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MANIFESTATION OF WHAT FOREIGN POLICY –

EU ACTORNESS IN THE CONTEXT OF OPERATION ATALANTA

**Lapin yliopisto, yhteiskuntatieteiden tiedekunta**

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The topic of this master thesis is the European Union foreign and security policy. More detailed, what sort of foreign policy EU is implementing through its military operation EU NAVFOR Atalanta launched to prevent and combat piracy off the coast of Somalia, and which kind of power position it is seeking through it internationally. The theoretical framework creating the structure of the research comes from Hans Morgenthau and his realistic theory, which he introduced more in detail in his book called Politics Among Nations – The Struggle for Power and Peace (1948). In this book, he separates three different policy types based on the state's foreign policy: policy of imperialism, policy of status quo and policy of prestige. The method of the research is directed content analysis.

All the state's actions, especially the ones that are considered to belong to the area of foreign politics, are somehow after power: they either seek to increase, stabilize or show off it. Consequently, the objective is to recognize whether EU is trying to acquire more power, hold on to its present power or mainly just demonstrating its power through Operation Atalanta. Furthermore, embarking upon the identification of the foreign policy type allows us to further see what kind of power distribution EU is seeking in relation to other security actors. By recognizing EU's global ambitions and how it seeks to pursue them in the international security arena predictions can be made of EU's future engagement beyond its borders in the field of foreign and security politics.

The analysis shows that EU is implementing mainly policy of prestige in the context of Operation Atalanta; in the beginning policy of prestige contributing towards status quo and later policy of prestige to increase power. Its main purpose was to bring visibility and

recognition to EU as a global security actor and increase its estimation of power internationally. Through acquiring more equal power distribution it was trying to place itself next to other big security actors and thus present itself as a credible and capable alternative security source. However, its fundamental objective was not to overthrow the present power balance completely but to make adjustments and shift the power structures towards more beneficial to its global actorness.

Avainsanat:

Euroopan Unioni, EU:n ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikka, Operaatio Atalanta, realismi, sisällönanalyysi

Muita tietoja:

Suostun tutkielman luovuttamiseen kirjastossa käytettäväksi_x_

Suostun tutkielman luovuttamiseen Lapin maakuntakirjastossa käytettäväksi__

(vain Lappia koskevat)

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# 1. Introduction

> If there is no struggle, there is no progress (Frederick Douglas.)

After a long European economic integration during the cold war times, European Union (EU) was formally established in 1993. Its most important aim was to be an economical union increasing the cooperation between its member states. From the beginning, EU has expanded not only by number of its member states but also by its functions. The Treaty of Maastricht established EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) already at 1992 and since then the EU has increasingly been strengthening its role in international contexts through all policy divisions. Solely an economic cooperation has extended its scope and policy agenda into for example political, legal, security and foreign relations areas, and broaden its influence beyond the European region through inter alia its development policy and military operations. It has formed its new foreign policy framework that is more coherent, consistent and visible than ever before.

As EU has engaged itself in actions beyond the economic dimension also the expectations from it have grown higher. New emerging and more diverse security challenges are calling for a greater response from the international community. EU can be seen as a viable option to balance the hegemony of the United States in this regard. Even though the current economic crisis, it and its member states would definitely have the military means to do that. The question however is, does EU have the motivation to shift the power structures and claim itself as a global security player? The answer has not been unambiguous. EU has failed to take a common stand in many crisis situations even geographically on the edge of its borders and having a common front and talking with only one voice has not been actualized properly. Despite this, EU's high-level officials and decision-makers have been increasingly calling for EU's responsibility to work as an important actor outside the EU area in the field of security (Keisala 2004; Solana 2005). The strengthening of EU's CFSP and later actions taken in the field of peacekeeping and military operations in Africa for example seem to be telling another story and demonstrate that, instead of a liaison between European states bringing economical security, EU is in fact trying to answer the call for international actions in the field of foreign and security politics and is more and more asserting itself as an important actor with a bigger role, status and impact world-wide.

## 1.1. Background and relevance

The topic of this master thesis is the European Union's foreign and security policy. More detailed, what sort of foreign policy EU is practicing in the contexts of one of its latest operations, EU NAVFOR Atalanta, and which kind of power position it is seeking through it. The theoretical framework, that creates the structure of this research, comes from Hans Morgenthau and his realistic theory, which he introduced more detailed in his book called *Politics Among Nations - The Struggle for Power and Peace* (1948). In this book, Morgenthau separates three different policy types based on the states foreign policy: policy of imperialism, policy of status quo and policy of prestige. According to Morgenthau, we can describe the power of people as we can describe power of states. Foreign politics for him is nothing else than attempts to increase, stabilize or show off power. All the states actions, especially the ones that are considered to belong to the area of foreign politics, are somehow after the power, no matter if its power for status quo, imperialism or prestige (Morgenthau 1960). Consequently, the objective for me is to see, whether the exact policy EU is practicing through operation Atalanta can be categorized within one of these three policy types and seek to understand the motivations of certain decisions EU has made along this operation and with its foreign policy development in more general level through that.

The operation Atalanta was launched in 2008 in accordance with the United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions 1814, 1816 and 1838 calling for protection of World Food Program (WFP) vessels delivering food aid to Somalia to repress all sorts of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia. The operation and its launch received a lot of support from both, the member countries and countries that are not part of the EU. Overall, 27 countries had participated on the operation until January 2013. It operates next to independently deployed counter-piracy missions of individual countries like South Korea, China, India, Japan and Russia as well as North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Operation Ocean Shield and multinational Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) operations Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 and 151. U.S. is one of the main contributors to the CMF and CTF 150 and 151 have also been commanded by Commanded by a U.S. Navy Vice Admiral. In 2012 Atalanta was extended to continue till December 2014.

The operation Atalanta was launched through European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). When the Treaty of Lisbon entered into a force in 2009, it also reformed the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The reforms were intended to make CFSP more

coherent and increase its visibility (Europa 2010). CFSP established for example the European External Action Service (EEAS) and created the position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Furthermore, it developed new Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to replace the previous ESDP, and this created a new foundation for operation Atalanta. Operation Atalanta is among the first operations working under this new foundation.

From 2008 till now, there has been many official reports and statements about the operation saying the same thing; operation is important when making the European CFSP known outside Europe, it is a good way for EU to get international experience in working globally and, also, it is important in making EU credible next to the big international security actors like NATO, United States and so on (Basil and Smith 2009, 583; House of Lords 2010; Stubb 2010). Based on the CFSP and the statements and reports from Atalanta it seems that EU is keener on working globally in the field of security politics and increasing its impact beyond the European continent.

Atalanta is the second military operation from EU going beyond the European continent that is launched independently. The first one, operation Artemis, was started in 2003 in the Democratic Republic of Congo. As aforementioned, the EU foreign policy has changed after that. Already the operation in Congo brought up questions and arguments against EU getting involved and interfering in actions and events that are not in close contact to it. It was also under debates why is EU acting like a state even though it is not one (Norheim-Martisen 2011). Now, after the Lisbon Treaty, the CFSP is transformed to be even more similar to nation states' foreign policies. It is more unified, coherent and has more tasks than the previous one. The operation Atalanta went also through severe critique, similar and different. There were already operations working against piracy at the coast of Somalia. Also, the situation in Somalia was seen so difficult and complex that merely detaining pirates was not seen as a feasible solution for the problems (Ehrhart and Petretto 2012, 32-34; Nnwobunwene and Orubani 2010, 567-569). Yet still most of the EU member countries decided to participate in the operation.

Why was the support of the operation from the member countries so high? And was there a reason other than economic or humanitarian to get the operation to start so fast after the UN resolution? The statements given and the official reports would most certain answer both of the questions. The operation was important for EU and later especially for CFSP for

receiving international visibility and transforming EU into a credible and strong security actor globally. Both of these objectives sound like a state seeking imperialism and prestige through its foreign policy according to Morgenthau. They are both means of struggling to increase and show off power in international field. So is European Union's foreign and security policy based on the Operation Atalanta imperial or prestige? Or can it be, in its struggle for power, still status quo? According to Morgenthau, to give meaning to a factual raw material of foreign policy, we need to approach it with a rational outline or roadmap that suggests meanings for it (Morgenthau 1960, 5). My roadmap giving meaning is that, indeed, EU is implementing one of this three foreign policy types and is seeking power.

The relevance in researching EU's foreign policy type is indubitable; finding out the embedded interests in actions through which EU engages itself with functions beyond its borders could be used to predict the direction where EU's heading in regard to its future actions and power position next to other big global security players like United States and NATO. According to Morgenthau, "We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power […] This assumption allows us to retrace and anticipate, as it were, the steps of statesmen – past, present, or future – has taken or will take on the political scene. […] Thinking of terms of interest defined as power, we think as he does, and as disinterested observers we understand his thoughts and actions perhaps better than he, the actor on the political scene, does himself" (Morgenthau 1960, 5). If EU is seen to be practicing status quo-policy it will not necessarily further expand its scope to continents far away with no imminent danger to its safety or economic wellbeing. However, if EU is demonstrated to be imperialistic in the sense of Morgenthau, it would increasingly be challenging other global actors in responding to many international crises in the future.

Consequently, the power structures of the present global politics in the field of security might be changing and EU could strategically be pushing itself towards the core. Social situations are answered with repetitive patterns. When the situation is recognized in its identity with previous situations, it evokes same response. However, if the matters are subject to dynamic change, like power structures, these traditional patters are no longer valid but need to be replaced by new ones reflecting this dynamic change (Morgenthau 2006, 7). Understanding where the EU's priorities lie in the sphere of foreign politics will help to understand the patterns of EU responding to crisis situations, and whether it could in the future be an alternative security source willing to take actions beyond its backyard.

## 1.2. Research question and the scope of the research

The specific research question of this thesis is: *based on the official reports, news, statements and legal basis of Operation Atalanta, what kind of foreign policy is EU implementing and which sort of position it is trying to achieve internationally through it?* Furthermore, *did this policy type change after the Treaty of Lisbon, and if so, how can it be seen through action; Operation Atalanta*?

As aforementioned, I will think the question through Hans Morgenthau's theory which he introduced in more detailed manner in his book called Politics Among Nations – The Struggle for Power and Peace (1948). In this book, Morgenthau separates three different policy types based on the states foreign policy: policy of imperialism, policy of status quo and policy of prestige. Which one of these is the EU implementing through the Operation Atalanta and what is it trying to achieve by it?

The core issue for researcher is always to acknowledge the paradigms of the research (Perry and Sobh 2005). In brief, a paradigm is the conceptual framework within to do research and it can be regarded as the "basic belief system or worldview that guides the investigator" (Guba and Lincoln 1994, 105). Political realism "believes […] in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion – between what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only a subjective judgment, divorced from the facts as they are and informed by prejudice and wishful thinking" (Morgenthau 1960, 4). Like positivists, also political realists believe that there is an objective universal truth of political and this truth can be accessible through observation and human reason. Even though realism is often considered to be dogmatic and even naïve in its epistemology, it serves well on my research as it is not monolithic but its paradigm enables more complex approaches to research (Hindrén 2007, 6).

When the Treaty of Lisbon came in to the force, the EU foreign policy was amended as well. Some of the goals and means of the policy also changed during that time to make the policy more coherent and thus stronger globally. Operation Atalanta has worked basing fundamentally on both, the old and new, foundations. As always in the field of transnational cooperation the actual written resolutions, decisions and doctrines are smoothened to appear more general and nondescript. Any hidden agendas there may be are cleverly hidden as the edges are evened out. Therefore, to actually study what kind of foreign policy is EU implementing and which sort of international position it wants to achieve, it will be more

beneficial to actually study the action, and its change, that is carried out within the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy but outside EU area instead of just focusing on the policy doctrines.

People often use the old phrase "actions speak louder than words". The same applies to my research. Action verifies reality, reveals embedded motives and demonstrates certain desires. For Morgenthau, political theory needs to judge the political qualities of intellect, will and actions, since only concentrating on motives can be futile and deceptive. In other words, the true nature of the policy is often concealed by ideological justifications and political realism is determined to unveil the embedded interest behind the policy doctrines. Motives will give us a clue of what the direction of foreign policy might be, but merely through studying motives and doctrines, we cannot predict the future. "Statesmen, especially under contemporary conditions, may well make a habit of presenting their foreign policies in terms of their philosophic and political sympathies in order to get popular support on them" (Morgenthau 1960, 7). For him, realistic theory is ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. Character of foreign policy can be determined through examination of political acts performed and from the foreseeable consequences of these acts (Morgenthau 1960, 5). By studying EU action, Operation Atalanta, as its struggle for power, no matter if for prestige, imperialism or status quo, my aim is to make more sense of its significance to the global power distribution and structures than merely studying EU foreign policy doctrines.

The decision to choose Operation Atalanta instead of some other EU operation was important to my research setting and indeed assisted with the problematization of the topic. The aforementioned fact that the operation is launched independently outside the EU territory and has been on action throughout the change of EU's security doctrine was an important factor. Furthermore, as Atalanta received a large amount of support despite that it represented huge risk for EU forces, there were already other operations on place on the region to secure the vessels and that the problems of Somalia that lead to piracy are so complex that the efforts and original functions of Atalanta would not help bringing a sustainable solution to it, the implication for other motives than merely humanitarian and economic ones stays strong (Nnwobunwene and Orubani 2010; Page 2011, 27). Since the thesis has its limitations for what comes to its length, it was important to choose a case that include all of these aspects to later draw more general conclusions of EU's foreign policy type and its desire for power. The other option, to choose multiple different operations, was

excluded due to the reason that I rather wanted to achieve a deep understanding of the issue and analyze it in an in-depth manner. Choosing multiple operations might have left the analysis quite shallow.

Furthermore, there are other aspects that have been left out from this research. Naturally, since no political player can act in a historical or pragmatic vacuum, every political decision has complexity of underlying motivations behind them (Ali-Laurila 2005, 10; Grant 1998, 148). Similarly Morgenthau notes that real man is a composite out of economic man, political man, religious man (Morgenthau 1960, 14). In regard to the Operation Atalanta, EU's and its dominant member states' economic and geostrategic motivations, for instance, are quite noticeable. The Gulf of Aden is important to maritime trade – it is the fastest transportation route of goods from Europe to Asia. The piracy effects directly to the countries that transport goods waterways. Many of these countries are EU member states. The overall costs of Somali piracy to the global economy was estimated to be between 5.7 and 6.1 billion in 2012 (Oceans Beyond Piracy 2013). Notwithstanding that the economic interest of EU to engage with the region prevails, I do not see the relevance to include it per se to this research. According to Morgenthau:

> The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. This concept provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be understood. It sets politics as an autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres, such as economics. (Morgenthau 1984, 5).

By excluding the economic aspect from the scope of the thesis, I can concentrate only to the foreign and security policy perspective in terms of interests defined as power, and highlight the EU's operational struggle for global power in a realistic framework instead of adding the EU economic discourse and member states' national economic interests to the political research sphere. However, as "[t]he political realist is not unaware of the existence and the relevance of standards of thought appropriate to other spheres upon political sphere", also this thesis acknowledges that the underlying national and economic interests remain but subordinates them in the analysis (Morgenthau 1960, 12). Indeed, as in realistic theory, also the autonomy of the political sphere in this research does not by any means imply disregarding the existence and importance of other spheres of thought, but rather lets them to be analyzed in their own spheres with their own terms. Nevertheless, at the end of the thesis,

when trying to achieve more comprehensive understanding of what determines EU's international security engagement, it will be necessary to tie the results of the analysis to the bigger picture that contains also other spheres than merely political. (Morgenthau 1960, 11-12.)

## 1.3. Research method and material

When choosing a research method, one has to contemplate between the options available keeping in mind the empirical material used and objectives of the research: what kind of empirical data am I using, what kind of answers am I hoping to find, and which kind of method really helps me revealing these answers and meanings (Hirsijärvi et al. 2009, 123-132). First division comes already at the very beginning of the research when defining the research question and selecting the empirical material: is my research quantitative or qualitative. As my objective in this research is to understand in-depth the reasons why EU has acted how it has in the context of Operation Atalanta – to achieve, stabilize or show-off power – qualitative method is more applicable. Using qualitative method will give me better theoretical understanding of the phenomenon and enables going further than merely observing the empirical data – it enables the interpretation of the meanings in the current political context (Palonen 1998).

In qualitative research the empirical data can be everything from one case or an interview to multiple ones. As the goal is not to find statistical regularities but "to provide knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon under study", the amount of material sufficient depends on the context (Downe-Wamboldt 1992, 314). Furthermore, also the type of primary material depends on the context. Basically, it can be everything between books, speeches, reports, interviews, legal norms, strategies and so forth (Tuomi and Sarajärvi 2004). In this thesis, the empirical material consists out of the relevant Council Decisions, Council Conclusions and Council Joint Actions regarding Operation Atalanta and its predecessor EU NAVCO as well as relevant press releases of Atalanta that can be found in the EU's official EUNAVFOR Atalanta–website. Furthermore, I have decided to include the Council Conclusion of Horn of Africa and EU Strategic Framework as they primarily guide the EU engagement and all of its actions in the Horn of Africa region.

The first Council Joint Action is from 19 September 2008 launching the EU Operation NAVCO in support of UN Security Council resolution 1816. The reason for including this for my empirical material is that this coordinated national response guided the launch of

Operation Atalanta only two months later. The following documents are the Council Joint Action from November 2008 planning the launch and Council Decision from 8 December 2008 finally officially launching the Operation Atalanta. The official Council Conclusions and Council Decisions included after 2008 are the ones that are extending the operation somehow, either timely or by its scope and activities. These include 6 documents, from which the last one is from 23 March 2012. In addition to these, it is important to include the Council Conclusion on the Horn of Africa from 14 November 2011 and EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa establishing the EU's comprehensive approach to the region. The reasoning behind this is, that the Strategic Framework creates the settings in which Operation Atalanta operates and articulates the primary objectives, challenges, engagement and future directions of EU in the region, thus making it easier to grasp EU's underlying motives behind certain actions and categorize these motives under specific foreign policy categories.

Lastly, I have decided also to include relevant official news releases of Operation Atalanta from EU NAVFOR Atalanta official website. All in all, the website has little more than 1000 news releases regarding Atalanta from 2008 to April 2014. However, as most of these news are rather describing in detail piracy attacks and the tactics how they were repelled and prevented, and therefore not relevant in regard to my research question as to help me revealing the fundamental political aspirations of EU, I have pruned out most of them. Eventually, I ended up using 39 different short news releases that were able to help me distinguish the dominating themes and underlying functions of the operation and give me clearance of the methods of the mission as well as find EU foreign policy objectives within them. I am also going to include publications, researches, and statements of the operation as well as EU's foreign policy development and doctrines in my thesis to show the framework the within policy is implemented, but these are going to work as a secondary material.

Different types of researches require different research models and analysis techniques (Knafl and Howard 1984). After thinking thoroughly my research purpose together with the empirical material, I came into conclusion that the most applicable method for this research is directed content analysis. Content analysis is considered to be a flexible method for analyzing text material systematically and objectively (Tuomi and Sarajärvi 2004; Weber 1990). It fits for analyzing unstructured material not intended necessarily on research purposes. Qualitative content analysis provides means to organize and arrange empirical material to compact and transparent form and enables creating a coherent, verbal description

of the phenomenon (Tuomi and Sarajärvi 2004). It goes beyond counting words to examine the language intensively through categorizing larger amount of text with the similar meanings (Hsieh and Shannon 2005; Weber 1990). As my empirical material is combined from relevant resolutions, decisions, official statements and news releases, directed content analysis provides recourses needed to recognize the important parts of the extensive documents, categorize them according to the theoretical framework, and interpret the meanings from them.

Content analysis can be divided into three distinct approaches that differ slightly according to which authors' model is followed. I have decided to use the one from Hsiuh-Fang Hsieh and Sharah E. Shannon, which they introduced in their article *Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis* (2005). In that article, content analysis is divided into conventional, directed and summative analysis. The major differences between these ones are among their coding schemes, origins of codes, and threats to trustworthiness. However, all of them interpret empirical text from a predominately naturalistic paradigm. The specific approach chosen varies with the theoretical and substantive interest and the problem being studied (Hsieh and Shannon 2005; Weber 1990). As my research question is very deductive and the chosen theoretical framework provides from the outset a coding scheme, the option to select directed content analysis was quite clear.

The goal of directed approach is to validate or extend conceptually a theoretical framework or specific theory (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1281). Theory helps focusing the research question and provides predictions about the key concepts or variables and relationship between them. This helps determining the coding categories and the relationship between the different codes as the operational definitions of each category are determined using the theory. My coding scheme origins directly from the theory used - the three foreign policy types of Hans Morgenthau will serve as the three key concepts and categories to identify what kind of foreign policy EU is implementing. As the theory predetermines the codes and their definitions, it enables me to start coding the empirical data immediately. If data has parts that cannot be coded through the initial codes, they must be identified and analyzed later to determine if a completely new category is needed or if they represent a subcategory of a exiting code (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1282). In the case of this study, this would mean identification and separation of subcategories that mix different policy types, thus ensuring that the initial coding does not bias the identification of relevant text. For example, if some actions cannot be categorized directly as policy of prestige, subsequent analysis is needed to

determine if it is a mixture of policy of prestige and status quo or policy of prestige and imperialism.

The way of introducing the findings of the content analysis can be done in multiple ways. The evidence can be presented by showing codes together with examples or through more descriptive evidence (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1282). As every research should be trustworthy and thus repeatable for everyone doing research with the same scientific choices, in qualitative research the different research processes and analysis should always be explained thoroughly (Hirsijärvi et al. 2009, 231-233). The same applies to evidence of directed content analysis. Because the analysis is unlikely to result in coded data that provides for meaningful statistical comparisons, the use of rank order comparisons of frequency of codes can be applicable (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1282-1283; Curtis et al. 2001). In this research, describing the findings by presenting the frequency of the three foreign policy type-codes from Hans Morgenthau in detailed and descriptive manner is preferred. The theory will further guide the discussion. If new categories are identified, they might later either refine the theory or show contradictory views of the phenomena (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1283).

One of the major advantages of using directive content analysis, in addition to supporting and maybe extending the theory, is that as the knowledge in the research area grows the approach makes it unlikely that researchers work in naïve perspective (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1283). However, the theory has its weaknesses as well. According to Hsieh and Shannon, researchers are more likely to find more supportive than non-supportive evidence because they approach the data with informed but strong bias. Furthermore, overemphasis of the theory might blind researchers to the contextual sides of the phenomena (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1283). Tuomi and Sarajärvi are, in addition, pointing out that even though content analysis enables the researchers to describe the analysis process well, the conclusions often stay shallow and meaningless (Tuomi and Sarajärvi 2004). I am trying to avoid these aforementioned challenges, not only by using the theory in more flexible way to draw conclusions, but also to tie the research later to the contemporary context of EU.

## 1.4. Research in the context of international relations

The European Union, its foreign and security policy in general and its development is a largely researched topic. The amount of researches and journals with an informative, school book-like approach to the EU, its foreign policy and its change is numerous (see e.g. Grevi,

Helly and Keohane 2009; Geabel 2011; Koehler 2010; Bonvicini and Comelli 2009). These studies focus on descriptively introducing the change in EU foreign policy doctrine, the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon and how it has provided and enabled more complex international activities to take place globally, and strengthen EU as a security actor next to other actors. They provide extensive substantive background information of EU as an executive institution, its structure, foreign policy doctrines, resources and functions. However, as they focus merely on the institutional analysis of EU, they are able to answer the question of what EU can do, but the other important aspects – how and why – remain unanswered. In other words, these studies often lack the theoretical vision and capabilities to provide understanding for the motives, interests and aspirations of EU and to explain in-depth what lies behind of EU's global engagement and where it might lead.

However, studies with an analytical and empirical perspective to EU, its foreign policy and global engagement exist to large extent as well. Many researchers have, for example, analyzed EU, its foreign policy and expansion in EU as a normative power–frame (e.g. Manners 2002; Haukkala 2008; Haukkala and Ojanen 2002). EU's presence in global arena and its military missions have, moreover, been analyzed in identity building and developing a political narrative point of views as well as something that is resulting from spill-over effect in definition of neofunctionalism (Inskanius 2008; Merritt 2010; Tiilikainen 1998). Popular aspect has also been to emphasize the influence of the changing global security environment to explain EU's foreign policy and international actorness (Hass 2008; Van Lagenhove 2010). Even though these aforementioned researches and many other already possess the important empirical aspect as well as theoretical vision, they all leave gaps within the current research agenda.

Explaining the variety of EU's foreign policy functions, especially EU's engagement in global military missions solely with EU's aspiration of projecting values and norms is not sufficient in my opinion. The economic and security interest of certain missions is unavoidable and stressing the normative postulate of EU can obscure the other aspects and complicate capturing the object how it is instead of how it should be. Furthermore, identity building and developing political narratives–aspects, even though both important components of EU foreign policy development, ignore largely the significance of the recognition received from other international actors in order to gain power in relation to others to define oneself. The fact that political and security environment and its change have influence in defining foreign policy doctrines is self-evident. However, explaining EU's

foreign policy, finding its embedded motivations in asserting bigger role as a global security actor and predicting the future patterns according which EU might act in the future and how those patterns might effect in the power distribution cannot be revealed through just analyzing global security environment, nor can it be done in the framework of neofunctionalism.

Realism, however, can provide me with the means to answer my research question and to interpret EU's interests behind its global security engagements. "For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. It assumes that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts. Thus, we can find out what statesmen have actually done, and from the foreseeable consequences of their acts we can surmise what their objectives might have been" (Morgenthau 1960, 5). Realism disregards the moral sentiments and considers the policy pursued to be explained and justified in ethical, legal or biological terms (Morgenthau 1960, 11). It also provides means to unravel this justification and find the embedded interests behind the action.

As mentioned earlier, realism has been criticized for being dogmatic, having one-sided world view, hiding its own ideological premises and stressing the power aspect excessively (Hindrén 2007, 6-8). I consider it and its concept of struggle for power to be the best framework to capture the different aspects and motivations behind operation Atalanta, explain the action and give meaning to it in the larger context of EU foreign policy and its international power position. However, I will try to use the theory in more flexible manner and thus allowing concepts to enter the researched political sphere that for Morgenthau would belong to other spheres not meaningful to tie to political research. Furthermore, I will try to update the theory slightly to modern day in terms of not using the three foreign policy manifestations, their methods and objectives in such a rigid way that it would exclude aspects that are important for interpreting EU's underlying ambitions in the present globalized and more unilateral world.

As the use Hans Morgenthau's theory as a basis of my thesis ties the research strongly to the tradition of political realism, and more specifically to the tradition of classical realism, where the role of nation-state is emphasized and it is assumed that all actions of nation-states derive from national interests and lust for power. Power is a relative concept connected to the realistic conception of international system, which is anarchical. All states, as rational actors,

pursue their own self-interest to defend themselves against the power of another state, and agreements with other states are enforced only to maintain desired international order and balance of power. Hence, for political realist, there is no authority over nation-state. (Ferraro 2014; Toledo 2005.)

Also Morgenthau uses his theory of different policy types when describing nation-states. However, since the international politics and nation-state domination in the global political arena has throughout the times transformed into more complex system, where political actors can, next to traditional states, be unions formed by different states, intergovernmental organizations or even non-governmental organizations, the realistic approach by Morgenthau and power relations between states, have been used as theoretical frame for many researches analyzing the political actions of something else than nation-state, like EU. In a sense, one could consider that the theory is this way brought to a present day. Indeed, even though EU is consisting out of multiple nation states, they have freely handed over some of their sovereignty to the EU Council and EU has legitimized and legally binding power over the states in regard to some subjects. Furthermore, it does have a unanimously ratified foreign policy that it implements. Nevertheless, the research does not disregard the nation states and their private interest, but instead ties all of the aspects together at the end to create a more comprehensive whole.

In recent years, there has been, in addition to all other research related to EU, a strong fashion to look EU through lenses of realism. Indeed, the evolution of EU's foreign and security policy and its objectives, EU's commitments and policies its pursues internationally, politization of humanitarian interventions and mission selection have all been evaluated in the framework of political realism (Ali-Laurila 2005; Hyde-Price 2008; Jude 2012; Page 2011; Romaniuk 2011, Wright 2011). Also Morgenthau and his theory introduced in Politics Among Nations have been used to bring theoretical depth to some of the researches. Despite all of this previous material, I still consider there to be space left for my research.

According to Chiara Ruffa, current debate assessing EU by realistic theoretical assumptions does not contribute too much to a better understanding of EU foreign policy – empirical testing in the context of a case studies are needed to gain in-depth understanding of what kind of power EU is (Ruffa 2011). It is indeed the case in with some of the aforementioned researches – some of them have either only a minor emphasis of the empirical analysis of specific cases or the theory is used only to orientate the study, not as a defining element.

Furthermore, the problematization of the research through theory differs from mine with many of the cases. In my research, the objective is since the beginning to combine both, theoretical and empirical aspects extensively through analyzing Operation Atalanta with the coding scheme given by Morgenthau to reveal what kind of power position EU is seeking.

## 2. Politics among nations according to Morgenthau

Hans J. Morgenthau (1904-1980) is considered to be one of the founding fathers of the realist school. He was born in Germany before the First World War and originally studied law at University. Due to his Jewish background, he was forced to move around, first in Europe and then later to the USA. In the United States Morgenthau published his study *Politics Among Nations: the Struggle of Power and Peace*, which became an instant academic bestseller establishing the foundation of political realism. The book has been referred as a realist manifesto, landmark in the US literature of international relations and the prime statement of the realist approach to the study of international politics (Frei 2001; Guilhot 2012, 89; Gurian 1949). As a theoretical framework, realism has been shaped in the context of the Cold War times and used for understanding the post-Cold War world. Indeed, Morgenthau was the leading figures of the study of international politics during the Cold War and even acted as a consultant for the U.S. Department of State. His scientific work in the field of international politics after the Cold War and his legacy of realpolitik has received a lot of recognition. However, his earlier work before moving to the U.S., his intellectual legal formalist origins in the field of law that has strongly affected his later work, has not been studied as extensively (Ali-Laurila 2005; Jütersonke 2006).

Morgenthau started developing his concept of power, theory of power-seeking nature of states and the three different foreign policy types; policy prestige, status quo and imperialism, long before political realism was founded. The separation of foreign policy types was first time mentioned in his study *La Notion du "Politique" et la Théorie des Différends Internationaux* published in 1933. In this publication Morgenthau analyzes power and lust for power in rather confrontational context of political and juridical questions (Ali-Laurila 2005, 29). Lust for power is for him the psychological foundation of politics, and political action that reveals itself in social relations is always a demonstration of this lust (Morgenthau 1933; Palonen 2006). Person who does politics in general sense tries to either maintain the power that it already has and keep the current state of politics static, or change the state of politics by increasing its power (Ali-Laurila 2005; Morgenthau 1933). In

addition, Morgenthau separates the third type (la politique de prestige), which he, however, does not yet connect to empirical analysis (Morgenthau 1933, 65).

In foreign politics, the political decision-makers of states and their lust for power can represent a manifestation of one of these policy types. Furthermore, power for him is objective, and all states are either seeking to increase or keep it. Nonetheless, that in politics lust for power is recognized and understood; comprehensive legal system tries to objectively create limits for it. Legal norms create conditions for relations between states and within which the states can pursue power (Morgenthau 1933, 43-62). Legal structure should, furthermore, create a system where peaceful solutions are possible. Morgenthau's thoughts should be interpreted in accordance with the time they were developed. After the First World War the League of Nations was established and especially among the legal scholars there were a strong trust for its changes to replace the power politics–way of thinking (Ali-Laurila 2005, 33). Struggle for power appears not as neutral in its definition in Morgenthau's later publications.

While in the La Notion du "Politique" et la Théorie des Différends Internationaux Morgenthau ponders the concept of power in foreign politics more in an international law context, Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace is written for political audience. Nevertheless, the legal aspect continues to effect subconsciously (Ali-Laurila 2005, 28-36; Jütersonke 2006). Furthermore, there is a more explicit continuity with Morgenthau's work from the times of La Notion du "Politique" et la Théorie des Différends Internationaux to Politics Among Nations - the lust for power, which is the basis of his theory, is considered to be typical for all human beings (Palonen 2005). However, only in Politics Among Nations Morgenthau will finally introduce the separation of all the three foreign policy types in detailed manner. In addition, the study is rather clear and more organized with practical examples than La Notion du "Politique" et la Théorie des Différends Internationaux thus making it easier to be used as the source of the theory for this thesis.

As a true classic, Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace gives a solid ground for the theoretical framework, since it is ever relevant for the field of international relations. However, it also presents a challenge. The text of the book has been constantly evolving throughout the years due to its many editions. All in all, Politics Among Nations has been edited seven times from which five times are done while Morgenthau was still

living. Therefore, firstly I needed to ascertain which of these editions will be the one to be used in this thesis. The first edition of the book, even though considered as a landmark, is still missing the *Six Principles of Political Realism*. Therefore, it is not meaningful to use it. The second edition already contains the six principles. Despite this, I have decided to use the third edition published in 1960 parallel to the final edition from 2006. The reasoning for this, next to the fact that these versions were more accessible, is that the 1960 version already contains all the important parts of the publication and it has been revised by Morgenthau himself. In the 2006 edition on the other hand some historical examples not relevant anymore has been deleted and thus the edition is brought more to the present day (Morgenthau 2006, xiii). However, as it has been revised after the death of Morgenthau, not by him but by Kenneth Thompson, I did not want to use it solely in case if it contains misinterpretations of Morgenthau.

Some researchers are in the opinion that there are as many Morgenthaus as there are editions of the Politics Among Nations – from the early thoughts that established is position as the founding father of true political realism to the later revivals that tend to bring up the moral and ethical dimensions of his thought "destabilizing every notion of what constitutes realism" (Guilhot 2013, 69). I have rejected the idea that all the editions are so profoundly different from original thoughts of Morgenthau that using any edition would somehow compromise or endanger the results of this thesis. However, as a precaution I still decided to include both, 1960 and 2006 editions to create depth in my thesis. I believe that using the 1960 edition will help me capture the original viewpoint of Morgenthau and the 2006 edition expands his thoughts further. With this method I do not need to compromise neither of these aspects.

## 2.1. The concept of power

> International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. (Morgenthau 1960, 27.)

Power and man's lust for it are the core concepts for Morgenthau, his ontology. He places the power-lust at the center of human existence – it is timeless and universal. Everyone is after it and at the end all actions are merely a permanent struggle for it. Man is a political animal for Morgenthau by its nature and selfishness is one of our fundamental features. Firstly, power for Morgenthau was merely rooted in the need for survival. However, later it

turned into something that Morgenthau calls *animus dominandi*, the desire to dominate, and this desire is limitless (Schmidt 2007, 51). Power is man's control over minds and actions of other men (Morgenthau 1960, 28). Therefore, as the man is born to seek power, their behavior and actions are always moving towards the power.

> The aspiration for power being the distinguishing element of international politics, as of all politics, international politics is of necessity power politics. (Morgenthau 1960, 31.)

And just as individuals, the goal of every state is to maximize its power. Despite the attempts to eliminate the struggle for power from the international scene through organizing the world with organizations like the League of Nations and the United Nations, or creating false expectations of harmonious co-operation of mankind through science of peace that that is in 2006 version of Politics Among Nations called *contemporary utopianism,* it cannot be denied that states have throughout the times met and will meet in the future each other in the contest of power (Morgenthau 1960, 32-35, Morgenthau 2006, 41). The reason for this is that the tendency to dominate is an embedded element of all human associations from every social level to the state (Morgenthau 1960, 34). The struggle for power is the essence of relations between states. Therefore, every activity of a state of political in nature internationally is a continuous effort to maintain, increase or demonstrate power. These are the three basic patters of the struggle for power for Morgenthau. (Morgenthau 1960, 27-35).

According to Morgenthau, the aforementioned three different political manifestations of struggle for power are always present in both domestic and international politics and every political phenomenon can be reduced into one of these three patterns. For these manifestations, three typical international policies correspond (Morgenthau 1960, 39). "A nation whose foreign policy tends toward keeping power and not toward changing the distribution of power in its favor pursues a policy of the status quo. A nation whose foreign policy aims at acquiring more power than it actually has, through a reversal of existing power relations – whose foreign policy, in other words, seeks a favorable change in power status – pursues a policy of imperialism. A nation whose foreign policy seeks to demonstrate the power it has cither for the purpose of maintaining or increasing it pursues a policy of prestige" (Morgenthau 1960, 39). The goals and interests of the state determine which type of foreign policy it practices.

However, the quest of power does not take place in a vacuum (Schmidt 2007, 51). The idea of interest defined as power as an objective but not changeless category is essential to Morgenthau's realism. Morgenthau quotes Max Weber: "Interests (material and ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions of men. Yet the "images of the world" created by these ideas have very often served as switches determining the tracks on which the dynamism of interests kept actions moving" (Morgenthau 1960, 9). The interests that define political actions at certain times are dependable of the current cultural and political context. The same applies to power – the present environment determines its content and how it can be used. In current political and cultural context EU posing as a peaceful union has its limitations within it needs to formulate its foreign policy. Even though its interests would be imperialistic in a sense of pursuing power, the means of it is controlled not only by the powers invested by its member states but also international law and present global political governance.

Morgenthau has been criticized of providing only a single-variable structural explanation for international politics holding power as the main element defining it (Kaufman 2006, 24). This makes the theory static and unable to explain contemporary issues. According to Jack Donnelly, power perceived by realists should be context-dependent and therefore linked with the cultural and political environment in which it has been formulated as well as with the wide range of motives that drive the state's behavior (Donnelly 2000, 56). Therefore, to apply the theory to current and more fluid environment we need not to exclude aspects that Morgenthau does not see as existing or belonging to the field of politics such as morality or economics from the reality that is been explored. Indeed, all competing even conflictive perspectives capture important aspects of world politics and help us making sense of the world. The theory of three foreign policy manifestations might not provide tools for deeper analysis of these aspects within his concept of interests defined as power but we can still acknowledge them. And by acknowledging them we use them as bringing rationale to shed light to the underlying motivations of states in engaging in actions in the field of foreign politics.

According to Morgenthau, power covers all social relationships from physical violence to psychological power over minds. In other words, it covers the domination of men over another in "western democracies" controlled by moral and constitutional safeguards, but also in barbaric environment where the only limitations are its own strengths (Morgenthau 1960, 9). In this sense, the power in present international context governed by the international law safeguards and cultural atmosphere that resents the violent, unjustified infringements of

sovereignty but highlights the importance of human being and human safety, military interventions and missions are proper channels to direct interest and power-lust through. But no matter how the interests will be materialized – through divine intervention, natural development of human affairs, even non-political means such as technical cooperation between states – when states strive to realize their goals and interests by means of international politics, they are striving for power (Morgenthau 1960, 27).

Morgenthau's fundamental idea of connecting all the actions in the field of foreign politics to conscious and intentional pursue of power and holding moral and ethical notions of foreign politics only as a disguise to seek support to the actions has largely been criticized. According to Daniel Fiott, it is a common assumption to hold realism hostile towards actions basing on ethical considerations such as humanitarian interventions (Fiott 2013). Because these ethical functions are not generally considered to be state's tools to intentionally seek influence over another but instead are basing on moral values of helping the ones in need, Morgenthau's realism has seen as not been able to grasp a full understanding of the contemporary politics.

However, as described by Mihaela Neascu, in Morgenthau's understanding "[m]an, perceived as a creature governed by antagonistic forces, is also a source of creation, causing positive changes by means of his longing for transcendence" (Neascu 2010, 62). Therefore, it can be seen that the theory is more complex than generally perceived. Indeed, primarily Morgenthau sees moralism to be a disguise for pursue of power. But he also notes that "not every action that performs with respect to another nation is of political in nature" (Morgenthau 1960, 27-28). A state can therefore engage in actions such as legal, economic and humanitarian without affecting on power relations, however, in these cases the actions are not within the sphere of politics. I, on the other hand, allow these aspects to enter the political sphere and this research and will primarily hold them as part of struggling for power. However, if seen that they do not contribute to the notion of power, they are not neglected but used as a competitive aspects creating larger understanding of the topic of launching Operation Atalanta.

For Morgenthau, next to understanding the fundamental nature of power, strive for it and the three manifestations of struggle for power, it is also important to separate why some states have power over another. The states actions can have an impact due to three reasons: the expectation of benefits, the fear of disadvantages and the respect or love for men or

institutions (Morgenthau 2006, 31). According to him, the expectation of benefits and fear of disadvantages are commonly quite well acknowledged and they can include anything between economic advantages or sanctions to positive or negative publicity. The respect for an institution is less obvious, but in not less important factor. When an institution has charisma it is easier for it to also achieve political power. Morgenthau uses United States government and Constitution as an example. Charismatic institution evokes trust through which men or in this case states can submit themselves to the wills of it. (Morgenthau 2006, 31.)

In addition to separating the reasons why some have power over another, Morgenthau also makes distinctions between power and influence, power and force, usable and unusable power, and legitimate and illegitimate power. All of these distinctions have an important meaning for understanding the concept of political power. Influence differs from power according to Morgenthau by its definition: a person that has influence over another can effect on the decisions of the other person. However, it cannot impose its own will upon the other. In contrast, the person that has power can impose its will upon the other by using the promise of benefits or threat of disadvantages. (Morgenthau 2006, 30.)

Furthermore, the political power needs to be distinguished from force in the sense of physical violence. Even though Morgenthau considers the threat of physical violence as an inherent part of international politics, the actualization of it will transform the political power into military power. However, the threat or a potentiality of force is an important factor contributing to the political power of another state over another (Morgenthau 2006, 30).

Morgenthau uses nuclear weapons as an example to demonstrate the difference between usable and unusable power. A threat of nuclear weapons can be a suitable instrument in foreign politics against a country without access to nuclear material. However, already during the times Morgenthau wrote his first edition of Politics Among Nations, it was apparent that increase in military power is not necessary conducive for political power, especially not when the counterpart can reply to the threat with similar manner (Morgenthau 2006, 30). In such case the mutual threats cancel each other out. What makes this illustration a good example of unusable power is, however, its irrational aspect. Realism assumes that the states act rationally within the frames of its knowledge. It is therefore very unlikely that it would be in state's interest to actually engage in nuclear war in all of its magnitude of destructiveness to change someone's will. Hence, it can be categorized as unusable power. In

contrast, conventional force can be seen as usable instrument of foreign policy due to its capacity to inflict limited damage with well-portioned risks to oneself and thus be suitable to use to persuade others to change their will (Morgenthau 2006, 30).

Lastly, Morgenthau separates illegitimate power from power whose exercise is morally or legally justified. This separation is important because political power is easier to attain and it is more effective in regard to influencing the will of others when its exercise has legitimate justification. Morgenthau gives an example of power exercised in self-defense or in the name of United Nations. This power has better chances to succeed compared to power used in violation of international law. (Morgenthau 2006, 30-31).

Between the lines the reader can acknowledge Morgenthau's legal background. However, even though the cultural and political conditions in which the different foreign policy types operate also includes international law, Morgenthau did not believe that the instability of the world can be changed. On the contrary, he did not believe on higher order bringing peace among nations. Interests, on which actions must be judged, are product of history and will therefore also disappear in the history (Morgenthau 1960, 10). Even though for Morgenthau "[n]othing in the realist position militates against the assumption that the present division of the political world into nation-states will be replaced by larger units of a quite different character, more in keeping with the technological potentialities and the moral requirements of the contemporary world", he did not believe that we can transform the political reality with its own laws, i.e. the power-lust, with an ideal that does not take the every nation-state's quintessential need for power into account (Morgenthau 1960, 10). This idea does not argue with my thoughts. As we see, the world still have its disputes and power is pursued sometimes in a more violent, sometimes more peaceful ways. However, in the present multilateral context the EU as a union of democratic countries is tied to pursue power more peacefully. Nevertheless, this does not exclude the thought that it is striving for power, either for status quo, imperialism or prestige.

## 2.2. Policy of status quo

As the three manifestations of the struggle for power and the foreign policy types that correspond with them are the main theoretical points of reference for my thesis, it is necessary to introduce all of them in more detailed manner. When all the actions of EU in foreign policy scene are struggle for power, but this struggle can have three different forms and aims, it is necessary to recognize what makes these manifestations of power

fundamentally different. This enables us to identify the foreign policy pattern EU is presently pursuing, comprehend the forces and interests that determine its behavior and predict where this practice of this specific foreign policy type might lead in the context of distribution of powers globally.

The first foreign policy type that defines politics among nations is policy of status quo. For Morgenthau, a state that practices policy of status quo is pursuing to keep the power that it already has. Consequently, the aim of policy of status quo is "the maintenance of the distribution of power which exists in particular moment in history" (Morgenthau 1960, 40). The title of the concept derives from *status quo ante bellum*, which is a diplomatic term implying to the return of distribution of power after the war (Morgenthau 1960, 39-40). Indeed, when introducing the policy of status quo, Morgenthau refers in particular to different peace treaties. For him the specific moment in history serving as a point of reference to policy status quo is, in fact, often the end of war when distribution of powers has been codified in a peace treaty.

But it is not merely peace treaties that can function as the point of reference for policy of status quo. After every power shift, no matter if resulting from violent war or more peaceful power struggle, formulation of either new legal terms or political conceptions is necessary to ensure the new distribution of power (Morgenthau 1960, 40). Morgenthau is mainly writing in terms of legal stipulations, but as the times of the more violent wars and creations of peace treaties has more or less passed in western world and more soft and diplomatic ways of demonstrating power and causing shifts in power structures have emerged, it is just a matter of updating the theory slightly to acknowledge the role of political recognition. Therefore, I would say that the reference point for policy of status quo would not need to be a specific peace or alliance treaty but it can also be a certain politically acknowledged status or power equilibrium.

Furthermore, even though the goal of policy of status quo is to maintain the power structures of certain historical reference point, the policy does not necessarily oppose all changes. The important criterion is merely that the general power balance stays stable. Therefore, minor adjustments on the distribution of power are not relevant to the point that the relative power positions among nations stay undisturbed. Morgenthau illustrates this with an example from 1971, where United States acquired the Virgin Islands from Denmark. Even though this procurement improved the strategic position of United States in the context of Caribbean, it

did not change the relative power position. Instead, it merely strengthened US power domination and was consequently compatible with the objectives of status quo policy. (Morgenthau 1960, 43; Morgenthau 2006, 55.)

## 2.3. Policy of imperialism

Morgenthau begins his introduction of imperialism by defining what imperialism is not. He refers to the widespread and indiscriminate "arbitrary" use of imperialism to describe particular type of foreign policy that is opposed, in which the real meaning of imperialism as an objective foreign policy type has lost its concrete meaning. Every foreign policy that is disapproved and discredited could in present terms be falsely called imperialistic. Therefore, it is important for theoretical analysis to break this pattern and define the term objectively to give it a neutral meaning that can later be applied to both theory and practice of international relations. (Morgenthau 2006, 56-57.)

Morgenthau separates the three most common misconceptions of imperialism. The first one was disclosed already in discussion with status quo. Not every foreign policy aiming to increase the power of a nation, represent imperialism. As status quo does not oppose all changes a policy aiming to minor increase of power, can still operate within its frame. As long as the policy does not aim to change the power distribution or overthrow the status quo, it is not by necessity imperialistic. Secondly, the common misconception is to consider preservation of an empire as an example of imperialism although the aim would only be to maintain, stabilize and defense the power. Thus, the imperialism becomes identified with features of policy of status quo as the objective of the struggle for power is not to acquire empire but to consolidate it. Lastly, Morgenthau connects false misconceptions of imperialism to the economic theories of it. (Morgenthau 2006, 57-58.)

> This economic connotation gave rise to the most extensive, most systematic, and also most popular body of thought which has sought to explain imperialism in modern times: the economic theories of imperialism. Here we find the third of the misconceptions that have obscured the true nature of imperialism. (Morgenthau 2006, 59.)

According to Morgenthau, the fundamental meaning of policy of imperialism does not imply to the economic theories consisting out of Marxist, Liberal and the "Devil" theories that holds economic forces and economic interests as the source of all imperialistic political

phenomena. Devil theories for Morgenthau mean imperialistic state's aspiration for territorial conquest in military means resulting on economic gains thus labeling the state as the "enemy" or "devil" (Ali-Laurila 2005, 41; Morgenthau 2006, 59). The reason why the explanation of imperialism according to these theories is not plausible is that it fails to test the historic experience (Morgenthau 1960, 49). For Morgenthau, no war has been waged by exclusively for economic objectives. Victory of wars might bring economic advantages, but he sees them more as by-products of the political consequences. Therefore, as the objective is to attain power, political needs to be held primary over economics (Morgenthau 2006, 61-62).

Then, what is policy of imperialism for Morgenthau? It is struggle for power that aims to overthrow the present power distribution, the status quo. Morgenthau separates three different situations, where the policy is most likely to occur, and three different typical aims for it to help us better recognize the conditions which favor or produce imperialistic policy. Victorious war, lost war and existence of weak states or politically empty spaces are ideal for favoring of imperialistic foreign policy. When a nation is engaged in a war, it is most likely that the nation is pursuing to change the distribution of power between it and defeated enemy, i.e. practicing imperialistic foreign policy. The more favorable status quo for victorious state of the war acquired through the policy of imperialism will, however, most likely call forth policy of imperialism on the counter-part. The overthrown nation will plausibly want to regain the lost power and therefore it might pursue policy of imperialism later on. Also existence of weak states and political empty spaces encourages pursuing imperialistic policy because they are attractive and more accessible for strong and powerful states. According to Morgenthau, this was the case in which colonial imperialism gained its popularity. (Morgenthau 1960, 54-55.)

The three objectives that policy of imperialism is most likely to pursue are world empire, continental empire and local preponderance. World empire could be seen as a synonym for super power. In other words, state with an imperialistic foreign policy could pursue dominant position characterized with influence and ability to exert power in a global scale. State that pursues continental empire is seeking to dominate certain continent or its localized parts. Here the geographical limits of the continent will set boundaries to the imperialism. State that is seeking local preponderance with its imperialistic foreign policy will, in contrast, set its own subjective limits for domination. In this case, it is not tied to strict

geographic limits but to limits defined by objective facts beyond which it could be either technically difficult or politically unwise to go. (Morgenthau 1960, 55-58).

In addition to previous, Morgenthau separates also the three typical means of policy of imperialism. Accordingly, he distinguishes between military, economic and cultural imperialism.

> In truth, military imperialism seeks military conquest; economic imperialism, economic exploitation of other peoples; cultural imperialism, the displacement of one culture by another — but always as means to the same imperialistic end. That end is always the overthrow of the status quo: that is, the reversal of the power relations between the imperialist nation and its prospective victims. (Morgenthau 1960, 58.)

Morgenthau sees the military imperialism as the fastest method to reach one's goal and attain power domination over the vanquished nation. However, no domination can last if it is founded upon merely military force. Economic imperialism is generally the less effective, but nonetheless more rational, method of gaining power compared to military imperialism. It is a product of modern times that enables conquering territories fairly and indirectly by way of economic control. Morgenthau points out that economic imperialism needs to be separated from imperialism of economic theories; on the contrary to the latter one, economic imperialism is only interested in the economic power and exploitation over other nations not occupying actual geographical territories. The last one, cultural imperialism, is according to Morgenthau the most subtle and successful if it only would have the capabilities to succeed alone. It aims to conquer the minds of men as an instrument of changing the power relations. However, it generally falls short in its abilities and therefore needs the assistance of the other two. (Morgenthau 2006, 42-44.)

Indeed, all the methods can be used in combination to pursue power. Cultural imperialism usually is used to support military and economic imperialism. In similar manner, also economic imperialism can play supportive role to military imperialism (Morgenthau 2006, 44). When putting these methods to present frame of international politics and relations between nations, it is easy to acknowledge why they need support from each other. The present general opinion does not see military imperialism that is pursued openly and in a large scale without legitimate reason as a rational instrument of foreign policy.

## 2.4. Policy of prestige

Even though mentioned already in 1933 in La Notion du "Politique" et la Théorie des Différends Internationaux, Morgenthau introduces the third manifestation of struggle for power in international scene, policy of prestige, first time in detail with examples in Politics Among Nations. Policy of prestige is at its fundamental nature an intrinsic element of relations between nations. Every nation has a desire for recognition, and this recognition serves as a dynamic force in determining our place in society. "It is only the tribute others pay to his goodness, intelligence, and power that he becomes fully aware of, and can fully enjoy, what he deems to be his superior qualities" (Morgenthau 1960, 73). The purpose of it is to impress other nations with the power that it wants them to believe it possesses. The reputation, mental picture and prestige drawn are exactly the factors that the nation can gain the security, power and wealth it desires. Prestige can be seen as the most expedient for foreign policy seeking not only to increase the reputation of power but also the substance of it (Morgenthau 2006, 91).

Policy of prestige has, according to Morgenthau, two main objectives: prestige for its own sake and prestige to support the other two manifestations of struggle for power – imperialism and status quo. While prestige for its own sake is not as common, one should not neglect the meaning of it. Despite that it is rarely the main objective of foreign policy, demonstrating power is important for states that rely upon their own protection in international scene – loss of prestige can have damaging influences on their power position.  This "negative policy of prestige" can lead to another state to test it in practice and actual loss of power. However, one should always remember that seeking prestige for its own sake is a two-headed sword, the exaggerated prestige, i.e. the bluff, can lead to mistakes and be revealed or even worse, be put to test and lead to loss of all the power. (Morgenthau 2006, 91-95.)

> The function the policy of prestige fulfills for the policies of the status quo and of imperialism grows out of the very nature of international politics. The foreign policy of a nation is always the result of an estimate of the power relations as they exist among different nations at a certain moment of history and as they are likely to develop in the immediate and distant future. (Morgenthau 1960, 80.)

Rational foreign policies are always based upon the beliefs of power distribution. Policy of prestige's aim is to effect on these beliefs. Morgenthau, for example, explains the relative stability of European continent in twenties with the prestige of France as the strongest

military power (Morgenthau 2006, 91). Hence, no other state wanted to challenge it. If France would have had the policy objective of status quo, the prestige possessed enabled it to hold on the power balance. In other words, no matter of the state's ultimate foreign policy objectives, the prestige as the reputation of power, is determinant in its success (Morgenthau 1960, 80). Prestige is an important weapon in the struggle over the minds and reputation of performance and power might exactly be the decisive factors on which other nations base their actions towards others.

Prestige has demonstrated itself as a vital part of a rational foreign policy. Nevertheless, it has been neglected for long in the field of international relations. Morgenthau gives rather many examples of why, but most importantly because of its equation with the aristocratic and sometimes absurd practices of the diplomatic world (Morgenthau 2006, 84). Indeed one of the two instrumentalities serving policy of prestige is the diplomatic ceremonial. In short, it means the ceremonial forms between political elites illustrating the power relations between nations. The respect shown in these ceremonies symbolizes the true respect among the nations (Morgenthau 1960, 74). Examples Morgenthau gives are the preposterous ones and from time to time slightly outdated. However, diplomatic ceremonials as instrument of prestige can also be put to a present context. Presently, for example invites to meaningful conferences and meetings between important policy-makers, internationally disregarded diplomatic statements and so forth can symbolize the respect given to certain countries and work as an instrument for prestige.

The second instrument serving towards policy of prestige is the display of military force. As the strength of military is often seen as the equation of the power of the nation, policy of prestige can indeed use demonstration of military as means to achieve its goals and impress others (Morgenthau 2006, 90). Morgenthau uses military visits, displays and even partial or total military mobilizations as examples of this type of illustration of power. Here the reputation of power works both as deterrent and preparation of war. Hence, the reputation – policy of prestige – is able to endorse and support for both status quo and imperialistic policies.

## 3. Analyzing Atalanta

This chapter is devoted to analyzing the primary material through the lenses of Morgenthau's three manifestations of struggle for power by using the directed content

analysis. As explained before, the directed content analysis uses the coding schemes generated by theory. Therefore, the theory will bring both structure and meaning for the findings of the analysis. In other words, the three policy types of Morgenthau provides not only the analysis categories and their operational definitions that enables the identification and structuring of the relevant parts of the text but also gives a formula through which I can understand and explain the findings.

I have decided to divide this chapter into four different subchapters according to the different themes emerging from the primary material. The main reason for using this kind of structuring instead of just dividing the chapters into the three policy types used for the coding of the material is unambiguous: even though the material is analyzed with an objective of recognizing which of these policy types is EU implementing through rank order comparisons of frequency, dividing the findings only into three categories omits some of the important data that cannot be categorized strictly into only one of these three as the different policy types are not always mutually exclusive. Therefore, it was rather meaningful to separate the four different themes defining Operation Atalanta and its methods of action, and use the theory to describe these findings of the analysis and recognize which policy types or combinations they represent. The themes are the launch of the operation as the window of opportunity for struggle for power, the evolving mandate expanding EU's sphere of activities as well as the geographical zone, seeking visibility and recognition as one of the main methods of the operation, and cooperation and EU's actions towards positioning itself next to other big security actors.

## 3.1. Launch – the window of opportunity

> In resolution 1816 (2008) on the situation in Somalia, adopted on 2 June 2008, the UN Security Council expressed its concern at the threat that acts of piracy and armed robbery against vessels pose to the prompt, safe and effective delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia, the safety of commercial maritime routes and international navigation. […] It authorised, for a period of six months from the date of the resolution, States cooperating with the TFG […] to enter the territorial waters of Somalia and to use, in a manner consistent with relevant international law, all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea. (EU Council1.)

> The European Union shall conduct a military coordination action in support of UN Security Council resolution 1816 (2008), named EU NAVCO. (EU Council1.)

For Morgenthau all actions in the field of foreign politics are struggling for power – power for prestige, status quo or imperialism. Therefore, when EU decided to launch operation EU NAVCO, the predecessor of Operation Atalanta leading to its the launch a few months later, after many individual countries as well as NATO and US-led CMF had already been working on the Gulf of Aden and Somali coast protecting vessels against piracy for some time cannot be seen as anything else than an attempt to struggle for power in an international arena. However, the question rises why now and why this operation? EU has had many opportunities to increase, stabilize or show off power throughout the past decade. There have been many moments where it could have responded to international crisis and positioned itself as an international security actor. So why did it choose specifically this region and this specific moment for its wakening?

The general background together with the Council Joint Actions establishing first the Operation EU NAVCO and then less than three months later Operation Atalanta give clearance to the aforementioned questions. Operations were the window of opportunity for EU's struggle for power. Somalia is often called the failed state (Larik 2013, 1). The lack of an effective government as well as the renewed armed conflicts and severe drought, erosion of fish stock and famine have acted as a launch pad and fertile breeding ground for piracy. In mid-2008, after increasing piracy attacks, the United Nations decided to finally adopt Security Council resolution to urge countries to take actions against piracy. This resolution together with the region being weak and in a spotlight of attention served as a great opportunity for EU to finally acquire power and increase its visibility.

> In its Resolution 1838 (2008) on the situation in Somalia, the UNSC commended the ongoing planning process towards a possible European Union (EU) naval operation, as well as other initiatives taken with a view to implement Resolutions 1814 (2008) and 1816 (2008), and urged States that have capacity to do so, to cooperate with the TFG in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea in conformity with the provisions of Resolution 1816 (2008). (EU Council2.)

Morgenthau separates legitimate power from illegitimate when explaining why some countries have power over another as explained on section 2.1. For him legitimate power invoked by moral or legal justification is more effective for acquiring power in struggle than illegitimate (Morgenthau 2006, 30). Therefore, launching the operation after it has been encouraged and legitimized by the United Nations is more functional tool in its struggle for

power whereas if it would have been launched in offensive manner without justification. Even though piracy has been going on for years, the United Nations resolution could be seen as the last push for EU to mobilize its military capacities. For acquiring more power and through it shifting or stabilizing the distribution of power would face more resistance if it would not display as a responding to the call from UN.

> On 15 September 2008, the Council reaffirmed its serious concern at the acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, deploring, in particular, their recent resurgence. (EU Council2.)

> The European Union (EU) shall conduct a military operation in support of Resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) […] hereinafter called 'Atalanta'. (EU Council2.)

However, the legitimatization cannot solely explain EU's engagement. According to Romaniuk, EU has demonstrated its ambitions to play global role for a long time already. Nevertheless, one of its major challenges has been to overcome the general conception that it is not only afraid to use military force, but also is generally powerless to use it beyond its borders (Romaniuk 2011, 10-13). For EU, therefore, to demonstrate that it in fact can and is willing to act internationally and be credible while doing that, it needs a solid base to do this. In addition of getting the legitimation for its actions Gulf of Somalia, as a region raising serious concerns as written in Council Joint Action quoted above, displays as an easy target for EU to demonstrate its ability and willingness to address international security threats on international arena by military means. Morgenthau identifies one of the breeding grounds for state's imperialism to be the existence of a weak state and empty spaces (Morgenthau 1960, 55).

It is self-evident, that Somalia can be considered as weak state attractive for easy struggle for power and increasing one's power. The "need for wider participation by international community" and the "concern at the upsurge of piracy attacks" pose as a power vacuums calling upon someone to take over (EU Council2). As portrayed by Larik, the operation was born out of favorable situation and represented more manageable challenge to EU compared to other international challenges (Larik 2013, 6). However, it cannot be unequivocally seen as an empty space since there were already naval missions securing the vessels. Therefore, there are two possibilities for EU's ambitions: either its objective was to, by challenging NATO and United States led CMF, to increase its power position at their expenses and

thereby shift the power structures drastically, or demonstrate its own power and receive recognition, prestige and this way equate itself next to the big international security players. According to Morgenthau, the latter does not constitute as imperialism, since it does not aim to overthrow the status quo but make adjustments (Morgenthau 1960, 45).

Indeed, the EU, instead of taking the lead, stresses in the Council Joint Action establishing Operation Atalanta the cooperation with other actors. The Combined Task Force 150, U.S. led mission joined by some EU countries like UK, Denmark, France and Germany, is explicitly mentioned as entities to liaise with. Furthermore, Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on the Operation Atalanta authorizes the release of classified information and documents of the Operation Atalanta in the name of cooperation (EU Council2). Accordingly, it cannot be shown that EU was trying to overthrow the power of the previous operations but instead work and position itself next to them.

One could ask if EU was not trying to overthrow the current power positions, could the launch of the operation then be considered as an act of policy of status quo? The answer is yes in one sense, since status quo, even though aims to the maintenance of current power distribution, does not oppose all changes (Morgenthau 1960, 42). Also a second fact supports the status quo statement. For Morgenthau expectations of benefits and fear of disadvantages form basis for domestic politics, but also have major impact on international politics (Morgenthau 2006, 33-34). Not launching the Operation Atalanta even though the increasing piracy and UN Security Council's requests for actions could have served as a major disadvantage for EU's power position in international scene.

The situation in the Gulf of Somalia, the piracy and kidnappings enjoyed large media coverage internationally. According to Germond and Smith, as the piracy is highly publicized, states are forced out to demonstrate that they are, in fact, doing something to prevent piracy and help kidnapped citizens (Germond and Smith 2009, 580). Furthermore, from EU member states there were already some, including France, Netherlands and Denmark, operating against piracy at the area. It is commonly known that the member countries possess the capacity to respond to security threats. However, as in many times before, EU as a whole has not been able to unite its member states and be coherent to take actions, but instead member countries have had to do that in their national capacity. This has been proven many times with multiple crisis situations (Pirozzi and Sandawi 2009). Indeed, even though EU has established its international security dimension with clear willingness to

be a global actor, one of its major criticisms has been its inability to coordinate its various resources (Germond and Smith 2009, 574). Therefore, launching the operation would not only prove its abilities to project power but also prevent it losing its credibility as international actor completely. Consequently, the launch served as benefit bringing prestige and visibility to its global actorness as well as countering losing the little power it has acquired with responding some crisis situations, i.e. maintaining the status quo.

> This was the first engagement a EUNAVFOR vessel has been involved since Operation Atalanta was launched 2 weeks ago, and demonstrates how good communication combined with prompt and robust action can thwart piracy attacks. (EU NAVFOR 27.12.2008.)

Indeed, the launch of the operation served as launch pad for fast and relatively easy prestige. For Morgenthau foreign policy is always a result of an estimation of one's power and the primary function of policy of prestige is to influence on this estimation (Morgenthau 2006, 91). Somalia has been troubled for decades and no-one expected the naval missions launched under UN resolutions 1814, 1816 and 1838 to solve the underlying reasons for piracy and stop it completely. The main goal was to protect "vessels of the WFP delivering food aid" and "vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast" (EU Council2). According to Romaniuk, certainly question whether EU is seeking to employ its military force increasingly in areas where it is certain to achieve its desired goals should be asked. Committing in global arena has become critical to EU's strategic future and robust force deployability and short-term successes are critical indicators of its power as a security actor (Romaniuk 2011, 17-28). Operation Atalanta enabled robust and largely published successes in preventing attacks, which then had a fast effect on the estimations of EU's power as global security actor.

> The forces deployed to that end shall operate, up to 500 nautical miles off the Somali coast and neighbouring countries, in accordance with the political objective of an EU maritime operation […]. (EU Council2.)

> Under the conditions set by the relevant international law and by UNSC Resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008), Atalanta shall, as far as available capabilities allow: […] take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery […]. (EU Council2.)

Finally, to be able to explain and understand EU foreign policy projected in the launch of Atalanta, a military operation taking place outside the EU territory, we must look at the current political situation together with EU's reputation as powerless entity to use its military capacity beyond its borders. According to Morgenthau, the interests that define political actions at certain times are dependable of the current cultural and political context. The same applies to power – the present environment determines its content and how it can be used (Morgenthau 2006, 9). For policy of prestige, the display of military force and partial or total military mobilizations are important demonstrations that serve to impress others with one's power (Morgenthau 2006, 90-91). However, in a present world waging war or plainly displaying military force close to other sovereign state's territory without justification cannot be seen as acceptable way of trying to increase or display power. The interests and the manner of using and demonstrating power need to be put to the present political and cultural framework. EU as a peaceful union has limitations within it needs to operate when displaying its military power.

The aforementioned limitation created by the current environment is linked also to Morgenthau's idea of usable and unusable power. As mentioned earlier, Morgenthau uses nuclear weapons as an example of unusable power as its use is more destructive compared to its benefits (Morgenthau 2006, 30). However, in a present environment also display of military force and partial mobilization of it could be seen unusable as without a proper legitimization it actually harms one's international reputation rather than bring advantages. Therefore, the situation in the Gulf of Somalia, the protection of the vessels delivering humanitarian aid through military means, and the legitimization from UN serve as a justification for EU to display its military capacity and abilities to rapid and effective deployment. For realists, politics subordinate morality and represent mean to attain and justify power (Griffits 1999, 37). Morgenthau does not separate unjust and just war since the humanitarianism as a justification to deploy military force is nothing else than means for political leaders (Jude 2012, 42; Koskenniemi 2002, 451). For him "the true nature of the policy is concealed by ideological justifications and rationalizations" (Morgenthau 1960, 86). Consequently, the true need for military protection for vessels delivering humanitarian aid and UN legitimization finally enabled EU to display its military capacities, to project power and use Operation Atalanta as important benchmark for its credibility as a global actor.

## 3.2. Evolving mandate – from humanitarianism to comprehensive approach

The previous subchapter analyzed the launch of the Operation Atalanta and the objectives behind it. In this subchapter I am going to concentrate on the evolving mandate of the operation – what does the change tell us about EU foreign policy, its goals and objectives? Operation Atalanta has been extended three times since its launch – in 2009, 2010 and latest in 2012 (EU Council5; EU Council7; EU Council10). The operation that was first planned to last only 12 months is now terminating 12 December 2014. Furthermore, the operation has been extended in regard of its scope of responsibilities and the geographic area that it covers, as well. In 2009 monitoring of fishing activities was added to Atalanta's activity list (EU Council5). In March 2010 the EU member states were given an authorization to inspect cargo to and from Somalia if there is a reason to suspect that the cargo may include material violating the arms embargo established in United Nations Security Council resolution 733 in 1992. Also, the member states shall collect identification data such as fingerprints and equipment used from pirates for international cooperation purposes (EU Council6). Lastly, in 2012 the Council decided to extend the force area to include Somali coastal as well as territorial and internal waters and land territory to the scope (EU Council10).

In addition, to extending the actual scope of the operation EU has adopted a Strategic Framework in regard to Horn of Africa extending its activities even further. It appointed an EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, focusing mainly to Somalia and the regional dimension of the conflict and piracy (EU Council8). In 2010, the EU started a military training mission EUTM in Somalia aiming, by providing military training to the Somali National Armed Force, to strengthen the Somali National Government. In 2012, EU regional capacity building mission EUCAP NESTOR was launched under Common Security and Defence Policy to assist the Horn of Africa and West Indian Ocean countries to enhance their maritime security including counter-piracy, and maritime governance through reinforcing coast guard functions, supporting the rule of law and, in Somalia, assisting in the development of a coastal police. Together with Operation Atalanta, these missions are aimed to contribute for the EU Strategic Framework.

> The Council noted that the Operation ATALANTA had demonstrated its ability to act effectively against piracy, that piracy off the coast of Somalia was likely to remain threat beyond Operation ATALANTA's current end date […] and that early agreement on extending the operation would facilitate the force generation. In this

context, the Council agreed that Operation ATALANTA should be extended for one year from its current date. (EU Council4.)

As was explained in previous subchapter the EU needed the legitimization from UN as well as the right disguise, the protection of the vessels delivering humanitarian aid through military means, to deploy and display its military force. EU was already able to demonstrate that it indeed can and is willing to launch a robust mission and deploy troops to the troubled areas. Furthermore, it was able to accomplish its required tasks and "demonstrate its ability to prevent piracy". Timely extension is surely justified, since piracy was and is nowhere close to disappear and protection of vessels was still needed – terminating the mission would therefore send a wrong message of EU's motivation and persistence to act as an international player. Furthermore, EU was managing well operationally and succeeding generally. However, why to expand and add both responsibilities and more geographic area for the mission to perform and execute? What foreign policy type does that embody and which objectives does it serve?

> The EU's first maritime operation to protect the World Food Programme and vulnerable ships from piracy is a grand success. (EU NAVFOR 2.9.2009.)

> We are extremely pleased with the continued success of the EU NAVFOR (Somalia) anti piracy operation. (EU NAVFOR 9.10.2009.)

> I very much enjoyed my tour of EU NAVFOR's Operational Headquarters and was extremely impressed with the professionalism and cooperation of so many participating EU Member States military personnel, as well as the close working relationship with the representatives of the civilian maritime organisations. Operation Atalanta has achieved a great deal in its first year and there is every indication from what I have seen that the second year will be as successful if not more so. (EU NAVFOR 19.1.2010.)

> Operation NAVFOR-Atalanta is a flagship of excellence in EU cooperation in security and defence. (EU NAVFOR 19.4.2010.)

During the launch of the operation, only the humanitarian and protective side of the operation was articulated – the goal was to protect vulnerable and WFP vessels delivering food aid. In Morgenthau's words, the objective of the political leaders was wearing a disguise and the overall foreign policy was presented in terms of philosophic and political

sympathies to gain support, justification and legitimization for it (Morgenthau 2006, 6). EU was trying to struggle for prestige as its foreign and military capacities were under-evaluated. Protecting vessels via heavily equipped and extensively trained naval forces against often untrained and young pirates seems like a manageable task even when considering the vast geographic area to be covered and EU was indeed succeeding with it. In this light, it is easy to see why EU was not pointing out or indicating anything towards solving the more complex problem of piracy from the beginning. As it was only aiming for fast and easy recognition – prestige – it needed a challenge it has capacities to manage. According to Jennifer Welsh, humanitarian interventions always hold strategic characteristics which make the interventions selective in nature – states only engage to ones that lead to benefits and are likely to result a wanted outcome (Welsh 2004, 62). However, as the EU cooperation turned out to be coherent and effective, the success rate of protecting the WFP vessels continued as 100% and the overall operation and EU foreign and security capacities enjoyed a lot of international appraisal, EU was ready to take more challenging responsibilities to achieve even more power.

> Piracy is one of the big challenges of our times, both for the region and for the international community. [...] I think the operation is going extremely well. (EU NAVFOR 21.5.2010.)

> Rear Admiral Duncan Potts, the Operation Commander, welcomed the visiting delegation and led a series of briefings, which focused on the continually evolving EU operation and highlighted 100% success of escorting the World Food Programme ships with food aid to Somalia. […] Operation EU NAVFOR/ATALANTA continues to be a highly successful mission […] The operation continues to be a significant force for good in the region and is making a significant impact on the fight against piracy. (EU NAVFOR 22.8.2011.)

Morgenthau separates three typical situations that favor imperialistic policy – as explained already previously. One of these situations is victorious war. According to Morgenthau, when a nation engages in a war that foreshadows in its victory, it is most likely seeking a permanent change in a power distribution in relation to its counterparts (Morgenthau 2006, 65). Even though the operations launched by EU, NATO and Combined Maritime Forces are in no definition a war, it is a psychological battle in the sense of these actors seeking to either increase, stabilize or show off their power. As discussed on previous subchapter, for

EU the participation was mainly showing off and keeping its power. However, as the original objective was achieved, the extension of the mission's scope thereinafter epitomize new objectives and maybe even new type of foreign policy. Indeed, the victorious war could be used to explain EU's increasing engagement to the region. "The nation will pursue a policy [of imperialism] regardless of what the objectives were at the outbreak of the war" (Morgenthau 2006, 65). The EU's potential for being a global security actor was actualized and it perhaps encouraged it to seek even more power. Even though policy of status quo does not oppose all changes, taking the pursuing of power too far can eventually lead to change in the power structures – to policy of imperialism. Whether this is likely to happen through only one successful operation is perhaps exaggerated, especially when taken into account EU's less credible background as international security actor compared to other actors in the region – EU has too much to catch up that one mission could have a drastic impact.

> There is no getting away from the fact that strategically, a naval presence is not deterring pirates. […] The solution has always and will always lie ashore. We will continue to 'hold the line' at the sea whilst international community, led by the EU, adopts a more comprehensive approach ashore. (EU NAVFOR 15.12.2010.)

> In Somalia, the EU has firmly guided the Somaliland region towards a sounder democratic process […] EU has played a key role in encouraging a path towards constitutional rule. (EU Council8, 6.)

In 2010, EU's political leaders and officials of Operation Atalanta started finally addressing properly the complex problem of piracy and what is needed for its solution and in this way demonstrating its willingness to expand its responsibilities to cover also the more fundamentally challenging functions. What should be noted is that instead of stressing the cooperation as before, EU was increasingly positioning itself as taking the lead with the comprehensive approach. As Larik expressed, the Gulf region had become a testing ground for multilateral cooperation due to the presence of the many navies from the major global players (Larik 2013, 4). As well could be said, as all the global security players where already present, the region was an ideal place to demonstrate prestige as well as show ones capacity of more advanced crisis solution compared to the others.

For Morgenthau policy of the prestige is often not the "end" itself but rather a contributor to either policy of status quo or imperialism (Morgenthau 2006, 84). If struggle for power is seen as a zero-sum game, EU seems increasingly, by taking the lead, struggling for minds

over men to believe that it rather than anyone else possesses the power and motivation to lead the international community towards the solution of the problem. Morgenthau uses the Cold War as an example of how United States and the Soviet Union were fighting with the weapons of prestige to decrease the relative power position of the other and seek imperialism (Morgenthau 2006, 91). Similarly, the policy of prestige that EU was implementing seems to instead of contributing towards policy of status quo to have an ultimate objective to overthrow the mental distribution of power that held other actors active in the region, NATO and United States in particular, more capable.

> Given the scale of the EU's engagement in the region, in terms of development assistance, trade and links between our peoples, the EU will ensure continuity and coherence of the different strands of its policies, through more effective engagement. The volatile situation on the ground merits flexibility and the ability to rapidly adapt the EU's approach and instruments. (EU Council8, 5.)

> The EU is heavily engaged in the region, with involvement focused around five main areas: the development partnership, the political dialogue, the response to crises, the management of crises and the trade relationship. (EU Council8, 5.)

Through the EU Strategic Framework that guides EU's present engagements at the Gulf area, also Operation Atalanta, EU has adopted and articulated many other activities related to other than maritime security. EU has especially been concentrating on the enhancing of economy, development and trade, humanitarian assistance and crisis responses and management. Morgenthau separates three typical means to employ imperialistic policies – military imperialism, economic imperialism and cultural imperialism (Morgenthau 2006, 65). These three can work independently though they are most effective when combined with each other. As Operation Atalanta has never aimed to physical conquests of certain territories but rather a psychological conquest of power struggle through displaying willingness, capabilities and military force that the weak region gave an opportunity to, military imperialism in its literal sense is not applicable to this context. However, the other two methods, economic and cultural imperialism, are more corresponding with EU's activities in the Gulf region. As mentioned earlier, Somalia can be seen as a weak state in Morgenthau's definition and as such, imperialistic policy is more likely to take place towards it. Weak states rely for their survival on assistance received from more powerful states, and this motivates states in general to pursue more economic and cultural power over these

states. Military operations as such are a combination of these powers, military in instrumental but also cultural in taking over minds to ensure that the political actor has the power to undertake and implement these missions.

> To achieve its objectives of peace, stability, security, prosperity and accountable government, the EU will […] Support efforts to promote the economic growth of all countries and people in the region […]. (EU Council8, 3.)

> Trade relations between IGAD countries and the EU are governed mainly by the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) provisions of Everything But Arms which provides duty free access to EU markets for almost all products from Least Developed Countries (i.e. all but Kenya). (EU Council8, 6.)

Both economic and cultural imperialisms are rational methods of gaining power in modern times (Morgenthau 2006, 70-72). Country that is practicing economic imperialism has a goal to overthrow the status quo by changing power relations through economic control. The economic control is usually indirect but nevertheless effective method of maintaining control over a certain area (Morgenthau 2006, 70). EU has been very subtle with spreading its economic and trade dominance over North Africa. The process has been articulated as bringing aid and investments as well as increasing the foreign exchange earnings and enhancing the economy. However, it has seen to be had negative effects as well as it has made Africa fairly dependent on Europe economically. In 2010, 60% of North Africa's export earnings came from Europe (Kamara 2010).

However, the economic dependency solely instead of moral and ethical reasons can hardly be seen as EU's objective with its efforts to promote economic growth, but rather a side effect. Indeed, EU is benefitting financially from the North Africa's orientation towards EU trade and therefore, in terms of realism, it is through aiding Africa economically consolidating its influence and securing its interests in the area. However, having a purpose of making a weak state dependent on the benefactor cannot be seen as the goal of development aid. This is where Morgenthau would perhaps exclude this aspect from the sphere of politics as not all actions carried out in international scene is after power thus belong to the area of politics (Morgenthau 1960, 27-28). However, I consider it important to be acknowledged that through its comprehensive approach including the economic side, EU has been able to assert itself as more important and wide-ranging actor in the Gulf region with capabilities to address also the underlying problems of piracy and the overall unrest in

the region compared to other international security actors. Therefore, the aspect contributes not only to the rationale of the topic but to recognizing how EU is trying to achieve power and thus recognition for its image as a comprehensive and versatile actor beyond its borders.

The cultural imperialism uses the control over minds as a tool of changing the power relations and its objective is a displacement of one culture over another (Morgenthau 2006, 72-72). It can use political ideology for example to guide the thoughts and actions of citizen. Furthermore, the target of cultural imperialism may be tried to influence through political affinities, public sympathy or impressing the "intellectually influential groups of a foreign country with the qualities of a civilization until these groups tend to find the political objectives and methods of that civilization equally attractive" (Morgenthau 1960, 63). Certainly, EU's objectives to for example "implement EU human rights policy in the region" through "enhancing coherence, impact and visibility of EU's multifaceted action in the region" could be seen as a way to influence the minds of the intellectually influential groups and attain public sympathy for EU's increasing influence in the region and its global actorness (EU Council8). Consequently, it could have an effect of an upswing of power that might change the power structures towards more favorable for EU compared to other security actors in the region.

> Building on this engagement and exploiting the opportunities provided for with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the appointment of a High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU aims to become both more visible and more effective through a comprehensive approach towards the Horn that will bring together all EU policy strands. (EU Council8, 8.)

As rationalists see morality as a subordinate in foreign policies and humanitarianism representing mainly a strategic tool for political leaders to attain the genuine objectives of their foreign policies, the cultural and economic imperialism could be used to explain EU's Strategic Framework (Jude 2012, 42; Gegout 2009, 232; Wheeler 2000, 30). According to Hyde-Price it is evident that EU foreign and security policies have been presented as "ethical" and as "force for good". He also recognizes that states do not only trust in the balance of power and relative considerations of their power capacities, but more actively seek to implement their normative or ideological agendas (Hyde-Price 2008, 30-31). Through the Treaty of Lisbon EU was able to increase its influence and functions in the

Somali region and improve the estimate of its power relation among other security players globally.

Indeed, it is important to notice that even though EU stresses cooperation in its Strategic Framework with actors like African Union, United Nations and Interpol, other actors considered being the lead international actors in regard to security and active in the Gulf area like U.S. are not mentioned. Furthermore, NATO is also mentioned only once as to cooperate "when appropriate, on counter-piracy and rule of law". In this way, EU does express itself as more powerful to what comes to international activeness in the field of soft security in the region. However, rather than seeking to overthrow the complete status quo, it seems that EU is more pursuing towards getting prestige and relative power in an area where it has more capabilities of doing so as the NATO and U.S. are, in respect, still appearing more powerful when it comes to hard military power.

Though it seems like EU was, through the evolving mandate of Atalanta as well as the Strategic Framework for Horn of Africa, increasingly seeking for more prestige and contributing with that towards imperialism, the policy of status quo does appear also in its objectives. EU articulated for the first time the need to protect European citizens in its Strategic Framework in 2011. Previously, it had only been stressing the need to protect and assist Somali people. "The Strategic Framework also recognizes the need to protect European citizens from the threats that emanate from some parts of the region, including terrorism, piracy and proliferation of arms" (EU Council8, 1). According to John Mearsheimer, rational countries are primarily concerned with their own security and survival (Mearsheimer 2001). Therefore, even though states would like to act as normative power, they are rationally aware of the power distribution and will not pursue the ethical or normative agendas on the expense of their national safety (Hyde-Price 2008, 31). Indeed, the piracy and unstable conditions of Horn of Africa do increasingly affect Europe, through for example kidnapping of EU citizens and financing of terrorism. Merely protecting the vessels in Gulf of Somalia is therefore not enough to safeguard the EU and its citizen but more comprehensive actions are needed. Therefore, it could be seen that the expanding the mission is also protecting and, in the words of Morgenthau consolidating, EU in the anarchic structure of the global world. If EU would not do this, the status quo of the power distribution and EU's existence could be threatened – and policy aiming to consolidate and protect is policy of status quo (Morgenthau 2006, 57).

## 3.3. Visibility and recognition

As discussed in the previous chapters, the launch and extension of the mission have both been tools for EU to demonstrate its military power, capacity and willingness to act as a global security actor. They have both been instruments to struggle for power to support its emerging international role. Through being active in the Gulf of Aden as well as in the Horn of Africa region it has both been seeking to increase and hold on to its power. The previous subchapters were more concentrating on recognizing what kind of foreign policy EU is implementing through analyzing its motives and objectives together with the possibilities the operation and the overall current global and regional situation enable. However, to recognize the foreign policy type it is also important to detect the main instrumentalities and methods the EU is executing in its operation typical for certain foreign policy manifestations. This and the following subchapter are dedicated to this.

One of the prevailing methods defining Operation Atalanta and its actions is the extensive seeking for visibility and international recognition for both its actions in the region as well as for EU and its priorities. Indeed, visibility has been highlighted explicitly in Strategic Framework and implicitly through EU's means and practices in Operation Atalanta. According to Morgenthau, the "desire for social recognition is a dynamic force determining social relations and creating social institutions". Only through reputation a state can get security and power, hence in the struggle for both power and existence the opinion of others about us is equal of what we truly are (Morgenthau 2006, 84). Thus, this common opinion about EU as an international security actor determines its actual position as a security actor in global society. In this context the EU's method of pursuing visibility and recognition stands for reason.

Two instruments of seeking visibility and recognition standing out from the primary material are the active PR and awareness-raising of the mission and high profile visits. The Atalanta has been taking part, inter alia, to the European Union Open Days where EU introduces its activities to the public and has hosted multiple Media Days and Media Events "to increase the journalists' knowledge of the current situation and their awareness of EU NAVFOR operations" and "highlight the EU Naval Force's (EU NAVFOR) efforts to fight against piracy along the East African coast and also support given to humanitarian operations in the region" (EU NAVFOR 30.7.2009; EU NAVFOR 8.5.2010; EU NAVFOR 13.6.2011; EU NAVFOR 25.10.2011; EU NAVFOR 26.4.2012; EU NAVFOR 14.5.2012). Furthermore,

they have met media representatives on board of the flagships as well as in the ports of different countries to, for example, "explain the mission and its capacities" (EU NAVFOR 5.10.2012; EU NAVFOR 3.12.2012; EU NAVFOR 22.1.2014). EU has even established its own Facebook site for Atalanta (EU NAVFOR 11.3.2013).

For Morgenthau, respect or love for institution that forms the basis of domestic politics also have an importance for international relations (Morgenthau 2006, 33). "There has been a tendency to reduce political power to the actual application of force or at least to equate it with successful threats of force and with persuasion, to the neglect of charisma. That neglect, as we shall see, accounts in good measure for the neglect of prestige as an independent element in international politics" (Morgenthau 2006, 33). For him not taking account the charisma of one institution, one can never understand certain phenomena of international politics. EU has never particularly been considered charismatic when it comes to its actorness in the field of global security politics (Pirozzi and Sandawi 2009). As discussed in previous subchapters, EU has on the contrary been seen as incapable to act effectively when faced with challenging situations and international instability. Therefore, the EU's increasing awareness-raising of its mission and successful activities contribute directly towards its "façade" and thus build its charisma. The charisma then allows it to build its "estimate of power relations as they exist among different nations" (Morgenthau 2006, 91). In other words, this increase of charisma contributes directly to the impression of the power that EU possesses as an international security actor.

The second instrument EU is using is the high profile visits. The Operation Atalanta headquarters and its flagship have been receiving visitors throughout the whole operation to learn about the operation and its successes. Furthermore, the Atalanta Force Commanders have met with many political leaders during their port visits. Some of the visitors hold a high profile in both inside Europe and internationally. Among these visitors have been King Carl XVI Gustaf of Sweden; EU High Representative Catherine Ashton; Ministers of Foreign Affairs from Seychelles, Tanzania and Djibouti; Anne Princess Royal, UK Minister for the Armed Forces, Minister of Defence of Sweden, President of the Seychelles, French Ambassador for international anti-piracy, Chairman of European Union Military Committee and so on (EU NAVFOR 19.3.2009; EU NAVFOR 2.9.2009; EU NAVFOR 9.10.2009; EU NAVFOR 19.1.2010; EU NAVFOR 6.5.2010; EU NAVFOR 21.5.2010; EU NAVFOR 29.10.2010; EU NAVFOR 1.12.2010; EU NAVFOR 31.3.2011; EU NAVFOR 24.6.2011; EU NAVFOR 22.8.2011; EU NAVFOR 6.9.2012 ). Furthermore, Atalanta staff has visited

or invited many of their counterparts of other missions, especially NATO and Maritime Task Force 150 and 151, operating in the Gulf region to visit them onboard in their vessels as "a gesture of cooperation and mutual understanding" (EU NAVFOR 30.3.2009).

These visits serve as an illustration of power for EU. Indeed, as mentioned already earlier the display of military force is one instrument for policy of prestige – military strength is a measure of one's power and display of it serves as a mean to impress others (Morgenthau 2006, 90). Morgenthau gives an example of how in peacetime military representatives of other nations are invited to see military maneuvers for instance in order to impress them with the military capacity, strength and preparedness of the host (Morgenthau 2006, 5). These visits have certainly enabled EU to present its strength, successes and capacities to other mission leaders as well as to political leaders inside EU to ensure their support, and outside EU to seek recognition, reputation and prestige.

However, the illustration power through military display is not the only reason behind the high profile visits. Morgenthau portrays diplomatic ceremonial as a way to demonstrate power. He gives many examples of ceremonial episodes throughout the history where different political leaders have demonstrated their superiority over another through rather symbolic gestures and forms. Furthermore, he separates the use of diplomats as an instrument of policy of prestige. The diplomats are the symbolic representatives of the countries and the respect shown by or to them is really connected to the respect towards the countries (Morgenthau 1960, 74). In this light, the invitation of many political leaders of different countries to visit operation Atalanta seems to be a way of illustrating the power of EU and Atalanta. EU has been inviting the important leaders and politicians as to show that Operation Atalanta is truly globally important security mission. And indeed, the diplomats, political leaders such as presidents and ministers, and representatives of other naval missions show enough respect towards EU as a credible security actor in the Gulf region to visit Atalanta. For Morgenthau, equality of treatment shows equality in reputation of power (Morgenthau 1960, 76). Consequently, the reality where mutual visits between other globally recognized security actors can take place equates EU reputation as a security actor with their reputation.

> European Union Sings Prosecution Agreement with Kenya. This represents important step toward in the EU's efforts to combat piracy and will act as a

> significant deterrent to those considering committing criminal acts of this kind in
> the region. (EU NAVFOR 6.3.2009.)

> During the meeting Rear Admiral García de Paredes highlighted the success that
> Operation Atalanta and other counter piracy forces are having in the High Risk
> Area, with pirate attacks down from 176 in 2011 to 35 by the end of 2012. (EU
> NAVFOR 8.3.2013.)

> Admiral Jugel illustrated the success of the mission with the words that 100 percent
> of all vessels of the WFP, which were protected by the Task Force, have reached
> their port destination with their food aid supplies to alleviate the humanitarian
> catastrophe. (EU NAVFOR 25.10.2011.)

In addition to the previously separated methods of EU to seek visibility and recognition, also propaganda as an instrument of a struggle for power can be distinguished from the primary material. Morgenthau defines propaganda as a chief instrument that "seeks to increase the prestige of one's own side and deflate that of the enemy, and foreign aid, which intends to impress the recipient nation with the economic and technological proficiency of the aid's provider" (Morgenthau 2006, 92). As one can see from the previous quotes, EU is often highlighting its successes in news releases, interviews, international conferences and during the visits of political leaders or its counterparts. This behavior is the core of struggle over the minds of men – to convince others of the power that EU possesses as a global international security player through stressing its successes achieved in the operation. Furthermore, the not so successful parts of the operation that could undermine its power, such as monitoring the fishing activities, are not brought to public. This indeed shows EU's methods of implementing policy of prestige and trying to increase its reputation of power and receive recognition.

## 3.4. Cooperation – the three big ones

> Despite its diversity, the problems of the region are inextricably intertwined – what
> happens in one country can have a profound impact on the others, and the problems
> of one can often only be solved with the involvement of the others. There is
> therefore a logic to dealing with the region as a whole. (EU Council8, 4.)

> The Strategic Framework also recognises the need to protect European citizens
> from the threats that emanate from some parts of the region, including terrorism,

piracy and the proliferation of the arms. It also identifies a number of common challenges such as climate change and migration. (EU Council8, 4.)

EU will […] Ensure that, until that is achieved, the insecurity in the region does not threaten the security of others beyond its borders, e.g. through piracy, terrorism or irregular migration. (EU Council8, 4.)

"It is necessary to extend the area of operations of Atalanta to include Somali internal waters and Somali land territory. (EU Council10.)

As Hyde-Price writes; realism considers all actions of a country to be primarily motivated by its security and survival due to the anarchic structure of international politics (Hyde-Price 2008, 30; Mearsheimer 2001). The safety and existence is the priority number one and this applies to EU as well. The piracy at the Horn of Africa started increasingly threatening its citizens and EU needed to take measures to protect them and itself. However, the piracy is not only a regional problem but global in the sense that it is affecting countries at the other side of the globe as well and needs to be addressed comprehensively. As states have the build-in need to pursue power and use this power to shape their environment for more secured for themselves, it creates an incentive to cooperate in front of the shared problems (Hyde-Price 2008, 31). Cooperate because every political action, mission and deployment have embedded chances of failure inside them, and states are not willing to solely carry the risks of failure as this effects their relative power capabilities but share the benefits of success. Therefore, EU was willing to expand the mission to address also the root causes of piracy and shape its international "milieu" for more secured in cooperation with other actors.

This expansion could mean an increase in the amount of resources for the operation and also increase in cooperation and collaboration with NATO and others carrying out operations in this area. (EU NAVFOR 26.2.2010.)

EU NAVFOR and CTF 151 have already forged close links at the sea and are part of the wider "coalition of willing" to counter seaborne criminality. (EU NAVFOR 16.7.2009.)

The Commanders of three Task Forces operating in the Horn of Africa and off the coast of Somalia reaffirmed their views that they were working closely together to fight Piracy and allow international merchant shipping safe passage to transport

their cargos all over the world without hindrance or danger from seaborne criminals. (EU NAVFOR 24.7.2009.)

There is an excellent cooperation with other maritime forces, mainly of NATO and the Coalition Maritime Forces (CMF). (EU NAVFOR 10.12.2011.)

Moreover, the continued coordination between EU NAVFOR, NATO and the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) allows greater impact. (EU NAVFOR 22.2.2012.)

According to Kenneth Waltz, the cooperation in front of shared problem to shape the international milieu is more likely to happen between the "great powers" due to the fact that they possess the capabilities to acquire responsibility and they have more at stake in the stability of the system (Hyde-Price 2008, 31; Waltz 1979, 194-210). More at stake because the instability weakens their relative power position not merely concrete but due to the fact that if they are not prepared to take actions, the perception of their power would appear smaller than it actually is. This is a rather good example of negative policy of prestige, and it affects the image of the state and how other states regard it and might lead to actual loss of power (Morgenthau 2006, 94-98).

Indeed, it was important to cooperate with other actors to combat piracy comprehensively. However, as from the quotes one can see, even though there were many states active in Gulf of Somalia, EU has highlighted its cooperation mainly with the two globally recognized and important security players: NATO and U.S. through the Combined Task Force 150 and 151. This proves the point that EU has truly self-proclaimed itself as a "great power", global security player and seeks prestige for this "estimate of its power relation" in relation to the other actors (Morgenthau 2006, 91-92). In practice, the operation is a manifestation of two purposes in this context: increasing EU's reputation as global security actor as well as ensuring its safety and existence. As policy of prestige, even though implemented here, is not the end as discussed before but contributes either to policy of imperialism or status quo, the end could be seen, due to the EU objective of securing itself to be, instead of shifting the power distribution completely, the status quo.

The Head of Department and Representative of Sweden to the PSC, Olof Skoog stated, the EU was able to position the EU NAVFOR Mission in the Centre of all anti-Piracy activities. (EU NAVFOR 12.10.2009.)

> At operational level EU Coordination Cell shall act as the point of contact with, in particular, ship owners' organisations, the relevant department of UN Secretariat, the World Food Program and the International Maritime Organisation, and with Combined Task Force 150 within the framework of Operation Enduring Freedom. (EU Council1.)

> It is also necessary for practical reasons to provide for the possibility of exchanging classified information in the theatre of operations. (EU Council7.)

> Scott Sanders USN, Commander of the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) on board of the CTF 151 flagship USS ANZIO (CG68). The meeting was held to deepen the cooperation between two task forces to deter, disrupt and suppress piracy on the waters surrounding Somalia. (EU NAVFOR 28.8.2009.)

The prestige does manipulate and make minor adjustments to the relative distribution of power thus increasing it for EU. However, as aforementioned, EU does not aim to overthrow the settled and internationally recognized global security actors completely but position itself next to them as alternative and powerful security source as equally capable to take actions. As mentioned earlier in subchapter 3.2. EU seeks prestige specifically when it has good chances of succeeding. In functions where it is particularly effective and operational, such as humanitarian and development aspects, it appears to take the lead. However, it stresses cooperation in the overall context highlighting specific actions such as operational support and sharing strategic information. These actions are specific but important for the success of the overall combat of piracy. This allows EU to share the credit of the security situation improvement in Horn of Africa, which consequently makes EU more credible as a security actor. In other words, the cooperation with the main international security actors benefits EU as it shares the credit and thus equalizes the distribution of power which otherwise could accumulate to the ones that already possess it.

Morgenthau defined alliances as "a necessary functions of balance of power" that can add one's own power the power of other nations. These alliances for him require a community of interests as necessity for their establishment and have often targeted enemy (Morgenthau 1960, 181). EU is not seeking to establish an alliance with CMF and NATO as such even though in Gulf of Somalia context they do have a common enemy, pirates. However, the alliance concept can be used to explain certain EU foreign policy objectives. As said earlier, EU seeks, through highlighting cooperation between it and other big global security actors,

to position itself next to them and gain some of their power. Indeed, as in alliance, the distribution of benefits is enabled through close cooperation (Morgenthau 1960, 181). When other missions have succeeded to decrease piracy rates, it benefits EU directly through increase of its security, but also indirectly through highlighting the general success of the common anti-piracy efforts. As an example, EU together with NATO and CMF have received the Lloyd's List Newsmaker of the Year –award for their "outstanding efforts to combat the threat of piracy off the coast of Somalia" (EU NAVFOR 21.11.2011). The visibility and recognition that the other two missions are receiving contribute to the visibility, recognition and prestige of EU as well because it has been able to proclaim itself as the *counter-piracy big third*. The distribution of benefits plausibly correlates with the distribution of power within alliance. As the benefits seem to increasingly be shared, EU is certainly enjoying a strengthening image of its power with the help of the other two security actors.

> Counter Piracy "Big Three" Meet at Sea. On 18 July the Force Commanders of the three international Counter-Piracy task forces, EU NAVFOR, NATO Ocean Shield and Combined Task Force 151 met on board of NATO flagship to exchange experience and coordinate the fight against piracy. (EU NAVFOR 23.7.2012.)

> Counter-Piracy "Big Three" Meet at Sea […] met on board of the EU NAVFOR flagship […] .(EU NAVFOR 24.8.2012.)

But how is EU then been able to self-proclaim itself as the big security actor next to NATO and U.S. and why do I call this mainly as policy of prestige from EU's behalf? As explained in previous subchapter, according to Morgenthau "Equality in treatment would have meant equality of prestige – that is, reputation of power" (Morgenthau 2006, 86). EU has been since the beginning of the mission inviting NATO and U.S. led missions CTF 150 and 151 officials for meetings. Morgenthau gives Cold War as an example of war fought with weapons of prestige. During this time U.S. and Soviet Union did not only try to impress the hostile alliance to weaken their morale but their own allies with their military might (Morgenthau 1960, 81). Through the military visits EU has been able to demonstrate its capacity. Furthermore, with increasing visibility, acquirement of tasks and its self-promotion as one of the big three have indeed made EU be treated equally between the major security actors, and hence enabled EU to receive equality of prestige.

> Commodore Bindt explained the current coordination of the counter piracy efforts between EU NAVFOR, CMF and NATO to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their combined counter piracy forces. (EU NAVFOR 23.11.2009.)

However, the self-promotion and demonstrating its capabilities to the major security players is not enough to be lifted universally to the major league. It has also been necessary for EU to assert its superiority compared to the rest of the actors in the Gulf of Somalia. As stated earlier, for Morgenthau equality of treatment symbolizes equality of prestige. "Humiliation of the representatives of foreign countries was intended to symbolize inferiority in power of the countries they represented" (Morgenthau 2006, 86). The earlier quote, where Commodore Bindt stressed the cooperation between the counter-piracy big three is given during China's visit on operation Atalanta flagship. Similar statements have been said during the visits of other mission representatives that do not represent NATO or CMF, as well. The statements are not "humiliation" to the letter, but they do demonstrate EU's superior position to these other actors whom the statements are presented to by stressing the EU's position in the "alliance" of the major players which they are not part of.

## 4. Fundamental realities and emerging opportunities

In the previous chapter the empirical material was analyzed descriptively through directed content analysis that received predetermined codes from Morgenthau's three manifestations of foreign policy. It was discovered that most often EU's methods of functioning and actions in the context of Operation Atalanta, its launch and extension as well as its ambitions invoked by the current political and security environment in the Somali region and EU's power relations in regard to international security seem by its features to be representing policy of prestige. However, not everything in regard to the Operation Atalanta and its means of action and underlying objectives fitted into the category of prestige. Indeed, the variables and key concepts of the other two manifestations of foreign policies, imperialism and status quo, were able to be identified as well.

The policy of status quo is represented in regard to the launch of the operation serving as a safeguard against disadvantages such as losing international credibility by not taking actions. Furthermore, it can be distinguished in the context of EU protecting its citizens as well as consolidating and securing itself through expanding the mission and adopting the strategic framework. Consequently, engaging in cooperation to shape the international milieu for

more secure can be seen as contributing towards holding on to the existing power. However, these aforementioned points were mainly implemented by means of policy of prestige, even though contributing to policy of status quo. Despite that, additional subcategory to the coding scheme method is not needed. Certainly, Morgenthau had already noticed this tendency when defining the objectives of policy of prestige – policy of prestige is frequently used in support of policy of status quo (Morgenthau 2006, 91). Consequently, the EU can be said every now and then to be implementing policy of prestige for the purpose of policy of status quo as to hold on to its present power and consolidate itself.

Furthermore, many findings from the empirical material seem also, from the outset, to fit into the category of policy of imperialism as Morgenthau defines it. Certainly, the situations where it typically arises – existing of weak state and victorious "war" as well as the typical means employed by imperialistic foreign policy, the economic and cultural imperialism, can be distinguished from the material. However, in the view of the objectives of policy of imperialism – acquiring world empire, continental empire or local preponderance – it cannot be said that EU was implementing it even though it was pursuing an increase of power as it is not trying to move towards these three goals of imperialism.

EU can indeed already be considered a continental empire inside its borders and immediately across them. With operation Atalanta it was pursuing to be recognized globally. Therefore, it does not have geographical boundaries as such. However, world empire, according to Morgenthau, does not know any rational limits to its expansion. Nation seeking it can only be stopped by a superior force (Morgenthau 2006, 67). EU and its actorness have rational limits in the context of Operation Atalanta: EU is aware of its capabilities and it acts inside that framework. Furthermore, as the power was not aimed to overthrow the whole present equilibrium but to adjust it by locating EU next to the other big security actors, it is not seeking hegemony i.e. world empire. Local preponderance could be seen as appropriate as it is not bound by geographical limits but sets its own constraints based on objective facts beyond it is unwise to go. However, as EU is still not trying to overthrow the power of NATO or CMF completely through Atalanta, it is not fully compatible either.

Nevertheless, as mentioned above, with operation Atalanta EU has been implementing actions and engaging in the Gulf region through means that are considered to be imperialistic. However, through this it is merely seeking to increase power to the maximum where it can and in a way seeking to be considered equal in terms of power to act in global

security matters. Also, the cooperation between the main security actors in the region proves this point – through to cooperative means EU is asserting itself as major security player next to the NATO and U.S. led CMF, and sharing their success to enable more equal distribution of power.

It is apparent that EU is trying to increase its power to support its emerging role as a security actor through the means of both policy of prestige and policy of imperialism. Still, the objective of policy of imperialism, to overthrow the present balance of power, does not exist in the EU's foreign policy as such. Indeed, EU is trying to adjust the power distribution and shift the power structures towards more beneficial to its position, but not overthrow the whole equilibrium. However, it is not trying to stay in the status quo state either. Therefore, a supplementary subcategory to the coding scheme is required at this point. This subcategory does not prove the theory wrong or offer a contradictory view of the phenomenon as Hsieh and Shannon anticipated (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1283). It mainly extends and expands the theory taking features from all of the three policy manifestations. This subcategory is defined as foreign policy seeking to increase international power to be considered as a credible security actor next to the other major actors. However, as this still is adjusting the power positions, it needs to be kept in mind that it might eventually, if taken too far, lead to the overthrow of the present equilibrium – to the policy of imperialism.

The following subchapters will be dedicated to the more general pondering of the results of the analysis and EU's actions in regard to the Operation Atalanta in the overall EU context. Its present foreign policy environment and its future and challenges it faces when implementing the exact foreign policy type as well as underlying effects for mission engagement outside its territory and global actorness will be reviewed. As power is seen as context-dependent by realists and subject to dynamic change it is very important to tie the results back to concrete EU policy environment to find meanings from the policy it implements in the present context in order to make generalizations and form patterns. This was done slightly already at the previous chapter in order to make the interpretation of the empirical material apprehensive. However, it is important to expand and amplify this rendering to find out the embedded interests in EU's engagement and to tie the main interests determining its actions in regard to Operation Atalanta to the current policy environment and the structural framework within which it operates in order to recognize social situations where it might answer with repetitive patters. As mentioned in the introduction, comprehending where the EU's priorities lie in the sphere of foreign politics

together with the current environment that enables the implementation of these priorities will help us understand the patterns of EU responding to crisis situations, and whether it could constitute as the alternative security source willing to engage in functions beyond its borders and increasingly challenge other big security actors in the future.

## 4.1. The change in the foreign policy framework

The EU cooperation has been deepening and widening for a long period of time already, and as the Union has grown bigger and been adopting more functions and responsibilities to cover, also the expectations of it in regard to global challenges have grown internally and externally. EU has demonstrated its global ambitions and aspirations in multiple contexts (Van Lagenhove 2010, 5). However, the former foreign policy framework that is meant to provide EU with the instruments and supplies to play a global role was suffering from significant shortcomings. According to Jonas Paul these shortcomings can be summarized as "a lack of leadership, continuity, consistency and diplomatic resources", which result in "a lack of strategic thinking, proactive decision-making and coherent action" (Paul 2008, 8). Therefore, EU was suffering a negative policy of prestige – estimation of power that is inferior to the actual power possessed (Morgenthau 2006, 98). Consequently, to fulfill its objective and acquire a more powerful role in world politics as well as in the field of global security, EU needed some new guidelines. Joachim Fritz-Vannahme articulated it as the need for "sustainable basic concepts and a new story line" that enables the European external self-assertion (Fritz-Vannahme 2009, 1-2).

Indeed, the Treaty of Lisbon and the changes it made to the Common Foreign and Security Policy can be seen as the new guidelines enabling EU to respond to the global challenges. According to Jean-Luc Dehaene, the former Vice-President of the European Convention, the Treaty of Lisbon serves as "a new European quantum leap" allowing EU to play global role (Van Lagenhove 2010, 5). Fritz-Vannahme calls the need for EU to establish a positive estimate of its international power position as self-assertion, however, prestige works as a synonym. EU needed to receive prestige both to and through its amended foreign policy doctrine. As interpreted in previous chapter, the launch of the Operation Atalanta served as a window of opportunity to EU's struggle for power – for both holding on to its power in the light of disadvantages if not able to engage the mission, but also for prestige to demonstrate its power and receive easy recognition as a legitimate, willing and robust international security actor. Already during the times of the launch it was known that EU will adopt the

Treaty of Lisbon that will also change the foundation of the Operation Atalanta – the treaty was concluded already in 2007 but entered eventually in force in January 2009. Why, despite this and the acknowledged need to assure the international community of the capabilities of the new foreign policy, did EU at the beginning lean more towards implementing policy of prestige to contribute towards policy of status quo and not the newly established subcategory of seeking to increase international power to be considered as a credible security actor next to the other major actors through means of both, policy of prestige and imperialism?

The reason for this might be that EU was somehow testing its capabilities. It was not yet self-confident enough nor did it possess the needed resources of power to seek to increase power in more imperialistic means such as asserting itself as the lead and spreading economic dominance and cultural influence over the minds of men. Indeed, as explained in the subchapter 3.1. the functions that it took over were still fairly easy at this point. However, while it made remarkable progress, succeeded with its tasks, and received recognition from other global security players and high profile politicians through visits and increasing cooperation for example, it also acquired more self-confidence, prestige and power and was ready to engage with more challenging functions and take over even more responsibilities.

As the power and self-confidence grew, EU was indeed more eager to take over responsibilities and implement policy to increase power through prestige and imperialistic tools. According to Fritz-Vannahme, the criticism within the EU of getting very little done despite the great deal of rhetoric is justified (Fritz-Vannahme 2009, 6). Operation Atalanta was a perfect chance not only to seek prestige and power to demonstrate the willingness of the EU, but also to acquire visibility and recognition for the new foreign policy and demonstrate its capabilities. Indeed, EU needed more prestige now when it had established more coherent and functional EU foreign policy. The Treaty of Lisbon created in practice a more functional base for EU's international security actorness, but without increasing its reputation of performance and convincing the global society of its power, it could not be seen as credible actor. Therefore, stressing its position as one of the big three, acquiring lead with some functions and especially establishing the comprehensive approach after the Treaty of Lisbon are reinforcing this view.

However, it needs to be reckoned that EU also needed to increase its functions after the Treaty of Lisbon expanded its functionality in regard to foreign politics. The treaty

established the position of a high representative to, for example, create consensus among member states, act as the one voice of foreign affairs, execute the CFSP, as well as coordinate crisis management missions to ensure efficiency and consistency of the EU's international efforts. Furthermore, the treaty established the External Action Service, legal bases for the European Defence Agency and a start-up fund for CSDP operations to allow prompt access to financing of urgent initiatives. It expanded EU's crisis management tasks and simplified European Council decision making (Europa 2014.) Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon enabled the execution of CSDP tasks by a group of member states acting together with the high representative and "a group of countries to enter into a permanent structured cooperation" (Paul 2008, 13-15). According to Paul, this single legal personality will remove all doubts "about the Union's capacity to act under international law and within international organisations" (Paul 2008, 13). Indeed, if EU would not, in the light of all the new possibilities that the Treaty of Lisbon enabled, be able to expand the Operation Atalanta and show increasing coherence, power and prestige, the Treaty of Lisbon together with EU's engagement towards more global actorness would look like a complete failure and lead to a loss of power in the relative power relations.

In addition of enabling more functional foreign policy, the Treaty of Lisbon enabled more pooled sovereignty and concentration of power internally, which are crucial aspects when seeking for international position. As Fritz-Vannahme articulated, EU that wishes to assert itself can "no longer afford never-ending disputes or a visible lack of solidarity, nor lengthy periods of inactivity designed to facilitate the alignment of common positions" (Fritz-Vannahme 2009, 3). Indeed, the treaty enhanced professionalism and potential to mitigate the lack of leadership in EU. The Treaty of Lisbon created some solidarity among member countries and allowed more independent and rapid decision-making which enables EU to work more coherently towards the international security actorness. The centralized decision-making is seen as strengthening EU. (Paul 2008.)

In short, EU already had the motivation to pursue a role of a credible international actor when launching the Operation Atalanta. It wanted to hold on to its present power but as it knew already about the forthcoming adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, it also wanted to seek prestige for it. Furthermore, EU knew at the point of the launch which possibilities the structure of the new foreign policy doctrine enables, but it did not yet have the self-confidence nor the power to implement other policy than policy of status quo and prestige contributing towards status quo. However, when the Treaty of Lisbon was adopted it enabled

EU to pursue global role through providing for more consistent, efficient and visible external action. This, together with the growing power, self-confidence due to the previous successes and the need to prove the capabilities of the new policy, EU's motivation to increase its power via policy of prestige as well as more imperialistic means and amend the international power structures grew as well.

In the future, we can expect EU to seek to increase its power through policy of prestige and even by imperialistic means within the existing EU structures and challenge other international security actors. However, it is important to remember that even though the foreign policy settings as well as the coherence and interests of the member countries were in place for Operation Atalanta, the social reality is prone to change (Morgenthau 2006, 7). Even though the Treaty of Lisbon developed tools for more functional, comprehensive, robust and coherent external action, EU is still as strong as its member countries together. As in the field of EU foreign policy the national governments retain significant autonomy of decision-making due to the unanimity rule, much will depend on their political will (Paul 2008, 6). And this political will is very much subject to the national interests, challenges yielding from the area of action, economic capabilities and the conceptions of the benefits gained compared to possible losses, or in the words of Morgenthau, principle of economy of effort (Morgenthau 2006, 7). However, it is important to note that the present foreign policy framework indeed gives more solid ground and instruments when needed to pursue power globally.

## 4.2. International positioning and EU actorness

In the previous subchapter the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon and the change in the EU's foreign policy doctrine to the overall EU foreign policy manifestation, objectives and practical possibilities were analyzed. We could notice that the change enabled EU to implement more power pursuing foreign policy and indeed reinforced its attempts as well as the motivation to amend the power distribution. EU has for longer time already had the aspirations to become a global actor, the amended CFSP just gave more functional tools and the needed push for it. However, as aforementioned, the general foreign policy framework cannot solely define EU's future position in the global security field. Previously the impact of the growing estimation of power together with the increasing self-confidence was elaborated. This subchapter is more dedicated to bundle up the underlying motivations of the EU in regard to the power position it is pursuing internationally with the challenges and

opportunities the global environment and social reality creates for its attempts. Furthermore, I will critically analyze the impact that the Operation Atalanta together with the policy type it demonstrates can have on the global power relations.

EU was since the beginning of Operation Atalanta trying to achieve more centralized position in the global world in regard to security. At first, it demonstrated willingness by launching the operation to work also outside its borders. However, launch could be as well seen as a way for EU to protect itself against disadvantages and hold on to its power as mentioned earlier. Furthermore, it seemed to be playing it safer by engaging in actions that were more manageable but despite this able to bring easy prestige for Atalanta. Already at this point EU was highlighting the cooperation between itself and other actors in the field. Therefore, it is noticeable that the EU was not trying to yet shift the power structures remarkably but mainly gain prestige, as reputation of power, and keep the power it had. However, the underlying fundamental objective to gain more power to be considered as a major security actor was still present, but EU did not yet have the power nor the self-confidence to actualize this more aggressively.

However, as the Atalanta expanded, so did the EU's aspirations in regard to its power position. According to Luk Van Lagenhove, becoming a global actor is not only determined by internal matters but it also depends on a number of external forces (Van Lagenhove 2010). Similarly in Morgenthau's vocabulary, EU needed to get a positive estimate of its power internationally to be centered in the core of the global actions and therefore, it needed to show off its power increasingly. EU used Atalanta as a disguise to pursue prestige by deploying and displaying its military force. Furthermore, it was increasing its activities to cover more fundamentally complex problems to show its capacities. Indeed, the functions it took over can be considered imperialistic according to Morgenthau. EU was, through the comprehensive approach spreading its economic influence as well as implementing EU's human rights policy and thus struggling over the minds of people through cultural imperialism. It was also seeking increased visibility and recognition through the high profile visits and awareness-raising of the mission. Especially it was stressing its own functionality, successes and cooperation with the major actors and thus building up its charisma.

In addition, EU was increasingly taking the lead in matters that are considered more as soft power. However, even though taking the lead, it could not be seen as overthrowing the power of NATO or United States. Nicole Koenig writes in the context of EU's response to

crisis in Libya that the "Libyan crisis showed that while it is still business as usual if the EU fails to deliver in the field of 'hard power', it is expected to step in when it comes to 'soft power'. The famous metaphor on the transatlantic division of labour comes to mind in which NATO (that is, the US) 'prepares dinner' while the EU 'washes the dishes'" (Koenig 2011, 29). Similarly, for EU to balance the power of the other two major actors in the region, it needed to pursue power in an imperialistic way where it could because in more hard power context it is still seen as the underdog.

The highlighting the cooperation with the major security actors in the Gulf region proves the point that EU was not seeking to overthrow the current power distribution but to adjust it to place itself among the powerful core. Through placing itself in the same line as NATO and CMF and emphasizing their cooperation as the big three EU was able to accumulate their success and receive recognition and power from the overall success of the western anti-piracy efforts and thus equalize the relative power relations between the actors. Indeed, it can be seen that EU was using Operation Atalanta as a benchmark or flagship to demonstrate its equal capabilities to be a global security actor next to the other major ones and through it push it self towards the core.

But as articulated above, the motivation and internal capabilities are not the only ones affecting on one's attempts to become a major power. The outside forces such as present security architecture and the political environment create challenges. The Treaty of Lisbon gave EU the recourses and internal coherence to assert itself globally and the Operation Atalanta gave a window of opportunity to demonstrate these resources in practical terms. But indeed, there are other powers undermining EU's efforts. Van Lagenhove notes that for example demographic decline and shifting of economic power away from Europe are weakening EU's global position. For him EU needs to deepen its integration with the rest of the Western world as well as step up its role in multilateral system to strengthen global governance (Van Lagenhove 2010). This multipolarity that Lagenhove describes can be seen as not just redistributing the power but changing the players of the game, as well (Van Lagenhove 2010, 18). Through cooperation with the major powers and demonstrating superiority among the rest of the actors in Gulf of Aden EU was distinguishing itself and trying to locate itself as one of the poles. This way it was not seeking for imperialism and hegemony but instead to increase its power to be accepted among the main global security powers, have its voice heard when it comes to decision-making in the context of global security and be able to project its interests more freely. Despite the contrary opinion of Van

Lagenhove, as the power relations are relative, and therefore some players will possess more of it than others, multilateral world can indeed have its "star players" (Van Lagenhove 2010, 24).

However, there is still a need for pondering whether the Operation Atalanta is in fact enough to demonstrate EU's power to make it a global actor. The piracy at Gulf of Somalia through creating a security situation calling for interference from powerful actors staged an arena for power struggle that became a perfect opportunity for EU to manifest itself. According to Morgenthau, when equilibrium is disturbed by outside forces, in this case by piracy, system shows a tendency to establish new equilibrium (Morgenthau 2006, 186). However, crisis at Gulf of Somalia and the powers of the mission cannot be said to have such leverage that it could have indeed overthrown the complete global balance of power. Rather, it was subverting it enabling a crack where EU could manifest its power and increase it gradually. EU was in regard to piracy able to demonstrate itself as competent actor globally and that gave the recognition needed to shift the power structures to show it as willing and capable of robust action. However, Operation Atalanta is one mission among others. As the power structures are subject to change, EU needs to increasingly continue demonstrating its power. If failing to take a stand when a new crisis situation emerges, it is prone to lose its powers it gained with Atalanta.

## 4.3. Engaging in military operations

In previous subchapters the foreign policy framework providing EU the capabilities and supplies to play a global role was analyzed. Furthermore, the change of the framework and how it has affected on EU priorities and global aspirations and thus the foreign policy type it is implementing was reviewed. In addition, the underlying motivations of the EU in regard to the power position it is pursuing internationally through Operation Atalanta together with the challenges and opportunities the global environment and social reality creates was pondered upon. However, to find meanings and recognize the situations deriving from the contemporary security environment in which the EU might in the future answer in similar way as to Operation Atalanta we need to pore over the embedded interests determining which CFSP missions EU engages.

In regard to the Operation Atalanta, the main interests to engage in the mission, next to the economic reasons elaborated in introduction, can be seen to have been EU's fear of disadvantages and will to receive visibility, power and prove itself as a credible global

security actor and thus amend the relative power structures more beneficial to itself. As the Treaty of Lisbon was formally adopted EU needed to increasingly affirm its functionality internationally and demonstrate that it now has the willingness, the proper tools and the coherence needed to really act as a global player to common good. However, EU was aware of its powers and started slow in the beginning in regard to its functions and responsibilities in the Operation Atalanta increasing them gradually as the prestige and power grew. According to Hyde-Price, states as rational actors recognize the structural power distributions and do not seek to pursue normative or international agendas on the expense of its own wellbeing (Hyde-Price 2008, 31). Consequently, even though in regard to the Operation Atalanta EU was implementing policy of prestige even with imperialistic means at the end, in the crisis situation where cons defeat the pros, EU will most likely engage itself with policy of status quo and protect and consolidate only its own existence.

Indeed, the private interests are always heavily involved and lead the shaping of the international environment. The goals of foreign policies are always to project and defend state's interests internationally (Jackson and Sorenson 2010, 59). Hyde-Price considers it ironic that the Europeans see through the ethical disguise of U.S. foreign policy but are not able to recognize the strategic behavior of the EU actions in the field of foreign politics (Hyde-Price 2008, 32). According to Germond and Smith, the maritime frontiers of the EU are hybrid and even though legally situated outside the EU they are functionally inside its strategic zone of interests. They separate six distinct reasons for EU to get engaged in the Gulf of Somalia; pirates constituting a threat to EU citizen and European energy security, harming marine environment and trade, pirates might create links to terrorists and finally they harm the Somali population by hampering the food aid deliveries (Germond and Smith 2009, 597-581). Indeed, only one of them is not closely linked to EU and its wellbeing even though the Operation Atalanta was at the beginning launched especially with the humanitarian justification to protect particularly the WFP vessels delivering food aid.

Therefore, it is easy to conclude that the main reason for EU engaging to military missions outside its borders is its own prosperity and wellbeing. Operation Atalanta was an example of protecting EU citizen and consolidating EU under the public eye by receiving prestige through launching the operation. By receiving power and prestige EU gets accepted among the big security players and can have more effect on the global decision-making in regard to the future crisis situations and also have power to engage in mission that benefit it in the future. Furthermore, the power that it was increasingly able to gain through the Operation

Atalanta created a positive conception of prestige that can deter other, power relations wise inferior, actors from challenging EU and its power. The anarchic structure of the global system together with the relative power positions create power competition between bigger actors inherently and that leads to so-called self-help system where states need to rely on their own capabilities to protect themselves and their interests (Hyde-Price 2008, 36). As Koenig stated in the context of Libyan crisis in 2011, the U.S. was demonstrating growing reluctance to "prepare dinner in Europe's backyard". Indeed, EU needed to become a credible actor with strategic consensus and coherent responses to crisis situations in order to defend its interests and to protect itself implicitly (Koenig 2011, 29).

However, as EU is a union combined of nation states their private interests and motivations do have a crucial impact on EU's engagement on military missions outside its borders due to the unanimity rule. To be as coherent to launch operations as in the Operation Atalanta, the benefits and interests need to actualize for EU member states. Without them seeing the benefits and the power it brings upon, in addition to been convinced by the little disadvantages and EU's actual capabilities of succeeding with the functions it takes over, EU's foreign engagement could get paralyzed. In regard to Operation Atalanta, the need to protect EU citizens and the possibilities that the engagement would bring in regard to receiving prestige to both EU and its new foreign policy framework as well as the economic benefits, legitimization from UN and the apparent humanitarian aspect of the mission creating good publicity was generally convincing enough to EU member states to accept the launch.

Indeed, one needs also to keep in mind that EU even though considered as a global actor needs a justification and space for taking actions through military means outside its borders. "A global power is not only a matter of one's relatively strength. It is also determined by the playing fields or 'theatres' where such power and influence can manifest themselves" (Van Lagenhove 2010, 9). Certainly, having power is not giving legitimization to further implement policy of imperialism nor prestige. It might not even be enough to implement policy of status quo, that is, to defend one's power position and implicitly threatened safety through military means. Morgenthau calls this the use of legitimate and usable power that EU had due to the legitimization of the mission by United Nations as well as through the apparent humanitarian justification. EU can show its global security actorness and engage in missions only in marked theatres, because demonstrating or increasing power without justification might lead to loss of credibility, charisma, international resistance by other

major players and eventually actual loss of power. Therefore, EU can be seen to really engage on military actions beyond its borders when it is called upon the global society, there is a personal interests to do so and the benefits are bigger than the possible disadvantages.

## 5. Conclusion

The thesis concentrated on analyzing European Union's actions and their underlying motivations in the context of EU NAVFOR Atalanta to unravel what kind of foreign policy EU is implementing and what power position it is seeking through it. The realistic theory of the three foreign policy manifestations from Hans Morgenthau created the theoretical framework for the study. According to him, all politics in the field of foreign affairs are struggle for power; either to increase, stabilize or demonstrate it. Hence, he has divided the foreign policies into three types: policy of imperialism, policy of status quo and policy of prestige. The objective was to find out which one of these three manifestations EU executes and carries out within the frame of Atalanta and whether it is trying to acquire a greater role, status and impact world-wide as a security actor or merely showing off or consolidating its power. Furthermore, as the operation was launched when Treaty of Lisbon had already been sealed but before it entered into force, the operation has been operational throughout the process of strengthening the EU foreign policy framework. Therefore, it was meaningful to also concentrate whether the foreign policy type EU was implementing changed after the Lisbon Treaty and how this was visible through its actions.

After introducing the theoretical framework and the three main policy types more in detail the thesis embarked upon analyzing the primary material consisting out of the relevant Council Decisions, Council Conclusions and Council Joint Actions regarding operation Atalanta, the Council Conclusion of Horn of Africa and EU Strategic Framework that guides EU's engagement in the Horn of Africa region as well as relevant official press releases of Atalanta. Directed content analysis was used as the methodology to create a deeper inter-linkage between the theory and the primary material from the beginning. The three foreign policy types from Morgenthau operated as the main categories providing the coding scheme for the analysis of the empirical material and defining its main concepts, variables and the mutual relations between the categories. The material was coded through the lenses of the theory and categorized into these three foreign policy manifestations. The theory was also used to guide the dialogue between the empirical material, itself and rationale further.

The empirical testing demonstrated that the launch of the Operation Atalanta served as a window of opportunity for EU to demonstrate its military capacity and willingness to act in the global security arena and receive power in a legitimate manner. Through the Operation Atalanta EU was able to receive fairly easy and robust visibility, recognition and prestige. However, it used the policy of prestige it was for the most part carrying out to contribute towards status quo – consolidating its existence. Indeed, EU would have faced multiple disadvantages if it would not have been able to launch the mission. The piracy in the Gulf of Aden was indirectly affecting the safety of EU citizens and as the situation in the Somali coast was enjoying a lot of publicity, not taking part of the international actions in the region would have meant losing its credibility as a security actor willing to work beyond its borders for EU.

However, as the operation made progress and the Treaty of Lisbon came into force EU started to increase its responsibilities and engage in more functions. As in the beginning it was highlighting the cooperation between different actors in the region, it now started increasingly stressing its lead in regard to some functions. Furthermore, it launched the comprehensive approach in regard to Horn of Africa through which it engaged itself with tasks that could, according to Morgenthau, be defined as methods of imperialistic foreign policy. However, as it most frequently used instrumentalities in Operation Atalanta to struggle for power were connected to displaying its military capabilities, seeking positive publicity, increasingly stressing its successes in combating piracy as well as having high profile visits from international political leaders and its counterparts, the claim that it was still implementing policy of prestige is well supported. However, it was not implementing policy of prestige to contribute towards status quo anymore but to increase its power and to amend the power distribution to more equal between itself and the other major global security actors, mainly U.S. and NATO.

The previous claim is supported also by the empirical material where EU is demonstrating its superiority towards other actors, mainly individual states, in the Gulf area but highlighting its efficient cooperation with NATO and U.S. led CMF. Indeed, EU had self-proclaimed to be one of *the big counter piracy three* – equal in terms of power, capabilities and influence in the region. Even though Morgenthau uses the definition of alliance in a completely different way for different purpose, its benefits, in particular the close cooperation between actors that enables more equal distribution of benefits, applies to EU's objectives in this regard. Indeed, in alliance one's own power can be added to the power of other nations and

this is exactly what EU was pursuing through the cooperation. It was not trying to claim itself as hegemony and overthrow the power of U.S. and NATO but instead shift the power structures and locate itself next to them with equal relative power recourses.

Due to the fact that EU can be seen implementing policy of prestige to increase its power but not contributing towards imperialism, I needed to create an additional subcategory for the coding scheme. This subcategory is defined as foreign policy seeking to increase international power to be considered as a credible security actor next to the other major actors and as an alternative global security source balancing the hegemony of the U.S. and NATO. The need to establish a new subcategory does not however prove the theory wrong – it only extends and modernizes it to comply with the present, more multilateral global environment. Nevertheless, it needs to be acknowledged that even though one operation is not enough to fundamentally shift the power structures to the extent that the current power equilibrium would be threatened, if EU will increasingly engage in missions, take responsibilities globally over the other actors and provide to be more useful and skilled when it comes to combating complex security threats, the policy of prestige increasing power might eventually shift to implementation of policy of imperialism.

To truly find the embedded and underlying motives and interests behind EU's military mission engagement beyond its borders as well as for trying to recognize the situations where it in the future might globally engage in military functions and make generalizations it was necessary to tie the results of the analysis of the Operation Atalanta to a larger context. It was noted that the change of the foreign policy framework did not only give EU the proper tools and instruments to effectively implement its foreign policy and carry out military missions outside its territory, but it also provided motivation and the needed push to truly demonstrate itself as a competent and capable global security actor. Furthermore, as becoming a global actor is not only determined by internal matters but it also depends on a number of external forces the need for EU to continue to demonstrate and pursue power to maintain its power position is relevant. Indeed, as power relations are relative and subject to change other forces that are not always in the sphere of neither security nor politics can undermine its position easily.

Nevertheless, the foreign policy framework and the policy environment are not enough to solely explain EU's military engagements. EU as a rational actor will pursue its own interest no matter how well its ambitions are disguised. In regard to the Operation Atalanta, it can be

noted that the main motivations to guide its actions were the benefits it gains and disadvantages it can prevent. Indeed, by launching it EU was next to the economic and geostrategic reasons for example able to consolidate its existence, protect its citizen and receive easy and robust prestige for both its actorness and the functionality of the new foreign policy framework. To make a naïve generalization, it could be said that EU will in the future engage in missions when the pros exceed the cons and there are substantial gains for it and its power relations.

However, the global world is too complex to make such easy conclusions. Power is a very context-depended concept. According to Morgenthau, certain social arrangements and institutions, even though existing now, do not necessarily exist in the future – at least not in same form. The present environment determines the content of power and how it can be used. Presently both, the foreign policy framework as well as EU's power position together with the UN legitimization, enabled EU to implement the policy of prestige through even imperialistic means. However, in the future situation might be different. If an emerging crisis situation is seen as too difficult and having too many risks, EU might retreat and change back to implementing policy of prestige contributing to status quo, or even only policy of status quo. It can also lose its credibility and thus power by being imperialistic and taking over functions that it is not able to complete successfully and consequently forced back to consolidating its existence. Indeed, in the international politics, according to realism, states are dependent on their own protection and ensuring survival in anarchic structure of world politics otherwise they will be wiped off the map. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that EU as a rational actor would implement policy of prestige to increase its power and engage on the mission beyond its borders that could somehow harm its power position and thus safety.

Furthermore, EU foreign policy is still essentially dependent on the national interests of its member states. Even though the realistic theory of the foreign policy manifestations would leave out some of the interests of the nation states determining their support to EU missions since they are not in the sphere of politics, they still need to be acknowledged. Economic and geostrategic motivations together with fear of disadvantages are heavily influential when deciding whether to support EU missions or not. Indeed, even though Morgenthau separates political sphere from all the other spheres of the facets of human nature, in contemporary international relations in practice everything is interrelated and all of the different perspectives capture important aspects of politics. There is no action taken without contemplating all aspects and benefits of the action first. Indeed, in recent years, especially

the economic aspect, next to the humanitarian and the power-seeking ones, has been pronounced. The realistic theory of policy manifestations seeking power does not give too much tools to analyze these motivations in detail, but gives enough space to use them to bring deeper rationale to the research.

As mentioned before, the member states of the EU have, due to the unanimous decision-making in the field of foreign politics, overriding control of the EU external actions. The member states have the power to either paralyze EU or to strengthen it. As the power relations are ever changing as elaborated previously, the paralysis might have a drastic impact. Indeed, it can easily repeal the power EU gained through Operation Atalanta and reduce EU's influence and credibility that it can only implement policy of status quo anymore. In launching Operation Atalanta the states were working together in a coherent manner and were able to take actions and implement policy of prestige. However, this is not always the case. Indeed, the study could be taken further by including the analysis of the primary motivations of the individual member states and to see how they in their national capacity effect on isolated actions and engagements in the field of EU foreign politics, what kind of objectives and underlying motivations they have for getting EU involved in crisis situations globally and which kind of environments encourage them to give green light for a launch of an EU military mission beyond the European continent. Furthermore, it would be indeed interesting, as states in general do not always have the same aspirations and interests, to review whose interests weight the most and whether an EU military operation that has a potential of bringing along lot if disadvantages to the EU could be launch basing on the interest of just few member countries.

All in all, the thesis was able to answer the research questions set at the beginning and make conclusions that the EU is presently implementing policy of prestige to pursue an increase of power. Hence, it is likely that it will increasingly engage on missions beyond its territory in the future and seek a stronger and more centralized power position. Consequently, it is challenging the hegemony of the present big security actors, not by overthrowing their power positions, but by adjusting them more equal and thus presenting itself as an alternative global security source. However, as the global world, emerging security threats, and power and social relations are more complex and fluid, situations change rapidly. Indeed, we can try to predict what EU will and will not intentionally pursue in the future, but whether it will be successful with reaching its goals, we are uncertain. Nevertheless, by studying the interests and actions of EU in the field of foreign politics, as in this case the launch and

implementation of Operation Atalanta, together with the current and more broad global context we are one step closer to understanding its future power position and power structures of the world and thus the functioning of the global security architecture.

> It is better to lead from behind and to put others in front, especially when you celebrate victory when nice things occur. You take the front line when there is danger. Then people will appreciate your leadership. (Nelson Mandela.)

> When we are no longer able to change a situation – we are challenged to change ourselves (Viktor E. Frankl).

> Be the chief but never the lord (Lao Tzu).

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