 2003: 303–304, 315–316). In terms of the primary targets of resistance in the context of the Iraq War, this conception would suggest that the anti-war movement should aim at inspiring more opposition at the level of global public opinion, which can then bring influence to bear ‘on political behavior, on voting patterns, and on decisions of governments’ (Castells 2008: 90).

In contrast, for radical poststructuralists the Iraq War is yet another manifestation of the radical transformation of global power structures towards a *permanent state of exception* and a *global state of war*. For them, the leading role of the US is significant, but does not in itself explain the transformation from a system led by nation states to a system of decentralized forms of power and governance in which war serves as the main instrument of the global order. (E.g. Hardt & Negri 2004: xii–xiii.)

When the Iraq War is interpreted from this more structural perspective, it follows that resistance cannot be targeted against any particular nation state; the entire system must be resisted. Hence, the approach echoes the postmodern 'being against' mentality with no easily identifiable opponents. As Hardt and Negri (2000: 210–211) put it: 'The first question of political philosophy today is not if or even why there will be resistance and rebellion, but rather how to determine the enemy against which to rebel'.

Both of the approaches are questioned by the critical the state-centric approach, which challenges the concept of a global state of war as well the argument that power in the international system has been fundamentally transformed. The state-centric approach suggests that the War on Terror (as well the Iraq War) should be seen as resulting from the weakness and inability of the US and/or other western states in defining a clear enemy and determining how to respond to new kinds of security threats (e.g. Chandler 2009a: 21–22; 179–182; 2009c: 260). In other words, it maintains that the absence of a clearly defined enemy has led western states to conceptualize opponents in highly abstract terms. This can be regarded as echoing the fact that nation states can no longer build their definitions of 'the enemy' using the traditional identity-political approach derived from Carl Schmitt's conception of the political as a clear distinction between a friend and an enemy. More generally, in regard to targets of resistance the state-centric approach argues that it is useless to fight against abstract enemies, which cannot become strategic objects of resistance (e.g. Chandler 2009a: 18; 2009b: 541). If one wishes to influence actual decision-making, it is governments and the political institutions of nation states that should be targeted instead.

This very contradictory theoretical debate is reflected on in this chapter by analyzing empirically how the Iraq War and its broader political context are understood within the anti-war movement and how the main aims and targets of resistance become defined and articulated. To this end, the empirical analysis investigates the research material through the following questions: Why is the Iraq War resisted? How are causes of the war defined and articulated? How is the war understood in its broader political context? What are the main aims of the movement? What are the main targets of resistance?

The chapter will demonstrate that the Iraq War and its broader political context are conceived quite differently within the British anti-war movement than the three focal theoretical approaches would suggest. Rather than explaining the war as due to an exceptionally dominant but transitory role of the US (liberal cosmopolitan approach), a permanent state of exception serving the global regime of biopower (radical poststructuralist approach), or the weakness of the West (critical state-centric approach), many of the organizations subscribe to a traditional Marxist analysis in that they regard the war as an imperialist endeavor of the US. Hence, the chapter will also show that most of the organizations define the main targets of resistance in quite traditional terms – as nation states and governments rather than, for example, abstract forms of governance. This locates their reasoning closest to that posited by the critical state-centric approach. Yet, when it comes to the long-term aims of the movement, many understandings can be found which correlate with liberal cosmopolitanism and to some extent also with radical poststructuralism. The results are thus mixed, indicating that there can simultaneously be clearly articulated state-level opponents as well as more abstract targets of resistance. Contrary to what the theoretical debate would assert, within the movement it is recognized that *both* can exist at the same time.

However, the chapter will show that are substantial differences between the organizations in regard to the broader struggles to which they link their resistance. While some regard resistance against the war as closely connected with the anti-imperialistic struggle, others contextualize it as a part of anti-militaristic struggle or link it to issues of global social justice and environmental conservation. There thus exists a great variety of more abstract targets of resistance, which indicates that, apart from opposition to the Iraq War, it is quite difficult to build a clear and coherent political project for the anti-war movement more generally. Since the movement's component organizations define their main goals in different terms, their views on the relationship between the short- and long-term goals of the movement are also different. Hence, one can see ongoing internal political conflicts as well as power struggles within the movement.

## 5.2 Against the War on Terror and the US Government

### 5.2.1 The Anti-Imperialistic Focus

Of the four organizations studied, the StWC is most explicit in its opposition to the US and the War on Terror. It defines its main aim as stopping the war against terrorism being waged by the US and its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The StWC points out that a war against terrorism cannot solve the problem of terrorism but ‘will simply add to the numbers of innocent dead, cause untold suffering, political and economic instability on a global scale, increase racism and result in attacks on civil liberties’ (Stop the War Coalition 2008a; Murray & German 2005: 6).<sup>1</sup> Therefore, the StWC is ‘committed to opposing any racist backlash generated by this war’ and also fights ‘to stop the erosion of civil rights’ (Stop the War Coalition 2008a). Although this three-fold objective is quite broad, the main focus clearly lies on resisting the Iraq War in the context of the broader War on Terror. Thus, the main target of resistance is the US (*ibid*, emphasis added):

The “war on terror” has progressed through a number of stages, and naturally the slogans of the day have changed to fit. It has also had consequences far beyond the immediate US-led military attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, but in each case, it has been *the US-led drive to war* which has been the *prime cause* of these crises, backlashes and other repercussions.

In fact, the StWC describes its opposition to the US as the main aim of not only the organization itself, but also of the whole anti-war movement<sup>2</sup>. In this way, it implies that there is a clear consensus about the main target

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<sup>1</sup> According to the StWC, terrorism is not something the US opposes in principle, since it has itself, for example, ‘sustained a terrorist campaign against the elected government of Nicaragua throughout the 1980s’. Other examples are also presented, such as encouraging apartheid in South Africa, the cases of Cuba and Indonesia and previous US support for al-Qaida. (Murray & German 2005: 10–11.)

<sup>2</sup> It is argued that ‘if there is a consensus running through the broader anti-war movement, it is based on the belief that defeating the policies of the US government is the most urgent priority in world politics’ (Murray & German 2005: 20).

of resistance, which is not quite the case, however, as further analysis reveals. For the StWC the War on Terror represents ‘an open-ended war against peoples and states across the world’ being ‘fought to impose a US-dominated new world order’ (Murray & German 2005: 9). Although arguing that the war was ‘planned long before’ 9/11 (ibid), in contrast to some more radical interpretations, the StWC does not support any conspiracy theories. It explicitly stresses that 9/11 ‘was not carried out by the US government’ despite the fact that the Iraq War had been just a matter of time, given that the war drive was manifested ‘in black and white in the words and deeds of the US government’ (ibid: 12; also Rees 2006: 28–29). Since Saddam Hussein’s regime was to be changed in Iraq ‘sooner or later’ (Rees 2006: 85), 9/11 was used ‘as a means’ for arriving at this goal (Murray & German 2005: 17).

Rather than ‘an entirely new departure’, the StWC regards the ‘Bush doctrine’ as ‘an extension of US foreign policy’ that evolved since the first Gulf War<sup>3</sup> and aimed at ‘remaking the planet in the image of the US – with mandatory adoption of a free-market economy as its bedrock organising principle’ (Murray & German 2005: 10, 17). As a strategy for ‘unilateral assertion of US power in the world’, the Bush doctrine is regarded as demanding ‘the submission of all to US interests’ and using force ‘to achieve that submission’ (ibid: 13). The StWC stresses the expanding scale of the war, which has reached ‘far beyond Iraq and Afghanistan to touch the Philippines, Pakistan, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Somalia’ while also ‘menacing’ Cuba, North Korea, Syria and Iran (ibid: 9). It is described as an effort ‘to encircle China with US bases and leave Israel as the dominant military power in the Middle East’ (ibid). The StWC goes on to represent the War on Terror as ‘the most far-reaching plan for world hegemony since Hitler’s demise’ (ibid: 19).<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The War on Terror is regarded as a continuation of the first Gulf War waged 11 years earlier due to the US wanting ‘no post-Cold War challenges to its power’ (Rees 2006: 17; also Murray & German 2005: 48).

<sup>4</sup> It is, however, added that the US ‘is not, of course, fascist, and George Bush is not a Nazi’ but that ‘the scope of the ambition of the US neo-conservatives, allied to their disregard for international law, invites a comparison in the sphere of global conduct’ (Murray & German 2005: 19–20). For discussion on Anti-Americanism in the context of the European anti-war movement, see e.g. Isernia 2006; Ruzza & Bozzini 2006; also Thomas 2006, and in the US context, see e.g. Tierney 2005.

The StWC stresses that ‘rather than making the world a safer place’, the war has resulted in ‘a general political instability across the Middle East and beyond’ (Nineham & Burgin 2008: 4). It is believed there is a danger of the wars between the major and minor powers ‘turning over into a larger complex’ that could bear serious consequences in a nuclear age (Interview 5; Nineham & Burgin 2008: 18). Thus, the main target of the anti-war movement should be the US and its imperialist aims and ‘humanitarian’ justifications of wars. US foreign policy is clearly interpreted as that of an imperialist state by the STWC, as it emphasizes that ‘the drive to war’ is due the country’s national interests and dependency on certain energy resources. In this view, competition between states in what is an uneven system leads to two types of imperialist conflict: conflict between major developed countries (the world wars) and between rich industrial and developing states (the Vietnam War and the Iraq War). (Rees 2006: 229.) Since ‘the drive to war’ is regarded as ‘endemic in the system’, the main ideology of the anti-war movement must be anti-imperialism (ibid: 228). Indeed, it is told that ‘great powers are the main enemy’ was one of the shared principles agreed upon at the founding of the StWC (ibid: 226). This obviously has clear implications for resistance (ibid: 229):

Systemic problems require systemic answers. This view directs the gaze of those looking for the causes of war away from merely ideological factors, though these too have their proper role to play in any full explanation of war, and towards those structural facets of the system that underpin the drive to military conflict.

Echoing the analysis above, the StWC describes the US motives in the Iraq War as ‘oil, Israel and strategic domination’ (Murray & German 2005: 36; also Rees 2006: 88).<sup>5</sup> It condemns the US claims of weapons of mass destruction and the ‘alleged desire of the Iraqi people to enjoy foreign liberation’ as lies, stressing that there were alternative ways to ‘liberate’ the Iraqi people (Murray & German 2005: 44).<sup>6</sup> For the StWC, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan<sup>7</sup> mark a new phase of neo-liberalism.

<sup>5</sup> Oil as a motive is discussed at length (e.g. Rees 2006: 68–91).

<sup>6</sup> It is pointed out that ‘many Iraqi individuals and groups advocated alternative means of deposing the Saddam regime, through international political action and solidarity’ (Murray & German 2005: 44).

<sup>7</sup> Rees (2006: 30) argues that the war in Afghanistan ‘gave the Bush administration

In this way, the relationship between neo-liberal capitalism and the war system is underscored, although competition between imperialist states is regarded as the main cause of wars.<sup>8</sup> In this context, the StWC represents the War on Terror as essentially a desperate effort by the US to sustain the status quo. It is argued that the ‘underlying position of the US militarily and politically can only grow relatively weaker over the next 20 or 30 years, even without allowing for dramatic turns in the international situation which could accelerate this process’ (Murray & German 2005: 13). In other words, the combination of ‘relative economic decline and absolute military power’ is where ‘much of the meaning of US strategy in the 21st century is to be found’ (Rees 2006: 13; also 37, 49, 67). The War on Terror is viewed as a US attempt to sustain its share of power and resources despite the gradual decline of its share in world production (Murray & German 2005: 13):

Military power cannot outstay economic power indefinitely. Even if US arms spending does not decline absolutely (clearly the US right will try to cut everything else first), other powers, growing relatively stronger in economic terms, will eventually be in a position to challenge Washington.

More specifically, the StWC regards US aggression as ‘driven by fear of economic competition from China and other emerging powers’ (Nineham & Burgin 2008: 22). It is suggested that although the US was economically, militarily and politically the most powerful state after the Second World War, the oil crisis in 1973 revealed the country’s weakness in economic terms; moreover, its political support ‘has been ebbing away’ over the last fifty years (Interview 4):

The idea that America morally led the world is gone ... Whatever was left of that, was blasted away after the Iraq War ... what they were left with was *their overwhelming military power* which they chose to use to ... regain some of that *economic power* by controlling the second or the third largest oil reserves in the world. Now, that’s gone really badly for them ... America globally is *weakened*.

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the momentum it needed to settle the new imperial design in stone and thus pave the way for the attack on Iraq’.

<sup>8</sup> The leading role of the US in the global economy is criticized in particular (e.g. German 2007: 7; Rees 2006: 2).

Regarding the war as a sign of weakness of the superpower, an StWC interviewee argues that the US is ‘in the process of breaking down the hegemony’. He regards the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as ‘based on fundamentally a weakness rather than strength’ and points out that ‘hegemony isn’t about exercising absolute power’ but rather an ability to control ‘without having to physically intervene’. Since US efforts have failed, it no longer has ‘the ability to intervene and tell people what to do’. (Interview 4.) More often the StWC, however, argues that due to the country’s ‘vulnerable position in the world’, wars and occupations are going to continue as ever (e.g. Nineham & Burgin 2008: 22).

This analysis echoes to some extent the radical poststructuralist understanding of war as a defining character of the international system, but the overall perspective is quite different. The StWC clearly considers US imperialism to be a main cause of the war, whereas in post-Marxist analysis, wars cannot be explained in relation to a single nation state, even if it is the superpower US. For radical poststructuralists, the global power structure is a significantly more comprehensive factor (e.g. Hardt & Negri 2004: xii–xiii).<sup>9</sup> It should be noted that the StWC is not always pointing a blaming finger solely at the US either. It recognizes that other liberal powers are part of the problem, also historically (Interview 4):

What America has done in last fifty or hundred years, but in comparison what Europe has done in last five hundred years, it pales ... Also we, as Europeans, have a long colonial experience and probably won’t ... do it over again, or I should hope they don’t want to do it again, whereas the Americans are beginning to learn that it ain’t pretty running the world.

Although the above argument as such is quite exceptional, critical views of European colonialism are common among all organizations studied. The history of British imperialism certainly gives a strong flavor to most of their analyses. Nevertheless, the StWC’s position represents a clear departure from that of radical poststructuralists, for whom nation states are no longer the most significant power-holders, making resistance against

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<sup>9</sup> The interpretation that the war should be regarded as a desperate effort on the part of the US is not very far from the view of critical state-centric approach either. However, while the critical state-centric approach is skeptical of the whole idea of US dominance, the StWC clearly is not.



them considered ineffective. In sharp contrast, for the StWC, nation states are important and powerful players and hence obvious targets of resistance when struggling against the war (e.g. Rees 2006: 6–7). Whereas Hardt and Negri see the battle as taking place between Empire and the Multitude, the co-founder of the StWC, John Rees, speaks of *three* titans – the nation states, the international economy and the working class (ibid: 3). This theory is well illustrated in the following somewhat lengthy but very apposite excerpt (ibid: 6–7, emphasis added):

Modern imperialism is defined by *the conflict between these three titans*. They are bound together as three facets of a single contradictory totality. Without the competitive dynamic between the individual economic units of the system they would not find themselves constantly pitted against others in a battle for survival. Without the states and their armouries such economic competition would not ultimately also involve military competition. Without competitive economic expansion the working class would not grow. Nor would it find its livelihood under the constant economic and political pressure which is the initial spur to resistance.

Rees (2006: 201) explicitly challenges Hardt and Negri's theory when he criticizes theorizations whereby the 'the new form of empire' is very 'different from what went before'. He claims that new conceptualizations 'underestimate the contradictions inherent in the relationship between competing units of capital and nation-states, thus attributing greater strengths to the system than it actually possesses' (ibid: 201). It thus seems that the anti-imperialist stance of the StWC can be regarded as resting mainly on modernist and traditional Marxist interpretations and is therefore not readily compatible with the post-Marxist approach advocated by radical poststructuralists.

## 5.2.2 The Anti-Nuclear Focus

For the CND, the US is also an obvious enemy to be resisted. This is not only due to the Iraq War but also because 'the US approach for decades has been to seek to use weapons, both conventional and nuclear, in a variety of military and political ways to secure its goals' (Hudson 2005: 221). Since the CND was originally an anti-nuclear organization, its approach

is quite different from the StWC's. However, it is a versatile organization whose aims have expanded over the years. The CND chair argues that it must not 'allow itself to be outside the mainstream of popular concerns on issues of war and peace, especially at a time when nuclear weapons are so central to war-fighting policies' (ibid: 243). Indeed, the CND took a strong stance against the Iraq War right from the beginning, producing, for example, many inquiries and statements regarding the legality of the war (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 2008c).

The CND's analysis of the causes of war is very close to the one of the StWC. It maintains that the US would have eventually resorted to military force in the Middle East: in its view, 9/11 only 'stripped away any lingering obstacles to Bush's increasingly aggressive foreign policy', showing 'a huge re-emphasis by the US leadership on nuclear weapons' during the next few years (Hudson 2005: 218, also 221, 229). The CND also shares the StWC's interpretation whereby the US 'uses its military pre-eminence to compensate for its relative economic decline' (ibid: 224). Since the US can no longer secure its global domination economically, it seeks to do so militarily (ibid).<sup>10</sup> The CND closely links war and militarism more to economic and military-industrial interests, and especially those of the US. Oil is regarded as the main motive behind the Iraq War, seen as a response to the neo-conservative imperative to 'fulfil the needs of a lots of arms complex and arms industries going on in the States'. (Interview 6.)

Contrary to the StWC, the CND links the issue of nuclear weapons directly to the War on Terror and the Iraq War. It regards the current situation as the worst in history, because the US is not only 'seeking global governance' but has also threatened to 'use nuclear weapons first'. The CND argues that there is a 'global struggle' going on in which 'the American desire for supremacy' dictates 'the global configuration'. It is also suggested that there is 'a race against time' since 'the war drive' may result in 'either the world or a continent' being destroyed. (Interview 1.) Similar apocalyptic views are evident elsewhere in the CND material (e.g. Hudson 2005: 2). In other words, in the context of the Iraq War

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<sup>10</sup> The logic is regarded as simple: 'as the US economy becomes less competitive it increasingly uses its military pre-eminence to impose its interests' (Hudson 2005: 219, also 223).

the CND is concerned about not only imperialist US aims but also the spread of militarism more generally and the possibility that nuclear weapons will be deployed in the new political context. Interestingly, this emphasis becomes politicized when the StWC criticizes the CND's position (Murray & German 2005: 56, emphasis added):

This is *a world of regular wars* of great destructiveness, in which nuclear weapons are neither used nor threatened – a world in which the threat of human annihilation through the use of the ultimate weapons of mass destruction has been replaced, in some measure, by the reality of imperialist wars of intervention. Of course, this does not make CND's core campaigning issue redundant. The “nuclear issue” touches on world politics in many ways – the US-proposed “Star Wars” plan being the most significant ... However, to take a stand on the totality of the war danger in *today's world requires moving beyond the mainly moral opposition to nuclear opposition* which has formed the core of CND's agitation.

Here, it is argued that the CND's analysis of the main problems is somehow out of date, as it has had to struggle 'to adapt to the new realities of the post Cold War world' (Murray & German 2005: 56). The CND suggests, on the contrary, that its ability to 'play a leading role in virtually every peace campaign since its birth' is due to its understanding that 'only a movement open to different views can adapt and develop in an ever-changing world' (Hudson 2005: 4). It stresses that it has always linked issues to 'the reality of what is going on in the world' and 'been most successful and effective when it has related directly to people's most pressing concerns' (ibid: 5). For the CND, recent global political developments, especially the run-up to the Iraq War, demonstrate 'an increased danger of the use of nuclear weapons' (ibid: 2, also 220–221, 229) in a 'striking' parallel to the first Gulf War, where 'two nuclear-armed powers were prepared to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state' (ibid: 181–182, also 220–221). Indeed, the CND considers nuclear weapons highly relevant in the context of any war (Hudson 2005: 184):

Nuclear weapons do not exist in a vacuum – they are part of a war-fighting machine – of a military arsenal – and they are also part of a political arsenal that enables nuclear weapons states to maintain their extraordinary leverage over world affairs. It is no accident that every permanent member of the UN Security Council possesses nuclear weapons.

The CND thus counters StWC's claims by stressing that the end of the Cold War did not remove the danger that nuclear weapons would be used (Hudson 2005: 181–182).<sup>11</sup> Rather, the fact that the US and UK are developing a new generation of nuclear weapons that are easy to use on the battlefield illustrates a 'qualitative shift in nuclear policy' (ibid: 249, also 2, 243, 236). When these two states, themselves possessing a huge arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), justified the war on the basis of Iraq's supposed WMDs and non-compliance with disarmament resolutions, they exposed their double standards, for they 'have never complied with their own obligations to disarm' in the context of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (ibid: 230). For the CND, the 'hypocrisy of the US and UK governments' became even more striking when both above-mentioned justifications for the war proved to be lies (ibid).

The notion that nuclear weapons are inseparably connected to the power and hegemony of the US places the CND quite close to radical poststructuralists, since the organization sees the threat of absolute war posed by nuclear weapons as lying at the core of the global state of war (Hardt & Negri 2004: 18–19). Although subscribing to a similar analysis in many other respects, the StWC and the CND clearly disagree on this position.<sup>12</sup> While the StWC regards the anti-nuclear emphasis as outdated, the CND is convinced that recent developments prove that the organization 'is as relevant today as at the time of its foundation' (Hudson 2005: 251). Accordingly, the history of the organization is titled *CND – Now More than Ever*. It is clear that the organization feels a need to reframe its focus and adapt to the changing political situation in order to make sense of its analyses and policies for its members. Moreover, reframing may be necessary in order to ensure that it will not lose out completely when competing with newer organizations, such as the StWC.

<sup>11</sup> While the Gulf War is described as a US attempt to 'consolidate its global domination', the US is now criticized for trying to make the use of nuclear weapons 'acceptable' even in peacetime as tactical nuclear weapons could be used in pre-emptive strikes against 'rogue states' (Hudson 2005: 185–186).

<sup>12</sup> This can mainly be explained due to their different focuses, but the criticism expressed by the StWC towards the CND might also, at least partly, reflect the fact that the Socialist Workers' Party (which is very influential in the StWC) has traditionally been very critical of the Labour Party (which plays an important part in the CND). The SWP has been criticized quite often for not acknowledging 'the *other* ideological approaches' (Taylor 1987b: 179, emphasis in original).

From a theoretical point of view, both the StWC and CND resonate with the liberal cosmopolitan and critical poststructuralist approaches in emphasizing US exceptionalism. However, the organizations are clearly closer to the liberal cosmopolitan approach in this regard (although rather critical of western neo-liberalism generally), because both explain the Iraq War as due to the weakness rather than the strength of the US given that it is trying to maintain its dominant position despite economic decline. The claim by radical poststructuralists that this is a permanent state of exception, a global state of war, does not receive much support from the StWC and CND – despite the fact that they do sometimes use terms such as ‘global struggle’, ‘global power’ or ‘global dominance’ in their political rhetoric. However, the content of these concepts is not the same for them as for radical poststructuralists.<sup>13</sup> Instead of regarding power or dominance as qualities of the decentralized power structure, the organizations clearly locate them in imperialist nation states. When talking about imperialist endeavors and the military-industrial complex, the StWC and CND are not referring to Empire but to the hegemony of the US as an imperialist state. Hence, it can be argued that in this regard they are closer to the liberal cosmopolitan (and even the critical state-centric) than to the poststructuralist approach.

### 5.3 Against the British Government

The second main target of resistance, the British government, is portrayed as an opponent of the anti-war movement for two different, but interrelated reasons. The first is its involvement in the Iraq War, which has occasioned two interpretations of the nation’s role: a ‘poodle’ of the US, that is, a close ally not wanting to jeopardize the transatlantic relationship; or more of an independent actor taking part in the war due to national (mainly economic) interests of its own. The second reason why the government is a target of resistance is that it is seen as an undemocratic form of government that did not take the opinion of its citizens into account when making the decision to participate in the war effort. Next,

<sup>13</sup> The StWC is also very critical of post-Marxist scholars in more explicit terms (e.g. Rees 2006: 201, 212–220; Interview 4; Interview 5; see also chapter 6).

these two different aspects are discussed in separate sections, although the views are so closely connected that it is often difficult to distinguish them analytically.

### 5.3.1 The Transatlantic Relationship

All the organizations studied express deep disappointment over the foreign policy of the British government, a feeling illustrated in their public material in various ways. The StWC and CND usually represent Britain as a close ally of the US that has little power of its own. Britain and its current government are described essentially as subordinates to the will and power of the US. For example, it is suggested that former Prime Minister Tony Blair's support for the War on Terror was not 'conditioned by his personal feelings' but must be understood as springing 'from the evolution of the foreign policy of "New Labour" and the interests in Britain this seeks to represent, much as George Bush's policies express definite interests in the US' (Murray & German 2005: 22).<sup>14</sup> In this context, London is described as 'a global centre of finance' aiming to make it 'safe for profit-making' throughout the globe by supporting 'the sort of world order outlined in the national security doctrines of the Bush administration' (ibid). The StWC maintains that Blair's policies are directly based on pleasing the US (ibid: 25, emphasis added):

So Blair's main orientation is clear. The world must be reordered along free-market capitalist lines, and Britain, because of its imperial past, has a particular part to play in this reordering – as *Washington's first help-mate*.

Here, Britain is described as subordinate to the US and its national and economic interests. There is also discussion about British imperialism being driven by similar interests that 'have retained their commanding position in Britain' (Murray & German 2005: 22). The StWC points out that as 'a British colony for the first 12 years of its existence', Iraq was a creation of the British Empire (ibid: 31). The interests of Britain

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<sup>14</sup> The StWC also talks about Blair's 'nostalgia for empire' as well as 'overt "liberal imperialism" of the Victorian times' (Murray and German 2005: 28).

back then are regarded as similar to those of the US today – oil and strategic domination of the wider region (ibid: 33). Oil is also linked to the operation of the world economy and ‘the profit margins of the big oil companies’ looking ‘forward to the war’ (ibid: 38). These interests are regarded as ‘woven into the power structure’ of imperialist nation states, the US and UK (ibid).

The CND’s understanding of the ‘special relationship’ between the US and UK is rather similar. It points out that Britain has been very dependent on the US ever since the end of the Second World War (Hudson 2005: 48). It also observes that during the Cold War the US supplied the UK with nuclear technology, with the latter acting ‘as a junior partner in the prosecution of the Cold War’ (ibid: 53). The CND regards the US/UK Mutual Defence Agreement (1958) as still relevant, for it continues to keep Britain ‘in the framework of US foreign policy, often a mistaken approach to follow, seen with such tragic effects recently in Iraq’ (ibid: 54–55). Challenging the ‘special relationship’ between these two countries is thus considered a central goal of the CND (ibid: 52).

In the public material of GR or WRI, the British government is rarely, if ever, mentioned. When interviewed, however, the WRI representative presents criticism of Britain and its current government that is qualitatively distinctive from that voiced by the other organizations. He explicitly questions the popular representation of former Prime Minister Tony Blair by the anti-war movement as ‘Bush’s poodle who doesn’t have his own idea, his own reasons to go to war’. In the interviewee’s opinion, this analysis of power totally neglects the fact that Britain has certain interests in going to war along with the US. He points a finger at ‘leftist activists’ who do not ‘look at why ... their own government, their own country [is] really involved’. In a word, the argument that the UK government is just ‘a poodle’ of the US is considered problematic, as it fails to take notice of deeper causes behind the war. The interviewee also notes that although Germany was publicly against the war, it tacitly approved it. (Interview 3.) In this way, he brings out the general stance of WRI that wars are due to militarism and nation states acting on their own interests without paying much notice to the views of their citizens.

To sum up, the organizations studied all share a view of the US as the main party responsible for the Iraq War, but also emphasize the liability of Britain. Some organizations stress the responsibility of Britain

more than others – a distinction which becomes most apparent in the interviews. The StWC and CND representatives maintain that Britain aims at pleasing the US or that it has somehow been forced to participate in the war due to the will of the US. This interpretation accords with the views expressed within the liberal cosmopolitan as well as the radical poststructuralist approach in that they both stress the exceptional role of the US in the international system, where other states have become less sovereign. However, it seems that the views of the StWC and the CND are, again, closer to those of the liberal cosmopolitan (as well as the state-centric) than the poststructuralist approach, since the main targets of resistance are again defined in terms of imperialist nation states, not decentralized power structures (Empire).

### 5.3.2 The Iraq War and the Crisis of Democracy

Many of the organizations strongly criticize the UK government for its ‘contempt of democracy’ in not taking into account the opposition to the war by its own citizens. They often refer to a crisis of democracy, or a crisis of the legitimacy of democracy. They bring up the issue in different ways, some referring only to the national level, others also mentioning the European and even the international levels. For the StWC the circumstances preceding the war illustrated that Britain was not only facing ‘an impending war’ but also ‘a democratic crisis’ stemming from the fact that the views of the majority of citizens were very different from the views of those in power (Murray & German 2005: 177). Some emphasize that a crisis of democracy has developed over a long period of time, with the Iraq War merely making it more visible. It is pointed out that the crisis had already appeared prior to the war in the form of dropping voting figures and a general distrust of politics (Interview 4):

Because for ten years before that people have had been saying ‘No-one is interested in voting anymore, politics is boring’ but in actual fact people were very interested in voting but they had *nothing to vote for*. That’s still the case in Britain today because of course *both major parties support the war* in Iraq and so you find that voting figures are dropping all-time lows.



Indeed, the voter turnout in the general election in 2001 was only 59 per cent, which is the lowest percentage since universal suffrage was granted in 1918 (Gillan et al. 2008: x). The Iraq War made the situation even worse, since it became difficult for many to vote for either of the major parties: both supported the war, unlike the majority of citizens. In the CND material, this difficulty is illustrated, for example, by describing political debates on electoral politics in which ‘many peace activists felt they could not, in all conscience, vote Labour after the Labour government’s participation in the illegal US-led invasion of Iraq’ (Hudson 2005: 60). As one of the CND interviewees, a long-time activist who is also involved in party politics in the Labour Party, describes the situation: since the Labour systemically and continuously supports the Iraq War, there are now ‘two conservative parties in Britain’ (Interview 1).

Similarly, a GR interviewee considers it unfortunate that the Labour government ‘is as left as it gets under the present system’. In her opinion, the Iraq War has resulted in huge mistrust towards politics, the main problem being the lack of alternatives: ‘if one does not vote for the Labour, who do you get, you get the conservatives’. The interviewee suspects that regular Labour voters might in the future even give their votes to the conservatives – not because they would agree with them but in order to show dissatisfaction with the Labour government. (Interview 7.) Indeed, at the time of the interview, the popularity of the Labour Party was reported to be very low. Later, it reached its lowest level ever.

The StWC emphasizes that Britain still has ‘a government that is deaf to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the country’ (Nineham & Burgin 2008: 20). Or, as an interviewee of the organization puts it, there is a ‘huge gap’ between ‘what people believe in and what the government believes’ and this is only ‘getting bigger’. He is convinced that the connection between people and politicians is eventually going to ‘snap’, leading people to totally ‘drift away from mainstream politics’. (Interview 4; also Rees 2006: 234.) In this and similar interpretations, it is maintained that the lack of real alternatives available in the political system makes political engagement in social movements, such as the anti-war movement, the only way to effect political change. Moreover, rather than trying to gain power in the parliamentary system, many believe the system itself should be challenged or that at least it should not be supported by taking part in it. Hence, there seems to be clear resonance with the

liberal cosmopolitan as well as the radical poststructuralist positions in this regard. Both schools of academic globalists have stressed that social movements may not only complement democracy, but also refresh it by challenging existing forms of power and politics. However, they usually regard this as a reason to take political activity and resistance to the global level, which many of the organizations studied here do not necessarily regard as essential or rational. It seems that many would rather have the domestic political institutions and political parties reformed such that they better reflect the will of the people and are more democratic in a true sense. The lack of political alternatives also seems to be one of the main concerns.

Indeed, in the theoretical debate it has been argued that in liberal western democracies citizen-voters may lack ‘the possibility of identifying with a differentiated range of democratic political identities’ – a weakness in those societies primarily due to ‘the blurring of the frontiers between left and right and the absence of an agonistic debate among democratic parties, a confrontation between different political projects’ (Mouffe 2005: 69). It is suggested that the ‘loss of legitimacy of democratic institutions’ easily results in a void to be ‘occupied by other forms of identifications’, which can be ‘problematic for the working of the democratic system’ (ibid: 64, 69). If established political parties cannot provide political alternatives, politics becomes consensual by nature, which leads to a growing appeal of so-called anti-establishment and populist right-wing parties as people seek collective identifications outside traditional parties (ibid: 69–70). Indeed, this may explain the substantial appeal and popularity of the British anti-war movement to a significant extent.<sup>15</sup>

While the discourse of the crisis of democracy may be strong within the British anti-war movement, it is not the only point of view where democratic politics is concerned. The analysis shows that it is common

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<sup>15</sup> It is somewhat paradoxical in Mouffe’s argumentation is that, on the one hand, she regards consensual politics as a serious problem for the proper working of democracy but, on the other, seems to be troubled by the growing appeal of anti-establishment and populist right-wing parties: these are some of the very few groups that can be regarded as properly political as well as radical in her own terms. However, although Mouffe does not discuss the anti-war movement in her book, she would probably consider it in quite positive terms, as it can be regarded as properly political but still not as anything as radical as some of the anti-establishment organizations.

to be simultaneously very critical of the current political situation but nevertheless consider it important to seek change through political parties. For example, despite their contempt towards the parliamentary politics in the context of the Iraq War, the StWC and CND clearly believe that they should try to influence politics by putting pressure on political parties and institutions. In fact, they have many sympathizers in Parliament and political parties (see chapter 6). Both organizations invest their hopes in possible political reforms inside the parliamentary system. They both refer to attempts to 'refresh' it from within, for example, by forming new political parties. As an StWC interviewee points out, there are some new and smaller parties 'growing up under the left and the right' which may possibly 'fill in' the gap between the people and the current government. While convinced that new parties will inevitably bring some sort of a change also in more general terms, he emphasizes that the Liberal-Democrats have grown substantially 'because they opposed, and have continued to oppose the war'. (Interview 4.) In regard to the Labour government, however, the StWC is highly critical. Stressing that there still has not been 'a full accounting for the Iraq War', it argues that 'the future of British democracy itself is at stake' unless 'those responsible for the war are brought to justice' (Nineham & Burgin 2008: 19).

To sum up, within the British anti-war movement there seems to be ever-growing skepticism towards representative democracy as well as parliamentary politics. In this regard, the idea of 'popular disengagement' from mainstream politics to which the critical state-centric approach often refers (e.g. Chandler 2009a: 2; 2009b: 531) can capture quite well indeed the nature of current mistrust towards political parties and the institution of representative democracy. The views of many organizations also seem to echo those of liberal cosmopolitans, who suggest that democratically elected governments, together with political elites, act only for their own interests and not those of their citizen-voters. For liberal cosmopolitans, the crisis of the legitimacy of representational politics and democracy represents a possibility of constructing new forms of collective engagement, a process which should, however, take place primarily at the global level (e.g. Beck 2000: 102–103; Castells 2008: 82–83). When viewed in the British context, the crisis has yet another layer to it.

From the perspective of the British anti-war movement, the fact that people are turning away from traditional forms of political activity has a

justification – the lack of real alternatives in as much as both major parties support the Iraq War. In other words, rather than considering the political system as such to be the main problem, in the particular context of the Iraq War especially some leftist anti-war organizations highlight that the Labour government's policies have stood in stark contrast to their own anti-war stance and political views more generally. Participation in the current anti-war movement seems to be very much 'boosted' due to the political crisis perceived in the domestic sphere, which is simultaneously regarded as a crisis of democracy. One must ask whether there are actually two different kinds of crises taking place simultaneously that are sometimes confused by both activists and scholars: a crisis of democracy, manifested in dropping voter turnouts and an increasing distrust of politics in general terms, as well as *a crisis of the left*, which exacerbates the first crisis in not providing any alternatives for people on the left.

Viewed from this perspective, the fact that people are increasingly turning away from representational politics and investing their political engagement into the anti-war movement invites an interesting question. Can this phenomenon, which some have claimed to represent the 'death of politics', be interpreted in terms of going *back to the roots* of politics, given that political parties were originally born out of social movements? If the growing interest in engaging in politics solely through social movements is not interpreted in terms of any of the three theoretical approaches – as disengagement from politics and a retreat from democratic politics (the critical state-centric approach); as a new form of political engagement avoiding being trapped in the 'old' categories of representation (liberal cosmopolitans); or as search for 'direct democracy' (radical poststructuralists) – could it be defined instead as an attempt to re-define and re-formulate politics as it was before political parties became established and corrupted by power? Could the intensifying interest in social movements thus be interpreted as an effort to *bring politics back into politics*?<sup>16</sup> This would represent a quite different idea from, for example, those that the alter-globalization movement has advocated in emphasizing more of an 'anti-political' stance, as is illustrated below.

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<sup>16</sup> This kind of an idea could also inspire interesting redefinitions of representational democracy in that it clearly maintains that democracy as it is understood now is not the only possible model or ideal.

## 5.4 Against Global Neo-Liberalism and International Institutions

Of the organizations studied, GR is closest to radical poststructuralists in its approach. It does not generally regard nation states or their governments as main targets of resistance, but rather primarily opposes the neo-liberal policies of international institutions such as the G8, IMF, World Bank and WTO. It also differs from the other organizations in that it defines itself as ‘an anti-capitalist *and* anti-war organisation’ located within the alter-globalization movement (Globalise Resistance 2008a, emphasis added). The GR website features popular slogans such as ‘No to racism, privatisation and war’ and ‘Another World is Possible’. The site notes that while the organization aims to ‘campaign, organise and mobilise’ within the alter-globalization movement, it seeks also to make the movement more ‘radical’ in order to enhance ‘its chances of building a better world’. (Ibid.)

GR strongly emphasizes the interconnectedness of different kinds of problems and injustices. In pointing out examples such as privatization of electricity and water to show that ‘the profits of multinational corporations are prioritised above people’s well being’. It also argues that neo-liberal policies have ‘a devastating impact on the environment, particularly climate change’. Although not underlining the anti-war stance as much as the other organizations, GR’s arguments put forward the strongest links between war and other forms of injustices taking place in the world. (Globalise Resistance 2008a.) It is argued that war is becoming more business-like now that multinational corporations play increasingly important roles in conflicts (Interview 2):

Corporations that go in ... they benefit from cheap labour, from cheap land ... they’re sort of sucking the heart out of the country. It’s presented as creating employment, creating opportunities but it’s not ... it’s sucking the countries dry. So, militarism on the one hand but ... corporate offences ... on the other ... they are side by side really. The military goes in and creates the opportunities for corporations to go and then clean up.

In the analysis above, it is suggested that mechanisms of a new kind of imperialism are at work in current conflicts. GR explicitly argues that it resists ‘all imperialist wars and their subsequent occupations’, such as the

ongoing Israeli occupation of Palestine, and supports resistance movements (Globalise Resistance 2008a), a stance in which it comes close to the StWC. When interviewed, both GR representatives emphasize fighting against different forms of imperialism and post-colonialism. They point out that military force was used to invade Iraq and take over its national resources, after which the ruling classes were maneuvered, trying to ‘make them favourable to the occupying force’ (Interview 2). GR frames the Iraq War in terms similar to those used by the StWC and the CND: it was not a mere reaction to 9/11, but a central part of the ‘Project for the New American Century’, which already shaped the US foreign policy agenda for years before the terrorist attacks (Globalise Resistance 2008c). GR shares many other interpretations with the StWC and CND: it maintains that the US has become militarily more aggressive because it is economically weakened,<sup>17</sup> and suggests that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq serve ‘purely to impose US hegemony, politically, economically and militarily, on the world’ (Globalise Resistance 2008a, also 2008g).

Thus, although GR regards neo-liberalism, western-governed international institutions and their unjust policies as main targets of resistance, this stance does not exclude opposition to the US. Its hegemony and imperialism are explicitly considered the main causes of the Iraq War. One interviewee points out that one unfortunate effect of the imperialist US foreign policy is that the concept of democracy has become a ‘curse word’, because so many ‘bad things’ have been done in its name. Hence, he believes that the anti-war movement should have the clear goal to not ‘only to stop the war but stop barbarism’. (Interview 2.) More generally, too, GR is highly critical of the western rhetoric of ‘spreading democracy’, which in its view should be recognized no more than a means to lubricate or justify the co-opting of natural resources, labor and state power (ibid):

How do you spread democracy, really? But because the intention is *not to spread democracy* but to use the natural resources ... there’s *no genuine aim* of actually resorting to the will of the people what actually ... divert away from the power so the occupying force can actually use the state, the country.

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<sup>17</sup> This is illustrated, for instance, in the argument that ‘Where the economic power fails, the military get involved’ (Globalise Resistance 2008e).

Here, liberal western powers are criticized for forcing their will on weaker nations while seeking solely to protect and promote economic interests of their own. It is emphasized that, instead of imposing democracy by military force, Britain should have supported opposition against Saddam Hussein in Iraq<sup>18</sup>. The Iraqi people should have been allowed to decide for themselves how to run their state and their lives, for democracy means ‘people taking charge of their life and deciding what to do with their natural resources’. Instead, every sector in Iraq has been privatized, with foreign contractors gaining ground. In this context, Britain is often equated with the US as a partner in crime. (Interview 2.) Yet much stronger criticism is expressed towards the US. As one interviewee puts it, situation in Iraq depends directly on the US (ibid):

All that needs to be done on a global level is that America will *stop to act* its role as if it's the *policeman of the world* and just keep to itself. Hopefully it will do some steps to promote ... the benefits of its own citizens but just *leaving the world for its own* will be enough ... We don't need the America to manage us.

To sum up, in many respects GR's analysis of the causes of the Iraq War, as well as of war in general, is quite similar to that of the StWC and CND. Nevertheless, GR's views are somewhat closer to the radical poststructuralist approach, because the organization's broader analysis emphasizes more strongly the role of multinational corporations and western-governed institutions than that of nation states. GR also constructs connections between global capitalism and war similar to those put forward by radical poststructuralists, bringing broader structural aspects into the discussion instead of accusing merely the US and/or UK of imperialism. These views probably stem from the alter-globalization movement, which is defined as the ‘home base’ for GR. Although both have many members of the SWP in their steering committees, GR's arguments are nonetheless closer to those put forward in post-Marxist and poststructuralist analyses than the StWC's.

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<sup>18</sup> As one interviewee puts it: ‘I mean Saddam Hussein was a tyrant ... absolutely no question ... but it was sophisticated and functioning country. Okay, it was functioning under a repressive regime but you look at it now, the infrastructure is just ... it is a disaster.’ (Interview 7/GR.)

## 5.5 Against War, Militarism and the Authority of the State

As the only pacifist organization in the study, WRI has quite a different approach to the question of war and defines its targets of resistance in a distinctive way. It questions all forms of violence, of which the Iraq War is regarded as but one example. On the organization's website, its main objectives are defined as being to 'promote nonviolent action against the causes of war, and to support and connect people around the world who refuse to take part in war or the preparation of war'. While working 'for a world without war' (War Resisters' International 2009a) by resisting war and militarism in all forms, WRI has the most abstract targets of resistance of the organizations studied. However, they are not as abstract as it may first seem, for war and militarism are defined as *institutions* constructed and maintained by *nation states* – a stance which pits WRI firmly against the authority of the state (Prasad 2005: 83, emphasis added):

The authority of the State itself is often one of the *causes of war*. Hence, one of the things that has to be confronted is the compulsion exercised by the State to make people do things under its authority. The pacifist struggle is not only against military conscription but conscription in its every form; in other words to *liberate the individual* and humankind as a whole from the *absolute authority of the State*.

Since WRI believes that nation states force people to do things 'harmful to the humankind' (Prasad 2005: 84), it views nationalism very critically. It stresses that the concept of nationalism is often exploited by the ruling class 'to confuse people's feelings of love and respect for their homeland with faithfulness towards their rulers' (ibid: 37). It is stressed that '[t]he State exists for man, not man for the State' (ibid: 100).

While arguing that 'under the garb of national defense' the state tries and often succeeds 'to subjugate the population – condition it to be able to keep it under control by all sorts of methods', WRI does not distinguish between democratic and other forms of governance (ibid: 84). It explicitly asks: 'Are not all the States, be they communist, Fascist, capitalist or so-called democratic, not authoritarian to different degrees in their treatment of the individual?' (ibid: 162). In a word, the people are under power of the state, from which they need to be liberated (ibid: 123). Although it generally operates on a very different kind of approach,



in this particular respect WRI seems to have something in common with radical poststructuralists, as it here uses almost the exactly same words as they do when they speak about the biopower of Empire that controls people all over world. The difference is that WRI resists nation states which are not primary targets of resistance for radical poststructuralists.<sup>19</sup>

WRI explains current wars as ‘nothing less than mass-scale murders’ falsely argued to be fought ‘for the sake of justice’ (Prasad 2005: 24). The organization condemns imperialism and refers to it as an ideology of the great powers (ibid: 124), just like the other three organizations studied here do as well. WRI also actively resists military alliances between states and is especially critical of NATO. Opposition to NATO has been on the agenda at least since the early 1960s (ibid: 369), and continued in different forms ever since. It is important to note that WRI does not limit its resistance to great powers and military alliances, but directs it to all nation states (ibid: 147; Interview 3).

Resistance to states is due not only to war and militarism but to other forms of injustice as well. It is stressed that ‘wars go on taking place unless their socio-political causes [are] eradicated from society’ (Prasad 2005: 294). For WRI, peace does not mean only an absence of war but entails other elements as well, such as freedom, social justice and equality, and therefore the organization must aim at revealing ‘the connection between militarism and economic power’ (Willoughby in Prasad 2005: 19). As such, this understanding is quite similar to that of the three other organizations, which are leftist by definition. However, WRI differs in that it has always been critical of both capitalist and communist systems. The view that all oppressive and corruptive systems should be resisted, whether capitalist or communist, has been made clear in the course of WRI’s history (Prasad 2005: 323–324, 384).<sup>20</sup> While capitalism has been accused of competition and exploitation (ibid: 98), communism has been criticized for centralism, totalitarianism as well as fascism (ibid:

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<sup>19</sup> Moreover, WRI sometimes admits that although government by state is ‘necessarily totalitarian in nature’, it is ‘a necessary evil’ (Prasad 2005: 253). As Hinton (1989: 73) notes, socialistically oriented pacifists have usually ‘looked to the evolution of a transnational civil society and the gradual withering away of the nation state as the key to human progress’.

<sup>20</sup> On non-totalitarian, anti-Stalinist approach and the anarchistic tradition of the anti-war movement, see e.g. Horowitz 1970: 18–23.

129, 161, 384), with the Cold War in particular confirming ‘the sterility of both the communist and capitalist models’ (ibid: 294).

Interestingly, whereas socialism clearly, in one form or another, provides the basis of the other three organizations’ ideology, WRI argues that socialism often has had negative side-effects on pacifism, especially during the Cold War.<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless, during WRI’s history even ‘a synthesis of socialism and pacifism’ has been discussed, acknowledging that attaining peace would require ‘a fundamental change in the economic base of society’ (Prasad 2005: 249). These debates have usually been accompanied by ‘considerable disagreement about the direction of the changes necessary’ (ibid: 249). Instead of promoting socialism or communism, WRI has advocated its own idea of ‘Good Society’ based on a ‘nonviolent revolution’ (ibid: 118–119)<sup>22</sup> or establishment of a ‘nonviolent social order’ (ibid: 83, 157). Within the organization, these ‘utopias’ are sometimes criticized. While some emphasize that resistance against war and militarism should remain WRI’s main focus, others underline the need for broader social analysis. Most arguments for the latter view have been ‘based on socialist and enlightened anarchist principles’ (ibid: 119), although to varying degrees depending on circumstances and changes taking place in the wider political context.

## 5.6 Against One or All Wars?

In regard to the question ‘what to resist’ in the context of the Iraq War, the clearest and perhaps most fundamental difference between the organizations is whether resistance is to target primarily the Iraq War, the Iraq War along with some other wars, or war in general. Partly, this is a question of the organizations’ attitudes towards pacifism. While pacifist organizations obviously believe all wars and violence must be resisted, for non-pacifists this is not necessary. Indeed, in the theoretical literature

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<sup>21</sup> For example, it is argued that when communist regimes became ‘all-powerful’, many pacifist activities died down. Moreover, the establishing by the USSR of a non-pacifist World Council of Peace (WCP) is said to have attracted many workers away from the pacifist cause. (Prasad 2005: 293, 305.)

<sup>22</sup> On the idea of nonviolent revolution, see e.g. Overy 1982: 13–18; Cortright 2006; 2008: 211–232.

peace movements are often categorized as movements to end all wars and movements to prevent or end particular wars (e.g. Overy 1982: 2–4). For purposes of the analysis in chapters to follow, it is important to take a closer look at how the question of pacifism is debated and dealt with in the current movement, since this has a clear bearing on what strategies and tactics of resistance are regarded as effective and how the effects of resistance are evaluated. Moreover, the issue relates to the global-local debate in that it illustrates very explicitly the sorts of contradictions that political differences in a very diverse movement can cause at the national, not to mention the global, level. In a word, reflecting on the issue here, however briefly, will<sup>23</sup> not only help to contextualize the analysis of strategies, tactics, effects and power, but also gives some indication of the kinds of differences and internal debates – and thus issues prone to politicization – that exist in and between the organizations.

Generally speaking, the issue of pacifism is not much discussed in the public material of the three socialist organizations. While obviously its most fundamental issue as the sole pacifist organization studied here, WRI does not often discuss pacifism publicly in political terms; rather, it concentrates on outlining its own nonviolent perspective. In other words, in public material WRI does not usually politicize the issue by contrasting its own approach with those espoused by non-pacifist organizations. However, in the interviews, the question of pacifism clearly arises as an issue that causes some controversies within the movement. For example, an StWC interviewee reveals that the hierarchy of issues in his organization is very different from that in the pacifist organizations. For the StWC, the anti-war movement is ‘not a peace movement as such’ but, more specifically, ‘a movement for peace in the Middle East’ as well as ‘a movement against wars in Iraq and Afghanistan’ (Interview 4):

Obviously, we are called the Stop *the* War Coalition and those words are important ... it's not Stop War Coalition. Although most people in the coalition are opposed to war generally, I don't think that you can conflate every war and say we want to stop them all. Stop the War refers to *a particular war* that grew out of 9/11.

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<sup>23</sup> Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to take part in the broader debate about pacifism (and pacificism) versus non-pacifism which, as an extremely broad and contested issue, has also been studied and covered in great depth (e.g. Cortright 2006; 2008).

Here, the StWC is described as closely connected to a particular political context, which means that its main task is not to ‘call for peace in the world’ but to tackle ‘the most urgent’ issues first. A distinction is drawn ‘between people who are peace activists and people who are against the war in Iraq’, as in the case of the latter group ‘there may be wars which with they agree’. The interviewee refers to people who are ‘otherwise’ opposed to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan but who at the same time may feel it is ‘important to go on and fight in another war’. In other words, it is very explicitly stressed that not ‘everyone who is involved, is a peace activist’. Additionally, it is emphasized that the StWC has members who have been or even currently are in the military. Since these people have been ‘trained to fight and to kill’, the interviewee argues that they cannot be regarded as peace activists. (Interview 4.) In this respect, the organization clearly echoes the Marxist-Socialist tradition, which has always been ambivalent in its relation to pacifism given that Marxism usually tends to positively identify ‘with military struggle as a means of spreading the international revolution’ (Shaw 1987: 61).<sup>24</sup>

In regard to the issue of pacifism, the StWC and CND representatives frame their stance similarly. A CND interviewee stresses that the anti-war movement in Britain is ‘not a sort of a bourgeois peace movement’, this being a reference to political and ideological differences between leftist and pacifist groups. In his view, the issue of pacifism creates some complications, because there is ‘always a risk of going off on every issue that comes and finds its way in’. (Interview 6.) However, it is also argued that people from the pacifist tradition are ‘all aware’ that ‘they would be welcome to Stop the War Coalition’, or the CND (ibid):

We always make very *minimal positions* on everything. We don’t attempt to provide a solution to ... an analysis of every issue around the world. They will make *their own* speeches and their own things. Our purpose is to provide a platform, the *widest ever* in this country, to people to come to.

This comment indicates that it is up to the pacifists to join the StWC and to realize that the debate about contradictions between pacifist

<sup>24</sup> On the relationship between peace, pacifism and the Marxist Left within the peace movement, see e.g. Taylor 1987b; Cortright 2008: 260–269.

and non-pacifist approaches is ‘a slightly sterile debate’ (Interview 6). The interviewee does not seem to even consider that from the pacifist perspective there might be anything problematic in the approach advocated by the StWC. The other CND interviewee also refers to the StWC as not being pacifist because it ‘contains everybody’ (Interview 1). Moreover, he explicitly stresses that his organization is not pacifist and will not become such in the future either (ibid):

You’re facing a *new challenge* now and it’s a new challenge of a *global disaster* ... whether you’re an absolute pacifist or not, it doesn’t matter. *CND has never been pacifist*. We’re now in a new situation. We’re in a global war that has to be avoided ... and this is *larger than the pacifist question*. I have every respect for pacifists, but it isn’t the same thing.

Here, it is suggested that in the current political situation, referred to as a ‘challenge of global disaster’ or ‘global war’, pacifism as such cannot be an adequate approach. Pacifism seems to be out of the question also in more general terms: the CND is not going to turn pacifist in the future either. This seems to be the case with GR as well. A representative of the organization argues that, being Jewish, he cannot escape the history of the Second World War and the holocaust: ‘I’m not a pacifist coming from the place I’m coming from’. By referring to the Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto who took up violent resistance against the Nazis, he emphasizes that ‘people should be able to defend themselves organized’ even with violent means if they are under the threat of being killed. He does not believe pacifism is the right ideology for the anti-war movement. (Interview 2.)

In sharp contrast to the views presented by the left-oriented organizations, the WRI interviewee underlines the importance of pacifism for any kind of resistance against war. He explicitly criticizes the StWC for not subscribing to such a position (Interview 3):

The problem is certainly that they don’t claim to be nonviolent. Nonviolent is not the word. So, there is certainly a *very wrong impression* about what does *anti-war politics* mean.

In other words, the main problem from the perspective of WRI is that the StWC does not advocate nonviolent resistance and therefore can be criticized for giving a ‘wrong impression’ about the real nature of anti-war politics. According to the interviewee, there are no easy answers when

it comes to war and peace; their relationship is very complex. Again referring to the StWC, he argues that opposing something is easy but when 'you ask more detailed questions what they're really opposed to, then you will already find differences'. (Interview 3.) It is thus suggested that the analysis of the causes of war by the StWC is different from the pacifist understanding, which is represented as being more adequate and comprehensive. While critical of non-pacifist organizations within the movement, the WRI interviewee, however, criticizes pacifist groups as well, for not engaging often and systemically enough in cooperation with non-pacifists groups. In working independently for the most part, small pacifist groups do not provide enough visibility for the nonviolent approach within the anti-war movement (ibid):

They're all happy in *small little groups* and do their small little things *independently* but for the movement it does not create visibility ... unless the more pacifist groups would get *more organized* there is nothing you can change.

To conclude, as a pacifist organization WRI resists all wars, while the three non-pacifist organizations are primarily concerned about the Iraq War in the context of the new anti-war movement. However, even for the left-oriented organizations the Iraq War is not the only war to be resisted, because they also oppose the war in Afghanistan and the occupation of Palestine. Nevertheless, these three organizations do not share the view that all wars should be resisted: in the interviews, their representatives make it clear that pacifism is not their cup of tea. Moreover, all three leftist organizations seem to regard pacifism as something that is not really that important for the current anti-war movement, and they often more or less explicitly suggest that pacifist groups should make the effort to adapt to the broader anti-war movement, not the other way around. The WRI interviewee regards the situation in exactly the opposite terms, arguing that, as a very influential organization within the movement, the StWC should take pacifists into account better and consider adopting a nonviolent position itself.

Since conflicting views were not discussed in the public material of the organizations, but often emerge in the interviews, one might receive the impression that there is some kind of a common agreement or understanding not to discuss these issues publicly in order to avoid

negative publicity for the one common cause shared – resistance against the Iraq War. However, as it seems that the issue of pacifism can easily lead to misinterpretations on both sides of the anti-war and the peace ‘camp’, it might be a more productive approach to discuss these issues more openly – at least within the movement, but perhaps even publicly.

## 5.7 Conclusions

This chapter has reflected on the theoretical debate concerning the definition of the aims and targets of resistance (*what is resisted*), which necessarily derives from an analysis of the causes of the war and its broader political context (*why is resisted*). The discussion has proceeded by analyzing empirically how these two questions are understood within the current anti-war movement. The aim has been to determine the extent to which the understandings within the anti-war movement ‘resonate’ with those of the three theoretical approaches, and what their main convergences and divergences are in this regard.

Since the anti-war movement’s analysis of the causes of war and the movement’s aims determine the primary targets of resistance, it may easily be assumed that primary targets of resistance in the struggle against the Iraq War are readily recognizable and definable. However, as the analysis in this chapter has illustrated, when causal relationships between different phenomena, as well as power relations between different political actors, are far from clear and simple, such recognition and definition are not always straightforward tasks. In both academic and activist realms, there are multiple competing analyses in regard to the Iraq War (as well as war in general) and therefore it can be difficult to determine the enemy whom one is to resist.

Interestingly, some organizations talk about a ‘global enemy’. Yet, the term is defined in different ways by the organizations: It is sometimes said to be the global hegemony of the US or the imperialism of the western powers, sometimes the international institutions or the G8 countries and their neo-liberal policies. In this regard, the global enemy is almost like ‘an enemy with a thousand faces’<sup>25</sup>, a kind of a chameleon. However,

<sup>25</sup> On different definitions of enemies, see e.g. Harle 2000.

hardly ever does any of the organizations point to a purely abstract global enemy in the sense that radical poststructuralists would have it; rather, the main targets of resistance are generally articulated quite clearly. Four main categories were found when views in regard to the Iraq War were analyzed in a broader context. Some of them are concrete and clear, while others are somewhat more abstract.

Firstly, while all organizations regard the US as the main perpetrator of the Iraq War, they are very critical of the US hegemony and power in more general terms as well. The War on Terror is most often regarded as a cover – an excuse – for the Iraq War, and therefore it is maintained that the anti-war movement needs to oppose both. Secondly, all organizations share the view that the British government is also an important target of resistance due to its involvement in the war. However, whereas two organizations (the StWC and CND) stress the importance of resistance against these two imperialist states and their governments, two others (GR and WRI) clearly maintain that resistance against nation states and their governments as such is insufficient in the struggle against the war. Accordingly, they define their targets of resistance in broader terms.

Thus, thirdly, in addition to resisting the US and UK governments, GR opposes neo-liberal international institutions such as the World Bank, the WTO and the IMF and their policies. These institutions are regarded as servants of neo-liberal global capitalism, which is the primary target of resistance for GR more generally. Although the organization emphasizes the role of the global political economy, multinational corporations and the military-industrial complex more than the StWC and CND do, its analysis of the causes of the Iraq War is very similar to theirs. The Iraq War is considered to be a result of a new kind of imperialism by the US, which is loyally supported by its close ally, Britain. Therefore, both the US and UK governments need to be resisted simultaneously. Fourthly, WRI maintains that, like all wars, the Iraq War must be resisted by targeting nation states but in a different sense than the other organizations urge. For the pacifist WRI, it is necessary to resist the authoritarianism and militarism embedded in every nation state and not concentrate solely on imperialist and great powers. However, the organization also believes that there is a direct linkage between economics and militarism, whereby it asserts that socio-economic problems and injustices must be tackled in order to remove causes of war.



In terms of primary goals, the StWC mainly struggles against the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but at the same time points out that its aims are continuously expanding. For example, the Palestinian issue has gained an especially important place on its agenda and it has campaigned 'pre-emptively' against possible military action against Iran (often prematurely referred to as 'the War on Iran'). The same is true of the CND, which, in addition to struggling against the above-mentioned wars in the context of the new anti-war movement, campaigns against nuclear weapons and the arms industry more generally. In opposing neo-liberalism and global capitalism, GR concentrates on not only anti-war but also anti-capitalist activities in the framework of both the anti-war and the alter-globalization movements. WRI's long-term work is based on promoting nonviolent approaches to war and thus, as it aims at the elimination of all wars, it does not concentrate solely on the Iraq War.

These differences are not surprising since all the organizations studied are originally built on different premises. They define and articulate their main opponents, as well as the broader context of their political struggle against the war, in distinctive ways. Although the three leftist organization (the StWC, CND and GR) share an interpretation of the Iraq War as being due to a new kind of imperialism of the economically weakened but militarily more aggressive US, the overall framework of the war is nevertheless regarded in a slightly different way by each of them. The analysis of the StWC seems to rest on a traditional Marxist approach, in which war is seen as the result of economic rivalry between great powers<sup>26</sup>. This interpretation is partly shared by the CND, which, however, strongly emphasizes that wars are intimately connected to the arms trade and power politics and stresses in particular the role of nuclear weapons. GR, for its part, underlines the role of multinational corporations and international institutions in the global capitalist system, and WRI regards war and militarism as institutions of nation states.

Two of the organizations – the SWC and CND – strongly emphasize the importance of resistance against the national government<sup>27</sup>. The

<sup>26</sup> Indeed, anti-imperialism has always been one of the main ideologies within the movement (e.g. Scherer 2004: 16; Phillips 2009: 242–243).

<sup>27</sup> Partly, this confirms the findings by Gillan et al. (2008: 88) that 'the British anti-war movement's target 'is primarily national and primarily the government'. However, this is not the whole truth, as the analysis in this thesis illustrates.

British government is usually portrayed as a target of resistance for the anti-war movement in two different ways. Firstly, due to its involvement in the Iraq War, it is represented as either a 'poodle' of the US, obeying the latter's will in the context of the transatlantic 'special relationship', or as more of an independent actor which has its own political/economic motives for participating in the war. There are thus differences in emphasis in how the organizations regard power and the motives of – as well as the alliance between – the two governments, a foreign and a national one. Interestingly, those organizations that oppose the British government actively (the StWC and CND) tend to represent Britain as a subordinate of the US. Logically, this means that they should concentrate much more of their efforts on resisting the US government than they in fact do.

Secondly, the British government is represented as an opponent of the anti-war movement due to its refusal to respect the will of the majority of its citizens, who opposed the nation's involvement in the war. Many of the organizations refer to a crisis of democracy, which is given different and partly overlapping meanings. For some people, the crisis stems from growing mistrust of political parties and parliamentary politics generally, whereby they regard participation in social movements as an alternative form of political engagement. For others, a crisis of democracy has more to do with the Labour government's decision to go to war despite opposition by the citizen-voters. It is often stressed that both major parties support the war, there are no real political alternatives and therefore the only way to engage politically in this context is through the movement.

While the two other left-oriented organizations consider anti-war resistance against the national government crucial for the movement, GR takes a broader and more structural perspective. It stresses the importance of resisting international institutions that maintain the status quo based on structural violence, which produces concrete violence and war. According to this view, resisting the US and UK governments on account of their policies is important, but not sufficient in itself to stop or prevent wars. WRI regards the issue from an even broader perspective, emphasizing that the main targets of resistance should be war and militarism as institutions of the nation state. The organization doubts that opposing the US or the British government even in regard to one particular war could be effective as such, because there are always deeper causes, ideologies, power relations and structures at work. Therefore, resistance

to governments and their policies is conceived as an incomprehensive approach; war and militarism must be resisted in much broader terms. WRI nevertheless recognizes that there can be various approaches in regard to some particular, ongoing wars and it thus indicates that the current division of labor between different organizations can be accepted. While some groups work for long-term goals and concentrate on, for example, educating people about causes of war, others can raise public awareness and concentrate on mass mobilizations. These issues are discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

To sum up, all the organizations studied have quite clearly defined targets of resistance, although the analyses and emphases they bring to bear in mounting resistance to war vary. It is noteworthy that none of the organizations is shy or hesitant about specifying the opponents it is struggling against – be they governments or more abstract opponents, such as militarism, imperialism, capitalism, neo-liberalism, and like forces. In fact, the organizations present so many different targets of resistance that it is sometimes difficult to determine the primary ones. Nonetheless, this shows that these organizations are not just resisting something totally abstract; they do not represent a movement without opponents. Accordingly, the movement cannot be criticized for having an overly general ‘being against’ attitude, which the alter-globalization movement has been criticized for.

Then again, it cannot be argued that the two movements have no similarities. Moreover, there seems to be quite a common understanding within the British anti-war movement that both the national government and the US government need to be resisted and that the power and the political, military and economic interests of the two states are closely intertwined. For most of the organizations, it is not, however, only states and their policies which need to be resisted. It is commonly maintained that there are structural aspects of power at work, too, which need to be first revealed in order to tackle them in the struggle against (the) war. Usually it is not very easy on the theoretical level to separate these from state level opponents, for their practices play out in arenas where the influence of these power structures and the dominant ideologies are manifested and embodied in concrete terms.

Although analyses of the war and definitions of main targets of resistance vary, the organizations studied within the new British anti-war

movement have at least one clear and common goal: stopping the Iraq War. As an interviewee puts it, all are opposed to the Iraq War 'but then it becomes a bit more complicated with Afghanistan' and with other wars (Interview 4/StWC). Indeed, while it seems that all agree on this particular goal, beyond it there is a great deal of diversity and complexity when it comes to the primary aims within the movement. For the most part, this diversity does not prevent most of the organizations from working together, although it makes cooperation difficult to some extent.

If one critically evaluates the organizations to ascertain which of them is (are) in a better position to influence how the primary targets of resistance are conceptualized within the movement, the StWC and the CND clearly emerge as quite powerful. As a rule, issues which touch upon the organizations using their influence within the movement to define justified objects of criticism or legitimate opponents are not publicly debated. In the interviews, however, these issues were cited quite often, indicating that there are political conflicts and even power struggles going on beneath the surface despite the movement's appearing relatively united on the surface.

Concluding in light of the main convergences and divergences between the premises of the four organizations in relation to the three theoretical approaches, it can be said that the approaches of the StWC and CND do not resonate much with any single theoretical approach as such. Although the two organizations share a highly critical view of the US with radical poststructuralists, they have a less critical understanding of global power structures in not 'believing' in Empire. Instead, they define their main targets of resistance in terms of nation states and governments. Although the StWC and CND share the notion of US exceptionalism with liberal cosmopolitans, the organizations differ in that they do not regard the situation to be transitory, but maintain that imperialist wars will continue at least as long as the US can compensate for its economic weakness by military power. As these two organizations regard the Iraq War as an imperialist endeavor of the US, they come close to traditional Marxist analysis. Their analysis is not easily compatible with the post-Marxist approach espoused by radical poststructuralists or the 'third way' social-democratic approach advocated by many liberal cosmopolitans.

The analysis detailed in this chapter suggests that the radical poststructuralist approach has common ground with only one of

the organizations studied, GR. Both can be said to regard power as decentralized and having shifted out of the control of nation states into the sphere of influence of global corporations. However, even in this case the resonance is only partial, because in discussing 'new imperialism', GR seems to conceptualize imperialism in quite traditional terms. WRI considers all wars to be caused by militarism and is highly critical of the authority of the state generally; it thus defines its main aims and targets of resistance in a way that distinguishes it from the other organizations and the theoretical approaches studied in this thesis. On the whole, it can be said that the organizations involved in the British anti-war movement understand the main problem, the Iraq War, as well as its broader political context, quite differently than the proponents of the three theoretical approaches studied. This implies that the solutions, means and strategies proposed by those approaches might not be easily compatible with the organizations' views (to be analyzed in chapter 6). Moreover, the organizations differ from each other in many other respects, which makes achieving a coherent perspective anything but easy.

In this context, it is useful to view the three theoretical approaches in a somewhat more philosophical perspective. While the liberal cosmopolitan approach maintains that a social movement does not necessarily need to define adversaries, the radical poststructuralist approach argues that it is impossible to define clear adversaries in the global era. Hence, they both adhere to the idea of 'being against' something without clearly defining an enemy or a target of resistance. In this way, there is a convergence between them in theoretical terms. It is often argued that the unwillingness and/or the difficulty of clearly defining opponents and targets of resistance reflects the paradigm shift from modern to postmodern, whether one is talking of mainstream or critical approaches to political philosophy.

Whereas modern critical theory challenged the normative basis of IR in such a way that there were clearly defined enemies and opponents to be found (and thus, it was possible also to have clear strategies for resistance), it has been argued that postmodern critical approaches have to some extent 'lost' this ability. This development is attributed to their tendency to regard violence and other forms of injustice as caused by structures and processes of faceless governance rather than political actors and institutions that can be concretely resisted. In contrast, the critical state-centric approach views both the liberal cosmopolitan and the radical

poststructuralist approaches very skeptically, because it maintains that there should always be clearly defined goals identifying who and what to oppose. The approach explicitly stresses that a clear political project is a basic requirement for politics and thus also for resistance.

The fact that the British anti-war movement has some clearly defined opponents and goals may prove the concern of the critical state-centric approach unnecessary in this context. However, not all organizations are as clear about their main targets of resistance, and for some organizations, especially in the case of long-term goals, these are sometimes quite abstract. What the analysis in this chapter has shown is that within the movement against the Iraq War there can be clearly articulated state-level opponents (the US and UK) and more abstract targets of resistance simultaneously, a situation which admittedly partly resembles the kind of being against mentality characteristic of new social movements such as the alter-globalization movement. Therefore, it can be suggested that in terms of defining its aim and targets of resistance, the current anti-war movement is *in between* these two approaches; actually, it can be better characterized as adhering to *both* at the same time.

## 6 HOW TO RESIST? STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE

### 6.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the *how* of resistance. It reflects on the theoretical discussion concerning the most effective political strategies (*how to resist*), which is intimately linked to the the primary context of resistance (here, national or global). This theoretical debate is discussed by empirically analyzing how the above-mentioned issues are understood within the current anti-war movement. The aim is to determine the extent to which the understandings within the anti-war movement ‘resonate’ with those of the three theoretical approaches and what the main convergences and divergences are this regard.

The three theoretical approaches have conceptualized strategies of resistance and their primary context in very different terms. The liberal cosmopolitan approach maintains that because social movements have gained power at the expense of nation states in the global era, they not only can, but should, target their political action directly to the global level and hence bypass territorialized boundaries of nation states altogether. The global context is regarded as the primary context for political engagement, whose main emphasis lies on symbolic politics. The aim there is to pressure states and governments ‘from below’ by influencing global public opinion. It is explicitly suggested that ‘social movements must think local’ but ‘act global – at the level where it really matters today’ (Castells 2004: 143, also 2008).

Radical poststructuralists argue that since power has escaped from nation states to decentralized and global Empire, resistance must take a similar, deterritorialized and global form in order to be effective. They maintain that social movements, unlike states, have a capacity for this kind of action because they are organized in a networked and non-hierarchical fashion. Global coalitions and solidarity are thus regarded as crucial for effective resistance. Local and traditional leftist forms of resistance are regarded as old-fashioned and ineffective where the aim is to link as many struggles as possible to form a common global movement of opposition.

Whereas the main slogan for liberal cosmopolitans is ‘think locally, act globally’ (see above), radical poststructuralists explicitly argue that we must ‘think globally and act globally’ (Hardt & Negri 2000: 207).

In contrast, the critical state-centric approach stresses that the most effective strategies for resistance are state-based, not global. It argues that social movements, which increasingly scale their political action to the global level, are likely to be less influential in that they fail to target the genuine subjects of power, that is, nation states. Therefore, instead of suggesting that movements should target abstract enemies and embrace a strategy of global resistance, the critical state-centric approach emphasizes the need for strategic thinking, coherent and clearly defined goals, and collective political engagement that is not based on mere symbolic action in the abstract (e.g. Chandler 2009a: 18–22, 207–208; 2009b: 541–542). In recognizing the deterritorialized nature of political ideas and ideologies (e.g. Chandler 2009a: 16), the approach stresses that concrete political action or resistance has to be ‘necessarily territorialized in terms of the specific strategies and articulations of those demands to put those demands into practice’ (ibid: 17). Hence, it can be argued that from this perspective social movements should ‘think globally but act locally’.

This highly contradictory theoretical debate is reflected on in this chapter by analyzing empirically how effective strategies and tactics of resistance, as well as their primary context, are understood within the anti-war movement, the ‘current agent’ of resistance against war. Specifically, the empirical analysis addresses the following questions: What strategies and tactics of resistance against (the) war are regarded as the most effective, and why? How is the relationship between national and global strategies understood? How is the primary context of resistance defined? How are the national and global levels articulated in relation to each other?

The chapter will show that instead of defining effective strategies of resistance in either purely nationally or globally oriented terms as the theoretical approaches do, most of the anti-war organizations studied advocate a ‘both-and’ approach; that is, they regard both state-based and global strategies as important for the movement, although for different purposes. However, the chapter will also illustrate that the organizations differ in the context they emphasize – either national or global – as the primary level of resistance and that there is also considerable disagreement between them on which strategies, and especially tactics, they regard



as the most effective. Of all internal divisions the one related to main strategies and tactics seems to cause the most controversy.

Before introducing the findings, it must be noted that any analysis of 'how to resist' is closely linked to the questions of 'what is resisted and why', which were analyzed in the previous chapter. Clearly, the organizations' views concerning effective strategies of resistance are connected to their analysis of the causes of the problem, their definition of the main targets of resistance and their interpretations of the source and quality of the opponent's power. Much as the previous chapter found that there are many different views among the organizations about the primary opponents and targets of resistance, it is evident here that there is also a great deal of diversity of views on how resistance should be effectively organized against these different opponents. The logic of this chapter is to first introduce the organizations' views regarding strategies and tactics of the movement against its main opponents and then proceed to discuss the strategies invoked against more abstract opponents.

## 6.2 Strategies of Resistance against Governments

### 6.2.1 Resisting the British Government

Those organizations which regard the British government as the primary target of resistance believe that there are two main strategies which can be used effectively against it. Firstly, it is maintained that the government can be resisted by creating as broad as an anti-war movement within the country as possible and thereby influencing public opinion, which in effect puts pressure on the government. For this, there are generally two main strategies: a mass mobilization and a direct action strategy. A mass mobilization strategy means organizing mass demonstrations or other forms of public action involving large numbers of people, whereas a direct action strategy means nonviolent action such as sit-ins and blockades of military bases by small groups of people. Secondly, it is maintained that the government can be effectively influenced by direct political engagement on the part of the movement, which means it that

participates in, supports or otherwise tries to influence political parties and parliamentary politics. In this same vein, cooperation with trade unions and other national or local groups working on related issues is considered necessary.

Mass mobilization is emphasized by the StWC and CND in particular, both of which have been very active in this regard: together they have organized dozens of mass demonstrations as part of the new anti-war movement. Nonetheless, both of these organizations also advocate the second strategy, direct influence on the political system. GR is also active in both respects, but in a different primary context. Next, the organizations' views on mass demonstrations are presented in more detail.

### Mass Mobilization as a Strategy

Of all the organizations studied, the StWC promotes most strongly the role of mass mobilization as an effective strategy of resistance against the Iraq War and war in general. Its view is based on 'the assumption that mobilization is a requisite of achieving its aims' and thus 'wars will be stopped [...] if people are marching in large numbers, if they effectively harass leading politicians wherever they might appear, if they publicly express their anger for all to see' (Gillan et al. 2008: 137–138). As an StWC interviewee argues in the context of the War on Iraq, the organization aims 'to create a movement which makes it difficult for British troops to stay there any longer and makes it easier for Gordon Brown to take the easy way out' (Interview 4).

Indeed, the StWC has organized over twenty national demonstrations since 2001 and taken part in coordinating some of the 'global action days'. On its website and in other public material, the role of demonstrations is usually articulated directly in regard to the power of the movement (see chapter 7). In the interviews, demonstrations are described as one of the most effective ways to have a political impact. They are also considered important because they are open to everyone (Interview 5):

If you're a pensioner or a school child, or if you're disabled or if you're working and don't have much time, demonstrations are something which *absolutely everybody* can participate in. And the effect of demonstrations is *not just on those who come* to demonstration. For

every person who comes ... they probably talk to ten or twenty or thirty people about the demonstration. And I think it has massive effect *on the wider public opinion*.

As suggested in the excerpt, demonstrations are considered an effective form of political contestation due to their impact on public opinion. The StWC often emphasizes that the February 2003 demonstration is cited officially in the Guinness Book of World Records as ‘the largest ever in British political history and the largest ever global demonstration’ (Interview 5). Participation in any demonstration is regarded as an excellent way for individuals to collectively ‘begin to effect change in the anti-war movement’. However, it is also suggested that other forms of mass mobilization, such as mass civil disobedience in demonstrations, school strikes, walk-outs and blockading roads, can be effective as well. (Interview 4.) Thus, the StWC emphasizes that it does not rely solely on demonstrations (Interview 5):

When the war broke out, we were very very effective in forming direct action. We blocked the roads in many major cities, and when the war broke out, we had to challenge the government in order to march. Last October we had to break the exclusion order which exists around the Parliament in order to march. The publicity stands that we’ve have been very successful often. So, there’s *variety of different forms of action*.

In social movement theory it is often suggested that mobilization is ‘in itself educative and, as such, a form of consciousness raising’ (Gillan et al. 2008: 139). In this respect, the approach of the CND is very similar to that of the StWC. For the CND, the idea that mobilization is a form of consciousness-raising has been always important in the organization’s opposition to nuclear weapons. In the course of its long history, the CND has organized quite a few large demonstrations against nuclear weapons<sup>1</sup>. An interviewee maintains that ‘demonstrations are a very effective way

<sup>1</sup> To mention just a few examples, one of the major demonstrations was held in October 1980, gathering over 80,000 protesters in the Trafalgar Square. The CND’s biggest demonstration was held in October 1983, assembling 400,000 people in Hyde Park. The demonstration of 1985 drew around 100,000 participants, as did one that was organized in 1987. (Hudson 2005: 135, 150–151, 161.)

because they make it clear that a lot of people are opposed to government policy' (Interview 1). However, the impressive repertoire of methods used by the organization during five decades of campaigning clearly illustrates that mass demonstrations are only one technique among many. It has organized and been part of 'vigils, lobbying, mass demonstrations, raising issues in elections, human chains, peace camps, non-violent direct action, theatre, letter writing, educations, leafleting, street stalls, poetry and art, festivals, die-ins (lying on the ground, symbolising death), petitioning, walks, music, fasts, and a host of other imaginative forms of work' (Hudson 2005: 3). This list shows that the CND is quite dynamic and flexible. It believes that various forms of action not only complement each other, but also inspire more interest in different methods. Taking part in demonstrations can convince people to do something else as well. Different forms of mobilization are thus regarded as useful and necessary, because in the end 'anything adds to a bigger sum'. (Interview 6.)

GR explicitly underscores that it is a 'mobilization organization'<sup>2</sup>. It regards mass mobilization combined with direct action as 'the best answer to corporate globalization' (Globalise Resistance 2008a). Hence, it actively mobilizes people at international summits of institutions such as the WTO, G8, IMF and EU (ibid). Mass demonstrations are valued, because they make it possible to 'show the extent of solidarity' (Interview 2). Although only a 'tiny percentage' of people are said to be active outside them, demonstrations indicate that the cause is important enough to mobilize a large number of people. When people are politicized, the anti-war movement can seek to channel their interest to other activities as well. (Interview 7.) In the context of the Iraq War, GR has engaged in many anti-war demonstrations organized by the StWC together with the CND and Muslim organizations (Globalise Resistance 2008d). Suggesting that the movement must keep an open attitude towards new methods, both GR interviewees point out that demonstrations are only one technique among many in the struggle against war (Interview 2; Interview 7).

However, demonstrations can have multiple tasks. As social movement scholars point out, they can 'turn sympathizers into participants,

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<sup>2</sup> As an interviewee puts it: 'We are not a political party or not a youth movement or not a NGO or a pressure group. We aim to mobilize people.' He also describes the organization as 'a revolution machine'. (Interview 2.)

neutralize opponents, and turn indifferent onlookers into sympathizers' (Tilly & Tarrow 2007: 70). Demonstrations also create potential for uniting people under one cause in that they help to make unified claims against common targets (ibid). It seems that for the above-mentioned reasons mass demonstrations are especially significant for the three leftist organizations studied here. The fourth organization, WRI, does not even organize demonstrations in Britain, but it has participated in and even organized some demonstrations against NATO in Belgium and Germany, for example<sup>3</sup>. Yet, many in the organization feel that it is not enough merely 'to demonstrate at the front doors of decision-makers' (Teršelič 2005: 8). The role of demonstrations is regarded as challenging because of their limited impact. Referring to the 'political naivety' manifested in the belief that it would be enough just to let the British government know that people are opposed to war, the WRI representative criticizes the current anti-war movement, and especially the StWC, for a lack of an effective strategy (Interview 3):

Well, these [demonstrations] happen once every year. They get smaller and smaller over the years because there's *no strategy* ... For people it's not enough to just give a witness statement. They want to show that they can actually *achieve something* ... For that you need to have a *visible strategy* which people can see that it makes sense ... I don't see that the Stop the War Coalition talks about strategy at all. *How* do they want to stop the war from happening? The *illusion* is that you can stop the war from happening by just going on a demonstration once a year.

By emphasizing that more discussion about strategies of resistance is necessary, the interviewee indicates that a more comprehensive analysis of power and the causes of war is required as well. Moreover, he suggests that because people want to feel that they are making a difference, a step towards more engaged forms of resistance should be taken. (Interview 3.) These views echo the general philosophy of WRI, which advocates strong commitment on the part of the individual. It is maintained that when individuals make strong commitments to work for the cause in

<sup>3</sup> The first proposal to organize a 'mass march to NATO Headquarters' was made in 1963 (Prasad 2005: 341). In 1966 it was suggested that WRI 'should dramatise opposition to NATO by organising resistance to any attempt to establish the NATO headquarters in another country' (ibid: 369).

their daily lives, then – and only then – it becomes possible to resist war effectively. WRI considers it necessary to engage people in very concrete forms of action, which in turn develop in them a stronger sense of commitment. Nonviolent direct action is regarded as the most effective form of resistance to this end. It is discussed in more detail later in this chapter in conjunction with the more general strategy of nonviolence.

### Involvement in Parliamentary Politics

The second main strategy of resistance against (the) war is to try to influence the government directly through political parties and the parliamentary system. In social movement theory it is suggested that ‘party alliances offer to the peace movement its most direct access to policy-making circles’ (Rochon 1988: 167, also 155). It is not, however, that they would guarantee it and there might be also problems, for example, due to the fact that parties may be ‘internally divided on issues as defence policy (ibid: 168)’ as it has often been the case with the Labour Party, famous for continuous balancing between its left and right wings. Moreover, as we have already, and will continue, to see, party alliances are only one among many strategies of the anti-war movement.

Within the anti-war movement involvement with political parties as a strategy is often described as a ‘long march through the institutions’ (Interview 4/StWC). In the material studied here, particularly that of the StWC contains many references to involvement in party politics. Some connections are portrayed as very significant and beneficial, but there is also criticism of certain political parties.

First of all, it is very openly emphasized everywhere that the Socialist Workers’ Party (SWP) is an extremely important partner. It is described as ‘by far the biggest and most dynamic of the organisations of the far left’, the one which was able to lay ‘the bedrock for the unity’ which is regarded as the first of the ‘foundation stones’ of the StWC (Murray & German 2005: 54). The SWP contributed to the evolution of the StWC ‘to the point where its members nationally and locally could play the largest single part in creating and sustaining the anti-war movement’, which is described as working very much ‘to the movement’s general advantage’ (ibid):

Without it [the SWP], there would have been the greatest risk of a *fragmented*, and hence, *futile* anti-war movement, in which the more traditional and well-established peace organisations would have campaigned in one place, big sections of the active left in another, Muslims in yet another, trade unions someplace else again – and the majority of people eventually mobilised by the campaign most probably nowhere at all.

The StWC also mentions co-operation with the Liberal Democrat Party, which contributed significantly' to the 'breadth and political impact' of the anti-war movement (Murray & German 2005: 163). However, the Liberal Democrats are criticized for being 'more against the idea of war than its reality' because after the war started, they supported it (ibid: 167). Thus, the StWC regards the party's claim to be 'the anti-war party' as 'open to legitimate challenge' (ibid). It also briefly describes its relationship with the Green Party, which at some point became 'more integrated into the Stop the War Coalition' (ibid: 177). Although it points out that the anti-war movement has even received some form of 'support from Tories and Whitehall', the StWC acknowledges that this has been regarded by many as 'unnecessary, or even undesirable, for a left-led mass movement' (ibid: 167). Its aim of building a truly popular mass movement is clearly illustrated in the argument that all forms of collaboration are necessary because 'winning a majority for anything in British politics requires convincing some of those millions who regularly vote the Conservative Party' (ibid). According to the StWC, all political connections have been created without the anti-war movement 'diluting its campaigning slogans or tactics' (ibid).

The StWC's conception of politics and power seems to be very traditional in the sense that political change is sought by influencing those in power, either by pressuring the government indirectly through the mobilization of public opinion or by directly collaborating with certain political parties within the political system. In this regard, the StWC reflects the Marxist, and especially the Trotskyist, traditions within the broader British peace movement, which have always emphasized the importance of extra-parliamentary mass action (e.g. Taylor 1987b: 174). Since it is accepted that this can involve some forms of cooperation even with parties that have supported the war, the approach cannot be regarded as particularly critical or radical. The StWC does not seem to

have any problems in working with the establishment as long as this collaboration contributes to the wider cause.<sup>4</sup> From the perspective of building as broad as possible an anti-war movement, this approach must definitely be regarded as rational, but, as we will see later, it also leaves the organization open to criticism and may result in its alienating groups that view cooperation with elites and state authorities skeptically.

The CND does not shy away from party politics either. Over the years, it has very actively tried to bring change through the Labour Party (e.g. Hudson 2005: 41–43), in which it also currently has many representatives sympathetic to its cause. There is even a section called ‘Parliamentary CND’, which is defined as ‘a cross-party group of MPs who regularly raise our campaigning priorities but need CND supporters to maintain pressure on their own MPs to ensure the nuclear weapons debate stays on top of their agenda’ (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 2008d). In the research literature it is pointed out that not only has the Labour Party been crucial for the CND’s strategy historically but the CND has been very important for the Labour Party (Taylor 1987a: 101).<sup>5</sup> In the 1960s, also the Communist Party was influential in the CND, and since the late 1970s the SWP and various Trotskyist groups have impacted the work of the organization as well. (Taylor 1987b: 162)<sup>6</sup>. As mentioned already (see chapter 5), the SWP has traditionally been very critical of the Labour Party, a policy that might partly explain some of the StWC’s criticism of the CND.

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<sup>4</sup> However, there are also critical views within the StWC in this regard. One interviewee, for example, says that taking part in traditional party politics cannot be considered a reasonable choice anymore. He believes that joining the Labour Party and ‘trying to change it from the inside’ is now regarded as ‘the most discredited’ option. In his experience, many people who have joined political parties ‘have ended up doing exactly what they criticized them for’, with this only reinforcing the observation that people are no longer interested either in voting or becoming themselves active in political parties. (Interview 4.)

<sup>5</sup> In fact, some peace movement scholars point out that while the CND was ‘partly a product’ of the struggle in the Labour Party in the late 1950s (Hinton 1988: 154), the CND leadership saw the Labour Party ‘as the natural vehicle in implementing CND policy’ (Taylor 1987a: 100). In the 1970s their relationship grew even closer (ibid: 101). For more on their relationship, see e.g. Hinton 1989; Overy 1982:65–68; Rochon 1988: 156–178; Taylor 1987a: 100–130.

<sup>6</sup> On Trotskyism and the peace movement, see e.g. Taylor 1987b: 173–179; Cortright 2008: 260–269.



The CND history tells openly that the relationship with political parties is a controversial one. The extent to which the organization should be engaging in parliamentary politics has been a much-debated subject (Hudson 2005: 59, 65; also Taylor 1987a: 127). The general position seems to be that although the CND ‘should not formally support one party over another’, it should nevertheless ‘intervene politically in the electoral arena to press support for anti-nuclear policies’ (Hudson 2005: 59–60). In practice this means, for example, organizing ‘peace hustings’ before elections, at which candidates are asked about their views on nuclear policy, war and peace (ibid: 60). Both CND representatives articulate the issue in a very a positive way in their interviews. They stress that engagement in party politics is an important strategy because it gives direct access to political power (Interview 1):

I think you should also be ... in a political party like myself ... in a political party which can *take power*. I'm not in favour of small parties even if ... I might agree with some of them what they stand for, but in a sense, you should do *both*.

It must be noted that both CND interviewees are themselves active in party politics, one being a Member of Parliament (MP) for the Labour Party and the other a member of the party's national executive. Hence, their views may not represent those of the entire organization. Nonetheless, the interviewees do not so much emphasize their own political activity as invest their hopes in the ‘new generation’. In their view, the new anti-war movement has demonstrated that there are more politically interested and motivated young people in Britain than ever before, especially in regard to international affairs. However, it is recognized that, at the same time, the national political context makes it difficult to get young people engaged with traditional political parties. (Interview 1; Interview 6.). The legacy of former Prime Minister Tony Blair is often brought up in this connection. He is blamed for trying to ‘tame’ the Labour Party, turning it into ‘a tame establishment institution’ (Interview 1):

There is more interest among young people in politics and in foreign policy today than there's ever been ... but they *shy away* from traditional political parties because they feel that the choice they have been given is a choice between *two conservative parties*.

While engaging with the political system is clearly important for the two left-oriented organizations mentioned above, the third one, GR, does not emphasize this as much. It has, however, a strong connection to party politics, with six out of sixteen members of its steering committee being members of the SWP. This is not often mentioned in its public material, except when introducing the Steering Committee on the website (Globalise Resistance 2008b). In the interviews, both GR representatives refer to their 'socialist comrades', probably meaning members of the SWP. They stress that pressuring political parties and MPs is a useful strategy for the anti-war movement and note that people from the Green Party, Labour Party and other parties 'left of the Labour Party' have been involved in the work of GR. (Interview 2; Interview 7). While especially enthusiastic about the role of new political parties in this regard, one GR interviewee is disappointed that an emerging new left party, the Respect Party, had a split. In her view, splits are 'something that only seems to be happening on the left'. (Interview 7; also Murray & German 2005: 48.)

As a pacifist organization, WRI is the most skeptical of party politics in particular and the political system more generally. Its website and public material contain no references to any political parties or traditional forms of political engagement. The skepticism of WRI towards political parties is clearly articulated by its interviewee, who argues that connecting with political parties is not beneficial for the anti-war movement. In the British context, he is especially critical of the SWP's connection to the anti-war movement through the StWC. He expresses this stance explicitly, for example, in a reference to Germany as a country where the movement is not 'dominated by the Trotskyians or the Socialist Party'. (Interview 3.)

### Cooperation with Trade Unions

Throughout history, trade unions have been significant partners for the anti-war movement in campaigns against war. In Britain, trade union involvement in the movement has traditionally been very strong. The unions have been considered to be among the most valuable allies of all, 'for they link the peace movement to organizations that are accustomed to influencing public policy' and which in turn link them to social democratic parties, such as the Labour Party (Rochon 1988: 140). The

significance of the trade unions is clearly manifested in the materials of the organizations studied here, with one exception. WRI is not directly connected to any trade unions. In fact, the WRI interviewee is not too enthusiastic about their influence in the anti-war movement, because they are closely connected with socialist groups, which he generally views in quite critical terms (Interview 3).

On the contrary, the CND history mentions trade unions as highly important partners (e.g. Hudson 2005: 63, 97, 242). A close relationship with unions has characterized the organization since its foundation due to its intimate relationship with the Labour Party (Taylor 1987a: 108–110; Rochon 1988: 141). In the context of the current movement, too, it is stressed that there is ‘big trade union involvement’ (Interview 6; Hudson 2005: 242). GR also emphasizes the importance of collaboration with trade unions, for example on its website, where they are publicly mentioned as partners of the organization (Globalise Resistance 2008a). Both interviewees stress that trade unions are necessary in *any* coalitions against war (Interview 2; Interview 7).

Of the four organizations, the StWC most often refers to trade unions, also in critical terms. It argues that it was crucial to get trade unions involved in the new anti-war movement for four reasons. Firstly, they ‘have been at the centre of almost every progressive political campaign in Britain for the past century’ and secondly they ‘could provide a degree of logistical support not easily found elsewhere’ (Murray & German 2005: 168). Thirdly, trade unions are considered important for their ability to pressure the government ‘through their influence within the Labour Party’ and fourthly for ‘their potential for mobilising mass action, including possibly industrial action’ (ibid).

Regardless of these characterizations, in referring to a ‘shift in the balance of importance between trade unions and other social movements in terms of political struggle’ (ibid: 172), the StWC implies that trade unions are not as important for the movement as they used to be. Most of the largest unions were not yet affiliated with the StWC at the time of the February 2003 demonstration, meaning that the anti-war protest ‘was built and sustained independently of most of the unions’ (ibid). In fact, convincing the trade unions ‘to take an active part in the anti-war movement’ is described as ‘a hard battle’ (ibid: 168, emphasis added):

[O]vercoming inertia in the larger unions proved difficult, notwithstanding that many had longstanding policies on peace and international questions. This was rooted in several factors, but above all a desire to *avoid giving offence* to a Labour government.

Traditionally, most trade unions in Britain (as well as in Germany and the Netherlands, for example) have supported the main aims of the anti-war movement (Rochon 1988: 142). However, there are also many factors that may discourage or limit trade union support (ibid: 142–145), as was the case in Britain, where trade unions were first very cautious in their approach because of the Labour government.

## 6.2.2 Resisting the US Government

The public material of the four organizations contains remarkably little discussion about how the anti-war movement could resist the US government, despite the fact that the US is often described as one of the main targets of resistance (see chapter 5). In the interviews, however, where all representatives are explicitly asked about resistance against the US government, three different strategies are brought up. Firstly, it is suggested that the US government can be effectively resisted by putting pressure on the countries and governments that support the US in its military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. A second influential strategy cited is encouraging and supporting the American anti-war movement in its struggle against the US foreign policy. Thirdly, it is maintained that the US can be effectively resisted by creating as broad and international an anti-war movement as possible, thereby influencing world public opinion, which in turn can put pressure on the US government.

In the case of the first the strategy, it is common to stress that pressuring the British government to withdraw its troops from Iraq can help to encourage other states to follow its example. An StWC representative, for example, argues it is an efficient strategy, because it can result in ‘leaving Bush isolated’ and bring the war to a close much more quickly (Interview 4). The view is shared by all organizations, but especially emphasized by the WRI interviewee, as he believes it is impossible for the British anti-war movement to confront the US government directly (Interview 3).

Encouraging the anti-war movement inside the US is regarded as an ‘extremely important’ strategy (Interview 1/CND). It is suggested that anti-war activists in other countries should ‘make a lot of contact’ with activists in the US and give them support (Interview 7/GR). Some believe that supporting the American movement is the only effective way to struggle against the war and hegemony of the US (Interview 3/WRI):

We really need to look into ... supporting much more the US peace movement because they’re doing a very very difficult job ... without challenging the US hegemony in the US *per se*, it will not change.

Indeed, many interviewees argue that the anti-war movement in the US has become broader than ever in the context of the Iraq War<sup>7</sup>. According to British activists, opposition to the war in the US ‘has kind of moved mainstream’ as ‘more people are waking up’. (Interview 1/CND; Interview 6/CND.) Some also regard the new American movement as quite powerful and believe that opposition to the war is only going to grow due to the unpopularity of President Bush (Interview 7/GR). In regard to the third strategy against the US government, all interviewees stress that trying to create a broad international anti-war movement makes it possible to influence public opinion both nationally and internationally. Moreover, many suggest that international coordination of the anti-war movement and working together with some other social movements (and sometimes also with actual resistance movements) is a key factor in building up effective resistance. This view is discussed in more detail below as a strategy which can be applied against both the UK and US governments.

### 6.3 Coalitions, Solidarity, Support to Other Movements

The foregoing analysis has discussed what strategies the organizations consider effective against more concrete targets of resistance, which in this context mean the US, the UK and their governments. However, as noted

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<sup>7</sup> Activists in the US emphasize this as well (e.g. Benjamin & Evans 2005; Hayden 2007; Robbins 2008).

earlier (see chapter 5), all organizations articulate resistance to broader struggles than the campaigns against the Iraq War. Whereas the StWC struggles against imperialism, the CND against nuclear weapons, and GR against neo-liberal capitalism, WRI fights militarism and war in general. These broader agendas require different strategies than those aimed at concrete, state-level opponents. In this regard, the organizations argue that one of the most important strategies is support for and collaboration with other like-minded groups and movements.

Firstly, the organizations consider it essential to express support for anti-war organizations and movements in other countries. Secondly, they maintain that it is necessary to support and enhance co-operation with other social movements struggling against related issues. A third contention is that supporting resistance movements in conflict areas enables more effective resistance against war. While each of the organizations studied brings forward all of these aspects, each clearly has different emphases. In fact, these differences are quite revealing in ascertaining how the organization regards the primary context of resistance.

### 6.3.1 Supporting Anti-War Organizations and Movements

A general strategy of resistance on which all studied organizations agree is providing support for anti-war organizations and movements in other countries. International cooperation, coalitions and networks between anti-war organizations and movements around the world are considered extremely significant. Nevertheless, the four organizations studied here differ in what they regard as the most important elements of international collaboration and how they conceive their own role in it.

In the StWC material any support for other anti-war organizations and movements is mainly articulated by reference to *solidarity*, although the organization has also been active in concrete terms through its role in coordinating worldwide demonstrations<sup>8</sup>. The organization's emphasis on

<sup>8</sup> There have been attempts 'to extend the impact of international coordination beyond the setting of dates for demonstrations' in that the StWC has, for example, participated in international meetings (Gillan et al. 2008: 114). There common declarations have been made offering 'a brief analysis of the global situation' and suggestions for 'paths that movements might follow to make social change' (ibid).

comparatively abstract forms of support is explained by an interviewee, who argues that the StWC strategy must be nationally oriented since its main aim is to pressure the British government to withdraw its troops from Iraq (Interview 4). Importantly, he points out that strategies in the British context are necessarily different from those in countries where popular opposition to the war has become a political force powerful enough to take down governments supportive of the war (ibid):

In other countries, the option is open to *elect a new government* ... In France and Italy ... they've had their movements but of course, theirs is a right-wing government. The left-wing government promised to withdraw troops from Iraq ... and so that government got elected. Ours is a *left-wing government* and therefore we don't have the option of just electing a new government.

In other words, Britain's involvement in the war under the Labour government has greatly influenced the anti-war movement's pressure strategies. For example, an StWC interviewee emphasizes that in countries such as France, Italy, Spain, Australia and the US it has been possible to take 'a different approach' to ending the war. He points out that while the anti-war movement in the US can support the Democrats, in Italy and Spain people already achieved 'a re-connection' when they voted for a government that would withdraw the troops. (Interview 4.)

Since its own organizational strategy is nationally oriented, the StWC suggests that the entire anti-war movement should have a primarily national focus. Emphasizing that it is difficult 'to give a lead to people in other countries whose politics are very different to our own', an StWC representative implies that a more international focus would entail some difficulties. Explicitly, he argues that 'it becomes complicated when you talk globally'. Because political forces and domestic politics vary in each country, anti-war movements are very different and they need to 'have autonomy in how they operate'. (Interview 4.) Nevertheless, the StWC is sometimes portrayed as a global role model of sorts by emphasizing the 'global role [it had] to play' in the February 2003 demonstration (ibid):

We have *globalized* our movement ... we coordinated in the sense what happened in Czechoslovakia and what happened in Paris, happened at similar time but was separate this time ... the February 2003 was coordinated very closely and deliberately. It was not something that

happened accidentally ... We have coordinated *internationally* in a way that we haven't done in a long time.

The other StWC interviewee shares this interpretation. Referring both to the February 2003 and March 2008 demonstrations as international days of action, he suggests that this kind of a 'global reach' is new for the anti-war movement. Unlike some others, he does not equate the current situation with the Vietnam War where the US lost due to 'the opposition in the occupied country and the opposition of the people of the occupying country', that is, the most crucial dynamic in resistance. (Interview 5.) In the context of the War on Terror, however, there are more problems, which he regards as international in nature (*ibid*):

I think that *every country* is affected by the War on Terror. I think civil liberties are being eroded on the international scale. I think the Islamophobia and racism are being stoked on the international scale. So ... *everybody* has an interest to be part of it.

The importance of international links is also emphasized by arguing that now 'we are all confronting the same issue'. One of the StWC interviewees stresses that the organization already has 'exceptionally good international links' and strengthening them can help 'to learn the experience of other movements'. He first says that the potential for international link-up at the moment is 'stronger than ever'. Interestingly, when discussing the issue in more pragmatic terms, international cooperation seems to be considered more of a challenge than an opportunity: 'Where you do have transnational agreements, you keep them as limited as possible' because 'the movement being international throws up different challenges for each movement'. (Interview 4.) Although international cooperation is regarded as especially important for showing solidarity and support, it is recognized that in practical terms cooperation is not always that easy.

The CND's approach, once again, resembles that of the StWC. Although closely linked to the political decision-making system at the national level, the CND also believes that international coordination with like-minded groups and movements in other countries is crucial for the anti-war movement. In its public material there are many references to the WSF and the ESF, in which the organization has been involved since 2002 (Hudson 2005: 240). Stressing that the organization is 'very conscious



of having to make' transnational ties and cooperate internationally, an interviewee argues that 'you should have as much cooperation as you can'. Sometimes a more international anti-war movement is represented as a necessity or as a reaction to 'a new challenge of a global disaster'. It is argued, for example, that there is a 'global struggle' going on due to 'the American desire for supremacy'. Moreover, it is suggested that this is recognized as a 'global problem' by not only the CND, but also people all over the world. (Interview 1.) The February 2003 demonstration is again brought up as an example of a 'global way' to resist the war. It is claimed to represent a 'rise of global consciousness', which means that people 'regain a new consciousness in the West of an interdependent world'. This, in turn, is believed to result in people working more closely together for common goals worldwide. (Interview 6.) Thus, the argumentation of the CND resonates substantially in this regard with the framings of academic globalists (e.g. Hardt & Negri 2004: 215–216, 284–285; Kaldor 2003a: 112; Castells 2008; also Beck 2000: 49–50, 90–91).

For GR, too, resistance against war and other injustices of the world requires international coordination with, as well as support from and to, like-minded groups. Having a very close relationship to the alter-globalization movement, GR usually cooperates with a wide variety of groups and organizations in the context of the ESF. These include anti-capitalist and environmentalist groups as well as trade unions that share the anti-war stance of the organization. (Globalise Resistance 2008a.) In cooperating, for instance, with local groups of the World Development Movement, the Friends of the Earth and Amnesty (Interview 2), GR seeks 'to increase collaboration between different strands of the movement' (Globalise Resistance 2008a).

In the WRI material, the organization is characterized as belonging to the broader peace movement, with explicit discussion about 'international solidarity' (e.g. Speck 2005: 24, 29). Thus, the primary level for resistance is clearly international. The principal purpose of the organization is to 'promote nonviolent action against the causes of war, and *to support and connect people around the world* who refuse to take part in war or the preparation of war' (War Resisters' International 2009a, emphasis added, also Prasad 2005: 450). In working closely with its members and affiliates in different countries, WRI cooperates mainly with other pacifist groups in Britain and elsewhere. It stresses that the British groups with which

it is affiliated are not in any way involved in the StWC. (Interview 3.) Cooperation with non-pacifist groups is considered useful but WRI 'must retain its specific pacifist character' and enhance 'the philosophy and technique of nonviolence in all fields' (Prasad 2005: 338).

The WRI history tells the organization was not originally projected 'as a European or Western organisation', but its outlook was 'global and secular' right from the start (Prasad 2005: 94). Nonetheless, it has not always been easy to implement a global and non-western outlook in practical terms. For example, a proposal to move the WRI headquarters to India caused some heated debate in the 1960s, as 'people who had the maximum say in such matters were not sympathetic to the idea of moving the WRI headquarters to a *third world country*' (ibid: 335, emphasis in original). It was felt that India's political and social climate were not suitable for WRI, 'for which freedom of action and keeping worldwide contacts were essential part of its program' (ibid). This argument must be viewed in light of the fact that even today, in the so-called 'global information age', the WRI headquarters remain in London.

In general terms, however, WRI can be regarded as truly international when it comes to networking and cooperation. It has an impressive network of sections and associations all over the world<sup>9</sup> and it organizes international conferences every year or sends representatives to take part in international conferences organized by other groups<sup>10</sup>. It collaborates also to some extent with some more formal partners and institutions. One of these is the UN, which is said to help to 'achieve small changes', for example, in human rights issues. The problem from the perspective of WRI is that the UN system 'is not opposed to war in principle', which makes it impossible to 'abolish war using the UN'. (Interview 3.) The UN has been viewed critically by the organization throughout its history. It is criticized for relying on arms in the enforcement of its authority, not respecting pacifism, and lacking the power, mandate and 'even imagination to try non-military methods to eradicate militarism altogether' (Prasad 2005: 294, 304). This illustrates, again, the degree of skepticism that WRI has towards states and formal institutions even

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<sup>9</sup> WRI consists of 90 groups in as many as 43 countries.

<sup>10</sup> The WRI representative says that it is often quite difficult to get people from poor countries to participate in international conferences due to limited financial support; nor is collaboration equally easy or intense in every country. (Interview 3.)

though they might be working for similar, or at least related, aims.

Sometimes participation in anti-war conferences and other international meetings is also problematic for WRI. The organization's representative argues that this is 'quite difficult', for example, in the context of the WSF, since the views of many dominant groups do not always resonate with the pacifist direct-action approach of his own organization. In other words, discussing and defining the objectives of the anti-war movement among many different groups is anything but easy. Although skeptical of cooperation between pacifist and non-pacifist groups to a certain extent, the WRI interviewee feels that some responsibilities can nevertheless be shared. In his view, traditional peace organizations and new anti-war groups cannot even be kept apart, because 'in a movement everyone is involved'. However, he points out that movements are diffuse and also very complicated. (Interview 3.)

Interestingly, although portraying the pacifist movement as an international movement, the WRI representative does not always give the same credit to the anti-war movement. For him, the anti-war movement is not an international or global movement as such, but rather a multiplicity of several movements working in different countries. One important source of criticism regarding the current anti-war movement is that 'a lot of what is called international is basically Western-European' (Interview 3; also Speck 2005: 28–29). The interviewee nevertheless regards international coordination as rational and desirable for the anti-war movement (Interview 3):

These common days of action ... one day it was demonstrations almost everywhere. Of course that helps to see ... it gives a *global identity* and *strengthens the impact*. To have demonstrations in different days, it doesn't become as visible. So, some *coordination on a global level* makes sense, but if you don't do your homework and develop membership that makes sense in your own country ... it doesn't help you very much.

Thus, although the interviewee speaks of the 'global level' and even 'global identity', he argues that there cannot be a unified strategy that would make sense everywhere, not least because political coalitions vary in each country. Moreover, he stresses that the potential of the anti-war movement is always connected to the domestic political context in a very concrete way. For example, if their country is not involved in the

war effort, it is difficult to activate people to take part in the anti-war movement. However, if the war can be linked to some local issues, it is possible to avoid remaining at too abstract a level. (Interview 3.) In other words, any local concern can become a question of strategy as well.

### 6.3.2 Supporting Other Movements

All the organizations studied maintain that it is important to support and cooperate with other social movements struggling against injustices related to the problem of war. This perspective is emphasized most strongly by GR and the CND, but also to some extent by the other two organizations. In this regard, many different movements are mentioned, thus linking the anti-war movement to several other broad contexts. For instance, the organizations bring up the alter-globalization, environmental and pacifists movements, as well as the movement against nuclear weapons.

The StWC material contains many references to the alter-globalization movement. It is highlighted that resistance against war should include anti-imperialist elements (e.g. Rees 2006: 228–240). Often it is suggested that the aims of the anti-war movement can be advanced by supporting the organization of the working class (ibid: 200–220). It is thus indicated that the anti-war movement reflects the interests of the working people and *vice versa*. Hence, supporting any movement with socialist principles and goals can be regarded as an effective, if not a necessary, strategy of resistance against war. For the StWC, support for the alter-globalization movement seems to represent such, at least to some extent. Here, resonance with the radical poststructuralist approach is obvious, although the Multitude as a concept is much broader than the proletariat (Hardt & Negri 2004: xiv, 100–115, 129). For radical poststructuralists, the anti-war and the alter-globalization movement are part of the same ‘new global cycle’, reinforcing each other (ibid: 215–216, 284).

The CND also refers to the alter-globalization movement quite often, but cites the environmental and anti-nuclear movements as well. These three are regarded as closely connected to the goals of the anti-war movement and it is thus implied that anti-war politics can be enhanced by supporting any of them. It is pointed out that the CND shares ‘a lot of common ground with the environmentalist movement that began

to emerge in the 1970s' (Hudson 2005: 109). It has campaigned with Greenpeace, for example, which was in fact originally founded in 1971 by twenty scientist-activists who opposed nuclear testing (Miles 2008: 154). Although Greenpeace shares the CND's aim to struggle against nuclear weapons, the latter does not necessarily share all the goals of the environmental movement. Stressing that its individual members 'do not have uniform views' on the question of nuclear power, the CND welcomes individuals and organizations with different views 'to participate and argue their position' (Hudson 2005: 110–111).

In regard to the alter-globalization movement, it is the roles of the WSF and ESF that are emphasized in particular (Hudson 2005: 240). The CND speaks highly of the ESF's work in London in 2004 as it managed to link 'the issues of neo-liberalism, third-world debt, racism and war in a way that had wide resonance against the backdrop of the US war drive against Iraq' (ibid: 187). These issues are said to represent a 'convergence of the peace movement', with NGOs and trade unions addressing issues such as 'the environment and third world poverty' (ibid). Thus, it is suggested that there is an obvious link 'between war and poverty, war and human rights abuse' (ibid: 240). Diverse social movements are seen as 'developing a common understanding of the relations between the unjust workings of the international economic institutions led by the US and the increasing use of military force by the US to impose its interests' (ibid: 187). The way in which the CND represents the interconnectedness of different problems is extremely interesting (ibid: 245, emphasis added):

[T]he second demonstration included campaigners against globalisation, against oppression in the occupied territories, against debt, against the arms trade, and much more. It was as if a *sudden realisation* had occurred, of how *all these events and problems* in the world are actually *linked together* and are *part* of a huge *process*.

Here, it is maintained that the causes of war and other global problems are increasingly intertwined, which clearly echoes the poststructuralist approach. Even the main problem is the same: neither the theory nor the CND discusses in concrete terms *how* these problems are linked and whether there really can be a *common* understanding by all. The CND merely argues that it works with other organizations and movements 'to raise our demands in *every* arena' (Hudson 2005: 240, emphasis added).

In the case of GR, the interconnectedness of different problems provides the basis for the organization's analysis. The argument that anti-war politics can be effectively advanced by global social movements supporting and cooperating with each other is articulated very explicitly. An interviewee explains the broad character of the anti-war movement through its connection to other 'anti'-movements. The aim is 'to link struggles to the trade union issues, social justice issues, anti-privatization issues, education and health and everywhere else, anti-war policies'. Together these issues are said to constitute 'one struggle, one entity'. It is pointed out that many activists already work for several causes – they may be engaged simultaneously in many movements, such as the anti-war and the alter-globalization movements, which the interviewee considers closely interrelated. (Interview 2.) Moreover, it is claimed that the goals of these two movements include environmental causes as well, since 'a lot of the activists, are actually in all those circles', the environmental, the alter-globalization and the anti-war movement (ibid):

In a way, *everyone* is trying to do as much as they can and in the field that they are operating. Some people decide to be *fulltime activists* and pulling certain aspects of the struggle at hand ... Some people have started in Globalise Resistance and then ... on to the Stop the War Coalition because they felt that this is a *more urgent* thing to do. Other people move on to the climate change campaign from Globalise Resistance because they felt that this is the field that they would like to contribute to.

When asked if people really understand the connection between all these three causes, the interviewee says that he is convinced they do. In his experience, people may find it more difficult to understand war and terrorism, 'but everyone understands climate change'. The interrelation between different causes is explained by 'the contradictions of capitalism' whereby some parts of the world 'need to be living in poverty and other parts need to live in high consumption'. (Interview 2.) In this interpretation, 'pseudo-peace' and the status quo are maintained despite structural violence and large scale injustices taking place in the world. Hence, there is no clear separation between the national and international contexts of resistance. Here, the question of poverty is also framed in a manner very similar to that seen in the radical poststructuralist approach (e.g. Hardt & Negri 2004: 129–131).

The other GR interviewee refers to a broad range of activities that have taken place 'within a sort of generalized ideology of anti-privatization or socialist view of the world'. These views can be 'deconstructed into many sorts of activities' which can 'energize people'. She herself joined GR because it is a network that brings together activists from around the world and emphasizes the interconnectedness of issues as well as people. While convinced that role of privatization in the world is crucial, the interviewee suggests that analyzing a local matter that has to do with privatization<sup>11</sup> makes it possible to 'get an insight into the big picture'. It can also help to understand the relationship between employers and workers across the world. (Interview 7.) Indeed, the interviewee repeatedly refers to local circumstances throughout the interview, thus making frequent connections between the local, national and the international levels. This kind of an analysis of global capitalism regards everything as interconnected, suggesting a dissolution of the local-global level much like that asserted by the radical poststructuralist approach.

Since the most challenging task is to make people realize that privatization is 'not just something that is very local', but a process taking place all over the world, it is suggested that one of the main responsibilities of activists is to inform people of the interrelation between different problems accelerated by globalization. Therefore, various organizations and movements should interact and help each other through solidarity. It is considered a significant strategy of resistance to support workers, trade unions and activists in other countries, as these actors can learn from each other. (Interview 7.)

A similar idea of *global solidarity* is articulated by the other GR interviewee when telling about his trip to India, where he met activists working on land ownership issues. Although they were fighting for a specific cause, he felt there were no barriers in terms of understanding what they were fighting for more generally. (Interview 2.) This view brings to mind the radical poststructuralist notion of separate but connected struggles, which, it is hoped, will result in an accumulation of grievances (e.g. Hardt & Negri 2004: 99–102, 268–285).

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<sup>11</sup> For example, the same multinational corporation can be responsible for privatization of water in South America and a doctor's surgery in North London (Interview 7).

Furthermore, GR stresses that networking and international cooperation is crucial not only for the organization itself but also for the movement as a whole. The WSF in particular is regarded as a good opportunity to meet like-minded people around the world who 'speak the same language' and 'feel at home', and it is seen as a platform for addressing local issues in the context of the 'big picture'. (Interview 2; Interview 7.) Again, these understandings come close to those of the poststructuralist approach. It can be concluded that GR resonates with the radical poststructuralist approach substantially more than the StWC and CND do. Given that it often is 'in the context of economic struggles' where the 'capacity to see a clear connection between local problems and wider structural dynamics has been developed most powerfully' (Walker 1988: 65), this is not a very surprising discovery as such since GR is intimately linked to the anti-capitalist movement. Indeed, it is perhaps more surprising that despite their traditional Marxist analysis, the StWC and CND have nevertheless adopted post-Marxist views (or at least rhetoric) to some extent, although they often otherwise criticize poststructuralist and post-Marxist conceptualizations.

Generally speaking, the views of WRI on the issue of cooperation with other social movements are in line with those of the three other organizations. As an organization, it is based on the notion that the movement must not only be anti-militarist and anti-armament, but 'a movement for nonviolent social change' as well (Prasad 2005: 405). In other words, resisting war and militarism requires fighting also other forms of injustice (e.g. Speck 2005: 23, 29). WRI thus needs to 'keep in close contact with and support movements such as the anti-nuclear weapons and human rights campaigns' (Prasad 2005: 337). Usually it is underlined, however, that while supporting other causes, WRI should never compromise its pacifist principles. On the one hand, it is admitted that if pacifists want to gain political power, they need to form alliances with non-pacifists, which can indicate acceptance of 'the methods of authority' (ibid: 302). On the other hand, there are many activities in which WRI can participate 'without compromise of principle, and where effective work could be done to advance the policy of the general peace movement' (ibid: 135). Cooperation with non-pacifists can even be regarded as rational, because it may do 'more for the pacifist cause than conscious efforts to spread pacifism within such groups' (ibid: 251). As



peace movement scholars note, this kind of an internal debate is typical of pacifist-anarchist groups, who feel that they must ‘develop a strategy *either* of co-operation with all sorts of other groups in order to win them over gradually to the non-violent revolutionary position *or* of maintaining a subculture which stays true to its own beliefs and gradually wins over converts’ (Overy 1982: 15, emphasis in original).

### 6.3.3 Supporting Resistance Movements in Conflict Areas

One form of support regarded as especially important by the three left-oriented organizations is that given to resistance and liberation movements in conflict areas. Although this is most often brought up in the context of the Palestinian conflict, it is also discussed in the context of the Iraq War. Indeed, the issue has caused some controversy within the movement. Some pacifist organizations have publicly criticized the new anti-war movement for not condemning violent forms of resistance taking place in Iraq and Afghanistan, pointing especially to the StWC in this regard. The StWC has announced that it stands ‘for justice for the Palestinians, and would support *anything* the Palestinians themselves recognise as such’ (Murray & German 2005: 87, emphasis added). This view is clearly shared by GR, and at least to some extent by the CND. A GR representative explicitly argues that ‘people should be able to defend themselves organized’ even with violent methods as long as it is for the cause of social justice, national liberation or self-determination. He brings up the Hitler’s Nazi government several times as an example: ‘What should the Jews have done in terms of resisting the Nazis – taken nonviolent direct action?’ (Interview 2.) Here, he directly refers to the Israel-Palestinian conflict (*ibid*):

Israel is such a powerful state that presents itself as a very weak one because in the psyche of the citizens they are the weak and they need to defend themselves but the army is the strongest in the area. *Against this strongest army, the Palestinians don't have much weapons ... not in the same scale that the Israeli army is equipped, they cannot do targeted assassinations with helicopters ... so, they're using rifle, they're using hand-made bomb ... It's quite a complex question again. What are the tools that were left for the occupied against occupier when all other means are not working?*

In other words, it is stressed that although ‘less bloodshed and less people suffering is better’, these issues are ‘very complicated’ as well as being ‘really context-related’. When asked about the nonviolent resistance manifested in Mahatma Gandhi’s teachings, the interviewee argues that the conditions in India were very different than they are currently in Palestine. In India there were hundreds of millions of people against ‘quite weak’ British forces, but in the case of Palestine and Israel, forces are more equal in terms of numbers. Pointing out in his comments that the Palestinians did try a nonviolent intifada, but without success, he stresses that violent methods of resistance are justified against an oppressive power which is ‘threatening to kill you’. (Interview 2.)

All of the above arguments are countered by the WRI interviewee. He is convinced that supporting violent resistance movements will not help to end wars. Specifically, he points out that he cannot support the political leaders of Hezbollah, which he accuses the StWC of: ‘You can hear a lot of support for Hezbollah or Iraqi resistance which is not a positive for nonviolent resistance’. (Interview 3.) This view represents a long-term stance of WRI. It was argued in 1968 that ‘nonviolent methods of struggle are best suited and most likely to gain the goal of producing a political arrangement which would permit Jews and Arabs to live in harmony’ (Prasad 2005: 403).

In other words, WRI is very skeptical of supporting ‘one but not the other’ (Interview 3). Due to its advocacy of nonviolent means of resistance, it cannot support resistance movements that advocate violent means. However, this does not mean that WRI would be ‘hostile’ towards revolutionary movements (Prasad 2005: 498; also 382, 385, 401). It can support objectives of liberation and resistance movements even if it does not accept the violence they use. The following section analyzes WRI’s strategy of nonviolence in more detail.

## 6.4 Nonviolence as a Strategy against War and Militarism

WRI believes that there must be a more profound and comprehensive approach in resistance against war generally than targeting only policies of nation states and their governments. For the organization, resisting war necessarily requires resistance to militarism as an institution of the nation

state. In this regard, it advocates a strategy of nonviolence. What is more, WRI regards nonviolence as a way of life (War Resisters' International 2009a, emphasis added):

For all of us, it is a form of action that *affirms life*, speaks out against oppression, and acknowledges the value of each person. Nonviolence can combine active resistance, including civil disobedience, with dialogue; it can combine non-cooperation – withdrawal of support from a system of oppression – with constructive work to build alternatives.

WRI demands that 'those committed to non-violence must never give any moral support to the conventional methods of defence, or any action in which they would think it wrong to participate as individuals' (Prasad 2005: 323). The organization aims at affirming 'the power of active nonviolence as an alternative to the military war machine in settling conflicts between nation states' (Willoughby in Prasad 2005: 19). This ambition requires educating people about ideologies which advance wars as well as increasing awareness of the causes and effects of war. Educational work necessitates long-term commitment: it cannot be connected to any single conflict, but must be built on a holistic approach.

In viewing strategies of resistance in terms of enhancing general anti-war and anti-militaristic sentiment internationally, WRI bears some resemblance to adherents of the liberal cosmopolitan approach, who also believe that it may eventually be possible to abolish war if global civil society helps lead the reformation of the international system (e.g. Kaldor 2003a). Indeed, liberal pacifism is one of the oldest traditions within the peace movement (e.g. Ceadel 1987; Cortright 2008: 233–259). However, while liberal pacifism is characterized by its reformism and legalism, the approach of WRI is clearly more anarchistic in nature. Moreover, the organization is very critical of western powers in general. It is stressed, for example, that not only western militarism, but also 'the Western way of life' must be questioned (Speck 2005: 29).

Yet, there are also structural understandings in the WRI approach, as it works for a world 'not only without militarism, but also injustice' (Prasad 2005: 334; also Speck 2005: 29). It is maintained that refusing military service is not enough; social change is also required (Sheehan in Prasad 2005: 18). Already in 1968 it was stressed that '[t]he key to revolution

is the change in relationships, which must in turn entail change in the structures, in the social structures, economic structures and so on, but the key is what we are as human beings and how we relate to other human beings' (Prasad 2005: 405). For the WRI as an organization, this means two essential tasks. At the grass-roots level, people need to be informed and educated 'to create themselves a pattern of life opposed to militarism in every respect', which can in effect help to 'create the climate for letting peace grow from below' (ibid: 61, 449). In the theoretical literature this is usually regarded as a '*pedagogic* type' of an approach, one commonly employed by nonviolent groups and supporters of conscientious objection (Bobbio 2007: 59, emphasis in original).

As 'word alone can never be effective in bringing nonviolence and pacifism to fruition' (Prasad 2005: 61), concrete action is also needed, a view emphasized also in theoretical literature on nonviolence (e.g. Cortright 2008: 339). Generally, these concrete forms of action are quite similar to those of the other organizations when it comes to holding meetings and conferences, making appeals, giving statements, and so forth. However, WRI stresses that it is not enough to 'make appeals and publish statements', but 'concrete steps with full personal commitment and responsibility' need to be taken as well (ibid: 61, also 127).<sup>12</sup> Beliefs and principles have to be applied and practiced at the personal level in order to fight violence and other forms of injustices, which requires deep commitment on the part of the individuals involved.

Accordingly, it has been argued in the theoretical literature that peace making always 'starts with oneself' (Overy 1982: 13) and that therefore nonviolence is an 'immediately political' method (Bobbio 2007: 81). WRI believes it envisages a process or, rather, 'a praxis – of restructuring social power from the grassroots' (Clark 2005: 20, also Moretti 2005: 11; Bhavé 2005: 14) in which empowerment is also a central goal (Clark 2005: 22). This echoes the Gandhian perspective, which emphasizes that ends and means are 'not distinct categories of analysis but complementary components of the same reality' (Cortright 2006: 17; 2008: 215). Where it is maintained that creating ends is more important than serving them

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<sup>12</sup> As social movement scholars point out, pacifist organizations have 'priorities others than mobilization onto the streets' (Gillan et al. 2008: 140), for they aim to educate, inform and activate people to take more active roles (ibid: 167).

(Cortright 2008: 215; 2006: 17–18), empowerment of participants is regarded as an essential part of the process. In this context, a nonviolent approach means primarily nonviolent direct action, which is regarded as the most effective form of resistance against war<sup>13</sup>.

#### 6.4.1 Nonviolent Direct Action

Originating from the Gandhian idea of nonviolence, nonviolent direct action can be defined as ‘any action which does not involve violence undertaken by individuals or groups against a social or international evil or for the purpose of resolving conflicts’ (Prasad 2005: 324). In the theoretical literature it is described, for example, as ‘force more powerful’ or a ‘form of coercion, and a means of exercising political power’ (e.g. Cortright 2008: 211, 220). The best-known examples of the method in the twentieth century are the movements led by Gandhi in India and Martin Luther King in the US<sup>14</sup>. As a simulation of ‘Gandhian tactics of civil obedience’, direct action became ‘noticeable’ in the anti-war movement in the mid-1960s (Horowitz 1970: 10; DeBenedetti & Chatfield 1990: 42–43).

For WRI, the idea of nonviolent direct action was one main themes in the conference it held in India in 1960. While nonviolent direct action may require ‘defiance of the law or established custom, non-cooperation and individual protest’, proponents argue that it seeks to ‘develop goodwill and understanding between all concerned’ (Prasad 2005: 324). In other words, it may be necessary to create conflict in order to remove ‘international or social evil’ (ibid).

WRI’s stance on nonviolent direct action remains basically the same, although there have been many debates about the issue and new forms of nonviolent direct action have been invented along the way. During its long history, WRI has organized a great variety of direct-action campaigns. The interviewee from the organization strongly suggests that the new anti-war

<sup>13</sup> However, as Overy (1982: 16) has observed, within the groups of nonviolent revolutionists such as WRI, there have been disagreements as to whether non-violence should be regarded as ‘a tactic or a principle’.

<sup>14</sup> On Gandhi, see e.g. Cortright 2006: 9–35; on Martin Luther King, see e.g. Cortright 2006: 53–71.

movement should more nonviolent direct action, because he believes its impact to be much more immediate than that of demonstrations. He is hoping for 'a step from protesting to resisting', meaning blockades and other kinds of nonviolent action. Demonstrations should not be completely dismissed but the movement should 'not just have some big demonstrations every now and then'. Interestingly, the interviewee argues that one problem with the demonstrations of the current movement is that they are legal and arranged with the knowledge and approval of the police and other authorities. (Interview 3.) Thus, he implicitly highlights the more anarchistic characteristics of his own organization.

Some interviewees from other organizations have quite a different approach. For example, when telling about the StWC's demonstration 'blocking the city of London' with four hundred thousand protesters during President Bush's visit in 2004, a GR interviewee says it was 'a bit humoristic to know that the police had suddenly felt completely incapable of containing the massive number of people' (Interview 2):

The high police officer phoned one of the organizers of Stop the War and said 'Well, it's seven thirty, congratulations, you managed to stop the town'. Nobody planned a direct action as such but it became a real manifestation of people's power, very democratic and very genuine.

Clearly, there are different understandings among organizations about what nonviolent direct action involves in practice. A GR interviewee stresses that one does not need to be an anarchist or a 'very very brave' peace activist in order to take part in mass direct action during demonstrations (Interview 2). The WRI interviewee defines direct action much more rigorously. He points out that although demonstrations can block a whole city for a day, 'it's the city of London, it's not where the war is being fought'. Moreover, he argues that if the government can 'easily give us a bit of the city of London as long as their planes can take off, when the troops can be moved and everything', demonstrations do not pose any actual threat to military action. In contrast, direct action, such as a blockade of a military base, is believed to pose more of a concrete challenge. (Interview 3.) The line between those advocating demonstrations and those preferring direct action is quite clear (Interview 4/StWC):

If you take five or ten people off and train them up and take them off to invade an army base, take a part playing in a submarine, you don't get very far. You end up in court ... often you get acquitted. It gets in the media a little bit but it doesn't go much further than that.

For the StWC, a 'small direct action approach' does not represent an effective tactic. Instead, the interviewee talks about 'mass direct action' (Interview 4), referring to the 'the biggest series of direct action campaigns so far in Britain' (Murray & German 2005: 98) organized by the StWC and CND. Indeed, direct action has been important for the CND throughout its history. Since direct action often means breaking the law, its role has been one of the 'key debates' within the organization since its inception (Hudson 2005: 66–69, also Hinton 1989: 165–170). Its predecessor, the DAC, regarded nonviolent direct action as a more effective method of campaigning than 'working through the established political process' (Hudson 2005: 66).<sup>15</sup> It was maintained that nonviolent direct action requires deep personal commitment (*ibid*), a position also shared by WRI. While direct action 'really engages a person much more', it also makes it difficult to get a large number of people involved (Interview 3):

It's hard to think about a way of to make it easy for new people to *make the step to confront the police* and sit down and *get arrested* because it's the first time that's always the hardest. Once you've done it several times, you don't mind getting arrested. It's easy. But the first time was quite a hard step. To get rid of your fears ... overcome your ideas that you have to follow the authorities and you cannot do something *illegal* and it's so bad to be arrested.

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<sup>15</sup> It is noteworthy that the question of direct action has had quite remarkable impacts on the entire CND. One of the main episodes of 'sharp conflict' in this regard occurred in 1959, when the CND president, philosopher Bertrand Russell, challenged Canon Collins, the chair of the organization, arguing that the CND's approach was too conventional. Eventually, this led to a split, with Russell planning a new movement, the Committee of 100, which concentrated on mass civil obedience aimed to attract wider public support. Russell resigned as president of the CND in October 1960 before the new organization was officially launched. Later, nonviolent direct action became a more accepted tactic in the CND. For more on the CND and the Committee of 100, see e.g. Hudson 2005: 70, 75; Miles 2008: 101, 107; Randle 1987: 148–150, 158; Rochon 1988: 110; Overy 1982: 68.

Given that direct actionists often get arrested – indeed, it is one of the aims of such action – the WRI interviewee observes that proper training and advance legal briefing are crucial for the participants. Such preparation will enable them to make enlightened decisions as to whether they really want to take part in this kind of action. In other words, potential participants need to understand what they are getting into and to be well-informed regarding possible consequences. As a cautionary example, the interviewee cites a sit-down in Trafalgar Square encouraged by the StWC during one of its demonstrations. (Interview 3.) He criticizes it for not providing people with relevant information on the possible consequences or with instructions in case they were arrested (*ibid*):

They told their own young people to sit down. They had had *no training*. They had *no legal briefing*, nothing. They didn't know what kind of laws they are breaking here, what the punishment can be, what's the procedure. It is all very important information. You need to be aware of what can happen to you. And it's actually *quite dangerous* to ask people to direct action unless they know what can be the consequences ... They told that okay, now we call for direct action but even in their website there was no legal briefing, nothing.

It is stressed that there should have been proper instructions on the StWC website for the participants, but that these were not provided. In contrast, the WRI website offers very detailed instructions. It is possible, for example, to download the WRI Handbook for Nonviolent Campaigns, which covers issues such as 'legal support' and 'jail support' (War Resisters' International 2009b; 2009c). Reflecting upon legal and arrest-related procedures is important because, as noted in theoretical literature, the moral principle behind nonviolence derives from the idea that those 'who claim a moral right to refuse to give a particular policy their co-operation on grounds of principle, and even physically to obstruct with non-violent means, must also be prepared to accept the legal consequences of their actions' (Randle 1987: 143).

In other words, the participants are expected to 'endure hardships, fines and imprisonment' (Randle 1987: 144, also Overy 1982: 69). As WRI stresses, they 'must be prepared for suffering and sacrifice' (Prasad 2005: 324). Indeed, this is why Gandhi suggested that 'nonviolent methods are for the strong, not the weak', for it 'takes courage not to fight' as well



as ‘to suffer for a cause and not respond with violence’ (Cortright 2008: 231, also 2006: 28–34, 65–66, 130).

It is here that the more philosophical divergence between WRI and the three other organizations becomes most apparent. Whereas the three leftist organizations believe that it is difficult for individuals to try to effect change on their own, and thus emphasize the importance of mass action under the united left, the WRI stresses that all change necessarily begins with the individual. In social movement theory, it has been pointed out that this kind of an approach might be understood as ‘essentially alien to the radical working-class tradition, which emphasizes *collective* action and is strongly focused on economic issues’ (Randle 1987: 151, emphasis in original). Although mass action is not be something totally undesirable or ineffective from the perspective of WRI, it does strongly emphasize that individuals need to be acting in a more sustained and committed way. In this sense, one can understand WRI’s tendency to regard those who promote state-based strategies and tactics within the political system of the nation state as preservers of the status quo and view themselves as the ‘real’ challengers of dominant power structures.

Nevertheless, as some scholars have pointed out, it is not obstruction as such that is important ‘but the *symbolism* of the action, its power to communicate and its potential to create moral and political dilemmas for the government’ (ibid: 144, emphasis added). In other words, by influencing public sentiment via the sacrifice and suffering of the participants, it becomes possible to ‘win political sympathies of those upon the exercise of political power’ depends (Cortright 2008: 217, also 2006: 130–136). Because ‘power ultimately rests on the consent of the governed, it is maintained that altering the ‘political and moral dynamics of the struggle’ may result in changing ‘the balance of power’ (Cortright 2008: 225; also 2006: 119, 121–122, 131, 136, 191–193).

To sum up, nonviolent direct action seems to be a method which all of the organizations studied have used but which, at the same time, is a controversial tactic because they view its usefulness and effectiveness very differently. As we have seen, definitions of the concept differ among them. Nonviolent direct action is clearly the main method for WRI, whereas the other three organizations consider mass demonstrations substantially more important. All four organizations, however, suggest that different methods can be used simultaneously. In this respect, WRI is the most

puritan in its repertoire, as it does not value mass demonstrations or direct engagement with the political system.

When viewed in historical terms, the views described above reflect more generally the debate about nonviolent direct action in the context of the British anti-war movement. Mainly the debate has revolved around whether it can be regarded as ‘a morally justified’ tactic in parliamentary democracy and whether nonviolence as such constitutes an effective political strategy (Randle 1987: 131, also Gillan 2006). Similarly, in the anti-war movement literature, direct action is either characterized by its ignorance ‘of the chance for immediate political success’ (Horowitz 1970: 19) or, alternatively, described as ‘the most effective form of political action available to the movement’ (Rochon 1988: 189).

With regard to both academic and activist circles, it is interesting that the debate between demonstrating and direct action in the late 1960s was very similar to what it is today. After the Vietnam War, it was argued that ‘lack of concreteness, lack of specific direction in response to the state’ led the anti-war movement to become much more oriented towards direct action (Horowitz 1970: 11). The fact that the anti-war movement of the late 1960s was marked by a ‘shift from the politics of symbolic opposition to the actual prevention of war activities that support and sustain war’ (ibid: 44) offers an intriguing contextualization for the current situation, in which the movement seems, on the contrary, to be moving towards ‘the politics of symbolic opposition’.

Yet it is unclear how valid a categorization this actually is. With most activists within the movement said to ‘believe that civil obedience should be used as a form of symbolic opposition only’ – in other words, not used to resist the authority of the state as such but to influence it (Rochon 1988: 190) – it may at first seem that there is a contradiction with the approach of WRI, given its campaigns to blockade military bases, for example. Nonetheless, although these kinds of acts of confrontation appear to be coercive in nature, it is possible to interpret them as symbolic forms of political opposition whose aim is not to challenge the state as such but to influence public opinion (ibid: 200).<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> For additional research on nonviolence and nonviolent direct action, see e.g. Randle 1987; Cortright 2006; 2008: 218–232.

## 6.5 Towards the Multitude? Working Class against War

The strategies of resistance against war and imperialism promoted by the three leftist organizations are usually linked to organization of the working class. As pointed out in the theoretical analysis (see chapter 2), this is the primary context for resistance envisioned by radical poststructuralists, for whom the Multitude is some sort of an ‘updated’ conceptualization of the working class (Hardt & Negri 2004: xiv, 100–115, 129). None of the organizations studied here has adopted the new concept as such, and even those organizations that are closely connected to the SWP are critical of new conceptualizations of imperialism and the working class. For example, while the co-founder of the StWC argues that ‘We are for the self-organization of working people, not least because we believe that such self-organization will lead to a more effective struggle against imperialism’ (Rees 2006: 232), he criticizes post-Marxist scholars.

Rees (2006: 201) directly refers to Hardt and Negri when criticizing new theorizations based on the belief that ‘the old methods of analysis and resistance are of little use’. He claims that these conceptualizations ‘underestimate the potential power of those who oppose the modern imperial system’ (ibid). Moreover, they lead to an interpretation that ‘the polarity in the modern world is no longer to be seen as between a highly centralized capitalist and imperialist ruling class and the working class, but between the dispersed power of empire and the self-defined democracy of the multitude’ (ibid: 219). For Rees, the Multitude is ‘a shallow generalisation’ and a failed attempt to redefine the working class, which is ‘not smaller on a global scale than before but larger’ (ibid: 218). He is convinced that it has not ‘been replaced by a socially indistinct ‘multitude’ nor lost the capacity to resist the system’ (ibid: 220). Criticizing redefinition of the working class as a network of organizations which ‘displace authority in collaborative relationships’, he argues that it ‘could never produce a practical organisational conclusion’ (ibid: 219):

Successful resistance depends on an accurate appreciation of both the strengths and weakness of the system and of those who oppose it. Neither ‘pro-war left’ who have taken the argument about ‘democratic imperialism’ or the ‘clash of civilizations’ at face value, nor those on the left who reflect the triumphalism of those at the helm of the ‘one remaining superpower’, have been able to provide a suitably

accurate account of the balance of the forces as it has unfolded in recent years.

According to Rees (2006: 222), Hardt and Negri misunderstand the nature of resistance because there ‘has long been an adage on the left that the breadth of a movement was inversely related to its political depth’. He points out that while ‘single issues mobilise large numbers, complex political analyses are narrower in appeal’, now the alter-globalization movement has ‘turned the received wisdom on its head’ in representing a ‘broad critique of free-market capitalism, an aspiration for an entirely different system-wide set of priorities’ (ibid). Despite its breadth, Rees suggests the alter-globalization movement has ‘the capacity to mobilise greater numbers than many pre-existing single issue campaigns, trade unions or political parties’ (ibid). Although skeptical of the concept of the Multitude, he seems to be articulating opposition to war and globalization in terms rather similar when, for example, he speaks of ‘a particular form of popular resistance which combines protest at the effects of globalisation with a movement against war’ (ibid: 200).<sup>17</sup>

Moreover, Rees (2006: 112) celebrates the alter-globalization movement for having provided ‘a common language and identified a common enemy in a way that has not been true of any international movement of revolt since the defeat of the last great upturn in struggle in the mid-1970s’. Suggesting that the struggle ‘is far from being homogenous in methods or aims’, he even goes on to argue that its subjects ‘would not necessarily recognise each other as allies nor agree on strategy or tactics’ (ibid). In a word, Rees maintains that there is a united political project against war and other global problems although the people and groups that are part of it are not necessarily conscious of each other – a view which very much resembles the arguments of radical poststructuralists (e.g. Hardt & Negri 2004; xv, 91–93). Another very similar view is embedded in Rees’s conviction that a ‘revolt from below’ can ‘express a real alternative to the global ruling elite’ (Rees 2006: 111). In a very Hardt-and-Negrian

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<sup>17</sup> Rees’s view also comes close to Hardt and Negri’s (2004: 13, 93–95) argument that the regime of biopower has to control and manage the biopolitical production of the Multitude continuously. This is illustrated in his argument that ‘democracy as the aim of working people has forced ruling elites to reformulate their own notion of democracy as the ‘best forms of government for capitalism’ (Rees 2006: 127).

manner, he argues that since solidarity ‘arises from below’, resistance, too, must derive from below, resulting in ‘united action’ by non-state actors (ibid: 234). Hence, although he criticizes radical poststructuralists, his ideas do not seem to differ radically from theirs. The main divergence is, of course, that the struggle is not being fought between Empire and the Multitude, but ‘between nation-states, corporate competition and the resistance of working class and poor – our three titans’ (ibid: 200).

In the interviews, when discussing their understanding of constituents of global resistance, all representatives were explicitly asked about their knowledge of and opinions about the theory by Hardt and Negri. Although not all of them are familiar with the theory, many of them refer to the concept of ‘globalizing resistance’ or frame some issues in a similar way. Interestingly, while interviewees familiar with Hardt and Negri express quite critical views, those without a specific knowledge of the theory refer to the concept of global resistance in a more positive vein.

The StWC interviewees, both familiar with the theory, are straightforward in their criticism. One argues that the theory by Hardt and Negri is ‘absolutely rubbish’. Nonetheless, he often uses concepts similar to theirs when describing the anti-capitalist struggle between the left and the forces of global capitalism. For example, he claims that ‘the breadth of the movement brings strength’, which is one of Hardt and Negri’s central arguments. The interviewee considers the anti-war movement as ‘the broadest what the left has been involved with’ for a very long time, but does not regard it as globalized in the way that Hardt and Negri describe the Multitude. Rather, he understands the anti-war movement as international in nature. He compares the February 2003 demonstration with the events of 1968, contextualizing it by likening it to ‘what happened in Czechoslovakia and Paris’. (Interview 4.) The other interviewee is concerned with the possible challenges that Hardt and Negri’s celebration of diversity causes in terms of defining clear goals (Interview 5). According to him, diversity is good when it succeeds in making the anti-war movement stronger (ibid):

And therefore *beyond the question of diversity* lies the question of *common approach* and understanding that in particular times the struggle will be *focused* in particular places and particular issues, and it has to have the ability to draw from that diversity and to focus on those global critical points ... Hardt and Negri have missed this.

One of the CND interviewees is familiar with radical poststructuralist theory. While arguing that there is no need for a new theoretical analysis of imperialism, he stresses that anti-imperialism ‘needs popularization rather than some new analyses’. (Interview 1.) The other interviewee, not aware of the theory, uses a definition of ‘worker’ that echoes Hardt and Negri’s concept of ‘immaterial labour’ (2004: 103–115, 129–138) when he brings up the need for a more united working class. In his view, workers include not only those working, for example, in a car factory, but also highly educated people who are ‘pressing buttons on a computer’. As the interviewee puts it in more familiar terms: ‘you might go to work on a car, you might wear a suit but you’re still a worker’. (Interview 6.)

The GR interviewees are not familiar with Hardt and Negri, but their organization arranged a public debate between Antonio Negri and Alex Callinicos<sup>18</sup> in Paris in 2003. This extremely popular event<sup>19</sup> dealt with the question of the organized and non-organized left. An interviewee recounts that the broadening of the concept of working class was fiercely debated, with the public especially criticizing the Multitude as something ‘incidental’ and ‘almost not conscious of its activity’. The interviewee himself argues that it is not necessary to have a new definition of the working class. (Interview 2.) Nevertheless, he often brings up the issue of global poverty and injustice in much the same way as Hardt and Negri do, stressing that without tackling broader questions of social injustice, inequality and oppression taking place globally, it will not be possible to tackle the problem of war (ibid):

I think that *nobody will fight if they have everything they need* for their living ... the strongest principle in social justice. I’m sure that if people will have education, health, security, good living conditions, they will not fight ... I think the way that the world is organized is completely irrational: half of the world, third of the world is living well and the other half is living shit ... It’s very clear, *there will not be any peace* if that’s the situation. So, this is my conclusion, it has always been my ethical guideline.

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<sup>18</sup> Alex Callinicos is Professor of European Studies at King’s College in London.

<sup>19</sup> The interviewee reports that there were three hundred places but that over three times as many people came. When left outside the lecture hall, people ‘started to bang on the doors and make a real noise because everyone wanted to hear Negri and Callinicos’. Eventually the sound system was taken outside the hall so that everyone could at least listen to the debate. (Interview 2.)

In another argument bearing a resemblance to Hardt and Negri's (as well as Foucault's) position, the interviewee advocates the idea of *permanent resistance*. For him, resistance should not be manifested only in 'micro-actions'; rather, there should be a more general analysis guiding different acts of resistance 'towards the same direction'. In this regard, he refers to the need to globalize resistance but in a more organized way than Hardt and Negri suggest. (Interview 2.) The other GR interviewee brings up the need for global solidarity as a means of encouraging workers to give support to each other in different countries in their specific struggles. She says she knows from her 'socialist readings' and her 'revolutionary socialist comrades' that in order to change anything there must first be real change in how the society is run. Hence, she stresses the need to act organized. In highlighting the importance of local and practical (organized) resistance she stresses the international character of the working class, thus, clearly subscribing to a more traditional definition of the working class than Hardt and Negri. (Interview 7.) On the whole, GR's views are, however, closer to those espoused by the radical poststructuralist approach than are the views of any of the three other organizations.

In regarding the working class as 'a bit of a simplifying concept', the WRI interviewee is critical towards not only post-Marxist conceptualizations, but traditional leftist concepts as well. He stresses, for example, that the working class is 'not necessarily the most progressive' political force. He regards the idea of the international working class as problematic, because 'when you look at it globally, you see that working class here globally benefits from the exploitation of the South', that is, those who are poor in the West are 'quite high up' when evaluated globally. (Interview 3.) When it comes to the new concepts of Empire and the Multitude, the interviewee brings out a very important point, one not discussed by any other interviewee or theorist studied in this thesis. He argues that the idea of globalizing resistance is problematic because there are so many different views and ideologies which 'might be opposing each other' (ibid):

So, there's an Empire, there's western capitalism and you have a lots of different people, movements opposing neo-liberalism, globalizing capitalism. But they are very different. They might be *opposing each other*. Some of them are right-wing fundamentalist forces, ours are more progressive ... you *cannot just throw them all together*. The world is too complex for any kind of simple answers or simple analysis.

The analysis presented here is extremely interesting, because it addresses one of the main problems of not only the approach advocated by radical poststructuralists such as Hardt and Negri, but also that promoted by liberal cosmopolitans. Neither of these theoretical approaches seriously engages in a discussion about possible political competition between different groups, organizations or movements within the Multitude or global civil society.

## 6.6 Conclusions

This chapter has reflected on the theoretical debate regarding effective political strategies (*how to resist*) and the primary context of resistance (national or global) by empirically analyzing how these are understood within the current anti-war movement. The aim has been to determine the extent to which the understandings within the anti-war movement ‘resonate’ with those of the three theoretical approaches, and what their main convergences and divergences are in this regard.

The analysis has revealed that within the British anti-war movement there are several different understandings of the question ‘how to resist’, whether the focus is strategies or tactics of resistance. All organizations share the view that both the national and international levels are important, but view their importance and functions differently. While some stress the primacy of the national level, others are more inclined to regard resistance against the Iraq War (or any war) as a matter requiring an international, or even a global, approach. They also connect resistance against the Iraq War to many other struggles and issues. Although their views about strategies and tactics of resistance are closely connected to their broader ideological approaches, not even those organizations that are based on similar ideologies necessarily have similar views.

Since the organizations define their main targets of resistance in different ways (see chapter 5), it is not a surprising finding that their views about primary strategies and tactics also vary. However, in regard to resistance against the US government, there are primarily three main strategies that all the organizations consider in rather similar terms. Firstly, it is maintained that the US government can be effectively resisted by putting pressure on the states and their governments which support



the US in its military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Secondly, it is argued that the US can be resisted by creating as international an anti-war movement as possible, thereby influencing world public opinion, which exerts pressure on the US. Thirdly, it is maintained that encouraging the American anti-war movement to resist US foreign policy within the country is an influential strategy. On the whole, it is somewhat surprising that the organizations do not generally discuss strategies against the US more often – given that in their political rhetoric they often regard the US as the main opponent of the anti-war movement.

In regard to the national context, the organizations regard different strategies as important in pressuring the national government. In particular, the StWC and CND – which emphasize the national level due to their understanding that the most effective way to resist the war is to put pressure on elected representatives – believe that it is important to mobilize public opinion and that this can be best advanced by organizing mass demonstrations. In other words, both organizations strongly advocate the strategy of mass mobilization. Despite this emphasis, both of these currently very influential organizations within the new anti-war movement also take part in party politics through their political representatives in the SWP and the Labour Party. Their understanding of politics and power is quite traditional in that they seek political change by influencing those in power, either by pressuring the government indirectly through mobilization of public opinion or by directly collaborating with certain political parties.<sup>20</sup> GR also has an intimate connection to the political system through the SWP, but it nevertheless seems to regard this kind of an engagement as less important than the StWC and CND do. WRI is the only organization that has no connections with the political system. It is also unique among the organizations in not cooperating with trade unions, a form of collaboration in which the other three engage and which they consider important.

The StWC and CND emphasize their international contacts and networks, especially in relation to the coordination of worldwide demonstrations such as those organized, for example, in February 2003

<sup>20</sup> Hence, although it is argued that the current anti-war movement is 'more jaundiced about established political parties' than its predecessors (Gillan et al. 2008: 189) and 'less inclined to follow a parliamentary focus' (ibid: 73), these arguments must be viewed in relative (historical) terms.

and five years later in March 2008. There are many references to the global context, although these often overlap and are partly detached from the discussions concerning international cooperation. The StWC connects the anti-war struggle to the struggle against imperialism practiced by great powers and stresses the importance of a united front and the organization of the working class. Its views are based mainly on traditional socialist understandings rather than the post-Marxist approach advocated by radical poststructuralists; to be sure, in certain contexts the organization has 'updated' its traditional analysis to some extent and now conceptualizes resistance in more global terms. Nevertheless, the struggle is not regarded as taking place between Empire and the Multitude but between 'three titans' – nation states, corporate competition and the working class and poor. In other words, strategies of resistance against war are conceptualized mainly in terms of the working class struggle against imperialist nation states.

Due to its anti-nuclear focus, the CND usually connects resistance against war to the movement against nuclear weapons but sometimes also to the environmental movement. In the context of the Iraq War, it regards the causes of war and other global problems as intertwined also in a broader, more structural sense. Hence, it is suggested that the international objectives of the anti-war movement are connected to those of the alter-globalization movement. The CND believes that different social movements are in the process of developing a common analysis of interconnected problems that stem from unjust international economic institutions. The common struggle is not, however, against an abstract Empire but against the unjust international system led by the US as an imperialist nation state.

GR can be considered an internationally oriented organization by virtue of the issues that it is struggling against, in particular war and other global injustices, which it regards as inseparably interconnected. The alter-globalization movement provides the main context for the organization, with the ESF functioning as an especially significant platform. Connections to the anti-war movement are both international (via the ESF) and national (through cooperation with the StWC and other British anti-war groups). GR regards itself primarily as a mobilization organization, activating people to demonstrate against international institutions. It also emphasizes the importance of local-level activities.

Resistance against war is regarded to some extent in poststructuralist and global terms, although the national level is still considered quite important in the current anti-war movement.

WRI is by definition more internationally oriented than the other organizations. It has member associations in over 40 countries, but because it cooperates primarily with other pacifist organizations, it has no cooperation with any of the British groups involved in this study. The interview with the WRI representative reveals that the organization is quite skeptical of the current anti-war movement and especially the leadership of the StWC. Although there are some problems when it comes to immediate causes such as the Iraq War, one gets the impression of a peaceful co-existence with the other organizations in which differences can be put aside to at least some extent. Nevertheless, the WRI stresses that long-term work promoting peace through nonviolent direct action is more important and far more effective than organizing mass demonstrations or working through the political system.

The main difference between the three leftist organizations and WRI is that while the last connects resistance against (the) war to issues such as the expression of individuality and freedom *from* big collectives, centralized organizations and state rule, the others consider the struggle to be more a question of freedom from imperialist, neo-liberal capitalist domination. This, in turn, is viewed as a force to be challenged by creating unified and large political collectives with a strong sense of solidarity, and often one of unity as well. Whereas WRI draws on liberal as well as libertarian ethics, regarding autonomy of the individual as more important than that of organizations or collectives, the three other organizations clearly value collectivity more than the individual. For them, the struggle against the war is usually linked to the struggle against imperialism, a policy reflected in, among other things, the explicit demands they voice in the socio-political sphere.

All the organizations regard resistance against the Iraq War as connected to other causes, these spanning global capitalism and unequal power structures, the military-industrial complex or the western culture of violence and militarism. As the Iraq War is considered an issue connected to broader struggles, all the organizations share the belief that resistance against (the) war can be enhanced by supporting the objectives of other social movements, although the organizations differ as to the particular

movements with which they articulate connections. Agreeing that support and cooperation with anti-war organizations and movements in other countries are necessary, the organizations examined here refer to many other social movements, ranging from the anti-imperialist, anti-nuclear, anti-capitalist to pacifist and environmental movements. This clearly illustrates that all organizations share an understanding of the interconnectedness of different aims and levels of resistance, albeit from different perspectives.

Often the organizations establish connections in more or less abstract terms, not outlining specific forms of support or collaboration in detail, but articulating these through references to *global solidarity*. From a theoretical perspective it can be argued that there are elements which bear a resemblance to the idea of global resistance advocated by radical poststructuralists (especially in the case of GR but also to some extent where the CND and StWC are concerned) and to the idea of global civil society advanced by liberal cosmopolitans (the StWC, CND and WRI). When referring to interrelated goals and common struggles, most of the organizations seem to assume that all the different movements and objectives are somehow automatically compatible with each other, this being the case especially with the left-oriented organizations. The analysis conducted here reveals that there is virtually no discussion about how the diversity of aims of different struggles and movements can result in political conflicts or contradictions. This is an interesting finding given that the analysis also shows that there is a wide range of issues about which the organizations in fact disagree; that is, issues that can potentially become politicized within the movement, particularly if some organizations feel that their primary goals may be endangered.

Only one interviewee from one of the organizations reflects upon this issue, pointing out that the idea of global resistance is problematic because great diversity necessarily means that there are views and ideologies that conflict with each other. This perspective is extremely interesting, as it squarely addresses one of the main problems of the consensual approach advocated by not only radical poststructuralists but also liberal cosmopolitans. Neither of these theoretical approaches seriously engages in discussion about possible political competition between different groups, organizations or movements that might lead to conflicts and contradictions within the movement. Liberal cosmopolitans

tend to overemphasize the consensual aspect of the new forms of political activity within the global civil society, whereas radical poststructuralists do not seriously address the question of possible contradictions within the Multitude.

This chapter has demonstrated that although all organizations share a feeling that they should work more closely together, in reality political and ideological differences cause some problems, whereby coordination between them is not as intense or as fruitful as it could be. Some of the organizations are quite adamant about certain issues, creating 'blocks' where different strategies and tactics are concerned. These views also cause some friction within the movement. The fact that the organizations have some common practices and understandings but that cooperation does not usually go deeper than that seems to confirm arguments that in the abstract (at the symbolic level) it is quite easy to share ideas, but in practice there are difficulties because all organizations want to protect their autonomy (e.g. Gillan et al. 2008).

To sum up, it can be said that when the understandings of effective strategies are evaluated in relation to the three theoretical approaches, only GR's views of effective strategies and the primary context of resistance resonate clearly with the radical poststructuralist approach. It emphasizes the importance of large international gatherings and demonstrations against international institutions and stresses the interconnectedness of different struggles that can be advanced by common strategies of global opposition. Two of the leading organizations of the British anti movement, the StWC and CND, clearly resonate more closely with the critical state-centric approach in advocating clear strategies and collective political engagement at the national level. They regard pressuring the national government with a strategy of mass mobilization as the most effective way to oppose the war and also readily engage in parliamentary politics through their close political contacts in the Labour Party and the SWP. Cooperation with trade unions is also considered important because of their broad membership base, which can be utilized, for example, in the form of industrial strikes.

However, by the same token, these two organizations also believe that it is important to engage in international campaigning and have taken part in organizing some international (often referred to as 'global') demonstrations. In other words, they represent a sort of a mixture between

different theoretical approaches in that they also consider symbolic politics at the global level to be important. In advocating this kind of a 'both-and' perspective, they actually represent quite a traditional approach by international social movements, and differ from new social movements of the postmodern era in that they do not necessarily regard the global as the primary level for engagement.

This internationalism also becomes evident when the two leading organizations connect resistance against the Iraq War to other issues, such as the anti-militaristic and the anti-imperialistic struggles, in which international coordination is considered necessary.<sup>21</sup> When referring to the working class (which is regarded as especially important in the context of the anti-imperialist struggle), the framework is also represented as international rather than global in the sense that radical poststructuralists would have it.

Yet another standpoint is illustrated by WRI, which regards resistance against war from a more traditionally defined international perspective: it does not seem to adhere to the postmodern singularities project, but rather chooses to engage in international cooperation with pacifist organizations internationally. In the case of specific strategies and tactics, WRI represents a very distinct approach compared to the other organizations or the theoretical approaches examined here in that it advocates a strategy of nonviolence and nonviolent direct action. While clear and strategically goal-oriented in their own context, nonviolence and direct action differ quite radically from collectively and politically oriented mass mobilization strategies. On the whole, it can be said that the strategies of resistance in the anti-war movement are informed primarily by the critical state-centric approach, although they do show some resonance with liberal cosmopolitan understandings and the radical poststructuralist approach as well.

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<sup>21</sup> The StWC and CND do sometimes use concepts such as global resistance and global struggle, which resemble certain concepts employed by radical poststructuralists. However, the concepts do not generally have similar content for them. The organizations often mean 'international' even when they say 'global'.

## 7 THE POWER OF THE MOVEMENT

### 7.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the question of *power* in the context of the new anti-war movement. It reflects on the theoretical debate concerning the power of social movements (*what is power*) by empirically analyzing how power is understood within the current anti-war movement. The aim is to determine to which extent the understandings within the anti-war movement ‘resonate’ with those of the three theoretical approaches examined in this study, and what their main convergences and divergences are in this regard.

The power of the new anti-war movement as a ‘peaceful superpower’ has been vigorously debated ever since the February 2003 demonstration day. On the one hand, it has been argued that the anti-war movement has become a powerful challenger of US foreign policy and hegemony, that is, a superpower in its own right whose power should also be conceptualized in globalized terms (e.g. Cortright 2007a; 2006; 2008). On the other hand, these arguments have been challenged by pointing out that the ‘superpower’ has been powerless against its mighty opponents, for the war continues (e.g. Ritter 2007). Although not directly reflecting on the power of the anti-war movement, the three theoretical approaches all conceptualize the power of social movements on a more general level. While both liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists maintain that social movements (as well as other non-state actors) have gained more power at the expense of nation states, the critical state-centric approach is much more skeptical in that regard.

More specifically, liberal cosmopolitans regard the power of social movements as depending on their ability to mobilize broad public support at the global level with their informational and soft-power resources. Shaping global opinion is regarded as the most effective form of power, as it can be used for putting pressure on states and governments while challenging their official foreign policy goals (e.g. Castells 2004: 161; 2008: 82–82, 90; Beck 2000, 70; Nye 2004a: 90, 31–32, 97–98, 105–106, 137). For radical poststructuralists the logic is basically the same: they maintain that globally oriented social movements and non-

state actors, although not capable of challenging the military might of the global regime of biopower as such, can nevertheless resist and challenge it with instruments of soft power. The power of social movements thus lies in their ability to execute ‘moral interventions’ against Empire (e.g. Hardt & Negri 2000: 35–36). The critical state-centric approach challenges the arguments of both approaches and suggests that symbolically and abstractly oriented global social movements are less of a challenge to governments and power elites than movements which understand that politics means essentially a struggle for power in the domestic context. Accordingly, the approach stresses that current social movements in fact escape power to the extent that they lack strategic engagement and concentrate only on symbolic manifestations of resistance at the global level. (E.g. Chandler 2009a: 18; 2004: 334.)

This very contradictory theoretical debate is reflected on here by analyzing empirically how power is understood and conceptualized within the anti-war movement, the ‘current agent’ of resistance against war<sup>1</sup>. To this end, the analysis poses the following questions: How is power of the anti-war movement articulated and defined? What elements and factors are regarded as constituting power and giving strength to the movement? How are different power elements articulated in relation to each other?

The chapter will demonstrate that each of the organizations studied has generally a broader and more multifaceted understanding of power than any of the three approaches in the theoretical debate. While the theoretical debate is based on a clear ‘either-or’ logic, where power is conceptualized in either purely symbolic terms (academic globalists) or purely instrumental terms (critical state-centric approach), most organizations combine these two notions and consider both important in

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<sup>1</sup> Understanding how power is conceptualized within the movement is of course significant also from the perspective of other issues that have been analyzed in this study, because ‘purposive action must be related to some conception of agency and some conception of power’ (Gillan 2006: 46). When working for social change what is required is also ‘a belief in the power of one’s agency and a desire for change’, that is, ‘an empowering understanding of one’s capacity to change that injustice’ (ibid: 56). A political actor such as a social movement must not only have power, but also be prepared to use its power for advancement of its goals in order to make a difference. As power is a complex concept that is understood in many different ways, the present research has confined its focus in this chapter to the question of how power is defined and understood by the actors themselves.



the struggle against (the) war, although each emphasizes them in different proportions. The chapter will show that the organizations conceptualize the power of the anti-war movement mainly in relation to three elements: public support through public opinion or public action, the unity of the movement, and the diversity of the movement. Almost all debate concerning the power of the movement revolves around these three elements, which are interrelated. In the sections to follow, these elements are presented for each organization in turn, after which similarities and differences between the organizations are discussed. The analysis starts with public support as an element of power and then moves on to the issues of unity and diversity.

## 7.2 Public Support as the Main Element of Power

Public support is clearly regarded as the single most important constituent of power for the anti-war movement. Three of the four organizations studied subscribe to the view that the power of the anti-war movement derives directly from the public, with the fourth adhering to this view only partly. The significance of public support is emphasized repeatedly in the StWC, CND and GR material, although there are some differences in emphasis between the organizations. The StWC and CND emphasize public support especially at the national level, whereas GR is more inclined to stress the importance of public support, especially in the form of public opinion, at the global level. WRI is quite skeptical of all forms of power by definition, including that of the anti-war movement, and even questions the ability of the movement to provide an adequate analysis of power. Nevertheless, a closer examination reveals that, unlike it may seem at first sight, WRI does not consider all forms of power to be corrupt and oppressive.

While some new social movements (such as the alter-globalization movement) have become well known for arguing that they do not seek power, or that they somehow wish to abstain from power, the findings here show that this is not the case within the anti-war movement, at least the new British movement. For example, the StWC can hardly be regarded as diffident about power when it explicitly refers to the anti-war movement as the world's second superpower (Interview 4): 'We've always

talked about ourselves as *the second superpower*, you know, the anti-war movement'. The argument is interesting, because in public as well as theoretical debate it has been 'world public opinion', not necessarily the anti-war movement, which has been referred to more often as the second superpower (e.g. Chomsky 2003; cf. Hardt & Negri 2004: 258–264; Cortright 2007b). However, after the February 2003 demonstration, the former view has gained more ground, indicating that the movement is thought to represent 'global public opinion' when challenging the actions as well as the rhetoric of the first superpower, the US (e.g. Cortright 2007b). Indeed, an StWC interviewee argues that at the international level the anti-war movement derives its power from people across the world. He nevertheless stresses that the most important sources of public support are 'the populations that are in the belligerent countries and the populations in the countries attacked'. (Interview 5.)

The StWC defines the power of the British movement in a similar way, that is, directly in regard to public support at the national level. This is usually done in two different ways. The first is to articulate it through popularity: 'The Stop the War movement is *the most powerful and influential popular political movements* of my lifetime and possibly of any period of our history' (Benn in Nineham & Burgin 2008: 1, emphasis added). Here, the power of the anti-war movement is articulated as support via *popularity*, that is, public opinion. The second approach is to describe the power of the movement as popular support via *public action*, especially in the form of mass demonstrations. These are explicitly defined as 'the backbone' of the movement (Nineham & Burgin 2008: 23, also Murray 2008) and thus public action is represented as the main constituent of power – a view that also becomes evident in the interviews. For example, an StWC interviewee argues that the power of the anti-war movement lies largely in the fact 'that people went out in the streets'. Hence, he regards public *mobilization* as the main element of power of the movement and in this way the difference lies in public *action* rather than public opinion. (Interview 4, also Interview 5.)

Underlying this conception of power is the belief that the most effective mechanism for resisting war is to have the movement put pressure on elected representatives via public pressure; this in turn depends directly on its popularity, as best manifested in mass demonstrations. Some would argue that this can be regarded as *democracy by extension*, since

the movement is regarded as depending on public support for its power in much the same way as political parties are dependent on their voters. This view of power reflects the idea of representative democracy – in contrast to, for example, the idea of direct democracy, which some other organizations promote – in that people are regarded as being represented, albeit not as members of the electorate, but of the anti-war movement. The StWC argues that the anti-war movement has become an increasingly powerful actor in the electoral process (Interview 4):

This is a democracy, after all, therefore they have to continue winning elections in order to stay in power ... that strengthens our hand *as long as we can make it look if they might not win in an election* and they might withdraw the troops in order to win it.

The conception of power espoused by the StWC here puts the anti-war movement and the government it opposes in direct confrontation with each other. Since public support is also important for those in government, whom the anti-war movement opposes, the government and the movement are actually competing head to head for public support. This can thus be regarded as a properly political struggle over power in the sense suggested by the critical state-centric approach (e.g. Chandler 2004: 334; 2009a: 7–18; 2009b: 531–532). While liberal cosmopolitans might regard this kind of a state-based struggle as an old-fashioned, unnecessarily partisan or ineffective form of political engagement for social movements of the global era (e.g. Castells 2004: 141–143; 2008: 82–83), radical poststructuralists would argue that the anti-war movement is engaging in a useless local struggle, one that poses no challenge to global power structures (e.g. Hardt & Negri 2000: 45–46).

In the material of the CND, the power of the anti-war movement is articulated in very similar terms. Public support through public opinion or public action is usually regarded as the main mechanism for pressuring elected officials and thus influencing politics. Public support is regarded as the key to power for not only political parties but also the anti-war movement. Both CND interviewees stress that public support provides the anti-war movement with the rationale, or the justification, for its existence. They also underline that government policies have activated and motivated people to support the movement. It is argued that people's

power is manifested on the streets, where the anti-war movement keeps on demonstrating against the war. (Interview 1; Interview 6.) At the same time, however, it is recognized that it is difficult to conceptualize the power of the anti-war movement (Interview 1). Both CND interviewees also express quite critical views in regard to public opinion. For example, when describing Britain's involvement in different wars over the past hundred years, one interviewee stresses that most wars have actually been very popular in Britain (Interview 6). It is pointed out, for instance, that while there was at first strong opposition to the First World War, this soon evaporated and demonstrations were held *in support of* the war (ibid):

In the inter-wars years there was a big movement towards peace ... Second World War, there was *no opposition* to it at all, of any size. Since then, it's got all the colonial wars and everything Britain has got involved with, the only ones there's been *any opposition* to is Suez for a short time ... Vietnam which Britain was not involved with anyway ... and *hardly any opposition* to the Falklands War in 1982. It was the Gulf War in 1991 and later Iraq and Afghanistan which *provoked the opposition*. The public opinion has *changed*.

In this interpretation, it is maintained that over the years the British public have somehow grown more critical towards war as well as Britain's involvement in military interventions. However, the other CND interviewee is not at all convinced that public opinion has changed that much. He does regard public opinion as important, saying 'the truth of the matter is that in the end public opinion matters', yet goes on to argue that the British anti-war movement 'has taken off on the whole *in spite of* the public opinion' (Interview 1). Here he seems to be referring to the fact that prior to the Iraq War, before major demonstrations took place, many people supported it. According to polls conducted before the war, only 20 per cent of the British were opposed to the war with or without the approval of the UN (Isernia 2006: 145).

In other words, the interviewee believes that the anti-war movement was first operating in a difficult pro-war atmosphere but over time managed to influence public opinion and create and inspire more opposition towards the war. It is noteworthy that in this interpretation the movement has not so much reflected the views of the public as influenced them. The power of the movement becomes defined here from a different angle – as

a capability to influence public opinion, which is more closely related to the achievements and effects of the movement (see chapter 8).

In the GR material, the power of the movement is not discussed at all as such. In the interviews, the GR representatives refer to public support as one of the main elements of the movement's power. However, the emphasis is more on the global level, since they usually refer to 'global public opinion' and rarely bring up the concept of public opinion in the national context. (Interview 2; Interview 7.) This can perhaps best be interpreted as reflecting GR's connection to the alter-globalization movement, which mainly focuses on the global level in its opposition to international institutions. The WRI material makes little reference to public opinion as such, and even less in terms of the power of the anti-war movement. Instead, there is a lot of discussion about empowerment, this occurring, however, in the more general context of nonviolence and pacifism rather than the anti-war movement (e.g. Bhave 2005; Clark 2005; Moretti 2005; Teršelič 2005; Speck 2005).

In this regard, it is maintained that rather than participating 'in the existing power structures', empowerment should aim at 'transforming power relationships through transforming one's self', which can result in changing cultural patterns and relationships in society (Teršelič 2005: 7, also Moretti 2005: 11; Clark 2005: 20). Although power is often considered a corruptive force (Moretti 2005: 12) or even something 'wicked', it is stressed that nonviolence should 'contribute in a way that will lead to shifts in power relations' (Teršelič 2005: 7, also Moretti 2005: 11). It is recognized that 'no human being who is part of our contemporary world can claim to be completely innocent as far as the use of power is concerned' (Bhave 2005: 13–14). Thus, it is necessary to 'deal with power' (Teršelič 2005: 7; Moretti 2005: 11), even take 'steps closer to power, on both a conceptual and working level' (Teršelič 2005: 9).

At the same time, 'the power of freedom' is strongly emphasized, referring to the idea that it is possible to 'transform situations of injustice' and 'make decisions autonomously' but also in solidarity with others (Moretti 2005: 11–12). It is stressed that the aim is to 'strengthen people's power-to-be and power-to-do' (Clark 2005: 20). In emphasizing the power in each individual (Bhave 2005: 14), power is not regarded in terms of 'power over' something, which indicates some form of domination, but rather power in relation to that something (Clark 2005: 20–22).

This multifaceted conceptualization of power perhaps explains why WRI regards the issue of power in the context of the current anti-war movement in highly skeptical terms. When interviewed, the representative of WRI frames and articulates the power of the movement quite differently from the interviewees of the other three organizations. Very skeptical of the movement's power in general terms, he is not convinced that the public support manifested in demonstrations constitutes any considerable power for the movement. According to him, neither the anti-war movement nor the British citizens have any power over the current government. This argument is based on the fact that almost two million people marched against the Iraq War at a time when almost eighty per cent of the citizens were opposed to the war, but even together these did not prevent the government from getting involved in the war. (Interview 3.)

In this interpretation, the power of the anti-war movement becomes evaluated in terms of concrete *influence* on government policy; this is clearly not the case with the three other organizations, which consider the movement powerful despite its failure in this regard. It is quite interesting that the WRI interviewee regards the power of the anti-war movement solely in terms of power over the current government, clearly subscribing to an instrumentalist view of power here (also Teršelič 2005: 7–8). This position is somewhat contradictory in the sense that, as a pacifist organization, WRI itself has not often been very powerful if evaluated from a purely instrumentalist perspective. Furthermore, in regard to its own objectives, the organization has continuously emphasized that nonviolent resistance against war and militarism requires long-term work and that no quick results are to be expected. In this sense, power or influence by non-pacifist organizations within the anti-war movement becomes evaluated from a different perspective and using different criteria than those applied in assessing the power of pacifist organizations.

The above-mentioned stance becomes even clearer when the WRI interviewee argues that it is 'political naivety' to believe that opposition to war manifested in demonstrations would as such be enough to compel the British government to do anything. In his opinion, this sort of an analysis denies any kind of power issues. He argues that there is 'a tendency in movements to ignore issues of power', which leads them to rely on ineffective strategies. (Interview 3.) In a word, it is claimed that the current anti-war movement, which advocates mass mobilization as its

main strategy and demonstrations as its main tactic, cannot realistically challenge government policies. Although WRI is strongly against state authority and state power generally, it does not accept the view that the current movement could challenge these forces, at least not by demonstrating alone. As pointed out earlier (see chapter 6), there is a deep divergence between the strategies and tactics advocated by WRI and those preferred by the other three organizations. Instead of putting confidence in mass protests and relying on public support, WRI accentuates that the anti-war movement should move 'from protesting to resisting' which involves blockades and other forms of nonviolent direct action. (Ibid.) However, within the organization there is also critical debate regarding the efficacy of direct action. For example, it is pointed out that 'activists sometimes confuse *symbolic power* and the espoused goal, especially when movements employ direct action' (Clark 2005: 20, emphasis added).

On the whole, WRI conceptualizes the power of the movement in terms quite different from the other three organizations, which emphasize popular support, democracy by extension and extra-parliamentary politics. From WRI's perspective, anti-war politics becomes defined as confrontation rather than a form of cooperation with the state and state authorities. Hence, power, too, becomes conceptualized in a different way. As scholars often note, for nonviolent revolutionist groups political power – whether the opponent's or the movement's – usually represents a form of oppression (Overly 1982: 14). It is indicated that 'power is based on the consent of those governed' and when 'this consent is *actively* withdrawn, power crumbles, it ceases to exist' (Speck 2005: 25, emphasis in original). However, WRI simultaneously emphasizes the importance of international solidarity, referring to 'the power that comes from the sense of belonging to an international movement' (ibid: 26, also 29).

### 7.3 Unity and Diversity as Elements of Power

The power of the movement is also articulated in relation to its unity and diversity. They are both regarded as elements of power that, it is claimed, give strength to the movement. Unity is most often discussed by the StWC and CND, but also to some extent by GR and WRI. The way in which the four organizations discuss unity – or diversity – and the

meanings these concepts are accorded in relation to power differ quite significantly. The StWC material usually articulates unity as a power resource for the movement or as a prerequisite for collective political action. Indeed, it is argued that unity was one of the founding principles of the StWC, a position justified on the basis of the claim that ‘those who oppose governments only have two fundamental strengths, their number and their ability to organise’ (Rees 2006: 225). Making use of these strengths requires unity and commitment from the anti-war movement in order to ‘maximise the forces’ fighting for common aims (ibid). Hence, the power of the movement is conceived as deriving from a unity of aims and having the maximum number of people working for those aims.

This view is substantially constricted where unity of the movement is defined explicitly as the *unity of the left* (Murray & German 2005: 54). According to the StWC, the Socialist Workers’ Party was able to lay ‘the bedrock for the unity which was the first of the Stop the War Coalition’s foundation stones’ (ibid). Despite this strong national emphasis, unity at the global level is emphasized as well (Interview 4):

It’s about unity and of course that is what the world anti-war movement has been about. It’s about uniting, first of all movements in countries, and then *uniting those movements together internationally* ... It’s all about unity and kind of bringing people together.

Despite the fact that the StWC regards the movement as most powerful when united, its material contains even more references to diversity as a constituent of power. Both StWC interviewees represent diversity as ‘one of the key strengths for the movement’ (Interview 5). It is accentuated that as ‘a majority movement’ the anti-war movement is very broad, this breadth giving the movement its strength (Interview 4). In other words, its heterogeneity is seen as making it more effective. However, since it is simultaneously underlined that diversity as such is not enough but needs to be concentrated, diversity becomes actually defined in a way that can be read as an effort to create more unity. One StWC interviewee says that diversity is good ‘if many streams flow into a single river’, because then it makes the movement stronger; but if these streams ‘remain single streams’, it does not help. Therefore, beyond the question of diversity there lies a more important question of ‘common approach and understanding that in particular times the struggle will be focused in particular places and



particular issues'. In short, the movement needs to have an ability to 'draw from that diversity' when focusing on critical issues. (Interview 5.)

In more general terms, diversity becomes articulated extremely often in relation to the February 2003 demonstration. The StWC chair stresses that it was a protest 'such as Britain had never seen before, all-embracing in its diversity and imposing in its unity of purpose' (Murray 2008). Thus, again, diversity and unity are mentioned simultaneously, seemingly without any contradiction. They are articulated in connection to each other in more explicit terms, for example, when the anti-war movement is described as 'a genuinely integrated and diverse movement, involving those of all religions and none, old, young, gay, straight, female and male' (German 2007: 10). Here, diversity becomes defined as *diversity of people*, but when it comes to the aims of the movement, unity is clearly valued over diversity. In short, for the StWC diversity refers to people and unity to the cause. It is indicated that too much diversity can pose a challenge to the movement (Murray & German 2005: 62, emphasis added):

A genuine "mass movement", reaching beyond the usual suspects, will inevitably encounter all sorts of views, prejudices and ideas which *do not fit with the principles of the left*, for so long polished in splendid isolation. The movement, if it is to maintain its breadth and momentum, *must accommodate* that range of outlooks *while remaining focused* on its central objective, and *not indulging behaviour which would be unacceptable under any circumstances*.

While recognizing the diversity of the current movement, the StWC in fact articulates quite a strong call for unity. Since the argument that the movement should not accept 'behaviour which would be unacceptable under any circumstances' is not specified, it leaves quite much room for interpretation in regard to what is considered acceptable. If viewed critically, it can be said to represent sort of a 'unity wanted, diversity tolerated' approach. Nonetheless, an StWC interviewee stresses several times that anti-war organizations and movements are 'all very different and the direction they take has to be decided by them' (Interview 4):

It's very difficult for us to *impose* on any other movement what they should believe but we all work very closely together because in general *what brings us together is more significant than what separates us* and most people can see through that.

In this view, political or ideological differences between organizations are not regarded as anything serious. Rather, the underlying assumption is that everyone understands they have common interests, which are more important than the differences. It is also emphasized that all organizations have their own tasks within the broader movement and that the StWC does not try to ‘impose’ its own ideas, values or beliefs on others. An StWC interviewee emphasizes that although in charge of mass action and mobilizing large numbers of people into the streets in Britain, his organization tries not to ‘run too far ahead’. Here, he refers to more radical, smaller groups in Britain and internationally. Indeed, the above-mentioned arguments in regard to unity and diversity are made mainly with reference to the national context. Where the broader anti-war movement is concerned, the StWC argues that it is ‘almost impossible to impose’ anything because national groups decide upon their own views and ‘use their own slogans’. (Interview 4.) Nevertheless, the importance of cooperation in the current situation is emphasized (*ibid*):

Today we confront a *global enemy* and one that isn't our country in a very real way but it's the *same problem* that exists in for the poor people in America or poor people in Pakistan or Thailand or wherever. So, we do confront *the global enemy* and that *forces us to make links we wouldn't do otherwise*.

What exactly these links are that the StWC would not do otherwise is not specified. When explicitly asked if traditional peace organizations and newer anti-war organizations should combine their efforts, some interviewees argue that they already have – through the StWC. A representative of the CND, for example, describes the StWC as a ‘very successful model’ since it has affiliated with all major trade unions as well as Muslim organizations, cooperation with which he considers especially important. In his view, the StWC has illustrated that the ‘capacity to mobilize across the society and to incorporate under an umbrella lots of different strands is a strength for the movement’. (Interview 6.) Hence, it is not surprising that the CND views the issue of unity and diversity similarly to the StWC, a closer analysis revealing that the emphasis on unity is usually much stronger. Unity is rarely mentioned on its own but becomes often articulated implicitly when discussing diversity (e.g. Hudson 2005: 252).

The CND argues that in order for the anti-war movement to be powerful and effective, it must sustain 'that *broad unity* which characterised the Iraq anti-war movement' because 'It is not every day that the Pope, the Socialist Workers Party and the Muslim Association of Britain are all on the same side' (Kent in Murray & German 2005: 259, emphasis added). Here again, unity is articulated as people from very different backgrounds being 'on the same side'. 'Broad unity' is regarded as desirable as well as possible. The CND chair argues that the unity of the movement has been 'remarkable', as organizations which have been working together already for years 'have all recognized the need for cooperation to keep the movement strong' (Hudson 2005: 243). Cooperation is considered especially important in regard to 'further challenges', such as 'the danger of attack on Iran' (ibid). In this interpretation, unity is represented as a necessary condition for a powerful movement that can be flexible where changing problems and new political opportunities are concerned.

At the same time, the CND refers to diversity as a power resource. It explicitly argues that 'over the years CND has generally benefited from this diversity and been strengthened by the different approaches to campaigning that this inevitably brings' (Hudson 2005: 59). No details are given, however, on how this takes place in concrete terms. It is merely suggested that being 'very pluralistic, both in perspectives and methods', the CND has 'always been a very broad organisation, encompassing in its membership an extremely diverse range of political views, ethical and moral considerations and social backgrounds' (ibid). It is argued that in the current movement diversity is manifested by people demonstrating against 'globalisation, against oppression in the occupied territories, against debt, against the arms trade and much more' (ibid: 245). This is believed to result in 'bringing together and linking the issues and making us all stronger by being and working together' (ibid, also 252).

The organization thus argues that problems which have been previously seen as separate are now regarded as closely interrelated, making the movement stronger. In this respect there is usually no discussion about possible contradictions that different views might cause. Nonetheless, the CND is more open about internal contradictions than, for example, the StWC. It admits that diversity has resulted in 'major and heated debated between different views within the movement' (Hudson 2005: 59), even to the point that during its 50 years of history the organization has been

occasionally ‘wracked by intense internal controversy’ (ibid: 77, also 92–93). In the experience of both CND interviewees, there have always been some sorts of contradictions as well as ‘occasional moments of intolerance’ within the anti-war movement, but at the moment differences are put aside ‘as a token of appreciation of what the challenge is’ (Interview 1; Interview 6). The movement as a whole is considered ‘very harmonious’ (Interview 6) – in other words, consensual and united. Indeed, diversity is here again seen as giving strength to the movement (Interview 1):

Obviously the fact that people from *various traditions* and people from various viewpoints come together to do this does *give strength* to the movement ... you cannot get the illusion of coherence where there is *no coherence*, and at the moment there isn’t. So, the fact that it’s *varied*. I think it’s *sort of strength*.

Extraordinarily, this particular interviewee gives a concrete example of how diversity can provide more strength to the movement. According to him, those people who previously viewed anti-war activism in negative terms ‘used to say that critics of American foreign policy were just a faction inside the Labour Party’. Due to growing diversity this has changed: ‘As soon as people came from various traditions that couldn’t be said anymore, and the movement became more powerful.’ (Interview 1.) Here, it is maintained that the power of the movement was enhanced because its critics could no longer portray it as a representative of a small minority. Indeed, the CND points out that its explicit purpose, together with the StWC, has been ‘to provide a platform, the widest ever in this country, to people to come to’ (Interview 6). It is stressed that they do not seek to interfere too much with other organizations’ priorities, because the CND is generally ‘opposed to western powers telling other people what to do’ (Interview 1). It is also argued that diversity in the anti-war movement guarantees that it cannot be dominated by any one organization (ibid), which is not, however, a view shared by all the organizations.

GR’s material has little discussion about unity as such, although the framework of the organization is regarded as global. It could be assumed that some sort of unity would be desirable for an organization that explicitly aims to globalize resistance. However, the exact opposite seems to be true. It is stressed that ‘the broader the movement and the more inclusive it is, the greater its chances of success’ (Globalise Resistance 2008a). Both

interviewees argue that diversity gives strength to the movement, because it engages a broad variety of people from different traditions, for example, from religious and minority groups as well as grass-roots members of socialist parties. (Interview 2; Interview 7.) Thus, diversity rather than unity is seen as constituting power for the movement.

Interestingly, in contrast to the argument made by the CND, a GR interviewee says that the anti-war movement has been criticized 'from the right' for its diversity, not being coherent or not having clear enough goals. This critique has now been proven wrong, as British activists have managed to fulfill their 'dream since the 70s, since Thatcher time', succeeding as they have in organizing 'all the different diverse specific struggles into one movement'. Although 'fragmented in its ingredients', the anti-war movement should not be regarded as 'tame'. GR's interpretation comes close to the view of the radical poststructuralist approach in that diversity is seen not only as a diversity of people but also as the interconnectedness of many different *causes*, such as economic and social justice, anti-privatization campaigns, education and health, trade union issues, and anti-war politics. For GR, these are not issues to be dealt with only in the national context, but ones that need to be tackled in broader forums. When asked about possible contradictions that diversity can cause, a GR interviewee argues that that different aims and struggles do not compete, because it is possible to 'co-operate and work on the same platform without excluding groups'. However, when telling about diversity in more practical terms, he admits that a very 'open form of democracy' can also lead to some problems. (Interview 2.) For instance, he describes the ESF in London as a 'nightmare' because there was a large number of groups discussing a variety of issues (ibid):

It was very very *difficult to get to a conclusion* but we did get in the end, we did get an event going, we did get *clear goal*. It doesn't mean that you want *uniformity* that you want regimented ... movement. No, the whole strength of the movement, its *power to overcome differences* in light of a much *stronger goal*.

In other words, when very diverse groups come together, it is not easy to reach conclusions or a consensus. While some might argue that reaching a consensus or creating unity is not even the main point of these kinds of events, the interviewee asserts that the strength of the movement in fact

lies in 'its power to overcome differences in light of a much stronger goal' (Interview 2). In the end, then, unity is considered more important than diversity when assessing the power of the anti-war movement. It seems that for GR most problems in the world result from the unified ideology and power structures of global capitalism. Therefore, it accentuates that all different struggles should be combined together in a unified attempt to challenge the 'mother cause' of all problems. Here, its position comes very close to the poststructuralist idea of the Multitude, where diversity and unity are also emphasized simultaneously without seriously engaging in a discussion of the problematic relationship between these two concepts.

The cases of StWC and CND also illustrate that while there is much talk about diversity and it is commonly portrayed as a power resource, unity is regarded as a more salient quality, at least when understood in terms of strength or an ability to work effectively. The fact that the anti-war movement is very closely tied to the unity of the left means in practice, however, that some groups and activists find it difficult to participate in the movement, as shown by the case of WRI described below.

WRI is the only one of the studied organizations that does not directly connect the power of the movement to its unity. Interestingly, however, it has the broadest definition of unity. The organization is characterized as 'a part of the history of humankind in its *sadhana* (endeavour, 'meditation' in Sanskrit) to be liberated from the bondage that stops it from realising the importance of human unity' (Prasad 2005: 21); or, put more specifically (ibid: 23, emphasis in original):

Humankind has to prepare itself to be able to know the difference between good and evil. And to be able to do that humans have to realise that they are *one* among the *many*, that they have to own the *whole* of which humankind is an integrated part.

Although referring to the unity of humankind (which some may find a problematic term) as an important element of its pacifist ideology, WRI generally regards diversity as a more important element than unity in the context of the anti-war movement. Most importantly, WRI differs from the three other organizations in that it does not define diversity solely in terms of a diversity of people from different backgrounds. It often also refers to a diversity of ideas, ideologies and political convictions. The WRI history notes that WRI was 'the first pacifist organization which,

from its foundation, aimed to address all men and women living in any part of the world, *irrespective of their philosophical or political convictions, religion, faith, colour or creed*' (Prasad 2005: 20, emphasis added). It is suggested that the WRI 'does not make any kind of discrimination: religion, faith, *conviction*, sex, race or colour' (Willoughby in Prasad 2005: 19, emphasis added). What is left unsaid, however, is that the above-mentioned philosophical, ideological or political convictions must not seriously conflict with the general ideology of pacifism. For WRI, too, there is a line where unity of purpose defines how much diversity – or, rather, what kind of diversity – can be accepted.

In regard to efforts to produce unity from above, WRI has emphasized that it is not 'a centralised body to dictate or even 'guide' the individual members or the groups associated with it', because such a body is 'neither possible nor desirable' (Prasad 2005: 93, 145). Centralization is regarded as impossible for practical reasons and undesirable due to the philosophical and political differences of its affiliates (ibid: 93). Therefore, WRI should sooner be regarded as a body bringing together like-minded individuals and groups, organizing common projects and doing 'some basic group thinking, both constructive and analytical' (ibid: 94).

Although WRI, unlike the other three organizations, does not discuss the concept of diversity explicitly in relation to the power of the anti-war movement, it is possible to determine the organization's stance on the issue by analyzing how it regards unity in the same context. The WRI interviewee underlines that the most important element of movements 'is that they don't have streamlines'. In his opinion, they 'set off issues which have to be the same on all different levels', resulting in 'more or less stability', which he regards as a negative thing from the perspective of effectiveness of resistance. (Interview 3.) In short, stability and too much emphasis on unity are believed to restrict the movement and hence decrease its power. The interviewee brings up other problems caused by strong emphasis on unity in the context of the movement. He feels that it is too much characterized by the SWP and the trade unions and views the StWC as a 'self-acclaimed spokes-organization for the movement' due to its leading position. Accordingly, he maintains that the overall situation for pacifist groups within the British movement is 'very difficult'. (Ibid.)

It is interesting that while demanding that the new anti-war movement should take a more open and tolerant approach in regard

to pacifist organizations, the WRI representative is very critical of the StWC's strong connection with another minority group, namely, British Muslim organizations. In his view, one of the main problems is that pacifists cannot give speeches or take an active role in events organized jointly by the StWC and Muslim organizations, because it could be interpreted as an expression of support for Hezbollah and violent forms of resistance. From the perspective of pacifist organizations it would be thus better if there were more 'progressive Muslim groups' involved in the British anti-war movement. Cooperation with non-progressive Muslims, characterized as 'homophobic' and 'bigamist' by the interviewee, would pose a serious problem, he believes, because it would require putting aside struggle for women and gay rights. (Interview 3.) This illustrates that not even WRI, which seems to have one of the most embracing definitions of diversity, can be regarded as truly tolerant of all the kinds of views expressed within the movement. On the contrary, many other organizations and scholars (e.g. Gillan et al. 2008, especially 73–102) have celebrated the incorporation of Muslims as a new group into the movement as something quite extraordinary and positive.

Importantly, the StWC has not tried to deny the problems that a diversity of views brings in this particular respect. It has publicly admitted that there is a problem in regard to representation of women, since the leadership of the MAB is 'entirely composed of men' who are 'mainly of Middle Eastern origin' (e.g. Murray & German 2005: 88). However, the StWC points out that MAB does have a women's section and stresses that women are not that well-represented in non-Muslim organizations either, pointing a finger especially at the trade unions (*ibid*):

Anyone remotely acquainted with the British trade union movement, for example, will be aware that neither sexism nor homophobia are uncommon in its ranks. The organisations generally have the appropriate policies, yet women can be subjected to more crude sexist behaviour than they might be likely to encounter within the Muslim Association of Britain. No one would suggest that an anti-war movement should have no truck with trade unionism until its ranks are 100 percent cleansed of such behaviour. Yet this is good enough as a stick to beat the Muslims with.

The StWC suggests that the above-mentioned attitude can be interpreted as 'a form of racism' due to the 'desire to hold *their* organisations at arms



length for flaws which are, in some measure, tolerated in *ours*' (Murray & German 2005: 88, emphasis in original). Although 'homophobia and attacks on women' should be opposed 'from whatever source', the StWC stresses that 'such views are far from being held by all Muslims, and are certainly not unique to Muslims' (ibid: 268):

It is absurd to insinuate that homophobic attacks or wife-beating are exclusively Muslim problems ... Of course, some Muslims – like many non-Muslims – hold views on some social issues that are more conservative than those of the socialist and liberal left. But that should not be a barrier to collaboration over common concerns. Would a campaign for gay rights, for example, insist that all those who took part share the same view of the war in Iraq?

## 7.4 Conclusions

This chapter has reflected on the theoretical debate concerning the power of social movements (*what is power*) by empirically analyzing how power is conceptualized within the current anti-war movement. The aim has been to determine the extent to which the understandings within the anti-war movement 'resonate' with those of the three focal theoretical approaches, and what the main convergences and divergences are.

The chapter has shown that the organizations studied clearly articulate three elements that are believed to constitute power for the anti-war movement: public support, unity of the movement and diversity of the movement. Almost all debate concerning the power of the anti-war movement revolves around these three issues in one way or another. Public support is usually articulated either by reference to *public opinion* or *public action*. As one of the main organizers of large national demonstrations and some global action days, the StWC strongly emphasizes public action in the form of mass demonstrations and defines it as a power resource for the movement. Mass demonstrations are regarded as manifestations of public support, which is considered the main constituent of the movement's power – especially at the national, but also the global level. The StWC emphasizes public action significantly more than the other organizations, the CND being closest to it in this regard.

GR is more inclined to regard global, and not national, public support as the main power resource of the movement. WRI defines the power of

the anti-war movement in different terms than the other organizations, viewing it, quite surprisingly, from a very instrumentalist perspective and remaining skeptical of the current movement having any power over the government. In this particular context, power is defined merely in terms of power over those in power, although more generally the organization subscribes to a more multifaceted conceptualization of power.

That most of the organizations studied conceptualize the power of the anti-war movement in terms of public support is logical, since public support is generally regarded as 'the ultimate resource and the final arbiter between contending political organizations' in any democratic system (Rochon 1988: 25). When viewed from this perspective, gaining public support can be considered as important for political parties competing with each other in the electoral arena as it is for social movements aiming to gain popular support outside the political arena in order to influence political decision-making by the political parties currently in power. In fact, it is usually argued that social movements are much more directly dependent on public support than political parties are. While political parties 'are much better able to endure periods in which they are out of touch with the views of their publics' (ibid: 25), social movements must always primarily aim at maintaining their public support, because without it they simply cease to exist (ibid: 101). Due to their organizational existence, political parties can concentrate their efforts on influencing policies (ibid), but social movements cannot take such risks (ibid: 25).

Hence, it can be concluded that the great emphasis put on public support as a source of power for the anti-war movement by the organizations reflects the prevailing conceptualizations of power in the context of social movements. The anti-war movement is no exception, because its power is also regarded as resting on 'its ability to convince others that it has extensive support' (Rochon 1988: 101). Put differently, it is dependent 'on the political legitimacy' it has been 'able to acquire in public discourse' (Ruzza & Bozzini 2006: 113).

Yet an interesting as well as important feature in the context of this study is that discussion about public support of the movement by the organizations is very often articulated in connection to the debate on the crisis of democracy. It is argued that people are not able to use their political power as voters and citizens of their country and that they therefore try to influence political decision-making through the anti-war

movement, which is believed to reflect and act on their political views and beliefs better than any of the political parties in the parliamentary system. In other words, it is argued that in the current political situation citizens are capable of exercising political power only outside the representational political system, whereby many have chosen to give their support to the anti-war movement instead of political parties and professional politicians. However, if viewed critically, support for the anti-war movement instead of political parties – at the end of the day also an attempt to influence political decision-making – is nothing very radical, because it can be regarded as more of a change of channel than as a radical effort to change existing power relations and structures.

The above-mentioned views are not uncommon elsewhere in the world, either. Particularly in countries which have approved or participated in the US war effort in Iraq, similar views have been commonly expressed in public debate as well as in statements by anti-war organizations in these countries (e.g. Ruzza & Bozzini 2006: 125–127). This sort of reasoning is becoming increasingly popular in many other social movements as well, and as we have seen, is increasingly often reflected in theoretical debates featuring approaches from liberal to radical. They suggest that social movements have become essential bodies for political participation. While both the liberal cosmopolitan and radical poststructuralist approach argue that traditional forms of political engagement in the representational political system are ineffective<sup>2</sup>, the state-centric approach maintains that traditional forms of political engagement are the most effective way forward when the aim is to influence political decision-making.

Although there clearly are very critical views of the political system within the anti-war movement, as reflected in the amount of explicit discussion about the crisis of democracy, the arguments of some of the organizations, such as the StWC and CND, actually resonate much more

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<sup>2</sup> As illustrated in chapter 2, liberal cosmopolitans maintain that political engagement is not, and should not be, any longer linked only to political parties, classes or representative democratic politics. It is argued that the most important and urgent problems are not solvable in the context of the traditional political system. The radical poststructuralist approach makes essentially the same argument, although from a more structural perspective. It maintains that the decentralized power of Empire can only be challenged by decentralized forms of political organization, an achievement which only social movements are capable of, since they are organized in a networked, non-hierarchical and deterritorialized fashion.

with the those of the critical state-centric approach than those of the liberal cosmopolitan approach. These organizations have attempted to create a broad mass movement at the national level, an ambition that can be regarded as explicitly political in that it is directly defined as a form of opposition to the existing government. Although the movement as such does not take part in parliamentary politics, both the StWC and CND have actively tried to put pressure on the government through traditional political platforms. By drawing on their political contacts, members in political parties and major trade unions, they also seek power in more concrete terms within the political system. Hence, in regard to the national anti-war movement, the two organizations' conception of power echoes the more traditional, instrumental view of power advocated by the critical state-centric approach. Yet, they are not hostile towards liberal and radical conceptualizations of symbolic power, for, at the same time, they consider it possible to engage politically outside the political system of the nation state and seek soft power via symbolic politics in the international context. In short, they have a 'both-and' approach, although the national context and power within the political system seem to be considered more important than symbolic power gained at the global level.

GR, too, operates on a 'both-and' logic, but its emphasis is the opposite. Its conception of power is closer to that of academic globalists, as the organization promotes symbolic forms of political engagement, and preferably at the global level. GR's approach actually comes closest to that of radical poststructuralists, as the organization seems to believe in some sort of global power that comes with global resistance. Only one of the organizations studied conceptualizes power in terms other than popular support, WRI. It is very critical of the power of the current anti-war movement, pointing out that it has not been able to put enough pressure on the UK or US governments to stop the war. Here, the power of the movement actually becomes evaluated from a very instrumentalist perspective. WRI does not seem to believe that the anti-war movement can have much concrete power in the first place. Moreover, it argues that the movement does not have a proper analysis of power: since the power of the opponent is not understood properly, it is also impossible for the movement to make use of its own power effectively. The criticisms that WRI presents are quite similar to those expressed by the critical state-centric theoretical approach, although the two critiques derive from

almost opposite premises. Contrary to what proponents of the state-centric approach might urge, WRI is highly critical of engaging with the establishment and skeptical of other forms of power as well.

While the StWC, CND and GR usually understand power in terms of collective power – that is, power of the masses – WRI explicitly criticizes this view in the socialistic framework. WRI itself has the most optimistic view in regard to the ability (power) of an individual to make a difference on her own. It is believed that an individual, no matter how powerless she might be considered, always has some form of power at her disposal. The most effective way to use it is by refusing to obey any official laws and restrictions set by authorities that the individual finds unjust or oppressing. In this view, an individual is not merely an object of the power of the state, but has power over authorities in her relationship with the state which can be used by refusing to obey, or by actively breaking, the law. This power is seen as manifested most effectively in civil obedience. Despite its strong emphasis on the power of the individual, WRI does not seem to totally disregard the idea of collective power. Nonviolent direct action campaigns are based on the idea of many individuals choosing to combine their efforts, using their power in a similar way when coming together. To some extent, the CND shares this view, especially when articulating the power of the movement in regard to certain forms of resistance, particularly direct action campaigns. However, when referring to the new anti-war movement, the CND views power in terms more similar to those used by the StWC and GR.

One interesting observation is that power as a concept is usually articulated by the organizations only when discussing the power of their opponents or the achievements of the movement; the power of the organizations themselves is rarely discussed, and the power of the anti-war movement is hardly ever evaluated critically. In other words, discussion about power struggles between different organizations or different ideologies within the movement is almost non-existent. Neither is there much critical discussion about the fact that as a part of the western and/or the European anti-war movement, the organizations do not always reflect ideas and values embedded in other cultures very well. Only the WRI interviewee brings this up explicitly as an issue, but not even he puts very much emphasis on it. On balance, the organizations hardly ever consider the power of the movement from a critical perspective. In failing

to reflect upon power issues in their own context, they are essentially guilty of the same obliviousness to relations of power that they often accuse western governments of.

When it comes to other elements that are believed to bring power to the movement, both unity and diversity are defined as power resources. The fact that unity is regarded as one of the major constituents of power is hardly surprising in the context of social movements. It is a commonly shared notion that a certain amount of cohesiveness is required of any social movement for it to be effective and reliable in its political demands. Thus, within the new anti-war movement, unity is also often regarded as a necessary condition for making collective claims and forming a powerful political body of resistance in the struggle against the war. However, there is much less explicit discussion about unity than about diversity. Indeed, one might get the impression that the importance of unity has been overwhelmed by that of diversity, given that the latter is constantly celebrated in almost all possible contexts. This perception would be flawed, however, as a closer analysis of how the organizations define and articulate unity and diversity reveals that much of the debate about diversity is actually related to issues that bear on the unity of the movement. In other words, when arguments are dissected, it becomes clear that, from the perspective of the power of the movement, most of the organizations ultimately consider unity more important.

Where diversity is explicitly discussed, it is argued to be an increasingly important factor, giving more strength and power to the movement (strength and power are for the most part used as synonyms). In this context, diversity is not so much of a value in its own right as a means to an end – one that helps to increase power. An interesting finding is that the organizations do not usually regard the concepts of unity and diversity as contradictory, but rather as complementary. It is of course true that there can be a certain level of unity and diversity at the same time. However, to regard the two simultaneously as equally important power resources is only possible when unity and diversity refer to different things – unity to the cause, and diversity to people. Only in this way is it logically possible to regard them as working in the same direction.

One reason for the popularity of the ‘diversity discourse’ within the anti-war movement might be that achieving unity when defining the primary goals, targets and strategies of resistance seems to be remarkably

difficult at the national level, let alone the global. Alternatively, it could be argued that the discourse of globalized politics and resistance has made the celebration of diversity necessary, as in the case of the alter-globalization movement. If power is not sought through unity (a clear definition of goals, enemies and strategies), then it must be sought via mass participation on a much more abstract level. Hence, celebration of diversity as a power element is connected to 'the logic of numbers' (Gillan et al. 2008: 84–85). The difference might also be understood as 'a distinction between political pragmatists and ideological purists' as well as 'between those who stress the political mission of the movement and those who give it chiefly a social role' (Rochon 1988: 90–91). Political pragmatists tend to stress the political mission of the movement, ideological purists the social role of the movement. For the first group, it is more important to get the maximum number of supporters, while for the second the crux of the issue lies in the ability to acquire supporters 'who are fully committed to the movement's ideology' (ibid: 91). While the three leftist organizations – the StWC, CND and GR – can clearly be placed in the first category, the fourth, WRI, belongs to the second category. For all of them, however, the issue of unity and diversity always seems to come down to the question of power and thus also to the definition of power, that is, which element is believed to be more important from the perspective of power of the movement.

Although not all organizations discuss the issue publicly, it is clear that the lack of debate about unity and diversity in relation to the power of the movement cannot be attributed solely to the numbers game or a need to keep the ideology as pure as possible. In addition, the organizations are likely to recognize that imposing unity on others can lead to internal conflicts<sup>3</sup> just as readily as extreme diversity can lead to tensions between different groups where a great number of competing views and interests emerge<sup>4</sup>. It is important how the organizations deal with each other, since

<sup>3</sup> Moreover, attempts to create more unity can 'lead to superficiality and a curtailment of debate' (Gillan et al. 2008: 98).

<sup>4</sup> Organizations do, however, compete with each other even within unified movements. As Rochon (1988: 95) points out, many outsiders have too 'romantic' a view about the peace movement when they imagine a 'late-night planning sessions over numberless cups of strong coffee', not recognizing that 'the debates at such meetings are as likely to be about how to vanquish rival movement organizations as they are about how to join forces to abolish nuclear weapons'.

rivalries ‘may not only deflect them from their chief task’ but ‘also weaken the claim of any one of them – or of the whole set of them – to speak in the name of the movement’ (Rochon 1988: 81). In short, both unity and diversity can be problematic: too much emphasis on unity may produce internal conflicts, but too much diversity can as well. Although conflicts are more likely to arise when a movement is in decline, as happened to the anti-war movement in the 1960s (Taylor Young 1987b: 296), even during growth periods conflicts arise ‘between those who see membership growth as desirable and are willing to sacrifice movement goals to continue that growth, and those who do not believe that membership growth is important and may even be alarmed by it’ (Rochon 1988: 90).

The analysis in this as well as previous chapters has demonstrated that there are many disagreements and even some conflicts between the organizations studied. Their differences are not usually discussed publicly: their websites and other promotional material contain hardly any mention of such problems, but in interviews they are brought up more openly. The interviews reveal that beneath the surface there is less unity than it might appear on the outside. It is interesting that many of the organizations seek to represent such a strong image of unity and consensus in the eyes of the public. While they seek publicly to de-politicize themselves in this regard, politics comes into the core privately in the interviews. The fact that there is not much discussion about differences or conflicts within the British anti-war movement more generally has been interpreted by some social movement scholars as a ‘deliberate strategy on behalf of many to create a welcoming and accommodating space of resistance to war’, reflecting the ‘desire to accommodate *everyone* within a diverse and heterogeneous movement’ (Gillan et al. 2008: 98, emphasis in original).

While it is easy to celebrate diversity on the surface, in practical terms an increasing degree of diversity means a growing number of conflicting views and interests within the movement, which can weaken its claims. Finding the right balance between unity and diversity can thus be regarded as an extremely difficult task. Growing diversity and inclusiveness might increase the power of the anti-war movement (if power is defined in terms of numbers of people involved), but even this can take place only to a certain extent. In the end, there is a dividing line somewhere, a point at which more diversity starts to equal less effectiveness or power (again, of course, depending on definition of power). More diversity may



result in broader public support and more people becoming active in the movement, but at the same time it may mean that the movement's aims and goals must be defined in considerably more abstract terms than in a more unified movement with clearer goals.

Here, defining the primary context of resistance becomes significant as well. Do the central organizations aim to make the anti-war movement an increasingly broad movement that relies on mass support at a global level and thus advocates mainly expressive politics in a search for symbolic power? Or do they aim to create a more unified and exclusive movement with more clearly defined goals in the national context, which might allow them to more effectively pressure those in power in the political system? Or do they wish to continue with the approach they seem to adhere to currently – pursuing both simultaneously but for different purposes?

As we have seen, these debates are not new within the anti-war movement, but they have gained new relevance and taken on new characteristics with the increased popularity of the discourse of globalized politics and resistance in both activist and academic circles. The idea that diversity brings more power to a movement seems to have become a mantra of sorts for new social movements, and has now become popular within the anti-war movement as well. Viewed from the perspective of the theoretical debate, it is important to note that the liberal cosmopolitan and radical poststructuralist approaches regard social movements as more or less consensual within themselves, working toward common goals in peace and harmony towards their stated objectives. In other words, the currently dominant globalist frameworks do not discuss any potential problems caused by a simultaneous celebration of unity and diversity.

Only the critical state-centric approach succeeds in illustrating the conceptual tension between diversity and unity. As Chandler (2009a: 220) points out, 'without clear goals and interests it is not possible to think strategically about collaboration and cooperation'. None of the three approaches, however, provides any suggestions as to how conflicting interests should be discussed and handled within movements in order to avoid their being undermined by internal controversies that may result in less power and efficacy. This issue will be reflected upon more in the concluding chapter when discussing the shortcomings and failures of the theoretical approaches in their connection to political practice.

To conclude with a more general perspective on the issue of power, the

alter-globalization movement provides an interesting case of comparison, because it has challenged some traditional understandings of power while arguing that it wants to abstain from power altogether. Chandler (2009a: 20) regards these arguments as alarming, interpreting them in terms of popular disengagement from politics as well as power: 'The more we engage in politics without a strong sense of collective social power the more we see power as alien and threatening to us'. While these are certainly legitimate concerns, ones that may have manifested themselves in the alter-globalization movement, the analysis here indicates that rather the opposite is true in the case of the British anti-war movement. The majority of the organizations regularly bring up the importance of power and evaluate the movement in terms of its effectiveness and achievements (see also chapter 8). Given that organizations represent the movement even as the 'world's second superpower', they can hardly be regarded as reluctant to broach the issue of power. They clearly articulate that power is an important, if not the most important, constituent of resistance.

This chapter has demonstrated, firstly, that the organizations regard the anti-war movement as striving for power, having power and using it to achieve its goals. Secondly, the chapter has demonstrated that the organizations conceptualize the power of the movement mainly in terms of public support, unity and diversity. Thirdly, and most importantly, the chapter has shown that each of the organizations studied generally has a broader and more multifaceted understanding of power than any of the three theoretical approaches analyzed. While the theoretical debate is based on a clear 'either-or' logic – power being conceptualized either in purely expressive and symbolic terms (academic globalists) or purely instrumental terms (critical state-centric approach) – most organizations combine these two and consider both important in the struggle against (the) war. In other words, the organizations sooner advocate a 'both-and' approach, although there are slightly different emphases in their views.

Despite the fact that power has been defined in this chapter in many different ways, it remains unclear what the power of the anti-war movement is, and what it can be, in more concrete terms. In order to go beyond the abstract level, the final empirical analysis chapter examines what the organizations believe the anti-war movement has been able to achieve while struggling against the Iraq War.

## 8 WINNING WHILE LOSING? SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

### 8.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the question of the *effects* of resistance. It empirically analyzes how the organizations studied understand the successes and failures of the current anti-war movement (*what have been its effects*). The chapter differs from the previous empirical analysis chapters in that it seeks to broaden and deepen what in the previous chapter was a rather abstract analysis of the different conceptualizations of power in the anti-war movement.

Hence, it is useful to probe the issue of power in relation to that of effectiveness, which means analyzing what the anti-war movement is thought to have achieved with its power when struggling against the Iraq War. The empirical analysis to that end addresses the following questions: What are regarded as the main achievements and effects of the new anti-war movement? What are regarded as its main failures and shortcomings? How are both successes and failures justified and explained?<sup>5</sup>

The chapter will demonstrate that the four organizations of the case study understand the achievements and successes of the movement quite broadly, defining them in *both* instrumental *and* symbolic terms as well as in *both* national *and* global terms. They differ, however, in what they consider the movement's most important achievements to be and what they expect it to be able to achieve. This indicates that they have different understandings more generally of how the effectiveness of resistance should be evaluated. In the conclusions, these observations help to contextualize findings of the previous chapter, which dealt with the question of power.

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<sup>5</sup> As the nature of these questions clearly illustrates, the purpose is not to make any kind of impact analysis, or claims about 'real' outcomes and effects of anti-war activism, but to analyze how they are understood within the movement.

## 8.2 Perspectives on Achievements and Successes

The organizations studied differ quite much in how they consider the main achievements of the new anti-war movement. Whereas one of them (the StWC) presents a great variety of remarkable achievements and successes both at the national and the global level, two are more cautious (the CND and GR), and one is very skeptical about any achievements (WRI). The section to follow presents the organizations' views about the main national achievements of the movement. Thereafter, the chapter introduces their views concerning broader impacts.

### 8.2.1 National Achievements

#### Constraining the Government and Shaking the Establishment

According to the StWC and CND material, one of the main achievements of the new movement has been to constrain the British government's actions and political decision-making in regard to the Iraq War. It is argued, for example, that due to pressure by the movement, the number of British troops in Iraq has been decreasing continuously. While pointing out that the number is four thousand at the time of the interview (March 2008), an StWC interviewee stresses that the Prime Minister has been 'forced to promise to withdraw' the remaining troops. (Interview 4.) However, it is admitted that it is difficult to evaluate the extent of the movement's influence since there are no 'figures saying the Stop the War movement has reduced the number of troops in Iraq to this level' (ibid):

Our movement has a very important role to play *even though we don't always see it...* and you never get a pat on a back for what you do ... but by constantly raising it as an issue you make it very *difficult* for governments to maintain troop levels there. And of course the nature of a resistance movement is not that you defeat the occupying power but you make it so *expensive* for them to maintain their occupation and so *politically difficult* for them at home to maintain their occupation that they want to leave.

Although it is admitted that any direct influence is difficult to evaluate, at the same time it is maintained that the movement has pressured the

government into reducing the number of troops in Iraq. Similarly, a CND interviewee argues that the movement can be credited with the fact that 'on the whole, the troops in Iraq couldn't be increased but they were reduced' (Interview 1). Some interviewees are concerned that people fail to recognize that government reductions in troop numbers are due to the pressure by the anti-war movement. For instance, an StWC representative says that he understands people may be frustrated due to the lack of progress in ending the war, but that he is disappointed because they do not 'look at the actual progress that has been made' (Interview 4).

The StWC also argues that the recruitment numbers of the British army have 'dropped off sharply as a consequence of anti-war campaigning' (Murray & German 2005: 274). The argument is supported by pointing out that the army itself has been 'forced to acknowledge publicly that the Stop the War Coalition has had an impact on levels of recruitment' (ibid: 3). Moreover, it is stressed that government decisions and policies 'have been exposed to public scrutiny as never before' (ibid: 274). It is also claimed that the movement 'deterred the government' from implementing its plans 'that Iraq was to be followed by more interventions' (Curtis in Murray & German 2005: 27). This is regarded as 'a major public success, a sign of how significant a force of popular protest can be, and how it can push elites off course' (ibid). Indeed, the StWC stresses that the movement 'has shaken the political establishment in Britain' (Nineham & Burgin 2008: 23) while reflecting 'the rising discontent with the world's one remaining superpower and its loyal allies in the Blair government' (Murray & German 2005: 5). The anti-war movement is described as a 'transformative movement' that has 'helped to change British politics' and claims that it is now considered 'part of the debate in unions, political parties and religious communities' (ibid: 6). Here, the movement is represented as 'central to the political culture on the left' and the belief is that it will continue 'to shape the course of politics' not only where the Iraq War and the transnational relationship are concerned, but also in regard to how 'Britain is governed' (ibid: 6, 202).

One very interesting argument is that the movement has not only made an impact on the current government but can potentially influence governments of the future as well. The StWC indicates that the anti-war movement could be 'accepted as a permanent feature in decision making by all *future* governments' (Benn in Murray & German 2005, emphasis

added). Simultaneously with this remarkable optimism, however, the organization points out elsewhere that the current government is still ‘deaf to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the country’ (Nineham & Burgin 2008: 20). In other words, there is some ambivalence in the arguments. In any case, directly influencing the government can be regarded as one of the most challenging tasks for any social movement (Rochon 1988: 108). As social movement scholars note, direct influence is usually only possible by putting ‘so many people into the streets that the government would fear for its electoral life if it did not respond to the movement’s demands’ or by ‘by gaining the support or at least some parties in the governing coalition’ (ibid).

### Getting Rid of Tony Blair

One of the most common arguments in regard to the achievements of the movement is its ‘getting rid of’ Prime Minister Tony Blair of the Labour Party. Broader impacts on the popularity of the Labour Party are also brought up. These arguments are found mainly in the StWC and CND material, are very rarely mentioned by GR, and not put forward at all by WRI; the same distribution applies in the interviews. By referring to its campaign slogan ‘Blair must go’, the StWC straightforwardly argues that the anti-war movement was Prime Minister Tony Blair’s ‘nemesis’ (Nineham & Burgin 2008: 23). More specifically, it is maintained that the mass demonstrations against the war organized by the movement ‘ended his career’ (Interview 4). Or, as a CND representative puts it, the movement ‘wrecked Blair’ (Interview 6).

Some interviewees describe the role of the anti-war movement a bit differently in this context. For instance, a GR representative says that some StWC members ‘would claim that Blair would have stayed longer in office if there hadn’t been pressure from the Stop the War’ (Interview 7). By wording her comment in this particular way, she implies that the argument is not necessarily very convincing. Even the StWC itself admits that, prior to the build-up against Iraq, Blair had ‘already lost much of his credibility’, being ‘widely resented within his own party and among his own natural supporters’ (Murray & German 2005: 29–30). It is also recognized that the doctrine of ‘liberal imperialism’ advocated

by Blair does not have a ‘great reservoir of support’ in Britain (ibid: 30). Here, the claim that the anti-war movement ended Blair’s career assumes an altogether different content.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, it is argued that the movement posed a challenge to the Labour Party in more general terms as well. According to the StWC, the movement takes credit not only for Tony Blair being forced out of Downing Street, but also for the fact that other central supporters of the war ‘have been driven from office’ (Nineham & Burgin 2008: 4). Similarly, a CND interview suggests that there has been ‘enormous long-term damage to the Labour Party’ and large numbers of members have resigned from it (Interview 6). None of the arguments evaluate or speculate on the extent to which certain developments might be attributed to the war itself instead of, or in addition to, the anti-war movement.

## Impacts on British Society and People

### *Influencing Public Opinion*

Many of the organizations regard shaping public opinion at the national level as a central achievement of the new British anti-war movement. The impact on domestic attitudes is mentioned often in both the promotional material and the interviews, especially by the StWC. One interviewee argues that the demonstrations organized in the course of several years have had a ‘massive effect on the wider public opinion’ (Interview 5):

We have had since the early days the *majority public opinion in this country* and the other countries around the world are against the war. And I think that the capacity of the movement to continue mobilizing throughout that period has been central to chancing public opinion on that scale.

In discussing the anti-war movement’s ability to shape public opinion, many interviewees refer to the February 2003 demonstration as the single most important political event (Interview 2/GR; Interview 4/StWC;

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<sup>6</sup> Moreover, the StWC points out that although Blair did leave office ‘early and in disgrace over the war’, things did not turn out too badly for him, as he was later appointed UN peace envoy to the Middle East (Nineham & Burgin 2008: 19).

Interview 5/StWC; Interview 6/CND). Some also refer to the critique that the movement has received in this regard (Interview 4/StWC):

People say *marches don't change anything* but ... in terms of *public opinion* it's important that you continue to march, and that people can continue to see that you march so they know there is opposition to what has happened ... of course the fact that people continue to march across the world ... suggests that the movement that has been created is kind of *sustaining itself* over the years and years.

Here, not only the size of the movement, but also its sustained nature is emphasized. These same features are accentuated by the other StWC interviewee, who stresses that the demonstration taking place at the time of the interview (20 March 2008) is already the organization's twentieth. He believes that the anti-war movement has succeeded in many ways in changing the atmosphere in the domestic context, with increasing numbers of people have turned against the Iraq War. (Interview 5.) The StWC history suggests that the justification for the war has been 'largely discredited' because the anti-war movement's arguments have prevailed and 'been vindicated' (Murray & German 2005: 3).

Both CND interviewees emphasize the movement's influence on domestic politics via mass demonstrations that have shaped public opinion (Interview 1; Interview 6). They argue that it is obvious that 'the huge demonstrations have made a difference' by changing the 'atmosphere and the cynicism which the public views the state, military and political leaders who [fight] that war' (Interview 6). In this and similar arguments, the organizations active in the anti-war movement are clearly regarded as opinion leaders who have put and keep the war on the public agenda. Nonetheless, it is very difficult to evaluate how much the movement has influenced public opinion<sup>7</sup>. Opinion polls generally only tell what people think about the war at different times. Even if people were directly asked how much they believe the anti-war movement has affected their opinions, it would be very difficult for them to evaluate the influence of a single factor among many. Some people certainly would have opposed

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<sup>7</sup> This difficulty has been acknowledged within the anti-war movement. It has been argued, however, that although it is difficult to prove a causal relationship between the movement and public opinion, it does not make sense to deny any impact by the movement on public opinion (e.g. Hayden 2007: 134).



the war even without the anti-war movement. When talking about beliefs and opinions, it is important to note that influence of this nature and magnitude circulates not only through a movement to people, but also from people to the movement (and from people to people). Thus, the movement was simultaneously reflecting the anti-war attitude and inspiring more of it. It also needs to be noted that influencing public opinion is one thing, and making public opinion politically effective is quite another. As social movement scholars point out, a common shortcoming within movements 'is the difficulty of translating large numbers of demonstrations into political power' (Rochon 1988: 109).

*Getting People Interested in Politics Again, Waking Up a New Generation*

Many of the organizations maintain that the new anti-war movement has managed to inspire interest in politics at a difficult time when there is generally deep mistrust towards political parties and representational democracy more generally. It is often stressed that the political system, and especially the Labour government, has misused its power in making war-related decisions the majority of its voters do not approve of. It is argued that the anti-war movement has compensated for this lack of democracy by offering at least some 'real alternatives'. In particular, the February 2003 demonstration in London is embraced as a proof of this. For example, an StWC interviewee says that 'when you have a march of that size, you can no longer talk about political apathy'. (Interview 4, also Rees 2006: 119.) In this interpretation, instead of voting, people express their opinions and manifest their power through participation in the anti-war movement and its demonstrations. Indeed, as social movement scholars point out, the great 'mobilization of anti-war support took place at a time when it was commonplace to point to declining participation in elections in established democracies' (Gillan et al. 2008: x, also 182). Despite (or due to) declining interest in traditional forms of political engagement, the anti-war movement has managed to attract millions of people to join demonstrations.

Another accomplishment brought up by the organizations – most often by the StWC and CND – is that the anti-war movement has succeeded in awakening the interest of young people who have not been

politically active previously. For example, the StWC suggests that an e-mail received after the February 2003 demonstration probably expresses 'the view of millions' (Murray & German 2005: 161, emphasis added):

I would just like to assure you that there are many of us *virgin marchers* of this year who will not forget, not be quiet, and not take injustice lying down any more. The marches of this year, *however much or little difference they made to the decisions or policies of government*, have made deep impressions *on the lives of the marchers*.

Some interviewees portray the February 2003 demonstration as sort of a 'key experience' for young people, which, as their first big demonstration, has a long-term effect on their opinions (Interview 4/StWC; Interview 6/CND). It is not, however, the only event which is believed to have had an impact on the younger generation. For example, hundreds of thousands of pupils and students marching out of schools to oppose the war during the period of school strikes is described as proof of a generation 'woken up to political involvement on the basis of the anti-war movement' (Murray & German 2005: 191). According to the StWC, this shows that the new generation has shaken off 'its undeserved reputation for political apathy and passive consumerism' (ibid). It is also believed that young people becoming politically active 'on a mass scale for the first time in more than a generation' will be an important factor 'in years to come' (ibid: 276).

Another achievement of the movement that becomes articulated in the above-mentioned context is empowerment of the participants. As one interviewee puts it, participation in the anti-war movement is a process that has the effect of changing the views of participants (Interview 2/GR). In other words, it is a learning process in which new meanings and interpretations are negotiated and constructed along the way. In social movement theory, empowerment has been described as a process that 'generally leads to an enhanced feeling of personal capability and of control over events' (Rochon 1988: 107). Hence, it is suggested that the deepest impact of any social movement activity 'is on the participants themselves' (ibid: 106). Additionally, it can lead to previously separate issues as well as groups of people being seen as connected to each other. This aspect is discussed in more detail below.

*Uniting People from Different Backgrounds*

Uniting people from different backgrounds is regarded as yet another achievement of the new anti-war movement. Indeed, scholars commonly point out that just as wars have the capacity to unify people via 'bonds of patriotism', the peace movement can unite 'those of divergent backgrounds and interests under a common cause' (Peterson 1973: 130). In the context of the new British anti-war movement, it is pointed out especially often that the movement has succeeded in providing a platform for the British Muslim community. Most frequently this is accentuated by the StWC and CND, which have cooperated with Muslim groups and associations (e.g. Murray & German 2005: 82). Pointing out that the idea of Muslims 'playing a leading part in a peace movement had apparently not occurred to anyone', the StWC stresses that now they 'have been brought into a campaign with the broader community on an unprecedented scale' (ibid: 57, 274). The wording is a little bit unfortunate as it gives the impression that the StWC 'brought' the Muslims in without the latter having much to do with the decision themselves. In a somewhat similar fashion, the StWC argues that the British Muslims have now established a connection to the socialist left (ibid: 61, emphasis added):

One of the consequences of the work of the Stop the War Coalition and the Muslim Association of Britain has been to intensify the isolation of such groups, both *by bringing millions of Muslims into alliance with the socialist left* and other sections of political life, and by demonstrating the power of the collective progressive politics.

More generally, it is suggested that 'the Stop the War movement' has succeeded in building 'an alliance that brings people from all nationalities together including Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Jews and Buddhists which will stand us in good stead in the future and build a strong international foundation for justice and peace' (Benn in Nineham & Burgin 2008: 2). Both of the examples mentioned above illustrate that the StWC regards uniting people from different backgrounds as a significant achievement insofar as it succeeds at the same time in producing and maintaining unity. In more explicit terms, maintaining unity of the movement 'is one of the achievements of the Coalition' (Murray & German 2005: 55), this unity referring to the unity of the left (ibid: 276, emphasis added):

*The left itself has been united in struggle* – no small achievement, given its fractious history, and essential for it to make any future progress.

As the StWC's close partner, the CND more or less celebrates all of the achievements presented by the StWC, as is well illustrated in a claim by the CND chair that the greatest achievement of the StWC has been to 'have the political understanding, vision and commitment to provide an inclusive framework which has embraced the breadth of people protesting, to articulate the moral outrage of very diverse communities, and to facilitate the protest of millions against the horrors of war and the plain lies that preceded it, and the injustices and barbarity that have followed' (Hudson in Murray & German 2005: 68). The CND suggests that while a coalition of socialists and Muslims has been regarded as 'strange bedfellows', there have been other kinds of 'strange alliances' in the new movement, proving that it has truly managed to unite people from different political backgrounds. For example, the fact that cooperation has taken place between the anti-war movement and the Conservatives is regarded as an extraordinary development. (Interview 6.)

## 8.2.2 Broader Impacts

### Enhancing Global Consciousness, Creating a Sense of Solidarity

Shaping public opinion at the international level is considered one of the wider-ranging achievements of the new anti-war movement. It is emphasized mainly in the materials of the three left-oriented organizations – the StWC, CND and GR. References to international or global public opinion are especially common in the context of the February 2003 demonstration. As an StWC interviewee puts it (Interview 4):

What we said was 'We know you're lying and when you find out, it will be problematic for you'. But also we said 'If this fails, if you get this wrong ... *30 million people across the world* might say 'We think you're getting it wrong". So, by creating the kind of mess that they have created ... there are *30 million people in the world now* who are sitting back saying 'I told you so', and probably substantially more.

In the same context it is maintained that the movement has played an important role in enabling ‘a rise of global consciousness’ by continuously informing the public on the causes and effects of the war. According to the StWC, the anti-war movement has ‘informed, organized and radicalized millions of people’ (German 2007: 8) and thus ‘helped unite the people of the world for peace’ (Nineham & Burgin 2008: 3). Interestingly, while most organizations in this context refer to the effects of the anti-war movements internationally, an StWC interviewee stresses that the British anti-war movement ‘has convinced people to oppose the war where their countries are involved with it’, referring to countries such as Poland, Italy and Spain. (Interview 4.) A CND interviewee makes a similar point, arguing that there has been ‘a rise in understanding and a rise in a sense that international peace movements can make a difference’. This, in turn, can result in people regaining ‘a new consciousness in the West of an interdependent world’ that encourages them to work with people in other countries. (Interview 6.) It is suggested that anti-war demonstrations can, especially if televised, ‘encourage people in other circumstances’ (ibid):

It might not mean much in London because there’s so many demonstrations but it means a huge amount in Gaza. So, one has to think of *the impact elsewhere*. It also encourages people to do other things, more direct action. It all adds, *anything adds to a bigger sum*.

The significance of expressing global solidarity is strongly emphasized by both GR interviewees. According to them, the new anti-war movement has provided people all over the world with an opportunity to express solidarity and hence helped them to understand that they are working for a common goal. On the whole, the work of the anti-war movement is believed to be resulting in ‘a growing number of people that are aware and are active’. (Interview 2; Interview 7.)

### Preventing Future Wars and Terrorist Attacks

One of the most interesting arguments to be found in the present material is that the anti-war movement has managed to prevent certain future wars. The StWC maintains that strong opposition to the Iraq War ‘has made further wars by George Bush less likely, and a comparable level of

involvement in them by Britain almost impossible to envisage' (Murray & German 2005: 274). Or, as it is claimed more explicitly: 'The strength of the anti-war movement has forced the US to put its plans for an attack on Iran on hold' (Nineham & German 2008: 23). In short, it is argued that the movement has stopped the 'next war'. StWC chair Andrew Murray put forward this argument in an article titled 'We didn't stop that war, but may have stopped the next', published in the *Guardian* (Murray 2008). One StWC interviewee refers to it directly (Interview 4):

As Andrew Murray says in his article for the Guardian a couple weeks ago, he said that 'We may have not stopped this war, but we may have *stopped the next one, the Iran war*'. It goes back in the agenda but falls off again but essentially I think that we went somewhere towards *preventing it* from happening.

While the interviewee admits that the movement failed to stop the Iraq War, at the same time he argues that it 'probably prevented an attack on Iran'. Demonstrations are given a very substantial role in this regard: 'When they [the Americans] think about attacking Iran, they think a similar size and scale of demonstrations, probably bigger'. Put differently, possible demonstrations are believed to 'derail invasion plans'. (Interview 4.) A similar argument is made by the CND (Corbyn in Murray & German 2005: 205, emphasis added):

Yes, *we lost*. Yes, tens of thousands have died. However, it has built anti-war sentiment and a sense of purpose all around the world. *Maybe it will stop other wars*.

It is suggested that the anti-war movement should not be evaluated so much in regard to its primary aim – stopping the war in Iraq – as in respect to the so-called 'War on Iran'. A CND interviewee suggests that people should not be disappointed by the fact that the Iraq War was not prevented or stopped, but rather should consider the effect the movement had on preventing the war against Iran (Interview 6):

Of those million, million that went in Hyde Park that day, eight hundred thousand probably think they *wasted their time* because they couldn't stop the war. I would say to them 'It's *stop the war on Iran*'.

The claim that the movement has succeeded in preventing a war other than the one it has primarily been opposing is extremely interesting. The same argument has surfaced also in the American anti-war movement (e.g. Bond 2005: 73–75; Benjamin & Evans 2005). As a claim, it is totally impossible to prove one way or the other, a dilemma pertaining to two other quite substantial claims, namely, preventing terrorist attacks and preventing the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the war. As regards the first claim, an StWC interviewee argues that since there is an explicit link between opposing wars and preventing terrorist attacks at home, the anti-war movement has helped to prevent terrorist attacks in both the UK and US. In his view, the movement has sent a clear message to the ‘people in the Middle East’ that ‘there’s no point in coming and attacking us’ because UK and US citizens ‘are as much against the war as you are’. (Interview 4.) In regard to the second contention, the CND argues that it has helped to prevent the use of nuclear weapons in the Iraq War: ‘Without the vigilance of world public opinion informed by organisations such as CND, it is possible that ‘low-yield’ nuclear weapons could have been used to minimise US casualties in Iraq’ (Hudson 2005: 251).

### Breaking up America’s Alliances and Shaping US Policies

Additionally, the StWC argues that the British anti-war movement has been able to break up ‘America’s alliances’ (Interview 4) by shaking the ‘unthinking alliance of most of the British establishment with the US’, which could otherwise have resulted in ‘long-term consequences in world politics’ (Murray & German 2005: 274). It is maintained that the ‘conduct of the war and occupation has been in some measure constrained by the strength of public opinion’ activated by the movement (ibid). For example, President Bush’s decision to declare ‘mission accomplished’ at such an early stage of the war ‘can be summed up in the word “resistance”: millions of people around the world opposed the war from the start’ (German 2007: 8). Elsewhere, however, it is pointed out that the Iraq War is not ‘about the force of opinion’ but ‘about the force of arms’ (Rees 2006: 36). It seems that even anti-war activists themselves evaluate the effects (as well as the power) of the movement from different perspectives – as is the case with the three theoretical approaches. Liberal cosmopolitans

explicitly celebrate the force of global opinion (e.g. Castells 2004: 161; 2008: 86; 2000a; 2000b; Nye 2004a: 90, 105–106, 137), while radical poststructuralists also talk highly of its potential (e.g. Hardt & Negri 2004: 258–264). The state-centric approach has not directly commented on the anti-war movement but is likely to be much more skeptical.

Interestingly, the organizations studied here do not bring up the argument that the anti-war movement succeeded in pressuring the UN Security Council to refuse an authorization for the use of military force by the US. Within the American anti-war movement this is a very common argument (e.g. Bennis 2005: 54, 56; Hayden 2007: 131–132; Weiss & Pugeda 2007: 120)<sup>8</sup>, and it is also brought up by some scholars. It has been argued, for instance, that preventing the ‘Bush and Blair governments from gaining Security Council support’ and forcing ‘them to proceed without international authorization’ was a ‘major victory of the global anti-war movement’ (Cortright 2008: 174, also 388)<sup>9</sup>.

## 8.3 Perspectives on Failures

### 8.3.1 The Failure to Pressure the Government to Withdraw the Troops

At the time of the interviews (March 2008), one of the main failures of the anti-war movement at the national level is said to be its inability to pressure the government to withdraw all British troops from Iraq. While not mentioned very often in the public material, the matter is often brought up in the interviews. For example, it is pointed out that the movement has been ‘walked over’ several times by Prime Minister Gordon Brown. An StWC interviewee accuses Brown of trying ‘to defuse the issue’ by making promises which have not been fulfilled, referring to his announcement of troop withdrawal in two phases in 2008. At the

<sup>8</sup> As an American activist puts it: the movement was able to ‘delegitimize the Machiavellian faction who sought war at any cost’ (Hayden 2007: 134).

<sup>9</sup> Cortright (2008: 175) suggests that a ‘creative dialectic developed between the Security Council and global civil society’ (including the global anti-war movement), representing a ‘unique and unprecedented form of global political synergy’.



time of the interview, there are over four thousand British soldiers in Iraq, which the interviewee considers 'a far cry from the two thousand and five hundred that should be there'. (Interview 4.)

Later on, Prime Minister Brown announced that British troops would leave Iraq in 2009. After six years of war, the troops were finally withdrawn. As is the case with other developments discussed above, it would be difficult to evaluate how much the anti-war movement influenced this decision. It is very likely that the movement had some influence in terms of pressuring the government via mass demonstrations as well as influencing MPs and political parties inside the parliamentary system, but it would be misleading to argue that the troops have been withdrawn solely due to the efforts of the anti-war movement. Several other important factors may have been at work in the decision, not least the US government's announcement to reduce the number of US troops in Iraq and to leave the country in 2011.

### 8.3.2 The Failure to Prevent or Stop the Iraq War

The main publicly articulated objective of the new anti-war movement has been to stop the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both of these wars are still going on at this writing (September 2010). The Iraq War has been the main point of opposition for the movement since the first demonstrations held against the war in late 2002 and early 2003. Although there have been reductions in American forces and the British troops already have been withdrawn from Iraq, the fact remains that the movement was not able to prevent the war from taking place, nor has it been able to stop it. In public debate, the movement has been repeatedly reminded of these unachieved objectives and this seems to be regarded as the main failure also within the movement. For example, when self-critically analyzing the 'weaknesses of the movement', the StWC points out that the 'tragic fact' is that it 'did not stop the war or British participation in it' (Murray & German 2005: 200). Or, as a GR interviewee puts it: 'You could say that the Stop the War Coalition wasn't very successful because, you know, there is still war five years on' (Interview 7).

As to the reasons why the movement has not been able to stop the war, two different types of explanations are presented. According to the

first, the movement came very close to preventing the war, but doing so would have required either more people participating in the protests or the use of different strategies. The second refers to the required time for effecting change. The first type of explanation, which is called here the ‘if only’ rhetoric, can be broken down into several categories.

The StWC’s stance on why the movement failed to stop the war is mixed. Some in the organization argue that it might have been possible if there had been more demonstrations and more people in the demonstrations prior to the war (Interview 5), while others say that it was not likely that ‘a further demonstration would make the decisive difference’ (Murray & German 2005: 177). With regard to the latter claim, it is stressed that ‘if the government could ignore 2 million people on the street, it could ignore 2.5 million, even if the larger number could be mobilised’ (ibid). The second type of argument concerns the choice of strategy, the claim being that the movement could have prevented the war if there had been more strikes in Britain prior to the war (Interview 5):

There were three hundred and fifty strikes when the war broke in this country. *If that would have been* three thousand and five hundred plus the demonstration, I think we could have stopped the war.

According to this interpretation, preventing a US-led war could have succeeded by organizing more strikes in Britain, which would have forced the British government to take a different stance on the whole issue of war. Without support from its close ally, it would have been more difficult for the US to start the war on its own. However, this line of reasoning is quite idealistic, because it assumes that Britain has a very strong influence on US foreign policy. Indeed, elsewhere the StWC contradicts its own argument by stating that ‘it did not seem that workplace-based action could be developed on a sufficient scale to stop Blair, although the Coalition did hold discussions with some union leaders to explore the possibility’ (Murray & German 2005: 177). The StWC is very critical of the role of trade unions, arguing that they should have been more active and taken a stronger stance against the war (ibid: 168, 172). It is even claimed that ‘the anti-war movement failed to stop the war because it was insufficiently implanted in a militant working-class movement’ (ibid: 201). The argument that the movement was unable to influence the

government effectively because of ‘the state of working-class organisation’ (ibid: 202) suggests that the war could have been prevented if the trade unions had been more active and the working class more unified.

WRI has a different approach to the issue. Since it generally considers nonviolent direct action as a more effective way of opposing war than demonstrations, its interviewee logically argues that there would have been better chances of preventing the war if there had been more direct action. More specifically, preventing the war might have been possible if only one per cent of the two million London protesters in February 2003 had ‘gone to Fairport, where the US bombers took off, and blocked the base’. It would have been a more effective strategy since ‘the government would not have been able to arrest twenty thousand people’. (Interview 3.) According to this interpretation, a different pressure strategy would have been more productive. However, it is again highly questionable whether a blockade of the US military base in Fairport in Britain would have prevented the US government from starting the war. Indeed, the argument that more direct action at US and British air bases and military facilities would have been more effective is explicitly challenged by the StWC. It stresses that only ‘a fairly small minority’ was ‘prepared for consistent confrontation with the state, and that would likely have led to their tactics, rather than the issues of peace and democracy, becoming the focus’ (Murray & German 2005: 202, also 177).

More generally in regard to the failure to stop the war, the StWC emphasizes that it takes ‘a long time to push these things through’. Hence, people should understand ‘that things don’t happen immediately’. (Interview 4.) Some comparisons are made, for instance, with the suffragettes of the early twentieth century, emphasizing that they ‘had a decade of campaigning, including vicious repression, before their aims were even partially won’ (Murray & German 2005: 7). There are also references to the US civil rights movement, for which it ‘took years – and much death and repression – to win even the most basic rights for blacks to be treated equally with whites’ (ibid, emphasis added):

The anti-war movement will have *the same historical sweep*, as millions around the world are forced to mobilise repeatedly against war, the poverty and inequality which breeds it, and the imperialism that launches it.

According to this and similar views, the anti-war movement should not be expected to produce any effects very fast,<sup>10</sup> although the pressure by the movement is ‘probably going to bring the US troops out eventually’ (Interview 6/CND). It remains unclear when – that is, how soon – this ‘eventually’ might occur. Here, it needs to be noted that the timeframe for expected results differs among and even within the organizations. In addition, they vary in what they regard as the most important short-term and long-term goals of the movement. A WRI activist has a legitimate point in emphasizing that the aims of the movement always need to be formulated in relation to ‘what it can achieve in a certain timeframe’ (Clark 2005: 20). He argues that ‘the more important it is to show results, the less visionary the demands become’ (ibid). Therefore, ‘the pursuit of the vision’ should not be abandoned because it is crucial to try to ‘find limited steps and possible forms of activity that enhance our capacity – our power-within and our power-with’ (ibid: 21, emphasis added):

We also need to look for *practical and attainable objectives* matched to our strength, which will ultimately be the steps towards realizing the vision: *the impossible takes a bit longer. Redefining what is possible* requires a strategy in which each phase creates a base for future expansion.

In other words, it is maintained that the movement must also have ‘impossible’ aims and objectives that can only be accomplished in the long run. It is, however, difficult to imagine that they could somehow be contradictory to the movement’s more immediate, short-time aims. Moreover, aims and goals may change along the way; they are not fixed for good. For example, although first an organization working on a single-issue campaign, the StWC has broadened its agenda due to political circumstances. Indeed, it suggests that those who argue that ‘the Stop the War Coalition has failed because it didn’t stop the war against Iraq miss the point – we are fighting against a whole set of wars and

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<sup>10</sup> Whereas the StWC, as a quite recently founded organization, emphasizes the achievements it has recorded in a very short period of time, the long-term organizations have a very different time scale. The CND, for example, often refers to its achievements in regard to the Cuban missile crisis and the Vietnam War (e.g. Hudson 2005: 4–5, 87). Interestingly, WRI more often refers to failures and problems than successes (e.g. Prasad 2005: 118, 178, 434, 449; Clark 2005: 21–22).

imperial adventures' (Murray & German 2005: 7). Thus, although it has been stressed that the organization's name, the Stop *the* War Coalition crystallizes its purpose, stopping the Iraq War is not regarded as the only goal anymore. Now, it is emphasized that the struggle against a broad range of 'imperial adventures' is going to 'continue as long as the danger of such wars hangs over humanity' (ibid).

## 8.4 Conclusions

This chapter has reflected on the question of the *effects* of resistance by empirically analyzing how the successes and failures of the anti-war movement are articulated and understood within the movement itself. The aim of the chapter as a whole has been to deepen the analysis and findings of the rather abstract analysis in the previous chapter concerning the different conceptualizations of the power of the movement.

The chapter has revealed that within the British anti-war movement there are several different understandings regarding the question of effects. Although it is acknowledged that the movement has not been able to prevent or stop the Iraq War, it is believed to have accomplished many other things. In fact, some of the organizations present quite a comprehensive record of the different achievements of the movement. In the national context, the most significant achievement is said to be 'getting rid' of Prime Minister Tony Blair, who is usually represented as 'Bush's poodle'. In this regard, it is pointed out that the anti-war movement has shaken the political establishment, because, among other things, it has negatively affected the overall popularity of the Labour Party. It is also argued that the movement has pressured the government in many different ways, although at the time of the interviews Britain had not yet withdrawn its troop from Iraq. Especially the StWC and CND stress that the government has not 'dared' to increase the number of British troops in Iraq, but rather has reduced the number because of the pressure from the movement. Moreover, it is maintained that influencing domestic public opinion, uniting people from different backgrounds, empowering participants, getting people interested in politics again and encouraging young people to become politically active are among the achievements of the new anti-war movement at the national level.

When it comes to the movement's achievements and impacts at the international (often articulated as 'global') level, the arguments become much more presumptuous. It is claimed, for example, that the anti-war movement has been effective in preventing terrorist attacks in the UK and US and that organizations such as the CND may have prevented the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the Iraq War. Of what are already quite forward arguments, without a doubt the most interesting is that the movement has prevented certain future wars from taking place, such as the 'War on Iran'. Moreover, it is argued that the anti-war movement has been effective in breaking up US alliances and shaping its policies. The most common argument, however, is that the movement has influenced global public opinion concerning the war and thus enhanced 'global consciousness' and created a sense of solidarity at the global level.

In regard to the main failure – not being able to prevent or stop the Iraq War – it is quite interesting that the organizations argue that the war could have been stopped if some other strategies or tactics of resistance had been used. Often, however, their views diverge on which strategies would have been effective in preventing or stopping the war. While some stress that it would have required more strikes and a more active effort on the part of the trade unions in uniting the working class, others argue that more and larger demonstrations might have turned the tide. Some believe that had there been more direct action, the war might have been prevented. In other words, despite the failures of the anti-war movement, all organizations strongly believe in the potential effectiveness of certain forms of collective action and the ability of the movement to achieve its goals by using these strategies and tactics – although they do not necessarily agree on which ones are the most effective.

In terms of differences between the organizations, the StWC, the main organizer of national mass demonstrations and some 'global' action days, seems to be the most eager to proclaim a great number of achievements and effects for the movement while also downplaying some of the principal failures. This is approach very logical, because it allows the organization to promote its own role within the new anti-war movement and thus perhaps gain more public support as well as power inside the movement. The CND also emphasizes many of the successes of the movement brought up by the StWC, whereas GR and WRI are more cautious, or even skeptical, in this regard.

The fact that the StWC and CND have in many ways been the leading and most influential organizations within the new British anti-war movement probably explains to a great extent why they as organizations can and 'dare' to refer to so many achievements and effects. Their arguments about the achievements of the movement must naturally be viewed as an integral part of their own political campaigning. Nevertheless, explicitly bringing out achievements and results can be regarded as a positive thing from the perspective of movement as a whole. Publicizing achievements provides an opportunity for people, whether full-time activists or more passive participants, to have experiences of success that may further encourage their involvement in the movement. Obviously, the organizations also need to justify their existence to their supporters. As suggested in social movement theory, it is important to show concrete results and 'specific political outcomes, or the temptation will grow to leave the movement' (Rochon 1988: 108). The StWC and CND are no doubt justified in claiming that they have achieved concrete results at the national level, mainly because they have very actively engaged in the domestic political context, where they have the possibility to affect political decision-making more directly. Viewed from this particular perspective, the new British anti-war movement can hardly be accused of failing to engage in a political struggle domestically or of seeking change only at a very abstract level.

When the findings of this chapter are evaluated in relation to the theoretical debate, it can be concluded that the views of the two organizations that regard the national level as their primary context resonate with the claims of the critical state-centric approach. The StWC and CND conceptualize the effectiveness of the anti-war movement mainly in terms of its ability to take part in and shape political struggle against government policies. Hence, their understanding of the anti-war movement is very similar to the view of the state-centric approach of 'properly political' movements, which are regarded as effective when they succeed in building a popular mass movement and influence political decision-making in concrete terms (e.g. Chandler 2009a: 18–22, 207–208; 2009b: 541–542). However, this constitutes only part of the organizations' understanding. At the same time, many of the suggested broader global impacts of the movement that the two draw attention to are similar to those presented by GR; together these views clearly resonate

with the argumentation by academic globalists. When the organizations argue, for example, that the anti-war movement has influenced global public opinion and resulted in a rise of 'global consciousness', they resemble liberal cosmopolitans (e.g. Kaldor 2003a: 112; Beck 2000: 65, 70; Castells 2008). When they frame the political significance of the movement in terms of uniting people with different backgrounds and creating 'global solidarity', they echo the tenets of Hardt and Negri's radical poststructuralist approach (2000; 2004).

Yet, the StWC and CND go even further than this, arguing that the anti-war movement has been able to prevent terrorist attacks as well as the 'War on Iran'. In this regard, it is relevant to note that the critical state-centric approach has argued that global claims of success made by social movements may correlate with their limited success at the national level (e.g. Chandler 2004: 326, 328). In this case, the argument could be regarded as either correct or incorrect, depending on how the success of the movement is evaluated. If it is maintained that the movement can be considered successful only if it manages to prevent or stop the war, then it would be possible to conclude that global claims of success may correlate with the failure to achieve primary goals. In other words, it could be argued that there is a clash 'between the claims made for global civic actors and the reality of their marginal influence' (Chandler 2004: 327). However, if it is maintained that the effectiveness of the movement should not be evaluated primarily on the basis of whether it has managed to stop the war or not, then the interpretation could be different. Indeed, in movement literature it is commonly emphasized that it is unrealistic to expect the movement to be able to end wars immediately and even less that it could 'topple the war-making system in the same process' (Hayden 2007: 171). On the contrary, it is suggested that, rather than concentrating on concrete policy changes, scholars should pay attention to 'private and modest successes that embolden the antiwar movement and sustain it from generation to generation' (Scherer 2004: 24). It is argued that small victories eventually help to achieve 'subtle and far-reaching effects, including their impact on the next wave of mobilization and even on other movements' (Chatfield 1992: xxv).

When it is maintained that 'peace movements tend to be concerned with what is possible for the future, rather than what is possible now', their actions are regarded as 'prophetic rather than immediately practical'



(Overy 1982: 1). In other words, movements are defined as ‘storehouses of analyses, strategies, visions of possible futures’ which can ‘contribute to the capacity of a society to change’ (Chatfield 1992: xxv, also 180–185). In this respect, anti-war (or any social) movements are regarded as characteristically different from other political actors. It is stressed that although political parties and social movements sometimes use similar tactics, the nature of the former should not be confused with the role of the latter (Hayden 2007: 170–171). Accordingly, the effects of social movements ‘must be evaluated by different criteria than those used for established political institutions’ (Rochon 1988: 101).

Although the successes of social movements in regard to their primary aims (such as stopping a war) are often described as partial, incomplete, or in some other ways compromised, it is suggested that they can nevertheless be successful and influential. In fact, there is a common saying among anti-war activists that ‘Many battles can be won while the war is lost’ (e.g. Green 1992: 148). Sometimes successes are even regarded as counterproductive, as the success of a movement can ‘defeat’ it (Tilly & Tarrow 2007: 133). In a word, when social movements succeed in achieving their goals, their rationale and justification cease to exist<sup>11</sup>. In certain cases, this might be true, especially where single-issue campaigns are concerned, but in the context of the anti-war movement it must be acknowledged that even if the movement had fulfilled its short-term goals – for example, ending the war in Iraq – there would still be many long-term objectives to pursue.

Indeed, the difference between long-term and short-term effectiveness is crucial, as it is intimately connected to defining the main objectives of the anti-war movement. When categorizing three types of opposition to war, Bob Overy (1982: 2–3) suggests that the effectiveness of each type should be evaluated according to different criteria. These are movements

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<sup>11</sup> Rochon (1988: 100–101) stresses that the most important issue for any movement is its ability to maintain itself and its popular support. While interest groups and political parties also have to ‘concern themselves with self-maintenance’, they are in a different position since ‘their organizations and the institutionalized place they have created for themselves in the political system frees them from concern with that maintenance on a day-to-day basis’ (ibid: 100). In contrast, for movements their own maintenance through popular support is ‘the single most important movement goal, greater in the short run than even policy influence’ (ibid: 101).

and organizations that aim 1) to eliminate all war, 2) to prevent or end particular wars, and 3) to prevent or eliminate particular aspects of war. Since the primary goals of each type are different, their main targets and strategies differ, and hence the criteria by which effectiveness is to be evaluated differ as well. When viewed from this perspective, it is obvious that 'it is easier to stop a particular war – and even a particular aspect of war – than it is to banish war itself from human affairs' (ibid: 3). An important point is also that those movements and campaigns which are aimed against particular wars – the Iraq War in the present case – usually 'operate closer to the existing political system in order to force change in government policy' while those aimed against all wars concentrate more on attitudes and public opinion and tend to keep 'some detachment from day-to-day government policies as they try to change the nature of the political system itself' (ibid: 3).

Hence, the more ambitious the central goal of a movement and the broader and more long-term its agenda is, the less it should be evaluated from an instrumental perspective stressing immediate policy change. In other words, movements which aim to abolish all wars should be assessed in terms of how broadly they succeed in gaining popular support for their views. Viewed from this perspective, a movement can indeed be winning while it is losing. Although it might fail in stopping a particular war, it can nevertheless gain support for its broader cause (Overy 1982: 4). On the contrary, movements which aim to stop a particular war 'can be judged by more pragmatic criteria', with the crucial question, 'Has it managed to stop the war?', becoming more relevant (ibid: 3). The problem is that 'there is considerable overlap' between different types of movements and they can also reinforce each other (ibid)<sup>12</sup>. Although it is possible to distinguish different types of movements theoretically, in practice it is not that easy and is sometimes even impossible. Most social movements engage in both particular, short-term struggles and broader, long-term

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<sup>12</sup> One of the main reasons why movements are overlapping and mixed is that different groups (such as pacifists, anarchists, Marxists) support campaigns that do not necessarily reflect their primary objectives. It is regarded as rational, because participation 'offers them an opportunity to demonstrate to a new audience the validity of their fundamental position' (Overy 1982: 3). Therefore, for example, pacifists who principally oppose war in all its forms often take part in campaigns against particular wars.

struggles. As we have seen in the thesis, this is particularly characteristic of the anti-war movement. There are also many tensions between different aims and timeframes (see chapter 5). It is not easy to bind short- and long-term goals together or to accommodate, for example, pacifist, anti-militarist, anti-nuclear, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist struggles into a single movement.

This diversity and complexity makes it extremely difficult to determine from which perspective the effectiveness of the anti-war movement should be evaluated and how the proper criteria for the assessment should be determined. If the effectiveness of the movement is evaluated merely by analyzing its immediate impact on government policies, it may be too easy to reduce it merely 'to a lobbying organization' to be evaluated by the corresponding standards (Rochon 1988: 205). While it is very difficult to evaluate even the movement's influence on government policy it becomes, as we will see below, substantially more challenging if the effectiveness of the movement is assessed from the perspective of broader achievements. To start with policy impacts, it is often suggested that since government foreign policy decisions are usually made in secrecy (Randle 1987: 158), it is almost impossible to evaluate how much influence the movement has possibly had on the substance of the policy, political accountability or the decision-making process (Chatfield 1992: xxv).

Therefore, some scholars argue that many victories of the anti-war movement 'occur in secret, unknown even to antiwar supporters themselves' (Scherer 2004: 24). It is also maintained that movements can usually be regarded as failing when evaluated from the perspective of directly influencing public policy (e.g. Tilly & Tarrow 2007: 128; Walker 1988: 5). Even when there are some obvious successes and effects, the anti-war movement rarely can be credited as the only cause behind change – although it often is 'entitled to claim *some* effect' (Hayden 2007: 159–160, emphasis in original). In other words, even where it is possible to claim that particular decisions were influenced by the anti-war movement, it is still extremely difficult to evaluate to which extent this has occurred. Additionally, there are always impacts that have very little or nothing to do with policy changes (Tilly & Tarrow 2007: 128). In this regard, it is strongly emphasized that participation in social movements always has effects on the lives of the activists and 'the social movement base in general' (ibid). This view is particularly popular among those who

stress the significance of social movements from a broader perspective and regard it as difficult, if not impossible, to achieve long-term goals solely through parliamentary democracy<sup>13</sup>. They argue that short-term objectives cannot be separated out from 'the need for long-term social, cultural, and economic transformation' (Walker 1988: 152, also Chatfield 1992: 179).

Both of the approaches discussed above – an emphasis on long-term versus short-term effectiveness – involve opportunities as well as challenges for social movements in terms of their effectiveness. As studies point out, movements which are based on short-term single-issue campaigns with clearly identifiable and immediate objectives are often parliamentary oriented and centralized in their organization and therefore often maximize their opportunities to directly influence government policy (Rochon 1988: 214–215). On the contrary, movements with an emphasis on rather long-term changes – and which thus primarily aim at presenting broad ideologically based critique – advocate a societal rather than a parliamentary strategy (ibid: 215). They are often organized in a decentralized fashion, whereby their 'likelihood of achieving near-term policy reform is slight' (ibid). However, they are more 'likely to exert revolutionary change on the values of those mobilized into the movement' than movements with a parliamentary focus and narrower in appeal which 'restricts the opportunity to mobilize large numbers of people and to change their political values' (ibid: 214–215).

In regard to the above-mentioned debates in social movement theory, it is interesting that there are not many examples of movements which have managed to combine the best elements from both approaches. For example, the new British anti-war movement seems to contain characteristics of both a popular mass movement and more parliamentary oriented elements. It also contains aspects of both the single-issue and ideological critique approaches, and simultaneously pursues multiple short-term and long-term goals. In light of this observation, it was already argued that the either-or' approach of the three theoretical approaches seems to be unable to relate to the 'both-and' perspective evident within the movement. The organizations studied generally conceive and assess

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<sup>13</sup> For example, Rochon (1988: 205) argues that these kinds of broader changes require 'a basic change in the international order'.

the achievements and effects of the anti-war movement in short-term *and* long-term, instrumental *and* symbolic, as well as national *and* global terms. When interpreted in the context of the discussion above, it can be argued that all of the theoretical approaches analyzed in this thesis are quite narrow. While academic globalists approach the effectiveness of any movement from an abstract and idealistic perspective, the problem in the critical state-centric approach is that it is mainly concerned with direct impacts on government policy, and thus fails to pay attention to broader and long-term goals, which take longer to materialize. Long-term goals are not often regarded as very exciting or revolutionary,<sup>14</sup> because they cannot result in rapid changes. Since the results are less visible, they are also much more difficult to evaluate. Nonetheless, it is very complicated to assess *any* effects of social movements, be they short- or long-term.

In fact, some scholars argue that this makes it necessary 'to go beyond asking questions' about the actual successes and failures of social movements 'within the existing conceptions of political life' (Walker 1988: 81)<sup>15</sup>. Arguing that 'political change is not just a matter of replacing one group of politicians with another', for example, Walker suggests that political change involves 'serious challenges to prevailing conceptions of human community, of the philosophical assumptions guiding people's conceptions of what human community can possibly become, of what kinds of activities are to be considered as political, and even about where political activity is supposed to occur' (ibid). In this perspective, the importance of social movements should not be 'assessed only by their overt power to bring about change by themselves or by the credibility of their specific policy recommendations' (ibid: 144), but

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<sup>14</sup> As 'radical' is a very ambitious term and implies a political confrontation, some within the peace movement regard it as too strong a word (Chatfield 1992: 80). For others, the movement must definitely be radical as well as revolutionary. As Walker (1988: 155) puts it: 'The ideal of the grand revolution is graphic and spectacular. It is heroic. It invites *machismo*. And violence. And counterrevolution. The practices of multiple transformations seem tame and unexciting, even evolutionary. They may be seen as diversions from the real goal: radical change.'

<sup>15</sup> Walker (1988: 169) criticizes those 'who stress the need for a clear vision of the way ahead', those 'who understand the need for persuasive messages that will mobilize millions', those 'who have absorbed the expectations of History and have learned to equate local differences and plural histories with weakness, parochialism, and relativism' as well as 'those who equate success with short-term achievements'.

should be evaluated in relation to 'their capacity to recognize, interpret, and symbolize patterns of contemporary transformations and to find new ways of being and acting that enhance the capacity of people to exercise control over the processes that affect their lives' (ibid:144).

This seems to be quite much expected from social movements, even though it is not assumed that social movements should come up with 'fully formed alternatives' (Walker 1988: 82). They are mainly expected to 'engage in an exploration of what such alternatives might be' (ibid). In the context of the anti-war movement, this would mean, for example, that it should seek to 'articulate ways of being together that enhance the possibilities of justice and undermine the need for violence' (ibid: 144).

When this debate on effectiveness, results and successes is connected back to the debate by the three theoretical approaches analyzed in this study, many critical questions arise. If it is maintained that social movements should be evaluated in terms of their ability to challenge dominant ways of thinking about politics or redefine power, why are they not then defined as the primary goals by the movements themselves? If the significance of social movements is defined in regard to their ability to redefine old categories of thinking about politics, can they nevertheless have other aims? How do these multiple aims relate to each other? What if the movements are not that interested in any aims other than their primary ones (such as to resist a war)?

Defining the primary purpose of social movements in a very abstract way is too 'easy' an approach, because it leaves strategic considerations aside, according them only a secondary status. Although it is true that for the more radical movements it is more difficult, and sometimes even impossible, to pursue goals by bargaining with the established political system (e.g. Rochon 1988: 78), and although it is clear that effects of social movements 'must be evaluated by different criteria than those used for established political institutions' (ibid: 101), it is nevertheless problematic to totally ignore the primary aims of the movements themselves.

Clearly, it is also necessary for the anti-war movement to have broader and long-term, even impossible, objectives. However, at the same time, these more 'imaginative' objectives need to bear at least some relationship to its short-term aims. As Rochon (1988: 108) stresses, in addition to long-term goals, it is necessary to have some 'immediately achievable objectives in order to maintain activist commitment'. Although social

movements must 'struggle for a just world peace as an ongoing process, not as a condition that can be specified clearly in advance' (Walker 1988: 5), this does not mean that there should not be any kind of specified objectives or strategies. There must be some kind of balance in this regard, just as there has to be some sort of a balance between unity and diversity (see chapter 7).

The purpose of this chapter has been to analyze how the anti-war movement itself conceptualizes its achievements, that is, the effectiveness of its resistance. Analyzing the organizations' views has clearly helped to broaden the discussion and debate also in regard to the findings of the previous chapter, which dealt with different conceptualizations of power. To be sure, the purpose here has not been to make any kind of impact analysis or claims about 'real' outcomes and effects of anti-war activism, because, as we have seen, it is very difficult to evaluate how much influence the anti-war movement has had. When the Iraq War is finally over, the anti-war movement may argue that it has played a central role in the process of ending the war. Undoubtedly, it will be as difficult to prove that argument wrong as it will be to claim that the anti-war movement has made no impact whatsoever. As Rochon (1988: 23) suggests, in movement analysis 'it is easy to overstate the significance of the peace movement based on the ideological claims of some of its leaders, or to underestimate its significance based on its immediate impact on policy'.

## 9 CONCLUSIONS

This thesis set out to critically engage in the ongoing and in many respects polarized and contradictory theoretical debate on global resistance examining it in the particular context of the anti-war movement. The study has reflected on two currently dominant theoretical approaches, the liberal cosmopolitan and the radical poststructuralist as well as critiques of them presented by the critical state-centric approach. The aim of the thesis has not been to propose a new political theory of resistance for the anti-war movement but to critically evaluate, and thereby develop further, certain aspects of the current theoretical debate in relation to the existing movement. In this framework, my role as a researcher has been to act as a critical mediator between the metatheories and micropolitics of resistance. Accordingly, this has been simultaneously a study of recent and popular theoretical discourses of resistance and of the politics of resistance in the context of the 'new' anti-war movement in Britain. The empirical analysis has drawn on a case study of four anti-war organizations, carried out using a qualitative content analysis of material published by the organizations themselves and the author's interviews with their representatives.

Critical evaluation of the theoretical debate in regard to the anti-war movement has been necessary in order to discuss the conditions in which the theories may become not only more reflective of the current political practice, but also more practical in the sense of truly critical theory suggested by Stephen Leonard (1990) in his 'critical theory in political practice'. Three main research questions were formulated in the thesis for purposes of the critical evaluation of the theoretical debate. The first is how the three theoretical approaches resonate with (or relate to) the political practice of the existing anti-war movement, that is, how much common ground there is between the theoretical realm and the movement at the moment. The second asks what the theoretical approaches fail to consider in terms of political practice of the movement. The third goes on to investigate the extent to which the values and beliefs embedded in the broader normative political projects and visions proposed by the dominant theoretical approaches are similar to, or at least compatible, with those held in the current movement.



In this concluding chapter, these three questions are answered in separate sections. First, the main findings of each analytical chapter will be presented briefly in order to lay out the main convergences and divergences between the theoretical debate and the premises of the organizations studied. Thereafter the discussion proceeds to a more detailed treatment of the main failures of the theoretical approaches. This is followed by suggestions as to how the theories can be developed further by outlining a 'both-and' instead of an 'either-or' approach. The chapter then concludes by critically discussing the broader normative political projects and visions proposed by the theoretical approaches and finally also reflects upon the anti-war war movement in that perspective.

## 9.1 Metatheories / Micropolitics of Resistance: Convergences and Divergences

When talking about global struggles, suggesting global strategies for resistance and even constructing visions of a global collective political subject dedicated to resistance against war, neither liberal cosmopolitans nor radical poststructuralists have engaged empirically with the current anti-war movement, but rather have based their conceptualizations on what they assume of the movement and/or what they want it to become. In other words, instead of studying the 'what, why and how' of the anti-war movement, they have considered it from above, analyzing mainly its concrete and visible political action. Many of the interpretations of academic globalists seem to be based solely on their observations based on the demonstration day on 15 February 2003, which is considered as not only a manifestation of global and consensual opposition towards the Iraq War but also a sign of the 'birth' of a new kind of an increasingly transnational, if not a global, anti-war movement. Clearly, February 2003 has been a source of inspiration for their conceptualizations of a more permanent kind of global political subject dedicated to resistance against war. For liberal cosmopolitans, the event indicates the formation of a consensual force of opposition towards war in general (global civil society) on the basis of universally shared values. For radical poststructuralists, it represents an example of the becoming Multitude, which can in the form of a consensual global body of resistance wage a 'war against war'.

Chapter 4 reflected on these issues by analyzing how the political agency of resistance, the anti-war movement, its ascendance and central characteristics are understood within the movement itself. It was demonstrated that there is a gap between the political reality experienced by the organizations within the movement and the highly globalized and consensual interpretations made by academic globalists. Both liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists emphasize global aspects and new characteristics of the movement substantially more than is the case within the movement itself. While many organizations do conceive some of its characteristics in new as well as global terms, the movement is more commonly characterized as a continuation of the long-term peace movement rather than a completely new and extraordinary phenomenon. Most organizations do resonate in some respects in outlook with the academic globalists, especially in regard to the celebration of the political significance of the February 2003 demonstration, but it is nevertheless more common to regard the movement from a national or international than a global perspective. Some contextualize the primary political meaning of the movement in domestic terms, for example, when describing it as a reaction to the failure of representative democracy in Britain. For others, the anti-war movement, rather than global, is characteristically international – more of a collection of nationally operating movements which, due to somewhat exceptional political circumstances, have managed to cooperate more closely together than is usually the case. In other words, international coordination in the context of the Iraq War is not necessarily regarded as evidence of a permanent phenomenon, or the start of a totally new kind of global project for the anti-war movement.

Moreover, the chapter showed that the ascendance of the movement was not as easy and consensual a process – nor its relationship to the alter-globalization movement as harmonious – as academic globalists tend to assume. In the British context there were many contradictions and internal conflicts even at the very beginning, ones which have continued to shape the relationship between different groups ever since. There are continuing disagreements within the movement, for example, in regard to leadership issues, cooperation between organizations, the preferred extent of centralization of the movement, and its connection to other movements. Although many differences were put aside for a while, some of the problems and sources of controversy still remain.

Chapter 5 reflected on the theoretical debate dealing with the aims and targets of resistance (*what is resisted*) as well as the causes of the war in its broader political context (*why is resisted*) by analyzing how these are articulated within the movement. It was shown that rather than invoking the abstract forms of governance put forward by the radical poststructuralist approach, most of the organizations define the main targets of resistance in quite traditional terms, that is, nation states and governments. It clearly locates them closest to the critical state-centric approach. In regard to the long-term aims of the movement, however, there are also premises that correlate with liberal cosmopolitanism and also with radical poststructuralism to some extent. In other words, the results are mixed, indicating that there can be clearly articulated state-level opponents and more abstract targets of resistance simultaneously. In contrast to the theoretical debate, it is maintained within the movement that these *both* are important, as they exist at the same time. In regard to the analysis of the causes of the war, there was not much resonance between the organizations and the theoretical approaches. Rather than explaining the war as due to an exceptionally dominant but transitory role of the US (liberal cosmopolitans), a permanent state of exception serving the global regime of biopower (radical poststructuralists), or the weakness of the west (critical state-centric approach), most of the organizations subscribe to a much more traditional Marxist analysis. They regard the war essentially as an imperialistic endeavor of the US, supported by its loyal ally Britain, which obeys its will while serving the transatlantic 'special relationship'. In this regard, the crisis of democracy was strongly emphasized. It was given different and partly overlapping meanings and explanations, of which some echoed the perspective of academic globalists and others resonated with the state-centric approach.

It was discovered that there are substantial differences in regard to how the relationship between the short- and long-term goals of the movement is understood and to which broader struggles the current anti-war movement is connected. While some regard the movement as a part of the anti-imperialistic, pacifistic or anti-militaristic struggles, others link it to issues of global social justice and the environment. Hence, it was concluded that, apart from its resistance to the Iraq War, it is quite difficult to build a clear and coherent political project for the anti-war movement more generally. Indeed, it became evident that there are

internal divisions and ongoing political conflicts within the movement even in regard to the Iraq War. In particular, the question of pacifism draws a clear division between some organizations.

Chapter 6 reflected on the theoretical debate regarding effective strategies (*how to resist*) and the primary context of resistance by analyzing how these are understood within the movement. It was found that two of the leading organizations consider pressuring the national government in the form of mass mobilization as the most effective strategy; they also engage in parliamentary politics via their contacts with political parties. Cooperation with trade unions is also regarded as important. In all of these regards, they clearly resonate with the critical state-centric approach while advocating political strategies and collective action at the national level. One of the organizations advocates a strategy of nonviolence and direct action that take place in direct confrontations with state authorities, and thus relies on more of a localized than a globalized strategy, although the strategy can be applied internationally as well. One organization resonates with the radical poststructuralist approach in emphasizing the importance of global demonstrations against international institutions and stressing the interconnectedness of different struggles to be advanced by common strategies of global opposition. More resonance with liberal cosmopolitanism and radical poststructuralism was found in regard to strategies serving the long-term aims of the movement.

These mixed results demonstrate that instead of defining effective strategies of resistance in either purely nationally/instrumentally or globally/symbolically oriented terms – as the theoretical approaches do – within the movement *both* state-based *and* global strategies in *both* their instrumentally *and* symbolically oriented forms are considered important at the same time, although for different purposes. While it is considered rational to pressure the national government, the significance of expressive, symbolic politics at the global level, especially in the form of international cooperation and solidarity, is emphasized at the same time. However, it was also discovered that the organizations have different emphases in regard to the primary context of resistance, and that there is considerable disagreement on which strategies are most effective. Of all the internal divisions, the one related to strategies is the most controversial and debated among the organizations.

The two final empirical analysis chapters were closely interrelated in probing the issue of power and effectiveness. Chapter 7 reflected on the theoretical debate dealing with the power of social movements (*what is power*) by analyzing how power is articulated and defined within the movement. It was shown that one organization regards the power of the movement purely in terms of symbolic power, as an ability to mobilize broad public support at the global level; in this respect its perspective is similar to that of the academic globalists. More resonance was found with the critical state-centric approach, with two of the leading organizations conceptualizing the power of the movement in quite traditional terms, articulating it primarily in relation to the national context, where the movement can seek to pressure those in power. These organizations refer to public support as the main constituent of power, in the form of either public opinion or public action, and regard direct engagement with the political system and cooperation with major trade unions as necessary. Thus, the power of the movement is understood mainly in terms of its ability to influence political decision-making in the context of the nation state. However, this conception does not exclude the significance of symbolic power at the global level. Rather, what we see here is a 'both-and' perspective, in which gaining power within the domestic political system is nonetheless considered more important.

Interestingly, in addition to being articulated as public support, power was described in terms of unity and diversity of the movement, which revealed most clearly the tendency to understand power in terms of collective power, that is, the power of the masses. It was found that while unity is regarded as a necessary condition for making collective claims and forming a powerful political body of resistance, there is much less explicit discussion of unity than of diversity. It would be easy to get the faulty impression that the importance of unity has been overwhelmed by that of diversity, given that the latter being celebrated continuously in all possible contexts. A closer analysis revealed that diversity is often used as a euphemism for unity, which is valued more in the end. A diversity of political convictions and ideologies is rarely emphasized or diversity articulated as a value of its own; rather, diversity is regarded as a means to an end – helping to increase the power of the movement. In other words, while unity refers to the cause, diversity refers to people, understood mainly as numbers and masses.

Broadening this discussion, chapter 8 reflected on the theoretical debate concerning the effects of anti-war activism by analyzing how achievements, successes and failures of the movement are articulated by the organizations. It was demonstrated that achievements are usually conceived in *both* instrumental *and* symbolic as well as in *both* national *and* global terms, illustrating again the tendency within the movement to regard the issue from a broader perspective than the theoretical approaches do. However, it was also discovered that there are substantial differences and even disagreements in regard to what the organizations consider the most important effects and what the movement is expected to be able to achieve in a certain time frame.

Taken together, chapters 7 and 8 showed that each of the organizations studied generally has a broader and more multifaceted understanding of the power and effectiveness of the movement than any of the three theoretical approaches. While the theoretical debate is based on an 'either-or' logic, in which power is conceptualized in either purely symbolic terms (academic globalists) or purely instrumental terms (critical state-centric approach), within the movement both of these are considered important in the struggle against (the) war, although the organizations differ slightly in emphasis. It was shown that in contrast to the alter-globalization movement for example, the anti-war movement publicly acknowledges that power is an important, if not the most important, element of resistance and is also quite eager to promote its achievements. The movement is regarded as striving for power – having it as well as using it for achievement of its goals. Nevertheless, it is problematic that power as a concept is usually articulated only when discussing the power of the opponents or the achievements of the movement; the power of the organizations themselves is rarely discussed, and the power of the movement is hardly ever evaluated from a critical perspective. Open discussion about power struggles and conflicts within the movement is almost non-existent, only few interviewees bringing up these issues. Neither is there much critical debate about the fact that despite its being a part of the influential western-European movement, neither the national movement nor the organizations involved necessarily reflect the ideologies and values of other cultures very well.

On the whole, the five empirical analysis chapters have demonstrated that although there is some common ground between the three theoretical

discourses and the current anti-war movement, substantial divergences nevertheless exist between the interpretations, conceptualizations and suggestions of the discourses, in particular that of the academic globalists, and the premises of the organizations studied. Many of the organizations resonate most in several respects with the state-centric approach, which defines politics as a struggle for power and argues that social movements are influential when they have clearly defined goals in the context where it is possible for them to gain political power, that is, the nation state. Nonetheless, all the organizations studied believe it is possible for the anti-war movement to simultaneously seek symbolic power at the global level. Thus, the aims, targets and strategies of resistance are defined in substantially broader terms by the movement than by the theoretical approaches. The fact that within the movement the understandings and premises are often overlapping, complex and mixed rather than clear and simple shows that is not only difficult but also unproductive to conceptualize resistance from only one single perspective. In this regard, all three theoretical approaches clearly prove to be inadequate.

Why is this then problematic? Firstly, from the perspective of 'normal' political theory it is troubling that a lack of engagement with a current movement leads theorists to make inadequate and sometimes even false interpretations of its character, aims, targets and strategies or to evaluate its power and effectiveness only from one particular, restricted perspective. Secondly, and more importantly, it is problematic from the perspective of critical theory that the theoretical approaches are characterized by their inability to engage and communicate with the objects of their conceptualizations and/or addressees of their visions and suggestions in terms which could be practical, helpful, or at least somehow relevant to them. Thirdly, as we will see below, it is unfortunate that theorists, particularly in the case of academic globalists, define their political projects of resistance and emancipation in a way which enables their conceptualizations to be autonomous from practice, and their normative suggestions and visions to be divergent from the values and beliefs held within the movement. Despite the globalists' many emancipatory claims, normative suggestions and even broader political projects against war, their connection to the political practice of the existing anti-war movement seems to be remarkably weak.

Before these findings can be elaborated on a higher level of abstraction, an important question needs to be asked: How generalizable can the empirical findings be considered when only four organizations have been studied in the context of one country? In other words: Would the empirical findings be different if, for example, German, French or Dutch anti-war organizations were studied instead of British groups? The answer is probably 'yes', at least in some respects. In each country there are historical, political and cultural factors which influence many of the issues studied here – for example, how the state and political system is being viewed by anti-war groups in different places and at different times. In Germany, for instance, the role of established political institutions has traditionally been quite weak in the anti-war movement, which is oriented to the grass-roots level and operates on a decentralized basis (Grewe 1985: 104; Kaltefleiter & Pfaltzgraff 1985: 189; Rochon 1988: 83–97). Thus, it is likely that the German movement resonates more with many of the perspectives of academic globalists than those of scholars espousing the state-centric approach. Indeed, ideologies and coalitions vary in each country. Whereas pacifism has historically had a negative connotation in France (Dumont 1985: 138), it is deeply rooted in the British political tradition, deriving from a broader Anglo-American tradition (Kaltefleiter & Pfaltzgraff 1985: 188).<sup>1</sup> It is important to note that while national anti-war movements in Europe are generally quite critical of their respective governments (Overy 1982: 6), the domestic political history has taught the British movement to be especially aware of the tendency of post-imperial states to emphasize global problems and resort to universalizing rhetoric<sup>2</sup>. Hence, the British movement might be more critical toward its national government and political institutions than movements in other European countries.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For more on the differences between the relationship of the movement and political parties in different countries, see e.g. Rochon 1988: 163–165, 213–215.

<sup>2</sup> However, this has not always been the case. It has been suggested that during the Cold War, for example, the British movement was characterized by an inability to break free from the nation's imperial history (e.g. Hinton 1989).

<sup>3</sup> National movements are also distinctive in terms of internal divisions. The Italian movement is characterized by lack of unity and 'rivalries between its different political and ideological components' (Rossi & Ilari 1985: 150, 155). The German movement is divided between communist and non-communist organizations, while the French one is considered the most divided in all of Europe (Rochon 1988: 93–94).



Due to the above-mentioned differences (and many others), it must be openly acknowledged that studying the premises of anti-war organizations in another country than Britain would surely have shown different degrees of resonance with the theoretical approaches under investigation. However, I argue that the most important finding of the thesis would nevertheless be the same. Even with its very limited case material, this thesis has clearly managed to demonstrate that the three theoretical approaches are excessively polarized and dualistic in their conceptualizations when these are compared to the understandings held within the movement; in that respect they all fail to relate to the movement's political practice and premises. Within the anti-war movement there are very complex and multiple understandings in regard to all issues and concepts studied, ones which in the current theoretical debate are treated in much more restricted 'either-or' terms. The following section discusses the broader context of this problematique and its implications in more detail, after which suggestion can be put forward as to how it would be possible to improve and develop the theories further.

## 9.2 Towards a 'Both-And' Instead of an 'Either-Or' Approach

When the differences between the three theoretical approaches as well as the divergences between their premises and those of the anti-war movement are evaluated in a broader context, an interesting question arises: Are the divergences and failures of the rival theoretical approaches actually due to the 'either-or' logic in their conceptualizations of power and the primary level of resistance? The liberal cosmopolitan approach maintains that political action should be globalized because politics has been globalized through external changes brought by globalization and the information revolution. The approach argues that any meaningful political engagement must take place at the global level, where social movements can gain symbolic power by influencing global public opinion through their informational resources. Radical poststructuralists hold that resistance should be globalized, because power has been decentralized and globalized. For them, too, the global level is clearly primary and they are blatantly hostile towards local forms of resistance. Critique by

the state-centric approach of both the above-mentioned ‘post-political’ approaches suggests that their analysis of the globalization of politics, power and resistance is fallacious. In order to be effective, resistance must be based on properly political, strategic and instrumental engagement at the national level, where real political power is located.

Hence, it can be argued that while for academic globalists ‘the struggle is the message’, for the critical state-centric approach the struggle is the necessary price of success<sup>4</sup>. Although the state-centric and global theoretical approaches are different, even opposite in this regard, they all share a characteristic that is deeply problematic as regards their connection to the existing anti-war movement. They are all based on somewhat binary and totalizing frameworks. While the critical state-centric approach succeeds extremely well in illustrating serious problems embedded in the global approaches, it is nevertheless based on a ‘either-or’ logic similar to that of the global approaches it criticizes. In other words, in recent theoretical debate it is claimed that resistance needs to be *either* global *or* local to be effective, depending on how the power of social movements is conceptualized. This invites an important question: Is it not possible to have *both*?

The problem with the liberal cosmopolitan approach is that when it conceptualizes effective resistance solely in terms of expressive and symbolic action at the global level – the level where social movements shape global opinion by communicating their values and beliefs – it ends up ignoring the more practical side of power. The radical poststructuralists make essentially the same mistake. The shortcoming of the state-centric approach is that its strong emphasis on the national context does not completely resonate with the understandings held within the anti-war movement either (and probably not with those of other social movements for that matter) as it is a movement which has always been working *both* nationally *and* internationally to various extents. Although recognizing that ‘Politics has always been deterritorialized in terms of its conceptualisation, in terms of the aspirational content of political demands’, Chandler (2009a: 16) argues that power is ‘necessarily territorialized in terms of the specific strategies and articulations of those

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<sup>4</sup> I have borrowed this idea from Horowitz (1970: 29), who compares the approaches of different civil rights movements in the US.

demands to put those demands into practice'. As we have seen, this view does resonate with the understandings of many organizations within the movement; however, it constitutes only a part of the big picture. The anti-war movement has demonstrated that both elements can be combined. In Britain there has been a popular mass movement which has sought political power in the national context, but has also engaged in coordination of international (or 'global') demonstrations and other campaigns, where symbolic politics play a more important role.

The state-centric approach importantly reflects on problems in regard to symbolic expressions of solidarity becoming the main point in political activism, a development understood as signalling a lack of political engagement, or even 'a radical justification for the refusal to engage politically' (Chandler 2004: 331). The approach argues that the discourse of global solidarity reflects the inability of social movements to convincingly articulate their political ideas to their domestic audiences which has led them to 'sought legitimacy more in their international connections' (ibid: 330). Although this is a legitimate concern and worthy of examining in greater detail, it must be noted that the above-mentioned aspects are not exclusive – or at least they need not to be. It is possible to have clearly articulated political projects at the national level but at the same time to express solidarity and acquire support for the cause beyond the nation state. Either there is 'no reason why a particular political activity cannot be *both* expressive *and* instrumental' (Rochon 1998: 122, emphasis added). Indeed, the analysis of the anti-war movement in the present study has given an indication that it is possible to avoid the problems of primarily globally oriented abstract resistance if the global and national dimensions are both included in a way which does not put the political at risk. From the perspective of the state-centric approach, this requires that the national be considered primary. Nonetheless, it does not mean that it would be impossible or undesirable to engage in symbolic struggles at the global level at the same time.

In short, the 'either-or-logic' embedded in the above as well as in the globalists frameworks seems to conceal the complexity of issues. Where does, then, the dualism and 'either-or' logic of the theoretical approaches derive from? Evidently, it can be explained partly due to their lack of involvement with the existing movement(s), an engagement that which would inevitably make theorists more aware of their complex nature as

well as multiple and overlapping premises. However, it also derives from the broader normative and political premises of the approaches. The fact that academic globalists have a strong tendency to emphasize the primacy of symbolic power and resistance at the global level cannot be separated from their highly negative views of state-based representational democratic politics. Because they believe that democracy in the context of traditional political institutions cannot serve the interests of people any longer, academic globalists stress that rather than trying to change specific policies of nation states and governments, social movements should aim at challenging the entire traditional political system. In contrast, the state-centric approach, which emphasizes instrumental power at the national level, strongly criticizes global forms of political engagement, which in its view not only undermine the democratic representational system, but also escape power due to the abstract, global and non-strategic nature of 'post-political' struggle. While adherents of the state-centric approach consider more traditional forms of political engagement to be the most effective way forward, academic globalists regard them as ineffective and old-fashioned, either due to the global character of current political problems (liberal cosmopolitans) or the deterritorialized form of power in Empire (radical poststructuralists).

Interestingly, this kind of a controversial and polarized theoretical debate resembles the spirited discussion between advocates of the 'resource mobilization theory' and the 'new social movement theory' in social movement theory a few decades ago. The resource mobilization theory maintains that social movements do not primarily aim at challenging political institutions, but at changing certain policies. Hence, they are expected to cooperate with political institutions of representative democracy. Social movements and conventional forms of political participation are regarded very similarly and they are to be analyzed using same standards and frameworks. (E.g. Rochon 1988: xvii, 18–19.) Social movements are defined as 'collective efforts to alter public policies' deriving their support from those 'who seek particular reforms' (ibid: xvii). The anti-war movement is thus considered a political force primarily trying to change particular policies and whose success is dependent on an ability to gain support among influential political institutions. This logic makes the anti-war struggle essentially a numbers game, because influencing political institutions requires building up a broad mass movement with

enough supporters. In other words, like the state-centric approach, the resource mobilization theory emphasizes that in order to gain political power social movements need to have clearly defined aims, opponents, strategies and centralized organizational structures. While defining power and effectiveness as the ability of social movements to achieve their stated aims (policy changes), it is obvious that the state-centric approach shares an instrumentalist view of power with the resource mobilization theory.

In contrast, the new social movement theory holds that the real significance of social movements derives not from their efforts to change policies of particular nation states or governments, but from their efforts to pose a 'revolutionary' challenge to established political institutions (Tilly 2004: 68–71; Rochon 1988: xvii; Walker 1988). When social movements are not regarded as instrumentally oriented but rather expressive in nature (Rochon 1988: 99), they are believed to be creative forces that construct countercultures which challenge the values and policies of their states and societies through collective action. In other words, they represent broad demands on the socio-political system while signalling 'the disaffection of a growing proportion of the population from the mainstream social and political institutions' (ibid: xvii). As they are taking part 'in a more far-reaching reinvention of political life', social movements are not assessed by their 'immediate capacity to induce existing elites to pursue more enlightened policies' but their ability to find 'new spaces in which to act politically', 'new ways of acting politically', 'new conceptions of knowing and being' as well as to discover interconnectedness of 'seemingly different movements struggling in different situations' (Walker 1988: 8, 80).

An extremely interesting argument is that strategies as such are not important for social movements because their goals cannot even be determined in advance. In the context of the anti-war movement, for example, it is argued that 'just world peace must grow out of the ongoing practices of people everywhere, not be molded by those who claim to have a god's-eye view of what is going on' (ibid: 7). It is even stressed that it is 'important to resist inevitable demand for hard-nosed, concrete solutions to particular problems' (ibid).

In other words, the difference between the resource mobilization and the new social movement theory is whether social movements are regarded as collective efforts 'to delegitimize the political system, or whether exercising political effectiveness within the system is paramount' (Rochon 1988:

xix)<sup>5</sup>. Both approaches have their strengths and weaknesses as well as their justifications and critiques. It is easy to agree, for example, with Rochon (1998: 14–15) that due to the growth of bureaucracy and governmental control in people’s daily lives, it is not surprising that the nation state is increasingly often regarded as an obstacle to human progress and has thus become an object of many kinds of resistances. It is also easy to agree that the resource mobilization theory does not answer or even address all relevant questions. As primarily interested in the interaction between social movement organizations and established political institutions, it concentrates mainly on the process of mobilization rather than the ideas and ideologies of movements. It also fails to recognize the fundamental critique that established political institutions are confronting across the western industrialized countries. (Ibid: 18–19, 122.)

The new social movement theory certainly has its shortcomings as well. For example, it fails to recognize the role of national, centralized organizations within a movement (Rochon 1988: 22), which, as we have seen in this thesis, are clearly still important. It is also understandable that the critics of the approach argue that social movements may ‘put the very survival of the liberal democratic regimes in jeopardy’ when they ‘undermine political authority by nurturing a systematic critique of the established political system’ (ibid: 14). This clearly represents the stance of the state-centric approach, which maintains that globally oriented forms of political engagement in particular can pose a serious challenge

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<sup>5</sup> Within the movement, this division has sometimes been conceptualized in terms of the ‘high road’ and the ‘low road’. Since the high road ‘aims directly at existing power structures to reach established “decision-makers” and through them to change the system’ (Green 1992: 43), it is regarded as a straighter but also a more narrow approach which often fails to relate large masses of people. However, it is clearly strategic, as it seeks to directly influence policies. The low road, described as ‘widespread and diverse’ and encompassing ‘a variety of grass-roots movements’, aims to establish ‘a new world order through the creation of new forms and institutions as well as new forms of living’ while, however, often failing to ‘relate to the actual political sources of power’ (ibid: 43–44). Peace movement scholars suggest that the divergence derives ‘from different ideas of the nature of peace, from different conceptions of the kind of changes in people and institutions that will be necessary to make peace possible’ as well as ‘what is considered an adequate strategy for bringing the required changes about’ (Washburn 1973: 153). For those who seek to transform politics, the primary point of resistance is the structure or leadership of power, but for those who seek to reform policy, it is issues and policies (Chatfield 1992: 183).

to democratic politics<sup>6</sup>. However, the main problem of the new social movement theory, which characterizes also the liberal cosmopolitan and radical poststructuralist approaches, is that it poses extremely challenging tasks for social movements and invests very idealistic, sometimes even utopian expectations for them<sup>7</sup>. It is argued, for example, that social movements ‘have the capacity to extend the horizons of our political imagination’ while transforming ‘the boundaries of the possible’ (Walker 1988: 3). They are believed to challenge universal paradigms and defy commonly held understandings of what politics and power are about and are therefore regarded as sources of political creativity in contrast to other more conventional and reactionary actors (ibid: 2). One of the most their central tasks is to rethink the most ‘fundamental assumptions about what it means to be human’ and deconstruct concepts such as peace, security or democracy (ibid: 4). It is suggested that social movements should ‘slip through or behind the familiar clichés and dead ends of contemporary debate about peace and justice’ (ibid: 60), because ‘the ability to raise interesting questions, and to do so in a way that will force established institutions to pay attention to them, is an exceedingly valuable function’ (Rochon 1988: 76). However, what is left unsaid is that in light of the challenge social movements face even in successfully influencing government policies, it is surely even more challenging for them to provide coherent and systematic critiques or concrete suggestions indicating how to better organize political life in general.

While this kind of a polarized debate was ongoing in the social movement theory already several decades ago, the same dualism, somewhat surprisingly, seems to characterize the theoretical debate today. Academic globalists consider social movements that aim to gain political power as reactionary, old-fashioned and inward-looking, and, at the same time, criticize the movements for trying to control the political landscape (as well as political imagination). The state-centric approach regards

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<sup>6</sup> Some social movement scholars as well have noted that global political strategies should be evaluated critically (e.g. Tilly 2004: 121, 131, 143, 155), which is not, as we have seen, an issue that academic globalists would have elaborated on.

<sup>7</sup> Often the expectations are also controversial. Simultaneously with many great expectations it can be acknowledged that ‘movements neither emanate from nor add up to a coherent alternative in the form of a new historical project toward a more acceptable and desirable future’ (Kothari in Walker 1988: x).

more broadly oriented social movements as naïve, utopist and ineffective, because they mainly aim at affecting values and attitudes. Nevertheless, the debate has gained new characteristics in a new theoretical context. The current debate is different from that of earlier periods, because increasingly globalized conceptualizations have clearly brought in new flavors. Due to their adherence either on instrumental or symbolic power, the three theoretical approaches studied in this thesis argue very explicitly that it is necessary for social movements to choose between political life and resistance *either* at the level of the nation state *or* outside of it, and thus also to choose between state-based or global strategies.

In the field of social movement research, the resource mobilization theory has been somewhat overpowered by the new social movement theory, for most of the leading social movement theorists now clearly advocate the latter. In the field of IR, the trend seems to very similar. The liberal cosmopolitan and radical poststructuralist approaches have become dominant in the recent theoretical debate concerning the role and power of social movements in the context of the changing international system, in which nation states are believed to have lost much of their power to ‘global forces’, however these may be defined. The discourse of the crisis of democracy has also brought new flavors to the debate, as have popular theories of the network society and the new information and communication technologies. In other words, the new social movement school seems to thrive in the postmodern era. The problem in IR is that – unlike in social movement research more generally – there no significant counter-discourses have emerged to balance out the claims of global academics. It is only recently that the critical state-centric approach has questioned the premises of global approaches.

Indeed, when critically evaluating the current state of theorization, one of the problems with especially global approaches is that they seem to have ‘gone wild’ on those perspectives that were articulated in what might be considered more down-to-earth terms in the late 1980s, when political theory was not as impregnated with global and abstract postmodern conceptualizations. In current theorizations, there seem to be no constraints at all: whatever social movements do, they are always regarded as powerful, emancipatory and contributing to the good of the whole world. In this regard, the suggestion that there might be ‘an inverse relationship between the amount of progressive ‘new characteristics’ these



struggles have and their strength and influence' seems to be relevant (Chandler 2004: 328). It is easy to agree that theorists advocating global frameworks seem to invest movements with 'their own ideas and aspirations' which 'can then be used by any institution or individual to promote their own importance and moral legitimacy' (ibid).

At the same time, however, it must be noted that in the name of realism it is always very tempting to argue that social movements are weak, fragmented and unsuccessful in their attempts to change the world for the better. The view that movements can be 'taken seriously only if they achieve power, if they take control of states or political parties or turn into mass movements capable of challenging entrenched elites and institutions' is not very productive (Walker 1988: 145). It presumes that 'power is always and everywhere the same' although it can be suggested that 'the *power to create* is not measurable in the same currency as the *power to destroy*' (ibid: 146, emphasis added). Therefore, the idea that social movements should not be assessed 'in terms of some timeless notion of what power is but in terms of their capacity to alter our understanding of *what power can be*' (ibid, emphasis added) is extremely interesting and would deserve substantially more attention in the theoretical debate. On the basis of this thesis, it can be argued that in any event theorists should not resort only to highly abstract conceptualizations, but rather it is necessary and at least equally important to revitalize theoretical discussion concerning more strategic and instrumental forms of political engagement as well. Fortunately, in the theoretical field new criticisms and perspectives are gained along the way. This thesis, too, has been an attempt to broaden and develop the theoretical debate further.

Thus far in the thesis it has been illustrated that the current theoretical debate is not only polarized but very dogmatic in many respects: none of the three theoretical approaches is satisfactory or adequate in exclusivity. In contrast, the analysis of the premises of the anti-war movement has demonstrated that it would be possible to have an intermediate, a sort of a 'middle' position that could combine the advantages of several perspectives simultaneously. Therefore, my contribution to the theoretical debate is to suggest that rather than framing the issue in terms of an 'either-or' logic, a 'both-and' approach<sup>8</sup> should be adopted. It would not

<sup>8</sup> I have adopted this terminology from Fay (1998: 224).

only reflect more accurately the way in which the relationship between the local and global (as well as many other concepts) is conceived within the anti-war movement, but would also provide a much more productive and comprehensive perspective for discussing the concepts of power and resistance in the context of social movements more generally.

In order to broaden the perspectives of the theoretical debate, four important points should be acknowledged. Firstly, it should be recognized that the state is not the only space where political activity and resistance can occur, but that it is nevertheless a space where it still can, and does, occur. Secondly, it would be important to understand that means and ends can often be viewed as dialectical elements, especially when we are talking about long-term aims of the movement. In other words, there cannot (and should not) always be a clear distinction between means and ends. Accepting this does not mean, however, that there should be no goals or any kind of strategic thinking. Thirdly, the theoretical approaches should recognize that there are different forms of power which can be important in the same context but in different sense. Both symbolic power and instrumental power are important because they are serving different purposes in the struggle. Due to its instrumental character, political power is useful when trying to change unwanted policies. Symbolic power can be important at the same time due to its social character, which is valuable when trying to change attitudes and beliefs in the long run. Fourthly, it needs to be acknowledged that social movements usually engage in both short- and long-term struggles at the same time. Therefore, even though it was accepted that in order to be effective social movements need to seek power where they can directly influence political decision-making, this does not mean they should not also seek support for their cause at the global level, for instance, by organizing global demonstrations or other kinds of events and campaigns. The global and local should not be regarded as competing frameworks for resistance, but rather as parallel frameworks that serve for different purposes. Both can be applied simultaneously in a manner that allows for political, strategic engagement at the national level as well as symbolic expressions of resistance at the global level.

The kind of 'both-and' approach that this thesis suggests for the three metatheories is not a unique or a totally new perspective as such, although the context is of course new and distinct. For example, in the late 1980s

some scholars pointed out that relying exclusively on either the resource mobilization or the new social movement theory 'would be to fail to recognize that ideology and organization are each important components' of social movements, because they work both in the political and social arenas and thus, rely simultaneously 'on widespread mobilization and on access to political institutions' (Rochon 1988: 20–21; also Hinton 1989: 201)<sup>9</sup>. Peace movement scholars have also emphasized that peace being 'both a utopian dream and an urgent necessity', it is necessary to 'build bridges between utopian thinking and effective action in the world as it is' (Hinton 1989: x; also Randle 1987: 155–156). This has been referred to as the 'dual nature of the peace movement' (Rochon 1988: 215). In other words, it has been recognized that the movement is a political force that acts with the established systems of authority and utilizes conventional political channels but is not, however, 'simply an extension of conventional politics' as it also brings long-term visions and fresh perspectives into traditional politics (*ibid.*).

As the empirical analysis in this thesis has illustrated, all of the organizations studied within the new British anti-war movement emphasize in one way or another idea that the 'high road' and the 'low road' approaches need to be combined. Similar views have been also expressed within the new American anti-war movement (e.g. Gottlieb 2007: 35; Hayden 2007: 119; Cagan 2005: 59). However, the fact that some activists within the movement consider an avoidance of binary positions important does not represent the view of the whole movement. Indeed, the issue is complex. It is controversial due to the different focuses, emphases and traditions of various organizations, all of which want to preserve their autonomy *as organizations* and advocate certain strategies and tactics in their specific struggles although they recognize that from the perspective of the broader, long-term movement it would be beneficial to accept and even to combine different approaches. Therefore, it can be suggested that the 'both-and' approach is something that could be more openly discussed, not only in the theoretical realm but within the movement as well.

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<sup>9</sup> Reflecting on the European anti-nuclear movement of the time, Rochon (1988: xviii) argues that it was 'far more integrated with established institutions than the new social movement theory would allow' but that its campaigns and organization could not be grasped by the resource mobilization school either.

In this thesis, it is obviously more important to stress the role of the theorists in this regard. They need to go beyond fundamental polarizations and dualisms, because when being caught in between the dichotomous categories of universality and particularity, political theory produces more unnecessary and even harmful dualisms. The ‘both-and’ approach not enables only global and state-based forms of political conceptualizations and imaginations to be considered simultaneously, but also allows consideration of dimensions such as theoretical-practical, modern-postmodern and instrumental-symbolic at the same time. As Brian Fay points out, dualisms and dichotomies can be overcome by deploying a *dialectical* approach in which rival perspectives are replaced by a more holistic and broader one. Such an approach enables one to take into account the premises of the original perspectives yet go beyond them, thereby ‘softening’ dichotomies and dualisms. (Fay 1998: 224, 227–228.) In other words, instead of deploying an ‘either-or’ logic, social science and political theory can often be more fruitful when constructed from a ‘both-and’ perspective. In the particular context of the theoretical debate analyzed here, it may also enable a more reflexive relationship between theory and political practice, as suggested by the findings here.

### 9.3 The Multitude / Global Civil Society as an Answer to War?

When it comes to evaluating the global political projects against war that academic globalists are talking about, the many divergences and shortcomings discussed above suggest that those efforts are not easily compatible with the normative premises of the existing anti-war movement. Moreover, it seems that the academic globalists’ suggestions regarding the organization of resistance, based as they are on quite different understandings of such central concepts as war and power, encounter the same problem. For liberal cosmopolitans the ideal towards which the forces of global civil society should be working is a cosmopolitan society based on liberal and universal values. For radical poststructuralists the ideal towards which the Multitude should guide the rest of world is based on a vision of a communistic but yet diverse and autonomous collective that relies heavily on post-Marxist understandings. Neither of these seems

to resonate very well with the political premises of the current anti-war movement. In the British movement, the premises of many organizations are based on a much more traditional Marxist analysis, where effective forms and strategies of resistance against war are conceptualized in terms of anti-imperialist struggle, preferably combined with international organization of the working class. There are also nonviolent ideals that perhaps challenge the liberal and radical approaches even more, neither being based on pacifistic ideals. Liberal cosmopolitans generally regard many interventions by western liberal states as legitimate, and radical poststructuralists do not advocate a pacifist principle when talking about a 'war against war' or 'democratic violence'.

These findings certainly do not help academic globalists to counter the criticisms they have attracted for not having a collective political subject that could 'give content to the theorising of global struggle' (Chandler 2009: 537). This can be explained in part as due to their not concretely and empirically engaging with the existing movement. They are not trying to understand its premises and practices more closely, an undertaking which could help them to make more enlightened suggestions and build those suggestions on at least somewhat similar premises or definitions of the main problems and aims. On the one hand, from the perspective of the current anti-war movement it seems that the broader visions and suggestions by academic globalists do not have much to offer. On the other hand, one may wonder whether a closer engagement with the existing movement is even their purpose, as both approaches have already fixed their notions of the goals and normative ideals towards which the struggles of resistance should proceed. When the end goal is already determined – either a global liberal cosmopolitan society<sup>10</sup> or a post-Marxist political regime – what is left to be done is merely to find a 'suitable' social movement that would lead the pre-ordained political project. In this way academic globalists actually put themselves above their forthcoming, but as yet non-existent global political subjects. Their arguing that resistance against war is the most important task for the Multitude or global civil society can be interpreted as a rational, move

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<sup>10</sup> As Chandler (2009a: 129) states, 'Whatever the agency, the ideal outcome is already established: grounding liberal claims without political subjects'.

since most people are against war <sup>11</sup>. But the question remains – what is the role of the current anti-war movement here?

In this context, an especially interesting finding of the theoretical analysis is that while continuously celebrating diversity, academic globalists fail to take the diversity of the anti-war movement into consideration in more practical terms. As the empirical analysis has shown throughout the thesis, within the current anti-war movement there is a great variety of political positions, beliefs and ideologies which are not always readily compatible with one other. In fact, they are sources of many kinds of political conflicts and power struggles within the movement. Therefore, it is troubling that in the theoretical debate the collective revolutionary subject is viewed in ‘post-political’ terms not only in regard to its opponents, but also in that possible conflicting interests and power struggles within the global political collective are not taken into account. The lack of this kind of discussion is especially problematic in Hardt and Negri’s theory, since they claim to construct a metatheory providing a clear direction for many movements to take while they themselves ignore political ramifications as well as power issues *within* the Multitude. The fact that Hardt and Negri do discuss these problems to some extent in regard to aid, relief and developmental agencies indicates that they have been considering these issues but have ignored – or for some reason chosen not to reflect upon – them when discussing the Multitude.

When it comes to liberal cosmopolitans, the problem is basically the same, but since they do not generally discuss power or power relations much – and usually not at all in terms of governance – the post-political and power-ignorant stance is much more predictable in their context. In other words, both liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists can be criticized for their inability to conceptualize possible conflicts and contradictions within their global movements. Although the state-centric approach does not discuss these issues either, it nevertheless seems to be the only one of the theoretical approaches capable of offering any analytical instruments for addressing the above-mentioned problems due to its definition of politics and the political.

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<sup>11</sup> In this one particular respect, peace can be regarded as ‘a consensus issue’ since everybody is in favor of it (e.g. Rochon 1988: 158).

Indeed, it must be noted that the anti-war movement has not yet – despite two hundred years of efforts – managed to create a truly global organization dedicated to resistance against war. Hence, taking a closer look at the history of the movement as well as exploring the diversity within the existing movement would be extremely beneficial for academic globalists. It would compel them to reconsider their conceptualizations of the Multitude and global civil society as more or less consensual political collectives in themselves. Although it may easily seem that there is a widespread consensus within the anti-war movement when viewed from the outside, below the surface there are many different views. Despite the fact that many groups have agreed upon some aspects of resistance against one particular war in one specific context, cooperation in broader terms is much more complicated. It is difficult to accommodate all the very different views into one national movement, let alone to a global one. Hence, transforming the anti-war movement into something more permanent and global is an extremely challenging endeavor, and one that cannot be established from above. Clearly, critical political theory can and even should play an important part in these debates, but it should not result in abstract intellectual projects that are independent of political practice and the premises of the movement. Critical political theory needs to communicate with its addressees in order to be emancipatory and practical (e.g. Leonard 1990: xiv, 14; Fay 1987: 2, 4, 22, 29). Visions and suggestions are definitely needed, and social movements can benefit greatly from new theories of political engagement and resistance. But such theories must not be too abstract or totally determined in advance, for that is probably the most certain way to ensure that the visions of political theories remain mere utopias.

The inability of both the liberal cosmopolitan and radical poststructuralist approaches to seriously address the problems discussed above results in their leaving much to be desired when it comes to offering convincing analysis, visions or practical suggestions for resistance. There are many other problems in these theorizations as well. To reflect on the more general critique that was partly developed already in the theoretical analysis (see chapter 2), it can be said that the liberal cosmopolitan approach does not take relations of power into account sufficiently or address power structures adequately: it has an obvious tendency to overemphasize the power of social movements and to consider the

structural aspects of power only in very limited terms. The approach also seems to depoliticize some issues, as seen in its tendency to regard certain (liberal) values as universal and not affected by power. Moreover, it uncritically equates a liberal order with peace and justice. This is a problematic view, because for many outside the western world this order actually equals violence and poverty, both of which are deadly. While emphasizing global interconnectedness, which is supposed to bring peace and stability to the whole world, the liberal cosmopolitans rarely pose the question from whose point of view peace and stability is, in fact, being constructed or secured. In other words, peace is often understood simplistically only as the absence of war, and the 'liberal way of war' is rarely, if ever, problematized. Within the anti-war movement, peace is understood in much broader terms, and the British movement seems to be particularly critical of 'humanitarian' interventions and 'pre-emptive' wars launched by powerful liberal states.

In contrast, the radical poststructuralist approach emphasizes the concepts of global power and global state of war perhaps too strongly and, at the same time, maintains a very broad and somewhat idealistic view of resistance that makes it difficult to propose concrete solutions and practical guidelines for resistance. Partly this can be due to the understanding that resistance *precedes* power, which sometimes seems to give Hardt and Negri's theory a strange mixed flavor of unfounded optimism and omnipotence, resulting in a determinism of sorts<sup>12</sup>. Moreover, although their concept of 'war against war' could be regarded as an effort to construct some sort of a middle ground between 'pacifism and traditions of revolutionary violence' (Reid 2006: 120), their notion of 'democratic violence' is highly problematic in the context of the anti-war movement. It legitimates the use of defensive violence, which is not a very fruitful approach from the perspective of the anti-war movement, at least if pacifists and other nonviolent groups are to be included. Although Hardt and Negri (2004: 344) argue that 'democratic violence' is to be used only for defensive purposes, it still is an extremely problematic concept. As Reid (2006: 105) argues, democratic violence, as a 'conception of the legitimacy of violence in terms of its defensive qualities, is intrinsic to the

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<sup>12</sup> Or, as Naomi Klein puts it on the back cover of *Multitude*, Hardt and Negri's theory is 'an inspiring marriage of realism and idealism'.



very liberal tradition of war' which Hardt and Negri 'are attempting to stand outside of'.

The problem with the state-centric approach is that it fails to recognize the legitimate critique of more of anarchistic types of approaches that base their resistance on the notion that it is justified to resist established political institutions of democratic nation states when these, in the name of liberal democracy, continuously resort to violence and military force. Moreover, by very strongly defending the representative democratic system, the state-centric approach is perhaps too hasty to dismiss many of the justified criticisms regarding shortcomings and failures of representative democracy put forward by both the liberal cosmopolitan and the radical poststructuralist approach. Even if one were to reconcile oneself with the view that representational democracy is the best political system that currently exists, it hardly can be argued that we have now achieved a perfect form of government that should not be criticized or cannot be improved. Instead of blaming people for popular disengagement from politics, perhaps the approach should direct more of its criticism towards the political parties and the political establishment, which have, as the anti-war movement suggests, in fact largely contributed to the crisis of democracy. The view by the state-centric approach that resistance should take place exclusively at the national level for the sake of effectiveness and political accountability can also be regarded as inadequate from the perspective of the anti-war movement. The movement does not conceptualize power solely in terms of instrumental power but rather also regards other, more symbolic forms of power as important. It also seems to consider meaningful political engagement, the role of social movements, and political life in general in broader and more multifaceted terms than the state-centric approach.

The fact that none of the three theoretical approaches seems to be very relevant for the organizations of the British anti-war movement studied invites the question whether it would not have been more productive to consider and analyze some other, more traditional Marxist theorizations in this context. While it would of course have been possible to choose such an approach, the whole research setting would have been very different. It would not have served the rationale of the thesis, whose explicit aim has been to analyze the *currently dominant* theoretical approaches that have directly addressed the anti-war movement as well

as the *critiques* of those approaches. Therefore, it has been justified to rule out traditional Marxist theories: they are definitely not dominant or popular in the current theoretical debate, nor have they addressed the anti-war movement in those terms that the academic globalists have. However, as has been shown, Marxist analysis is quite influential among the organizations studied and it can thus be suggested that academic globalists should take these and similar premises better into account when providing suggestions and visions for the movement.

Although the thesis has shown that the organizations studied have surprisingly little interest in deploying the visions or suggestions of academic globalists, it has demonstrated that liberal cosmopolitan as well as post-Marxist theories of resistance have started to influence the views and understandings held by the groups within the new (British) anti-war movement. For example, concepts such as 'global resistance' or 'global struggle' are being used more commonly by the organizations, although the content of these concepts as used by the movement differs from that found in the theoretical debate. Even though the three theoretical approaches studied here are not the most relevant theories for the anti-war movement, the movement does not live in a vacuum, whereby it is important to recognize the interplay between the theories and the understandings held within the movement. Reflecting on this relationship has been the main rationale of the entire thesis. In fact, the study has demonstrated how the anti-war movement has responded (and adapted its strategies of resistance) to the changing international system in comparison to how these have been conceptualized by different theoretical discourses. In the future, it is likely that the theoretical approaches analyzed here will have more influence within the anti-war movement as a whole, that is, beyond the organizations involved in the British anti-war movement. The extent to which they will have influence, however, depends greatly on the internal debates within the movement since there are constant political struggles going on in regard to how to define main aims, opponents, strategies and tactics. Different understandings of the main constituents of power of the movement and how power is conceptualized more generally will influence and shape the choice of strategies of resistance.

To conclude by summing up some of the main problems concerning the relationship between the theoretical debate and political practice

of the anti-war movement, it can be said that all three theoretical approaches have been shown to be problematic. While they, like any conceptualizations in political theory, are necessarily based on some kind of empirical observations, their links to any particular movements, and especially to the anti-war movement, are not well grounded. The problem with liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists is that when they do refer to some particular movements – which is very rare – they mainly reflect upon their observations drawn ‘above’ and uncritically suggest that utilizing the resulting conceptualizations is the only way forward if social movements wish to become effective in the global era. The shortcoming of the state-centric approach is that it scarcely refers to any movement. Although it criticizes global approaches for a lack of social agency and political subjects in their theorizations, it does not offer these itself either. However, it has to be acknowledged that the state-centric approach is different from the two other approaches in that it must be understood as a critique of the dominant theoretical frameworks by definition. In this regard, its main arguments derive from the notion that there are no coherent political projects or collective political subjects at the moment.

The argument that social movements are essentially efforts to redefine political life by searching for new forms of political engagement and rethinking what power is and what it can be (e.g. Walker 1988) is problematic as well. In particular, the idea that ‘political movements are not primarily “about” the issues that they appear to champion’ (Rochon 1998: 17) invites many critical questions. How should we think about the primary goals of social movements themselves? Should those be abandoned altogether? If the main significance of social movements lies, for example, in their ‘capacity to redefine the nature of political power’, why not then have this as the main and clearly stated aim? If it were defined as the main goal, it would become possible on that basis to define the struggle in terms of that particular objective and start to think about proper strategies for working towards achieving it. Ever more strongly, it starts to seem that the reason why this is not the case is quite simple – because social movements themselves usually are not *primarily* interested in those kinds of objectives. More often they are fighting in actuality against those problems and injustices in the world that they believe it is important and necessary to struggle against. At least on the basis of this study it can be argued that it is fundamentally more important for the

anti-war movement to try to stop a war or to inform people about the causes and effects of war and militarism than it is to try to redefine the nature of political power itself. If something like that takes place in the process, it can be regarded as a positive development, but, importantly, it is only a side-effect, not the main goal of the movement. Even if this interpretation is false, it still is problematic that even the most progressive and imaginative theories do not seek to find out what movements really think and how they regard their struggles and resistances.

Here, the gap between theory and political practice comes again up, yet in another form. Therefore, the suggestion that academic globalists are investing social movements ‘with their own ideas and aspirations’ (Chandler 2004: 328), which means that theorizing ‘becomes a political act or statement in itself regardless of any link to social agency’ (Chandler 2009b: 535; also 2009a: 125), starts to seem very convincing in this context. While theorists see what they want to see in social movements, referring often to *tendencies* and *becomings* – which only can prove to them that social movements are heading towards the direction where theorists want them to go – they end up ignoring how movements themselves consider these issues, that is, where they believe they are heading, why, and how. Although very useful in revealing serious problems in global theoretical frameworks, the state-centric approach is also problematic in this respect. It either does not aim to relate to the political practice and social movements directly, but merely suggests that academic globalists are wrong and that social movements that believe their misguided advice will end up in an even worse situation by becoming less strategic and less influential. Furthermore, although criticizing academic globalists for being utopian, the state-centric approach does not represent too many alternatives either. As Chandler (2009a: 222) himself admits when discussing ‘Marx’s consideration of a similar crisis of political subjectivity’, it is ‘difficult to see an emerging political subject which can give renewed content to political concepts and reconstitute the political as a concrete sphere of contestation’. It would be extremely interesting to learn what kinds of proposals and ideas the state-centric approach would consider possible and desirable in this regard.

On the whole, all the problems of the three theoretical approaches analyzed in this study provide justification to suggest that their connection to political practice, and thus, to emancipatory critical theory

is problematic and inadequate. At the same time the study has shown that any generalizations are difficult because movements really are very complex and multifaceted and it is impossible to grasp all the aspects of their work and to provide all-in-one solutions. Hence, I argue that critical theorists should aim at looking at specific movements in the way Leonard (1990), for example, suggests and also to engage directly with them, because otherwise it is impossible to establish anything of an emancipatory dialogue from the perspective of 'critical theory in political practice'. By communicating with social movements and activists, it is also possible for theorists to learn many new and alternative ways of thinking which, in turn, may help them to transform the relationship between theory and political practice, knowing and being, into something more reflexive and dialectical. For the same reasons – although the purpose of the thesis has not been to 'talk to the movement' directly but to critically evaluate the theoretical debate and develop it further to reflect and address the movement better – it is also necessary for the researcher here herself to address the movement. Therefore, in the next and final section of the conclusions, some problematiqués which have been discovered in the course of this research process will be reflected upon from the perspective of the anti-war movement.

#### 9.4 Unity, Diversity and the Politics of Resistance

The political revival of the anti-war movement and especially the international demonstration day in February 2003 have sparked not only a vigorous theoretical but also political debate about whether the movement should adopt a more global approach and even aim at becoming some form of global organization. However, these kinds of debates are not new or extraordinary, but surface regularly within the movement. For example, in an article published in 1962, the WRI chair warned 'of "the bewilderment of the man-in-street" at the number and variety of pacifist organisations' and asked whether they could not be 'more closely associated with one another in some worldwide movement in which each will continue to fullfil its own particular functions within the framework of a common programme' (Prasad 2005: 329).

It is very revealing that in 2010 this question remains as topical as ever. There are thousands of different kinds of peace and anti-war

groups, associations and organizations across the world, some of which are pacifist and some of which non-pacifist. Their aims and objectives, ideologies and premises vary greatly. Is there something that all would agree upon, some sort of common ground, a common political project? This is a question that has been asked over and over again during the two-hundred-year history of the movement. Where all discussions finally end up is the defining line between unity and diversity: if there were a common project or even a global organization, how can it be guaranteed that diversity is genuinely accepted within it? In other words, it necessarily involves discussion about the least possible level of unity required and the ultimate level of diversity that can be accepted for the struggle to somehow still be coherent.

The difference between past and current debates about unity and diversity is that nowadays the discussion about the importance of diversity takes place in a new kind of a context where it is increasingly often declared that resistance against war must be globalized in order to be effective. Put differently, it is maintained that resistance should be diversified and globalized at the same time. However, it is still unclear how these two are to be pursued and realized simultaneously. It is an intriguing question, because various anti-war/peace groups and organizations within the movement have different kinds of analyses of the causes of war, main opponents, strategies and tactics of resistance. There is a great level of fragmentation not only nationally but also internationally. Different 'branches', such as anti-imperialistic, pacifistic and anti-militaristic groups, have all formed their own coalitions and movements, ones which relatively rarely come together. Already in the 1920s it was 'generally felt that there was a degree of overlap' in the activities of different movements and that 'there ought to be some kind of co-ordination among these international movements' (Prasad 2005: 141, also 130). The same was emphasized in the 1960s when demanding that the peace movement 'must unite and must become international in order to face the challenge of the cold war in general and of the nuclear age in general' (ibid: 339).

In other words, external changes in the political context have always been a source of debate concerning the necessity of producing more unity as well as more international forms of organization. Hence, it is not surprising that the events of 9/11 and the War on Terror have led to a similar kind of debate. Within the current anti-war movement, the

discussion about unity seems to have many different streams. While some organizations stress, for instance, the importance of unity in the context of the political left, others believe that different social movements could all be working towards common goals. Some go as far as to argue that ‘the ultimate destiny of humankind is not only unity within their own species but also with the universe as a whole’ (Prasad 2005: 27). Unity (as well as diversity) is a powerful concept, but one which seems to be defined in multiple ways by different actors.

Finding a proper balance between unity and diversity is an extremely difficult task. If there is too much emphasis on unity, it may alienate potential members and partners who have different views on certain issues. Encouraging too much diversity, on the other hand, may result in even more fragmentation and give rise to potential contradictions and internal conflicts and thus prove to be counter-productive from the perspective of generating effective resistance against war. Indeed, fragmentation and ‘splits’ can be regarded as a general problem of the left. Often it seems that non-left political forces have the ability to become and stay united while the strong emphasis on tolerating differing opinions and standpoints has led the left to become more fragmented and thus often also weaker. Accordingly, the left-oriented anti-war organizations’ attempt to produce more unity does have a certain logic to it. Nonetheless, it also poses a challenge, because the movement should be open to non-left groups.

Although diversity and fragmentation should not automatically be regarded as a direct sign of weakness, it is too simplistic to argue that diversity is the ultimate source of power, as many poststructuralists and post-modern philosophers claim. It all depends on the context, aims and actors, and many other things. In some situations and contexts, unity might be more important than diversity, and *vice versa*. However, they can also be important simultaneously. It is difficult to produce any general rules in this regard and therefore the dominant theoretical debate is problematic. It is true within the anti-war movement as well. Therefore, it might be suggested that if it were to discuss the issue of diversity and unity more openly, the anti-war movement could also help to broaden the theoretical debate in this regard. It is possible that anti-war activists reflect on this issue from a more creative and practical perspective than theorists, who are often trapped in their own categories of thinking about the issue of unity and diversity, usually favoring one over another.

Indeed, from the perspective of political theory, the question of unity and diversity is very interesting in other respects as well that bear direct implications for the movement. An emphasis on unity can, for example, be interpreted as an attempt to *de-politicize* the anti-war movement in terms of its aims, strategies and methods. When issues are represented as something there is a general consensus about, it sends a signal that there is only one universal truth. Too strong an emphasis on unity and, thus, consensus can be regarded as problematic also in the sense that it runs counter to the criticism that the anti-war movement has presented towards its opponents, mainly the liberal western powers. Some may find it hypocritical to accuse the opponents of trying to impose a unified perspective on the whole world when the movement can be considered to do the same. Emphasis on diversity, on the other hand, can be interpreted as an attempt to present the movement as tolerant and inclusive, although in practical terms it is not always as tolerant as it tends to accentuate.

These tensions have surfaced in different ways in this thesis. It is not always a diversity of views and opinions which is celebrated; often those organizations that emphasize diversity regard it as diversity of people in terms of their 'origin'. On the surface (especially in the promotional material) the heterogeneity of objectives of the anti-war movement may be celebrated, but at the practical level it is often regarded as a sort of a hindrance (this being revealed especially by the interviews). Thus, it can be argued that mechanisms of power reveal themselves in efforts to produce more unity despite the continuous public celebration of diversity. There is a deep contradiction between the common metanarrative of a unified struggle of resistance and the practical level, where ideological and political differences of various organizations create many possibilities for conflict and internal controversy. The fact that these difficulties have not produced more serious problems more often within the movement does not guarantee that this will continue to be the case in the future. Along with changes taking place in the political context and in the power relations between different organizations, there will be more room for competition and internal politicization, which may also take the form of a more direct conflict at some point <sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>13</sup> As Leonard (1990: 89–90) points out, 'active confrontation may occur not only at the level of relations between oppressor(s) and the oppressed, but also at the



There are always going to be some tensions within the movement due to its plurality of views and understandings. Attempts are often made to overcome contradictions by referring to commonly shared values and beliefs, which are sometimes even argued to be universal. However, this strategy is doomed in the sense that differences and contradictions are not going to disappear anywhere. Common values can be sought only by first admitting and recognizing the diversity of views and perspectives, with this *then* making it possible to evaluate what kinds of common aims can be constructed. Therefore, I hope that one of the contributions of this thesis will be to convince the anti-war movement to have a more open discussion about internal differences, tensions and conflicting views. One especially troubling aspect is how the concept of diversity is used as sort of a buzzword, one that does not seem to be referring to a diversity of opinions, ideologies and political views, but to diversity understood in terms of different people from different backgrounds (hence, always lists of genders, religions, and so forth). If diversity is continuously celebrated without properly defining its meaning or addressing the problems related to it, it can lead to more severe problems. There should be more open dialogue about problems and controversies but, of course, also about shared understandings, common aims and new strategies. As some pacifist and anarchist organizations have taught us, there are alternative ways to think about power and many different ways to engage in resistance against war besides the traditional emphasis on mass mobilization. It would be a shame if these alternatives were not considered due to excessive emphasis on unity, or merely, due to a lack of dialogue.

This is by no means an issue brought up only in this thesis. While pointing out that more unity does not necessarily equal a more powerful movement, for example, Gillan et al. (2008: 97–98) suggests that if the anti-war movement wishes to gain more influence, there needs to be more interaction and networking between various groups as ‘stronger and deeper ties’ require ‘more sustained interaction’. Or, as some activists have stressed themselves, in order to work for the removal of ‘internecine rivalry among those who follow different paths to the same goal’, it is

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level of relations within the empowerment struggle itself’. In other words, ‘those seeking a practical overthrow of oppressive conditions may find themselves making choices of action that close off communication with others, rather than keeping them open’ (ibid: 90).

necessary to keep ‘channels of communication open and clear of the sludge of petty, inter-organizational rivalries’ (Green 1992: 46–47). These are extremely important viewpoints, particularly considering that especially the British movement has been seriously divided repeatedly during its history. There have been disagreements about ethics, strategies and tactics, for example, in the case of the First and Second World Wars as well as the Vietnam War (Young 1987a: 18). The British movement has been characterized by ‘disparity of ideological stance amongst the different strands’, which means that there can be ‘enormous potential problems and conflicts’ between different groups and organizations (Taylor & Young 1987b: 295). The conflicts have derived from different political, ideological and philosophical traditions, ranging from the war resistance tradition to the Marxist-Socialist, liberal internationalist, pacifists, Labourist, direct actionist and feminist traditions (Young 1987a: 5–10). Although traditions or ideologies as such have not been the object of analysis here, many of the above-mentioned traditions have surfaced continuously also in this study. The CND is still closely connected to the Labourist tradition and WRI to both pacifist and direct actionist traditions. The StWC and GR are linked to the Marxist-Socialist tradition, although from different perspectives, since the former reflects the traditional internationalist Marxist and the latter the transnationalist (globalist) post-Marxist approach.

This study has also confirmed the observation that usually ‘conflicts are the turf battles that may occur between different national groups that define themselves as general peace movement organizations’ (Rochon 1988: 92). At the same time, it must be noted that conflicts, disagreements and power struggles ‘within and between organizations is a perfectly natural phenomenon’ (ibid: 97). As a long-time activist in the American peace movement, Tom Hayden (2007: 120) puts it, ‘organizational rivalries never cease’.<sup>14</sup> Sometimes it has been even suggested that although a unified movement ‘would be able to speak to the authorities more effectively, there are certain advantages to be gained by diversity

<sup>14</sup> Internal conflicts and rivalries do not characterize only the British anti-war movement. For example, organizational and strategic tensions within the American movement have been covered in great detail (e.g. Chatfield 1973b: xxvii; 1973d: 68; 1992: 56–73, 172–175; DeBenedetti 1973: 58, 62; DeBenedetti & Chatfield 1990: 25; Martin 2007: 145; Raskin 2007: 43; Patterson 1973: 21, 24–26, 33).

and even by antagonism between rival movement organizations'. In fact, organizations within the movement can be regarded as a 'microcosm of social change through conflict' (Chatfield 1992: 183) since they provide 'a way for these conflicts to be resolved' (Rochon 1998: 97).

When it comes to a discussion encompassing globality, unity and diversity, there has always been some kind of an understanding of the anti-war movement as a loose network crossing the boundaries of nation states. Now, however, it has become somewhat more transnational in its activities. The new anti-war movement is also more closely connected to other social movements (such as the alter-globalization movement) than has been the case previously. Due to these and other developments, there is not only room for more cooperation but also for more controversy. Although contradictions are not anything new, it seems that the extensive public celebration of diversity may be subjecting them to scrutiny in a new way in the postmodern world. Indeed, the debate has gained new flavors due to the metatheoretical turn from modern to postmodern, that is, from normative universalism to normative skepticism. While in the modern approach it was maintained that there could be some kind of a universal political project for emancipation and social change, the postmodern approach questions the very premises of such universal truth claims and suggests that there should be a generalized attitude of doubt at work that questions all forms of unity and universality as constructions of power while giving prominence to the view that no-one can possess the truth. Hence, any kind of a clearly defined unified front of resistance is challenged by an understanding of resistance as diverse, decentralized and deterritorialized form of opposition.

In this regard, it seems that the British anti-war movement can actually be regarded as a mixture of *both* modern *and* postmodern analyses and elements, thus being somewhere 'in between' new and old movements<sup>15</sup>. Moreover, it can be argued that there is a tendency to focus on both the universal (global) and the particular (national or local).<sup>16</sup> The movement

<sup>15</sup> Also in terms of political practice of resistance, there are clearly traditional as well as new characteristics in the movement.

<sup>16</sup> Similar observations have been made at many different stages of the movement's history (e.g. Rochon 1988: 91; Young 1987a: 20–21), which demonstrates that the movement has always consisted, at any particular time, of some sort of a mixture of both old and new elements.

is likely to continue to have a strong connection to the modernist school of critical theory as long its socialist-oriented organizations are dominant within the movement. Nevertheless, there are many changes that have started to take place within the socialist framework due to popularity of post-Marxist conceptualizations, for example. Also the diffusion of ideas from other movements as well as political opportunities brought by developments of world politics will undoubtedly continue to transform the anti-war movement. Nevertheless, on the basis of the analysis conducted in this thesis, it seems that the movement will not, at least any time soon, slip into cosmopolitan utopianism (liberal globalism) or poststructuralist utopianism (radical globalism), both of which share the view that change will come more or less automatically.

It is good to remember that the hopes invested in the capacity of the anti-war movement to resist, end and even prevent wars are controversial in the sense that the movement is, on the one hand, expected to reject and challenge the universalistic paradigms which produce wars and injustice in the world but, on the other, to provide a coherent alternative political project of its own. Coherence and unity, as we have seen in the thesis, are not merely very difficult to achieve; it is also questionable how much they should be valued in the first place, because efforts to produce unity from above can lead to many problems. However, at the same time, it is necessary to discuss and have some strategies as well; respecting diversity should not become an excuse for wholly non-strategic thinking and a lack of debate on how to achieve the most important goals of the movement.

While there has been a great deal of discussion about globality and locality of resistance, it needs to be noted that the resistance analyzed here cannot be characterized as 'localized' in the true sense that it would be taking place where the war is actually being fought, or that it would necessarily be constructed such that the people who are directly affected by these wars would believe the resistance to be effectively organized. The anti-war movement is a *solidarity movement* and not a resistance movement as such: thus the struggle taking place in Britain or other western societies against the war is being conducted on behalf of, and for the sake of, others. This invites some critical questions, especially since many of the organizations argue the movement represents 'global opinion' or speaks on the behalf of 'humanity'. Much as it is necessary to be critical of the universalist claims of the movement's opponents, its own rhetoric must

be critically evaluated from same the perspective.

Firstly, it needs to be noted that despite global labels and worldwide demonstrations, current anti-war activism is still heavily western-based. Therefore, it might be relevant to ask whether there are similar mechanisms of power, and even some forms of governance, at work here that may bear a resemblance to humanitarian and relief agencies saving 'human species lives' in crisis areas and serving to legitimate war. Secondly, if the 'global' anti-war movement means mainly a western anti-war movement it needs to be asked whether activism should be regarded as some sort of guilt relief for people of industrialized countries. Engagement in the anti-war movement is a relatively safe way for citizens of the developed countries to satisfy their need for collectivity, feeling 'global' and responsible. Indeed, the anti-war movement has always been 'predominantly middle-class in background', which also explains 'working-class and lower-class opposition to the movement' (Horowitz 1970: 27, also Rochon 1988: 149). Thirdly, given that the anti-war movement seems to be quite fragmented and not very radical, it needs to be asked whether it may even help to preserve the status quo. When taking part in the movement, many may think nothing else is required, which can then be regarded as a legitimization for actual non-engagement. Fourthly, it needs to be asked whether the western anti-war movement really takes into account what those people whose lives are on the line want themselves, or is it more of a symbolic power struggle between the western war machinery (mainly the US and UK) and western anti-war activists. After all, both the movement and its primary opponents come from the dominant culture, speaking the same language and thinking often in terms of the same categories (although from opposite poles thereof).

However, these kinds of critical views may surface precisely because the anti-war movement is often studied from an overly western-centered perspective, which has admittedly also been the case here, given that the thesis has analyzed organizations within the British anti-war movement. In retrospect, it has to be admitted at this point that the selection of the case study has begun to feel somewhat too 'obvious' or conventional. However, as was pointed out in the introduction, it was necessary to limit the perspective somehow, and studying the British movement has been extremely interesting in many respects. For example, the debate concerning the political crisis as well as the crisis of democracy in the

British context resonates with that many other countries, inviting critical questions in regard to liberal democracy in broader terms. Not only the British, but many other western governments allied themselves with the US, forming the 'Coalition of the Willing', although the majority of their citizens fiercely opposed involvement in the war. Thus, the efforts of western 'peace people' should not be belittled but rather admired in this regard. Nevertheless, critical debate is also necessary within as well as outside the movement. In fact, it is more or less inevitable, since different approaches and perspectives are being debated and constructed within the movement continuously.

To conclude by reflecting on the diversity of the anti-war movement, it should perhaps be admitted that it makes as much sense to try to produce a unified perspective for the movement as to try to develop a universal receipt for resistance against war in theoretical terms. Indeed, as Leonard has illustrated, emancipatory political projects based on critical theory are deeply historical and necessarily localized in their efforts to change a perceived injustice since otherwise 'the ghost of universalism' will bring many more problems. However, he stresses that it is not enough to engage only in 'localized' forms of critique; what is required as well is 'a metatheoretical self-understanding' which accommodates 'one the one hand, the need for collective solidarity, and on the other, a respect for plurality and difference' (Leonard 1990: 87, also Walker 1988: 5, 157). While admitting that simultaneous commitment to *both* solidarity *and* plurality 'is no mean task', he argues that 'to be anything less runs the risk of repeating the same mistakes that gave rise to the need for critical theory' (Leonard 1990: 261). It is an ideal 'made possible only by *living* it; it is not simply an end we should seek, but also the only means by which we can do so', not assuming that it is possible to live 'in harmony and agreement' but that it may be possible to 'live with our differences without resorting to coercion' (ibid: 269, emphasis in original):

Every voice cannot be realized, and not every voice *should* be realized. Does this, then, imply a contradiction at the heart of the critical theory, a contradiction between the plurality it needs to respect and the solidarity it must pursue? Taken in the abstract, yes. But if this study of critical theory demonstrates anything at all, it is that questions about when we should act, and how we should act, cannot be answered only in the abstract.

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# Appendix 1

## Summary of the Three Theoretical Discourses

	<b>Liberal Cosmopolitan</b>	<b>Radical Poststructuralist</b>	<b>Critical State-Centric</b>
<b>Globalization</b>	Viewed Positively	Viewed Critically	Viewed Skeptically
<b>Iraq War</b>	Exceptionalism of the US, (Humanitarian Causes) (State Building)	Global State of War	Weakness of the West (Identity Politics)
<b>Power/War</b>	Hegemony of the US	Biopower/Empire	Nation States (Western)
<b>Resistance</b>	Global Civil Society, Global Political Action, Consensual, Long-term	Multitude, Global Resistance, Permanent Resistance,	Traditional Movements, State-based Political System, Strategic Aims/Projects
<b>Power</b>	Symbolic/Soft Power	Symbolic/Soft Power Foucauldian Power	Political/ Instrumental Power
<b>Politics</b>	No Left/Right distinction Awareness-rising / Self- Expression / Symbolic Contestation	Blurring the Distinction	Traditional Left/Right, Struggle for Power



## Appendix 2

### Themes of the In-Depth Interviews

1. Personal Motivation and Engagement in the Anti-War Movement
2. Anti-War Activism in Action: the Practice and the Premises
3. Defining Concepts and Context
4. Transnational Ties and Global Connections
5. Globalizing Resistance?
6. The Role of the 'Global' Public Opinion
7. The Role of the Media and the Internet
8. The Question of Effectiveness and Political Impact
9. Responses to the Critique
10. Challenges and Visions for the Future

This is the end / Beautiful friend  
This is the end / My only friend / The end

*The Doors*