

# Two Causative Forms in Korean

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## 1. Introduction

We all agree that sentences must be synonymous with each other if they are to be related by transformation. But the question is whether or not they are "really" synonymous. There are growing number of cases in which a set of sentences that were previously regarded as synonymous turn out to be non-synonymous when subject to deeper investigation. In many cases, arguments for non-synonymy seem to be correct; but there are some cases in which such arguments do not hold simply because the investigators incorrectly observed the phenomena and then jumped to erroneous conclusions.

One phenomenon which deserves our reconsideration in conjunction with synonymy arguments is causative forms. For example, generative semanticists decomposed the surface verb 'kill' into semantic primes of 'CAUSE-BECOME-NOT-ALIVE' on the tacit assumption that the verb and the semantic primes are synonymous. On the other hand, Fodor (1970) criticized the generative semanticists' approach of lexical decomposition on the grounds that the surface verbs and their decomposed elements are not synonymous.

In order to show this semantic difference, he provides syntactic phenomena such as *do-so* rule, sentential pronominalization, and adverbial modification.

In a similar fashion, Shibatani (1973a, b) claims that lexical causatives and their corresponding clausal (i.e., periphrastic by him) causatives in Japanese and Korean are not synonymous. He argues that a lexical causative expresses direct causative and a clausal causative indirect causation. In an attempt to show this semantic difference, he provides some syntactic arguments such as the *do-so* rule, sentential pronominalization, reflexivization, adverbial modification, and others. He argues that these syntactic phenomena behave differently with respect to the two types of causatives.

This paper attempts to defend my (Yang 1972a:203-217) earlier view that the two types of causatives in Korean are synonymous as opposed to Shibatani's claim. These opposing views may be referred to as the synonymy hypothesis and the non-synonymy hypothesis, respectively. This paper will demonstrate that both lexical and clausal causatives can express both direct and indirect causation, or even permissive causation with equal force. What is different between the two causative forms is the mode of expression, not the degree of causation of the act. The argument of this paper proceeds according to semantic and syntactic bases.

Section two will discuss some semantic aspects of causation such as direct vs. indirect causation, commission vs. omission causation, and intentional vs. non-intentional causation. Section three will discuss some syntactic aspects such as the *do-so* rule, sentential pronominalization, reflexivization, constraints on lexicalization, and adverbial modification. The last section summarizes my conclusions.

## 2. Semantic Aspects of Causation

In this section I will discuss semantic aspects of causation. One of them is the degree of causation, which is dependent on the causer's activity in relation to the causee's activity.<sup>1</sup> Since the degree is scalar, it is not easy to exactly quantify it.<sup>2</sup> So I will simplify the degree by dividing it into three categories: direct, indirect, and remote causations. It will be rather convenient to combine indirect and remote causations. The second aspect here concerned is the distinction between commission and omission causations. The third aspect here concerned is the distinction between intentional and non-intentional causations. I will discuss these aspects in separate sub-sections.

### 2.1. Direct, Indirect, and Remote Causations

Lakoff (1968) noted that causative constructions can express both direct and indirect causations, and argued that the distinction is not a matter of underlying structure but a matter of use. He claimed that (1a) and (1b) are generally used to indicate direct causation, while (2a) and (2b) are generally used to indicate indirect causation. But

<sup>1</sup> I adopt Shibatani's terms 'causer' and 'causee' for ease of reference. They refer to the matrix subject and the constituent subject, respectively.

<sup>2</sup> It may be the case that Ross's (1972b) concept 'squish' and Lakoff's (1972) concept 'hedge' will shed light on the study of the degree of causation.

actually either interpretation is possible. Since either interpretation is possible, he claims that the underlying verb can be taken to be 'cause' in causative constructions:

- (1) a. A breeze stiffened John's arm.
- b. A breeze caused John's arm to stiffen.
- (2) a. A breeze brought it about that John's arm stiffened.
- b. A breeze made John's arm stiffen.

Chomsky (1970:218) raised a question against the synonymy hypothesis. He notes that it is not correct to regard the distinction between direct and indirect causations simply as a distinction of use. He cites the following sentences, where the clausal causative sentences (3a, b) are grammatical whereas the corresponding lexical causative sentences (4a, b) are not:

- (3) a. John's clumsiness caused the door to open.
- b. John's clumsiness caused the window to break.
- (4) a. \*John's clumsiness opened the door.
- b. \*John's clumsiness broke the window.

With these examples he intends to show that 'John's clumsiness' can be in indirect causation, but not in direct causation.

A closer examination of Chomsky's examples, however, enables me to remedy the ungrammaticality. At this point it is necessary to refer to Vendler's (1967:164) and Dowty's (1972) contention that the underlying subject of 'cause' is not an individual subject but a sentential complement. Evidence for this claim comes from paraphrasability between a causative sentence with an NP as the subject and a causative sentence with a *by*-phrase:

- (5) a. John made Mary leave the party by telling dirty jokes.
- b. John's telling dirty jokes made Mary leave the party.
- (6) a. The rock killed John by falling on his head.
- b. The rock's falling on John's head caused his death.

As noted by Dowty, another type of evidence for a sentential complement comes from NP-Verb-NP-Adjective constructions:

- (7) a. She shot him dead.
- b. She painted the house red.
- c. He knocked the man unconscious.
- d. He {drank, ate, smoked} himself {silly, to death, into oblivion}.

These sentences can be paraphrased into the following sentences which have *by*-clauses:

- (8) a. She caused him to be dead by shooting him.  
 b. She caused the house to become red by painting it.  
 c. He caused the man to be unconscious by knocking him.  
 d. He caused himself {to be silly, to die, to fall into oblivion} by {drinking, eating, smoking}.

These examples suggest that the underlying structure of the causer is a sentential complement rather than an individual. I will refer to the sentential complement as the method clause. The method clause is usually realized into the *by*-clause in English.

If we recover the method clauses for Chomsky's ungrammatical examples (4), we will obtain the following sentences:

- (9) a. John's clumsiness in shutting the window broke it.  
 b. John broke the window by shutting it clumsily.  
 c. John shut the window clumsily and broke it.

These sentences are all synonymous. (9a) realizes the method cause by an *in*-clause; (9b) by a *by*-clause; and (9c) by a causal conjunct *and*. The grammaticality of these sentences seem to show that the ungrammaticality judgment on (4) is not well-founded.<sup>3</sup>

It is interesting to note that the translations of (9b, c) into Korean and Japanese converge into one sentence form which conveys 'pre-step means' conjunction. The two conjuncts are connected by conjunct *asə* in Korean and *te* in Japanese:

- (10) K. John-i səthulike changmun-il tat-asə, changmun-il kke-assta.<sup>4</sup>  
           clumsily window close window break-past  
 J. John-ga hetani mado-o sime-te, mado-o kowasi-ta.  
           clumsily window close window break

In the case of Japanese and Korean causatives, Shibatani (1973a, 1973b) repeats what Chomsky (1970:218) claimed; that is, lexical causatives express direct causation while clausal causatives indirect causation. Hence, the two types of causatives are not synonym-

<sup>3</sup> We will come back to the topic of the method clause in 2.3. Kastovsky's (1973) analysis of causatives agrees with the treatment of the method clause in this study.


<sup>4</sup> Particles which frequently appear in this paper are delimiter *nin* 'only concerned', nominative marker *ka*, accusative marker *lil*, instrument marker *lo*, and dative (or experiencer) marker *eke*. *nin*, *ka*, *lil*, and *lo* become *in*, *i*, *il*, *ilo* after consonants, respectively. Appropriate variants are used in the data. Throughout the data these particles are not glossed, and auxiliary (i.e. modality) forms are not represented in terms of exact morphological analysis; they are adjusted to pronunciation to some extent. It will be convenient for non-native speakers of Korean to remember that Korean is a SOV language.








c. (underlying)



Predicate-Raising and Argument-Raising optionally yield (12d), which has the compound causative verb *us-ke ha* 'to cause to smile':

d.



- (13) a. John-i se-tal-toen aki-eke os-il *ip-ke* ha-assta.  
 3-month-old child clothes wear-comp cause-past

‘John caused the three-month old baby to wear clothes.’

- b. John-i se-tal-toen aki-eke os-il *ip-hi-* assta.  
 wear-cause past

‘John dressed the three-month old baby.’

According to Shibatani, the speaker uttering (13a) is reporting a miraculous event since we cannot expect a three-month old baby to be caused to dress itself. There is, on the other hand, nothing miraculous in uttering (13b) since the subject dressed the baby instead of causing it to dress itself. He says that this semantic distinction results from the difference of the verb *ip-ke ha* involving two agents (i.e. the causer and causee) and the verb *ip-hi* involving one agent (i.e. the causer). Note that his definition of direct vs. indirect causation is based on the difference of one agent (i.e. the causer) and two agents (i.e. the causer and causee).

The contrasted sentences (13a, b) look attractive in favor of the non-synonymy hypothesis. If Shibatani’s interpretation of this pair were absolutely correct, the synonymy hypothesis would be definitely paralyzed. When asked to make a judgment on (13), most native speakers, at the first glance, would agree with Shibatani. Since the context of (13) requires one hundred percent activity of the causer (excluding any activity of the causee) simply because a three-month old baby cannot dress itself at all, they would regard the clausal causative sentence (13a) as odd. This semantic judgment, however, is not correct. It is a common knowledge that native speakers’ (as opposed to native linguists’) ‘at-the-first-glance’ intuitions are not necessarily correct.

As Lakoff (1968) claimed for English, both types of Korean causatives can express both direct and indirect causations, and the distinction is not a matter of underlying structure but a matter of style or use. In terms of naturalness of the sentences, I agree that the lexical causative *ip-hi* is more natural than the clausal causative *ip-ke ha* in the context where the causee’s activity is excluded. However, the sentence (13a) which contains the clausal causative is not totally out; that is, sentence (13a) is a ‘logical paraphrase’ or ‘round-about expression’ of sentence (13b). The state in which the baby is in clothes instead of being nude is expressed as in (14):

- (14) aki-ka os-il ip-assta. ‘The baby is in clothes.’  
 baby clothes wear-past

The ‘direct way to express’ the event in which John (i.e. the causer) changes (14) into a direct causation is the lexical causative (13b).

And the 'indirect way to express' the same event is the clausal causative (13a).

The same event may be expressed in either way. What is crucial is the fact that *a direct vs. indirect mode of expression* is not the same notion as *a direct vs. indirect causation*. The two notions must not be confused. In this sense, the clausal causative (13a) is a perfect logical paraphrase of the lexical causative (13b). Hence, the speaker uttering (13a) is reporting a natural logical event, but not a miraculous event. When I explained the clausal causative (13a) to native speakers this way, they nodded. From all of this, we can infer that both lexical causative *ip-hi* and the clausal causative *ip-ke ha* can express direct causation.

If we do not allow stylistic licence to optional transformations, they will lose their status in linguistic theory simply because there is no optional transformation which does not change a stylistic flavor. If we admit that optional transformations may change stylistic flavor, then the lexical causative *ip-hi* and the clausal causative *ip-ke ha* must have a common underlying structure.

Interestingly enough, there are cases where lexical causatives are more natural than clausal causatives in the context of indirect causation (not direct causation). Suppose a situation where school elevators are limited in number and there are many visitors coming every day. In this situation, we in Korea frequently find such a sign as 'Let us make visitors get on the elevator first.' This sign reads as follows:

- (15) a. oepusonim-il mǎncə *tha-iu* psita.  
 visitor first get on-cause let-us  
 'Let us make visitors get on (the elevator) first.'
- b. oepusonim-il mǎncə *tha-ke* *ha* psita.  
 get on-comp cause  
 'Let us make visitors get on (the elevator) first.'

The first sentence contains lexical causative *tha-iu* 'to cause to get on' and the second sentence contains clausal causative *tha-ke ha* 'to cause to get on'. The situation guarantees that causers (i.e. students) do not directly carry or lift visitors onto the elevator; instead, they just give way to visitors so that they can get on the elevator first. Hence, a case of indirect causation is involved in this situation. If the non-synonymy's claim that lexical causatives express direct causation whereas clausal causatives express indirect causation is correct, then the lexical causative *tha-iu* in (15a) must sound unnatural in this context. Contrary to the non-synonymy hypothesis, however, lexical causative *tha-iu* is more natural than clausal causative *tha-ke ha* in the context of (15). These contrasted examples clearly show that both lexical and clausal causatives may express both direct and indirect causat-

ions, that the distinction between the two types of causatives is not a matter of underlying structure but a matter of style or use, and that the surface naturalness cannot necessarily solve the issue at point.

Shibatani (1973b : 285) states:

If the causee functions as an agent capable of initiating an event, [the 'causer' (i.e. the agent that brings about the causative situation) may motivate him to carry out a certain event. Such a motivation can be given to the causee through letter writing, for example. However, if the causee does not take on the role of agent, the causer must be directly involved in carrying out the event. Thus, it is not appropriate for me to use *ip-hi-ta* 'to dress' in reporting a situation where I wrote a letter to my nudist friend in Seoul to the effect that he should be more decent and wear clothes. However, it is perfectly appropriate for me to use *ip-ke ha-ta* 'to-cause to get dressed' in the same situation.

We must take this quotation seriously in order to examine the point at issue. The above quote guarantees a case of remote (or indirect) causation since the letter writer (i.e. the causer) just told the letter receiver (i.e. the causee) to wear clothes. The essence of the above quote is that clausal causatives are appropriate for remote causation whereas lexical causatives are not. The essence, however, is not correctly observed. Consider the following:

- (16) a. na-nin os-il pəs-ko tani-nin Tokyo-ii hippie-chinku-eke  
I clothes with-no going-around of friend-to

phyənci-lil pone-əsə, os-il ip-ke ha-assta.  
letter send-and clothes wear-comp cause-past

'I sent a letter to a hippie-friend who went around with no clothes on in Tokyo, and caused him to wear clothes.'

- b. \_\_\_\_\_, os-il ip-hi assta.  
clothes wear-cause past

'(the same translation as the above).'

It is significant to note that the clausal causative *ip-ke ha* and the lexical causative *ip-hi* are equally natural in the situation of remote (or indirect) causation. The two types of causatives can express remote causation with equal force, contrary to the non-synonymy hypothesis.

Now I will examine a case where the two types of causatives can express direct causation in which the causer's activity is maximal and the causee's activity is none or minimal. The following example is very interesting and significant with respect to direct causation where the causee's activity is none:

- (16) a. taxi-kangto-ka uncənsu-lil ccill-əsə,  
robber driver stab-and

*sum-ci-ke*                      *ha-assta.*  
 breath-cause-comp    cause-past

'The taxi-robber killed the driver by stabbing him.'

b. \_\_\_\_\_, *cuk-ke*    *ha-assta.*  
    die-comp    cause-past

'(the same as the the above).'

c. \_\_\_\_\_, *cuk-i*        -assta.  
    die-cause

'(the same as the above).'

The situation here guarantees a case of direct causation since the robber killed the driver by stabbing him. The lexical causative is *cuk-i* in (16c). A round-about (i.e. logical) paraphrase of the lexical causative is the corresponding clausal causative *cuk-ke ha* in (16b). A more round-about (i.e. logical) paraphrase of the lexical causative is the form *sum-ci-ke ha* 'to cause one's breath to be ceased'. We frequently see and/or hear such a news story as (16a, b, c). Daily news-papers and news broadcasts tend to prefer the most round-about expression *sum-ki-ke ha* of (16a) to the other two of (16b) and (16c). It is clear that if round-about expressions are not logical paraphrases of the lexical causative, they will not use round-about expressions simply because they will avoid distorting the fact — changing from direct causation to indirect causation. The fact that the most round-about expression (16a) is most commonly used in a case of direct causation (i.e. killing, murdering) provides a strong argument for the synonymy hypothesis.

Now we take another example in connection with direct causation:

(17) a. John-i aki-ii    son-il cap-ko,    *kəl-ke*        *ha-assta.*  
    child-of hand    hold-and walk-comp    cause-past

'John caused the child to walk by holding his hand.'

b. \_\_\_\_\_, *kəl-li-*        assta.  
    walk-cause    past

'(the same as the above).'

Note that the degree of causation in the above situation is a case of direct causation since John helped the child to walk by holding his hand. This is a case where the causer's activity is maximally involved and the causee's activity is minimally involved. Interestingly enough, the two types of causatives are equally natural in expressing the same situation. Thus, we have no reason to regard the two types as non-synonymous.

In order to show that the two types of causatives are synonymous, I will provide further examples below:

- (18) a. na-nin na-ii son-hana kkattak-ankho, Mary-eke  
I my hand-one without-moving

os-il {ip-ke ha, ip-hi} -assta. (remote)  
clothes wear-comp cause wear-cause

'I caused Mary to get dressed, without moving my hand at all.'

- b. Hitler-nin coe-əps-nin manhin salam-il  
crime-without many people

{cuk-ke ha, cuk-i} -assta. (remote)  
die-comp cause die-cause

'Hitler killed a lot of people who were innocent.'

- c. namphyən-i puin-eke coh-in os-il manhi sa-asə,  
husband wife good clothes many buy-and

{ip-ke ha, ip-hi} -assina, puin-in machimne  
wear-comp cause wear-cause past-but wife at last

namphyən-il cəpəli-ko mal-assta. (indirect)  
husband discard-comp end-up-past

'The husband caused the wife to buy a lot of high quality dresses, but she at last discarded him.'

- d. John-i Mary-eke sip-nyən-tongan mulyo-lo  
ten-year-for free-of-charge

caki cip-esə {ca-ke ha, ca-iu} -assta. (indirect)  
self house-at sleep-comp cause sleep-cause past

'John made Mary sleep (i.e. stay) at his house free of charge for ten years.'

- e. Mary-ka sucə-lil tilsu-əps-nin whanca-eke  
spoon hold-cannot patient-to

pap-il {mək-ke ha, mək-i} -assta. (direct)  
food eat-comp cause eat-cause past

'Mary made the patient who cannot hold a spoon eat.'

- f. John-i pisə-eke hyuka-lil cu-asə,  
secretary-to leave give-and

il-cu-kan {nol-ke ha, nol-li} -assta. (direct)  
one-week-for rest-comp cause rest-cause

'John made the secretary take a rest, by giving her a leave of one week.'

(18a, b) are intended to show remote causation. Since I caused Mary to dress without moving my hand at all, the context can guarantee a case of remote causation. We here ignore the case where Hitler himself killed people. Since Hitler made the system and the system caused the massacre, the context provides a case of remote causation. In expressing the remote causations in (18a, b), the lexical causatives are a little more natural than the



clausal causatives, contrary to the non-synonymy hypothesis. (18c, d) are intended to show indirect causation. In (18c) the husband did not dress his wife, but provided her with a lot of money so that she can buy a lot of high quality dresses. Hence, the context provides a good case of indirect causation. In (18d) John did not force Mary to sleep or stay at his house, but provided her with a room to sleep. Hence, the context is a case of indirect causation. In expressing the indirect causations in (18c, d), both causatives are equally natural. (18e, f) are intended to show direct causation. In (18e) Mary directly helped the patient to eat food. In (18f) the secretary could not take a rest of one week if the boss (i.e. John) did not give her a leave. Hence, both cases are direct causations.

The lexical causatives in (18e, f) are a little more natural than the clausal causatives, but both are perfectly acceptable. Thus far I have attempted to show that the two types of causatives can express remote, indirect, and direct causations with equal force although their stylistic effects may be slightly different depending on the situation and the context. I have also demonstrated that naturalness is determined not by the type of causative forms, but by the context and the situation. All of this supports the synonymy hypothesis.

Now we need to specify the range of causation and its factors. When I (Yang 1972a) discussed Korean causation from a syntactic point of view, I indicated that the term 'causation' is a cover term whose referring range is very wide (Yang 1972a : 217):

We have assumed that the term 'causation' has unambiguous meaning. However, it should be noted that causation involves a matter of degree. Consider the following:

(28) John made Mary bathe.

In this sentence, the activity of *John* and that of *Mary* will vary. It seems that the degree of causation is not only a matter of vagueness but also a matter of ambiguity. The point is that the term 'causation' is a cover term whose referring range is very wide. But I do not discuss such aspects of causation here.

The degree of causation depends upon various factors such as the causer, the causee, types of verbs, and the total context. A causer is usually an animate NP, but sometimes quasi-animate NP's such as engines, robots, wind, falling water, etc. can be a causer. A causee may be either an animate NP, a quasi-animate NP, or an inanimate NP. The causer's causal activity is varied, ranging from just influential causation (i.e. remote causation) to direct causation through the intermediate stages; the portion of the causee's caused activity is usually in reverse proportion to the causer's activity. In the following examples, the causal activity is scalar:

(19) a. I asked Mary to be cleaner, so she bathed.

- b. I scolded Mary for not bathing, so she bathed.
- c. I ordered Mary to bathe, and she bathed.
- d. I helped Mary to bathe.
- e. I bathed Mary.

The example (19a) represents a case of influential causation where the causer's activity is minimal and the causee's activity is maximal. On the extreme opposite point of the scale, the example (19e) represents a case of direct causation where the causer's activity is maximal and the causee's activity is minimal or none. The sentences in (19) can all be actually or logically paraphrased either by (20a) or (20b) which explicitly expresses the sense of causation:

- (20) a. I caused Mary to bathe.
- b. I made Mary bathe.

In this paper, the term 'causation' covers the whole range of the examples in (19).

As indicated above, another factor which participates in the scalar degree of causation is types of verbs. It seems that we may dichotomize verbs into two categories. One category potentially may exclude the causee's activity. Such verbs include 'kill, dress, bathe, etc.' In this case, the causee's activity may or may not be involved. The other category does not exclude the causee's activity. This category necessarily requires some portion of the causee's participation. Such verbs include 'sleep, eat, cry, smile, walk, etc.' In this case, the causer cannot perform all of the activities involved since the accomplishment [of the causer's intended act or event necessarily requires the causee's participation. For example, we cannot make or cause somebody to sleep without his cooperation. Or we cannot make somebody eat something without his cooperation. The second category of verbs requires two agents (i.e. the causer and causee). The first category requires one agent (i.e. the causer) if the causee's activity is excluded, or two agents (i.e. the causer and causee) if the causee's activity is not excluded. This paper regards all of these cases as causation, which also includes 'omission' causation (cf. 2.3.).

There are cases where the causal activity is initiated by the causee, but not by the causer. Consider the following:

- (21) a. Mary-ka ul-ko      siph-ta-ko ha-asa, na-nin  
              cry-comp want      do-since I
- Mary-lil *ul-ke*      *ha-assta.*  
              cry-comp permit-past

'I let Mary cry since she wanted to.'

b. \_\_\_\_\_, *ul-li* -assta.  
cry-cause past

‘(the same as the above).’

Note that it is possible to interpret the second conjuncts in (21a) and (21b) as a type of causation. But the first conjuncts guarantee that the causal activity is not initiated by the causer but by the causee. For this reason, it is usually called ‘permission’ rather than causation (cf. Yang 1972a; Shibatani 1973a, 1973b). It seems to me (now) that permission is a sub-type of causation since some portion of the causer’s influence is involved in the process of the total activity performed. What is significant in the examples (21a, b) is that both *ul-ke ha* and *ul-li* can equally express the same event. I (Yang 1972a:202-217) and Shibatani (1973a, 1973b) erroneously have claimed that only clausal causative forms may express the permission reading. But this judgment is not correct. The fact that both clausal causative forms and lexical causative forms may equally express the permission reading is significant in the sense that this paper claims that the two types of causatives are synonymous.

Now a question arises as to how to represent such differences of the degree of causation (including the permission reading). In English, causative verbs ‘cause’ and ‘make’ are, strictly speaking, some sort of pro-verbs since they stand for actual method clauses. For example, ‘John made Mary cry’ is a pro-form for ‘John kicked Mary and she cried’, ‘John hates Mary and she cried’, or ‘John divorced Mary and she cried.’ In other words, ‘cause’ or ‘make’ is a pro-form for ‘kicking’, ‘hating’, or ‘divorcing’. Interestingly enough, the nature of the pro-form of causative verbs in Korean is realized in the form of the pro-verb *ha*. The method clause is reflexed in Korean as the causative pro-verb *ha* ‘to do, to cause, to make’. We can ascribe the ambiguity of causation to the pro-verb *ha* at a certain stage of the total derivation. This fact also provides evidence that the underlying structure is the clausal causative which contains the pro-verb *ha*, but not the lexical causative which does not contain the pro-verb *ha*.

At this point Katz’s (1970) argument deserves some comment. He argues that ‘kill’ is not synonymous with ‘cause to become not alive’, ‘cause to die’, or ‘cause to cease living’. He states (1970 : 253):

As a counterexample we can offer a case where someone is the cause of another’s death but is not the person who killed him. Suppose that the sheriff of an old town is to fight a gun-duel with an infamous badman at high noon. Suppose also that, so as not to take any unnecessary chance, the sheriff goes to the local gunsmith to have his trusty sixshooter put in top working condition. Suppose, furthermore, that the gunsmith, who is a friend of the outlaw, installs an

old, rusty firing pin in the sheriff's gun and tells him that the newest and best available pin has been put in. Now, when the gun-duel takes place, the sheriff, who draws first, is unable to fire his gun because the defective firing pin prevents it from discharging, and the outlaw then shoots and kills the sheriff. Clearly, the gun-smith caused the death of the sheriff, but, equally clearly, the gunsmith did not kill him.

Katz's argument does not seem to be convincing. The relation between the sheriff, the gunsmith, and the outlaw can be expressed as follows:

- (22) a. The outlaw (directly) killed the sheriff.  
 b. The gunsmith (indirectly or remotely) killed the sheriff.
- (23) a. The outlaw (directly) caused the sheriff to die.  
 b. The gunsmith (indirectly or remotely) caused the sheriff to die.

At any rate the gunsmith also killed the sheriff although the method is indirect or remote. As far as the killing of the sheriff is concerned, there is no difference between the gunsmith and the outlaw; the only difference is the degree of the causative activity (i.e. the method clause).

A stronger support for the synonymy hypothesis comes from the asymmetrical structure of causative forms. As noted earlier, not all the clausal causatives have their corresponding lexical causatives (i.e. accidental gaps). For example, the following clausal causatives do not have the corresponding lexical causatives:

- |                                  |                                    |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| (24) o-ke ha 'to cause to come'  | ilh-ke ha 'to cause to lose'       |
| noh-ke ha 'to cause to place'    | nah-ke ha 'to cause to be born'    |
| kil-ke ha 'to cause to be long'  | aphi-ke ha 'to cause to be pained' |
| kop-ke ha 'to cause to be prety' | masi-ke ha 'to cause to drink'     |
| cu-ke ha 'to cause to give'      | chac-ke ha 'to cause to find'      |
| iss-ke ha 'to cause to exist'    | təp-ke ha 'to cause (an animate    |
| swi-ke ha 'to cause to rest'     | NP) to feel warm',...              |

If the non-synonymy hypothesis' claim that clausal causatives express only indirect causation while lexical causatives express only direct causation is correct, the verbs which compose only clausal causatives (excluding lexical causatives) are naturally expected not to express direct causation. However, this is not the case. There are situations where direct causation is required and one of the verbs in (24) is required. In a case like this, we are definitely forced to use clausal causatives since lexical causatives are not available. Consider the following:

- (25) a. John-i umciki-ci mos ha-nin whanca-eke mul-il  
 moving cannot do patient-to water

ip-e pu-əsa, masi-ke ha-assta.  
 mouth-to pour-and drink-comp cause

‘John made the unmovable patient drink water, by pouring water into his mouth.’

- b. John-i Mary-lil tteli-əsa, aphī-ke ha-assta.  
 hit-by feel-pained-comp cause

‘John made Mary feel pained, by hitting her.’

These examples make only direct causation, since in (25a) the patient is not free to move about and John poured water into his mouth and in (25b) John directly hit Mary against her will. Note that verbs *masi* ‘to drink’ and *aphi* ‘to feel pained’ can compose only clausal causatives but not lexical causatives. Interestingly enough, the clausal causatives in the above examples DO express direct causation. Thus, it is proved that clausal causatives can express direct causatives as well as indirect causatives. In short, the asymmetrical structure makes the non-synonymy hypothesis turn out to be inadequate.

Another strong support for the synonymy hypothesis comes from the adverbs ‘directly’ and ‘indirectly’ in causative constructions. If clausal causatives can express only indirect causation and lexical causatives can express only direct causation, the adverb ‘directly’ cannot be allowed in clausal causatives and the adverb ‘indirectly’ can not be allowed in lexical causatives. However, as illustrated in the following examples, these adverbs can be allowed in either type of causatives:

- (26) a. John-i Mary-lil cikcəp us-ke ha-assta.  
 directly smile-comp cause

‘John directly caused Mary to smile.’

- b. John-i Mary-lil kancəpəcəkilo us-ki -assta.  
 indirectly smile-cause

‘John indirectly caused Mary to smile.’

(26a) is a clausal causative, and yet naturally allows the adverb ‘directly’. (26b) is a lexical causative and yet naturally allows the adverb ‘indirectly’. Thus, these examples provide a strong support for the synonymy hypothesis. Adverbial modification will be discussed in 3.5.

## 2.2. Commission and Omission Causations

Another aspect of semantics of causation is the distinction of commission vs. omission causation. The former refers to the case where the causer does something to initiate the

cause. The latter refers to the case where the causer neglects his duty or obligation or something supposed to be done. So far we have dealt with only commission causation. Omission causation is exemplified in the following:

- (27) a. I caused my soldiers to be killed by making an unexpected mistake.  
 b. I killed my soldiers by making an unexpected mistake.  
 c. ne-ka kkampak cal-mos ha-asə, puha-lil  
 I unexpectedly mistake do-by subjects  
*cuk-ke ha-assta.* (clausal causative)  
 die-comp cause  
 d. \_\_\_\_\_, puha-lil *cuk-i* -assta. (lexical causative)  
 die-cause

The English sentences (a, b) are translated into Korean (c, d). The method clause is ambiguous: it may be interpreted as a commission causation or as an omission causation. If my mistake is interpreted as doing something, then it is a commission causation. If my mistake is interpreted as neglecting to do something, then it is an omission causation. Note that in either interpretation clausal and lexical causatives are equally used. This fact is for the synonymy hypothesis.

Consider the following:

- (28) a. John-i aphin atil-il tolpo-ci ani ha-asə,  
 sick son take-care-comp not do-since  
 atil-i *cuk-əssta.* kyəlkuk John-i atil-il *cuk-ke*  
 son die-past in fact son die-comp  
*ha-assta.* (clausal causative)  
 cause-past  
 ‘John did not take care of his sick son and the son died. In fact, he caused him to die/he killed him.’  
 b. \_\_\_\_\_ . kyəlkuk John-i atil-il *cuk-i* -assta.  
 in fact son die-cause  
 ‘(the same as the above).’

In the case like this, the causer did not actively do anything, but he neglected to do something to prevent the caused event. He neglected his duty or obligation, which resulted in his son's death. This is like the case where an adult commits a crime by not helping a drowning man. In law this is referred to as a crime by omission. Notice that omission causative sentences can be expressed by either clausal or lexical causatives. This fact is another piece of evidence for the synonymy hypothesis.

Cohen (1971:128) criticizes Vendler (1967:164) who regards (29b) is the fuller form

of (29a):

- (29) a. John caused the disturbance.  
 b. John's doing something caused the disturbance.

Cohen argues that it is wrong because John might have caused the disturbance by his failure to do something, rather than by his doing something. This is a case of what I call omission causation as opposed to commission causation. Thus, we can answer Cohen's criticism by incorporating omission causation into the system of causation.

Omission causation is further exemplified in the following:

- (30) a. John did not love his wife and caused the divorce.  
 b. John caused the divorce by not loving his wife.  
 c. John's not loving his wife caused the divorce.

All of these sentences are synonymous.

### 2.3. Intentional and Non-intentional Causations

Dowty (1972) specifies semantics of causation into intentional vs. non-intentional causation. For example, sentence (31) is ambiguous: it may be intentional or non-intentional:

- (31) John killed Mary by kicking her.

He proposes to show the subject's (i.e. the causer's) intention by positing the semantic prime 'DO' in the highest sentence whereas the subject's non-intention by not positing it.

Dowty's semantic representations for intention vs. non-intention reading, however, do not seem to be satisfactory. Notice that the intention vs. non-intention distinction is not confined only to causative constructions. Any verb of activity involves this semantic distinction. I believe that the predicate 'DO' must be assigned for the representation of activity (cf. Ross 1972a). If so, we need to seek an adequate representation for intentionality. Usually, surface structures do not contain the word 'intentionally' or 'unintentionally'. But sometimes they are present on the surface as shown in the following:

- (32) a. John intentionally killed Mary by kicking her.  
 b. (?) John intentionally killed Mary by intentionally kicking her.  
 c. \*John intentionally killed Mary by unintentionally kicking her.  
 d. John unintentionally killed Mary by kicking her.  
 e. (?) John unintentionally killed Mary by unintentionally kicking her.  
 f. John unintentionally killed Mary by intentionally kicking her.  
 g. It was intentional that John killed Mary by kicking her.  
 h. It was unintentional that John killed Mary by kicking her.

The ambiguity of sense (31) is represented in (32). (32b, e) are logically possible although the repeated use of the same word seems to decrease the degree of acceptability. (32c) is impossible because any intentional activity cannot be performed by unintentional method clauses. The fact that the ambiguity of (31) can be disambiguated in the structures of (32) suggests that the ambiguity of the agent with respect to intentionality vs. non-intentionality can be represented by the higher predicate 'intentional' or by the negation of it.

As noted in 2.1. Vendler (1967:164) proposed that the subject of a causative sentence be a sentential complement rather than an individual. In other words he claimed that (29b) is the fuller form for (29a). Shibatani (1973a:336-338) criticizes Vendler on the ground that the two sentences are not synonymous. He uses the adverb 'intentionally' to show the distinction:

(33) a. John intentionally caused the disturbance.

b. John's intentionally doing something caused the disturbance.

According to him the first sentence is semantically different from the second sentence. The first sentence does not say that John did something, but it says that John intentionally caused the disturbance. The second sentence says that John did something 'intentionally' but it does not say that John intentionally caused the disturbance.

Shibatani's argument does not seem to be convincing. Recall that I have discussed that Vendler's sentential complement should be interpreted as the method clause. Any causative sentence has its method clause overtly or covertly. When the method clause is not present on the surface, the causative sentence does not give us any concrete information. The method clause may become a sentential complement in a nominalized form. Yet (33b) is not the correct paraphrase of (33a). The correct paraphrase may be 'John's doing something intentionally caused the disturbance'. But still this is not correct since a sentential complement cannot express intentionality in the main clause. The correct paraphrase will be 'John intentionally caused the disturbance by doing something'. Incidentally this shows that not all the method clauses can become sentential complements. Shibatani's argument seems to become inadequate when we interpret the sentential complement as the method clause.

In connection with the semantic distinction between (33a) and (33b), Shibatani further argues that two adverbs are allowed in a sentence like (33b), but not in a sentence like (33a):



(34) a. John's intentionally doing something accidentally caused the disturbance.

b. \* John intentionally accidentally caused the disturbance.<sup>6</sup>

Here again the correct paraphrase of (34a) is not (34b), but the sentence which has the method clause like 'John accidentally caused the disturbance by intentionally doing something'. Shibatani claims that the adverbs like 'intentionally' strongly support that the agent of causation must be the subject of the verb 'cause' rather than the sentential complement. However, he seems to have missed a significant fact that the sentential complement is a transform of the method clause which is equivalent to the 'pre-step means' conjunct.

### 3. Syntactic Aspects of Causation

In this section I will discuss the syntactic aspects which Shibatani (1973a, 1973b) adduced to support the non-synonymy hypothesis, and some others.

#### 3.1. Do-So Rule

According to Shibatani (1973a: 354-355), when a sentence to which the *do-so* rule (i.e. *soo su-ru* rule in Japanese, *kilokhe ha-ta* rule in Korean) applies has an embedding structure, the resulting *do-so* sentence becomes ambiguous as to which verb phrase (i.e. the matrix verb or the constituent verb) the *do-so* phrase refers to. A clausal causative sentence produces ambiguity when the *do-so* rule applies, but a lexical causative sentence does not. This fact shows that the two types of causatives in Japanese are different, according to him.

His observation is not correct for Korean. My judgment is that the *do-so* phrase refers uniquely to the verb phrase of a matrix sentence regardless of the type of causative construction. Consider the following:

(35) a. John-i Mary-lil *ul-ke* *ha-nikka*, Harry-to *kile-assta*.  
cry-comp cause-because also so-do

'Because John made Mary cry, Harry did so too.'

<sup>6</sup> The ungrammaticality of (34b) is not necessarily due to the two adverbs, but to the contradiction of the two adverbs. To some speakers, the following (b) sentence which contains two adverbs is acceptable:

(a) John's stupidly doing something accidentally caused the disturbance.

(b) John stupidly accidentally caused the disturbance.

I owe these examples (a, b) to Bob Ramsey. It seems to me that (b) is ambiguous: in one reading it is equivalent to (a) and in the other reading the two adverbs are conjoined.

- b. John-i Mary-lil *ul-li-nikka*, Harry-to *kile-assta*.  
 cry-cause-because also so-do

‘(the same as the above).’

Sentence (35a) contains a clausal causative, and sentence (35b) contains a lexical causative. In either type of causatives the *do-so* phrase has the same interpretation, ‘Harry did the same thing to Mary as John did.’ Another interpretation, which is an extremely forced one, of sentence (35a) might be ‘Harry did the same thing as Mary did.’ But if this extremely forced interpretation were available from (35a), the same interpretation would be also available from (35b). Thus, the *do-so* rule does not support the non-synonymy hypothesis.

### 3.2. Sentential Pronominalization

Shibatani (1973b:289-291) says that the sentential pronominalization *kikəs* ‘it’ refers either to the matrix proposition or to the embedded proposition in a clausal causative sentence whereas it refers only to the matrix proposition in a lexical causative sentence. His observation, however, is not necessarily correct. Consider the following:

- (36) a. John-i *kəci-til-eke* *o-nyən-kan* *mulyo-lo*  
 beggars-to 5-year-for free of charge  
*pap-il mək-ke ha-assta.*  
 food eat-comp cause-past  
 ‘John made beggars eat free food for five years.’
1. John-in *kikəs-ttemune* *phyochang-il* *pat-assta.*  
 it-because commendation receive-past  
 ‘Because of that, John was commended.’
2. *kəci-til-eke-nin* *kikəs-i* *yuilhan* *cilkəum* *i-assta.*  
 beggars-to it only pleasure is-past  
 ‘It (i.e. eating) was the only pleasure for the beggars.’
- b. John-i *kəci-til-eke* *o-nyən-kan* *mulyo-lo*  
 beggars-to 5-year-for free of charge  
*pap-il mək-i -assta.*  
 food eat-cause past  
 ‘John made beggars eat free food for five years.’

Sentence (36a) contains a clausal causative *mək-ke ha* ‘to cause to eat’. When the sentence is followed by (1), the pronoun *kikəs* ‘it’ refers to the matrix proposition, ‘John made beggars eat free food for five years.’ When the sentence is followed by (2), the pronoun refers to the embedded proposition, ‘Beggars ate free food for five years.’ This shows that the sentential pronoun *kikəs* ‘it’ may refer either to the matrix proposition or to the



### 3.4. Constraints on Lexicalization

Thus far I have shown that a clausal causative and the corresponding lexical causative are synonymous. Hence we are allowed to derive one from the other. I have also provided that the clausal causative must be the underlying structure.

In lexicalization, that is, in the process of deriving the lexical causative from the underlying clausal causative, we confront some syntactic problems. There are some syntactic phenomena which can be incorporated within clausal causative structures, but cannot be incorporated within lexical causative structures. Such phenomena include (1) accidental gaps: not all the clausal causative verbs have the corresponding lexical causative verbs (this is already discussed in 2.1.), (2) delimiters which are specific to Korean and Japanese, (3) the honorific *si* which is specific to Korean, (4) one of the negative forms which is specific to Korean, and (5) some types of adverbial modification.

These phenomena are not counterevidence against the synonymy hypothesis. Shibatani (1973b:295) says that these constraints on lexicalization are strange and ad hoc. Contrary to his claim, these constraints rather provide strong supports for the synonymy hypothesis. If a speaker wants to incorporate the syntactic phenomena under consideration into causative sentences, he must necessarily choose clausal causative sentences instead of lexical causative sentences. If Shibatani is correct in that lexical causatives express only direct causation but not indirect causation, it is inferred that the presence of these syntactic phenomena under discussion in causative sentences must necessarily force the sentences to have only indirect causation reading. However, the fact is that once these phenomena are chosen in causative sentences, the causative sentences are confined only to clausal causative sentences: accordingly, any degree of causation must necessarily be expressed only by clausal causative sentences. Thus, it is clear that clausal causative sentences can express direct causation as well as indirect causation, contrary to the non-synonymy hypothesis.

At the present stage of the development of transformational grammars, it is generally agreed upon that optional transformations accompany constraints of one sort or another. In this sense generative grammarians have tacitly accepted the 'no constraints, no transformations' assumption. Until a better legitimate alternative to this assumption is proposed, it is proper that we may stick to the existing assumption. The constraints on lexicalization in causative constructions result from the structural contraction when clausal causatives (i.e. long-form causatives) become lexical causatives (i.e. short-form causatives). Certain meaning-carrying elements may be placed within clausal causative forms. When clausal



words, (39c) is the nominalized version of a clausal causative, but not of a lexical causative, in its meaning.

### 3.4.2. Honorification

Korean has some syntactic devices to express the speaker's deference towards the person referred to (i.e. the sentence subject). One of the devices is to suffix the honorific morpheme *si* (which becomes *isi* after consonants) to the verb root. It is possible to incorporate the honorific *si* which refers to the causee (i.e. the constituent subject) within clausal causative verbs, but not within lexical causative verbs:

- (40) a. John-i Mary-lil us-*isi*-ke ha-*si*-assta.  
 smile-honorific-comp cause-honorific-past

'John (honored) made Mary (honored) cry.'

- b. John-i Mary-lil us-ke ha-*si*-assta.  
 smile-comp cause-honorific-past

'John(honored) Made Mary smile.'

- c. John-i Mary-lil us-*isi*-ke ha-assta.  
 smile-honorific-comp cause-past

'John made Mary (honored) smile.'

- d. John-i Mary-lil us-*ki-si* -assta.  
 smile-cause-honorific past

'John (honored) made Mary smile.'

- e. \*John-i Mary-lil us-*isi*-ki -assta.  
 smile-honorific-cause past

'John made Mary (honored) smile.'

The first three sentences contain the clausal causative *us-ke ha* 'to cause to smile', and the last two contain the corresponding lexical causative *us-ki* 'to cause to smile'. In (40a) the speaker's deference to Mary (i.e. causee) is represented by the first *si* which is suffixed to the constituent verb *us* 'to smile' whereas the speaker's deference to John (i.e. the causer) is represented by the second *si* which is suffixed to the matrix verb *ha* 'to cause'. The honorific *si* in (40b) refers to the causer (i.e. the matrix subject) since it is suffixed to the matrix verb *ha* 'to cause'. The honorific *si* in (40c) refers to the causee (i.e. the constituent subject) since it is suffixed to the constituent verb *us* 'to smile'. Sentence (40d) contains the lexical causative *us-ki* 'to cause to smile'. In this sentence the honorific *si* refers only to the causer (i.e. the matrix subject). As shown in (40e), the causee (i.e. the constituent subject) cannot have the honorific *si* in the lexical causative sentence.

If the speaker wants to show deference to the causee (i.e. the constituent subject) by







clause (i.e. repeated jailings) or the embedded clause (i.e. Robin Hood be in jail). If we analyze the verb 'jail' as in (44b), we can account for the ambiguity of the time adverb. In (45) the time adverb 'until tomorrow' is usually not used with a past tense verb as shown in (45b), but it is compatible with the past tense verb 'lent' in (45a). If we analyse the verb 'lent' as in (45c), we can explain why it is compatible with the past tense verb 'lent'. McCawley contends that the above examples are evidence for the justification of lexical decomposition.

On the other hand, Fodor (1970) argues that the adverbial modification in general does not support the position which analyzes 'kill' as 'cause become not alive'. Following Fodor, Shibatani (1973a, 1973b) argues that manner, place, and time adverbs (in fact, only point time adverbs) may modify either the causer's activity (i.e. the matrix sentence) or the causee's activity (i.e. the constituent sentence) in clausal causative sentences, but they may modify only the causer's activity in lexical causative sentences; hence, the two types of causatives are not synonymous. I will examine his claim in what follows.

### 3.5.1. Manner (or Method) Adverbs

The position of adverbs in a sentence (especially a complex sentence) affects the interpretation of the sentence in connection with its scope of modification. Since it is not easy to examine all the cases exhaustively, my examination will be confined to manner adverbs placed immediately before constituent verbs. Now consider the following:

- (46) a. kamtok-i yapeu-lil *melyəkcəkilo* us-ke ha-assta.  
 director actress attractively smile-comp cause  
 (1) 'The director attractively made the actress smile.'  
 (2) 'The director made the actress attractively smile.'
- b. John-i Mary-eke os-il *ppalli* ip-ke ha-assta.  
 clothes quickly wear-comp cause  
 (1) 'John quickly made Mary put on clothes.'  
 (2) 'John made Mary quickly put on clothes.'

In all of these clausal causative sentences, there is ambiguity as to which event the manner adverbs modify. They may modify either the causer's activity or the causee's activity.

Shibatani argues that the same ambiguity does not arise in lexical causative sentences; in this case, manner adverbs modify only the causer's activity (i.e. the matrix verb). In order to test his claim I will replace the clausal causatives in (46) with lexical causatives in (47). In addition I will add some phrases such that the context can guarantee a chance for constituent verbs to be modified by the adverbs:

- (47) a. *cangmyən-i melyəkcək i-yəyaha-milo,*  
 scene attractive be-must-because

*kamtok-i yəpəu-lil melekəkilo us-ki-assta.*  
 director actress attractively smile-cause-past

'Because the scene must be attractive, the director made the actress attractively smile'

- b. *Mary-lil towacu-ci ani ha-ko,*  
 helping-comp not do-and

*John-i Mary-eke os-il ppalli ip-hi-assta.*  
 clothes quickly wear-cause-past

'Without helping Mary, John made her quickly put on clothes.'

In (47a) the additional phrase 'because the scene must be attractive' sufficiently makes the manner adverb 'attractively' modify the constituent verb (i.e. Mary's smiling). In (47b) the additional phrase 'without helping Mary' sufficiently makes the manner adverb 'quickly' modify the constituent verb (i.e. Mary's putting on clothes). These sentences are perfectly natural. Thus, it is now clear that manner adverbs may modify the causee's activity (i.e. the constituent verb) in lexical causative constructions, contrary to the non-synonymy hypothesis.

The following example is more interesting:

- (48) *Mary-ii olinccok nun-i aphi-milo, John-i Mary-eke*  
 right eye sick-because

*phyənci-lil han-nun-ilo {ilk-ke ha, ilk-hi} -assta*  
 letter one-eye-with read-comp cause read-cause past

'Because Mary's right eye is not free, John made Mary read the letter with one eye.'

Because the first conjunct 'because Mary's right eye is not free' is concerned with the method adverb 'with one eye' of the second conjunct, the adverb modifies the causee's (i.e. Mary's) activity. What is important is the fact that this statement equally applies both to the clausal causative *ilk-ke ha* 'to cause to read' and to the lexical causative *ilk-hi* 'to cause to read'. Here again, method adverbs do not support the non-synonymy hypothesis.

### 3.5.2. Place Adverbs

Consider the following:

- (49) a. *John-i Mary-lil kyosil-esə ul-ke ha-assta.*  
 classroom-in cry-comp cause

(1) 'In the class-room John made Mary cry.'

(2) 'John made Mary cry in the class-room.'

b. John-i Mary-lil *kyosil-esə* ul-li-assta.  
classroom-in cry-cause-past

(1) 'In the class-room John made Mary cry.'

(2) 'John made Mary cry in the class-room.'

(49a) is a clausal causative sentence, in which the place adverb 'in the class-room' may modify either the causer's activity (i.e. the matrix verb) or the causee's activity (i.e. the constituent verb). Likewise, the place adverb may modify either activity also in the lexical causative sentence, as shown in (49b). Thus, place adverbs do not provide evidence for the non-synonymy hypothesis.

### 3.5.3. Time Adverbs

Fodor (1970) and Shibatani (1973a, 1973b) have observed that a time gap can be represented in clausal causatives, but it is not possible in lexical causatives. For example, the causer's activity may take place at one time and the causee's activity at another time in clausal causatives. On the other hand, the causer's and the causee's activities must take place at the same time in lexical causatives. Consider the following:

- (50) a. John-i *ilkop-si-e* Mary-lil *ahop-si-e*  
7-o'clock-at 9-o'clock-at  
kke-ke ha-assta.  
wake-comp cause-past  
'John at seven o'clock made Mary wake up at nine o'clock.'
- b. \* John-i *ilkop-si-e* Mary-lil *ahop-si-e* kke-iu-assta.  
7-o'clock-at 9-o'clock-at wake-cause-past

In (50a) John's causing activity took place at seven o'clock, and Mary's caused activity (i.e. Mary's waking up) at nine o'clock. A possible situation is the case where John sets an alarm clock at seven such that the alarm clock would ring at nine. This, however, is not possible in the lexical causative sentence, as shown in (50b).

It is true that Fodor and Shibatani correctly observed the phenomenon. This example, however, does not provide evidence against the synonymy hypothesis. For in my analysis we can account for the ungrammaticality of (50b) by positing a constraint on lexicalization if two point time adverbs are present (cf. 3.4.).

Note that the above discussion applies only to point time adverbs. Duration time adverbs provide a strong support for the synonymy hypothesis, as McCawley (1971, 1972) has illustrated. Consider the following clausal causative sentences:

- (51) John-i Mary-lil *o-pun-tongan* us-ke ha-assta.  
 5-minute-for smile-comp cause-past

(1) 'For five minutes John (repeatedly) made Mary smile.'

(2) 'John made Mary smile for five minutes.'

This clausal causative sentence is ambiguous as to the modification of the duration time-adverb 'for five minutes.' It may modify the causer's (i.e. John's) activity to the effect that John repeated his causing activity for five minutes. In another reading it modifies the causee's (i.e. Mary's) activity to the effect that she continued smiling for five minutes. Interestingly enough, the same ambiguity exists also in the corresponding lexical causative sentence:

- (52) John-i Mary-lil *o-pun-tongan* us-ki-assta.  
 5-minute-for smile-cause-past

(1) 'For five minutes John (repeatedly) made Mary smile.'

(2) 'John made Mary smile for five minutes.'

Thus, duration time adverbs support the synonymy hypothesis.

#### 4. Conclusion

The point at issue is whether or not clausal causatives and their corresponding lexical causatives in Korean are synonymous. Shibatani (1973b) has claimed that clausal causatives express indirect causation and lexical causatives express indirect causation and lexical causatives direct causation. On this observation, he has concluded that they are not synonymous (i.e., the non-synonymy hypothesis). According to Shibatani's view the types of causatives must have their own underlying structure instead of one form being derived from the other. This paper, on the other hand, has demonstrated that both types of causatives can express both direct and indirect causation with equal force; hence, they are synonymous (i.e., the synonymy hypothesis). What is different between them is the mode of expression, not the degree of causation. In other words, what is crucial is that a direct vs. indirect mode of expressing the same event or act is not identical with a notion of direct vs. indirect causation. The two notions must not be confused.

There are cases in which one type of causative is more natural. In other cases, the other type is more natural. Hence naturalness cannot be the absolute criterion for choosing one of the two hypotheses. If one type of causative were consistently less natural or more natural to express the same event or act, we could rely on naturalness to settle the

debate. Such a consistency, however, is not available in Korean causative forms.

The synonymy hypothesis is supported by all of the semantic aspects such as direct vs. indirect causation, commission vs. omission causation, and even permissive causation. This hypothesis is also supported by syntactic aspects such as the *do-so* rule, sentential pronominalization, reflexivization, adverbial modification, and others.

In lexicalization some constraints with respect to delimiters, honorification, and negation must be posited, simply because these elements cannot be incorporated within lexical causative verbs. If a situation requires us to use these elements, there is no other way than use of clausal causatives to express the message. In cases like this, there is neither *a priori* nor *a posteriori* reason for clausal causatives to allow only one degree of causation at the exclusion of other degrees of causation. Hence, this structural asymmetry between the two types of causatives provides strong support for the synonymy hypothesis. Another type of structural asymmetry results from the fact that not all the clausal causatives have their corresponding lexical causatives. This provides a strong support for the synonymy hypothesis for the same reason as the above, that is, the constraints on lexicalization.

Lastly, the observations in this paper give us a significant lesson: semantic judgments must be made carefully.

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