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정책학석사 논문

Decision-making mechanism on Korea's foreign troop dispatch

- Applying modified version of the
Two-Level Game theory -

2014 년 8 월

서울대학교 행정대학원

정책학 전공

김 주 형

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이 논문을 정책학 석사학위논문으로 제출함

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Abstract

Sending troops to foreign region inevitably involves upon a highly political decision making process, due to its substantive ramification to the society at large. Apart from the inherited risk of shedding the blood in violent combat, such decision directly and indirectly influences the international structure via threat assessment modification in between various governments, power disposition and the credibility of every nations that are the participants of the dispute. From time immemorial, numerous political entities attempted to change the status quo in more favorable terms to themselves through power aggregation, asking for troop dispatch to other political entities, if necessary. The current international setting of the post-cold war era at first glance seem to be a long hull of peace without a major armed conflict. However, the embedded historical sentiment of regional and ethnic aspect has erupted relentlessly, snowballing the need for security. In that context, the need for troop dispatch has been increased more than ever. And therefore, the necessity for a more effective and efficient troop dispatch decision has risen.

This thesis focuses on an idealist decision making mechanism that factor in various players that shape the finalized outcome. Most of the previous studies assumed a coherent and rational state-centric decision making apparatus that automatically leads to the maximization of the national interest. However, a decision making is actually performed by multiple combination of chemistries that possess different shade and stance. In order to enhance the analysis, the researcher applied a ‘modified version’ of the two-level game theory; strengthening the Putnam’s model through blending David Easton’s

advantageous aspect of the system theory, grasping the negotiation procedure in between states and penetrating inside a reputed black box of state's decision making apparatus. As a result, the troop dispatch decision can be understood as a multi-dimensional interaction between state-counter party state, and the political entities within domestic circles. In order to distill some meaningful implication, this thesis selected three troop dispatch cases that covers the timeframe of roughly 40 years: Vietnam, East Timor and Iraq.

Certain lessons have been retrieved from the analysis. First, voices of the society tend to gain trait as democracy progresses, culminating in the strengthened domestic elements, especially NGOs and the media. Second, when president loses its grips, the whole structure will likely to malfunction. Third, 'legitimacy' becomes an important factor in troop dispatch decision. Fourth, international structure does not necessarily fixate the Korea's range of option or win set. Fifth, narrowing the domestic win set would not automatically lead to a favorable outcome. To remedy such shortfalls and upgrade the decision making process, this thesis suggests that the government should factor in the civil society's view in advance, and the president should orchestrate the decision making process and display his/her stance in lucid fashion. Adding to that, it is important to forge legitimacy in whatever terms it may be and the president should fully understand the structural constraint and should maximize the national interest within that boundary. Lastly, the president should not only consider the win set itself but the overall implication of the dispatch decision.

Keywords: troop dispatch, decision making mechanism, win set

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ABBREVIATION

APEC : Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

APODETI : Associacao Popular democrata de Timor

ASEAN : Association of South-East Asian Nations

DMZ : Demilitarized Zone

DPRK : Democratic People's Republic of Korea

DRV : Democratic Republic of Vietnam

FRETILIN : Frete Revolucionario do Timor-Leste Independente

FTA : Free Trade Agreement

GDP : Gross Domestic Product

GNP : Grand National Party

HEU : Highly Enriched Uranium

IMF : International Monetary fund

MND : Ministry of National Defense

MNF : Multinational Force

MOFA : Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCNP : The National Congress for New Politics

NFL : National Liberation Front

NGO : Non-Governmental Organization

NPT : Non-Proliferation Treaty

NSC : National Security Council

OECD : Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

PTBT : Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

ROK : Republic of Korea

SOFA : Status of Forces Agreement

SOP : Standard Operating Procedure

UDT : The United Democratic Party of Timor

ULD : United Liberal Democrats

USFK : US Forces in Korea

USSR : The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WMD : Weapons of Mass Destruction

WTO : World Trade Organization

I. Introduction

1. Purpose of research

1.1 Overall Background

From time immemorial, since the onset of civilization, armed conflict between people was a perennial, 'business as usual' kind of affairs that lingered throughout the history. In order to prevail over other competing party, increased number of manpower equipped with enhanced weaponry was a sine qua non. Once the notion of a 'nation-state' has been materialized after the Westphalia treaty of 1648, nations in the European continent strived their best effort for power and victory, engaging in multiple military skirmishes, normally ensued force dispatch to foreign regions.

Under the intricate alliance structure, the European nations involved in various troop dispatches believing that their national interest might be maximized through such decision. Napoleon's army, coupled with England's industrial revolution virtually transformed the erstwhile 'limited conflict' to a 'total war', making war more impactful for the entire nation, from civil society to the top brass. In a nutshell, war became more deadly and decision upon troop dispatch gained its critical attribute.

Irrespective of the invention of the nuclear warhead, dispatching troops were frequently favored as settling scores in international dispute. Since nuclear bomb was regarded as a weapon of last resort and an inconceivable instrument that can be flexibly deployed in global affairs, states preferred using conventional armed forces to display their intentions and messages to the nations which are at loggerheads. After the world war II, various armed conflicts followed : Korean war was a testing ground for the enforcement of

the newly founded United Nations, Vietnam war had embroiled a superpower and many other alliances, Iraq war of 1991 was a first gathering of multinational forces right after the post-cold war era, orchestrated by the US. Apart from major military skirmishes, there were countless regional, small-scale troop engagement around the globe resulting serious casualties to numerous individuals.

Once the Soviet Union dissolved and lost the grips on its satellite states, international structure had undergone a tectonic change that led to a near unipolar world. Optimist like Francis Fukuyama famously quipped the “end of history” and declared that the world would be a safer (or rather a bit boring) place since democracy is likely to be the only path that is left for nations to adopt as a ‘proven’ model of success and prosperity. In the similar vein, democratic peace theory have gained its momentum as a plausible logic that were partially applied as a governmental policy, coined as ‘nation building’ during the Clinton era.

However, the jingoistic nationalism, religious fanaticism and many other grudging dissents that were lurking under the seemingly fixed cold-war structure erupted rampantly. Multinational Yugoslavia, backed by a charismatic leader Tito, fell apart. Thousands of refugees migrated to the border countries, evoking an international problem. The power vacuum created by the rivalry of the two superpowers turned the African continent as a venue for free-for-all power game initiated by rebels, insurgent and militias. Meanwhile, weak governments in Afghanistan and other central Asian countries lost the full control of their sovereign region and unfortunately branded as a ‘failed state’, offering a springboard to illicit existence such as terrorists and international narcotic industries.

Amid such volatile arrays of events, the US have somewhat cringed to engage actively since the 18 casualties caused in the Somali incidence raised domestic concern for a possible second Vietnam quagmire that might lead to shedding needless blood. Adding to that, the fall of the USSR prompt the US to de-escalate foreign engagement and reduce the overall defense budget. In a nutshell, comparing to the demand of security service, the supply plummeted and the gap tend to increase with the passage of time.

In order to mind such gap, the UN devised a novel concept of Peace Keeping Operation that was not clearly stipulated in the UN Charter¹. Irrespective of the criticism upon the Peace Keeping Operation's ineffectiveness and its meagerness, the overall circumstances that badly required security guarantees triggered the support for the PKO. Some notables, including former Russian president Gorbachev stressed upon the importance of the PKO as a viable problem-solving instrument, especially in the post-cold war era². As a result, the number of soldiers that were deployed under the aegis of the UN surged. South Korea was one of the active participants to the newly invented notion of security management.

9/11 enabled a sea change to US' passiveness. Starting from the Iraq war of 2003, proactive engagement continued to proceed, spearheaded by the Bush administration. Alongside with the PKO, again, multinational forces

¹ A peacekeeping operation consists of military, police and civilian personnel, who work to deliver security, political and early peacebuilding support. Even though the concept of peacekeeping is not explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter, it has evolved over time to meet the organization's changing role in the maintenance of international peace and security.

² Gardner, Richard N. (1987-1988) "The case for practical internationalism" 『Foreign Affairs, CFR (66)』 pp. 838

came to the fore as an active instrument for managing international disputes albeit depending more on legitimate credentials from the UN (via security council or the general assembly's approval).

All in all, the world that we live in is not peaceful or stable as some optimist predicted at the early phase of the post-cold war period. If not a doomsday scenario depicted in the 'clash of civilization', the vulnerable attribute of global structure will very likely to persist throughout the foreseeable future. Since security affairs within a single state eventually emanate throughout the region, multinational approach seems to be the wave of the future. Under such interconnectedness, states will involve one another via troop dispatch (whether in the name of multinational forces or the PKO), more than ever.

1.2 Relevance vis-à-vis the public administration

With regard to the issue of sending troops abroad, it seems to be remote from the areas of public administration at first glance. However, it depends upon the analytic prism that is utilized upon seeing the matter. Considering the definition of public administration³, troop dispatch can be regarded as a critical decision-making procedure which is deeply involved by the government branches, the president and other miscellaneous bureaucratic bodies.

As it will be further discussed in the 'previous studies' part, most thesis

³ Public administration refers to two meaning: first, it is concerned with the implementation of government; second, it is an academic discipline that studies this implementation and prepares civil servants for working in the public service. As a "field of inquiry with a diverse scope" its "fundamental goal is to advance management and policies so that government can function." The candidate is thoroughly focused on the 'policy making' aspect.

delving on this topic highlights the performance of troops in the foreign territory or delicate power relationship vis-à-vis the countries that request the dispatch. Furthermore, as a basic assumption, sovereign state is commonly regarded as a rational, unitary, black box⁴; that the decision making process within a state is largely irrelevant. Since a state is presumed as a billiard ball, in-depth analysis has been done in the following areas: global structure that constraints the activity of states, overall relationship between states within the boundary of an alliance structure and so forth.

In terms of legalistic perspective, some research interprets the troop dispatch issue under the legal-illegal framework. Using the established and existing legal canon (From constitution, domestic law, treaty, customary international law to UN charter), such view traces the legal grounds of sending troops abroad: whether it violates the preambles of the constitution.

As a public policy major, the researcher is expected to thoroughly focus on the decision making process within this 'black box'. If various other dissertations have shed light on the relationship between the black boxes, or the result and impact of such chemistry, my interest would be to squeeze inside the seemingly cohesive mechanism and find out its unique peculiarities and seek further implications it ensues.

Yet, interdisciplinary nature of the policy science will inevitably introduce some instruments developed and utilize in other academic fields. For instance, main toolkit for analyzing state relationship will be from international

⁴ In neorealist international relations theory, the sovereign state is generally regarded as a black box: states are assumed to be self-interested actors. Liberal and constructivist theorists often criticize neorealism for this 'black box' approach. Yet for convenient reason, most of the thesis assumes state as a coherent amalgam.

relations theory: Rosenau's pre-theory, Putnam's Two-Level Game, Michael Doyle's Democratic Peace Theory and so forth. From the political science area, David Easton's 'system theory' will be adopted.

In sum, the researcher will undergo a thorough analysis regarding the decision making process within the governmental segment. The interactions between various governmental actors will be the core focus area. In addition, there will be simultaneously some explanations upon to the factors that directly and indirectly influence the governmental organization: external factors like US-alliance and internal ones including NGO and media.

1.3 Necessity of research

Dispatching troop may contain multiple purposes. As the 21st century has complex issues that were unseen in past periods, solutions to resolve such problematic situation require smarter and ingenious methods. Unlike in the previous generation, nowadays armed forces are not simply engaged in simple man-to-man combat. The introduction of 'nation building'⁵ requires the troops to deliver multi-role packages to the troubled region. Since the job involves in implanting democracy from scratch, intervention in political aspect is virtually ineluctable. Thus the foot soldier should be an administrator, politician, diplomat and a mechanic at the same time.

⁵ Traditionally, the notion of nation building is understood as the process of constructing a national identity using the power of state. This process aims at the unification of the people within the state so that it remains politically stable and viable in the long run. Nation-building can involve the use of propaganda or major infrastructure development to foster social harmony and academic growth. However, the terms used above is equivalent to "the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy" which Mylonas Harris defined in his book *The Politics of Nation-Building : Making Co-Nationals, Refugees and Minorities* (2013).

As mentioned above, the post-cold war period has displayed a teeming insecurity in many parts of the globe. Yet the termination of the deadly competition between two the superpowers have left the US to modify and recalibrate their strategic interest. The concern upon rising China and the increasing terrorist threat thanks to the optimal conditions that some failed states provide have turned US' eyes on places that are considered to be the newly emerging flashpoints in the contemporary time.

However, the traditional areas still needs careful security management. Moreover, the want for more troop dispatch will undoubtedly surge in the coming years. Since the world is more tightly intertwined, negligence on certain province or marginalizing a local dispute as a mere 'peripheral matter' will be inconceivable in the long run, due to its spillover effect. Simply put, the demand for sending troop is very likely to snowball in the looming days ahead.

Under such setting, Korea is not free from its mooring. Ever since the Republic of Korea has officially become a member nation of the UN in 1991, there were number of occasions from the Security Council. As a result, soldier with Korean nationality were deployed in East Timor, Somalia, Angola Lebanon, Haiti and many other places that accepted the foreign troop presence.

As Korea's international influence gain weight, demand for greater burden sharing and request for further risk bearing will indeed be expected to increase. Alongside with the peace keeping operation, troop dispatch in the name of multinational forces is not likely to wane in the immediate foreseeable future. The ROK-US alliance structure keeps the Korean Peninsula to maintain its stableness and provide the necessary breeding ground for economic prosperity.

Yet, the newly initiated global war on terror has heightened the possibility of Korea's troop dispatch at the request of the US government. Irrespective of the huge defense budget⁶ US spends annually, global economic turmoil triggered by the fall of the Lehman Brothers have heavily constrained the material leeway that the Obama administration could disburse.

Moreover, serious degradation of credibility, inflamed by the bullying nature of the Bush administration coupled with the reluctance to send military personnel in a faraway place have all functioned in the direction of a more prudent and nuanced approach upon US troop dispatch. In that context, US sought more legitimacy and shown the tendency to forge multinational forces before intervening in the disputed area. Such movement somehow guarantees the justifiable mood to intervene and to a certain extent it paper over the unilateral attribute of the US.

Under the banner of multinational forces, backed by the ROK-US alliance, Korea sent troops to Vietnam in the 1960s and Iraq in 2003. As in the case of the PKO, this type of involvement will continue throughout the future.

Unfortunately, looking through the past track record, decisions were made in a rather rough manner, somewhat in desultory, lacking a systematic way that might have maximized the national interest instead. It would indeed be an interesting academic exercise to delve upon the lessons of past decision making in a 20/20 hindsight. Yet sending troop is not a finalized or a finished task. Thus, it is critical to distill the quintessential implications and forge

⁶ According to the 2013 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, US comprised approximately 39% of the global defense spending. US' size of \$682 billion is roughly equivalent to the aggregated sum of 11 countries that rank from 2nd to 12th.

some useful policy suggestions to ameliorate the current shortfalls to the betterment of the overall national interest.

Since troops are dispatched to areas that lack stability or a region that needs to be established from scratch, it is pretty axiomatic that risks will entail. The possibility of spilling blood and human casualty transform a troop dispatch issue into a contentious agenda that covers the op-ed in a country. Even though such decision is made and implemented in a similar vein as other important affairs including FTA agreement, Official Development Assistance and exporting/importing GMO product, the risk level at hand is way higher and eventually put more gravity on the subject.

Coupled with that, the dear leader's death in December 2011 led the 28 year old Kim Jung Eun to actually run the North Korean regime with lesser amount of legitimacy. Compared to his grandfather or his father, the young leader had virtually no time to prepare for the job. Since Kim Jong-il's abrupt death had precipitated the young ruler to receive full power at the last moment, his leadership was questioned by the public at large. Amidst such precarious situation, Kim Jung Eun took bold moves to show the world that he is not a soft touch and has some guts to take strong initiatives, culminating in the third nuclear test and the successful launch of its long-range rocket, Kwangmyongsong. However, such series of events clearly reflect the vulnerable nature of the current regime, desperate to acquire legitimacy from the inside.

The heightened probability of a North Korean implosion and the following unification issue leaves a Herculean task for the surrounding countries to pick up the pieces. Since South Korea is not the signatory state of the Korean War

of 1950, it leaves the US and China to supervise the Northern part of the DMZ. However, the notion of desecrating the sacred homeland to foreign troops will very likely to inflame hostile attitude towards outside influence. Furthermore, US and China's forces may be engulfed in a dangerous escalation derived by rivalry, eventually degrading security conditions in the Korean Peninsula. In order to avoid such ominous consequence, South Korean troop may be an appropriate policy tool to assuage risk factor and prompt the nation building process. Indeed, there are already some rudimentary researches⁷ upon this specific scenario, utilizing Korean troops as a PKO. In this regard, sending adequate number of troops in a timely fashion will be the key essence. Such performance will only be viable when the decision-mechanism is soundly set and function smoothly in contingency.

In conclusion, amidst the changing external circumstances that boost the need to dispatch forces abroad, not only in an exclusively armed conflict but operation that deals with nation building, Korean troops will likely be sent in the coming days to disputed places. Compared to such growing demand, our government's decision making procedure and its implementation has not fully upgraded to a certain level. It is thus fairly important to analyze past decisions regarding dispatch and retrieve substantial lessons. With the gathered facts, the researcher will suggest couple of meaningful implications as well as relevant suggestions.

⁷ Bae Sung Pil (2005) prescribes ROK's peace keeping operation in North Korean territory yet recommends not to be deeply involved in sensitive areas (disarmament of DPRK's forces and defusing WMDs) at first phase.

2. The scope and subject of analysis

Among multiple dispatch cases, the researcher cherry-picked three events (Vietnam, East Timor and Iraq) as a range of analysis. Each case has its own significance. The matrix of three has been chosen mainly by the following reasons. In order to compare the structural and international differences between the cold war and the post-cold war era (in terms of multinational forces), comparison between Vietnam and Iraq is critical. Second, grasping the UN-led PKO activity is necessary and East Timor is a model case for the type, (albeit it was initially a MNF that turned into a PKO, by the approval of the UN) Iraq and East Timor was taken as an example since MNF and PKO need to be analyzed in parallel. Lastly, as a policy suggestion in the conclusion part, the researcher will extract several critical implications and suggestions to each one of those cases.

Thus in terms of the timeframe, this thesis covers the range of approximately 40 years (1965 ~ 2003). In a nutshell, the researcher will extract some idiosyncratic features of decision making from the past three dispatch cases.

II. Formulization on decision-making and Previous Studies

1. Formulization on decision-making theory/model

The origin of understanding decision making mechanism began with the exploration of fundamental nature of a human being. One school of thought developed from the area of economics. Its main focus was on the individual's proclivity to maximize their utility, assuming consumer, producer and investor as a *homo economicus*⁸. This ensued in a rationality model that posit a decision making apparatus that contains a rational and consistence character. Meanwhile, a 'social model' that derived from psychology, viewing human as a complex amalgam of feelings, emotions and instincts, guiding their action as well as choices, emerged.

Initially, the pendulum between the 'rational' and 'social' model swayed in favor of the former. The industrial revolution and the enlightenment gave the upper hand in a scientific, quantifying approach to the Western society that created the ground for the social science to imbue with more 'rationality'.

Under such context, David Easton introduced a primitive decision making model in order to formulate a scientific setting in the area of political science. To him, decision making was an output of a value distribution against a certain input coming from the outside. Based upon such logical attribute, so-called system theory were broadly utilize in understanding various decision

⁸ Assuming that individual human (or, namely consumers) will make choices that maximizes the net benefit of each activity – the total benefit of the activity minus its total cost. Such attribute of 'maximization' differs from *homo sociologicus* which emphasizes on the collective societal influence on making decision. See Rittenberg, Libby. and Tregarthen, Timothy. (2009) "Principle of Microeconomics" 『Flat World Knowledge』 Chapter 6. pp. 2

making that were involved in foreign affairs.

This “systematic approach” inevitably posits a state as a coherent, unitary actor in international politics which assumed it as rational, just as *homo economicus* in economics seems to be a given. Furthermore, a government of a certain country is regarded also as an instrument of maximizing the national interest, tantamount to an incarnation of a state. Such understanding was a logical extension of a balance of power theory that regarded maximizing of the national interest as a state’s *raison d’etat*.

With the passage of time however, these logical traits lost its ground after the Vietnam debacle. The devastating event in the South Eastern jungle triggered the possibility that government might well be irrational, and the realist assumption would contain some fallacies. This dubiousness upon the ‘rationality’ itself has further impaired the credibility of its assumption as a whole⁹. As a corollary, a new perspective started to gain momentum: that key decisions made within the government can be incoherent, if not self-defeating. During the mid-1970s, scores of scholars begin to suggest the fallible nature of human beings that are involved in decision making and the situational context that skew the original intention of a policymaker.

⁹ Herbert Simon introduced the notion of ‘bounded rationality’. Contrary to the traditional decision-making model which posit an absolute rationality of the participants, he asserted that a more realistic assumptions must be applied for minding the discrepancies in between the real practice and theory. His central assumptions are : First, in choosing between multiple alternatives, the individuals attempt to satisfy or look for the one which is satisfactory or ‘good enough’. Second, the individual perceive the miniature of the real world which simplifies the complexities inherent in the real world. Third, since ‘bounded satisfaction’ is the key motivation, the decision-maker would not analyse all possible options at hand. Thus, the choices they make are not necessarily the best selection. Herbert Simon, edited by Latsis J. Spiro (1976), “Method and appraisal in economics” 『Cambridge University Press』 pp. 130-131

Such school of thought focused on the 'subjectively perceived reality' of the decision makers, rather than the objective reality itself as the quintessential element that determine the outcome of a specific issue. Furthermore, Snyder insist that the analysis must be given light to the decision making procedure that may seem somewhat like muddling through, rather than the finalized decision itself.

Another key distinction from the system theorist was its emphasis on various surrounding elements that compose the decision making: social structure, policymaker's inner character and other situational factors. Henry Kissinger emphasized the importance of the individual's role in decision making, asserting that the structural inevitability can't define a predictable path in a certain policy. In the similar vein, historian E.H.Carr suggested a middle ground between the individual and the structural given that shape the history. Furthermore, Kenneth waltz divided the level of analysis as international system, state and an individual in his famous publication "Man, the State and War¹⁰". These three layer approach represent the different perspective according to the level of analysis and offer heterogeneous result and prescription respectively. Although he emphasized the priority on international system level, it was quite impressive to used multi-layered analytic approach in foreign policy decision making.

Distancing from the rationality model, this modification has offered some valuable analytic tool, especially the dynamic nature of decision making process that was difficult to grasp when state was regarded as a rational,

¹⁰ Waltz, Kenneth N. (1959) "Man, the state, and war : a theoretical analysis" 『Columbia University Press』

billiard-ball like character. By introducing the irrational aspect in the state decision making process, various decision making models were invented under that basis.

Michael D. Cohen developed a new concept called a 'garbage can model' that provided an alternative approach to the rationality model. In contrast to a rational decision that are made within a strictly hierarchical organization, decision-making in Cohen's model contains a logic of coincident and irrational feature. It posits four elements (Choices, Participants, Problems and Solutions) as a prerequisite. A decision is made when these four elements converge at a certain moment. This extremely irrational approach can be understood as a strong approach in seeking alternative.

There were other attempts (if not extreme) to form a reasonable theory than can substitute the state-centric understanding. Closely reviewing the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, Graham Allison suggested three models of analysis : 1) rational actor model 2) organizational process model and 3) bureaucratic politics model. Rational actor model which is also referred as Allison model I, is the similar as conventional approach that posit a rational, coherent state as the basic analysis. In contrast, the organizational process model assumes certain inherent inertia rooted in the decision making procedure. Such permeated custom in decision making enforces the standard operating procedure (SOP) to prevail.

As a result, radical shift from previous decisions are highly unlikely and future decisions tends to follow a similar path of the past. Lastly, the bureaucratic politics model starts from the point that where someone is poised, the view depends. In this perspective, decision making is a complex process

which is equivalent to dynamic interaction between various governmental branches that possesses different opinions. Naturally, the finalized result is a compromise of all participants, albeit more favorable to the one brandishes the greatest influence among them. Irrespective of the highest command chain that the president is situated, it can be regarded as *primus inter pares*, not an ultimate arbiter-of-event at all circumstances.

Allison model is another attempt to look into the state or government body and see how decision is actually made. Again, such method offers an alternative way of interpretation towards the same event, in many cases largely divergent from state-centric prism.

Alongside with the tendency to infuse more 'irrational attribute' in order to enhance the precision of the model itself, the structured backdrop of a cold war era aroused the question of how nations (especially the weaker ones) decide a certain foreign policy in such setting. Shoemaker and Spanier modified the traditional Patron-Client model into a 2 by 3 matrix and explained that a weaker country may have certain decision in terms of weaker members choosing, under the military alliance vis-à-vis the stronger counterparty.

Due to the groundbreaking event of the Soviet Union's dissolution, the cold war structure reshuffled in 1991. At the start of the post-cold war era, theories based upon the notion that state possessing democratic stature is less likely to be engaged in war compared to other nations have been in the limelight. Conjuring up Immanuel Kant's asserted theory, Michael Doyle and Bruce Russett polished the 'democratic peace' theory with quantitative and qualitative analysis. They suggest that the polity of a state is the most

important element that tilts a foreign policy decisions towards a certain direction.

In particular, they claimed that the probability of war between the two democratic countries were extremely unlikely and polity with a democratic orientation would display certain reserve in opening war. Yet, if incongruent aspect of the national interest emerges, between a democracy and a non-democracy, the former will fight the war to the end with fierce attributes.

Meanwhile, there were attempts to forge a model that link the internal as well as external element regarding policy making. James Rosenau pursued a way in linking domestic and international politics and asserted that a general theory can be consolidates in this field, just as in the natural science area. This hypothesis-verification method is called 'Pre-Theories' and is generally understood as a more scientific approach than the previous initiatives. Rosenau divided the analytic level into five components: 1) Individual 2) Role 3) Government 4) Society and 5) System, which is frequently used by researchers dealing with foreign policies. His upgraded version of Pre-Theories in 1969 has aroused the positive sentiment that this approach has brought new perspective, linking domestic and external affairs and generally touted as a major initiative that categorized multiple analytic level, enhancing rational nature in international politics. Yet, broadness of its attribute made extremely difficult for formulating a theory that contains conciseness and generality.

In order to formulize my own model of analysis that can adequately explain Korea's past troop dispatch decisions and distill some useful implications, I would like to have a thorough review and underline its strong

as well as weak points upon a number of key foreign policy making theories that are frequently used in analysis and highlight the most critical factors that influence the final outcome. Specifically, six theories will be outlined: 1) David Easton's system theory 2) Garbage can model 3) Allison model 4) Patron-client model 5) Democratic peace theory 6) Rosenau's pre-theory.

2. Decision making models

2.1 David Easton's system theory

David Easton strived to frame an analytic model in his published book : A Systems analysis of political life (1965). His intention was to introduce a theoretical framework that can generally be applied in politics¹¹. Through his expectation to imbue more scientific attribute in the area of politics, an input-output model (namely system theory) has been forged. His theory posits several elements as the following: 1) A political system is a structure that can be separated from the environment (or surrounding). David Easton pointed out that the authoritative allocation of values for a society is the main function of this individual system. In that context, a system can be compared to an organic structure in the natural science. 2) A certain 'boundary' exist between the system and the environment. 3) Every substance outside the boundary of a system can be divided into two categories (Intra-societal and extra-societal). The former includes the domestic feature such as economic, cultural and social structure. Meanwhile, the later refers to international factors like int'l political system, int'l social system etc. 4) An amalgam of stress from the

¹¹ Easton, David. (1965) "A Systems analysis of political life" 『Wiley』 pp. 10-13

environment turns into an ‘input’ to the system. 5) The input undergoes a ‘conversion’ by the policy makers, and 6) A certain ‘outcome’ is selected. 7) Such output becomes a ‘feedback’ to the whole environment. These arrays of component functions as the figure 1.




Figure 1. Decision making mechanism of the system model

The figure 1 displays how a certain policy is made within a system. Once the various stresses form a meaningful input, it penetrates the system and turns into an agenda. However the numerous public has different sets of interest as well as interpretations upon such input, key decision makers (for instance, politician, bureaucrats, interest groups etc) filter the signal into a meaningful categories. After the process of ‘conversion’, the policy makers forges certain output which can have various form – from administrative order to legislation. Once certain outcome is produced, it impacts the environment through feedback.

Irrespective of some critical flaws¹², the system theory is regarded as one of the most important developments in modern political science, due to its attribute of a scientific model.

2.2 Garbage Can Model

Michael D. Cohen, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen introduced a concept called ‘garbage can model’ in decision making. The purpose was to develop an alternative decision making mechanism that can’t be explained by the traditional theories that posit an hierarchal organization that contain certain tangible pattern regarding decision making. Focusing the analysis on the organization that possess relatively fluid form of decision making (for instance in universities), the garbage can model understands the process as ‘organized anarchy’ : devoid of pre-set rulings yet it progresses when a certain condition is met. Instead of a given rule (or a SOP – Standard Operating Procedure), a decision making is made when four components (a stream of problems, a stream of choices, a flow of solutions, a stream of energy from participants) converge in a somewhat coincident manner.

A major feature of the garbage can process is the partial uncoupling problems and choices. Although decision making is thought of as a process for solving problems, that is often not what happens. Problems are worked upon in the context of some choices, but choices are made only when the shifting combinations of problems, solutions, and decision makers happen to

¹² G. Murdal assessed this system as an ideological instrument, an artificial tool that can’t be found in the real life. See Soon-Gi, Shin. (1984) "An Inquiry into the Political System Theory of David Easton" 『Research works of the graduate school Vol.8 No.1』 pp. 455

make action possible¹³.




Figure 2. Decision making: Traditional versus the garbage can model

As figure 2 indicates, the traditional decision making model has a predictable path that is linear, in terms of time sequence. In contrast, in the garbage can model, decision is made when four elements meet at a certain point.

All in all, the garbage can model is an alternative way in explaining decision making in a loose organization like universities or state research

¹³ Cohen, Michael D. and March, James G. and Olsen, J. (1992) "A Garbage Can Model of Organization choice" 『Administrative Science Quarterly』 pp. 16

institutions. However, the model can't be applied to general organizations and institutions that have its nominal rules and process of decision making.

2.3 Allison model

In the "Essence of decision", Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow explained why US response was finalized as a quarantine, rather than a military option entailing an air strike during the Cuban missile crisis via three models : 1) rational actor model 2) organizational process model and 3) bureaucratic model.

Allison model I is based upon the premise that a foreign policy is a rational activity of a state. In this perspective, the central government of a state pursues the most reasonable measures for the betterment of the national interest. Decision maker will review all alternatives and select an option that is most likely to entails positive result to the state as a whole. Such method can be tantamount to a consumer finding the Pareto optimum¹⁴ in economics. When facing several options, a decision maker undergoes a thorough review and picks up the best means among multiple alternatives without exception. However, assuming a human being as an overly rational existence and all-knowing, Allison model I contains certain shortfall. Furthermore, the exorbitant cost for going through an in-depth analysis upon all options at the table makes the model's assumption somewhat irrelevant from the reality.

¹⁴ Pareto Optimum is a state that when production and consumption can no longer be reorganized so as to improve the welfare of some without at the same time reducing the welfare of others. See Salvatore, Dominick. (1997) "Microeconomics : theory and applications" 『Addison-Wesley』 3rd edition pp. 15




Figure 3. Allison model I: Rational model

In contrast, Allison model II does not necessarily regard the outcome of a decision making as ‘rational’. Instead, it assumes that the government has its own inertia and pre-arranged protocol. This ‘Standard Operating Procedure’ lessens the onus of the decision making since viable options and its implementation is set before an issue has been aroused. In such circumstances, decision making becomes a routine that follows a predictable pattern. The finalized outcome is a mixture or a compromise between different voices because each governmental body has its own SOP. However, in crisis situation, adequate measures may not be guaranteed due to the SOP’s limit.




Figure 4. Allison model II: Organization process model

Allison model III, which is also named as the bureaucratic model, views the finalized decision as a result derived from a consultation among various

participants. Unlike state-centric perspective, Allison model III posits governmental bodies possessing divergent voices that interpret the notion of national interest, based upon their own stance. President is regarded as one of the multiple ‘players’ who influence the decision-making process. Depending on the circumstances, each player’s impact fluctuates and thus the finalized decisions are relatively inconsistent. Moreover, the decision making process itself is equivalent to pulling and hauling that eventually lead to a compromise and ineluctably, a completely rational result would not likely to prevail in the final analysis.




Figure 5. Allison model III: Bureaucratic model

2.4 Patron-Client model

Considering the anarchical structure of international politics, a single nation’s security can’t be 100 percent guaranteed. In that regard, minding the security gap through alliance is fundamentally important, as Liska has referred¹⁵. The types of alliance can be divided as the capability aggregation and the autonomy-security trade-off. The former assumes the participant as

¹⁵ Liska, George. (1962) "Nations in alliance : the limits of interdependence" 『Johns Hopkins Press』 pp. 3

near equal in terms of power. Like the countries in the European continent in the Napoleonic war, the major powers including Russia, England, Austria and Spain forged an anti-Napoleon alliance, so that the individual nations would enhance their power and lessen the possibility of being defeated by the French army.

In contrast, the autonomy-security trade-off focuses on the asymmetric relation between the alliance. US-Korea would be one of the perfect examples that can be neatly included in that category. As the name of the type indicates, this asymmetric alliance operates through a trade-off between autonomy and security. After the alliance structure is formed, the weaker participant is provided with greater security and stability compared to the status quo ante, yet with a price tag that is called autonomy. During the cold war era, many nations took side either to the United States or the Soviet Union. Once alliance is made, security (including the nuclear umbrella) has been guaranteed by the two super powers albeit with one caveat: sacrificing certain amount of autonomy and the loss of some portion freedom regarding maneuverability.

The Shoemaker and Spanier's modified version add several conditions to the traditional model in order to understand whether the client can influence the patron, instead the other way around. The Shoemaker model basically assumes a strict bipolar system of the mid 1960s that a nuclear balance was maintained. According to Shoemaker, the asymmetric power distribution coerces a seemingly fixed responses to the clients and makes the activity pretty predictable. However, the nuclear parity that evaporated the US preponderance in the area and the emergence of the developed (economically recovered Germany and Japan) as well as the third countries (due to de-

colonization) changed the global power configurations from bipolar to bipolar-centric structure that offered a relevant power increase of the countries except for the two superpowers. According to Shoemaker, this structured shift provided the client states to raise their influence vis-à-vis the patron in a specific condition.




Figure 6. Correlations between patron-client's stakes

As displayed in the figure 6, the client state can have greater room of maneuver when it is under a low-threat environment. Once the circumstances become more vulnerable, the need of the patron's staunch support increased and the voice of the client inversely decrease. Meanwhile, the patron state can

maximize its influence towards the client when the issue is related to ideological goals. At this level, the client state is not required to supply the patron except for a political siding. In case of gaining international solidarity, the client should provide a political (and sometimes economic) assets to the patron which decreases the patron's influence vis-à-vis the client.

Lastly, when the patron asks for a compensation that can enhance its strategic advantage, the client state should convey its key assets to the patron, making the job more difficult. For instance, the point A position offers the greater room of influence to the client state. Point A can be referred to the ROK-US relationship during the Iraq war of 2003. US requested a 50,000 ~ 10,000 combat troops to Korea in order to secure the deteriorating Iraqi region. However, the Korean government did not perceived the threat situation as the US. This offered more optional room for the Roh Moo Hyun presidency. In contrast, point B is where the patron has its greatest influence towards its weaker counterparty. This particular situation can be explained through ROK-US relationship right after the Korean war. The US had a nuclear preponderance compared to the Soviet Union and pursued an ideological battle against that country. Meanwhile, Korea was under a vulnerable security structure, facing a threatening DPRK just North above the DMZ, backed by a Red China nearby.

2.5 Democratic peace theory

Ever since Immanuel Kant suggested that democracy is a peace-prone political structure and non-democracy as basically bellicose, the notion was somewhat overlooked, due to the ceaseless military conflict and the prevailing balance of power theory. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the

proliferation of democracy at the starting point of the post-cold war era enabled the democratic peace theory to reemerge as an important theory that may explain war and peace. Michael Doyle organized the Kant's suggestion into a democratic peace theory and Bruce Russett introduced statistical method to verify such theory.

The contemporary democratic peace theory posits three key assumptions:
 1) Countries that possess democratic political structure do not wage war against other democratic country
 2) When a clash of national interest occurs in between democratic and non-democratic countries, war would be the likely result
 3) Irrespective of its cautiousness in involving a war, once democratic country engages upon a military conflict, it is very likely to escalate into a full scale, all-out war.

Polity	Democracy	Non-Democracy
Democracy	NL	VL
Non-Democracy	VL	L

NL : Not Likely, L : Likely, VL : Very Likely

Table 1. Likeliness of conflict between different polities

As table 1 indicates, war between democracy and non-democracy is very likely. Michael Dolye explains this tendency by pointing out an imprudent vehemence or a careless and supine complaisance of the democracy that increases the probability of military entanglement vis-à-vis the non-

democratic countries. Meanwhile, Bruce Russett pinpoints two aspects for the unlikelihood of war between democratic country : the structural-institutional perspective and cultural-normative approach. The former is typified as the political institutions that comprise a democracy. Check and balance between the legislative and administrative body, separation of powers and an open debate are the notable examples. He explains that the non-democracy goes to war more easily due to the devoid nature of such institutional setting.

Meanwhile, the cultural-normative interpretation focuses on the uniqueness of the culture aspect. In this perspective, democratic peace theory can be explained by the culture of peace-loving or preference upon peaceful resolution ingrained in democracies. Compared to undemocratic country, people under democratic society has the propensity to choose peace rather than war. Thus, as the logic goes, war is highly unlikely between democratic countries since these states will extinguish every possible solutions (for instance diplomatic means, international law or the third parties' mediation) before deciding to go to war. War is regarded as a last-ditch option or a last resort that is seldom brandished toward the counterparty nation. This tendency can be commonly found among democratic countries because the inherent culture strongly enforces the decision makers to use peaceful options on crisis management.

Structural-institutional and cultural-normative interpretation emphasizes the rational nature of domestic actors and democratic way of managing crisis, respectively. Irrespective of the different aspects it lights up, both approaches are normally used in propping up the democratic theory. Moreover, scholars asserting the democratic theories' viability generally consider institutional and cultural component as complementary, not mutually exclusive.

2.6 Rosenau's Pre-theory

Like David Easton's effort in introducing a system theory, Rosenau is renowned for his effort to lay out a foreign policy theory that contains relatively more scientific way of analysis. By verifying certain hypothesis, Rosenau thought a general theory can be forged, suggesting that a foreign policy can be explained by five key variables.

First, individual variables are decision maker's personal attributes including value, talent and experience. Simply put, the personal traits of a decision maker will likely to influence the shape and size of the foreign policy's decision making process as well as the finalized result. For instance, president Nixon's personal attribute of preferring secrecy, coupled with his strategic mindset, opening Red China was possible. Meanwhile, president Carter's preference upon supporting human rights, he pressed the Korea government by brandishing the option of US troop withdrawal from the Korean peninsula, strongly recommending president Park to democratize the Korean society.

Second, Role variables are in the different spectrum compared to the individual variables. Role variables focus on the role the decision makers play in foreign policy. Apart from the personal trait, this factor highlights on the legal credential and purview that is granted. Depending upon which institution or a governmental body a certain individual is situated, specific stance will likely to be set in a peculiar color. Bureaucratic turf war and the dissenting voices between different governmental branches can be explained through the prism of this 'role' factor.

Third, government variables shed the light in the area of governmental

structure ; whether it is democratic or autocratic and so on. This approach is in line with the basic tenets of the democratic peace theory. Governments that run a democratic pluralism are prone to be more peaceful and more cautious in opening a war compared to non-democracies.

Fourth, societal variables includes non-governmental, non-political factors like the public opinion, value orientation of the society at large, the level of social integration and industrialization that influences the foreign policy. Countries that have relatively influential civil society may cherish legitimacy in sustaining a certain policy. For instance, US involvement in Vietnam became entirely onerous, due to the growing public sentiment in the domestic front.

Fifth, systemic variables are the external elements that set the surrounding of a country. For instance, geographical reality, strategic position and the aggressive intention of the adversary states are some of the key sources that comprise this category. During the cold war period when strict bipolar structure was maintained, two superpowers could not easily attempt a freewheeling policy in the third world without a high price tag. In contrast, at the onset of the post-cold war era, US embarked on a swift and effective military operation against Iraq, thanks to the crumbling Russia.

Yet, Rosenau asserted that an appropriate appraisal on these five factors are the prerequisite since the level of impact varies by different circumstances. He laid out eight state types and clarified the relative priority between the five factors using three criteria: 1) Geography and physical resources 2) The level of economic development 3) The openness of the political system

Territory & Resources	Level of Economic development	Level of Openness	Priority between factors				
			Individual	System	Role	Government	Societal
Small	Under-developed	Closed	Individual	System	Role	Government	Societal
		Open	Individual	System	Role	Societal	Government
	Developed	Closed	Role	System	Individual	Government	Societal
		Open	Role	System	Societal	Government	Individual
Big	Under-developed	Closed	Individual	Role	Government	System	Societal
		Open	Individual	Role	Societal	System	Government
	Developed	Closed	Role	Individual	Government	System	Societal
		Open	Role	Societal	Government	System	Individual

Table 2. Rosenau’s categorization

The table 2 indicates the detail of the Rosenau’s logical conclusions. Regardless of the countries’ physical size, or the level of openness, ‘individual’ factor is a key decision making factor in the underdeveloped country. Vice versa, ‘role’ and ‘system’ tend to be a crucial factor devising a policy setting in a developed country.

2.7 Pros and Cons

The aforementioned five models/theories contain its own merits as well as constraints. The table 3 is a matrix that outlines such features.

Polity	Strength	Weakness
System Theory	Introduced a scientific method in decision making	Assumes decision making apparatus as a black box
Garbage Can Model	Offers an alternative to decision making procedure	Disregard the organizational structure
Allison Model	Covers both the unitary and non-unitary features	Lack the external-internal negotiation
Patron-Client Model	Appealing explanation between asymmetric counterparties	Lack the analytic feature between domestic elements
Democratic Peace Theory	Finding a causal link between domestic polity and war	Overlooks the international power distribution
Rosenau's Pre-Theory	Factor in the various foreign domestic participants	Less elaborate on the dynamic linkage between each elements

Table 3. Pros and cons of the various models

Starting with the system theory, it can be touted by its attempt to introduce a ‘scientific model’ in an area of political science. The input-conversion-output-feedback cycle provides the tool for an objective understanding with regards to policy making. However, the conversion process is assumed as a black box that can’t be analysed further. Such unitary aspect of the decision making apparatus can be picked as its key theoretical limitation.

Meanwhile, the garbage can model suggested a radically different approach, offering an alternative decision making mechanism compared to the conventional theories that normally posit a unitary approach regarding policy making. Such enables us to understand seemingly irrational decision making that was hard to comprehend in the previous phase. Yet, its assumption of disregarding the organizational and hierarchical procedure lower down its power of explanation.

Allison model intended to grasp the two extremes by developing model I

and III that explain the unitary and non-unitary attributes of policy making. Adding the organization process model (model II) to his arrays of toolkit, the appropriateness of its model has been heightened. Yet, it thoroughly focused on what happened inside the 'black box' and lacked the interaction between the external and internal negotiation process that led to a certain decision.

Patron-Client model has been formed in order to explain the weaker client's maneuver under the existence of a more powerful patron. Within the asymmetric power distribution (typically a ROK-US alliance structure), the model offers a reasonable perspective on the weaker side's path and actions. Yet, the model is devoid of the (dynamic relationship between domestic players) domestic factor analysis that eventually designs a nation's foreign policy.

Democratic peace theory shed a new light to an assumption that has been professed for couple of hundreds of years. Its focus in the domestic political structure and the likeliness of international conflict enhanced the appealing nature especially in the post-cold war era. However, it somewhat has overlooked the power distribution and the international structural constraint that limit the window of options left for the domestic decision makers.

Lastly, Rosenau's pre-theory covers the broad range of players (from individuals to government) that influences a foreign policy making. Factoring in many elements, he strived to forge a general theory that possess some scientific attributes, possessing dynamic linkage with one another.

In order to imbue greater preciseness, the researcher will devise a new model (a modified version of the Two-Level Game theory) that water down the weakness mentioned earlier. The key features of the new model will be

equipped with the following elements: 1) Explaining both the unitary and non-unitary nature regarding the decision making process 2) Factoring in the relationship between internal and external elements 3) Applying the power distribution that set structural constraint – endowment point that the domestic decision makers would embrace it as a given 4) And the dynamic intertwining nature of factors that influence the decision making as a whole.

3. Types of troop dispatch

3.1 Difference between PKO and MNF

After the drastic failure of the League of Nations' peace maintenance mechanism that eventually led to a much more devastating world war II, the founders of the UN have clearly outlined the institution's key purpose : maintaining peace and security. In order to achieve that goal, the UN offer clauses that stipulate conflict management measures. It is typified in both Chapter VI and VII. The Chapter VI (also known as "Pacific Settlement of Disputes") authorize that parties to a dispute should (generally advisory, not compulsory) use peaceful method of resolving disputes, including mediation and negotiation.

Meanwhile, Chapter VII (named as "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression") stipulates more strong methods including economic coercion and severance of diplomatic relations. If the measure is understood as insufficient, the UN Security Council can then take "such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security".

However, the ensuing cold war structure prevented such measures to be activated in a timely fashion. Due to the veto system that is run by the Security Council, the Chapter VII were nearly dormant, which tied the most appropriate instrument at the UN's disposal and only left the Chapter VI that lacked the teeth as a viable option. The two superpowers were at loggerheads with one another and the so-called proxy war occurred in the third countries that possessed a vulnerable political structure and poor economic foundation. Considering such dyfunkt status, the UN developed a new concept of conflict management that were absent during its creation.

In order to avoid the dilemma of the unbinding weak measures of the Chapter VI and the strong yet easily vetoed Chapter VII, the UN introduced the notion of 'Peacekeeping' that contained stronger measures, compared to the Chapter VI that could be triggered by the receiving state's consent (thus circumventing the veto procedure). Devoid of an overt clause in the UN Chapter regarding PKO, it was nicknamed as Chapter VI and 1/2, reflecting its middle ground attribute between Chapter VI and VII.

The newly adopted PKO was first referred in the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion in the 'certain expenses of the United Nations' case of 1962. The PKO's initial function at the time of its creation was focused on 'peace maintenance' that supervise the already settled structure, not to enforce or create the peaceful condition in a contentious area. The use of arms were also squarely limited in self-defense purpose. Alongside its strict cap upon the rules of engagement, it was allowed to be equipped in a light arm. However, with the passage of time, the role of PKO broadened, covering a wide range of operation.




Figure 7. Different types of conflict management¹⁶

The figure 7 reflects the different conflict management method that contain diverging aspects, concerning the progress of crisis. The conflict prevention involves the application of structured or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict. Peacemaking generally include measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves in diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement. Peace enforcement involves the application with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Peacebuilding involves a range of

¹⁶ United Nations Peace Keeping operations “principle and Guidelines” (2008)

measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development¹⁷. In a traditional understanding, the PKO functions were limited within the boundary of peacekeeping as well as peacebuilding. However, the changing backdrop of post-cold war structure and the ensuing challenges of ethnic, religious, environmental issues expanded the PKO's role into an uncharted territory.

As a corollary, the nowadays PKO involves in multiple areas, blurring the traditional separating line that categorized the operations. Moreover, the five areas of conflict management do not occur in a time sequential order in the real world. In most cases, several functions do develop in a simultaneous fashion which require more appropriate conditions for the PKO's intervention.

¹⁷ Ibid.

Categories	UN		Non-UN
	PKO	MNF	MNF
Ground of Existence	UN Security Council Resolution	Forged by the member states Via UN Security Council's approval	Allied state's Domestic Approval
Requirement for Activation	Consent from the receiving country	Not needed	Not needed
Use of Force	Self-Defense	Repelling and Suppressive Purpose	Repelling and Suppressive Purpose
Responsibility of Payment	UN Member States	(MNF) Participating States	(MNF) Participating States
Role	Mostly Peacekeeping and Peace building	Mostly Peace Enforcement	Various Missions
Command and Control	UN's Direct Control	Directly by the Participating States Indirectly by the UN	Directly by the Participating States
Cases	East Timor	East Timor	Vietnam Iraq

Table 4. Differentiation in between PKO and MNF

Table 4 is a matrix that categorize the difference between the aforementioned PKO and the Multinational Forces. As indicated, the PKO is formed by the UN Security Council resolution and dispatched to the disputed region only with the consent of the receiving state. UN directly supervises the PKO's function and squarely limit its use of arm in self-defense situation. Whereas, the Multinational Forces (MNF) has different attributes. The MNF that is activated through the UN Security Council 's authorization is basically for the operations that are listed in the Chapter VII. With the approval from

the UN Security Council it does not require the receiving state's consent for the operation to begin. This type has a loose grip from the UN by delegating the command and control function to the participating states, forming a united command structure. The UN Security Council undergoes an indirect supervision through setting the range of the mission and reviewing of the timeframe of its mission. As the Chapter VII illustrates, the UN-authorized MNF are permitted to use heavy weapons for the purpose of repelling the hostile entity.

Meanwhile, a non-UN approval MNF are formed by the 'coalition of the willing', in most cases between (militarily) allied states. This type of MNF circumvent any international organization including the UN and only requires the participating countries' domestic approval process that is stipulated in each state's constitution. The mission and the command and control are freely set by the countries involved.

Three dispatch cases – Vietnam, East Timor and Iraq – will be reviewed in this paper can be categorized as in the figure. Korea dispatched its forces in Vietnam through US' request. In the East Timor case, the UN asked for Korea's participation in the UN approval MNF. And few months later, it was changed to a PKO. Meanwhile, Korea's participation in Iraq followed a similar trait of the Vietnam case.

4. Previous studies

Domestically, there are currently more than two hundred dissertations, selecting troop dispatch as its key topic, directly or indirectly. However, many

of the materials focused on the troop's performance abroad or otherwise pointed out some tactical fallout from the dispatch. Roughly two-third of the works are written either from purely political science or military perspective. The followings are the brief summary from chosen papers that are much closer to my research approach and focus, possessing public administrative contour.

4.1 Papers analyzing with a decision-making model

Park Bung Ju (2005) used the Toulmin's argument model and has done an argumentation structural analysis on Korea's troop dispatch policy to Iraq. Argument model basically judge the decision making process through a mechanism of Data information => Warrant => Backing => Rebuttal => Qualifier => Policy Claim. Interpreting the numerous different argument that were made during the Iraq war, the author strived to find out whether sending troops to Iraq was a right decision.

Park Won Hee (2007) adopted James D Morrow's security – autonomy tradeoffs model in order to clarify the appropriateness of the number of troops that were dispatched during the Iraq war. She concludes that the size of armed forces were adequate since Korea's autonomy of action enhanced without dampening the security status during 2003. Throughout the couple-of-decades time period, Korea's structural relationship became more symmetric and eventually offered the Korean government to decide in a more favorable direction than any time in the past. As a result, the finalized number of dispatched troops were rather bit smaller, compared to the initially requested amount from the US.

Kim Segyu (2010) and Woo Kyong Lim (2010) both chose the Allison

model, analyzing 1st and 2nd troop dispatch to Iraq during the Roh Moo Hyun presidency. Looking through the analytic prism of the Allison Model II¹⁸ and III¹⁹, both of the researchers concluded that the importance of a president as a key decision maker has not faded and the Korea's structural constraint deriving from ROK-US alliance is still significant. Allison Model II and III were applied to 1st and 2nd dispatch, respectively.

Jung Do Saeng (2006) connected multiple theories from Rosenau's Pre-theory, the Allison Model, Putnam's Two-Level game, Bruce Russett's Democratic peace theory to David Easton's system model. Using these theories as an analytical tool, he reviewed the dispatch decision policy process upon three PKO activities: Somalia, Angola and East Timor. Jung concluded that the president was the most influential figure in contrast to the National Assembly that merely performed as a rubber-stamp for the administrative policy. He noticed the emerging nature of the NGO and the overall public opinion in the political landscape, yet he saw some negative aspect that the government did not strived hard to mind the gap between the anti-dispatch public sentiment and the decisions that were made in the cabinet.

Park Ji Hye (2013) utilized Putnam's Two-Level game in order to

¹⁸ Referred as a 'Organization model' it posits the following propositions: 1) When faced with a crisis, government leaders don't look it as a whole, but break it down and assign it according to pre-established (or Standard Operating Procedure) organization lines 2) Because of time and resource limitations, rather than evaluating all possible courses of action to see which one is more likely to work, leaders settle on the first proposal that adequately addresses the issue, which is coined as "satisficing".

¹⁹ This model assumes a political seesawing within the government. It presumes: 1) A nation's actions are best understood as the result of politicking and negotiation by its top leaders 2) Even if they share a goal, leaders differ in how to achieve it because of such factors as personal interests and background.

understand Korea's foreign policy decisions during the 1st phase of the Iraq dispatch. Park points out that in past dispatch cases, external/international element – mainly vis-à-vis US was the key factor that determined the result. However, the domestic realm expanded thanks to the evolving nature of the civil-society. And as a result, public opinion has put a heavy burden on the decision making process including troop dispatch. Through the lens of the Two-Level game, 1st Level (external factor - US) still remains to be a critical component, yet 2nd Level (domestic factor – Public opinion)'s rising influence has somewhat countervail the asymmetric balance between the 1st and the 2nd Level. In a nutshell, Park concluded that although the Korean government dispatched troop to Iraq, the nuance as well as the specifics (the size and the equipment etc.) were carefully designed, adopting what the public arduously asserted.

Yu Byung Sun (2001) applied Rosenau's Pre-Theory and the Allison Model to interpret the troop dispatch decision making during Vietnam, Gulf War and the PKO activity. Regarding the president as the most decisive figure, Yu's conclusion is almost identical to Jung Do Saeng (2006). He further adds that during Vietnam, the hierarchical order among factors in terms of influence was Systemic-Individual-Government-Role-Societal. It changed during the Gulf War (Systemic-Role-Individual-Government-Societal) and the PKO activity in East Timor (Individual-Systemic-Role-Government-Societal).

Kim Sae Hyun (2011) chose CNN effect, Rosenau's Pre-Theory, Putnam's Two-Level Game and the Democratic Peace theory as an analytical framework. Kim compared these four instruments, interpreting the troop dispatch decision making during 2010's Afghanistan case. Among four theories, he concluded that the Two-Level Game had the most relevant,

effective explanatory attribute. As a policy implication, Kim suggested that the flexibility (or a leeway of discretion) of a government's decision making depends upon the president's aptitude to guide and manage the public opinion in favor of the government policy. He points out that government's 'management of the public opinion' existed during the Afghan dispatch event.

Kim Jang Hum (2010) forged a new analytic model, nicknamed as 'PAR model'. 'PAR' is an acronym that refers to Putnam, Allison and Rosenau. As in the case of other previous studies, Kim applied the Rosenau's Pre-Theory and the Allison Model to understand internal decision making process in the NSC. In terms of external negotiations regarding the US, Putnam's Two-Level game was used as an analyzing tool. Similar to Yu Byung Sun (2001), Kim concluded that the factors influencing the decision making shifted from Vietnam's Individual-Systemic-Government-Societal to Iraq's Individual-Societal-Government-Systemic. Kim further mentioned that Societal component will emerge as the most critical factor on troop dispatch decision. Since the society will turn more pluralistic, alongside with the enhancing position of the civil society, he asserts that the overall relationship between factors will become more symmetric in the coming days. As a result, Kim recommends the policy makers not to be overwhelmed by public opinion. Instead, he suggested a prudent 'management' or perhaps 'taming' of public sentiment to a direction that is favorable and beneficial to the national interest. Finally, Kim stresses upon the importance of forming a transnational network/international regime that can be exploited as a lever against the counterparty nation.

Chang Jae Hyuk (1998) picked Snyder model as his major analytic instrument and interpreted the Vietnam troop dispatch case in that perspective.

Korea's decision making during the Vietnam war was virtually led by a single actor, the President. Even though the National Assembly had some dissenting view regarding the President's decision, the opposing voice did not materialized due to an exclusive, authoritative and secretive nature of the decision making process. He concluded that President Park was the sole arbiter of events when it comes to critical decision making.

Shin Hee Seop (2003) analyzed the troop dispatch decision making (comparing Vietnam and Iraq) process using Shoemaker's Patron-Client model. In case of Vietnam, Korea had some leeway of negotiation vis-à-vis the US since Patron's strategic interest in maintaining credibility as a reliable superpower representing the free world was critical enough, even though the Client (Korea) had an immediate threat from North Korea. Contrastingly in Iraq, US acquired certain level of security which made Korean troop dispatch being relatively lesser urgent matter. Shin admonishes the Korean government to strive their best effort linking North Korean issue with US' strategic interest. By that measure, he asserts that the asymmetric balance between Patron-Client would somewhat become more equal.

Choi Sang Bok (2005)'s way of analysis was nearly identical to Jung Do Saeng (2006), combining Rosenau's Pre-Theory and the Allison Model, adopting David Easton's System theory as the basic framework. As Jung mentioned in his conclusion, the role of the President and the asymmetric power distribution between ROK-US were the factors that virtually determined the result in both cases (Vietnam and Iraq), irrespective of the growing influence of the public opinion.

Lee Yun Ju (2009) gathered the opinion of individuals that have directly or

indirectly involved in the decision making regarding troop dispatch and aimed to distill statistically meaningful implications. After using the T-test methodology, Lee summarized the factors that must be considered before sending troops to foreign regions. In a hierarchical order, Public opinion-National Assembly-President and the National Security Committee-international opinion-relationship with the US was recommended as the most important element that must have been considered during decision making. But as a pivotal suggestion, she emphasized that public opinion should be applied squarely under the context of the national interest.

Han Jeong Ah (2006) adopted the foreign policy decision model from Michael Brecher, finding meaningful implications from the Iraq case. Han pointed out troop dispatch decision during the Iraq war was mainly derived from international pressure and the Roh administration had little choice other than sending certain portion of troops. Simply put, such decision was in line with the effort to globalize Korea's standing in world community. Han further mentioned that Iraqi dispatch was resulted from a careful analysis from the perspective of national interest and she thought president Roh made this strategic move in order to assuage the US government's growing concern upon anti-Americanism at the time. She concluded that sending troops to Iraq has been decided and implemented in a relatively smooth and sound fashion, thanks to the favorable public opinion.

Jung Yoo Jin (2004) specifically focused on the influence of NGOs during the 2nd troop dispatch to Iraq. Even though the ROK-US alliance structure's significance as a factor regarding dispatch decision was overwhelmingly great, she found out that the overall influence of the NGOs were gaining its momentum. As a conclusion, Jung suggested the President's role as a teacher

or perhaps as an instructor was insufficiently performed during the 2nd dispatch which eventually widened the schism between civil society and the cabinet.

Kim Kwan Oak (2005) applied the Two-Level game in order to compare the different nature of troop dispatch decision between Vietnam and Iraq case. As other researchers who've used the Two-Level game as its pivotal analytic tool, Kim concludes that decisions during Vietnam was swift and somewhat lacked a choice (other than sending troops), due to a wide 'wind set (in other words, weak civil society coupled with an authoritative president that has relatively free hand to decision whatever he wants so)' of Korea. In contrast, during the Iraq War, civil society gained its influence, more than any time in the previous period, lessening the wind set of Korea. That has eventually led to a conclusion, sending soldiers in a smaller size and shape compared to the initial request from the US government.

Oh Byoung Suek (2006), like Shin Hee Seop (2003) used the Patron-Client model in order to understand the past troops dispatch decision making cases. He concluded that sending military personnel should be helping in enhancing Korea's international status since contingencies in the Korean Peninsula in the future will require a swift, effective help from the international society. Simply put, Oh stressed upon the fact that attaining an image of a responsible stakeholder through the eyes of the United Nations is critical and strongly recommended on preparing for the rainy days.

Jung Soo Yong (2001) applied the Patron-Client model, interpreting the true motives of troop dispatch during the Vietnam war. Unlike the conventional understanding that president Park's decision was a trade-off

between Korean forces and economic incentive for further development, Jung suggest the activity as an alliance structure transformation. Displaying the US that Korea is strategically a key ally by sending troops swiftly, ROK-US alliance became more even, more equal than the previous phase. Simply put, troop dispatch can be understood as a strategic move, aiming a structural change in the one-asymmetric relation and creating some area of influence for the Korean government.

4.2 Others

Gye Un Bong (2012) tried to analyze the most important national interest element that led to the overseas troop dispatch using Alderfer's ERG (Existence-Relatedness-Growth) theory. Applying the theory, Vietnam troop dispatch was an appropriate measure since the motto of national survival (from North Korea's threat) and economic development was relevant to the national interest. Yet in the Iraqi case, Gye concluded that national interest was partially superseded by the ethnic interest (between the two Koreas), somewhat tainting the once rock solid ROK-US relations. He suggested ROK-US alliance should be strengthened in order to maximize the national interest, not ethnic interest. In terms of the EGR theory, decisions upon troop dispatch were made during the Vietnam war period considering economic=>survival=>influence factor. However in Iraq case, the hierarchical order changed into survival=>influence=>economic

Lee Byung Choel (2005) sees that past troop dispatch decisions were made in a haphazard manner, lacking a lucid understanding on national interest. Apart from strengthening the ROK-US alliance and enhancing Korea's international status, he suggests other elements of national interest

(such as reserving international help in likeable future contingencies in the Korean Peninsula, enhancing operation capability of the Korean army, acquiring foreign investment opportunities during nation building process and the emergence of the PKO as a novel type of activity).

Kang Hyun Koo (2009) analyzed the linkage between troop decision during Iraq and the general national interest. He suggests that in future dispatch decisions, the following factors should be seriously considered: 1) Proactive military diplomacy vis-à-vis Arab countries 2) ROK-US alliance that helps maximizing the overall national interest 3) Strengthen anti-terror alert 4) Strategic review upon sending Korean troops to Afghanistan 5) Constructing constant communication channel to the Obama administration 6) A clear vision upon rebuilding North Korean province 7) Better management on economic crisis

Shin Kyeongeun (2013) used Snyder's 'alliance security dilemma' theory to understand Korea's troop dispatch decision during the Johnson administration. She asserts that in terms of security dilemma theory, the year 1968 was extremely a formidable period for the Korean government (since there was an assassination attempt to president Park in January, that year) and president Johnson exploited the tactical card of troop withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula. Under such pressing circumstances, Shin concludes that the South Korean government had virtually no other choice than sending its own troops to Vietnam. Even though applying Snyder's theory, Shin tried to overcome Snyder's key assumption: in bipolar structure, alliance do not fear 'abandonment' by the superpower since there exists no other alternatives.

Kim Woo Sung (2005), focused the role of the media during the Vietnam

war period (1965-1973) and the influence it gave to the troop dispatch decision. As other researchers have concluded, irrespective of growing dissent and public outcry against the government, Kim mentioned that the president's decision was made without serious disruption during the Vietnam war era. However Kim pointed out the emerging status of the public opinion, coupled with effective distributive instruments including the internet in contemporary times. In contrast to the Vietnam war, troop dispatch decisions during the Iraqi War were difficult, due to the public opinion that effectively displayed their disagreement.

Bae Syung Pil (2004) analyzed the troop dispatch case in East Timor and sought applying Korean forces as PKO in future North Korean contingencies. He suggest Korea's troop dispatch should be made in a timely order and should be selectively deployed in the Northern part of the Peninsula, performing PKO-led civil activity that do not involve in sensitive operations such as disarmament and defusing WMDs. He suggests the Korean government to prepare for the future scenarios and should decide sending appropriate number of troops, doing the proper operation, in the most adequate operational area side-by-side with other UN member states.

Kim Kyoung Hwha (2005) researched on the legal aspect of troop dispatch. Considering the Korean constitution article 5 verse 1 & 2²⁰, she mentioned that sending troops during Iraq had illegal nature. Even though Kim admitted the illegality of troop dispatch, he asserts the necessity of such

²⁰ Article 5 (1) The Republic of Korea shall endeavor to maintain international peace and shall renounce all aggressive wars (2) The Armed Forces shall be charged with the sacred mission of national security and the defense of the land and their political neutrality shall be maintained : The Constitutional Court.

choice because reality has quite a gap between the written law. He thus suggests that new legislative activity that mind the gap should be regarded as an act of priority since future dispatch is foreseeable. Kim concluded a stipulated legal substance will help government to decide troop dispatch, relieved from the pressure coming from possible illegality.

Song In Hwan (2008) tried to single out the key factors that led the troop dispatch decisions during the Iraq War. Among four critical elements (Korea-US relation, relationship between South-North Korea, economic and military), Song pointed out the vulnerable nature that derived from ROK-US was the most important reason that triggered Korea's troop dispatch. In particular, ministry of defense spearheaded the decision-making process during the 1st dispatch since the organization had close linkage with the US in the context of ROK-US alliance. However, during the 2nd dispatch decision, public opinion was inflamed in a negative way, and the issue of sending troop become politicized. Thus, in the latter case, the main decisions were led by the President and the NSC members.

Kim Hyun Mee (2007) delved upon the anti-Iraq War movement in Korea and its overall influence on troop dispatch decisions. As a divided country she concluded that Korea is under a heavy pressure of 1) security-first policy, 2) economic development and prosperity, 3) conventional ideology strapped by nationalistic (if not jingoistic) garment. Kim suggest the establishment of a strong and effective educational institution alongside with stronger lobbying activity towards the National Assembly.

Cho Bok Hyun (2003) argues that sending troops to Iraq in the name of securing international peace and enhancing overall national interest is

groundless since multinational forces led by the Bush administration tarnished the credibility and degenerated the morale since there was no WMD to be found. Furthermore, Cho asserts that the numerous referred 'economic profit' is also groundless considering Korea's minor role during the Iraqi national building. Moreover, a nation's credit rating depends upon the strength of the economic fundamental, not from dispatching troops. He suggest when sending troops in the future, decisions should be made more in accordance with the 'adjusted' form of national interest, much different from the current notion of understanding.

Kim Jin Hwan (2004) assessed the troop dispatch decision in a similar vein with Cho Bok Hyun (2004). Kim mentioned that disadvantage of declining troop dispatch is not as great as it is generally conceived. Instead, he suggest that sending troops would inflame security weakness, eventually impairing the national interest.

In summary, the abovementioned papers can be categorized as table 5.

Researcher	Case			Analytical tool			
	Vietnam	PKO	Iraq	Putnam's Two-Level Game	Allison Model	Rosenau Pre-Theory	Other
Park Bung Ju			○				○
Part Won Hee			○				○
Kim Segyu			○		○		
Woo Kyong Lim			○		○		
Jung Do Saeng		○		○	○		○
Park Ji Hye			○	○			
Yu Byung Sun	○	○			○	○	
Kim Sae Hyun		○		○		○	○
Kim Jang Hum	○		○	○	○	○	
Chang Jae Hyuk	○						○
Shin Hee Seop	○		○				○
Choi Sang Bok	○		○			○	○
Lee Yun Ju			○				○
Han Jeong Ah			○				○
Jung Yoo Jin			○				○
Kim Kwan Oak	○		○	○			
Gye Un Bong	○		○				○
Oh Byoung Suek		○					○
Lee Byung Choe		○	○				○
Kang Hyun Koo			○				○
Shin Kyeongeun	○						○
Kim Woo Sung	○						○
Bae Syung Pil		○					○
Kim Kyoung Hwha		○	○				○

Table 5. Classification of key previous studies

5. Differentiation of this thesis

Most of the previous studies have either delved upon a single dispute case, or have made a comparison between the two, somewhat in a static manner. My focus is to extract a meaningful pattern and the implication of Korea's past three dispatch decisions. From domestic to external facts, tracing the

dynamic linkage would shed light how the decision making mechanism actually functioned. Under such basis, the differentiating feature of this thesis is as follows.

First, grasping power shift between the various factors. The three dispatch cases this paper is about to analyse covers the timeline of roughly 40 years. The social and international backdrop between Vietnam, East Timor and Iraq dispatch differs greatly. Even though the three dispatches were made under the skeleton of the Republic of Korea, the inherited social fabric and the international settings have undergone a change that is far from a static nature. In other words, the participants that comprises the society have existed throughout the 40 year timeframe. Yet its relative power balance have experienced a major shift. It is thus important to distinguish the key variables from relatively unimportant ones in each dispatch decisions and understand how these key variables have shaped a certain outcome.

In particular, the blooming democracy and its natural result of a stronger civil society raises the curiosity regarding the chemistry between growing NGOs and media's influence versus the government's (especially the president) decreasing power, in terms of forging a certain policy. This paper expects to seek a reasonable clue via a thorough review, applying a new model (modified version of the Two-Level game theory).

Second, finding out the differences between the MNF and a PKO dispatch. As aforementioned, most of the previous studies have either chose multinational force or a peacekeeping operation type dispatch. At first glance, it may seem convenient and reasonable to separate the dispatch in different categories. However, Korea's troop dispatch should be understood in a

wholistic view. The purpose of juxtaposing the MNF and the PKO oriented dispatch is to grasp the public perception vis-à-vis the different types of dispatch. Through such approach, comparison between the two types would be possible. Fortunately, Korea sent combat troops to East Timor (1999) which attained the status of a PKO, and in Iraq (2004) as a MNF.

Moreover, the time gap of five years offers a relatively lesser discrepancies (if not a perfect *ceteris paribus*) upon comparison, making the job less skewed by the surrounding condition. Apart from the Vietnam dispatch, the two later cases (East Timor and Iraq) have been materialized well after the democratization of the Korean society. The enhanced clout of the civil society – NGOs in particular – will provide an interesting element in reviewing the two.

Third, verify whether the structural setting would enforce a certain decision making. Under the structural fabric of an asymmetric ROK-US alliance, the Korean government's window of option tends to be limited by such built-in constraint. However, it is important to notice that even within such limit, specific results of the negotiation between the two parties differ, case by case. This leads to question like : how much discretion would be actually given to the Korean government in shaping a certain outcome? Once the ROK-US relationship shifts in a more hospitable direction, in terms of relative power, does Korea possess greater vantage point that might guarantee a more favorable result?

Through the modified version of the Two Level game theory, the researcher will try to answer to those questions. As mentioned, the 40 year timeline has altered many of the surrounding condition including the power

balance between Korea and the external counterparty. Korea's democratization, economic development and its modernization, coupled with the onset of the post-cold war era, Korea's international status has experienced a fair enhancement and its clout has also increased, proportionally. This thesis will capture such changing nature and find out how those sources influence the decision making mechanism.

Fourth, distilling critical implication and provide meaningful prescriptions. Alongside with the hypothesis, this paper will extract some important implications from the three dispatch cases and offer policy suggestion to each of those implications. One of the key purpose of this thesis is to prescribe some guidelines that can set a better way of decision making that will ultimately enhance Korea's national interest. This point has substantial importance since future dispatch is extremely likely considering the current international setting. As the probability of future need is expected to be at a fair level, it will be somewhat imprudent not to forge a scenario that can modify the past errors and inefficiencies.

As history has shown, a case-by-case approach that lack a certain strategy will only lead to uncountable human and material loss, degrading the overall national interest. Especially at a time when international economy is barely on its recovery path, the North Korea's fragile legitimacy enhances the possibility of provocative measures and the nationalistic jingoism tends to appeal the nearby states (China and Japan etc), it is a meaningful task to prescribe a better path in deciding troop dispatch that helps the national interest.

III. Method of analysis

1. Analytical framework and hypothesis

1.1 Putnam's Two Level games

In his groundbreaking paper, Robert Putnam introduced a theory dubbed: the "two-level games"²¹. In order to offer some better explanations to the international negotiation process, especially domestic-international interactions, he forged a concept of dual level (Level I & Level II). Level I refers to the bargaining between the negotiators, that in most cases can be understood as state-to-state or government-to-government relationship. Level II is a discussion or a negotiation, separately pursued within each group of constituents.

As mentioned earlier, in traditional international relations theories, a state is commonly regarded as a coherent, billiard-ball like fixed entity, functioning with relatively high rational attribute. However, in various international negotiations or in a treaty making, internal dissonance within a country usually influences the process as well as the outcome of the given affairs, albeit in a different level.

In order to factor in the domestic-international interactions and mind the gap between the actual reality versus the conventional theories that was utilized in explanation, Putnam suggested that in real situation, Level I and Level II games are performed simultaneously.

²¹ Putnam, Robert D. (1988) "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics : The Logic of Two-Level Game" 『International Organization 42(3)』 pp. 427

1.2 The notion of 'win-set'

Putnam's two level game has a distinctive feature, coined in as the "win-set". Depending upon the negotiating skills and fluctuating circumstances within the discussion process of Level II, a certain state's window of option or the range of concession varies. This very area of bargaining is another word for win-set. Thus, each nation has its own win-set that changes with the passage of time. An accord or agreement can be formed in between the area that the two parties converge.




Figure 8. Win-set and the possible agreement zone²²

As displayed in the figure 8, each nation has its own distinctive win-set. Logically, an agreement can be stuck if the participant's win-set converges. Yet the conclusion of such agreement can be asymmetric, due to the different win-set of the participant X and Y, which is determined by the Level II negotiations within each two states, respectively.

In the figure 8, even though an agreement can be made in between the Y1-

²² Reorganized from Putnam, Robert D. (1988) "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics : The Logic of Two-Level Game" 『International Organization 42(3)』 pp. 441

X1 range, country X will prefer Y1 point as the most optimal result and point X1 for country Y. Since each counterparty expects to acquire the most favorable outcome, the overall win-set has a tendency to atrophy. However, if the win-set narrows to a certain threshold, zone of possible agreement will be unable to exist and deadlock will be ineluctable. Such notion can be also illustrated as an Edgeworth box²³ and the indifference curve, adopted from micro economics.




Figure 9. Win-set displayed in indifference curve²⁴

In the left Edgeworth box of the figure 9, win-set (or the possible

²³ The width of the box measures the total amount of good 1. in the economy and the height measures the total amount of good 2. Person A's consumption choices are measured from the lower left-hand corner while person B's choices are measured from the upper right. See Varian, Hal R. (2010) "Intermediate microeconomics : a modern approach" 『W.W.Norton & Co』 8th edition

²⁴ This “political” indifference curve is logically identical to a typical indifference curve used in the field of economics. However, unlike the conventional indifference curve, political indifference curve measures with the loss of vote, rather than the broader notion of utility

agreement zone) is formed within the converging area between X-X3-X4 and Y-Y3-Y4. In contrast, in the other Edgeworth box, situated at the right side do not have such win-set because converging area is non-existent between X and Y. In order to create a win-set, either the X-X3-X4 or Y-Y3-Y4 should expand further.

1.3 Determinant of 'win-set'

Among various elements, Putnam asserts that three factors are the key components in influencing the overall size of the win-set.

First, preferences and coalitions matters. The size of the win-set depends on the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level II constituents²⁵. Domestic constituents are normally not homogeneous in its nature and thus diverging voices are inherent within. Such disparate view and perspectives provide opposite signals, carving up the size of the win-set.

Second, political institutions including strict quorum rule in the legislative body or strong state autonomy relatively against the civil society will clearly influence the size of the win-set. Compared to a democratic state, an authoritative one may possess greater force to dictate its term, regardless of the non-government sector's dissent that leads to a wider size of win-set.

Third, negotiator's strategies in the Level I will very likely influence the size of the win-set²⁶. This can be pursued in three ways. In order to maximize the favorable outcome, the negotiator may induce the domestic sentiment

²⁵ Ibid. p442

²⁶ Ibid. p450

against the ongoing negotiations. This method is called 'tying hands' strategy which expects to narrow down the domestic win-set.

On the contrary, the negotiators might consider that agreement of the given negotiation as vital. In this case, negotiators will dissuade the domestic dissonance and will maximize the area of win-set. This 'cutting slack' strategy can be applied when issues of national security or other critical concern is directly linked with the successful outcome between the two countries. Furthermore, a negotiator may try to increase the counterparty's win-set by linking multiple issues. Such 'synergistic linkage' strategy can actually transform the negotiating structure by connecting different affairs, increasing some room for further negotiation which concession becomes a virtual possibility.

1.4 Limitation of the model

Indeed, the Two Level Game theory offers a powerful tool, enhancing the understandability of inter as well as intra negotiation process. Even there were some attempts to shed light upon the domestic factors that can be linked with international area (most notably James Rosenau, Ernst Haas and Joseph Nye)²⁷, the notion of win-set is substantially improved from former theories. Through the introduction of the Two Level Game theory, the limitation wrought by the traditional notion of state as a rational, coherent agent has somewhat become weakened.

²⁷ James Rosenau introduced the concept of "linkage politics" in order to indicate some linkage between national and international affairs. Ernst Haas seek to find similar notion on the regional integration matter and coined the word "spillover". Co working with Robert Kohane, Joseph Nye tried to explain domestic factor's role via the term "interdependence" in his book "Power and interdependence : world politics in transition" 『Little Brown』

Yet, the Two Level Game has constraints of its own. It posits the negotiator or a key decision maker as an unitary actor²⁸. However in reality, a government's stance is generally a result of an intensive discussion within. Except for some extreme governmental apparatus (a radicalized dictatorship would be the most notable example), most governments make policies by consensus, albeit strongly influenced by the key person at the helm.

Just like other domestic factors that influence the Level II negotiation, various voices within governmental branches does influence the decision in one way or the other. If such nature is not factored in, the overall explanation of the Two-Level Game would possess certain amount of constraint.

Applying the Allison model III²⁹ (or the bureaucratic model) can be one of the solutions³⁰. The bureaucratic model can provide plausible explanations upon the diverse opinions held in the governmental branches and why the government's overall stance with regard to a specific affairs has reached to such direction. Yet this approach may blur the wall between the negotiator and other domestic factors that participate in shaping the win-set.

²⁸ Sung Hoon, Lee. (2004) "Decision making process analysis of additional troop dispatch in Iraq : In the perspective of Two-Level Game" 『Military Forum 39(Summer)』 pp. 62

²⁹ Allison, Graham T. and Zelikow, Philip. (1999), "Essence of decision : explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis" 『Longman』 2nd edition

³⁰ Lee Sung Hoon (2004) suggested a bureaucratic-two level game, which is a combination between the Two Level game and the Allison model III. He asserts that the limited explanations inherited in Putnam's theory can be greatly relieved by applying the bureaucratic model within the government. See Sung Hoon, Lee. (2004) "Decision making process analysis of additional troop dispatch in Iraq : In the perspective of Two-Level Game" 『Military Forum 39(Summer)』 pp.61-62

Furthermore, Putnam's research undermines the disposition of power between states as well as the overall influence of international institutions including the UN³¹. Side by side with the domestic attributes, it is more realistic to factor in the international elements.

For that reason, I will forge a new analytic model that may be more relevant in understanding the troop dispatch decision making mechanism.

1.5 New model – a modified version

Irrespective of bureaucratic differences and its perennial turf war between various governmental branches, it still shares some commonalities that are distinctive from the legislative body (National Assembly) or the areas of civil society including NGOs and public opinion. Moreover, organization like Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense possess somewhat lesser degree of autonomy and power compared to the president. In the same token, within the National Security Committee, president is key actor that can call the shots.

In a nutshell, unlike other domestic factors that shape the win-set in Level II game, government branch has somewhat hierarchical order with asymmetric interdependence. Such delicate nature of governmental inter-relationship must dealt carefully with nuance.

³¹ Putnam pinpoints the critical factors that influence the win set (mostly domestic), typified as : 1) power distribution between domestic players 2) domestic preferences upon policy 3) domestic institution 4) negotiations strategy. Yet, the power structure of the international arena also provides significant impact and constraint to the domestic win set. Moreover, the favorable international opinion, symbolized by the UN's resolution clearly influences the domestic win set directly and indirectly.

Thus, I will combine the Two-Level Game with David Easton's system theory³² in order to mind the gap between the reality and theory. System theory posits a linkage among various actors within a certain system that can be separated from other elements that are located within various other systems. In that regard, governmental branches form a system and other domestic factors are situated within another system. This synthetic version would allow to show how different segments of government can virtually participate in the Level II game but with certain constraint, compared to other domestic factors. Regarding Korea's troop dispatch decision making mechanism, a modified version of the Two Level game can be illustrated as the following.

³² Soon-Gi, Shin. (1984) "An Inquiry into the Political System Theory of David Easton"
『Research works of the graduate school Vol.8 No.1』 pp. 448-452




Figure 10. Korea's troop dispatch decision mechanism

Unlike Putnam's original Two-Level game, this modified version offers some room of maneuver for individual governmental branches. For instance,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense may have different stance upon the size and the timing of troop dispatch. MOFA would consider the relationship with US or UN as the most critical factor and expect a swift dispatch with minimum time lag.

In contrast, MND might examine the number of troops after a time-consuming thorough review upon the practical situation in the actual field. Such discrepancy would influence the size of the domestic win-set in a contrasting fashion. Yet, unlike the media and NGO that regard risk factor (possibility of shedding blood in the combat area, led by an armed conflict) as the most important element on sending troops, governmental branches would not question the troop dispatch decision in general.

The different nature between System I and System II can be also explained by the following figure 11, in the perspective of the time sequence.




Figure 11. Policy making flow in a democratic structure

In a strictly narrowed perspective, a decision or an outline of a plan is initially contemplated by the president with the advise provided by the various ministries within the government. Such policy is confirmed in the National Security Committee and than finalized in the cabinet meeting, ready to be submitted to the National Assembly. This is the phase I of decision making that contains the interaction between the participants within the System I.

Once the motion is sent to the National Assembly, the details would be thoroughly reviewed in the permanent committee (in case of troop dispatch, the Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee is likely to be the designated organ). Once it is confirmed, the motion would finally conveyed to

the plenary session for vote. The deliberate, phase II process contains the function of System II participants. Of course, System I and System II interacts with one another, just like Putnam's original model assumes. For instance, the NGOs and the media can press hard when the president's idea is discussed within the cabinet meeting or in the NSC. Likewise, the president himself can convey his reserve upon the National Assembly's attempt to water down or distort the finalized plan in the cabinet meeting.

Moreover, the impact is under constraint of the time sequence. The participants in each System I and System II can maximize its influence within each Systems. Thus, the relationship between the two Systems can be described as 'separate organization yet with notable linkage'. Starting from such understanding of nuance, my modified version of the Two-Level game model will be applied to the three troop dispatch cases, in order to gain meaningful implication.

1.6 Hypothesis

As mentioned in the previous studies section, most research came up to a conclusion that the asymmetric relationship vis-a-vis the external counterparty (mostly the US) as the most substantial element that shape the size of a win-set. Its influence seems quite definitive. However, I would like to question that seemly obvious result and seek an alternative possibility for such matter.

Hypothesis 1: Even under the asymmetric power distribution, external factors may not solely define the troop dispatch decision or its result

Furthermore, many of the previous studies have reflected the increasing

clout of civil society and its implication. Mostly against government's troop dispatch decision, such growing voices have interpreted as a stumbling block to the overall decision making. Yet I would like to question the conventional assumption that media and NGO's increasing profile is a disadvantage. Instead, as a mixed blessing, contending voices of the civil society can be exploited, maximizing the national interest.

Hypothesis 2: Growing momentum of the civil society is not always a disadvantageous element on the troop dispatch decision

Considering the nature of Multinational Forces and the Peace Keeping Operation, people tend to perceive different threat perception to each form. Even though Peace Keeping Operation contains the risk of using violence and Multinational Forces may be deployed in relatively secured combat areas, high risk assessment is regarded as quite natural for the MNF in contrast to PKO. I would like to look through whether such pattern can be distilled from past troop dispatch decisions.

Hypothesis 3: Due to higher risk perception, troop dispatch in Multinational Forces face greater headwind compared to Peace Keeping Operation

2. Analytic Methods

In order to grasp the mechanism with greater preciseness, the researcher will use modified version of the Putnam's Two Level Game and explain how decisions are actually made through the interaction between domestic and external factors. This job would be somewhat broad because it will inevitably

involve in connecting and covering most previous studies upon this subject.

Since specific details and informations with regard to Korea's past dispatch decisions are not fully released to the public (except from some memoirs and biography which might contain some level of subjectiveness), I will mainly use distributed materials from governmental institution (from Ministry of National Defense to the Blue house (Cheong Wa Dae) – including presidents speeches that are relevant to troop dispatch) as a prioritized material. Adding to that, as a second reference, I will use various media substances, mainly from newspapers and published journals that contain interviews from key decision makers, individual troops and public opinion at large. Furthermore, some 30~40 dissertation will be thoroughly reviewed and analyzed.

3. Key Variables

3.1 Research target – various participants

By using decision making models, the researcher will interpret interactions between the various internal and external factors that shape the finalized form of troop dispatch.

3.1.1 Internal Factor³³ - President

President is the ultimate decision maker³⁴ within a sovereign country. As

³³ 'Internal' refers to entities, bureaucratic body that can be included as government organization.

the Korean constitution stipulates³⁵, the President enjoys a number of prerogatives including troop dispatch. Actually, in previous occasions, President was indeed a critical component and brandished its influence in decision making.

3.1.2 Internal Factor – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The MOFA is the organization that officially receives the request from foreign entities, whether the UN or the United States. As a channel that communicates in between the domestic government and international counterparty, MOFA can influence the decision making process by sending mixed signals.

3.1.3 Internal Factor – Ministry of National Defense

Ministry of National Defense possesses the material (human/non-human) assets at its disposal for a dispatch. Since professional and accurate assessment upon issues regarding military operation is made within this entity, sensitive matters such as adequate number of soldiers, the right types of equipment and the role of the personnel can be estimated firsthand and be suggested to the President. In that regard, the MND has some level of influence.

³⁴ Some countries with parliamentary system use a term meaning as ‘president’ for the head of parliamentary government, often as President of the Government, President of the Council of Ministries. However, such an official is explicitly not the president of the country. Rather, such officials are actually *premiers*, and to avoid confusion are often described simply as ‘prime minister’ when being mentioned internationally.

³⁵ Article 72 of the Korean constitution : “The President may submit important policies relating to diplomacy, national defense, unification and other matters relating to the national destiny to a national referendum if he deems it necessary” : Constitutional Court of Korea.

3.1.4 Internal Factor – National Security Council³⁶

Before the agenda upon troop dispatch is sent to the National Assembly for voting, the President holds the inclusive meeting through NSC for further discussion and debate. Even if the President has a decisive, resolved stance on some topics, the participants in the NSC can heavily influence within the structure of a groupthink. NSC's significance has been clearly demonstrated in the Cuban missile crisis³⁷ of 1962. In comparison with the NSC run by the US, Korean model might have different shade. But it still shares similar function in the overall sense.

3.1.5 Domestic Factor³⁸ – National Assembly

As stipulated in the constitution³⁹, the National Assembly has the right to consent the dispatch of armed forces. Korea's President has powerful authority, putting more weight on administrative compared to legislative body. Yet, as a forum that represents the voice of the people, the National Assembly

³⁶ NSC (National Security Council) is an executive branch government body responsible for coordinating policy on national security issues and advising chief executives on matters related to national security. The functions and responsibilities of an NSC at the strategic state level are different from those of the United Nations Security Council, which is more of a diplomatic forum. Korea's NSC has been launched in December 17, 1963.

³⁷ The famous 'quarantine' response was framed within the NSC, that in fact was a brilliant middle-ground reactions placed between doing nothing and a military attack that eventually contributed in de-escalating the crisis.

³⁸ 'Domestic' factor refers to entities and institutions which is Korean that exists outside the administrative government.

³⁹ Article 60 verse (2) of the Korean constitution : "The National Assembly shall also have the right to consent to the declaration of war, the dispatch of armed forces to foreign states, or the stationing of alien forces in the territory of the Republic of Korea" : Constitutional Court of Korea.

can be considered as one of the key factors that influence the result of a policy. In the US, the dramatic rise in congressional power over military and foreign affairs made it increasingly difficult for the executive to make commitments and to act decisively⁴⁰.

3.1.6 Domestic Factor – Media and NGOs

Korea's civil society is still undergoing an inchoate phase, yet its influence is gaining momentum day-by-day as democracy deepens. As a natural consequence, its voice and opinion is being a considerable factor on making decision, especially decisions that impacts the public at large. In particular, media in modern times shapes public opinion by conveying images and messages which is coined as the 'CNN effect'⁴¹. In the same token, various NGOs pinpoint a certain issue that they prefer to arouse and give key decision makers to think about the consequences before a decision is made. The ongoing democratization has elevated the will of the people to be important factor in critical decision making⁴².

3.1.7 External Factor – Counterparty state/entity

Currently, Korea is an official UN member and a military ally with the US. Under this setting, request from these entities have significant implications.

⁴⁰ Huntington, P Samuel. (1987~1988) "Coping with the Lippmann gap" 『Foreign Affairs : CFR(66)』 pp. 455

⁴¹ Belknap, Margaret H. The CNN Effect : Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk? Strategy Research Project (2001) pp. 1~2

⁴² Vlahos, Michael. (1987~1988) "The end of America's postwar ethos" 『Foreign Affairs : CFR(66)』 pp. 1101

Of course, as a sovereign country, Korea is able to decline the demand and choose the response that fits her best interest: sending economic aid instead of military personnel, dispatching a symbolic, negligible number of soldiers that may have minor impact on the region. However, such comes with a price tag⁴³. Since ROK-US alliance is based on asymmetric power relationship, disregarding the wants from the White House is extremely difficult. Furthermore, UN request to assemble soldiers and dispatch as a PKO also can't be lightly treated. Korea's international status as a 'responsible stakeholder' is largely shaped by actual burden sharing. Through this way, Korea can gain the image (if not soft power) of a trustworthy participant, and request for tangible and intangible help from the international society when faced with difficulties.

4. Key cases

In order to catch the flow and the distinctive patterns of decision making, case studies (Vietnam, East Timor and Iraq) will be utilized.

4.1 Multinational forces – Vietnam and Iraq

Multinational forces⁴⁴ are normally gathered by the countries that are under military pact or alliance. In some cases, MNF are forged by several

⁴³ Alongside with financial assistance, many countries depend upon the weight and prestige of the superpower (US) to protect them from various political or military humiliations in the international forum. Stephanie G. Neuman. (1987-1988), "Arms, Aid and the Superpowers" *Foreign Affairs*, (66). pp. 1061

⁴⁴ A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose, also called MNF.

countries in a voluntarily manner that share certain strategic interest, best notified by ‘coalition of the willing’⁴⁵. This type of troop dispatch does not have the legal credentials as the UN PKO. However, violence is basically allowed which is beyond self-defense, in accordance with the rules of engagement. Korea sent troops to Vietnam (1965) and Iraq (2003) as a MNF.

4.2 PKO – East Timor

As mentioned in the previous chapter, peace keeping operation is a novel concept that did not exist in the UN charter. Referred as a “Chapter VI and half”⁴⁶, PKO is permitted to use its light weaponry in case of self-defense. Since this type of dispatch is viable only with the consent of the receiving country, it has somewhat limited maneuvering room compared to MNF. However, backed by the legitimacy provided by the UN and the near-international consensus it possess, PKO can operate with lesser burden to justify the cause. Furthermore, PKO deals not only with traditional missions but also unconventional and complex issues, including nation building. In between the 23 years of timeline from the point of acceptance as a UN member to the present, Korea sent PKO to seven countries.

⁴⁵ The term coalition of the willing is a post-1990 political phrase used to collectively describe participants in military interventions that fall outside of United Nations peacekeeping operations. It has existed in the political science/international relations literature at least since UN peacekeeping operations began to run into complication in 1993-94, and alternatives began to be considered.

⁴⁶ Second UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld coined this notion because it falls between provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter which provides for pacific settlement of disputes and Chapter VII which enables enforcement actions by the UN Security Council.

Below, I've displayed the research targets as a matrix

Classification	External Factor	Internal Factor	Domestic Factor
President		O	
Ministry of Foreign Affairs		O	
Ministry of National Defense		O	
National Security Council		O	
National Assembly			O
Media & NGOs			O
Counterparty State	O		

Table 6. Factors that influence decision making

Classification ⁴⁷	Multinational Force	Peace Keeping Operation
Vietnam	O	
East Timor ⁴⁸		O
Iraq	O	

Table 7. Case studies that is analysed in this paper

⁴⁷ In this dissertation, only the meaningful dispatch cases will be selectively analyzed. The most critical criteria upon such choosing are the number of troops and the type of troop that is mostly comprised by combatants. Apart from the cases displayed above, Korea dispatched MNF in Afghanistan (2001~2003, 2010) and Somalia (2009). In case of PKO, Somalia (1993), West Sahara (1994), Angola (1995), Lebanon (2007).

⁴⁸ East Timor case is both circled in MNF and PKO since Korea's dispatch was first initiated as a multinational force but changed into a PKO, couple of months later.

IV. Case Studies

1. Vietnam

1.1 Background

Briefly after the World War II, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independence of Vietnam from the French rule on September 2, 1945, quoting words from Thomas Jefferson, “we hold these truths to be self-evident. That all men are created equal.”⁴⁹ However, the French army insisted their portion of authority in lieu of the power vacuum that the Japanese withdrawal has made. The struggle between the French and the Vietnamese army lingered on forwards, culminating in Dien Bien Phu⁵⁰ on 1954. Due to the favorable conditions for Vietnam, the discussion of the Indochina problem at the Geneva Conference that began on May 8 created more hospitable ground for the communist to breed. Buoyed by their victory at Dien Bien Phu, spokesperson for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops and immediate free elections⁵¹.

After the Geneva Conference of 1954, the partisan of communist Vietnam formed the National Liberation Front (NLF) in the Southern province and ignited a brutal civil war. The US government argued that the NLF was

⁴⁹ Herring, George C. (1986) "America's longest war : the United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975" 『Temple University Press』 pp. 3

⁵⁰ On March 13 1954, the North Vietnamese launched an all-out war attack on the French legionnaire, situated deep within the Dien Bien Phu, seriously grounded down. Kissinger, Henry A. (1994) "Diplomacy" 『Simon & Schuster』 pp. 630-631

⁵¹ Lewy, Guenter. (1980) "America in Vietnam" 『Oxford University Press』 pp. 7

performing as a proxy of the patrons in the Northern province of Vietnam, receiving armaments, munition and other military equipment. Since this activity was perceived as a flagrant violation of the Geneva accord that overtly intended to overturn the Vietnam government, US felt justified in its intervention⁵², for the purpose of deterring the communist's pressuring grips, sweeping around the area. However, the Viet Cong interprets the Vietnam war as a nationalistic revolution, aiming for national integration and independence of its people. In other words, the Viet Cong claimed that the Vietnam war was a 'pure' revolution, naturally-provoked by the insiders of the Vietnamese community without the outside help and influences.

As a logical result, the Viet Cong strongly argued for the withdrawal of all outside interferences. However, the North Vietnamese government was receiving massive military support both from the Soviet Union and the Red China that ultimately utilized to the betterment of the ongoing guerilla warfare in the South.

These arrays of events strengthened the logic of the so-called domino theory, makin the communist's propaganda of world revolution quite relevant to the US policymakers. The communist victory in China and it's increasing appeal and impact⁵³ to the nearby East Asian countries generated a Munich

⁵² This can be confirmed by president Kennedy's remark : "This is our offspring – we cannot abandon it". "What we must offer them is a revolution". "And if it falls victim to any of the perils that threaten its existence – communism, political anarchy, poverty and the rest – then the United States, with some justification, will be held responsible; and our prestige in Asia will sink to a new low – a political, economic and social revolution for superior to anything the communist can offer". Kissinger, Henry A. (1994) "Diplomacy" 『Simon & Schuster』 pp. 648

⁵³ Even before the onset of the Vietnam, the Chinese government was funneling arms to Viet

mentality in the US foreign policy apparatus.

The gulf of Tonkin incident⁵⁴ in 1964 occurred under that context. At first glance, the Vietnam war seem to be a war between a clear-cut good and evil, the good guys against the bad ones. The towering triumph in World War II was still the dominant image in the imagination of most Americans⁵⁵. Moreover, the popularity upon the Vietnam war was quite popular⁵⁶. Coupled with the cold war structure, the initially favorable condition activated the Korea's troop dispatch.

1.2 Elements in decision making

1.2.1 External factor

1960's can be described as the era of a relatively 'stable' bipolar system. The opening of the cold war, by Winston Churchill's Fulton speech (famously dubbed as the Iron Curtain speech) of March 1946 have gained its teeth by the Truman administration's NSC-68⁵⁷ that stipulated an overt containment

Cong and Laos.

⁵⁴ Referred also as the USS Maddox incident is a naval skirmish that happened on August 2 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin. During patrol, USS Maddox engaged three North Navy ships and exchanged fires.

⁵⁵ Isaacs, Arnold R. (1997) "Vietnam shadows : the war, its ghosts, and its legacy" 『Johns Hopkins University Press,』 pp. 7

⁵⁶ Following the Gulf of Tonkin affairs, president Johnson's popularity in the poll captured from 42 percent to 72 percent overnight; support for his Vietnam policies increased from 58 to 85 percent. Wells, Tom. (1994) "The war within : America's battle over Vietnam" 『University of California Press,』 pp. 11

⁵⁷ NSC-68 virtually issued a wholesale reappraisal of global strategy defense of the non-

strategy against the communist powers.

Via the 'Truman Doctrine' of the 1947, US pledged to militarily and economically support countries that were under the communist threat. After witnessing the communist China's victory in 1949, US decided to stem the tide of the communism and actively engaged in Vietnam. At the initial phase, US issued an indirect help when France was embroiled in the Vietnam affairs⁵⁸. Only when the French forces were embroiled in difficulty managing its war with the Viet Cong and its incompetent nature in dealing with the communist threat, US sent troops and began its containment role in earnest.

Backed by the notion of the domino theory, key policy makers in Washington though defense of South East Asia was critical for the defense of the entire free world and interpreted that a possible communist victory in the region would tip the balance much more unfavorably for the US. Furthermore, the US government perceived communist China's pro-Vietnamese and Indonesian communist foreign policy as a rising threat that must be stopped, one way or another. Such trend of threat analysis gained its trait after the China's successful nuclear test of 1964 that provided a similar shock to the US as it were in the Sputnik launch case in 1957. In a logical conclusion, the US tried to prevent such negative tide through Vietnam war participation.

At that time, the Soviet foreign policy maintained its expansionist

communist world. See Tae-Hwan, Kwak. (1976) "United States-Korean Relations and the Korean War : A Core Interests" 『Research Review of Kyungbook National University. Vol.22』 pp. 76-77

⁵⁸ The Eisenhower administration was extremely hesitant engaging in the region since it might be seen as another imperialistic actor starting the old business as usual. Only after the humiliating defeat in the Dien Bien Fu that US change the baton from France

character ever since the communist revolution triggered by Bolshevism. Soviet regarded themselves as a hub to the international communist movement and enjoyed to be poised in the control tower. Irrespective of the geographical distance and its scant historical commonality and economic relevance with Vietnam, the sweeping tide of global communism and the tight bipolar system prompted the Soviet's to strongly intervene in this region. In sum, Soviet's foreign policy in the South East province was to root out the US influence and establish a communist regime.

Just after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962⁵⁹, the Soviet Union attempt to halt support towards the Viet Cong for a short interval. However, amidst the Sino-Soviet conflict, when China pursued its pro-Viet Cong policy, the Soviets strengthened its support to the Viet Cong under the assumption that China's aggressive diplomacy would degrade (if not insulate) the overall influence of the USSR in the international arena.

After the US bombing of the North Vietnam, Soviet supplied military equipment⁶⁰. Chinese authority interpreted the proactive US intervention in this region as a major East Asian policy initiative to contain China. As a

⁵⁹ The height of the cold war was marked by the 1962's Cuban Missile crisis that lead the two superpowers to a brink of nuclear catastrophe. After that, US president Kennedy and the Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev delved on structuring the crisis more manageable by developing the hotline and the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) on 1963. However, such conciliatory gesture was a understanding between the two superpowers that a successful nuclear destruction of the counterparty is an unrealistic option and only through a mutually assured destruction would be a viable conclusion that lead to nuclear stability. Yet the low-intensity warfare has mushroomed ever since, making the proxy war a more favorable method to expand the influence of the each side, avoiding huge risk.

⁶⁰ Ninety SAM-2 missiles, fifty MIG-17/19, fifteen MIG-21 and five IL-28s and many armed vehicles and howitzers

response, China supplied political and military counsel and other material help and even contemplated sending ground forces and offer military assistance⁶¹ to the North Vietnam for the purpose of spreading communism throughout the region and consolidate China's defense.

Unlike the Soviet Union, China was geographically at the proximity of North Vietnam and regarded as a center state of the world. When the mainland China transformed into a communist state in 1949, China was at the throes of recovery and desperately seeking for internal stability. Yet, the Korean war that squeezed the finite resources and late 1950s' burgeoning Sino-Soviet strife placed China in a competition vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in terms of gaining favor from the North Vietnam. Even though China and the Soviet Union shared a common goal of fending off US from the region, China was fundamentally at loggerheads with USSR on the paternal role regarding North Vietnam.

Meanwhile, Korea's troop dispatch decision during the Vietnam war was requested by the US government, as a duty of a blood alliance. At then, Korean government was heavily influenced by the US foreign policy. Starting from the late 1950s, US pursued a roll-back policy that assumed a tough reaction to the communist side's aggressive activities especially in the East Asian province.

In particular, the launch of a Soviet Satellite Sputnik alarmed the US and had a groundbreaking impact upon the US foreign policy. Yet the increasing financial burden of the 1960s prompted a forces reduction, coupled with the

⁶¹ China provided small firearms, light machine gun, rocket launcher, various munition, sea mine and the MIG 17 aircraft

withdrawal of the US forces worldwide. As a corollary, the US applied the 'New Look' policy which signaled the gradual reduction of the USFK, compensating with an economic support package.

This policy shift entailed a vulnerability to the Park administration in terms of security. In response, the Korean government contemplated some plans to halt or somewhat slow down the withdrawal of US forces in Korea. Decisions on sending troops to Vietnam were one of those plans forged by the third republic.

At the onset of the Vietnam war, the US government sought allied participation especially from NATO members in order to water down the growing domestic sentiment. Yet most of them revealed their reservation⁶² and refused to send troops, disagreeing with the exorbitant interpretation of the touted domino theory. Under such circumstances, the US officially asked the Korean government for participation and with the President Park's consent, specifics regarding the troop dispatch decision was negotiated.

US government officially conveyed its request for Korea's troop dispatch in late 1963 and the South Vietnamese government's request followed on January the fifth, 1964. As a response, the Korean government convened the National Security Council to set the government's stance.

Factoring in the aforementioned circumstances, Korea's room of maneuverability was squarely limited. In particular, the existence of the DPRK and the geographically nearby red China naturally enforced the Korean

⁶² Irrespective of the cold war structure, UK and France were still feeling sores from the US' passive engagement during the Suez crisis of 1956.

government to maintain close relationship with the US and its other allies⁶³. Thus the Vietnam war was a symbolic case for the South Korea that was closely intertwined with Korea's existence⁶⁴. The goal of the war was to stem the domino effect in the region, evaporate any miscalculation of the communist protagonists (especially Mao Zedong and Kim Il-Sung). Therefore, US' request for troop participation contained the significant importance to the Korean government. In a nutshell, the external factor was a critical (if not overwhelming) element in deciding the troop dispatch decision.

1.2.2 Internal factor

Among several internal factors, president's clout was the most significant. The administration was strongly influenced by the President's personal character. Well including South Korea, countries running the presidential system inevitably concentrated serious amount of power with regard the decision making.

⁶³ Through the situational demand, and by the US exhortation, Korea grudgingly pursued the normalization with the Japanese in 1965. This eventually lead to a Korea-US-Japan quasi triangular alliance, against the USSR-China-North Korea blood alliance. Cha, Victor D. (1999) "Alignment despite antagonism : the United States-Korea-Japan security triangle" 『Stanford University Press』 pp. 125-138

⁶⁴ Unlike Korea, most other countries had some level of reserve vis-à-vis the US' engagement in Vietnam. This can be explained by the different room of options each country could take : Europe for instance, was also faced with the Warsaw pact army just across the Elbe river. However, their economic fundamental was way more higher than Korea, thanks to the ongoing economic integration in between the European countries. Moreover, the firm institution of NATO gave the breathing room for the Europeans to dissent on the US activity. Simply put, the European continent was too precious for the US to lose. Meanwhile, the other East Asian countries, was influenced by the non-aligned movement that was sparked by the Bandung conference of 1955. They tried to rebuke both of the superpower and maintain neutrality. Yet their choice of action reflects the tendency to avoid risk, embroiling in a proxy war, instigated by the two superpowers.

In particular, authoritative government mostly from the developing countries that experienced a coup (or some other radical power shift) naturally has a strict, top-down decision making mechanism. Likewise, President Park Jung Hee inaugurated at the Presidency through an abrupt coup d'état (in the interim there was a limited presidential election) that possessed exclusive authority, similar to that of a commander in the military. In sum, President's influence was the greatest source among internal factors that shaped the troop dispatch during the Vietnam war.

In order to receive US' credentials and water down its illegitimate nature, President Park visited US in 1961 and met the newly inaugurated President Kennedy. During the visit, President Park initially suggested Korean combat troop dispatch to Vietnam. This proactive attitude can be interpreted as president Park's desperate desire of acquiring international legitimacy in order to offset the fragile domestic legitimacy. President Park's coup was triggered by the complex amalgam of economic distress, political unstableness and social polarization. And once successful in acquiring power, President Park turned conciliatory towards the US in order to receive material support and maintain the Presidency.

Facing the dual threat of economic devastation and the possible North Korean provocation, President Park first proactively embarked on a massive economic development plan to gather a favorable public opinion and strengthen the seemingly illegitimate government. To fund the economic plan and modernize the Korean military, President used the troop dispatch option as the most viable card at its disposal.




Figure 12. US aid to Korea during the Vietnam war⁶⁵

As it can be seen in the figure 12, the size of military grants increased in a consistent manner (with the exception of 1970 and 1972) during the Vietnam war period. This troop dispatch – economic compensation, military modernization trade off was possible, due to President’s iron grips in decision making and implementation. Looking through the President’s personal trait as a military-academy graduate, serving in the military for the most time of his career, it is somewhat a corollary that the decision making pattern has been a top-down and authoritative.

President Park was enjoying an un-interrupted hierarchical bureaucratic structure, faced with virtually minimal resistance or divergent voices from bottom up. All in all, coupled with the president's deep interest in foreign affairs, it can be said that the troop dispatch decision has been motivated as well as pursued heavily by the individual at the helm.

⁶⁵ Reconstructing data from the US Agency for International Development, Overseas Loans and Grant and Assistance from International Organization, 1975 editions.

Such structure also puts more emphasis in the Presidential secretariat and inevitably allows it to become a significant branch in critical decision making. Under the Korea's political structure, the power of the Presidential secretariat has gained enormous power, starting from the third republic. Compared to the first and second republic, the presidential secretariat's role has been upgraded from mere aide to the president to a major communication instrument in between the president and the cabinet.

The Presidential secretariat of the third republic could provide great influence⁶⁶ to every foreign policy decisions, due to its high access ability to the President. Furthermore, President's long experience as a military staff, mixed with an authoritative style in decision-making ineluctably formed a strict top-down administrative rule.

In particular, President with a military background naturally transformed decision making as a President-centered job. This tendency has been strengthened by the President's deep interest in setting the national agenda and the proactive attitude toward foreign policy making. In this circumstance, President's political control as well as the leadership is well likely to prevail over decision making as numerous cases verifies.

For instance, decision making in opening red China was designed mainly by a limited few top brass under president's authority. During the 1971,

⁶⁶ To be sure, the presidential secretariat influence during president Park is profoundly different from the NSC during the second Iraq dispatch during president Roh Moo Hyun. In the case of the later, the NSC Voiced its own opinion, sometimes against the president's stance, clashing with the other governmental branches (MOFA, MND). However, the former was influential, only when it conveyed the president's stance. The president of the third republic were not a mere *primus inter pares*.

president Nixon and the national security advisor Henry Kissinger planned a rapprochement between US and China, circumventing the somewhat byzantine bureaucratic circles. To be sure, that is rather an extreme example and the president normally does not solely decide every decision and dictate his terms upon other participants in the government. However, there is a grain of truth that president does possess substantial power in framing a policy.

Apart from the president himself, national security council and the state council provided a useful venue in deciding key decisions including troop dispatch. President Park convened the NSC whenever a decision making issue rose regarding national security. As stipulated in the Article 87 verse 1 of the third republic constitution⁶⁷, President is expected to be consulted by the NSC before the matter goes to the cabinet meeting for further deliberation. The NSC was run by the following participants : president and prime minister, minister for foreign affairs, minister for defense, minister for finance, chief of the central intelligence agency and the head of the presidential secretariat.

Receiving the official troop dispatch request from the US and the South Vietnamese government in late 1963, President Park convened the NSC in January 1964, constituting prime minister, chief of the central intelligence agency, minister of defense, minister of foreign affairs and the leader of the democratic-republican party. Ever since, the NSC functioned as a subsidiary role, following the President's decision, until the second Iraq troop dispatch during president Roh Moo Hyun.

⁶⁷ Article 87 (1) : A National Security council shall be established to advise the President on the formulation of foreign, military and domestic policies related to national security prior to their deliberation by the State Council (same as the Article 91(1) of the current constitution) Constitutional Court of Korea.

The participants of the NSC at that time were either from the military background⁶⁸ or from the bureaucratic organization. Regardless of their different credentials, these protagonists shared a practical and realistic ethos that prioritized the national interest as their top agenda by propping up the dual mandate of economic development and the national security.

Side by side, the state council was a venue that finalized the administration's domestic policy and submitted the result as a legislative plan or a bill to the National Assembly. During the third republic, the cabinet meeting was convened by the Prime minister, deputy Prime minister, minister for foreign affairs, minister of interior, minister of justice, minister of construction, minister of transport, minister of communication and some other participants.




Figure 13. Occupation background of high ranking administrators⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Prime minister Jung Il Kwun, Chief of the KCIA Kim Hyung Wook, Defense minister Kim Sung Eun are the most notable figures.

⁶⁹ Modification from Byong-Man, Ahn. (2003) "Elites and political power in South Korea"

As it can be seen in the figure 13, 68% of the high level administrators including the state council member were from army and bureaucratic circles. This background boosted a solid loyalty to the President and made possible to follow and implement the President's decision without a second thought. Backed by such condition, the state council functioned as a mere formality by authorizing the consensus made by the National Security Council. This proclivity applied to the state council throughout the third republic since they shared commonality and similar background that ultimately formed a favorable chemistry for the President to decide and implement a decision with minimum resistance.

Both groups - NSC and the state council are formed by elites that possess similar mindset in terms of national interest. Thus a novel opinion that is relatively distanced from the conventional thought is very likely to be quelled and the members in the decision making apparatus will try to avoid being an odd man in the group. Such group thinking becomes an ossified procedure especially when the leader at the helm possesses authoritative and ultimate power.

For instance, Saddam Hussein during the Gulf war of 1991 ceaselessly recounted the inevitability of Iraq's victory against the US 'intruders' even though the given facts were severely deteriorating as time went by. Most of the cabinet ministers were fully aware with the ongoing situation. Yet, Saddam's strong grips upon the domestic front virtually silenced the possible emergence of a devil's advocate. Similarly (albeit in a lesser extreme), during the early days of the Kennedy administration, the white house decided to

『Edward Elgar Publishing,』 pp. 164

invade Cuba and topple the newly formed Castro government. Even with the strong evidence from the CIA that were unfavorable to the invasion, the key decision making members dithered in revealing a strong 'against', fearing of being brandished as a pushover.

All in all, the president of the third republic was poised to greatly influence in forging a policy due to the weak elements within the internal factors. Rather than a *primus inter pares*, president Park enjoyed a dominant stature in forging a specific plan. The constitutionally ingrained powers to the NSC and the state council as well as the governmental branch's (MOFA and MND) legal power was somewhat overwhelmed by the president's clout.

1.2.3 Domestic Factor

During the third republic, the National Assembly perceived US' engagement on the Vietnam war as a crucial defense against the swarming communism and thus fundamentally advocated on the need of a troop dispatch. Alongside that, domestic opposition was almost to a nil, unlike the US. Furthermore, almost the entire public was favorable in sending troops, lacking any source of serious backlash at the initial phase. As a result, the National Assembly basically approved the governmental dispatch plan, with some 'noise' that could be regarded as a mere grumbling voices⁷⁰ that hardly influenced the government's decision. As noted earlier, the general public was

⁷⁰ Several tactical opposition as a formality including : 1) sending well-trained combat troops in a massive scale might create a hole in the national security 2) the magnitude of human as well as financial cost entailed with troop dispatch would not be negligible 3) the economic support of the US as a trade-off from troop sending will probably be utilized as a personal political pocket money for the President and will ultimately benefit the state sponsored big companies that have corrupt relationship vis-a-vis the government.

for the dispatch. Compared with the US domestic opinion during the same period⁷¹, the difference was remarkable.

This was validated by the landslide victory of the President Park during the presidential election of 1967. When four of the troop dispatch decisions were implemented (1964.7/1965.1/1965.8/1966.3) President Park's pro-Vietnam stance was widely supported by the general public : he experienced a landslide victory in the 1967 presidential election by acquiring 5.6 million votes⁷² (a 1.6 million margin against his opponent Yoon Bo Sun). That margin was much narrower during the 1963 election⁷³ (0.2 million). This reflects the stark increase of the number of constituents that favored president's pro-Vietnam dispatch policy. Since there were readily few political figures who opposed the dispatch decision, it can be said that the dual mandate of economic development and military modernization appealed the general public and wave of support being accepted by the National Assembly with minimal resistance.

Meanwhile, the influence of the public opinion as well as the civil group were minimized at best in terms of shaping critical decisions. Even though the revolution took place at April 9 (that led president Rhee to resign) gained momentum, democracy was in its phase of inception and was easily supported by the president Park's authoritative statecraft. Thus, the overall influence of

⁷¹ 장재혁. (1998) "제3공화국의 베트남 파병결정과정과정에 관한 연구 : 대통령과 국회의 상호작용을 중심으로" 『동국대학교 대학원』 박사학위 논문 pp. 67

⁷² Dong-A ilbo (1967.5.5)

⁷³ Dong-A ilbo (1963.10.19)

the social factor can be regarded as a meager one.

In particular, political participation of the civic group during the President Park was almost absent. Moreover, coupled with the objective of economic development and military modernization, the Park administration has sought for the most reasonable path obtaining that particular aim. Such goal was publically shared through the general public which were facing absolute poverty and the perennial threat from the North.

In addition, public opinion during the third republic was heavily under control by the government. Alongside with the civic group, public opinion could not successfully influence the government-led, partially secret troop dispatch decision making. The media turn negative towards the troop dispatch, starting from the third dispatch. Yet the dissenting voices could not come to the fore.

On May 26 1966, presidential candidate Yoon Bo Sun strongly opposed president Park's policy, branding the Vietnam dispatch as a tool to garner political fund in exchange for selling blood of the youngsters. Such argument tend to factor in the implicitly dissenting voices that were permeated in some quarters of society.

However, President Park quelled such sentiment from being amplified and instead utilized this dissent as a useful negotiating card vis-à-vis the US : asserting a firm security guarantee of the Korean Peninsula by the US forces, wage increase of the dispatching Korean troops, modernization of the Korean army that culminated in the Brown memorandum. As mentioned, even though the negative public opinion gradually gained momentum with the passage of time (incrementally through 2nd, 3rd and the 4th dispatch), the overall impact

was marginal.

1.3 Negotiating Process

1.3.1 First dispatch (1964/7/31)

The growing concern of Vietnam's insecurity, instigated by a coup against South Vietnam, the reinforcement of Viet Cong and the tantalizing argument from the ASEAN countries prompted the US to convey the missive to the 25 countries⁷⁴, requesting for the assistance towards South Vietnam. However, such feeler that was sugarcoated by a noble cause eventually generated sour response from most of those nations. Korea, in contrast, has favorably considered its dispatch plans. In response to the request from the US⁷⁵, the Korean government issued a thorough review on sending non-combatant personnel to Vietnam. As a result, the defense ministry recommended⁷⁶ a plan for sending a mobile army surgical hospital and taekwondo instructor based

⁷⁴ Kyunghyang Newspaper (1964.5.9)

⁷⁵ After receiving the missives from the US, president Park suggested for dispatching combatants. However, president Johnson asked for non-combatants including mobile army surgical hospital.

⁷⁶ The ground for suggesting such recommendation can be typified by the following four reasons: First, the 'spillover' of the Vietnamese crisis might endanger the South Eastern countries' security status, thus further degrading the overall situation in the region. Moreover, this negative trend would prompt Kim Il-Sung to miscalculate the correlation of forces and seek for an aggressive move within the Korean Peninsula. Second, the moral responsibility helping other country in need for military assistance - The Republic of Korea was able to exist, thanks to the 16 countries that sent their armed forces under the banner of 'collective defense' by the United Nations. Third, relatively long haul after the Korean War has somewhat downgraded the Korean forces' combat readiness, lacking field experience. Fourth, the material compensation from troop dispatch will very likely supply the dearly needed economic resources in building the infrastructure, underpinning Korea's industrial development.

on the research and the result of the Vietnam inspection team.

Upon such swift response, the ministry of foreign affairs maintained a cautious stance, yet with little opposition since troop sending has been already decided by the President himself. From then onwards, the ministry of foreign affairs concentrated on the diplomatic issues that might be entailed by the troop dispatch. The Defense ministry's recommended 'Research plan for supporting Vietnam' gained consensus in the NSC at the same year, May 21. Through the result, government gave its dispatch preparation order to its relevant branch and departments.

On June 10 1964, defense minister Kim Sung Eun issued a statement to UN commander Hamilton H. Howze - United Nations command position involving US and ROK troops - that the Korean government has approved to send mobile army surgical hospital and taekwondo instructor to Vietnam⁷⁷. In response, the UN command accepted the Korea's offer of dispatch on July 16.

Within briefly, the original version of US request which the NSC concurred, was authorized by the cabinet meeting and sent to the National Assembly for vote⁷⁸. On July 31, the troop dispatch plan was passed unanimously in the regular session of the National Assembly. Thereafter, on

⁷⁷ Hong Yong, Park (2000) "Let's Review! : South Korea's Involvement in Vietnam 1961-1966" 『Korea journal of international relations Vol.40 No.4』 pp. 190

⁷⁸ On July 30, the Korean government laid out several reasons to pass the dispatch plan in the National Assembly : First, the situation in South Vietnam will well influence the Korean Peninsula. Second, it is a corollary helping the South Vietnamese people since ROK was established through US' military support. Third, US have officially requested for troop dispatch to 25 countries, including Korea. Fourth, the South Vietnamese government has asked for sending troops on July 15, 1964. Lastly, based upon the verse 4 of the Korean constitution, there exist an obligation to maintain international peace.

August 24, a Korea survey team was dispatched and as a follow-up, army surgical hospital and taekwondo instructor, totaling 140, had headed for Saigon in September 11, 1964.

The first dispatch decision was made in a swift phase, finalizing the original US version, almost without a modification. This result was possible due to the president Park's adamant stance of sending the forces. His proactive suggestion (to send combatant instead of US' request for non-combatant), virtually expanded the Korea's win set. The year 1964 was barely three years from the May 16 coup d'état and the president Park's consolidation of absolute power was still an ongoing issue. Lacking the legitimacy that most democracy provides to the person at the helm, president Park had urgent obligation in meeting the dual mandate: 1) Maintaining peace and stability against the Kim Il-Sung regime in the Northern province of Korea 2) Rapid economic development. The first condition can be met via the staunch support of the US, backed by the rock-solid ROK-US alliance. President Park was obliged to support the counterparty when the need occurred. Meanwhile, Korea was undergoing the five-year economic development plan that began in 1962. In order to receive the necessary economic resources, president Park understood the troop dispatch as an opportunity to enhance the Korean economy.

In terms of the international structure, 1964 can be interpreted as a relatively thawing period between the two superpowers. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 that almost led the earth to a third world war was peacefully settled, and the two parties tried to find more practical way to manage the overall crisis level. However, the so-called proxy war was ongoing and the US was just involved in the South East Asia to stem the communist tide.

Moreover, facing more powerful and more economically developed brethren in the North, the South Korean government had virtually no room for autonomous choice, other than a complete, if not subservient support to the US. The National Assembly and the media was under the strict control of the president Park's military government. Alongside that, the various governmental branches were extremely weak compared to the president's authority.

As a result, the first dispatch can be understood as president Park's decision, in the name of maximizing the national interest. Dissenting voices had no room to stand, neither the power to influence the decision-making process. This can be illustrated as the figure 14.




Figure 14. Decision making during the 1st dispatch (Vietnam)

The decision-making mechanism during the 1st dispatch has an attribute of a president-centered, predominant system I. President Park's overwhelming influence virtually made the system I as an unitary actor, since other governmental branches within the system I was rather subordinate. The ministry of national defense and the ministry of foreign affairs received crucial influence from the NSC – that is marked as a dotted line – However, president Park's influence was substantial.

Likewise, the democracy was in its infancy which marginalized the players of the system II. Due to the frozed and squeezed civil society, the players had a meager interactions in between. This enabled the president a maximum maneuverability in the domestic area, able to stretch Korea's win set to the extreme. As a result, without almost no constraint or resistance from the domestic front, he first offered the US a plan to send combatants in the battle field. The US declined the offer. Yet, initially asked for the dispatch of non-combatants, the finalized outcome was materialized as the mobile army surgical hospital and taekwondo instructor.

1.3.2 Second dispatch (1965/1/26)

With the passage of time, US involvement in the Vietnam jungle began earnest. The Gulf of Tonkin incident offered the binding justification for US' escalation that entailed a massive introduction of human and non-human materials in the region. This heightened intensity increased the US need for additional allied help. This signal was conveyed through US ambassador Winthrop Brown to the Korean government for more troop dispatch, explaining the deteriorating status of the South Vietnamese and the US stance.

In response, president Park issued an thorough research to the defense

minister, regarding the troop dispatch to South Vietnam on December 22⁷⁹. The pressure increased by the US' request. On December 24, special assistant to the president Chester Cooper and James Thomson urged the Korean ambassador that troop should be dispatched (at least some portion, if not all) until January 15 1965, at the latest. Two days later, William Bundy at the state department re-emphasized the importance of troop participation to the Korean ambassador, reminding him the due date of January 15 1965⁸⁰. On December 26, the minister of national defense convened an emergency meeting and concurred the details and specifics of troop dispatch, under certain condition⁸¹. After the government-led 123rd cabinet meeting on December 29, defense minister Kim Sung Eun asked for a fast approval to Lee Hou San, the Chairman of the National Assembly.

Since the very issue had significant importance, the republican party decided to pass the issue to the next session. Even amidst of such muddling through theme tend to continue in the National Assembly, the defense ministry reported the army's opinion (upon the dispatch) to the cabinet meeting and

⁷⁹ On December 18, visiting the blue house, ambassador Brown initially requested for additional troop dispatch, mainly comprised by transportation and engineers. As the previous dispatch event, president Park suggested two-division size combatant instead. However, ambassador Brown declined the offer. See Kwan Oak, Kim. (2005) "A Comparative Analysis of Dispatching Politics of the Korean Troops toward Vietnam and Iraq = An Analysis of Dispatch Diplomacy of the Korean Troops from the Two-Level Approach" 『Korean Journal of Political Science Vol.13 No.1』 pp.367

⁸⁰ Hong Yong, Park (2000) "Let's Review! : South Korea's Involvement in Vietnam 1961-1966" 『Korea journal of international relations Vol.40 No.4』 pp. 193

⁸¹ That Korea's overall combat readiness should not be degenerated by sending troops. However, the level of US military and economic assistance to Korea should not be reduced.

sent advance team to Vietnam on January 8, 1965. On the same day, second dispatch decision was confirmed by the cabinet meeting and President Park pushed for a rapid troop dispatch in January 12.

On January 25, the National Assembly begun its dispatch agreement motion process and passed the motion almost without modification from the original version (totaling 2,000 personnel, mainly comprised by transportation and engineers) in the plenary session on January 26. Finally, on March 16, 1965 the construction Support Group – ‘Dove’ force was dispatched.

Unlike the previous dispatch process, slight opposition was sensed within the National Assembly as well as in the governmental branch. After intense discussion, the opposition party (Min-Jung Dang) voted against the dispatch plan in the defense committee. Furthermore, couple of younger groups in the republican party expressed a strong reserve upon the dispatch plan. Such dissents were virtually absent during the previous dispatch decision making. The second dispatch decision making mechanism can be illustrated as figure 15.




Figure 15. Decision making during the 2nd dispatch (Vietnam)

In comparison to the first dispatch, some differences can be distilled from the 2nd one. The overall international structure seem to be the same, yet the US' need for assistance increased, due to the Gulf of Tonkin incident. That turn of event changed the significance of the Vietnam war, requesting for more material and reinforcing the ground for justification. This needy nature slightly widened the US win set. Furthermore, accentuating argument from the National Assembly was noticeable during the second dispatch. The opposition parties formed an anti-dispatch stance as its consensus and expressed their veto upon the plan by absence during the vote. This strengthened the System II, creating a negative feedback to the System I (illustrated in the figure 15). Such cacophony was even noticed by the US government, creating a possibility of widening the Korea's win set.

However, president Park's authoritative control on the domestic area, coupled with his initial suggestion of sending two-division size combatant maximized the Korean win set to the extreme. Growing dissent from the civil sector has been successfully subdued. Moreover, the US quite successfully constraint Korea's size of win set by urging Ambassador Brown to consult and assuage the opposition party members and promising economic and military assistance that Korea desperately sought. As a result, almost identical from the original request from the US' version of 2,000 personnel (mainly comprised by transportation and engineers) were dispatched to Saigon.

In a nutshell, it is noticeable that the National Assembly simply not 'rubber-stamped' the troop dispatch plan. But Korea's economically and militarily vulnerabl⁸² stance, coupled with the asymmetric power distribution between the US silenced such negative sentiment. President's strong grips vis-à-vis the domestic area has reinforced such pattern.

1.3.3 Third dispatch (1965/8/13)

Detecting the escalating violent tendency in Vietnam, general Westmoreland recommended a more aggressive tactic (branded as 'search and destroy') to president Johnson on February 1965. Such similar concern was shared by many others, including the national security advisor McGeorge Bundy. This marked the watershed of the US' Vietnam policy. Starting from April 1965, the US officially abandoned the previous policy of requesting only non-combatants (named as the 'Free World Assistance to South Vietnam :

⁸² The US brandished its card of forces relocation of USFK to South Vietnam.

More flag) and to seek the participation of combatants⁸³. This implies the growing demand of combat troops in the South East Asian region, prompting the US to seek further help from its allies. As a result, US officially requested a division size troop dispatch to the Korean government.

The groundwork has been started through the Lee-Rusk (between minister of foreign affairs Lee Dong Won and secretary of state Dean Rusk) meeting⁸⁴ of Washington. On April 26, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. was sent to president Park for re-emphasizing the troop dispatch. Similar message has been discussed on May, between president Park and president Johnson during the summit meeting in Washington. Yet, instead of the swift answering to the request, president Park asked for certain conditions⁸⁵. Since Johnson administration was at a hurry, Korea's conditions were implicitly guaranteed.

After the minister Lee's US visit, the Korean government have initiated a pros and cons debate, regards to military, economic and diplomatic aspect of the 3rd troop dispatch. President Park ordered both defense minister Kim Sung Eun and deputy premier Chang Ki Young for further preparation on ROK-US

⁸³ Hong Yong, Park (2000) "Let's Review! : South Korea's Involvement in Vietnam 1961-1966" 『Korea journal of international relations Vol.40 No.4』 pp. 195

⁸⁴ received an official acceptance of Korea's request regarding the third troop decision : 1) In exchange of the troop dispatch, Korean army should be modernize up to a level that can deter any provocation from the North Korean threat 2) an equal treatment between US and ROK soldier in Vietnam, wages paid exclusively by the US government 3) transportation of military equipment should be dealt by the Korea 4) technical assistance for Korea's economic development, these facts can be confirmed by Kukmin Ilbo (1989.12.15)

⁸⁵ Such conditions were : first, since the security vacuum that might occur due to the dispatch, the North Korea can exploit the chance. Second, UN armies' constant stationing in the Korean Peninsula. Third, swift signing of the Status Of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Fourth, promising incessant economic assistance.

negotiation. In addition, the overall assessment regarding the dispatch condition was delegated to the ministry of foreign affairs. With the MOFAs' outlined plan, president Park convened the NSC meeting at July 1 and decided to send troops in the ministerial meeting on the next day. The motion was sent to the National Assembly. As it was in the second dispatch, the opposition parties were voicing their dissent on the troop dispatch affairs.

However, during the July-August of 1965, the political parties were at extreme loggerheads with one another regarding the issue of ROK-Japan normalization issue that absorbed most of the energy and focus within the National Assembly. On August 13, defense minister Kim Sung Eun asserted the need of the forces dispatch in the National Assembly⁸⁶. On the same day, with the firm support of the ruling party, coupled with the distracted opposition party members, the motion was passed 101-for, 1-against. The decision making mechanism during the third dispatch can be illustrated as the figure 16.

⁸⁶ First, stemming the possible communist's provocative activity via victory in the South Vietnam. Second, continuity in the overall victory by the ROK forces participation. Third, Korea's combatant dispatch shall maintain the troop level of USFK and thus will have no negative effect to the USFK's defense capability. Fourth, enhancing not only the relationship between ROK-US-South Vietnam, but the general international status, helping to maximize the national interest.




Figure 16. Decision making during the 3rd dispatch (Vietnam)

The decision making of the third dispatch can be symbolized by the urgent US request and president Park's intent on maximizing Korea's national interest. The deteriorating situation on Vietnam demanded for more troop engagement from the US. Due to its internal constraint, the US had difficulty recruiting further combatant. Therefore, assuming that Korea would send combatants to the field without reservation, US planned its own scenario regarding the reinforcements. However, president Park prolonged the issue, adding further conditions to the US, eventually baffling the Johnson administration.

As a result, Korea received a further guarantee from the US for military-economic assistance. This can be illustrated as a widened US win set and a narrowed Korean win set. Meanwhile, the System II remained approximately

the similar influence to the System I, due to the contentious ROK-Japan normalization affairs. The growing dissent among the opposition party members were apparent. Yet, in terms of priority, their focus was more distracted to the normalization issue. Through a solid support from the ruling party, the dispatch plan was passed without significant resistant in the National Assembly. Eventually, finalized result of the third dispatch was predictable yet with more compensation to the Korean government. Since the overwhelming security and the economic need, alongside with the huge contribution of the ROK-US alliance structure, Korea virtually had no option but to comply the US request.

Truly, president Park fully understood that if sending Korean troops do not meet the date, some of the USFK would reallocate to South Vietnam. The other options virtually did not exist (if affirmative, the price tag would be unbearable to the Koreans). However, president Park strived to extract the maximum compensation through this seemingly an inevitable process without infuriating the US (which motivated them to change its Korean policy in a negative fashion). In addition, as in the previous two dispatch cases, president Park's strong grip upon both the System I and System II participants (albeit not totally of the National Assembly) allowed him to make effective negotiation with the US.

1.3.4 Fourth dispatch (1966/3/19)

On July 1965, the US declared 'the Americanizing the Vietnam war' and propped up its overall engagement. As a result, roughly 184 thousand troops alongside with one division from Korean and Australia, has been dispatched to the region. However, general Westmoreland's 'search and destroy' strategy

was unsuccessful⁸⁷ at best and demanded more combat troops for managing the war. Secretary of state Dean Rusk initially conveyed the need to the Korean government during minister of foreign affairs Lee Dong Won's visiting the general assembly of the United Nations on December 1965.

However, Lee pinpointed that the US was not fully implementing the benefits it asserted during the previous three dispatch negotiations. He maintained a firm pro-implementation, post-dispatch stance. Secretary Rusk responded vice-versa that led the negotiation to nowhere⁸⁸. This hastened the US to send the Vice president Hubert Humphrey as a envoy to president Park on January 1, 1966 for troop dispatch.

As a result, president Park affirmed the request and Ambassador Brown submitted the written memorandum containing economic support (coined as the Brown memorandum⁸⁹). Moreover, On February 14, South Vietnamese prime minister Nguyen Cao Ky officially requested the fourth dispatch to the government. Starting from that point, the Korean government embarked on a specific discussions on dispatch and the negotiation regarding the conditions from dispatch have begun.

The issue was officially registered in the 52nd military-diplomacy joint

⁸⁷ Secretary of defense Robert McNamara's memo submitted to president Johnson explains that the overall result of the Vietnam endeavor as a part failure and pulverizing enemy points is near impossible. He further adds that the status quo would conceivably be the best outcome with the help of the reinforcements.

⁸⁸ Korea's fourth dispatch to Vietnam, see Daily today (2013.6.26)

⁸⁹ Hong-Guk, Oh. (2011) "A study of the modernization of the Republic of Korea's Armed Forces during the Participation in the Vietnam war" 『Military Forum Vol.67』 pp.101-121

meeting and gone through 11 times of intensive discussions and heated debate. On March 18, the troop dispatch plan was submitted to the general meeting session.

During the deliberation, a strong objection has surfaced, that were greater than the previous dispatch decisions. A number of members of the opposition party that reserved its dissent to the dispatch in the name of national interest disclosed their discontent regarding troop sending. Even some members of the ruling party that agreed on the party consensus have displayed utter reserve and opposition, after grumblingly voting for the troop dispatch.

However, prime minister Jung Il Kwon assuaged the dissenting voice by mentioning that the ongoing Vietnam war does not impair the security status of Korea, and the matter upon the economic maintenance of the 600 thousand ROK forces will be solved sooner or later. Furthermore, two-third of the national defense budget is to be provided by the US in the 1966-1967 fiscal year. And further dispatch will be out of the table since it might deteriorate the Korean Security⁹⁰. As a result the troop dispatch plan has been approved at the 14th general meeting in March 19. Briefly after, the defense ministry pinpointed the white horse division and initially sent the installment on August 30.

The further dispatches of ROK forces were mere replacement of the already sent personnel. Due to the North Korean special forces' assassination attempt on 1968, coupled with the president Johnson's refusal for re-election

⁹⁰ Hong Yong, Park (2000) "Let's Review! : South Korea's Involvement in Vietnam 1961-1966" 『Korea journal of international relations Vol.40 No.4』 pp.199

that led the Nixon administration that embarked on the de-escalation and the withdrawal US forces, additional troop dispatch issue regarding Vietnam was not raised ever since. The decision-making mechanism of the fourth dispatch can be illustrated as the figure 17.




Figure 17. Decision making during the 4th dispatch (Vietnam)

The strategic miscalculation of US transformed the Vietnam area, equivalent as a quagmire. More troops were a necessary component, just to maintain the security situation in the region. Due to the cold war structure and the perennial North Korean threat, Korea's win set displayed no change, just as the previous three dispatch cases. However, president Park tried to extract the maximum benefit, particularly from the economic sector in this fourth dispatch. Instructing the foreign minister Lee to negotiate in advance, he conveyed the 'pre-support, post-dispatch' stance on a firm fashion this time.

Side by side, president Park lagged on with the approval as a sign that Korea was not as urgent as the US. This seesawing was materialized into the Brown memorandum. In it, not only the security guarantee but bountiful economic assistance was stipulated, that eventually functioned as a fuel for the grand industrialization of Korea. Simply put, president Park's orchestrating of the domestic participants and his shrewd diplomacy increased the US' win set, distilling the maximum outcome without infuriating the counterparty.

Meanwhile, the domestic elements both in the System I and System II have been successfully quelled again this time. To be sure, the dissenting voice of the opposition party was rampant in the National Assembly. Yet, such diverse influences were silenced by the government, promising economic prosperity that the Brown memorandum would enable. Furthermore, the prime minister guaranteed that there will be no additional troop dispatch, except for the replacement for the previously sent. These two pledges somewhat alleviated the System II's disgruntling arguments and mold it to comply the president's decision.

1.4 Conclusion

Overall, the troop dispatch decision mechanism of the Korean government was successful and effective, considering the stiff structural limitation. With the passage of time, Korea's negotiating strategy has been improved, increasing the positive payoff from the US. Under the blood alliance, Republic of Korea was facing a hostile North Korean regime, coupled with the communist China situated close by. This structural vulnerability led the Koreans to be fully compliant vis-à-vis the US request.

In this regard, the asymmetric power distribution between the two counterparty had severely restricted the negotiation from the starting point. Unlike what Putnam argued through his original two-level game theory, window of option regarding the level I would be virtually limited (if not wholly fixed), irrespective of the level II negotiation outcome. The mounting security need and the dependable alternatives as an impracticable option.

However, president Park tried to garner the maximum outcome through this seemingly inevitable process. Understanding that the Korean government had scant alternatives other than sending troops, he proactively suggested the US for ROK combat forces dispatch to the region. Even though the US maintained its policy as receiving only non-combatants, this exorbitant steps initially maximized the Korean win set, decreasing the incentive of the US to widen theirs’.

Eventually, 1st and 2nd non-combatant dispatch was proceed smoothly with minimum resistance from Korea’s domestic realm (especially from the National Assembly). This gave the impression to the US that Korea’s participation would be requested at a low cost, with certain predictability. The US though president Park’s dual mandate of deterrence to the DPRK and the economic development would leave no other alternative to the ROK, but to be in full concurrence with the US.

This seemingly unavoidable circumstance tend to change, however. The Gulf of Tonkin incident and the failure of the US’ aggressive Vietnam policy enforced to modify the previous US stance. Under the growing domestic anti-war sentiment and the increasing need for combat personnel in the region, the US requested for combatants. At first glance, the US thought this would be an

automatic, given result. This was verified by the US' further planning of reinforcement even before conveying the official request to the Korean government.

Yet, president Park procrastinated the response that have tantalized the US. During the 3rd and 4th dispatch, president Park and its foreign ministry played a shrewd diplomacy game vis-à-vis the US negotiations claiming that the dispatch of combatants would seriously deteriorate the defense stature of Korea. In response, the US promised multiple package of economic assistance as well as secretary guarantee that would meet the demand of president Park's dual mandate. The result was the Brown memorandum and its follow-ups.

This profit maximization strategy was extended during the fourth dispatch, Korean government not only received the promise of a direct US economic help, but a ROK-US-South Vietnam economic aid pact and investment opportunity. Since US alluded the possibility of relocating the USFK if Korea persist not to send its own troops, Korean government sent the requested forces almost identically to the US' original version, relatively swiftly, leaving small room of igniting infuriation from the US' side. Yet president Park extracted the huge economic aid and military support that eventually helped the on-going industrialization, coined as the five-year economic plan.

Such result was possible, due to president Park's authoritative control over the domestic elements. At then, the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of national defense were a mere instrument, implementing the president's will, further confirmed by the NSC. Considering that many of the former military personnel were placed into such bureaucracy, a top-down, military-like decision making/implementing structure virtually turned the System I as a

unitary actor.

This also applied to the System II, even though the constitution stipulated the legislative body the privilege of enacting (or vetoing) administrative plan. Those functions were near-dead during the 1960s. Irrespective of the opposition party member's absence, ruling party passed the dispatch plan without further delay. Due to the infancy of democracy itself, the virtually absent civil sector lacked the power to emanate and link the dissenting voice in the National Assembly, devoid of the civil societies' linking power made the System II to be at the same track with System I. Simply put, asymmetric influence between the System I and System II virtually turned the System II to be overwhelmed by the System I's existence.

As a result, throughout the four dispatch cases during the Vietnam war, president had firm grips, both on the System I & II participants, freely deciding the win set of Korea. Limited domestic disagreements enabled the Korean win set to maximize its range throughout the whole dispatch events. This initially resulted in a US-tilted troop dispatch with relatively minimum payoff, especially in the 1st and 2nd dispatch. However, president Park exploited the urgent nature of the US during 3rd and 4th dispatch, extracting the maximum outcome. This counters the many previous studies that Korea's negotiation strategy was unsuccessful, failed to grasp the domestic dissent, especially from the National Assembly.

Unlike the first two cases, the result of the latter two dispatches were successful, considering the heavy restraint the structure was enforcing upon. If domestic dissent can't be managed in a sound fashion, the negative impact would certainly eclipse the initial benefit of narrowing the win set. A diverse

voice and a prolonged decision making would harm the credibility of a nation, embracing a more difficult and vicious cycle of negotiations. In that regard, the Vietnam troop dispatch decision making mechanism functioned mediocre in the two initial dispatch and extremely well, during the latter two dispatches.

2. East Timor

2.1 Background

Ever since the Portugal's incorporation of Timor Island of 1701, the province was within the effective control of the patron country. Meanwhile, the West Timor has been allocated to the Netherland, starting from the point of a Netherland-Portugal's divide pact of 1913, culminating in the returning of the sovereignty to the Indonesian government in 1949. Portugal's direct rule of the East Timor loosed its traits, due to the independence movement of Africa, coupled with the Portugal's political internecine and its ailing economy. As a result, Portugal declared the termination of its control and announced East Timor's independence on October 1975.

As the critical date approached, three main political pivots emerged amidst the power vacuum entailed by the Portugal's withdrawal: 1) The pro-Portugal UDT (The United Democratic Party of Timor) that expects a gradual independence from Portugal and support a close economic, military with the former patron 2) The leftist party FRETILIN (Frete Revolucionario do Timor-Leste Independente) that urges for a swift and complete independence from the Portugeses 3) The APODETI (Associacao Popular democratia de Timor) that aims for a merger to the Indonesian government.

After the election of January 1975, the three parties clashed militarily, ensuing numerous casualties and offered unstableness throughout the region. Irrespective of the Indonesian government's military support, the FRETILIN captured the capital Dili and declared People's Democratic Republic on November 28 1975, marginalizing the other two powers, near the Indonesian border. This provoked the Indonesian government to embark on a counter offense in order to topple the FRETILIN regime. As a result, UDT and APODETI initiated its guerilla activity with the support of the Indonesian regular army. This led to a massive attack of the combined faction, culminating in the Indonesian government's declaration to designate East Timor as the 27th state of Indonesia. During the process the Indonesian army's brutal 'search and destroy' tactic towards the remnant FRETILIN cliques mounted not only the targeted objects but also the East Timorian civilians at large. From then on, the deterioration human rights condition aroused the concerns from the international society.

However, several reasons kept the issue being significant: 1) The president Suhartos' on-going campaign fighting against the proliferating communism justified such 'collateral damage' the FRETILIN's pro-communism traits increased concerns of US, based upon the notion of the domino theory which stemming the tide seem an axiomatic selective 2) The bountiful resources of the East Timor (especially crude oil) triggered other governments to urge the Indonesian government to develop a secure and reliable supply chain 3) The growing need to maintain stability in the region and share the Indonesian's economic boom. The roughly 13 thousand isles left the region extremely vulnerable from the outside interference, leaving an ample room for chaotic

situation. President Suharto promised to flow the prosperous⁹¹ Indonesian economy to East Timor, in exchange of its incorporation.

For twenty years onward, the physical clashes between the Indonesian government in East Timor and the remainder of FRETILIN guerilla occurred in fits and starts, the precarious status quo somewhat tend to maintain its structure in the region. But the independence movement ceaselessly occurred which triggered a strong suppression from the Indonesian government, rousing constant international concern. The Suharto's resigning his presidency on May 21 1998 and the gradual withdrawal of Indonesian forces from East Timor tipped the scale. Under the UN security council's resolution, a referendum (regarding the independence of East Timor) was to be held on August 30 1999. With the majority's support (78.5%), the UN Secretary General Koffi Annan submitted his support for the result three days later.

However, the pro-Indonesian local militias threatened to upset the entire fabric, arguing that the independence was an inconceivable outcome. This aroused an international concern that massive bloodletting may soon follow. Considering the past track record, such prognosis was an extremely likely outcome. Eventually the 4045th UN Security Council on September 15 1999, approved the resolution creating a Multinational Force – INTEFET (International Force for East Timor). The resolution indicated a shift from the MNF to PKO soon as possible and pinpointed the operations as maintaining peace and security in East Timor, supporting humanitarian assistance process.

⁹¹ Indonesian government maintained a fair economic growth well until the 1990. This can be depicted as a faire performance, compared to the average Asian countries in the East Asian region. This outcome was due to the boon of high oil price and the economic and technical support from the Western countries.

Korea's troop dispatch decision was made under such context.

2.2 Elements in decision making

2.2.1 External Factor

Unlike the troop dispatch cases in Vietnam and Iraq, the direct counterparty during the East Timor dispatch was a multilateral institution – the UN. Due to its unique attribute that has significant difference with a sovereign nation, reviewing the external factor in this specific occasion needs to focus on the merits and demerits that Korea might receive from the international society regarding the troop participation. That job basically is a complex and perhaps ambiguous, since a clear compensation-penalty structure that comes from an asymmetric military alliance can't be grasped when the counterparty becomes the UN. In that context, understanding the changing global environment and Korea's status would be a relevant approach in grasping the external factor.

Ever since the Soviet Union's implosion and the termination of the 'Yalta' system has become real, multiple problems – ethnic, religious, environmental etc – erupted all over the globe. One of the superpower's demise has indeed significantly reduced the intensity in the major political demarcation line that led to a lowering of the probability of a high-intensity warfare using nuclear warhead and massive conventional arms.

At first glance, this thawing sparked some spectator's relief that the once longed peace has eventually prevailed⁹². Truly, the major flash points during

⁹² Francis Fukuyama asserted a radical shift from a bipolar system of the cold war to a unipolar system that sets 'democracy' as the ultimate victor. He refers this as the 'End of

the cold war (for instance West Berlin) experienced a de-escalation of tensions that used to simmer in. Moreover, the 1991's Gulf war displayed an united action (approved both by Russia and china) Saddam' aggression had functioned as a lucid case that verified the optimist's prognosis. However, the US led uni-centric system did not obviate the seed of strife.

Once the US tone downed its nerves and ended the deadly competition with Russia, the cold war struggle in the strategically unimportant places (Africa and the Balkans for example) lost its traits and the moorings that constrained the traditional conflict came to the fore. As a corollary, countless violent incidents occurred. Somalia (1993) and Bosnia (1994) are the most notable cases. Irrespective of such growing unstableness, the absence of a major foil touted the US to be the strongest nation that faced no serious challenger or a near-peer adversary⁹³.

The growing turmoil in the era of Pax Americana created a severe security supply-demand gap, that was prompted by the US' unwillingness to intervene in global matters as it used to be in the cold war era⁹⁴. This emerged the UN authorized peacekeeping operation that were somewhat under functioning, due to the cold war era that divide the side in the Security Council.

History' : Kyunghyang Shinmum (1992.2.10)

⁹³ Dong A Ilbo (1996.7.25)

⁹⁴ 18 US casualties during the Somalian civil war led the US stance more reluctant in forces deployment : HanKyoreh (1993.10.25)




Figure 18. Trend : cost and the number of PKO cases '91~'98⁹⁵

Indeed, as the figure 18 displays, the financial cost and the number of PKO cases markedly increased after the 1991. East Timor case was one of the mounting security need, deriving from such structural changes.

Alongside with the conversion to a post-cold war era, 'globalization' became a trend especially throughout the 1990s, due to the technological advancement and the convenient transportation that linked the world more closer than ever. Even though the attempt of deepened interdependence existed throughout history, globalization of the 1990s typified as the novel approach of its unprecedented level. As Anthony Giddens has propagated, the interdependence between geographically divided or remote regions have reached to a fever pitch, and the globalization has virtually extended such attribute to the all corners of the globe⁹⁶. This tendency was also caught by

⁹⁵ Data modified from the United Nations (<http://www.un.org/en/>)

⁹⁶ Min Hyeon, Kim "Globalization and how Korea has overcome Economic Crisis since IMF period" 『Dong-A University』 pp. 7-8

Korea. President Kim Young Sam overtly mentioned the catchphrase of globalization after the Sydney APEC meeting on November 1994. This has been officially adopted as one of the key agendas of the Korean government that materialized by the creation of government reorganization act, emphasizing a 'small and efficient' government⁹⁷.

Starting from achieving UN membership in 1991, Korea proactively participated in the international society by being an official member in important multilateral organizations. The National Assembly ratified Korea's entrance in the WTO⁹⁸ and enjoyed the invitation from the OECD in 1995. These arrays of event not only enhanced Korea's status that reflected its growing economic clout, but the overall closeness to the global economic stature has been entered into a new area.

The dark side of globalization - rapidly influencing one another almost instantaneously, topples down vulnerable nations in a time of crisis - has materialized by the IMF crisis of 1997.

⁹⁷ Dong A Ilbo (1994.12.29)

⁹⁸ Dong A Ilbo (1994.12.17)




Figure 19. Trend of Korea's unemployment and the GDP⁹⁹

The figure 19 is the trend of Korea's GDP and the number of unemployed from the first quarter of '97 to the fourth quarter of '99 (when the East Timor troop dispatch was made). The period between December 1997 ~ January 1998 marked the watershed. From that point onwards, the number of unemployed increased threefold and the GDP growth rate entered into a minus area. Even though the economy somewhat recovered in 1999, it failed to reach to the pre-crisis level (the growth of export was enabled by the extremely devalued Korean Won against the US Dollar). The IMF event indicated Korea's interconnectedness with the global economy that contained both pros (the IMF's bailout virtually resuscitate the Korea economy), and cons (the global hedge funds and the money market fund's extracting of its investment from Korea worsened the economic crisis).

In sum, East Timor troop dispatch decision should be understood in the aforementioned context. The growing clout and its enhancing reputation as a

⁹⁹ Source : KOSIS (Korean Statistical Information Service) and ECOS (Economic Statistic System)

problem solver¹⁰⁰ in the post-cold war era provided a meaningful role for the nations to shape peace, not passively monitor the given situation. As a beneficiary of the UN force during the Korean War, president Kim Dae Jung noticed the arising moral responsibility to participate. Furthermore, the ongoing globalization and the painful IMF crisis pressured the Korean government to proactively engage in multilateral regime (rather than insulating from the surrounding) in order to prepare for the rainy days. Indeed, the UN lacked power to impose material and non-material penalty to the sovereign country that declined the UN's request.

However, when the interconnectedness was at its peak, the throes of the IMF still remaining, and UN PKO's conflict management range broadening, the Korean government faced reasonable amount of pressure. Furthermore, the legitimacy it hoards has significantly different meaning compared to the initiatives of the 'coalition of the willing', mostly forged under the traditional military alliance structure. Unlike in the Vietnam and Iraq dispatch case, troop participation regarding East Timor, the Korean government had to deal less with garnering legitimacy and setting a justifiable cause for participation.

All in all, the external factor in terms of the counterparty was not critical as the overwhelmingly powerful US that were linked by the security alliance, but not negligible.

2.2.2 Individual Factor

From the formative years and especially after entering politics, president

¹⁰⁰ Unlike the limited PKO functions during the cold war period that mostly operated as border patrol and armistice monitoring, the empowered UN expanded the PKO's mission in unconventional areas : most notably national building and semi peace enforcing.

Kim Dae Jung propagated the democratization of Korea, frequently clashed with the tenets of the third and fourth republic's decision making apparatus. Such stance paid a heavy toll including torture, imprisonment and political abolishment. Yet such steadfast exertion developed his image as a staunch supporter towards human rights improvement and seasoned democracy in the civil society area. Having such personal attributes, the East Timor incident was understood through his prism of experience. His overt support and the swift measures regarding troop dispatch reflects his concern on human rights violation.

At the 7th APEC summit on September 12 1999, Chinese premier Jiang Zemin suggested a peaceful settlement that fully considers the result of the East Timor referendum, somewhat in a moderate tone. However, president Kim asked for the Asian-Pacific society to provide a support and emphasized the Indonesian government's responsibility to resolve the crisis in a peaceful manner¹⁰¹. He further suggested the US and Japan delegates to convoke a separate meeting and solely deal with the restoration of peace in East Timor, and steering the Indonesian government to be more compliant to the East Timor referendum result¹⁰². On the next day, in the separate meeting, president Kim strongly argued that the criticism and doubts would mount against APEC if the institution maintain silence upon the inhumane activities happening in the East Timorian soil¹⁰³.

¹⁰¹ Dong A Ilbo (1999.9.12)

¹⁰² Hankyoreh (1999.9.13)

¹⁰³ Dong A Ilbo (1999.9.13)

The Korean government made an unofficial notification to the general secretary of the UN regarding troop dispatch with the caveat of coordination between political parties and the cabinet aide, with the approval of the National Assembly. Meanwhile, the Indonesian president Habibbi expressed his willingness to accept international PKO, by dispatching the Indonesian foreign minister to the UN, pledging to confirm to the East Timor referendum¹⁰⁴.

After the suggestion of president Kim's strong measures against the East Timorian human rights violation and the peaceful settlement of the matter on September 13 1999, both the ministry of foreign affairs and the minister of national defense announced its plan to undergo a thorough and practical review upon the dispatch plan. On the same day, an emergency NSC permanent committee was held under the participants including minister for national defense Cho Sung Taek, minister for foreign affairs Hong Soon Young and Hwang Won Tak from the blue house reviewing the current situation in East Timor and the UN's stance upon the matter. As a result, the committee decided to make a proactive response in case of UN requests for troop dispatch¹⁰⁵.

Such flow gained momentum once the UN Security Council unanimously passed the resolution on September 15 regarding the approval of the dispatch of MNF and its use of force for the sake of restoring peace and stability in East Timor. Just moments after, the UN secretary general, alongside with the

¹⁰⁴ Dong A Ilbo (1999.9.13)

¹⁰⁵ Dong A Ilbo (1999.9.14)

foreign minister of Australia have conveyed the official request for troop dispatch to minister of foreign affairs Hong Soon Young. In response, the Korean government convened the regular committee of the 71st national security meeting on September 16 and decided to dispatch approximately 400 personnel, comprised by infantry, medic and communication staff¹⁰⁶.

Once East Timor troop dispatch issue came to fore, pros and con discussion have become vivid within the Korean society at large. In particular, the negative sentiment backed by several reasons¹⁰⁷ that turned this topic into a contentious political point.

Under such situation, president Kim strived his effort to assuage such concerns that were arising from some quarters. He invited the former presidents to the blue house and explained that the central purpose of the troop dispatch to East Timor was to maintain peace, coupled with the acceptance from the Indonesian president Habib¹⁰⁸.

In a similar vein, on September 16, president Kim sent a message to the

¹⁰⁶ Maeil Business Newspaper (1999.9.17)

¹⁰⁷ That the decision has been 1) unilaterally made by the president without heeding the public opinion 2) possible deterioration on the relation vis-à-vis the Indonesian government would eventually worsen the security condition of the Korean in overseas.

¹⁰⁸ Such justification was materialized by the blue house comment of the September 22. It can be summarized into the following three reasons : 1) Since Korea was protected by the sacrifice of soldiers dispatched by numerous countries during the Korean war, thus the Korean government has the moral obligation to help the needy with the prerequisite of the UN approval 2) The Indonesian government displayed the official request from the Asian countries' participation 3) Sending foot soldiers, rather than mechanics and medics will ultimately be more safer against an unexpected accident and assault by the militia, since combat forces are more suitable for such risky mission : Kyunghyang Shinmun (1999.9.21)

chairman of the National Assembly Park Joon Kyu that “troop dispatch decision has been authorized by the UN on behalf of the Indonesian government and president Habib has also welcomed Korea’s participation. To fulfill the international obligation and responsibility as a democratic country I expect that a bipartisan effort to agree upon the dispatch plan would be made”. On the next day, upon inviting United Liberal Democrats members to the blue house, the president advised to cooperate as a responsible ruling party¹⁰⁹.

These strings of events clearly reflect the president’s strong will towards the matter. Once a decision is made, he concentrated on alleviating the dissenting opinion, in and out of the government.

Looking back the overall process of the dispatch decision making, it is notable to point out the fact that the government’s decision to send troops has been preceded two days from the official request of UN on September 15. Furthermore, considering the president’s suggestion to create a separate meeting for this particular subject during the APEC summit on September 13, it is quite obvious that the decisions sending troop dispatch were virtually decided by the president in a fast track manner.

Several reasons may explain the president’s swift and decisive dispatch decisions : First, president Kim Dae Jung’s prime objective of focusing the East Timorian human rights issue in the international community was to achieve the diplomatic aim of enhancing the general value of the human race and contributing to global problem solving that was declared as the 1999’s major foreign policy outline. Second, to reinforce the president’s credentials

¹⁰⁹ Kyunghyang Chinmum (1999.9.29)

as a guarantor of human rights and to promote and build the national image of Korea as a pro-human right could be another reason. Third, perhaps a calculated strategy to gain the Nobel peace prize might have been the motive for such a move¹¹⁰.

The truth would be the combination of all those three elements, albeit in a different portion. Anyway, the president strongly influenced the troop dispatch decision. Irrespective of the decision making environment as a more democratized Korea, he effectively exploited his own credentials as a human rights activist, to appeal domestic constituency as well as APEC member states.

Meanwhile, during the troop dispatch decision making process, the National Security Council functioned as a subsidiary role, affirming the outlined plan, on behalf of the president. When receiving the unofficial request from the UN, and when the president emphasized the human rights conditions in East Timor at APEC, the NSC tilted strongly for dispatch, revealing several grounds¹¹¹ for support. As it was in the Vietnam dispatch, the NSC functioned as a loyal conveyor of the president's decision. This

¹¹⁰ During the voting of the dispatch plan in the National Assembly on September 28, opposition party member Huh Dae Bom criticized that it would be a historic speck to send troops in order to acquire the Nobel prize : Hankyoreh (1999.9.29)

¹¹¹ First, foot soldiers best serves the mission's objective that most suits for risky situation. Second, the most important mission of restoring peace and security that the UN security council has delegated to the MNF can best be guaranteed by ground forces. And third, compared to foot soldiers, the defense capability of medics and mechanics is fairly weaker that eventually increases the vulnerable nature vis-à-vis the indigenous militia's attack. Fourth, since medics and mechanics have the high tendency to accompany expensive devices in order to fully operate in the region which increases the budget pressure. Lastly, considering the logistics of military supply, pre-education and other elements of preparation, combatants are the most adaptive to new environment.

tendency changed during the Iraq war case.

The other domestic factor – the ministry of foreign affairs – maintained its cautious stance at the initial phase due to the concern on the possible violence towards the Korea's overseas. The MOFA closely monitored the international flow upon East Timor.

On early September 1999, UN has developed a layout plan, forming a two-brigade size multinational forces that was to be transformed into a PKO, once situation in the ground attain certain level of peace and stability that would be deployed during mid-September. On September 7, UN conveyed an unofficial request for the participation of the MNF forces to multiple countries including Korea. Yet at that time, the Indonesian government was brandishing its sovereignty over East Timorian province, and clung to a stance MNF would dispatch would not be accepted unless the Indonesian congress officially approve the East Timorian referendum result on late October or early November.

Thus, when countries including Australia, New Zealand, UK and France have officially displayed their willingness to dispatch armed forces, Korea was in a delicate situation in accepting the UN request (against the Indonesia's objection) since Korea maintained relatively close relationship with the Indonesian government in terms of economic ties and as a major export route of defense equipment. Apart from such burden, sending troops within two week was a technically an uneasy task, especially considering the National Assembly approval process that is stipulated by the constitution.

Therefore, the ministry of foreign affairs maintained its cautious vigilance to the matter and not hastefully responded to the UN request. However, on

September 12, the Indonesia's president Habibie succumbed to the growing international pressure and officially asked to UN secretary general for multinational peace keeping troop dispatch to East Timor¹¹². Such turn of events virtually removed Korea's obstacle in dispatching troops. Once dispatch decisions were made through the NSC committee, the ministry of foreign affairs welcomed the Indonesian's decision to request for a UN PKO force on behalf of the swift restoration of peace and security in the East Timor.

From then onwards, when troop dispatch decision became a fixated stance of the government, MOFA tried its best effort in alleviating the somewhat proliferating anti-dispatch movement. Minister of foreign affairs Hong Soon Young advised the Indonesian ambassador Jauhari Nataatmaja to clarify the security conditions of the overseas Koreans in Indonesia. In response, the ambassador mentioned that "the Indonesian government accepts and welcomes the UN Security council's resolution to send multinational forces in order to restore peace and security of East Timor...since our (Indonesian) government officially requested for the dispatch, an atmosphere of antagonism deriving from the notion of internal affairs interference would not emerge". The ambassador assuaged the risk concern by mentioning that "the Indonesian troops are gradually withdrawing from the disputed region and the remaining pro-Indonesian militias will not be a match for the international

¹¹² Indonesian government was facing the external pressure, especially from the UN resolution and inevitably had to accept the troop dispatch. Under such circumstances, the Indonesian welcomed the Asian countries' dispatch decision in order to check Australian influence in the region and expecting these participants to maintain neutrality in the mission regarding the local militias.

PKO¹¹³.

Such effort was also directed to the National Assembly. Foreign minister Hong Soon Young phoned the opposition party members one-by-one, asking for the approval of the dispatch plan that was about to be submitted to the National Assembly¹¹⁴.

In sum, the ministry of foreign affairs has mainly functioned as supporting the president's stance and utilizing the resources at its disposal to dissuade the negative public sentiment that might transform into a major obstacle.

Meanwhile, the ministry of national defense has gone through an internal review ranging from the expected amount of financial burdens to the overall preparedness of the combat troops, once receiving the unofficial troop dispatch request from the UN on September 7 1999. The ministry of national defense submitted its own assessment plan both to the blue house and the ministry of foreign affairs on September 9.

Once Indonesian president Habibbi announced to receive the UN PKO, the blue house converged a 'positive review' order to the government branches, including the MND. When the government's dispatch decision have been made within the permanent committee of the NSC on September 13th, more specific orders has been reached to the military. On the next day, selection of dispatch troops, personnel and equipment has begun. The field inspectors were been dispatched on September 17 and the actual pre-dispatch education

¹¹³ Hankyoreh (1999.9.22)

¹¹⁴ Dong A Ilbo (1999.9.27)

process has been initiated.

In the meanwhile, after the September 21 cabinet council meeting, the foreign ministry submitted the dispatch plan to the National Assembly amidst a fierce attack from the opposition party. The specific details of the Korean troop dispatch plan reported to the regular session of the National Assembly by Foreign minister Hong Soon Young and asked for an approval¹¹⁵.

As it can be seen, alongside with the NSC, the two key governmental branches – ministry of national defense and foreign affairs has merely functioned as a conveyor and on implementer with regards to the decisions that were made by the president. In particular, the foreign ministry focused on watering down the negative public sentiment using foreign ambassadors. The defense ministry completed its preparation in two weeks, from the point it received the dispatch instruction from the top.

Therefore, the bureaucratic body played a somewhat confined role as implementing the blue houses' stance without having a sufficient time for internal discussion and thorough review. The two governmental branches, initially had concerns upon troop dispatch, due to the safety issues of the overseas Korea's and the economic and military linkage with the Indonesia, they quickly conformed to the president's stance, once a direction was set in

¹¹⁵ Minister Hong pinpointed five critical elements of the plan. First, one battalion size, approximately 400 Korean troops shall be dispatched as an multinational forces under the UN Security Council resolution 1264. Second, the time length of the Korean forces would be initially set as a year, and even after the status of the force changes into a PKO in November 30 1999, dispatch will continue. Third, under the UN Security Council resolution, the mission of the Korean forces is to restore peace and security and support the multinational forces in East Timor, assisting humanitarian relief activities. Fourth, the troops should be sent at the earliest possible date after the approval from the National Assembly. Fifth, government fully charges the cost pertaining to the troop dispatch.

the NSC.

2.2.3 Domestic factor

The newly inaugurated Kim Dae Jung had relatively a weak political basis¹¹⁶, the ruling party – The National Congress for New Politics (NCNP)¹¹⁷ - occupying only 79 seats in the National Assembly, making a strong statecraft difficult. In order to break through the seemingly constrained situation, the NCNP formed an alliance with the United Liberal Democrats party and pinpointed Kim Jong Pil as a prime minister¹¹⁸. Such ceaseless reshaping and reorganizing of the political landscape led to a fierce internecine between the ruling and opposition party. The two parties sought for a solution out of might, rather than a reasonable one. These atmospheres continue to linger throughout, when the East Timor PKO dispatch issue was adopted as an agenda in the National Assembly.

Regarding the East Timorian troop dispatch plan, the ruling party (combination of the NCNP and the ULD) and the opposition party (Grand National Party) has been on the parallel within the National Assembly, each voicing for dispatching combat and non-combat troops, respectively.

¹¹⁶ After the defeat in the 14th presidential elections of 1992, candidate Kim Dae Jung declared to withdraw from politics and seem to distance from the political arena. However, the split of the presidential candidate in between the consecutive party, coupled with the emerging influence of the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) poised Kim Dae Jung as a victor of the 15th presidential election of December 1997, vis-à-vis Lee Hoi Chang, the opponent leader. Since the conservative party remain unscathed in the National Assembly, constituting a large portion, Kim Dae Jung administration had a strong opposition as a basis.

¹¹⁷ Maeil Business Newspaper (1995.8.21)

¹¹⁸ Kyunghyang Shinmun (1998.2.24)

Once the president announced his decision to send troops and asked for a thorough review to the governmental branches, the NCNP convened its internal meeting and began a staunch president-supportive activities against the opposition parties. NCNP member Cho Soon Seung emphasized the embedded uncertainty in the East Timor and mentioned that only infantry can self-defense themselves and maintain peace in the region¹¹⁹. Fellow member Yang Sung Chul also professed the inevitable nature of sending combat troops in the region. He pointed out that Korea's troops in the East Timor is not sent for the purpose of combat but security maintenance under the UN multinational forces. And such dispatch is the successful result of president Habibi's acceptance of the president Kim's suggestion in the APEC summit. Another member from the NCNP Kim Sang Woo questioned the opposition party's conditional approach by saying "it is a mere trick of words to disapprove combat troop and accept non-combatants, the such specifics should be decided squarely by the army¹²⁰.

Meanwhile, the opposition party poised its stance that sending combatants in the region as fairly an unreasonable choice considering multiple aspects – diplomatic, military and political.

Upon visiting the US Secretary of State on September 14 1999, head of the GNP Lee Hoi Chang revealed his negative view regarding the dispatch, mentioning that lacking the relevant information, the GNP would be unable to

¹¹⁹ Hankyoreh (1999.9.18)

¹²⁰ Hankyoreh (1999.9.29)

decide whether to concur with the dispatch¹²¹. On the same day, during its internal meeting, the opposition party generally agreed to the dispatch itself, considering Korea's international status but asked for a cautious approach towards combatants.

Such reserves tend to be mitigated after the Indonesian government's acceptance of the MNF and the passing of the UN Security Council resolution 1967 on September 15. However, once the overseas Koreans asked to reconsider the troop dispatch due to its consequences that will provoke anti-Korean sentiment in the region¹²², the opposition party raised its voice against sending combatants¹²³.

At the Unification and foreign affairs and trade committee of September 27 1999, the sour attribute of the opposition party was well disclosed. There were more intense arguments between the ruling and the opposition party members. Amidst the presence of minister of foreign affairs Hong Soon Young and the minister of national defense Cho Sung Tae, the opposition party issued a revised plan that contains only 'non-combatants', comprised by

¹²¹ Dong A Ilbo (1999.9.15)

¹²² Dong A Ilbo (1999.9.27)

¹²³ The opposition's logic can be summarized in five categories: 1) As president Habibullah has quipped, sacrificing the relationship with the 0.2 billion Indonesian people for 0.8 million East Timorians is realistically an unaffordable choice 2) It is rather unfair to participate in the faraway issue of East Timor when the human rights condition in the North Korea province is reaching a fever pitch 3) The dispatch would weaken the security status of the overseas Koreans 4) Who will be responsible if first casualties occur and it is clear enough that the endeavor would not turn into a second Vietnam quagmire 5) When US and Japan has not devoted their troops, why should Korea undertake such task first handedly: Dong A Ilbo (1999.9.13)

medics, communication and mechanics. The ruling party, in response, refused the variation of their original plan and asserted the inevitability of sending combatants in sake of the human rights of the East Timor people and Korea's status within the UN¹²⁴.

Due to such delicate situation, a certain consensus wasn't made, failed to reach a conclusion. Eventually, through the Chairman of the National Assembly's authority, the affairs were submitted to the regular session of the National Assembly. On September 28, a voting was made with the absence of the opposition party. As a result, the plan was passed by 158 for, 1 against and 1 abstention¹²⁵.

The 30 year time gap between the Vietnam war and the East Timor incident has imbued a stronger attribute of democracy in Korea which enhanced the influence of the domestic factor. It's relative growth compared to the internal factor was revealed through the National Assembly. It emanated a dissenting voices, in a liberal fashion incomparably greater than the third and fourth republic. Yet, president and the ruling party successively constrained the argument of the opposition and made a swift dispatch (East Timorian dispatch took merely twenty days in total – from the UN's official request to dispatch) possible.

After the inauguration of president Kim Dae Jung, the public opinion was starkly divided between geographical regions and in between conservatives

¹²⁴ Chosun Ilbo (1999.9.28)

¹²⁵ Juxtaposing the 1980's Gwang-Ju situation with East Timor, GNP member Lee Mi Kyung voted for the dispatch : Kyunghyang Shinmun (1999.9.24)

and progressives. This is the accrued result of the presidential election of 1997 and the political landscape of a strong opposition party and a weak ruling party as aforementioned. In the same token, the overall assessment upon the government's performance largely differed from regions, regardless of the high approval (82%) to the president's performance¹²⁶.




Figure 20. Approval rate of the president Kim's economic policy¹²⁷

As it can be seen in the figure 20, asking whether the president Kim's economic policy was appropriate, Gwangju province gave high marks (87.5%) compared to the Daegu (57.3%). This 30% point gap indicates the regional and political divide that was strongly embedded at the time. Such factionalism was basically inherited in the public opinion.

During the APEC summit meeting in Auckland, president Kim declared its deep interest on the peaceful solution for the East Timorian affairs. Shortly thereafter the passing of the UN security resolution, the Korean government's

¹²⁶ Hankyoreh (1998.12.5)

¹²⁷ Dong A Ilbo (1998.11.2)

review upon the combat troop dispatch begun in earnest, entailing the contentious argument in the domestic area.

Questionnaire	Response	%
Stance upon the East Timor troop dispatch	Should support the Peace keeping operation	66.9
	Should be cautious, due to the possible casualties and diplomatic friction	27.7
	Not sure	5.4
Concerns upon the Human rights condition In East Timor	Not interested	50.6
	Monitoring with concern	43.4
	Not sure	6.0

Table 8. Poll result regarding the East Timor troop dispatch¹²⁸

However, the bloodletting between the independence group and the militia in East Timor led the public opinion for a rapid dispatch of the UN peace keeping force. As it can be seen in the table 8, 66.9% of the respondents has agreed on the dispatch, that was more than a twofold of than the other side of the pendulum. Even though half (50.5%) of the respondents expressed their indifference upon the issue, the public opinion was quite favorable on troop dispatch. To be sure, there were disputes in the public opinion. Yet the direction was tilting towards to the dispatch.

One of the notable aspects of the civil area during East Timor dispatch is the NGO’s surging influence towards every part of the society. From the early

¹²⁸ Dong A Ilbo (1999.9.21)

phase of the Kim Dae Jung presidency, many NGOs advocated the president's stance. One of the notable example would be the civil activist group's supporting the president, raising their voice for a media reform when the media was on an uneasy path with the president¹²⁹.

When president Kim elucidated his willingness to send troops to East Timor during the APEC summit meeting on September 13 1999, the 38 civic activist groups (including Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice and Friends of the Earth) formed a citizens coalition claiming for the independence of East Timor and declared a broad-based movement for the cause¹³⁰. It is almost unprecedented for the civic activist group to voluntarily found an alliance and act accordingly.

Furthermore, it must have been impossible for this conduct to happen at the same day when the president announced his opinion in a foreign country, unless there was a pre-arranged, implicit communication between the two parties. This tendency shows a stark contrast compared to the Iraqi dispatch issue that will be further discussed in the next chapter. Compared with the East Timorian dispatch, civic groups furred violent recriminations to the government's decision on dispatching troop to Iraq, arguing "that the irresponsible dispatch decisions that threaten the national security should be rescinded and the already deployed Seohee and Jaema forces should be

¹²⁹ People's Coalition for Media Reform was just about to be forged in order to protect the people's rights via thorough vigilance upon the media : Hankyoreh (1998.8.24)

¹³⁰ Kyunghyang Shinmun (1999.9.15)

withdrawn”¹³¹.

Overall, the combination of favorable public opinion that was forged by the civic activity group alongside with the proactive NGO’s existence, suppressed the anti-dispatch alliance of the media and the opposition party members in the National Assembly. Even though the president held the key in making decision, the civic activist group functioned as a critical component regarding the troop dispatch decision.

2.3 Negotiating process

2.3.1 Dispatch decision (1999/9/28)

After the referendum¹³² regarding East Timor’s independence has been took place on August 30 1999, the local militias having anti-independence stance initiated an armed attack toward the independence movement. This led to many dead, creating massive refugees, which heightened the political tension in the nearby countries. Such mounting violence and upset motivated the secretary general of the UN to issue an unofficial request to multiple countries (including Korea) to thorough review upon the possible dispatch as a MNF.

This naturally made the East Timor affairs as the key topics of discussion during the 7th APEC summit which held in September 12. Originally forged as

¹³¹ 30 progressive groups denounced the government’s plan on dispatching troops to Iraq defining the act as spilling youngster’s blood by embroiling in US’ war on terror : Munhwa Ilbo (2003.9.16)

¹³² As aforementioned, the referendum was passed with the support of the majority (78.5% approval)

a venue for assessing the previous year's economic performance and extracting the lessons from the IMF crisis that swept the East Asian countries, the APEC this time were utilized as a stage for expressing concerns for human rights violations in the East Timor. Through this occasion, president Kim Dae Jung emphasized the responsibility of the Indonesian government to peacefully resolve the matter, fully considering the justifiable voice of the East Timorians. President Kim reiterated his willingness to deal with the issue two days later in Auckland, mentioning that "the international society should proactively engage in East Timor, in order to stem the tide of violence in the region¹³³". On the same day, Indonesian president Habibbi officially asked the UN for peace keeping operation force.

On the domestic front, the 70th NSC meeting of September 13 concluded that Korea would dispatch its troops as a PKO with the approval from the National Assembly, once the official request from the UN is submitted¹³⁴. After the unanimous vote for the resolution on multinational forces dispatch to East Timor in the UN security council has been made, the UN officially requested for Korea's troop participation on September 15. In addition, the Australian government conveyed the similar message on the next day.

In response, the Korean government convened the regular session of the

¹³³ Dong A Ilbo (1999.9.12)

¹³⁴ After the NSC meeting, speaker of the MOFA welcomed the Indonesia's decision to receive outside help in order to rapidly restore the peace and security of the East Timor. He further mentioned that Korea would participate within ROK's given capability and its purview. Moreover, 38 civic activist group forged a 'civic-alliance for East Timor Independence' and strongly insisted for troop dispatch. Furthermore, the ruling party – the National Congress party – convoked its internal meeting and submitted the government for a rapid troop dispatch to the disputed region.

71st NSC on September 16 confirmed the decision regarding troop dispatch of a 400 size. The field inspection team was dispatched next day and the government's finalized motion was submitted to the Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee of the National Assembly. With the headwind coming from the opposition party, the motion went thorough review within the committee. Finally, on September 28, the 'multinational forces dispatch plan' was passed with 158-for, 1-against and 1-absentee, with the boycott from most opposition party member. The decision making mechanism during the East Timor can be illustrated as the Figure 21.




Figure 21. Decision making during the East Timor dispatch

The post- cold war era of 1999s can be understood as the unraveling of the previous geography, religious and national settings since the two superpower's grips have been somewhat loosened, after the implosion of the

former Soviet Union. The relatively disinterested feature of the US to the ‘strategically lower valued’ countries and the soaring disputes in these regions created a supply-demand gap in terms of security. The 1993’s Somalia incident made the US even more passive than before, eventually forcing the UN to take the baton and be responsible for minding such gap. Under such context, the UN noticed the violent event that occurred in East Timor.

However, unlike the US request for troops during the Vietnam war, UN had greater international legality, imbued with more justifiable appeal, albeit with relatively weak material resources. In that regard, even though the situation in East Timor demanded for forces dispatch, UN could marshal the needed personnel from the member states. Thus, the UN’s win set was wide, leaving an ample room for negotiation and consultation with the specifics. Without a detailed plan, the UN has decided to gather a MNF until late September.

President Kim Dae Jung’s willingness for participation was pretty obvious from the start. The short period of time (within two-weeks from UN’s official request for support and the National Assembly’s vote on the NSC’s finalized decision) reflects the strong will of the president himself. Without utilizing the surrogates or other governmental branches, president Kim expressed his clear intentions through an external channel – APEC, summit at New Zealand – signaling a proactive feature of troop participation. His credentials as a staunch support of the human rights has been strongly pushed for the direction.

With regard to the other governmental branches in the System I, the participants acted in accordance with the president’s stance, without revealing a notable friction in between. Although the two ministries initially had its own

view – somewhat negative – upon the dispatch, they have complied to the NSC's final decision without strong resistance. The ministry of foreign affairs had its reserves on sending troops, claiming that diplomatic relations vis-à-vis the Indonesian government would deteriorate that might increase the vulnerability of the overseas Koreans. In fact, the Koreans in Indonesia conveyed their concerns upon the troop dispatch to governments and the National Assembly members, persisted to reconsider the risk increasing decision that might provoke president Habibii.

However, the UN resolution that enhanced the legitimacy, coupled with the Indonesian ambassador's assurances that Korean people's security will be in good hands lowered the anxiousness of MOFA, making more penchant to incorporate the president's view. The 71st NSC's decision marked the watershed, which made the MOFA follow suit. This tendency also occurred to the ministry of national defense. At the first phase, the MND was negative on sending combatant forces (arguing that the economic linkage between ROK and Indonesia that is sustained by military equipment export could be severely damaged), and instead suggested for a non-combatants. However, as it was in the MOFA, the MND turned loyal after the NSC decision. Thus in terms of the System I, the NSC and the other two ministries functioned its pure bureaucratic role, implementing the president's decision.

Meanwhile, the System II showed a different pattern. The opposition party members in the National Assembly strongly opposed sending combatants in the region, depicting it as a risk-proliferating action that might replicate the Vietnam quagmire. However, such impact was diluted due to the ruling parties' strong support to the president and the NGO's favorable stance upon sending troops.

In particular, the NGO's influence was significant when the NSC decided to send troops on the condition of an official UN request on September 13, 38 NGOs have openly addressed for the Korea's participant in the name of human rights. This event virtually deterred the dissenting voices from the participants in the System I and capped the influence of the opposition parties in the National Assembly. At the same time, president was at loggerheads with the media. The uneasiness between the two parties naturally led to the media's cautious view upon the troop dispatch issue. However, the NGO's concentrated voice for and investigation and major overhaul on 'corrupt' media kept the media to maintain low profile in the same period, lacking the teeth to express its opposition to the president's decision, point blank.

2.4 Conclusion

Troop dispatch during East Timor crisis was Korea's first participation of combatants, ever since the Vietnamese war era, almost 30 years later. Also, it possessed a symbolic meaning in terms of international relations after the Korea's membership in the UN of 1991. The US' rather passive engagement in the international arena put heavy onus to the UN's shoulder, in areas that involved in violence that required more personnel and firepower to stem the negative tide. East Timor's worsening human rights conditions were a testing ground for the UN's cause and prompted the institution to gather the multinational force until late September 1999 for a swift and effective counteraction. In that context, the US requested the Korean government for an urgent troop dispatch on September 15. The mere two-weeks until the deadline seemed somewhat exorbitant to the Korean government to comply such request, initially widening the UN's win set.

At that critical juncture, the two key ministries – MOFA and MND – that traditionally deals with the specifics regarding troop dispatch, expressed their concerns on the matter, fearing the diplomatic relations with Indonesia and the entailing vested interest including the safety of the overseas Korean and the economic profit that was deriving from ROK-Indonesian relations would severely damaged. However, the president’s adamant nature upon the human rights issue strongly shaped the government’s stance.

Meanwhile, the NGO’s staunch support to the president quelled other possible dissent within the System II participants. Irrespective of the growing tensions between the president and the media, multiple NGOs propped up the president’s initiative on tax inspection and the broad-banded overhaul of the media. Furthermore, the opposition party member’s disagreement was not effective, due to the ruling parties’ strong support to the government.

Overall, the president’s strong (if not dominating) grips in the System I and the NGO’s effective control of the System II created a favorable condition for the president to brandish his ideas, all the way to the implementation. The result is quite counterintuitive to the first hand intuition. Normally, the more the democratization process pursues, the more the society becomes complex, creating multiple voices that was non-existent (or dormant) before, inviting numerous participants in the decision making arena.

The strong civil society that is tantamount to a System II with greater influence vis-à-vis the System I, normally constraint the initiatives coming from the System I as it was during the Nixon’s policy during the Vietnamese

war era¹³⁵. Instead in the East Timor case, the NGOs revealed its staunch support to the president's affirmative stance upon troop dispatch. The common link between the two participants – the president and the NGO – can be explained as the favorable view to the human rights itself. Placing the human rights matter as a critical component of national interest, a bizarre *modus vivendi* have been created between the two participants¹³⁶. The near alliance between the two quieted other dissenting voices from both System I and System II which turned the Korean domestic arena as a unitary actor.

This rare occasion enabled the president to decide and implement his plans. Apart from the genuine and ulterior motives of his strong insistence upon the issue (whether to 1) Acquire the Nobel prize, 2) In order to follow his firm belief in human rights, 3) enhancing Korea's international status by active participation, especially through risk-inherited operations), it was clear that an effective and swift decision was the outcome. As a result, Korea's win set was widened to the extreme. This wide range of negotiable ground submerged any possible friction with the UN.

One of the critical reason that explain such extraordinary aspect of the close coordination (even though there was no proven linkage between the two

¹³⁵ In order to withdraw the US troops from Vietnam, maintaining the Hanoi's integration to the Paris peace accord, Nixon initiated a fierce military attack when a trace of violation was detected. However, against this strategy, the congress constraint Nixon's action by legislating several bills that limit the president's authority and the economic assistance to South Vietnam. Eventually, by the Watergate scandal, Nixon resigned and the congress legislated the 'war powers act' that further limited the president's authority on war.

¹³⁶ In contrary, during the Carter administration, the president's tendency to apply his moralistic perspective to international policy aroused serious setback from the Washington circles, mostly from other governmental branches. This discrepancy in view nearly wrecked the Carter's several diplomatic initiatives, making matters more worse.

participants) between the president and the NGO can be explained by the greater legitimacy of the UN itself. Even though sending combatants to the highly volatile area of the East Timor contained a fair possibility of armed conflict that might lead to serious casualties, UN's reputation as a global institution, coupled with its unanimous resolution made the System II more comfortable in supporting the dispatch plan. Moreover, the Indonesian government's official request for help assuaged any remnant opposition that might have worked against the effective forces dispatch.

The opposition party member's dissent lost its tract not just because of the NGOs and the ruling parties' successful strategies to quell disagreements but also its lack of consistency. Considering the past track record during the Vietnam war, the then ruling party (the current day opposition party) strongly supported the president's decisions to dispatch combat forces in the name of national interest, arguing that the action as an 'inevitable' considering the dual mandate of economic development and military modernization. This tendency also occurred in the Iraq was dispatch during the Roh Moo Hyun administration during 2003 – 2004. Thus, the opposition parties' stance during 1999 can only be interpreted as a tactical objection, not out from a fundamental belief.

Likewise, the media's reserve towards the president's stance can be understood in the similar vein. Under the political struggle between the president and the media, the media's cautious stance upon troop dispatch could not possess a meaningful trait (to the threshold that can influence the president and possibly the NGO).

All in all, the two domestic participants control of the System I and

System II, backed by the legitimacy of the UN made an swift and effective dispatch possible. In spite of the more democratized Korea, the decision upon sending combatants to a risky region was approved around two-week time period with relatively little resistance. Perhaps this sound decision making was possible due to the counterparty might have been unveiled in a different way. Such unraveling can be seen in the next case of troop dispatch decision making, the war in Iraq.

3. Iraq

3.1 Background

On January 17 1991, the Gulf War broke out, in order to repeal the Iraq's aggressive activity towards Kuwait. Backed by the UN Security Council resolution, the war drew to a close, barely 45 days later, on February 26. During the Gulf War of 1991, the US inspectors were astonished by the Iraq's level of quality and the sheer quantity of the WMD, far exceeding what western experts have conceived before the war. Thus, the allied forces stipulated the need to completely abolish biological, chemical and nuclear weapons as a condition for signing an armistice treaty. Logically speaking, at face value, the second Gulf War (or the Iraq War) was triggered by the Iraq's violation (or some unfaithfulness in complying) of the major conditions for the truce.

However, the profound reason that ignited the Iraq War was the crash of civilian aircraft to the World Trade Center. The events of 11 September – or 9/11 as the day soon became universally known – caused shockwaves

throughout the world. In the United States it provoked a psychological revolution, changing national sentiment and redirecting national policy¹³⁷. Starting from this critical juncture, the attribute of US foreign-military policy turned aggressive. Not only for the Neocons that argued for an assertive-realism, internationalist democrats like Kenneth Pollack insisted for an invasion since Saddam Hussein's aggressive nature can't be tamed merely by containment or deterrence, ensuing a dangerous development of the WMD¹³⁸. As a result, the logic of 'preventive war' was embraced by the Bush administration as part of the so-called War on Terror¹³⁹. Under such setting, the Bush administration initially waged war against the Taliban regime, stationed on the terrains of Afghanistan. After a swift victory in Central Asia, United States and its 'coalition of the willing' invaded Iraq on March 19, 2003¹⁴⁰, under the ground of several war cause¹⁴¹. The Saddam Hussein's

¹³⁷ Although the UN issued a multinational approach against the war on terror, leniency upon

terrorism itself has drastically reduced. See Mu-Hyuk, Kwan. (2005) "Concentrated on triangular relationship just after the accident = 9/11 terror attack and its implications on South- North Korean relations" 『Korea Journals of Political Science Vol.13 No.2』 pp. 3-4

¹³⁸ Keegan, John. (1995) "The Iraq war" 『Vintage Books』 pp. 89

¹³⁹ Geun-Wook, Lee. (2011) "From the invasion of Bush to Obama's withdrawal" 『Hanul』 pp. 84

¹⁴⁰ Stiglitz, Joseph E. and Bilmes, Linda. (2008) "The three trillion dollar war : the true cost of the Iraq conflict" 『W.W.Norton』 pp. 3

¹⁴¹ The US cause for Iraq war can be garnered from President Bush's March 20 statement. The reason can be summed up into three category: First, the illicit nature of the Iraq regime do not possess the very legitimacy to exist, representing its people. Second, unshackling the Iraqi people from the 24-year old tyranny, enforced by the dictator Saddam. Third, stemming a possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in order to build more stable and reliable international structure.

forces were crushed almost instantaneously.

After toppling the Hussein regime, president Bush declared the end of the Iraq war on the main deck of the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln, on May 1, 2003. Irrespective of the short timeframe of the war (an official termination declared a mere 43 days after the US initiation of war against Iraq), Bush emphasized that shifting tyranny to democracy is worth its efforts and clarified his intention to station US forces until such goal is achieved.

However, the growing insurgency within Iraq, fueled by the various religious and ethnic sects – Baath, Sunni Shiite and Kurd – without a lucid centrifugal element worsened the security situation on the ground. Furthermore, implanting the Western democracy has imbued more confusion, rather than an harmony in this complex society. Thus, the normalization and restoration (nick-named as ‘nation building’ turn out to be an Herculean task for the US, sipping the US credibility in the region, causing more difficulty to Washington.

Coupled with the US’ lacking of international blessings by not receiving the UN Security Council resolution as it was in the case of the Gulf War of ’91, no sign of an expected WMD depot, the mounting need of legitimacy and actual material help triggered the US to ask further assistance from allied countries. In that line of understanding, the US government officially requested for an Iraqi dispatch to the blue house on September 4 2003 using Richard Rollies from department of defense as a conveyor. On September 9th, president Roh affirmed a cautious decision upon the US’ request in the security-relations current report meeting. From September 24th to October 13th, the Korean government has sent the joint inspector task force to Iraq.

President Roh summoned a security relations ministerial meeting on October 17th and finally decided the troop dispatch in the National Security Council on October 18th.

3.2 Elements in decision making

3.2.1 External Factor

Just after the inauguration of the Bush administration, US brandished its Missile Defense plan and refused to enact the Kyoto protocol on climate change. This inflamed a negative opinion from the international society. In spite of such headwind, the US hardened its unilateral approach that paved the way to create a US-centered international structure by announcing the “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” announced on September 20th 2002.

Considering the two stool of foreign and security ideology, generally categorized¹⁴² as realism and idealism, the Bush administration’s stance upon foreign policy can best be described as an ‘aggressive realism’, taking the philosophical trait of Leo Strauss. After the 9/11 incident, US has strengthened such stance through the swift two-month Afghan war that toppled the regime and the briefly followed Iraqi war illustrated the US’ intention to project power against its perceived threats.

¹⁴² Among many criterion for situating a certain doctrine, the following three elements are most commonly used as the yardstick: 1) Achieving peace through peaceful means 2) Willingness for humanitarian intervention 3) The level of unilateralism. To each of those conditions, the Bush doctrine prescribes: 1) A coercive measure of if necessary 2) Strongly for humanitarian intervention 3) Prefer a multilateral approach yet will enforce its measures without such international consensus. Vice president Dick Cheney’s notion of ‘preemptive war’ is a stark example of the extreme unilateralism.

Under the banner of “peace through force” backed by a strong military reserve, the Bush administration displayed a diplomacy of aggressive realism that is typified as 1) Strengthening US’ strategic allies in order to forge a strong ‘coalition of the willing’ 2) Performing an anti- terrorism policy through enhancement in both of its conventional and nuclear capability 3) Introduction of a preemptive strike doctrine as its official strategic stance¹⁴³.

In particular, the NPR (Nuclear Posture review) that was announced in 2002 points out the inappropriateness of the conventional belief of Mutually Assured Destruction and pointed out the growing need to tackle the arising unconventional threats of the 21st century in a noble way. The review suggest the need to provide a nuclear and nonnuclear options to resist all sorts of armed attack. In other words, mounting asymmetric threats in the current international structure emanating from unspecified and unexpected corner radically increased the need for a customized measures that were yet to be shaped. This new approach eventually led to substituting the traditional defensive mechanisms that possessed a ‘passive’ nature¹⁴⁴.

The collapse of the Soviet Union during the early 1990s enabled the US to

¹⁴³ Bush, George W. (2002) "From containment and deterrence to preemptive strike"
『Monthly Korea Forum Vol.153』 pp. 36-43

¹⁴⁴ Such radical shift has been somewhat moderated after the global economic crisis of 2008 and president Obama’s inauguration. At the graduating cadets at West Point military academy, Mr. Obama tried to steer a course between a foreign policy of cold realism and reckless interventionism in a speech billed as a definitive enunciation of how he sees the US role in the world. The speech, long in the planning, follows a sustained period of introspection in the US after two draining wars and a financial crisis from which the economy is only just recovering : Financial Times (2014.5.29)

be staged as a sole superpower in the international arena¹⁴⁵. In spite of the numerous dissenting voices around the globe that garnered the momentum of an anti-US hegemonic traits, it is quite obvious that there were virtually no practically alternative player within the given structure. Considering the fact that international structure led by a powerful hegemon has been a normal phenomenon in human history, rather than an anomaly, the only relevant question was whether the hegemon at the helm is relatively benign to mankind¹⁴⁶. In a nutshell, a power that brandishes a policy that complies most closely to the defined notion of ‘public good’, possessing a cosmopolitan moral norm that appeals rather than create recrimination that lessens the probability of international conflict and help to maintain peace and stability.

Under such standard, the past track record puts the US into a ‘benign’ hegemony, albeit in relative term. US is the most materially strongest nation on earth, typified by its huge GDP¹⁴⁷ size. Moreover, in non-material terms, US has the most flexible society that maximizes soft power, sustained by a dynamic pluralism within its society. However, two critical component – 9/11 and the mounting US economic burden – turned US to pursue a more

¹⁴⁵ Professor Kim Young Ho asserted that the era of politically ‘uni-centric’ system has been opened : Hankyoreh (1992.1.1)

¹⁴⁶ This is generally dubbed as a ‘paternal hegemony’ that offers some fringe benefits to the client. For example, the US persevered large sums of trade deficit vis-à-vis Western Europe and Japan during the cold war, in order to maintain the Dollar-gold exchange system.

¹⁴⁷ According to the International Comparison Program, China is poised to overtake the US as the world’s largest economy in 2014. Yet, this calculation is based upon the PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) criterion; with the traditional terms of GDP (especially the GDP per capita), US is expected to be at the edge in the global economic arena for the foreseeable future.

unilateral stance, sacrificing the benevolent nature that was stoked for the past decades.




Figure 22. Trend of US total and military defense spending¹⁴⁸

As it can be seen in the figure 22, US' total spending maintained its increasing phase, starting from the post-cold war era. The defense spending has somewhat been constrained for a while. Yet it rapidly increased, due to the 9/11 incident. The coupling of the heavy onus of economic burden with the alarming threat from terrorism, US selected aggressive realism as its stance to secure its national interest. As professor John Conybeare has pointed out¹⁴⁹, US shifted from a benevolent hegemony to a predatory hegemony. Under such context, the Iraq of Saddam Hussein has become a regime to be toppled in the eyes of the Bush administration.

Iraq is situated in a fertile land west of Syria and Jordan, south of Turkey,

¹⁴⁸ Data distilled and modified from http://www.usgovernmentdebt.us/us_deficit

¹⁴⁹ Conybeare, John A.C. (1984) "Public Goods, Prisoners, Dilemmas and the International Political Economy" 『International Studies Quarterly, Vol.28 No.1』 pp. 24

East of Iran, North of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Lacking the international legitimacy, US was battered by the international society that ulterior objective of the Iraqi invasion was non-other than securing petroleum in the Middle East. Iraq possesses the largest oil reserves next to Saudi Arabia¹⁵⁰. Regarding the Iraqi war, the countries that had dividends in terms of joint oil investment rights and the ones that were opposed to the Saddam regime displayed a starkly contrasting views vis-a-vis the endeavor¹⁵¹. Once Iraqi war occurred, countries including France, Germany, China has disclosed a strong dissent to the US initiative. Even from some domestic quarters of US and from the traditional allies (UK and Australia), fierce opposition has been erupted. Such opposition was quite predictable prior to the Iraqi war due to its lack of international approval through the UN.

After implementing a blitz ‘shock and awe’ strategy in the battlefield, the US declared its official termination of war. Yet, the following post war incidents¹⁵² has lowered the international societies’ approval rate vis-à-vis the US. At this critical juncture, US forces’ continued stationing matter, alongside with the restoration and reestablishment mission in the Iraqi government was an enormous task for the US to handle in a unilateral manner. As a corollary, the US’ need for other countries’ help and assistance has been sky rocketed

¹⁵⁰ According to the CNBC, the top five countries in terms of remaining oil reserves in 2012 are (in a decreasing order) Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, UAE and Kuwait.

¹⁵¹ Such contentious view swept the globe, including countries like China. See OhmyNews (2003.2.28)

¹⁵² Violation of human rights in Abu Ghraib would be the most notable case. See 강은지. (2004) "미군 포로학대 진원지 아부 그라이브 교도소출소 이라크인 3인 인터뷰 : 이게 미국이 말하는 민주주의라면 우린 민주주의 필요없다" 『민족21 통권39호』

ever since. Furthermore, in order to alleviate the international societies' negative opinion, US requested for troop dispatch and assistance from allied countries. As a result, the Korean government was asked for a troop participation in the region.

Meanwhile, ROK-US alliance structure was under a frictional circumstances, due to the change in power distribution of the two parties and the unclearness of the most reasonable portion of burden sharing.

Basically, the security uneasiness between Korea and US is derived from the fact that Korea's substantial bulk of defense has been largely dependent to US. Thus the core issue in terms of ROK-US alliance was the appropriate level of US military support to Korea. The ROK-US alliance treaty, the withdrawal of US forces in Korea, burden sharing of the defense cost issue have all been come to the fore when US pronounced to modify its size of assistance to Korea.

The Korea's response upon such alteration has differed by times. The key national stance has been modified during the different phases of history : 1) 1950~1960s – a totally reliant phase that reflected the asymmetric power distribution between the two countries 2) 1970~1980s – incrementally imbuing self-reliant nature in some quarters of defense 3) 1980s – a phase that enjoyed more independence in defense area.

At the time of the US' invasion of Iraq, Korea under Roh Moo Hyun presidency was seeking a new phase, in terms of alliance structure. US forces in Korea can be regarded as the very gist to ROK-US alliance. Both of the party admits that the fundamental relationship between the two comes from the presence of the forces. Thus the two countries' overall relationship is

virtually maintained by shared the concept of security interest.

It is in that regard that security matters were treated uniquely apart from other areas of concern including social, politics and economy as a precondition. Unlike other areas, security issues were carefully dealt and modulated through a regular meeting between the defense ministers, annually¹⁵³. Even if the internal domestic atmosphere of Korea was not supportive to the US' eyes, US hesitated in linking the affairs to the overall security.




Figure 23. Trend of Korea's unemployment and its rate¹⁵⁴

Truly, the US as a security bedrock was critical that had broad-based influence to the social fabric of Korea. As it is displayed in the figure 23,

¹⁵³ The SCM (Security Consultative Meeting) was originally designed to enhance the security in the Peninsula as well as the interoperability between the military forces under ROK-US alliance structure. The first meeting was held in April 17, 1968 between president Park and president Johnson, that was strongly influenced by the North Korean special operation forces' attempt to assassinate the president on January 21, 1968.

¹⁵⁴ Source : KOSIS (Korean Statistical Information Service)

economic circumstances – in terms of unemployment level – was somewhat being in a worsening phase during the 1st and 2nd troop dispatch decision have been made (that converged with the early days of the Roh presidency). At that timing, the domestic demand was in a somewhat sluggish mood, coupled with the global economy's gradual recovery from the IT bubble of 2002. The concerns that an unsuccessful troop dispatch will lead to an increasing fissure between the once rock solid ROK-US alliance, strengthening the downward pressure regarding the sovereign ratings, that entail a vulnerable economic stature¹⁵⁵. This concerns upon a vicious cycle again reflects the importance of US backed security, even when Korea achieved remarkable GDP growth throughout the past decades.

Understanding such significance, even at the very height of the economic strife between the two, the US has seldom connected the matter with USFK. Side by side, the Korean government though the security issue as a keenly linked component with the republic's survival itself and regarded collateral damage or some other sacrifice as a reasonable price to pay in holding the US forces in Korea. The security uneasiness of the two parties, was triggered by the growing gap between the US' grand strategy towards the Korea in terms of the national interest by partially reversing its once pursued role as a generous benefactor and Korea's intention to modify towards a equal leveling field, backed by its economic growth.

Moreover, the strategic interpretation has been changed, largely from the US' side. Even though Korea wanted to be a more equal player vis-à-vis its counterparty, Korea considered the US as an important ally in terms of

¹⁵⁵ Chosun Ilbo (2003.4.2)

politics, economic and cultural aspect, expecting to maintain its 'tripwire' role that remained as a guarantor of aggression against the Northern brethren.

Whereas, US' global war on terror and the base allocation policy, triggered by the radical change of its global strategy somewhat lowered the strategic importance of Korea. Ever since, Korea emerged into the limelight and absorbs greater attention when the US tilted more towards an Asian policy. Due to such disparate view of the each side, Korea's influence towards the ROK-US security negotiation has been drastically reduced.

Korea's enhancing national power elevated its status during the security negotiation that were arranged to solve the uneasiness between the two counterparty. The defense cost burden sharing affairs which emerged from the late 1980's illustrated that pattern. Originally, the negotiation was to seek an appropriate level of burden sharing and the size of assistance the Korea should receive, that can be regarded as reasonable. The issue turned rather sour and tapped the contentious nature that were hoarded in the Korean society.

The death of the middle school girl by US armored vehicle on June 13 2002 and its ensuing massive protest, pushed the Korean government to take an upper hand and to alter the unequal character of the ROK-US alliance structure. Even though the majority still cherished the ROK-US alliance that to be maintained and reinforced¹⁵⁶, disgruntling voices inflamed by the middle school girl accident and the mishandling of the SOFA revision have inflamed the anti-US sentiment that were once shared less by the public at large.

¹⁵⁶ According to Pew Research result 74% of the Koreans still regarded American people as hospitable, although 54% of the respondents expressed inhospitable attitude towards the US as a nation : Dong A Ilbo (2003.6.10)

Moreover, this trend was a major risk factor since these negative seeds could mushroom into a serious threat to the future of ROK-US alliance itself.

Under such sensitive timing, the Korean government decided to dispatch troops to Iraq. Zaytun division was the first foreign troop dispatch since the creation of the Korean military that comprised by a varied types of uniform : army-navy-airforce, fully backed by the government budget¹⁵⁷. After declaring the end of the Iraq war on May 1 2003, US faced the need of allied support, and officially requested for additional troop dispatch to Korean government on September 4 2003 as a result. The Korean government announced its plan for troop dispatch on October 18th and formed a reconstruction division – the Zaytun division.

Even though the external factor – structural setting and the US remain as an important element in decision making. Korea's increasing clout coupled with the progressing democratization has greatly empowered the domestic factor which balanced the external sources.

3.2.2 Internal Factor

At the outset, from president Park Jung Hee to president Roh Moo Hyun, republic of Korea was run by a presidential system. Thus, the president's policy direction and attributes was an important component on decision making process. After practicing as a human rights lawyer that strongly advocated the democratic movement of the June 1987. His active participation in bouts of social activities in a pro labor orientation caused his barring from practicing the law on a temporarily basis. His credential as a strong backer of

¹⁵⁷ UPKOREA (2004.2.13)

human-rights, pro-democracy attribute continue to remain throughout his period in the National Assembly. After his brief post as the chief in the ministry of oceans and fisheries, he climbed up the greasy pole at 2002 with a modest approval¹⁵⁸.

Once the US requested the troop dispatch, the Roh administration, typified as the participatory government clearly underlined a prudent and cautious response, after reviewing the international circumstances and the overall public opinion. The first dispatch of 700 non-combatants to Iraq were made under the radar in a relatively quiet fashion due to the president's honeymoon period and its smaller risk as a non-combatant.

However, the president's unclear, middle-ground like stance aroused intense contention between the pros and con within and out of the government, when US requested for a second dispatch of 50,000 to 10,000 size combat troops. Due to the fierce criticism that interpreted the troop dispatch as an evidence of a subservient diplomacy, the president dithered and choose not to proactively engage in persuading the anti-dispatch figures.

Yet after the president Roh's Washington visit on May 2003, his stance tilted more closer to the US. The visit kindled a greater divide inbetween the two extreme of humiliating kowtowing and a practical diplomacy backed by the notion of Realpolitik. As a result, the president's distinguishing feature : 1) the past track record as an anti-American, professing an independence from the US (as an individual) 2) prudent and practical stance to embrace US request in terms of maximizing the national interest (as a president) pitted the

¹⁵⁸ Presidential candidate Roh Moo Hyun acquired 48.7%, followed by the Lee Hoi Chang's 46.8% : Kukmin Ilbo (2002.12.19)

public opinion, embroiling the public sentiment into an area of quagmire.

Out of his individual tenet, president Roh strived his best effort for the betterment of the peoples' equality and participation, emphasizing the lesser dependence on the US clout, expecting greater autonomy regarding Korea's diplomacy. The view from his post as a president that steer the nation with a wholistic statecraft, he calculated that an unconciliatory and irreconcilable vis-a-vis the US would lead to a loss of credibility as an US ally, mounting the security threat and flaming internal cacophony without eventually watering down the dependence upon the US. Such dilemma deteriorated the impasse during the Iraqi dispatch affairs.

President Roh's middle ground, indecisive attitude inflamed many domestic figures including the National Assembly, public opinion and the civic group in particular. Surely, the non-combat dispatch for humanitarian issue of the first dispatch has been made relatively swiftly albeit with some level of dissent. However, during the second dispatch affairs, it lagged six full months, from receiving the US request for dispatch to the National Assembly's approval of the dispatch bill, amid hot conflict in the domestic front. Furthermore, even at the implementation level when dispatch plan was approved by the National Assembly, the antiwar movement of the civic group and the remainder of the negative public opinion ceased to lose its influence.

All in all, it virtually took a year for the Korean forces to reach Iraq. Since the diplomatic handling was performed in a somewhat unseasoned manner, President Roh could not achieve the maximization of the national interest. It can be said that the president has been stalled by the public opinion offering

the significant portion of decision making initiatives to the domestic factor¹⁵⁹ that increased the possibility of drifting. The result was a lagged dispatch and the degeneration of the presidency itself that paid the price of impeachment attempt.

Apart from the president, the national security council had an important implication among internal factors. When the US' final ultimatum was conveyed to Saddam Hussein on March 17 2003, president Roh had planned a organizational reform in the NSC, in order to streamline the foreign and the military policy. The blueprint of the newly empowered NSC was disclosed throughout the press next day¹⁶⁰. The measure virtually upgraded the role in the NSC, imbuing greater autonomy to the inside members. By strengthening the three aspects: 1) Better grasping the changing international security environment 2) Firm intention in pursuing as independent foreign policy 3) Concentrating the key decision making role to the civilian experts and the blue house, president Roh levered up the function of the NSC from its traditional role of an advisory attribute to and decision making body within the governmental apparatus. This structure maintained its figure until it experienced a partial modification on January 2006.

¹⁵⁹ For example on September 15 2003, the high governmental official announced the president's message regarding the second dispatch that the affairs will be cautiously considered by factoring in multiple elements including: 1) Resolving North Korean nuclear crisis 2) Maintaining peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula 3) Consolidating the traditional ROK-US alliance 4) Considering international circumstances, public opinion including the stance of the National Assembly: Pressian (2003.9.15) This broad-banded perspective narrowed down within two weeks. On September 26 2003, president Roh conveyed his message through the blue house speech that a 'proactive garnering of the public opinion' is critical in making a precise decision : Dong A Ilbo (2003.9.26)

¹⁶⁰ Yonhap News (2003.3.18)

The newly upgraded NSC functioned as an influential decision making participants during the second Iraq dispatch. However, as it will be further described in the following pages, its leniency towards the domestic factors (the National Assembly and the NGOs in participation) and the somewhat domineering attitude vis-à-vis the two governmental branches¹⁶¹ (MOFA and the MND) have provided the detrimental impact to the overall outcome. Exploiting the indecisive president as their head, the NSC during the second Iraq dispatch brandished its enhanced clout, somewhat in a negative manner.

3.2.3 Domestic Factor

When the second troop dispatch decision was made, the overall political realm emanated extreme confusion. The National Assembly was divided between the ruling party that were for the troop dispatch, and the opposition Grand National party, side by side with the Peoples United New party¹⁶² that were on the other edge. Even with some disparate view, the latter two parties revealed its disagreement with the government's second dispatch decision on the ground that 1) the Iraqi war has already entered in a civil war phase and concern is mounting that the affairs can very likely to deteriorate into a second Vietnam war quagmire 2) sending combat troops itself is a clear

¹⁶¹ When the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of national defense both pinpointed the lagging nature of the troop dispatch, prompting a rapid decision making, the blue house retorted in a negative nuance, criticizing the stance of the two branches were exorbitantly tilting towards the dispatch. Such cacophony between internal factors occurred after the NSC's promotion. Ji-Hye, Park. (2013) "The Role of Domestic Actors in the Korean Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process : Focusing on the Additional Troop Dispatch to Iraq" 『Hanyang university』 pp. 53

¹⁶² Gathered 37 and 5 members each from ruling and opposition party, respectively : Yonhap News (2003.9.20)

violation of the constitution that denies a predatory war¹⁶³.

Yet two days after the October 16th UN Security Council's resolution on Iraq was unanimously passed, president Roh convened the NSC and decided for the second dispatch. This decision tipped the scale. As the NSC formed a consensus for the troop dispatch, the Grand National party and the Peoples United New party eventually conformed to the government's decision. Irrespective of some reserve within¹⁶⁴, the strong opposition from the National Assembly has been silenced ever since the government's decision.

In spite of the UN resolution, growing insurgency and the prolonged nation building process in Iraq, increased the inherited risk of troop dispatch that fueled the civic groups' anti-war movement, pledging to run an anti-campaign towards the candidates that support the dispatch again resurfaced the opposition voices within the National Assembly. But once, the government finalized the troop dispatch in December 17 and submitted the additional troop dispatch plan to the Nation Assembly, the bill was eventually passed in the defense committee on February 14 2004.

At first glance, the National Assembly seem to play as a government supporting role as usual, with some vocal argument. However, a turn of event that followed provided a ground for a different interpretation.

On March 12th 2004, the National Assembly passed president Roh's

¹⁶³ Article 5(1) : The Republic of Korea shall endeavor to maintain internal peace and shall renounce all aggressive wars. Constitutional Court of Korea

¹⁶⁴ Ruling head of the Peoples United New Front Kim Keun Tae revealed his personal disappointment that abrupt decision making right after the passing of the UN resolution contradicts the president Roh's promise of a prudent approach : OhmyNews (2003.10.19)

impeachment resolution act. This unprecedented incident's genuine cause can't be squarely narrowed to the second troop dispatch decision. It would be more objective to say that the accumulated friction between the president-National Assembly has been erupted, triggered by the troop dispatch event. was fairly an unpredictable one. This single event changed the conventional understanding that the National Assembly is almost totally pliant to the president's decision. Such results were hardly imaginable during the military regime and even during the Kim Dae Jung era. In fact, this example indicates the increased clout of the legislative body. Even though the troop dispatch was approved in the National Assembly, the president eventually had to pay the huge price in return.

This increased clout of the legislative body was also substantiated by the US' careful handling of the National Assembly members. At the initial phase, the US did not offered sufficient heed to the members (opposition members in particular) of the National Assembly. Yet, once US requested for a combat troops to the Korean government, the atmosphere have drastically changed¹⁶⁵. The Washington media interpreted that the cause of such aggressive shift can be explained by the additional dispatch request. The US understood that since Grand National party was the majority party, consulting the opposition party had huge gravity, side by side with persuading the president.

The impeachment incident that surfaced right after when Iraq dispatch

¹⁶⁵ The opposition party leader's visit in Washington on mid-September 2003 did not aroused an interest among high ranking officials. However, once the US revealed its intentions to ask for additional troop participation, key political figures including National Assembly Advisor Condoleezza Rice, deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage, deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz have conveyed their intentions to meet the leader of the GNP, Choi Byung Yul.

plan, is a symbolic evidence of the National Assembly's enhanced status that has far distanced from the previous function as a rubber-stamping, government dependent institution, compared to the Vietnam and even the East Timor case, the clout of the National Assembly has been incomparably enhanced. This of course has its limitation. Perhaps the president Roh's personal attribute of indecisiveness may paved the way for the greater role of the National Assembly. Moreover, it must be noted that the government's outlined plan has been approved in spite of the outburst of anger and the fervent voice that erupt from the opposition party.

Still, the unprecedented impeachment episode has made a watershed the era of a powerful legislative body. The occurrence of such groundbreaking incident implies that in future decision making regarding troop dispatch, the National Assembly's impact would be incomparably greater.

Meanwhile, the deepening of the democratization, and at some extent the globalization that swept through the globe provided more nutrition to the civil society. Public opinion is one of the meaningful yard stick that can be utilized in gauging the direction of the civil society.

Public opinion flow during the Iraqi dispatch affairs can be summed up as the following : death of a middle school girl by an US armored vehicle, environmental pollution triggered by US' spilling toxic waste, disturbance of the local people in the vicinity of a US firing field and other crimes that were committed in the nearby of the US bases have all been combined and functioned as a negative factor.

At that juncture, the newly inaugurated president Roh that asserted a diplomacy laced with greater autonomy and equality, indicating a clear

departure from the previous ‘subservient’ tendency to the US has been hailed by the public. When US invaded Iraq in the early 2003, the international society blamed the US’ unilateral fashion that lacked the UN approval. Side by side with the sentiment that focused on the illegitimate nature of US’ Iraqi invasion, Korea’s domestic opinion was initially against the Iraqi war. However, once the Iraqi reconstruction resolution was passed within the UN security council and president Roh decided to send troops to Iraq, public opinion turned relatively favorable to the troop dispatch.

Research Institution	Date	Questionnaire	For/ Yes	Against/ No
Hangil Research	March 22~23 2003	Do you agree or disagree the Iraq war	22%	75%
		Should Korea send its troop if asked?	38%	59%
		Would Korea’s troop dispatch beneficial to the economy?	26%	52%
Dona A Ilbo	April 1 2003	Is the overall ROK-US Relationship in a good mood?	28%	66%
		In terms of the linkage between the North Korean Nuclear issue and the Iraq dispatch, do you approve sending troops?	48%	45%
Maeil Business Newspaper	September 13~14 2003	Should Korea dispatch It troops to Iraq?	*60%	32%
		As an UN PKO, do you Approve the dispatch of combat troops?	51%	**32%
		What is the prime reason of US request for Korea’s participation on Iraq?	76% - the mounting task in post war Iraq	
Hangil Research	September 16 2003	Is Iraqi war a ‘just war’?	15%	81%

* The 60% is the combination of 33% (should dispatch in accordance with the original request) and 27% (It can be positively considered if non-combatants are to be dispatched)

** The 32% gave a conditional participation (approve only non-combatant dispatch)

Table 9. Poll result regarding the Iraqi matter

Initially, the public poll result was somewhat unfavorable with regards to the Iraq dispatch. The Hangil research's poll¹⁶⁶ of March 22~23 indicates that 75% of the respondents were against the Iraq war, compared to the 22% that were hospitable to the endeavor. In a similar vein, 59% responded negatively to the possibility of sending troops to Iraq if it was requested. Apart from the legitimacy of the war, the general public was unconvinced by the practical benefit that the Iraq war would entail. More than half of the respondents (52% - a twofold compared to the 26% who regarded as economic boon, followed by the Korea's participation) thought economic windfall that might be derived from the Iraq dispatch would be negligible.

Such trend was also caught by the Dong A Ilbo's April 1st poll¹⁶⁷. Asking whether the two parties are in a sound relationship, 66% have disclosed its disagreement, compared to the 28% who defined the alliance sound and healthy. In addition, questions regarding North Korean nuclear issue – Iraq war linkage and utilizing the troop dispatch to settle the nuclear crisis, the response was somewhat in a half-and-half manner. In sum, the public opinion was negative both to the issue of troop dispatch and the war itself, in the first quarter of 2003.

However, as time went by, the public opinion turn more closer to the troop dispatch. The Maeil Business Newspaper's poll result¹⁶⁸ of September 14 reflects such shift. Asked whether the Korean troop should be dispatched, 33%

¹⁶⁶ OhmyNews (2003.3.24)

¹⁶⁷ Dong A Ilbo (2003.4.1)

¹⁶⁸ Maeil Business Newspaper (2003.9.15)

consented in sending combatants as US initially requested and 27% agreed only when the non-combatants are dispatched. Meanwhile, 51% and 32% agreed on displaying combatants and non-combatants, respectively, when the job was done under the banner of the UN PKO. Irrespective of such modified views compared to couple months ago, the realistic assessment was right on the mark. 76% of the respondents pointed out the post war national building task triggered the US to ask troop participation to Korea. Such hard headed understanding was confirmed by the Hangil research of September 16¹⁶⁹. 81% designated the Iraq war as an unjust war that aimed to maintain the US national interest in terms of petroleum in the region and strengthening the basis for the Bush's reelection.

Overall, the public opinion move closer towards the troop dispatch with the passages of time. Even though the realistic assessment of the war itself has not been changed, the approval for troop dispatch has somewhat gained its momentum. In fact, during the couple of month time frame, the Roh administration strived to shape a troop dispatch plan that could cap the infuriation of the general public. That reflects the high-profile of the civil society in decision making. Furthermore the civil activist organized a union and concentrated its power in order to influence the government's troop dispatch decision making throughout the period¹⁷⁰.

3.3 Negotiating process

¹⁶⁹ Pressian (2003.9.17)

¹⁷⁰ Yonhap News (2003.9.23)

3.3.1 First Dispatch (2003/4/2)

The 9/11 incident coalesced the US public opinion to be fully supportive to the government's strategic shift. Under such basis, president Bush singled out Iran, Iraq and North Korea as 'axis of evil' and prepared for an aggressive war on terror in January 2002. In order to beef up the plan and add justification on that endeavor, US requested to multiple countries for their human and non-human participation. In that context, on November 2002, US officially asked the Korean government for troop dispatch.

On March 18 2003, US declared its ultimatum to the Iraqi government and embraced on its military operations, two days later. At that time, president Roh was thoroughly reviewing the troop dispatch issue, in and out of the government : he invited 14 members from the National Assembly's national defense committee to the blue house and discussed the government's response and the troop dispatch issue regarding the Iraqi war. He then convened the NSC and stressed upon the importance of sending forces to Iraq¹⁷¹.

As a result, a 700 personnel size, comprised by construction and medical support was discussed in the March 21 cabinet meeting. The motion was submitted to the National Assembly and first expected to be dealt on March 25. However, due to the fierce opposition from the civic movement, side by side with the ruling party, the National Assembly delayed the issue for a

¹⁷¹ When Iraqi occurred on March 20 2003, president Roh convoked the NSC and conveyed a statement as follows : "I have reaffirmed our government's stance that we support US as well as the international societies' measures and considering the international opinion, the non-proliferation efforts of the weapons of mass destruction and the importance of the Korean-US relation, it seems to be most in accordance with our national interest to support the US' endeavor.

couple of days. Finally, on April 2 2003, the troop dispatch plan was passed, 179-for, 68-against, 9-abstention, backed by president Roh’s direct support¹⁷². The first troop dispatch decision making can be illustrated as the figure 24.




Figure 24. Decision making during the 1st dispatch (Iraq)

With regards to the US foreign policy and its operational doctrine, 9/11 became a groundbreaking event which marked the watershed. The once remote notion of ‘assertive realism’ that was conceptualized by the neocons within the Bush administration gained the support from the American public for a ‘tough foreign policy’, using military force if necessary. This tendency was relevant during the first dispatch decision making. Backed by the staunch

¹⁷² He emphasized the importance of a sound ROK-US relationship in the context of practicability. He stressed further that such strengthened alliance would be directly helpful on solving the North Korean nuclear problem in a peaceful fashion.

public support, the US waged war against Afghanistan and prepared for the Iraqi invasion. This led the US to have a small win set that was hard to be negotiated.

Furthermore, the North Korea's acknowledgement of its HEU (highly enriched uranium) program on October 2002 has triggered the second nuclear crisis, culminating of its declaration of withdrawal from the NPT regime on January 10 2002. This gave a heavy burden of the newly inaugurated Roh administration. Facing the dual presence of aggressive US foreign policy of post 9/11 and the second North Korean nuclear restraint the Korea's win set from narrowing further, despite its growing domestic dissention.

On the domestic front, torrent of criticism from numerous NGOs and civil rights activists were ceaselessly divulged, blackmailing the National Assembly members to run an anti-campaign if the troop dispatch plan were implemented¹⁷³. Thousands of people swept through the streets, arguing for a foreign policy, imbued with more autonomous nature. Some pinpointed the illicit nature of the Iraqi war itself¹⁷⁴. Such impact is displayed in the figure as an arrow deriving from the NGO, that points toward the National Assembly. Due to the democratic process that gone through for the past couple of decades, the civil sector's room of influence has been the greatest among three dispatch (Vietnam, East Timor and Iraq) cases.

However, its overall impact during the first dispatch has been somewhat reduced by mainly five reasons : first, timing of the dispatch was well within

¹⁷³ NEWSis (2004.2.14)

¹⁷⁴ OhmyNews (2003.3.24)

the timeframe of a honeymoon period between the president and the civil sector. Barely one month from inauguration, president Roh's credential as an independent, US-distancing policymaker was not tarnished nor questioned in the initial phase. Furthermore, symbolized as the backer of the lower and middle class people who constitute the social fabric, his popularity was not in a serious level. Second, the finalized decision of sending 700 non-combatants were less contentious since the possibility of embroiling into military clash that ensue casualties was less likely than sending combatants. Third, the second North Korean nuclear issue made the Korean Peninsula, once again into a cold war structure, on a temporarily occasion. The DPRK's retreat from the NPT regime gave serious shockwaves to the South Koreans that the thawing between the two Koreas, symbolized by the June 15 declaration of 2000 was tenuous at best. This raised the voice that strong ROK-US alliance would be the bulwark against any North Korean provocation and forging an autonomous foreign policy was set aside, until the urgent crisis was wound up peacefully. Fifth, US' strong military response seemed understandable. Just before the Iraq war, the sore of the 9/11 was relatively vivid and the presumed WMD that Saddam Hussein was hiding wasn't discovered yet. Moreover, there were speculations that the Iraqi war of 2003 would resemble the Gulf war of '91, resulting in a small number of casualties.

Adding to that, the domestic participants of System I – ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of national defense – almost completely act in accordance with the president's decision, on the ground that sound ROK-US relationship was the highest priority, especially during the nuclear crisis.

Assessing the first dispatch, it can be said that the influence of the System I and System II were on par. Even through the civil sector enjoyed its

maximum range of influence compared to no era before, president Roh's (backed by the two ministries that truly supported the cause of ROK-US alliance) saliently influential argument of limiting the alliance structure with the peaceful resolution of North Korean nuclear issue consolidated the System I's power that limited the System II's impact going further. There indeed was a time gap between the US request (2002.11) to the dispatch approval (2003.4) that might have tantalized the counterparty, the overall situation in Iraq wasn't bad and the DPRK's nuclear crisis eclipsed other domestic agenda in the Korean public. The remaining credential of president Roh and the honeymoon period had softened the process throughout the first dispatch. In addition, the designated troop's non-combatant nature capped the public concern and dissent on to a certain level, that was quite manageable.

3.3.2 Second Dispatch (2004.2.13)

The swift victory in the Iraqi invasion allowed president Bush to declare an official termination of the war on April 14 2003, barely a month after the invasion. Yet, the following task of security maintenance and the nation-building in the region faced a huge headwind. Guerrilla warfare opened its new phase and the US casualties gradually increased with the passage of time. The presumed WMD were to be found nowhere and the US public opinion feared that the US' stationing might soon resemble the Vietnamese quagmire. Against its degrading credibility, this pushed the US to seek for more participation of the international society.

As a result, US conveyed its need of additional troop dispatch via deputy undersecretary of defense Richard Lawless during his visit in the 4th ROK-US alliance meeting in Seoul, September 4 and through undersecretary of defense

Paul Wolfowitz to foreign minister Yoon Young Kwan who was visiting Washington. On September 7, Bush administration officially requested for a 'Polish-type division'¹⁷⁵ to 29 countries, including Korea.

In response, president Roh convened the cabinet meeting on September 16 and opened up a debate regarding the disputed issue. Both the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of national defense have argued for the inevitability of swift troop sending since North Korean nuclear issue, reallocation of US forces in Korea and participation in the nation-building process in Iraq was at hand.

Furthermore, these ministries emphasized the asymmetric power distribution between the ROK and US, warning that the price tag of refusal would be simply unbearable. However, national security advisor Lee Jong Seok disclosed his disagreement by mentioning that cacophony within the government regarding the exact timing of the troop dispatch is salient. Adding to that, blue house Yoo In Tae disgruntled that the MOFA and MND have deeply biased the troop dispatch which lost the objectivity¹⁷⁶.

In order to garner more facts on the ground, the Roh administration issued an inspection upon the Iraqi situation by sending the 1st joint-government

¹⁷⁵ This refers to the multinational forces that were comprised by 19 countries, spearheaded by Polish forces. This 9,000-troop size MNF's pivotal role is to maintain peace and security of the stationing region. This division was named after the 2,900 Polish forces (comprised by special operation units, engineers and medics) that supervise and command the other 18 countries' forces. See Yonhap news (2003.7.15)

¹⁷⁶ OhmyNews (2003.10.18)

inspection team from September 24 to October 3¹⁷⁷. However, the Iraqi situation worsened further and Turkey's reversal of its troop dispatch decision widened the domestic cleavages within Korea.

After the US' consistent effort¹⁷⁸ and the UN resolution on Iraq of October 16, president Roh decided to send troops to Iraq, two days later in the cabinet meeting. To verify the government's decision, president Roh ordered for the dispatch of 2nd joint-government inspection team for more information. On December 23, upon receiving the result of the inspection team, the Korean government decided to send 3,200 troops (comprising 1,400 special forces). The motion was sent to the National Assembly the day after. With the ruling party's strong dilatory tactics, the subject was postponed until February 9, 2004. Backed by the minister of national defense' intensive explanation regarding the justification cause of dispatch the motion was discussed in the 245th defense committee. Finally, the troop dispatch plan was passed in the National Assembly on February 13, 155-for, 50-against and 7-abstention. The decision making mechanism can be illustrated as figure 25.

¹⁷⁷ Sung Hoon, Lee. (2004) "Decision making process analysis of additional troop dispatch in Iraq : In the perspective of Two-Level Game" 『Military Forum 39(Summer)』 pp. 64

¹⁷⁸ Undersecretary of state Richard lawless offered a downgraded version of 5,000 size troop dispatch and indicated the returning of the territory – equivalent to approximately 80% Yong San base - that the USFK was using. Furthermore, president Park showed intimacy toward president Roh during the APEC summit meeting, expecting more 'cooperative response' from the Korean government.




Figure 25. Decision making during the 2nd dispatch (Iraq)

The second dispatch decision making process was the most complex, close to a ‘muddling through’ among previous dispatch cases, that revealed the severe fissure between various participants. After the rapid victory, US faced with the greater need of manpower in order to squeeze the indigenous insurgents and international terrorist that attempted to dislodge the stableness that US tried to implement. This became an urgent issue.

Such demand for troop participation initially widened the US’ win set. In terms of other alternatives, US’ window of option was decreasing day by day, with the growing US casualties on the ground, the non-existence of the WMD, and the deteriorating economic status of the Iraqi people. The European countries – especially France, Germany – were castigating the Iraq war as an illicit invasion and Japan’s military participation was severely restricted by its

constitution. As mentioned earlier, Turkey and Korea were the most viable candidate for additional troop participation. Upon requesting, the US suggested to the Korean government for a swift troop dispatch, prompting a favorable response. Undersecretary of state Richard Lawless' generous offer of returning large tract of territory to the South Korean government is a notable example.

After receiving the US request, the Korean government reviewed the specifics of the troop dispatch, not questioning the dispatch itself. The ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of national defense played a 'functional' role during the 2nd dispatch, arguing that it is an ineluctable as well as inevitable to send troops on behalf of the US since the sound ROK-US alliance is the only meaningful tool to handle the ongoing North Korean nuclear issue. Moreover, under the global war on terror, Korea has no option but to support the US. President Roh was not free from such setting. Unlike his previous role as a minister (of oceans and fisheries), president Roh understood the importance of the overall national interest and the asymmetric ROK-US power distribution. This practical calculation motivated his pro-dispatch stance and guided his further path regarding this affair.

At the early phase, System I seem to be in a somewhat congruent, unitary organism just as the previous dispatch cases. However, one event reshuffled this pattern. The increasing power of the NSC obviously influenced the other elements in the System I. The NSC had undergone a major reorganization and upgraded as a significant decision making channel, especially regarding the national security and crisis situation. Within this newly empowered institution, dissenting voices clashed if not overwhelmed, MOFA, MND and the president.

In particular, the NSC maintained its stance of ‘greater autonomy’ vis-à-vis the US. In contrast to the US’ request for a 5,000 combatant troops that can manage the security of the designated Iraqi province, the NSC member Lee Jong Seok (nicknamed as the ‘Taliban’ in the Washington echelon¹⁷⁹) was negative for an early dispatch. Fellow member Yoo In Tae assailed the MOFA and MND that their stance was biased towards the dispatch. The NSC’s influence was significant enough that during the security relations ministerial meeting on November 1, president Roh discussed detailed dispatch plan without the presence of foreign affairs assistant Ban Ki Moon and national defense assistant Kim Hee Sang¹⁸⁰.

The growing influence of NSC clashed with the other branches of government most notably the ministry of foreign affairs. The internecine between the two institutions had eventually led to the resignation of the foreign minister Yoon Young Kwan due to the diplomat’s grumbling voice against the ‘autonomous’ NSC which have been revealed to the general public. This friction within the System I was unforeseen in the first dispatch.

Once the NSC gained the upper hand, instead of other key ministries that traditionally dealt with troop dispatch decisions, the win set of Korea markedly reduced. Maintaining a strict ‘autonomous’ stance towards the US, troop dispatch plan was not finalized until the end of the year. The NSC’s tough stance and its uneasiness with the other branches gave the US counterparty and impression that the Korean government’s decision making

¹⁷⁹ Sisa Journal (No. 1281 - 2014.5.7)

¹⁸⁰ Sung Hoon, Lee. (2004) "Decision making process analysis of additional troop dispatch in Iraq : In the perspective of Two-Level Game" 『Military Forum 39(Summer)』 pp. 67

process was not on a firm basis, still under a complex struggling without a clear pivot in the center. This shifted the US' initial phase of offering positive incentives.

Instead, the US issued an array of implicit penalty to induce Korea's participation. Undersecretary of state Richard Lawless modified his previous offer of 80% to 70% regarding the Yong San base territory. Furthermore, Donald Rumsfeld revealed his displeasure claiming that Korea should help the US, just as the US' support during the Korean war 50 years ago and implied the reduction of USFK by mentioning the possibility of a forces reallocation from Korea to Iraq¹⁸¹.

Meanwhile, the heating of the public sentiment functioned as narrowing of the Korean win set. Irrespective of the seemingly replenished legitimacy of the war by the UN resolution on Iraq, civic activist's concern mounted after the December 2nd four murdered Koreans in Iraq¹⁸² and the risk inherited in sending combatants. The NGOs threatened the National Assembly members of a veto-campaign in the upcoming election of April 2004. Such pressure squeezed the political parties to take more cautious stance upon troop sending. This led the National Assembly to postpone the plan for two months and blue house member Yoo In Tae blurted out against troop dispatch itself¹⁸³.

The second dispatch was a combination between the maximization of US

¹⁸¹ Hankook Ilbo (2003.2.7)

¹⁸² Many NGOs argued for the withdrawal of the entire forces, including the already dispatched non-combatants in Iraq.

¹⁸³ Hankyoreh (2003.9.17)

win set and the minimization of Korea's. As a result, unlike in any other dispatch decision made previously, the finalized outcome was the most favorable to the Korean government. As a corollary of the democratic society, the civil area – System II – especially the NGO's influence had reached a new notch. The NGO's political influence cringed the National Assembly from taking a 'rubber stamp' role as in the past.

Moreover, NGO's fierce outcry against the dispatch gave a direct influence towards the president himself and the NSC. Assailing the president's identity problem, NGOs raised the cause of independent foreign policy especially vis-à-vis the US. Such finger pointing headed towards the NSC. Both of the participants of the System I succumbed such suppressive sentiment, emanating from the System II. This created a huge discrepancy in ideas within the System II that eventually led the minimizing the Korean win set. The result was a 3,000 size combatants : far from US' initial request of 5,000~10,000 combatants that can manage security maintenance in the stationing area, coined as the 'polish division', far from Korea's suggestion of sending non-combatants instead.

3.4 Conclusion

Even in this post-cold war era of 2003~2004, the combination of the 9/11 and the second North Korean nuclear issue frozed the Korean Peninsula to the pre -1991. The war on terror and the and the Iraqi war left a big security hole in the Middle Eastern region, demanding the US to implement an Herculean task of implanting Western democracy to an erratic place. The mounting violence in the region naturally linked to US' request of troop dispatch to the Korean government. Understanding the magnitude of the nuclear crisis from

the North, Korean government (starting from president Roh) knew the inevitability of sending troops to Iraq of the Korean side.

However, twice of the dispatch decision, especially the second one revealed a poor maneuver. Although the second dispatch decision was the most successful in terms of the negotiated outcome – that was the most closest to the Korea's preferred option – the process as well as the impact is hard to gain scores. It seems inevitable that a democratic country would provide more power to the NGO and the media, it is a different matter of overwhelming the governmental bodies in the System I.

After the inauguration, president Roh understood the importance of a wholistic statecraft, maximizing the national interest, sometimes picking options that contradict his own belief and faith. ROK-US alliance was in that category. The anti-US, independent credential was somewhat restrained during his presidency. He insisted upon the importance of sound ROK-US relationship, arguing that the troop dispatch shall be helpful in handling the second North Korean nuclear crisis. At the initial phase, when president Roh barely sat down at the helm, first Iraqi dispatch decision was made under such tenet, with relatively low resistance. The first dispatch did not encountered the fierce resistance from the System II participants due to few reasons. It was within the honeymoon period of the Roh administration and the dispatched forces were non-combatants that encountered lesser possibility of material violence.

Furthermore, the governmental stance was already outlined and concurred by the Kim Dae Jung administration in late 2002. However, the civil movement – especially the NGO – assailed the president to pursue foreign

policy with more independence. Agonized by the two stool of the national interest and his personal belief and credentials that were strengthened by the previous constituencies (now in the civic movement), he lagged on and maintained a middle-ground stance, seeking more information, typified as the postponement of decision and sending Iraqi inspection team twice. Even though he was adamant on sending troop itself, he dithered with regard to the details of the forces. This eventually led the other participants to shape the detailed outline.

The two branched of government – the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of national defense – that are key players when it comes to troop dispatch, initially proceed with the dispatch plan, assessing with their own expertise, that was backed by president Roh. Against the uncertain president and the mushrooming dissent deriving from the System II, the two ministries persist upon the swift troop dispatch in the name of sound ROK-US alliance and the possible participation in the Iraqi nation-building process.

However, such appealing security and economic grounds were dashed by the NSC's opposition that worsened the relationship between the NSC-MOFA, culminating of foreign minister Yoon Young Kwan's resignation. This event can also be understood as the president's indecisiveness, leaving the huge chunk of decision-making to other ministries, including NSC and MOFA.

Unlike the tradition of its coordinating fashion, the NSC after the March reorganization gained the upper hand in major decision making. Apart from the cautious president, NSC members conveyed the NGOs within the decision-making apparatus of the System I. After the foreign minister's downfall, the ministry of national defense also became quelled, if not

subservient to the NSC. Eventually, the president followed the NSC's recommendation, co-operative all the way through to the shaping of government's dispatch plan. This left a 3,200 size combatant, far lesser amount from US' request of 5,000 ~ 10,000.

Meanwhile, the National Assembly showed a contentious move. Arguing the illicit nature of Iraq war and the entailing high risk inherent in the volatile region, the ruling party strongly opposed the government's troop dispatch plan. The opposition party basically supported the a plan yet with conditions since NGO's anti-campaign pledge seemed a real possibility. Such wariness was reflected by the near two-month procrastination within the National Assembly.

The amalgam of negative sentiment of the System II, coupled with the floundering System I made the Korean decision-making mechanism a very disorganized, haphazard and muddling through procedure. The dilatory and flip-flop nature of the Korean government tantalized the US, as time went on. Unlike the generous suggestions that were conveyed right after the US' request for additional dispatch forces to Iraq, the US released its disappointment and even leaved the possibility of a penalty if the request was not met properly.

However, the US' change of nuance, say, Rumsfeld's comment of relocating some of the USFK to Iraq, aroused greater anti-US sentiment in the System II. This added more pressure on the ROK-US relationship and worsened the Korea's key policy maker in the eyes of the Washington (for instance NSC member Lee Jong Seok was referred as the 'Taliban' within the Washington circles). Eventually, the range of common denominator between the two countries narrowed down.

At first glance, the Korean government seem to gain a significant victory in terms of the 2nd dispatch negotiation. It is no small feat that Korea extracted the maximum concession from the US amidst the growing need of soldiers to secure Iraqi region. However, this can not be interpreted as a successful negotiation, neither a model decision-making process. The second dispatch decision took a long time to be finalized, partly drifted during the procedure. The president's unclear, compromising attitude left the MOFA and MND to degrade into an implementing branch of the NSC, virtually being excluded from the key decisions. Moreover, the NSC itself was worryingly influenced by the participant's – especially the NGO.

Such disarraying decision making mechanism left some negative legacies. First, the pivot of the Level II negotiation faced a serious degradation, leaving the other multiple players to cry out their varying voice that usually function as a gridlock, hampering an effective and efficient decision making. To be sure, president during the Roh administration clearly differs from the Park presidency of 1960~70s. However, even in the modern democratic society, president's role is somewhat similar to a coordinator or perhaps an orchestrator.

As a *primus inter pares*, the president should garner the relevant information and decide the guidelines in a timely fashion. Of course, the emerging multiple voices from System II and System I is unavoidable. But the president need to set the guideline in a swift manner, and try to coordinate the different opinions if possible. As FDR constantly pursued the war-weary Americans to be involved in the WWII, and as president Kennedy asked for a thorough review within the NSC but solely decided the government's stance, the president is the ultimate coordinator in key decision making. President

Roh's indecisiveness paid himself by the National Assembly's passing the impeachment motion on March 12, 2004.

Second, Korea's lagging move eventually infuriated the counterparty, putting a high price tag on the overall national interest. The ROK-US relationship was tested during the Roh administration, being awkward by some events including the middle school girl – US armed vehicle incident of 2002, July. It is somewhat natural that Korea's increasing national strength would expect different relationship with the counterparty.

It is also true that the deepened democratization enabled many other players to partake in the key decision making that may lead to utter confusion and turn war during the process. However, the lack of a pivot in the middle, silenced MOFA and MND, cringed National Assembly and a fierce NGO made Korea's decision making as a haphazard, unreliable process in the eyes of the counterparty, further degrading the credibility of the Korean government.

In that regard, the troop dispatch decision during the Iraqi war can't be categorized it as a 'successful' mechanism.

V. Results

1. Policy Implications and suggestions

After reviewing the three dispatch cases, several implications can be distilled. Among them, five critical implications would be meaningful to be discussed.

Implication I. Voices of the civil society tend to gain trait as democracy progresses, culminating in the strengthened System II

As aforementioned, the participants in the System II during the Vietnam dispatch was under a frail condition, if not completely dead. Apart from the nominal authoritative powers that were stipulated in the constitution and various other law, the asymmetric power distribution between the president and the System II enabled the Park administration to freely organize the Korea's win set with minimum price or resistance.

Yet, almost thirty years later, during the Kim Dae Jung presidency, the civil sector garnered sufficient momentum to convey its own view and message to the System I and II. NGO's staunch support during the East Timor case enabled the president to send troops in the disputed area. President's relationship was becoming more sour with the media, exchanging a tax investigation and a tirades with the president, the NGO's firm footing for the troop dispatch resulted a swift and effective decision.

Coupled of years later, during president Roh, the civil sector gained greater momentum than ever before, actually functioned as shaping the policy itself. Even though president Roh was adamant in sending troops, the NGOs waged a fierce battle against sending risk-inherited combatants in the

contentious region. NGO concentrated its powers towards both the System I and System II to influence the finalized plan. As a result, the National Assembly members maintained its passive stance, due to the NGO's pledge to implement its anti-campaign initiative. In the same token, the NSC members inhibited many of the NGO's stance and indicated through the NSC meeting which eventually ossified the ministry of foreign affairs and ministry of national defense.

All in all, the deepened democracy opened up a new phase of decision making : introducing more players in the decision-making arena, imbuing more authority and power in the System II participants, leading to a more complex, multi-dimensional decision making.

Implication II. When president loses its grips, the whole structure might malfunction

To be sure, this 'grips' do not narrowly refer to an authoritative, tyrant-like control vis-à-vis the other participants within the decision making apparatus. Of course, during the Park presidency, the militaristic top-down command control virtually created the System I – System II as a unitary actor that provides the maximum maneuvering room to president Park. Yet, president Kim Dae Jung soundly orchestrated the various participants under the more democratic structure. His firm ideas were conveyed to the various governmental branches including the NSC.

In particular, the initial negative stance of MOFA and the MND has been changed after confirming the president's strong intention during the NSC meeting. Furthermore, president Park invited the National Assembly members to the blue house to assert his view upon the dispatch. Eventually, East Timor

dispatch was decided and approved within two week time frame. In contrast, the second dispatch during the Iraq was revealed an opposite pattern. After deciding the general principle of distributing troops, president Roh delegated the details to the newly empowered NSC, which were extremely sensitive to the System II (especially the NGO, possessing anti-dispatch stance).

Instead of president Roh orchestrating the decision making process, it turned a turf war between MOFA-NSC and MND-NSC and a passive president, battered by the System II-National Assembly, NGO and the media. Even though initial dispatch stance was forged by the president, such power game lagged the entire process, and as a result, finalized plan that contained a middle-ground approach. In this case alone, without a clear pivot, decision making shown a muddling through, which seem garbage can model a relevant analytic tool to some extent. At first glance, it might be considered as an axiomatic result due to the growing democracy.

However, considering that only 4 to 5 years time gap exist between the East Timor and the Iraq dispatch, the importance of president's role can't be overlooked. In a nutshell, when president's role of a key decision maker and an orchestrator is neglected, the other participants become equal to the role of a president, inhibits an effective and efficient policy making.

Implication III. 'Legitimacy' becomes an important factor in troop dispatch decision

Basically, as in all three cases reflects, troop dispatch decision is made under the assumption that the decision would maximize the national interest of Korea. During the Vietnam war it was the dual mandate of economic development and military modernization. In East Timor, enhancing the

international status of Korea and securing human rights was the key aim. In Iraq, resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis was the major justification.

Yet, as democracy blossoms within the society, interpreting the national interest in a different perspective became rampant. Even though the growing concerns in the System II was existent during the Vietnam dispatch, the dominating power of the president pushed its decision making under his own interpretation of the national interest. At then, the quagmire-like lingering Vietnam war and the complex nature of the South Vietnam, coupled with the increasing number of US casualties fed the US domestic opinion against the war itself. Such phenomenon was possible due to the democrats in the congress and civil rights activist view that 'legitimacy' is vanishing in the war that eventually weakened the cause of the war.

In contrast, president Park utilized his authoritative power in stemming diverging view upon the national interest that might hamper his dual mandate. During the East Timor case, the legitimacy was reinforced by the key factors : 1) the UN resolution and UN's request for troops, as a PKO 2) Indonesian government's official request for assistance 3) president Kim Dae Jung's credentials as a human rights activist. Unlike the Vietnam war, the UN passed the unanimous resolution in order to tackle the turbulent violence in East Timor. This eased the Indonesian government's nerves of a possible interference in internal affairs and officially asked for other countries' troop participation.

Adding to that, the president with a strong track record as a human rights activist claimed for cherishing the value in East Timor. Even through risk-inherited combatants were dispatched, the NGOs within the System II

strongly supported the action that led to a swift and effective dispatch. In contrast, during the Iraq dispatch, System II expressed its utter opposition towards the dispatch plan. Irrespective of the large casualties through 9/11 incident, the clear lack of Iraq and Al-Qaeda and the absence of the presumed WMD and the increasing insurgents in the past was Iraq all vanished the ground of troop maintenance in the region. Coupled with the growing concerns in the international society, domestic participants in the System II gathered their force and dissuade other participants from dispatch combatants in the region.

In conclusion, acquiring legitimacy becomes an important job in the modern day troop dispatch decision making. Since democratization is irrevocable and the strong influence in the System II is very likely in coming years ahead, it will be more difficult to dispatch troops (especially combatants) with negligible price.

Implication IV. International structure does not necessarily fixate the Korea's range of option or win set

Quite counterintuitive to the common sense, the three dispatch case shows that window of option is always open even under the structure that comes from asymmetric power distribution. It is time that throughout that past sixty plus years of ROK-US relationship, the asymmetric nature has never been changed. Moreover, in 'relative' terms, Korea's economic growth and the weakened DPRK modulate the overall Korea-US relations into a more preferable ground. This logically offers more room for the Korean government to stand in a more equal footing vis-à-vis the US. Yet, such enhancing condition does not warrant a favorable outcome.

During the Vietnam war, Korea faced a counterparty with an overwhelming power, under the setting of the cold war. Such heavy onus pushed the president Park to comply US' request without certain condition. Such passiveness was spotted during the first and second dispatch, resulting in a swift dispatch without any reservations.

However, in the later third and fourth dispatch, president Park lagged the process, slowing-down the dispatch decision. He knew it was somewhat inevitable for him to choose sending troops, since the other alternative would entail a heavy price (for instance, forces relocation of USFK to Vietnam) that would disrupt dual mandate as well as the grandiose five-year economic development plan. Thus he overtly acknowledge to send troops but managed the negotiating in a somewhat slow-phase in order to gain practical compensation.

As a result, the Brown memorandum that warranted economic support package side by side with military modernization. Unlike the two former dispatches, president Park emphasized the 'economic benefits' that the dispatch would bring, rather than the moral responsibility of a reciprocity to the help Korea received during the Korean war. In case of East Timor, Korea had a range of options. Considering the nature of the counterparty as an UN, Korea's possible loss by declining its request was manageable (perhaps a deterioration of the ROK's image in the international society as an irresponsible country). Thus, president Kim Dae Jung could issue a broad range of options, starting from open support for the East Timor independence to economic assistance.

However, asserting the responsibility of Korea's participation on

cherishing human rights. Lastly, the troop dispatch decision during Iraq seem quite unfettered from the US pressure at first glance. Truly, the finalized result of 3,000 troop size was far from the US' original version of 5,000 to 10,000 functioning the similar role of a Polish division. However, as mentioned, the decision was led by the other participants in the System I and II beside the passive president.

Due to the divergent voices emanating from various quarters, the US became tired of waiting the finalized result and withdrew its suggestion of economic inducement. This tantalized the US even after troop dispatch has been decided that further deteriorated the overall ROK-US relationship. In the domestic front, the decision of sending combatants in the region infuriated the NGOs and the member in the National Assembly that ensued the impeachment attempt towards the president himself. It left a lasting price to the external as well as internal relationship.

In sum, there is no such a 'fixated' result. Even under an unfavorable international structure, the decision makers can select alternatives that can maximize the outcome – the national interest. Likewise, even in a more favorable condition, a poor decision making can breed a poor outcome, sometimes resulting in a worsening of the national interest.

Implication V. Narrowing the domestic win set would not automatically lead to a favorable outcome

As it is shown in the fourth implication, Korea made more effective decision making during the latter two dispatches, rather than the first two occasions regarding the Vietnam war. Yet, Korea's win set vis-à-vis the US was incomparably wider than the US'. The difference was the point within the

common denominator between the ROK-US. It shifted more closer to Korea as time passed by. Likewise, Korea's win set was substantially high during the East Timor dispatch case, leaving a wide range of common denominator with the US. Under such circumstances, president Kim freely pursued to send 400 size combatants.

In contrast, during the second dispatch during Iraq war, Korea's win set significantly decreased. This squeezed and minimized the window of option that can be negotiated with the US. Rather than making the negotiation more conducive, the each side viewed the counterparty distrustful, eating up the credibility and reliability that were accumulated throughout the 60 year plus ROK-US alliance.

It is logical to think that a narrowed win set might create a result more favorable to Korea, such may induce the counterparty's escalation on further narrowing the win set, making the negotiation unmanageably intense. On the contrary, even under the wide range of win set, a favorable outcome can likely be occur depending upon the decision making process. In this section, the researcher will display some meaningful suggestion in enhancing the troop dispatch decision making. Each of the suggestion layed out here would be corresponding to the each implications described in the previous pages.

**Suggestion I. The government should factor in the System II
participant's view in advance**

Since the democratization process seem to be an on-going, it is very likely that the voice and influence of the System II would inevitably increase. Facing such multiple elements, the president is enticed to choose either circumventing the System II or fully succumbing. In the former case, as it was

in the Nixon administration, the key decisions were made within the White House, neglecting other branches of government and the American public. Even though the exclusive and secretive Nixon-Kissinger decision making channel enabled some extremely successful result like opening red China, the secretive nature eventually precipitated the downfall of Nixon, amplifying the opposing voice from the public at large. In the latter case, the decision would not be formulized and like the second Iraq dispatch, it is very likely to muddle through, dissipating almost every participants both in the System I and II¹⁸⁴.

In order to avoid these two extremes, it is recommendable to gather the opinion of the System II when the issue is being formulized in the System I. At least the president should create a channel with the System II and display that their sentiments are factored in. Total disregard of the System II may contain risks of modification when the motion is sent from the cabinet meeting to the National Assembly. If the plan is not altered, the System II still possess the capability to prolong the discussions that will damage Korea's credibility and make other President's motion (irrespective of the type) more difficult to be passed inside the National Assembly.

Suggestion II. The president should orchestrate the decision making process and display his/her stance in a lucid fashion

Basically, the NSC is the venue for intense discussion on issues regarding

¹⁸⁴ As in the case of Nixon-Kissinger, Gorbachev appear to have worked out by a small group of trusted civilian advisers in the Foreign Ministries and International Department with only limited involvement of the military, regarding major arms control initiatives. However, such feat is possible since the Soviet Union had a strict control of the civil society. Larrabee, Stephen. (1987~1988) "Gorbachev and the Soviet military" 『Foreign Affairs : CFR(66)』 pp. 1011

the national security. The committee members can suggest their view freely but it is the president who calls the shots. Likewise, the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of national defense is fundamentally an organization that implements the decision set by the person at the helm. If the president loses its grips within the System I, the decision making process and drift further, as in the case during the second Iraq dispatch. It is totally understandable that the growing System II may surely put heavy burden on the president's shoulder.

However, if an ambiguous stance is maintained (perhaps out of fear lasting popularity from the general public and a premature lame duck period would follow) towards the other participants, especially the NGOs that lack the legislative authority compared to the president will exploit the occasion and degrade the overall national interest. Thus, the president should understand the basics of the matter in hand and decide his/her plan with the gathered information. Even after the government's plan is submitted to the National Assembly, the president should display the reason and the cause of such decision not only towards the National Assembly members, but to the general public.

Once a certain stance is set, it is important for the president to maintain its consistence this giving clear signals to the counterparty, leaving no room for miscommunication and convey the seriousness of its stance. This would not guarantee the most favorable outcome, but at least such consistence would set a positive setting, both to the external and internal participants that supports the national interest.

Suggestion III. It is important to forge legitimacy in whatever term it

may be

Even if the aforementioned two suggestions are applied in the most favorable attribute, lacking legitimacy will very likely to emanate fierce opposition from the System II that would make the president's task an herculean job. Thus it is an imperative to maximize the legitimacy. Perhaps enhancing this factor might be more important than choosing non-combatants, instead of sending combatants in the region. If some reasonable amount of legitimacy is acquired as it was in the East Timor case, the System II might even support the government's decision of sending combatants.

The best way to garner such legitimacy would be to be backed by the multinational organization that reflects the multiple nations around the globe. If not at least the legitimate government in the disputed area should acknowledge the need for troop participation. Again, the president should strive his/her best effort acquiring the maximum amount of legitimacy, not only when the decision is being shaped, but also when the disputed plan has been submitted to the National Assembly for approval. This ceaseless job has growing importance, especially in the democratic society of the current era.

Suggestion IV. The president should fully understand the structural constraint and should maximize the national interest within that boundary

To be in the president's seat is significantly different from other positions, in or out of the government. As it is in the case of the president Roh, it will be stressed to select either the personal belief and the national interest that limit the personal preferences as an option. However, the structural given – for instance the asymmetric ROK-US alliance – can't be unfettered during

decision making. Since international structure has not been formed in a single day, it can't be reorganized in a single stroke of a pen.

The attempt to reshuffle the setting without the backing of actual power or legitimacy (president Roh's vaunted 'balancer role' in the Far East region, especially between US and China is a stark example¹⁸⁵) would further endanger the national interest. Therefore, it is strongly recommendable to set the initial position factoring in the given circumstances and entailed variables. However, once the negotiation begins, the president should pull the finalized outcome more closer to the Korea's most favorable stance within the common denominator between the Korea-US win set. As it was in the third and fourth dispatch during the Vietnam dispatch, Korea should extract the greatest amount of compensation for the other side.

**Suggestion V. The president should not only consider the win set itself
but the overall implication of the dispatch decision**

As aforementioned, the second dispatch during the Iraq war has achieved the most fair result, on the outset. By disclosing strong dissent from both the System I-NSC and System II-NGO, Korea's win set has been narrowed down to the level that was unforeseen. At first glance, narrowing the win set through domestic opposition may be a logical path for a better outcome, with more equal-ness between Korea and the US.

However, this may blind the reality and have the risk of pursuing for the

¹⁸⁵ At the 40th military academy graduation, president Roh emphasized the unstable feature of the Far East and suggested Korea to function as a balancer in the region, in order to secure peace and prosperity in the Korean Peninsula, including the Far East. See Nocutnews (2005.3.22)

extreme. In fact, the criteria for a successful negotiation is the overall outcome, not only the details of the dispatch decision, but the general legacy it leaves to the external and internal participants. Simply put, if an extreme stance is persistently taken, the finalized decision may prove more favorable. However, the impaired relationship vis-à-vis the counterparty and the degenerated feature due to the internecine in between the domestic participants would evaluate the overall troop dispatch decision as unsuccessful. This happened during the 2nd dispatch during the Iraq war.

In spite of the most favorable outcome, the strained relationship with the counterparty made the US more distrustful to the Korean government, putting less emphasis in the ROK-US alliance and instead elevating the US-Japan alliance to a higher notch. Such negative impact did not halt there. The fierce opposition from the System II participants, NGO in particular, triggered the National Assembly members to embark upon the impeachment attempt, seriously degraded the damaged relation inside out, negatively influence the pending important issues that were against the national interest.

It is fairly important for the president to set the plan, considering the full reverberation of the decision. Stressing again, the criteria on judging the result of a troop dispatch decision should grasp the overall implication, including the finalized plan itself.

2. Hypothesis verification

Since the lessons as well as policy suggestions from the three troop dispatch cases has been dealt in the previous chapter, verifying the three

hypothesis that were laid out in the chapter III will be the gist of this section.

Hypothesis 1 (Even under the asymmetric power distribution, external factors may not solely define the troop dispatch decision) tends to be confirmed in the affirmative way. As pointed out in the implication IV, the decision makers faces a variety of alternatives, even in the most crude situation of an asymmetric power distribution. Bluntly speaking, there are no fixated response under a certain situation. In fact, there are pay-offs and compensation upon every choices the key participants can take. The very gist is whether the selected path can warrant the maximum amount of national interest (in terms of multi-dimensional segments, including economic, military, international status and social cohesion etc) and whether prices that entail can be bearable. To be sure, as mentioned in the suggestion IV, policy makers can't emancipate them from the structural limitation unless inflicting a huge (or exorbitant) damage to its credibility. As shown in the implication IV, the contrast between the 3rd and 4th dispatch during Vietnam and the second dispatch of Iraq war are the most stark example.

In the former case, president Park initially conformed to the US' request in order to receive badly needed help that was critical in achieving his dual mandate. However, he delayed the dispatch, exploiting the other participants in the System I to extract the most beneficial economic and military support package from the US. At face value, the finalized decision of dispatching combat forces look somewhat a subservient, unilaterally imposed decision.

Yet the Korean government distilled the very needed sources to reinforce its own initiatives. Considering the difficult nature of then Korea to receive such huge assistance from international organizations, the decision seem quite

successful, despite some recriminations from quarters that define the dispatch itself as sending ‘mercenaries’ and spilling meaningless blood. In contrast, the Korean government during the Iraq war expressed its strong voice, with the support of the NGOs and the National Assembly member (even some key members in the NSC) who assert for more independent foreign policy, the negotiation with the US lagged on, leaving turmoil in the domestic arena, and deep distrust in the eyes of the US.

Eventually the decisions were made in the middle ground. Compromise to the request of the US to send combatants, the Korean government significantly downgraded its level of troops to 3,000 (which was way smaller than the US version of 5,000 to 10,000 that can function similar as the Polish division). Even though the basic condition was more favorable than the Vietnam war era, the mishandling of the whole job left more ominous elements.

As mentioned in the suggestion V, the decision making should focus on the aggregated sum (including tangible and intangible aspects) of the national interest, rather than the mere outcome of the dispatch itself. In order to achieve that goal, the president should fully understand the structured limit and the possible options within such range, just as suggestion IV pointed out.

Hypothesis 2 (Growing momentum of the civil society is not always a disadvantageous element on the troop dispatch decision) is also confirmed in the affirmative way. In the current democratic structure, the growing influence of the System II – civil society is a given matter. Unless this nation retrogrades to an authoritative state apparatus, participants of the System II will well remain as an important factor in the dispatch decision

making. The important aspect of the System II is its ambivalence. The influence of the System II is not pre-determined. Comparison between the East Timor and Iraq dispatch will be most relevant. During East Timor, the NGOs strongly supported president Kim's decision to send combatant forces to the dispatched area. Irrespective of the risk-inherited nature, NGOs strongly concurred to the decision on the ground of human rights improvement. In contrast, during the Iraq war, president Roh, NSC as well as the National Assembly with a fierce resistance coming from the numerous NGOs. The commonality between the two cases are the significance of the System II-NGO's influence within the decision making process.

However, the former and the later differed in its strategy towards the NGOs that resulted in the opposition extreme. One of the difference was the amount of gathered legitimacy. The request for East Timor dispatch was made by the UN, which passed its resolution in a unilateral fashion. Under such multinational character, Korea's participation seem quite reasonable and credit worthy, both in the eyes of the international society and from the domestic constituency.

The official request from the Indonesian government and president Kim's reputation as a human rights activist reinforced the NGO's ground for troop dispatch. Whereas, the Iraq war was facing growing legitimacy problem with the passage of time. As the nation building process prove to be a formidable task against growing insurgences and US casualties in the region, coupled with the absence of the presumed WMD that justified the invasion in the first place. The international opinion turn sour and the lack of legitimacy made the System II participants in the domestic arena roared against the government's dispatch plan. Eventually the troops were sent, yet with a huge price tag.

As pointed out in the implication III, acquiring legitimacy in whatever kind may assuage the negative public sentiment. Or at least the president should head the System II's opinions from the phase I of decision making that will enhance the procedural legitimacy, as asserted through suggestion I. The Putman's laid out strategy of ankle-tying of narrowing the win set, via the opposition from the domestic domain should be carefully applied in terms of suggestion II and IV. If the president lacks the understanding of the structured limits or fails to convey his/her own stance that virtually delegate the decision makings to other participants, the strong System II would actually lead to a detrimental conclusion. As explained in the suggestion V, a mere narrowing of the win set through a strong System II would not allow to achieve the goal of maximizing the national interest.

Hypothesis 3 (Due to higher risk perception, troop dispatch in Multinational Forces face greater headwind compared to Peace Keeping Operation) seem to be confirmed in the affirmative way, yet there are some reservation. Truly, there are overt difference between the MNF and the PKO in terms of the role and the rules of engagement. As mentioned, the MNF is basically forged as a coalition of the willing, mostly for combat and security restoration that contain risk of casualties during combat. Thus, heavy armament and resilient rules of engagement is adopted. In contrast, the PKO is forged under the UN's request, armed with light armament, applying a strict rules of engagement, allowing combat for self-defense only. This difference usually form a dispatch opinion from the general public.

However, the critical factor of such differing view is the problem of legitimacy, not the composition of forces. In fact, the troops that were dispatched to East Timor was initially gathered as a MNF under the UN. The

force changed its nature as a PKO, few months later. Basically, the troops are equipped with heavy armor. Moreover, the situation in East Timor was far from stability to the indigenous people. Thus, the biggest difference that led to the different public sentiment was 'legitimacy' not the type of the force itself. However, considering the attributes of its cause and the missions (and the issuer – UN), PKO would most likely face smaller resistance compared to the MNF. Again, the importance of gaining maximum legitimacy is more important as it is revealed in the suggestion III.

3. Factual summary

This section concentrates on the visualization of the three dispatch cases. In order to attain that goal, the researcher introduced two matrices and a bar chart, imbuing certain numbers to grasp the basic trend. Even the numbers and the figures used here are not as accurate as the result of a statistical model, nevertheless it offers a useful insight into the matter, enabling one to understand the point with great ease.

Cases		Vietnam				East Timor	Iraq	
Type of Factor	Dispatch Participant	1 st	2 nd	3 rd	4 th	1 st	1 st	2 nd
External Factor	Counterparty	S	S	S	S	M	M	M
Domestic Factor (System I)	President	S	S	S	S	S	M	W
	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	W	W	W	W	W	W	W
	Ministry of National Defense	W	W	W	W	W	W	W
	National Security Council	W	W	W	W	W	M	S
Domestic Factor (System II)	National Assembly	W	W	W	W	M	M	M
	NGO	W	W	W	W	S	S	S
	Media	W	W	W	W	M	M	M

S : Strong, M : Moderate, W : Weak

Table 10. Matrix : The Participants

Table 10 is the matrix of the each participants that are involved in the troop dispatch decision making. As it is annotated, the alphabet S, M and W stands for Strong, Moderate and Weak influence, respectively. In particular, ‘strong’ are colored in order to understand the most influential participant at each dispatch cases. First, the US during the Vietnam war era maintained its strong clout under the asymmetric ROK-US alliance. Its influence tend to moderate, due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the start of the post cold-war era. President Park and Kim both attained strong influence, due to the authoritarian political structure for the former and the track record and the accumulated credential as a staunch supporter of the democratic cause to the latter. President Roh lost such vintage point, especially during the 2nd dispatch

during the Iraq war. Meanwhile, the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of national defense maintained its low profile and as an implementation branch of the government throughout the three dispatches.

NSC also functioned as a venue of discussion yet after it gained institutional power on 2003 March, its influence has shown an upsurge during the 2nd dispatch. Meanwhile, the National Assembly was weak during the presidency of Park Jung Hee but imbued with greater power during president Kim and Roh's era, thanks to the progressive democracy in South Korea. NGOs had a radical power shift during the 30 year time period. Its influence was minimal at best during Vietnam due to president Park's strong grips on the System II. However, gained it significance once the deepening democracy provided greater power to the civil society. The media shown a similar trait yet with a lesser degree during East Timor & Iraq, due to the president's vigilant check vis-à-vis the media's purview.

Focusing at the participants that have 's' would explain the pivot of the decision making. During Vietnam, the US and the president Park mainly shaped the outcome. During East Timor, president Kim's strong stance, backed by the support of the NGO enabled a swift dispatch decision. And during Iraq case, the fierce NGO and the influenced NSC strongly tamed the past dispatch tendencies that had certain inertia and momentum.




Figure 26. Participant’s influence during the three dispatches

Figure 26 contains similar implication with the table 10 matrix. In this bar chart, the participant’s influence is counted in numbers. The researcher put 3, 2 and points to ‘s’, ‘m’ and ‘w’, respectively. When dispatches are made in multiple occasions (Vietnam and Iraq) averaged number was used. Again, it can be confirmed by this bar chart is the shifting power relationship between the participants. As time goes by, the counterparty and the president’s relative influence mitigated and the National Assembly and the NGO gained traits. In sum, the influence between System I and II participants have somewhat become more equalized.

Cases	Dispatch	Preferred stance And the outcome			Time Frame** (Days)
		Korea	Outcome	US/UN*	
Vietnam	1 st	Combatant	Non-Combatant (Medic, Instructor)	Non-Combatant (Media, Instructor)	82
	2 nd	Combatant	Non-Combatant (Engineer, Transportation unit)	Non-Combatant (Engineer, Transportation unit)	42
	3 rd	Combatant	Combatant	Combatant	118
	4 th	Combatant	Combatant	Combatant	78
East Timor	1 st	Combatant	Combatant	Combatant	13
Iraq	1 st	Non-Combatant (Media, Engineer)	Non-Combatant (Medic, Engineer)	Not clearly Outlined	142
	2 nd	Non-Combatant (3,000) (Regional Reconstruction)	Combatant (3,000) (Regional Reconstruction)	Combatant (5,000 ~ 10,000) Security Maintenance	160

* US : Vietnam, Iraq, UN : East Timor

** From official request for dispatch to the approval of the National Assembly

Table 11. Negotiations : initial stance and the result

Table 11 is a matrix that reflects the original stance (or preferred outcome) and the finalized result. During the first two dispatches, the US materialized its preferred outcome, against the Korea's willingness to send combatants. However, during the latter two dispatches, the both parties conceived and choose to dispatch combatants. However, the president's strenuous effort to maximize the compensation from the US president Park intentionally lagged the process. This could be confirmed by the increased time frame of 118 days of the third dispatch, compared to the previous ones. Meanwhile, president Park strongly agreed to participate in East Timor, responding in the most swift

fashion to the UN's request for troop dispatch. In contrast, the two Iraqi dispatch displayed the extensive muddling through process, reflected by the long time frame of 142 and 160 days. In the first dispatch, Korea sent medic and engineer forces just as what Korean government intend to send from the first place. The first dispatch during the Iraq war was rather less contentious due to the US' ambiguous stance by not clearly outlining the specifics of the preferred forces.

However, the second dispatch reveal an intensive negotiation that led to a perfectly middle ground that left uneasiness to both of the parties. The finalized outcome of the 3,000 combatants for regional reconstruction task was small in number to US' initial request of 5,000 to 10,000 (and the purpose was downgraded from security maintenance to reconstruction). Whereas, troop type was different from Korea's original suggestion of non-combatant (even though the number of troops were somewhat identical to the Korea's initial plan).

VI. Conclusion

1. Limitation of this thesis

By reviewing Korea's troop dispatch cases, this thesis aimed to achieve three objectives : 1) To extract the decision-making pattern from the previous dispatches 2) To distill meaningful implication 3) Outlining important policy suggestions that might be helpful in the future dispatch decision making. Yet there exist some limitations in this paper.

First, it has been ten years since Korea's dispatch to Iraq has been decided. Many elements of the structure have undergone significant changes during the 10 year time frame. In particular, the growing influence of the NGO and the media has not been fully grasped since troop dispatch of a significant number (apart from several PKO dispatched) was absent during the 10 year period. The increasing nature of the System II can be indirectly gauged through the mad-cow disease incident or the FTA issue. However, dispatching combatants would be a totally different matter. Furthermore, the impact of a global economic meltdown of 2008, triggered by the fall of the Lehmann Brothers must have influenced the government apparatus' calculation upon the cost, it too has not been tested until recently.

Second, The convenient nature of singling out three dispatch cases may lose some important implication by neglecting other PKO dispatch cases. Even though the PKO dispatch legislation¹⁸⁶ has been passed in 2010, thorough review upon other dispatches cases would offer some meaningful

¹⁸⁶ This made the troop dispatch more easier that the MNF since the newly adopted legislative relieved the PKO to be sent to the disputed region without the plenary session approval in the National Assembly

insight regarding decision making within the System I.

Third, this paper did not deal in the possible North Korean issue. The brittleness of the current Kim Jong Un regime increases the probability of an implosion that might lead to a chaotic situation. Even if such abrupt circumstances do not materialize, the North Korean government's growing incapability in terms of domestic control may heighten the possibility of a gradual loss of control regain the central government, heading towards dissolution, which is equivalent to the implosion. Or in a more dire condition, all-out military clash between the two Koreas may occur, albeit with a less likelihood. Under such setting, the international society might forge a PKO to supervise the North Korean territory and engage in a nation building process. Considering the xenophobic nature of the North Korean citizen, US involvement in the region may cause a serious uprising and a physical clash that might turn the issue into a harsher situation. Thus, sending Korean troops as a PKO in the region would soften the process and speed up the nation-building process, utilizing the advantage of same language, same ethnic background. In that regard, finding out the most effective and efficient way of decision making is a very important matter that must be dealt.

Fourth, this thesis has took a qualitative approach in a political orientation towards the subject, giving lesser emphasis in the economic aspect, quantitative feature is somewhat missing. In order to see the process with more accuracy, an economic oriented, quantitative analytic method should be added.

2. Final remarks

Dispatching military personnel to abroad that contains the risk of combat is perhaps one of the most sensitive and political decisions that a governmental apparatus can make. Due to its inherent risk and the overall implication to the nation at large, it involves in a delicate decision making by the key participants in and out of the government. Even with the already formulized standard operating procedure, the built in institutional settings do not fixate the result. Instead, the different strategies of the players shape the path of a certain outcome.

Therefore, it is important to cherry pick the problematic nature and suggest a better alternative decision making mechanism. Under such basic premise, this thesis singled out the three past important dispatch cases and attempt to thoroughly review the process and details. Irrespective of the somewhat limited aspect of the analytical tools that were utilized, some meaningful implications are distilled. Of course, it is left to the policy makers, who are actively involved in statecraft to choose the most appropriate way to dispatch troops, or whether to send or not to send troops, the suggestions lay out in this paper would at least help the process to get a bit closer in maximizing the national interest.

This particular subject is not squarely sided to the merit of academic area. Considering the unification matter that contains the possible implosion of North Korean government, sending troops turns into a practical debate issue in the real world. Since mishandling troop dispatch process can seriously strain the relationship with the counterparty as well as in between the domestic participants, inventing other innovative and constructive suggestion is badly needed. In that context, more thorough review upon this subject, backed by more deeper insight will be critical.

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국문초록

군의 해외파병은 필연적으로 고도의 정치적인 정책결정 과정을 수반하며 파병의 사회 전체적인 파급력을 감안할 시 국익과 직결되는 중요한 사항임을 알 수 있다. 교전으로 인해 발생할 수 있는 내재적 위험과는 별개로, 한 국가의 파병결정은 주변국의 위협 인식의 변화, 힘의 세력구도 변동, 무력 사용국간 신뢰도 증감을 통해 직간접적으로 국제질서에 영향을 주며 복합적인 연쇄효과로 이어지는 경향이 있다. 문명이 시작된 이래로 많은 정치 개체들이 현상유지를 타파하고자 무력사용을 시도하였으며 주변국의 파병을 요청함으로써 분쟁국가 대비 힘의 우위를 지키려 하였다. 현 탈냉전 체제는 일견 대규모 분쟁이 없는 긴 평화의 시기가 될 것으로 관측되었으나 수세기간 잠복해오던 종교적, 인종적 불만 요소들이 강하게 분출되면서 안보에 대한 수요를 도리어 증가시키는 방향으로 작용하였다. 그러한 문맥에서 볼 때, 파병의 가능성은 보다 높아졌다고 평가할 수 있으며 효과적이고 효율적인 파병결정에 대한 필요성 또한 이에 연동해서 높아졌다고 사료된다.

본 논문은 이상적인 정책결정 과정 혹은 매커니즘을 모색하고자 하는 것에 주 목적을 두었으며 파병결정에 영향을 주는 다양한 행위자들을 분석에 포괄하려 하였다. 대부분의 선행연구는 국가이익의 극대화를 궁극의 목적으로 취하는 합리적이고 일관적인 국가중심적 정책결정 과정을 기본 전제로 삼았으나, 정책 결정은 사실상 상이한 관점을 내포하고 있는 다양한 행위자들간의 복합적인 접점의 결과물이다. 분석의 타당성을 높이기 위해 연구자는 변형된 양면

게임 이론 (Putnam이 제시한 기본 모형에 David Easton이 제시한 시스템 이론의 강점을 가미하였음)을 사용하였으며 이를 통해 국가간 협상과정 및 국가내 정책과정을 설명하였다. 요약하자면, 파병결정 과정은 국가간, 국가내 행위자들의 다면 협상을 통한 결과물로 이해할 수 있다. 본 논문은 파병결정과 관련하여 몇 가지 유용한 함의를 추출하고자 약 40여년의 시간적 범주를 포괄한 세 가지 과거 사례 (베트남 (1964~1966), 동티모르 (1999), 이라크 (2003))를 선택하여 분석을 시도하였다.

변형된 투레벨 게임 분석을 통해 몇몇 시사점을 도출하였다. 첫째, 지속되는 민주화 과정을 통한 시민사회의 성장은 NGO와 언론을 비롯한 정부외 행위자들에게 큰 힘을 실어주고 있다. 둘째, 대통령이 파병결정에 대해 주도권을 상실하고 방관적 위치에 서게 되는 순간 결정과정 전체가 흔들리게 된다. 셋째, '적법성' 요소가 파병결정에 지대한 영향을 준다. 넷째, 국제적인 구조 자체가 한국의 원셋 자체를 항상 결정짓는 요인으로만 작용하지는 않는다. 다섯째, 자국의 원셋을 줄이는 것이 자동적으로 최적의 협상결과로 이어지는 않는다. 상기한 부분들을 개선하고 보완하기 위해 본 논문에서는 다음과 같은 정책 제언을 한다. 먼저 정부는 파병과 관련된 시민사회의 관점 및 의견을 사전에 고려해야 하며 대통령은 파병결정을 직/간접적으로 주관하며 당 사안에 대한 본인의 의견을 명확하게 제시해야 한다. 또한 정책 결정 과정에서 어떠한 형태로든지 적법성을 창조할 필요가 있으며, 대통령은 주어진 구조적 제약을 잘 인식하고 있어야 하며 그 범주 내에서 국익 극대화를 추구해야 한다. 마지막으로 대통령은 한국의 원셋만을 고려할 것이 아니라 파병결정의 총

체적 파급력을 고려해야 한다.

파병결정 과정을 보다 깊은 차원에서 분석하면서 본 논문은 향후 발생할 수 있는 파병과 관련하여 보다 유연하면서 진통을 최소화하는 정책 제언을 시도하였으며 이는 국가간, 국내 행위자들간 마찰을 줄이는 동시에 국익 극대화에 한발짝 더 가까이 갈 수 있는 대안을 제시하였다는 차원에서 그 의의가 있다고 판단된다.

주요어: 해외파병, 정책결정 과정, 원셋

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