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“Electoral Competition and Party Positioning”

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Abstract

We survey the literature on the positioning of political parties in uni- and multi-dimensional policy spaces. We keep throughout the survey the assumption that there is an exogenous number of parties who commit to implement their policy proposals once elected. The survey stresses the importance of three modeling assumptions: (i) the source of uncertainty in election results, (ii) the parties' objectives (electoral –maximizing their expected vote share, or their probability of winning the elections– policy oriented or both), and (iii) the voters' preferences (if and how they care for parties beyond the policies implemented by the winner).

1 Introduction

Most papers in the political economy literature have concentrated on some form of “median voter theorem” within the so-called Downsian approach, with 2 parties (or candidates) simultaneously proposing platforms (belonging to unidimensional policy spaces) to voters and committing to implement their platform if elected. Moreover, parties are assumed to care only about winning the elections, while voters care only about policies. Finally, there is no uncertainty in the model, in the sense that parties can perfectly anticipate the election results at the time where parties propose their platform.

As mentioned by Roemer (2006), there are many problems associated with this approach and with the results it generates. Parties do not care for policies, which contradicts how they have developed historically. There is no room for voters to care about the identity of the elected party (as opposed to the policy this party enacts). The lack of electoral uncertainty at the time parties choose their platform constitutes a very strong assumption. Finally, concerning the results of the model, the convergence of parties to the same policies is not observed in practice (as we will show later on in the survey), and this model has generically no equilibrium in pure strategies as soon as the policy space is multi-dimensional.

The objective of this paper is to survey the literature on the positioning of political parties in uni- and multi-dimensional policy spaces. We will keep throughout the survey the assumption that there is an exogenous number of parties who commit to implement their policy proposals once elected. This survey will stress the importance of three modeling assumptions: (i) the source of uncertainty in election results, (ii) the parties’ objectives (electoral –maximizing their expected vote share, or their probability of winning the elections– or policy oriented), and (iii) the voters’ preferences (if and how they care for parties beyond the policies implemented by the winner). We now turn to the plan of this survey.

We describe the general setting and notation used throughout the survey in section 2. Then show in section 3 that, in the absence of uncertainty, parties converge to the same policy whether they are electorally or policy motivated when the policy space is unidimensional, and that there is generically no equilibrium in pure strategies for multidimensional policy spaces. The first conclusion we draw is that introducing some form of uncertainty as to the election results is primordial. There are several different ways to introduce uncertainty. The easiest one is to add some noise to the voters' behavior, irrespective of the policy proposals of the parties. We develop this so-called stochastic partisanship approach in section 4. We then assume alternatively that parties are uncertain as to the policy preferences of voters in section 5 where we detail several ways to introduce this uncertainty, varying in the degree of micro-foundation of the uncertainty, in section 5.1. Such uncertainty creates a discontinuity in the expected vote/probability of winning function when both parties propose the same policy, so that there are equilibrium existence problems when parties are electorally motivated. We then concentrate on policy motivated parties in section 5.2, and on the case where parties have both electoral and policy motivations in section 5.3. In both cases, we first deal with analytical results before mentioning various applications of these models.

We then examine in section 6 models in which candidates' electoral prospects depend on a valence component—voters' non-policy evaluation of candidates—and where all voters agree that one party has better characteristics than another. Section 6.1 is devoted to the study of unidimensional policy spaces. We analyze in section 6.1.1 the case where there is uncertainty as to the election results, while section 6.1.2 is devoted to the case where uncertainty concerns the valence of the candidates. Section 6.2 deals with valence in multidimensional policy spaces. We present different theoretical models in sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.4, while section 6.2.5 concentrates on a specific empirical application.

Finally, in Section 7 we present the “unified model” developed by Adams, Merrill and Grofman where voters care both for multi-dimensional policies and for the parties enacting them. More precisely, voters differ in their partisanship, with some being closer to one party and others to another party, with this partisanship affecting their policy preferences. Adams *et al.* also add a random component to the voters’ utility, as in section 4. We start in section 7.1 with the description of their model, including some analytical results that they obtain. We then move in section 7.2 to two empirical applications of this model (to the 1988 French presidential elections, and the 1989 election in Norway). We consider an empirical extension where valence is added to this unified model (as in sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2) in section 7.3, before offering a general conclusion in section 8.

2 General setting and notation

We give here the basic setting and notation used throughout the survey. The policy space is denoted by X and is a subset of the Euclidean space with d dimensions. X is assumed to be non-empty, convex and compact. There are n voters, where n can be finite (in which case it is assumed to be odd) or infinite. There are J political parties, or candidates, with $J \geq 2$.¹ Since most papers deal with only 2 parties, we use below the notation $j \in \{A, B\}$ (or A and D in section 6, for reasons which will become obvious there) whenever possible rather than $j \in \{1, \dots, J\}$.

All voters are endowed with a utility function $u_i(x, j)$, where $x \in X$ and $j \in \{A, B\}$. In words, voters care for policies but may also care for the party proposing the policy. Voter i ’s utility function is assumed to be concave over X , and we denote by \tilde{x}_i voter i ’s most-preferred policy (also called an ideal or blisspoint). Note that this blisspoint is independent of the party’s identity. In some sections,

¹We will use the terms candidate and party interchangeably throughout the survey.

we also assume that preferences are Euclidean, so that voter i 's utility is decreasing in the distance between the proposed policy x and her blisspoint \tilde{x}_i .

All parties simultaneously choose a policy x in X , which we denote by x_j , $j \in \{A, B\}$, which they commit to enact if they are elected. Voters observe x_j and simultaneously vote for the party that offers them the highest utility level.² We are looking for Nash equilibria in pure strategies of the game played among parties. In the absence of such a Nash equilibrium, we will look for either a local Nash equilibrium (section 6.2.2) or for a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.

The parties' objectives may be electoral, policy-related, or both. We consider two types of electoral motivations: maximizing the probability of winning the elections (henceforth called the "*win motivation*"), and the expected number (or fraction) of votes (the "*vote motivation*"). We denote by $\pi_j(x_A, x_B)$ the probability that party $j \in \{A, B\}$ wins the election when it proposes policy x_A while its opponent proposes x_B , and by $EV_j(x_A, x_B)$ its expected vote. In the case of *policy motivation*, we assume that each party j is endowed with a utility function $U_j(x)$. This utility function will be in most cases given exogenously, but may also be endogenized as part of the equilibrium. We denote party j 's most-preferred policy (i.e., the policy maximizing $U_j(x)$) as \tilde{x}_j , $j \in \{A, B\}$.

A very important distinction is between deterministic voting (where all candidates can predict with certainty the voting behavior of all individual voters at the time where policy platforms are offered) and probabilistic voting (where voting behavior is modelled as a random variable from the perspective of the candidates, with parties computing the probability that each voter gets more utility under its proposal than under its adversary's). In the latter case, we will talk of aggregate uncertainty when parties are unable to forecast with certainty the election results

²This behavior, often called sincere voting, corresponds to the elimination of weakly undominated strategies when $J = 2$ and voting is assumed, as here, to be costless. In case several parties give the same utility to a voter, she fairly randomizes her vote among those parties.

at the time where platforms are made public. Observe that probabilistic voting does not imply aggregate uncertainty: as we will see in section 4, if there is a large number of voters who are affected by i.i.d. shocks to their utility function, the voting behavior of any individual voter is stochastic, but their aggregate behavior (and thus the election results) is known with certainty, thanks to the law of large numbers. Depending on the model presented, we will either introduce uncertainty at the micro level (i.e., at the level of the individual voter), or at the macro level (i.e., at the level of the electorate, without providing the micro-foundations for this aggregate uncertainty)—see section 5.1.

3 Deterministic voting

In this section, we assume away uncertainty, so that parties know the individual voters' preferences and can compute with certainty the voting behavior of all individuals when choosing their platforms. Moreover, we assume that voters care only about policies, so that $u_i(x, j) = u_i(x)$ for all voters i and parties $j = \{A, B\}$. It is well known since Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957) that,

Proposition 1 *Assume that there is no uncertainty, that $d = 1$ and that both parties are electorally motivated (maximizing either their probability of winning or their number of votes), then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies where both parties propose the median voter's ideal point: $med(\tilde{x}_i)$.*

This result is known as the “median voter theorem.” Moreover, it is also known since Plott (1967) and Hinich et al (1973), among others,³ that

³McKelvey (1976, 1979), Schofield (1978, 1983, 1985), Cohen and Matthews (1980), McKelvey and Schofield (1986, 1987), Caplin and Nalebuff (1991), Banks (1995), Saari (1997), and Austen-Smith and Banks (1999). Eaton and Lipsey (1975) also obtained instability results when there are three or more candidates.

Proposition 2 *Assume that there is no uncertainty, that $d > 1$ and that both parties are electorally motivated (maximizing either their probability of winning or their number of votes), then there generically does not exist any Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.*

The generalization of Proposition 1 to a multidimensional setting requires the existence of a “median in all dimensions” of the policy space. This in turn requires that the distribution of voters’ most-preferred policies be radially symmetric, which is an extremely restrictive assumption. Moreover, any move from a radially symmetric distribution of blisspoints, however small, results in the (generic) non-existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies.⁴

As for equilibria in mixed strategies, there is no general existence theorem because the parties’ payoffs are not continuous in general when $d > 1$. Duggan and Jackson (2005) show that, if indifferent voters are allowed to randomize with any probability between zero and one (rather than with $1/2$ as often assumed), then mixed equilibria do exist. Moreover, they show that, starting with a distribution of individuals such as a Nash equilibrium in pure strategy exists and perturbing this distribution, then the equilibrium mixed strategies of the parties will put probabilities arbitrarily close to one on policies near the original equilibrium in pure strategies. In other words, mixed strategy equilibrium outcomes change in a continuous way when voter preferences are perturbed.⁵

What about moving away from electoral preferences towards policy motivations? Unfortunately, this does not change the results with $d = 1$, as shown in the next proposition due to Wittman (1977), Calvert (1985) and Roemer (1994):

⁴Alternatively, existence may occur when the decision rule requires a sufficiently large majority (Schofield, 1984; Strand, 1985; Caplin and Nalebuff, 1988).

⁵McKelvey (1986), Cox (1987), and Banks, Duggan and Le Breton (2002) show that the support of the mixed strategy Nash equilibria lies in the uncovered set, a centrally located subset of the policy space.

Proposition 3 *Assume that there is no uncertainty, that $d = 1$ and that both parties are policy motivated with $\tilde{x}_A < \text{med}(\tilde{x}_i) < \tilde{x}_B$, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies where both parties propose the median voter's most-preferred blisspoint: $\text{med}(\tilde{x}_i)$.*

Since parties care for the implemented policy, they first have to win the election in order to influence this policy. When parties are located on opposite sides of the median voter's blisspoint, this requires them to converge to this position.⁶ The introduction of policy motivation under certainty then results in the same prediction as the classical Downsian modelling where parties are office motivated and compete on a single dimension.

What about multidimensional policy spaces? At first, there is more hope to have an equilibrium in pure strategies than with electoral motivations, for the following reason. With electoral motivation, a party finds it profitable to deviate to any policy which is preferred by a majority to the policy proposed by its opponent. With policy motivations, a profitable deviation must moreover increase the utility of the deviating party. There are then fewer potentially profitable deviations.

Unfortunately, Duggan and Fey (2005) prove that an equilibrium in pure strategies will almost never exist when $d > 2$. More precisely, they come up with Plott-like conditions where voters with exactly opposite preferences in the d -dimensional space are paired with each other. Interestingly, in the knife edge case where such an equilibrium exists when $d \geq 2$, both Duggan and Fey (2005) and Roemer (2001) show that a near universal feature of the equilibrium is that both parties propose the same policy, which is most-preferred by at least one voter. Finally, the results by Duggan and Jackson (2005) apply here as well, so that a mixed equilibrium exists if indifferent voters randomize in a flexible way.

⁶If $\text{med}(\tilde{x}_i) < \tilde{x}_A < \tilde{x}_B$, then both parties proposing \tilde{x}_A is an equilibrium, since party A gets its most-preferred policy, while party B can only affect the implemented policy by proposing a policy to the left of \tilde{x}_A , which it dislikes even more than \tilde{x}_A .

The message of this section is thus pretty bleak: if $d = 1$, we obtain convergence to the median blisspoint irrespective of the (electoral or policy) motivation of parties, while there is generically no equilibrium in pure strategies with $d > 2$.

We now introduce uncertainty, so that parties see the individual voters' behavior as random. We first look at situations with stochastic partisanship, then to stochastic preferences.

4 The stochastic partisanship approach

One way to introduce uncertainty is to assume that uncertainty affects voters' preferences. This is modeled by assuming that voters' preferences are affected by a random shock determining the bias the voter has for one of the two parties, the so-called stochastic partisanship approach.

4.1 Theory

In this section, we assume that voters' preferences are additively separable into their preferences for policies and for parties, so that with slightly abusing notation,

$$u_i(x, j) = \begin{cases} u_i(x) & \text{if } j = A \\ u_i(x) + \gamma_i & \text{if } j = B \end{cases}$$

where the vector of party biases $(\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_n)$ is seen as a random variable by both candidates A and B .⁷ More precisely, both parties have the same beliefs and assume that each γ_i is distributed according to the cdf F_i with pdf $f_i > 0$ over its support. Observe that we do *not* assume that these biases are independently distributed. The probability that voter i will vote for party A is then given by

⁷Coughlin and Nitzan (1982) study the multiplicative formulation, where voter i 's utility function is log-concave with i voting for party A if $u_i(x_A) \geq u_i(x_B)\gamma_i$. Duggan (2014) indeed shows that the two approaches are equivalent, up to a simple transformation.

the probability that his bias γ_i in favor of party B is lower than the difference in utility $u_i(x)$ between the proposals of party A and party B :

$$\rho_{iA}(x_A, x_B) = F_i(u_i(x_A) - u_i(x_B)) \quad \text{and} \quad \rho_{iB} = 1 - \rho_{iA}. \quad (1)$$

We will only study the vote motivation for parties in this section and refer the reader to Duggan (2014) for win and policy motivations (which have been less extensively studied in the literature). Party A then maximizes

$$EV_A(x_A, x_B) = \sum_{i=1}^n \rho_{iA}(x_A, x_B),$$

while party B maximizes $EV_B(x_A, x_B) = n - EV_A(x_A, x_B)$.

The next proposition has been proven by Hinich (1977, 1978), Lindbeck and Weibull (1987, 1993) and has been generalized by Banks and Duggan (2005):

Proposition 4 *In the stochastic partisanship model with vote motivation and $d \geq 1$, if (x_A^*, x_B^*) is an interior equilibrium, then*

$$x_A^* = x_B^* = \bar{x} = \arg \max_{x \in X} \sum_i f_i(0) u_i(x). \quad (2)$$

In words, both parties converge to the same policy \bar{x} , which is the (unique) policy maximizing weighted sum of the individuals' utilities, where the weights used correspond to the densities of the voters' biases at zero, $f_i(0)$. The intuition for this result is that the “neutral” voters (those with $\theta_i = 0$) are the ones whose votes are the most easily swayed in favor of the party. As both parties compete to attract these voters who are the easiest to convince to change their vote, they end up proposing the same platform.⁸ This proposition holds whatever the dimensionality of the policy space.

⁸ \bar{x} has no normative appeal, since there is no normative general reason for any social planner to use these specific weights. A special case arises where all voters i share the same distribu-

Proposition 4 does not tackle the problem of the existence of the equilibrium. Observe from (1) that the probability that a given individual i votes for party A is a continuous function of party A 's proposal. This translates into the continuity of the expected vote function with respect to the party's proposal. In other words, introducing uncertainty smooths the parties' objectives. The other condition (beyond continuity) needed to have an equilibrium in pure strategies is that parties' objectives be quasi-concave. The following proposition (due to Hinich, Ledyard and Ordeshook (1972, 1973), Enelow and Hinich (1989) and Lindbeck and Weibull (1993)) gives sufficient conditions on the cdf F_i to have an equilibrium:

Proposition 5 *In the stochastic partisanship model with vote motivation and $d \geq 1$, sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies are that (i) $F_i(u_i(x) - u_i(y))$ is concave in x and (ii) $F_i(u_i(y) - u_i(x))$ is convex in x , for each voter i and all policies $y \in X$.*

Propositions 1 and 4 may seem to clash with each other, in the following sense: without uncertainty and with $d = 1$, the unique equilibrium in pure strategies is for both parties to propose the median most-preferred point. Adding a small amount of uncertainty (with distributions functions F_i of biases converging to the point mass on zero) then moves the equilibrium policy to (the utilitarian –unweighted– optimum) \bar{x} . This apparent clash can be explained away thanks to Laussel and Le Breton (2002) who have proved that the equilibrium in pure strategies fails to exist in the stochastic partisanship model when voting behavior is close to deterministic. In other words, one needs sufficiently large uncertainty for the sufficient conditions mentioned in Proposition 5 to hold. It is worth stressing this point, since it indicates that stochastic partisanship probabilistic voting can actually create existence problems in one-dimensional settings where a deterministic,

tion F_i , in which case policy \bar{x} is the utilitarian optimum (maximizing the unweighted sum of utilities).

Downsian equilibrium in pure strategies exists.

Thanks to the continuity of parties payoffs, an equilibrium in mixed strategies exists with stochastic partisanship probabilistic models. Moreover, Banks and Duggan (2005) show that the support of this equilibrium converges to the median most-preferred policy when the amount of noise goes to zero. Finally, observe that moving to a win motivation for parties makes the existence problem worse, in the sense that the conditions enunciated in Proposition 5 are not sufficient anymore to guarantee existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (see Duggan, 2014). In other words, it is even more difficult to generate quasi-concave payoff functions for parties with a win motivation, compared to a vote motivation.

4.2 Applications

The stochastic partisanship modeling has proved very attractive and has been used in many applications to specific policy dimensions. As Persson and Tabellini mention in their 2000 textbook, the reason for this success is that “these models have unique equilibria even when the policy conflict is multidimensional” (p59). For instance, Persson and Tabellini (2000) apply this approach to the modeling of special interest politics (chapter 7), alternative electoral rules (chapter 8), public debt issued by partisan candidates (chapter 14), or where candidates care about economic policies not because of their ideology, but because they want to appropriate rents for themselves (chapter 4). At the same time, this approach has not been used to explain empirically the policy positions of political parties in actual elections. Even for unidimensional policy, Persson and Tabellini (2000) write that they “know of no attempts in the literature to try and discriminate empirically between this model of electoral competition and the median voter model. (p58)”. One reason for this lack of application is that the stochastic partisanship approach predicts that both parties should converge to the same policy platforms. As we

will see later (see section 7.2), this prediction is not supported by the empirically evidence. Moreover, it is worth recalling here Laussel and Le Breton (2000)’s conclusion that “intrinsic preferences for candidates must be dispersed enough across the electorate to make the first order approach [underlying Proposition 4] valid (...). Hopefully the next wave of empirical structural models of electoral competition will incorporate that aspect into the picture.”

Observe that, if the biases are independently distributed and if there is a large number of voters, then there is no aggregate uncertainty, in the sense that, thanks to the law of large numbers, the result of the election is deterministic when both parties announce their policy platforms. In other words, we need either a small number of voters, or correlated shocks, for aggregate uncertainty to occur with probabilistic partisanship models. We now move to alternate modelling of uncertainty on individual voting behavior, which generates aggregate uncertainty.

5 The stochastic preferences approach

An alternative way to introduce uncertainty is to assume that voters do not have partisan preferences, as in the previous section, but rather that parties are uncertain as to the *policy* preferences of voters.

5.1 Micro vs macro uncertainty over voters’ preferences

There are two approaches to modelling the parties’ uncertainty as to the voters’ policy preferences. The first starts at the individual voter level, and constructs the expected vote/probability of winning functions of both parties by aggregating voters’ behaviors. The second models parties as having “macro level uncertainty” as to the election results. We briefly describe a few examples of these two approaches, starting with the micro approach.

One way to model the first approach is to assume that voters are endowed with concave and differentiable utility functions

$$u_i(x_i, \theta_i),$$

where $\theta_i \in \Theta$ is a preference parameter distributed according to the cdf $G_i(\cdot)$. Each individual i has a most-preferred policy which is a function of its type, $\tilde{x}_i(\theta_i)$. One can then move from the uncertainty in θ_i represented by G_i to uncertainty with respect to the distribution of most-preferred points, as represented by the cdf H_i . We need not assume that the types θ_i are drawn independently, but rather that the types are sufficiently dispersed (see Duggan (2014) for the full mathematical statement). In the one-dimensional model ($d = 1$) with quadratic voter utilities and where θ_i denotes voter i 's ideal point, the winning party is the one whose platform is closest to the median's ideal point. Let H_μ denote the distribution of the median's ideal point. Party A 's probability of winning function is then

$$\pi_A(x_A, x_B) = H_\mu\left(\frac{x_A + x_B}{2}\right),$$

since with quadratic utilities the indifferent voter prefers the policy which is half way in between x_A and x_B .

Roemer (2001)'s book contains three different ways to construct the probability of winning function from prior assumptions, without building micro-foundations for this uncertainty, at the individual voter level. These three different approaches give modelers the ability to choose the one most-appropriate to the specific application studied. The first two specifications assume a continuum of types. The first one, called the *state space approach to uncertainty*, is the one closest to the micro-founded uncertainty presented above. Voters care only about policy, with θ_i denoting the type of the individual. There is a set of states S , with a proba-

bility distribution σ . The distribution of voters preferences varies from one state to another: for each state $s \in S$, there is a probability measure \mathbf{F}_s on the set of types. This model can have several interpretations, the simplest one being that citizens' preferences are known with certainty by parties, but that the set of actual voters on election day may depend on the state of the world, such as the weather conditions on that day. At the time of making policy proposals, both parties know the distribution of voters preferences in each state, and the probability that each state occurs, but they are uncertain as to which state will realize on election day.

We now show how to construct the probability of winning function from these assumptions. The set of types who prefer policy x to y is denoted by $\Omega(x, y)$. The fraction of voters who prefer x to y is then denoted by $\mathbf{F}_s(\Omega(x, y))$. The set of states where x beats y is

$$S(x, y) = \{s \in S \mid \mathbf{F}_s(\Omega(x, y)) > 1/2\},$$

so that the probability party A wins when it proposes x while B proposes y is

$$\pi_A(x, y) = \sigma(\mathbf{S}(x, y)).$$

An alternative way to build macro uncertainty consists in assuming that parties can compute their (deterministic) vote share as a function of parties' proposals, but that they are uncertain as to the realization of these vote shares. With this modelling strategy, we only need one distribution function \mathbf{F} over the set of types. The fraction of citizens who prefer policy x to y is given by $\mathbf{F}(\Omega(x, y))$, but the parties are confident up to a margin of error of the true fraction, with the true fraction being uniformly distributed over the interval $[\mathbf{F}(\Omega(x, y)) - \beta, \mathbf{F}(\Omega(x, y)) + \beta]$ with $\beta > 0$. The probability that party A wins is then given by

$$\pi_A(x, y) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \mathbf{F}(\Omega(x, y)) + \beta \leq 1/2 \\ \frac{\mathbf{F}(\Omega(x, y)) + \beta - 1/2}{2\beta} & \text{if } 1/2 \in [\mathbf{F}(\Omega(x, y)) - \beta, \mathbf{F}(\Omega(x, y)) + \beta] \\ 1 & \text{if } \mathbf{F}(\Omega(x, y)) - \beta \geq 1/2 \end{cases}$$

The easiest interpretation of this *error-distribution model* is that parties are confident about pre-election polls results (the computed expected vote share) up to a certain margin of confidence.

Finally, Roemer (2001) also proposes a *finite type model of uncertainty*, which is more cumbersome to describe.

Observe that all variants of macro (and micro) uncertainty generate aggregate uncertainty, with the expected electoral results being a random variable for both parties when announcing their policy platforms. The main characteristic of those approaches is that, unlike in the stochastic partisanship approach, both the probability of winning and the vote share functions are discontinuous along the diagonal—when a party crosses over the other one by proposing the same policy. Despite this discontinuity, there is a unique equilibrium in the case of unidimensional policy space, where both parties propose the same policy (see Duggan 2006a for the vote motivation, and Calvert 1985 for the win motivation). We refer to Duggan (2014) for a more complete examination of the solutions under those two forms of electoral motivation, and we turn to the much more developed analysis of this model under policy motivations.

5.2 Purely policy motivated parties

We first develop the analytical modelling, before moving to various applications.

5.2.1 Theory

A Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of this game is dubbed a Wittman equilibrium. The following proposition has been proved by in various guises by Wittman (1983, 1990), Hansson and Stuart (1984), Calvert (1985) and Roemer (1994):

Proposition 6 *In the stochastic preference model with policy motivations and $d \geq 1$, if (x_A^*, x_B^*) is an equilibrium, then the candidates do not locate at the same policy position: $x_A^* \neq x_B^*$.*

The intuition for this proposition resides in the aggregate uncertainty generated by the stochastic preferences model. At the time of announcing their platforms, parties face a trade-off between increasing their probability of winning and moving closer to their most-preferred policy. Since parties differ in their policy preferences, they end up proposing different platforms. For instance, if $d = 1$ and utilities are quadratic with $\tilde{x}_A < \tilde{x}_B$, we have that the equilibrium, if it exists, is of the form $\tilde{x}_A < x_A^* < x_B^* < \tilde{x}_B$.

Calvert (1985) and Roemer (1994) further show that, if the policy space is unidimensional ($d = 1$), the stochastic preferences model with policy motivation gets close to Downsian, in the sense that the equilibrium policies (assuming equilibrium existence) of both candidates converge to the median ideal policy as the amount of noise added to the Downsian model goes to zero.

As for equilibrium existence, the good news is that the discontinuity of the probability of winning function when both parties propose the same policy does not translate into a discontinuous pay-off function. The intuition is that the discontinuity in π_j occurs when both parties propose the same policy, so that the utility obtained by a party is anyway the same with both policies. On the other hand, quasi-concavity of the pay-off function is not guaranteed, so one needs additional assumptions for equilibrium existence. These assumptions are not very

strict in the case of a unidimensional policy space. For instance, Roemer (1997) proves that a sufficient condition for equilibrium existence if $d = 1$ in the micro-founded model described in section 5.1 is that the distribution of the median ideal points among citizens be log concave. Roemer (2001, section 3.4) provides a sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies with $d = 1$ with the error-distribution model of uncertainty, and Roemer (1997) proves a similar one for the state-space model. Unfortunately, these conditions are stated in terms of the probability of winning function π_j , rather than in terms of the data of the model. Roemer (2001, p.68) concludes that “we find that in most interesting examples Wittman equilibria exist, but a truly satisfactory general existence theorem is not known.”

Sufficient conditions for existence are more difficult to find when $d > 1$ and, to the best of our knowledge, there is no general proof of existence for multi-dimensional policy spaces. As for the micro approach to uncertainty, Duggan (2014, p.43) states that “in higher dimensions, equilibria in the stochastic preference model can fail to exist”, while Roemer (2001, p.163) writes that “all we can say is that there is no guarantee that Wittman equilibrium exists when $d > 1$, but if one does exist, it is probably generic.”

Finally, observe that equilibria in mixed strategies exist, and that they are continuous from the Downs model (in the sense that the support of any mixed strategies equilibrium converges to the Downsian outcome as the amount of noise tends toward zero, see more in Duggan, 2014).

5.2.2 Applications

Roemer (2001)’s book contains many applications of this model to different policy realms, where $d = 1$, including fiscal policy, partisan dogmatism and political extremism, and political cycles. These models generate analytical predictions

which can then be taken to the data, or are solved using calibrated numerical simulations. Another example of policy application can be found in De Donder and Hindriks (2007), who study the political economy of social insurance with voters' heterogeneity on two dimensions: income and risk levels. Individuals vote over the extent of social insurance ($d = 1$), which they can complement on the private market. They obtain equilibrium policy differentiation with the Left party proposing more social insurance than the Right party (the Right party attracts the less risky and richer individuals, and the Left party attracts the more risky and poorer individuals). In equilibrium, each party is tied for winning. They also attempt at calibrating the model with real data, using U.S. data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics survey.

Roemer (2001, chapter 5) goes further and endogenizes the policy preferences $U_j(x)$ of the political parties. He assumes that each party represents the set of citizens who vote for it in equilibrium (which he calls the party's membership). Each party member receives an "equal weight" in the determination of party preferences. He formalized this "equal weight" requirement in two different manners. The first one, where each party represents its "average member", can be applied to multi-dimensional policy spaces, as we will see in section 5.3.2. The second one can only be applied to unidimensional policy spaces, and assumes that party members vote to elect their party representative, with this representative imposing its preferences when competing electorally with the other party.

Finally, we are not aware of applications of the Wittman model to (i) multi-dimensional policy spaces, and (ii) explaining the observed policy positions of parties in past elections.

We now move to the case where parties care about both electoral and policy considerations.

5.3 Party members: opportunists and militants

Parties are formed by individuals who may have different motives for being in the party. In this section we first outline Roemer's (2001) model in which there are two party factions (the opportunists and the militants), then present some applications of this model.

5.3.1 Theory

Roemer (2001) assumes that two factions coexist inside both political parties. In each party j , the opportunists care exclusively about winning the elections (and maximize $\pi_j(x_j, x_k)$, $j \neq k$), while the militants care about the specific policy proposal x which their party proposes (and maximize $U_j(x)$). Any of the approaches mentioned in section 5.1 above can be used to model aggregate uncertainty (so that π_j is not degenerate).

Both intra-party factions bargain with each other over the party's policy proposal. Each faction has a complete preference order on the set of possible policies, and Roemer assumes that the party's preference ordering is determined by the intersection of these two orders. In other words, unanimity between the two factions is required for a party to accept a deviation from its current policy. This unanimity rule determines the preferences (payoffs) of the two parties who simultaneously choose their political platforms. A party unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE) is a equilibrium of this game.

Definition 7 *Assume that two parties, denoted A and B , compete in an election. The policy pair (x_A, x_B) is a PUNE if and only if $\forall (j, k) \in \{A, B\}, j \neq k, \nexists x \in X$ such that (i) $U_j(x) \geq U_j(x_j)$ and (ii) $\pi_j(x, x_k) \geq \pi_j(x_j, x_k)$, with at least one strict inequality.*

Roemer does not provide a general existence theorem for the PUNEs, but men-

tions that PUNEs do exist in all the applications he has studied. The intuition for why PUNEs exist (even in multidimensional policy spaces) is that the unanimity requirement (between factions) restricts the set of admissible deviations for both parties. Another way to put it is that the unanimity requirement means that each party's preference ordering over policies is incomplete, since a party can only rank policies if both its factions have the same ordering. Since deviations must fulfill the harsh requirement of pleasing both factions at the same time, the existence of PUNEs in many environments becomes intuitive.

Roemer (2001) establishes that the PUNEs (when they exist) form a two-dimensional manifold whatever the dimensionality of the policy space $d \geq 2$. He shows (Roemer 2001, section 8.3.) that the bargaining that takes place within parties can be represented as a generalized Nash bargaining problem when appropriate convexity properties hold. More precisely, take the threat point of this intra-party bargaining game to be the situation which occurs when the other party wins the election for sure. The Nash bargaining games between militants and opportunists in party A and party B are given by

$$\max_{x \in X} [\pi_A(x, x_B) - 0]^\alpha [U_A(x) - U_A(x_B)]^{1-\alpha}, \text{ and} \quad (3)$$

$$\max_{x \in X} [\pi_B(x_A, x) - 0]^\beta [U_B(x) - U_B(x_A)]^{1-\beta} \quad (4)$$

where α and β measure the relative bargaining power of the opportunists in party A and B respectively.

Roemer (2001) shows that a PUNE can be expressed as a pair of policies (x_A, x_B) which solves equations (3) and (4) simultaneously for some values of $\alpha, \beta \in [0, 1]$. The two-dimensional manifold of PUNEs can then be indexed by these two variables, α and β . It is important to note that we cannot be guaranteed that an equilibrium will exist for any pre-specified pair of numbers α and

β . Roemer (2001) shows that the specific case where both factions have the same bargaining power in both parties ($\alpha = \beta = 1/2$) corresponds to the Wittman equilibrium, while the classical Downsian equilibrium (with purely policy motivated parties) corresponds to $\alpha = \beta = 1$.

5.3.2 Applications

The PUNE modelling approach has been applied to many different policy areas. In several applications, the model delivers neat analytical predictions which are valid for all PUNEs. In that sense, the multiplicity of PUNEs does not prevent from obtaining sharp analytical predictions as seen in the following two examples. Roemer (1999) studies electoral competition over quadratic taxes, and obtains that all PUNEs exhibit marginal tax rates which increase with income. This provides a positive foundation for the observation that income tax schedules are progressive in most developed countries. Roemer (1998) supposes that the electorate is concerned with two issues (taxation and, say, religion) and shows, under certain conditions (namely, that the salience of the religious issue is sufficiently large, that uncertainty is sufficiently small, and that the mean income of the cohort of voters who hold the median religious view is greater than mean income in the population as a whole) that, in all PUNEs, both parties propose a tax rate of zero! This result illustrates starkly the importance of “non economic” preferences in the democratic determination of the tax rates.

Lee and Roemer (2006) have applied this model to the race issue in the US, by means of a calibration (for instance, the distribution of voter racism is estimated from the American National Election Studies). They fit the model to the data for every presidential election in the period 1976-92 and achieve an excellent fit. Their objective goes beyond fitting observed electoral data, since it consists in conducting counterfactual experiments looking at how the equilibrium tax rates

would be affected by variations in the racist preferences of the US electorate. They obtain that “the marginal tax rate would increase by at least ten points, were American voters not racist, making the US fiscal system much closer in size to that of the northern European democracies. (Roemer 2006, p. 1026).

Another application is due to Cremer et al (2007) who study the PUNEs in a model where both parties have to choose how much to tax a polluting good, and the fraction of the tax proceeds to rebate based on the labor (as oppose to capital) income of the constituents. They calibrate the model based on US data (the polluting good being energy) and obtain two different sets of equilibria, one with a tax on the polluting good and another with a subsidy.

Roemer (2001) extends the PUNE concept to the case where the militants’ utility is endogenous, and is given by the average utility among the party members (defined, as in section 5.2.2, as the set of citizens who vote for this party at equilibrium). Roemer (2001, chapter 13) develops two applications of this PUNE concept (where the last two letters stand for “endogenous parties”). The first uses the National Election Surveys to parametrize the preferences of the US polity when the two-issue space consists of taxation and race. The second application endogenizes parties in the model of progressive taxation mentioned above (Roemer, 2009).

While the PUNE approach has proved very fruitful in many applications to specific policy areas, we are unaware of attempts to use this framework to replicate generic policy positions of political parties in specific elections.

We have covered in section 4 above on stochastic partisanship the case where voters disagree on the attractiveness of exogenous, non-policy related characteristics of political parties. The next section covers the case where they all agree that one party has better characteristics than another.

6 Valence models

Stokes (1963, 1992) seminal papers emphasized that the non-policy evaluations, or valences, of candidates by the electorate are just as important as electoral policy preferences. He was particularly concerned with the fact that the Downsian and policy motivated models with and without uncertainty did not do well when taken to the data and argued that this evidence should allow theorists to modify their models. Stokes proposed that there exist “evaluative” dimensions that he termed “valence issues” that are fundamentally different from any policy positions the parties may have, and that moreover do not affect the distribution of parties and voters. So that valence issues affect voters’ electoral choices independent of the policies chosen by candidates. In Stokes’ world, voters share the same beliefs over valence issues such as reducing crime, increasing economic growth, or evaluations of candidates’ characteristics such as integrity, charisma or competency. He posited that candidates cannot affect voters’ valence beliefs during the election, i.e., that voters’ valence issues are independent of policy and are non-manipulable by candidates. He also argued that while valence issues are exogenously given to candidates at election time, they may vary across candidates, e.g., voters may perceive candidates as differing in ability to govern.

Stokes seminal papers led researchers to incorporate non-policy factors into spatial models. We do not exhaustively cover all the valence models available in the literature, rather we have chosen to pick different models illustrating the variety of valence models available in the literature. We first study the case of a unidimensional policy space before moving to multidimensional spaces.

6.1 Valence in unidimensional policy spaces

In this section, we assume that two parties compete electorally by simultaneously choosing a policy in a one-dimensional policy space ($d = 1$). As in section 4, voters care both for policies, and for the party which enacts those policies. Abusing slightly notation, we have that

$$u_i(x, j) = \begin{cases} u_i(x_A) + \vartheta_A & \text{if } j = A \\ u_i(x_D) + \vartheta_D & \text{if } j = D \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

Unlike in section 4, the non-policy preference parameters v_A and v_D are common to all voters. These represent the valence of the parties, and without loss of generality assume that $\vartheta = \vartheta_A - \vartheta_D > 0$, so that party A (respectively, D) is valence-advantaged (valence-disadvantaged), with ϑ measuring the relative valence of A compared to D . So that voter i votes for party A if $u_i(x_A) - u_i(x_D) + \vartheta > 0$.

Models with policy motivated parties where the electorate cares about both policies and candidates' valence may generate policy divergence, even in the absence of uncertainty (which is not the case without valence, see above Section 3). For instance, assume that $\tilde{x}_A < x_m < \tilde{x}_D$ where x_m is the median voter's blisspoint. Suppose that A has a valence advantage over D which is such that A wins the election unless

$$|x_A - x_m| > |x_D - x_m| + y,$$

where $y > 0$. In words, party A is guaranteed to win if it locates within y units of the median, and thus can move closer to her ideal point \tilde{x}_A than x_m . For instance, if $\tilde{x}_A < x_m - y$, there is an equilibrium with $x_D = x_m$ and $x_A = x_m - y$, so that A wins for sure and D prevents A from moving further to the left.

We now introduce uncertainty into the model. Two ways of adding uncertainty

have been studied in the literature: one over the electoral outcome, the other over candidates' valence. While we do not exhaustively cover the literature, we now summarize some of results derived from valence models with uncertainty.

6.1.1 Uncertainty over election results

In this section we assume that candidates don't know the location of the median voter but know the valence advantage of candidate A relative to D .

Groseclose (2001) extends the Calvert (1985) and Wittman (1977, 1983) policy-seeking two-candidate one-dimensional ($d = 1$) policy models by including valence issues. He assumes that candidates care both about policy and holding office and standardizes the value candidates place on office to one. The utility of the valence advantaged candidate A is given by

$$U_A = \begin{cases} \lambda + (1 - \lambda)\Psi(|\tilde{x}_A - x_A|) & \text{if } A \text{ wins} \\ (1 - \lambda)\Psi(|\tilde{x}_A - x_D|) & \text{if } D \text{ wins} \end{cases}$$

where Ψ is a decreasing and concave function. Candidates are win-motivated when $\lambda = 1$, policy-motivated when $\lambda = 0$ or have mixed motives when $0 < \lambda < 1$.

The simplest model has a representative (or median) voter with an ideal point $x_m \in \mathfrak{R}$ with preferences over the policy and valence characteristics of the candidates as in (5).⁹ The median voter's ideal point—unknown to candidates—is drawn from a continuous distribution symmetric about zero with density $f(\cdot)$ and distribution $F(\cdot)$ known to both candidates. This voter votes for A if

$$\vartheta + \phi(|x_m - x_A|) > \phi(|x_m - x_D|).$$

where ϕ is a decreasing and concave function.

⁹The model can easily be generalized to the case of many voters with varying ideal points in the unidimensional policy space, since a party wins if and only if the median voter votes for it.

When candidates care only about winning and there is *no* valence advantage, i.e., $\lambda = 1$ and $\vartheta = 0$, then Groseclose re-states Calvert’s (1985) result in Proposition 8 (i) and shows in part (ii) that, with purely office motivated parties, the introduction of even an infinitesimal valence destroys equilibrium existence.

Proposition 8 (i) *When $\lambda = 1$ and $\vartheta = 0$. The unique equilibrium is $x_A^* = x_D^* = x_m = 0$. (ii) *When $\lambda = 1$ and $\mathcal{V} > 0$, there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.**

The intuition behind the non-existence result in Proposition 8 (ii) is simple. While candidate A prefers to adopt the same policy as D to capitalize on its valence advantage so as to win with certainty, D has to move away from A to have even a small chance at winning. Hence, no matter what positions the candidates adopt, at least one wants to move. This reasoning extends to the case of multi-dimensional policy spaces ($d > 1$), and to the vote motivation objective. This illustrates the knife-edge quality of the Downs and Wittman results when valence is introduced. We refer the reader to the appendix for a brief survey of papers dealing with Nash equilibria in mixed strategies in that setting.

Groseclose (2001) then focuses on the case where candidates care about policy *and* office (i.e., $\lambda < 1$), and where their ideals are symmetrically located about the median voter’s expected ideal point, i.e., $\tilde{x}_A = -\tilde{x}_D$. He focuses on the symmetry of bliss points essentially for analytical convenience and notes that this assumption is reasonable when each party represents one half of the electorate, when parties’ most-preferred policies are the ideal points of their median members, and when voters preferences are distributed symmetrically.

Groseclose (2001) does not provide any existence or uniqueness result, but rather characterizes the equilibrium in pure strategies, assuming it exists. His numerical results show the existence of at most one such equilibrium (but no equilibrium when λ is large and \mathcal{V} small, which is not surprising in the light of Proposition 8). He obtains the following results.

Proposition 9 *For very general forms of $\Psi(\cdot)$, $\phi(\cdot)$ and $f(\cdot)$ the following six relations hold (no proof is given of relation 5). (i) As A 's valence advantage increases, divergence among candidates' policies increases. (ii) As A 's valence advantage increases from 0 to a small amount, A moves towards the expected median. (iii) However, as A 's advantage increases beyond a certain point, A adopts a more extreme position closer to her ideal point. (iv) As A 's valence advantage increases from 0 to a small positive amount, D moves away from the expected median. (v) D 's equilibrium location moves away from the expected median as A 's valence advantage increases. (vi) For all levels of A 's valence advantage, A 's policy is more moderate than D 's.*

The key characteristic of the modelling which explains those results is that election uncertainty increases when parties diverge (at the opposite, when both propose very similar policies, A is sure to win the election). The intuition for results (ii) (dubbed the “moderating frontrunner” effect) and (iv) (the “extremist underdog” effect) is as follows. The equilibrium policy of a party trades-off centripetal incentives (moving closer to the center to increase its probability of winning) and centrifugal incentives (moving away from the center to increase its utility in case of a win). Increasing A 's valence advantage from zero moves the cut-point voter (the one indifferent between both parties) further away from A 's policy, and closer to D 's policy. If the voters' utilities are concave enough, this means that the (absolute value of the) marginal utility of the cut-point voter increases at the policy proposed by A , and decreases at the policy proposed by D . This reinforces the centripetal force for A , and decreases it for D , resulting in both parties moving in the direction of D 's ideal policy.¹⁰

¹⁰ Adams, Merrill and Grofman (AMG, 2005, chapter 11) stress that the extremist underdog effect requires a level of uncertainty over the location of the median voter which is not empirically reasonable, at least in US elections (see section 7.3). Note that AMG (2005) assume that voters have quadratic preferences, while Groseclose's sufficient condition for the extreme underdog

Part (3) of Proposition 9 is proved by showing that, when its valence advantage becomes infinite, party A locates at its preferred policy \tilde{x}_A and wins for sure. Beyond proving part (6), Groseclose also proves the counter-intuitive result that if party A has a large valence advantage then party D may propose at equilibrium a policy which is more extreme than its blisspoint \tilde{x}_D ! The intuition is that, when ϑ is large, the cut-point voter is located at a more extreme position than D 's proposed policy (even when D proposes its favored policy \tilde{x}_D). In that case, D has an incentive to propose a more extreme position, trading off a first-order gain in winning probability for a second-order loss in utility in case it wins the election.

As Groseclose (2001) writes “relations 2, 4, 5 and 6 [in Proposition 9] are somewhat unintuitive, since instead, one might expect that valence-advantaged candidates would parlay their advantage into a position that they personally favor more and disadvantaged candidates would do the opposite. However, notwithstanding this, the results have strong empirical support. First, they are consistent with Fiorina’s (1973) evidence against the marginality hypothesis.(...) Fiorina finds—despite the conventional wisdom of congressional scholars of the 1950s and 1960s—that electorally strong incumbents tend to moderate more than electorally weak incumbents.” (p 874). Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2001) also find empirically that high-quality US House candidates adopt more moderate positions than low-quality ones.

We now move to the case where the uncertainty pertains to the valence advantage of candidates, rather than directly to the elections results.

6.1.2 Uncertainty over valence

Londregan and Romer (1993) develop a two-party valence model of congressional elections in which parties are represented by candidates at the constituency level.

effect to appear is that voters preferences are more concave than in the quadratic case (with a negative third derivative).

Candidates have divergent preferences over the unidimensional ($d = 1$) policy space and differ in their ability to deliver constituency services, with abilities, α_A and α_D , drawn independently of each other from a joint density function $\phi(\alpha_A, \alpha_D) > 0$ with cumulative density $\Phi(\alpha_A, \alpha_D)$. Let $\boldsymbol{\alpha} \equiv (\alpha_A, \alpha_D)$ denote the vector of abilities. Voters prefer candidates with higher abilities who can deliver higher constituency services.

While parties only have noisy signals about candidates' abilities at the candidate selection stage, candidates abilities are perfectly known to voters at election time. Parties are then unsure as to the electoral outcome when choosing their platforms as they do so before voters' observe candidates' abilities.

At the beginning of the game, each party observes a signal of candidates' ability and selects one candidate to represent it in the election with the party's policy being that of the chosen candidate. Let (x_A, x_D) denote the parties' platforms.

With a continuum of voters whose preferences satisfy the single crossing condition, the election is determined by the choice of the median voter. Parties' know the location of the median voter's ideal point and know that the post-election constituency services provided by the winning candidate depends on her ability.

Given platforms, (x_A, x_D) , the median voter's utility, after observing candidates' abilities, is given by

$$u_m(x_j, j) = -d(x_m, x_j) + \gamma\vartheta(\alpha_j),$$

where γ measures the importance voters give to the constituency services and $\vartheta(\alpha_j)$ —an increasing function in α_j —denotes the constituency services provided by candidate j . Since $\vartheta(\alpha_j)$ is the same across voters and is independent of candidates' policies, it fits our definition of valence, except that in this model ϑ_j increases in candidate j 's ability.

The median voter votes for A when $u_m(x_A, A) > u_m(x_D, D)$, i.e., when

$$\vartheta(\alpha_A, \alpha_D) \equiv \vartheta_A(\alpha_A) - \vartheta_D(\alpha_D) > \frac{1}{\gamma} [d(x_m, x_A) - d(x_m, x_D)].$$

So that the median votes for A when the valence gap between A and D , $\vartheta(\alpha_A, \alpha_D)$, is large enough. Since at the platform selection stage parties view $\vartheta(\alpha_A, \alpha_D)$ as a random variable, the ex-ante probability that A wins the election is given by the probability that the median votes for A , i.e.,

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_A(x_A, x_B; \boldsymbol{\alpha}) &= \Pr [u_m(x_A, A) > u_m(x_D, D)] \\ &= \Pr \left[\vartheta(\alpha_A, \alpha_D) > \frac{1}{\gamma} [d(x_m, x_A) - d(x_m, x_D)] \right] \end{aligned}$$

where $d(x_m, x_j)$ for $j = A, D$ measures the distance between the median voter's ideal, x_m , and the party's policy x_j .

For each pair of policy platforms (x_A, x_D) and each pair of median voter preferences (x_m, γ) , there is a valence gap $\vartheta(\alpha_A, \alpha_D)$ that leaves the median voter indifferent between voting for either candidate.

Candidate j 's expected utility, after the two parties have chosen their candidates but before abilities are revealed, is given by

$$U_j(x_A, x_D) = -\pi_A(x_A, x_B; \boldsymbol{\alpha})d(\tilde{x}_j, x_A) - [1 - \pi_A(x_A, x_B; \boldsymbol{\alpha})]d(\tilde{x}_j, x_D)$$

where $d(\tilde{x}_j, x_A)$ and $d(\tilde{x}_j, x_D)$ measure the distance between candidate j 's policy and the policy implemented by the winning candidate. Candidates, who are policy motivated, choose their policy platforms to maximize their expected utility.

Londregan and Romer (1993) prove the following proposition:

Proposition 10 *(i) There is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which candidates adopt the same platform, i.e., $x_A^* \neq x_D^*$. (ii) Moreover, x_A^* and x_D^* will lie*

outside an interval that contains the median voter's ideal policy with this interval increasing as γ increases.

Proposition 10 (i) says that the party's equilibrium policies diverge. This divergence is generated by divergence in the party's policy preferences, by the uncertainty parties have on candidates' abilities and by the trade-off voters face between policies and the ability of candidates to deliver better constituency services. Proposition 10 (ii) says that as γ increases, so that voters become more service-motivated, policy polarization increases and policies become more extreme. Intuitively, given the distribution of abilities, as γ increases, parties become more uncertain about the level of constituency services candidates will provide to voters and so become more uncertain about how voters evaluate candidates. Thus, Proposition 10 provides a minimum bound of the valence advantage that A must have over D for there to be an equilibrium and shows that the bound increases as voters give greater importance to valence issues.

The one testable hypotheses emanating from their model is that policy polarization increases in the saliency voters place on constituency services. Their empirical tests find no support for this hypothesis in the 1978 US National congressional election perhaps due to the small number of open seats in the election.

Adams, Merrill and Grofman (2005, chapter 11.3) propose a similar but simpler model, where the valence advantage of party A is $\vartheta = v + \epsilon$, with v the expected valence advantage, and where ϵ is distributed according to a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation σ_v . They first show that, if an equilibrium in pure strategies exists with $v = 0$, $\tilde{x}_A = -\tilde{x}_D$ and $x_A^* = -x_D^*$, then there is substantial candidate divergence. They then compute numerically the equilibrium with $v > 0$. They obtain that the divergence between parties increases with both v and σ_v . Moreover, both x_A^* and x_D^* shift to the left (closer to \tilde{x}_A) when v increases. This is in stark contrast with the results from the preceding section.

Results remain qualitatively similar when parties have mixed (policy and electoral) motivation, rather than being purely policy-motivated.

6.2 Valence in multidimensional policy spaces

We now present *multidimensional* spatial competition models in which voters also rank candidates along a valence dimension. These valence models derive the conditions under which a d -dimensional party positioning equilibrium exists even when the necessary conditions for a Condorcet winner do not hold. This is in sharp contrast with the generic non-existence results in multidimensional models without valence described in Proposition 2 .

6.2.1 Ansolabehere and Snyder’s win-seeking policy-valence model

In their *multidimensional* two-candidate valence model, Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) present the necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of equilibrium and characterize the equilibria when candidates care only about winning office in a model with no uncertainty except for ties broken in a fair manner. As Ansolabehere and Snyder state: when one candidate has a large enough valence advantage that candidate wins the election irrespective of candidates’ positions, meaning that equilibria in multidimensional policy spaces with valence always exist. Their contribution to this literature is to show that the “yolk,”¹¹ which sets limits on the uncovered set (McKelvey 1986; Cox 1987), bounds the set of equilibria in these valence models.

Given voters’ valences $(\vartheta_A, \vartheta_D)$, office-seeking candidates A and D simultaneously choose their policies \mathbf{x}_A and \mathbf{x}_B to maximize their expected payoff,

¹¹The “yolk” is usually a small, centrally located set (McKelvey, 1986; Feld et al, 1988).

$$V_j(\mathbf{x}_A, \vartheta_A, \mathbf{x}_D, \vartheta_D) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } n_j > n_k \\ 1/2 & \text{if } n_j = n_k \\ 0 & \text{if } n_j < n_k \end{cases}$$

for j and k in A, D and where n_A (respectively n_D) is the measure of voters that prefer A (D) to D (A).

Given candidates' d -dimensional policies and valences, $(\mathbf{x}_A, \vartheta_A, \mathbf{x}_D, \vartheta_D)$, voter i 's utility from candidate j is given by

$$u_i(\mathbf{x}_j; \vartheta_j, \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i, \gamma) = \gamma\vartheta_j - \|\mathbf{x}_j - \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i\|^2 = \gamma\vartheta_j - (\mathbf{x}_j - \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i)'(\mathbf{x}_j - \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i)$$

where i 's ideal policies, $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i$, and candidate j 's policies, \mathbf{x}_j , are d -dimensional vectors, $\|\cdot\|$ is the Euclidean distance and γ represents the importance voters give to the valence issue. Voters *indifferent* between A and B are those for whom the utility difference from the two candidates, $\Delta u_i(\mathbf{x}_A, \vartheta_A, \mathbf{x}_D, \vartheta_D)$, is zero with $\Delta u_i(\mathbf{x}_A, \vartheta_A, \mathbf{x}_D, \vartheta_D) = 0$ defining a hyperplane that is orthogonal to $\mathbf{x}_D - \mathbf{x}_A$.

Using the set of median hyperplanes of voters' ideal points, Ansolabehere and Snyder derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium, giving bounds to the set of equilibria in terms of the "yolk"—the smallest ball that intersects all median hyperplanes—so that when \mathbf{c} is the center of the yolk and r its radius, they prove the following proposition.

Proposition 11 *Suppose $\vartheta_A > \vartheta_D$. Then $(\mathbf{x}_A, \mathbf{x}_D)$ is an equilibrium if and only if (i) the maximum distance between the ideal point of any voter and any median hyperplane is bounded above by $\sqrt{\gamma(\vartheta_A - \vartheta_D)}$. (ii) $r < \sqrt{\gamma(\vartheta_A - \vartheta_D)}$. Moreover, if $(\mathbf{x}_A, \mathbf{x}_D)$ is an equilibrium, then $\|\mathbf{x}_A - \mathbf{c}\| < r + \sqrt{\gamma(\vartheta_A - \vartheta_D)}$.*

Note that the equilibria place *no* restrictions on the strategies of the low valence candidate but require that voters' ideal points be close enough to any median

hyperplane. Proposition 11 shows, however, that unless A 's valence advantage is large, then A 's policy position must be near the yolk. If candidates maximize their vote share, rather than their probability of winning office, then equilibria typically do *not* exist unless one candidate has a very large valence advantage. Intuitively, as in the one dimensional policy space, while the valence advantaged candidate A wants to be at D 's position, D being valence disadvantaged has an incentive to locate at a different point than A in order to win some votes. This is true unless voters' ideal points are all within $\sqrt{\gamma(\vartheta_A - \vartheta_D)}$ of \mathbf{x}_D .

Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) shows that even without imposing institutions that restrict choices in a multi-dimensional policy model with valence and no uncertainty, an equilibrium exists when A has a large enough valence advantage over D . A wins the election regardless of candidates' location in the policy space.

They conclude that pure strategy Nash equilibria in multidimensional spatial models can exist and that valence politics and positional politics are inseparable as valence issues are just one aspect of elections that affect candidates' positions. While advantaged candidates take moderate positions, disadvantaged ones may take moderate or extreme positions. They suggest that these results are related to three empirical observations. **(1)** The personal vote, when voters favor a particular candidate—due, for example, to credit-claiming, campaign spending, etc.—is just a valence issue. **(2)** Party domination in certain periods may be due to the party's superior valence on these issues during this period (e.g., less corrupt, more likely to maintain a strong stable economy, better able to provide foreign policy leadership). **(3)** Partisan policy realignments are triggered by large changes in valence issues, e.g., due to the parties' perceived performances on a given set of valence issues or to changes in the weight voters place on different valence issues. e.g., the fall in parties credibility during severe economic crises.

We now examine a valence model where candidates cannot observe voters'

individual valences and so are uncertain as to the electoral outcome.

6.2.2 Schofield's win-seeking policy-valence model

Schofield (2007) introduces valence asymmetries among candidates into a multidimensional *multi-candidate* model where candidates choose their policies to maximize their vote shares. Given the on-going debate about whether candidates converge or not to the electoral mean¹² in many electoral systems (e.g., US, and many European countries), Schofield's model studies the conditions under which candidates converge to the electoral mean.

Candidates $j \in \mathcal{C} = \{1, 2, \dots, c\}$ simultaneously announce the d -dimensional policies $\mathbf{x}_j \in X$ before the election, with $\mathbf{x} = (\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_j, \dots, \mathbf{x}_c)$ denoting the matrix of candidates' policies.

Given \mathbf{x} , voter i 's utility vector, for $i \in \mathcal{N} = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ is given by

$$\mathbf{u}_i(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\vartheta}, \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i) = (u_i(\mathbf{x}_1, \vartheta_1, \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i), \dots, u_i(\mathbf{x}_j, \vartheta_j, \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i), \dots, u_i(\mathbf{x}_c, \vartheta_c, \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i))$$

$$\text{where } u_i(\mathbf{x}_j, \vartheta_j, \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i) \equiv -\beta \|\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i - \mathbf{x}_j\|^2 + \vartheta_j + \epsilon_{ij} = u_i^*(\mathbf{x}_j, \vartheta_j, \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i) + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (6)$$

and $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i$ is voter i 's d -dimensional ideal point, β the importance voters give to the policy dimensions and $\|\cdot\|$ the Euclidean norm on X . Voter i 's valence for candidate j is given by $\vartheta_j + \epsilon_{ij}$ where j 's *mean* valence, ϑ_j , is common to all voters and exogenously given with voter i 's idiosyncratic valence component, ϵ_{ij} , varying around ϑ_j according to a Type I extreme-value distribution with mean zero and variance $\pi/6$. The *mean* valence vector $\boldsymbol{\vartheta} = (\vartheta_1, \dots, \vartheta_j, \dots, \vartheta_p)$ is such that $\vartheta_1 < \dots < \vartheta_j < \dots < \vartheta_c$, so that candidate 1 is the one with the lowest mean valence. The term $u_i^*(\mathbf{x}_j, \vartheta_j, \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i)$ represents the observable component of i 's utility, meaning that, parties know the mean valence vector $\boldsymbol{\vartheta}$ but not the random component, ϵ_{ij} ,

¹²The electoral mean is the d -dimensional vector of voters' ideal policies in each dimension.

in voters' utility and so are unsure about the electoral outcome.

Given parties policies, \mathbf{x} , and since the idiosyncratic component in voter i 's valence is stochastic, the probability that i votes for j is given by

$$\rho_{ij}(\mathbf{x}) = \Pr[u_i(\mathbf{x}_j, \vartheta_j, \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i) > u_i(\mathbf{x}_h, \vartheta_h, \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i) \quad \text{for all } h \neq j \in \mathcal{C}]$$

i.e., given by the probability that voter i gets a higher utility for j than from any other party. With voters' idiosyncratic valences, ϵ_{ij} for all $i \in \mathcal{N}$, drawn from a Type I extreme-value distribution, the probability that i votes for j has a logit specification, i.e., is given by

$$\rho_{ij}(\mathbf{x}) = \frac{\exp[u_i^*(\mathbf{x}_j, \vartheta_j, \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i)]}{\sum_{k=1}^c \exp[u_i^*(\mathbf{x}_k, \vartheta_k, \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i)]} \quad (7)$$

Candidate j maximizes its expected vote share, i.e., maximizes

$$V_j(\mathbf{x}) \equiv \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} \rho_{ij}(\mathbf{x}) \quad (8)$$

with $\mathbf{V}(\mathbf{x}) = (V_j(\mathbf{x}), \text{ for all } j \in \mathcal{C})$ denoting the profile of candidates' expected vote shares functions.

Define the electoral mean as the mean of voters' ideal points, i.e., $\mathbf{x}_0 = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} \mathbf{x}_i$ with the joint electoral mean given by $\mathbf{x}_0 = (\mathbf{x}_0, \dots, \mathbf{x}_0)$ that can be standardized to zero, so that $\mathbf{x}_0 = \mathbf{0} = (\mathbf{0}, \dots, \mathbf{0})$ denotes the joint electoral mean.

Schofield points out that in political models, the eigenvalues of the Hessian of the parties' vote share functions at the critical equilibrium—those satisfying the first order condition—may be positive for one of the parties implying that the expected vote share functions of such a candidate fails pseudo-concavity. Since none of the usual fixed point arguments can be used to assert existence of a “global” pure Nash equilibrium (PNE), he uses the concept of a “critical Nash equilibrium”

(CNE), namely a vector of strategies which satisfies the first-order condition for a local maximum of candidates' expected vote share functions. Moreover, as he points out standard arguments based on the index, together with transversality arguments can be used to show that a CNE will exist and that, generically, it will be isolated. A local Nash equilibrium (LNE) satisfies the first-order condition, together with the second-order condition that the Hessians of all candidates are negative (semi-) definite at the CNE. Clearly, the set of LNE will contain the PNE. The sufficient (necessary) condition for parties to converge to the electoral mean is that the eigenvalues of the Hessian of second order partial derivatives of candidates' vote share functions, when evaluated at the electoral mean, be negative (semi-)definite. Schofield shows that the necessary and sufficient condition can be summarized in what he calls the convergence coefficient that we now define.

Definition 12 *Suppose all parties locate at the electoral mean, \mathbf{x}_0 . The probability that voters choose party 1, ρ_1 , with the lowest valence, using (7), is given by*

$$\rho_1(\mathbf{x}_0, \boldsymbol{\vartheta}) = \left[\sum_{k=1}^c \exp[\vartheta_k - \vartheta_1] \right]^{-1} \quad (9)$$

and the convergence coefficient of the election, $c(\boldsymbol{\vartheta}, \beta, \sigma^2)$, by

$$c(\boldsymbol{\vartheta}, \beta, \sigma^2) \equiv 2\beta(1 - 2\rho_1)\sigma^2, \quad (10)$$

where $\rho_1(\mathbf{x}_0, \boldsymbol{\vartheta})$ is given by (9) and $\sigma^2 \equiv \sum_{s=1}^d \text{var}(s)$ denotes the sum of the variance of voters' ideal points along each dimension with $\text{var}(s)$ being the variance of voters' ideal points along dimension s .

If parties locate at \mathbf{x}_0 , $\rho_1(\mathbf{x}_0, \boldsymbol{\vartheta})$ in (9) depends only on the valence advantage that the top $c - 1$ candidates have over the lowest valence candidate, candidate 1, is independent of candidates' policies and voters' ideal points, so is the same for

all voters and gives candidate 1's expected vote share at \mathbf{x}_0 .

Schofield (2007) proves the following Proposition.

Proposition 13 *Let voter i 's idiosyncratic valence, ϵ_{ij} for all $i \in \mathcal{N}$, follow a Type I extreme-value distribution. (i) The joint electoral mean, \mathbf{x}_0 satisfies the first order conditions. (ii) The necessary and sufficient condition for \mathbf{x}_0 to be a LNE is that the matrix $2\beta(1-2\rho_1)\nabla$ has negative eigenvalues where ∇ is the $d \times d$ variance-covariance matrix of voters' ideal points. (iii) When the convergence coefficient is smaller than the dimension of the policy space, i.e., $c(\boldsymbol{\vartheta}, \beta, \sigma^2) \leq d$, the necessary condition for convergence to \mathbf{x}_0 has been met by all parties. The joint electoral mean, \mathbf{x}_0 , is a LNE of the election. (iv) If $c(\boldsymbol{\vartheta}, \beta, \sigma^2) > d$, the necessary condition for convergence to \mathbf{x}_0 has **not** been met by at least one party. The joint electoral mean, \mathbf{x}_0 , is not a LNE of the election and at least one party locates far from the electoral mean. (v) If $d = 2$ and $c(\boldsymbol{\vartheta}, \beta, \sigma^2) \leq 1$, the sufficient condition for convergence to \mathbf{x}_0 is met by all parties and the joint electoral mean, \mathbf{x}_0 , is LNE of the election.*

Proposition 13 predicts that if an equilibrium exists at the electoral mean, all parties adopt the same position, the electoral mean, i.e., candidates' equilibrium policies are the mean of voters' ideal policies. The proposition also highlights that when candidates' differ in their valences, an equilibrium in which all candidates converge to, or locate at, the electoral mean exists when $c(\boldsymbol{\vartheta}, \beta, \sigma^2) < d$. The convergence coefficient, $c(\boldsymbol{\vartheta}, \beta, \sigma^2)$ in (10), increases in β and σ^2 and decreases in ρ_1 . In particular, when the valence advantage of the top $c - 1$ candidates increases relative to that of the most valence disadvantaged candidate, candidate 1, i.e., when the difference between ϑ_1 and $\{\vartheta_2, \vartheta_3, \dots, \vartheta_c\}$ increases, the probability voters choose candidate 1 with the lowest valence when located at the electoral mean, $\rho_1(\mathbf{x}_0, \boldsymbol{\vartheta})$ in (9), decreases. As a consequence, candidate 1 will move *away*

from the electoral mean \mathbf{x}_0 in order to increase its vote share, i.e., at \mathbf{x}_0 candidate 1's vote share is at a minimum or at a saddle point. This result says that as the valence advantage of the top $c - 1$ candidates relative to the most valence disadvantaged candidate increases, the joint electoral mean is less likely to be a LNE of the election.

Note that $c(\boldsymbol{\vartheta}, \beta, \sigma^2)$ in (10) decreases when β decreases, i.e., when voters give greater relative importance to the valence issue. It is then more likely that $c(\boldsymbol{\vartheta}, \beta, \sigma^2)$ will be less than d , and thus more likely that all parties, including the lowest valence party, adopt the same policies by locating at the electoral mean. Thus, the greater the importance given to the valence issue the more likely it is that candidates converge to the electoral mean, *ceteris paribus*.

Schofield's (2007) result deals with more than two candidates and highlights that existence of an equilibrium at the electoral mean depends on candidates' valences, on the importance voters give to policies (and indirectly to the importance voters give to the valence issue) and on how dispersed voters are in the policy space. Schofield's result is similar to that of Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) given in Proposition 11 when candidates have policy rather than win-motivation and contrasts with the non-existence results in the non-valence multidimensional models given in Proposition 2 in Section 3. In addition, Schofield's results also points out that convergence to the electoral mean depends on the probability that voters' chose the candidate with the lowest valence. When $c(\boldsymbol{\vartheta}, \beta, \sigma^2) > d$, Proposition 13 says that parties locate away from the electoral origin.

6.2.3 Theoretical extensions of Schofield's (2007) model

Schofield's (2007) model has been extended to examine parties' equilibrium policies when voters in different regions of the country face different sets of parties while allowing voters to have sociodemographic valences, i.e., allowing voters'

propensities to vote for the various candidates to depend on their sociodemographic characteristics (age, gender, education,...). Gallego et al (2014) develop a model with national and regional parties. In the model, one party runs only in one region (e.g., the Bloc Quebecois in Quebec) with national parties competing in all regions to study the effect that this regional party has on the electoral outcome in that region and on the national parties' positions in that region and in the rest of the country. Labzina and Schofield (2015) adapt this regional model to study a country with three regions in which there are two regional parties competing in two different regions and three national parties competing in all regions. In these regional models, voters' utilities depend on the region in which they live and the parties competing in that region. The conditions for convergence to the regional electoral mean are similar to those in Schofield (2007) given in Section 6.2.2, convergence at the national level requires convergence in every region.

Gallego and Schofield (2016a) extend Schofield's (2007) model to study the effect that advertising has on the policy position of US Presidential candidates. Voters are characterized by their policy preferences and by their campaign tolerance level—the number of times they want to be contacted by candidates—and by three exogenously given valences: sociodemographic (age, income, etc.) and competency valences as well as by candidates' traits valences (candidates' charisma, age, race, etc.). The model shows that in spite of the fact that the one-person-one-vote principle applies, candidates weight voters differently in their policy and advertising campaigns, giving higher weights to undecided voters and little or no weight to voters who vote with high probability for any candidate. Moreover, like in Schofield's (2007) model, the valence advantage of the top $c - 1$ candidates relative to the lowest valence candidate affects convergence to voters' weighted mean policy and campaign tolerance levels.

Gallego and Schofield (2016b) extend the Gallego and Schofield (2016a) model

to examine the effect that campaign advertising has on the policy positions in US Presidential elections at both the state and the national levels when differences across states matter. Candidates' electoral campaign consists of their policy and advertising campaign in each state and at the national level. Voters' utility function depend on candidates campaign in their state of residence and at the national level as well as on their sociodemographic, traits and competency valences with valences having an idiosyncratic component, unobserved by candidates, drawn from Type-I Extreme Value distributions. Convergence to the state weighted policy and campaign tolerance mean depends on the combined valence advantage of the top $c - 1$ candidates relative to the lowest valence candidate in that state and national levels. Candidates' electoral state campaigns determine the electoral campaign at the national level so that, convergence at the national level depends on convergence in each state. If candidates converge to the weighted state and national means, they weight undecided states more heavily than states voting with high probability for any candidate. Thus, providing a theoretical foundation for candidates spending more time and resources during the electoral campaign in undecided states and shows the effect that the combined state and national valences have on convergence at the state and national levels.

6.2.4 Endogeneizing valence: political activists in Schofield (2007)

Even though published earlier, Schofield's (2006) extends Schofield's (2007) multi-dimensional multi-candidate model by allowing candidates to have both exogenous and *endogenous* valences. The endogenous valence is generated by the contributions (of time and money) party activists make to candidates to influence their policy positions with candidates using these resources to present themselves more effectively to voters thus increasing their endogenous valence. Since activists have more extreme positions than average voters, candidates must trade-off adopt-

ing the more radical policies demanded by activists against the loss of electoral support due to these more extreme policies. Each party then must balance the electoral and activists pulls.

In this extension, voters' utility given in (6) changes to

$$u_i(\mathbf{x}_j, V_j, \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i) \equiv -\beta \|\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i - \mathbf{x}_j^2\|^2 + \mu_j(\mathbf{x}_j) + \vartheta_j + \epsilon_{ij} = u_i^*(\mathbf{x}_j, \vartheta_j, \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i) + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (11)$$

where all the components are as in (6) and $\mu_j(\mathbf{x}_j)$ represents the component of valence generated by the activist contribution to candidate j .

Schofield (2006) defines the balance solution as follows:

Definition 14 Let $[\rho_{ij}] \equiv [\rho_{ij}(\mathbf{x})]$ be the matrix of probabilities that voters vote for candidate j and let $[\alpha_{ij}] \equiv [\alpha_{ij}(\mathbf{x})] = \frac{\rho_{ij} - \rho_{ij}^2}{\sum_{i \in N} \rho_{ij} - \rho_{ij}^2}$ be the weight candidate j gives to voter i at policy vector \mathbf{x} . The balance equation for candidate j 's policy vector \mathbf{x}_j^* is given by

$$\mathbf{x}_j^* = \frac{1}{2\beta} \frac{d\mu_j}{d\mathbf{x}_j} + \sum_{i \in N} \alpha_{ij} \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i. \quad (12)$$

Define the weighted electoral mean of candidate j by $\sum_{i \in N} \alpha_{ij} \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i = \frac{d\mathcal{E}_j^*}{dx_j}$. The balance equation in (12) can be re-written as

$$\left[\frac{d\mathcal{E}_j^*}{d\mathbf{x}_j} - x_j^* \right] + \frac{1}{2\beta} \frac{d\mu_j}{d\mathbf{x}_j} = 0$$

where the term in square brackets measures the marginal electoral pull of candidate j , a gradient pointing towards the weighted electoral mean with the electoral pull being zero at the weighted electoral mean. The second term, $\frac{d\mu_j}{dx_j}$, measures the marginal activist pull of candidate j .

If x_j^* satisfied the balance equation for all j , then \mathbf{x}^* gives candidates equilibrium balanced policy positions.

Note that if $\mu_j(z_j) = 0$ for all $j \in \mathcal{C}$, then we are back in Schofield's (2007) exogenous valence model. Schofield (2006) proves the following proposition.

Proposition 15 *Let the stochastic valence component in voters' utility function in (11) have a Type I extreme-value distribution in the model with exogenous and activist valences. (i) The first order condition for \mathbf{x}^* to be a local strict Nash Equilibrium is that it is a balance solution. (ii) If all activist valence functions are highly concave, in the sense of having negative eigenvalues of sufficiently great magnitude, the balance solution will be a Pure Nash Equilibrium of the election.*

Schofield's (2006) endogenous valence model highlights that if the activists valence functions are sufficiently concave, there exists a strict LNE in which d -dimensional policies balancing the activist and electoral pulls. With their resources activist pull policies away from the electoral mean by providing resources that candidates' use to increase their endogenous valence.

We now discuss empirical applications of Schofield's (2007) valence models.

6.2.5 Empirical applications of Schofield-type valence models

The empirical literature provides substantial evidence that valence components contribute in a significant way to an understanding of voter choice. For example, Clarke, Kornberg and Scotto (2009) and Clarke, Sanders, Stewart and Whiteley (2005), Clarke, Scotto and Kornberg (2011) and Clarke, Kornberg, MacLeod and Scotto (2005) study the effect that electoral perceptions of leaders' *character traits* have on British, Canadian and US elections. From their analysis for Britain, they conclude that electoral responses

“... were a reflection largely of [the] changing perceptions of the decision-making competence of the main political parties and their

leaders. At any point in time, [the] preferences were strongly influenced by their perceptions of the capacity of the rival parties—the putative alternative governments of the day—to solve the major policy problems facing the country.”

Thus, valence—as measured by voters’ perceptions of the candidates’ or party leaders’ character traits—matter in electoral outcomes. Clarke, Kornberg and Scotto (2009: 159) test the “Downsian” or pure spatial stochastic model and a traits model of the 2000 and 2004 US presidential elections and conclude that “the two models have approximately equal explanatory power.”

Taking this evidence seriously, Schofield and co-authors used his 2007 model to study elections in developed and developing countries under various political regimes (presidential, parliamentary and anocratic¹³). The advantage of using Schofield’s (2007) model to study actual elections is that the model assumes that voters’ idiosyncratic valence components come from Type-I Extreme value distributions. The probability that a voter chooses any party has a Logit specification and provides an easy transition to using empirical multinomial Logit (MNL) models to estimate the coefficients in voter i ’s utility functions in (6) in real elections.

In order to find if there is an equilibrium at the electoral mean \mathbf{x}_0 in a particular election, party j ’s expected vote share function in (8) at \mathbf{x}_0 must be estimated and this requires estimating the probability that voter i chooses candidate j in (7) in the election. Estimating this probability requires finding estimates of the components in voter i ’s utility in (6): the importance voters give to the policy dimension, β , voter i ’s ideal policy, $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i$, party j ’s policy position, \mathbf{x}_j , and j ’s

¹³In anocracies, a dictator governs alongside a legislature but exerts undue influence on the election. Anocracies lack important democratic institutions such as freedom of the press. Since autocrats hold regular elections in an attempt to give their regime legitimacy, anocracies are also called partial-democracies. Opposition parties participate in elections to become known political entities and to communicate with voters. Even though their objective is to oust the autocrat either in an election or through popular uprisings, the assumption is that they maximize their vote share even when there is little chance of ousting the autocrat in the election.

valence, ϑ_j for all voters and all parties, i.e., finding estimates of the parameters in Schofield’s model: $(\beta, \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i, \mathbf{x}_j, \vartheta_j)$ for all $i \in \mathcal{N}$ and $j \in \mathcal{C}$.

The following procedure was used to estimate these parameters for the elections shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3 below. Voters’ answers to pre-election surveys were used to estimate voters’ multidimensional policy positions using factor analysis.¹⁴ The surveys also contain voters’ voting intentions and their socio-demographic characteristics. In the majority of elections studied by Schofield and co-authors, the factor analysis showed that there were two latent policy dimensions that were important to voters during the election. These dimensions varied by country with one usually related to economic matters and the other to some social issue such as race or religion. Using the factor loadings from the factor analysis, voters’ two dimensional ideal policy positions were estimated, $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i$. Since Schofield’s (2007) model predicts that when a LNE exists parties locate at the electoral mean, this mean vector was calculated using the mean of voters’ ideal policies, \mathbf{x}_0 .

Using $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i$ for all $i \in \mathcal{N}$ and \mathbf{x}_0 , a logit regression was used to estimate the parameters (β, ϑ_j) for all $j \in \mathcal{C}$ in voters’ utility function in (6). The valence of each party ϑ_j is given by the intercept of the utility function in the MNL regression as it is independent of voters’ ideal policies and parties policy positions. Using these estimates and their significance levels, the ranking of parties’ valences were determined and the party with the lowest valence was identified.

Taking the estimates of $(\beta, \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_i, \mathbf{x}_j, \boldsymbol{\vartheta})$, the probability of voting for the lowest valence party when parties locate at the electoral mean, $\rho_1(\mathbf{x}_0, \boldsymbol{\vartheta})$, was estimated using (9). Using voters’ ideal points, their variance, $var(s)$, along each dimension was used to calculate $\sigma^2 \equiv \sum_{s=1}^d var(s)$, then using the estimates of $(\boldsymbol{\vartheta}, \beta, \sigma^2)$, the convergence coefficient, $c(\boldsymbol{\vartheta}, \beta, \sigma^2)$, given in (10) was calculated. Confidence intervals on all these estimates were derived using bootstrap methods on the idio-

¹⁴Factor analysis is a statistical method used to describe variability among observed, correlated variables in terms of a potentially lower number of unobserved policy dimensions.

syncratic valences in voters' utility functions. The estimated convergence coefficient and its confidence interval was used to evaluate whether parties convergence to electoral mean in each election using the results in Proposition 13.

The convergence coefficient derived in various election studies carried out by Schofield and co-authors were used in Gallego and Schofield (2013, 2015) to classify political systems: Table 1 shows countries using Plurality Rule, Table 2 those using Proportional Representation and Table 3 anocracies.¹⁵

Tables 1, 2 and 3 about here

Table 1 shows the derivation of the convergence coefficient for the 2000, 2004 and 2008 US elections and for the 2005 and 2010 British elections, two countries using Plurality rule in their electoral systems. The results for the US show that the convergence coefficients for the first two elections were similar in value but that it increased in 2008 when the variance in voters' ideal policies had increased relative to the two previous elections. Given the confidence intervals around the value of the convergence coefficient and using the result given in Proposition 13 it is clear that the convergence coefficient is significantly less than the dimension of the policy space ($d = 2$) implying that the Republican and Democratic parties converged to, or located, close to the electoral mean in each of these elections. A similar result emerges when looking at the convergence coefficients in the two UK elections. Table 1 suggests that in countries using plurality rule, parties converge to the electoral mean, meaning that the valence difference between parties was not large enough to generate policy divergence between them.

Table 2 gives the convergence coefficient for elections in countries using proportional representation. The convergence coefficient in Israel and Poland are

¹⁵Tables 1, 2 and 3 are taken from Gallego and Schofield (2013, 2015). We refer the reader to Gallego and Schofield's papers for a more detailed analysis of each of these elections and for references to the papers in which each of these elections are studied in great detail.

significantly above the dimension of the policy space ($d = 2$) in both countries implying that in these countries with a large number of parties at least the low valence parties found it in their interest to locate far from the electoral mean, as using Proposition 13 it is clear that were they to locate at the electoral mean their expected vote share would be very low (see Table 2). The dramatic change in the convergence coefficient in Turkey between the 1999 and 2002 elections (not significantly different from 2 in 1999 and significantly greater than 2 in 2002) is due to the electoral reform prior to 2002 implementing a high cut-off rule. This, coupled with a dramatic change in parties' valences between the two elections, led to a more fractionalized political system in 2002 as indicated by the values of the convergence coefficient. Table 2 then suggests that proportional representation leads to highly fractionalized political systems where parties do not converge to the electoral mean. In particular, low valence parties prefer to locate in the electoral periphery distinguishing themselves from larger mainstream parties and do so to secure the votes of their core supporters.

Table 3 shows the value of the convergence coefficient in the anocracies of Georgia for the 2008 election, in Russia for the 2007 election and in Azerbaijan for the 2010 election. In all three elections the convergence coefficient was not significantly different from the dimension of the policy space¹⁶ so that using Proposition 13, the necessary condition for convergence to the mean is not satisfied. Thus, parties in these three anocracies are at a knife-edge equilibrium, meaning that under some circumstances, parties converge to the mean, under others they diverge. Which of these two equilibria materializes depends on the valence/popularity of the President/autocrat and his party, on the other parties' valence and on the dispersion of voters in the policy space.

¹⁶In Azerbaijan, the factor analysis identified that voters in this election were only concerned with only one policy dimension: demand for democracy.

The general conclusion from Tables 1, 2 and 3, is that the convergence coefficient varies across elections, countries and political systems and can be used to classify political systems. In addition, in more fractionalized polities, the valence of the parties, in particular that of small parties, the weight voters give to the policy dimensions and the dispersion of voters across the policy space are crucial elements in determining whether there is convergence to the electoral mean.

Extensions of Schofield's (2007) model have also been taken to the data to study the effect that regional parties have in the regional and national elections. In these models, the voters' utilities depend on the region in which they live and on the parties competing in that region. Gallego et al (2014) develop and test a model of the Canadian 2004 federal election in which the Bloc Quebecois runs only in Quebec. The model studies the effect that the Bloc's policy positions and valence had on the electoral outcome in Quebec and how the anticipated outcome in Quebec and the parties' valences in Quebec and in the rest of Canada affected the policy positions all parties in both Quebec and the rest of Canada. Labzina and Schofield (2015) examine the 2010 British general election where the Scottish National Party ran only in Scotland and Plaid Cymru only in Wales to study the effect that these two parties and their valences had on the policy positions of all parties including the national parties (the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats) who ran in Scotland, Wales and England.

The general conclusion of the empirical applications of Schofield -type valence models is that valence matters in determining the outcome of the election as the size of the valence advantages of some candidates together with the importance voters give to the policy dimensions relative to the valence issues determines whether there is convergence to the electoral mean in different elections in the same country, across countries and across political regimes.

7 The “unified model” à la Adams-Merrill-Grofman

In their 2005 book, Adams, Merrill and Grofman (AMG hereafter) propose a “unified model” in which voters care both for multi-dimensional policies and for the parties enacting them. Their modelling of how voters care for parties, and how this relates with their preferences for policies, is richer than what has been developed in the preceding sections. Voters differ in their partisanship, with some being closer to one party and others to another party. Moreover, the members of one party have different preferences over the policy issues. AMG also add a random component to the voters’ utility, as in section 4. We start with the description of their model, including some analytical results that they obtain. We then move to various empirical applications. Finally, AMG add a valence term to their approach, as in sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2. Section 7.3 presents some empirical applications of their unified model with valence in unidimensional policy spaces.

7.1 Theory

There are $J \geq 2$ political parties competing for the votes of n citizens by simultaneously proposing them policies in a $d \geq 1$ policy space. Voter i ’s most-preferred location is denoted by the vector \tilde{x}_i , with generic element k denoted by \tilde{x}_{ik} . Similarly, party j proposes a vector x_j with generic element x_{jk} .

The utility of a voter i for party j proposing x_j is given by

$$u_i(x_j, j) = - \sum_{k=1}^d a_k (\tilde{x}_{ik} - x_{jk})^2 + \mathbf{b}_j \mathbf{t}_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}. \quad (13)$$

The first two components of the utility function are assumed to be observable, while ϵ_{ij} is a random variable (from the point of view of parties). The first component denotes the utility that voter i derives from policy x_j , and is given by the Euclidean distance between proposed and most-preferred policy. The parameter

a_k measures the salience of policy dimension k , and is the same for all voters. The vector \mathbf{t}_{ij} measures non-policy variables, with coordinate t_{ijl} for voter i , party j and non-policy variable l . For instance, it can measure partisanship, and take a value of one if voter i identifies with party j , and zero otherwise. The vector \mathbf{b}_j of parameters has coordinates b_{jl} , measuring the salience of non-policy issue l when voting for party j so that the non-policy contribution to voter i 's utility is

$$\mathbf{b}_j \mathbf{t}_{ij} = \sum_l b_{jl} t_{ijl}.$$

An important aspect of this formulation is that it allows policy preferences to depend on the vector of non-policy variables \mathbf{t}_{ij} (for instance, as we will show in a moment, AMG assume that the distribution of blisspoints \tilde{x}_i may differ among the partisans of different parties).

AMG assumes that the random variables ϵ_{ij} are independently generated from a type I extreme-value distribution. Denote by $u_i^*(x_j, j)$ the observable component of voter i 's utility when voting for party j , i.e.,

$$u_i^*(x_j, j) = - \sum_{k=1}^d a_k (\tilde{x}_{ik} - x_{jk})^2 + \mathbf{b}_j \mathbf{t}_{ij}.$$

The probability that i votes for j has a logit specification and is given by

$$\rho_{ij}(x_j, x_{-j}) = \frac{\exp[u_i^*(x_j, j)]}{\sum_{j'=1}^J \exp[u_i^*(x_{j'}, j')]}.$$

Party j 's expected vote is the sum of the voting probabilities across voters,¹⁷

$$EV_j(x_j, x_{-j}) = \sum_{i=1}^n \rho_{ij}(x_j, x_{-j}),$$

¹⁷There is no aggregate uncertainty if the number of voters n is sufficiently large.

so that parties maximize their expected vote share EV_j .

AMG provides theoretical results when $d = 1$, in which case

$$u_i(x_j, j) = -a(\tilde{x}_i - x_j)^2 + bt_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij},$$

where t_{ij} is a binary party identification variable.

They assume that a proportion m_j of voters identifies with party j . Among those voters, the distribution of blisspoints \tilde{x}_i is represented by a density function f_j with mean μ_j . A fraction m_0 of voters are “independent”, meaning that they do not identify with any party. The overall mean of the blisspoints distribution is μ_V , and AMG assume that the average blisspoint of the independents equals μ_V (they check empirically that is is the case when they put the model to the data).

AMG (2005, appendix 4.1) have an existence (and uniqueness) theorem, provided that a condition on endogenous variables is satisfied. Their theorem does not specify what the equilibrium policies are in equilibrium. Rather, they provide an algorithm to compute the equilibrium policies numerically. We now list the main characteristics of these equilibrium policies, starting with the simplest cases.

When $b = 0$, we are back to the stochastic partisan approach (section 4) with a unique equilibrium in pure strategies where all parties propose the centrist policy μ_V when a is close to zero. If a is larger than zero, then this equilibrium may not be unique. It is worth emphasizing that this result holds for $J \geq 2$ —i.e., with more than two parties! If $J = 2$, we obtain a unique equilibrium with policy convergence to μ_V even if $b > 0$ (provided that a is close to zero). This in some sense generalizes the results obtained for the “probabilistic” approach.

More generally, if $J \geq 3$, $b > 0$ and a tends towards zero, then parties propose policies which are located in between the centrist position (μ_V) and the average position of their partisans (μ_k). The reason why vote-seeking candidates shift away

from the center in the direction of their partisans is that the marginal change in a candidate's probability of attracting her own partisans' votes via policy appeals is higher than the marginal change in her probability of attracting a rival candidate's partisans.

AMG also provide comparative statics analysis of their model. They first obtain that increasing a (the salience of policy issue) and σ_V^2 (the dispersion of policy preferences) both lead to more dispersed policies. They obtain the same qualitative impact when partisans of party j become more extreme (as measured by average preferred policy μ_j) and when they become more numerous (larger μ_j). This is important, because more extreme parties often have fewer partisans, so that the two effects go in opposite directions. As we will see with the empirical applications to France and Norway, this leads to predictions that extreme parties (such as the communists and the Front National in France, or the Progress party in Norway) should have, in equilibrium, less extreme policy positions than more moderate parties! The impact of increasing b (the salience of partisanship) is ambiguous, but for empirically reasonable values of the parameters a larger value of b should lead to more extreme parties. Also, increasing the number of parties, J , should make policy proposals more extreme for existing parties. Finally, increasing the fraction of independent voters (m_0) should lead to more centrist policy proposals (as, at the limit, if all voters are independent, all parties converge to the centrist policy μ_V).

The AMG (2005) model is similar to Schofield's (2007), as both predict convergence to the electoral centre. For uniqueness of the equilibrium, AMG require that the weighted sum of voters' ideals be contained within an open ball. In Schofield's model the convergence condition differs, since the requirement is that the convergence coefficient be less than the dimension of the policy space, d . Like in the AGM model, convergence in Schofield's model depends on the variance

of voters' ideals along all dimensions but in addition depends on the importance voters give to the policy dimensions, β , and on the probability that voters chose the lowest valence party, $\rho_1(\mathbf{z}_0, \boldsymbol{\vartheta})$ in (9) which in turn depends on the valence differences between the top and lowest valence candidates. It is the interaction of these three factors through the convergence coefficient that determines whether there is convergence to the mean in Schofield's (2007) model. If the distribution of voters' ideals is too dispersed along any dimension, i.e., high σ^2 , or if the probability that voters chose the lowest valence party, party 1 is high, a high $\rho_1(\mathbf{z}_0, \boldsymbol{\vartheta})$, or if voters care a lot about policies, high β , then there is no convergence to the electoral mean.

We now turn to two applications of this unified model to party positioning in elections held in 1988 in France and in 1989 in Norway.

7.2 Applications of the unified model

7.2.1 France 1988 presidential elections

AMG (2005) study the 1988 presidential elections in France. They concentrate on the five most prominent candidates (representing the extreme left, left, center right, right and extreme right parties on the left-right dimension) and on the first round of the election.

They use the answers to Pierce's 1988 Presidential Election Study by the 748 respondents who have voted in the first round of the election. These respondents position themselves and the 5 candidates on four different scales numbered from 1 to 7 (so that $d = 4$): (1) the classical "left-right" one, (2) an immigration scale, (3) a public sector size scale and (4) a church school scale. They compute the average position of the 5 candidates on the 4 scales and obtain the same ordering on all 4 scales.

They first test what they call the “policy only model” which corresponds to utility (13) with $\mathbf{b}_j = 0$, so they individuals care about policy only, with some noise added to make voting probabilistic according to a conditional logit formula. This model performs poorly when confronted to the data, for two reasons: (1) it does a bad job at explaining the share of votes obtained by the 5 candidates in the sample of 748 voters, when the policy positions of the candidates are given by their average position as determined by these 748 voters and (2) it also does a very poor job at explaining the policy positions of the five candidates. More precisely, AMG obtain two types of equilibria, one with full convergence (where all candidates propose the centrist position in the sample) and one with partial convergence (where candidates form two blocks, a two-party block proposing a moderate left policy and a three-party block proposing a moderate right policy).

They conclude that their “policy-only” model, together with the assumption of vote maximization (which is very close to the stochastic partisanship model developed in section 4) does a poor job at explaining this election.

AMG then move to the unified model, where they add non-policy preferences by voters. More precisely, they add as covariates the class, income and gender of the respondent, and his partisanship (defined as the candidate with whom the respondent identifies). This model performs much better than the preceding one on two counts: (1) it explains much better the share of votes that each candidates received, when candidates policy positions are set at their average location as seen by the respondents, and (2) it generates nicely dispersed equilibrium positions, in the four dimensions studied (left-right, immigration, public sector size and attitude toward church schools). AMG report results on the left-right scale, where the expected vote functions are nicely concave in a candidate position when all other candidates positions are kept fixed (at their computed equilibrium value). The equilibrium positions are less extreme than the mean position advocated by

the partisans of the party, which is in line with the theoretical results provided above. At the same time, two characteristics of the equilibrium are not found in the actual candidates positions. First, the extreme parties (the communists and the Front National) adopt at equilibrium less extreme policies than the moderate (socialists and RPR, respectively) parties. This result falls in line with the theoretical results presented above, but clashes with the real position of these parties. AMG suggest that extreme political parties do not maximize their expected vote, but rather an objective which induces them to be more extreme than if they maximized expected vote. Second, the equilibrium policies are less extreme than those observed in reality. One way to make the equilibrium policies more extreme is to introduce the “unified model with discounting” where voters consider that parties will not be able to enact their announced policy when elected, but rather will cover the fraction $1 - d_j$ of the distance between a status quo position SQ and the announced policy x_j , so that the policy preference of voter i becomes

$$-a(\tilde{x}_i - (SQ + (1 - d_j)(x_j - SQ)))^2.$$

Not surprisingly, this modified model (1) generates less convergent (i.e., more extreme) policy proposals by parties and (2) better fits the empirical data (since there is an additional degree of freedom in the estimation of the parameter d_j). The estimated value of the parameter (assumed to be the same for all parties j) is $d_j = 0.34$, meaning that voters discount candidates’ promises by one third (and believe that a candidate will, if elected, move the actual policy to two-thirds of the distance between the status quo (exogenously set at the mid-point of the 1-7 scale) and the policy advertised by the candidate.

7.2.2 Norway 1989 elections

AMG proceed in a similar way to study the 1989 elections in Norway, which counts 7 different parties. They obtain very similar results, with the “policy-only” model incapable of reproducing the vote shares and policy positions of the parties, and the “unified model” performing much better on both counts, but generating positions which are (1) less extreme than the actual positions observed and (2) such that the extreme right (Progress) party proposes a more centrist position than the right party. The introduction of discounting in this unified model also allows to generate more extreme policies, moving them closer to the observed positions (with a discounting factor $d_j = 0.47$).

AMG also consider an extension to their model, which includes the fact that parties form one of two coalitions in Norway: a left-wing coalition comprised of two parties, or a right wing (comprised of 3 parties) (the Liberal and Progress parties were not potential members of either traditional bloc in 1989). They then consider that a party maximizes a weighted sum of its expected vote share and of the vote share of its coalition partners, with a relative weight of α on the latter. They obtain numerically a unique Nash equilibrium for exogenous values of α (set at 0.5 and 0.75), while a Nash equilibrium does not exist for $\alpha = 1$. The equilibrium policies are actually not very responsive to the value of α , showing that moving to coalition considerations does not affect much the parties’ equilibrium policies. Out of 7 parties, 4 equilibrium policies move closer to the actual policy positions, including the extreme-right party whose position becomes more extreme.

7.3 Adding valence to the empirical unified model

In the two empirical applications with 2 candidates ($J = 2$) (France’s second round and US presidential elections, both held in 1988), AMG add a valence component

(modelled as in section 6.1) to their unified model. They first estimate a conditional logit voting model with partisanship (and other covariates), where they interpret the intercept of the conditional logit equation for the winning candidate (Mitterrand for France, Bush for the US) as the valence of this candidate.¹⁸

Before introducing uncertainty (as to the candidate’s valence or the election results), they use this model to answer several questions. First, could the losing candidate have won the elections by choosing another policy (keeping the policy of the winner constant)? The answer is negative, showing that the winner’s valence advantage was large enough to prevent the valence disadvantaged candidate from winning. Second, they measure the policy leeway of the winner by computing the range of policies he could have proposed while still winning the election, whatever the policy choice of his opponent. They find quite large policy intervals for both countries, which they call the “dominance zone” of the election winner. This in turn means that the eventual winner had quite a lot of leeway to move close to his most-preferred policy, while the valence disadvantaged candidate had no such leeway and had to remain closer to the mean of the electorate.

They then introduce uncertainty for the valence of the winning candidate, assuming that this parameter (given by the intercept of their regression) is normally distributed with some standard deviation σ_V . This model being much more complex than the simple one developed in section 6.1.2, they can not focus on the median voter’s voting behavior. Rather, they make the assumption (which they call approximation) that the valence uncertainty generates a normal distribution of the expected vote share of both candidates, with a standard deviation which

¹⁸AMG also study the 1997 UK election. They exogenously fix the Liberal Democrat party’s policy at its observed position, and they endogenize the policy positions of the other two parties (Labour and Conservative). The rationale for this approach is that pre-election polls gave the Lib-Dem no chance at all of winning the general election, and that the implemented policy is assumed to be the one proposed by the party obtaining the plurality. They obtain results qualitatively very similar to those reported here for the France and US 1988 elections.

does not vary with the candidates positions. In other words, the expected vote share of candidate j is given by $EV_j(x_j, x_{-j}) + \varepsilon$, where $EV_j(x_j, x_{-j})$ is computed from the unified model estimated above, and where ε is normally distributed with a standard deviation of σ_ε . The probability of winning of party j is then given by

$$\pi_i(x_j, x_{-j}) = \Phi \left(\frac{EV_j(x_j, x_{-j}) - 0.5}{\sigma_\varepsilon} \right),$$

where Φ denotes the cdf of the normal distribution.

Solving the model numerically for both of France and the US, they obtain an equilibrium in pure strategies.¹⁹ They obtain in both cases that (1) the valence advantaged candidate proposes at equilibrium a policy close to his most-preferred policy (exogenously set for this exercise) while the valence disadvantaged candidate locates much closer to the average position of the electorate, and (2) that both candidates propose more extreme policies than the ones they would have proposed if their objective had been to maximize their probability of winning the elections. These two results give strong support to the theoretical predictions made at the end of section 6.1.2. Moreover, they obtain that the dispersion between equilibrium policy proposals increases with σ_ε . Intuitively, as the perceived election probability becomes less responsive to shift in policies (because of more valence uncertainty generating more uncertainty as to the winning probabilities), parties obtain more leeway to move closer to their most-preferred policies \tilde{x}_j .

AMG also apply the model of electoral uncertainty developed in section 6.1.1, to the 1988 elections in France and in the US, and the 1997 elections in the UK. They assume that the uncertainty in the location of the median voter translates into an uncertain distribution of the expected vote shares of the parties, with a

¹⁹They depict the expected utility and expected probability of winning of both candidates, as a function of the candidate's policy proposal, when his opponent policy proposal is fixed at his equilibrium values. The curves depicted are not everywhere quasi-concave, but they do exhibit a global maximum.

standard deviation increasing with the distance between the parties' policy proposals. So, the assumption that the median location is set at $m + \varepsilon$ with ε normally distributed around zero with standard deviation σ_m translates into an expected vote function normally distributed with a standard deviation σ_u defined by

$$\sigma_u = s\sigma_m |x_A - x_B|,$$

with s a parameter whose value is inferred from the data. They then proceed to numerical simulations of the two parties' equilibrium locations as a function of their (exogenously set) ideologically preferred most-preferred points and amount of uncertainty σ_m . They obtain a substantial amount of policy dispersion between the two parties even with low values of σ_m . For such low values, the valence-advantaged candidate is more extreme than the other candidate, while the opposite occurs for large values of σ_m . They then argue that the former case corresponds better to developed countries where the pre-election polls are usually quite informative, while the latter case (the "extreme underdog" effect) would rather occur in less developed countries where pre-election polls are less informative. To the best of our knowledge, this conjecture concerning less developed countries has not yet been put to the data.

8 Conclusion

This paper has surveyed the literature dealing with the positioning of political parties in uni- and multi-dimensional policy spaces. Constraints on the length of the paper have prevented us from surveying all contributions to this rich literature. A notable limitation of our survey is the restriction to models with an exogenous number of parties who commit to implement their policy proposals once elected. We have tried to focus on the main contributions, as well as on the more recent

ones. Our main focus is on theoretical contributions, but we also survey papers providing empirical applications of the theoretical concepts developed.

We first show that, in the absence of uncertainty, parties converge to the same policy whether they are electorally or policy motivated when the policy space is unidimensional, and that there is generically no equilibrium in pure strategies for multidimensional policy spaces. The first conclusion we draw is then that introducing some form of uncertainty as to the election results is primordial.

We first survey the papers assuming that voters' preferences are affected by a random shock determining the bias the voter has for one of the two parties, the so-called stochastic partisanship approach. The main result is that parties converge to the same policy when a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists, but that equilibrium existence requires a sufficiently large amount of uncertainty. It is worth stressing this point, often forgotten by contributions making use of this approach, since it indicates that stochastic partisanship probabilistic voting can actually create existence problems even in one-dimensional settings where a deterministic, Downsian equilibrium in pure strategies exists.

We then move to an alternative way of introducing uncertainty assuming that voters do not have partisan preferences, but rather that parties are uncertain as to the *policy* preferences of voters. There are important equilibrium existence issues when parties have electoral motivations, so that we concentrate on policy motivations. Although there is no satisfactory general existence theorem, the so-called Wittman equilibrium often exists in uni-dimensional policy spaces, and exhibits the nice property (empirically validated) that parties do not converge to the same policy. Unfortunately, equilibria generically fail to exist in multi-dimensional policy spaces. We then examine the approach pioneered by Roemer, where parties are composed of two factions, one having electoral motivations while the other has policy objectives. The resulting Party Unanimity Nash Equilibria

often exist, and several papers provide empirical applications of this approach.

Next, we survey models in which candidates' electoral prospects depend on a valence component—voters' non-policy evaluation of candidates—and where all voters agree that one party has better characteristics than another. In a one-dimensional policy model with valence and no uncertainty with two win and office motivated candidates, Groseclose (2001) proves the non-existence of Nash equilibria in pure strategies. The intuition behind this result is that at any position one of the two candidates wants to move. This result extends to multidimensional policy two candidates models with no uncertainty, thus showing the knife-edge quality of the Downs and Wittman results in valence models. Extensions of Groseclose's model with mixed strategy Nash equilibria are discussed in the Appendix showing that the knife-edge property of the Downsian model is an illusion since the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium converges to the Downsian pure strategy equilibrium when the valence advantage converges to zero. In a two-candidate one-dimensional model with valence, Londregan and Romer (1993) show the existence divergent policy platforms when parties are uncertain as to candidates' ability to generate constituency services in which the degree of policy polarization increases in the importance voters' give to the valence issue.

We then examine *multi-dimensional policy* models in which voters rank candidates along a single valence dimension. These models derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) show that equilibrium existence in a win-motivated two-candidate no uncertainty model depends on voters' ideal policies not being too dispersed in the policy space, but that equilibria typically fail to exist when candidates maximize their vote share rather than their probability of winning.

Schofield's (2007) multi-dimensional multi-candidate model shows that candidates converge to the electoral mean if the convergence coefficient is less than

the dimension of the policy space and this happens when voters do not give too much importance to the policy space (or alternatively, when votes give greater importance to the valence issue), when their ideal policies are not too dispersed and when the probability of voting for the lowest valence candidate –when all candidates locate at the electoral mean–is high enough so that the valence difference between the the lowest valence and all other candidates is not too large. We then examine extensions to Schofield’s (2007) model to elections with regional parties tha affect convergence to the electoral mean.

We also study Schofield’s (2006) *endogenous* valence model where activists contribute resouces of time and money in an effort to influence candidates’ policy positions when candidates use these resources to influence voters’ decisions. This endogenous valence model shows that in equilibrium candidates’ locate where the activist and electoral pulls balance each other. The section ends with a discussion of the empirical evidence on valence models as applied to several elections in various countries under various political regimes.

In the final section, we present the “unified model” developed by Adams, Merrill and Grofman where voters care both for multi-dimensional policies and for the parties enacting them. More precisely, voters differ in their partisanship, with some being closer to one party and others to another party, with this partisanship affecting their policy preferences. This unified model has been fruitfully applied to several elections, such as the 1988 French presidential elections, and the 1989 election in Norway. We also consider an empirical extension where valence is added to this unified model.

9 Appendix: Equilibria in mixed strategy with valence and office motivation

Aragones and Palfrey (2002) solve the mixed strategy equilibrium version of the Groseclose model where candidates chose from a finite number of position and candidate A has an infinitesimal valence advantage (e.g., value of holding office, incumbent performance, constituency service, campaign advertising) over candidate D . Candidates maximize their probability of winning but don't know the location of the median voter's ideal point. They assume that voters vote for A unless D is closer to the voter's ideal by some fixed distance, δ . In general, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibria. In their unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium with no gaps, candidates randomize over a fairly small number of positions in a region near the expected median. They show that as the number of positions becomes fairly large—so that the policy space approximates a continuous space—the region over which candidates chose positions converges to that of the expected median voter's position. They find that as A 's advantage converges to zero, the equilibrium probability of winning converges to $1/2$. This continuity result also depends on the valence dimensions playing a *minor* role in the election. Aragones and Palfrey conclude the knife-edged property of the Downsian model is an *illusion* since the distribution of strategies in the mixed equilibrium converges to the Downsian pure strategy equilibrium.

In their 2005 paper, Aragones and Palfrey argue that the limitations of their 2002 model is that (1) candidates do not have preferences over policies; (2) hard to imagine how candidates implement mixed strategies; and (3) candidates have perfect information about the objective function of her opponent. Aragones and Palfrey (2005) argue that by adding private information they can justify mixed strategy equilibrium and relax these assumptions in a two-candidate two-dimensional

asymmetric information model where one candidate has a quality advantage and candidates care about policies and winning. The weight placed on winning and their ideal policy are the candidate's private information with the weight drawn independently of each candidate from a commonly known distribution. The median voter's ideal point is drawn from a distribution common to both candidates. They show that candidates locate at the center if and only if her value of holding office is sufficiently high. They also show that the advantaged (disadvantaged) candidate A (D) is more (less) likely to locate at the centre the more likely D (A) is to locate at the centre. An increase in the uncertainty about the median voter's ideal point (or alternatively, as the electorate becomes more polarized) makes both candidates more likely to adopt more polarized policies. They show that the equilibrium policies converge to those of Aragonés and Palfrey (2002) as the weight candidates give to policies converges to zero.

Aragones and Xefteris (2012) develop a two-candidate Downsian model in which one candidate has a valence advantage and the policy space is continuous. They assume that voters have quadratic (rather than Euclidean) policy preferences, thus making candidates payoff functions continuous (rather than discontinuous) so that the best response function of the disadvantaged candidate is well (rather than not well) defined. They study the pure strategy Nash equilibria when candidates' beliefs on the distribution of the median's ideal policy is unimodal. In equilibrium, the advantaged candidate chooses to locate at the expected median voter's ideal with probability one and the disadvantaged candidate chooses to locate with equal probability at one of two policies symmetrically located about the expected median. Their results show that an equilibrium exists for any size (small enough so that there is no pure strategy equilibria) of the advantage if and only if the variance of the location of the median voter's ideal is low enough relative to the size of the advantage, i.e., when candidates believe that the median voter's

ideal is close enough to $1/2$ with high enough probability. The advantage candidate adopts policies that are more moderate than the disadvantaged one with the advantage candidate having a larger probability of winning than the disadvantaged candidate. Moreover, they find that as the advantage increases so does the probability of the advantaged candidate winning, candidates' policies become more differentiated, and the existence conditions on the variance of the median's ideal are relaxed. As the advantage disappears, the disadvantaged candidate's policy moves closer to the advantage one, thus converging to the standard Downsian model where both candidates converge to the expected median.

10 Appendix: Convergence coefficient tables

Table 1: The Convergence Coefficient in Plurality Systems^a					
	United States			United Kingdom	
	2000	2004	2008	2005	2010
Importance given the policy dimensions (β)					
Est. β	0.82	0.95	0.85	0.15	0.86
(conf. Int. ^a)	(0.71,0.93)	(0.82,1.08)	(0.73,0.97)	(0.13,0.17)	(0.81,0.90)
Sum of variance of voters' ideal policies along two dimensions (σ^2)					
σ^2	1.17	1.17	1.63	5.607	1.462
Probability of voting for lowest valence party (party 1, $\rho_1 = [\sum_{k=1}^c \exp(\vartheta_k - \vartheta_1)]^{-1}$)					
	Dem ^b	Dem ^c	Rep ^c	LibDem ^d	Labour ^d
Est. ρ_1	$\rho_{Dem} = 0.4$	$\rho_{Dem} = 0.4$	$\rho_{rep} = 0.3$	$\rho_{Lib} = 0.25$	$\rho_{Lab} = 0.32$
(conf. Int. ^a)	(0.35,0.44)	(0.35,0.44)	(0.26,0.35)	(0.18,0.32)	(0.29,0.32)
Convergence coefficient ($c \equiv c(\boldsymbol{\vartheta}, \beta, \sigma^2) = 2\beta[1 - 2\rho_1]\sigma^2$)					
Est. c	0.38	0.45	1.1	0.84	0.98
(conf. Int. ^a)	(0.2,0.65)	(0.23,0.76)	(0.71,1.52)	(0.51,1.25)	(0.86,1.10)

^a Table taken from Gallego and Schofield 2013, 2015); ^b Conf. Int. = Confidence Intervals;

^c US: Dem=Democrats; Rep=Republican; ^d UK: LibDem=Liberal Democrats.

Table 2: The Convergence Coefficient in Proportional Systems^a				
	Israel	Turkey		Poland
	1996	1999	2002	1997
Weight of policy differences (β)				
Central Est. ^b of β (conf. Int. ^c)	1.207 (1.076,1.338)	0.375 (0.203,0.547)	1.520 (1.285,1.755)	1.739 (1.512,1.966)
Electoral variance ($trace_{\nabla} = \sigma^2$)				
σ^2	1.732	2.34	2.33	2.00
Probability of voting for lowest valence party (party 1, $\rho_1 = [\sum_{k=1}^p \exp(\vartheta_k - \vartheta_1)]^{-1}$)				
	TW ^d	FP ^e	ANAP ^e	ROP ^f
Central Est. ^b of ρ_1 (conf. Int. ^c)	$\rho_{TW}^I = 0.014$ (0.006,0.034)	$\rho_{FP} = 0.08$ (0.046,0.145)	$\rho_{ANAP}^T = 0.08$ (0.038,0.133)	$\rho_{ROP}^P = 0.007$ (0.002,0.022)
Convergence coefficient ($c \equiv c(\boldsymbol{\vartheta}, \beta, \sigma^2) = 2\beta[1 - 2\rho_1]\sigma^2$)				
Central Est. ^b of c (conf. Int. ^c)	4.06 (3.474,4.579)	1.49 (0.675,2.234)	5.75 (4.388,7.438)	5.99 (5.782,7.833)

^a Table taken from Gallego and Schofield 2013, 2015); ^b Central Est. = Central Estimate;

^c Conf. Int. = Confidence Intervals; ^d Israel: TW = Third Way;

^e Turkey: DYP = True Path Party. ^f Poland: ROP = Movement for Reconstruction of Poland.

Table 3: The Convergence Coefficient in Anocracies^a			
	Georgia	Russia	Azerbaijan^e
	2008	2007	2010
Weight of policy differences (β)			
Est. β (conf. Int. ^b)	0.78 (0.66, 0.89)	0.181 (0.15,0.20)	1.34 (0.77,1.91)
Electoral variance ($trace_{\nabla} = \sigma^2$)			
σ^2	1.73	5.90	0.93
Probability of voting for lowest valence party (party 1, $\rho_1 = [\sum_{k=1}^p \exp(\vartheta_k - \vartheta_1)]^{-1}$)			
	N ^d	SR ^c	AXCP-MP ^d
Est. ρ_1 (conf. Int. ^a)	$\rho_N^G = 0.05$ (0.03,0.07)	$\rho_{SR}^R = 0.07$ (0.04,0.12)	$\rho_{AXCP-MP} = 0.21$ (0.08,0.47)
Convergence coefficient ($c \equiv c(\boldsymbol{\vartheta}, \beta, \sigma^2) = 2\beta[1 - 2\rho_1]\sigma^2$)			
Est. c (conf. Int. ^a)	2.42 (1.99,2.89)	1.83 (1.35,2.28)	1.44 (0.085,2.984)

^a Table taken from Gallego and Schofield 2013, 2015); ^b Conf. Int. = Confidence Intervals;

^c Georgia: N=Natelashvili; ^d Russia: SR=Fair Russia;

^e Azerbaijan: AXCP-MP=Azerbaijan Popular Front Party (AXCP) and Musavat (MP).

The estimates for Azerbaijan are less precise because the sample is small.

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