

## Trends of Value Changes in Korea: Comparison of the Survey Results of 1979, 1998 and 2010\*

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*By combining the survey result of 2010 to those of 1979 and 1998, this research aims to figure out how Koreans' values have shifted for three decades and how it is expressed in generation gap. For that purpose, we conducted a face-to-face interview survey to 800 people after sampling 100 women and men respectively from people in their 20s, 30s, 40s, and 50s living in Seoul, six metropolitan cities and Gyeonggi Province's cities and towns. The questionnaires in the survey were composed of 21 questionnaires on values (three questionnaires for individualism centered on oneself and family, post-authoritarianism, assertiveness, uncertainty avoidance, future orientation, gender egalitarianism, and affluent life), the same ones as those used in 1998, and one questionnaire on post-materialism. The result showed that just like during the 19 years from 1979 to 1998, individualism centered on oneself and family and gender egalitarianism increased the most during the 12 years from 1998 to 2010. In some questionnaires in regards to post-authoritarianism and assertiveness, the importance on consideration for the seniors and humility showed a tendency of significant growth during the latter 12 years. In most of the values that radically changed, people in their 20s showed a much faster change during the first 19 years compared to people in their 50s, which contributed a significant generation gap. However, during the latter 12 years, we witnessed a generation gap being a little bit narrowed down as people in their 50s swiftly started to adjust to the changing world. Moreover, the survey conducted in 1998 right after the Asian financial crisis showed that people were retreating a little bit towards materialism and such tendency was spreading much more quickly among younger people. However, in 2010, even though the proportion of post-materialists was still higher among the younger population, the mixed type has decreased as the proportion of materialists among youngsters*

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*increased. The mixed type increased among the older generation as materialists among them has decreased, bringing down the generation gap. The 2010 survey was unique in that an increased number of respondents said that we do not have to be particularly hospitable to foreigners, which reflects a new cultural environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> century where the number of foreigners with various nationalities is dramatically rising. The values that received more than the majority of people's approval regardless of their age and gender for the last three decades are important as the common ground for communication.*

*Keywords: values, change, generation, gap, Koreans, individualism, gender equality, post-authoritarianism, assertiveness, communication*

We are living in an era where values undergo rapid changes. Values are final decisions and evaluations an individual makes based on one's belief, and can be defined as an individual's belief, attitude and judgment in areas of human nature, world, society, culture, individual career and jobs, family life, and interpersonal relations (Newcomb et al.1970). In other words, it is a fundamental belief one holds on what is right and wrong, forming specific attitudes and being the basis of behaviors. Values are relatively stable and they rarely change compared to attitudes and behaviors. Nonetheless, in a rapidly changing society, changes of values are also very significant enough to be visible, which enables us to measure them through an empirical study. However, changes can be much more accurately proven only when measured with the interval of more than 5-10 years.

Values are different depending on generations, regions, and culture. Even though values are commonly shared by people living in a wide-ranging area, differences exist among different generations, genders, or nations. Therefore, an accurate understanding on values and their changing processes in a society contribute to the enhancement of social integration and happiness through sympathetic communication as it allows us to figure out common and uncommon thoughts of the members of a society.

Research on values by Rokeach (1973) sparked intensive interest in values. Based on how much importance people put on the values expressed in a single word, Rokeach measured values and divided them into two categories. More specifically, terminal values are the ones people aspire to achieve as a final goal of their life while instrumental values are the values that serve as

instruments to achieve those terminal values. For instance, 'cozy life, exciting life, freedom, happiness, stable family, etc.' are examples of terminal values whereas 'ambitious, generous, pleasant, independent, and responsible, etc.' are examples of instrumental values.

In particular, value changes serve as the basis of the procedures of social changes. When the existing ideology fails to explain daily experiences in a society, the beliefs and values undergo changes and establish themselves as a new ideology and such process has been theorized by Fussell (1996). The changing process does not happen in an artificial setting of teaching and learning but is rather a part of a process in which people naturally adjust to the new order of a society.

Noelle-Neumann (1998) summarized how German values shifted from right to left by combining 'unexpected findings' in the process of conducting researches on social phenomena. Noelle-Neumann began his research with the assumption that bourgeois values, which used to define unique characteristics of German society for 200 years, were weakened from 1967 to 1972; when asked whether they feel themselves belonging to leftists or rightists, Germans felt themselves much closer to leftists; and political leaning towards left or right was highly related to the leftist and rightist values (e.g.: leftist values such as social stability, welfare, and human bonds; rightist values such as economic competition, national security, and religion). Noelle-Neumann focused on the fact that 81% of people in their 30s responded that they should teach politeness and good manners to their children in 1967 while the proportion dropped to 50% in 1972. Moreover, 71% of the younger generation responded in 1967 that they should teach their children to work accurately and conscientiously but the proportion dropped to 52% five years later. According to this research, the proportion of people belonging to the rightist was far higher in 1978 whereas in 1989 people belonging to the moderate had the largest proportion and proportion of leftists and rightists started to show a symmetric balance.

Research on value changes is much more systematic in Japan. Makita and Ida (2001) conducted a survey on values in seven categories for every five years from 1973 to 1998. Interestingly, the perception that house chores and child-raising should not be left to women alone but should be shared by men has steadily increased for 25 years. However, the survey conducted by NHK

in 1995 on the use of time showed that women on average spent 4 hours and 35 minutes for housekeeping whereas men spent only 34 minutes. Just like in Korea, there still existed a discrepancy between ‘perception’ and ‘behavior’ (E.Y. Na and G.H. Min 1998). In addition, people aged from 25 to 55 in Japan attached importance on present and future with equal proportion in 1973; however, in 1998, the proportion of people attaching importance on the pleasure of present has become two times that of people attaching importance on the pleasure of future.

Research related to values is very rare in Korea.<sup>1</sup> In particular, there are only a couple of ‘empirical’ research related to value ‘changes.’ It usually stops at simply stating that either ‘values have changed’ or ‘there is a gap in the values between different generations’ in several areas, and it is hard to find empirical evidence to support such arguments. Several researches on values do provide answers to some extent, but they deal with values only partially or with particular age groups, which fails to give us an overall picture on Koreans’ view of life and consequently falls short of enabling us to conduct a nationwide research on values with comparison among different generations. Even though many people agree that it is important to trace values and their changing processes, comprehensive empirical research on the subject is not so common. It is probably because nationwide long-term research of tracing the changes of values is very difficult. It is no exaggeration to say that there is seldom a research that focuses on and analyzes ‘changes’ of the values over a long period as values rarely change with the time span of just 1-2 years.

To give several cases of rare research on value changes, D.U. Han and G.S. Lee (2003) surveyed university students and made rankings after devising value criteria for 13 questionnaires. It was based on criteria on one’s view of life developed by Morris and Jones (1955) and revised by Dukes and Dempsey

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<sup>1</sup> Out of the total academic papers released by the Korean Psychological Association since 1970s, the number of papers found to have the word ‘values’ were altogether 23 (except five overlapping papers) (refer to the homepage of the Korean Psychological Association). Among them studies on values related to consumption, physical body, appearance, advertisement, etc. had the largest number (7 papers) followed by those related to social phenomena (6), gender and marriage (4), organization, job and work (3), and counseling and development (3). There are some researches related to sociology but a long-term empirical research is still insufficient.

(1966). What makes this research valuable is that it showed the changes in rankings on values for 30 years from 1970 to 2002. To summarize the result, university students in Korea (1) preferred 'self-control' as the highest priority in 1970s. However, the ranking of the 'self-control' dropped in 2002 whereas the 'active behavior to solve tasks through efforts in a real society,' which had the second ranking in 1970s, started to occupy the first ranking since 1990s. (2) And 'sensual and exciting life enjoyed as one pleases' and 'pursuit of pleasure that can be earned simply and easily' had their rankings raised higher since 2000s.

Another survey conducted in 1982, 1992 and 2002 on university students using value criteria of Rokeach (1973) showed that (D.U. Han and G.S. Lee 2003), (1) among the terminal values 'family welfare' was preferred with the highest consistency and the ranking of the 'safety of a country' consistently dropped. Moreover, the rankings of happiness, pleasure and cozy life, etc. have increased. (2) Among the instrumental values 'responsibility' and 'honesty' ranked the highest consistently and the rankings of 'competence' 'generosity,' etc. increased since 2000s. In case for women, preference towards 'polite attitude' decreased while preference towards 'logicality' gradually rose.

Research on differences in problem awareness among different generations in Korea is also very interesting. In their study, M.S. Chung and H.R. Kim (2005) focused on differences among generations found in life values and youth's daily behaviors. Their research result showed that harmony within family was perceived as an important value regardless of generations and behaviors that disrespect the elderly among the youth behavior was regarded as one of the most unacceptable behaviors. In particular, grandparents disapproved on their young grandchildren's behaviors related to computers.

Research on values and politics for university students was conducted by H.G. Lee (1987)'s study on student movement. Conducted right after the student movement reached its peak, the research found out that among the 'social values' composed of social welfare, collective goal, group identification and moral pressure, groups with 'middle' and 'low' level of social and economic power displayed a much stronger social values, with the exception of collective goal, compared to the group with 'high' level of social and economic power. Moreover, as they became seniors, such tendency started to decline, which showed that some started to accept conservative values as they

prepared for graduation.

In research on North Korean values which surveyed North Korean defectors (J.G. Chung 2002), there was a difference in gender egalitarianism between North and South Korea. More specifically, overall gender egalitarianism was much higher in South Korea; and the difference was much greater between North and South Korean women than between North and South Korean men. In other words, North Korean women had the similar level of gender egalitarianism to that of South Korean men.

Another interesting research deals with the effect individuals' ethnic values and organization-centered tendency have on their tolerance against bureaucratic corruption (J.E. Byun et al. 1997). The research finds that for ordinary people academic background and income have influence on an individual's ethnic values, which in turn results in differences in their tolerance against bureaucratic corruption. For government officials, demographic traits influence organization-centered tendency, which in turn results in their differences in tolerance against bureaucratic corruption.

J.H. Cha (1985) conducted a survey on six hundred people at one point in 1979 to figure out the changes of Koreans' values, attitudes and faith since the independence. It aimed to draw conclusion on changes of values through a research at one certain point under the assumption that people living in rural areas with poor academic background tended to have a relatively more traditional values whereas people in Seoul with higher educational background tended to have a relatively future-oriented values.

Compared to that, research conducted by E.Y. Na and J.H. Cha (1999) is a survey devised in a way that enables us to make direct comparisons of responses made at two different times. The research is significant in that it provides an empirical survey result against eight hundred nationwide sample respondents which represent Koreans in terms of value changes for twenty years from 1979 to 1998. Their research surveyed values in seven categories. On top of the five cultural categories offered by Hofstede (1991), individualism-collectivism, power distance, assertiveness, uncertainty avoidance, and future orientation, gender egalitarianism and affluent life were added. By doing so, it was able to identify in which particular aspects the overall value changes happened the most, and in which aspect the generation gap has widened.

To summarize the major findings, there were (1) an increase in individualism centered on oneself and family (in particular, among young people and people with higher educational background and higher income), (2) an increase in the perception on equality for women (allowing women's social activities, weakened sense on chastity, etc.), (3) a slowdown in the increase of post-materialism values (in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, values tended to move slightly towards materialism), and (4) a rising tolerance towards assertiveness and uncertainty. Such results are in most parts identical to the results of the research conducted on university students (D.U. Han and G.S. Lee 2003). As for the generation gap, the more the values tended to change radically, the higher the generation gap turned out to be, because the range of change tended to be much greater among the younger generation compared to the older generation (E.Y. Na and J.H. Cha 1999).

Moreover, the tendency towards post-materialism weakened in 1998 after the 1997 Asian financial crisis and our society seemed to retreat back towards materialism. The speed of such reverse change towards materialism was also much faster among the younger generation.

The purpose of this research is to study the values of Koreans living in the present era of 2010 in line with the previous studies conducted in 1979 and 1998. By doing so this research aims to (1) figure out value changes for the past 30 years and degree of increase and decrease in generation gaps, (2) identify differences in the changing patterns between the first 19 years (from 1979 to 1998) of the 30-year-period and the latter 12 years (from 1998 to 2010), and (3) distinguish stable Korean values that persisted on for 30 years from values that underwent changes over time. By doing so, this paper would like to serve as a foundation for initiating communication based on mutual understanding among Koreans.

Therefore, the research subject and hypotheses can be summarized as the following:

Research Subject: What is the direction and speed of the Koreans' value changes for the past three decades and do they have continuity?

Hypothesis I: Just like the changes that happened from 1979 to 1998, a tendency towards individualism, post-authoritarianism, assertiveness,

awareness on gender equality, affluent life, and post-materialism must have increased from 1998 to 2010 as well.

Hypothesis II: Just like the speed of changes from 1979 to 1998, changes must have happened much more rapidly among the younger generation compared to the older generation from 1998 to 2010, leading to an increased generation gap.

## METHODOLOGY

As a quasi-longitudinal study, the survey was devised in a way to have both the characteristics of ‘trend study’ and ‘similar kind group/multiple-cohorts study.’ The surveys were conducted in 1979, 1998 and 2010, having an irregular interval of approximately 20 years (19 years) and approximately 10 years (12 years). Given the ever-increasing speed of changes over time, there was an increasing need to survey present values before it becomes too late; as it seemed desirable to make future studies more regular with the interval of five to ten years, the third survey was conducted in 2010.

### Survey Subject and Sampling Method

From Seoul, six metropolitan cities and Gyeonggi province’s cities and towns, eight hundred Koreans were selected through quota sampling conducted according to gender, age, and regions. Survey was conducted by using the value questionnaires identical to the one used in 1998. Table 1 displays the distribution of the sample.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The survey conducted in 1979 targeted 600 female and male married adults in their 20s and over the age of 50 living in urban and rural regions. However, for the surveys conducted in 1998 and 2010, 800 female and male adults over the age of 20 regardless of their marital status were selected through quota sampling in accordance with population proportion or gender and age. In 1998, sampling was selected from Seoul, six metropolitan cities and eight Provinces’ cities and towns. However, in 2010, sampling was selected from Seoul, six metropolitan cities and only Gyeonggi Province’s cities and towns. In 1998 study, there were 46 people among the respondents over the age of 60, but in 2010 study, the age group was limited to people in their 20s and 50s. During the 1998 survey the number of sampling of those living



**Table 1.** The Change in Values of Koreans: Comparison of the Result from 1979, 1998, and 2010

	Region	Age					Total
		20s	30s	40s	50s		
Men	Seoul	37	38	38	37	150	400 (392) (300)
		(29)	(26)	(18)	(19)	(92)	
		(100)	(0)	(0)	(100)	(200)	
	Six metropolitan cities	38	37	37	38	150	
		(31)	(31)	(21)	(22)	(105)	
		(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	
	Gyeonggi Province (City/Gun of eight Provinces) (Districts below Myeon)	25	25	25	25	100	
		(52)	(55)	(35)	(53)	(195)	
		(50)	(0)	(0)	(50)	(100)	
Women	Seoul	38	37	37	38	150	400 (408) (300)
		(29)	(27)	(19)	(23)	(98)	
		(100)	(0)	(0)	(100)	(200)	
	Six metropolitan cities	37	38	38	37	150	
		(31)	(31)	(19)	(28)	(109)	
		(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	
	Gyeonggi Province (City/Gun of eight Provinces) (Districts below Myeon)	25	25	25	25	100	
		(47)	(53)	(33)	(68)	(201)	
		(50)	(0)	(0)	(50)	(100)	
Total	200	200	200	200	800		
	(219)	(223)	(145)	(213)	(800)		
	(300)	(0)	(0)	(300)	(600)		

in cities and towns (especially in towns) of eight Provinces and people in their 60s was very small and therefore it seemed it would have minimal impact to exclude those groups.

## Composition of Questionnaires

### *Value questionnaires: 21*

Among the survey questionnaires used in the study conducted in 1979 by J.H. Cha (1985), three questionnaires were selected for every five cultural category suggested by Hofstede (1980; 1991), i.e. (1) individualism (centered on oneself and family), (2) post-authoritarianism, (3) assertiveness, (4) uncertainty avoidance, and (5) future orientation. In addition, three questionnaires were added for both categories of (6) gender egalitarianism and (7) affluent life, thought to be undergoing significant changes over time. As a result, a total of 21 questionnaires were selected. Among them, two questionnaires were hard to find in the 1979 questionnaires and were therefore newly added to the 1998 survey. As the 2010 survey included all of these questionnaires, it ended up using the same 21 survey questionnaires as those used in 1998 survey.

**Individualism centered on oneself and family:** Individualism puts priority on the interests of individuals rather than on the interests of groups, and is in contrast with collectivism which puts interests of groups before those of individuals (Hofstede 1991; Lewicki 2008). To measure individualism centered on oneself and family as well as the traditional value of loyalty and filial piety, we asked the following three questionnaires. (1) Is the traditional value of loyalty and filial piety important, or not? (2) Among 'country' and 'oneself and family' which one should be prioritized? And (3) which one is genuine filial piety, giving parents faithful support with hand and foot or making successful careers?

**Post-authoritarianism:** The more one respects the authority of one's superior boss and willing to follow him/her, the lower the tendency of post-authoritarianism is. It is similar to the concept of 'power distance' introduced by Hofstede (1991). The power distance becomes longer and close to authoritarianism if a person in a lower position takes for granted the authorities enjoyed by people of higher positions. Conversely, power distance becomes shorter and close to post-authoritarianism as equality regardless of people's position is emphasized. For this research we measured

the post-authoritarianism with the following three questionnaires. (4) When employing people, do you prefer obedient person or person with a strong sense of responsibility? (5) Which one seems to you more important, classification according to ranking or classification according to specialty? And (6) is it better to keep a blind eye to my boss' mistake or is it better to point it out?

**Assertiveness:** Assertiveness is sometimes called masculinity-femininity (Hofstede 1991) and refers to what degree we prefer achievement (masculinity) and harmony (femininity). In a masculine culture, the overwhelming value of a society is 'strength, achieving many things, including money, and indifference towards others and their quality of life.' In contrast, feminine culture can be defined by relationship, child-raising, interest in quality of life (Hofstede 1991; Lewicki 2008). For this research we put the following three questionnaires to measure assertiveness: (7) When discontent rises, is it better to put up with it or to raise complaint? (8) Is it better to stay humble or to display our competence? And (9) is it naturally inevitable that some people are left behind or should we help them?

**Uncertainty avoidance:** A tendency to avoid uncertainty is "a tendency of being afraid of unfamiliar things. (Hofstede 1991)" In other words, it refers to "the extent how much people feel uncomfortable with unfamiliar and uncertain situations." Certain situations are stable, secure and absolute, whereas uncertain situations are defined by radical changes and new things (Hofstede 1991; Lewicki 2008). In a culture that tolerates with uncertainty, people accept unfamiliar things with open mind and curiosity. For this research we put the following three questionnaires to measure the tendency of avoiding uncertainty. (10) Which seems to be wiser, to be relaxed or to be in a hurry? (11) Do we have to be more or just as the same or less hospitable to foreigners than our own people? And (12) is it better to be hospitable or vigilant when encountered with a stranger?

**Future orientation:** Future orientation is a person's directivity towards a longer time span (Hofstede 1991) and refers to how much a person can tolerate the present difficulties for better things in the future. For this research

we put the following three questionnaires to measure future orientation. (13) If you can choose among past, present and future, would you throw off future or past? (14) Which one is more important, enjoying the present or preparing for the future? And (15) is traditional custom helpful in overcoming crises of the modern world?

**Gender egalitarianism:** Though gender egalitarianism was not included in cultural categories offered by Hofstede (1995), it has been included since 1998 survey as it seemed to show visible changes. For this research we asked the following three questionnaires. (16) Do you think we have to keep chastity before marriage or not? (17) Do you think women should continue their social activities after marriage or should remain in house? And (18) do you think more attention should be given on husband's family or wife's family after marriage? As the survey questionnaires in 1998 and 2010 used the same expression used in 1979, some expressions such as 'virgin's fidelity' and 'loyalty towards husband's family' may sound awkward these days. However, for the sake of exact and direct comparison among surveys conducted in different years, the same expression was used. When interpreting the result of the survey, however, it was explained in expressions that reflected the modern time.

**Affluent life:** Though it is not included in the cultural category offered by Hofstede (1995), it has been included since 1998 survey as it was thought to be undergoing significant changes. For this research we put the following three questionnaires. (19) Is money a vital element or just an option in your life? (20) Which one do you prefer – to lead a clean and righteous life without mistakes or to lead an affluent and fruitful life with some mistakes? And (21) Do you think all occupations are equally honorable or they have different rankings?

Three questionnaires were given for each seven category and respondents were asked to select one out of two contrasting options. For instance, respondents were asked to choose between the two options: "what we have to honor the most is (1) our country" or "(2) ourselves and our family." When analyzing the result, the change in the proportion of people who selected the second option served as the criteria.

*Post-Materialism questionnaire: 1*

Questionnaire used for measuring post-materialism was translated by C.H. Chung (1997) after being developed by Inglehart (1997). Respondents were asked to select six out of twelve items important for a national goal. In an era of materialism, economic growth and motivation for achievement were given priority. However, the opening of an era of post-materialism can be defined as the time when more and more countries, starting from advanced countries, are changing in a way that tends to emphasize individuals' rights and quality of life while maximizing subjective welfare (refer to E.Y. Na and G.H. Min 1998; Inglehart 1997). In measuring post-materialism, calculation was made based on how many items of post-materialism (increase of right to speak in workplace and society, improvement of environment, guarantee of press freedom, increase of right to speak in government's decision-making, development towards a more humane society, and a society that put greater importance on ideas than money) were included among the twelve important long-term national goals each respondent chose.

### **Study Period and Data Collection Method**

Survey was conducted on 6-28 May 2010 by specially trained interviewers of Hana Marketing Service. They collected data by carrying out face-to-face interviews through sampled questionnaires.

### **Procedures and Method of Analysis**

The study analyzed how the proportion of responses changed from 1979 to 1998 and 2010 for every questionnaire belonging to the seven categories on values (individualism, post-authoritarianism, assertiveness, uncertainty avoidance, future orientation, gender egalitarianism, and affluent life). In analyzing the change in the proportion of respondents choosing the second option (mostly liberal) was used as criteria. In addition, differences in response rates depending on gender, age and educational background were also analyzed with  $\chi^2$  (refer to Table I-8 at the annex). To find out a generation gap, differences of response rates between people in their 20s and 50s for

each period were measured and then it was evaluated whether it increased or not. Finally, the score on post-materialism followed the way suggested by C.H. Chung (1997). Respondents were asked to select six out of twelve items important for a long-term national goal and were classified as materialists when more than five items they chose came from materialistic values. They were classified as post-materialists when more than five items they chose came from post-materialistic values. And the rest were classified as the mixed type.

## Result

### Summary of value changes and generation gap between 1979, 1998 and 2010

Table 2 provides the summary of value changes and generation gap between 1979, 1998 and 2010. The left side of the Table 2 shows that altogether twelve questionnaires increased more than 10% compared to 1998: all three questionnaires for individualism, two questionnaires for gender egalitarianism, post-authoritarianism and future orientation respectively and one questionnaire for assertiveness, uncertainty avoidance and affluent life respectively. Absolute value of value changes for 21 questionnaires between 1998 and 2010 were added according to seven categories. The result was that gender egalitarianism (57.84%) had the highest change while individualism (51.48%) and future orientation (41.1%) ranked the second and third respectively. They were followed by uncertainty avoidance (37.53%), affluent life (27.9%), post-authoritarianism (25.24%) and assertiveness (11.28%). Overall, the direction of value changes for 12 years from 1998 to 2010 was the same as the one shown during 19 years from 1979 to 1998. Therefore, hypothesis I was proved to be correct.

On the other hand, as we can see from the right side of Table 2, there was only one questionnaire that showed more than 10% of generation gap compared to 1998: we do not have to be especially more hospitable to foreigners. Out of 21 questionnaires, we saw a decrease in the generation gap in nine questionnaires: all three questionnaires for individualism, two questionnaires for gender egalitarianism and post-authoritarianism

**Table 2.** Changes in Values of Koreans from 1979, 1998, and 2010 and Summary of Increase/Decrease in Generational Gap\*

Questions	Change in values Increase				Decrease in generational gap			
	1979	1998	2010	Change in values Increase	1979	1998	2010	Decrease in generational gap
<b>Individualism</b>								
1. The thought of loyalty and filial piety is unimportant	19.65	25.35	38.50	5.70 13.15	11.3	29.0	15	17.7 -14
2. Respect for oneself and one's family	41.30	71.75	89.13	17.40 17.38	15.3	19.1	15	3.8 -4.1
3. Success is to fulfill filial duty	47.00	43.30	64.25	-3.70 20.95	4.0	19.2	-1	15.2 -18.2
<b>Post-authoritarianism</b>								
4. Responsibility is more important than obedience	66.80	69.70	65.38	2.90 -4.32	9.0	12.6	-1	3.6 -11.6
5. Classification based on one's function is more important than hierarchy	27.15	30.40	41.25	3.25 10.85	-1.7	18.5	20	16.8 1.5
6. Point out the wrongdoings or mistakes of person whose status is above oneself	74.00	86.95	76.88	12.95 -10.07	5.0	11.7	0.5	6.7 -11.2
<b>Assertiveness</b>								
7. Request change rather than waiting patiently	64.50	66.10	76.13	1.60 10.03	24.0	28.1	8	4.1 -20.1
8. Show one's competence rather than respecting humility	34.50	20.70	20.75	-13.8 0.05	-1.0	7.1	15.5	6.1 8.4
9. Save stragglers (-)	76.20	62.30	63.50	-13.9 1.2	-3.7	-4.0	-8	0.3 4
<b>Uncertainty avoidance</b>								

Table 2. (continued)

Questions	Change in values Increase				Decrease in generational gap			
	1979	1998	2010	Change in values Increase	1979	1998	2010	Decrease in generational gap
10. Hurry up with one's life	42.35	31.35	26.50	-11.00 -4.85	-2.0	5.3	5.3	3.3 0
11. Less kindness for foreigners	18.00	14.05	38.63	-3.95 24.58	6.0	2.6	-16	-3.4 13.4
12. Be alarmed with strangers	-	12.90	21.00	- 8.10	-	-7.8	-9.5	- 1.7
Future orientation								
13. Desert past rather than future	89.85	92.35	88.13	2.5 -4.22	0.4	-5.2	-0.5	4.8 -4.7
14. Prepare for one's future	-	82.90	62.75	- -20.15	-	-9.9	-18.5	- 8.6
15. Traditional customs are useless	21.00	22.40	39.13	1.40 16.73	0.0	7.1	3.5	7.1 -3.6
Gender egalitarianism								
16. Women do not have to keep chastity before marriage	12.00	28.85	61.63	16.85 32.78	14.6	32.6	22.5	18.0 -10.1
17. Women should stay in one's family after marriage (-)	60.50	34.35	36.38	-26.15 2.03	1.7	-10.3	-16	8.6 5.7
18. Equality between woman's family and her family-in-law	36.65	66.85	89.88	30.20 23.03	16.7	21.6	2	4.9 -19.6
Affluent life								
19. Money is a must-have	68.35	76.50	79.38	8.15 2.88	-9.9	-13.8	-12.0	3.9 -1.8
20. Life should be affluent	35.85	50.05	70.25	14.20 20.20	14.3	37.1	5.5	22.8 -31.6
21. All occupations are equally honorable (-)	58.85	68.20	63.38	9.35 -4.82	-0.4	-1.0	5	0.6 4



Note: \*Column 1 in each 4th row of 'Change in value' and 'Increase/decrease in generational gap' indicate the changes from 1979 to 1998, 2nd row indicate the changes from 1998 to 2010. In "change in value", the 3rd row is the % of the people who chose the 2nd item (left in the table) out of two options for each question). Increase/decrease in generational gap' indicate the value of the selection percentage of people in their 20s subtracted by selection percentage of the people in their 50s. If the selection percentage by the people in their 50s is higher than that of 20s, then negative value will be yielded. However, when calculating the increase/decrease in generational gap, it simply means the increase/decrease in generational gap; thus, the calculated mark can be dismissed. Instead, the value is yielded by subtracting absolute value of generational gap between 1970s and 1990s from that of 1990s and 2010s respectively. If the calculated value (the far right column) is negative, it indicates the decrease in generational gap.

respectively and one questionnaire for assertiveness and affluent life respectively. It is in sharp contrast from 1979 and 1998 during which not a single questionnaire showed more than 10% drop of generation gap; rather, five questionnaires (the traditional value of loyalty and filial piety, building successful career is genuine filial piety, important to make classification according to specialty, do not have to keep chastity before marriage, and life should be affluent) showed more than 10% of increase in the generation gap. Therefore, hypothesis II turned out to be incorrect. To summarize, the overall changing direction of Koreans' values shows that there is a continual increase in individualism and gender egalitarianism for the last 30 years. However, generation gap is not continuously on the rise but at a certain point it is narrowing down. It can be seen as a process of naturally adjusting to each other in a society where older and younger generations have to live together.

### Analysis on value changes in 1979, 1998 and 2010 for each questionnaire

#### *Individualism centered on family*

**The 'traditional thought of loyalty and filial piety' is becoming less important:** The proportion of people who think the traditional value of loyalty and filial piety is not that important is on the constant rise since 1979 (refer to Figure 1). The generation gap between people in their 20s and 50s




Figure 1. Decrease in the percentage of people who answered 'filial duty' is important

increased from 11.3% in 1979 to 29.0% in 1998; however, it dropped to 15% in 2010. In other words, generation gap for approximately 20 years from 1979 to 1998 increased 17.7% but it decreased 14% during approximately ten years from 1998 to 2010. However, there still prevailed a tendency that as age group became younger people tended to regard the value of loyalty and filial piety less important ( $\chi^2=9.503, p<.05$ ).

**Individualism centered on 'oneself and family' (showing an ever-increasing trend since 1998 when it joined the mainstream values):** Questionnaire 2 asked respondents whether they would choose country or family as one of the most important things to uphold and the responses reflected changes towards individualism over time (refer to Figure 2). Individualistic values centered on oneself and family rose 17.38% compared to 1998. In 1979 the proportion of people who chose oneself and family was higher among women than men by 16% but the majority of both men and women chose 'nation.' However, in 1998 the majority of people chose oneself and family and it joined the mainstream values. With men and women choosing it at a similar proportion (men 71.7%, women 71.8%), differences between gender disappeared. In 2010 the proportion of men choosing oneself and family was higher than women by 4.7%. ( $\chi^2=4.656, p <.05$ ).

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



Figure 2. Increase in the percentage of people who answered 'choose oneself and one's family'

**'Building successful career is filial piety' (joined the mainstream values):** In 1979 and 1998 a majority of people thought that faithfully serving parents was more important than building successful careers for fulfilling filial duty. However, in 2010 there was a reverse in the mainstream value as the proportion of people who thought making successful career rather than supporting parents was filial duty increased to 64.25% (47.00% in 1979, and 43.30% in 1998). Such thinking grew significantly among people in their 20s, increasing the generation gap to 19.2%. In 2010 people in their 50s who also responded that making successful careers was filial duty reached the similar proportion (62.5% for people in their 50s, and 61.5% for people in their 20s), lowering the generation gap by 18.2% compared to 1998. In 1979 there was no difference between men and women as the majority of both men and women thought supporting parents was more important than building careers for fulfilling filial duty. However, in 1998 more men tended to think supporting parents was genuine filial duty than women did. In 2010 the proportion of women who thought building successful career was genuine filial duty was higher than men by 7% ( $\chi^2=4.267$ ,  $p<.05$ ), but the majority of both men and women (men 60.8%, women 67.8%) tended to think building



**Figure 3.** Increase in the percentage of people who answered ‘classification based on one’s function’ is important for maintenance of social order

successful career was genuine filial duty.

*Post-authoritarianism*

**Emphasizing responsibility on hiring employees (stable value):** In 1998 older people with lower educational background tended to prefer obedient people (E.Y. Na and J.H. Cha 1999). However such tendency was no longer found in 2010. Nonetheless, in 1979, women tended to prefer obedient people slightly more than men (difference of 13%) and in 1998 both women and men tended to put emphasis on competence (responsibility) with similar proportion (2.2% higher among women) and the difference widened to 4.2% in 2010, which confirms that the similar pattern is prevailing.

**Still putting more importance on hierarchical rankings but classification according to specialties is becoming more important:** There still was an overall tendency to put greater importance on hierarchical classification. However, more and more people are gradually thinking that classification according to specialties rather than hierarchical ranking is more important for maintaining social order (refer to Figure 3). There was value changes of

3.25% between 1979 and 1998 and 10.85% between 1998 and 2010, which means that the importance of classification according to specialties has grown much rapidly during the recent 12 years (refer to Table 2). Such tendency was more prevalent among people over the age of 30 than people in their 20s ( $\chi^2=18.713, p<.001$ ). From 1979 (26.3%) to 1998 (36.5%), the proportion of people emphasizing classification according to specialties increased among people in their 20s. In 2010, the proportion increased to 52.0%, finally becoming the majority.

**Pointing out when boss is wrong still occupies the majority but it is a little bit retreating:** Unlike in 1998 (men 90.6%, women 83.3%), both men and women showed a declining tendency in 2010 (men 75.3%, women 78.5%). Even though a high proportion of both men and women still responded that they should point it out when their boss was on the wrong, the tendency retreated as the proportion declined by 10.07% (refer to Table 2). It can be seen as part of being compliant to authoritarianism but it may also be seen as part of social consideration, 'civil indifference'<sup>3</sup> and individualism.

#### *Assertiveness*

**To lead a happy life together one should raise complaint when discontent rises (stable value):** From 1979 to present the proportion of people occupied the majority who think we should speak out when discontent rises to lead a happy life together. In 2010 the proportion rose to 76.1%, increasing 10% compared to 1998 (refer to Figure 4).

Among the people who responded that one should speak out when discontent rose, there was a huge gap between men and women in 1979 (men 81.0%, women 48.0%). However, the proportion fell to 65.8% among men and increased to 66.4% among women in 1998. It means that a middle ground was found between men and women as the past gender prejudice in which women should be tolerant while men should be demanding became blurred

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<sup>3</sup> Civil indifference is a terminology suggested by Goffman that explains an instrument that acknowledges and protects each other out of a desire for existential safety, i.e. one does not interfere because one does not want to be interfered.




Figure 4. Increase in the percentage of people who answered, in order to happy live together, 'demand changes' rather than 'staying patient'.

(E.Y. Na and J.H. Cha 1998). In 2010 survey, the result ( $\chi^2=5.014$ ,  $p<.05$ ) showed that there was a higher proportion of such response among women than men (men 72.8%, women 79.5), which showed a reverse in the trend of assertiveness between men and women.

From 1979 to 1998 the proportion of people who replied that complaints should be raised when discontent arose increased by 10.7% among people in their 50s and 14.8% among people in their 20s. However, from 1998 to 2010 the proportion increased 18.8% among people in their 50s whereas it dropped 1.3% among people in their 20s. From 1970s to 1998 generation gap continued to be one of the most representative questionnaires; however, since 2010, the generation gap was reduced to 20.1% (refer to Table 2). It may be seen as a result of people in their 50s trying to adjust swiftly to the rapidly changing values in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In other words, rapid value changes that happened among the younger generation from 1979 to 1998 seemed to stabilize and maintain a status quo in 2010. However, values held by people in their 50s which fell behind for the last 20 years of the 20th century seemed to rapidly catch up during the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Therefore, just from a 'generation gap' perspective, 1998 seemed to have a much larger generation gap. These days, however, people regardless of their age seemed to

have realized that joining the 'prevailing opinion' is a safe option for survival.

**Being humble is more important than showing off competence (stable value):** There was no difference between the results of 1998 and 2010, which is in sharp contrast with the result of the assertiveness questionnaire related to raising complaint. It is probably because emphasizing humility than showing off competence is a kind of 'moral answer' and people's desire to change in the direction of higher morality may have been reflected (E.Y. Na and J.H. Cha 1998).

In 1998 the proportion of people who valued humility was 7.1% higher among people in their 50s (80.2%) than people in their 20s (73.1%). Such tendency was found in 2010 as well. The older they were (71% for people in their 20s, 79% for people in their 30s, 80.5% for people in their 40s, and 86.5% for people in their 50s), the more they thought that it was better to be humble than to display competence ( $\chi^2=14.868$ ,  $p<.01$ ). Another interesting result related to this questionnaire was that responses differed depending on whether the respondents were students (the total sampling of 118 persons) or whether they were employed or not (the total sampling of 682 persons). Student group (66.1%) tended to value humility more than non-student group (81.5%) ( $\chi^2=14.552$ ,  $p<.001$ ). Such result implies not only an age effect but also the possibility that schools and offices have a different atmosphere.

**The majority favors helping those left behind but there is an increasing trend that thinks dropout is naturally inevitable:** Though more and more people changed in a way to think that competition for survival is inevitable compared to 1970s, people still felt sorry for those left behind and thought that they should be helped. In particular, in 2010, people with lesser educational background tended to think so ( $\chi^2=6.076$ ,  $p<.05$ ). Moreover, in 1979, a similar proportion of both men and women (approximately 24%) thought those falling behind were naturally inevitable, but in 1990s, more men than women (men 40.1%, women 35%) started to accept values that tolerated competition. In 2010, however, the gap between men and women who thought so (men 37.3%, women 35.8%) was narrowed down to 1.5%.

*Uncertainty avoidance*

**The proportion of people who think it is wiser to be relaxed is rising while keeping the majority:** It turned out that the proportion of people who thought being relaxed is more important was constantly on the rise. There was no difference between 1979 and 1998 among people with higher educational background (0.5%); however, the proportion of people who thought so radically increased among people with lower educational background (18.4%). Therefore, the proportion has become similar between people regardless of their educational background. After the Asian financial crisis, in 2010, more than 70% of those with both low and high educational background responded that it is important to be relaxed. It reflects people's desire to be relaxed in the midst of the rapidly changing society.

**Radical drop in the number of people who think foreigners should be given special hospitality:** There was a huge change over time and generation gap was also found to be significant (refer to Table 2). The proportion of people who responded that one should be as much as or less hospitable to foreigners increased 24.58% compared to 1998. The idea that we do not have to be especially more hospitable to foreigners is probably because the number of foreigners coming to Korea has radically increased and their nationalities also have become diverse.

In 2010 the generation gap between 20s and 50s in regards to the attitude towards foreigners was 16% ( $\chi^2=11.152, p<.05$ ). The younger generation tended to be more favorable to foreigners compared to the older generation (68.5% for 20s and 52.5% for 50s). In 1979 the generation gap was 6% whereas in 1998 it was reduced to 2.6%. In 2010 the proportion of people in their 20s who responded that foreigners should be treated more favorably was reduced 15.1% compared to 1998; the proportion also dropped 33.7% among people in their 50s, and the falling rate was more than double the younger generation. Out of the total questionnaires of 2010, this questionnaire was the only one that showed more than 10% of generation gap compared to 1998.

Moreover, in the past, both women and men thought that one should be more hospitable to foreigners (80.3% for men, 83.7% for women in



1979; 84.9% for men, 87% for women in 1998). In 2010 the proportion of people who responded so was 66.3% among women, 10% higher than 56.5% of men ( $\chi^2=8.020$ ,  $p<.01$ ). Furthermore, in 2010 we saw a tendency that people with higher education background responded that we should be more hospitable to foreigners ( $\chi^2=13.444$ ,  $p<.01$ ). As academia and political community all regard that the emergence of multicultural family<sup>4</sup> to be inevitable, people with higher educational background must have shown a higher tendency of supporting foreigners. At the same time, given the fact that foreigners who have joined the Korean labor force are mostly from low educational background, it is no wonder that Koreans with low educational background and income<sup>5</sup> might have felt that they have relatively lost their competitiveness to those foreigners.

Furthermore, student groups (76.3%) tended to be more hospitable to foreigners compared to non-student groups (58.8%) ( $\chi^2=12.956$ ,  $p<.001$ ). As non-student groups are more likely to get disadvantaged while being with foreigners compared to student groups, they are probably more reluctant to be generous to foreigners who contain the elements of uncertainty.

**Being favorable towards strangers but increasing vigilance:** The proportion of people who responded that one should be hospitable to strangers was high both in 1998 and 2010 but it showed a tendency of decline just like the questionnaire 11. It is also in line with a relative increase in our attitude of avoiding uncertainty. The significant difference shown between men and women in 1998 also disappeared. In 1998 men seemed to be more vigilant

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<sup>4</sup> In a broader sense, multicultural family means families that live in Korea and that have foreigners included in their members. It refers to various types of families, such as families formed by international marriage (families formed by marriage between Korean and foreigner), foreigner workers (composed of foreigners only), international students, compatriots with foreign nationalities, overseas Chinese and North Korean defectors. (S.S. Lee et al. 2009).

<sup>5</sup> The higher educational background is, the higher income level is. When cultural contact with the inflow of immigrants is perceived as a threat, and when groups of larger number of people is under resource stress in terms of occupation, status, power, etc., minority immigrant groups can feel a sense of relative deprivation and is under higher possibility of becoming a 'scapegoat.' (Leong 2008; Esses et al. 2001; Recited from S.W. Yoon and S.D. Kim 2010).

towards strangers than women (9.9% for men, 15.9% for women) but the proportion became similar between men and women in 2010 (21.8% for men, 20.3% for women). Just like the questionnaire 11, questionnaire 12 showed a significant difference between student groups (the total sampling of 118 persons) and non-student groups (the total sampling of 682 persons). Student groups (90.7%) tended to be more hospitable to strangers compared to non-student groups (77.7%) ( $\chi^2=11.378, p<.01$ ).

### *Future orientation*

**Future being more important than past and present (stable value):** The majority of respondents (88.13%) said that they would throw off past rather than future but the value change was a mere -4.22% and the generation gap was reduced 4.7% compared to 1998. Either in terms of value change or generation gap, this questionnaire did not have much increase or decrease (refer to Table 2). In 1979 women tended to be more future-oriented than men but in 1998 such difference between genders disappeared. Moreover, in 1998 people in their 20s tended to be more future-oriented than people in their 50s but in 2010 such generation gap between 20s and 50s almost disappeared to 0.5%.

**The majority chose preparing for the future as more important but an increasing tendency towards enjoying the present:** Regardless of age and gender, the majority of respondents valued future more than present. However, such tendency has been in steady decline for the last 12 years (refer to Figure 5). Moreover, unlike the trend in 1998 (85.2% for men, 80.6% for women), there seemed to be no difference in 2010 between men and women in putting importance on preparing for the future (64% for men, 61.5% for women). In 1998 the proportion of people who responded that enjoying the present was more important was higher among 20s than people over the age of 30. Such trend continued in 2010; the younger they were (49.5% for 20s, 36.5% for 30s, 32% for 40s, 31% for 50s) the more they preferred present to future ( $\chi^2=18.589, p<.001$ ). Moreover, there was a significant difference between student groups (the total sampling of 118 persons) and non-student groups (the total sampling of 682 persons). The majority of the student




Figure 5. Increase in the percentage of people who answered it is more important to enjoy the present than preparing for the future

groups (55.9%) wanted to enjoy the present while 34.0% of non-student groups wanted to do so ( $\chi^2=20.668, p<.001$ ).

**Still valuing traditional custom but increasingly considering it as helpless:** Even though the majority of the respondents said that traditional custom was important in overcoming crises of the modern world, the proportion of people who thought otherwise radically increased 16.73% during the recent 12 years (refer to Figure 6). In 1998 older people tended to value traditional custom but the generation gap dropped from 7.1% to 3.5% in 2010. Respondents in Seoul (the total sampling of 300 persons), six metropolitan cities (the total sampling of 300 persons) and Gyeonggi Province (the total sampling of 200 persons) showed difference; respondents who said that tradition was key to overcoming the present crises were 70.7% in six metropolitan cities and 55.0% for both Gyeonggi Province and Seoul ( $\chi^2= 19.322, p<.001$ ). People living in Seoul relatively did not seem to value traditional customs.




Figure 6. Increase in the percentage of people who answered traditional customs are not important to overcome the civilization crisis




Figure 7. Increase in the percentage of people who answered keeping virginity before marriage is unimportant

*Gender egalitarianism*

**‘Keeping chastity before marriage is unnecessary’ has become the mainstream value (the most significant value change over time):** This questionnaire had the largest change over time of 32.78% in 2010 survey (refer to Table 2). The proportion of people who responded that it is unnecessary to keep chastity before marriage has been radically rising since 1998. In 1979 the proportion of people who thought so was only 12% but in 1998 the proportion increased to 28.85% and in 2010 it joined the mainstream value as it surpassed the majority with 61.63% (refer to Figure 7).

Even though generation gap was reduced, younger generation tends to be less conservative. Similar to the result of 1998 survey (45.2% for 20s, 34.5% for 30s, 18.6% for 40s, 12.6% for 50s), people in their 20s and 30s seemed more liberal towards the idea of chastity in 2010 (66.5% for 20s, 76% for 30s, 60% for 40s, 44% for 50s) ( $\chi^2=45.981, p<.001$ ). The survey result of 2010 differed from that of 1990s in that the relationship between age and chastity showed the reversed U-shape. During the period from 1979 to 1990s the proportion of people who thought chastity does not have to be kept before marriage increased 7.9% from 4.7% to 12.6% among people in their 50s; but the change was much more significant among young people as the proportion increased by 25.9% from 19.3% to 45.2% among people in their 20s. However, during the period from 1990s to 2010, the change was more visible among the older generation as there was an increase of 31.4% and 21.3% among 50s and 20s, respectively.

Furthermore, people with higher educational background seemed to hold more liberal views on chastity in 1998 and these days as well. For 19 years from 1979 to 1998 there was almost no change in their view on chastity among people with lower educational background but people with higher educational background became far more liberal, raising the gap between groups of different education background to 28.3%. In 2010 there was 21.8% of change among respondents with lower educational background, which showed that this group seemed to hold much liberal view but it stopped short of being the majority. At the same time, the proportion continued to increase radically among people with higher educational background, bringing the


gap to 31.3% ( $\chi^2=20.245, p<.001$ ). Therefore, the gap for the last 10 years was larger than the gap shown 20 years prior to that.

**Slowing down of the number of people who think women should continue their social activities after marriage:** In 1979 more than half of the respondents said married women should stay home. However, more than half of the respondents in 1998 responded that married women should also engage in economic activities. The proportion in 2010 was similar to that of 1998, increasing 2.03% (refer to Table I-6 at the annex). Compared to 1979, the proportion of respondents who thought women should do economic activities increased both among men and women in 1998; however, the increase was much higher among women, younger age group and higher educational background group.

In 2010 more women responded so than men ( $\chi^2= 3.937, p<.05$ ), and more people with higher educational background said so than those with lower educational background ( $\chi^2=13.881, p<.01$ ). Moreover, there was not much difference among age groups in 1998 but in 2010 the proportion became much higher among younger people ( $\chi^2=15.701, p<.01$ ).

In regards to women's social activities after marriage, the study conducted by E.Y. Na and J.H. Cha (1998) did not mention the results according to residential district and occupation type. In 2010 survey, respondents showed difference depending on their residential district; respondents in Seoul (the total sampling of 300 persons) had the highest proportion with 70.0% followed by 67.3% of six metropolitan cities (the total sampling of 300 persons) and 48.5% of Gyeonggi Province (the total sampling of 200 persons) ( $\chi^2=26.820, p<.001$ ). Student groups had a far higher proportion than non-student groups ( $\chi^2=7.173, p<.01$ ).

**Husband's family and wife's family should be treated equally (continues to rise after joining the mainstream in 1998):** As shown by Figure 8, the proportion of respondents who think wife's family should be treated equally with husband's family is continuously rising. The proportion increased 30.20% from 1979 to 1998, securing more than half of the respondents among both men and women; the proportion continued to increase 23.03% from 1998 to 2010 (refer to Table 2).



**Figure 8.** Increase in the percentage of people who answered equal treatment is necessary between 'woman's family-in-law' and 'woman's own family'

However, the proportion was higher among women than men during all three surveys of 1979, 1998 and 2010. In 2010 85.3% of men and 94.5% of women responded that husband's and wife's family should be treated equally, showing the idea started to join the mainstream view but still 9.2% of gap existed between men and women ( $\chi^2=18.805$ ,  $p<.001$ ). In 1979 the difference was 9.3% and 12.3% in 1998. From 1979 to 1998 both women and men went through a significant change as the proportion increased 21.5% among women and 24.6% among men. For this questionnaire, women changed much faster for the first 19 years whereas men changed much faster for the latter 12 years. Overall, women seemed to change first and men seemed to be adjusting to the prevailing mood.

### *Affluent life*

**Money is vital (stable value):** The idea that money is vital for our life continues to be held by more than half of the respondents from 1979 to 2010. Just like in 1979 and 1998, people in their 50s in 2010 put more emphasis on the necessity of money than people in their 20s ( $\chi^2=21.646$ ,  $p<.001$ ). Moreover, similar to 1998, the relationship between age and the perception

on the necessity of money continued to show an inverse U-shape in 2010 (68.5% for 20s, 82% for 30s, 86.5% for 40s, 80.5% for 50s). Study conducted by E.Y. Na and J.H. Cha (1998) argues that middle-aged adults are most sensitive to the necessity of money and it is probably because their life cycle is directly related to the need of money.

There was not so much difference between men and women on the idea that money is vital; 67% of men and 69.7% of women responded so in 1979 and 76% of men and 77% of women said so in 1998. However, women had a higher proportion than men by 7.8% in 2010 as 75.5% of men and 83.3% of women responded that money was vital to their life in 2010 ( $\chi^2=7.338$ ,  $p<.01$ ). It is probably because of increased social activities of women and a growing social consensus that women need to have some degree of economic capability to exercise their rights equally to men in a society.

There was not so much difference between people with different educational background in 1998; however in 2010 people with higher educational background seemed to have much relaxed attitudes towards money ( $\chi^2=11.283$ ,  $p<.01$ ). It is probably because those people are generally more affluent. Moreover, 61.9% of the student group responded so whereas 82.4% of the non-student group responded so, which is 10.5% higher than the student group ( $\chi^2=25.925$ ,  $p<.001$ ). Maybe it is because the student group tends to be much younger and can, therefore, hold relatively more idealistic values.

**More people choosing ‘affluent and fruitful life’:** The proportion of people steadily increased from 1979 to 2010 who responded that it is better to lead an affluent and fruitful life with some mistakes than to lead a clean and righteous life without mistakes (refer to Figure 9). It increased 14.20% from 1979 to 1998 and 20.20% from 1998 to 2010. It surpassed the majority for the first time in 1998 (50.05%) but in 2010 the majority of people in all groups regardless of gender, age and educational background responded so. Not only in 1998 but also in 2010 preference of affluent and fruitful was much more dominant among people with higher educational background than people with lower educational background ( $\chi^2=8.341$ ,  $p<.05$ ).

**All occupations are equally honorable (stable value):** The idea that all






Figure 9. Increase in the percentage of people who answered living a rich life is important

occupations are equally honorable is held by the majority of people from 1970s to the present time. Value changes and generation gap all had less than 10% of changes. In 1998, people living in larger cities relatively tended to think that there are some hierarchies among occupations but the difference was not that significant (34.7% for large cities, 28.9% for middle cities, 26.9% for smaller towns and villages). In 2010 survey, we divided respondents living in Seoul area (the total sampling of 300 persons) and non-Seoul areas (the total sampling of 500 persons); people living in Seoul area (43.3%) were more likely to think that some occupations are more valuable than others compared to non-Seoul area residents (32.6%) ( $\chi^2=9.306, p<.01$ ).

#### *Value changes of post-materialism*

According to the study by E.Y. Na and J.H. Cha (1998), the tendency towards post-materialism was held back during the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and people started to retreat back to materialism and such trend was much faster among the younger generation (refer to Table 3). In contrast, the 2010 survey shows that the proportion of materialists, which soared during the economic crisis, radically dropped after the crisis (-46.05%) while the mixed type people increased (43.75%) and post-materialists slightly rose (2.35%).

**Table 3.** Percentage of people who are materialistic, non-materialistic and both by each from 1995, 1998, and 2010

Age Group	Materialistic				Both				Non-Materialistic			
	1995	1998	2010	Increase/Decrease	1995	1998	2010	Increase/Decrease	1995	1998	2010	Increase/Decrease
20-29	7.3	51.0	10.5	43.7 -40.5	83.0	39.7	76.0	-43.3 36.3	9.6	9.1	13.5	-0.5 4.4
30-39	15.7	60.5	18.5	44.8 -42.0	77.4	36.8	75.5	-40.6 38.7	6.9	2.7	6.0	-4.2 3.3
40-49	23.0	64.8	14.5	41.8 -50.3	72.8	32.4	82.0	-40.4 49.6	4.2	2.8	3.5	-1.4 0.7
50-59	32.6	71.9	20.5	39.3 -51.4	65.2	25.1	75.5	-40.1 50.4	2.2	3.0	4.0	0.8 1.0
Increased Amount Average				42.4 -46.05				-41.1 43.75				-1.3 2.35
Generation Gap of 20s to 50s	-25.3	-20.9	-10.0	-4.4 -10.9	17.8	14.6	0.5	-3.2 -14.1	7.4	6.1	9.5	-1.3 +3.4

Footnote. Changes in 1995-1998, 1998-2010 in the top-down order of the increase/decrease row. The result from 1995 is by C.H. Chung (1997), result from 1998 is by E.Y. Na and J.H. Cha (1999). Calculation of increased amount in the percentage of each type in each year, and the generational gap of 20s-50s.

One interesting fact is that there was an increase in the proportion of materialists among the younger generation in their 20s and 30s in 2010 compared to 1995; during the same period, the proportion of materialists dropped among the older generation in their 40s and 50s. Therefore, the generation gap was reduced during the 15 years. In contrast, the proportion of the mixed type people decreased among people in their 20s and 30s while increased in 40s and 50s. Therefore, it also had the effect of reducing the generation gap.

There was no survey conducted on post-materialism in 1979 but comparison was made between 1995 data provided by C.H. Chung (1997) with that of 1998 and 2010 to make comparison between the pre-Asian

financial crisis period and post-crisis period. The post-materialism trend of 1998 can be summarized as a temporary increase of materialists in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, particularly faster among the younger generation. However, in 2010, the proportion of materialists radically dropped nearly to the level of 1995 (but the average proportion of materialists is much smaller than in 1995). The drop in materialism and increase of mixed type, which is closer to post-materialism, happened much faster among the older generation. It is in line with the overall speed of change in the value.

## CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS

During the 12 years from 1998 to 2010, values held by Koreans underwent significant changes as there were (1) increase of individualism centered on oneself and family (2) increased gender egalitarianism (3) increased tendency to value present (enjoying present rather than preparing for the future, traditional custom does not prove to be helpful) (4) slowing down of the increase in post-authoritarianism and assertiveness (5) decreased attitude towards giving special hospitality to foreigners and (7) increased tendency to pursue affluent life with some mistakes. Following is the summary of the major findings of the study.

First, categories that underwent significant changes for the last three decades were individualism, gender egalitarianism, affluent life, and enjoying present life. The categories of assertiveness and post-authoritarianism had been growing for the last 20 years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century before it slowed down in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century as two values of 'humility' and 'consideration to the boss' conflicted with each other.

Second, gender gap in values continued to narrow down well into the 2010 survey just like the previous surveys of 1979 and 1998; in some questionnaires there was even a reverse of trend between men and women (eg: raising complaint rather than putting up with it when discontent rises).

Third, in categories that had greater value changes, people in their 20s changed much faster than people in their 50s from 1979 to 1998, widening the generation gap; however, from 1998 to 2010, people in their 50s rapidly caught up with the changes, bringing down the generation gap. Though the

direction of changes was consistent, not all generations showed the same change in all categories at all times.

Fourth, stable values of Koreans that were chosen by more than 50% of respondents from all generations consistently for 30 years are as the following:

- (1) Even though the proportion of people is increasing who think the traditional value of loyalty and filial piety is not important, the value is still held important by more than half of the respondents regardless of their gender and age.
- (2) When hiring employees, a sense of responsibility is a criterion much more important than obedience.
- (3) Even though the proportion of people is on the rise who think classification according to specialties is more important for maintaining social order, the majority of Koreans still regard the hierarchical ranking more important (only people in their 20s broke the 50% level by showing 48% in 2010).
- (4) One should point it out when our boss is on the wrong rather than keeping a blind eye.
- (5) To live happily together, one should raise complaint when discontent rises rather than just putting up with it (only people in their 50s had less than 50% by showing 42.6% in 1979).
- (6) It is better to be humble than showing off competencies.
- (7) It is regrettable that some people are left behind.
- (8) One should lead life in a relaxed manner than being in a hurry.
- (9) One should be hospitable to foreigners and strangers.
- (10) It is better to throw off the past if we have to choose between past and future.
- (11) Even though people are putting more and more importance on enjoying the present, the majority of the respondents regardless of gender and age still think it is important to prepare for the future.
- (12) Even though there is an increasing tendency to think that traditional customs are not helpful, the majority of the respondents regardless of gender and age still think it helps us in overcoming crises of the modern world.
- (13) Money is vital for our life.
- (14) All occupations are equally honorable.

Fifth, questionnaires that failed to have the majority in the past but nowadays

have gained the majority and joined the mainstream values are categories related to individualism centered on oneself and family and gender egalitarianism. More specifically the questionnaires are as the following:

- (1) Caring for oneself and family is more important than serving the country.
- (2) Building a successful career rather than supporting parents with hand and foot can be a genuine filial duty.
- (3) Chastity before marriage does not have to be kept.
- (4) Women should continue their social activities after marriage.
- (5) Husband's family and wife's family should be treated equally.
- (6) It is better to lead an affluent and fruitful life than to lead a clean and righteous life without mistakes.

Sixth, the younger generation tends to think as the following in questionnaires that have the largest generation gap in 2010:

- (1) Chastity before marriage does not have to be kept (generation gap 22.5%).
- (2) Classification according to specialties is more important than hierarchical rankings (generation gap 20%).
- (3) One should enjoy the present rather than preparing for the future (generation gap 18.5%).
- (4) Women should continue their social activities after marriage (generation gap 16%).
- (5) One should be more hospitable to foreigners (generation gap 16%).
- (6) It is better to show off competency than being humble (generation gap 15.5%).
- (7) The traditional value of loyalty and filial duty is not important (generation gap 15%).
- (8) Caring for oneself and family is more important than serving the country (generation gap 15%).
- (9) Money is not a vital element; it is just an option in my life (generation gap 12%).

Seventh, the younger generation tends to think as the following in questionnaires that used to have a widening generation gap in 1979 and 1998 but narrowed down as people in their 50s rapidly adjusted to the change faster than 20s for the recent 12 years:




Figure 10. Change Patterns of Values of Koreans from 1979, 1998, and 2010

- (1) Building a successful career rather than supporting parents with hand and foot can be a genuine filial duty.
- (2) A sense of responsibility is more important than obedience.
- (3) Husband's family and wife's family should be treated equally.
- (4) It is better to lead an affluent and fruitful life than to lead a clean and righteous life without mistakes.

Finally, new issues that emerged since 1998 are those related to hospitality towards foreigners and co-existence of assertiveness and authoritarianism. It seems that some adjustments are being made as an increasing number of people cross borders in the globalized world, which has led to a radical change in values and started to expose conflicts with our traditional values.

What we can infer from the findings is that

- (1) both for the first phase (19 years from 1979 to 1998) and the second phase (12 years from 1998 to 2010), there were increase of gender egalitarianism,

individualism centered on oneself and family, affluent life, classification according to specialties, and tendency to raise complaint when faced with discontent, and

- (2) for the final 20 years of the late 20<sup>th</sup> century ‘reduced gender gap’ and ‘increased generation gap’ were the most characteristic features, whereas for the first 12 years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, people in their 50s adjusted fast to the rapidly changing values, contributing to the reduced generation gap.

Therefore, hypothesis I that assumed on the direction of changes was supported whereas hypothesis II that assumed on the speed of changes was not supported. There was a consistency in the direction of value change but speed of change varied from time to time as the younger generation used to change faster first and the older generation endeavored to change much faster to catch up with the young people. Differences exist among different questionnaires in detail but the overall trend turned out to be so.

Speed of change varied from generations but it also differed from each period within the same generation. It also showed different changing patterns depending on questionnaires. Figure 10 provides the summary of the values we have discussed so far, in particular the changing patterns of values that underwent radical changes. Even though the overall generation gap was reduced since 1998, there were some questionnaires that still showed a huge generation gap. For instance, 19.3% of people in their 20s and 4.7% of people in their 50s in 1979 thought chastity before marriage does not have to be kept, bringing the generation gap to 14.6%. However, 66.5% of 20s and 44.0% of 50s in 2010 responded that chastity before marriage does not have to be kept, widening the generation gap to 22.5% (refer to Table I-6 at annex). As both the younger and the older generations went through huge value changes, 50s in 2010 (44.0% responded chastity before marriage is unnecessary) had a much more liberal attitude compared to the 20s thirty years ago (19.3% responded chastity before marriage is unnecessary). Some questionnaires still had a huge generation gap even though it narrowed down for 12 years as the gap was too big from the first place; some questionnaires still had a huge gap even though it was reduced because the gap widened so much in 1998; other questionnaires had the newly rising generation gap in 2010. As we can see from such findings, communication between different generations still remains a huge challenge due to different values they have.

Generally, the more radically values change the greater the generation gap becomes. The younger generation accepts changes relatively faster whereas the older generation accepts changes more slowly, bringing the generation gap wider (E.Y. Na and J.H. Cha 1999). However, as we can see from the 2010 survey, the generation gap was narrowed down in some questionnaires due to the fast adjustment among the older generation, which is highly encouraging. It is probably a result of implicit consensus to move towards a harmonious society.

As pointed out by E.Y. Na and Duckitt (2003), both value consensus and value diversity harmoniously co-exist in a society. According to the study on value changes of Koreans for three decades, we can classify values into three categories: 'mainstream values,' which form the very basis of the value questionnaires and rarely change over time, 'dynamic values,' which change so radically and endorsed initially by the younger generation and later accepted by the older generation as they want to join the prevailing mood of the society, and 'emerging values,' which are newly formed or changed due to changes in external conditions of the members. As society and humans move and change together, there is a possibility that 50s living in 2010 can be more liberal than 20s in 1979. As all humans do their best to adjust to the social conditions they face with the best thoughts and behaviors, they voluntarily or involuntarily undergo changes in their thought and behaviors during such process, which seems to be the universal principle of human lives.

Korean society is known to have a large generation gap (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). However, this study shows that there are some values which different generations have reached consensus despite a huge generation gap. For successful communication, 'common grounds' should be widened and stable values that were supported by more than half of the respondents regardless of gender and age can serve as such grounds.

Generation gap still exists in some stable values while other values are losing stability as they go under gradual changes. However, as some values lose stability others slowly gain it. Consequently, we do not have to worry so much as stable values which the majority of the members in a society agree on serve as a basic foundation and based on such foundation various values are maintained and managed with their unique characteristics. While respecting each other, 'unity in variety' and 'variety in unity' should be pursued.



The issue that newly emerged in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is that the generation gap is widening in the value related to favoring foreigners as cross-border movements are soaring and Korea is rapidly emerging as a receiver in terms of the number of foreigners moving in and out of the country. Comparison with studies on other countries shows that gender egalitarianism and individualism are increasing worldwide and more and more people are sharing the value that welfare and self-expression opportunities should be given equally to everyone while each person faithfully fulfills their own role. Nonetheless, there still exists difference among generations in terms of the degree and speed of accepting new situations. Each country has their own unique tradition and political and economic circumstances but it seems that there is a common direction towards which our human's universal thought is moving. Countries that joined the universal change and direction belatedly may be seen at some point as undergoing much faster change.

Despite some significant and useful findings in theory and practice through this study, there are some limitations. First, as questionnaires were not open-type questions but closed-type questions where the respondents had to choose between the two options, respondents were not given chances to freely express their full opinions. New criteria of measuring values that do not lose its relevance over a long time can be developed to overcome such problem and conduct a periodic and systematic survey. Second, since values have been measured through language, it was difficult to reflect the change in the meaning of language over time in numbers. Changes in the meaning of language are inevitable but a development of standardized measuring method is needed that can reduce the error coming from the change in the meaning of language. Finally, the degree of sampling's representativeness for each period can differ as slightly different sampling methods have been used for each three survey.

Nonetheless, despite such shortcomings, the result of value changes for a long period of three decades have been consistent, which is a proof that samplings used for this study can be trusted with their representativeness. Long-term survey is very challenging, but it can serve as a useful foundation for wisely preparing for the future based on the empirical findings in the changing direction from past to present.

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## APPENDIXES I-1

### Individualism

		1. Filial duty		2. What to respect		3. What is filial duty		Total (N)
		Important	Unimportant	Nation	Oneself and Family	Caring for one's parents	Achieving success	
Sex	Men	63.8	36.3	13.3	86.8	39.3	60.8	400
		(76.3)	(23.5)	(28.3)	(71.7)	(61.2)	(38.8)	(392)
		(79.0)	(21.0)	(66.7)	(33.3)	(52.3)	(47.7)	(300)
	Women	59.3	40.8	8.5	91.5	32.3	67.8	400
		(72.8)	(27.2)	(27.9)	(71.8)	(52.0)	(47.8)	(408)
		(81.7)	(18.3)	(50.7)	(49.3)	(53.7)	(46.3)	(300)
Age	20-29	54	46	6.5	93.5	38.5	61.5	200
		(58.4)	(41.6)	(17.8)	(82.0)	(46.1)	(53.9)	(219)
		(74.7)	(25.3)	(51.9)	(49.0)	(51.0)	(49.0)	(300)
	30-39	61.5	38.5	8.0	92.0	31.0	69.0	200
		(78.5)	(32.6)	(30.5)	(69.5)	(59.2)	(40.4)	(223)
	40-49	61.5	38.5	7.5	92.5	36.0	64.0	200
		(77.2)	(22.8)	(27.6)	(72.4)	(57.9)	(42.1)	(145)
	50-59	69.0	31.0	21.5	78.5	37.5	62.5	200
		(86.8)	(12.6)	(36.5)	(69.2)	(65.3)	(34.7)	(167)
(86.0)		(14.0)	(66.3)	(33.7)	(55.0)	(45.0)	(300)	
Education Level	Below middle school	58.5	41.5	13.2	86.8	26.4	73.6	53
		(81.4)	(18.6)	(41.0)	(59.0)	(65.4)	(34.6)	(156)
		(89.5)	(10.5)	(67.0)	(33.0)	(61.5)	(38.5)	(200)
	Graduated from high school	63.7	36.3	9.2	90.8	31.5	68.5	251
		(76.4)	(23.6)	(27.5)	(72.2)	(57.5)	(42.5)	(313)
		(83.5)	(16.5)	(65.5)	(34.5)	(51.0)	(49.0)	(200)
	College/ University Attendance or above	60.7	39.3	11.5	88.5	38.9	61.1	496
		(69.5)	(30.2)	(22.7)	(77.3)	(51.4)	(48.3)	(331)
		(68.0)	(32.0)	(43.5)	(56.5)	(46.5)	(53.5)	(200)

## APPENDIX I-2

## Post-authoritarianism

		4. Hiring people		5. Maintenance of social order		6. When one's superior is wrong		Total (N)
		Obedience	Responsibility	Distinction between superior and inferior	Classification of functions	Pretend not to know	criticize	
Sex	Men	36.8	63.3	59.3	40.8	24.8	75.3	400
		(31.4)	(68.6)	(68.1)	(31.9)	(9.4)	(90.6)	(392)
		(26.7)	(73.3)	(72.7)	(27.3)	(13.0)	(87.6)	(300)
	Women	32.5	67.5	58.3	41.8	21.5	78.5	400
		(29.2)	(70.8)	(71.1)	(28.9)	(16.4)	(83.3)	(408)
		(39.7)	(60.3)	(73.0)	(27.0)	(39.0)	(61.0)	(300)
Age	20-29	34.5	65.5	48.0	52.0	21.5	78.5	200
		(25.1)	(74.9)	(63.5)	(36.5)	(8.2)	(91.3)	(219)
		(28.6)	(71.4)	(73.7)	(26.3)	(12.3)	(87.7)	(300)
	30-39	35.5	64.5	63.0	37.0	26.0	74.0	200
		(25.6)	(74.4)	(62.8)	(37.2)	(8.5)	(91.5)	(223)
	40-49	35.0	65.0	56.0	44.0	23.0	77.0	200
		(33.8)	(66.2)	(73.1)	(26.9)	(14.5)	(85.5)	(145)
	50-59	33.5	66.5	68.0	32.0	22.0	78.0	200
		(37.7)	(63.2)	(82.0)	(18.0)	(20.4)	(79.6)	(167)
Education Level	Below middle school	34.0	66.0	56.6	43.4	20.8	79.2	53
		(36.5)	(63.5)	(71.8)	(28.2)	(21.8)	(78.2)	(156)
		(42.5)	(57.5)	(69.5)	(30.5)	(26.0)	(74.0)	(200)
	Graduated from high school	31.9	68.1	59.0	41.0	21.5	78.5	251
		(30.0)	(70.0)	(75.1)	(24.9)	(12.1)	(87.5)	(313)
		(36.0)	(64.0)	(75.0)	(25.0)	(12.0)	(88.0)	(200)
	College/ University Attendance or above	36.1	63.9	58.9	41.1	24.2	75.8	496
		(27.5)	(72.5)	(63.4)	(36.6)	(9.7)	(90.3)	(331)
		(21.0)	(79.0)	(74.0)	(26.0)	(6.5)	(93.5)	(200)

APPENDIX I-3

Assertiveness

		7. To be happy together		8. Between humility and showing off		9. Trend of strag-gler's lagging		Total (N)	
		Patience	Demand for change	Humili-ty	Show one's competence	Natural conclusion	Sad thing		
Sex	Men	27.3	72.8	78.5	21.5	37.3	62.8	400	
		(34.2)	(65.8)	(80.9)	(19.1)	(40.1)	(59.9)	(392)	
		(19.0)	(81.0)	(62.7)	(37.3)	(23.3)	(76.7)	(300)	
	Women	20.5	79.5	80.0	20.0	35.8	64.3	400	
		(33.6)	(66.4)	(77.7)	(22.3)	(35.0)	(64.7)	(408)	
		(52.0)	(48.0)	(68.3)	(31.7)	(24.3)	(75.7)	(300)	
Age	20-29	20.5	79.5	71.0	29.0	39.5	60.5	200	
		(19.2)	(80.8)	(73.1)	(26.9)	(39.3)	(60.7)	(219)	
		(34.0)	(66.0)	(66.0)	(34.0)	(25.7)	(74.3)	(300)	
	30-39	21.5	78.5	79.0	21.0	36.5	63.5	200	
		(27.8)	(72.2)	(78.5)	(21.5)	(38.1)	(61.9)	(223)	
	40-49	25.0	75.0	80.5	19.5	38.5	61.5	200	
		(41.4)	(58.6)	(86.9)	(13.1)	(37.9)	(62.1)	(145)	
	50-59	28.5	71.5	86.5	13.5	31.5	68.5	200	
		(47.3)	(52.7)	(80.2)	(19.8)	(34.7)	(64.7)	(167)	
		(58.0)	(42.0)	(65.0)	(35.0)	(22.0)	(78.0)	(300)	
	Educa-tion Level	Below mid-dle school	22.6	77.4	86.8	13.2	20.8	79.2	53
			(45.5)	(54.5)	(80.8)	(19.2)	(30.1)	(69.2)	(156)
(57.5)			(42.5)	(68.5)	(31.5)	(14.0)	(86.0)	(200)	
Graduated from high school		23.5	76.5	82.9	17.1	37.5	62.5	251	
		(34.5)	(65.5)	(84.3)	(15.7)	(37.4)	(62.6)	(313)	
		(45.0)	(55.0)	(70.0)	(30.0)	(28.0)	(72.0)	(200)	
College/ University Attendance or above		24.2	75.8	76.6	23.4	37.7	62.3	496	
		(27.8)	(72.2)	(73.7)	(26.3)	(41.1)	(58.9)	(331)	
		(35.5)	(64.5)	(58.0)	(42.0)	(29.5)	(70.5)	(200)	



## APPENDIX I-4

## Uncertainty Avoidance

		10. Life wisdom		11. Encounter with foreigners		12. Meet someone for the first time		Total (N)
		Relaxed	Hasty	More kind	The same / less kind	Be kind	Doubt	
Sex	Men	74.8	25.8	56.5	43.5	78.3	21.8	400
		(67.3)	(32.1)	(84.9)	(15.1)	(90.1)	(9.9)	(392)
		(55.3)	(44.7)	(80.3)	(19.7)			(300)
	Women	72.8	27.3	66.3	33.8	79.8	20.3	400
		(69.1)	(30.6)	(87.0)	(13.0)	(83.8)	(15.9)	(408)
		(60.0)	(40.0)	(83.7)	(16.3)			(300)
Age	20-29	75.5	24.5	68.5	31.5	83.5	16.5	200
		(62.6)	(37.0)	(83.6)	(16.4)	(92.2)	(7.8)	(219)
		(58.7)	(41.3)	(79.0)	(21.0)			(300)
	30-39	66.0	34.0	61.5	38.5	79.5	20.5	200
		(70.0)	(29.1)	(82.1)	(17.9)	(87.9)	(12.1)	(223)
	40-49	76.5	23.5	63.0	37.0	79.0	21.0	200
		(73.8)	(26.2)	(93.8)	(6.2)	(80.7)	(18.6)	(145)
	50-59	76.0	24.0	52.5	47.5	74.0	26.0	200
		(68.3)	(31.7)	(86.2)	(13.8)	(84.4)	(15.6)	(167)
(56.7)		(43.3)	(85.0)	(15.0)			(300)	
Education Level	Below middle school	77.4	22.6	45.3	54.7	71.7	28.3	53
		(69.9)	(20.1)	(86.5)	(13.5)	(80.1)	(19.9)	(156)
		(51.5)	(48.5)	(81.0)	(19.0)			(200)
	Graduated from high school	71.3	28.7	55.8	44.2	72.5	27.5	251
		(68.1)	(31.3)	(87.5)	(12.5)	(85.9)	(14.1)	(313)
		(54.0)	(46.0)	(79.0)	(21.0)			(200)
	College/ University Attendance or above	74.2	25.8	65.9	34.1	83.1	16.9	496
		(67.7)	(32.0)	(84.3)	(15.7)	(90.9)	(8.8)	(331)
		(67.5)	(32.5)	(86.0)	(14.0)			(200)

APPENDIX I-5

Future orientation

		13.What to desert between the past and the future		14.Select between the present and the future		15.Traditional customs		Total (N)	
		Desert present	Desert past	Enjoy future	Prepare future	Overcome civilization crisis	Not helpful		
Sex	Men	13.0	87.0	36.0	64.0	59.3	40.8	400	
		(8.7)	(91.8)	(14.8)	(85.2)	(76.5)	(23.2)	(392)	
		(13.3)	(86.7)			(79.7)	(20.3)	(300)	
	Women	10.8	89.3	38.5	61.5	62.5	37.5	400	
		(6.4)	(93.6)	(19.4)	(80.6)	(78.2)	(21.6)	(408)	
		(7.0)	(93.0)			(78.3)	(21.7)	(300)	
Age	20-29	16.0	84.0	49.5	50.5	59.0	41.0	200	
		(9.1)	(90.0)	(23.7)	(76.3)	(74.9)	(25.1)	(219)	
		(10.0)	(90.0)			(79.0)	(21.0)	(300)	
	30-39	8.0	92.0	36.5	63.5	60.0	40.0	200	
		(4.9)	(95.1)	(15.2)	(80.6)	(74.0)	(25.1)	(223)	
	40-49	8.0	92.0	32.0	68.0	62.0	38.0	200	
		(9.0)	(95.2)	(13.8)	(76.3)	(79.3)	(20.7)	(145)	
	50-59	15.5	84.5	31.0	69.0	62.5	37.5	200	
		(4.2)	(80.4)	(13.8)	(86.2)	(82.0)	(18.0)	(167)	
		(10.4)	(89.6)			(79.0)	(21.0)	(300)	
	Education Level	Below middle school	13.2	86.8	32.1	67.9	73.6	26.4	53
			(9.6)	(89.7)	(16.7)	(86.2)	(76.9)	(22.4)	(156)
(17.5)			(82.5)			(75.0)	(25.0)	(200)	
Graduated from high school		13.1	86.9	35.5	64.5	59.4	40.6	251	
		(8.9)	(91.1)	(15.7)	(86.2)	(78.3)	(21.4)	(313)	
		(8.0)	(92.0)			(76.5)	(23.5)	(200)	
College/ University Attendance or above		11.1	88.9	38.7	61.3	60.3	39.7	496	
		(5.1)	(94.9)	(18.7)	(82.6)	(76.7)	(23.3)	(331)	
		(5.0)	(95.0)			(85.5)	(14.5)	(200)	

## APPENDIX I-6

## Gender egalitarianism

		16. Female virginity		17. Married woman		18. Women's family-in-law and woman's own family		Total (N)	
		Keep	Don't keep	Active	Stay within family	Loyal to the husband's family	Family -in-law = one's own family		
Sex	Men	35.5	64.5	60.3	39.8	14.8	85.3	400	
		(69.9)	(29.8)	(59.9)	(39.9)	(38.8)	(60.7)	(392)	
		(86.3)	(13.7)	(36.3)	(63.7)	(68.0)	(32.0)	(300)	
	Women	41.3	58.8	67.0	33.0	5.5	94.5	400	
		(72.1)	(27.9)	(71.1)	(28.9)	(25.5)	(73.0)	(408)	
		(89.7)	(10.3)	(42.7)	(57.3)	(58.7)	(41.3)	(300)	
Age	20-29	33.5	66.5	68.0	32.0	11.0	89.0	200	
		(54.8)	(45.2)	(72.6)	(27.4)	(23.7)	(74.9)	(219)	
		(80.7)	(19.3)	(38.7)	(61.3)	(55.0)	(45.0)	(300)	
	30-39	24.0	76.0	66.5	33.5	7.0	93.0	200	
		(65.0)	(34.5)	(65.0)	(34.5)	(26.0)	(72.2)	(223)	
	40-49	40.0	60.0	68.0	32.0	9.5	90.5	200	
		(81.4)	(18.6)	(61.4)	(38.6)	(32.4)	(67.7)	(145)	
	50-59	56.0	44.0	52.0	48.0	13.0	87.0	200	
		(87.4)	(12.6)	(62.3)	(37.7)	(46.1)	(53.3)	(167)	
		(95.3)	(4.7)	(40.4)	(59.6)	(71.7)	(28.3)	(300)	
	Education Level	Below middle school	66.0	34.0	49.1	50.9	7.5	92.5	53
			(87.2)	(12.2)	(62.2)	(37.8)	(44.9)	(53.8)	(156)
(88.5)			(11.5)	(60.5)	(39.5)	(75.0)	(25.0)	(200)	
Graduated from high school		39.8	60.2	57.4	42.6	10.4	89.6	251	
		(75.1)	(24.9)	(62.0)	(37.7)	(28.1)	(71.2)	(313)	
		(87.5)	(12.5)	(29.0)	(71.0)	(66.0)	(34.0)	(200)	
College/ University Attendance or above		34.7	65.3	68.3	31.7	10.3	89.7	496	
		(59.5)	(40.5)	(70.7)	(29.3)	(29.6)	(69.2)	(331)	
		(88.0)	(12.0)	(29.0)	(71.0)	(49.0)	(51.0)	(200)	

APPENDIX I-7

**Affluent life**

		19. Money		20. Living well		21. Honorable and dishonorable occupations		Total (N)	
		Matters not much	Must have	Integrity and rightness	Affluence	yes	no		
Sex	Men	24.5	75.5	32.3	67.8	36.3	63.8	400	
		(24.0)	(76)	(52.3)	(46.9)	(32.0)	(67.3)	(392)	
		(33.0)	(67.0)	(65.3)	(34.7)	(38.0)	(62.0)	(300)	
	Women	16.8	83.3	27.3	72.8	37.0	63.0	400	
		(23.0)	(77)	(46.8)	(53.2)	(30.9)	(69.1)	(408)	
		(30.3)	(69.7)	(63.0)	(37.0)	(44.3)	(55.7)	(300)	
Age	20-29	31.5	68.5	26.5	73.5	32.5	67.5	200	
		(34.2)	(65.8)	(28.8)	(71.2)	(33.3)	(66.7)	(219)	
		(36.6)	(63.4)	(57.0)	(43.0)	(41.4)	(58.6)	(300)	
	30-39	18.0	82.0	26.0	74.0	38.5	61.5	200	
		(18.4)	(81.6)	(44.8)	(54.7)	(27.8)	(72.2)	(223)	
	40-49	13.5	86.5	34.5	65.5	38.0	62.0	200	
		(15.2)	(84.8)	(60.7)	(38.6)	(34.5)	(64.8)	(145)	
	50-59	19.5	80.5	32.0	68.0	37.5	62.5	200	
		(20.4)	(79.6)	(65.9)	(34.1)	(32.3)	(67.7)	(167)	
		(26.7)	(73.3)	(71.3)	(28.7)	(41.0)	(59.0)	(300)	
	Education Level	Below middle school	9.4	90.6	26.4	73.6	43.4	56.6	53
			(25.0)	(75.0)	(68.6)	(30.8)	(24.4)	(75.0)	(156)
(34.5)			(65.5)	(71.0)	(29.0)	(42.0)	(58.0)	(200)	
Graduated from high school		15.9	84.1	36.7	63.3	35.5	64.5	251	
		(19.2)	(80.8)	(50.2)	(49.2)	(31.0)	(68.7)	(313)	
		(33.0)	(67.0)	(67.5)	(32.5)	(37.5)	(62.5)	(200)	
College/ University Attendance or above		24.2	75.8	26.6	73.4	36.5	63.5	496	
		(26.9)	(73.1)	(39.9)	(60.1)	(35.3)	(64.7)	(331)	
		(27.5)	(72.5)	(54.0)	(46.0)	(43.5)	(56.5)	(200)	

## APPENDIX I-8

The difference in value distribution by major demographic factor ( $\chi^2$  verified)

	Individualism					
	1.Filial duty		2.What to respect		3.What is filial duty	
	2010	1998	2010	1998	2010	1998
Sex	n.s.	n.s.	4.656*	n.s.	4.267*	6.78**
Age	9.503*	47.01***	31.300***	20.03***	n.s.	15.74**
Education level	n.s.	8.51*	n.s.	17.77***	6.167*	8.48*
	Post-Authoritarianism					
	4. Hiring people		5. Maintenance of social order		6. When one's superior is wrong	
	2010	1998	2010	1998	2010	1998
Sex	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	8.70**
Age	n.s.	12.07*	18.713***	22.76***	n.s.	23.51***
Education level	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	10.73**	n.s.	14.09***
	Assertiveness					
	7. To be happy together		8. Between humility and showing off		9. Trend of straggler's lagging	
	2010	1998	2010	1998	2010	1998
Sex	5.014*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Age	n.s.	56.85***	14.868**	11.30*	n.s.	n.s.
Education level	n.s.	14.95***	n.s.	11.32**	6.076*	n.s.
	Uncertainty avoidance					
	10. Life wisdom		11. Encounter with foreigners		12. Meet someone for the first time	
	2010	1998	2010	1998	2010	1998
Sex	n.s.	n.s.	8.020**	n.s.	n.s.	6.39*
Age	n.s.	n.s.	11.152*	12.35*	n.s.	10.84*
Education level	n.s.	n.s.	13.444**	n.s.	13.015**	11.99**

	Future orientation					
	13. What to desert between the past and the future		14. Select between the present and the future		15. Traditional customs	
	2010	1998	2010	1998	2010	1998
Sex	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Age	11.503**	15.62**	18.589***	9.77*	n.s.	n.s.
Education level	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
	Gender egalitarianism					
	16. Female virginity		17. Married woman		18. Women's family-in-law and woman's own family	
	2010	1998	2010	1998	2010	1998
Sex	n.s.	n.s.	3.937*	10.68**	18.805***	15.54***
Age	45.981***	65.24***	15.701**	n.s.	n.s.	30.19***
Education level	20.245***	44.91***	13.881**	6.24*	n.s.	15.27***
	Affluent life					
	19. Money is		20. Living well		21. Honorable and dishonorable occupations	
	2010	1998	2010	1998	2010	1998
Sex	7.338**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Age	21.646***	27.08***	n.s.	79.47***	n.s.	n.s.
Education level	11.283**	n.s.	8.341*	36.02***	n.s.	n.s.