

International Humanitarianism and Refugee Protection: Consequences of Labeling and Politicization*

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This study explores the inconsistency between legal frameworks and international humanitarian operations and examines characteristics of contemporary forced migration and international humanitarian responses. Forced migration has been politicized and international humanitarian responses have changed as follows. First, the increasing number of IDPs and changing national refugee policies indicate that the international community is reluctant to host refugees. Second, refugees are likely to relocate to neighboring countries, thereby intensifying the financial burdens on host countries. Third, LDCs and developing countries are suffering from a greater burden than developed countries to support refugees and IDPs because most forced migrants stay within their countries of origin or within bordered countries. Finally, the recently increasing involvement of UNHCR to help IDPs has made it difficult for a government to deny the access of the international community to displaced people in its territory.

Keywords: Forced Migration, Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), International Humanitarian Responses

1. INTRODUCTION

They are at the same time both invisible and storytellers. Refugees are neither seen nor heard, but they are everywhere. They are witnesses to the most awful things that people can do to each other, and they become storytellers simply by existing. Refugees embody misery and suffering, and they force us to confront terrible chaos and evil.

— Arthur Helton (2002:8)

Not the loss of specific rights, then, but the loss of a community willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever, has been the calamity that has befallen ever-increasing numbers of people. Man, it turns out, can lose all so-called Rights of Man without losing his essential quality as man, his human dignity. Only the loss of a polity itself expels him from humanity.

— Hannah Arendt (1966:297)

Forced migration crises are chronic features in both human experience and international relations. Even the end of the Cold War did not do away with these phenomena around the world. It can be observed from the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries that as the number of forced migrants increase, forced migration demands compassion, leading both to calls for help and a fear of discrepancy in international relations, state policies, and individuals' lives. In international relations, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)

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embody “products of humanity’s worst instinct” as well as “some of its best instinct”—their varying situations show “the willingness of some persons to oppress others” as well as “the willingness of many to assist and protect the helpless.” To states, they can be “threats or weapons” as well as “trophies or embarrassment.” For individuals, they matter simply because “it could be me” (Helton, 2002:7).

The international community engages in forced migration crises to varying degrees by providing humanitarian assistance and protection for displaced people. Humanitarian responses are expected to play important roles in contemporary forced migration crises because perpetrator governments are unable or unwilling to care for forced migrants, and host governments employ more restrictive refugee policies than ever before. Therefore, refugees and IDPs are more likely to seek asylum with the help of humanitarian agencies after fleeing the violence in their country of origin.

The international community traditionally concentrates on the assistance and protection of refugee rights. Yet, in contemporary forced migrations crises, the number of refugees has decreased and the number of IDPs has dramatically increased. Additionally, displaced people are likely to relocate themselves in neighboring countries or within their country of origin instead of moving far away from their country of origin. Given changing attributes and processes of refugee flows and other forced migrant movements in international relations, the legally defined concept of a refugee is not inaccurate but incomplete in order to resolve the puzzles in social science and provide durable solutions to forced migration crises.

This study aims to investigate the inconsistency between legal frameworks and international humanitarian operations and analyze the consequences of international humanitarian actions for the lives of displaced people in contemporary forced migration crises. The next section explores how the ways of categorizing forced migration and labeling forced migrants affect the accessibility of forced migrants to international assistance. In the third section, I examine the roles of international humanitarianism in forced migration. In the fourth section, I investigate the characteristics of forced migration and international humanitarian responses, focusing on global figures of refugees and IDPs, refugee flows and burden sharing, and IDP flows and the expansion of international humanitarianism between 1980 and 2008. The last section provides a summary and suggestions for future research and policy development.

2. LABELING FORCED MIGRANTS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Among the contemporary academia of forced migration crises, forced migration is often defined in a way that focuses on the causes and consequences of three categories of forced migration induced by conflict, natural disasters, and development policies, with an emphasis on the experiences of those affected. The categorization of forced migration illustrated in Table 1 is developed by political and policy concerns to handle humanitarian demands, rather than analytical ones.

Practitioners and scholars are likely to apply the conceptual framework developed in situations of conflict to analyze displacements caused by development projects and natural disasters (Adelman and McGrath, 2007; Hathaway, 2007). In doing so, the potential problems of ‘conceptual stretching’ cannot be avoided because of the conceptual distortion that occurs when a concept does not fit new cases (Sartori, 1970). In theory, such a broad concept of forced migration makes it difficult to define the population of interest and draw

Table 1. Typologies of Forced Migration

Types	Economic Migration		Forced Migration	
Nature of force	Globalization	Development	Conflict	Environment
Acting agents	Migration policy, Individual's motives	Government, International Development groups	Government, Armed groups	Natural disasters
Migrants	Economic immigrants, Illegal laborers	Refugees (less likely), IDPs (more likely)	Refugees, IDPs	Refugees (least likely), IDPs (most likely)
International community	Monitoring the abuse of international laborers	Mixed	Likely to be denied by government	Likely to be welcomed by government

meaningful and generalizable conclusions from verifiable evidence (Collier and Mahon, 1993; Collier and Gerring, 2009). It is inappropriate to use the term 'refugee' to describe people who leave their country or place of residence simply because they want to seek a better life. On the other hand, broadening the concept makes it possible to compare sub-categories of forced migration for the gathering, description, and analysis of empirical data.

How categories change or should change when they are applied to new cases is also an important question in practice for humanitarian field operations. The international community specifies a population to be assisted and the conditions under which it should respond to humanitarian emergencies. Therefore, defining or labeling categories of forced migration changes the lives of a potentially very large number of people (Zetter, 1999 and 2007). For instance, people who fall into the refugee category are more likely to have opportunities to be safe; on the corollary, they are often ignored and their lives become more endangered. However, it is categorically and morally difficult to distinguish refugees from other forced migrants who are equally in need due to certain types of human rights abuses.

Most displaced people generally fall into one of three categories of forced migration. They exercise a lesser degree of freedom of choice than those who experience economic migration. Some forced migrants relocate themselves outside of their countries of origin to be recognized as a refugee; others are likely to stay within their countries of origin and labeled as an IDP. Although the most significant difference between refugees and IDPs is whether they are given legal status by international law, they are similarly in desperate need of help.

Nevertheless, the level of international support for displaced people varies according to the political will of countries and the international community. For example, "[w]hile victims of natural disaster are the focus of sympathetic attention and international aid (as are many of those displaced by conflict), the same cannot be said for victims of development-induced displacement although the consequences may be comparably dire" (Robinson, 2003:3). This is because development projects are viewed as domestic affairs that are well recognized and protected by other sovereign states under the principle of non-interference.

In essence, national governments are responsible for assisting, protecting, and resettling displaced people. Therefore, forced migrants' access to international assistance is often more

limited by the principle of sovereignty in the international system (Deng, 2006; Deng et al., 1996). On one hand, governments facing natural disasters, including the Haitian earthquakes in January 2010, call on the international community for immediate humanitarian action. On the other hand, governments sometimes deny international assistance or downplay the consequences of displacement or the need for assistance because the governments displace people by targeting them in conflict or by implementing development projects. This often leads to the refusal of governments to accept international assistance at the cost of unnecessary suffering experienced by displaced persons.

In practice, the international community has become reluctant to give displaced people a refugee status and host them. The statistics of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) show that most refugees remain in their region of origin and flee to bordered countries. By the end of 2009, there were 10.4 million refugees around the world; however, developing countries host 8.3 million refugees, which is over 80 percent of the global refugee population; countries in the major refugee generating regions host on average between 76 and 91 percent of the refugees within their region of origin (UNHCR, 2010).¹ UNHCR (2010) also reports that only 17 percent of the total 10.4 million refugees lived outside their region of origin at the end of 2009. This pattern remains consistent over the period between 2001 and 2009. During these years, the minimum percentage of refugees who stayed in their region of origin was recorded at 71 percent in Europe in 2004, and the maximum percentage was 94 percent in Latin America in 2004.²

Yet, there has been a growing recognition during the past three decades that a great number of people are in refugee-like situations within their own countries with the same level of special needs that refugees have. Since IDPs relocate themselves to a different part of their own country, international assistance to and the protection of IDPs become politically controversial issues in international relations. Unlike refugees, IDPs do not have a specific legal status; yet, they are in as much desperate need as refugees are. However, the application of international refugee law is less plausible and would weaken their protection because the law would marginalize displaced people who are not entitled to refugee status (Cohen and Deng, 1998; Mooney, 2005). Thus, the international community has developed an international IDP regime since the early 1990s.

Although the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance to IDPs lies with national authorities, governments can hardly deny international assistance on arbitrary grounds. In contemporary forced migration crises, governments reluctantly but increasingly allow humanitarian agencies to launch humanitarian operations within their territories. The international humanitarian community led by UNHCR increasingly engages in field operations for IDPs although no international humanitarian agency including UNHCR has a mandate to assist or protect IDPs. Consequently, 15.6 million out of 27.1 million IDPs benefited from UNHCR-involved operations in 2009. With an increase of 1.2 million IDPs compared to 2008 (14.4 million), the 2009 figure was more than double than that of 2005 (6.6 million).

¹ This number does not include Palestinian refugees. There were, on average, 4.2 million Palestinian refugees from 2000 to 2009 (<http://www.un.org/unrwa>). They fall under the responsibility of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency of Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Therefore, they are not included in the UNHCR's statistics.

² The data are available from UNHCR Statistical Yearbooks from 2001 to 2009.

Importantly, the majority of IDPs worldwide live in protracted displacement in which the processes of finding durable solutions have stalled and/or IDPs are marginalized as a consequence of violations or a lack of protection of human rights, including economic, social, and cultural rights (IDMC, 2010). In this situation, it is difficult to assess their number, particularly in countries with both protracted and new displacements. In the August 2008 conflict between Russian and Georgian forces, for example, the situation of people displaced since the 1990s was overlooked in favor of the people affected by the new displacement crisis.

3. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM CONTESTED

The effort to address the connection between conflict and humanitarianism is not new in international relations studies. Conflicts trigger humanitarian crises and elicit humanitarian responses; humanitarianism inspires normative imperatives and sometimes alters processes and/or outcomes of conflicts. For example, the 'just war' theory has provided the international community with justifications for acceptable military behavior to prevent the harm inflicted by armed conflict. The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (*hereafter* 1951 Convention) and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (*hereafter* 1967 Protocol) were created to protect conflict-induced refugees. Since the early 1990s, the multiple legal frameworks and institutions that assist IDPs have evolved and received widespread attention (Weiss and Korn, 2006).

In accordance with the evolution of the international humanitarian legal framework, the international humanitarian community has undergone expansion. International humanitarian advocacy groups, including UNHCR, are expected to advocate for persons of concern within its mandate in order to safeguard the worth and welfare of those in distress. At the same time, they are political entities in the sense that they engage in the political processes that determine who receives things of value, which is called 'humanitarian politics' (Forsythe, 1977; Minear and Weiss, 1995; Campbell, 1998). They lobby or press the governments to become responsible parties and live up to their commitments.

In addition, international humanitarian agencies seek to be genuinely nonpolitical, to be 'other oriented,' for the benefit of persons of concern, whereas governments strongly tend to prioritize strategic and partisan goals (Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, 2004). Nevertheless, humanitarian agencies often inadvertently have an impact on the strategic or partisan goals of public authorities. For example, during the mid-1990s, when UNHCR sought to curtail the operations of various Hutu militia that were intermingling with genuine civilians in flight from Rwanda, it had an impact on the Hutu-Tutsi militarized conflict.

International humanitarian assistance and protection should be intertwined, instead of something distinct from one another. Thus, the international community has developed the concept of 'Responsibility to Protect' as a good reason for military intervention in dealing with the emerging challenges in contemporary humanitarian crises. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) maintains that sovereignty must yield to the protection of refugees and IDPs from the most egregious violations of humanitarian and international laws, including genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other crimes against humanity (ICISS, 2001). This ICISS 2001 report received little attention soon after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. However, ongoing humanitarian disasters, including the failure to protect the people of Darfur, have

signaled that the international community as a whole needs to do more to deal with genocide and other mass threats against populations. Consequently, using the military to protect people has become a viable alternative.

The evolution of the international humanitarian system has affected humanitarian field operations, and accordingly, the expectation of displaced people to be assisted and protected. Forced migrants are more likely to seek asylum with the help of international humanitarian agencies when their own governments and neighboring countries do not have the willingness and capability to support them. The presence and effectiveness of humanitarian actions inside and outside a country of origin provide a critical base for displaced people's decisions about crossing international borders. International humanitarian efforts increase forced migrants' expectation that their basic needs will be fulfilled and their security will be maintained.

In this context, the African Union Convention on the Protection of and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (known as the Kampala Convention) came into force on December 6, 2012 to bind governments to provide legal protection for the rights and well-being of those forced to flee inside their countries of origin due to conflict, generalized violence, human rights violations, man-made and natural disasters, and domestic development projects. The Kampala Convention is a major breakthrough for the protection of IDPs. It reaffirms that the primary responsibilities of sovereign states for their own IDPs and calls for national and regional actions to prevent internal displacement and ensure that IDPs are protected and helped. As of November 30, 2013, the Convention legally binds 15 African countries. UNHCR and the African Union is promoting further ratifications and assisting governments to internationalize the contents of the Convention in national laws.

International humanitarian responses, however, do not always produce positive outcomes (Lischer, 2003; Loescher, 1993). Humanitarian responses sometimes generate classic collective action problems among states and humanitarian agencies. UNHCR and other humanitarian NGOs unintentionally provide relief resources for rebellions due to their inattention to conflict dynamics (Anderson, 1999; Salehyan, 2007). The insensitivity to the demands of displaced people has often been criticized as a result of the pathological bureaucratic procedure of international organizations (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). The price of forced migration becomes 'the price of indifference' (Helton, 2002) depending on the varying degrees of the willingness and capability of a country of origin, neighboring countries, and the international community.

Forced migration crises demand that the international community provide humanitarian assistance and protection. Some recipient governments and rebel groups, however, manipulate humanitarian assistance so that such activities become military tools to advance non-humanitarian goals. In other words, studies of forced migration and international relations have to deal with the triadic relationship of root causes, neighborhood responses, and international responses in the process of forced migration in order to analyze the extent to which humanitarian responses affect the decisions of forced migrants.


4. CHARACTERISTICS OF FORCED MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

4.1. Fewer Refugees, More IDPs in Armed Conflicts

While mainstream international relations studies focus on the causes and consequences of war, not all wars have the same mechanisms in terms of goals, means, or consequences. Since the establishment of the Westphalia system of states, wars have primarily been fought by states. As Tilly (1992) maintains that states made war and war made states, the number of sovereign states has increased in a process of the power struggle among sovereign states. Since 1945, however, history has witnessed a new tendency: the threat of war between countries is declining while the incidence of conflict within a country is increasing.

In general, wars among the great powers and other interstate wars are becoming obsolete; on the other hand, most wars now occur in the Global South, which is home to the highest number of countries and characterized by the largest populations, the least income, and the least stable governments. Between 1946 and 2008, a total of 240 armed conflicts broke out in 151 different locations worldwide. Since the end of the Cold War, 128 armed conflicts have occurred in 81 countries. Of these 128, only eight are interstate wars while the remaining 120 are internal conflicts. For the past two decades, conflicts recurred in the same locations or specific regions. Since 2003, the year with the lowest number of conflicts since the 1970s, the biggest increase of conflict has occurred in Africa, from nine in 2003 and seven in 2005 to twelve in 2008.

Figure 1. Global Figures of Refugees and IDPs, 1980-2008 (in millions)



Data: UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database (UNHCR) for data on refugees and *Forcibly Displaced Population* (FDP), 1964-2008 for data on IDPs.

Note: The FDP data have been compiled by Monty G. Marshall of the Center for Systemic Peace (<http://www.systemicpeace.org>) using the data presented by *World Refugee Survey* (USCRI, 1980-2004) and *Internal Displacement* (IDMC, 2005-2008). The number of refugees is the sum of refugees residing in each country in a given year.

The humanitarian consequences of conflict have also changed. Government and armed groups often strategically target civilians with the changing number and locations of armed conflicts. As Figure 1 illustrates, both the number of refugees and the number of IDPs increased until the early 1990s. Since then, the number of IDPs has increased while the number of refugees has decreased. The number of refugees steadily increased from 8.2 million in 1980 to 17.6 million in 1992, the year with the highest number of refugees, and then, it decreased to 8.9 million in 2008. On the other hand, the number of IDPs motivated by conflicts reached 27.6 million in 1994 (the highest number of IDPs), increasing from 16.6 million in 1989. While it decreased to 18.1 million in 1998 (the lowest number of IDPs since 1989), it increased again to 27 million in 2008. Put differently, the ratio of IDPs to refugees has increased from 1:1 in 1985 to 1.4:1 in 1992 to 2:1 in 1999 to 3:1 in 2008.

The global figures of refugees and IDPs in Figure 1 imply that individuals do not make the same decisions in facing the same violence during conflict. The conventional assumption of a monolithic relationship between conflict and forced migrants' movement does not hold true anymore. Taking into account the increased number of internal conflicts and IDPs in the past two decades, the gap between the concept of refugee and forced migration in practical application is expected to become wider and wider in conflict-prone developing countries. For instance, the ratio of IDPs to refugees in sub-Saharan Africa has increased from 2:1 in 1985 to 3.5:1 in 1992 to 4:1 in 2000 to 5.5:1 in 2008. Therefore, the centrality of the individual from the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol must be expanded from 'refugee' to 'forced migrant' in order to encompass IDPs and other types of forcibly displaced persons.

The changes in the number of refugees and IDPs in Figure 2 result partly from the shifting interests of neighboring countries and the international community. Although refugees were once considered to be trophies of ideological competition, their strategic value is not the same as that in the Cold War era. Since the mid-1990s, the international community began to prefer an encampment policy to a resettlement policy after some humanitarian interventions failed to prevent genocides. For example, while the United Nations established the UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOMI) in 1992 to provide assistance and protection for displaced people, UNOSOMI was not able to prevent the mass atrocities in the so-called 'safe house' area in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, operated by UNOSOMI. In 1993, the United Nations also created a safe area in response to international concern over the humanitarian emergencies in Srebrenica of the former Yugoslavia. The UN Protection Force, however, failed to prevent the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995. As a result, the international community, including the United States, became reluctant to engage in protection operations in later ethnic conflicts, and consequently, displaced people have relied upon international assistance through humanitarian camps.

4.2. Refugee Flows: More Burden on the Developing Countries

The geographical distribution of refugee-generating and refugee-hosting countries has changed since the international refugee regime was established. As Table 2 shows, most countries among the top-15 refugee-generating countries are located in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Among the most frequently listed countries are Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Somalia, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), all of which have been significantly influenced by domestic conflict. On the other hand, Pakistan and Iran are the top two countries for hosting refugees. Most refugees in these countries come from their neighboring

Table 2. Top-15 Refugee-Generating and Refugee-Hosting Countries

Refugee-generating countries					Refugee-hosting countries				
1988	1993	1998	2003	2008	1988	1993	1998	2003	2008
AFG	AFG	AFG	AFG	Iraq	Pakistan	Iran	Iran	Pakistan	Syria
Ethiopia	MOZ	Iraq	Sudan	AFG	Iran	Pakistan	Pakistan	Iran	Iran
MOZ	Burundi	BIH	Burundi	Somalia	Somalia	Germany	Germany	Germany	Pakistan
Iraq	Iraq	Somalia	DRC	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan	Tanzania	Tanzania	Germany
Viet Nam	Liberia	Burundi	Somalia	DRC	Ethiopia	Malawi	USA	USA	Jordan
Angola	BIH	Viet Nam	Iraq	Viet Nam	Malawi	USA	Serbia	China	Tanzania
Somalia	Somalia	SLE	Viet Nam	Burundi	Germany	Guinea	Guinea	Serbia	Kenya
Sudan	Viet Nam	Sudan	Liberia	Turkey	USA	DRC	Sudan	UK	Chad
Rwanda	Rwanda	Liberia	Angola	Serbia	Mexico	Tanzania	Armenia	SAU	China
Burundi	Eritrea	Eritrea	BIH	Myanmar	DRC	Serbia	China	Armenia	UK
SLV	Sudan	Croatia	Serbia	Eritrea	China	Armenia	Ethiopia	Kenya	USA
ESH	Azerbaijan	Azerbaijan	Azerbaijan	China	Costa Rica	Kenya	DRC	DRC	SAU
Laos	Angola	Angola	Croatia	Angola	Burundi	China	Kenya	Uganda	India
Chad	SLE	Armenia	Turkey	Sri Lanka	Tanzania	Croatia	Azerbaijan	Zambia	Sudan
DRC	Togo	Russia	ESH	CAF	Honduras	Uganda	Uganda	Guinea	Canada

Data: UNHCR Online Population Database.

Note: AFG stands for Afghanistan; BIH for Bosnia and Herzegovina; CAF for Central African Republic; DRC for Democratic Republic of Congo; ESH for Western Sahara; MOZ for Mozambique; SAU for Saudi Arabia; SLE for Sierra Leone; and SLV for El Salvador.

countries, Afghanistan and Iraq.

Only five countries are listed in both the top-15 refugee-generating countries and refugee-hosting countries. These are Burundi and DRC in 1988, Azerbaijan in 1998, Serbia in 2003, and Sudan in 2008. Most top-15 refugee-hosting countries share international borders with at least one of the top-15 refugee-generating countries. This implies that refugees are more likely to stay in neighboring countries instead of choosing a long emigration with limited international support. This is the opposite of the common perception that industrialized countries suffer from the greatest number of refugee inflows.

The burden level imposed on host countries by refugee flows can also be illustrated in terms of the host country's financial capacity. The statistics in Table 3 represent the number of refugees divided by GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita. That is, the number of refugees that are supported by a hosting country with US\$1 of GDP (PPP) per capita is reported in the table. All top-15 refugee-hosting countries are developing or the least developed countries. In 2008, the first-ranked developed country was Germany (in 25th place with seventeen refugees per GDP (PPP) per capita in US\$), followed by the United Kingdom (in 37th place with eight refugees), the United States (in 40th place with six refugees), and Canada (in 46th place with four refugees). DRC is not on the list of the top-15 refugee-hosting countries in Table 3, but it is on the top of the list when its economic capability is considered. In other words, in terms of the measurement of the absolute number of refugees, DRC seems to bear a lesser burden of hosting refugees; however, in light of

Table 3. Number of Refugees per GDP (PPP) per capita (US\$)

1988		1993		1998		2003		2008	
Pakistan	2,023	DRC	1,482	DRC	801	DRC	929	DRC	522
Ethiopia	1,192	Malawi	1,091	Tanzania	657	Tanzania	681	Pakistan	313
Malawi	997	Pakistan	825	Pakistan	641	Pakistan	567	Tanzania	276
Sudan	751	Liberia	747	Ethiopia	525	Uganda	273	Syria	269
Burundi	549	Tanzania	698	Guinea	500	Ethiopia	248	Chad	225
Iran	525	Sudan	689	Sudan	315	Zambia	213	Kenya	218
DRC	483	Guinea	648	Uganda	280	Kenya	186	Uganda	151
Tanzania	321	Burundi	598	Liberia	267	Guinea	178	Nepal	119
China	271	Ethiopia	576	Iran	261	Chad	134	Ethiopia	104
Uganda	194	Uganda	478	Kenya	181	Nepal	134	Jordan	102
Zambia	108	Iran	362	Zambia	169	Burundi	120	Sudan	91
Honduras	88	Rwanda	343	Armenia	149	Iran	113	Iran	91
Guatemala	68	Bangladesh	274	Nepal	147	Liberia	107	India	67
Costa Rica	46	Armenia	231	China	126	Sierra Leone	102	Zambia	67
Mexico	37	Kenya	231	India	117	Sudan	93	Yemen	63

Data: UNHCR Online Population Database for data on refugees and World Development Indicators Online (World Bank) for data on GDP (PPP) per capita.

relative financial measurement, it has carried the greatest burden since the mid-1990s. Tanzania and Pakistan have also been under the stress of both financial shortages as well as a great number of refugees.

According to the principle of burden-sharing between the country of asylum and UNHCR, host countries are supposed to allot financial resources for refugee assistance and protection. In sub-Saharan Africa, host countries are incapable of managing the large number of refugees, and many of them are politically unstable. Thus, without sufficient international resources, these host countries often close their humanitarian camps or have to stop running them. This can be observed in the refugee policy changes that the Tanzanian government has developed since the middle of the 1990s. Due to limited resources, the competition between local residents and refugees is likely to be intensified as calls by citizens on the government to privilege its own citizens increase. In that sense, refugees are viewed as threats to national and international security. Thus, the international community should increase its financial support to lessen the fear of threat and competition and to draw political cooperation of host governments to deal with forced migration crises.

4.3. IDP Flows: The Growing Expansion of UNHCR's Humanitarian Operations

Conventional classification leads to a decreasing number of refugees but an increasing number of IDPs because governments and the international community often use these modes of classification to realize their political interests. All of the top-15 IDP-producing countries in Table 4 are the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The top-5 ranked countries account for around 48 percent of the world's IDPs. Most internal displacements in the last decade were caused by internal armed conflicts rather than international or internationalized

Table 4. Top-15 IDP-Producing Countries (in thousands)

1988		1993		1998		2003		2008	
South Africa	3,570	Sudan	4,000	Sudan	4,000	Sudan	4,800	Sudan	4,900
Sudan	2,600	South Africa	4,000	Colombia	1,400	DRC	3,200	Colombia	3,505
Afghanistan	2,000	Angola	2,000	Angola	1,200	Colombia	2,730	Pakistan	3,000
Mozambique	1,750	Mozambique	2,000	Iraq	1,000	Uganda	1,400	Iraq	2,842
Ethiopia	1,100	Bosnia	1,300	Bosnia	836	Angola	1,000	DRC	2,000
Iran	1,000	Afghanistan	1,000	Afghanistan	770	Iraq	900	Somalia	1,300
Angola	975	Liberia	1,000	Myanmar	750	Myanmar	800	Turkey	1,077
Israel	845	Myanmar	750	Turkey	700	Indonesia	800	Zimbabwe	785
Iraq	750	Lebanon	700	Azerbaijan	576	Jordan	800	Uganda	622
Lebanon	650	DRC	700	Sri Lanka	560	Turkey	675	Ivory Coast	600
Somalia	600	Somalia	700	India	520	India	650	Azerbaijan	588
Sri Lanka	450	Azerbaijan	600	Burundi	500	Azerbaijan	571	India	500
Guatemala	325	Sri Lanka	600	Rwanda	500	Ivory Coast	500	Sri Lanka	495
El Salvador	325	Peru	600	Lebanon	425	Sri Lanka	500	Myanmar	451
Nicaragua	275	Philippines	600	Uganda	400	Liberia	500	Syria	433


Data: Forcibly Displaced Population, 1964-2008 (Center for Systemic Peace) from *World Refugee Survey* (USCRI) and *Internal Displacement* (IDMC).

conflicts.

Sudan, DRC, and Iraq are major countries that consistently produce refugees and IDPs. In these countries, although the non-displaced population may be exposed to the same abuses and barriers, the fact that IDPs have been displaced within their countries tends to further keep IDPs from access to physical security, the basic necessities of life, and other rights. IDPs are likely to have lost property, their livelihoods, and documentation in their flight, as well as the support of family members and community networks. They are also likely to have suffered severe physical and psychological trauma in the process.

In the worst case, these people are often not acknowledged by national authorities. Governments often deny situations of internal displacement caused by conflict, generalized violence, or human rights violations. The governments of Ethiopia, Indonesia, Israel, Myanmar, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe did not acknowledge the existence of internal displacement during 2008. Thus, it is difficult to profile a forcibly displaced but hidden population along with their suspected outstanding needs. In these cases, the influence of international humanitarian actions on IDPs becomes marginal, especially when those governments reject international humanitarian assistance.

Notably, no international institution has been given the mandate to protect or assist conflict-induced IDPs. Nevertheless, the international community has become increasingly involved in forced migration crises. According to the concept of 'responsibility to protect,' while it is first and foremost the responsibility of individual governments to protect their populations, the responsibility shifts to the international community when the government is unable or unwilling to protect their citizens. Based on this concept, the international community has used a range of measures from diplomacy to military intervention to protect IDPs.

Figure 2. Global Number of IDPs and IDPs Assisted by UNHCR (in millions), 1993-2008

Data: UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database.

Figure 2 illustrates the increasing involvement of UNHCR to help IDPs in keeping with its commitment to the cluster approach launched in January 2006. The number of IDPs who benefited from UNHCR's protection and assistance activities stands at 14.4 million at the end of 2008, the highest figure on record. This constitutes an increase of more than about 700,000 when compared to the previous year (13.7 million). While 15 percent of the total number of IDPs was assisted directly by UNHCR, almost 53 percent of the global IDPs benefited from UNHCR-involved operations in 2008.

UNHCR has become a de facto leading agency for assisting and protecting IDPs based on the assignments of the cluster approach. There are objections that expanding UNHCR's responsibility for IDPs possibly diminishes UNHCR's traditional role and dilutes its mandate of refugee protection; yet, UNHCR's engagement to protect and assist IDPs has resulted from a process of institutionalization of the IDP protection framework in the international humanitarian system. UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Gutierrez told Reuters in October 2005 that the inability of the United Nations to protect and aid IDPs "is undoubtedly the international community's biggest failure in terms of humanitarian

Table 5. Comparison of UNHCR's Engagement and Refugee Outflow by Decades

	Forced Migrants Flows with All Observations				Forced Migrants Flows with UNHCR's Engagement			
	1980s	1990s	2000s	total	1980s	1990s	2000s	total
Ratio of Refugees	0.71	0.52	0.57	0.59	0.73	0.48	0.54	0.56
Observations	80	113	134	327	57	85	123	265
Average UNHCR's Expenditure	11.6	13.5	11.9	12.4	16.3	17.9	13.0	15.3

Note: One-year-lagged UNHCR's expenditure in US\$1 million.

Source: Song (2012:24)

action. You cannot refuse to act just because they have not crossed a frontier.’ As such, the development of an international IDP regime and the expansion of UNHCR’s humanitarian operations have rooted in the recognition that the legally provided concept of refugee does not fully capture the changing reality and excludes a great number of would-be refugees.

The UNHCR has engaged in IDP assistance and protection since the late 1990s. Table 5 illustrates to what extent UNHCR has engaged in forced migration crises. UNHCR was involved in 71.3 percent of new displacements during the 1980s, 75.2 percent during the 1990s, and 91.8 percent during the 2000s. This is because UNHCR has expanded its role in assisting and protecting refugees and IDPs in the 2000s in responding to the increasing attention of the international community to IDP crises worldwide. However, average UNHCR expenditures in a country of origin have decreased during the 2000s so that displaced people have to survive with a lack of resources (Song, 2012:23-24). Thus, host governments come to become reluctant to host refugees due to financial burdens to support the displaced and consider refugees and IDPs as potential threats to national security.

5. DISCUSSION

The words and findings in this study are not final ones. Instead, they will be enriched and articulated through and provide a basic foundation for future studies on forced migration and international relations. For this purpose, suggestions in this section are focused on broad normative and policy issues in international relations studies, including human rights, human security, global governance, globalization, and interdependence, as well as empirical issues regarding geographical scope, temporal dynamics, data collection, and different types of forced migration.

First, international humanitarian responses to forced migration represent the domains of international human rights law and a “real erosion of state sovereignty” (Russett, Starr, and Kinsella, 2010:289). While UNHCR was established to protect refugees, it has actively engaged in forced migration crises to help IDPs. However, the question of on what basis IDPs can be entitled to universal human rights needs to be articulated. When governments are human rights violators, the international community has difficulties in justifying its intervention in domestic affairs. Additionally, conceptual articulation of human rights, human security, and human development will be useful for researchers and practitioners to go beyond the legal definition and provide more substantive suggestions to deal with the plight of forced migrants.

Second, human security is relevant to posit and articulate the relationship between states and individuals based on the recognition that the security of a state does not always coincide with the security of individuals. The application of human security to forced migration may make the concept too inclusive to be useful. However, it reflects the widening sources of threat at individual, national, and international levels. Population movements are complex, but the causes and consequences of the movements have varied according to changes in sending and hosting communities in terms of resource competition, diseases and public health, conflict diffusion, and so on. The traditional concepts of security and sovereignty become less relevant to explain the emergence and evolution of humanitarian norms and regimes. The challenging task is how to define what is to be secured.

Third, international responses to forced migration have significant relevance to the study

of global governance in political, institutional, and normative contexts. Unlike other transnational policy issues, there is no coherent global governance of the movements of refugees and IDPs. Thus, why states have cooperated in establishing and expanding the current refugee regime to include IDPs and other forced migrants can be examined using the concepts of effectiveness and compliance. Additionally, while the human rights regime, refugee regime, IDP regime, and labor migration regime address different aspects of forced migration, they overlap with one another to varying degrees. Therefore, to what extent this proliferation of international regimes will be effective in providing protection of forced migrants is an important question. Although there are no clear-cut answers to these questions, it is apparent that the importance of international norms to protect refugees and IDPs as well as the roles of the United Nations and UNHCR in governing forced migration has been increasingly recognized in academic research and policymaking.

Fourth, while globalization is considered to bring about changes in knowledge, production of goods, identity, and global governance, it has also affected causes and consequences of forced migration. The causal relationship between globalization and the underlying causes of forced migration can be hypothesized in many respects. International trade in primary products such as diamonds and oil may increase the likelihood of forced migration by financing armed groups and intensifying competition over the access to natural resources. Economic liberalization, such as structural adjustment, may erode state capacity, leading to population displacement. Changes in identity may contribute to displacement caused by cleavages in religion and ethnicity within a country or a region. The global news media may contribute to the globalization of human rights norms, reducing the incentives of governments and armed groups to displace people. Displacement caused by environmental changes and international development projects can also be linked with the study of globalization. In general, the focus of these studies will be on how globalization impacts conflict-ridden and marginalized areas and people, how forced migration is an intrinsic part of globalization, and how globalization determines people's livelihoods in post-conflict or post-disaster reconstruction and recovery. These questions will also be answered in studying forced migrant movements from LDCs and/or developing countries to developed countries and comparing international responses to forced migration in LDCs and/or developing countries with those in developed European countries.

Fifth, forced migration can be examined in terms of interdependence. Refugee and IDP issues are beyond the capacity of any one government to deal with effectively. How one country deals with the problem will have consequences for others and influence future relations between states. The existence of forced migrants implies that the government is no longer able or willing to provide a safeguard, by which the home government would be responsible for protecting those who fall under its jurisdiction. Hence, in granting refugee status, a host state automatically makes a statement about the country of origin, and in assisting IDPs, the international community has to be concerned with the domestic conditions in the countries. In both cases, the international community should recognize a failure that could have serious political or economic repercussions between states. The failure to respond adequately to refugee movements is largely influenced by the political and international nature of the problem.

To make the findings of this study more generalizable, the following suggestions will be useful in future empirical analyses. First, geographical scope should be extended to other regions. In an attempt to draw causal inference and build a mid-range theory at the regional level, forced migration in sub-Saharan African countries between 1980 and 2008 was of

main interest in this study. Forced migration in sub-Saharan Africa reveals changes and continuities in the international politics of forced migration. However, the underlying causes and consequences may be different depending on the politics of asylum in each region. For example, international responses to humanitarian emergencies and displacement in North Africa and the Middle East in spring 2011 bring up the controversies over humanitarian imperatives versus states' selective engagement. Many European countries, including Italy that used to have economic, political interests in North Africa are reluctant to host refugees. Displaced people face detention and violence, but they are stopped from fleeing from Libya due to the waning political interests of European countries in this region. In addition, forced migration in East Asia and South America may also occur due to different motives.

Second, temporal dynamics should be taken into account in empirical studies. Large-N statistical analyses may not capture different patterns according to the changes in the regional and international system. UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies have paid much attention to European refugees since the inception of their establishment. Sub-Saharan African refugees received international attention during the decolonization of the region, but they were largely ignored in the 1990s. Although they have regained international attention since the late 1990s, the international community has adopted containment policies, instead of resettlement policies, without recognizing fewer displaced people as refugees. In East Asia, refugees were assisted and protected until the early 1980s, but since the mid-1980s when the region became a virtually conflict-free zone, international attention has shifted to other regions. Thus, researchers need to develop a large-N study considering this temporal dependency.

Third, both increasing the reliability of data on IDPs and building a database about camp militarization in future empirical studies will contribute to forced migration and international relations literature. Although international organizations, including the United Nations and UNHCR, have developed reliable data on refugees, international efforts to collect data on IDPs began for the first time in 1982 with estimated information. UNHCR and IDMC (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center) have provided the data, but measurement errors can hardly be avoided especially when they are used on the global level of empirical analysis. It does not necessarily mean that the data should not be used. Instead, the data will be more useful in region-specific empirical research and comparative case studies.

Finally, while this study focused on forced migration caused by violent conflicts, studies on other types of forced migration will also have significant implications for international relations studies. International humanitarian approaches to refugees and IDPs in forced migration crises caused by conflict are different from those in forced migration crises caused by natural disasters, environmental changes, and development projects. The 2010 Haiti earthquake and the devastating earthquake and tsunami in Japan in 2011 have inspired the international community to provide prompt assistance and protection services for displaced people. However, there is no international organization that has a mandate to assist people displaced by natural disasters and/or development projects because traditionally this has been considered as falling into the jurisdiction of state sovereignty. Questions concerning to what extent international humanitarian norms are applicable to those people and how the norms evolve through the global discourse should continue to receive theoretical and empirical attention in international relations.

6. CONCLUSION

It has been widely acknowledged that the conventional distinction between refugees and IDPs has become blurred because of the increasing number of IDPs and the same level of needs that they hold when compared to refugees. Therefore, focusing on the conventional concept of the refugee risks excluding other types of forced migrants, such as those displaced in their countries of origin, from policy and analytic concerns.

The need for expanding the concept of refugee arises from the inconsistency between the established concept of refugee and all the evidence of this study. First of all, while interstate wars are becoming obsolete, civil wars and other internal conflicts that target civilians prevail. Second, the increasing number of IDPs and changing national refugee policies indicate that the international community is reluctant to host refugees. Third, refugees are likely to relocate themselves in neighboring countries, thereby intensifying the financial burdens on host countries. Fourth, it is often said that developed countries suffer more from a rising number of refugees, but LDCs and developing countries are suffering from the largest burden to support refugees and IDPs because most forced migrants stay within their countries of origin or within adjoining countries. Finally, although state sovereignty becomes an obstacle to the assistance and protection of IDPs, recently increasing involvement of UNHCR to help IDPs has made it difficult for a government to deny the access of the international community to displaced people in its territory.

Population displacement has changed as the nature of warfare has changed. Since the late 1970s, most proxy wars in the East-West conflict occurred within a country's territory, which implies that most of the forced migrants were IDPs rather than refugees. In addition, since the end of the Cold War, accepting refugees has provided no political gains to host countries, especially when they come from the poorest of countries. As a result, asylum policies have become very restrictive as "the end of the Cold War swept away any remaining ideological motive for accepting refugees" (Human Security Centre, 2005:104). Superpowers were reluctant to get involved in the politics in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s. Governments and armed groups have targeted civilians in internal conflict; consequently, refugee numbers continued to fall, but IDP numbers continued to rise. Hence, the international community has developed international institutional frameworks to assist and protect IDPs when governments are unwilling and/or unable to fulfill their responsibilities to their citizens.

The end of the Cold War changed the image of who exactly is a 'refugee.' Refugees do not carry symbolic importance anymore in the ideological competition between the East and the West. Following the occurrence of mass flight in the Balkan region in the mid-1990s, concerns of the international community regarding refugee assistance and protection have shifted from Africa to Europe, making refugees and IDPs in sub-Saharan Africa survive with only one-tenth of international assistance that European refugees and IDPs received. In addition, the September 11 attacks and the emergence of new transnational threats linked to terrorism have factored into forced migration issues in sub-Saharan Africa. Many host governments, including the Kenyan government, have become reluctant to host new refugees, leading to a decreasing number of refugees and an increasing number of IDPs.

Not all forced migration crises get attention from each state. Realists argue that states engage with a forced migration crisis only if the states would have broader interests in providing assistance and protection. Thus, the decreasing number of refugees since the early

1990s does not result from the decreasing number of forced migrants, but it results from the restrictive refugee policies of host governments (Song, 2012:30-31). Refugee hosting countries have securitized refugee inflow and concerned about its negative influence on national security. When refugees are considered threats to national and international security, countries return those displaced people to their countries of origin and/or confine them along countries' borders.

State sovereignty may be limited by the emerging concept of 'responsibility of protection.' Although the primary responsibility for the protection of citizens lies with the state itself, the incapability and unwillingness of the government to protect and assist displace people may provide grounds for the international community to engage in forced migration crises. In this context, UNHCR has actively involved humanitarian operations in helping IDPs so that over 60 percent of the world's IDPs were assisted by UNHCR involved humanitarian operations in 2012.

This study illustrated the inconsistencies between the concept and the reality and between norms and practice. The legalized concept of refugees has not appropriated reflected realities in forced migration crises. Therefore, researchers in forced migration and international relations studies should have a theoretical and normative answer about what the subjects of their research represent before developing empirical measurements. Further theoretical and empirical analyses need to be done to resolve the inconsistency between the established concepts and changing realities of forced migration crises in international relations.

Lastly, this study suggests that international humanitarian agencies need to employ various approaches at the same time. Only resorting to humanitarian imperatives can hardly answer the question about what to do when states do not have the physical accommodations and willingness to help the displaced. International humanitarian agencies, therefore, should not be solely relied upon the international refugee protection regime. The international communities need to improve an international regime for IDPs and utilize other international regimes of human rights as well as the current international refugee regime in order to draw international cooperation to protect the human security of refugees and IDPs.

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