



저작자표시-비영리-변경금지 2.0 대한민국

이용자는 아래의 조건을 따르는 경우에 한하여 자유롭게

- 이 저작물을 복제, 배포, 전송, 전시, 공연 및 방송할 수 있습니다.

다음과 같은 조건을 따라야 합니다:



저작자표시. 귀하는 원저작자를 표시하여야 합니다.



비영리. 귀하는 이 저작물을 영리 목적으로 이용할 수 없습니다.



변경금지. 귀하는 이 저작물을 개작, 변형 또는 가공할 수 없습니다.

- 귀하는, 이 저작물의 재이용이나 배포의 경우, 이 저작물에 적용된 이용허락조건을 명확하게 나타내어야 합니다.
- 저작권자로부터 별도의 허가를 받으면 이러한 조건들은 적용되지 않습니다.

저작권법에 따른 이용자의 권리는 위의 내용에 의하여 영향을 받지 않습니다.

이것은 [이용허락규약\(Legal Code\)](#)을 이해하기 쉽게 요약한 것입니다.

[Disclaimer](#)

국제학석사학위논문

The 2012~2015 ROK-Japan Summit
Disengagement :

Constructivist analysis based on
national identity and historical memory

2012~2015 한일정상회담의 부재

-국가정체성과 역사적 기억으로 본 구성주의적 분석-

2016년 2월

서울대학교 국제대학원

국제학과 국제지역학 전공

박 범 준

국제학석사학위논문

**The 2012~2015 ROK-Japan Summit
Disengagement :**

**Constructivist analysis based on national identity
and historical memory**

2012~2015 한일정상회담의 부재

-국가정체성과 역사적 기억으로 본 구성주의적 분석-

2016년 2월

서울대학교 국제대학원

국제학과 국제지역학전공

박 범 준

국제학석사학위논문

2012~2015 한일정상회담의 부재

-국가정체성과 역사적 기억으로 본 구성주의적 분석-

The 2012~2015 ROK-Japan Summit

Disengagement :

**Constructivist analysis based on national identity
and historical memory**

2016년 2월

서울대학교 국제대학원

국제학과 국제지역학전공

박 범 준

The 2012~2015 ROK-Japan Summit Disengagement
-Constructivist analysis based on national identity and historical
memory-

지도교수 박철희

이 논문을 국제학석사학위논문으로 제출함

2016년 2월

서울대학교 국제대학원
국제학과 국제지역학전공
박범준


박범준의 석사논문을 인준함

2016년 2월

위원장 한영혜

부위원장 신성호

위원 박철희



Abstract

The 2012~2015 ROK-Japan Summit Disengagement -Constructivist analysis based on national identity and historical memory-

성명: Park Bumjoon

학과 및 전공: International Studies, International Area Studies
Graduate School of International Studies
Seoul National University

The more than three years long summit disengagement following the rapid chilling of relations from late 2012, immediately after the heydays of ROK-Japan “shuttle diplomacy”, was a puzzling turn of events. Although the initial discord of 2012 could be attributed to several visible events like President Lee’s visit to Dokdo, it is difficult to provide an easy answer as to why such discord continued for such a long time in the form of summit disengagement. There have been troubled relations in the past, but this was the first time summitries were foregone for such a long time. This paper seeks to explain this anomalous summit disengagement between the ROK and Japan during the years 2012~2015.

Based on the understanding that Realist and Liberal security/utility maximizing rational choice models prescribe closer cooperation and not disengagement between the ROK and Japan, I have employed the Constructivist approach to analyze the 2012~2015 summit disengagement by employing the concepts of national identity and historical memory, and their functions in the ROK-Japan relational dyad. As a result, from examining various statements of the two countries' heads of state and their foreign policy conceptions, and how the eventual November 2015 summitry and December 2015 announcement on mutual steps for resolving the issue of comfort women came to be, it was possible to identify frictions between the Park administration's national identity of regional moderator and the Abe administration's national identity of resurgent Japan. Specifically, the frictions arose between the Park administration's pursuits of trustpolitik that conceptualized Japan's trustworthiness on its succession of "correct understanding of history", and the Abe administration's passive reactions on issues regarding history due to their controversial nature, the issues' negative effects to the pursuit of Japan's pride and honor, and the relatively small presence of the ROK in the administration's foreign policy conception. Present in this friction were divergent historical memories that conditioned the Park administration's pursuit of Japan's "correct understanding of history", and the Abe

administration's pursuit of Japan's pride and controversies in its domestic politics like those regarding history education. Similar friction could also be found in the issue of comfort women between the ROK and Japan.

Keywords: Korea-Japan relations, Summit disengagement, National identity, Historical memory, Comfort women, Trustpolitik

Student ID.: 2013-22064

Table of Contents

I. Introduction-----	1
II. Literature Review -----	4
III. Friction of National Identities between the Park and Abe administrations -----	17
1. Park administration’s national identity of regional mediator -----	19
2. Abe administration’s national identity of resurgent Japan -----	24
3. Lead up to the November 2015 summitry; incremental convergences of national identity -----	31
IV. Analysis of the Friction of National Identities Through the Issue of Comfort Women -----	39
1. Trust and the issue of comfort women in statements of President Park --	42
2. Japan’s honor and the issue of comfort women in PM Abe’s statements --	44
3. December 2015 announcement of mutual steps to resolve the issue of comfort women-----	47
V. Conclusion -----	53
Bibliography	
Appendix 1	
Appendix 2	
Appendix 3	

I. Introduction

Anyone familiar with the ROK (Republic of Korea)-Japan bilateral relations would recognize that it has been characterized by a cycle of antagonism and rapprochement. In this paper, I seek to explain how and why the anomalously long disengagement of summitry in the 2012-2015 periods occurred between President Park Geun-hye and Prime Minister (PM) Abe Shinzo governments respectively of the ROK and Japan.¹ While it can be argued that a summit meeting in and of itself has little actual substance in devising diplomatic agreements, it nevertheless can be understood as an important part of modern diplomacy in that it (1) provides bureaucratic and political strength to diplomatic efforts as the summits jointly endorse them as the highest executive authorities, (2) demonstrates that there has been substantive negotiations with only some final agreements left for the heads of states, and (3) publicly present the countries' relations as amicable. In this sense, the recent 3.5 years of exceptionally long absence of a summit meeting between the ROK and Japan through the 2012~2015 period signified that there were a relative lack of negotiated agreements or efforts for the heads of states of finalize or provide support for. It is this lack of the heads

¹ Specifically the periods between PM Abe's and President Park's inaugurations in December 26th 2012 and February 25th 2013 respectively, and the eventual summit meeting in November 2nd 2015.

of states' engagement in bilateral diplomacy, amidst the existence of various issues of common interests² and their comparatively vibrant engagements with the heads of other states, that made the ROK-Japan relations between 2012~2015 seen as being in a bad state. This, seen in contrast to the high point of ROK-Japan relations we have witnessed in the “shuttle diplomacies” between the immediately former President Lee Myung Bak and PMs Fukuda Yasuo, Hatoyama Yukio, Kan Naoto, and Noda Yoshihiko, is what is commonly being described as the “deterioration” of ROK-Japan relations. The situation is more anomalous considering the fact that there have always been reciprocal summitries between the two countries. As shown in Appendix 1, ROK-Japan summitries were regularly held within every 3 years from 1990 to 2013 for 23 years.

As I will explain in the following literature review, security/utility maximizing rational choice models of Realist and Liberal international relations theories may explain how such summit disengagement was possible, but they do not sufficiently provide an explanation as to why such an anomalous disengagement took place at all. Only when viewed through the Constructivist lens, we can understand the summit disengagement to have been a result of the

² See The Federation of Korean Industries (2015), for details on possible economic and business cooperation; Bek (2015) for security; and East Asia Institute (2015) for possible ROK-Japan cooperation regarding N. Korea.

frictions between the ROK's and Japan's national identities based on divergent historical memories. Readings of President Park's and PM Abe's various foreign policy statements reveal that they have each conceptualized the ROK's and Japan's national identities as respectively that of "regional mediator" and "resurgent Japan". It is not that these two identities are directly in conflict with each other, but the divergent historical memories of Japan's colonization of Korea have a significant influence in the case of the ROK-Japan national identity dyad. It is this influence of divergent historical memories between the ROK and Japan that appears to have caused diplomatic frictions in the two countries pursuits of their national identities, which in turn produced the 2012~2015 summit disengagement. To explain this in detail, I will first provide a literature review of previous works on ROK-Japan relations to justify the use of Constructivist approach and the scrutinizing of national identities. Then, I will analyze the conceptions of the Park administration's and Abe administration's national identities to reveal their frictions in divergent historical memories, followed by a similar analysis on the issue of "comfort women",³ since it was the issue most widely cited as reason for the summit disengagement.

³ There are strong arguments for using the term "wartime sex slaves" instead of "comfort women", since the latter term is a euphemism for what was in actuality sex slavery. However, I have decided to use the term "comfort women" for easier reference, since the discussions surrounding the issue have been using this term.

II. Literature Review

Discord in ROK-Japan relations, influence of ideational variables like national identity, historical memory, and nationalism are all common subjects for studies on international relations of Northeast Asia in general, evaluations of ROK-Japan bilateral relations in particular, and issue specific topics like that of the comfort women. First, the overarching question regarding international relations in Northeast Asia in general and bilateral relations between the ROK and Japan in particular, and subsequently issue specific topics of ROK-Japan relations, has been whether the relations would be cooperative or conflictual. Friedberg (1994) once evaluated Asia to be “ripe for rivalry” due to there being insufficient mitigating factors for cooperation like regional institutionalization and sufficient economic interdependence, that could keep a check on the aggravating factors for conflict like trends towards multipolarity, historical animosity, and arms buildup. Pempel (2006) on the other hand found sufficient factors for countries in East Asia to cooperate, and views sufficient possibilities for the trend of regional economic cooperation and integration to spill over even into the field of security cooperation.

So far, Northeast Asia has yet to see real conflict despite identifiable aggravating factors like changes in balance of power, arms buildup, lack of international institutional framework, and so on. Perhaps this is a result of growth

in regional cooperative frameworks in economics and security as argued by Pempel (2006). However, although not to the point of straight out conflict, Northeast Asian countries have been subjected to turbulent shifts in relationships between amity and contention. Park (2012) identified two phases of “strategic convergence” that shifted ROK-Japan relations in recent years. First was the phase of strategic convergence between the ROK and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) against Japan between 1998 and 2007, and the second was the phase of strategic convergence between the ROK and Japan against the PRC (p. 154). The key factor Park (2012) identifies as precipitating this kind are the countries strategic outlooks on issues like those regarding North Korea, the rise of the PRC’s economic and military presence, those regarding history, the US presence in the region, and so on. In this vein, the straining of ROK-Japan relations starting from late 2012 can be understood to have occurred due to another shift in the two countries’ strategic outlooks on various issues. Park (2014) views the two countries’ colliding “national strategic identities” between Japan’s overarching concern over the PRC as an object to balance against, and the ROK’s need for cooperation with China for its North Korea policies and the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative, as well as its need for resolving the issue of comfort women.

Like the divide described by Park (2014) between the ROK's and Japan's perspectives over the PRC. One popular explanation for the ROK-Japan disengagement is the "rising China" argument. This argument claims that due to the ending of the Cold War, and the economic and strategic rise of the PRC, Japan no longer commands the important position it used to in ROK's diplomatic considerations. The year 2015 is a symbolic year for ROK-Japan relations in that it is the 50th anniversary of diplomatic normalization, and the 70th anniversary of Korea's independence from Imperial Japan, and the end of the Second World War in Asia Pacific. For this symbolic occasion, many commentaries and reports regarding the recent disengagement between the ROK and Japan were made by various academics and think tanks, and many of them have identified the rise in The PRC's economic importance and the US and Japan's responses to the PRC's military postures in the South China Sea as the background that precipitated the ROK-Japan disengagement.⁴ Some like Michishita (2014), while acknowledging limitations and problems, observes the ROK to be essentially bandwagoning the PRC's rise, and argues that the ROK's perception of the importance of cooperation with Japan will continue to decrease without changes in attitudes

⁴ Such can be found in Masao Okonogi's 2015 AJISS (Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies) commentary among others.

towards countering the PRC's rise.

However, this explanation only makes sense when viewed under an offensive realist framework. It is true that the ROK has made strides in deepening its relations with the PRC through the conclusion of a Free Trade Agreement, and becoming a founding member of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) initiated by the PRC, and frequent summitries. Nevertheless, the ROK's improved relationship with the PRC has no reason to be in a zero-sum relationship with its relationship with Japan. If such understanding was the case, it would mean that the ROK has made a conscious decision to accommodate China's revisionist stance towards the international system. However, ROK's behavior towards China cannot be understood to be entirely accommodating, considering the strong security ties it maintains with the US. Also, the question of whether China is indeed a revisionist power is still up for debate. Thus, although it is true that the ROK has deepened its engagement with the PRC as it disengaged with Japan, it cannot be said that the former has been a definite causal factor to the later.

Another possible explanation is that the ROK and Japan, as democratic governments, are simply following the preferences of their citizens as a 'reactive government'. Based on observations, a great number of scholars including Johnston (2012), Park (2013), and Kim (2015) all find public outcries on issues of

historical memories to be of significant influence to the diplomatic behaviors of Northeast Asian countries. According to polls, citizens of both the ROK and Japan have been increasingly viewing each other negatively since 2012. Just a few months following the 2012 ROK-Japan summitry, President Lee made a surprise visit to the Dokdo/Takeshima Island on August 10th 2012, making him the first ROK President to make such a visit to the island that is effectively administered by ROK but claimed by Japan to be part of its territory. This action soured ROK's relationship with Japan, and was reciprocated by Japan's proposal for instigating proceedings before the International Court of Justice regarding the Dokdo/Takeshima matter, to which the ROK has declined. This action was then taken seriously by the Korean public as an attempt at infringing the ROK's sovereignty. A survey by the Genron NPO and East Asia Institute (2015) shows the Dokdo/Takeshima issue to be one of the greatest factors for Koreans' negative views towards Japan (p. 6). Additionally, what may have also instigated greater popular resentment from Japan was Lee's subsequent statement that was perceived in Japan as calling for the Emperor's apology as a precondition if he wishes to visit the ROK. According to the Japanese Cabinet Office's (2013) survey, positive perceptions of the ROK fell from 62.2% to 39.2% of the respondents, while negative perspectives increased from 35.3% to 59%.

Furthermore, there have been a slew of other independent surveys indicating the same trend.

However, like the rising China argument, a correlation between the deterioration of public sentiments towards one country, and the deterioration of diplomatic relations, does not necessarily mean that the former has caused the later. It could just as well be the case that the strained image of bilateral relations is what is causing the public to construct the bad image, and when relations improve, the public may change its perception. It could be the public that is reacting to the actions of the government.⁵ Another shortcoming of the reactive government argument is that there is a mismatch between what the public considers as important, and what the government is stressing. As mentioned in the above paragraph, what the ROK public considers as the greatest issue between the ROK and Japan is the territorial dispute of Dokdo/Takeshima. However, as discussed in the above section, although the Dokdo/Takeshima issue is not something the ROK government takes lightly, it is not what is specifically cited by the Park administration as an issue that needs to be addressed for a summitry with Japan.⁶ Conversely, the Comfort Women issue, which is being directly cited by

⁵ This is further complicated when considering other related factors like the “framing effect” and other media effects.

⁶ This is understandable considering the fact that the ROK is effectively controlling the islands,

President Park as the issue that needs attention for the progress of ROK-Japan relations, is surveyed by The Asan Institute for Policy Studies [Asan] (2014) in 2013 to be considered by the ROK public as the least important factor for ROK-Japan relations (p. 29). Moreover, the same report also found that around 65.4% of respondents were supportive of a ROK-Japan summit, and were found to consider President Park's efforts necessary for the resumption of summitry (Asan, 2014, p. 22). Furthermore, responses in all periods of this 2013 survey show that those in favor of a ROK-Japan summitry outnumbered those against it (Asan, 2014, p. 23). Assuming that such public opinions were sufficiently conveyed to the government, public opinion should have been a positive, not a negative factor, for a ROK-Japan summitry.

Accepting a prolonged absence of summitry to be a signal of bad ROK-Japan relations, how is it possible to explain its occurrence? Realists would find answers in the systemic power configurations of the East Asia region. Victor Cha's (1999) Quasi-Alliance model explains that symmetric and asymmetric perceptions of abandonment and entrapment by the U.S. pressure the ROK and Japan to either let historical tensions burst, or form closer relationships (p. 199). According to this model, the 2012~2015 summit disengagement, along with other

and thus has the interest not to make it appear as a territorial dispute.

recent ROK-Japan disputes, can be explained as a result of symmetric understandings of U.S. security commitment by the ROK and Japan, similar to the situation of 1980s. The argument is that the ROK and Japan can afford to let tensions of historical issues run its course because they are less constrained by security concerns that would otherwise reign in such issues. This argument does explain how the external environment allowed certain issues to exert themselves, but does not provide any explanation for why such issues exist as contending issues in the first place.

Berger (2003), while finding there to be some Realist and Neoliberal explanations to ROK-Japan diplomatic tensions, argues that Realist and Neoliberal logic provides stronger reasons for the two countries to cooperate, and explains that it is necessary to investigate the influence of historical memories in the ROK's and Japan's constructed understanding of each other in order to comprehend the "less rational" interactions of the two (p. 400). There is no place for ideational factors like historical memory in the Realist⁷ and Liberal⁸ IR

⁷ There are variations in Realist international relations theory, such as Classical Realism, Neo (or structural) realism, Offensive Realism, and Defensive Realism. Although these variations disagree on exactly how states would maximize security, they all hold the rational drive for security maximization in an anarchical international environment as their core assumption.

⁸ Liberal international relations theory also has numerous variations like Neoliberal Institutionalism, Economic Interdependence Theory, Democratic Peace Theory, etc. Although different from Realism, Liberalism also considers states to rational, albeit as utility maximizers in

theories' security/utility maximizing rational choice models. Only a Constructivist approach can help us analyze the ROK- Japan summit disengagement through ideational factors.

The Constructivist critique is that states' behaviors are not given, but are constructed by intangible and conceptual factors like identity, historical memory, and culture (Fierke, 2007, p. 80). Analyzing ideational concepts like historical memory or national identity is part of the Constructivist IR theory's method that seeks to explain how national interests, understandings of how the world works, and perceptions of other nations are constructed and constrained by 'identities' (Wendt, 1992, p. 393). Kim (2015) even finds national identities to have been the stronger factor to external strategic factors throughout the history of ROK-Japan relations. Several other scholars including Gilbert Rozman, Thomas U. Berger, and Cheol Hee Park have analyzed the influence of ideational factors, specifically of national identity and historical memories, in fermenting antagonism in ROK-Japan relations.

Rozman (2013) makes an expansive explanation for bilateral animosities in East Asia, based on national identity gaps between different East Asian countries (p. 7). National identity is a contended concept that attempts to define a

an anarchic international environment.

phenomena that is prone to change, and is composed of multiple dimensions.⁹ Rozman (2013) recognizes this and attempts to remedy the problem by treating the dyad as the basic unit of analysis, covering the identities of both parties that can be measured and traced over time, and concentrating on the states as single actors (p. 176). He also argues for understanding national identities in a six-dimensional framework of ideological, temporal, sectoral, vertical, horizontal, and depth (Rozman, 2013, p. 155). In this conception, Rozman (2013) evaluates the temporal dimension of national identity in the ROK-Japan dyad to be the one with the greatest gap (p. 171). Although this evaluation is based on events up to 2010, it is still arguably the most relevant, since it is the dimension most closely tied to historical memory, which features very prominently in ROK-Japan animosities.

Berger and Park also consider historical memory as a key component in the construction of diplomatic postures between the ROK and Japan. Berger (2003) claims that despite some ideological bases for cooperation, animosities were maintained due to the ROK's historical memory of colonial rule by Imperial Japan, and the Japanese selective memory of victimhood (p. 402). From this, it is possible to understand two important features of historical memory in the ROK-Japan dyad. One is that there is a disproportionate presence of the other in the two

⁹ See Smith (1991) for discussions on the concept of national identity.

countries' conception of national identity. While the colonial experience is presented quite prominently in the ROK's historical memory, Japan's memories of colonial rule of Korea are overshadowed by those of dual victimhood to the US atomic bombings and the Imperial military (p. 403). This feature of historical memory in ROK-Japan relations is also present in the 2012~2015 friction of the two countries' national identities.

Park (2013) also recognizes the impact of differing historical memories between the two countries, but finds their significance in how they are manifested through different political regimes (p. 45). Park (2013) focused on explaining the shifting nature of national identities by scrutinizing different administrations of the ROK and Japan. He finds that there are possibilities of amity, accommodation, friction, and clash depending on whether the qualitative dimension of national identity is converging or diverging, and whether the dispositional dimension of national identity is congenial or confrontational (Park, 2013, p. 48). Taking this into consideration, the sudden deterioration from previous administrations' "shuttle diplomacy" to the more than three years of summit disengagement can be understood as a shift from amity to friction in the ROK-Japan relations, based on the changes in the two countries' political environment.

Some works like those of Berger (2003) and Park (2008) considers

‘nationalism’ as a factor in explaining ROK-Japan relations. Although I do believe understanding the workings of nationalism to be important in grasping the detailed picture of ROK-Japan relations, nationalism is a contested term that requires careful and extensive scrutiny into a country’s political, social, and historical developments for appropriate use. Conducting such scrutiny could take the focus of this paper away from the specific topic of the 2012~2015 ROK-Japan summit disengagement. Therefore, I have opted to employ national identities and historical memories for analyzing this specific instance of ROK-Japan relations, since both concepts allow for snap-shot conceptions relevant to the specific time period concerning the 2012~2015 summit disengagement.

As we can see from these previous works, there have been plenty of attempts to explain ROK-Japan animosities (or ROK-Japan deterioration of relations) through ideational factors like national identity and historical memory. Based on the reviews of above works, it appears that historical memory would be most aptly understood as a comprising sub-factor of national identity. Although Berger (2003) treated historical memory not as something comprising national identity, but as an independent factor influencing the construction of states’ international perspective and posture, Park (2013) and Rozman (2013) recognized the influences of historical memories as factors that are part of the larger national

identities. I also find this conception more useful, as it accounts for the contemporary construction of foreign policy perspectives and postures from both changing and enduring ideational variables. Simply attributing historical memory cannot sufficiently explain the anomalous summit disengagement, since historical memory is one of the stickier and enduring ideational variables with not much evidence for drastic changes in its recent conception – at least when it comes to ROK-Japan relations. Thus, to explain the 2012~2015 summit disengagement, I will first describe the recent conceptualizations of national identity by the Park administration and Abe administration, to demonstrate how such conceptualizations and the enduring influence of historical memory had facilitated the summit disengagement.

III. Friction of National Identities between the Park and Abe Administrations

National identity is a tricky concept to employ, because when one observes to identify a nation's identity, one finds that it is complex and multifaceted. A casual understanding of national identity would simply be the characteristics of a nation (often, but not exclusively discussed in the unit of nation-states) that makes it distinct and thus be existentially real as a separate unit from other nations. The problem with employing this casual understanding of national identity is the fact that it is very difficult to clearly identify the set of characterizations that make a nation real and distinct. This is because the "nation" is a cognitive concept made real only through the mass imagining of the existence and the reality of such national community (Anderson, 2006).

As a cognitive concept, it is very difficult to clearly operationalize national identity for research, because the imagined nature of the nation makes its identity consisted of multiple combinations, and despite its stickiness, ultimately prone to change over time. This difficulty becomes more precarious when taking into account that individual members of the nation may conceptualize different characterizations (combination of features) of their nation's identity while all

claim to hold the same national identity as a member of that nation. Another complication is the fact that individuals may hold multiple identities (not just national, but others like religious, gender, and professional identities) as they crisscross among different national, cultural, and social boundaries (It can be argued that this tendency is increasing due to globalization). Thus, attempts to narrowly define ‘national identity’ would miss out some features observable in the real world, while a broad definition would be unhelpful as a tool of analysis, since it would mean so many different things as to not mean anything at all.

To address these problems, I will take Rozman’s conceptualization of national identities in a dyadic relationship by focusing on the ROK-Japan dyad, and focus the analysis to the identifiable national identity conceptions of the Park administration and Abe administration, in accordance to Park’s (2013) pointing out of the necessity for understanding differing conceptualizations of national identity by different political forces. Among the various dimensions of national identity explained by Rozman (2012), I will focus on the temporal dimension pertaining to historical memory, and the ideological dimension regarding national identity as a pursuit towards some ideational goals – of foreign policy in particular. As I will explain further in detail below, there is an identifiable friction between the Park administration’s national identity of “regional mediator” and the Abe

administration's national identity of "resurgent Japan".

1. Park administration's national identity of regional mediator

It is difficult to succinctly describe an administration's foreign policy, since there would be various aspects to it, let alone sufficiently extrapolate its national identity from such an abstruse factor. Nevertheless, it is possible to make out certain reoccurring key-words to describe the Park administration's foreign policy conceptions regarding the ROK-Japan relations, and to derive the historical memories comprising the administration's national identity towards Japan from such conceptions. These key-words are the "Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative" (NAPCI) and "trust" or "trustpolitik".¹⁰ Specifically, it is the influence of historical memory in defining what constitute "trust" between the ROK and Japan that appears to have caused the friction that led to the 2012~2015 summit disengagement.

The use of the word trustpolitik by various government officials can be found continuously throughout President Park's tenure, including the period of ROK-Japan summit disengagement. Of course, it is difficult to describe a

¹⁰ *Shinroewaegyo* in Korean, the term can also be literally understood as 'trust diplomacy', but I will use the more officially used English term trustpolitik.

country's diplomacy with one simple word, but the fact that trustpolitik has been continuously invoked by various government officials in describing the ROK's foreign policy goals and methods, warrant close scrutiny of the term. In the ROK's 2014 and 2015 diplomatic white papers, they designate "'Trustpolitik pursued with the support of the people' as the overriding principle" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea [MOFAROK], 2014; MOFAROK, 2015). The Ministry also identified the NAPCI as part of trustpolitik.¹¹ Cheong Wa Dae¹² (2015) also describes trustpolitik as one of three strategies for achieving one of the "Four Administrative Priorities" of "Laying a Foundation for Peaceful Unification".

Regarding what trustpolitik is specifically about, the clue can be found in the term "Asia Paradox", a concept that often appears wherever trustpolitik or trust in general is discussed in relation to the Northeast Asia region. During her address at the joint session of the US Congress, President Park described "Asia's paradox" as "the disconnect between growing economic interdependence on the one hand, and backward political, security cooperation on the other hand, and backward political, security cooperation on the other." (Office of the President,

¹¹ See MOFAROK (2015) for details on the NAPCI.

¹² The Presidential Residence of the ROK, which is also commonly known as the "Blue House".

2013). This point was repeated in her speech at the ceremony for the 68th anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japanese colonial rule, with the addition of historical and territorial tensions as other negativities that persist despite the growing economic interdependencies in the Northeast Asia region. Furthermore, President Park found the Asia Paradox to be “deepening” in the region (Office of the President, 2015). Regarding as to why such a paradox persists, President Park points to the lack of sufficient regional cooperation mechanisms that would facilitate regional cooperation, and lack of trust that is essential for such mechanisms to work. In this sense, the NAPCI and trustpolitik can be understood to be the corner stones of the Park administration’s Northeast Asia diplomacy.¹³

Based on these descriptions, it is possible to identify trustpolitik as the Park administration’s overarching diplomatic principle, and the NAPCI as both a sub-strategy of applying the trustpolitik principle in the Northeast Asia region, and a process for realizing the goal trustpolitik seeks to achieve. Thus, the Park administration’s foreign policy conception towards Japan can be understood to fall within the NAPCI and trustpolitik frameworks, since Japan is part of the NAPCI’s conceptualization of the Northeast Asia region that is suffering from the Asia paradox. While the NAPCI and trustpolitik both have larger scopes that

¹³ See MOFAROK (2015) for more official information regarding the NAPCI.

encompass not only Japan, and complex relations to other foreign policy concepts like the “Eurasia Initiative” and the "Trust-building Process on the Korean Peninsula", I will focus on just the NAPCI and trustpolitik as they are the ones most relevant to the ROK’s diplomatic posture towards Japan, and subsequently its national identity conception in the ROK-Japan dyad.

Judging from the conceptualizations of the NAPCI and trustpolitik, it can be said that the Park administration’s ROK has come to view itself as a regional moderator with the goals of resolving the Asian paradox, and building regional cooperation. At first glance, both the NAPCI and trustpolitik would seem to prescribe closer relations with Japan, a principle Northeast Asian state, for the realization of regional cooperation. However, as exemplified by the 2012~2015 summit disengagement, this had not been the case. Closer scrutiny into President Park’s statements regarding ROK-Japan relations reveals that her conception of trust in the context of the two countries’ relations is heavily conditioned by historical memory of Imperial Japan’s colonial rule of Korea. From early on in her Presidency, President Park stated that it is incumbent for Japan to have a “correct understanding of history” for there to be “rock-solid trust” between the two countries (Office of the President, 2013). Considering that the occasion this statement was made was the 94th commemoration of the March First

Independence Movement Day, one may consider this statement to have been made for the domestic audience. However, this conception of “correct understanding of history” being the bases for “trust” or trustpolitik with Japan consistently reappeared in President Park’s statements throughout the period of 2012~2015 summit disengagement. In this sense, trustpolitik not only describes the Park administration’s approach to diplomacy, it also contains some expectations regarding other countries, and seeks to establish a kind of code of conduct based on “trust”.

The fact that Japan’s trustworthiness is called into question warrants closer inspection of what exactly Park administration’s conditions for “trust” are regarding Japan. Examining President Park’s statements reveal two components: (1) “correct understanding of history” and (2) curbing of politicians’ revisionist remarks.¹⁴ As to what it means to have a “correct understanding of history”, it appears to mean the maintenance of the understanding of history laid out in the previous cabinet’s various official statements, like the Murayama statement and the Kono statement. President Park mentioned this to be the case during a Q & A session of a New Year Press Conference in 2014, and was repeated during her meeting with veteran statesmen from the ROK and Japan in June 1st of 2015, her

¹⁴ See Appendix 2 for excerpts of President Park’s statements regarding Japan.

meeting with President of the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) Katsuya Okada, and also during her commemorative address on the 70th anniversary of Korea's liberation. Regarding the issue of Japanese politician's revisionist remarks, no specific references were made, but can be understood to be in the same vein as the call for the "correct understanding of history".

2. Abe Administration's national identity of resurgent Japan

As mentioned in the literature review, the ROK and the historical memory of its colonial experience occupies a relatively less prominent presence in the make-up of Japan's national identity. Moreover, Park (2014) explains that the ROK has low priority in the Abe administration's national strategic identity regarding its external strategy (para. 11). Again, it is difficult to provide a simple description of a country's national identity, but I nevertheless find it appropriate to describe Japan of Abe administration to have the national identity of resurgent Japan, in the ROK-Japan relational dyad. What does it mean for Japan to be "resurgent"? The Abe administration's general foreign policy conception seems to comprise of two main components; return to greatness, and a more proactive stance in the international scene. During his visit to Washington D.C. in February 22nd, 2013, PM Abe delivered a speech at the Center for Strategic and

International Studies titled “Japan is Back”. The speech was composed in a manner of a response to some skeptical thoughts on Japan becoming a “Tier-two country”. In the speech, PM Abe argued that “Japan must remain a leading promoter of rules”, and that it “must continue to be a guardian of the global commons” (Abe, 2013). Also mentioned was that Japan must remain a robust partner “in the fight against terrorism”, “in promoting human rights, in the fight against poverty, illness, and global warming”, and so on (Abe, 2013). All of these goals insist that Japan be a proactive contributor to various international issues. Additionally, North Korea’s nuclear test and abduction of Japanese citizens, along with greater concerns regarding the dispute with the PRC over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, was mentioned as issues that must be properly addressed. In order to achieve these goals, PM Abe provided his “Abenomics” economic policy and revamping of Japan’s defense readiness by revisiting the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and increasing the Defense Ministry's budget. These wording illustrates the image of Japan seeking to once again surge itself onto the global stage on various issue areas, based on renewed economic and defense strengths/capabilities. Hence the Abe administration’s national identity of “resurgent” Japan.

Various subsequently produced government documents pertaining to

Japan's foreign policy supports this conceptualization of national identity. The National Security Strategy (NSS) that was adopted on December 17 of 2013 presents the policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" which seeks to achieve the objectives of: (1) strengthening of deterrence capability, (2) strengthening of Japan-US alliance and enhancing relationships with various other countries, and (3) strengthening the international order based on universal values and rules.¹⁵ Japan's 2014 and 2015 Diplomatic Bluebooks also mentions "Proactive Contributor to Peace" as the guiding policy for Japan's diplomatic activities, and discusses various areas like deepening cooperative relations with neighboring countries, greater involvement in the United Nations activities (especially peacekeeping operations), and increased voice and activity in various other issue areas like nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, ODA (Official Development Aid), and so on.¹⁶ The NDPG that was produced at the same time as the NSS expresses concerns for "gray-zone" situations over territory, sovereignty, and maritime interests, as well as concerns regarding China's intentions and transparency in its military buildup. It lays out plans for plans for addressing such concerns, primarily through streamlining its defense architecture,

¹⁵ See the Official Website of the Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet (2013) for the detailed translation of the NSS.

¹⁶ See Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan [MOFAJ] (2014), and MOFAJ (2015) for details of the Japanese government's Diplomatic Bluebook.

strengthening of Japan-US alliance, proactive diplomacy with relevant countries and international organizations, and so on. Regarding its future goals, the NDPG seeks the attainment of effective deterrence capabilities for the stabilization of Asia-Pacific and global security in general.

Like the Park administration's national identity, a first glance at the details of the Abe administration's national identity of resurgent Japan does not contain any visibly outstanding components that could have brought about the 2012~2015 ROK-Japan summit disengagement. In fact, the goal of realizing a more proactive Japan based on enhanced capabilities prescribes closer cooperation with the ROK. The NSS designates the ROK as a "country of the utmost geopolitical importance for the security of Japan" (National Security Strategy, 2013). The two Diplomatic Bluebooks recognize the ROK as the most important neighboring country, and along with the NDPG, claims the need and intention to seek closer cooperation.¹⁷ The friction between the ROK's and Japan's national identities is not from any intentional design. They are however from unexpected influence of historical memory that conditioned the ROK's conceptualization of Japan's trustworthiness, and the lack of sufficient recognition of such influence in the ROK-Japan relations that precipitated the ROK-Japan summit disengagement.

¹⁷ See Japan Ministry of Defense (2013) for the details of the NDPG.

Regarding various disputes on issues of history between the ROK and Japan, while recognizing the existence of such issues in a broad sense, the Abe administration argued them to not be issues of politics or diplomacy.¹⁸ PM Abe had repeatedly argued that he is open to talks with President Park, so long as there are no preconditions. PM Abe stated at a House of Councilors main session in April 4th 2014 that “Japan’s doors for dialogue are always open” (National Diet of Japan [NDJ], 2014). PM Abe also stated at a House of Councilors budget session in August 24th 2015 that he “hopes for the continued improvement of Japan-ROK relations that would lead to a summit meeting” (NDJ, 2015). In both statements, PM Abe called for the ROK side to engage in dialogue without preconditions. The preconditions are most likely references to President Park’s insistence on Japan to establish trust and actively address the Comfort Women issue.

Other than insisting on a more “future oriented” ROK-Japan relations, there are no clear indicators of why the Abe administration was not able to simply satisfy the ROK’s requests and move on to substantial cooperation on mutual interests. It is true that the ROK occupies a relatively lesser prominence in Japan’s foreign policy conception compared to the US or the PRC, but its importance is

¹⁸ Such can be found in descriptions of the ROK-Japan bilateral relations in the 2014 and 2015 Diplomatic Bluebooks.

not small enough to justify a prolonged summit disengagement,¹⁹ and thus there should be something about the ROK's conception of trust and the issue of comfort women that was problematic for the Abe administration to just plainly accept. The issue of comfort women will be discussed in the following chapter in detail, but as mentioned already, it is possible to make out the divergence between the two countries' historical memories. Although Japan's various foreign policy documents mention how issues of history were resolved in the past, they do not recognize such issues to be pertaining to the present. One explanation for such lack is the fact that historical memory is related to many controversial issues pertaining to Japan's domestic politics. These include the education of history in Japan, and to a lesser extent the issues of Constitutional revision.²⁰

When it comes to history, the Abe administration and PM Abe himself have been advocating a more "balanced" or positive description of Japan's history. The "balance" here refers to countering the notion of the "masochistic view of history". Such conceptions can be found in the newly revised Fundamental Law on Education, and subsequent claims for its better implementation. In *Utsukushii*

¹⁹ It can also be argued that coordination with the ROK is important for Japan-US alliance and Japan's regional security in Northeast Asia in general.

²⁰ The issue of Japan's revision of its Constitution will not be discussed here as it has little direct connection to ROK-Japan relations or the issue of comfort women, but it is a similar issue to that of history education regarding charges on lack of nationalistic or patriotic sentiments.

Kunie, a book authored by PM Abe on his political manifesto and personal reflections on various topics, he argues for fostering a Japanese national identity through pride through fostering positive education of Japan's history and tradition. "Masochistic view of history" or "self-abusing" (自虐的) view of history that was hampering students' capacity for developing national pride (Abe, 2006, p. 202). Although he does not explicitly explain in the book, which contents of history taught in Japan should change in this respect, it can be inferred that Abe wishes to see what he considers a more "balanced" depiction of history in textbooks. He has also maintained the position on the need to "reform" Japan's education so that it could instill more national pride to children.²¹ Such sentiment was also made by Abe's Minister of Education Hakubun Shimomura during a 2012 interview, and newly sanctioned textbooks have subsequently drastically reduced the mention of the Comfort Women issue (Kingston, 2015, para. 10). From these examples, it is possible to speculate that issues pertaining to Japan's negative history, like the issue of comfort women, do constitute a part of the "masochistic view of history".

²¹ During the main session of the House of Councilors of the Japanese National Diet in January 30th of 2014

3. Lead up to the November 2015 summitry; incremental convergence of national identity

As mentioned in the above section, the Park administration's conceptualization of Japan's trustworthiness rested upon its correct understanding of history, curbing of Japanese politicians' revisionist remarks, and Japan's active engagement in the issue of comfort women. What it means for Japan to have a "correct understanding of history" was specified as the succession of the previous cabinets' statements regarding Japan's imperial history. Although the Abe administration never actually revised or did away with the previous cabinets' statements, there were a few statements and actions by the Abe administration that called its sincerity to the succession of the previous cabinets' statements into question. During a Diet session on April 22nd of 2013, PM Abe stated that he would not simply repeat the Murayama statement, and replace it with a new statement for commemorating the 70th anniversary of the ending of the Second World War.²² It was also uncertain whether the Kono statement was going to be succeeded by the Abe administration, since there were controversies surrounding whether or not the statement would be maintained. Ultimately, the Kono statement was maintained, but there were accusations towards the Japanese government for

²² See House of Councilors Budget Committee (2014) record for details.

undermining the statement, as it conducted a probe into the making of the Kono statement with the subsequent publication of a report suggesting collusion between the ROK and Japanese governments. These and other incidents like Deputy Minister Aso's visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine on April 21st of 2013, and PM Abe's visit on December 26th of the same year, and lack of noticeable progress on the issue of comfort women all worked against the ROK's conception of what it means for Japan to be trustworthy.

Nevertheless, we did see some loosening of friction between the two countries' national identities regarding these issues towards the eventual ROK-Japan summitry in November 2nd of 2015. As I have explained, the two national identities are not inherently at odds with each other. It just so happened that the differing historical memories that influenced these identities produced some points of friction, and thus it is possible to expect closer cooperation between the ROK and Japan once the friction is dealt with.

In terms of chronology, a gradual convergence of the points of friction started to occur following a ROK-Japan-US trilateral summitry during the occasion of the Nuclear Security Summit in Hague on March 25th of 2014. Although it is difficult to say that this event was a turning point, it did provide the first instance of official communication for the otherwise strained and disengaged

ROK-Japan relations. Prior to the trilateral summitry, the ROK-Japan relations for the first year of Park and Abe administrations were characterized by lack of communication, staunch criticisms from the Park administration regarding Japan's "understanding of history" and non-engagement with the issue of comfort women, and the Abe administration's insistence on issues of history being nonissue or inappropriate as political/diplomatic issues. Although these tit for tat continued even after the trilateral summitry, communications between some government agencies did start to continue.

First, although not a bilateral summitry, this was the first instance where President Park and PM Abe met each other to discuss directly in official capacity, and a ROK-Japan Foreign Ministers' meeting was held thereafter on August 10th of 2014 during the ASEAN Regional Forum – the last Foreign Ministers' meeting was held on July 1st of 2013. Also, although not directly tied to the trilateral summitry, director level negotiations on the issue of comfort women by the two countries' foreign ministries started from the following month of April. According to Park (2014), the US government's efforts for bringing President Park and PM Abe to the trilateral summitry were crucial. The US mediated between the Park administration that appeared staunchly rigid and principled on issues of history at the expense of the changing Northeast Asian security architecture sought by Japan

and the US, and the Abe administration that was seemingly insensitive to historical sensitivities with PM Abe visiting the Yasukuni shrine in person on the December of 2013 (Park, 2014). Another reason for the holding of the trilateral summitry appears to have been the fact that neither the ROK nor Japan wanted the US's security apparatus to appear troubled from the two countries' discord (Park, 2014). Nevertheless, while the trilateral summitry was meaningful in that it precipitated the first contact between the heads of the ROK and Japan since their inauguration and paved the way for further communications, substantial rapprochements did not immediately occur.

The next key factor for gradual convergence of friction, that actually precipitated resumption of higher government level communications, seems to have been the fact that the year 2015 marked the 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between the ROK and Japan, and the 70th anniversary of the ending of the Second World War in Japan and the liberation of Korea in the ROK. Due to these symbolic significances of the year 2015, it was a prime timeframe for advocating closer ROK-Japan relations. Perhaps due to this significance, various minister level talks resumed this year with the eventual summitry in November, and the announcement on December by the two countries' Foreign Ministers regarding the mutual steps for resolving the issue of comfort

women. First, the bilateral Foreign Ministers' meeting was resumed in March 21st, since the last meeting in August of 2014. Successive meetings were prolifically held in the following months of June, August, September, and on November 1st, a day before the ROK-Japan summitry. The Finance Ministers' meeting resumed on May 23rd, and the Defense Ministers' meeting also resumed in May 30th, with another meeting on October 20th.

Along with these resumptons of high level communications between the ROK and Japanese governments, some changes started to occur in President Park's and PM Abe's statements. First, whilst maintaining her previous positions regarding Japan, President Park expressed her interest in PM Abe's statement that was to be issued regarding the 70th anniversary of the ending of the Second World War, during the meeting with the General Council Chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan in February 13th of 2015 (Office of the President, 2015). A more clear message regarding the specification of "correct understanding of history" as the succession of the statements made by the previous PMs and their cabinets, was made by President Park during her meeting with veteran statesmen from the ROK and Japan in June 1st of 2015, and also during her meeting with the DPJ leader Katsuya Okada in August 3rd of 2015 (Office of the President, 2015).

From the side of PM Abe, the PM's insistence on not making issues of history like that of the comfort women into political/diplomatic issues, which was consistently repeated in his Diet responses, no longer appeared in his Diet statements after the last mentioning in February 18th of 2015. This suggests that perhaps around this time in early 2015 was when the Abe administration made the decision to be more accommodative to the Park administration's calls for "correct understanding of history". PM Abe's responses to questions regarding "understanding of history" also resumed to be that he succeeds the statements made by the previous cabinets. Although this official position was mentioned in previous years, the later part of 2014 starting from October exhibited strong statements from PM Abe that advocated restoring Japan's honor, proper evaluation of its position from the international community, and forming of understandings of history based on "facts". This was in response to the scandal regarding the newspaper company Asahishimbun's misreporting of the issue of comfort women. This with PM Abe's television appearance in January 2015, where he stated that he may not reuse key words from the Murayama statement, garnered worries regarding the contents on the understanding of history in PM Abe's expected statement on the 70th anniversary of the ending of the Second World War.

PM Abe's resumption of statements regarding the succession of previous cabinets' statements culminated to his speech for commemorating the 70th anniversary of the ending of the Second World War. He stated that the positions "articulated by the previous cabinets will remain unshakable into the future" (Abe, 2015). By stating such a position in the occasion that garners world attention, it was made difficult for the Abe administration to go back on the statement's words, as doing so would call into question the administration's credibility. Although President Park expressed some shortcomings of the Abe statement, she nevertheless recognized the statement to be upholding the previous cabinet statements that form the bases of the ROK-Japan relations.

Moreover, there were relatively less controversies about revisionist statements or actions made by Japanese politicians during the months leading up to the November 2015 summitry. Also, it is possible to speculate that there were some active engagements regarding the issue of comfort women between the ROK and Japanese negotiators, since there had been 9 rounds of negotiations between April 4th of 2014 and September 18th of 2015,²³ and 2015 summitry announced that the two heads of states concurred to "continue and accelerate the

²³ There had been total of 11 rounds of negotiations until the announcement on mutual steps of resolve the issue of comfort women had been made on December 28th of 2015.

consultations [on the issue of comfort women] in order to conclude them as promptly as possible” (MOFAJ, 2015). Following this summitry, there was an announcement by the two countries’ Ministers of Foreign Affairs on mutual steps to resolve the issue of comfort women, on December 28th of 2015. As these events show, there was a correlation between the Abe administration’s satisfying the Park administration’s conception of trustworthiness, and the realization of the November 2015 summitry. Correlation by itself is not necessarily a proof of causation. However, the friction evident between the Park administration’s insistence on trust based on the correct understanding of history, and the Abe administration’s reluctance to deal with such issues of history whilst engaging in controversial policies regarding history textbooks, suggest strong connections between national identities and the 2012~2015 summit disengagement.

IV. Analysis of the Friction of National identities Through the Issue of Comfort Women

Although it may be difficult to say whether the issue of comfort women was the decisive factor in causing the 2012~2015 summit disengagement, it was certainly the most openly referred to issue regarding the disengagement. To explain why the issue of comfort women had been so often cited as a negative factor to the 2012~2015 summit disengagement, it is helpful to analyze the issue's points of contentions. Here too, we can find the same friction of national identities as discussed above. President Park had expressed her understanding for the need for cordial relations between the ROK and Japan ever since her inauguration address, but also pointed out the need for Japan to "properly face history" and specifically referred to the issue of comfort women for needing attention. This line has ever since been repeated in her successive speeches regarding ROK-Japan relations, and as a result specifically made the comfort women issue into a kind of a precondition to the resumption of a summit meeting. PM Abe has also repeatedly expressed his willingness to meet President Park, but has constantly refused to readdress the comfort women issue, citing that the issue has been resolved through the 1965 ROK-Japan Normalization Treaty.

As to how the issue of comfort women came to be of such importance in the ROK-Japan relations, it can first be argued from Victor Cha's (1999) understanding of the ROK-Japan relational dynamic that the security environment provided by the U.S. to the ROK and Japan opened the window of opportunity for issues of history to make its voices heard. The answer to why the issue of comfort women, among various other issues of history came to function as the prolonging factor for the absence of bilateral summitry can be found from the 2011 ROK Constitutional Court ruling. It stated that the lack of government actions to determine whether the 'comfort women' victims' right to claim reparation has been nullified through the 1965 ROK-Japan Normalization treaty, was unconstitutional (Constitutional Court of Korea, 2011). This ruling legally bound the ROK government to more actively take up the Comfort Women issue with the Japanese government, and led to a standoff on the issue. The Constitutional Court ruling and the subsequent activism on the issue by the ROK government led to a reportedly sour summit meeting in 2012 between President Lee and PM Noda. This sour relations regarding the issue of comfort women can be said to have continued into the Park and Abe administrations.

As mentioned above, the issue of comfort women has consistently been mentioned in President Park's statements addressing Japan. Although neither

President Park nor the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs admitted that there are any preconditions to a summitry with Japan, both had been consistent in cautioning that a summitry for the sake of summitry may be counterproductive, and stated the issue of comfort women to be the most pressing issue in the bilateral relations.²⁴ In an August 2015 meeting with the DPJ leader Okada Katsuya, President Park responded to Okada's thoughts on the necessity of frequent ROK-Japan summitry by saying that "solving existing issues with patience would contribute to forming the atmosphere conducive to ROK-Japan summitry" (Office of the President, 2015, para. 9).

A glance of these statements suggests that the issue of comfort women was one of the main barriers to the resumption of the ROK-Japan summitry. Although the ROK Foreign Ministry denied it as a precondition, it is true that President Park had consistently voiced concerns for the lack of progress in the Comfort Women issue on occasions relating to Japan, suggesting that it is an important factor if not a de facto precondition in resuming bilateral summitry. PM Abe for his part has also contributed to the prolonged absence of summitry by refusing to recognize the Comfort Women issue as a diplomatic issue with the

²⁴ Such concerns can be found from President Park's meeting with the former Japanese PM Mori in September 19, 2014.

ROK for quite some time. Despite mentioning the personal sorrows he feels for the victims, PM Abe has consistently called for not making the issue pertaining to politics for diplomacy.²⁵ Eventually, Foreign Ministers of the two countries did announce mutual measures to resolve the Comfort Women issue on December 18th 2015,²⁶ after 11 rounds of negotiations since April 4th 2014, and being taken up during the eventual summitry that was held in November 2nd of 2015.

1. ‘Trust’ and the issue of comfort women in President Park’s statements

Interestingly, none of President Park’s statements directly mention the key contention point between the ROK and Japan; the question of Japan’s legal responsibility towards the comfort women. However, it is possible to extrapolate what may be the Park administration’s position on this question, by observing her statements.²⁷ To summarize, President Park’s statements regarding the issue of comfort women can be largely generalized into the following four categories. (1) Call for the correct understanding of history. (2) Criticizing against revisionist

²⁵ Such remark was first made at the 2013 Jan. 31 House of Representatives main session, and was constantly repeated by PM Abe thereafter.

²⁶ See Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan (2015, December 28) "Japan-ROK Foreign Ministers’ Meeting" found in http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000365.html for details

²⁷ Excerpts of these statements can be found in Appendix 2.

statements from some Japanese political figures. (3) Call for the restoration of the comfort women's honor and dignity. (4) Framing the Comfort Women issue as a matter of universal human rights and values.

Categories 1 to 3 are related to each other in that they pertain to historical memory. Calling for a 'correct' understanding of history seems to be in reference to the understandings of history mentioned in the Kono statement specifically, and various other statements made by previous Japanese cabinets in general. The Kono statement recognized the Japanese military's involvement in coercive recruitment processes, and the responsibility of the Japanese government. Similarly, criticizing Japanese political figures' statements regarding comfort women can be understood in regards to their statements not being in line with the official historical understandings of the previous cabinets. Regarding the call for the restoration of the comfort women's honor and dignity, 'honor and dignity' would be in reference to the understanding that the comfort women were victims of systematic violence of the Imperial Japanese state, and that it was none of the women's fault, since it was beyond their power to avoid or escape from being a comfort women. In essence, the statements by President Park are overall calls for Japan to recognize the wrong deeds of the Japanese Empire, and to actively atone for such deeds as a successor state. The fourth category of framing the comfort

women issue as a matter of universal human rights and values seems to be a method employed by the Park administration in bringing about international attention to pressure Japan to actively engage with the ROK in solving the issue of comfort women.

These statements regarding the issue of comfort women do appear to be tied to the notion of Japan's trustworthiness. Most statements with calls for Japan to establish trust through the correct understanding of history also point out the issue of comfort women as a particular issue of interest to be taken up in the ROK-Japan relations. President Park's commemorative address on the 70th anniversary of the liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule in particular tied the Kono statement, as part of the understanding of history that "have been the key underpinnings" of the ROK-Japan relations (Office of the President, 2015).

2. Japan's honor and the issue of comfort women in PM Abe's statements

For most parts, PM Abe's statements repeat the basic official position of his administration.²⁸ However, there are some instances where his statements in

²⁸ See House of Representatives November 10th 2015 Budget Committee record for the most detailed statement.

the National Diet revealed more than his usual repetitions.²⁹ First is his insistence on the lack of evidence for forceful recruitment of women by the Japanese authorities. Despite maintaining that the Abe cabinet succeeds the Kono statement, which admits to many women having been recruited against their will through coercion, PM Abe has also consistently maintained that the historical fact is that there is no evidence of forced recruitment of comfort women by the Japanese authorities of that time.³⁰ It is interesting how PM Abe as a politician and head of state insists on a perceived historical “fact” while arguing that issues of history should not be made into a matter of politics or diplomacy. Considering this kind of position along with the eventual probing of the Kono statement, which suggested a sort of collusion between the ROK and Japanese government regarding the wording of the Kono statement at that time, it suggests that PM Abe intends to accept the wordings of the Kono statement as the official government position, but does not necessarily agree personally with the statement’s specifics on the issue of comfort women.

Second instances can be found from his replies to questions regarding the issue of comfort women as a subject of the government’s screening of history

²⁹ See Appendix 3 for a list of excerpts of PM Abe’s Diet statements relating to the issue of comfort women.

³⁰ See House of Representatives February 7th 2013 Budget Committee record.

textbooks. The issue of comfort women has been taken up in the Diet discussions regarding the screening of history textbooks, in the form of both concerns regarding their absence, and their presence. Some worry that contents regarding the comfort women are disappearing, while others charge that contents regarding the comfort women should mention that there were no forced recruitments. To both accusations, PM Abe's responses were simply that the issue of comfort women, like any other contents, would be subjected to the same screening criteria of the New Fundamental Law on Education.³¹ Although these responses do not clearly reveal PM Abe's thoughts on the appropriate representation of comfort women (or whether it should be covered at all), it is possible to infer from his previous calls for more "balanced" history textbooks with more "positive" aspects of Japan's history, and his cabinet's protests against the contents of U.S. textbooks mentioning the forced recruitment of the comfort women,³² that PM Abe prefers Japan's textbook contents to reflect the administration's position on the issue of comfort women.

Third, the most indicative of PM Abe's understanding of the issue of comfort women in relation to Japan's pride was revealed in the Diet sessions

³¹ See House of Councillors May 23rd 2014 Main Session record, and June 12th 2014 Education and Science Committee record for details.

³² See AFP-JIJI (2015, January 16), Japan asks U.S. publisher to 'correct' textbook's 'grave' errors on sex slaves. *The Japan Times*.

following the Asahishimbun scandal regarding its misreporting of the issue of comfort women, back in the 1980s and 90s.³³ Regarding this incident, PM Abe stated that such action resulted in “scaring Japan’s and the Japanese people’s honor (名誉)”.³⁴ It would be difficult to ask anyone to have pride in a dishonorable historical memory. These statements reveal that the issue of comfort women, specifically regarding the forced recruitment of women and the accusation of the practice of sex slavery, is an issue of national honor and pride for the Abe administration.

3. December 2015 announcement of mutual steps to resolve the issue of comfort women

As explained so far, the Park administration’s understanding of the issue of comfort women, like the conceptualization of Japan’s trustworthiness, was heavily influenced by the historical memory of victimhood. The Abe administration on the other hand conceived the issue as that of Japan’s honor, based on the understanding of the issue of comfort women being a nonissue that had already been sufficiently resolved. The fact that the November 2015 summitry

³³ See Yoshida, R. (2014, August 5), Asahi Shimbun admits errors in past ‘comfort women’ stories. *The Japan Times*.

³⁴ See House of Representatives October 3rd and 6th 2014 Budget Committee record.

had been held prior to the December 2015 announcement on mutual steps to resolve the issue of comfort women suggests that the issue was not an absolute precondition to the summitry as claimed by the Park administration. Nevertheless, simply because the issue was not a real precondition does not mean that it was not a contributing factor to the anomalous summit disengagement.

Various factors such as probable US pressure for cooperation, and the negative imagery of forgoing a summitry on the occasion of PM Abe's visit to Seoul for the ROK-Japan-PRC Trilateral Summitry during the passing of the symbolic year of 50th anniversary of the ROK-Japan normalization (not to mention suspicions of the ROK leaning too much towards the PRC with the frequent summitries) may have pressured both countries to make efforts towards holding the November summitry. However, the fact that the issue of comfort women was covered in the summitry whilst the summitry being a very low-key one,³⁵ along with the repeated attribution of strained bilateral relations to the issue, suggests that the issue of comfort women was a serious contributing factor to the disengagement.

The issue of comfort women, and the way it was announced to be resolved reveals that friction of national identities due to the influence of differing

³⁵ There wasn't even a press conference following the summitry.

historical memories did indeed prolong the disengagement of the ROK-Japan summitry. Like how the ROK's victim mentality of historical memory conditioned the Park administration's conception of Japan's trustworthiness to the "correct understanding of history", the issue of comfort women is also closely tied to the notion of the "correct understanding of history" in its insistence on the maintenance of and adherence to the Kono statement. Just as how "correct understanding of history" or historical memory relating to the colonial rule of Korea was a controversial issue for Japan's domestic politics and as a matter of national pride, the issue of comfort women was also controversial in relation to the issue of history textbook contents and Japan's honor/pride.

In terms of progress towards the December announcement, it is difficult to confidently describe it, since the details of the 11 rounds of negotiations have yet to be made public. Nevertheless, it is possible to speculate similar developments to the lead up to the November summitry. While President Park did maintain her position on the importance and urgency regarding the issue of comfort women throughout the period of summit disengagement, PM Abe's position did exhibit some change as he no longer stated the issue to be inappropriate as a political/diplomatic issue, since the early months of 2015. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the symbolic significance of the year 2015 may

have precipitated the summit agreement to speed up the negotiations, and produced the announcement in December before the turn of the year. Another contributing factor to the announcement being produced before the passing of 2015 could have been the sense of urgency provided by the passing of nine former comfort women victim in the first few months of 2015, making the survivors' numbers down to 46 from 120 in 2007. Although a sense of urgency had always existed from the elderly age of the victims, the urgency of the issue became more pronounced in President Park's statements from around the time of the victims' passing. Indeed, President Park directly cited this sense of urgency as the rationale for arriving at an agreement that "is unlikely to be deemed entirely satisfactory", in her national address regarding the Foreign Ministers' announcement (Office of the President, 2015).

The December 2015 announcement on the mutual steps to resolve the issue of comfort women exhibits efforts for converging the two governments' positions. In the end, the 11 rounds of negotiations produced an announcement that included the admittance of the Japanese government's responsibility, apology from PM Abe, and contribution of funds entirely from the Japanese government's budget. To this, the ROK government was to set up and operate the foundation to distribute the funds, refrain from criticizing the Japanese government in the

international community regarding this issue, and strive to solve the issue of the statute built in front of the Embassy of Japan in Seoul in an appropriate manner under the acknowledgement of the statue being of concern by the Japanese government as possible disturbance of the peace of the Embassy's mission and impairment of its dignity. Although it remains to be seen if these steps will be fully implemented and solve the issue of comfort women, this announcement illustrates a convergence of the ROK's and Japan's national identities through the coordination of historical memories.

From this announcement, it is possible to understand it as a kind of agreement to solve the friction by in a sense converging the ROK's and Japan's historical memories and subsequently their national identities. The announcement shows that the Japanese government has agreed to recognize its responsibility and act accordingly by issuing the PM's apology and contributing funds from the government budget. However, the question remains regarding the nature of the Japanese government's responsibility and the nature of the funds that are to be contributed by the Japanese government. Some critics argue that the Japanese government should admit to a legal responsibility regarding the issue of comfort women, but Minister of Foreign Affairs Kishida stated this to not be the case. With this, it is possible to understand that the Abe administration has in general

adhered to the Park administration's call for trust, while leaving out the specific nature of the Japanese government's responsibility open to interpretation, since a specific admission to legal responsibility would go against the Abe administration's conception of Japan's honor and pride in history. Perhaps the Park administration felt pressure from the passing away of nine comfort women victims in 2015 that prompted the administration to settle on less ideal terms. Regardless, the fact that the Park administration has accepted such kind of adherence suggests that some specific details of history were not stiff and absolute parts of the administration's conception of trust, and that its requirements were not new, but pertained to the maintenance and enactment of past statements of the previous Japanese cabinets.

V. Conclusion

Throughout this paper, I sought to explain the anomalous summit disengagement between the ROK and Japan during the years 2012~2015. Based on the understanding that Realist and Liberal security/utility maximizing rational choice models prescribe closer cooperation and not disengagement between the ROK and Japan, I have employed the Constructivist approach to analyze the 2012~2015 summit disengagement by employing the concepts of national identity and historical memory, and their functions in the ROK-Japan relational dyad. As a result, from examining various statements of the two countries' heads of state and their foreign policy conceptions, and how the eventual November 2015 summitry and December 2015 announcement on mutual steps for resolving the issue of comfort women came to be, it was possible to identify frictions between the Park administration's national identity of regional moderator and the Abe administration's national identity of resurgent Japan. Specifically, the frictions arose between the Park administration's pursuits of trustpolitik that conceptualized Japan's trustworthiness on its succession of "correct understanding of history", and the Abe administration's passive reactions on issues regarding history due to their controversial nature, the issues' negative effects to the pursuit of Japan's pride and honor, and the relatively small presence of the ROK in the

administration's foreign policy conception. Present in this friction were divergent historical memories that conditioned the Park administration's pursuit of Japan's "correct understanding of history", and the Abe administration's pursuit of Japan's pride and controversies in its domestic politics like those regarding history education. Similar friction could also be found in the issue of comfort women between the ROK and Japan.

These findings suggest that the influence of historical memory on countries' national identity and subsequently bilateral relations does merit attention in analyzing and providing explanations for aspects of international relations that does not conform to the rational choice models. For the ROK-Japan relations in particular, the findings reveal both how bilateral relations can be strained, and how they can be ameliorated. Although the ROK's conception of the national identity of regional mediator and adoption of trustpolitik can be understood as something particular to the Park administration, the influence of historical memory of Korea being a victim to Imperial Japan's colonialism had persisted in various forms. As we could see from the fact that it was neither countries' intentions to experience the summit disengagement, its ultimate occurrence informs us that historical memory continues to be a relevant factor in the ROK-Japan relations. Underestimating the influence of historical memory

would be to open the opportunity for another unexpected and counterproductive strain on the ROK-Japan relations. However, while national identities and historical memories do provide an explanation for the summit disengagement, subsequent questions about why national identities and historical memories function as they did still remains. Such questions were not covered since doing so would have blurred the focus of this paper away from the 2012~2015 summit disengagement. Further research regarding the inner workings of national identity, and the constructive process of formulating and signifying historical memory could be of help in better understanding ROK-Japan relations in particular, and international relations in general.

Bibliography

- Abe, Shinzo. 2006. *Utsukushiikunie* [Towards a Beautiful Country]. Tokyo: Bunshunshinsho.
- Abe, Shinzo. 2013. "Japan is Back". Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, February 22. Accessed January 21, 2016.
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/abe/us_20130222en.html.
- AFP-JIJI. 2015. "Japan asks U.S. publisher to 'correct' textbook's 'grave' errors on sex slaves." The Japan Times, January 16. Accessed January 21, 2016.
<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/01/16/national/history/japan-asks-u-s-publisher-mcgraw-hill-correct-textbook-references-regarding-comfort-women/#.VnePr49OJPb>.
- Anderson, Benedict. 2006. *Imagined Communities*. Brooklyn: Verso.
- Bek, Yeri. 2015. "Gamjeongjeokeuro Ilbon Barabaseon Andwae, Hanilgwangye Pullryeomyun Ilbonbuteo Jedero Gongbuaeya" [Japan should not be viewed emotionally, Japan must be properly studied to resolve Korea-Japan relations]. *ECONOMYCHOSUN*, July 28. Accessed January 21, 2016.
http://economyplus.chosun.com/special/special_view_past.php?boardName=C05&t_num=8705&myscrap=&img_ho=130.
- Berger, Thomas U. (2003). "Power and Purpose in Pacific East Asia." In *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, edited by G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, 387-420. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Cabinet Office. 2013. "Gaikou ni Kansuru Yoronchousa [Survey on Diplomatic Relations]." Accessed January 21, 2016.
<http://survey.govonline.go.jp/h25/h25-gaiko/index.html>.
- Cha, Victor. 1999. *Alignment Despite Antagonism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

- Constitutional Court of Korea. 2011. "Challenge against the Act of Omission Involving Article 3 of "Agreement on the Settlement of Problem concerning Property and Claims and the Economic Cooperation between the Republic of Korea and Japan." Accessed January 21, 2016. http://search.ccourt.go.kr/th/pr/th_pr0101_P1.do.
- East Asia Institute. 2015. *Shinshidaeruel Uwihan Hanilui Gongdongjinhwa* [Korea-Japan Mutual Evolution for the New Generation]. Seoul: Ha, Y., Son, Y., Lee, S., Lee, W., Jeon, J., & Jeong, J.
- Fierke, Karin M. 2007. *Critical Approaches to International Security*. Malden: Polity Press.
- Friedberg, Aron. 1994. "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia." *International Security*, 18(3):5-33.
- Genron NPO, & East Asia Institute. 2015. "Jesamhoei Hanilgongdonginshikjosa [The 3rd Korea-Japan Joint Survey on Perceptions]." Accessed January 21, 2016. http://www.eai.or.kr/type_k/panelView.asp?bytag=p&catcode=+&code=k_or_report&idx=13764&page=1.
- Japan Ministry of Defense. 2014. "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond." Accessed January 21, 2016. <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217e2.pdf>.
- Johnston, Alastair I. 2012. "What (If Anything) Does East Asia Tell Us About International Relations Theory?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 15:52-78. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.040908.120058.
- Kim, Ji Young. 2015. "Rethinking the role of identity factors: the history problem and the Japan-South Korea security relationship in the post-Cold War period." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 15:477-503. doi:10.1093/irap/lcv007.

- Kingston, Jeff. 2015. "History problems cast a shadow over Abe's Japan." *The Japan Times*, April 18. Accessed January 21, 2016. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/04/18/commentary/history-problems-cast-shadow-abes-japan/#.VkGBADahdPZ>.
- Koh, Byung Chul. 2007. *Between Discord and Cooperation : Japan and the two Koreas*. Seoul: Yonsei University Press.
- Michishita, Narushige. 2014. "Changing Security Relationship between Japan and South Korea: Frictions and Hopes." *Asia-Pacific Review* 21(2):19-32. doi:10.1080/13439006.2014.970327.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. 2014. "Diplomatic Bluebook 2014." Accessed January 21, 2016. http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pp/page22e_000566.html.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. 2015. "Diplomatic Bluebook 2015." Accessed January 21, 2016. http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pp/page24e_000100.html.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. 2015. "Japan-ROK Foreign Ministers' Meeting." Accessed January 21, 2016. http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000365.html.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea. 2015. "Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative: Moving beyond the Asian Paradox Towards Peace and Cooperation in Northeast Asia." Accessed January 21, 2016. http://mofa.go.kr/ENG/North_Asia/res/eng.pdf.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea. 2015. "2014 Diplomatic White Paper." Accessed January 21, 2016. <http://www.mofat.go.kr/ENG/policy/whitepaper/index.jsp>.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea. 2015. "2015 Diplomatic White Paper." Accessed January 21, 2016. <http://www.mofat.go.kr/ENG/policy/whitepaper/index.jsp>.
- National Diet of Japan. 2013. "House of Representatives Budget Committee, 2. 40." Accessed January 21, 2016. <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi->

bin/KENSAKU/swk_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=11565&SAVED_RID=1&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV_ID=10&DOC_ID=472&DPAGE=2&DTOTAL=25&DPOS=24&SORT_DIR=1&SORT_TYPE=0&MODE=1&DMY=11776.

National Diet of Japan. 2014. “House of Councilors Main Session, 24. 30.” Accessed January 21, 2016. http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/swk_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=11565&SAVED_RID=1&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV_ID=10&DOC_ID=1481&DPAGE=1&DTOTAL=25&DPOS=12&SORT_DIR=1&SORT_TYPE=0&MODE=1&DMY=11776.

National Diet of Japan. 2014. “House of Councilors Education and Science Committee, 18. 142.” Accessed January 21, 2016. http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/swk_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=11565&SAVED_RID=1&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV_ID=10&DOC_ID=1546&DPAGE=1&DTOTAL=25&DPOS=11&SORT_DIR=1&SORT_TYPE=0&MODE=1&DMY=11776.

National Diet of Japan. 2014. “House of Representatives Budget Committee, 2. 38.” Accessed January 21, 2016. http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/swk_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=11565&SAVED_RID=1&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV_ID=10&DOC_ID=2614&DPAGE=1&DTOTAL=25&DPOS=9&SORT_DIR=1&SORT_TYPE=0&MODE=1&DMY=11776.

National Diet of Japan. 2014. “House of Representatives Budget Committee, 3. 195.” Accessed January 21, 2016. http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/swk_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=11565&SAVED_RID=1&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV_ID=10&DOC_ID=2618&DPAGE=1&DTOTAL=25&DPOS=8&SORT_DIR=1&SORT_TYPE=0&MODE=1&DMY=11776.

National Diet of Japan. 2015. “House of Representatives Budget Committee, 22. 81.” Accessed January 21, 2016. http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/swk_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=11565&SAVED_RID=1&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV_ID=10&DOC_ID=2618&DPAGE=1&DTOTAL=25&DPOS=8&SORT_DIR=1&SORT_TYPE=0&MODE=1&DMY=11776.

AGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV_ID=10&DOC_ID=5169&DPAGE=1&DTOTAL=25&DPOS=1&SORT_DIR=1&SORT_TYPE=0&MODE=1&DMY=11776.

National Diet of Japan. 2015. “Kokkaigijiroku Database [National Diet Records Database].” Accessed January 21, 2016. <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/>.

Okonogi, Masao. 2015. “Japan and the ROK: In Search of a Renewed Relationship.” *AJISS-Commentary*, No. 216. Accessed January 21, 2016. <http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary>.

Office of the President. 2013. “Remarks by President Park Geun-hye on the 94th March First Independence Movement Day.” Accessed January 21, 2016. http://english1.president.go.kr/activity/speeches.php?srh%5Bboard_no%5D=24&srh%5Bpage%5D=6&srh%5Bview_mode%5D=detail&srh%5Bseq%5D=2618&srh%5Bdetail_no%5D=2.

Office of the President. 2013. “Address by President Park Geun-Hye of the Republic of Korea to the joint Session of the United States Congress.” Speech, May 9. Accessed January 21, 2016. http://english1.president.go.kr/activity/speeches.php?srh%5Bboard_no%5D=24&srh%5Bsearch_type%5D=1&srh%5Bsearch_value%5D=Congress&srh%5Bview_mode%5D=detail&srh%5Bseq%5D=2623&srh%5Bdetail_no%5D=1.

Office of the President. 2014. “The President Meets with Former Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori.” Accessed January 21, 2016. http://english1.president.go.kr/activity/briefing.php?srh%5Bboard_no%5D=21&srh%5Bsearch_type%5D=1&srh%5Bsearch_value%5D=Mori&srh%5Bview_mode%5D=detail&srh%5Bseq%5D=7344&srh%5Bdetail_no%5D=1.

Office of the President. 2015. “Resolving history issues is key to a better relationship: president.” Accessed January 21, 2016. http://english1.president.go.kr/activity/headlines.php?srh%5Bboard_no%5D=22&srh%5Bsearch_type%5D=1&srh%5Bsearch_value%5D=Resolving

ing+history+issues+is+key+to+a+better+relationship&srh%5Bview_mode%5D=detail&srh%5Bseq%5D=10969&srh%5Bdetail_no%5D=1

Office of the President. 2015. “The President Meets with General Council Chairman of Liberal Democratic Party of Japan.” Accessed January 21, 2016.

http://english1.president.go.kr/activity/briefing.php?srh%5Bboard_no%5D=21&srh%5Bsearch_type%5D=1&srh%5Bsearch_value%5D=The+President+Meets+with+General+Council+Chairman+of+Liberal+Democratic+Party+of+Japan&srh%5Bview_mode%5D=detail&srh%5Bseq%5D=9423&srh%5Bdetail_no%5D=1.

Office of the President. 2015. “The President Meets with President of the Democratic Party of Japan Katsuya Okada.” Accessed January 21, 2016.

http://english1.president.go.kr/activity/briefing.php?srh%5Btext%5D=Okada&srh%5Bview_mode%5D=detail&srh%5Bseq%5D=11659.

Office of the President. 2015. “Keynote Address by President Park Geun-hye at the 70th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.” Accessed January 21, 2016.

http://english1.president.go.kr/activity/briefing.php?srh%5Bboard_no%5D=21&srh%5Bsearch_type%5D=2&srh%5Bsearch_value%5D=paradox&srh%5Bview_mode%5D=detail&srh%5Bseq%5D=12424&srh%5Bdetail_no%5D=3.

Office of the President. 2015. “Address to the Nation on the Agreement on the ‘Comfort Women’ issue.” Accessed January 21, 2016.

http://english1.president.go.kr/activity/briefing.php?srh%5Bboard_no%5D=21&srh%5Bview_mode%5D=detail&srh%5Bseq%5D=13638&srh%5Bdetail_no%5D=449.

Official Website of the Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. 2013. “National Security Strategy (Provisional Translation).” Accessed January 21, 2016.

http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/documents/2013/___icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/17/NSS.pdf.

Park, Cheol-Hee. 2008. “Historical Memory and the Resurgence of Nationalism:

- A Korean Perspective. In T. Hasegawa & K. Togo (Eds.), *East Asia's Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism (190-204)*. Westport: Praeger Security International.
- Park, Cheol-Hee. 2012. "Intra-regional geopolitical dynamics in Northeast Asia." In *The Asia-Pacific, Regionalism and the Global System*, edited by Christopher M. Dent and Jorn Dosch, 149-168. Northampton: Edgar Elgar.
- Park, Cheol-Hee. 2013. "National Identities and South Korea-Japan Relations." In *National Identities & Bilateral Relations*, edited by Gilbert Rozman, 45-64. Chicago: Stanford University Press.
- Park, Cheol-Hee. 2014. "Korea-Japan Relations after The Hague Summit Meeting." The Asan Forum, April 4. Accessed January 21, 2016. <http://www.theasanforum.org/japan-south-korea-relations-3/>.
- Pempel, T. J. 2006. "The Race to Connect East Asia: An Unending Steeplechase." *Asian Economic Policy Review*. 239-254. doi: 10.1111/j.1748-3131.2006.00027.
- Presidential Archives. 2016. "Presidential Archives." Accessed January 21, 2016. <http://www.pa.go.kr/index.jsp>.
- Rozman, Gilbert. 2012. *East Asian National Identities*. Chicago: Stanford University Press.
- Rozman, Gilbert. 2013. *National Identities & Bilateral Relations*. Chicago: Stanford University Press.
- Smith, Anthony D. 1991. *National Identity*. Reno: University of Nevada Press.
- The Asan Institute for Policy Studies. 2014. "Ilboneul Hyanghan Doo Shiseon: Hanguokinui Hanilgwangye Inshikgwa Geu Hamui [Two Views Toward Japan: Koreans' Understanding of ROK-Japan Relations, and its Meaning]." Accessed January 21, 2016. <http://asaninst.org/contents/%EC%9D%BC%EB%B3%B8%EC%9D%84>

-%ED%96%A5%ED%95%9C-%EB%91%90-
%EC%8B%9C%EC%84%A0-
%ED%95%9C%EA%B5%AD%EC%9D%B8%EC%9D%98%ED%95%
9C%EC%9D%BC%EA%B4%80%EA%B3%84-
%EC%9D%B8%EC%8B%9D%EA%B3%BC-%EA%B7%B8-
%ED%95%A8/.

The Federation of Korean Industries. 2015. “Daum 50Nyuneul Uwihan Miraejihyangjeok Hanil Saneophyupryuk Bangan [Plans for Future Oriented Korea-Japan Industrial Cooperation for the Next 50 Years].” Accessed January 21, 2016.
http://www.fki.or.kr/FkiAct/Promotion/Report/View.aspx?content_id=b0eb6486-fc4f-42f4-a3ac-5245fae0c338.

Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics.” *International Organization*, 46:391-425.
doi: 10.1017/S0020818300027764.

Yoshida, R. 2014. “Asahi Shimbun admits errors in past ‘comfort women’ stories.” *The Japan Times*, August 5. Accessed January 21, 2016.
<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/08/05/national/politics-diplomacy/asahi-shimbun-admits-errors-in-past-comfort-women-stories/#.VnePoY9OJPZ>.

Appendix 1: List of ROK-Japan summitries³⁶

Date and Location	Nature and Occasion of the Summitry
1953.1.6. Tokyo, Japan	Rhee-Yoshida, Unofficial meeting
1961.11.11. Tokyo, Japan	Park (Supreme Council Park, C.H.)-Ikeda, de facto summitry, stopover on Park's way to Washington
1983.1.11~12. Seoul, ROK	Chun-Nakasone, state visit
1984.9.6~8. Tokyo, Japan	Chun-Nakasone, state visit
1990.5.24~26. Tokyo, Japan	Roh (TW)-Kaifu, state visit
1991.1.9~10. Seoul, ROK	Roh-Kaifu, state visit
1992.1.16~18. Seoul, ROK	Roh-Miyazawa, state visit
1992.11.8. Kyoto, Japan	Roh-Miyazawa, working visit
1993.11.6~7. Gyeongju, ROK	Kim (YS)-Hosokawa, working visit
1994.3.24~26. Tokyo, Japan	Kim-Hosokawa, state visit
1994.7.23~24. Seoul, ROK	Kim-Murayama, state visit
1995.11.18. Osaka, Japan	Kim-Murayama, following an APEC meeting
1996.3. 1. Bangkok, Thailand	Kim-Hashimoto, during their attendance at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)
1996.6.22~23. Jeju, ROK	Kim-Hashimoto, working visit
1996.11.24. Manila, Philippines	Kim-Hashimoto, during the APEC meeting
1997.1.25~26. Beppu, Japan	Kim-Hashimoto, working visit
1998.10.7~10. Tokyo, Japan	Kim (DJ)-Obuchi, state visit
1999.3.19~21. Seoul, ROK	Kim-Obuchi, state visit
2000.5.29. Seoul, ROK	Kim-Mori, working visit
2000.9.22~24. Atami, Japan	Kim-Mori, working visit
2001.10.15. Seoul, ROK	Kim-Koizumi, working visit
2002.3.12~13. Seoul, ROK	Kim-Koizumi, official visit
2002.6.30~7.2. Tokyo, Japan	Kim-Koizumi, closing ceremony of the 2002 FIFA World Cup
2003.2.24~25. Seoul, ROK	Roh (MH)-Koizumi, following the inauguration of Roh's Presidency

³⁶ Based on the information taken from Ko (2007), President Archives website, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan website.

2003.5.6~9. Tokyo, Japan	Roh-Koizumi, state visit
2004.7.21~22. Jeju, ROK	Roh-Koizumi, working visit
2004.12.17. Ibusuki (Kanagawa Prefecture), Japan	Roh-Koizumi, working visit
2005.6.20~21. Seoul, ROK	Roh-Koizumi, working visit
2006.10.09. Seoul, ROK	Roh-Abe, working visit
2008.2.25. Seoul, ROK	Lee-Fukuda, on the occasion of Lee's Presidential inauguration
2008.4.20~21. Tokyo, Japan	Lee-Fukuda, working visit
2009.1.12. Seoul, ROK	Lee-Aso, working visit
2009.6.28, Tokyo, Japan	Lee-Aso, working visit
2009.10.09. Seoul, ROK	Lee-Hatoyama, working visit
2011.10.19. Seoul, ROK	Lee-Noda, working visit
2011.12.18. Kyoto, Japan	Lee-Noda, working visit
2012.05.28. Beijing, PRC	Lee-Noda, following the ROK-Japan-China trilateral summit
2015.11.02. Seoul, ROK	Park-Abe, following the ROK-Japan-China trilateral summit

Appendix 2: Excerpts of President Park's statements regarding Japan³⁷

March 01, 2013

Remarks by President Park Geun-hye on the 94th March First Independence Movement Day

History is a mirror for self-reflection and a key to unlocking a future of new hope. The same is true for the history between Korea and Japan. Only when there is honest soul-searching about the past will our two nations be able to usher in a future of shared progress together.

The historic dynamic of one party being a perpetrator and the other party a victim will remain unchanged even after a thousand years have passed.

It is incumbent on Japan to have a correct understanding of history and take on an attitude of responsibility in order to partner with us in playing a leading role in East Asia in the 21st century.

Only then will we be able to build rock-solid trust between our two nations, which will in turn enable reconciliation and collaboration in a genuine sense.

We must not place the heavy burden of the past on the future generations of our two nations. It is high time for the political leaders of this generation to demonstrate their determination and courage.

In order for our two nations to heal the wounds of the past as soon as possible and march together toward a future of shared progress, it is necessary for the Japanese Government to change unreservedly and behave in a responsible manner.

September 30, 2013

The President Meets with U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel

Commenting next on the importance of security cooperation among Korea, the United States and Japan, Secretary Hagel expressed the hope that Korea-Japan relations would improve, particularly with regard to the importance of historical issues.

To this, President Park responded, "I too consider Japan an important country that we will have to partner with to bring peace and stability in Northeast Asia. I also know well the importance of cooperation among Korea, the United States and

³⁷ Taken directly from the Cheong Wa Dae, or Office of the President website. Those without English versions are reproduced in their original Korean version. Underlines are made by the author to highlight points regarding ROK-Japan relations.

Japan. But because of the Japanese leadership and its repeated backward-looking remarks on historical issues as well as territorial issues, trust has not been established.

"While there are some issues that can be resolved by leaders sitting down together to talk, this particular issue involves citizens who still live with the pain of the suffering inflicted on them. Any resolution to this issue must therefore be reached together with the people; this isn't something that two leaders can talk out on their own.

"The ``comfort women`` issue is ongoing history that is still being lived. These women saw their youth taken from them and destroyed while still in its bloom, and to this day, they live with their pain. Yet Japan, far from making apologies, continues rather to subject these women to further insult and humiliation. To this, not only the women themselves but also the Korean people can only respond with outrage. Should this be allowed to happen? And yet it does. Would this issue be resolved just because the leaders of Korea and Japan talked about it?

"In this kind of situation, what is necessary is for Japan to show some degree of sincerity in its attitude; talks between leaders must proceed together with this. Yet what is being shown instead is a disregard for such a need, a total absence of sincerity, and it is a truly unfortunate situation. Even if an agreement to work for better relations could be reached during a summit, the wounds of the people would still remain. What's more, if after the summit the Japanese leadership were to again make upsetting remarks, just as it has done in the past, we would have to wonder, as our people once again feel pain, why such a meeting was held in the first place. This kind of vicious cycle is a real problem. For this reason, though, I am very thankful that the United States Government is directing its attention to this issue and making various efforts for its resolution. In any case, I hope you will continue to take an interest and to exercise your influence so that Japan will make the effort necessary to earn the trust of its neighboring countries. If Germany had continued to say things that inflicted pain while acting as if all was well, would European integration have been possible? I think the answer is no."

December 06, 2013

The President Meets with U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden

Vice President Biden stressed that both Korea and Japan are important allies for the United States and said he hoped to see the earliest possible resolution of the various obstacles affecting Korea-Japan relations, along with significant progress toward friendlier ties.

President Park, in turn, affirmed the need for Japan to become a key cooperative partner. She expressed hope that Korea and Japan would be able to establish a forward-looking relationship on the basis of trust and that Japan would take steps to demonstrate its sincerity in pursuing this end.

January 06, 2014

New Year Press Conference Q & A Session

김종균(YTN) 기자 : 외교안보 분야에 대해서 질문 드리겠습니다.

대통령께서 새해에 만나고 싶지만 만날 수 없는 힘든 상황을 가진 이웃이 두 명 있다고 생각합니다. 한편으로는 대화를 하자, 관계 개선을 하자고 하고, 또 한편으로는 끊임없이 도발하고 있는 일본 아베총리와 또 북한의 김정은 제1위원장이 아닌가 생각합니다. 아베총리는 지난해 12월 26일, 야스쿠니 신사를 전격적으로 참배했습니다. 이웃국가들에게 큰 실망감과 아픔을 줬는데, 이대로라면 내년 한·일 국교 정상화 50주년이 되는 내년까지도 한·일 정상회담이 어렵지 않을까 하는 관측도 나오고 있습니다. 그렇지만 일본의 변화만 기다리기는 어려울 것 같고, 이런 악화일로의 한·일 관계 속에서 우리가 할 수 있는 게 어떤 게 있고, 이 가운데 한·일 정상회담도 포함되는지 묻고 싶습니다. 덧붙여서 지금 남북 상황에서는 다소 뜬금없지만 김정은 제1위원장과 남북 정상회담을 임기 내에 추진할 의향이 있는지 궁금합니다.

박 대통령 : 북한에서 올해 신년사에 남북관계 개선에 대해서 얘기를 했는데 그 자체에 대해서는 환영을 합니다. 그런데 중요한 것은 말이 아니라 행동이고, 또 진정성 아니겠습니까? 작년도 신년사에서 남북 관계 개선을 이야기했지만 작년에 북한이 실제로 어떻게 행동을 했는지 여러분들께서 잘 알고 계실 것입니다.

저는 한반도의 평화와 또 통일시대 준비를 위해서 필요하다면 북한의 지도자와 언제든지 만날 수 있다 하는 입장에는 변함이 없습니다. 그러나 이게 회담을 위한 회담이 된다든가 이렇게 돼서는 안 되고, 한반도 평화를 위한 실질적인 성과를 내는 회담이 되도록, 또 그런 회담이 나올 수 있는 환경이 되어야 된다고 생각을 합니다.

그리고 일본과 관련해서는 일본은 동북아의 평화와 번영을 함께 열어갈 중요한 이웃나라라고 생각을 하고 있습니다.

또 저는 새 정부 출범할 때부터 한·일 관계의 발전을 바라왔고, 또 특히 양국 간에 신뢰 형성의 기초가 되는 올바른 역사인식, 그것에 대해서 좀 성의 있는 자세를 보여줄 것을 강조를 해 왔습니다. 그동안의 한·일 관계를 돌아보면 한·일 관계가 무라야마 담화, 고노담화, 그것을 기초로 해서 그것을 바탕으로

깔고 쪽 한·일 관계가 이어져 온 것 아니겠습니까? 그런데 최근에 와서 그것은 일본 정부의 공식입장이었습니다. 우리도 그것은 일본이 갖고 있는 확고한 공식입장이다 해서 이런저런 일들이 그동안 있었어도 공식입장을 믿고 한·일 관계가 이어져 온 건데 최근 들어서 한국은 그렇게 계속 가려고 하는데 자꾸 그것을 부정하는 언행이 나오니까 이것이 양국 관계의 협력의 환경을 자꾸 깨는 상황을 만들어가고 있습니다. 그래서 지금 양국 협력이 확대되어 나가야 할 중요한 시기인데, 이러한 협력을 할 수 있는 환경이 자꾸 깨지는 일이 반복되고 있어서 저는 이 점을 안타깝게 생각합니다. 저는 여태까지 한일 정상회담을 하지 않겠다고 말한 적이 없습니다. 그러나 이 한일정상회담은 두 나라 관계 발전에 도움이 되는 결과를 가져와야 하기 때문에 그런 결과가 도출될 수 있도록 사전에 충분한 준비가 있어야 또 그런 준비 하에 추진이 되어야 할 걸로 생각을 합니다.

March 01, 2014

Address by President Park Geun-hye on the 95th March First Independence Movement Day

Next year will mark the 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic ties between Korea and Japan. Thus far, upholding shared values on the basis of mutual understanding, the two nations have fostered close cooperative relations for the sake of peace and common progress in Northeast Asia.

A painful history notwithstanding, the two nations were able to develop such relations since there were efforts to promote friendly and good neighborly relations with surrounding countries on the basis of the Peace Constitution. There were also efforts to march toward the future based on Japan's reflection on its colonial rule and invasion through the Kono Statement and the Murayama Statement.

It can be said that a nation's historical consciousness serves as a compass needle pointing to the future direction of the nation. If it fails to look back upon past wrongdoings, it will not be able to open a new era. It goes without saying that a leader who is not ready to acknowledge past wrongs cannot open up a new era in the future.

Courage in the genuine sense is not about negating the past but about facing up to history as it was and teaching undistorted historic facts to future generations.

Now is high time for the Japanese Government to make the right and courageous

decisions so that our two nations will be able to overcome our painful history and move forward toward a future of new prosperity. In particular, it is imperative to heal the wounds of the comfort women victims of the Japanese imperial military; after having lived all their lives overwhelmed by indescribable resentment and grief, now only 55 of them survive.

If a nation continues denying past history, it will only end up driving itself into a corner and looking more miserable. People who are still alive are witness to the truth of history. Turning a deaf ear to their testimonies and ignoring them just for the sake of political interests will only result in isolation.

Politics should not stand in the way of the friendship and trust the peoples of our two countries have so far fostered. Even now, they are still sharing mutual understanding by means of culture.

I hope that the Japanese Government, guided by the universal conscience of humanity and the good precedent made by post-war Germany, will be able to break away from its negation of the past and write a new chapter in history characterized by truth and reconciliation for a future of cooperation, peace and shared prosperity.

July 25, 2014

The President Meets with Tokyo Governor Yoichi Masuzoe

President Park said that despite close friendly ties so far between the peoples of the two nations, she felt sorry that they seemed to have become estranged because of the recent discord in political circles. Noting that inappropriate remarks by some Japanese politicians added to the difficulty in bilateral relations, the President expressed the hope that the Governor would work hard to ensure that bilateral ties make steady progress on the basis of a correct reading of history. In particular, the President said that she anticipated the day the issue of comfort women, which is also a matter of women`s human rights, is resolved on the strength of sincere efforts on the part of Japan.

...

Governor Masuzoe next explained to President Park that he had met with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe just prior to departing for Seoul and had stressed to him the utmost importance of Korea-Japan relations and the consequent need for a future-oriented approach to developing the bilateral relationship. He said that Prime Minister Abe had expressed agreement on this and had asked the Governor to relay to President Park his willingness to make efforts to improve bilateral relations.

President Park responded by saying first that Korea and Japan are friendly nations who need to cooperate together for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. She pointed out also that she has continued to stress Korea-Japan relations as a priority for her Administration since her first days in office. She said, “It is difficult to proceed to a relationship of genuine trust without the foundation of a correct understanding of history; my hope therefore is that we can establish this foundation and build on it a relationship of trust to be strengthened and developed over time. All countries have their land and their history. The land, we say, is the people’s body, and the history, the people’s soul. So if the soul is afflicted, the very core of the people is shaken. Our two nations have engaged with one another continuously, geographically and historically, and I don’t believe that politics should be allowed to estrange the friendship between our people.”

August 18, 2014

Address by President Park Geun-hye on the 69th Anniversary of Liberation

Next year marks the 50th anniversary of the normalization of ties between the Republic of Korea and Japan. It is now time to set our sights on the next 50 years and start making progress toward future-oriented friendly, cooperative relations. To do so, efforts must be made to heal the wounds of history that persist to this day.

Korea and Japan have maintained a long tradition of cultural exchange. Through culture, the Korean and Japanese people are fostering mutual understanding, expanding the scope of bilateral exchanges and keeping the foundation of relations solid. Politics must seek to understand the hearts and minds of the people and set a proper course. Yet in Japan, the actions of some politicians have caused rifts between our two peoples and brought serious pain.

The Korean Government has continued to call on Japan’s leaders to take a correct view of history and especially to take proactive measures acceptable to the comfort women victims of the Japanese imperial military while they are still alive.

When this issue is properly resolved, relations between Japan and Korea will be able to progress soundly, and next year’s 50th anniversary of diplomatic ties will be an occasion of wholehearted celebration for the people of the two nations.

I believe this is the way for the Japanese Government to do the right thing and stand upright before future generations. The facts of history cannot be obscured or denied at will. Witnesses to that history still remain, and future generations will continue to seek the truth.

My hope is that next year will be the starting point from which Korea and Japan

set out together toward a brighter future, united by the friendship between the two peoples. I look forward to seeing the Japanese leadership demonstrate great wisdom and resolve to this end.

In the Northeast Asian region, conflicts and confrontations have been transpiring at levels unseen since the end of the Cold War. Tensions surrounding historical and territorial issues are intensifying and new seeds of distrust are being sown in the political, economic and military sectors. Depending on how we respond, however, the challenges before us can become opportunities.

For one, the Northeast Asian region has a high density of nuclear power plants, and problems with nuclear safety are posing a serious threat to the people in the region. So, just as Europe pioneered a framework for multilateral cooperation through the European Coal and Steel Community, later going on to establish the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), I propose that we create a consultative body for nuclear safety in Northeast Asia. Korea, China and Japan would spearhead the effort, with participation open not only to the United States and Russia but also North Korea and Mongolia.

It will also be necessary to expand regional cooperation with regard to various other issues, including disaster relief and rescue, climate change response and drug trafficking, and make efforts to lay the groundwork for lasting peace and prosperity. I look forward to the active participation of neighboring countries in this Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation Initiative so that together we may usher in a new future for the region.

September 19, 2014

The President Meets with Former Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori

Noting that next year will mark the 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan, the President expressed the hope the two nations could move towards a future-oriented relationship. She continued to say that to this end, sincere efforts had to first be made to heal the wounds wrought by past history. Particularly, the President said she looked forward to the former prime minister's role in helping 55 surviving comfort women, who were forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese Imperial Army, regain their honor while they are still alive, thereby contributing to the smooth development of bilateral ties.

On the topic of a Korea-Japan summit, President Park stressed the importance of making careful preparations beforehand, noting that some past summits had ended

up setting relations back rather than improving them.

October 21, 2014

김관진 국가안보실장, 야치 쇼타로 日 NSC 국장 면담 결과

김 안보실장은 야치 국장의 방한을 환영하고, 한일간 협력이 양국관계 뿐 아니라 동북아 지역 및 세계의 평화와 안정을 위해서도 중요함을 강조하면서, 내년 한일 국교정상화 50주년을 계기로 양국이 미래지향적 관계로 나아갈 수 있도록 진지한 노력을 기울일 필요가 있다고 했습니다. 이를 위해서는 무엇보다도 일본 정치 지도자들의 과거사 상처 치유를 위한 진정성 있는 노력이 중요하며, 특히 일본군 위안부 피해자 문제의 해결은 가장 중요한 핵심현안임을 강조했습니다.

October 24, 2014

The President Meets with Delegation from Japan-Korea Parliamentarians' Union

“The plight of the comfort women is symbolic of such pending issues between Korea and Japan and the resolution of this issue is regarded as the first step toward a new start in improving bilateral relations. I hope Japan will take convincing actions to help fully restore the honor of the surviving victims while they are still alive. In advancing Korea-Japan ties based on trust, it is also important for Japan to refrain from repeating remarks on historic issues that exacerbate the situation and hurt the Korean people.”

November 03, 2014

The President Meets with Dutch King Willem-Alexander

President Park next explained that she was proposing a Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative with an aim to build trust by developing a habit of cooperation among Northeast Asian countries. The Initiative is starting with issues for the common interest and progress in the region that are easier to find areas of agreement on and will then move on to solving more difficult issues on that accomplishment. She went on to say that the recent suggestion to create a nuclear safety consultative body was part of the Initiative and that cooperation would be possible in such areas as disaster relief, climate change responses and

counter-terrorism efforts. Introducing an international forum attended by the United States, China, Japan, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations, which was held in a bid to put the Initiative into practice, the President explained that the participating countries concurred on the need for the Initiative and reached an agreement to present agenda topics for cooperation. Moving onto the issue of Korea-Japan relations, President Park said that Korea and Japan are partners that should work together for the realization of peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia, but there are some unresolved historic issues, particularly the issue of comfort women who were forced to work as sex slaves by the Japanese military, that the two countries need to work to solve.

December 19, 2014

The President Meets with U.S. Congressman Michael Honda

President Park said that as late as 2007 when she visited to the U.S., there had been over 120 former comfort women still living, but with most having been very elderly, only 55 now remained. She called it a duty to fully restore their honor while they were still alive.

The President said that the comfort women issue was a matter of women's human rights relevant to basic universal values. Therefore, she said, it was not an issue pertaining only to the past but rather an issue for the present and the future. She said she looked forward to seeing it resolved shortly and noted the devoted efforts by Rep. Honda to raise awareness of the issue in the U.S. Congress.

In reply, Rep. Honda expressed full agreement that the comfort women issue was relevant to the present and future and said that reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific region would require Japan's acknowledgment of its responsibility and the fulfillment of justice for the victims.

February 13, 2015

The President Meets with General Council Chairman of Liberal Democratic Party of Japan

In order to commemorate the 50th anniversary in a meaningful way and pass a more stable bilateral relationship on to future generations, President Park said that the key pending issue of comfort women, who were coerced into sexual slavery by imperial Japan during World War II, had to be addressed first and foremost—the first step in improving bilateral relations.

Noting that there is not much time left to address the issue given the average age of 88 of the 53 surviving victims, President Park urged the visiting lawmaker to

take interest in the matter and make efforts so that reasonable measures would be taken as early as possible to restore their honor.

In reply, Chairman Nikai said that it was only natural to address the issue while they were still living and promised that he would join forces to that end.

Mentioning that the international community is paying attention to Prime Minister Abe's to be issued to mark the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II this year, President Park said that it was desirable for the chairman to express the view that wide-ranging opinions from all walks of life in Japan have to be reflected in the statement for the future of Japan.

March 01, 2015

Address by President Park Geun-hye on the 96th March First Independence Movement Day

Now is high time for our two nations to become more mature partners for the next 50 years and to write a new chapter in history together. My Administration has, since its inauguration, striven to open a new era of cooperation with Japan in the 21st century, looking ahead into the future of the relationship based on the correct perception of history. Notwithstanding that we are close neighbors geographically, the two nations have regretfully failed to narrow the distance in their hearts because of the conflicts over the past.

The Korean Government has so far urged the Japanese Government to promptly address the human rights violations against comfort women victims, who were forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese imperial military during World War II. It is a historic task that has to be resolved without fail in the journey of our two nations to the future.

This year two more victims passed away, with lifelong wounds still festering deep in their hearts. Now there are only 53 victims remaining, and given their average age approaching 90, there is little time left to restore their honor.

We have to keep in mind what a historian recently pointed out: history is not about choosing only what we want to remember, and the recognition of history is the only path to progress. The continued attempts by the Japanese Government to publish school textbooks containing distorted facts damage relations with neighbors.

The two peoples are becoming closer through cultural exchanges. In order to further promote mutual understanding and deepen interaction, the governments should make efforts to expand areas where such heart-to-heart exchanges can

grow.

As Germany and France became key players in rebuilding Europe by overcoming conflicts and confrontations, I hope Japan will now have the courage to recognize historical truths with sincerity and work together with Korea to write a new chapter in history as future partners for the next 50 years.

June 01, 2015

Resolving history issues is key to a better relationship: president

"By properly resolving history issues, we can develop our bilateral relationship on a sounder basis," said the president. "The Japanese government's clear expression of its recognition of history, as was done in the Murayama Statement and the Kono Statement declared by past administrations, is vital to improving the two countries' relationship. The Japanese government needs to wisely use the opportunity, including the expected announcement to be made on August 15."

"One of the elderly women who were enslaved as 'comfort women' passed away last week, and there are only 52 of them remaining," said President Park. "I hope that the Japanese government makes a brave resolution so that their honor can be reclaimed while they are still alive."

June 06, 2015

'Peaceful unification to follow the will of patriotic martyrs'

"The political situation across Northeast Asia is developing more tension. No progress has been made across the region because of issues of historic truth, such as the 'comfort women' issue and territorial disputes."

June 25, 2015

The President Meets with UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein

President Park said that resolving the comfort women issue was important not only for forward-looking advancement in Korea-Japan relations but also with regard to the protection of women's human rights during wartime. She stressed that it was important to restore the honor and dignity of the comfort women, victims of lifelong suffering, while they still lived.

August 03, 2015

The President Meets with President of the Democratic Party of Japan Katsuya Okada

In addition, President Park stressed that reconciliation with the past is more

important than anything else in stabilizing Korea-Japan relations, which are intricately intertwined with issues related to the past, present and future.

Noting that DPJ President Okada was directly involved in the process of drafting Prime Minister Kan's Statement, President Park said that the correct understanding of history upheld by previous Japanese administrations through both the Murayama and Kono statements, which expressed repentance for colonial rule and aggression and looked toward the future, had made it possible to advance Korea-Japan relations to date. She also expressed the hope that Prime Minister Abe's statement, which is expected to be announced on the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, would clearly reaffirm the correct perception of history reflected in the preceding statements, thereby setting a major milestone for forward-looking relations between the two countries.

Explaining how he had joined the process of writing Prime Minister Kan's Statement, DPJ President Okada said that he would pass President Park's remarks on to the Japanese Government. He continued to say that, for his part, he looked forward to Prime Minister Abe making a statement containing a good message.

In regard to the issue of comfort women who were forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese military, President Park said that seven victims passed away this year alone and there were now only 48 remaining. Considering their average age nearing 90, the President added, this issue should be addressed with a sense of urgency. She reiterated that now would be virtually the last opportunity to solve the issue given the old age of the victims.

August 15, 2015

Commemorative Address by President Park Geun-hye on the 70th Anniversary of Liberation

Since ties were normalized in 1965, the view of history articulated by the previous Japanese cabinets, including in the Kono Statement and the Murayama Statement, have been the key underpinnings of the Korea-Japan relationship.

In this sense, it is hard to deny that Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's statement of yesterday marking the 70th anniversary of the end of the war, did not quite live up to our expectations.

History cannot be hidden, but rather lives on through the testimony of surviving witnesses.

This notwithstanding, we take note of the message that was clearly conveyed to the international community; namely, that the position articulated by the previous Japanese cabinets, based on its apologies and remorse for how Japan's aggression

and colonial rule caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries in Asia, and caused suffering to the “comfort women” victims, will remain unshakable into the future.

We sincerely hope that Japan will come forward and forge shared peace in Northeast Asia, as an open-hearted neighbor.

We look to the Japanese government to match with consistent and sincere actions its declaration that the view of history articulated by its previous cabinets will be upheld, and thereby win the trust of its neighbors and the international community.

In particular, we hope the Japanese government resolves the issue of “comfort women” victims of the Japanese Imperial Army in a speedy and proper way.

While considerable difficulties remain, it is high time for us to move forward to a new future guided by a correct view of history.

I also look forward to serving together the cause of peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia and the world in a way that does justice to our standing in the international community.

Appendix 3: PM Abe's statements regarding the Comfort Women issue during the National Diet sessions 2012~2015³⁸

[025/025] 183 - House of Representatives, Main Session, No.3
2013.01.31

これまでの歴史の中では、多くの戦争があり、その中で女性の人権が侵害されてきました。二十一世紀こそ、人権侵害のない世紀にすることが大切であり、日本としても全力を尽くしていく考えであります。

慰安婦問題についても、筆舌に尽くしがたい、つらい思いをされた方々のことを思い、非常に心が痛みます。この点についての思いは、歴代総理と変わりはありません。

また、私としては、この問題を、政治問題、外交問題化させるべきではないと考えています。

いわゆる河野談話は、当時の河野官房長官によって表明されたものであり、総理である私からこれ以上申し上げることは差し控え、官房長官による対応が適当であると考えます。

[024/025] 183 - House of Representatives, Budget Committee, No.2
2013.02.07

大分私の意図をねじ曲げて御発言をされているんだと思いますよ。

整理をいたしますと、まずは、さきの第一次安倍内閣のときにおいて、質問主意書に対して答弁書を出しています。これは安倍内閣として閣議決定したものです。つまりそれは、強制連行を示す証拠はなかったということです。つまり、人さらいのように、人の家に入って行ってさらってきて、いわば慰安婦にってしまったということは、それを示すものはなかったということを明らかにしたわけでありませぬ。

しかし、それまでは、そうだったと言われていたわけですよ。そうだったと言われていたものを、それを示す証拠はなかったということを、安倍内閣においてこれは明らかにしたんです。しかし、それはなかなか、多くの人たちはその認識を共有していません

³⁸ These were retrieved from the Kokkaigijiroku Database [National Diet Records Database]. Only Japanese versions were available.

ね。

ただ、もちろん、私が言おうとしていることは、二十世紀というのは多くの女性が人権を侵害された時代でありました。日本においてもそうだったと思いますよ。二十一世紀はそういう時代にしないという決意を持って、我々は今政治の場にいるわけでありませぬ。女性の人権がしっかりと守られる世紀にしていきたい、これは不動の信念で前に進んでいきたいと思っています。

そのことはまず申し上げなければいけないし、そしてまた、慰安婦の方々が非常に苦しい状況に置かれていたことも事実であります。心からそういう方々に対してお見舞いを申し上げたいと思う、この気持ちにおいては歴代の内閣と変わりはない。しかし、今の事実については、そうではない、それを証明するものはなかったということをはっきりと示したわけでありませぬ。

そして、私がずっと言い続けてきたことは、これは違うという事実があるのであれば、それはある程度アカデミックな世界においてもちゃんと議論をしてもらいたいということでありませぬ。

しかし、今、私が総理大臣として正面からこの問題について、先ほど申し上げましたような言いぶりになることによって、結果として外交問題になっていくんですよ。ずっとそうだったじゃないですか。それはとるべき道ではなくて、これは私は何もやらなやかかそういうことではなくて、官房長官において、安倍内閣の官房長官ですよ、安倍内閣の官房長官において、どう対応していくかということについて検討していくということ。官房長官が勝手にやるわけではないですから、私のもとで官房長官が対応していく。これは総理大臣の口から発信するべきことではなくて官房長官から発信すべきものだという仕分けを、この安倍政権においては行ったということでありませぬ。

[023/025] 183 - House of Representatives, Budget Committee, No.10
2013.03.08

今、事実関係において間違いを述べられたので、ちょうどいい機会ですから、ここではっきり述べさせていただきたいと思いますが、ブッシュ大統領との間の日米首脳会談においては、この問題は全く出ておりませぬ。

ブッシュ大統領が答えられたのは、その前に私が既に述べている慰安婦についての考え方として、いわば、二十世紀においては戦争や、人権が著しく侵害された時代であっ

た、そして女性の人権も侵害された、残念ながらその中において日本も無関係ではなかった、二十一世紀においてはそういう時代ではない、人権がしっかりと守られていく、女性の人権も守られていく時代にしていきたいということを述べていたことについての評価として述べたわけでありまして、その事実関係が違うということだけははっきりと申し上げておきたいと思えます。

そして、その中において、この問題というのは、いわば歴史のファクトの問題でもあります。一方、総理大臣の私の口からそのことについて議論することは、これは外交問題にもつながっていく可能性もあるわけでありまして、そこはやはり専門家に任せていくべきであろう、このように考えたわけでございます。

[022/025] 183 - House of Councilors, Budget Committee, No. 17
2013.05.14

釈明ではなくて説明ですね。説明については、ずっと従来から私は答弁をしておりございまして、そして、村山談話につきましては、まさにこれは今申し上げたとおりでありまして、これは従来から何回も何回も申し上げているとおりでございまして、言わばもうじき七十年を迎えるわけでありまして、その段階で安倍政権として、安倍政権が続いていけばということでございますが、安倍政権として是非そのときにまた未来に向かって談話を発表したいと、こう考えているところでございます。

そして、河野談話につきましては、まさに、これは繰り返し私は既に述べているわけでございますが、慰安婦の方々が大変つらい思いをされた、筆舌に尽くし難い思いをされたということに対しましては、心から同情をするわけでございます。

その上において、第一次安倍政権においては閣議決定をしているものもあるわけでございます。そうしたものをどう理解をしていただくかということも含めて、これは官房長官の下で今検討をしているということになるわけございまして、いずれにせよ、歴史認識の問題については政治問題あるいは外交問題にするべきではないと、こう考えているところでございます。

[021/025] 183 - House of Councilors, Budget Committee, No. 18
2013.05.15

私は、累次申し上げておりますように、慰安婦の方々に対して言わば筆舌に尽くし難い

苦しみを与えたことについては痛切に反省をしなければならないことであると、これはもう累次申し上げているとおりでありまして、その思いは今も変わらないわけでございます。

その上に立って申し上げれば、言わばこの問題については今の安倍政権としては官房長官からお答えすることが適切であろうと、このように考えているところでございます。

[020/025] 183 - House of Councilors, Account Balance Committee, No.1
2013.05.20

これまでも累次答弁をさせていただいておりますが、その際、いつも私は必ずこのように申し上げているわけですが、これまでの歴史の中では多くの戦争があり、その中で女性の人権が侵害をされてきた、二十一世紀こそ人権侵害のない世紀にしていくことが大切であり、日本としても全力を尽くしていく考えである、慰安婦問題については、筆舌に尽くし難いつらい思いをされた方々のことを思い、非常に心が痛む、この点についての思いは私も歴代総理とは変わりがないということをお申し上げてきておりでございます。

そして、橋下代表の発言については、私も全て詳細に存じ上げているわけでもございませんし、報道されている中身しか知らないわけですが、これも何回か委員会で申し上げているとおりで、私もまた自由民主党も全く立場が異なるということは申し上げているとおりでございまして、他党の代表の発言でありますから、一々このことに我々、私どもが更にコメントする立場にはないということは申し上げておきたいと、こう思う次第でございます。

そして、慰安婦の方々に対しては、既にこれは基金をつくって日本は誠意を示してきて今日に至っているということではないかと思えます。

[019/025] 183 - House of Councilors, Cabinet Committee, No. 8
2013.05.23

今まで累次お話をさせていただいておりますように、慰安婦の方々に対しては心から同情をしているということは申し上げているとおりでございます。

[018/025] 185 - House of Councilors, Main Session, No. 3
2013.10.18

慰安婦問題についてお尋ねがありました。

慰安婦問題についても、これまで累次の機会に申し上げてきたとおり、筆舌に尽くし難いつらい思いをされた方々のことを思い、非常に心が痛みます。この点についての私の思いは、歴代総理と変わりありません。同時に、私としては、この問題を政治問題、外交問題化させるべきではないと考えています。

これまでの歴史の中では多くの戦争があり、その中で女性の人権が侵害されてきました。二十一世紀こそ人権侵害のない世紀にすることが大切であり、日本としても全力を尽くしていく考えであります。先般の国連総会の演説において、私は、二十一世紀において女性の人権を守るための具体的施策を明らかにしたところであります。

御指摘のとおり、我が国の考え方を関係する諸国に伝えていくことは非常に重要であり、あらゆる機会をとらえて安倍内閣の考え方を説明していく所存であります。

[017/025] 186 - House of Councilors, Main Session, No. 2
2014.01.29

国連社会権規約委員会と国連拷問禁止委員会における慰安婦問題に関する勧告についてのお尋ねがありました。

これらの勧告は、我が国の考え方が全く反映されておらず、また、事実誤認に基づく一方的なものであり、法的拘束力を有するものではありません。

国連安保理決議一三二五号に基づく行動計画についてのお尋ねがありました。

女性・平和・安全保障に関する行動計画の策定は、女性の力の更なる活用といった現代的課題について、国際社会との協力や途上国支援の強化を目的とするものであります。慰安婦問題等の過去の問題を扱うものではありません。

憲法改正に向けた姿勢についてのお尋ねがありました。

自由民主党は、立党以来、憲法改正を主張しており、昨年、憲法改正草案を発表し、二十一世紀にふさわしいあるべき憲法の姿を広く国民に示し、憲法改正を正面から訴えてまいりました。今後、憲法審査会などの場においてしっかりとした議論を行うことにより、新しい時代にふさわしい憲法の在り方について国民的な議論を更に深めてまいり

たいと考えています。この議論の深まりを踏まえて、私としてはしっかりと着実に憲法改正に取り組んでまいります。

[016/025] 186 - House of Councilors, Budget Committee, No. 3
2014.02.06

そこで、日韓関係であります。価値を共有する最も大切な隣国であろうと、このように思います。その中におきまして、一昨年、竹島そしてまたいわゆる従軍慰安婦問題に端を発しまして関係が悪化をしていたわけでございます。そこで、朴槿恵大統領が就任をいたしまして、私も電話会談を行ったところでございますし、魚住先生を始め公明党の皆さんも交流をされ、そして昨年も、協力委員会にも日本の総理として初めて出席をさせていただきました。

また、先般のダボス会議におきましても、朴槿恵大統領の講演を拝聴をいたしまして、その際、尹炳世外務大臣とも握手をし、また大統領府の人たちとも挨拶をさせていただくこともできました。

日本といたしましては、また私といたしましては、課題があるのは事実であります。課題があるからこそ胸襟を開いて前提条件を付けずに首脳会談を行うべきだろうと、このように思っております。こちらの対話のドアは常にオープンでありますし、そしてこの対話のドア、開けている対話のドアに、ドアの中で待っているということだけではなくて、我々も積極的に出ていって、この首脳会談、政治レベルにおける交流が実現するように努力を重ねていきたいと、このように思っているところでございます。

[015/025] 186 - House of Representatives, Budget Committee, No.12
2014.02.20

私は先般、ロイス米下院外交委員長を初め七名の超党派、委員長を入れると八名なんです。下院議員一行の皆様とお目にかかったところでございます。

ロイス委員長自体が、いわゆる慰安婦の碑に行かれたという事実は承知をしておりますが、いわば、外交委員長を初め、アジア太平洋地域の安全保障状況あるいは日米同盟の重要性について理解をしている方々、議会の方々とお目にかかって、意見交換を進めていくことは、日米同盟を強化していく上において、相互理解を進めていく上で重要である、こう判断をしてお目にかかったところでございます。

また、ロイス委員長は、今回の訪問中に拉致被害者家族とも懇談を行っていたわけですが、私も面会をする際に、古屋拉致問題担当大臣にも同席をしてもらったわけですが、

その会談の中においては、先方から慰安婦問題についての議論はなかったわけですが、これは、ロイス委員長だけではなくて、極めて日本のことをよく知っているシャーボット下院外交委員会のアジア太平洋小委員長もおられて、さまざまな議員の方がおられますので、必ずしもそのことについて、こちら側からあえてお話しはいたしませんでしたが、日本の基本的な外交方針、積極的平和主義等々についてはお話をさせていただいたところがございます。

[014/025] 186 - House of Councilors, Budget Committee, No. 13
2014.03.14

慰安婦問題については、筆舌に尽くし難いつらい思いをされた方々のことを思い、非常に心が痛みます。この点についての思いは私も歴代総理と変わりはありません。この問題については、いわゆる河野談話があります。この談話は官房長官の談話ではありますが、菅官房長官が記者会見で述べているとおり、安倍内閣でそれを見直すことは考えていないわけであります。

先ほども申し上げましたように、歴史に対して我々は謙虚でなければならないと考えております。歴史問題は政治・外交問題化されるべきものではありません。歴史の研究は有識者や、そして専門家の手に委ねるべきであると、このように考えております。

[013/025] 186 - House of Representatives, Main Session, No.9
2014.03.18

歴史認識についてお尋ねがありました。

歴史認識については、戦後五十周年の機会には村山談話、六十周年の機会には小泉談話が出されています。安倍内閣としては、これらの談話を含め、歴史認識に関する歴代内閣の立場を全体として引き継いでいます。

慰安婦問題については、筆舌に尽くしがたい、つらい思いをされた方々のことを思い、非常に心が痛みます。この点についての思いは、私も歴代総理と変わりありません。

この問題については、いわゆる河野談話があります。この談話は官房長官の談話です

が、菅官房長官が記者会見で述べているとおり、安倍内閣でそれを見直すことは考えておりません。

これまでも申し上げているとおり、歴史に対して我々は謙虚でなければならないと考えています。歴史問題は、政治、外交問題化されるべきものではありません。歴史の研究は、有識者や専門家の手に委ねるべきであると考えています。

[012/025] 186 - House of Councilors, Main Session, No. 24
2014.05.23

伝統と文化を尊重し、それらを育んできた我が国と郷土を愛する態度を養うことができるよう、我が国の歴史について子供たちの理解を深めることは重要と考えております。

教科書にどのような事項を取り上げ、どのように記述するかは教科書発行者が判断し、申請した内容について、先般改正した検定基準に基づき検定がなされるものであり、南京事件、慰安婦についてもその中で取扱いが検討されるものと考えます。

[011/025] 186 - House of Councilors, Education and Science Committee, No. 18
2014.06.12

これまでも申し上げておりますように、歴史に対して政治家は謙虚でなければならぬと考えております。歴史問題は政治・外交問題化されるべきものではないわけでありまして、歴史の研究は有識者や専門家の手に委ねるべきものであると考えております。

そして、国民一人一人が自らの誇りと自信を取り戻すことができるよう、改正教育基本法の趣旨を踏まえた教科書で子供たちが学ぶことが重要であると思えます。教科書にどのような事項を取り上げ、どのように記述するかは教科書発行者が判断し、申請した内容について、先般改正した検定基準に基づき検定がなされるものでありまして、例として挙げられました慰安婦についてもその中で取扱いが検討されるものであります。

今後とも、教育基本法の趣旨を踏まえ、バランスよく記載された教科書を用いながら、我が国の歴史について子供たちがしっかりと理解を深めていくことができるように取り組んでいきたいと考えております。

[010/025] 187 - House of Representatives, Main Session, No. 3
2013.10.01

また、既に検定に合格した現行の教科書における慰安婦に関する記述の訂正を発行者

に求めることまでは考えておりませんが、今後の申請図書については、先般改正した新しい検定基準に基づき、教科用図書検定調査審議会において適切に教科書検定が行われるべきものと考えます。

[009/025] 187 - House of Representatives, Budget Committee, No. 2
2014.10.03

安倍内閣総理大臣 本来、個別の報道についてコメントすべきでないと思っておりますが、しかし、慰安婦問題については、この誤報によって多くの人々が傷つき、悲しみ、苦しみ、そして怒りを覚えたのは事実でありますし、ただいま委員が指摘をされたように、日本のイメージは大きく傷ついたわけであります。日本が国ぐるみで性奴隷にした、いわれなき中傷が今世界で行われているのも事実であります。この誤報によってそういう状況が作り出された、生み出されたのも事実である、このように言えますし、かつては、こうした報道に疑義を差し挟むことで大変なバッシングを受けました。

かつて、まさに、日本が性奴隷にしたということの判決をクローズアップした番組をNHKがつくったわけではありますが、これに中川昭一さんと私が事前に介入して番組を変えさせたという朝日の報道があったわけではありますが、これも、中川昭一さんは事前には会っていないということがその後明らかになり、朝日新聞が認めていますし、私が呼び出したということも、そうではないということが明らかになっているわけでございます。

しかし、今回、これが誤報であったということが明らかになったわけでございます。政府としては、客観的な事実に基づく正しい歴史認識が形成され、日本の取り組みに対して国際社会から正当な評価を受けることを求めていく考えでありますし、そのため、これまで以上に戦略的な対外発信を強化していかなければならないと思っております。

もちろん、現在でも、紛争下において女性の人権が侵害される、これに対して、日本は積極的に、そうした状況において女性の人権が侵害されることのないように貢献していく、その貢献策について先般国連で演説をしてきたところでございます。

他方、こうしたいわれなき中傷については、そうではないという発信をしっかりとしていくことが大切ではないか、このように思っております。

[008/025] 187 - House of Representatives, Budget Committee, No. 3
2014.10.06

安倍内閣総理大臣 報道については読みました。

個別の報道機関の記事については本来コメントをするべきではない、このように思いますが、しかし、この朝日新聞の慰安婦問題に関する誤報により、多くの人が苦しみ、そして悲しみ、そしてまた怒りを覚えたわけであります。そして、日韓関係に大きな影響、そして打撃を与えたとも言える、このように思います。そして、国際社会における日本の、日本人の名誉を著しく傷つけたことは事実であります。

こうした誤報を認めたのでありますから、この記事によって傷つけられた日本の名誉を回復するためにも今後努力していただきたい、このように思います。

[007/025] 187 - House of Councilors, Budget Committee, No. 2
2014.10.08

慰安婦問題や歴史認識を始めとする過去の問題については、韓国側に対し、我が国のこれまでの取組や立場をしっかりと受け止めてもらうべく、引き続き説明を重ねていく考えであります。こうした粘り強い取組を通じて関係改善を図っていく考えでございます。

[006/025] 189 - House of Representatives, Main Session, No. 7
2015.02.17

慰安婦問題についてのお尋ねがありました。

慰安婦問題については、これまで累次の機会に申し上げてきたとおり、筆舌に尽くしがたい、つらい思いをされた方々のことを思い、非常に心が痛みます。この点についての思いは、私も歴代総理と変わりません。

同時に、私としては、この問題を政治問題、外交問題化させるべきではないと考えています

[005/025] 189 - House of Councilors, Main Session, No. 7
2015.02.18

歴史認識及び慰安婦問題についてのお尋ねがありました。

安倍政権としては、戦後五十年の村山談話、戦後六十年の小泉談話を含め、歴史認識に関する歴代内閣の立場を全体として引き継いでおり、今後も引き継いでいく考えであ

ります。

慰安婦問題については、これまで累次の機会に申し上げてきたとおり、筆舌に尽くし難いつらい思いをされた方々のことを思い、非常に心が痛みます。この点についての思いは、私も歴代総理と変わりません。同時に、私としては、この問題を政治問題、外交問題化させるべきではないと考えております。

[004/025] 189 - House of Councilors, Budget Committee, No. 13
2015.03.27

内閣総理大臣（安倍晋三君） 慰安婦問題については、筆舌に尽くし難いつらい思いをされた方々のことを思い、非常に心が痛む思いでございます。この点については、まさに歴代の総理と変わりがないということでございます。

そして、これまでの歴史の中では、多くの戦争があり、その中で女性の人権が侵害されてきたわけでございます。二十一世紀こそ人権侵害のない世紀にすることが大切であり、日本としても全力を尽くしていかなければならないと、こう考えているところでございます。

[002/025] 189 - House of Councilors, Budget Committee, No. 20
2015.08.24

内閣総理大臣（安倍晋三君） もう既に何回も、この委員会等も含めまして、いわゆる慰安婦の方々が辛酸をなめたということにつきまして心が痛む思いであるということは申し上げてきたとおりでございます。そうした方々も含め、多くの女性たちが戦争の陰で名誉と尊厳が傷つけられたということを申し上げているわけであります。

[001/025] 189 - House of Representatives, Budget Committee, No. 22
2015.11.10

安倍内閣総理大臣 慰安婦問題については、政府としては、一九六五年の日韓請求権協定で法的に解決済みとの立場には変わりはありません。その上で、本年八月十四日の内閣総理大臣談話では、戦時下、多くの女性たちの尊厳や名誉が深く傷つけられた過去をこの胸に刻み続け、二十一世紀こそ、女性の人権が傷つけられることのない世紀とするため、世界をリードしていくとの決意を示しました。

今回の日韓首脳会談では、慰安婦問題が日韓関係の発展に影響を与えているとの認識

のもとに、両国が未来志向の関係を築いていくため、将来の世代の障害にならないようにすることが重要との認識で一致をいたしました。本年が日韓国交正常化五十周年という節目の年であることを念頭に、できるだけ早期に妥結するため、協議を加速化させることで一致したことでありまして、このことを踏まえて、韓国側と引き続き局長級協議を行っていく考えであります。

국문초록

The 2012~2015 ROK-Japan Summit Disengagement -Constructivist analysis based on national identity and historical memory-

성 명: 박범준

학과 및 전공: 국제학과 국제지역학
서울대학교 국제대학원

한일관계에 있어서 역사문제로 인한 관계악화와 국익을 위한 관계회복은 늘 반복되어왔던 패턴이다. 하지만 2012년 대한민국의 이명박 정부말기부터 2015년 11월까지의 3년이 넘는 기간 동안에 한일정상회담이 부재했던 것은 초유의 사태였다. 초기의 관계악화는 이명박 대통령의 대한민국 대통령으로서 처음으로 독도를 방문한 것에 기인 할 수 있지만, 일본의 독도 영유권 주장만으로 한일 간에 정상회담이 긴 기간 동안 성사되지 못했던 것은 설명이 되지 않는다. 이 논문의 목적은 2012년 5월에 있었던 한일정상회담으로부터 2015년 11월에 재개된 한일정상회담까지의 3년의 넘는 기간 동안 정상회

답이 성사되지 못했던 원인과 요인을 분석하고자 한다.

사실주의와 리버럴 국제관계이론의 안보나 유용성의 최대화를 추구하는 합리적 선택형 모델의 한계를 인지하며, 본 논문은 국가정체성과 역사적 기억을 활용하는 구성주의적 접근을 통해 대한민국과 일본 양자관계를 분석하고자 하였다. 구성주의적 접근으로 양국 국가원수의 각종 발언들과 양국 정부의 외교정책구상, 그리고 2015년 11월의 한일정상회담과 동년 12월에 있었던 위안부문제에 관한 양국 외교장관의 공동기자회견의 내용들을 분석해보았다. 그 결과 박근혜정권의 “지역협력 조성자”로서의 국가정체성과 아베정권의 “재도약하는 일본”으로서의 국가정체성간에 마찰적 요인이 있는 것이 확인되었다. 정확히 말하자면 박근혜정권이 추구하는 “신뢰외교”가 인식하는 일본의 신뢰성이 “올바른 역사인식”을 기반으로 하고 있는 점과, 아베정권이 추구하는 일본의 “명예와 자부심의 회복”간에 마찰이 있는 것이다. 이러한 마찰은 상이한 역사적 기억으로 인해서 생성된 것이며, 2012년~2015년 동안 한일관계악화의 원인으로 자주 인용된 위안부문제에서도 발견된다.

주요어: 한일관계, 정상회담, 국가정체성, 역사적 기억, 위안부, 신뢰외교

학 번: 2013-22064