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정치학석사학위논문

## Emotions in Political Attitudes:

Long-held Partisanship, Compassionate Anger, and  
Self-regarding Anxiety in the Korean Public Opinion

정치태도의 감정적 토대:

한국 대중여론에서 장기적 당파심, 공감적 분노,  
개인적 불안감의 정치적 의미

2015년 8월

서울대학교 대학원

정치외교학부 정치학 전공

신 화 용

# Emotions in Political Attitudes:

Long-held Partisanship, Compassionate Anger, and  
Self-regarding Anxiety in the Korean Public Opinion

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts  
(Political Science)  
in Seoul National University  
July 2015

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## Abstract

### Emotions in Political Attitudes:

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This study aims to understand the political significance of emotions in political attitudes in the context of South Korea. Against the popular notion of democratic citizenship in which emotions are marginalized while intellect and knowledge are emphasized, this study proposes that emotions can be the central route through which citizens interact with political discourses and contexts to shape their political attitudes. The findings of this study shed light on the political relevance of emotions, which has been overlooked in the public opinion studies of South Korea for a long time.

The results of the survey experiment on fifteen social issues highlight the political significance of emotions with the following implications. First, through the experimental survey with partisanship cues, it is found that party

identification, the long-held emotional attachment to political parties, serves as a structural background of political attitudes on which individuals accept or reject elite discourses and accordingly determine their own opinions, rather than randomly or uncritically accepting all types of elite discourse. The mobilizing effect of elite discourse can be either substantial or negligible depending on individual citizens' partisanship, the partisan cleavage shaped around the issue, and the issue salience. These findings imply that partisanship might contribute to the democratic process as a solid basis of political attitudes.

Second, on the issues that are applied with compassion cues, it is found that compassionate anger toward social injustice or hardships of others encourages individuals to be more attentive to the given message and to more actively reflect it on their political attitudes. When compassionate anger is triggered, people show higher tendency to accept the alternative viewpoint that is in conflict with their initial preference, which implies the conducive role of emotions in promoting tolerance for different opinions. Furthermore, especially on the issues that are closely related to specific political symbols, compassionate anger strengthens the connection between policy preference and preexisting political predisposition such as ideology, which suggests another way of how emotions come to have political relevance in mass opinion.

Lastly, when self-regarding anxiety is triggered by neighborhood cues, the linkage between personal life and political agenda is strengthened in citizens' minds, as it is manifested on their expressed opinions. While it has been claimed in the previous studies that personal interest has minimal impact on political attitudes because citizens perceive political issues as abstract and distant from their own lives, the results of this study indicate that

self-regarding anxiety, triggered by the localization of issues, significantly alters individuals' opinions in accordance with self-regarding anxiety about their expected personal consequences. These findings imply that citizens form their political attitudes based on the reasonable considerations for personal conditions through self-regarding anxiety.

Despite the substantial difficulty of studying emotions due to their impalpable nature, this study contributes to the political science scholarship of South Korea as an initial attempt to empirically demonstrate the political relevance of a wide range of emotions in diverse social contexts. Rather than being a disruptive or inconsequential component of political attitudes, this study suggests that emotions can encourage citizens to more actively engage in political affairs in the following ways: first, the measured responses to elite discourses based on partisan attachment; second, the active consideration of relevant information and the tolerance for differing opinions encouraged by compassionate anger; and lastly, the intimate connection between the political issues and their own lives fostered by self-regarding anxiety. Through these findings, I wish that this study would be a watershed in the public opinion studies of South Korea as the first serious attempt to include emotions as the central research agenda in our pursuit to understand political thoughts and behaviors of the mass public.

**Keywords: Emotion, Public Opinion, Party Identification, Compassion, Anxiety, Survey Experiment**

**Student Number: 2013-20180**

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# I . Introduction

## 1. Emotions and The Study of Public Opinion

Emotions are indescribable and impalpable. While we always feel emotions, it is difficult to clarify the nature of emotions because they unconsciously rise and fade in our minds. Could we clearly pinpoint the starting moment of the emotion that we currently feel? Could we easily disentangle fear from anxiety or enthusiasm from hopefulness? Could we even separate emotions from deliberative thoughts in a clear-cut way? Answers to these questions will invariably be negative.

Yet, emotions are ubiquitous and powerful in every moment of our life, including our 'political' life. When we feel anger toward a political mishap of our government, we begin to underrate their performance. When we feel anxiety about a potential threat in our society, we begin to observe the movements of president, parliament, and media with more care. When we feel enthusiasm for a future envisioned by a politician, we bother to go to the ballot place to cast a vote to the person. In other words, emotions, which are felt by every citizen without exception, powerfully shape political attitude and behavior of the mass public.

However, emotions were marginalized in the study of public opinion for a long time. Scholars focused more on deliberative and calculative aspects of political behavior of the mass public that involve cost-benefit analysis, performance evaluation, factual knowledge, or solidly structured ideology (Downs 1957; Key 1966; Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Converse 1964; Carpini and Keeter 1996). Furthermore, emotions were even considered as malicious

component of public opinion. Emotions were often contrasted with calculative deliberation, spreading the perception that emotions make political judgments to be rash, factious, inconsistent, or habitual (Madison 1787; Converse 1964).

This scholarly neglect or condemnation of emotions probably stems from the amorphous nature of emotions. In other words, it is highly likely that the study of public opinion underrated the importance of emotions or attributed them as a cause of instability, simply because it is difficult to observe them. Different from deliberative thoughts or calculation, emotions emerge without prior notice and out of our intentional control. However, in reality, emotions might wield greater leverage in our political life than deliberative calculation. Depictions of public opinion as “holy ghost” (Key 1961) or “phantom” (Lippmann 1925) literally signify the complex and inscrutable nature of public opinion, but they might also implicitly allude to the overarching influence of ‘intangible’ emotions on political attitudes of the mass public. In other words, the difficulty of observation may have deterred proper study of emotions with respect to public opinion, despite its obvious significance in our political life.

Acknowledging both the difficulty and necessity of studying emotions in regard to public opinion, this study aims to understand how emotions influence the way individuals perceive social issues and accordingly shape their political attitudes. As to capture the workings of emotions that are beyond our consciousness, I devise a set of survey experiments that incorporates political frame cues that evoke partisan attachment, compassion, or anxiety about social issues found in South Korea. Although it might require speculation and imagination to interpret frame cues as emotion-laden stimuli, I attempt to observe how emotions permeate into political attitudes at least indirectly, rather than simply disregarding emotions as unobservable.

With the aim of understanding the political meanings of emotions among the mass public, this study contributes to the studies of political science in South Korea, as the first attempt to highlight a wide range of emotions as central component of public opinion through experimental methods, with the following significances.

First, this study expands the scope of public opinion studies in South Korea to non-electoral context. The public opinion studies in South Korea have been mostly limited to the election period, especially on how citizens make vote decisions. Scholars have hardly focused solely on political attitudes or policy preferences per se, but usually connected them to voting behavior (이재철 2008; 장승진 2013; 김성연·정효명 2014). In consequence, political attitudes or policy preferences were seldom considered as the ultimate object of inquiry, but often became a given set of independent variables. While the studies that can be labeled as 'voting behavior' studies are abundant, the studies that can be labeled as 'public opinion' studies are relatively rare in the Korean political science literature. This study, on the other hand, focuses on the political attitudes that precede voting behavior and finds implications that are not restricted to electoral contexts, with full attention to the public opinion itself.

Second, this study highlights emotions, which have been overlooked or narrowly dealt with in the public opinion studies in South Korea, as the central linkage between the mass public and political issues. Most studies about the Korean electorate have concentrated on political knowledge, left-right ideology, or policy preferences, without serious concern for emotional facets of mass opinion (이내영 2009; 류제성 2012; 강우진 2013). Emotions did

receive scholarly attention, but only in the aspects of partisan attachment or likes and dislikes toward election candidates and political parties, with limited measurements of party identification and feeling thermometer (강원택 2012; 한정훈 2012; 장승진 2012; 허석재 2014). While overlooked in the field of political science, the political role of emotions in public opinion has been rather studied in the field of communications studies (이건혁 2002; 이강형 2006; 김춘식 2010). Going beyond the preexisting boundary, this study widens the scope of the political science literature of South Korea to encompass a wide range of emotions that are triggered by diverse social issues that consistently arise even during non-election periods.

Third, this study proposes methodological value of experiments to the studies of political science in South Korea. The study of public opinion in South Korea, with a clear bias on election periods, has largely depended on survey as the dominant research method. Except for the recent studies that use experiments (박원호·안도경·한규섭 2013; 박원호·신화용 2014), it is difficult to encounter with the studies that use experiment as research method in the Korean political science research. Through this study, I reaffirm the value of experiment as a way to study political behavior that can disentangle the convoluted relationship between multiple factors, by clarifying the preceding factors and causal relationship between them (Kinder and Palfrey 1993; 안도경 2014). Moreover, through experimental method, I imitate real-life situations in which individuals encounter political issues and shape their attitudes, which is another merit of experiment that allows researchers to mimic reality in social science research (Kinder and Sanders 1990) and to capture subtle interaction between political attitudes and delicate stimuli such as emotional cues (Brader 2006).

Lastly, the significance of this study is found in the challenges that it poses against the popular notion of democratic competence of citizens that has dominated the political science research for a long time. Rather than discrediting citizens for lack of cognitive capabilities and limiting the range of meaningful citizenship with a harsh criterion on political sophistication, I propose that emotions can lead citizens, regardless of intellectual ability, to effectively reflect newly given information on their attitudes in a reasonable way. In this contemporary era that is full of media coverage and virtually unlimited access to information, it is the 'motivation' behind political engagement, not the 'intellectual qualification,' that needs to be given a greater attention in assessing competency of democratic citizens. Therefore, I expect emotions, along with other cognitive components of political attitudes, will be given a greater importance in our scholarly pursuit of finding ways to achieve democratic ideals.

This study finds its theoretical background in the previous studies in the context of the American mass public, whose research targets range from long-term partisan attachment to short-term enthusiasm, anger, and anxiety (Sears *et al.* 1980; Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus 2002; Brader 2006; Redlawsk 2006; Valentino *et al.* 2008). Through this study, I wish to highlight emotions as a long-forgotten, but important component that is essential in understanding the mass behavior of the Korean public.

## 2. Research Questions and Outline of Chapters

Based on the experiments on fifteen social issues in South Korea, which involve partisan attachment, others-oriented emotions, and self-oriented emotions, this study poses the following research questions.

First, can emotions be considered as a virtue of democratic citizenship that provides structural background of public opinion, increases tolerance to alternative viewpoints, or triggers individuals to more actively connect themselves to social issues? While recent literatures of public opinion studies raised questions in a similar vein (Marcus 2002; Valentino *et al.* 2008), alternative perspective that emphasizes cognitive capabilities such as political knowledge, sophisticated belief system, or calculative skill as democratic virtues of citizenship (Converse 1964; Lippmann 1922; Madison 1822; Key 1961; Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Carpini and Keeter 1996) has dominated the public opinion literature for a long time. Against this cognition-centered perception of democratic virtue, can emotions also be considered as democratic virtue that connects citizens to social issues and that encourages citizens to reasonably consider relevant information and alternatives in forming political attitudes?

Second, does party identification, a long lasting emotional attachment to political parties, provide structural background of individual political attitude and aggregate public opinion? What is the role of attachment to political parties that sustains throughout an individual's entire life and is stable even across generations (Campbell *et al.* 1960; Jennings and Niemi 1975; Converse and Markus 1979; Sears and Funk 1999; Green *et al.* 2002), especially regarding political attitudes about social issues? In other words, how does



partisan attachment influence the way individuals shape political attitudes in interaction with political discourses found in our society?

Third, can others-oriented emotion, notably compassion, about social problems encourage citizens to be more tolerant about conflicting ideas? In other words, can emotions, rather than making political attitudes to be habitual, uncritical, factious, or polarized (Madison 1787; Feigenson 1997), free individuals from habitual dispositions and channel their attention to relevant information to seriously consider alternative viewpoints? Rather than being solely self-centered with an aim of utility maximization when facing political affairs (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974), are individuals willingly empathize with social injustice or disadvantaged social groups even if these problems are distantly related to themselves, and further reflect this compassionate mind on their political attitudes? Can citizens perceive social issues in a sociotropic way, not only as evaluation of economy or government performance (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000), but also as empathetic emotional reaction, in forms of anger, anxiety, grief, or disappointment, toward social problems or sufferings of others?

Lastly, can self-oriented emotions, such as self-regarding anxiety about potential threat to individual health and property or self-regarding enthusiasm about potential comfort and gain, lead individuals to more strongly associate themselves with the social issues at hand? While an array of studies has found minimal impact of self-interest on political attitudes (Sears *et al.* 1980; Brader *et al.* 2008; Lau and Heldman 2009; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010), can anxiety triggered by regional proximity crystallize physical danger or material interests at stake, so that those personal negative consequences are more

clearly reflected on their attitudes toward social issues? In other words, can self-oriented emotions lead citizens to perceive in social issues with greater interest and vigilance on personal circumstances?

With these questions in mind, this study consists of five chapters as follows. After this introductory chapter, in Chapter 2, I build a theoretical foundation of this study, based mainly on the studies of political science and also on the studies of other disciplines such as psychology and neuroscience. In Chapter 3, I introduce experimental survey design that I devised with an intention to understand how partisan attachment, others-oriented emotions, and self-oriented emotions influence the way individual citizens perceive and assess political issues. In Chapter 4, in search of answers to the abovementioned research questions, I analyze the results of the survey experiments. I first provide an overall analysis of the entire study, and later analyze six selected issues in depth to infer political significances of emotions in public opinion. In Chapter 5, I summarize political meanings of each type of emotions among the Korean public opinion and propose future research tasks in the quest to understand workings of emotions in political attitudes and mass opinion.

## II. Theoretical Backgrounds

### 1. Emotions and Democratic Citizenship

#### 1.1. Emotions as Undemocratic Trait

Despite the prevalence of emotions in our political life, there has been a longstanding bias toward intellectual reasoning in the study of public opinion and mass political behavior. A normative view that “reasonable decisions led by thought, rather than unreasoned decisions led by emotion, are preferable in a democratic society” has been dominant in the study of political science at least since the enlightenment era (Kuklinski *et al.* 1991). Consequently, the majority of the public opinion studies have emphasized the central role of intellect and knowledge in ordinary citizens’ political preference and behavior.

The popular notion that considers intellectual capabilities, which are unswayed by emotional stimuli, as the democratic virtue of citizens is found in the discussions of the Founding Fathers of the United States. In *The Federalist Papers*, Madison (1787) contends that political misjudgment and error will occur when individuals abide by “every sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse which the people may receive from the arts of men” and that emotions cause political factions that are harmful to a community. In his scheme of government, “[it] is the reason, alone, of the public that ought to control and regulate the government” and that “the passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the government” (Madison 1788). Furthermore, in a letter to W. T. Barry, he mentions that a popular government devoid of popular knowledge presages “a farce or a tragedy,” and requires individuals to “arm themselves with knowledge” in order to participate in the governing

process (Madison 1822). In general, the Founding Fathers emphasize the role of intellectual reasoning in a sound rule of government and society, while alerting the need to suppress the influence of emotions among the mass public. In this line of thought, scholars have often considered emotion as capricious and undependable base of political attitudes that needs to be suppressed (Kant 1785/1998) because it leads public opinion to become an amorphous “mood” (Almond 1950) that is “eerie” (Key 1961) like a “phantom” (Lippmann 1925).

In this scholarly tradition, only the individuals with high level of political sophistication or intellect are assumed to have coherent and rational political attitudes (Converse 1964; Key 1961; Carpini and Keeter 1996) or to be capable of participating in democratic process more effectively and actively (Palfrey and Poole 1987; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Individuals with low level of political sophistication have been considered as having no meaningful political attitude or as having inconsistent and capricious attitude, which is summarized as ‘non-attitudes’ (Converse 1964).

In extreme cases, scholars have derived political attitude or behavior from a complex set of calculations on expected benefits and costs, assuming that rational citizens would undergo this process when they form political attitudes (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974). If not numerically rigorous on material benefits and costs, individuals were expected to possess sophisticated knowledge or well-structured belief system in order to be considered as democratically capable citizens (Converse 1964; Madison 1787; Key 1961). Discussions on the use of heuristics or shortcuts in knowledge acquisition (Simon 1985; Mondak 1993; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Lau and Redlawsk 2001), despite their relaxed assumptions, still

emphasize knowledge as a central basis of political attitudes.

Under this belief that sound political judgment is based on political knowledge or sophistication, only a small portion of ordinary citizens are found to be equipped with sufficiently high level of political sophistication (Converse 1964; Neuman 1986; Zaller 1992; Carpini and Keeter 1996). In other words, intellect or knowledge is not a universally shared basis of political attitudes among the mass public.

Logical calculation and reasoning as a requirement of democratic citizenship are not only unrealistic, but also potentially detrimental to democracy. When intellectual capability occupies the central place in assessing citizen competence while the role of emotion is undermined, the scope of meaningful democratic citizens will be sadly reduced to a limited portion of ordinary people. Only the individuals who can be entitled as “special public” (Key 1961) or “issue public” (Converse 1964) will be considered as democratically competent citizens, while the others, the majority of the public who has feeble understanding of politics in an intellectual way, will be marginalized from the political process. In other words, the cognition-centered image of ideal democratic citizenship might undervalue a large portion of the mass public in contemporary democracy as being unqualified to effectively engage in political affairs.

However, is it desirable or even possible to set aside a large portion of the mass public as democratically incapable citizens for their lack of sophisticated knowledge about politics? Is it inevitably necessary to require citizens to fulfill an unrealistic criterion of intellect to be considered as a citizen with democratic virtue? Does this type of perception necessarily lead to a proper

understanding of mass opinion and behavior in political science research? Confronting this popular condemnation of contemporary citizens for their intellectual deficiency regarding political affairs, this study orients the focus toward emotions in understanding public opinion and mass political behavior, by proposing ‘emotions’ as a central route through which ordinary citizens engage in politics.

## **1.2. Emotions as Democratic Virtue**

In reality, citizens rarely behave in a highly meticulous and calculative way when they engage in politics, which belies the expectations of the aforementioned discussions. It is practically impossible to find an individual who scribbles down all the expected costs and benefits before making a vote decision. It is likewise improbable that a person harbors policy preferences to multiple issues that are systematically intertwined with his or her ideological orientation without variation. In other words, a citizen who is highly knowledgeable about political phenomena with an adroit calculative skill is an unrealistic portrait of contemporary citizens.

While emotions have been overshadowed by logical reasoning as a basis of political attitudes for a long time in the field of public opinion studies, scholars of other disciplines have highlighted the need to understand emotions in order to truly comprehend human nature and capability.

In the fields of psychology and evolutionary biology, scholars have noted that emotions precede human thoughts and behaviors as the ultimate motivation behind adaptive, strategic, and prompt reactions to surrounding

environment (Freud 1915/1957; Zajonc 1980; Westen 2008; Darwin 1872/1998). In the fields of neuroscience and social psychology, emotion, along with cognition<sup>1</sup>, has been considered as a central determinant of attitude formation. Emotion and cognition, rather than being separate entities, together influence attitude and behavior of individuals in an interactive way (Ledoux 1989; Petty and Wegener 1998). Furthermore, it is claimed that emotions, not only precede perception and judgment, but can also improve decision makings or undergird rational judgments by triggering attention to surrounding environment and relevant information (Damasio 1994; Rolls 2005). Against the popular notion that emotions cannot serve as a solid basis of a sound decision, this line of thought suggests that “higher cognition requires the guidance provided by affective processing” (Adolphs and Damasio 2001, 45).

In fact, when we trace back the political science scholarship with wider perspective, we can encounter a long line of thought that emphasizes emotions as antecedent of thoughts and behaviors that shapes our political life. Hume (1738/1896), who considered emotion as the underlying basis of political morality, recognized “reason” as “the slave of passions,” which “can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” Likewise, Hobbes (1651/1968) also considered emotion, especially passion, as the fundamental motivator behind human thoughts and behaviors in relation to other social members.

Furthermore, it has been claimed that emotions, rather than being a

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<sup>1</sup> While the concept of cognition is more intricate and debatable than those of knowledge and intellect, cognition is largely differentiated from affect or emotion for being more conscious and intentional mental process about factual correctness. Partly depending on the detailed discussion of the differences between affect and cognition found in Zajonc (1998, 596-597), this study focuses on the intellectual and deliberative aspects of cognition in order to clarify the conceptual difference between cognition and emotion.

destabilizer of a society, can engender shared social values and concepts, such as social justice or human rights, among the members of a society (Hobbes 1651/1968; Smith 1759/1959; Pizarro 2000; Hunt 2008; Frazer 2012). More recently, studies have highlighted emotions as an alternative democratic virtue that can enhance and activate citizens' interest in political affairs and political participation (Marcus 2002; Valentino *et al.* 2008). In this line of thought, scholars have claimed that emotions can provoke attention to political affairs or crystallize previously hidden opinions, rather than being an undesirable or negligible component of political attitudes.

Moreover, long-lasting emotions such as partisan attachment can serve as a life-long basis of diverse political attitudes of individual citizens or can operate as perceptual screen or informational shortcut in making political decisions (Campbell *et al.* 1960; Bartels 2002; Gerber *et al.* 2010). Short-term emotions such as anxiety or fear felt toward politicians or society can provoke interest in politics, trigger the search for relevant political information, encourage political participation, or shape clear attitudes or coherent behavior regarding political figures or public policies (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus 2002; Huddy *et al.* 2005; Brader 2006; Valentino *et al.* 2008; Westen 2008; Shin 2015). In other words, rather than destabilizing a society, emotions can link individuals to their society and buttress social stability (Nussbaum 1996; Shin 2014).

With these theoretical backgrounds, this study confronts the popular belief that emotions are dangerous to democracy and highlights the political significance of emotions among the mass opinion in three ways. First, while the intellectual criteria of democratic citizenship rank individuals according to their intellectual ability, this study incorporate a wider range of people as



competent citizens who can emotionally connect themselves with social issues. Second, this study provides evidence that emotions, rather than producing inconsistent political attitudes, can serve as a democratic virtue, with a power to direct attention to pertinent information. In other words, this study explores whether emotions can elicit political attitudes that are based on long-term partisan attachment, compassion to others with tolerance for conflicting ideas, or reasonable consideration for personal consequences. Lastly, the focus on emotions in understanding mass political behavior can lead to a more realistic portrait of contemporary citizens. While it is awkward to think of a person who calculates and logically explains all of his or her political attitudes, it is easy to find individuals who express instantaneous emotional reactions toward politics when a scandalous or heart-rending incident happens in our society. With the political role of emotions in mind, we will be open to a greater possibility of finding a more realistic and convincing path to democratic ideals in contemporary societies.

Through the experimental survey, I examine how long-held emotional attachment, sociotropic emotions, and self-oriented emotions, unconsciously but powerfully, influence political attitudes. For that end, theoretical backgrounds of each type of emotions are discussed below.

## 2. Emotions toward Political Parties, Society, and Self

### 2.1. Long-term and Short-term Emotions

Despite the long-held emphasis on intellectual awareness as the normative demand on democratic citizens, there have been studies with different perspectives that have tried to uncover political significance of emotions. There are three main theoretical approaches in the study of emotions in political science: approach-avoidance theories, appraisal theories, and affective intelligence (AI) theory (Brader and Marcus 2013). After reviewing each of these approaches, I discuss emotions from a temporal perspective according to the orientation of each emotional state.

As to briefly overview the previous theories on emotions, first, approach-avoidance theories understand affect as a preconscious appraisal of given stimuli as ‘punishment or reward,’ or as ‘likes or dislikes’ (Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Damasio 1994). An adaptation of approach-avoidance theories in political psychology is hot cognition approach that emphasizes distinction between positive and negative emotions, in which distinction among specific emotions matters less (Brader *et al.* 2011). According to the hot cognition theory, sociopolitical concepts are charged with negative or positive affect in memory and the affect is automatically reflected on evaluations through the repeated coactivation of concept and affect, which implies the automaticity and precedence of emotions in political judgments (Lodge and Taber 2013).

Second, appraisal theories, rather than situating emotions on a bipolar dimension of likes to dislikes, consider a wider variety of emotional states and seek to understand how different appraisal of surrounding environment is

matched with distinct emotional reactions (Scherer *et al.* 2001). In other words, appraisal theories predict that specific emotions have distinct antecedents (Brader *et al.* 2011). Recent studies that are grounded on appraisal theories have explored precedents of distinct emotions in the political sphere of our life, regarding a wide range of contexts from candidate evaluation to policy preferences (Just *et al.* 2007; Small and Lerner 2008; Valentino *et al.* 2011).

Third, the affective intelligence (AI) theory suggests that individuals interact with surrounding environment through two emotional systems: the disposition system and the surveillance system (Marcus 2002). While the disposition system works on familiar and habitual environment, generating affective states that range from enthusiasm, depression, to aversion, the surveillance system redirects attention to novelty of the environment, provoking emotions ranging from calm to anxiety (Marcus *et al.* 2000). In recent studies with this theoretical approach, structure of emotional appraisal is understood as being three-dimensional: enthusiasm, anxiety, and aversion/anger (Brader and Marcus 2013). Studies have tested whether each of these dimensions have different significances in political contexts such as candidate evaluations, electoral behavior, or political learning (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Brader 2006; Hutchings *et al.* 2006; Valentino *et al.* 2008; Druckman and McDermott 2008).

On the one hand, the approach-avoidance theories overly simplify our emotional experience as being on a single dimension that ranges from likes to dislikes. On the other hand, the appraisal theories and the affective intelligence theory assume that our emotional experience can be discretely distinguished as distinct types of emotions. In consequence, these theoretical approaches cannot

be neatly applied to this study for the following reasons. In this study, respondents of experimental group are expected to feel specified types of emotions such as affection, anger, or anxiety, which makes difference from the approach-avoidance theories. At the same time, since this study does not clearly measure the respondents' emotions in a discrete way, I cannot rule out the possibility that each respondent may have felt slightly different emotions or that some respondents could have felt multiple types of emotions at once. Therefore, rather than explaining the emotional reactions captured in this study through the abovementioned theoretical approaches<sup>2</sup>, I understand emotions according to the following criteria: first, its nature of persistence – how long a specific emotional state lasts in an individual's mind; second, the orientation or attitude object – either political party, society, or self – of a specific emotional state.

I denote emotions as 'long-term' if an emotional state lasts for several years or even decades, throughout an individual's life or across multiple generations. These emotional states are in close relationship with the discussions of 'symbolic politics,' which consider some political attitudes to be based on entrenched affective attachment toward persistent political symbols such as political parties or racial groups (Sears *et al.* 1979; Kinder and Sears 1981; Lau and Heldman 2009). Social identity theory or the studies that emphasize group-centric nature of political attitudes (Nelson and Kinder 1996; Greene 1999; Brader *et al.* 2008) also cohere with the symbolic politics and

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<sup>2</sup> I acknowledge that a highly sophisticated research design is required in order to clearly provoke specific sorts of emotions and to measure them as pure, not as reconstructed, emotions in a persuasive way. While pointing out this as an ongoing research agenda, I understand results of this experimental survey as three types of emotional engagement (partisan attachment, compassionate anger, and self-regarding anxiety), despite some ambiguities in interpretation.

the concept of long-term emotions. In this study, I focus on party identification, one of the long-term emotions that has received much scholarly attention, through an experiment that intends to capture the political significance of partisanship in political attitude.

On the other hand, I understand emotional states as ‘short-term’ if those emotions arise as a reaction to external stimuli in surrounding environment and last for a relatively short period of time. While entrenched long-term emotions are directed toward political symbols such as political parties, left-right ideology, or prominent social groups that exist almost permanently as long as a society persists, short-term emotions are directed toward social events, political figures, government, or even foreign countries and are expressed as a reaction to the changing political environment. Short-term emotions encompass both negative emotions of anger, anxiety, or frustration and positive emotions such as enthusiasm, hopefulness, or proudness.

While long-term emotions are mostly ‘sociotropic,’ because they are directed toward political objects that consist a society, short-term emotions are categorized into being either ‘sociotropic’ or ‘self-regarding’ according to the orientation, which depends on how a social issue is framed. When a political issue is presented as national agenda, emotions toward relevant social entities, such as government, social groups, or society as a whole, would be evoked. However, if the same political issue is presented as a agenda of a person’s neighborhood, emotions that are more self-oriented, regarding personal well-being, would be evoked.

In order to capture the workings of sociotropic emotions in political attitudes, I devise an experiment that provokes compassionate anger toward

social injustice or hardships of disadvantaged social groups. As to understand the impact of self-regarding emotions on political attitudes, I design an experiment that triggers self-regarding anxiety for personal loss or self-regarding enthusiasm for potential benefit<sup>3</sup>. I wish to note that ‘compassionate anger’ and ‘self-regarding anxiety’ are simply representative terms of expected emotional reactions, rather than definite or exhaustive list of predicted emotions from the experiments. I acknowledge the possibility that depression or frustration may have occurred instead of anger or that anger and anxiety may have taken place together. Therefore, in the following sections, rather than enumerating the previous studies on every type of discrete emotions, I will review previous literatures based on the research interest of this study, which is to understand how compassionate or self-regarding emotions affect political attitudes about social issues.

Based on this temporal understanding of emotions with an interest in the orientation of emotional states, I posit the following questions as research agendas of this study. First, how does the long-term emotional attachment toward political parties conditions perception of political discourse and formation of political attitudes? Second, how does short-term sociotropic emotions felt toward others, notably disadvantaged social groups or social injustice, encourage understanding of conflicting ideas and how this tolerance for different opinion is reflected on political attitudes? Lastly, how do short-term self-oriented anxiety about negative personal consequences can sway political attitudes about the issue at hand? With these research questions, in the following sections, I discuss theoretical backgrounds and relevant studies

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<sup>3</sup> For the coherence of the discussion, regarding the neighborhood cues that are explained below, the analysis of this study, chapter 4, focuses on the policy proposals with negative personal consequences.

on partisanship, compassionate anger, and self-regarding anxiety.

## **2.2. Partisan Attachment**

Partisan attachment, or party identification, has been one of the most thoroughly debated concepts in the public opinion studies. Party identification is a deep-rooted psychological attachment to a political party, which is formed at early stage of individual lifespan and persists throughout a person's entire life (Campbell *et al.* 1960; Miller and Shanks 1996; Greene 1999). Moreover, at the macro level, partisan attachment is found to be stable over multiple generations (Jennings and Niemi 1975; Converse and Markus 1979; Green *et al.* 2002) and across different nations (Schickler and Green 1997). Studies have highlighted party identification as a core determinant of political behavior that effectively explains electoral choice and public opinion (Jacoby 1988; Carsey and Layman 2006; Gerber *et al.* 2010; Sniderman and Stiglitz 2012).

Symbolic politics especially emphasize the emotional component of party identification as a long-standing affective attitude toward political parties as political symbols. According to the symbolic politics literatures, party identification is one of the stable affective preferences that people acquire through conditions of their preadult years, with little calculation of the future costs and benefits (Sears *et al.* 1979; Sears *et al.* 1980; Kinder and Sears 1981). Studies of symbolic politics have found that symbolic attitudes, with a solid emotional foundation, better explain policy preferences and electoral choices than material interest does (Sears *et al.* 1980; Lau and Heldman 2009; Valentino *et al.* 2013).

On the other hand, ‘information shortcut’ (Downs 1957) and ‘perceptual screen’ (Campbell *et al.* 1960) have been representative terms that effectively capture the political role of partisan attachment in political attitude formation. Since political reality is extremely complex, citizens simplify, perceive, and evaluate political affairs through their partisan angle (Rahn 1993; Mondak 1993; Sniderman and Stiglitz 2012). It has been found through survey and experiments that different partisan affiliation leads to different kinds of perception and opinions even under the same circumstances and conditions (Bartels 2002; Carsey and Layman 2006; Gunther *et al.* 2012; Jerit and Barabas 2012).

While some studies have found that party identification is unstable or not as influential as expected (Dalton 1984; Brody and Rothenberg 1988), it is still commonly believed that party identification is one of the strongest motivators behind political judgment of the mass public. Furthermore, there does exist revisionist perspectives that consider party identification as not being highly emotional or persistent, but as being malleable attitude that is constantly updated upon evaluations of political reality as a ‘running tally’ (Fiorina 1981; Franklin and Jackson 1983). However, majority of the previous studies have repeatedly found partisanship as a stable psychological attachment that remains highly stable and robust against changing political environment (Jennings and Niemi 1975; Sears *et al.* 1979; 박원호·신화용 2014).

Concept of partisan attachment becomes more controversial in countries other than the United States. Since party identification has its origin in the American political environment of two-party system, its applicability to other nations with multi-party system or unstable party system has been doubted. As



a result, party identification has been measured in diverse ways, depending on the party system of each nation (Johnston 2006). Its existence and stability have been tested in countries across the globe, including Europe, Latin America, and Asia (Borre and Katz 1973; Schickler and Green 1997; Dalton and Weldon 2007).

In South Korea, where this study was taken place, party identification has received much attention mainly as a core determinant of electoral behavior. While the party system of South Korea has been criticized for its instability and inconsistency, manifested through their frequent changes in party labels or party manifestos (강원택 2007; 곽진영 2009), it has been found that the Korean electorate still possess a stable emotional attachment to political parties that powerfully explains their political preferences and electoral choices (장승진 2012; 박원호 2013b).

Based on the studies of partisanship as stable emotional attachment, this study further explores how partisanship shapes attitudes toward social issues in interaction with elite discourse on political affairs. Through expressed policy statements of politicians as experimental cues, I examine how individuals exhibit distinct reactions depending on their partisanship and how the partisan context provided by political elites affects political attitudes of the mass public.

### **2.3. Compassionate Anger and Self-regarding Anxiety**

Different from partisanship that has enjoyed great academic attention for a long time, short-term emotions are relatively new in the public opinion studies and began to draw scholarly interest quite recently. It is surprising to learn that emotions were largely ignored in academia during 1970s and 1980s and

that it has been less than a decade for handbooks of political psychology to include a separate chapter on emotions (Brader *et al.* 2013).

In other words, studies on political emotion is a newly emerging sphere of study. There is an ongoing debate on measurement, dimensionality, and discrete typology of emotions (Marcus 2000). Since scholars are still searching for the most appropriate model, which involves the number of discrete type or dimension of emotions, I only review previous studies that are relevant to this study, rather than mentioning all possible types and dimensions of emotions in an unclear manner.

First, compassionate anger<sup>4</sup> about social injustice is the first type of short-term emotion that is examined in this study. While fear and anxiety that are directed toward self have been widely studied in relation to policy attitude, electoral choice, and evaluation on candidate or government (Lerner *et al.* 2003; Davis and Silver 2004; Huddy *et al.* 2005; Brader 2006; Valentino *et al.* 2011; Hetherington and Suhay 2011), studies on compassionate, others-oriented emotions, have received relatively less scholarly attention in the public opinion studies. Compassion, or sympathy, is considered as a source of political virtues or a type of moral emotions that go beyond the direct interests of self (Pizarro 1993; Haidt 1993). Compassion to others link individuals to society (Nussbaum 1993; Shin 2014) or spread democratic concepts such as human rights or social justice (Hume 1738/1896; Hunt 2008; Frazer 2013). Since the compassion experiment in this study intends to trigger compassionate emotions about 'social injustice' that evokes negative emotions,

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4 As I mentioned above, although anger is highlighted as a representative case, I acknowledge that the compassionate feeling about social injustice can involve other negative emotions such as frustration, anxiety, fear, or depression.

I find relevant theoretical discussions in the studies on anger or anxiety. In regard to anger, it is found that anger promotes political participation (Brader 2006; Valentino *et al.* 2011) and leads citizens to be bold and optimistic in policy stance (Lerner and Kettner 2000; Lerner *et al.* 2003; Huddy *et al.* 2005). Anxiety triggers individuals to be free of habitual dispositions to consider alternatives in light of available information (Marcus *et al.* 2000; Marcus 2002; Brader *et al.* 2008; Valentino *et al.* 2008). With these studies as theoretical background, I seek to understand whether compassionate anger can promote acceptance of alternative opinion.

Second, self-regarding anxiety<sup>5</sup> is the second type of short-term emotion that is discussed in this study. When citizens encounter public policies, fear or anxiety makes citizens to be more pessimistic or cautionary on political issues (Lerner and Kettner 2000; Lerner *et al.* 2003; Huddy *et al.* 2005). However, it has been found that individuals do not clearly connect personal stakes to national agenda (Kinder and Kewiet 1981) and thus rarely reflect self-interest on their political opinions (Sears *et al.* 1979; Brader *et al.* 2008; Lau and Heldman 2009). In light of the discussions that self-interest comes to influence attitudes when personal stakes (personal consequence), immediacy, and salience (vividness) are evident (Crano 1995; Green and Gerken 1989) or when costs and benefits are clear and substantial (Sears and Funk 1990), this study reframes national agenda to local agenda, with an expectation that this context shift would trigger self-oriented anxiety for personal environment and local community. With this experiment, I explore whether self-oriented anxiety leads personal stakes to condition political attitudes on social issues.

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5 While proposing anxiety as a representative type of expected emotion in the neighborhood experiment, I do not rule out the possibility of other negative emotions such as fear or depression.

Through survey experiments, this study explores the role of compassionate anger and self-regarding anxiety in political attitudes. Amidst the dearth of attention on short-term emotions in the studies on the Korean public, I gauge the political role of short-term emotional reaction toward social issues. Expanding from the limited measurement of thermometer ratings toward political parties or presidential candidates in electoral context, this study discusses political significance of short-term emotions in diverse social contexts. Against the previous studies that have understood political attitudes from the aspect of calculative and deliberative thoughts, through this study, I propose a different perspective that political attitudes can be highly emotion-laden, because citizens understand political discourse and engage in social contexts in emotional ways. Furthermore, through empirical findings, I aim to further demonstrate the potential contributions of emotions that direct attention to pertinent considerations in shaping political attitudes about diverse social issues.

### III. Research Methods and Data

#### 1. Issue Framing and Political Attitudes

Political phenomena are not simple. Multiple actors interact in complex ways, and innumerable events incessantly occur without prior notice, further complicating the situation. In consequence, political issues in our real life is multifaceted and open to multiple understandings and interpretations. In other words, how an issue is framed strongly determines how the issue is understood by individual citizens.

“Frames” in opinion questions therefore mimic a quasi-reality (Kinder and Sanders 1990), in which elites, politicians, and media produce political frames to simplify the complex reality to become more perceivable, and in which these frames are understood and accepted by individual citizens (Zaller 1992; Druckman 2010). A single issue can be conveyed and understood in multiple ways, depending on how the issue is framed with different source, contents, emphasis, or tone of voice (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Chong and Druckman 2007). In other words, depending on how political issues are presented, immediately accessible considerations in assessing them can change in individuals’ minds (Zaller 1992).

Practically anyone can be the producer of political frames. However, in most cases, political elites such as politicians, political activists, or media are the major creators of the political frames with intentions to persuade the mass public (Iyengar and Kinder 1984; Zaller 1992; Druckman 2010). In relation to this point, in partisanship experiment and compassion experiment, I use political discourses of politicians and media in the Korean society as

experimental cues that evoke partisanship or compassionate anger. In this way, frame cues included in survey questionnaires provide a lens through which the effects of elite communication on mass attitudes can be studied, such as the impact of reference to political party (partisanship experiment) or emotional appeals about social problems (compassion experiment).

On the other hand, frames can also highlight a specific context to emphasize a potential consideration about political issues. In neighborhood experiment, I compare how issues are perceived according to different contexts, as either national agenda or local issue. As previous studies noted that emotions such as anxiety, fear, or enthusiasm can be triggered by presenting an issue in a more vivid or proximate way (Fiske *et al.* 1983; Iyenger and Kinder 1987; Gartner 2004; Brader 2006), I expected localization of issues can provoke self-regarding emotions through increased proximity and vividness. While previous studies utilized audiovisual methods to provoke the feelings of vividness and proximity (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Brader 2006), I frame social issues as a local agenda to elicit similar effects. Based on these discussions, the neighborhood experiment seeks to understand whether the change of context leads individuals to conceive and assess political issues in a different way.

As previous studies on frame effects (Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Kuklinski *et al.* 1997; Sniderman and Theirault 2004; Chong and Druckman 2007; 박원호·안도경·한규섭 2013), this study likewise incorporates political frame cues that provide certain ways of understanding political reality. With experimental survey design as explained below, this study explores how individuals shape attitudes toward diverse social issues, depending on how the issues are delivered with emotionally charged dialogues.

## 2. Experimental Survey Design

With an aim to examine the role of emotions in political attitudes, I designed a randomized survey experiment that covers fifteen social issues in South Korea. In the pre-election wave (the first wave), respondents were asked to assess policy agendas without any experimental cue. In this wave, an array of simple statements about social issues was provided at once as shown in Appendix 1. However, in the post-election wave (the second wave), respondents answered one policy proposal at once, as presented in Appendix 2. On each proposal, experimental cues were randomly assigned according to the research focus. While half of the respondents expressed their political attitudes under the influence of experimental cue, the other half indicated their political attitudes without being exposed to the experimental cue. This research design enables over-time and cross-sectional comparison of the impact of experimental cues.

This survey experiment was included in the national survey conducted by the Center for Political Communication at Seoul National University. The survey was composed of pre-election and post-election waves executed immediately before and after the 2014 Korean local election, which was conducted on June 4th. The pre-election survey was conducted from May 15th, 2014 to May 22nd, 2014, while the post-election study was executed from June 5th, 2014 to June 24th, 2014. Among the 2,718 respondents of the pre-election wave, 1,930 remained in the post-election sample, allowing the over-time comparison of this study.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> There were additional respondents who participated in this panel study since the 2012 presidential election study (1,032 in the post-election wave who are retrieved from the survey of the 2012 presidential election). While these respondents constitute long-panel

The pre-election wave serves as a baseline for the entire survey as it does not include any experimental component. In this wave, policy agendas on fourteen social issues are addressed as it appears in Table 1. To these ‘simple’ statements on social issues, respondents were asked to express their attitude on a 5-point scale: 1. strongly disagree, 2. somewhat disagree, 3. neither support nor oppose, 4. somewhat agree, 5. strongly agree.

Table 1. Opinion Questions by Research Focus

	Please indicate how much you support or oppose each of the following policy proposals.
Partisan Attachment	Expanded cooperation – in the matters of economy or military – with China, more than other nations, is desirable.
	Tax benefit to the firms with open employment policy – employment irrespective of educational background – is desirable.
	Governmental control can be imposed to suppress labor strikes.
	Half-price college tuition plan is desirable. <sup>7</sup>
Compassionate Anger	Corporal punishment at school should be permitted.
	Private firms’ autonomous management of temporary workforce is desirable.
	Free school meal, previously served only in elementary schools, should be extended to middle and high schools.
	Korea-US alliance should be strengthened.
	Aid to North Korea should be continued in order to ease the tension in the Korean peninsula.
	Expanded cooperation – in the matters of economy or military – with Japan, which claims the ownership of Dok-do, is desirable. <sup>8</sup>
Self-regarding Anxiety (Enthusiasm)	Construction of additional nuclear power plant is desirable.
	Establishment of additional special-purpose high school is beneficial to students.
	Additional budget allocation to science business belt construction – to advance basic science – is desirable.
	Construction of public rental apartment – with an aim to relieve house shortage – is desirable.
	Expansion of local bus route – despite the expected traffic increase – is desirable.

In this study, political issues are categorized into three types, according to the goal of experimental study in the post-election wave. First, for the policy

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data that extend from the year 2012 to the year 2014, most of the following analyses involve the fresh cross-section that were recruited in the 2014 local election period.

7 This issue was not included in the pre-election wave, and was only asked as experimental survey in the post-election wave of this study.

8 The original questionnaire is “*Reduced* cooperation – in the matters of economy or military – with Japan, which claims the ownership of Dok-do, is desirable.” However, for the ease of interpretation, I present the issue in a reversed direction.



agendas in the ‘partisan attachment’ category, publicly expressed policy statements of politicians who are representative figures of a political party are provided to the experimental group, while this partisanship cue is absent in the questionnaires to the control group. Second, in regards to ‘compassionate anger,’ the experimental group received emotion-laden descriptions about social injustice or hardships of disadvantaged social group. On the other hand, the control group received the similar message described with a dry tone or numeric information. Lastly, the issues in the ‘self-regarding anxiety’ category deal with anxiety about personal loss or danger (or enthusiasm for personal benefit) triggered by localized issues that encourage individuals to connect with the issues in a more personal way. The contents of experimental cues and the order of policy questionnaire are presented in Table 2.

Table 2. The Order and Contents of Questionnaires<sup>9</sup>

		Group A	Group B
1	Nuclear Power Plant	<b>Neighborhood Cue</b> + Safety Info	Safety Info
2	School Punishment	Numeric Info	<b>Compassion Cue</b>
3	Public Rental Apartment	No Cue	<b>Neighborhood Cue</b>
4	Temporary Workforce	<b>Compassion Cue</b>	Dry tone
5	Special-purpose High Schools	<b>Neighborhood Cue</b>	No Cue
6	Free School Meal	Dry tone	<b>Compassion Cue</b>
7	Science Belt	Budget Info	Budget Info + <b>Neighborhood Cue</b>
8	Cooperaton with China	No Cue	<b>Partisanship Cue</b>
9	Korea-US Alliance	<b>Compassion Cue</b>	Numeric Info
10	Bus Route	<b>Neighborhood Cue</b>	No Cue
11	Open Employment	<b>Partisanship Cue</b>	No Cue
12	Governmental Control	No Cue	<b>Partisanship Cue</b>
13	Aid to North Korea	<b>Compassion Cue</b>	Numeric Info
14	Cooperation with Japan	Dry tone	<b>Compassion Cue</b>
15	Half-price College Tuition	<b>Partisanship Cue</b>	<b>Compassion Cue</b>
	N	974	976

<sup>9</sup> The random assignment of experimental condition among the respondents was successful, because the averages of the demographic traits (age, income, education, gender) of two groups are not statistically different at a significance level of 5%. Specific contents of political frame cues for experimental and control group can be found in Appendix 2.

In order to best approximate the political reality in which the emotional components are embedded in various political frames, the contents of the frame cues are based on real news reports, social events, and the actual utterances of politicians. While survey experiments are susceptible to the criticism about its limited generalizability to the real world, I intended to improve the external validity of this study by designing experimental cue based on the actual political debates found in South Korea. Moreover, in order to minimize the impact of the preceding experimental cues on following opinion questions, I intentionally allocated the order of questionnaires as shown in Table 2, in a way that respondents do not receive same type of experimental cues in succession by interposing questionnaires with no cue or different type of cue in between the questionnaires with the same cue type. Detailed analyses on each issue further validate that preceding experimental cue did not have systematic impact on answers to the following questions.

### **2.1. Partisanship Experiment: Elite Discourse**

The partisanship experiment intends to examine the role of partisan attachment in perceiving political reality and shaping political attitudes. While the pre-election wave does not have any experimental component, in the post-election wave, I randomly assigned elite discourses that were spoken by prominent political figures, who represent a political party, about the following policy agendas: cooperation with China, governmental control of labor strike, open employment, and college tuition. Difference between experimental group and control group can be considered as the impact of partisan attachment on political attitudes, because the only difference between the two groups is the

existence of partisanship cue. Partisan background of each politician, except for the president, is mentioned in each cue in order to clearly trigger partisan attachment in perceiving the issue at hand.

First, for the issue of cooperation with China, I provided an expressed policy stance of a party leader of the Saenuri Party, the current ruling party of South Korea, as the partisanship cue. In March 4th, 2014, Woo-yeo Hwang, the party head of the Saenuri Party, expressed his opinion that the cooperative relationship with China should be reinforced.<sup>10</sup> While the experimental group received this cue, the control group received the questionnaire without this cue. Thus, this survey experiment examines how individuals' political attitudes might differ, once the position of a party leader is provided.

Second, with the issue of governmental control of labor strike, a similar experiment was conducted. However, this time, the experimental group was informed about the stance of a party leader of the opposite party, the Democratic United Party (hereafter the DUP). On December 23rd, 2013, Seung-jo Yang, a party leader of the DUP, criticized the government for the use of public force in suppressing the labor strike of Korail, the national railroad company.<sup>11</sup> His expressed opinion, along with the reference to his party, was designed as the partisanship cue. The difference in responses caused by the existence or the absence of the partisanship cue would be measured as the impact of partisan attachment on political attitudes.

Third, the issue of half-price college tuition, which was a controversial

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10 우은식 (2014, March 6). 황우여 "중국과 굳건한 관계 지속해야"...주한中대사 접견. 뉴시스. Retrieved from <http://www.newsis.com/>

11 임형섭 (2013, December 23). 野최고위원들 "유신정권 아바타", "작은 계엄령". 연합뉴스. Retrieved from <http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/>

issue during the 2014 Korean local election, is a special case in this study. While the questionnaire on this issue was not included in the pre-election wave, I included this questionnaire in the post-election wave to compare the impact of partisan attachment and compassionate anxiety about a social problem. In other words, on this issue, the impacts of partisanship and that of compassion on political attitudes are compared.

On May 26th, 2014, there was a televised debate between the candidates of two major parties for the Seoul mayoral election, in which the college tuition was hotly debated. Since the pre-election wave of this study was already finished when this debate was broadcasted, I had to include this issue only in the post-election wave. In this debate, Won-soon Park, the incumbent mayor and the candidate of the New Politics Alliance for Democracy (hereafter the NPAD)<sup>12</sup>, claimed that half-price tuition is “an investment to the future of college students.” Criticizing this viewpoint as imprudent, Mong-joon Chung, the candidate of the Saenuri party, asserted that “there are ways to support college students, other than allocating huge governmental budget to reduce the tuition.”<sup>13</sup>

As of the control group, I designed compassion cue that triggers compassionate anxiety toward the college students who are under heavy financial burdens. It has been often reported in news media that there are many college students who are under an extreme financial hardship due to the expensive college tuition. The compassion cue describes the routine of a

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12 Despite the different party labels, the DUP and the NPAD refer to the same political party in South Korea, because the DUP (otherwise called as the Democratic Party) changed their party label to the NPAD in March 2014.

13 박성인 (2014, May 27). 박원순 vs 정몽준 '반값등록금' 입장 엇갈려. 아시아투데이. Retrieved from <http://www.asiatoday.co.kr/>

college student introduced in a news report, who are forced to work 12 hours throughout the night and to attend classes with sleep deprivation in order to earn college tuition.<sup>14</sup>

Lastly, partisanship cue that includes opinion of the president was designed on the issue of open employment. To all respondents, I provided general discussion of support and opposition to this policy. However, to the experimental group, I quoted a speech of President Geun-hye Park that there should be no more discrimination on educational background in job employment.<sup>15</sup> By indicating the policy stance of president with a clear partisan background, this experimental design measures how political attitudes are influenced by partisan attachment that stems from a political leader.

## **2.2. Compassion Experiment: Others-regarding Emotions**

The compassion experiment attempts to explore how compassionate anger or anxiety about social injustice or grievances of others influences political attitudes. Through emotion-laden anecdotes about social injustice or hardships of other members of a society, the compassion cues intend to provoke sympathetic feelings of anger or anxiety toward society and others. On the issues of corporal punishment at school, temporary employment, free school meal, Korea-US alliance, aid to North Korea, and cooperation with Japan, half of the respondents received the compassion cue, while the other half received essentially the same message in the form of factual descriptions or statistical

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14 박준철 (2011, June 10). 등록금 이것이 문제다 - 밤엔 마트 경비로 날새우고... 낮엔 학교 공부 파김치. 경향신문. Retrieved from <http://news.khan.co.kr/>

15 김진명 (2014, April 15). 직무능력에 따라 같은 대우받는 학력차별 없는 사회 밀어붙일 것. 조선일보. Retrieved from <http://news.chosun.com/>

numbers.

First, in regard to the corporal punishment at school, I intended to evoke anxiety through the compassion cue that describes parents' unjust treatment to teachers. In March 2013, a parent angry at a teacher who punished his son at school used abusive language to the teacher and forced her to kneel down in front of her students.<sup>16</sup> In the compassion cue, I adopted verbatim the expression that "parents made a teacher to kneel down in front of students" from a news report, with an intention to trigger compassionate anger among the respondents in understanding this issue. To the control group, I applied a frame cue that has basically the same message. However, the message was delivered as statistical information that the number of infringement cases on teachers' authority has increased 17.6% in the year 2014 in comparison to the year 2013.<sup>17</sup>

Second, as for the temporary employment issue, I intended to evoke anxiety for unprivileged social group through compassion cue. At a national airport in South Korea, a temporary workers' union began a strike in December 2013. During the strike, hardships of these workers were exposed and widely distributed among the public through online media.<sup>18</sup> Citizens expressed anxiety and anger toward the airport and sympathized with the temporary laborers who had worked under unjust conditions, as illustrated in the compassion cue of this study. In order to compare the impact of the compassion cue to that of the factual information, I presented a plain

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16 이영재 (2013, October 17). 교사 무릎 꿇리고 폭행한 학부모 항소 기각... "심각한 교권침해... 정황도 대단히 나빠". 국민일보. Retrieved from <http://news.kmib.co.kr/>

17 박영훈 (2014, May 12). 교권 침해에 세월호 침몰까지...우울한 '스승주간'. 헤럴드경제. Retrieved from <http://news.heraldcorp.com/>

18 For an exposé of the unjust working condition of temporary laborers at the XX airport, see: <http://mongu.net/903/>

discussion on the issue of temporary workforce management in a neutral tone for the control group.

Third, as regards the free school meal issue, I included an argument of a politician who supports this policy proposal to provoke compassion toward the potential policy victims. In March 2010, Jae-sung Choi, a politician of the NPAD, expressed his opinion on the free meal issue in his personal blog. He argued that the paid school meal is problematic because it imposes poor students the burden of “confessing poverty” to their peers and of “feeling humiliation” for the disclosure of family misfortune.<sup>19</sup> I included these descriptions verbatim in designing the compassion cue to trigger compassion toward the poor students who are the potential policy victims if free school meal policy is not implemented. To the control group, I assigned the same discussion, but as a more moderate description without emotionally provocative vocabularies. In both groups, I did not indicate the source of the argument, which was a politician with a party label, in order to exclude the impact of partisanship.

Fourth, as to the Korea-US alliance issue, I designed compassion cue that triggers anxiety and anger on the issue through the Yangju highway incident that happened on June 13th, 2002. In this incident, American soldiers drove over two 14-year Korean girls with a military vehicle but were cleared of any charge for the deaths of the girls.<sup>20</sup> As a treatment to the control group, I included the statistics that there have been 1,489 incidents of crimes committed by US Army in Korea, and 72.9% among those crimes were

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19 민주당 김성순 의원의 ‘포퓰리즘 비판’ 신선하다 (2010, March 18). 동아일보. Retrieved from <http://news.donga.com/>

20 Korean anger as US soldiers cleared (2002, November 22). BBC News. Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/>

exempted from indictment.<sup>21</sup> Similar to the case of the corporal punishment at school, I intended to compare the impact of emotion-laden cue with that of statistical information on political attitudes.

Fifth, for the issue of aid to North Korea, I included the story of separated families that were split due to the division of Korea. By describing the sufferings of separated families who are eager, but blocked from being in touch with their families for more than 60 years, I intended to provoke compassion for their agony and sorrow. For the control group, I provide a statistical information retrieved from the Integrated Information System for Separated Families that informs the number of separated families who applied for the opportunity to meet their family members, along with the number of annual deaths among the applicants due to the old age.<sup>22</sup> Both groups receive logically the same message, but the different way of presenting the message would result in the inter-group difference that reflects the impact of compassionate anger. Through this questionnaire, I expect to understand whether compassionate concern for the sorrow of separated family can lead individuals to be more supportive about the aid to North Korea.

Lastly, for the issue of cooperation with Japan, I applied the Dok-do Island dispute between Korea and Japan as the frame cue that ignites anger on the issue. On January 28th, 2014, the Japanese government announced an official guideline for school textbooks that includes false claim that Dok-do island is an official territory of Japan.<sup>23</sup> This official announcement of the Japanese

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21 배민욱 (2013, October 8). 5년간 주한미군범죄 1489건...72.9% 불기소처분. 뉴스스. Retrieved from <http://www.newsis.com/>

22 김정은 (2014, January 22). 이산가족 상봉 신청자 중 작년에만 3천800여명 사망. 연합뉴스. Retrieved from <http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/>

23 조준형 (2014, January 28). 일본 "독도는 日 고유영토"...교과서지침에 명기. 연합뉴스. Retrieved from <http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/>



government confronts the Koreans' long-held emotional attachment to Dok-do Island, which is a representative symbol of South Korea. This dispute was included as the compassion cue for the experimental group. To the other half of the respondents, I provided a balanced discussion from both the pro and con sides with a factual tone, with a simple reference to the false claim of Japan on Dokdo. This experimental design allows the understanding about the impact of shared anger toward an issue that is related to a deep-rooted political symbol.

### **2.3. Neighborhood Experiment: Self-regarding Emotions**

The neighborhood experiment is designed to trigger anxiety or enthusiasm about personal loss or benefit regarding social issues. To the experimental group, I indicated the name of the region in which the respondent lives as the neighborhood cue, in order to present the issue as a local agenda. Based on the demographics gathered at the start of the survey, each respondent received personally tailored cue that shows their own residential area. As it will be explained later, I applied cues on either county level or provincial level according to the scope of policy proposal. In this way, I intended to direct respondents' attention to their residence area in understanding the social issues. Through this experimental design, I intended to trigger an instant and unconscious provocation of feelings of proximity, which would lead to a self-regarding anxiety or enthusiasm regarding the issues. As for the control group, identical questionnaires were provided without the neighborhood cue. The social contexts of the Korean society that serve as the basis of the neighborhood cue design are explained below.

First, on the issue of construction of nuclear power plant, factual information about the safety of nuclear power plant generation was provided to all respondents. This safety information was retrieved from promotional materials of The Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Corporation, a government-affiliated institute that is responsible for nuclear power production in South Korea.<sup>24</sup> To half of the respondents, the neighborhood cue was inserted at the end of the policy questionnaire by indicating the individual respondent's residence region in its provincial level, because it will be unrealistic to construct a nuclear power plant in a county level region. As reflected on the opposing voices about the nuclear power plant in their resident regions in South Korea<sup>25</sup>, it is expected that the localization of this issue would make individuals to become more opposed to this proposal. This experimental design is intended to demonstrate the impact of self-oriented anxiety for potential danger and loss on political attitudes.

Second, the establishment of special-purpose high school implies potential regional and economic benefits to the residents of adjacent area in the social context of South Korea, as reflected on frequent appearance of its construction as the election pledges in local elections.<sup>26</sup> However, in its broad sense, it is a highly controversial issue. Special-purpose high school specializes in foreign language or science education, which constitutes a unique feature of the Korean educational environment. It is commonly perceived that these schools

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24 Promotional materials of The Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Corporation:

[http://cms.khnp.co.kr/?post\\_type=knowledge4&p=20326/](http://cms.khnp.co.kr/?post_type=knowledge4&p=20326/);

[http://cms.khnp.co.kr/?post\\_type=knowledge5&p=20329/](http://cms.khnp.co.kr/?post_type=knowledge5&p=20329/)

25 조원진·장지승. (2015, June 8). “고리1호기 폐쇄하라” 부산·울산 환경단체 막바지 힘모은다. 서울경제. Retrieved from <http://economy.hankooki.com/>

26 안성용. (2008, March 28). 수도권 후보들 너도 나도 “특목고 유치” 공약 남발. 노컷뉴스. Retrieved from <http://www.nocutnews.co.kr/>

provide a better education with a well-managed system, which usually results in an exceptionally high admission rate to top-tier universities. As special-purpose high schools became more popular, the property value of the nearby areas has increased. Although there are oppositions to special-purpose high school in a general sense for the reasons such as equal opportunity of education, when it is framed as a local issue, this issue comes to be strongly related to the potential economic benefit of regional development or the rise of real estate value. Considering its range of local benefit, I designed the neighborhood cue on this issue to be applied on county level.

Third, the construction of science business belt is another issue that highlights local benefit. While it is commonly perceived that basic science should be supported, the huge amount of government budget might dissuade individuals from supporting this proposal. To all respondents in the post-election wave, I provided factual information that the Korean government allotted a significant sum of budget – 6.7 trillion won – on basic science in 2013.<sup>27</sup> However, in order to see whether self-oriented enthusiasm for potential gain influences political attitudes, I inserted the neighborhood cue at its province level to half of respondents. While individuals might have perceived the issue as remote in its abstract context, the neighborhood cue makes the issue to be more relevant to personal environment.

Fourth, the construction of public rental apartment, likewise, is usually related to potential cost to the residents of nearby area in the social context of South Korea. Public rental apartments, operated by a government-based corporation, are provided to low-income households. Since public rental

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27 권영진 (2014, January 19). 미래부, 내년 기초연구사업에 7천억원 투자. 연합뉴스. Retrieved from <http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/>

apartment attracts low income households to the nearby area, it is often conceived that its existence degrades the living condition of residential area and further decreases the value of real estate of the nearby region. As a result, a proposal of its construction often faces opposition from the residents.<sup>28</sup> However, in a broad sense, it has beneficial effects such as relieving house shortage and providing housings to poor families. Based on these notions, I devised neighborhood cue that mentions county-level region where each respondent resides, to provoke self-regarding anxiety for the potential cost in relation to the proposal. As for the control group, I did not include the neighborhood cue, in order to leave the proposal as broad-sensed as it was.

Lastly, the expansion of local bus route is another policy proposal that provokes enthusiasm for potential benefit. As this topic may be the most apolitical issue among all the social issues in this study, I included this proposal to examine political attitude on an issue that is closely related to our everyday life. In order not to biasedly highlight potential benefit of this proposal, I included the phrase “despite the expected traffic increase” in the midst of the questionnaire. While the potential benefit and cost might be unclear in its broad sense, I examine whether the county-level neighborhood cue provokes enthusiasm for personal benefits, and how these emotional reaction leads personal interest to influence attitudes.

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28 박희제. (2015, March 11). 송도국제도시 첫 민자 임대아파트 건립 논란 - 입주민단체 항의방문 등 강력 반발. 동아일보. Retrieved from <http://www.donga.com/>

## **IV. Emotions in Political Attitudes**

### **1. Public Discourse, Context, and Attitude**

Citizens form their political attitudes in the ever-changing political environment that incessantly provides dialogues and comments – which can be considered as frames – from political elites, mass media, and acquaintances. These public discourses about social issues shape specific contexts under which individuals perceive and assess the problem and form their attitudes. In other words, political attitudes are the result of interaction among public discourse, social context, and individual citizens.

Through the experimental survey as outlined in the previous chapter, this section discusses the findings and implications from this study. After proposing hypothetical expectations based on the source and the type of emotional cues, I analyze the results of this study with a special focus on political meanings of emotions in attitude formation. In the first part of the analysis, I provide the overall analysis on all issues and discuss the impact of emotional cues. In the second part, in-depth analyses on selected issues are provided with implications on the contexts under which long-held partisanship, compassionate anger, and self-regarding anxiety can become politically relevant.

#### **1.1. Sources and Types of Emotional Cues**

Emotional cues can influence political attitudes in different ways depending on the sources of the frames and the type of framing effect. Along with the

general question on the significance of emotions, this study offers specific research questions and interpretations of the results that can vary according to the contents of the cues that largely consist of first, the source of the frame and second, the type of framing effect.

The source of frame can range from political elite and mass media to everyday acquaintances. First, politicians produce a way of understanding social issues with an aim to mobilize support or to win elections. Since partisanship powerfully conditions the overall attitude of individual citizens, political elites often emphasize their partisan affiliation in expressing their political stance, which is reflected on the partisan cues in this study.

Second, politicians, media, or political activists often appeal to emotions in order to make public opinion more favorable to their own stance. Through the public discourse that triggers compassionate minds, old issues are revitalized into salient issues, while new issues attract public attention to rise to political agendas. This interaction between public discourse and public opinion is mirrored in the compassion cues of this study.

Lastly, since the nature of issues is not fixed or singularly predetermined, political agendas can appear on multiple layers. In other words, the context of political issues can significantly be altered, which can consequently change how citizens face those issues. In relation to this point, the neighborhood cues in this study capture how the context shift from national agenda to local issue can make abstract issues more tangible and proximate to ordinary citizens.

Thus, the impact of emotional cues is partly attributed to the impact of different source of frames. Through partisanship cues, I examine how partisan

background of elite discourse influences policy stances of individuals. In regard to compassion cues, the impact of emotional appeals in public discourse on political attitudes will be discussed. Through neighborhood cues, I explore how the shift from national context to local context of issues influence policy preferences.

In interpreting the results of experiments, the type of framing effects is worth considering. First, “emphasis framing effect” refers to the situation in which “a subset of potentially relevant considerations are emphasized, so that individuals can focus on these considerations in constructing their opinions” (Druckman 2001, 230). Second, another type is entitled as “equivalency framing effect,” in which “the use of different, but logically equivalent, words or phrases causes individuals to alter their opinions” (Druckman 2001, 228).

Different types of framing effect can be expected from frame cues with different research targets. In this study, I expect emphasis framing effect through partisan cues and neighborhood cues, while I intend equivalency framing effect through compassion cues.

Through partisanship experiment and neighborhood experiment, with an intention of emphasis framing effect, I apply questionnaires with different emphasis on control group and experimental group. Experimental cues that emphasize partisan affiliation or local environment were given only to experimental group to highlight the potential consideration of partisanship or nearby residence area in evaluating the relevant issue. Thus, in these experiments, whether an emphasis frame exists or not would result in inter-group difference.

Meanwhile, in compassion experiment, I expect equivalency framing effect

in order to capture the workings of compassionate feeling for others in political attitudes. To this aim, the phrases with basically the same message were provided all respondents. However, only the experimental group received the phrases with stronger emotional appeal that triggers compassionate care for society and others. In this experiment, therefore, the different degree of emotional appeal of two types of questionnaires would result in inter-group difference.

## **1.2. Research Hypotheses**

The research question that encompasses the entire questionnaires in this study is whether political attitudes can be shaped through the emotional component of public discourse and social context regarding relevant issues. However, since the workings of emotions in political attitudes can vary according to different issues and contexts, I present specified hypotheses for each type of experimental cues that trigger partisan attachment, compassionate anger, or self-regarding anxiety as follows.

First, in regard to partisan attachment, I hypothesize that partisanship can condition how elite discourse is accepted by individuals and is reflected on their political attitudes. In other words, I expect that people are more supportive to the messages from political elite with the same partisan affiliation, while the same message dissuades the individuals of opposing partisan affiliation. However, this role of partisanship as a perceptual screen, which often polarizes the public opinion, is not always effective. I postulate that the mobilization effect of elite discourse is meaningful only when the partisan cleavage on the issue is clear among both the elites and the public. In



other words, through the partisan cues, I look into whether the elite discourse about an issue with clear partisan cleavage effectively mobilizes support, while the elite discourse about an issue with unclear partisan cleavage fails at it. Moreover, the reaction of the public toward elite discourses with partisan background becomes more explicit as the issue at hand is more salient and actively discussed among the social members.

The hypotheses in relation to partisanship cues are as follows. First, partisan attachment lead individuals to support the elite discourse with the same partisan affiliation, while rejecting the elite discourse of the opposing party. In this way, I reconfirm whether partisanship works as a perceptual screen that provides a structural background of attitude formation. Second, the elite discourse about an issue with clear partisan cleavage succeeds to mobilize support from the citizens with the same partisanship (while dissuading those with the opposite partisanship). On the other hand, the mobilizing effect of elite discourse is weaker in the case of the issues that do not have clear partisan cleavages shared by the members of a society. Lastly, elite discourses trigger partisan attachment to wield greater impact on political attitudes when the issue is more salient among the public.

Second, regarding compassionate anger<sup>29</sup> toward social injustice that includes social problems or hardships of disadvantaged groups, I hypothesize that compassion leads individuals to actively consider and accept the message of the given discourse. Through compassion cues, I examine whether a discourse that triggers compassionate mind to society can persuade individuals

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29 The word 'compassionate' is used here in the sense that the public shares the same emotional states toward a social issue, not necessarily confined to the compassion as a sympathetic care for sad situations.

to be more supportive about the propose stance in the cue. However, the symbolic meaning of attitude object might determine how compassionate affects the correlative linkage between policy preferences and other political predispositions that reflect political belief or value, such as ideological orientation. For example, I look into the possibility whether compassionate anger toward an issue with historically deep-rooted political symbol can trigger preexisting political predisposition, such as ideological orientation, to strongly determine policy preferences, while compassionate anger toward an issue unconnected with socially shared political symbol leads political attitudes to have weak correlation with ideological orientation.

Through compassion cues, I test the following hypotheses in this study. First, compassionate anger felt toward social injustice leads individuals to be more receptive about the viewpoint and policy stance proposed in the cue. Second, compassionate anger attracts individuals with opposing stance to openly consider the alternative viewpoint suggested in the cue. In other words, through this hypothesis, I test whether compassion can lead citizens to more actively consider the issue from the suggested viewpoint, less bounded by preexisting preferences. Third, on the issues unconnected with socially shared political symbols, compassionate anger attracts individuals of the entire range of ideological orientation to side with the given message. However, lastly, on the issues that are closely connected with socially shared political symbols, compassionate anger can make policy preferences be more strongly correlated with preexisting ideological orientation.

Lastly, through the localization of issues through neighborhood cues, I test whether self-regarding emotions, such as anxiety or enthusiasm, can affect policy preferences as the issues become more vivid and immediate to citizens'

living environment. Against the previous observations that citizens rarely connect their own lives with political issues, I explore whether the consideration for personal well-being and living area can be reflected on political attitudes, as the issues are localized into the agendas of their local community. By focusing on the issues in which the issue localization triggers anxiety for negative personal consequences, I look into whether this self-regarding emotions can universally influence the entire public or selectively affect citizens whose potential losses are crystallized more clearly than others.

Under the assumption that the neighborhood cues trigger self-regarding emotions because issue localization clarifies personal consequences of policy proposals, the following hypotheses are examined with a focus on self-regarding anxiety about potential danger or loss. First, different from the previous findings of ‘minimal impact of self-interest on political attitudes,’ self-regarding anxiety for potential loss leads individuals to become less supportive about the relevant policy proposal, reflecting their self-oriented consideration. Second, the dissuading impact of potential anxiety is universal across all strata of the public when the execution of policy proposal is expected to indiscriminately involve all strata of the public. In other cases, third, the deterring impact of self-regarding anxiety is selective depending on the personal conditions of individuals, when the personal consequences of policy execution differ by individual circumstances. In this case, the group of people who face greater and clearer loss would be more strongly dissuaded from the issue.

In the following sections, I first provide an overall review of the results of the entire survey experiment, through which I select two questionnaires for each type of experiment as the targets of further analyses. In the subsequent

sections, I provide in-depth analyses on six questionnaires to test the hypotheses of this study. Through the following analyses, I seek to understand whether political attitudes have emotional underpinnings on which citizens face, accept, or reject the public discourses that incessantly intervene in the attitude formation toward diverse social issues.

## 2. Impact of Emotion-laden Context

As it is explained in chapter 3, the survey of this study consists of two waves, among which only the second wave included experimental components. In the first wave (pre-election wave), simple statements about social issues are provided at once as presented in Appendix 1. However, in the second wave (post-election wave), each questionnaire was provided separately with additional comments with different wordings to control and experimental group, as presented in Appendix 2.<sup>30</sup> The impact of emotional cues in policy attitudes will be inferred from the comparison between experimental group and control group in the second wave, along with the comparison between answers of the first wave and those of the second wave.

While the elite discourse used as partisanship cue intends to persuade citizens to support the elite's proposed policy stance, the overall result of Table 3 implies that the public is not indiscriminately mobilized by the elite. The result implies that the elite discourse about the issues with clear partisan

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30 As it is shown in Table 3-5, the average responses in the second wave often present greater support on the issues even without any additional cue (control group). This acquiescence bias in the second wave might be attributable to the different format of questionnaires as shown in Appendix 1 and 2. The questionnaire format of the second wave attracts greater attention to the issue at hand, in comparison to the first wave, which might have induced more support from respondents.

cleavage mobilize support more effectively. Since the elite discourse on the issue of 'governmental control over labor strike' mobilizes support in accordance with the preexisting partisan cleavage on the issue, the elite discourse that opposes the proposal leads the overall opinion to its intended direction, as shown in the lower support of experimental group than control group ( $2.95 > 2.81$ ,  $p=0.01$ ). However, while the elite discourse on the 'cooperation with China' issue, with an unclear partisan cleavage as it will be discussed further in the following section, supports the given proposal, the average response in experimental group is lower than that of control group ( $3.42 > 3.38$ ,  $p=0.30$ ), which implies that elite discourse did not effectively mobilize support when the partisan cleavage on this issue is unclear. Moreover, the issue of 'open employment,' along with 'cooperation with China,' also reveals that mobilizing effect is weak when partisan cleavage on the issue is unclear and when the issue salience is low ( $3.70 > 3.68$ ,  $p=0.61$ ). In comparison to the 'governmental control' and 'college tuition' issues that were hotly debated in recent years due to the 2013 Korail strike and the 2014 local election, 'open employment' and 'cooperation with China' did not receive much attention in recent years.

Lastly, the issue of 'college tuition' requires different interpretation because it is applied with different experimental design. Different from other partisanship cues that provide elite discourse of a single politician, for the tuition issue, the policy stances of two politicians each representing different political party are provided as the partisanship cue. On the other hand, to the control group, the phrases that trigger compassionate care for college students under financial hardship are provided as compassion cue. The result implies that the compassion cue had an universal impact over all populations and led

them to higher support than the condition with the partisanship cue (3.70 > 3.68, p=0.00). The partisanship cue did have effect on this issue, because the comparison between individuals with different partisan background, although the detailed result is not presented in this thesis, reveals that the two-sided partisanship cue made responses to be more partisan than under the compassion cue condition. The college tuition issue, therefore, also indicates that the elite discourse on the issues with clear partisan stances and high salience can lead the public opinion to be more polarized.

Table 3. Average Attitude by Experimental Condition: Partisanship Cues

	Wave 1	Wave 2	
		Control Group	Experimental Group
			Partisanship Cue
Governmental Control	2.72	2.95	2.81
Cooperation with China	3.27	3.42	3.38
Open Employment	3.83	3.70	3.68
		Compassion Cue	Partisanship Cue
Half-price College Tuition	-	4.04	3.83

To summarize, it is inferred from Table 3 that elite discourse aligning with a clear partisan cleavage of a salient issue can mobilize support to a statistically significant degree, as shown in the case of ‘governmental control of labor strike.’ Inversely, the elite discourse about an issue with unclear partisan cleavage has a weaker mobilizing effect, as shown in the issues of ‘cooperation with China’ and ‘open employment.’ The salience of issues also affects how the partisanship cues work. The elite discourses about the issues with low salience, ‘cooperation with China’ and ‘open employment,’ have minimal persuasion impact on overall policy stances.

While some of the hypotheses regarding the partisanship cues are answered

by Table 3, the central hypothesis that partisan attachment conditions how individuals react to elite discourse and form their policy preferences is yet to be proved with this analysis. In order to understand how partisanship leads the partisanship cues to have dissimilar impact on political attitudes, in the next section, I further discuss the ‘governmental control’ and ‘cooperation with China’ issues with sub-group analyses according to partisan affiliations. These two issues are selected as the focus of further analysis, because they incorporate one-sided partisan cue, in comparison to other issues – ‘open employment’ and ‘college tuition’ – that employ president cue without a reference to the partisan label or two-sided partisan cue.

The impact of compassion cues on political attitudes is presented in Table 4. In the cases of ‘free meal plan,’ ‘Korea-US alliance,’ and ‘aid to North Korea,’ the average responses of control group and experimental group are similar. The compassion cue leads to a slightly greater support in the ‘free meal’ issue ( $3.40 < 3.42$ ,  $p=0.80$ ) and in the ‘US-Korea alliance’ issue ( $3.25 < 3.27$ ,  $p=0.66$ ), while the compassion cue results in weaker support in the ‘aid to North Korea’ issue ( $2.96 > 2.95$ ,  $p=0.86$ ). The differences between the two groups in these issues are statistically insignificant as indicated by the p-values. However, when these results are compared with the averages of the first wave, it is revealed that the compassion cues did have effect in mobilizing support toward the intended direction of the cues. Respondents became more supportive about the ‘free meal at school’ and ‘aid to North Korea’ issues, as the cues triggered concern for socially disadvantaged people, and they became less supportive of the ‘Korea-US alliance’ issue when the misdeeds of US troops in South Korea were reminded. However, it seems that experimental condition and control condition were so similar that they engendered similar

effect in both groups. While I attempted to narrow the difference to the unequal degree of emotional appeal between the two conditions, the difference turns out to be too subtle to result in significant differences in the overall opinion response.

Table 4. Average Attitude by Experimental Condition: Compassion Cues

	Wave 1	Wave 2	
		Control Group	Experimental Group
			Compassion Cue
School Punishment	3.28	3.52	3.62
Temporary Workforce	2.32	2.60	2.27
Free Meal at School	3.27	3.40	3.42
Korea-US Alliance	3.31	3.25	3.27
Aid to North Korea	2.87	2.96	2.95
Cooperation with Japan <sup>31</sup>	2.52	2.45	2.32

On the other hand, the successful cases of equivalency framing effects are the issues of ‘corporal punishment at school’ and ‘cooperation with Japan.’ Regarding the issue of ‘school punishment,’ negative aftermath of the reduced authority of teachers is presented to both groups. However, the message was delivered as statistical numbers to the control group, while a vivid anecdote of actual incidents was presented to the experimental group. Despite the same logical message, the experimental group shows more supportive attitude for school punishment (3.52 < 3.62, p=0.04). While the control group also reveals increased support in the second wave than the first wave (3.28), which can be attributed to the impact of logical thought, a greater increase is found in the experimental group, which implies the greater impact of compassionate anger.

Likewise, on the issue of ‘cooperation with Japan,’ all respondents received

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31 This issue is discussed in its inverse format, as explained in footnote 9.



a cue about Japan's false claim on Dok-do. Only the respondents of experimental group received detailed information that triggers anger about the Japanese government's claim about Dok-do. Consequently, greater opposition to the issue is found in the experimental group ( $2.45 > 2.32$ ,  $p=0.00$ ), which reveals the impact of compassionate anger toward Japan's attitude toward Dok-do that has symbolic value in the Korean society. The decreased support of the second wave in comparison to the first wave (2.52) further reflects that citizens became less supportive of the issue as the outrage is triggered by the unjust claim of Japan.

In addition, the issue of 'temporary workforce' also reveals the impact of compassionate anger on political attitudes. Overall response results in a relatively more supportive side as the balanced information of the issue is provided. However, the overall response is more negative when the compassionate cue that triggers compassionate anger about unjust work conditions of temporary workers are provided ( $2.60 > 2.27$ ,  $p=0.00$ ).

Through the result of Table 4, it is demonstrated that compassionate anger can lead individuals to be more receptive to the given information in forming political attitudes. This implication is also found in the issues with insignificant inter-group differences, because they likewise reflect the impact of compassionate anger through the change of overall attitude from the first wave. However, since Table 4 does not test the other hypotheses that are related to preexisting opinion and political predispositions, in the following section, detailed analyses on 'school punishment' and 'cooperation with Japan' will be further examined.

As per Table 5, self-regarding anxiety about policy consequences leads to

weaker support for relevant policy proposals, which substantiates the first hypothesis about neighborhood cues. In the issues of 'nuclear power plant' and 'public rental apartment,' as the personal stakes on the issues become clearer as the issues are localized, people in general become more opposed to these agendas. The degree of overall impact of the neighborhood cue is greater in the 'nuclear power plant' issue as it is implied in the stronger opposition of the experimental group ( $2.87 > 2.53$ ,  $p=0.00$ ). The overall impact of the neighborhood cue is relatively weaker on the 'public rental apartment' issue, because the inter-group difference is smaller ( $3.74 > 3.65$ ,  $p=0.05$ ) than that of 'nuclear power plant.'

While the analysis of this paper on neighborhood cues centers around the role of self-regarding 'anxiety,' the impact of self-regarding enthusiasm for potential benefit on political attitudes is reflected on the issues of 'special purpose high school' and 'bus route.' The average response is more supportive both in 'special purpose high school' ( $2.63 < 3.02$ ,  $p=0.00$ ) and 'bus route' ( $3.72 < 3.81$ ,  $p=0.03$ ) as the issue is localized and highlights potential benefit on the residential area. The weaker support for 'science belt' of the experimental group ( $3.74 > 3.65$ ,  $p=0.72$ ) might mislead that personal consequences do not matter in this issue. However, the analysis based on regional context reveals that residents of the provinces with abundant facilities for basic science became less willing for additional science belt in their region, while the residents of the provinces with deficient resources became more supportive about potential science belt in the nearby area. Table 5, therefore, as a whole provides evidence that when abstract national issues are localized, the considerations for personal consequences and local community are more clearly reflected on political attitudes.

Table 5. Average Attitude by Experimental Condition: Neighborhood Cues

	Wave 1	Wave 2	
		Control Group	Experimental Group
			Neighborhood Cue
Nuclear Power Plant	2.71	2.87	2.53
Special Purpose High School	2.56	2.63	3.02
Science Belt	3.60	3.55	3.57
Public Rental Apartment	3.53	3.74	3.65
Bus Route	3.48	3.72	3.81

Table 6 summarizes the inter-group difference in the second wave on the entire questionnaires of this study. While Table 3 – 5 only provide the average values, Table 6 also presents the statistical significances of inter-group differences based on the t-tests for each survey item.

Table 6. Inter-group Difference by Experimental Condition

	Partisanship Cue	Compassion Cue	Neighborhood Cue
<b>Governmental Control</b>	<b>-0.14 (0.04)***</b>		
<b>Cooperation with China</b>	<b>-0.04 (0.04)</b>		
Open Employment	-0.02 (0.04)		
Half-price College Tuition	-0.21 (0.05)***		
<b>School Punishment</b>		<b>0.10 (0.05)**</b>	
Temporary Workforce		-0.34 (0.05)***	
Free Meal at School		0.02 (0.06)	
Korea-US Alliance		0.02 (0.05)	
Aid to North Korea		-0.01 (0.05)	
<b>Cooperation with Japan</b>		<b>-0.13 (0.04)***</b>	
<b>Nuclear Power Plant</b>			<b>-0.34 (0.05)***</b>
Special Purpose High School			0.39 (0.05)***
Science Belt			0.02 (0.04)
<b>Public Rental Apartment</b>			<b>-0.09 (0.05)*</b>
Bus Route			0.09 (0.04)**

\*\*\*p<0.01; \*\*p<0.05; \*p<0.1 (t-test)

Note: Entries are difference between average response of experimental group and that of control group (experimental group – control group), with standard errors in parentheses (N1 = 976, N2 = 974, allocated as Table 2).

Among the issues with the partisanship cues, the inter-group difference is statistically significant when the issue has clear partisan cleavage and when the

issue is salient and has been widely discussed in the Korean society in recent years (governmental control of labor strike, half-price college tuition). Among the questionnaires with compassion cues, the items in which the experimental cues are clearly differentiated from control conditions for stronger emotional appeal result in statistically significant inter-group differences. Lastly, the impact of neighborhood cues results in statistically significant inter-group differences in all survey items except for the science belt issue. Among these issues, the bold-faced issues will be analysed in detail, in order to examine whether emotional cues do have significant impact on how citizens form their attitude toward social issues.

### 3. Political Significances of Emotions

#### 3.1. Partisanship as Structural Background<sup>32</sup>

The first type of emotional cues aims to understand the role of partisan attachment in political attitudes when faced by the elite discourse. In this section, I examine the following hypotheses as they were laid out earlier: first, whether partisan attachment conditions how individuals react to elite discourse and accordingly form their attitudes; second, whether the elite discourse about an issue without clear partisan cleavage has weaker mobilization effect than the elite discourse about an issue with clear partisan cleavage; third, whether the partisanship cue wields greater impact upon public opinion when the issue is more salient.

##### 3.1.1. Governmental Control of Labor Strike

In December 2013, the labor union of Korail, the national railroad operator, started a strike to oppose the privatization of the company and to raise wage complaints. Since the labor strike continued for 22 days, which was recorded as the longest labor strike ever existed in South Korea, the issue was hotly debated by the media. In order to restore the normal operation of Korail, the government intervened to suppress the labor strike. According to the preexisting ideological cleavage between ‘individual freedom versus governmental intervention’ (박원호 2013a), the Saenuri supporters with conservative orientation are expected to be more supportive about the

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<sup>32</sup> The results of the survey questionnaires with the partisanship cues are analyzed in further detail in 박원호·신화용 (2015), including these two issues on governmental control and cooperation with China.

government's action, while the NPAD supporters with liberal orientation are expected to be more opposed to the issue.

On this issue, the following phrases are provided to respondents. The partisanship cue was designed from an elite discourse of a politician who represent the NPAD, in which the politician strongly opposes the governmental oppression of the labor strike.

*Wave 1: Governmental control can be imposed to suppress labor strikes.*

*Wave 2 (Type A, Control Group): Some people have suggested that, even if the labor strike causes inconveniences to citizens, it is undesirable for the government to suppress the strike of labor union with governmental power. Which of the following comes closest to your view about whether the government can intervene in labor strikes?*

*Wave 2 (Type B, Experimental Group): Some people have suggested that, even if the labor strike causes inconveniences to citizens, it is undesirable for the government to suppress the strike of labor union with governmental power. From this viewpoint, in December 2013, Yang Seung-jo, a party leader of the DUP, criticized the government that "the imposition of governmental power to suppress the strike of the Korail labor union can be likened to the revival of 'Yushin Government."<sup>33</sup> Which of the following comes closest to your view about whether the government can intervene in labor strikes?*


Figure 1 displays the distribution of opinion responses in the second wave according to experimental condition. The percentage of support in the experimental group is lower (30.23%) than that of the control group (34.09%).

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<sup>33</sup> The term refers to the Fourth Republic of South Korea that was centralized authoritarian system, in which the governing power was concentrated to president Chung-hee Park.

Moreover, the experimental group shows higher percentage of opposition (40.88%) than the control group (34.70%). These results imply that the elite discourse succeeded in attracting the public opinion to side with it. Thus, Figure 1 shows that an elite discourse about a salient issue with clear partisan cleavage can mobilizes support in aggregate level (*the second hypothesis*).

Figure 1. Distribution of Political Attitude (%):  
Governmental Control of Labor Strike



While Figure 1 only illustrates the overall impact of partisanship cue, Table 7 provides the sub-group analysis based on partisan affiliation. The role of partisanship as a perceptual screen is well-demonstrated in Table 7, because individuals with different partisanship respond to the same elite discourse in dissimilar ways. First, among the NPAD supporters, when the partisanship cue is provided, the percentage of support is lower (22.38% > 16.89%) and the that of opposition is higher (48.01% < 54.64%) in comparison to the control group. This implies that NPAD supporters were mobilized by the partisanship cue. Second, non-partisans show similar trend of greater opposition (28.91% < 39.21%) and weaker support (29.71% > 24.47%) in the experimental group. Third, in contrast, the Seanuri supporters show a reverse trend. When the elite

discourse of the NPAD politician’s opposition is provided, among Saenuri supporters, the support for the issue is greater (63.49% < 68.22%) and the opposition is weaker (14.11% > 10.75%) than the control group. To summarize, Table 7 demonstrates that the partisanship cue persuades individuals with same partisan affiliation or non-partisans, while dissuading the people of opposing partisanship (*the first hypothesis*).

Table 7. Attitude Distribution (%) by Partisanship:  
Governmental Control of Labor Strike<sup>34</sup>

		No Cue	Partisanship Cue
Saenuri	Disagree	14.11	10.75
	Agree	63.49	68.22
Non-partisan	Disagree	28.91	39.21
	Agree	29.71	24.47
NPAD	Disagree	48.01	54.64
	Agree	22.38	16.89

Note: The summation of percentages of agree and disagree does not equal to 100% because there were responses of ‘neither agree nor disagree.’

Table 8, which shows the determinants of political attitude through OLS regression, further demonstrates the impact of partisanship cue on political attitude. When the elite discourse is provided, party identification and ideology comes to have explanatory power on policy preferences, while these two variables have statistically insignificant correlation with policy preferences in the control group. As people are exposed to a politician’s criticism that the government’s action was undemocratic and reminiscent of authoritative

34 The partisanship distribution (number of respondents) in the second wave according to experimental condition is as follows:

	No Cue	Partisanship Cue
Saenuri	241	214
Non-partisan	377	380
NPAD	277	302



government that suppressed citizens' freedom, both partisanship and ideology effectively differentiate political attitudes of citizens. In the experimental condition, individuals who are more liberal or who are more supportive about the NPAD are more opposed to the issue, vice versa for the people who are more conservative or more supportive about the Saenuri party. This again reconfirms the polarizing effect of elite discourse. Furthermore, in comparison to the issue of 'cooperation with China,' this result also indicates that the partisanship cue has substantial impact on the issues with higher salience, which were controversial and hotly debated in recent years (*the third hypothesis*).

Table 8. Determinants of Political Attitude by Experimental Condition:  
Governmental Control of Labor Strike

	No Cue	Partisanship Cue
<b>Party Identification<sup>35</sup></b>	<b>0.05 (0.03)</b>	<b>0.15 (0.04)**</b>
<b>Ideology<sup>36</sup></b>	<b>0.02 (0.02)</b>	<b>0.08 (0.02)**</b>
Feeling Thermometer for Saenuri Party	0.02 (0.00)**	0.01 (0.00)**
Feeling Thermometer for NPAD	-0.01 (0.00)**	-0.00 (0.00)
Age	0.01 (0.00)*	0.05 (0.00)
Income	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Education	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)
Female	-0.17 (0.07)*	-0.25 (0.07)
Constant	2.36 (0.27)**	1.53 (0.28)**
R <sup>2</sup>	0.23	0.27
N	883	880

\*\*p<0.01; \*p<0.05 (two-tailed tests)

Note: Entries are unstandardized ordinary least-squares regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

35 *Party identification* is measured on a 7-point scale (1=strong connection with the NPAD, 4=non-partisan, and 7=strong connection with the Saenuri Party). Individuals who supported non-major parties other than these two major parties are excluded in this measurement (N=265).

36 *Ideology* reflects an individual's left-right orientation, measured on a 10-point scale (0 = strongly liberal, 5 = moderate, and 10 = strongly conservative).

### 3.1.2. Cooperation with China

Cooperation with China has been long on the political issues in the Korean society. Not only China is geographically proximate to South Korea, but also the relationship with China is important regarding the North Korea issue. Regarding this issue, the conservatives with hawkish stance toward North Korea have expressed negative opinion about China, because North Korea's dependence on China nullifies the hard line policy of South Korea (한관수·장윤수 2012). As a result, in military matters, the conservatives are expected to be less supportive about cooperation with China because China supports the North Korean regime. On the other hand, when the economic aspects are highlighted, the conservatives, who usually have the pro-business inclination (이향우 2011), are expected to express more supportive stance toward this issue, because the cordial relationship with China is vital for economic gains. This economic aspect has been more strongly emphasized in recent years, as China has risen to an important business partner of South Korea.

To briefly summarize, the issue of 'cooperation with China' is multi-layered in the Korean society. The conservatives or the Saenuri supporters are more likely to be less supportive about the issue in terms of military matters, but they are more likely to be more supportive about it in terms of economic cooperation. This confusion leads this issue to have an unclear partisan cleavage and strengthens this issue's trait as being weakly partisan. A conservative politician's supportive remark about the cooperation with China is applied as the partisanship cue on this issue, with a curiosity about the effect of an elite discourse on an issue without a clear partisan cleavage.

On this issue, the following phrases are provided to respondents, with the partisanship cue designed as an elite discourse from a politician of the Saenuri party, the conservative party, who emphasizes the importance of cooperation with China.

*Wave 1: Expanded cooperation – in the matters of economy or military – with China, more than other nations, is desirable.*


*Wave 2 (Type A, Control Group): Some people have suggested that expanded cooperation with China – in the matters of economy or military – is desirable, while others have suggested that more effort is needed to expand the cooperation with countries other than China. Which of the following comes closest to your view about this problem?*

*Wave 2 (Type B, Experimental Group): Some people have suggested that expanded cooperation with China – in the matters of economy or military – is desirable, while others have suggested that more effort is needed to expand the cooperation with countries other than China. In regard to this problem, Woo-yeo Hwang, a party head of the Saenuri Party, recently expressed his opinion that “the cooperative relationship with China should be reinforced.” Which of the following comes closest to your view about this problem?*

Figure 2, which illustrates the distribution of attitude responses of the second wave according to the experimental condition, shows that the elite discourse is ineffective in persuading the public when the issue has no clear partisan cleavage. Although the partisanship cue supports the increased cooperation with China, the percentage of support is smaller in the experimental group (44.77%) than in the control group (47.54%). Moreover, the percentage of opposition is greater in the experimental group than in the

control group, which indicates that partisanship cue failed to persuade the public in aggregate level, supposedly because the issue itself has no clear partisan structure among the public opinion (*the second hypothesis*).

Figure 2. Distribution of Political Attitude: Cooperation with China



The ineffective impact of the partisanship cue is found again in Table 9, which present the results of the second wave. The percentage of support is lower in the experimental group than in the control group across all partisan groups, including non-partisans (38.73% > 34.74%), the NPAD supporters (49.46% > 47.02%), and even the Saenuri supporters (60.17% > 57.01%). Reversely, the percentage of opposition is greater when respondents received the partisanship cue, as shown in non-partisans (12.20% < 14.21%) and NPAD supporters (9.03% < 11.92%). Among the Saenuri supporters, while the percentage of opposition is slightly lower when the partisanship cue is given (9.54% > 8.88%), the difference is almost insignificant to be considered as mobilizing effect. From Table 9, it is demonstrated that partisanship plays less role in conditioning political attitudes when the partisan cleavage about an issue is confusing and unclear (*the first and second hypotheses*).

Table 9. Attitude Distribution (%) by Partisanship: Cooperation with China

		No Cue	Partisanship Cue
Saenuri	Disagree	9.54	8.88
	Agree	60.17	57.01
Non-partisan	Disagree	12.20	14.21
	Agree	38.73	34.74
NPAD	Disagree	9.03	11.92
	Agree	49.46	47.02

Note: The summation of percentages of agree and disagree does not equal to 100% because there were responses of 'neither agree nor disagree.'

Moreover, Table 10 again reveals that the partisanship cue fails to mobilize the public in a partisan way. Different from the 'governmental control' issue, partisanship and ideology have statistically insignificant explanatory power on political attitudes in the experimental group, which might also be attributable to the issue salience. While the partisan cleavage about governmental control issue was clearly expressed and understood by the public through the recent public attention to the problem, the issue of China has not been hotly debated as much as the labor strike issue in recent years. Therefore, along with the unclear partisan cleavage due to its mixed meaning as military issue and economic issue, the low issue salience also can be another cause for the insignificant impact of the partisanship cue on this issue (*the third hypothesis*).

Table 10. Determinants of Political Attitude by Experimental Condition:  
Cooperation with China

	No Cue	Partisanship Cue
<b>Party Identification</b>	<b>-0.05 (0.03)</b>	<b>-0.03 (0.03)</b>
<b>Ideology</b>	<b>0.03 (0.02)</b>	<b>-0.03 (0.02)</b>
Feeling Thermometer for Saenuri Party	0.00 (0.00)**	0.01 (0.00)**
Feeling Thermometer for NPAD	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Age	0.02 (0.00)**	0.02 (0.00)**
Income	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Education	-0.02 (0.03)	0.09 (0.03)**
Female	-0.19 (0.05)**	-0.23 (0.05)**
Constant	2.75 (0.22)**	2.22 (0.22)**
R <sup>2</sup>	0.09	0.12
N	883	880

\*\*p<0.01; \*p<0.05 (two-tailed tests)

Note: Entries are unstandardized ordinary least-squares regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

### 3.2. Compassion as Tolerance for Alternatives

The second type of emotional cues intends to explore how compassionate anger influences political attitudes through considerations for social injustice and hardships of others. As it was introduced earlier, I seek to test the following hypothesis: first, whether compassionate anger toward the problems of society or others can lead individuals to be more willing to follow the proposed viewpoint; second, whether compassionate anger can encourage individuals to more actively consider alternative perspectives that are different from their preexisting opinion; third, whether the existence of long-term political symbol can determine how political dispositions such as ideology affect political attitudes under the influence of compassionate anger.

### 3.2.1. Corporal Punishment at School

In the past, corporal punishment by teachers to punish students' misdeeds were socially accepted in the Korean society. However, in recent years, the general trend has changed to the reduced or stoppage of corporal punishment for educational purposes. As a result, teachers have been dissuaded from using corporal punishment at school. However, still, there are some people who claim the necessity of corporal punishment, pointing out that students are not effectively controlled and that students might belittle teachers if teachers are prohibited from using corporal punishment in necessary cases. In regard to this controversial issue, there have been incidents in which parents who were angry at corporal punishment on their child used violent language or physically harmed teachers. Based on these incidents, some people have suggested that moderate amount of school punishment should be allowed in order to protect the teachers' authority at schools and to improve the teacher-student relationship.

Reflecting the recent situation, the experimental cue intends to highlight potential problem on teachers' right that might occur if school punishment is prohibited. While the control group is provided with statistical information, the experimental group is exposed to the phrases that trigger compassionate anger about the maltreatment of teachers in detail as follows.

*Wave 1: Corporal punishment at school should be permitted.*

*Wave 2 (Type A, Control Group): It was recently reported that the number of cases in which the teachers' rights were infringed by abusive words and assaults of student or parents has increased approximately 17.6% in 2013 compared to that of 2012.*


*Which of the following comes closest to your view about whether corporal punishment should be permitted at schools?*

*Wave 2 (Type B, Experimental Group): Recently, a series of incidents in which parents forced a teacher to kneel down in front of students or in which parents used abusive words and browbeat teachers has happened, which aroused much criticism as these incidents became known to the public. Which of the following comes closest to your view about whether corporal punishment should be permitted at schools?*

According to Figure 3, which presents the opinion distribution of the second wave, although the two groups received logically the same message, the compassion cue attracted greater portion of respondents to agree with the message of the given cue, which insinuates the necessity of school punishment. The percentage of support is greater under the compassion cue than under the numeric information (59.03% < 63.63%). Likewise, the compassion cue results in smaller percentage of opposition than the statistical information (17.35% > 14.04%). This result support the hypothesis that compassionate anger triggered about social problem can lead individuals to become more attentive and receptive to the provided information in assessing the relevant problem (*the first hypothesis*).



Figure 3. Distribution of Political Attitude: Corporal Punishment at School



Through Table 11, it is further demonstrated that compassionate anger encourages individuals to consider the alternative opinion more seriously, unbounded by their initial preference on the issue. The persuasion effect is most prominent among the people who previously opposed to the issue. The compassionate cue and the numeric information have almost the same effect on the individuals who were previously neutral, as shown in similar percentage of support (51.12% > 50.95%). However, among the individuals who initially opposed to this proposal in the first wave, greater portion of respondents shifted their stance to support side (16.20% < 27.50%). The percentage of opposition also decreased among the people who previously opposed the issue (55.09% > 48.50%). This result implies that compassionate anger encourages citizens to become more acceptable for the alternative viewpoint in light of new information, less bounded by prior attitude (*the second hypothesis*).

Table 11. Attitude Distribution (%) by Prior Attitude:  
Corporal Punishment at School<sup>37</sup>

Wave 1	Wave 2	Numeric Info	Compassion Cue
Disagree	Disagree	55.09	48.50
	Agree	16.20	27.50
Neutral	Disagree	10.22	9.18
	Agree	51.12	50.95
Agree	Disagree	4.04	2.39
	Agree	85.39	88.04

Note: The summation of percentages of agree and disagree does not equal to 100% because there were responses of 'neither agree nor disagree.'

Furthermore, Table 12 presents how the compassion cue and the numeric information influence political attitudes in a different way. When numeric information is provided, more conservative individuals are more supportive about the issue as reflected on the positive sign of the regression coefficient. However, as compassionate anger is provoked, ideological orientation no longer has statistically significant correlation with political attitude. In other words, different from the subsequent analysis on the Japan issue that is related to an entrenched political symbol, the issue of school punishment does not remind of any specific long-held political symbol. Since there is no long-term political symbol that might activate ideological predisposition to determine political attitudes, compassionate anger on this issue rather leads people to have similar stance regardless of ideological leaning (*the third hypothesis*).

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<sup>37</sup> The distribution (number of respondents) according to the wave and experimental condition is as follows:

Wave 1	Wave 2	
	Numeric Info	Compassion Cue
Disagree	216	200
Neutral	313	316
Agree	445	460

Table 12. Determinants of Political Attitude by Experimental Condition:  
Corporal Punishment at School


	Numeric Info	Compassion Cue
<b>Ideology</b>	<b>0.06 (0.02)*</b>	<b>0.02 (0.02)</b>
Party Identification	0.07 (0.03)*	0.11 (0.03)**
Age	-0.01 (0.00)*	-0.00 (0.00)
Income	0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Education	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)
Female	-0.24 (0.07)**	-0.34 (0.07)**
Constant	3.42 (0.23)**	3.69 (0.23)**
R <sup>2</sup>	0.05	0.05
N	883	880

\*\*p<0.01; \*p<0.05 (two-tailed tests)

Note: Entries are unstandardized ordinary least-squares regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

The second and third hypotheses are reconfirmed through Figure 4, which illustrates the predicted policy stance when all other variables are fixed at their means. Under the numeric information condition, the policy preferences on this issue are differentiated by ideology, as displayed through the dashed line. However, when compassionate anger is more strongly provoked through the compassion cue, the predicted policy stance becomes more similar across different ideological groups. In comparison to the control group, when the compassion cue is provided, more liberal people come to have more supportive stance on the issue, while more conservative people come to have less supportive stance on the issue. In other words, Figure 4 again provides evidence that compassionate anger leads individuals to more actively consider and accept the alternative viewpoint. The solid prediction line of the experimental group indicates that, as compassionate care for society is triggered, the explanatory power of ideology on political attitude is weakened on the issue that is not related to a representative long-term political symbol (*the second and third hypotheses*).

Figure 4. Predicted Political Attitude by Ideology:  
Corporal Punishment at School



### 3.2.2. Cooperation with Japan

Cooperation with Japan is another issue that has been long in the Korean politics and that has received much public attention. In relation to the colonization period during which Korea was ruled by the Japanese government, there has existed anti-Japan sentiment in the Korean society. Moreover, as Japanese people made the false claim that Dok-do island in the East Sea is their territory, Dok-do island became a long-entrenched political symbol that triggers negative feelings toward Japan. In 2014, the anti-Japan sentiment was rekindled as the Japanese government publicly announced a guideline for school textbooks that stated Dok-do as Japan's territory. Since this announcement can significantly affect the common knowledge among Japanese people, especially among young students, Koreans were enraged about the news.

Reflecting this recent social circumstance, the following questionnaires were provided on this issue. In order to trigger the compassionate anger about the

unjust claim of Japan, a detailed description about the recent announcement of the Japanese government is included as the compassion cue, while the control group received a message described in a dry tone with a simple reference to Dok-do. In this way, the impact of compassionate anger on attitude on this issue will be captured through the different degree of anger between the two groups.

*Wave 1: Expanded cooperation – in the matters of economy or military – with Japan, which claims the ownership of Dok-do, is desirable.*

*Wave 2 (Type A, Control Group): Some people have suggested that we need to reduce cooperation – in the matters of economy or military – with Japan, which claims the ownership of Dok-do, while the other people have suggested that the cooperation of private businesses of two countries is important in order to prevent exacerbated diplomatic relationship from adversely affecting economic relationship. Which of the following comes closest to your view?*

*Wave 2 (Type B, Experimental Group): The Japanese government publicly announced a textbook guideline that states Dok-do as a territory of Japan, which increased the possibility that Japan's false claim on Dok-do will be included in the sociology, geology, and history textbooks in Japan. Which of the following comes closest to your view about the proposal to reduce cooperation – in the matters of economy or military – with Japan, which claims the ownership of Dok-do?*

The overall impact of compassionate anger on political attitude is displayed in Figure 5, which illustrates the distribution of attitude of the second wave by experimental condition. A greater portion of the respondents who received the compassionate cue expressed opposition than the control group (51.03% < 56.97%). The percentage of support for the issue is lower when the

compassionate anger is more strongly provoked through specific circumstances in the experimental group (11.91% > 9.84%). Through Figure 5, it is demonstrated that compassionate anger leads individuals to become more receptive about the message of the given information (*the first hypothesis*).

Figure 5. Distribution of Political Attitude: Cooperation with Japan




Table 13, which presents the percentage of support and opposition according to the initial preference expressed in the first wave, also reveals that compassionate anger can encourage individuals to consider the problem from an alternative perspective. Increased percentage of opposition is found in all subgroups, including the respondents who disagreed with the issue in preelection wave (70.43% < 72.76%). However, the increased opposition through the compassion cue is more clearly manifested among the respondents who previously supported the issue (31.43% < 37.93%) or who were neutral about the issue (33.52% < 40.90%). Furthermore, the impact of compassionate anger was greater among the individuals whose initial preference was supportive, as reflected on the smaller percentage of support in the experimental group (27.86% > 23.28%) than among the people who were

previously neutral about the issue (11.81% > 11.48%). This result implies that compassionate anger does induce individuals to be more receptive about the alternative opinion under the consideration for relevant information (*the second hypothesis*).

Table 13. Attitude Distribution (%) by Prior Attitude:  
Cooperation with Japan<sup>38</sup>

Wave 1	Wave 2	Dry Tone	Compassion Cue
Disagree	Disagree	70.43	72.76
	Agree	7.23	5.57
Neutral	Disagree	33.52	40.90
	Agree	11.81	11.48
Agree	Disagree	31.43	37.93
	Agree	27.86	23.28

Note: The summation of percentages of agree and disagree does not equal to 100% because there were responses of 'neither agree nor disagree.'

As it was mentioned above, Dok-do island has been the center of public attention for a long time as a long-term political symbol that triggers adverse feelings toward Japan among the Korean people. When respondents are exposed to the cue about Japan's attempt to infringe upon this entrenched political symbol of Korea, as Table 14 illustrates, ideology yields a significant influence on their policy stances. While more conservative respondents leaned toward support, more liberal respondents were driven to stronger opposition under the influence of compassion cue. This result, in comparison to that of

<sup>38</sup> The distribution (number of respondents) according to the wave and experimental condition is as follows:

Wave 1	Wave 2	
	Dry Tone	Compassion Cue
Disagree	470	503
Neutral	364	357
Agree	140	116

the school punishment issue without a clear political symbol, implies that the public opinion about the issue becomes more ideologically divisive when compassionate anger is directed toward a long-term political symbol that has been discussed by the public for a long time (*the second hypothesis*).

Table 14. Determinants of Political Attitude by Experimental Condition: Cooperation with Japan

	Dry Tone	Compassion Cue
<b>Ideology</b>	<b>0.00 (0.02)</b>	<b>0.06 (0.02)**</b>
Party Identification	0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)**
Income	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)
Education	0.05 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)
Female	0.18 (0.06)**	0.12 (0.06)
Constant	2.19 (0.21)**	2.39 (0.21)**
R <sup>2</sup>	0.01	0.02
N	883	880

\*\*p<0.01; \*p<0.05 (two-tailed tests)


Note: Entries are unstandardized ordinary least-squares regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

The relationship between ideology and political attitude toward the Japan issue is visualized in Figure 6. When all other variables are fixed at their means, ideology effectively differentiates respondents' policy stances in the experimental group. In contrast, as evidenced by the flat dashed line of control group in Figure 6, when compassionate anger is weakly provoked by a simple reference to Dok-do, ideology has almost no explanatory power on individuals' political attitudes. The result implies that the concrete and detailed cue that clearly triggers compassionate anger leads preexisting political predisposition to differentiate the policy preferences when the anger is oriented toward an socially entrenched political symbol. In comparison with the preceding analysis on the school punishment issue, the analyses on the compassion cues imply



that compassionate anger activate ideological orientation in appraising political issues when a long-term political symbol is related, but weakens ideological basis of political attitudes when there is no representative political symbol relevant to the issue at hand (*the third hypothesis*).

Figure 6. Predicted Political Attitude by Ideology: Cooperation with Japan



### 3.3. Anxiety as Alert of Potential Loss<sup>39</sup>

The third type of emotional cues intends to trigger self-regarding anxiety about personal stakes through the localization of issues. As it was mentioned earlier, through the neighborhood cues, I test the following hypotheses: first, whether self-regarding anxiety about personal stake dissuades individuals from supporting the policy proposal, which implies the role of self-interest in political attitudes; second, whether a wider range of the public is dissuaded from the issue when self-regarding anxiety is triggered for all people regardless

<sup>39</sup> The results of the survey questionnaires with the neighborhood cues are analyzed in further detail in 신화용·안도경·박원호 (2015), including these two issues on nuclear power plant and public rental apartment.

of personal traits; third, whether self-regarding anxiety can have selective impact on political attitudes when the personal loss from policy consequences is relevant only to the people under specific conditions.

### 3.3.1. Nuclear Power Plant Construction

While the construction of nuclear power plant has multiple benefits to an entire society, it is an exemplary case of NIMBY (Not in My Back Yard), which is strongly opposed by the residents of nearby areas. Despite the social necessity of this facility, as shown in the recent cases of Samcheok-shi or Yeongdeok-gun, there have been protests by the residents of the regions that are selected as the candidates of additional nuclear power plant.<sup>40</sup> In other words, the personal stake regarding this issue significantly differs depending on whether the policy proposal is presented as national agenda or as local issue. The intensity of self-regarding anxiety is multiplied when the issue is localized, because the negative personal consequences that include physical danger and material loss are more clearly envisioned when the nuclear power plant is proposed to be built in the neighboring area.

In regard to this issue, the questionnaires are presented as the following phrases. In the second wave, all respondents received the safety information that emphasizes the social benefit of nuclear power plant. Only the half of the respondents received the issue as a local agenda of their residential region. Through these questionnaires, I capture the impact of sociotropic concerns on political attitudes in the control group, while inferring the significance of

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40 홍춘봉. (2015, June 9). “삼척핵발전소반대투쟁위, 원전 건설계획 철회 촉구.” 뉴스시스. Retrieved from <http://www.newsis.com/>; 김대기. (2015, April 13). “영덕 군민연대, 영덕 원자력 발전소 ‘백지화’ 요구.” 노컷뉴스. Retrieved from <http://www.nocutnews.co.kr/>

self-regarding anxiety through the experimental group.

*Wave 1: Construction of additional nuclear power plant is desirable.*


*Wave 2 (Type B, Control Group): According to the Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Corporation, nuclear power is an essential alternative energy source for Korea, which has scant natural energy reserves and a high level of energy import dependency. Moreover, nuclear power is an environmentally friendly energy source with low production costs and little CO<sub>2</sub> emission. Which of the following comes closest to your view on the construction of an additional nuclear power plant in XX (the province where the respondent lives)?*

*Wave 2 (Type A, Experimental Group): According to the Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Corporation, nuclear power is an essential alternative energy source for Korea, which has scant natural energy reserves and a high level of energy import dependency. Moreover, nuclear power is an environmentally friendly energy source with low production costs and little CO<sub>2</sub> emission. Which of the following comes closest to your views on the construction of an additional nuclear power plant?*

Figure 7 shows the distribution of policy stances by experimental condition in the second wave. Between these two groups, the most striking differences were the percentages of 'strong opposition.' When only the safety information was given, the percentage of strong opposition was lower (17.42%), in comparison to the experimental group that received both the safety information and the neighborhood cue in which the percentage of strong opposition is higher (27.93%). In aggregate level, when the geographical proximity cue was simply dropped into the policy proposal, the percentage of support is lower (31.66% > 21.97%), while the percentage of support is bigger (34.02 < 45.38), than the control group that only received the safety

information. Different from the previous studies that found minimal impact of self-interest on political attitudes, this result implies that self-regarding anxiety about potential loss or danger that is triggered by a localized issue can effectively dissuade individuals from supporting the policy proposal (*the first hypothesis*).

Figure 7. Distribution of Political Attitude: Nuclear Power Plant



Regarding the second hypothesis, Table 15 demonstrates that ideology and age come to explain the differences of policy appraisals less when the issue is localized. When only the safety information is provided, individuals express more supportive stance to the issue as they are more conservative or older. However, these attitude trend based on ideology and age is weakened as the issue is localized and the personal stakes become more evident. From this result, it can be assumed that the neighborhood cue had an overarching influence on the entire strata of individuals regardless of their ideology and age, which is further displayed in Figure 8 and Figure 9.

Table 15. Determinants of Political Attitude by Experimental Condition:  
Nuclear Power Plant

	Safety Info	Safety Info + Neighborhood Cue
<b>Ideology</b>	<b>0.10 (0.02)**</b>	<b>0.05 (0.03)*</b>
<b>Age</b>	<b>0.01 (0.00)*</b>	<b>0.01 (0.00)</b>
Party Identification	0.12 (0.03)**	0.12 (0.03)**
Income	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Education	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.12 (0.04)**
Female	-0.32 (0.07)**	-0.32 (0.08)**
Constant	1.92 (0.25)**	2.21 (0.25)**
R <sup>2</sup>	0.10	0.08
N	883	880

\*\*p<0.01; \*p<0.05 (two-tailed tests)

Note: Entries are unstandardized ordinary least-squares regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

As Figure 8 and Figure 9 aptly illustrate, self-regarding anxiety provoked by the localization of issue has universal impact upon the public, across different ideological orientations and age groups. In Figure 8, when all other variables are fixed to their means, the support on this issue is weaker in experimental group than control group not only among the conservatives but also among the liberals, as shown in the solid line located below the dashed line over the entire range of ideological stance. Likewise in Figure 9, when all other variables are fixed to their means, self-regarding anxiety about negative personal consequences dissuades individuals of every age group in a similar way, illustrated through the solid line located lower than the dashed line. These results, in overall, demonstrate that self-regarding anxiety that reminds the clear disadvantage for all strata of individuals can sway public opinion toward the opposition side, regardless of personal traits (*the second hypothesis*).

Figure 8. Predicted Political Attitude by Ideology: Nuclear Power Plant





Figure 9. Predicted Political Attitude by Age: Nuclear Power Plant



### 3.3.2. Public Rental Apartment

In the Korean society, public rental apartment, which is provided to low-income households, is another case of NIMBY that are often opposed by local community. However, different from the nuclear power plant issue that provoke worries not only about material loss, but also about health or physical

danger, public rental apartment triggers self-regarding anxiety mainly in terms of material benefit and loss. Moreover, since the main aftermath of construction of public rental apartment is the decreased value of real estates of the region, the individuals who own houses or real estates are especially influenced by the proposal in a negative way, while the persons who does not possess house or real estates are minimally influenced.

Under this social background, the following phrases are provided on the issue of public rental apartment. Since the regional magnitude of the policy is smaller than nuclear power plant on which the neighborhood cue is applied on the province level, the neighborhood cue is applied to a lower level of local district, which is the county level. Therefore, on this issue, the name of county, instead of that of province, in which the respondent lives is inserted in the questionnaire to the experimental group.

*Wave 1: Construction of public rental apartment – with an aim to relieve house shortage – is desirable.*


*Wave 2 (Type A, Control Group): There is a proposal to expand the construction of public rental apartment in order to relieve house shortage problem. Which of the following comes closest to your view about this problem?*

*Wave 2 (Type B, Experimental Group): There is a proposal to expand the construction of public rental apartment in XX (the county where the respondent lives) in order to relieve house shortage problem. Which of the following comes closest to your view about this problem?*

As shown in Figure 10, which displays the attitude distribution of the second wave, the localization of issue and self-oriented anxiety about personal consequences pull the responses to more opposing side in the case of public

rental apartment too. In comparison to the issue as a national agenda, the localized issue attracts greater portion of individuals to oppose the proposal (11.50% < 14.55%). In contrast, the percentage of support is smaller when the issue is localized in the experimental group than in its abstract context in the control group (63.35% > 58.91%). Through Figure 10, it is again shown that self-regarding anxiety about potential disadvantage attracts public opinion to opposition, which again demonstrates the workings of self-interest behind political attitudes (*the first hypothesis*).

Figure 10. Distribution of Political Attitude: Public Rental Apartment



The relatively small inter-group difference in aggregate level supposedly results from the selective impact of the neighborhood cue on individuals with different personal conditions. As noted earlier, public rental apartment casts more danger on the personal stakes of individuals with more wealth. Table 16 provides evidence of the selective impact of the neighborhood cue depending on the income level and the real estate ownership. Even without the neighborhood cue, individuals who possess real estates are more opposed to the proposal than the people who do not own houses, with a statistically



significant inter-group difference in policy preferences. As the neighborhood cue is provided, the gap between home owners and leasers increases as evidenced by greater absolute value of the regression coefficient of the experimental group (-0.46 < -0.55). Moreover, while income does not have significant impact on policy preferences in the control group, it comes to have statistically significant explanatory power on policy stances in the experimental group. In accordance with the proposed hypothesis, the issue localization more strongly triggers self-regarding anxiety among the wealthier people and led these individuals to have more opposing stance toward the given proposal (*the third hypothesis*).

Table 16. Determinants of Political Attitude by Experimental Condition:  
Public Rental Apartment

	No Cue	Neighborhood Cue
<b>Income<sup>41</sup></b>	<b>-0.00 (0.02)</b>	<b>-0.05 (0.02)**</b>
<b>Real Estate Ownership</b>	<b>-0.46 (0.08)**</b>	<b>-0.55 (0.08)**</b>
Ideology	0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Age	0.02 (0.00)**	0.01 (0.00)**
Party Identification	-0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Education	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)
Female	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.14 (0.07)
Constant	3.74 (0.23)**	4.23 (0.25)**
R <sup>2</sup>	0.06	0.09
N	883	880

\*\*p<0.01; \*p<0.05 (two-tailed tests)

Note: Entries are unstandardized ordinary least-squares regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.


The relationship between income and policy preferences is graphically presented in Figure 11, which displays the predicted political attitude when all variables other than income are fixed to their means. When the issue is

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41 *Income* reflects monthly income of respondent's household and is measured on a 11-point scale (1=less than 1,000,000 won (approximately 1,000 dollars) ~ 11=more than 10,000,000 won (approximately 10,000 dollars)).

provided in abstract context as a national agenda, income does not differentiate between individuals' policy stances, as evidenced by flat dashed line. However, when the issue is localized through the neighborhood cue, the individuals with higher income become much less supportive about the issue. When the issue is localized, it is clear that wealthier people are much less supportive about the proposal than poorer individuals, which is illustrated as the slanted solid line. Moreover, it is found that the individuals from households with extremely low income are more supportive about the issue, because these people, in contrast to wealthier people, are potential beneficiaries of the increased supply of public rental apartment. Figure 11 thus implies that the way self-regarding anxiety works on political attitudes can vary according to the distinct personal conditions, which lead to different personal consequences in regard to the issue at hand. From this result, it is reconfirmed that self-regarding anxiety can have selective impact if the personal stakes vary according to household income (*the third hypothesis*) and that self-interest does influence political attitudes when the personal consequences on the issue are concrete and vivid (*the first hypothesis*).

Figure 11. Predicted Political Attitude by Income: Public Rental Apartment



## V. Discussion

In this study, I bring emotions to the center of discussion to understand the emotional underpinnings of political attitudes. Although the public opinion scholarship of South Korea has often underemphasized or narrowly discussed the emotions' role in political attitudes, a wide range of emotions needs to be studied in our pursuit to correctly understand the mass opinion, because emotions incessantly intervene in our political life and powerfully shape our viewpoints about social issues. In this line of thought, this study demonstrates that political attitudes are significantly affected by the emotional cues that are embedded in political discourses and social contexts.

Through the survey experiment, this study finds that partisan attachment, compassionate anger, and self-regarding anxiety significantly influence how citizens shape political attitudes about diverse social issues. On the whole, emotions are found to have potentials to serve as structural background of attitudes, to induce considerations for alternative viewpoint, and to strengthen the connection between individuals and political issues on a more personal level. In other words, rather than being a detrimental or dangerous component of the public opinion, emotions can be beneficial to democracy, by encouraging citizens to be attentive to relevant information and context in forming their political attitudes through emotional reactions.

Partisan attachment powerfully conditions how individuals perceive elite discourse and assess political issues, especially when the issues have clear partisan cleavage and are salient among the public. Compassionate anger orients individuals' attention to the given information and increases acceptance of the alternative viewpoint that is in conflict with initial preference.

Self-regarding anxiety, provoked through the localization of issues, leads individuals to relate political issues with their personal environment more clearly.

These findings contribute to the study of political science, especially in South Korea, by shedding light on the political meanings of emotions that have been often overlooked in the public opinion studies. The survey experiment with emotional cues provides evidence that emotions, rather than being marginal or inconsequential, are central in how citizens form attitudes about political issues.

Furthermore, this study, as an initial attempt to understand the political meanings of emotions in the Korean public opinion, suggests a number of future research agendas that stem from the limitations of this study.

First, one of the future research avenues is found in the task of measuring emotions in a reasonable way. As it was mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, the impalpable nature of emotions has cast substantial difficulty on the empirical research of emotions in political science. In order to overcome the difficulty, I attempted to capture the workings of emotions through the emotion-laden cues in this study. However, this study design still falls short of measuring emotions in an observable way. For example, the specific types and intensity of emotions are not directly measured, but are indirectly assumed based on the contents of the cues. Although pure emotions are vaguely perceived even by the respondents themselves, which might distort the survey answers on the intensity or frequency of emotional experiences, further efforts on it would contribute to the construction of a solid basis of the empirical findings about the political roles of emotions.

Second, while this study covers fifteen social issues found in the Korean society in recent years, the number of issues and emotional cues introduced in this study might be insufficient to elicit a generalized conclusion about the workings of emotions in political attitudes. Since the cases explored in this study are the examples of possible contexts under which emotions can affect political attitudes, subsequent studies on other types of issues or emotional cues with different contents would further support the importance of emotions as a central basis of political attitudes.

Third, this study links emotions to political attitudes of individuals, but does not gauge the potential impact of emotions on political processes, such as electoral outcomes, agenda setting, or policy executions. Since citizens' inner motivation to their political attitudes are aggregated into the public opinion that influences the real political process, the linkage among emotion, political attitudes, and democratic process would be another interesting research agenda to further understand the role and potential of emotions in our political life.

Despite the shortcomings of this study as reflected on the future research agendas, this study contributes to the public opinion studies by proposing a possible way to learn the political significances of emotions through an empirical research method. I end this thesis with a hope that emotions will receive more scholarly attention in the public opinion studies, as a central component of our political life with potential contributions and roles as one of the most fundamental motivators behind our political thoughts and behaviors.

# Appendix (Korean Version)

## 부록 1. 정책태도 설문 문항 (서울대학교 정치커뮤니케이션센터 2014년 지방선거 1차 조사)

- 다음 각 견해에 대해 찬성하거나 반대하는 정도를 각각 표시해주시시오.

	매우 반대	약간 반대	중도	약간 찬성	매우 찬성
학교에서 차별이 허용되어야 한다.					
한미동맹관계를 더욱 강화해야 한다.					
비정규직 노동자문제는 개별 기업에 자율적으로 맡겨야 한다.					
주택난 해소를 위해 임대아파트 신축을 확대해야 한다.					
독도영유권을 주장하는 일본과 경제, 군사 등에 관한 협력을 줄여야 한다.					
남북긴장완화를 위해 대북지원을 지속해야 한다.					
원자력 발전소 추가 설립이 필요하다.					
노사갈등을 해결하기 위해 공권력을 투입할 수 있다.					
특목고 신규 설립을 통해 학생들의 경쟁력을 높일 수 있다.					
다른 국가보다는 중국과 경제, 군사 등에 관한 협력을 확대해야 한다.					
학력차별 없는 열린고용을 실천하는 기업에 세제지원 등을 강화해야 한다.					
기초과학진흥을 위한 과학비즈니스벨트조성에 예산을 더 투입해야 한다.					
교통혼잡 증대가 예상되지만 시내버스 노선확장이 필요하다.					
무상급식을 초등학교 뿐 아니라 중고등학교까지 확대하여 전면 실시 해야 한다.					

## 부록 2. 정책태도 실험설문 문항 (서울대학교 정치커뮤니케이션센터 2014년 지방선거 2차 조사)

- 다음 각 견해에 대한 귀하의 입장을 표시해주시시오. (응답자를 랜덤하게 나누어, 절반의 응답자에게는 A유형 문항을, 나머지 응답자에게는 B유형 문항을 제시. A/B 유형 뒤에 적힌 숫자는 실제 문항번호. 음영처리 된 부분이 각 단서이며, 설문지에서는 별다른 표시 없이 제공함.)

### 1. 당파성 단서

<b>A-8.</b> 중국과 경제, 군사 등에 관한 협력을 확대해야 한다는 입장이 제기되는 한편 중국보다는 다른 국가들과의 협력 확대에 힘써야 한다는 입장도 제기되고 있습니다. 이 문제에 대한 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?	<b>B-8.</b> 중국과 경제, 군사 등에 관한 협력을 확대해야 한다는 입장이 제기되는 한편 중국보다는 다른 국가들과의 협력 확대에 힘써야 한다는 입장도 제기되고 있습니다. 이에 관하여 최근 새누리당 황우여 대표는 주한중국대사와 연결에서 "중국과 굳건한 친선관계를 지속해야 한다"는 입장을 밝혔습니다. 이 문제에 대한 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?
다른 국가보다는 중국과 경제, 군사 등에 관한 협력을 확대해야 한다.	

<b>A-11.</b> 최근 박근혜 대통령은 “직무능력에 따라 대우받는 학력차별 없는 사회가 되는 것이 중요하다”는 입장을 밝혔습니다. 이와 관련하여, 학력차별 없는 열린고용을 실천하는 기업에 세제지원 등을 강화해야 한다는 입장이 있는 반면, 세제지원이 근본적으로 문제를 해결하지는 못한다는 반론도 있습니다. 이 문제에 대해 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?	<b>B-11.</b> 학력차별 없는 열린고용을 실천하는 기업에 세제지원 등을 강화해야 한다는 입장이 있는 반면, 세제지원이 근본적으로 문제를 해결하지는 못한다는 반론도 있습니다. 이 문제에 대해 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?
학력차별 없는 열린고용을 실천하는 기업에 세제지원 등을 강화해야 한다.	

<b>A-12.</b> 노조과업으로 인해 시민들의 불편이 발생하더라도 노조의 투쟁을 정부가 공권력으로 진압하는 것은 바람직하지 않다고 보는 입장이 있습니다. 노사갈등을 해결하기 위해 정부가 개입할 수 있는지 여부에 관한 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?	<b>B-12.</b> 노조과업으로 인해 시민들의 불편이 발생하더라도 노조의 투쟁을 정부가 공권력으로 진압하는 것은 바람직하지 않다고 보는 입장이 있습니다. 이러한 입장에서, 2013년 12월, 민주당 양승조 최고위원은 "철도노조 투쟁을 진압하기 위한 정부의 공권력 투입은 마치 유신의 부활을 보는 것 같다"며 비판했습니다. 노사갈등을 해결하기 위해 정부가 개입할 수 있는지 여부에 관한 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?
노사갈등을 해결하기 위해 공권력을 투입할 수 있다.	

당과성 단서	공감 단서
<b>A-15.</b> 박원순 새정치민주연합 서울시장 후보는 "미래에 대한 투자인 반값등록금은 대학생들에게 아르바이트 대신 공부·자기개발의 기회를 준다"며 반값등록금 정책을 지지했습니다. 반면 정몽준 새누리당 서울시장 후보는 "장학금 중대·기숙사 증축 등 반값등록금 외에도 학생들의 부담을 줄이는 방법이 있다"며 반값등록금 정책에 반대했습니다. 반값등록금 정책에 대한 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?	<b>B-15.</b> 00대학 2학년 조 모 학생은 대학등록금 마련을 위해 밤 10시에 대형마트에 출근하여 밤샘 야간 경비 알바를 아침 10시까지 하고, 바로 등교하여 오전 11시부터 오후 4시까지 수업을 듣고, 틈틈히 동아리방에서 새우잠을 청합니다. 강의가 끝나면 곧장 도서관에 가서 밀린 과제를 처리하고, 밤8시에 집에 돌아와 다시 출근 준비를 합니다. 이처럼 공부하기 위해 대학을 다니는지 등록금을 벌기 위해 알바를 다니는 건지 헷갈릴 정도로 학생들의 사례가 많습니다. 반값등록금 정책에 대한 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?
대학 반값등록금 정책을 도입해야 한다.	

## 2. 공감 단서

<b>A-2.</b> 학생 및 학부모의 폭언/폭행 등 교사에 대한 교권 침해 사례가 2012년에 비해 2013년에 약 17.6% 증가하였다는 조사결과가 발표되었습니다. 학교에서 체벌이 허용되어야 하는지의 문제에 대한 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?	<b>B-2.</b> 학생들이 보는 앞에서 학부모가 교사의 무릎을 꿇거나, 교사에게 폭언·협박하는 사건이 최근 잇따라 발생했다는 사실이 알려지며 물의를 일으켰습니다. 학교에서 체벌 허용여부에 대한 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?
학교에서 체벌이 허용되어야 한다.	

<b>A-4.</b> 최근 00공항에서 비정규직 청소아주머니들이 서비스평가시에는 화장실에서 못 나오고, 간식도 계단에 숨어서 먹어야 한다는 부당한 근무조건이 알려지며 논란이 있었습니다. 비정규직에 대한 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?	<b>B-4.</b> 비정규직 노동자가 정규직 노동자와 동일한 노동을 수행함에도 임금을 적게 받는 것은 공정하지 않다는 주장이 있습니다. 비정규직에 대한 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?
비정규직 노동자 문제는 개별 기업에 자율적으로 맡겨야 한다.	

<b>A-6.</b> 유상급식을 실시할 경우 저소득층 학생이 급식비 지원을 하는 과정에서 가정환경이 드러나 학교생활에 불편을 겪는 사례가 많았는데, 그러한 피해를 막기 위해 전면적 무상급식이 실시되어야 한다는 주장이 있습니다. 무상급식을 초등학교 뿐 아니라 중·고등학교까지 확대하여 전면 실시해야 한다는 입장에 대한 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가깝습니까?	<b>B-6.</b> 유상급식을 실시할 경우 월 5만원의 급식비를 지원받기 위해 학교에 '가난'을 증명하고, 친구들에게는 '가난한 집 자식'이라고 고백하게 되어 모멸감을 느끼는 아이들이 많았는데, 그러한 피해를 막기 위해 전면적 무상급식이 실시되어야 한다는 주장이 있습니다. 무상급식을 초등학교 뿐 아니라 중·고등학교까지 확대하여 전면 실시해야 한다는 입장에 대한 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가깝습니까?
무상급식을 초등학교 뿐 아니라 중·고등학교까지 확대하여 전면 실시해야 한다.	

<b>A-9.</b> 2002년 6월 13일, 친구의 생일을 축하해 주러 가던 신효순, 심미선 두 학생이 길에서 미군의 장갑차에 깔려 사망한 사건이 발생했지만 군사재판에서 관련 미군들의 무죄판결이 내려졌고, 한미주둔지원협정(SOFA)에 따라 한국의 독자적 사법권이 제한되어 있어서 제대로 된 처벌이 이루어지지 않았습니다. 이에 대해 한미동맹의 불평등성에 대한 반발의 목소리가 있었습니다. 한미동맹에 대한 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?	<b>B-9.</b> 2009년부터 2013년 동안 주한미군 범죄사건이 총 1489건이 발생했으나, 한미주둔지원협정(SOFA)에 따라 한국의 독자적 사법권이 제한되어 있어서 제대로 된 처벌 없이 72.9%가 불기소처분 되었습니다. 이에 대해 한미동맹의 불평등성에 대한 반발의 목소리가 있었습니다. 한미동맹에 대한 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?
한미동맹관계를 더욱 강화해야 한다.	

<p><b>A-13.</b> 남북분단 이후 60년이 넘는 세월 동안 기약 없이 부모와 떨어져 사는 아픔, 형제를 보고 싶어도 보지 못하는 슬픔을 견디며 살아가는 이산가족들이 많습니다. 이제 고령의 나이가 되어 만남은 커녕 생사조차 모른채 세상을 떠나게 될까봐 두려워하며 애타게 이산가족 상봉 신청 결과를 기다리는 이들도 많습니다. 남북긴장완화를 위해 대북지원을 지속해야 한다는 주장에 대한 귀하의 견해는 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?</p>	<p><b>B-13.</b> 이산가족정보통합시스템에 등록된 이산가족 찾기 신청자는 모두 12만9천264명이며, 이 중 이산가족 상봉에 참여했던 인원은 1만7천986명 뿐이며, 생존자는 2013년 말 기준으로 7만1천480명이나 됩니다. 또한, 신청자 중 3천~4천명이 고령 등으로 매년 사망하는 추세입니다. 남북긴장완화를 위해 대북지원을 지속해야 한다는 주장에 대한 귀하의 견해는 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?</p>
<p>남북긴장완화를 위해 대북지원을 지속해야 한다.</p>	

<p><b>A-14.</b> 독도 영유권을 주장하는 일본과 경제·군사적인 협력을 줄여야 한다는 주장이 있지만, 반대로 일본은 한국의 주요 경제협력 파트너이므로 정치·외교 관계 악화가 양국 경제관계에 미치는 악영향을 최소화시키기 위해 양국간 민간 산업협력이 중요하다는 주장도 있습니다. 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?</p>	<p><b>B-14.</b> 올해 초 일본정부는 중고등학교 교과서 제작지침에 독도가 일본의 고유 영토라는 주장을 명시하는 방안을 공식 결정하여 발표했으며, '독도는 일본땅'이라는 일방적인 주장이 사실상 일본의 모든 사회, 지리, 역사 교과서에 실릴 가능성이 커졌습니다. 독도영유권을 주장하는 일본과 경제, 군사 등에 관한 협력을 줄여야 한다는 입장에 대한 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?</p>
<p>독도영유권을 주장하는 일본과 경제, 군사 등에 관한 협력을 줄여야 한다.</p>	

### 3. 지역 단서

<p><b>1-A.</b> 한국수력원자력에 따르면, 원자력은 에너지 부존자원이 부족하고 에너지 수입의존도가 높은 우리나라에 필수적인 대체에너지이며, 연료비용이 저렴하고 이산화탄소 배출이 거의 없는 친환경 에너지원이라고 합니다. <b>[해당 도](*16개 광역시가 아닌 8개 도)</b>에 원자력발전소가 설립 되는 것에 대한 귀하의 견해는 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?</p>	<p><b>1-B.</b> 한국수력원자력에 따르면, 원자력은 에너지 부존자원이 부족하고 에너지 수입의존도가 높은 우리나라에 필수적인 대체에너지이며, 연료비용이 저렴하고 이산화탄소 배출이 거의 없는 친환경 에너지원이라고 합니다. 원자력발전소 추가 설립에 대한 귀하의 견해는 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?</p>
<p><b>[해당 도]</b>에 원자력 발전소 추가 설립이 필요하다.</p>	<p>원자력 발전소 추가 설립이 필요하다.</p>

<p><b>3-A.</b> 주택난 해소를 위해 임대아파트 신축을 확대해야 한다는 논의가 있습니다. 이 문제에 대한 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?</p>	<p><b>B-3.</b> 주택난 해소를 위해 <b>[해당 구시군]</b>에 임대아파트를 신축해야 한다는 논의가 있습니다. 이 문제에 대한 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?</p>
<p>주택난 해소를 위해 임대아파트 신축을 확대해야 한다.</p>	

<p><b>A-5.</b> <b>[해당 구시군]</b>에 특목고를 신규 설립하여 통해 학생들의 경쟁력을 높일 수 있다는 논의가 있습니다. 이 문제에 대한 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?</p>	<p><b>B-5.</b> 특목고 신규 설립을 통해 학생들의 경쟁력을 높일 수 있다는 논의가 있습니다. 이 문제에 대한 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?</p>
<p><b>[해당 구시군]</b>에 특목고 신규 설립을 통해 학생들의 경쟁력을 높일 수 있다.</p>	<p>특목고 신규 설립을 통해 학생들의 경쟁력을 높일 수 있다.</p>

<p><b>A-7.</b> 2013년 미래창조과학부는 기초연구개발 지원 정부예산으로 약 6조 7백억원을 지출했습니다. 향후 기초과학을 육성하기 위한 과학비즈니스벨트 조성을 위한 예산을 책정한다고 할 때 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?</p>	<p><b>B-7.</b> 2013년 미래창조과학부는 기초연구개발 지원 정부예산으로 약 6조 7백억원을 지출했습니다. 향후 기초과학을 육성하기 위한 과학비즈니스벨트를 <b>[해당 시도 (16개 광역시/도)]</b>에 조성하기 위한 예산을 책정한다고 할 때 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?</p>
<p>기초과학진흥을 위한 과학비즈니스벨트 조성에 예산을 더 투입해야 한다.</p>	<p><b>[해당 광역시/도]</b> 기초과학진흥을 위한 과학비즈니스벨트 조성에 예산을 더 투입해야 한다.</p>

<p><b>A-10.</b> 교통혼잡 증대가 예상되지만 <b>[해당 구시군]</b>에 버스노선 노선확장이 필요하다는 논의가 있습니다. 이 문제에 대한 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?</p>	<p><b>B-10.</b> 교통혼잡 증대가 예상되지만 시내버스 노선확장이 필요하다는 논의가 있습니다. 이 문제에 대한 귀하의 입장은 어디에 가장 가깝습니까?</p>
<p>교통혼잡 증대가 예상되지만 <b>[해당 구시군]</b>에 시내버스 노선확장이 필요하다.</p>	<p>교통혼잡 증대가 예상되지만 시내버스 노선확장이 필요하다.</p>



## Appendix (English Version)

### Appendix 1. Questionnaires on Policy Preferences (The First Wave of the 2014 National Survey conducted by the Center for Political Communication of Seoul National University)

– Please indicate how much you support or oppose each of the policy proposals.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Corporal punishment at school should be permitted.					
Korea-US alliance should be strengthened.					
Private firms' autonomous management of temporary workforce is desirable.					
Construction of public rental apartment – with an aim to relieve house shortage – is desirable.					
Reduced cooperation – in the matters of economy or military – with Japan, which claims the ownership of Dok-do, is desirable.					
Aid to North Korea should be continued in order to ease the tension in the Korean peninsula.					
Construction of additional nuclear power plant is desirable.					
Governmental control can be imposed to suppress labor strike.					
Establishment of additional special-purpose high school is beneficial to students.					
Expanded cooperation – in the matters of economy or military – with China, more than other nations, is desirable.					
Tax benefit to the firms with open employment policy – employment irrespective of educational background – is desirable.					
Additional budget allocation to science business belt construction – to advance basic science – is desirable.					
Expansion of local bus route – despite the expected traffic increase – is desirable.					
Free school meal, previously served only in elementary schools, should be extended to middle and high schools.					

### Appendix 2. Questionnaires with Experimental Cues on Policy Preferences

(The Second Wave of the 2014 National Survey conducted by the Center for Political Communication of Seoul National University)

– Please indicate how much you support or oppose each of the policy proposals.

(In the post-election wave, respondents were randomly divided into two groups. Half of the respondents were provided with type A, while another half were provided with type B. The number after alphabet A or B indicates the actual number of each questionnaire. Dark shaded parts are the experimental cues, but they were provided in the actual survey without any special indication.)

## 1. Partisanship Cue

<p><b>A-8.</b> Some people have suggested that expanded cooperation with China – in the matters of economy or military – is desirable, while others have suggested that more effort is needed to expand the cooperation with countries other than China. Which of the following comes closest to your view about this problem?</p>	<p><b>B-8.</b> Some people have suggested that expanded cooperation with China – in the matters of economy or military – is desirable, while others have suggested that more effort is needed to expand the cooperation with countries other than China. In regard to this problem, Woo-yeo Hwang, a party head of the Saenuri Party, recently expressed his opinion that “the cooperative relationship with China should be reinforced.” Which of the following comes closest to your view about this problem?</p>
<p>Expanded cooperation – in the matters of economy or military – with China, more than other nations, is desirable.</p>	

<p><b>A-11.</b> Recently, President Geun-hye Park expressed her opinion that “it is important to realize a society in which employees are evaluated by job performance without the discrimination based on educational attainment.” Regarding this issue, some people have suggested that tax benefit to the firms with open employment policy is desirable, while the others have suggested that tax benefit cannot fundamentally solve the problem. Which of the following comes closest to your view about this problem?</p>	<p><b>B-11.</b> Some people have suggested that tax benefit to the firms with open employment policy is desirable, while the others have suggested that tax benefit cannot fundamentally solve the problem. Which of the following comes closest to your view about this problem?</p>
<p>Tax benefit to the firms with open employment policy – employment irrespective of educational background – is desirable.</p>	

<p><b>A-12.</b> Some people have suggested that, even if the labor strike causes inconveniences to citizens, it is undesirable for the government to suppress the strike of labor union with governmental power. Which of the following comes closest to your view about whether the government can intervene in labor strikes?</p>	<p><b>B-12.</b> Some people have suggested that, even if the labor strike causes inconveniences to citizens, it is undesirable for the government to suppress the strike of labor union with governmental power. From this viewpoint, in December 2013, Seung-jo Yang, a party leader of the DUP, criticized the government that “the imposition of governmental power to suppress the strike of the Korail labor union can be likened to the revival of ‘Yushin Government’.” Which of the following comes closest to your view about whether the government can intervene in labor strikes?</p>
<p>Governmental control can be imposed to suppress labor strikes.</p>	

Partisanship Cue	Compassion Cue
<p><b>A-15.</b> Won-soon Park, the NPAD candidate for the Seoul mayoral election, supported the half-price college tuition plan, commenting that “the plan is an investment for future that provides college students with opportunities to learning and self-improvement instead of working part-time jobs.” On the other hand, Mong-joon Chung, the Saenuri candidate for the Seoul mayoral election, opposed the plan, commenting that “there are other ways to reduce financial burden of students, such as increasing the amount of scholarship or additional construction of dormitories.” Which of the following comes closest to your view about the half-price college tuition plan?</p>	<p><b>B-15.</b> Mr. Cho, a sophomore at OO University, in order to earn money for tuition, works at a mall as an overnight security guard from 10 PM to 10 AM. After the work, he immediately goes to the school to attend classes from 11 AM to 4 PM, sleeping curled up at a vacant room in spare times. After the classes, he goes to library to deal with the pile of undone homeworks, and comes back home at 8 PM to prepare to go to work again. Like this case, there are many students whose situations are harsh to the extent that it is confusing whether they are attending schools to study or they are working part-time jobs to earn tuition. Which of the following comes closest to your view about the half-price college tuition plan?</p>
<p>Half-price college tuition plan is desirable.</p>	

## 2. Compassion Cue

<p><b>A-2.</b> It was recently reported that the number of cases in which the teachers’ rights were infringed by abusive words and assaults of student or parents has increased approximately 17.6% in 2013 compared to that of 2012. Which of the following comes closest to your view about whether corporal punishment should</p>	<p><b>B-2.</b> Recently, a series of incidents in which parents forced a teacher to kneel down in front of students or used abusive words and browbeat teachers has happened, which aroused much criticism as these incidents became known to the public. Which of the following comes closest to your view about whether</p>
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be permitted at schools?	corporal punishment should be permitted at schools?
Corporal punishment at school should be permitted.	

<b>A-4.</b> Recently, unjust working conditions at OO airport were revealed to the public, which aroused much criticism. At this airport, temporary workers, who are mostly middle-aged women, were prohibited from coming out of the bathrooms during a service assessment period, and were forced to hide in stairwells when they needed to hurriedly eat between meal times. Which of the following comes closest to your view about temporary employment?	<b>B-4.</b> Some people have suggested that it is unfair to temporary workers to receive lower wages even if they carry out the same tasks as employees with a permanent employment contract. Which of the following comes closest to your view about temporary employment?
Private firms' autonomous management of temporary workforce is desirable.	

<b>A-6.</b> Under the policy of paid school meals, in the process of financial support for poor students, the family misfortune of students from low income families was revealed to others, which caused inconveniences in their school life. Some people have suggested that free school should be provided in all schools in order to prevent those problems. Which of the following comes closest to your view about the claim that free school meal, previously served only in elementary schools, should be extended to middle and high schools?	<b>B-6.</b> Under the policy of paid school meals, there were many students who felt humiliated because they need to prove their 'poverty' and confess to friends that 'I am a child of poor family' in order to receive financial support of 50,000 won (approximately 50 dollars) for their school meals. Some people have suggested that free school should be provided in all schools in order to prevent those problems. Which of the following comes closest to your view about the claim that free school meal, previously served only in elementary schools, should be extended to middle and high schools?
Free school meal, previously served only in elementary schools, should be extended to middle and high schools.	

<b>A-9.</b> On July 13th, 2002, Shin Hyo-sun and Shim Mi-seon, middle school students who were heading at a friend's birthday party, were run over and killed by an armored vehicle of US troop. However, at a court martial, the soldiers involved in the incident were cleared of any charge, and those soldiers were not properly punished because the independent judicial power of Korea is restricted by the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Regarding this situation, there have been resistant voices that criticize the inequality of Korea-US alliance. Which of the following comes closest to your view about Korea-US alliance?	<b>B-9.</b> From 2009 to 2013, the number of crimes committed by US troop was 1,489, but among 72.9% of those crimes were not indicted and were not given proper punishment because the independent judicial power of Korea is restricted by the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Regarding this situation, there have been resistant voices that criticize the inequality of Korea-US alliance. Which of the following comes closest to your view about Korea-US alliance?
Korea-US alliance should be strengthened.	

<b>A-13.</b> Due to the division of Korea, innumerable separated families suffer from the agony of being separated from their parents without hope and from the sorrow of not being able to see their siblings for more than 60 years. There are many elderly people who desperately look forward to the results of their application for the meetings of separated families under the threat of imminent death, without knowing the whereabouts of their lost families. Which of the following comes closest to your view about the claim that aid to North Korea should be continued to ease the tension in the Korean peninsula?	<b>B-13.</b> According to the Integrated Information System for Separated Families, the number of applicants, counted in late 2013, who registered for the search of their lost families is 129,264, among which only 17,986 participated in the reunion of separated families while 71,480 still survive. Moreover, among the applicants, almost 3,000~4,000 people lose their lives every year due to the old age. Which of the following comes closest to your view about the claim that aid to North Korea should be continued to ease the tension in the Korean peninsula?
Aid to North Korea should be continued in order to ease the tension in the Korean peninsula.	

<b>A-14.</b> Some people have suggested that we need to reduce cooperation – in the matters of economy or military – with Japan, which claims the ownership of Dok-do, while the other people have suggested	<b>B-14.</b> The Japanese government publicly announced a textbook guideline that states Dok-do as a territory of Japan, which increased the possibility that Japan's false claim on Dok-do will be included in the
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that the cooperation of private businesses of two countries is important in order to prevent exacerbated diplomatic relationship from adversely affecting economic relationship. Which of the following comes closest to your view?	sociology, geology, and history textbooks in Japan. Which of the following comes closest to your view about the proposal to reduce cooperation – in the matters of economy or military – with Japan, which claims the ownership of Dok-do?
Reduced cooperation – in the matters of economy or military – with Japan, which claims the ownership of Dok-do, is desirable.	

### 3. Neighborhood Cue

<b>1-A.</b> According to the Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Corporation, nuclear power is an essential alternative energy source for Korea, which has scant natural energy reserves and a high level of energy import dependency. Moreover, nuclear power is an environmentally friendly energy source with low production costs and little CO2 emission. Which of the following comes closest to your view on the construction of an additional nuclear power plant in XX (the province where the respondent lives)?	<b>1-B.</b> According to the Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Corporation, nuclear power is an essential alternative energy source for Korea, which has scant natural energy reserves and a high level of energy import dependency. Moreover, nuclear power is an environmentally friendly energy source with low production costs and little CO2 emission. Which of the following comes closest to your views on the construction of an additional nuclear power plant?
Construction of an additional nuclear power plant in XX is desirable.	Construction of an additional nuclear power plant is desirable.

<b>3-A.</b> There is a proposal to expand the construction of public rental apartment in order to relieve house shortage problem. Which of the following comes closest to your view about this problem?	<b>B-3.</b> There is a proposal to expand the construction of public rental apartment in XX (the county where the respondent lives) in order to relieve house shortage problem. Which of the following comes closest to your view about this problem?
Construction of public rental apartment – with an aim to relieve house shortage – is desirable.	Construction of public rental apartment – with an aim to relieve house shortage – in XX is desirable.

<b>A-5.</b> There is a proposal that additional establishment of special-purpose high school in XX (the county where the respondent lives) is beneficial to students. Which of the following comes closest to your view about this problem?	<b>B-5.</b> There is a proposal that additional establishment of special-purpose high school is beneficial to students. Which of the following comes closest to your view about this problem?
Establishment of additional special-purpose high school in XX is beneficial to students.	Establishment of additional special-purpose high school is beneficial to students.

<b>A-7.</b> In 2013, Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning spent approximately 67 billion won as government budget for the subsidy to the R&D of basic science. Which of the following comes closest to your view about the future budgetary plan for the construction of science business belt to develop basic science?	<b>B-7.</b> In 2013, Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning spent approximately 67 billion won as government budget for the subsidy to the R&D of basic science. Which of the following comes closest to your view about the future budgetary plan for the construction of science business belt in XX (the province where the respondent lives) to develop basic science?
Additional budget allocation to science business belt construction – to advance basic science – is desirable.	Additional budget allocation to science business belt construction in XX – to advance basic science – is desirable.

<b>A-10.</b> There is a proposal that expansion of local bus route in XX (the county where the respondent lives) – despite the expected traffic increase – is desirable. Which of the following comes closest to your view about this problem?	<b>B-10.</b> There is a proposal that expansion of local bus route – despite the expected traffic increase – is desirable. Which of the following comes closest to your view about this problem?
Expansion of local bus route in XX – despite the expected traffic increase – is desirable.	Expansion of local bus route – despite the expected traffic increase – is desirable.

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## 국문초록

# 정치태도의 감정적 토대: 한국 대중여론에서 장기적 당파심, 공감적 분노, 개인적 불안감의 정치적 의미

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본 연구는 한국정치의 맥락에서 감정이 정치태도에서 갖는 정치적 의미를 살펴보려는 시도이다. 공적 여론에 관한 기존문헌에서 민주적 시민에게 요구되는 덕목으로 지적능력과 지식이 강조되어온 반면 감정의 기여는 간과되어 왔는데, 이러한 민주적 시민상에 대한 기존의 관점에 대하여, 본 연구는 정치적 담론 및 사회적 맥락과의 상호작용 속에서 시민들이 정치태도를 형성하는 과정에서 감정이 개인들과 정치적 사안을 이어주는 중요한 연결고리로 작용할 수 있다는 가능성을 제시한다. 이를 통해, 이 글은 한국의 공적 여론 연구에서 오랫동안 주목받지 못했던 감정의 정치적 의미를 새롭게 조명한다.

최근 한국정치에서 논의되고 있는 열다섯 가지 사회적 이슈에 관한 실험설문의 결과를 통해, 본 연구에서 다음과 같은 감정의 정치적 의미가 발견된다. 첫째, 당파성 단서를 사용한 실험설문의 결과는 정당에 대한 장기적 애착

심인 정당일체감이 정치적 태도의 구조적 배경으로 작용하며, 특히 개인들이 자신의 당파심에 기반하여 엘리트 담론을 받아들이거나 거부하고, 그에 따라 정치적 입장을 형성한다는 것을 보여준다. 즉, 시민들이 모든 종류의 엘리트 담론을 임의적으로 또는 무비판적으로 받아들이는 것은 아니며, 개인들의 당파적 애착심과 해당 이슈에 관해 사회적으로 형성된 당파적 균열, 그리고 해당 사안에 대한 사회적 주목도에 따라 엘리트 담론의 동원력이 강력하거나 미약한 것으로 나타났다. 이와 같은 발견은 당파심이 정치태도의 견고한 기반으로써 민주적 과정에 기여할 수 있는 가능성을 함의한다.

둘째, 공감 단서가 적용된 이슈들에 관한 실험설문의 결과에 따르면, 부당한 사회적 문제나 다른 이의 곤란한 상황에 대한 공감적 분노는 사람들로 하여금 주어진 정보를 더 적극적으로 고려하도록 만들며 이를 자신의 정치태도에 반영하도록 유도한다. 공감적 분노가 촉발될 때, 기존의 입장에 반하는 대안적 시각을 수용하는 성향이 더 강해지며, 이는 상이한 입장에 대한 관용적 태도를 촉진하는데 감정이 긍정적으로 기여할 수 있음을 함의한다. 나아가, 특정한 정치적 상징과 밀접한 관계에 있는 사안에 대하여 공감적 분노가 촉발되는 경우, 이념과 같은 기존의 정치적 성향과 정책입장 간의 관계가 강화되는데, 이는 감정이 대중 여론에서 정치적 연관성을 갖게 되는 하나의 방식을 보여준다.

마지막으로, 지역단서를 통해 개인적 불안감이 촉발되는 경우, 태도응답을 통해 표출되듯 개인들의 마음 속에서 정치적 사안이 개인적 삶과 보다 밀접한 것으로 인식되어 정책제안의 개인적 여파에 대한 고려가 정책입장에 더 뚜렷하게 반영된다. 기존의 정치학 문헌에서 시민들이 정치적 이슈를 추상적이고 개인의 삶과 무관한 것으로 인식하므로 개인적 이해관계가 정치태도에 거의 영향을 미치지 못한다는 발견이 있어왔지만, 본 연구의 결과는 이슈의 지역화를 통해 유발된 개인적 불안감이 개인적 이해관계에 부합하는 방향으로 정치



태도를 변화시킨다는 것을 보여주며, 이는 시민들이 개인적 불안감에 바탕하여 개인적 여건에 대한 타당한 고려를 통해 정치태도를 형성하고 있음을 함의한다.

구체적인 관찰이 어렵기 때문에 발생하는 감정에 관한 연구의 난점에도 불구하고, 본 연구는 각종 사회적 맥락 속에서 다양한 감정이 갖는 정치적 의미를 경험적 연구를 통해 입증해보고자 하는 초기 시도으로써 한국의 정치학 문헌에 기여한다. 본 연구는 감정이 정치태도에서 부정적인 또는 무의미한 요소이기 보다는, 첫째, 당파적 애착심에 기반한 엘리트 담론에 대한 숙고된 반응, 둘째, 공감적 분노를 통해 촉진되는 관련 정보에 대한 적극적 고려와 상이한 입장에 대한 관용, 셋째, 자신의 삶과 정치적 사안을 보다 밀접하게 연관 짓도록 해주는 개인적 불안감을 통해, 감정이 시민들로 하여금 정치적 사안에 더 적극적으로 관여하도록 만드는데 기여할 수 있다는 가능성을 제시한다. 이상의 논의를 통해, 일반대중의 정치적 생각과 행동을 이해하려는 노력 속에서 감정을 주요한 연구 대상으로 부각시키는 시도의 출발점으로서 본 연구가 한국의 공적 여론 연구에서 중요한 전환점이 되기를 희망한다.

**주요어:** 감정, 공적 여론, 정당일체감, 공감, 불안감, 실험설문  
**학 번:** 2013-20180