

## The Failure of the Muslim League in Post-Colonial Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal

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### ABSTRACT:

**Objectives:** The main objective of this research paper is to highlight the causes of the failures of Muslim League in Pakistan, of which it was the founding party. It examines the role played by the politicians and bureaucracy which became the dominant actor in national power politics.

**Methodology:** This is a qualitative research entirely based on literature survey from library data collected from books and articles.

**Significance:** Nations states in developing societies were a legacy of colonial rule. The catastrophic world wars of the European metropolis had spillover effects in developing countries, where colonialism was replaced by communism and nationalism among post-colonial peoples. The political parties who led anticolonial nationalist movements employed demonstrations, agitation, and mobilization at broader level for their intentions, but without the existential enemy of the colonial oppressor they were prone to division and faced numerous incidentals, natural and hostile challenges, particularly in the case of Pakistan, whose birth was deliberately sabotaged by British imperialism as well as Indian nationalism. Nevertheless, the Muslim League was essentially successful in its fundamental aim of creating a Muslim state in South Asia and began to administer it after independence. This study explores the character and role played by the post-colonial political parties, especially the Muslim League, whose consequences left the effects on dictatorship generally and on politics particularly that have shaped the development of South and Central Asia ever since.

**Conclusion:** Throughout the history of Pakistan, democratic forces have not been permitted to enhance their political power due to the continual interventions by bureaucrats and military dictators. When the military took over the political and democratic institutions of Pakistan, the elected representatives in power could not actually wield their influence. On the other hand, in alliance with the military, the bureaucracy has repeatedly reaffirmed its stranglehold on state affairs, thereby subjugating those who ostensibly wield political power, and effectively controlling them.

**KEY WORDS:** Muslim League, Political Parties, Nationalist Movements, Pakistan, Post colonialism.

### I. INTRODUCTION

In democratic states, popularly elected politicians are instituted to make policies and decisions and to implement them. Politicians are in fact the ultimate authority in respect of matters related to the state, although they generally share accountability with other stakeholders in modern societies, including the civil service, the civil society and the media. Nevertheless, politicians wield power that has significant implications for people's lives in all countries, and in many developing countries this power is effectively shared (or usurped by) the 'big three': the military establishment, the corporate elite and the civil service (commonly known as the bureaucracy). The elite members of these three classes dominate the regiments of military and establishment and become the king makers in due course, ultimately deciding the fashion in which a state function.

The political party that gathered the Muslim masses on a platform to gain a separate free homeland failed to maintain its preeminence after the death of its founder and guide, Quaid-i-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948). The Muslim League was essentially more an activist movement within precolonial India rather than a regular national political party.<sup>1</sup> To be more precise, it was a charismatic movement that mobilized

<sup>1</sup>Khalid.B. Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p. 83.

various groups and social forces rallied around the demand for Pakistan under Jinnah's guidance, and it was not able to become a mature, united, and well-disciplined political party.<sup>2</sup> It was only the charismatic leadership of Jinnah that the Muslim masses were brought on to one platform and goal. Once the goal of Pakistan was achieved and subsequently the Quaid-i-Azam was gone, the downfall of the Muslim League accelerated rapidly; its character degenerated and its spirit disintegrated. Its leadership continued to be assumed by the landowning and Western-educated elite, but they generally lacked political experience, knowledge and skills necessary for the extraordinary challenges of governing a newly established state. Put simply, they lacked the necessary competence to formulate a nascent state, due to which the Muslim League failed to function as a conventional post-colonial national party, in contrast to the Indian National Congress.

The roots of this impasse can be traced back to the divergence between the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Muslim League already apparent by the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, when Allama Shibli Nu'mani (1857-1914) criticized the relatively limited ambitions and vision of the latter.<sup>3</sup> During the late British Raj, the Muslim League became a single-issue party, consumed with the goal of creating Pakistan, without a commensurate programme of national political and socioeconomic reform for the betterment, stability and prosperity of the new state and nation, unlike the INC. Its attempts to curtail opposition within Pakistan caused further frustration and divisions, and its leaders could not win the confidence of the nation, and in-fighting and opportunism among leading party figures damaged the party as well as the political system.

The leaders lacked commitment to the development of the best suitable system for the interest of a free and independent/prosperous nation where people could realize a free, independent and dignified life after colonial rule.<sup>4</sup> Inamur-Rehman states that brought up and bred in British Parliamentary tradition in undivided India, the Muslim League leadership knew of no better system on which to model the political system of the new state of Pakistan.<sup>5</sup> The inheritance of the League was that of bureaucratic ruling unconstrained by any political control.<sup>6</sup>

By chance circumstances in the historical process and the design of its enemies in the British Raj and India, Pakistan had to face innumerable problems on its creation. Perhaps there are very few countries which started their journey with such severe handicaps as Pakistan faced.<sup>7</sup> Keith Callard is of the view that prior to 1940 the Muslims did not envision the prospect of British rule ending. The future of the state and its policies were not seriously considered, and Muslim political activity was thus directed for the most part against the Hindu influence in the ensuing struggle for power.<sup>8</sup>

This situation was compounded by the problems caused by Partition, particularly the demographic crisis of mass refugee immigration, which Pakistan struggled to administer, along with communal riots and the double-dealing over Kashmir, exacerbated by the hostile and intransigent attitude of India. Those elements which were opportunists in nature grasped the present scenario and disturbed the interior conditions. They used conspiracies and intrigues in their struggle for power. In this malaise, the generality of League members looked to the bureaucracy for success and security, as Jinnah had long foreseen:

The Muslim camp is full of those spineless people who, whatever they may say to me, will consult the Deputy Commissioner about what they should do.<sup>9</sup>

Jinnah intentionally and heavily relied on the bureaucracy because he knew the strength, ability, usefulness, and potentially valuable role of civil servants, at least for the duration of Pakistan's initial, formative stage, but he also overtly warned them not to subvert the political process:

You have to do your duty as servants; you are not concerned with this political or that political party that is not your business. It is a business of politicians to fight out there under the present constitution or the future constitution that may be framed. You therefore, have nothing to do with this or that party. You are civil servants.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Huma Naz, *Bureaucratic Elites and Political Developments in Pakistan (1947-1958)*, (Islamabad: NIPS, 1980), p.67.

<sup>3</sup> Arshad Islam, 'Allama Shibli and the Early Muslim League: A Dissenting Voice', *Intellectual Discourse*, 21:2 (2013), pp. 197-219.

<sup>4</sup> Sayeed, p. 32.

<sup>5</sup> Naz, p. 92.

<sup>6</sup> Sayeed, p. 62.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 60.

<sup>8</sup> Keith Collard, *Pakistan: A Political Study* (New York: The McMillan Company, 1957), p. 137.

<sup>9</sup> Ch. Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 372.

<sup>10</sup> Jamil-ud-din Ahmed, *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah Vol.11*, (Lahore: Publishers United Limited, 1964), p. 502.

He correspondingly warned political leaders to keep themselves alienated from cajoling or coercing civil servants and not to interfere in their professional role for their own self or party interests,<sup>11</sup> and he requested civil servants to oppose such inducements:

If you civil servants want to move the status and standard of Pakistan up, you don't need to fall a victim to anyone's pressure but do your duty as servants to the people and the state fearlessly and honestly. Governments are formed, governments are defeated, Prime Ministers come and go, but you stay on, and therefore, there is a very special responsibility placed on your shoulders.<sup>12</sup>

In democratic government systems, political leaders' authenticity/legality is premised on the support of constituent stakeholders and factions, such as representatives and members of leaders' own political parties and allied parties, voters, civil society, the media, and the armed forces. After independence and Partition, Muslim League politicians who migrated from India found themselves with little but their wits to sustain their basic livelihoods, aside from losing their traditional political base, and power was naturally accrued by the indigenous landowning class who had mass popular support among their traditional serfs. The peasants (*Haris*) depended completely on their landowners (*wadera*) for financial support, in cases regarding legal matters and police action, family matters like ailments, marriages, and loss of animals.

While the traditional feudal protections afforded to peasants became increasingly meaningless in the new Pakistan, the landowners' expectation of subordination and obedience, including in political affairs, continued. The peasantry formed a vote bank and a strong political base for Pakistani landowners (*waderas*) and was rallied to support their masters and oppose their opponents whenever needed. Landowners continued to nurture and reiterate their close, receptive and approachable links with the local bureaucracy, including the courts, revenue officials and law enforcement officers. Such sureties and interconnections enabled the feudal to consolidate control of the ostensibly modern democratic framework within a nexus of favours, thus the average voter "will vote for the leader who helps in getting one's nephew released from the police lock up."<sup>13</sup> Consequently, magnate dynasties have wielded extensive influence in Pakistani politics since the establishment of the country, such as the Arbabs, Hotis, Khans, Makens, Mamdots, Meers, Noons, Tiwanas, Qazilbashes, and Sardars etc.

It should be noted that most of these groups did not belong to pre-colonial (i.e. Mughal) aristocratic origins, and most of them were descended from clients of the British East India Company and the subsequent British Raj. Their defining characteristic was self-interest, with no tradition of lofty standards of devotion to the state in their political conduct.<sup>14</sup> The professionalism and education of Muslim League members was no match for the mass support, money and prestige of the Pakistani feudal class in the political administration of independent Pakistan. Consequently, the League fragmented, and seven new political parties appeared during the period 1948-58, alongside nine extremely unstable governments, because the politician's loyalties kept on changing frequently;<sup>15</sup> one day they would be criticizing the government, and the next day they would be accepting the offers of the same regime.<sup>16</sup>

An illustrative case is that of Khwaja Nazim-ud-din (1894-1964) who passed a budget that was rejected, and he was soon dismissed by the Governor General. The devotion, importance and value of parliamentary practices were badly lacking.<sup>17</sup> Most of the party members accepted the Governor General's new appointee as their Prime Minister.<sup>18</sup> There was no debate in the legislature about the Nazim-ud-din's dismissal, which exposed the weakness of the politicians and the political parties. After only a year the Governor-General dissolved the first Constituent Assembly. The abdication of responsibility by the political parties enabled the bureaucracy to increase their power in order to fill the void, and a new political party was formed at the Chief Executive's order, known as the Republican Party. The emergence of this party was due to the Iskandar Mirza's (1899-1969) efforts; basically, a bureaucrat, he became a politician and wished to appoint neutral and impartial leaders in this party. Being the favorite party of the President, it got his full support and thus it was dubbed the "King's party". It controlled the West Pakistan administration as it was evident that it was the only party that

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 502.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 520.

<sup>13</sup> Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Bribanti, W. Howard Wiggins eds., *Pakistan: The Long View* (Durham: Durham University Press, 1977), p. 257.

<sup>14</sup> Sayeed, p. 36.

<sup>15</sup> K.K. Aziz, *Party Politics in Pakistan, 1947-50* (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976), p. 180.

<sup>16</sup> Naz, p. 66.

<sup>17</sup> Sayeed, p. 35.

<sup>18</sup> Collard, pp. 137-139.

could function effectively (in terms of daily functioning), due to executive support. Another civil servant, Chaudhary Muhammad Ali (1905-1980), was selected as Prime Minister. The then National Assembly members were under the authority of a civil servant instead of a political leader.<sup>19</sup>

Iskandar Mirza did not credit the parliamentary institutions and had always encouraged the Republican Party to keep hold of power one way or another, and when the Republican Party failed to be successful to gain majority support in the central legislature the President saved them by imposing the Governor's rule in the province.<sup>20</sup> It can be said that whatever Iskandar Mirza was doing, it was all for continuing his own regime, as part of which he continually marginalized political parties. Politicians' role was reduced to that of puppets. Opposition groups such as the Doultana, Garzdazi, Gilani, Noon and Qazilbashi factions were all busy with their intrigues and betrayals.

There were fights among the groups and their composition was quite temporary, as they fought for single, temporary objectives such as undermining enemy occupants of ministries or winning particular elections etc., and later on these momentary coalitions dissolved.<sup>21</sup> This situation of the political instability brought the toughest times for the political system, particularly exacerbated by the lack of moral authority of the executive: "It was true that most of the politicians deserved to be stoned, but it was not for President Iskandar Mirza to cast the stones."<sup>22</sup>

Iskandar Mirza maintained his power due to adept manipulation of potential political rivals and policies that pandered to civil servants. Consequently, the system of governance under his premiership is best described as bureaucratic rather than democratic. There were four main developments that caused the failure of the nascent political system of Pakistan: the collapse of the Muslim League; the highly centralized executive government system inherited from the colonial age, instead of an anticipated legislative authority; the Punjabi elite who controlled the main decision-making posts etc.; and growing regional tensions in the context of Pakistan's disparate geographical location (i.e. West and East Pakistan).

Sindhis, Balochis, Punjabis and Pathans were the four main ethnic groups in West Pakistan, along with the Indian immigrants collectively known as *muhajirs*, the majority of whom were from Uttar Pradesh and Bombay. East Pakistan, where 54% of Pakistan's citizens lived, had no such ethnic diversity, being composed almost entirely of Bengalis. Due to its historical legacy and activism in both regions, only the Muslim League could hold Pakistan together and orient its diverse component groups toward common goals and objectives, and in the new country Muslim League was expected to play the same role as the INC did more successfully in India, such as establishment of a national government having parliamentary election system in order to develop a political structure.<sup>23</sup> However, the political opportunism and ethnic divisions in West Pakistan, leading to the collapse of the Muslim League, in turn paved the way for the subsequent dissolution of Pakistan as there was not enough emotional and political capital to attach East Pakistan to the country.

For the understanding of relationship between bureaucracy and the political parties, it is necessary to consider some major factors which determined the nature of the relationship. In British India, the bureaucracy grew and developed to act as a bridge between the colonial rulers and the natives. As the nationalist movement gained intensity, the gap between the ruler and the ruled widened. The bridge between them was torn between the needs to restore law and order for the colonial rulers or to identify itself with nationalist aspirations. The bureaucracy as an instrument of colonial rule was not in a position to play an active role in the nationalist movement that could lead to emergence of nation-states. It was reluctant and, in most cases, neutral towards nationalist movements. Thus, although the party system and bureaucracy grew simultaneously in the colonial period, they ran the parallel courses.

The political leaders perceived the bureaucracy as an arrogant, elitist agent of colonizers and an anti-political force. On the other hand, the bureaucrats considered the political leaders as narrow-minded opportunist agitators, and the political parties as divisive.<sup>24</sup> This impasse between the bureaucratic and political classes affected the development of political and administrative establishments as a scramble for power and influence rather than a properly functioning democratic state. The bureaucracy played an important role in different aspects of the society; in economic development, in modernization, administrative structure, and establishment etc., although these developments worked but were not enough supportive for the course of political growth and in the development of institutions.

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<sup>19</sup>Mumtaz Ahmed, *Bureaucracy and Political Development in Pakistan* (Karachi: NIPA, 1974), p. 94.

<sup>20</sup>Sayed, p. 85.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., pp. 87-89.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., pp. 91-92.

<sup>23</sup>Omar Noman, *Pakistan: A Political and Economic History Since 1947*, (Ann Arbor: Kegan Paul International, 1990), p. 8.

<sup>24</sup>Saeed Shafiqat, *Political System of Pakistan 1947-1977: A Brief Analysis Vol. X, No. 1A2 (Jan-July-Dec 1984)* (Karachi: Progressive Publishers, 1982), p. 155.

While the bureaucrats were inherently elitist, they were united, well-disciplined, and well-organized, and conscious of the importance of maintaining the status quo and ensuring law and order. Managing state affairs autonomous was their primary function, which they continued even after the independence. Any attempt towards altering this reality was resisted by the bureaucrats. They believed that authoritarian values rather than democratic norms were well developed and culturally acceptable. Political processes depending on popular, mass elections were anathema to them, thus they contrived to hamper the prospects of democratic officials, justified to a large extent by the evident machinations and opportunism of the political class themselves. The entrenchment of an inefficient and corrupt political system prevented the emergence of a credible national democratic party,<sup>25</sup> and political institutions remained weak and abortive, with the bureaucracy necessarily filling the void; throughout the history of Pakistan, whenever political parties have got weaker the bureaucracy has consolidated its power and *de facto* supremacy,<sup>26</sup> utilizing political leaders in ceremonial and vainglorious positions while they control key positions behind the scenes with the politics of benefaction.<sup>27</sup> The formation of actual functioning political parties of the type conventionally expected in democratic systems was thus precluded, and after the collapse of the Muslim League the remnants of the political system was disorganized and chaotic, with politicians unable to demonstrate effectiveness. The landowning class who underpinned the political establishment were interested in personal power and enrichment, thus they had no interest in coherent political programmes, and they lacked legitimacy even within the conventional political discourse. Moreover, there were legal restrictions on the political activities of politicians (e.g. section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code and PRODA etc.). In a statement issued after declaring martial law in 1958, President Iskandar Mirza said that:

The mentality of the political parties has sunk so low that I am unable any longer to believe that elections will improve the present chaotic internal conditions and enable us to form a stable and strong government capable of dealing with the innumerable and complex problems facing us today.<sup>28</sup>

During the hold of bureaucracy which had a stable and strengthened position, the government was being run but with fear and uncertainty inside and without the will and wish of the common citizens; the government emerged this way in the post-colonial state of Pakistan.

## II. IMBALANCES IN THE POLITICS

The amalgamation of four provinces of West Pakistan into one administrative unit, commonly known as the One Unit Scheme, was proposed by Punjabi politicians and backed by the Governor General. This idea was presented by Choudhry Muhammad Ali, Finance Minister and Zonal Sub Inspector and Malik Feroz Khan Noon (1893-1970), Chief Minister of Punjab, in the Constituent Assembly, and it came into existence in October 1955.<sup>29</sup> The opposition was threatened by the pragmatic use of the Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act (PRODA), and many ministries were dismissed due to resistance against the scheme in different provinces.<sup>30</sup> The Assembly of Sindh passed a resolution in October 23, 1954 against the projected future scheme but the same Assembly passed a resolution on December 11, 1954 in support of the scheme, with an irresistible majority of 100 votes against 4.<sup>31</sup> The Scheme established civil, military, bureaucratic dominance and small provinces felt that it was a conspiracy by the Punjabi elite. It also distributed equal powers to both wings and made it impossible for East Pakistan to prove its majority in Assembly. It was an attempt to consolidate all powers and to build strong hold of Center. As K. J. Newman stated:

To some extent this regime represented... a return to the system that had existed in India before Partition. The Cabinet resembled a new kind of Viceroy's Executive Council – perhaps something more than that, for it was not subject to ultimate control of a popularly elected body such as that which the British House of Commons had had over the Viceroy.<sup>32</sup>

Due to the growing sickness of Ghulam Muhammad he was unable to run the affairs of the country and on July 6, 1955, Major-General Iskandar Mirza assumed office on October 6, 1955, as Governor General, and on March 23, 1957, he became President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. He had experience of 28 years as a civil servant and institutional interests were put before anything else. Addressing the civil servants in 1957 he presented

<sup>25</sup>Sayeed, p. 83.

<sup>26</sup>Shafiqat, p. 156.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 130.

<sup>28</sup>*The Pakistan Times*, October 9, 1958.

<sup>29</sup>Rizwan Malik, *Politics of One Unit 1955-1958* (Lahore: University of Punjab, 1988), p. 85.

<sup>30</sup>HamidaKhuro, *Muhammad AyubKhuro: A Life of Courage in Politics* (Lahore: FerozSons 1998), p. 413.

<sup>31</sup>*Dawn*, December 12, 1954.

<sup>32</sup>K.J.Newman, "Pakistan's Preventive Autocracy and its Causes" *Pacific Affairs*, XXXVII (March, 1952),p. 29.

himself as one of them and said “I find it very refreshing to talk to you, as one of you.”<sup>33</sup> Iskandar Mirza, declared his political philosophy a few months before becoming head of state:

Some people in undeveloped countries have to learn democracy, and until they do so they have to be controlled, with so many illiterate people, politicians could make a mess of things. There was nothing undemocratic in declaring the state of emergency, because 95 percent of the people welcomed it. The people wanted an honest government and they would get it. They would also get law and order, and prompt justice. There was no point in having the fine British administrative system with good traditions that Pakistan had inherited unless it was run in the British way. A district officer or magistrate must be given full powers to deal with any situation. Politicians could make policy, but they must not interfere.<sup>34</sup>

The 1956 Constitution provided *inter alia* that the Prime Minister and Cabinet hold their offices at the President’s pleasure made a mockery of any pretensions to democracy.<sup>35</sup> Iskandar Mirza used a diplomatic way to control the politicians as well as other pressure groups. He took a personal interest in forming a new party of his own with the help of Dr. Khan Sahib, an ex-Congress Chief Minister of North-West Frontier Province, who at one time opposed the formation of Pakistan, and was installed as the Chief Minister of West Pakistan during the creation of the Republican Party in April 1956. According to Mir Abdul Qayyum, the Secretary General of the Republican Party, “the Party was formed in the Government House Karachi, and the Government House, Lahore.”<sup>36</sup> Mirza was successful in eliminating opposition in National Assembly through the old policy of divide and rule, and the majority of the members were under the authority of Iskandar Mirza.<sup>37</sup>

The Prime Minister Chaudhary Muhammad Ali realized he was impotent under the supremacy of President Iskandar Mirza and found it impossible to work independently, thus he resigned from office. Now the House was again open for Mirza to install a puppet. In September 1956, H. S. Suhrawardy (1892-1963) assumed the office of the Prime Minister after the resignation of Chaudhary Muhammad Ali, but the discretionary power of the President again made it impossible to achieve any change in the existing system.<sup>38</sup> In a three-year period (1956-1959) Pakistan had five prime ministers under President Iskandar Mirza.

In this chaos the bureaucratic ascendancy reached its height due to the absence of effective political parties. Iskandar Mirza effectively manipulated the politicians and formed alliances with different parties according to the needs of the time; his Republican Party was a tool of exploitation.<sup>39</sup> With the passage of time the Muslim League tried to reunite and started creating opposition to the President. By 1956, the League began to mobilize masses in West Pakistan and arranged public meetings and remained successful to some extent. In East Pakistan Bengali politicians pressurized the government for provincial autonomy. The President fomented crises as an excuse to impose martial law and to discredit the political process, creating the impression that political leaders were incapable of providing a viable government. Under growing pressure, the President asked the military to interfere and the military decided to establish its hegemony by delegitimizing the political parties.<sup>40</sup> On October 7, 1958, a group of generals under the leadership of Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan, seized power. The intensity of the tension could better be judged from the following words of Mirza’s Proclamation of Martial Law:

The mentality of political parties has sunk so low that I am unable any longer to believe that elections will improve the present chaotic internal situation and enable us to form a strong and stable government. The same group of the people who have brought Pakistan to the verge of ruination will rig the elections (so that they) will be contested mainly one personal, regional and sectarian basis. However much the administration may try, I am convinced that elections will elections will neither be free nor fair; they will not solve our difficulties.<sup>41</sup>

In the beginning, Iskandar Mirza was removed too but in upcoming years the civil and military bureaucracy developed a partnership and dominated the political system of Pakistan for decades to come. Khalid bin Sayeed described Pakistan’s political condition thus:

<sup>33</sup> *Dawn*(Karachi) March 19, 1957

<sup>34</sup> *The Times* (London) October 30, 1954.

<sup>35</sup> Hamid Yusuf, *Pakistan in Search of Democracy 1947-77*(Lahore: Afrasia Publications, 1980)p, 5.

<sup>36</sup> *Dawn*, March 1957.

<sup>37</sup> Ahmed, p. 94.

<sup>38</sup> K.B.Sayeed, ‘The Political Role of Pakistan’s Civil Service’, *Pacific Affairs Vol.31, No.2* (June 1958), pp. 136-137.

<sup>39</sup> Saeed Shafqat, *Civil Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto* (Lahore: Pak book Corporations, 1997), pp. 32-34.

<sup>40</sup> Ahmed, p. 97.

<sup>41</sup> *The Pakistan Times*, October 9, 1958.

Pakistan was very much like Hobbes state of nature where every political or provincial group fought against each other group. It was a ceaseless and ruthless struggle for power. Most of the leaders thought of themselves, their families, or at best their provincial groups and did not give a second thought to Pakistan. Pakistan needed a desperate remedy for this malady.<sup>42</sup>

### III. CONCLUSION

Throughout the history of Pakistan, democratic forces were not permitted to enhance their political power due to the continual interventions by the bureaucracy and dictators in the military. When the military took over the political and democratic institutions of Pakistan, the elected representatives in power could not actually wield their influence. On the other hand, in alliance with the military, the bureaucracy had been repeatedly establishing its stronghold over the affairs of the state thereby subjugating those in the political power and controlling them. Therefore, in Pakistan, the military has been remaining a highly powerful institution and has been enjoying a considerable political advantage over the civilian institutions enabled by its organizational superiority. As a result, the armed forces have utilized chances to safeguard and promote their self-interest. In fact, their personal interest is the key factor making them interfere in the political and state affairs. At the same time, there was no competent political leadership after Jinnah that could check the overstepping behavior of the bureaucracy, and the political institutions were certainly too fragile to do this.

The political party institutions, civil society and public participation upon which democracy depends were seriously lacking. The conflict between bureaucracy and political parties has continued and thus authoritarianism and autocracy have become common acceptable practices in Pakistan. Only the bureaucrats could ensure the basics of life, and indeed they played a pivotal role in the survival of Pakistan, particularly when any pretense of conventional political life dissolved after the death of Jinnah and the collapse of the Muslim League into factions, whereby bureaucrats established their hegemony and the ruling elite totally failed in framing a constitution for Pakistan. Bureaucracy is historically instituted to ensure the smooth running of state functions by personnel with strong administrative experience, guided by and subject to political will, providing the capability and proficiency to achieve complex social responsibilities; they are the professional and undemocratic counterweight to the elected and democratic politicians in a vibrant democracy, but when the latter is moribund or fails in its necessary functions, the bureaucracy can assume a more direct and powerful role in governance without commensurate accountability, which is an existential danger to civil society and democracy; as alluded to by Max Weber (1946), "bureaucracies can serve any master."

Pakistan has become a country where diverse kinds of decisions and policies are imposed on the public, and the public is not actually aware of who is involved in the making of those policies that govern them. Generally, the politicians are only blamed when the poverty and inflation are on the rise and corruption gets egregiously rampant in the country. But the fact should not be forgotten that there are other dominant forces in the country in the background having an upper hand in making decisions who push their political puppets forward to distract the masses while they wield effective and real power over the destiny of the Pakistani people.

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<sup>42</sup>K.B.Sayeed, "Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan" *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. XII, No.4( Autumn, 1959).