

Title      Ali Nasreen

Name      Community and individual identity of the  
Kashmiri community: a case study of Luton

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**COMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY OF THE KASHMIRI  
COMMUNITY : A CASE STUDY OF LUTON**

**By**

**NASREEN ALI**

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of  
Luton**

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University of Luton  
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Luton  
Bedfordshire

April 1999

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

**DEDICATION**

*For my Family and in Loving Memory of my Mother Rashida Bibi*

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

When I began this journey I did not realise the debts that I would incur and I never imagined that my thanks would have to extend so far beyond the managers of my funds (Dad, Pog and Maggie). But now that I come to the end the list of those who have helped me on my way has become too large to numerate. So I am left overwhelmed and at a loss for words as to how I might extend my gratitude. Custom demands that I make attempts (however tardy) to acknowledge those that have made this possible. So here it goes...

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Last but not least I would like to say a special thank you to the iconoclastic Sumerian Sayyid for showing me how to dream of cows, be steadfast and dragging me though the last stretch of my journey. Keep flying high.

# **COMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY OF THE KASHMIRI COMMUNITY: A CASE STUDY OF LUTON**

## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis is the study of the relationship between individuals and communities in the context of racialised minorities in the United Kingdom. The research examines the ways in which individuals belonging to the Kashmiri community articulate and manifest “Kashmyriat” in conditions of diaspora.

Specifically, the research is an investigation of the core features of Kashmiri identity. These were selected as being identifications based on culture, religion and the territorial identification with the land of Kashmir, the nature of “culture conflict” between individuals and community and differences between generations of Kashmiris and the role of gender identity in “Kashmyriat”. The central premise is that identity is constantly updated, multiple and redefined in relation to contextual changes through a process of enculturation.

Results of the research suggest that culture, religion and territorial identification with the land of Kashmir are central core features of Kashmiri identity in Luton. The younger generation appear to be maintaining a distinct and separate identity based partly on shared culture, religion and territorial identification with the land of Kashmir with the older generation whilst they are redefining their identity in response to the contexts in which they have been born and brought up. Gender identities appear to be less significant as part of overall identity development.

Theoretically the thesis is an exploration of identity and its relationship to cultural identity among migrants. In this thesis I rely on qualitative ethnographic work as well as the quantitative research methodology of Identity Structure Analysis (ISA) to try and draw a textured analysis of Kashmiri identity transformation in the wake of immigration to Luton. Using the notion of enculturation the thesis sets out to deepen and make this concept more analytically rigorous. Enculturation is deployed as a means to understanding the process of identity transformation.

Results of the research suggest that culture, religion and affiliation with the land of Kashmir. Whilst they share the first two with other South Asian ethnicised communities in the United Kingdom it appears that the territorial identification with the land of Kashmir which can be translated as political identity is currently their self-defined identity. This is marking the Kashmiris as a national community whose individuals and collectivities centre their identity on “Kashmyriat”.

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Map 1-The State of Jammu and Kashmir in relation to its neighbours

Source: Lamb, A. 1991

## **INTRODUCING COMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY OF THE KASHMIRIS IN LUTON**

This study can be said to belong to the genre of writing that deals with the ontology of the social. Specifically, it is an attempt to understand the complex ways in which migration and settlement impact on the formation of a community. Of the many peoples that have settled in the British Isles following World War II, the Kashmiris are in many ways the most intriguing. For much of their history in Britain they have been subsumed under the category of (South) Asian and their virtual invisibility in Britain, has to some extent mirrored their political absence from the world stage, where the lack of a Kashmiri state has further undermined the specificity of a Kashmiri presence. To this end, this study has two main purposes, firstly it investigates the impact of migration and settlement in Britain on Kashmiris as well examining the way in which Kashmiri nationalism has emerged into the global arena in recent years. In other words, the story I want to tell is how people from Mirpur and Kotli, began to think of themselves as Kashmiris, and how this Kashmiri identity developed as a consequence of its migration and settlement in Britain.

The Kashmiris in Britain have migrated to Britain during a particular phase of migration in the 60s and 70s. Academic and public policy responses to the settlement of ethnicised communities can be encapsulated in a series of tropes that

can read such as that of assimilation, acculturation, social integration and more recently multiculturalism. Despite the many differences between these concepts, they have largely done little to question the unequal terrain upon which these concepts were formulated and deployed. Generally, these ideas have not given space for the expression of separate identities. Even in the case of multiculturalism where ethnic identity has been considered it has been utilised to see ethnic groups as categories of identification based on an ascribed identity. That is, an identity assigned by largely state and state-led institutions. As ethnic minorities have sought to challenge the colonial ascriptions of the British State, social sciences have been forced to re-think their analytical and conceptual agenda. The refusal of the ethnicised minorities to simply comply with the dominant ascriptions has coincided with global transformation of power relations that had undergirded European hegemony for the last two hundred years. The story of the Kashmiris, while apparently dispersed in the conurbations of post-imperial Britain, such as in Luton, while seemingly locked into the local, is marked by these global transformations. I hope to show in this thesis how by focusing on the local, we can better appreciate the full impact of the global and the emergence of a Kashmiri diaspora.

## **I. THEORISING ENCULTURATION**

In this study I elaborate on the concept of enculturation as a means of describing the situation of Kashmiri settlers in Luton. Enculturation refers to as process of

adaptation and transformation in which both the ethnicised minorities and the so called host society exchange cultural tokens and in the process transform their identities. In some ways the notion of enculturation points towards the way in which syncretic and hybridised forms of identification are the norm rather than the preserve of an *avant-garde*. This banalisation (or normalisation) of syncretic and hybrid subjectivities is the experience which I label enculturation. In other words it is the process by which collective identities (which are internally divided and intrinsically fuzzy) maintain their stability while undergoing radical transformations. The theoretical discussion of this concept will be found throughout this thesis. Its elaboration and development is one of the main tasks of this study. I sustain that not only is enculturation relevant to the Kashmiri experience but it has wider relevance to the study of ethnicised communities.

## **II. OUTLINE OF THESIS**

The first part of this study (chapters one, two, three and four) is mainly concerned with theoretical and methodological issues. In chapter one I review some of the literature on ethnic identity and put Identity Structure Analysis (hereafter referred to as ISA) into context. In chapter two, I present the theoretical postulates and indices derived from ISA. Chapter three addresses the way in which constructions of cultural, religious and national identities among Kashmiris are affected by generational, and gender recontextualisations. In chapter four I describe and

discuss the field work stage of the research including the reasoning behind using the particular approaches.

The second part of the thesis consists of chapters five, six, seven, eight and nine. This part of the thesis is devoted to an ethnographic account of the Kashmiris in Luton. By using narratives from respondents I present in a series of snapshots a picture of Kashmiriness, “before migration”, “during migration” and “after settlement.” The purpose of these chapters is to show the transformations in the idea of Kashmiriness as Kashmiris left their homes in Kashmir and settled away in Luton. Chapter five sets the scene for investigating the way in which practices which promoted a sense of Kashmiriness in Kashmir have been adapted to the British context. In chapter six I review the prevailing debates on migration and its relationship to identity changes. Chapter seven shows the significance of Luton as an arena for the development and dissemination of “Kashmiriyat.” Chapter eight looks at the impact of settlement on Kashmiri identity. In chapter nine, I analyse the agents and mechanisms by which Kashmiri identity is articulated and maintained.

The third part of the thesis consists of chapters ten, eleven, and twelve. In this part of this study I discuss and present the results derived from application of ISA. In chapter ten I present the biographical details for the samples with the intention of giving some indication of the sample characteristics to help develop an overall

picture of the individuals involved in the research. In chapter eleven I compare my Kashmiri sample with an Anglo-Saxon sample, as a way of working to what extent changes in Kashmiri sample are specific to them. In chapter twelve I empirically review the six main postulates of the research using ISA indices with selected indices.

### **III. RESEARCH AIMS AND METHODS**

Specifically the thesis is based on an examination of six dimensions concerning Kashmiri identity. The first maintains that cultural networks are a central collective dimension of Kashmiri British identity. The second considers the role of religion to be a central collective dimension of Kashmiri British identity. The third states that national identification is a central component of Kashmiri collective identity. These three examine Kashmiri identity in its collective manifestations.

The following three dimensions are examinations of the way in which Kashmiri subjectivity is articulated. That is how individuals are interpolated into Kashmiri collective identity formations. The first area for consideration is how identity is redefined amongst the cohort of Kashmiris who were either born in or brought up in Britain. I suggest that the process of enculturation is far better able to describe the experiences of this cohort than ideas of acculturation. The next dimension considered is the extent to which the idea of “cultural conflict” amongst Kashmiri migrants and their offspring is significant in explaining the current situation of

Kashmiri youth. The final dimension examines the relationship between gender and redefinitions of identity amongst Kashmiris in Luton.

These six postulates form both the framework of my Identity Structure Analysis (ISA) derived research and the basis of my ethnographic work. ISA provides a systematic means of operationalising these postulates whilst the ethnographic aspect of my research use these postulates as a guidance in conducting informal discussions, and carrying out semi –structured interviews.

During both my ethnographic and ISA research I followed the British Sociological Association's Statement of Ethical Practice. In particular I have maintained and respected the anonymity, privacy and confidentiality of research participants. With this intention throughout the thesis I have withheld the real names of participants and informants. I have also ensured that I have exercised my responsibility with those members of the Kashmiri community in Luton and Azad Kashmir who have assisted and participated at all stages of the research.

## **CHAPTER ONE: THE PROBLEM WITH IDENTITY**

### **I. INTRODUCTION**

In recent years there has been an explosion of interest in identity. This interest has been manifested in a variety of academic disciplines and traditions ranging from post-Marxism, Social Developmental Psychology and even International Relations.<sup>1</sup> What is common to these approaches is an appreciation of the centrality of the question of identity for any understanding of political, cultural and socio-economic phenomena. In what follows I will concentrate on the way in which the question of identity has been used to discuss ethnicity.

Race, language and culture were used during the nineteenth century to define ethnic identity. Using these criteria it was easy to define ethnic groups. This was the basis on which much of acculturative and assimilatory rhetoric was founded. Subsequently, problems have been found with this static notion of ethnicity. Researchers are more reluctant to argue that one can have a list of attributes, which can define ethnicity outside any particular context. This idea that ethnicity is a social construct rather than a natural category has brought radical changes to the field of ethnic studies. The question of defining an ethnic group can no longer be resolved simply by collecting data on a select group of features (such as costumes, rituals, language). This means that the analysis of ethnicity requires a deeper examination of the process by which

identity and ethnicity are constructed and maintained. ISA provides a rigorous framework in which to explore this nebulous concept.

My aim is to try to use ISA as a way of linking the theoretical debate on identity, from disciplines such as Sociology, Anthropology and Social Psychology, with the operational needs of fieldwork research into the identity of Kashmiri settlers. ISA is a complex framework, which necessitates considerable explanation. It builds upon insights from symbolic interactionism as well as the psychodynamic tradition, thus capturing both the sociological and psychological aspects of identity development. From anthropology it gains its theoretical and empirical approach to culture. My research is an attempt to build on the strengths of ISA as an analytical tool, while at the same time focusing substantively on the formations and transformations of Kashmiri ethnic identity.<sup>2</sup>

There are three main issues that I deal with in this chapter. Firstly, I introduce the main theoretical approaches to identity that have influenced this research, and show how two main influences have come from theories about self-identification within psychology, and accounts of community structures within sociology and anthropology. Secondly, I then go on to discuss the political (and public policy) response to the challenge of migration and settlement of ethnicised communities in Britain. My particular interest is to show how similar notions of assimilation and multiculturalism have governed the main debate about Britain's relations with its

ethnic minorities, both at an intellectual and political level. Simultaneously, I illustrate how these assimilationist and multiculturalist assumptions have failed to account for the way in which Kashmiri identity and community has been constructed. I also go on to suggest that the Kashmiri experience may be better described by using the category of enculturation. As a prologue to this I present a genealogy of enculturation, and in particular a discussion of the way it has been used by Peter Weinreich in ISA. I then outline the way in which I will develop the concept.

## **II. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS TO THE RESEARCH**

Ethnicised communities in Britain have been ascribed ethnic identities. These have usually been based on ideas that place of birth is the most decisive factor in determining ethnicity.<sup>3</sup> The emphasis on place of origin has provided the basis for much of the work on ethnicised communities in Britain, leaving a serious gap in research on the self-ascribed identities. This gap claims to have been filled by the PSI Survey Research, which argues that it has taken into account the “ethnic voice”.<sup>4</sup> The methodology of PSI surveys, however, is based on a synchronic framework. In other words, they use static notions of what constitutes identity, together with their respondents’ replies to questionnaires and interviews, which are built on ascriptive vocabularies. Therefore the respondents have the option of only replying within the categories opened up by the questionnaire or the interviewer. The limitations of this are obvious when dealing with questions of identities that do not derive from the ascriptive vocabularies that circulate in influential discussion. This, as I will

demonstrate, is the case for Kashmiris. What differentiates this project from other research is that by focusing on ISA and oral history style narrative it attempts to move away from simple questions and answers to a dialogic construction of the “Kashmiri voice”.

Previous approaches to ethnic identity have tended to minimise the complexities that exist within ethnicised communities. Indeed, researchers and policy makers have only recently moved away from perceiving the ethnic minority community as being homogeneous to recognising internal differences within those communities. There is still a tendency to rely too much on overarching categories such as Asian when describing settlers of South Asian descent. In this case, even those included within the South Asian category are not differentiated in terms of religion, nationality, cultural practice and geography (e.g. people of South Asian descent from East Africa are lumped together with other South Asians even though many of them have never been to South Asia).

In recent years, in the press and among the general public, there is some confusion over appropriate categorisation of ethnic minorities in Britain.<sup>5</sup> With the breakdown of the category “black” to describe all “non-white” people, there is increased use of the term Asian even though it could be argued that emergence of Muslim consciousness in Britain is subverting the very idea of what Asian (and to a lesser extent “black”) refers to, and how useful it is.<sup>6</sup> For the Kashmiris in Britain the issue is

particularly acute. Despite the fact that many are categorised as Asian and within this group most of these are labelled Pakistani, they have not been ascribed a distinct identity. The effect of this is to turn them into an invisible minority within an minority. One reason for this, of course, is culturally insensitive, generalised approaches to identity. The starting point for the investigation of ethnic identity in this research is therefore self-ascription. Individuals, however, do not exist in isolation, and one's position in society has significant effects on the construal of one's' identity.<sup>7</sup> In other words, identity has both an individual and social dimension. In order to understand the context of the process of identification there is a need to examine the social dimension of identity formation and re-formation. In the next section I look at the way in which notions of individual identity interact with ethnicity.

### **A. Self Identification and Ethnicity**

Milton Gordon has referred to ethnicity as a sense of "peoplehood" created by common race, religion, national origin, history or some combination of these.<sup>8</sup> In Britain, the idea of ethnicity has often been restricted to members of ethnic minorities i.e. the post-war settlers from the New Commonwealth. It is these people who are considered to have "ethnic" foods and "ethnic" clothes, whereas the idea of English clothes or food is considered not to be part of a specific ethnicity.<sup>9</sup> Not only is it that ethnic minorities are ethnically marked, but, as I have mentioned before, this marking has tended to be ascribed to them. The difficulty with such ascription is clearly pointed out by Nimmi Hutnik:

The sense of personal identification with the ethnic group and the identification by others as being a member of that ethnic group defines, in part, but only in part, the concept of ethnic identity.<sup>10</sup>

In other words, ascribed identities may produce a situation in which there is a gap between what an individual considers to be her or his identity and what others consider to be that person's identity. So that for example, in the case of Kashmiris then one could argue that any reference to them being Pakistanis or British may be irrelevant to them if what is psychologically important is to be Kashmiri. In this case self-definition will be rendered useless since this is not recognised by others.

Earlier Lange and Westin had also seen ethnic identity as dividing into the same two categories i.e. "defined/perceived" by others and "self defined/perceived".<sup>11</sup> The "definition/perception by others" is split into a public ethnic identity and public personal identity, whilst the "self defined/perceived" splits into "intra-group" and "intra-individual". The former is the shared ethnic stereotype whilst the latter is individual identity and distinctiveness as "reflected self" which is how the person believes others see them.

Within ideas of self-definition is the idea of the flexibility of identity. That is, ethnic identity is not a fixed inflexible commitment, nor is it singular. Multiple (ethnic) identities may exist. (One has to be careful about the notion of "multiple identities", since too often they tend to give the impression that ethnic minorities are made up of schizophrenic individuals. By insisting on the multiple nature of identity there is an

implicit suggestion that somehow ethnicised individuals lack coherent personality, as they are always being torn between the culture of their communities and the culture of Western society). It is more useful (and certainly more precise) to see individuals as having multiple subject positions. The idea of multiple subject positions appears at first to be similar to the notion of “identity options” as suggested by Sandra Wallman.<sup>12</sup> In reality, however individuals have very little in the way of “options” that they may choose from. Identity “options” may be affected by a change in context but in this case the idea of “situated identities” outlined by Weinreich, Kelly and Maja is more useful.<sup>13</sup> They suggest that alternative states of identity may be engaged in by an individual when cueing into different social contexts. Such alternative identity states may be regarded as aspects of one’s overall identity, in which how one behaves, presents oneself and experiences one’s situated self differ according to the social context. Identity in this view is constantly changing, as it is associated with new encounters and terminations of social interactions. Glynis Breakwell in *Coping with Threatened Identities* also regards identity as a dynamic social product residing in psychological processes. It cannot be understood except in relation to its psychological context and historical perspective.<sup>14</sup> The context in which identities are formed and reformed are also central to ISA as Weinreich writes: “identity systems may be updated and redefined for a contemporary sense of identity in response to contextual changes.”<sup>15</sup> In the next section I present a discussion of the importance of context and some social changes that have influenced the emergence of Kashmiri

identity in Britain. I begin by putting Kashmiri settlement in Luton into the context of post-war immigration to Britain.

### **B. Putting Kashmiris in their Place: Context and Community**

The settlement of large number of Kashmiris in Luton is a product of post-war migration to Britain.<sup>16</sup> Labour shortages after the Second World War meant that the Ministry of Labour turned to the colonies and ex-colonies to alleviate the problem. Large numbers of migrants started arriving from 1950s. The initial immigration immediately produced two problems for “immigrants”: employment in low status jobs and living in inner city slums. Immigrant labour was recruited to do those jobs that white, British workers were not willing to do, and, since most of these jobs were in large metropolitan areas, immigrants settled in the slums of these urban areas.<sup>17</sup> White residents of these areas filtered into better areas, as they became more affluent.<sup>18</sup> The final waves of migration came about in the 1970s. By the mid-1970s primary migration had come to an end in response to increasing government legislation to restrict entry into Britain.

Immigrants were welcomed as workers, but were socially excluded. Social exclusion was marked by their marginal economic status. This contributed to new racial stereotypes and a new kind of colour racism in Britain.<sup>19</sup> Thus from very early in British immigration history, “black” was used as an overarching categorisation for migrants in Britain. One of the reasons for this was that South Asia provided the

source for labour by migration to other parts of the empire, such as South Africa, as well as to Britain. Settlement of Asians in places like South Africa helped produce an anti-colonial front in which the black and white divide became associated with the colonial and anti-colonial positions. For British race relations this was reflected in the political categorisation of South Asians as “black”.

The end of migration in Britain is generally associated with the increasing “racialisation” of the immigration issue. Increasing public and parliamentary debates centred on the “black problem” in the inner city areas and increasingly Britain’s problems were analogous to those of America’s black ghettos. The watershed for British immigration policy is usually seen as the Nottingham and Notting Hill riots between white and black youths in 1958. A series of acts of parliament followed which imposed strict immigration controls.<sup>20</sup> Restrictive immigration legislation combined with a declining demand for labour, a growing discontent and some racial violence in inner-city areas, with the increasing visibility of the “black” population, had the effect of focusing attention away from immigration to the difficulties of settlement.<sup>21</sup>

By the early 1980s there were increasing demands that a separate “Asian” identity be recognised.<sup>22</sup> In response to this “new” development, “Asians” became a homogenous category and race relations language changed from using race as basis of categorisation to using ethnicity as a basis of categorisation. This ethnic

categorisation and “accommodation” of ethnic identity did not prevent “Asian” being treated as a crude sociological group. Rather, most research on “Asians” failed to recognise differences within the groups and adopted an approach where complex identities were reduced to anthropological generalisations. So that when there was any acknowledgement of difference, the definitions of immigrants have tended to revolve around over-simplified explanations of customs and beliefs inherited from localised family groups confined to small areas of South Asia. These tended to exoticise and ethnicise issues around religious, linguistic differences. Much of the research on “Asians” emerged from within this framework. Such a framework neglected the Kashmiris because too often it was simply conflated with Pakistani identity. The absence of ethnic categorisation for Kashmiris highlighted the way in which this large population of settlers was denied a space for self-ascription or self-identification.

### **1. Assimilation to Multiculturalism**

Early British sociological approaches to migration and settlement leant heavily on the writings of Eisendadt, Liberson and Gordon who saw the reduction and eventual elimination of cultural difference as necessary to alleviate problems of large-scale immigration.<sup>23</sup> In these early years, the response to the challenge of cultural diversity was encapsulated in discourses on acculturation and assimilation.<sup>24</sup>

The terms acculturation and assimilation are often used interchangeably in these discussions. Claire, Peterson and Scheff see acculturation occurring when a small number of persons from a dominant group seek to impose all or part of its culture on a subordinate population.<sup>25</sup> They also suggest it may occur where a group of immigrants foreign to the host society take on all or part of the host culture. Eisenstadt, Liberson and Gordon, however regarded assimilation as the final stage of acculturation. Raymond, Teske and Nelson suggest that assimilation and acculturation are separate processes.<sup>26</sup> Whilst there are major differences between writers, there is the unifying feature that acculturation and assimilation are defined as a process rather than a single unitary event.

Johnstone sees assimilation as two processes. Firstly, it is external, where migrants' exterior qualities become less distinguishable from the indigenous population. Secondly, it is subjective, where the migrant is willing to identify with the 'host' culture and considers it proper to do so.<sup>27</sup> Gordon also distinguished certain sub-processes of assimilation. These are structural, cultural, psychological and biological. It is within Gordon's four elements of assimilation that J. Milton Yinger defines and discusses acculturation. He sees acculturation as the process of change towards greater cultural similarity brought about by contact between two or more groups. An ethnic group is acculturated to the degree that the range of values and norms held by its members (the blueprints for action and for cognitive, aesthetic, and ethical questions) fall into a pattern similar to that of the general population.

Definitions have also been suggested which have tried to accommodate difference to a greater degree. They include additive acculturation and substitutive acculturation.<sup>28</sup>

Additive acculturation refers to the possibility of the addition of values, norms and styles creating a more complex cultural repertoire on which to draw. In this case, acculturation does not mean a loss or impoverishment but can be seen as an enrichment. Additive acculturation is close in meaning to the concept of biculturalism and can be seen as a process of dual socialisation. Under some conditions, often those that require adaptation to a dominant culture by members of a disadvantaged ethnic minority, many individuals will learn and act according to both the mainline culture and the ethnic subculture.

Although all the above definitions see acculturation as a process, inherent within these definitions is the notion that it is a one way process by which the minority becomes more like the majority group by foregoing elements of their own identity. Yinger in his definition does suggest that majority does not necessarily mean superior but it is difficult to disentangle notions of majority (or dominance) from notions of superiority. Certainly, Britain's early official response to the presence of large numbers of immigrants, who were distinguished by their skin-colour, language, religion and culture, was to simply declare that they must be assimilated to a unitary British culture. This implied the notion of the superiority of white dominant culture. Indeed Yinger himself has suggested that “no one can doubt the coercive policies against

distinctive cultural groups around the world. At the same time, paradoxically, peaceful processes that reduce the differences between members of interacting ethnic groups are also readily seen”.<sup>29</sup> .Minority culture is regarded as static and individuals within minority communities as being in opposition to the dominant culture. Implicit within this concept of acculturation is the notion that the dominant culture has a clear cut set of values and is homogenous with no major divisions. In reality the dominant community is far from being homogenous, and minority identifications with this other ethnic group are rarely self-conscious decisions but rather arise from everyday unreflective processes. In other words Kashmiri youngsters do not necessarily identify consciously with members of the white, ethnically unmarked, majority community. Any realisation of majority dominance is recognised over time. Therefore it is not the case that there will necessarily be an opposition to the dominant culture, as acculturation suggests. In this sense, acculturation does not represent the individual's everyday experiences and actions.


Notions of additive or substitutive acculturation imply an either/or scenario. Yinger points out that additive acculturation may be enriching. Implicit within this idea, however, is that the white dominant culture will “enrich” the ethnic culture. Substitutive acculturation implies that individuals must forego their own ethnic identities and substitute it with white dominant culture. Ideas about additive or substitutive acculturation are attempts at dealing with an inadequate concept by generating further forms of the concept. Theories of acculturation obscure the

processes of individual identification and give no space to discuss salient ethnic identities. This results in static ideas about minority groups, which render these concepts inappropriate within today's society.

From a social psychological perspective, Berry does recognise that acculturation may also be an individual as well as group phenomenon.<sup>30</sup> The significance of this for my research is that I am exploring the relationship between individual and communal identities. In other words, how do Kashmiris take on aspects of living in Britain whilst the Kashmiri community in Luton remains distinct? Berry acknowledges Graves<sup>31</sup> as making the important distinction between acculturation as a collective or group-level phenomenon (change in the culture of the group) and *psychological acculturation* (change in the psychology of the individual). Berry also introduces two concepts of *acculturation attitudes* and *acculturative stress*.

Acculturation attitudes he argues are where cultural groups and their individual members, in both dominant and non-dominant situations, deal with the problem of how to acculturate. He notes that the two important issues are *cultural maintenance* (to what extent cultural identity and characteristics are considered to be important, and worth maintaining); and *contact and participation* (to what extent should they become involved in other cultural groups, or keep themselves to themselves). Considering the above points simultaneously, Berry has presented a framework, which posits four acculturation strategies. This is represented in Figure 1.1 below.

Figure 1.1 Berry's Acculturation Strategies based on two issues: cultural maintenance and contact and participation.



In Figure 1.1 above the arrows represent attitudinal dimensions positive and negative, (Yes or No). Responses to these will intersect to define four acculturation strategies. The strategies carry different names depending on which group i.e. the dominant or non-dominant groups is being considered. According to Berry:

From the point of view of the non-dominant groups, when individuals do not wish to maintain their cultural identity and seek daily interaction with other cultures, the *Assimilation* strategy is defined. In contrast, when individuals place value on holding onto their original culture and at the same time wish to avoid interaction with others, then the *Separation* alternative is defined. When there is an interest in both maintaining and developing one's original culture, while also having daily interactions with other groups, *Integration* is the option; here, there is some degree of cultural integrity maintained, while at the same time seeking to participate as part of the larger social framework. Finally, when there is little possibility or interest in cultural maintenance (often for reasons of forced cultural loss), and little interest in having relations with others (often for reasons of exclusion or discrimination), and then *Marginalisation* is defined.<sup>32</sup>

There are three main problems with Berry's model, which can be used to illustrate larger problems inherent within all the above models of cultural adaptation. Firstly, Berry seems to have a notion of culture, which he sees as static. This is evidenced in his definition of acculturation: "acculturation is essentially a form of culture change that results from contact between two independent cultures"<sup>33</sup>. I would argue that if one abandons the view that cultures are hermetically sealed autonomous (and relatively unchanging) entities, then many of the assumptions on which Berry bases his models also collapse.<sup>34</sup> This essentialist notion of culture underlies his whole analysis.

Berry seems to have a very clear idea about cultural boundaries. However, there is no reason why we should think that cultural frontiers are so clear-cut. Is it always possible to identify particular cultural elements as being part of a specific culture? For example in a recent survey the most popular dish in Britain was "chicken tikka masala". Does this show acculturation and if so by whom, since the dish does not exist outside Britain? A similar point can be made about Balti restaurants in the Midlands. What culture do Balti dishes belong to? Are they part of an English culture, a Midlands culture, a South Asian culture or some hybrid?

Secondly, it is interesting that Berry acknowledges that although his analysis is based on the assumption that: "non-dominant groups and their individuals members have the freedom to choose how they want to acculturate, this is of course, not always the case."<sup>35</sup> He continues to base his analysis on "choice" when he says that:

When the dominant group enforces certain forms of acculturation, or constrains the choices of the non-dominant groups or individuals, then some other terms need to be used. Most clearly, people may sometimes choose the *Separation* option; but when it is required of them by the dominant society, the situation is one of segregation. Similarly when people choose to *Assimilate*, the notion of the Melting Pot may be appropriate; but when forced to do so, it becomes more like a pressure cooker. In the case of *Marginalisation*, people rarely choose such an option; rather they usually become marginalised as a result of attempts at forced assimilation (pressure cooker) combined with forced exclusion (*Segregation*).... *Integration* can only be 'freely' chosen and successfully perused by non-dominant groups when the dominant society is open and inclusive in its orientation towards cultural diversity.<sup>36</sup>

The key distinction between dominant and non-dominant must be their unequal ability to express preferences i.e. make "choices". Thus, we find that "non-dominant" individuals and communities are not able to express a "choice" in the way in which they acculturate. These decisions are taken at a governmental level and are usually very specific to each country's political trajectory. For example, South Asian children were discouraged from speaking non-European languages in Britain during the 1970s. As a result they were often made to feel that their command of a language other than English was a source of embarrassment. The children did not choose to be embarrassed by their mother tongues; they did so as a result of a complex set of decisions made at a public policy level that filtered down to the classroom.

Thirdly, it is not entirely clear that Berry acknowledges how racism affects the various stages of acculturation. He does not seem to appreciate the way the relations of power affect processes of acculturation. For example if as he suggests acculturation is

indeed a two way process (acculturation should be seen as a “two-dimensional (rather than a one dimensional, either/or process”) then how would the dominant community acculturate?<sup>37</sup> In fact, acculturation is not a neutral term in principle. That is, change may take place in either or both groups as Berry maintains. It is the case that he acknowledges that in “practice acculturation tends to induce more change in one of these groups” but he fails, however, to recognise that the *acculturating group* is more often than not the subordinate group.<sup>38</sup> Accordingly it will be the “non-dominant” (subordinate group) that suffers from Berry’s *acculturative stress*. He points out that:

This refers to one kind of stress, in which the stressors are identified as having their source in the process of acculturation; in addition, there is often a particular set of stress behaviours that occur during acculturation, such as lowered mental health status (especially confusion, anxiety, depression), feelings of marginality and alienation, heightened psychosomatic symptoms, and identity confusion.<sup>39</sup>

It is concepts such as these that have helped to popularise notions of ‘culture conflict’ and “stuck between cultures”, and it these notions which have often been used to describe migrants (usually migrant youth) and pathologise ethnicised communities within academic and popular discourse. For example, there does not seem to be much attention paid to the possibility that a politically, and economically dominant group may actually experience acculturative stress during the acculturation process. For example, did the English in India during the Raj suffer such stress? It would appear that Berry’s notion of *acculturative stress*, is nothing more than metaphor for racism? In other words, when people suffer *acculturative stress* is this not a description of the effects of racism. Ethnicised communities in the United Kingdom asserting their

political identity have, in recent years increasingly undermined the notion that Britishness meant a privileged identity, as acculturalist accounts tended to assume. In response to these developments, multiculturalism has been put forward as an alternative to acculturation.

Multiculturalism was a move towards acknowledging cultural diversity, the end goal of which is seen to be pluralism or living with difference.<sup>40</sup> In other words, multiculturalism seemed to promise an abandonment of the idea that cultures were in some hierarchy in which ethnically marked cultures were inferior to European culture. It emerged first in the United States as an education policy, in response to Eurocentrism within the curriculum. That is, multiculturalism was based on the rejection of the view that saw European culture as the essence of the modern world through which all culture should be defined.<sup>41</sup> Multiculturalism aimed to recognise and promote past and present cultural diversity. John Solomos and Les Back have pointed out that the debate on multiculturalism has been entangled with anti-racism.<sup>42</sup> Since the 1980s in Britain anti-racism has been used in a very expansive way to refer to public policies aimed at dealing with racial inequality<sup>43</sup>. Multiculturalism appeared as a way of dealing with racial inequality, by arguing that racial groups in British society were not simply the products of racism but had their own rich cultures, and public policy should encourage cultural self-expression as a means of reducing the effects of racism.<sup>44</sup> Multiculturalism became the official policy by which the British State dealt with its ethnic minorities.

Although multiculturalism was a move towards recognising cultural diversity it has been used to define a group of people as different so that they are then able to maintain ethnic boundaries. This difference has been used to define neat communities. It has been argued that “by focusing on cultural difference and (more narrowly) linguistic competence, [multiculturalism] was effectively a facade behind which social inequalities could remain unresearched, unrecognised in official circles, and therefore unchallenged.”<sup>45</sup> This emphasis on cultural difference was, however, not the only problematic aspect of multiculturalism. There is also the problem as to how this cultural difference was conceptualised.

In the case of (South) Asians in Britain, cultural differences tended to revolve around customs and beliefs inherited from localised family groupings. Discussion has centred on kinship and sectarian influences.<sup>46</sup> Thus the unit of analysis in looking at the Asians in Britain tended to be a culturalist notion of ethnic community. The study of South Asians in Britain tends to be synonymous with the study of an ethnic community. This ethnic community provides the arena for Britain’s (South) Asian minorities to manifest themselves. An ethnic community is assumed to be defined by its concentration in particular (urban) districts and by its size and visibility.<sup>47</sup> Such unproblematic notion of an ethnic community leads to a number of difficulties. Firstly, whilst size and visibility are important dimensions of 'community', the factors of belonging, and identification with an ethnic group larger than the local community, tend to be neglected.<sup>48</sup> This is particularly important for Kashmiris who see

themselves as belonging to a transnational Kashmiri community. This is the identification with the disputed homeland of Kashmir, which is a political/national identification and transcends state boundaries. In addition, Kashmiris like many other Muslims identify with the *Ummah* (a world wide Muslim community).<sup>49</sup> It is a transnational community that exists outside of state boundaries and transcends ethnic, racial, linguistic and national identities. Thus too much of an emphasis on the local and particular forms of ethnic communities tends to ignore the significance of transnational aspects of ethnic collective identity. The significance of transnational identities can be seen by for example looking at the way in which “Pakistanis” speak of their collective identity.<sup>50</sup> While it is the case that although identity is always situational depending on particular interactional context, in the political arena three primary communal identities are most frequently recognised. These are: British Muslims, British Pakistanis, and British Asians. Of these three the most significant seems to be that of British Muslims.<sup>51</sup> This is the identity most often suggested by “Pakistanis” to be the most positive of their self-attributed identities. It is also an identity whose horizons cannot be easily contained within the ghettos of Bradford or Leicester. In other words, the localism of ethnic communities does not negate the influence of global (i.e. transnational) factors in constructing collective identities. In the same way that racism does not define all the experiences of ethnicised minorities, their “ghettoisation” does not exhaust their identity options.

Furthermore, the idea of ethnic community that is locally circumscribed and concentrated, tends to give the impression of an homogenised collective identity. This has the effect of denying the possibility of ethnic communities existing within these over-arching ethnic identities. The implications of this can be seen even in some of the best ethnographic writing on South Asians, which reinforces the dominance of Pakistanis in South Asia, by continuing to classify Kashmiris as “Pakistanis”. Even though the majority of those categorised as Pakistani have been ascribed a 'minority within a minority identity'. Kashmiris continue to struggle for acknowledgement that the Kashmiri community is different from the Pakistani community. For Kashmiris, the significance of their cultural and religious identity has been superseded by the importance of their national identity, manifested in their oral identification with the land of Kashmir. It is this demand for recognition as a national community, which separates Kashmiris and makes them distinct from Pakistanis and Indians. The move towards multiculturalism will offer more space for self-ascription than ideas associated with acculturation. It is still handicapped by its reliance on particular ideas of cultural transformations in the immigration experience. Multiculturalism continues to share with acculturation the notion of a well-defined culture, with discrete stages in the process of cultural change. It is this notion of culture and cultural change that I wish to challenge.

## **2. Towards a Genealogy of Enculturation**

As a way out of the conceptual impasse created by the development of notions of acculturation and multiculturalism. I would like to explore the notion of enculturation. One of the earliest references to enculturation was by Melville J. Herskovits in his 1949 paper, "Some Psychological Implications of Afro-American Studies".<sup>52</sup> Margaret Mead points out that "in all his work Melville Herskovits has stood for the significance of historical uniqueness of each culture and each cultural tradition".<sup>53</sup> Building on this tradition Mead discusses the confusion and resultant interchangeability of the concepts of socialisation and enculturation. She suggests that socialisation should be understood as the process of learning in its universal form and defines enculturation as the process of learning culture in all its uniqueness and particularity.

Within ISA, Weinreich relies on the idea of enculturation especially to explain redefinitions of identity amongst youth. He sees enculturation as a process whereby individuals experiment with various roles, try them on for fit, reject some components and accept others. They formulate their own points of view on a range of topics, such as dress, music, boy and girl friends, and begin to scrutinise given moral imperatives. Weinreich suggests that through a process of enculturation people may in part identify with certain characteristics of another group without foregoing their own ethnic group allegiance and thereby redefine or update conceptions of their own ethnicity.<sup>54</sup> Later, working with Chung Leung Luk and Michael Harris Bond, Weinreich has

further defined enculturation as change through incorporation of cultural elements, as opposed to acculturation, which is seen as change towards the dominant culture. In this study they continue to point out that this “is in keeping with the evidence that subordinate and minority ethnic groups generally maintain a remarkable resilient sense of their own ethnic identity”.<sup>55</sup> In other words, cultural change is not one way (as acculturation theories tend to imply), nor does it imply the replacement of one cultural identity with another. Weinreich’s *en passant* conceptualisation of enculturation provides a useful entry point for its discussion within this research. There are a number of issues however, that require further clarification and elaboration, all of which flow from the (implicit) notion of culture that sometimes ISA seems to share with some multiculturalist accounts.

The first point that needs to be re-examined is the use of ideas of the dominant and subordinate. It is not clear if dominant is used as a purely descriptive term or whether the idea of dominant being superior is implicit within the Weinreich, Luk and Bond’s definition of enculturation. There is also the issue that dominant and subordinate are often used more or less interchangeably with host and immigrant cultures respectively in the context of studies of Britain’s racialised minorities. Also what is unclear is on what grounds they base their assumption. Could it be argued that they are validating Western notions of superiority by presenting Orientalist categorisations of the other which are not necessarily internalised by the so called subordinate groups?<sup>56</sup> For

example, many Kashmiris and other Muslim communities' world-wide would not subscribe to the view that their culture was in some way inferior.

A lack of care in using ideas about a dominant or subordinate culture risks eroding the difference between enculturation and acculturation. For example, if Muslim women decide to wear Western dress is she enculturating or is she acculturating. Of course, if it were considered that she is not “foregoing aspects of ones own ethnic identity” it would mean that this a process of enculturation. Is it possible that subordinate ethnicity could remain constant in the process of identity development? Is it not more likely that all identities are being redefined? In other words, a Muslim woman wearing a Western dress may transform the dress and what it signifies.

The second issue revolves around the notion of culture that ISA seems implicitly to rely on. In ISA the context is very important to identity development. Indeed much of Weinreich's conceptualisation about redefinitions of identity is grounded in this. Despite the attention to context within ISA, it can give the impression that it is (implicitly) a situational model which is very successful in bringing into focus ethnic minority identity but does not make explicit its notion of culture, giving the impression that it relies on bounded ideas of culture in which culture corresponds to basically national formations e.g. English, Scottish, Welsh, Irish, Canadian, Chinese, Ethiopian etc. In other words there is a clearly bounded English or Ethiopian culture. This notion of discrete cultural units is precisely what I wish to put into question.

Enculturation is a process by which, coming from a specific culture one becomes part of another culture. This idea relies on a notion of cultures as blocks where one can hold onto one identity which remains unchanged whilst taking on another.

This idea of cultures as blocks becomes incredible when one looks at some common misgivings about cultural practices. Take for example Asian youth music movements such as Ragga. To what extent are they holding on to their own culture or adopting elements of a new one? Similarly the recent explosion of mendi painting. It is generally regarded to be a South Asian cultural tradition but is currently gaining prominence in magazines and large department stores, which are regarded as British institutions outside Britain. Further the common preference for parents that their children choose marriage partners from a similar background depends on identifying which cultural practice belongs to which culture. Is this specific to Asian parents or something universal? Unfortunately notions of bounded cultures in this case would lead to the common idea that this is an Asian phenomenon which is often translated as “generational culture conflict”. These examples break down the idea of bounded cultures. In these situations one faces a problem.<sup>57</sup>

I would suggest that it is more useful to understand cultures as consisting of overlapping networks and practices which do not have strict boundaries but are constantly being transformed.<sup>58</sup> If one sees culture as fluid and relational then the idea of “foregoing own ethnic identity” does not arise. For example, the idea that certain

aspects of Kashmiriness change and others remain constant is problematic, since it seems to suggest that identity may be transformed by external cultural influences but what is internal to Kashmiri culture remains unchanged. It would be more helpful to see that the signifier remains constant but what the signifier actually constitutes is being changed.<sup>59</sup> Thus for the Kashmiris what remains constant is the signifier Kashmiri but its constitution is fluid.

Using the metaphor of culture as networks then acculturation is impossible. It remains useful only as a tool for understanding certain policies, which rely on a particular historical/political trajectory. Enculturation as defined by Weinreich is a more useful approach if it is used with a clearer opinion of culture. I would suggest the use of enculturation as a tool to explain identity definition and redefinition with an explicit definition of culture as an unbounded series of overlapping networks. In this research enculturation is seen as a process by which individuals pull together cultural elements which are available to them through a series of networks whose boundaries are intrinsically fuzzy and overlapping.<sup>60</sup>

Using the above definition of culture also allows us to move away from the idea of ethnicised communities as being primarily defined by local enclaves and towards the possibility of exploring the relationship of these communities as diasporic. That is, the possibility that communities may share common experiences and culture despite the fact that they may be located many miles from each other. For example, in his book

*The Black Atlantic* Gilroy writes about the cultural networks spanning Africa, the Americas, the Caribbean and Britain which has proved a source of strength and continuity for people of African descent wherever they are in the world. In this same way Kashmiris, despite being scattered all over the world continue to maintain the idea of a common people.

It is clear that there needs to be a reappraisal of the dominant discourses in which essentialist accounts of culture have been presented. It is necessary therefore to move beyond seeing culture as static and simply primordial but dynamic and redefined in relation to continuously changed contexts. This is particularly important as cultures become politicised and are mobilised around cultural symbols. For example there is the recent drive to identify a British culture and in the case of the Kashmiris to create a Kashmiriness.

These particular articulations of cultural identity have very little to do with culture but more to do with the recontextualisation of culture. As Sumerian Sayyid argues:

Culture (or any form of unity) cannot be a unified object of analysis independent of its articulations and readings. In other words, cultures have no intrinsic or essential identity or unity –outside history or politics-that can be reached by a transparent reading. Rather, cultures are created and interpreted by human practice they are like all other practices, products of articulation rather than and essence.<sup>61</sup>

In other words there is no such thing as an essential culture. What constitutes cultures are different people giving different descriptions that tend to reflect their own interests

and locations. Thus, for example, in the case of the JKLF, they argue for a distinct Kashmiri culture based on shared history, which has become central to Kashmiri nationalism and the independence struggle. In this way there can also be no bounded culture.

### **III. CONCLUSION**

In this chapter I have shown that there is a long and complex history of British contact with people overseas, who have raised issues of identity usually mobilised around race. Whether in policies of assimilation, acculturation or more recently multiculturalism much of these debates have been informed by the dominant paradigm. The discourse has been one of the premises of Western (especially English) superiority. The migration and settlement of different cultural groups have helped to bring about changes within demographic, economic and social structures. They have brought about new cultural diversity, which often brings into question issues of identity.

A variety of strategies discussed were developed to deal with ethnic minorities. All gave little space for the assertion of self-ascribed identity in overarching identities, which informed policies and the responsibility of “civilising” the “natives”. It can be argued that the race relations industry, rather than allowing self-ascribed identities to flourish, used homogenising identities such as “black” and “Asian” to “melt down” the experiences of various migrant groups. Despite its ongoing anti-racist stance, the

official race relations industry has been committed to a policy of assimilation, by which British hosts will transform the non-British immigrants into normal citizens of the country. Enculturation was presented as an alternative tool to understanding identity transformations. I have argued that if one teases out the notion of cultures as overlapping networks, than the ISA account of enculturation is significantly enriched. The rest of this thesis will make good this claim as I tell the story of Kashmiris in Luton. The next episode in this story is to examine the way in which the central features of Kashmiri identity are expressed in Luton, but before I do this, I need to elaborate the ISA postulates. This is the subject of the next chapter.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> See for example, Hall, 1988 and Connolly, 1991.
- <sup>2</sup> Although there has been much work done on ISA (a lot of which I have used to understand ISA and some of which I use in this research) it is necessary to point out at this early stage that ISA is not a closed system, there is room for and need for further refinement. In this regard my attempt to “apply” ISA will necessarily imply transforming ISA so that it can be useful for an analysis of Kashmiri identity. In other words ISA is a conceptual framework which I will use to guide my research- it is not a methodology that I will simply apply.
- <sup>3</sup> See for example, the statistics provided by the Labour Force Survey.
- <sup>4</sup> See Madood, (et. al), 1997.
- <sup>5</sup> See for example, Madood, 1997 and Gilroy, 1994.
- <sup>6</sup> For a brief summary of these developments see Solomos and Back, 1997, pp. 134-141.
- <sup>7</sup> See Weinreich, 1986
- <sup>8</sup> Gordon, 1964.
- <sup>9</sup> In semantics, unmarked terms tend to be more general, and marked terms are more restricted- often denoting a subset e.g. "woman" is more specific than "man", since the former denotes only female humans, while the latter can be applied in some contexts to refer to both male and female humans. See Lyons, 1968, pp. 305-311, for further details on this point.
- <sup>10</sup> Hutnik, 1991, p. 19.
- <sup>11</sup> Lange and Westin as quoted by Liebkind, 1989, p 35.
- <sup>12</sup> Wallman, 1983.
- <sup>13</sup> Weinreich, Kelly and Maja, 1988.
- <sup>14</sup> Breakwell, 1983, p.9.
- <sup>15</sup> Weinreich, 1987.
- <sup>16</sup> The history of migration to Britain is well documented in research by scholars such as Holmes Castles, Harris, Solomos, and Hall to name a few. In particular Paul Rich, and Fryer, trace it back to the inter-war years with the settlement of workers in the port towns of Britain. These and many other studies show that Britain’s immigration and settlement was inextricably linked with colonialism.
- <sup>17</sup> Sivavandan, 1976.
- <sup>18</sup> For more detail on the filtering process of residential mobility see Short, 1978.
- <sup>19</sup> Glavanis, 1997.
- <sup>20</sup> For an account of this racialisation of immigration issue, see Gilroy, 1986.
- <sup>21</sup> Castles, 1987
- <sup>22</sup> Madood, 1988.
- <sup>23</sup> Eisendadt, 1954; Liberson, 1963; Gordon, 1978
- <sup>24</sup> By discourse I mean more than the conventional understanding. (e.g formal treatment of a subject through talking or writing I am using discourse in a way similar to Michel Foucault. ). A discourse is the way meaning is regulated through the use of linguistic and extra-linguistic elements to form a coherent hold. For further details see Stuart Hall in Hall and Gieben, 1992.
- <sup>25</sup> Claire, Peterson and Scheff, 1995.
- <sup>26</sup> Raymond, Teske and Nelson, 1974.
- <sup>27</sup> Johnstone, 1963.
- <sup>28</sup> Yinger, 1994, p.72
- <sup>29</sup> Yinger, 1994, p.75.
- <sup>30</sup> Berry in Bond, 1997, p.145. For Berry acculturation is essentially a form of culture change that results from contact between two independent cultures.
- <sup>31</sup> Graves 1967 as quoted by Berry in Bond, 1997, p.145.
- <sup>32</sup> Berry in Bond, 1997, p 145.

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> I discuss my approach and alternative way of looking at culture in the section where I discuss enculturation.

<sup>35</sup> Berry in Bond, 1997, p.146

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 147

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 145.

<sup>38</sup> See Berry, 1988. Berry points out that although mutual changes are implied in his definition of acculturation that in fact most changes occur in the non-dominant group as a result of influence from the dominant group. It is the non-dominant group that psychologically adapts. However I have not found this references in relation to his acculturative strategies.

<sup>39</sup> Berry in Bond, 1997, p. 147. The concept of acculturative Stress was introduced by Berry and Annis, 1974.

<sup>40</sup> Integration was also put forward at this time. Halsey sees social integration as a highly differentiated process of absorption, incorporation and accommodation to the multiple relationships of locality, occupation, politics and the whole network of society. Social integration is therefore described as a situation in which a group continues to be an integral unit or unit on its own but one, which is accepted by the majority. The three stages to social integration presented are; firstly, where a group is integrated in this sense would keep it's own distinguishing features, such as religion and language, but children go to state schools and migrants do a job alongside the majority population. Migrants are therefore involved in the social system of the host society but only with a contractual tie in the employment and educational fields. The second stage may be reached when a migrant still keeps a contractual ties with the host society, but has built up a primary community based on kinship-friendship networks amongst fellow migrants. Here the migrant tries to reproduce at least some of the social institutions of their country of origin, which also provide them with familiar norms and values governing situations. When this primary community develops to encompass more ethnic institutions and facilities, the members of the community usually prefer to live in the area where these facilities are available and this usually results in segregation. This keeps migrants within their communities. However as outlined above Berry points out that is dependent and successful only if pursued by non-dominant groups when the dominant society is open and inclusive in orientation toward cultural diversity.

<sup>41</sup> See Hall, in Hall and Gieben (eds.) 1992, pp. 276-89. Hall shows how the idea of Europe was conflated with idea of modernity and progress.

<sup>42</sup> Solomos and Back, 1996, pp. 134-141.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Macionis and Plummer, 1997, p. 123.

<sup>45</sup> Ratcliffe, 1994, p.13.

<sup>46</sup> For an approach that emphasises kinship see the work of Ballard, 1994. For work that focuses on sectarian influences see Werbner, 1989. Either of these approaches are mutually exclusive.

<sup>47</sup> See for example Philip Lewis, 1994.

<sup>48</sup> The discourse around diasporas recognises this. The term diaspora refers to how despite the migration and dispersal of ethnic groups throughout the globe they continue to share common experiences and cultural elements.

<sup>49</sup> I did not include questions of membership of the *Ummah* in my ISA instruments but open interviews and informal conversation with Kashmiris during the research period highlighted the importance they place on belonging to a world-wide Islamic community. Conversations with Pakistanis in South Asia and in Luton also suggest the importance placed on identifying with the *Ummah*.

<sup>50</sup> Werbner refers to Pakistanis, failing to acknowledge Kashmiris. See Werbner, 1991.

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<sup>51</sup>The use of British as a prefix to Muslim is also problematic as it ignores the theological debate within Islam and self-description by Muslims as belonging to the *Ummah*.

<sup>52</sup>Mead, 1963, p.184.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid.

<sup>54</sup>For a personal view on enculturation see Weinreich, 1997, pp.154-165.

<sup>55</sup>See Weinreich, Luk and Bond, 1996, p150.

<sup>56</sup>Weinrich would assert that the use of the terms superordinate and subordinate reflect descriptions of power relations between different groups and not necessarily notions of culture or superiority or inferiority. This however in the context of British race relations requires an elaboration of the question of power relations. Is power something that the dominant group holds and the subordinate group lacks? Or is power found throughout society? See Foucault, 1983 for further elaboration on question of power.

<sup>57</sup>This notion of culture is also seen in definitions and use of concepts such as individualism and collectivism by empirical research using ISA. See particularly Weinreich and Kelly, 1991. Their basic assumption is that Western culture is individualistic and Muslim culture is collectivist. This idea does nothing more than reproduce Orientalism, which makes the distinction that individualism is a virtue of the West Vs the collectivist culture of the East. In other words that there is a clear-cut ontological difference between West and East. Although they make the point that “there are wide variations on such individualist ideology from region to region” such an approach seems to neglect the collectivist institutions of the West, for example monasteries.

Having made this distinction between Western and Eastern culture they continue to mark their sample as “orthodox” and “progressive” based on different value orientations, which they ascribed to the two constructs concerning gender (so that those Muslim Pakistanis they consider as progressive felt that boys and girls should be able to mix freely (as in the indigenous culture) and those they consider as orthodox as thinking that it was not a good idea for boys and girls to be able to mix freely. Such categorisations are fraught with difficulties. Specifically there are two problems.

Firstly, their definition of “Muslimness” is based on a narrow criteria which fails to accommodate diverse and complex differences. Importantly they define their Muslim youth as progressive and orthodox based on a societal factor rather than any measure of religious observance. Any reference to religious observance is based on identification with the Imam and people involved in the Markazi-Jamiat-Ahl-E-Hadith which they call a fundamentalist Muslim Organisation. Of course it is very difficult to measure religious observance but their account makes no attempt to understand Muslim identity (they don’t even problematise fundamentalism). For example is he talking about “nominal” Muslims for whom Islamic identity may be based on little more than a cultural heritage with only rudimentary observance of religious precepts (typically the fasting at Ramadan) or is he talking about practising Muslims or cultural Muslims?

Secondly, it is interesting that their measure of being progressive is marked with respect to becoming more like the indigenous population and a free mixing of the genders. This begs the question as to what extent their categorisations (even if they are derived from their respondents) are in fact a dissemination of Orientalism which allows a distinction to be made between Muslims based on ideas of what it is to be a “good Muslim”.

Further by placing emphasis on the free mixing of genders they are starting with a well versed stereotype that that all Muslim women are located within the private sphere. Any Muslim women who are in the public space, and mixing with the opposite gender is Westernised (individualistic). In fact it may show something else for example class positions, different understandings of Islam and so

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on. In their defence Wenreich and Kelly would argue that they are reliance on this language is simply instrumental and not devotional. They would also claim that they have empirical support for their use of these terms. None of these charges however meets the challenge of Said's critique of Orientalism, since the main point is that the initial ontological division between West and East is recycled in a number of tropes, which assume the distinction to be unproblematic. See Sayyid, 1997, pp. 31-35, and also Clifford, 1980, pp. 207-212.

<sup>58</sup> Mann, 1986, pp 1-4. Compare this with Mann's, approach of seeing societies as a series of networks. This has been particularly useful to the development of a perspective on culture in this research. Mann sees societies as constituting multiple overlapping and intersecting socio-spatial networks of power. Within this idea then societies are not unitary and they are not totalities. Accordingly it is not possible to find any society bounded in geographical or social space. Therefore, because there is no totality, there cannot be "sub-systems" "dimensions" or "levels" of such a totality.

<sup>59</sup> Sayyid, 1997, pp. 41-49.

<sup>60</sup> In this sense enculturation is similar to ideas about cultural hybridity which have emerged in recent years. See for example, Gilroy, 1996.

<sup>61</sup> Sayyid, 1987, p 226

## **CHAPTER TWO: ISA THEORETICAL POSTULATES**

### **I. INTRODUCTION**

In the previous chapter I explained that this study is heavily indebted to ISA. This debt has two aspects: one is the general influence that ISA has exercised over the work, and the other aspect is far more specific. It is to do with the use of ISA instruments as a way of addressing some of the main questions concerning Kashmiri identity. What I will do in this chapter is elaborate on some of the central tenets of ISA as a prelude to applying them to the investigation of my research propositions on Kashmiri identity.

### **II. ISA AND IDENTITY**

#### **A. Ethnic Identity and ISA**

Weinreich sees ISA as a metatheoretical framework in the sense that it is a “scaffolding” type theoretical orientation, which uses explicitly defined concepts. It allows for the inclusion and elaboration of four perspectives on self and identity: the psychodynamic, symbolic interactionist, personal construct and cognitive affective consistency theory. It attempts to use them in order to generate further empirically grounded theoretical propositions, which take into account contemporary value and belief systems as they are held by the individuals and groups concerned, in addition to existing hypotheses.<sup>1</sup> In this sense it is a theoretical orientation to identify phenomena rather than an “identity theory”. Weinreich argues that an understanding

of the processes of identity within societies has hitherto been hampered by a lack of theoretical concepts concerning identity development and change, which could be readily used for empirical research in the field. He makes the point that sophisticated theorising about ethnic identity is generally not matched by a use of concepts by which it (ethnic identity) may be compared from group to group and from one social context to another. The mismatches between theory and practice are largely problems of conceptualising the process of identity development and defining the complex of concepts associated with it. It is as a way of covering this gap between identity theory and its operationalisation that Weinreich sees as the principal task of ISA. ISA is then an open-ended metatheoretical framework of concepts and postulates about current structure and process pertaining to identity.<sup>2</sup> For the purposes of this thesis my interest relates to ethnic identity. Weinreich's definitions of identity are as follows:

One's identity is defined as the totality of one's self-construal, in which how one construes oneself in the present expresses the continuity between how one construes oneself as one was in the past and how one construes oneself as one aspires to be in the future.

One's ethnic identity is defined as that part of the totality of one's self-construal made up of those dimensions that express the continuity between one's construal of past ancestry and one's future aspirations in relation to ethnicity.<sup>3</sup>

Central to Weinreich's definition of ethnic identity is self-construal. As a way of operationalising this, the theoretical concepts of ISA make a number of assumptions and present quantitative indices of identity structure, which can empirically assess

individuals. These can be operationalised through idiographic analysis and nomothetic comparisons within and across cultures and subcultures.

## **B. Theoretical Postulates and Indices Concerning the Identification Process.**

As mentioned above ISA allows for the investigation of identity at the structural and individual levels. By looking more closely at some of the assumptions behind ISA we can begin to draw some theoretical assumptions and indices of identity together, which allow for the empirical analysis of identity.

### **1. Role Model Identification with Others**

One of ISA's assumptions is that: *one's positive and negative reference models represent one's positive and negative value systems*. Weinreich makes a distinction between two modes of identification: empathetic identification and idealistic identification.<sup>4</sup>

Empathetic identification refers to one's de facto states of being in relation to others. In other words it is a sense of recognising a *de facto* commonality with that person. Individuals will have affinity with others but this does not necessarily mean that empathetic identification is always a positive identification. Individuals may recognise commonality with the other in terms of shared vulnerabilities or a compassionate understanding of shared failures.<sup>5</sup> So in this way empathetic identification is the degree of similarity between the qualities one attributes to the

other. Weinreich also makes the distinction between current and past empathetic identification where past empathetic identification with another is seen as the degree of similarity between the qualities one attributes to the other in one's past self-image. In summary the ISA assumption is that: "One identifies empathetically with others, generally some of whom do not constitute totally positive reference models"

Idealistic identification is one's orientation towards others in terms of aspirations and dissociations. In other words idealistic identification is the extent to which one aspires to or wishes to emulate the other in terms of the extent of "desirable" qualities possessed by the other. These aspirations can be deduced from one's aspirations as defined in terms of one's ideal self-image, in other words how one would like to be. Within ISA, these aspirations are directly operationalised by reference to construals of "me as I would like to be". From this it is possible to obtain idiosyncratic aspirations for oneself in terms of attributes, beliefs, skills, behaviours, characteristics of lifestyle that may denote what and how one wishes to be. Weinreich suggests that it is important to highlight two points with regard to a person's ideal self-image.<sup>6</sup> Firstly, the quality of aspiration or the "wish to emulate", is directly assessed by reference to the person's ideal self-image (or occasionally, proxies such as an admired person, or by contrast a disliked person). In this, semantically, the words "me as I would like to be" denote the positive orientations of aspirations. In this way it is fundamental to the ISA conceptualisation.

Second, the meaning of “idealistic identification with the other” is to be understood as referring to some variable degree of wishing to emulate the other which may range from minimal to considerable. Only when idealistic identification is considerable can one assume that the other is a positive reference model. The respective formal definition of idealistic identification with another is defined as the “degree of similarity between the qualities one attributes to the others and those one would like to possess as part of one’s ideal self-image”.<sup>7</sup>

The term contra-identification with the other refers to the extent to which one wishes to dissociate from the characteristics of the other, shown as polar contrasts. As with idealistic identification with the other, one’s contra-identification with another is a parametric variable for which only high values would indicate that the other in question might be regarded as a clear-cut negative role model. It is perhaps worth noting that it is possible for one to perceive “positive” role models as having qualities from which one would wish to dissociate. The same may be true of one’s contra-identification where for example a Kashmiri individual may contra-identify with the overall ideology promoted by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) but nevertheless idealistically identify with some of the policies being suggested. Contra-identification and idealistic identifications will vary over time and from context to context as particular issues become salient and as individual biographies change over time, but are likely to be relatively more stable in the shorter term than empathetic identification which may vary from situation to

situation.<sup>8</sup> The formal definition of one's *contra-identification with another* is "the degree of similarity between the qualities one attributes to the other and those from which one would wish to disassociate".<sup>9</sup>

## **2. Conflicts in Identifications with Others**

ISA makes the assumption that *one generally has conflicts in identification with certain significant others and groups*. Since ISA is a developmental, as well as socio-psychological conceptualisation it places the individual's biographical development in a socio-historical context. "What this means in practice is that, in accordance with the ISA definition of identity being the totality of one's self-construal, in which how one construes oneself in the present expresses the continuity between how one construes oneself as one was in the past and how one aspires to be in the future, one's psychological state in the current moment is poised between one's past biographical state in the current moment, and one's wishes for the future projected from now."<sup>10</sup> Thus the social context is of fundamental importance to ISA conceptualisation. It follows then that the one's empathetic identification with the other is located within the social context. If the individuals simultaneously wished to dissociate (contra-identify), conflicts in identification with the other will take place. "One's conflict in identification with another is both a function of the extent of one's current identification with the other and one's simultaneous wish to dissociate from certain characteristics of the other".<sup>11</sup> Weinreich also points out that when a person's current empathetic and contra-identifications with the other increase so that person's conflicts in identification will also become greater.<sup>12</sup>

The ISA conceptualisation sees both the formation of new identifications and the resolution of conflicts in identifications as fundamental to the process of identity development and reformation of identity. Individuals attempt to resolve conflicts in identification with others striving for an “optimising” solution. They are seen to achieve a balance over time between resolving such conflicts and maintaining realistic appraisals of self and others. Attempted resolutions of specific conflicts may be achieved as individuals dissociate from others through decreasing empathetic identification with them and/or forming more positive appraisals of others and decreasing contra-identification with them.

Weinreich points out that whereas Erikson drew attention in general terms to the synthesis and re-synthesis of earlier identifications in identity development, ISA is specifically concerned with the process by means of which people attempt to re-synthesise their existing identifications and synthesise further ones with those already existing. These themes have been central within this research and are presented in the following ISA postulates:

Postulate one: *Resolution of conflicted identifications*. When one’s identifications with others are conflicted, one attempts to resolve the conflicts, thereby including re-evaluations of self in relation to the others within the limitations of one’s currently existing value system.

Postulate Two: *Formation of new identifications*. When one forms further identifications with newly encountered individuals, one broadens one’s value system and establishes a new context for one’s self-definition, thereby initiating a reappraisal of self and others which is dependent on fundamental changes in one’s value system.<sup>13</sup>

In his study of a group of adolescent boys and girls from two ethnic minorities, Weinreich found that in nearly all the cases of “West Indian” and “Asian” adolescents, conflicts in identifications with general representations of their own ethnicity were salient, despite other differences amongst the groups.<sup>14</sup> He attributed this as the outcome of dual socialisation arguing that first children form identifications with their parent cultural group during early primary socialisation, which then becomes altered through secondary socialisation through the indigenous culture, schooling and so on. This leads to varying degrees of conflict with some of the early identifications which has led to popular ideas about “identity conflicts” being the result of young people from ethnically marked communities being “stuck between two cultures.”<sup>15</sup>

ISA conceptualises identity diffusion as the degree of difficulty in re-synthesising childhood and later identifications. That is a difficulty in incorporating new identifications and resolving conflicts in existing identifications, which are dispersed over a number of significant others. Individuals may however have difficulty in re-synthesising identifications, incorporating new identifications and resolving conflicts in existing identifications.<sup>16</sup> The concept of identity diffusion is used to identify the dispersal of conflicts in identification with others. The conflicts in identification associated with identity diffusion are viewed as providing the impetus towards reappraisals of both oneself and others in question. In general, individuals will aim to maintain an optimal dispersion of conflicts in identifications.<sup>17</sup>

Weinreich's Bristol study has also shown that a range of self-evaluations, which can range from negative to positive, may accompany identity diffusion. The ISA definition of self-esteem takes into consideration the idea of self-construal in the present and the past and the continuity between both in line with the ISA definition of identity discussed in preceding paragraphs. As Weinreich comments: "One's *self-esteem* is defined as one's overall self-assessment in terms of the continuing relationship between one's past and current self-images, in accordance with one's value system".<sup>18</sup> In some circumstances high identity diffusion may be accompanied by very low self-evaluation and the individuals involved may be in a state of identity crisis. However in other circumstances individuals may exhibit identity diffusion as a result of having identification conflicts and yet have moderately favourable self-evaluation.

### **3. Ego-involvement with Others**

Weinreich sees ego-involvement as the degree of overall responsiveness to the other.<sup>19</sup> He points out that empirical investigation using the concept as defined by ISA indicate that: firstly, one is more ego-involved with people with whom one is familiar (parents and siblings) than more remote individuals (for example acquaintances). Secondly, one may have high ego-involvement with others who, although remote from oneself, have a strong impact on one's sensibilities (in the case of the Kashmiris Maqbool Butt, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) or

negatively with the Indian and Pakistani leaders Narasimha Rao and Benazir Bhutto, respectively).

The ISA definition of ego-involvement has brought attention to the importance of identity processes in people's responsiveness to entities, and both their negative and positive evaluations. Previously it was only possible to see one's ego-involvement in terms of positive connotations. The current definition leads to clarification and more relevant empirical meaning. Therefore formally: One's ego-involvement with another is defined as one's overall responsiveness to the other in terms of the extensiveness both in quantity and strength of the attributes one construes the other as possessing.

#### **4. Structural Pressures on Constructs**

Constructs are developed from personal biographies, religious and cultural beliefs and values. Structural pressures on these constructs measure the consistency or stability of core evaluative dimensions of identity, which may represent cultural interpretations of behaviours. In other words the ISA indices of Structural Pressure are able to assess the centrality of people's values and aspirations as represented by their constructs, or alternatively the uncertainty and evaluative inconsistency with which they hold and use them. Formally, then, Weinreich defines structural pressures on one's construct as "the overall strength of the excess of compatibilities over

incompatibilities between the evaluative connotations of attributes one makes to each entity by way of the one construct and one's overall evaluation of each entity".<sup>20</sup>

### **III. CONCLUSION**

In the sections above, I have presented some main points of ISA which pertain to my research. ISA's open-ended framework allows for the operationalisation of concepts central to the research through specially designed computer programs which also allow for theory building.<sup>21</sup> In this chapter, I have presented the skeleton of my thesis by focusing on the ISA framework. In subsequent chapters, I will flesh out this study by examining the question of Kashmiri identity. I argue that ISA is a useful way of investigating Kashmiri identity, and later on in this study I will show what insights can be gained from the application of ISA. What I want to do next, however, is to develop the theoretical postulates concerning Kashmiri identity, which I presented in the introduction.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> See Weinreich, 1986, pp 229-320
- <sup>2</sup> For more information on ISA refer to Weinreich, 1989. Pp 41-77; Weinreich's *Manual for Identity Exploration using Personal Constructs*, 1980.
- <sup>3</sup> Weinreich, Luk and Bond, 1996, pp 117-118.
- <sup>4</sup> Weinreich, 1989, pp. 221-223.
- <sup>5</sup> For more detail of empathetic identification see Weinreich, 1989, p. 223.
- <sup>6</sup> Weinreich 1989, p.222.
- <sup>7</sup> Ibid., pp 72-73.
- <sup>8</sup> See Weinreich, 1980, p.18; Weinreich 1996, p. 21. Empirical studies using ISA have shown that empathetic identification may vary from context to context and over time.
- <sup>9</sup> Weinreich, 1980, p. 18; Weinreich, 1996, p. 21.
- <sup>10</sup> Weinreich, 1986, p. 224.
- <sup>11</sup> See Weinreich, 1983, p. 159.
- <sup>12</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>13</sup> These definitions are taken from Weinreich, Luk and Bond, 1996, p.122.
- <sup>14</sup> The results and discussion from Weinreich's Bristol study are presented in Weinreich, 1983, pp. 149-185.
- <sup>15</sup> For an example of the idea of culture-conflict see Anwar, 1998. For arguments rejecting notions of cultural-conflict see Weinreich's 1983 Bristol study.
- <sup>16</sup> See Weinreich, 1989, p. 74 for a further elaboration of this definition.
- <sup>17</sup> For more details on identity diffusion refer to Weinreich, 1980, p.18 and Weinreich, Luk and Bond, 1996, p.121.
- <sup>18</sup> See Weinreich, 1980.
- <sup>19</sup> For more detail on ego-involvement see Weinreich, 1989, p.226.
- <sup>20</sup> See Weinreich, 1989, p.75.
- <sup>21</sup> See Weinreich, Gault and Asquith, 1987

## **CHAPTER THREE: KASHMIRI IDENTITY-THEORETICAL POSTULATES**

### **I. INTRODUCTION**

In chapter one I examined the way in which identity has been theorised in the context of ISA. In particular, I focused on the concept of enculturation. In the previous chapter I examined the way in which ISA theorises ethnic identity, especially looking at the theoretical postulates and conceptualisation concerning the identification process as a way of understanding the complex nature by which identities are transformed. In this chapter I want to use some of these theoretical insights to introduce the main contours of Kashmiri identity. This chapter presents a review and discussion of the main influences on Kashmiri constructions of identity as a prologue to the six research postulates that will be developed in the succeeding chapters. Kashmiri identity is here conceptualised as being constructed along three main dimensions: cultural networks, religious identification and a sense of nationhood. Within these there are specific issues of redefinition of identity with regard to changing contexts, such as how individuals continue to narrate themselves into the future despite changes in their current situation(s) of community. This research focuses on the way in which constructions of cultural, religious and national identities are affected by generational and gender recontextualisations. The following sections attempt to develop these further and present the research postulates.

## II. CULTURAL NETWORKS

Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller suggest that ethnic cultures play a central role in community formation: “when ethnic groups cluster in specific areas, they establish their own spaces, marked by a distinctive use of housing and public areas.”<sup>1</sup> As I have discussed previously there are considerable problems in defining the term “culture”. I suggested that it is useful to think of culture not as some totality with fixed and sharply defined boundaries but rather as series of overlapping networks, which may be densely clustered around one particular element but more sparsely clustered around another set of elements. These elements would correspond to what Richard Dawkins calls memes, that is the cultural equivalents of genes, bits of information including beliefs and ideas.<sup>2</sup> For the purposes of this research I want to focus on memes about kinship and *biraderi*. It is these types of cultural relationship which tend to mark out the Kashmiri settlers from the Anglo-Saxon hosts. In the new settler environment these types of cultural relationships help individuals to organise community, resist exclusion and discrimination and maintain a sense of self-esteem and personal identity in a situation where their experiences and capabilities are undermined.<sup>3</sup> Much of South Asian society in the sub-continent is organised around two important and linked features of social networks - Kinship and *Biraderi*.<sup>4</sup> Both are very influential over major aspects of behaviour within the home and in the wider society and therefore have a very important place within the considerations of this research. Linked to this are extra-familial kin networks. These relationships are referred to as “birder”. The word stems from the word *biradar*, meaning brother, and

it is this which shapes kinship networks beyond the joint extended family. What is interesting is that self-definitions within the Kashmiri community in Luton continue to be based around pre-migration memes. I am not suggesting that there is an essential Kashmiri culture, which the Kashmiris carried with from Mirpur to Luton. Rather, I want to examine how the pre-migration memes were adapted and (re-)defined for the post-migration world of Luton and its environs. In other words, I want to investigate the claim that cultural networks (by this, I mean relations of kinship and the biraderi) are crucial aspects of Kashmiri collective identity. This will be *Postulate One: Cultural networks are a central collective dimension of Kashmiri British identity.*

### **III. RELIGION AS A COMPONENT OF PAKISTANI/KASHMIRI IDENTITY**

Religiosity is an important aspect of Kashmiri life and has significantly contributed to the reproduction of a distinct social world. The “private Islam” is difficult to observe whilst the “public Islam” is more visible to the observer and is institutionally represented by mosques. A feature of Kashmiri settlement in Luton has been the rapid conversion of buildings into Mosques followed by the building of purpose-built Mosques with associated *madradas* for Quranic learning. The large-scale investment into Mosques is an indication of the dedication and commitment to the maintenance of a religious identity within a non-Islamic context. Further it reflects the importance placed on the continuation of a religious identity for the younger generation.

Religious values and practices are preserved through the construction of places of worship and associated religious centres of learning such as *madrasas* and “religious circles” Religion is an important marker of difference. In this way then a group which is defined as being different and inferior, by more powerful group, which does not recognize as being its equal, and denied the opportunity to assume its identity will rely on self conception and self-esteem focused on religious belief and practice.

For many academics religion is not seen as separate to ethnicity but rather an integral feature of ethnicity. Rohit Barot points out that, where the majority community stigmatises ethnic minorities and their cultures as inferior to what is conventionally regarded as European culture, this leads to marginalisation and exclusion from the normal civil society. This often leads to ethnic mobilisation in which the notion of group solidarity based on common religion may have an important role to play.<sup>5</sup> According to Barot reconstructions of religious identity may take place in three main ways: firstly through preservation of religious values, secondly through the use of space, and thirdly as a result of feeling threatened. In an alien environment these religious identities may be reinterpreted and constructed.<sup>6</sup> There has been considerable discussion in the literature on the reconstruction of religious identities. The recent research such as the Runnymede Trust’s Islamophobia Report talks of threatened identities for Muslims as a result of religious discrimination. It suggests that Muslims are suffering disproportionately from marginalisation and exclusion based on religious discrimination.<sup>7</sup> Therefore their experience of resentment,

hostility, racism and prejudice makes the religious difference larger and religious identities more threatened by this added dimension of religious discrimination.

According to the assimilationist assumptions, living in European secular societies would mean that for immigrants religions would be relegated to the private sphere. The assumption is that this would certainly be the case if not for the first generation of migrants then certainly for the offspring born and brought up in this country. This is what Sahgal and Yuval-Davis are suggesting when they point out that:

It is likely that the mode of expression of identity through religion must be modified, and may eventually become little more than a residue, at least as a basis for activism or political mobilisation. They argue that social mobility puts a greater focus upon relations with more powerful exterior forces-relations, which see legitimacy symbolised in other, more secular ways. The new Muslim middle class in Britain will continue to undermine Islamism (as opposed to the simple expression of religious faith as an aspect of ethnic identity).<sup>8</sup>

Similarly Fuller and Lesser argue that Islamic/Muslim communities abroad will find that eventually this identity will be dissolved into secular Western identities.

They comment that:

On the one hand Islamic communities in the West will try to retain their conservative social philosophy and to preserve their values in the Western community. On the other hand with each generation it will prove increasingly difficult to maintain these practices. Muslim immigrant parents will have problems holding their teenagers to traditional social patterns as the children push for greater assimilation with Western lifestyles and attitudes - it will be nearly impossible for Islam to play the formal institutional role in daily life.<sup>9</sup>

They suggest that as Islam becomes more secularised two forms of Islam will emerge. Firstly, full Muslim integration into European society (to the extent that

Europeans permit it) while preserving Islam as a matter of personal faith and cultural preference Secondly, ghetto Islam, a recreation of Islamic society within European society on the basis of separatism. It is clear that Fuller and Lesser do not regard many of the Muslims born and brought up in Europe as European. They assume that Europe is a clearly demarcated geographical space and its inhabitants (together with their large global diaspora) share a wide range of social, cultural and biological characteristics which mark them off as being different from non-European. European identity, is however, like other forms of social identity relational and negative. Europe defines itself in relation to what it is not.<sup>10</sup> Historically, Islam, has constituted one of the main others of Europe.<sup>11</sup>

Contrary to Saghal and Yuval-Davis and Fuller and Lesser's observations the case of Muslims in Britain suggests that in fact the opposite is happening. Religion in the form of Islam appears to be increasingly becoming a source of public as well as private identity. Barot, however, suggests that this return to an Islamic fold is similar to the desire of Bengali Muslims in Tower Hamlets to emphasise the value of Islam more than the principle of universal political participation.<sup>12</sup> His assumption is that Islam is not political and is therefore making the distinction that Sayyid has discussed in his "immigrant studies model" between the host society having politics and the immigrants having sectarianism.<sup>13</sup>

Islam appears to be growing in Britain in line with the demographic growth of the Pakistani/Kashmiri and Bangladeshi communities. With the passing of time since initial migration, the evidence appears to suggest that Islam has remained central within the life of the British Pakistani/Kashmiri communities. This is evidenced by changes in British legislation on burial rites, *halal* meat, dress codes in schools and the establishment of Islamic schools and purpose built mosques.<sup>14</sup> It is estimated that there are currently approximately one thousand Mosques in Britain and many more are being planned or are under construction.

This research shows how religion continues to be central to Kashmiri ethnic identity in Luton. Importantly this is not the case simply for migrants but also for their offspring who have been born and brought up in Britain. As with other aspects of ethnic identity religion is redefined and modifications occur in relation to contextual change. As Vertovec writes:

Ethnic ideologies comprised of selective reflections on the past, present and future plights of a community within a given context arise or are modified at certain historical junctures often marked by rapid social change. Religious concepts, values and practices may play fundamental roles in the formation of such ideologies, since they provide points of reference or legitimisation, which hold considerable affective power among community members.<sup>15</sup>

In other words the vocabulary of religious values may help furnish the descriptions of identity that individuals may use in secular contexts. *Thus Postulate Two states that: Religion is a central collective dimension of Kashmiri British identity.*

#### **IV. NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION**

The territory of Kashmir is divided between India and Pakistan. India has the larger part of Kashmir including the capital Srinagar and the valley of Kashmir. Pakistan controls the area known as Azad Kashmir. (See Map 1) The Kashmiri migration to Britain has basically been from Azad Kashmir. This division of Kashmir is disputed by the majority of Kashmiris. Unlike the Pakistanis in Britain with whom they closely share religious affiliations, the Kashmiris in Britain come from and identify with a homeland whose borders and control are subject to international dispute. For the Kashmiris the disputed nature of their “homeland” is currently a priority in terms of maintaining ethnic distinctiveness. As previously discussed, most research has started either with the notion of being Pakistani or from a particular district such as Mirpur and consequently has not given space for “Kashmiriyat” to be expressed. It is obvious, however that Kashmiri identity is not completely separate from that of Pakistani identity. Kashmiri identity will share the features described by Werbner i.e. of being British Muslims or British Asians in terms of common beliefs, culture and experiences. But it is the contention of the research that it is the national identification with the land of Kashmir and the aspirations for that territory that are currently an important part of Kashmiri identity and therefore separates the group from the Pakistanis by adding another dimension to their identity. Therefore

*Postulate Three: National identification is a central collective dimension of Kashmiri identity in Britain*

## V. REDEFINITION OF IDENTITY

The above three postulates form core collective dimensions of Kashmiri identity. However, they do not exhaust all significant identity factors. In the following section, I will present postulates that focus on the individual experience of the above core dimensions. I am interested in how Kashmiris cope with the above collective identities. In other words, how do notions of “Kashmiriness” manifest themselves in the everyday life of individuals who call themselves Kashmiris and who are called Kashmiris by others? Richard Rorty suggests that we should:

(T)hink of human minds as webs of belief and desires, of sentential attitudes - webs that continually reweave themselves so as to accommodate new sentential attitudes.....just assume that new ones keep popping up and that some of them put strains on old beliefs and desires. Or we may create a whole host of new beliefs and desires in order to encapsulate the disturbing intruder, reducing the strain which old beliefs and desires put on it and which it puts on them. Or we just unstitch, and thus erase a whole range of beliefs and desires.<sup>6</sup>

Rorty believes that no self can be distinct from the self-reweaving web he describes. In similar vein, Weinreich suggests that individuals formulate their own points of view on a range of topics, such as dress, music, boy and girl friends, and begin to scrutinise given moral imperatives. Thus in circumstances where alternative ethnic identities are salient young people may empathetically identify with elements of the alternative lifestyles and world views represented by these other salient ethnic groups. Therefore some partial cross ethnic identifications may occur without them actually *acculturating* and forgoing any of their ethnic allegiances. What appears to be happening is a process of *enculturation* where identifications are made with

respect to the majority culture within the context of their own ethnicity. This thinking has led to: *postulate four: Contemporary contextual redefinition of identity is taking place amongst second generation Kashmiri British youth through a process of enculturation rather than acculturation, in which results in high levels of self evaluation are maintained.*<sup>17</sup>

Redefinitions of identity have often been misunderstood as the popular notion of “culture conflict” between older and younger generations. It has usually been negatively portrayed in the media. Take for example the often quoted issue of arranged marriages within South Asian communities. These individuals are depicted as facing the dilemma of bipolar values, to the overall detriment of identity development. They are seen as being “stuck between two cultures” or more recently rather than being stuck just being “between cultures”, having to choose either the perceived constraining norms of the parental culture or the perceived freedom offered by Western values.<sup>18</sup> Conflicts are seen as leading to negative self-concept.

These scenarios do not give space for the expression of separate identities or the persistence of ethnic identities. Rather than being seen as negative, this research sees conflicts in identification with significant others as being an important psychological impetus for personal change. It uses the ISA notion of identification conflict or the absence of identification conflicts to investigate. Identification conflicts may accompany high or low self-evaluations. So in the case of moderate self-evaluation,

identification conflicts may give rise to re-appraisals of self and others and redefinitions of identity. *Postulate Five: "Culture conflict" amongst Kashmiri migrants and their offspring is leading to negative self-concept.*<sup>19</sup>

As discussed previously, identities are not singular entities. Individuals may have differing subject positions. In this way gender identity is seen as a composite part of ethnic identity. Here gender identity is being used as socially constructed and related to male-female dynamics that occur in everyday life, which are influenced by changes in the contexts in which they are negotiated. In Kashmiri society gender roles are clearly marked by cultural and religious traditions. The combination of these has fuelled images of women in Kashmiri society (as in the case of South Asian and particularly Muslim South Asian settler communities) as backward and oppressed. Generally the marker for this has been misunderstandings of male-female dynamics within Muslim communities. Significantly women have been seen as lacking any agency. The differences in terms of gender dynamics have also been marked in terms of those women born in the subcontinent and women born and brought up in Britain. Weinreich argues that moral issues such as those concerning sex, love, marriage and family are central to the processes which underlie gender roles and the formation of "new" conceptions of ethnic identities. He believes that there is often strong conflict between primary ethnic gender roles on the one hand and powerful secondary identifications with other salient indigenous gender roles on the other. Also significant are the ways in which these gender dynamics are redefined

in the new context. Thus Postulate Six suggests that: *Redefinitions of gender identity are a composite and integral part of redefinitions of ethnic identity.*

## **VI. CONCLUSION**

In this chapter, I have presented three collective postulates and three individual postulates. These six postulates will frame this research. The three collective postulates refer to communal notions of Kashmiri identity, while the three secondary postulates are pitched at the level of the individual. In the subsequent chapter, I will present the fieldwork, which was used to investigate these postulates. Before I do this it is important to discuss the specificities of researching Kashmiris in Luton.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCHING KASHMIRIS**

### **I. INTRODUCTION**

Some of the epistemological difficulties of researching ethnic minorities have already been referred to in previous chapters. In what follows, I address how these general epistemological concerns have impacted on methodological problems of studying Kashmiris. In this chapter, I will outline the research strategy, sample criteria, and issues of data collection. The aim is to clear the ground for subsequent chapters where I will use some of the findings to address the propositions outlined in the previous chapter. I will show that there is a need for an inter-disciplinary approach to the investigation of ethnic identities. That is, research by “mixing and matching” qualitative and quantitative research methods is better placed to offer an account of Kashmiri identities than uni-disciplinary methodologies.

### **II. RESEARCH STRATEGY: AN INTER-DISCIPLINARY, MULTI-METHOD APPROACH**

An inter-disciplinary approach was taken to the study of Kashmiri British individual and community identity. The research incorporated research strategies whose foundations lie within anthropology, sociology and social psychology. Further, it adopted qualitative and quantitative approaches in the multi-method style. The historical antagonisms between different disciplines and between proponents of quantitative and qualitative research are well documented in the literature. However

there appears to be little attempt to fuse the inter-disciplinary approach and the multi-method approach. The research design reflects the complexity of the study of identity and contributes towards bridging this methodological gap. Discussion of the research methodology also highlights some of the particularities of researching with the Luton Kashmiri community and in doing so questions the use of traditional methods when undertaking community research of this type. Although each piece of research is unique there are nevertheless commonalities. We can learn from each other's experiences in an attempt to resolve our research questions.

Whilst it is customary in presenting research methodology to describe the different phases of research undertaken it must be noted that whilst such presentations provide neat and tidy accounts of the conduct of research they are nothing short of misleading, for in this context, research is presented as a linear model with a beginning, a middle and an end. Yet the reality is very different and infinitely more complex. "The project and the methodology is continually defined and redefined by the researcher and in some cases by those researched".<sup>1</sup> For presentation and discussion purposes the methodological approaches have been separated but the intention is not to present a simplistic linear model of the methodological approaches adopted. In reality many of the procedures overlapped and the interviews and observation continued throughout the research.

Three inter-linked and complementary research approaches were used to investigate the identity structures and identity development of Kashmiris and a small sample of Anglo-Saxon individuals. These were observations and interviews in the ethnographic style, a biographical questionnaire in a sociological style and an ISA instrument in the social psychological style. Data collection utilised qualitative and quantitative methods.

### **A. Observations and Interviews**

If one desires to understand what is important in terms of identity to the Luton Kashmiri community then the logical step is to consult the Kashmiris themselves. With this founding principle the research design was integrative. The intention from the beginning was to ascertain what is important in terms of identity to the Luton Kashmiris who are resident in the “Bury Park” area of the town. Early on in the research I recognised the need for understanding the wider context which impacts on Kashmiri identity.

For this reason my ethnographic data was collected from a variety of sources in Luton and Azad Kashmir from 1991 to 1996. During this period I carried out 75 in depth interviews (open and well as semi-structured) interviews.<sup>2</sup> The data collected from Azad Kashmir was a product of two field trips undertaken in 1991 and 1996. During the first fieldtrip I gathered background information and undertook participant observation and informal interviews amongst Kashmiris in Kotli, and Mirpur districts.

The second field trip involved participant observation and a number of open interviews and informal discussions with government officials, leading members of political parties as well as ordinary Kashmiris in Mirpur and Kotli districts.

Observations and interviews were undertaken in order to provide Kashmiri narrative on important issues impacting on Kashmiri identity<sup>3</sup> and more specifically to design measuring instruments that were a reflection of the community under study. Since the Anglo-Saxon sample was seen as a “comparison sample” and was not the focus of the study, participant-observation was not carried out within the white majority community. However, interviews were carried out.

The term participant-observation refers to a multitude of activities and roles: the term is only a loose and general label that covers the many varieties of participation and observation, and distinguishes them from formal interviewing or library research. Thus Everett Hughes writes, “the unending dialectic between the role of member (participant) and stranger (observer and reporter) is essential to the very concept of field work, and this all participant observers have in common: they must develop a dialectic relationship between being researchers and being participants”.<sup>4</sup> Gans identifies three types of participant-observer: 1) Total participant - the field worker who is totally involved emotionally in a social situation and who only after it is over becomes a researcher again and writes down what has happened. 2) A researcher participant, who participates in a social situation but is personally only partially

involved, so that he can function as a researcher. 3) Total researcher, who observes without any personal involvement in the situation under study.<sup>5</sup> At various stages of the research I became all three types of participant-observer. I was a total participant whilst out shopping in “Bury Park”, at weddings, funerals, children’s parties and religious gatherings. In these situations I did not take notes until I returned home. I became a researcher participant whilst visiting functions at community centres, open community meetings or religious meetings. Only at political meetings did I become a total researcher.

Frankenberg points out that to undertake participant observation the researcher must deliberately submit and become resocialised into another society, which is substituted for the researcher’s own.<sup>6</sup> Being a total participant and researcher participant at one level came easily to me since there was no process of submission or resocialisation. Although I am not a Kashmiri, but of Pakistani origin, I share some commonalities of culture, dress, language and religion with the Kashmiris I was observing. It is the case however that the researcher must make some adjustments in attitude. Although I made my research intention clear from the outset, the research would have been difficult to conduct without these commonalities, since it was because of these shared characteristics that I was seen as an “insider”. My participation and observation was “approved” because I was seen as “one of them”. I was not seen as a foreign intruder and consequently, “the fear and suspicion which always lurks in the minds of subjects and informants during social research in general were almost absent”<sup>7</sup>

On occasions, however I was perceived as an “outsider”. This occurred most prominently at political meetings and in these situations I became a total researcher since I had no personal involvement. There were two reasons for my “outsider” status. Firstly, gender was an issue. Kashmiri women are not directly involved in political meetings and my presence went against the norms of the society. Secondly, my Pakistani origin was considered irregular since these meetings centred on the issue of independence from Pakistan and India. So in effect I was an insider and outsider within the same study.

Throughout the participant-observation stage of the fieldwork I kept detailed notes. At the time these notes seemed irrelevant to the research aims. However in retrospect they were vital for establishing a holistic view of community concerns and they were important at the interpretation stage of the research. There are problems with participant-observation. Most prominently data may not be available to be observed. Examples include past events, privacy situations where the observer would not be tolerated and situations where the presence of a researcher would alter behaviour to give misleading impressions.<sup>8</sup> These sentiments were expressed by members of the community and exemplified by the following comments. Ms F commented, “it’s so good to see one of us doing work on our own communities. At least you won’t sell your own people short and make them look like uneducated fanatics”. Mr N said, “I’m only telling you this because you understand what I’m talking about and it means as

much to you as it does to me. I wouldn't tell anyone else". Mrs K said, "You're OK, you're one of us".

The risk with developing such close links is that personal, emotional and psychological detachment from the issues becomes difficult to maintain. This is one of the major criticisms directed at "insider" participation-observation.<sup>9</sup> The researcher by being insider and participant is prone to becoming too closely identified with the subjects of her study and thus eroding the difference between object and subject. This type of criticism is however based on a positivist epistemology, which itself becomes subject to major critique from various positions. The abandonment of positivism must lead to the conclusion that total objectivity in research is impossible. There is no intrinsic reason why an insider-participant is more vulnerable to bias, poor judgement, or over-simplification than an "objective outsider-analyst".<sup>10</sup> While I do not share completely the positivist belief of an objective knowledge, it is useful to have more than one account. In other words information based on positivist assumptions may help to provide a different texture. In an effort to avoid total reliance on insider-participant observation, further data was collected simultaneously through interviews with members of the community. Interviews are an essential prerequisite for the methodology involved in constructing ISA instruments. The example presented in the Manual for Identity was used as a guide to structure the interviews.<sup>11</sup>

As mentioned previously initial interviews were carried out with Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir and in Luton and with members of the majority Anglo-Saxon community in Luton. Interviews with the Kashmiris were of several types: informal discussion, semi-structures interviews, consultation with respected community members, multi-person interviews in homes, male head of household in home, women only in a community centre, and younger generation of both genders in the university. Interviews with members of the white majority community were carried out in the university only on a one-to one basis. Interviews were semi-structured and they were conducted with some notes to direct discussion. It was important to discuss the overall aims of the project and also those questions which might prove sensitive. The aim had been to carry out individual interviews with selected members of the Kashmiri community. In the event the interviews soon became group discussions as other members of the family, friends, next door neighbours, visiting relatives and friends joined in. The same situation occurred during interviews with respected members of the community outside the home setting. This lengthened the interview process, with interviews lasting from one to three hours. This did however mean that the data collected was rich with information, which proved vital for the impressionistic accounts provided in the forthcoming chapters as well as corroboration of the ISA results. Further, contact with a number of community members for interviews meant that my work was gaining a credible reputation which proved vital for snowballing and accessing Kashmiri families during the final data collection stage. Three individual interviews and four group discussions were carried out with members of the Kashmiri community. Three

interviews were carried out with members of the white majority community on a one-to-one basis at the University. All interviews were tape-recorded and were carried out in the interviewee's desired language.<sup>12</sup> During the interviews some important features in the person's development were noted:

*Background and family life:* which included issues of generational interaction with parents, members of own ethnic group and other ethnic groups. Present self and future self: emphasis here was on how respondents saw themselves at the time of the interviews and how they felt about themselves for the future; their aspirations, role models and reference groups. Influences on socialisation: which included significant people, culture and religion. The importance of these on value systems in a person's development. Views on marriage and gender interaction were also addressed.

*Views on society:* for the Kashmiri sample views on their own society were discussed in the context of the majority white society and in the case of the Anglo-Saxon views on the Kashmiri community as well as opinions of their own community were ascertained. Opinions about living in the United Kingdom and Luton, issues of nationality and the political situation in Kashmir were also addressed.

Constructive research must take into account the value systems, belief systems, customs and religious systems of the individuals/community that the researcher is working with. These systems are usually repeatedly expressed in common phrases and

words, as well as embedded in institutions and organisations.<sup>13</sup> Amongst the Kashmiri group certain words such as *izzat*, *biraderi*, JKLF and Islam commonly recurred. Amongst the Anglo-Saxon sample John Major, the Conservative Party, the Church recurred. The intention from the start was to identify what in terms of identity was important to the two samples.<sup>14</sup> The data collected was used to formulate three measuring instruments: 1) a biographical questionnaire for the Kashmiri sample. Since the Anglo-Saxon sample was seen only as a comparison group and a profile of the Anglo-Saxon sample is easily obtainable from documented sources, it was felt that a biographical questionnaire for the Anglo-Saxon group would not add to information already available. 2) An ISA instrument for the Kashmiri sample. 3) And an ISA instrument for the Anglo Saxon sample.

Instruments were created for the older and younger generation respondents in both samples in order to make them more meaningful to individuals. At the interview stage there appeared to be differences in terms of important issues for the younger and older generation. A closer investigation, however, revealed that these were not sufficiently significant to warrant two separate identity instruments, especially since ISA allows differing opinions on the same issue to be represented by means of the same instrument. Thus in retrospect it was felt that the creation of older and younger generation variations in the instruments was unnecessary and time consuming. Further, at the data collection stage, the use of two different instruments created some suspicion, particularly for the older generation who felt that younger members of the

family were being asked to comment about the elders. In one instance the male member of the household requested to see the younger generation instrument before granting permission for his son to complete it. Participant observation and interviewing led to overall familiarity with the “Bury Park” area and informal interaction with the Kashmiri community. Also, importantly, it established relationships with members of the Kashmiri community which were vital for accessing Kashmiri families in order to complete the biographical questionnaire and the ISA instruments.

## **B. The Measuring Instruments**

### **1. The Biographical Questionnaire**

A biographical questionnaire for individuals within Kashmiri households was developed to collect personal data, migration data, residential details and data on the maintenance and nature of links with Azad Kashmir. The questionnaire (see Appendix 4.11) was designed after considerable reference to questionnaire and survey design methods. Household surveys, the Census and the questionnaire developed for the Health and Lifestyles Project under the auspices of the Health Education Authority were all used as examples, with particular reference to demographic questions.<sup>15</sup> The final questionnaire was a combination of analytical and relational techniques set up specifically to show: 1) The biographical details of the Kashmiri community. These helped to identify individuals who complied with the sample criteria, and to build a profile of the community. Further results helped locate the Kashmiris within migration

and settlement literature discussed in chapters three and four. A detailed description of the biographical data is provided in this chapter. 2) Associations between selected variables. The associations provide the basis for exploring explanations. They contribute towards substantiating the research propositions and provide vital information for interpreting the ISA results. Some of the questions were also intended for descriptive analysis. The advantage of these open-ended questions is that they allow a range of individual expression and thus provide a rich data source. This can provide important additional data to that obtained by the fixed range questions. Therefore not all the questions are intended to show causal relationships between one variable and the other. Opinions, preferences and perceptions show associations and correlations, which together with historical details help to build a profile of the Kashmiri community in Luton. All this data was vital for interpretation of ISA results.

The questionnaires were tested in several stages. Kashmiri students at the University, family and friends were approached to answer the initial questionnaire. Although not all these respondents were Kashmiri, testing the questionnaires revealed that several questions were poorly worded and that it was necessary to make changes to the order of questions to improve the overall structure of the questionnaire.

A pilot study was then carried out in conjunction with the ISA pilot.<sup>16</sup> Eleven Kashmiri households were approached and seventeen questionnaires completed (eight men, nine females, seven older generation and ten younger generation). Respondents

were asked to comment on their overall feelings about the questionnaire. All respondents mentioned that the questionnaire was too long and cumbersome. This fact was aggravated as respondents were also expected to complete the ISA instrument after completing the biographical questions. They also felt that some of the questions were ambiguous. Selected questions were removed and others were reworded. The result was a more concise questionnaire, which took less time to complete. This increased participation of responses by reducing respondent fatigue<sup>17</sup>. The final questionnaire asked a total of seventy-five questions and took between an hour and an hour and a half to complete.<sup>18</sup>

The original intention had been to ask respondents to complete the biographical questionnaire with the interviewer. (ISA instrument on their own with the interviewer present for guidance purposes only). However in the event a strict interviewing procedure could not be adhered to. Individuals within the households had different requirements. Some respondents chose to complete the questionnaire on their own, some with the interviewer present for guidance purposes only, whilst others relied on the interviewer to take down responses as they read a duplicate questionnaire. Furthermore in some cases the interviewer had to verbally translate the questions for the non-English speaking respondents. There were therefore inconsistencies in the way that questionnaires were answered.<sup>19</sup>

Early recognition of these problems meant a constant interview technique was quickly established. Hence any inconsistencies resulting from the misinterpretation of questions are likely to be perpetuated throughout the study and therefore the data can be regarded as reasonably comparable. The above problems were not encountered at the pilot stage of the inquiry. This may have been a reflection of the small size of the pilot sample. A larger pilot sample may have brought to light some of the above problems in advance.

When all the replies had been collected the responses were analysed using the SPSS computer programme. A prerequisite of data entry using SPSS is that the questions should be coded and labelled. The questions had been coded from the outset to ease data entry. The coded questions were labelled and entered into the SPSS computer programme for statistical analysis. The SPSS computer programme enables data from surveys to be analysed fully and flexibly. It includes a wide range of procedures for statistical analysis and provides facilities for tables and graphs.<sup>20</sup> For the purpose of this research SPSS was used to:

- Examine the basic biographical features of the respondents and summarise the spread of the data by using simple frequencies. Frequencies were carried out for personal details, motives for migration and migration data, and residential details. This was done to establish a biographical profile of the community but also to identify patterns of chain migration and settlement. The frequency data was not

symmetrical and any further statistical analysis required a non-parametric statistical test.<sup>21</sup>

- Identify associations between selected variables. Cross tabulation was used to identify frequencies of association for gender and generation with respect to selected coded variables.
- Assess the degree of association (significance) between the cross-tabulated variables selected. Since the data was nominal and non-parametric the Chi-square test was used. There are a number of restrictions to the test. Data must be in frequencies (i.e. the number of discrete objects occurring in different categories), categories must be mutually exclusive to avoid double counting (cannot have answered more than one). If the number of categories is greater than two, no more than one in five of the expected frequencies should be less than five and none should be less than one, and if the number of categories is two both the expected frequencies should be five or larger.

## **2. The ISA Instrument**

“Custom designed” personal psychological ISA instruments were created after the semi-structured probing interviews mentioned above (see Appendix 4.2 for the Kashmiri instruments and Appendix 4.3 for the Anglo-Saxon instrument). These semi-structured probing interviews were undertaken to assess the individual’s appraisal of self, of others and of significant aspects of his or her social world, such as institutions,

religion, customs and value systems which have been important influences within the person's life. Since one's identity is made up of partial identifications with significant others, it is essential that the entities should contain a judicious mix of such significant others and component aspects of self-image, certain of which are mandatory for ISA.<sup>22</sup> Since primary identifications were with family, relatives, children, elders, religious leaders, mosques and political figures, and centred on interaction with the opposite gender, these were included. At the open interview Kashmiri individuals were asked to identify important white majority social groups and institutions which have had and indeed are having an impact on their lives. These represent the individual's social worlds and provide broader biographical context. Accordingly, white majority institutions, political parties and people were included. Common features of the interviews were used to develop a number of "entities" Common modes of verbal expression were noted and used to develop "constructs" which measure the individual's construal of self, others and significant influences on their life.

Although most of the constructs were elucidated from the interviews some were supplied. Such constructs are in a sense bipolar, since one pole can only be used to differentiate people when it is contrasted with another characteristic e.g. pole one might be weak minded and the contrast pole two might read strong willed.<sup>23</sup> Weinreich points out that since ISA ascertains the individual's value system, full use of this facility should be made by including, alongside quite usual constructs, such as

“masculine-feminine”, the more subtle ones for which some individuals would choose the other pole. It is often more revealing to avoid “obvious” bipolar constructs and to replace them with ones that allow for both “polar” characteristics to be designated e.g. masculine-not at all masculine: feminine-not at all feminine.

An essential first step towards the creation of the final ISA instrument was piloting the instruments with a small cross section of the respondents. This was carried out simultaneously with the piloting of the biographical questionnaire. The intention was to ensure that the instruments contained significant entities, appropriate constructs, overall understandability of the instruments and time required to complete the instruments. With this intention a semi-standard instrument containing entities and constructs was developed for older and younger generations within the Kashmiri and Anglo-Saxon samples. The Kashmiri instrument was offered in English and Urdu in order to optimise understanding and meaningfulness of the responses.

Eleven Kashmiri households were visited and seventeen instruments completed (eight men, nine women, seven older generation and ten younger generation). Five members of the white majority community completed instruments (three men, two women, three younger members and two older members). All interviews with respondents from the white majority community took place at the university. The respondents were asked to rate the entities on all the constructs using a seven-point centre zero rating scale and were asked to comment on the significance of the entities,

appropriateness of the constructs, overall understandability of the instrument, and length of the instruments.

After some interviews it became apparent that some of the entities were ambiguous. They were not relevant to the respondents. A common complaint was that the instruments were too lengthy and time consuming. This limited the accuracy of the responses, as respondents became tired towards the end of the instrument. Some individuals failed to complete the instrument.

As mentioned above the Kashmiri instrument had been translated into Urdu to make it more meaningful to those respondents who were unable to read English. However, many of the Kashmiri respondents of the older generation complained that the written Urdu was a classical written Urdu and not an everyday spoken Urdu. These comments are best expressed by one respondent, Mr L, who said:

Yes of course I can read Urdu, but not this Urdu. My Father taught me to read Urdu and he wasn't even an educated man. To understand this Urdu you have here (the instrument) I would need a university degree in Urdu. None of the people you will be interviewing will understand this because they are from rural villages not universities.

Reassessment based on the pilot study and respondents' comments led to the instruments being re-evaluated. Ambiguous entities were removed and replaced by more Luton Kashmiri specific ones. For example the entity Mosques was regarded as too general and was replaced by the specific named Mosques in Luton. The length of the instruments were reduced and the Kashmiri instruments retranslated to reflect

more precisely the Urdu spoken by the Luton Kashmiris. Retranslation proved time consuming and expensive and with hindsight a cost that might have been prevented through better consultation on instrument design with members of the community.

Entities were developed to reflect Kashmiri primary identification and social and interactional influences. The final instruments comprised twenty-eight entities, which are here recategorised for clarity. Entities are only listed for the Kashmiri sample. The same overall principles were used to develop equivalent entities for the Anglo-Saxon sample. Entities relating to Kashmiris were included within the Anglo-Saxon instrument to identify Anglo-Saxon perceptions of Luton Kashmiris. Appendix 4.3 shows the Anglo-Saxon instruments. The following entities were chosen for aspects of self-image. These are mandatory for assessing identity parameters with ISA.

Me as I am now (current self image)

Me as I would like to be (ideal self image or ego ideal)

Me as I was when I left Azad Kashmir (past self image - older generation)

Me as I was when I left school (past self image - younger generation)

The person's ideal self-image provides the basis for designating one's value system. This is a prerequisite for calculating one's evaluations of all the other entities that one construes; the extent to which other people form one's positive or negative reference groups; and the extent that one has identification conflicts. His current and past self images are required to estimate his level of self esteem, as well as to delineate one's

patterns of empathetic identifications with others in terms of both his past and current self construals.<sup>24</sup> The following entities were chosen as mandatory entities for reference purposes, such as assessing the validity of results.

Person in the community I admire

Person in the community I dislike

Here the community refers to the respondents' own community. These mandatory entities are additional anchoring features of identity that provide checks on the validity of the identity indices calculated for each respondent.<sup>25</sup>

Other entities chosen for "significant others" were:

My children born in the UK (older generation)

My parents

My children born in Azad Kashmir (older Kashmiris)

My children to be born in the future (younger Kashmiris)

Significant others chosen for ethnic identification were:

Young English women in Luton

Young English men in Luton

Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir

Young Asian men in Luton

Young Asian women in Luton

Kashmiri music (older generation)

Bangra music (younger generation)

Luton University

British Media

Apache Indian (younger generation)

Actual evaluative connotations and use of the cognitions and beliefs in construing significant others and symbols are ascertained within ISA for each respondent thereby determining explicitly the differences between individual respondents and their value systems.

Entities chosen for cultural representations were:

Kashmiri Biraderi

Pakistan/Kashmir welfare association

Entities chosen for religious representations:

Mosque Noor

Luton Islamic Society

Madina Masjid

Jammia Masjid

Entities chosen for political representations were:

JKLF

Muslim Conference

John Major

Narasimha Rao

Benazir Bhutto

In retrospect some of the entities were ambiguous even after the pilot. Many Anglo-Saxon respondents mentioned that some entities were irrelevant to them. Increasing the number of semi-structured interviews at the instrument creation stage might have reduced this problem, but time constraints involved in a study of this scale prevented this. Excluding some of the entities would have reduced the size of the instruments.

As mentioned above, the constructs were developed after verbal expressions at the interview stage but some were stated and intended to touch upon the issues delineated in the propositions. The constructs for the Kashmiri instrument are listed below. The equivalent constructs for the Anglo- Saxon instrument can be found in Appendix 4.3.

1 I have warm feelings towards

I don't like at all

2 is/was strongly English in  
my/their ways

is/are very Asian in my/their ways  
and keeps away from English customs

3 is/was/are strongly Pakistani in

is/was/are strongly Kashmiri in

their attitudes and customs and see Kashmiri as the same as Pakistani

their everyday life and regard Kashmiri attitudes and customs to be different from Pakistani customs

4 speak/s English only because it is necessary for employment in the UK

speak/s English to become fully integrated into English society

5 speak/s traditional language because it is an important part of heritage

speak/s traditional language only because of pressure from family and *biraderi*

6 believes that traditional systems of arranged marriages are fundamental to being Asian

believe/s that in today's society it is better to have the freedom to choose one's own marriage partner

7 believe/s that parents and elders should be treated with special deference

feel/s that parents/elders should be treated as equals and have to earn special respect

8 feel/s that Kashmir should be reunited and independent of both Pakistan and India

think/s that all of Kashmir should be part of Pakistan

9 believes and respects *izzat*

think/s that doing the right thing according to one's sense of morality is more important than *izzat*

10 feel/s deeply committed to the system of *biraderi*

believe/s in the freedom for individuals to follow their own independent life

11 outside the home prefers to wear traditional dress

outside the home prefers wearing western style dress

12 prefer/s the company of men in leisure time

would spend time with men only at work or school/college/university

13 enjoy/s spending leisure time with women

prefer/s to mix with women only at work or at school/college/university

14 feel/s Muslims should only marry Muslims	feel/s Muslims should be able to marry non-Muslims
14 prefers to socialise with Muslims	would socialise with all Asians
16 is/are strongly Kashmiri and would be happier in Kashmir	is/are Kashmiri but feel/s more at home in Luton
17 feel/s happy with British nationality	would feel happier with Kashmiri nationality
18 feel/s that a Kashmiri should only marry a Kashmiri	believe/s that Kashmiris should be able to marry non-Kashmiris
19 feel/s more at home in Kashmir	feel/s more at home in Britain
20 want/s the younger generation to think of Kashmir as their homeland	believe/s that the younger generation should think of Britain as their homeland

The constructs posed some problems. Most individuals mentioned problems whilst they were answering the instrument. Others noted their comments on the rating sheet or at the end of the instrument in the comments section provided. Respondents emphasised the restrictive nature of the constructs. Some felt that by rating some entities towards one pole they were committing themselves to that pole whereas the issue was wider and warranted discussion.

Construct six was recurringly referenced as being too constraining. An often noted postscript was that there should be parents' choice but with own demands considered.<sup>26</sup> One respondent wrote:

Marriages these days aren't as cut and dry as this question is suggesting and arranged as everyone imagines where two people are

thrown together on the wedding day without consultation beforehand. Although parents make the final choice we have a lot of freedom in the selection of the marriage partner, after all parents are aware that it is our life.

Although problematic for the constructs these postscripts were essential at the interpretation stage of the research. Construct eleven was also seen as being too restrictive and it was often explained that:

Western dress is OK as long as it is Islamic dress which refers to modesty for example long loose skirts for women which cover the whole body and not revealing mini skirts or tight jeans.

Constructs twelve and thirteen were also problematic for most respondents as they mentioned that socialising with the opposite gender was prohibited only if that person was not part of the extended family. For example one respondent wrote: "My brother and father are men and yes I spend leisure time with them outside of school so in that sense I do socialise with men so this question is irrelevant". A further problem of the constructs was that often the respondents were being asked to make crude generalisations about deep-seated emotional issues which it was clear in the interviews were causing considerable "soul searching".

Despite these problems with the constructs it is important to note that whilst identifying some of the problems of ISA instrument design they also provided important insights into the wider nature of some of the issues being investigated, in turn providing significant input for interpretation of the results.

The respondents were asked to rate (construe) each entity with each construct by marking their response on a seven-point centre zero scale. The intention was to best reflect their views of each entity, including facets of self-image in relation to the construct. One design limitation of the instrument is that not all entities are relevant to the construct. In such cases and where the constructs were irrelevant to the respondents, they were requested to mark the centre zero point on the scale. This method is obligatory for the ensuing computational analysis.<sup>27</sup> The ISA instruments described were analysed using the Identity Exploration computer software. The principal generic names of the software in the IDEX system are IDEX-IDIO (Idiographic) and IDEX-NOMO (Nomothetic).<sup>28</sup> These are described below.

The IDEXPC forms part of the IDEX-IDIO (Idiographic) software. This software allows the user to:

- create and edit identity instruments
- display and check such instruments on screen
- print the instruments
- enter data on screen
- analyse the data from an identity instrument, that is to compute the identity indices for individuals
- display on screen the full format of identity indices
- accumulate multiple data files and transfer the protocol data files to the IDEX

### IDIO (Idiographic) mainframe software

- store the instruments for future use and reference.

The responses from the printed instruments were entered into the PC computer using a template instrument. Each instrument was designated a stem code based on sequence of the instrument, ethnicity, generation and gender of respondents. Multiple data files (protocols) were created from the many respondents who were transferred to the mainframe IDEX programmes. The IDEX-IDIO programme calculates empirically assessed indices for the individual case based on the value and belief system of the respondent. The resultant idiographic analysis can be:

- examined and interpreted in terms of theoretical postulates concerning process, structure and context in order to derive empirically grounded theoretical propositions for the individual.

- utilised to make comparisons between individuals and groups using the IDEX

NOMO (Nomothetic) computer software. As with the Idiographic case, examination of theoretical postulates with reference to the distinctive group commonalities of identity characteristics may lead to the development of empirically grounded propositions for the groups in question.

IDEX-NOMO (Nomothetic) permits collation of information derived from the IDEX-IDIO software for the comparative analysis of categories of respondents classified

according to the needs of the research, for example according to ethnicity, generation or gender. IDEX-IDIO normalises or standardises identity indices to scales so that they may be directly compared from individual to individual and group to group. Since the indices are standardised, any idiosyncrasies in respondents' different style in use of the rating scales or in different values systems of the respondents are eliminated. The following tasks can be performed on a set of data generated by the IDEX-IDIO programme:

- The tabulation of the mean values of these indices for each specified group according to the chosen criteria
- The graphical display of the mean values of such indices for selected groups.
- Analysis of variance
- The abstraction of specified indices for selected groups, to a separate data file, for further analysis by other statistical packages.

IDEX-NOMO was used to tabulate mean values of the indices for specified groups. Two way analysis of variance was computed and graphical displays of mean values were obtained for presentation using selected groups' criteria.

Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) examines the effects of independent variables on the dependent variable. As mentioned above, ANOVA is available within the IDEX-NOMO computer software. Three-way ANOVA was used to make comparisons

between Kashmiri older and younger individuals and Anglo-Saxon older and younger individuals for a general comparison between the two groups. Two way ANOVA was used to examine the interaction between the independent factors of generation and gender for the Kashmiri individuals on the different identifications (entities) using selected indices (dependent variable).

The target entities selected were current diffusion, past diffusion, current evaluation and past evaluation. A further eight indices were chosen in relation to selected entities. The indices chosen were ego-involvement, ideal identification, contra-identification, current empathetic identification, past empathetic identification, identity conflicts based on the current self, identity conflicts based on the past self, evaluation of self and others. The index of structural pressure was used to investigate the respondents' consistency in using the constructs and identifying the centrality of people's values and aspirations as they are represented by their constructs, or alternatively the uncertainty and evaluative inconsistency with which they hold and use them.<sup>29</sup> The results of analysis of variance and discussion are presented in chapters eleven and twelve.

### **III. SAMPLE CRITERIA**

The sampling criteria for the Biographical questionnaire and the ISA instrument was that wherever possible each Kashmiri household should contain individuals who were born in Azad Kashmir (older generation) and their offspring who were born in Britain

or came to live in Britain as babies or young children (younger generation). They were Muslim Kashmiris of both genders. The Anglo-Saxon sample was selected according to age. Individuals above thirty were considered to be older generation and those below thirty as the younger generation.

Given that the Kashmiri community's statistical profile is submerged within that of the Pakistanis it is impossible to look at probability based sampling techniques since it is not possible to extract data specific to Kashmiris. There are no accurate parameters for the population. Census data have traditionally formed one of the most important sources of information in this type of study. One problem encountered when using the census data is the problem of classification. There is a danger of generalising about groups which share a common classification. In the census, for example, people born in the New Commonwealth are classed as a single population but in reality this forms a broad group of people from well over twenty countries including India and Pakistan.

Similarly census data only provides us with estimates of the size and the location of the Pakistani community in Luton.<sup>30</sup> The Kashmiris are not referenced as a separate group and come within numbers enumerated as being Pakistani. Thus the census data can provide nothing more than an indication of the location of the Pakistani community in Luton of which a high proportion are Kashmiri. In view of this, extreme caution has to be used when using the census data for comparative purposes. Further, the Kashmiri community is not homogeneous but is composed of many clan groups

and Islamic denominations. This makes it impossible to obtain a structured sample and thus mitigates the use of probability sampling. There is also a widely held belief that some degree of under-enumeration of immigrant groups in the United Kingdom has occurred. Also the UK census only provides a decennial record, which significantly increases the unreliability of data.

A major technique used that can be used is of snowballing based on community networks where a few appropriate individuals have been located and then asked for the names of addresses of others who might also fit the sampling requirements. Ecob and William and Chaturvedi and McKeigue have highlighted the use of the electoral register in identifying Asian names. If this approach is repeated a number of times it can yield substantial numbers.<sup>31</sup>

Snowballing techniques have been widely criticised as not fully representing the population of concern. This type of community research is heavily dependent on the researcher's judgement because of the constraints over access as discussed previously. It is anticipated that by monitoring the responses it will be possible to obtain a fair sample of older and younger generation Muslim Kashmiris of both genders. Therefore the final sample will be representative within its own parameters in terms of information which should give an indication of both the diversity and commonality of views.

In an attempt to maintain this balance I tried to obtain as wide a spread of individuals as possible by using a second technique to complement snowballing. A variety of registers were used to map the location of Kashmiri families to give a spread beyond those produced through snowballing.

The electoral register of 1991 was used to determine the scatter of Muslim households in Luton. An analysis of names has often been used in community studies to provide community based sampling frames.<sup>32</sup> Many Muslim names are distinctive and easily distinguishable because of their Quranic origin. Households can be identified through their Muslim names. However there are significant methodological problems with using the electoral register:

- data becoming unreliable very quickly due to the movement of households
- under registration
- it has been difficult in distinguishing between Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Kashmiri names.

Another valuable information resource is the funeral register. There are several funeral committees in Luton serving each community. These committees take responsibility for sending back bodies to Azad Kashmir for burial. The committee has a concise list of names and addresses of Kashmiri households in Luton.

A third invaluable but little known data source is the Mosque Register. The Mosque register is used to record families that make regular monthly contributions (*chunda*) to the upkeep of the Mosque. To corroborate the information in the electoral register and to identify households that complied with the sample criterion, key members of the Luton Mosque committee who record this data were approached. Through their record keeping they have an intimate knowledge of each Muslim family in the area and were able to help in identifying Kashmiri households that reflected the requirements of the sample criteria. Such a compilation of data provides a unique body of information on residential distributions of Kashmiri households. They have not hitherto been adequately utilised in research of this type. Thus with the additional information from the internal community registers the data extracted from the electoral register can be reliably used to depict the spread of the Kashmiri community in Luton.<sup>33</sup>

There were however issues in using Mosque registers which a researcher needs to be aware of. In Luton for instance there are three main Mosques broadly reflecting particular ethnic nationalities and Islamic denominations. The information obtained from the initial open interviews was invaluable in identifying which Mosque reflected the overall Kashmiri religious commitment. With a few exceptions the majority of the Kashmiris identify with the Jammia Masjid which is the large purpose built central Mosque in “Bury Park”.

Having ascertained the spread of Kashmiri households in Luton the strategy was to collect data centrifugally. That means working from within the community building on links already established and networking the community. This involved some “cold calling” to complement the snowballing technique. The intention was to visit approximately thirty households in order to complete a biographical and identity instrument for two or three members within the household. The sample comprised 110 individuals. The table below shows the breakdown of data for the sample by ethnicity, generation and gender. A more detailed profile of the sample is provided in Chapter Ten.

Table 4.1: Ethnicity, Generation and Gender of the Sample. The sample of respondents who completed the biographical questionnaire and the ISA instruments.

	Kashmiris	Anglo-Saxon
Ethnicity	70	40
Gender		
Male	28	15
Female	42	25
Ethnicity x Generation		
Older Male	18	8
Older Female	19	15
Younger Male	10	7
Younger Female	23	10

As mentioned previously in addition to the above respondents I also collected data from 75 other respondents using an ethnographic methodology. This ethnographic data was collected in Luton during 1992-1996 and from Azad Kashmir during field trips in 1991 and 1996.

#### **IV. DATA COLLECTION**

Data collection used quantitative and qualitative methods. There are distinct advantages to be gained from the juxtaposition and integration of these two styles of research.<sup>34</sup> Quantitative and qualitative methods were also combined with a case study approach. "Using a variety of data collection techniques and methods allows more rounded, holistic study than with any other design".<sup>35</sup> Also "different kinds of information about man and society are gathered most fully and economically in different ways, and the problem under investigation dictates the methods of investigation"<sup>36</sup>

The first phase of the research involved "getting into" the Kashmiri community in Luton. Fundamentally, access involves getting permission to conduct research in a particular setting. This process involved negotiation and renegotiation with the "gatekeepers" of the community. The procedure of negotiation and renegotiation continued throughout the research. Commenting on Geer's work Van Maanen points out that access to the research site is not a one off event; it is instead a social process that occurs throughout the research project. Indeed the access that a researcher

obtains influences not only the physical accessibility but also the development of design, collection, analysis and dissemination phases of the investigation.<sup>37</sup> Gatekeepers are particularly important in relation to getting access to the community. In most cases they are able to determine the success or failure of a research project. This may hinder and control the direction of the research. In the course of the research gaining access of two types and was undertaken at different stages of the study:

- Gaining credibility from the community gatekeepers to gain access to Kashmiri households and to promote the legitimacy of the research. These gatekeepers were community leaders, leading members of Mosques, welfare organisations and political parties in Luton. All were men. These gatekeepers were the main source of initial contact into the community and offered the names and addresses of families who would be willing to co-operate with the interviews.
- Gaining credibility with household/family gatekeepers. Once the names and addresses of families had been obtained using the methods described above and from the community gatekeepers, initial contact was made by telephone and an appointment was arranged with families. It proved essential during the introductory conversation to mention where I had got the telephone number. Once families knew that community leaders, relatives or friends had recommended them, conversations

flowed more freely. Where telephone numbers were not supplied or were unavailable, visits were made unannounced. At times the women of the household were reluctant to be interviewed until the male head of the house had given his permission for the discussion to take place. Often I had to get the permission of the male head of the house before I could proceed with the interviewing. The household/family gatekeepers were usually the grandfather, father, eldest son or on occasion an uncle. In some cases negotiation was delayed by the household/family gatekeeper being unavailable. In such cases further appointments were made for a mutually convenient time. In only one case was permission for interview refused. The cause was stated as the male head of household not approving of the sensitive nature of the questions. Interviews with the Anglo-Saxon sample and the initial open interviews with women and offspring of both gender in settings other than the household did not necessitate negotiations with household gatekeepers and consequently were less time consuming.

The impact of the ethnicity, class, language and gender of the researcher are well documented as being potential barriers to research in particular environments. "Access is shaped by the cultural and ascriptive differences between the field researcher and the researched. Where these differences are minimal, access and even acceptance are likely to be enhanced, but where the differences are large, participation opportunities may be constrained severely and even eliminated"<sup>38</sup> "Literature on fieldwork processes does not adequately address all the specificities (entering the field, and developing relationships of exchange and trust) of conducting research with

ethnic minorities. Further there is very little information on the unique conditions faced by minority scholars conducting research in minority communities”.<sup>39</sup> Rhodes suggests that there has been little discussion in the British literature on issues of race and its role in the interviewing process.<sup>40</sup> American research has been more forthcoming on this debate and has highlighted the hostility and distrust among minority people towards researchers who are “outsiders”. For example Blauner and Wellman point to the growing hostility in many black ghettos.<sup>41</sup> Moore's account of the history of a study on Mexican Americans reveals community suspicion against Anglo researchers.<sup>42</sup> A common complaint was, “Why is it always Anglos who study us, why can't it be one of us?” Some of these suspicions can be overcome by being an “insider”.<sup>43</sup> Distrust can arise where individuals have “two mutually incompatible world views” Anderson references the work of John Gwaltney a black anthropologist who has written about the mistrust of white social scientists expressed by black men and women.<sup>44</sup> They reported, “I wouldn't want to talk to any anthropologist or sociologist or any of those others if they were white because whatever I said they would write down what they felt like, so I might as well save my breath”. Another said, “We know white folks but they do not know us, and that's just how the Lord planned the thing. Now you know they are great ones for begging you to tell them what you think. But you know, only a fool would really do that”. Black people may be inhibited in their communications to a white interviewer not simply because they feel that communications will be passed through a white cultural filter, but that there are dimensions of the black experience that are invisible to the white interviewer who

possess neither the language nor the cultural equipment either to elicit or understand the experience.<sup>45</sup> As Ladner points out “Blacks have always been measured against an alien set of norms. As a result they have been considered to be a deviation from the ambiguous white middle class model, which itself has not always been clearly defined”.<sup>46</sup>

To avoid research which has come across as racist and patronising proponents of anti-racist research in America and Britain have emphasised the importance of matching interviewers and respondents by a series of social characteristics such as race and more recently ethnicity. The idea has been for more inclusive research incorporating the experiences and perspectives of minority groups through the conducting of research by minority scholars themselves. Accordingly Blauner and Wellman point out that “there are aspects of the racial phenomena, however, that are particularly difficult, if not impossible, for a member of the oppressing group to grasp empirically and formulate conceptually”.<sup>47</sup> These barriers are existential and methodological as well as political and ethical. We refer here to nuances of culture and group ethos; to the meaning of oppression and especially psychic relations; to what is called the Black, the Mexican American, the Asian and the Indian experience.

Similarly Zinn argues that field research conducted by minority scholars with minorities has some empirical and methodological advantages which are summarised as follows. Firstly, the “lenses” through which they see social reality may allow

minority scholars to ask questions and gather information others could not.<sup>48</sup> “Undoubtedly, white social scientists are as capable of engaging in race research as their non-white colleagues even though their everyday experiences differ. However because they come to the task with different backgrounds they are likely to see different problems and pose different questions. The intellectual and practical concerns may overlap, yet their analysis and recommendations will almost necessarily differ insofar as these are tempered by differences in the individual sense of urgency and conception of the possible. The results of these differing perspectives for what appears as interpretations of the urban world are profound”.<sup>49</sup> Secondly, insider research is less apt to encourage distrust and hostility and the experience of being excluded from the communities or of being allowed to “see” what they want them to see. Thirdly, white researchers often lack insight into the nuances of behaviour. This is not to say that researchers who come from the community being researched do not experience problems. It is just that the problems are different.

As discussed above a sense of commonality in terms of racial identity and ethnicity with the respondents was very important. This was exemplified by one of the first questions the respondents, particularly the older generation, asked me: “Are you a Kashmiri?” which was closely followed by “Are you from Luton?” and “Are you a Muslim?” It was clear that the researcher's ethnicity was important to the respondents. Being from a similar culture (Pakistani origin) and common religion mattered to the respondents. Often initial conversations with community leaders, household/family

gatekeepers and the respondents involved a review of my own personal details. Discussion of family background, parental roots, parental residence, talk of religion, marital status were common. It was clear that I was being researched. No doubt my evaluation by the Kashmiri respondents affected the quality of the information they provided throughout the various stages of the research. Only when there was total satisfaction with my profile did discussions about the research interviews follow. I did not find this intrusive since it follows that if I was asking personal questions of them, they would do the same with me.

During interviews it was also clear that respondents felt at ease and placed considerable emphasis on common colour, culture, and religion, signifying existence within the same system. Implicit within this is similarity in rationalisation and understanding of their concerns and opinions. This formed an instant bond between the researcher and the respondents. If the researcher had not been from a similar culture and more importantly the same religion, access to the families and the respondents within the family would have been different, as would the direction of conversations and content of responses.

These sentiments were referenced in comments such as, “look I really don't mind telling you this because you're a black sister like me”. Mr F highlights the importance placed on race when he points out that, “I'm going to tell you this because you're not white. Whenever I talk to white people about these things they look at me as if I'm

some freak, they just don't understand where I'm coming from right". Another respondent commented, "Why are you asking me this? You should know what I'm going to say you're a Muslim aren't you?" With reference to construct six one young girl commented, "This is a really personal question. I like arranged marriages. Do you understand what I mean? They're not as bad as everyone thinks. Our parents only do the best for us. We're not forced like all white people think. You know what I'm talking about. I don't need to tell you because I know you understand". It was obvious that this young woman valued an interviewer from a racially and ethnically similar background when discussing such a personal issue. It is clear that ethnicity of the researcher and compatibilities of worldviews was important to the respondents.

The effects of different race and ethnicity of the researcher did not appear to cause hostilities from the Anglo-Saxon respondents. Discussions centred around my occupation as a researcher and a member of the University. Thus some transparency was maintained through similarities in status. Since emphasis was on occupation it could be argued that the emphasis here was on class rather than race or ethnicity.

There is a notion that "women are more 'natural' field workers since their traditional role in many societies is one of interaction and relationships".<sup>50</sup> This idea however has been based on the experiences of largely white European women researchers who have been outsiders. Although the marginality of black women scholars and their

status as “outsiders within” gives them distinctive advantage of race, class and gender, the experience of women's insider status may also affect data collection.<sup>51</sup>

The Kashmiris in Luton belong to a patriarchal Muslim society. In such society there are clearly delineated social spaces for men and women. Family roles are traditional and women are seen first and foremost as sisters, wives and mothers. Social interaction between the genders is not encouraged. Since as mentioned above the gatekeepers were men, there were some initial problems carrying out discussions about the research. My identity was perceived as a woman first and only secondly as a researcher and professional. Many respondents, usually the older men, questioned my role as a researcher as this broke from the traditional norms. This was most often referenced in comments of concern for my safety and the need for a male protector. For example, Mr W said, “A young women like you shouldn't be doing this type of job, it's not safe for girls to be on their own these days and it's not really very Islamic”.

Mr N said, “I'm not sure that education in our culture means that a young girl should be out and about on her own. It's important that we educate our daughters so that they can educate their sons but not so that they should go from home to home” Mr K commented that, “You really ought to have a husband or at least a brother with you, it just isn't right for you to be here on your own” One often quoted comment which

in essence sums up the above mentioned perceptions of women's role was succinctly put by Mr A who asked, "When are you going to settle down"?

Further problems were encountered when interviewing male members within households, particularly the younger male respondents. In some cases it was impossible to get a private interview. Often a female member of the family would be present during the interview. In some cases this discouraged discussion and honest responses to some of the more personal questions. One of the advantages of being a Muslim female researcher was that once the above concerns were eliminated I was readily accepted into the family and allowed to interact with all family members. Being accepted into the family home meant that I was also able to extensively observe family environment and family interactions. A male researcher would have been seen as more of a "threat" and not been given ready access to family homes, and certainly no access to the female family members of the household. A white female researcher might have been given limited access.

Due to these problems of accessibility, research on South Asian communities has often focused on the public arena rather than the private. This has led to misconceptions of the role of women in Muslim communities. Much research has given the impression of Muslim women's lack of agency and community participation, which has often led to a false impression of the dynamics of power within Muslim families. Certainly as with any community, oppression of women does take place,

indeed there is enough literature pointing to this.<sup>52</sup> Being a Muslim woman, speaking the language and understanding the dynamics of gender relations allowed me access into the private arena of the Kashmiri/Muslim community in Luton. This allowed me to understand the role of women and to contribute to acknowledging their extensive roles in British Kashmiri identity development. Linguistic differences were problematic. There were three dimensions to this: Problems with spoken language, the class dimension in the relationship between the researcher and the older respondents, and problems with written language.

### **A. Spoken Language**

My ability to speak Punjabi and Urdu was of great help since most Kashmiris in Luton speak a dialect of Punjabi. The socio-linguistic history of the area of Azad Kashmir is that most families speak varieties of Punjabi which are mutually intelligible.<sup>53</sup> It is true that in the initial stages of the research it was difficult to understand the dialect, which led to some difficulties in explanation and understanding responses. However these were overcome early on in the research as contact with respondents increased and I became increasingly familiar and comfortable with the Kashmiri dialect (*Pahari*).

### **B. Class Distinctions**

There was a class dimension to the relationship between me as the researcher and the older respondents. After initial conversations it became clear to respondents that I was a British born Pakistani of urban background whereas the older respondents were

of rural backgrounds. The rural, urban divide in Pakistan is one of the social indicators within Pakistani society. In many cases conversations were a mixture of Punjabi dialect, Urdu and English. Some individuals began to make conversation in a fragmented English although I made my introductions in Punjabi. On occasions this English would be interspersed with sentences in Urdu and then respondents would revert to English before returning to their obviously more comfortable Punjabi dialect. This together with reference to my privileged background, urbanised Punjabi and fluent English created perceptions of social distance between myself and the older Kashmiris. My experience made clear to me that research occurs within the context of power relationships. After all research does not occur independently of society's values and structures. To reduce these differences, wherever possible I emphasised similarities between myself and the respondents.

### **C. Problems with Written Language.**

As mentioned above the Kashmiris in Luton speak a dialect of Punjabi. It is not true to say that Punjabi does not have a written form. As with Urdu it can be written in the Perso-Arabic script. However, for most practical purposes, including surveys, it might as well not have written form since the Punjabi script is not used in Pakistan or Britain.<sup>54</sup> Although the local dialects of Punjabi are spoken in the home it was decided to offer the ISA instruments in Urdu rather than Punjabi. Urdu is the language of literacy. It is the national language of Pakistan and is used in Government offices and educational establishments. It is a language based on the speech of the (urban)

educated Muslims of northern India.<sup>55</sup> The research instruments were therefore bilingual, written in English and Urdu in order to optimise the meaningfulness of responses. However there were disparities in Kashmiri Urdu literacy, which raises major research issues.

The older generation men were able to read the written Urdu and the English. The younger generation of both gender were able to read the English but not the Urdu. However the older generation women were unable to read the Urdu or English. The women were illiterate in Urdu and English. Those who had been educated explained that their education in their villages of origin was an oral education rather than a written one. In these cases the questionnaire was answered verbally in the Punjabi dialect.

Other factors which affected the overall length of the interviewing process: the older generation respondents of both gender had difficulties in consigning their responses to paper. There appears to have been a psychological barrier. They were unwilling to make a written commitment to paper. There are three possible explanations for this: the sensitive nature of some of the questions; suspicions as to the end use of the research; but an often quoted reason was that this was 'something that they are not used to' since as mentioned above their education had been oral rather than written. In such cases I would verbally ask the question and then mark the instruments where the respondents indicated usually by pointing to the seven point centre zero scale. This

raises issues of the extent to which this type of research can be carried out by researchers from different backgrounds to the researched.

Often terms used whether in English, Urdu or the spoken Punjabi were not understood. In such cases I had to explain these terms often using examples. Hospitality meant that I was often offered tea and other refreshments. This was appreciated but prolonged the interviewing process. These combined factors meant that interviews took approximately an hour with native English readers and anything up to three hours with non English and Urdu readers. Throughout the data collection I emphasised commonalities between myself and the respondents and drew attention away from my British education and upbringing. I upheld and respected the nuances of etiquette. I wore Pakistani *shalwar kameez* throughout the research and where the situation required I wore the *dupata* to cover my head. I made my introductions in the Islamic way and addressed the respondents with the respect that one must accord to those elder and younger and male and female within Pakistani/Muslim society. Older male respondents were addressed as *sahib* (Mr), elder women as *khala*, younger men referred to as *paji* (brother) and women as *baji* (sister). Men and women closer to my own age or younger were referred to by name. In return I was referred to as *beti* (daughter) or *baji* (sister).

Coming from a similar cultural background, sharing the same faith, communicating in the same language, respecting the nuances of etiquette, spending time with

community leaders and socialising with the community in informal settings led to overall inclusion within the community. The following comments are typical. 'This young woman is one of our community daughters and we must help her with her work. She is one of our sisters'. Therefore early on in the research a strong relationship developed based on cultural, religious and linguistic similarities, leading to mutual respect and trust. The building of credibility to allow me to be accepted into the community networks has been vital. The relationship between the research worker and the person in the field is the key to effective interviewing. This often determines whether the door to research will be open or shut.<sup>56</sup> I relied heavily on community people's support. During the research I developed strong relationships with some of the families and in most cases became part of their lives. I attended weddings, *Eid* celebrations, many evening meals particularly for breaking of fast in the month of Ramadan and in two cases the celebration of the birth of children. All of these are occasions not to be taken lightly, and are events for family and close friends. I was always conscious of the exploitative nature of research and most often felt like the "special" and "privileged" insider.<sup>57</sup> I assisted some families with completing social security forms, applying to the university for a degree course, helping younger members of the family with homework, organising assertiveness classes for local community women, and in one case paying gas bills. Although this was not intended as part of the research it was a small attempt to reciprocate their help. In the event it actually helped to gather further information and through informal conversations to understand their overall concerns.

Whilst being an “insider” has been important in my research it has raised some issues. Researcher objectivity is often quoted as a problem of “insider” research. The implication is that the researcher should not make assumptions based on these commonalities. An important step has been to separate self from the research and to make no assumptions based on common background. This, however, is no different from any researcher working within their community. The other more significant issue has been one of responsibility and accountability to the Kashmiri people I have studied.<sup>58</sup>

## **VI. CONCLUSION**

The purpose of this chapter has been to highlight two major factors: firstly the need for an inter-disciplinary and multi-method approach to the study of identity and secondly the particularities of researching in the Kashmiri community, which questions the use of traditional research methods. Community research cannot rely on traditional methods of research such as probability sampling. This chapter has highlighted some original data sources, internal to the communities, which have hitherto not been adequately utilised in community research. This type of community based research is likely to be problematic for researchers who do not share cultural, religious or linguistic commonalities with the researched. To optimise interaction and produce valuable research the researcher needs to be sensitive to the researched communities’ belief systems. The researcher should exemplify as far as possible the

key values of the researched. In doing so the researcher is according them *izzat* and being sensitive to the belief systems that will optimise interaction. Being from the same community as the researched does raise issues of objectivity for the Asian researcher but this should not be overemphasised and it is no more a caution than that which is applicable to any researcher working within their own communities. It is not being suggested that all researchers should share ethnicity, class, language and gender with the researched. As a political strategy this would marginalise Asian issues and Asian researchers. What is being suggested, however, is that often in this type of community this type of research may be more appropriate. Having discussed the methodology that informed my research I now turn to the question of Kashmiri identity, specifically. In the next chapter I begin to draw out the main points of Kashmiri identity development.

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Burgess, 1984, p.32

<sup>2</sup> This was in addition to the 110 interviews carried out for ISA.

<sup>3</sup> The narratives collected during the two fieldtrips to Azad Kashmir and in Luton are presented throughout the research. They are also used to corroborate ISA data in Chapters eleven and twelve.

<sup>4</sup> Hughes as quoted by Gans, 1989, p.54.

<sup>5</sup> Gans, 1989, p.54.

<sup>6</sup> Frankenberg 1989, p.50.

<sup>7</sup> Nukunya in Burgess, 1984, p.23.

<sup>8</sup> See Suchman, Chapter 3 in Doby (ed.), 1967.

<sup>9</sup> Stephenson and Geer, in Burgess, 1984, p.22.

<sup>10</sup> In the critique of Orientalism pioneered by Edward Said, for example, he clearly demonstrates that being an outsider does not lead to a dis-interested analysis. It could be easily argued that outsiders are as likely to be influenced by their environment e.g. Universities, as insiders are to be influenced by the study situation. See Said, 1985.

<sup>11</sup> See Weinreich, 1980.

<sup>12</sup> In most cases older Kashmiris preferred to be interviewed in Punjabi. During the course of the interview however it was common that the language would change from Punjabi to English and vice versa depending on how fluent the particular respondent was in English. The younger Kashmiris spoke English. It is important to point out that interviews and conversations with Kashmiris in Luton and Britain have been important throughout the research and have been central to the subsequent chapters where Kashmiri narrative have been used to illustrate many theoretical points.

<sup>13</sup> Martin Blumer pointed out the importance of these in his first postulate of human action, which is, that human beings act toward things on the bases of the meanings that the things have for them. See Bulmer, 1986.

<sup>14</sup> This is similar to content analysis although within sociology this has been used most extensively to examine the content of communication; usually referring to documentary or visual material.

<sup>15</sup> See Doby, 1967, Lutz, Lockerbie, Chalmers and Hepburn, 1992 and Openheim, 1992.

<sup>16</sup> I discuss the pilot study later on in this chapter.

<sup>17</sup> The responses to the pilot questionnaire were analysed for use within a report used to transfer from MPhil to PhD registration but not used in the final analysis. It was felt that whilst they were useful as preliminary data changes made to the questionnaires would make them incomparable with the later questionnaires.

<sup>18</sup> With hindsight the final questionnaire was perhaps still a little lengthy and this was an often quoted complaint. A copy of the biographical questionnaire is available in Appendix

<sup>19</sup> One of the initial main problems with "on the spot" verbal translations of the questionnaire was the interviewer's lack of Punjabi and/or Urdu vocabulary to express what the questions were asking. Some questions were misinterpreted and in some cases the respondents placed emphasis on the wrong words. In such situations the respondent had to be guided to give the answer required. Hence, the responses had to be treated with care and any conclusions drawn must take this into account. Problems might have been reduced with the use of a tape-recorded questionnaire for respondents to follow or an Urdu translated questionnaire for non-English speaking respondents.

<sup>20</sup> Neil Frude, 1987.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> See Weinreich, 1980. Weinreich's *Manual for Identity Exploration* provides a comprehensive procedure for constructing ISA instruments.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

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<sup>26</sup> In retrospect a more explicit construct would have avoided some of these problems. The new IDEXWIN software allows the researcher to enter lengthy discourses as constructs which can then be printed as an ISA instrument.

<sup>27</sup> Weinreich would argue that this is not a design limitation and that it is rare for all entities to fall within the "range of convenience" of any one construct. He has commented that the centre-zero scale in this case is a merit of the instrument since the respondent may indicate where a particular construct does not apply to a particular entity. In my research however I found that some respondents found this confusing and delayed the completion of the instrument.

<sup>28</sup> There are a series of ISA instruction booklets. The functions provided by the IDEX-IDIO computer software can be found in the IDEX-IDIO Identity Exploration notes, Weinreich Gault and Asquith 1987. The functions provided by the IDEX-NOMO computer software can be found in Asquith and Weinreich 1987. In addition the IDEXPC user guide is useful. See Weinreich, Asquith, Liu and Norhover, 1991.

<sup>29</sup> Weinreich, 1989 (a)

<sup>30</sup> Estimates of the Pakistani population in Luton can be found in Bedfordshire County Councils', 1991 Key Statistics for Ethnic Groups in Bedfordshire.

<sup>31</sup> .See Ecob and William, 1991; Chaturvedi and Mc Keigue, 1994.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Again I followed the British Sociological Association's statement of ethical practice. Accordingly I recognise the importance of informed consent from those compiling these registers and of preserving the privacy of respondents at all stages of the research.

<sup>34</sup> See Burgess, 1986, pp.3-11

<sup>35</sup> Hakim, 1987, p12.

<sup>36</sup> Trow, 1947, p39.

<sup>37</sup> Van Maanen, 1991, p28.

<sup>38</sup> Stebbins, 1991.p. 26.

<sup>39</sup> Zinn, 1979, p 209.

<sup>40</sup> Rhodes, 1994.

<sup>41</sup> Blauner and Wellman 1973

<sup>42</sup> Moore's study is discussed in Zinn, 1979, pp210.

<sup>43</sup> Harris, 1987.

<sup>44</sup> Anderson, 1994.

<sup>45</sup> Rhodes, 1994.

<sup>46</sup> Ladner 1973 This inability or refusal to deal with blacks as part and parcel of the varying historical and cultural contributions to the American scene has, perhaps, been the reason sociology has excluded the black perspective from its widely accepted mainstream theories.

<sup>47</sup> Blauner and Wellman 1973, 329.

<sup>48</sup> Zinn, 1979, p.212. Zinn provides a particularly useful debate on the insider-outsider controversy. pp. 211-217.

<sup>49</sup> Ellis and Orleans, 1971.p. 18.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> See Zinn, 1979 for an elaboration of this point.

<sup>52</sup> See Knott

<sup>53</sup> Linguistic Minorities Project, 1984, pp 46-46.

<sup>54</sup> Rudat, 1994.

<sup>55</sup> Linguistic Minorities Project, 1984, pp. 45-46.

<sup>56</sup> Doby, 1967.

<sup>57</sup> See Blauner and Wellman, 1973, p.323 for a discussion on the importance of altering the exploitative nature of this relationship.

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<sup>58</sup> Throughout out this study I was very aware of the ethical issues surrounding the relationship between the researcher and the researched. In particular I was conscious of the exploitative nature of this relationship and the argument that minority scholars, through their research, are still working towards career advancements.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: MIGRATION AND IDENTITY**

### **I. INTRODUCTION**

In order to understand how Kashmiri identity has been transformed through settlement in Britain, it is necessary to understand what “Kashmiri” identity was prior to migration to Britain. In this chapter, I will present a “before” picture of “Kashmiriness”, so that the nature of changes that have taken place amongst the Kashmiri community and individuals is clearly seen. In other words, the main elements of the collective individual propositions of this study will be examined diachronically.<sup>1</sup> The aim is to present the main lines by which Kashmiri identity has been transformed in the movement from home (i.e. Azad Kashmir) and away (i.e. Luton).

### **II. THE CULTURAL NETWORKS OF HOME**

In Kashmiri society the home and the family unit form the focus of life. The family is a complex unit and many writings about ethnic minorities have adopted an essentialist and simplistic approach to the study of South Asian families. Often complex family situations have been diminished to the point where any explanations fail to offer any understanding or confer any positive regard for culture. It is not therefore my intention here to homogenise the Kashmiri family and reinforce essentialist constructions of the other. What is intended here is to offer some elucidation of the influences on Kashmiri family life. It is offered as an attempt to move towards acknowledging difference, accepting difference and

embracing difference through the adaptation of anti-racist perspectives on difference. This is perhaps not in itself enough for understanding identity but will create some awareness of the range of factors that affect its maintenance and reformation.

The form and functioning of the Kashmiri family are bound together by religion. The majority of Kashmiris from Azad Kashmir are Muslim. Like most religions Islam is a way of life and governs and affects moral and social order as well as family life. The Quran and the Hadith (teachings of the prophet Mohammad PBUH) lay out the particulars of Islamic family behaviour. Subsequent chapters make further reference to the religious component in Kashmiri life. The foundations of the family are seen in the extended family system, the importance of and respect for relationships within the family, *izzat* (honour), the continuation of religious heritage, and the adherence to eating and dress codes that have a religious as well as a social base.

Extended families are based on a set of kinship ties that exist between persons as a result of their genealogical connections, and also encompass affinal relations created by marriage and descent. The extended family may include several generations of family members. These may be immediate family, parents, siblings and their partners with their children and also grandparents, aunts, uncles and cousins.

The exact roles and responsibilities of members within the family are clearly delineated. This reinforces the nature of the relationships and special regard for family members. Elders within the family are treated with special respect and the younger siblings and women of the family protected. This ensures a sense of belonging and mutual need, and encourages family bonding. As Verity Saifullah Khan indicates, “relationships between the family are close, emotional, dependent, they are relationships of loyalty and obligation”.<sup>2</sup> It is frequently a three-generational unit that comprises the extended family unit, including grandparent(s), married son(s), their wives and children, unmarried sons and daughters and sometimes divorcees or widowed uncles or aunts.

The joint family members usually pool their resources and have common property. There could be some absent members of the family who work in a city or live in another country, such as Britain, but have the same status. No doubt, family composition changes over time. It changes according to the natural cycle of the family, some members die, others are born, daughters marry out and daughters in law come in, as it is a patriarchal family structure.<sup>3</sup>

Migration separates families but does not necessarily disrupt the workings of the extended family. The relationships that go beyond the extended family are regulated by the biraderi system. The word biraderi literally means brotherhood and is analogous to the clan system. It is this which shapes kinship networks beyond the joint-extended family. The Biraderi includes all persons who are able to trace their relationship to a common ancestor, however remote. It refers to all those belonging to a patrilineage and any non-related members who have become acquainted.<sup>4</sup> Anwar has suggested that often kinship-friendship networks are

undervalued [by external researchers] but are extremely important in the understanding of values and norms.<sup>5</sup>

Alavi explains *biraderi* as:

.....a descent group, including in principle all those between whom actual links of common descent can be traced in the paternal line, regardless of the number of generations that have elapsed. In this sense then the *biraderi* is indefinite in size.<sup>6</sup>

Alavi goes onto make an important point when he comments that a practical problem arises with *biraderis*, which is that written genealogies are not generally kept and without such records the boundary of the *biraderi* is determined by the limits of recognition.<sup>7</sup> As memory fails in tracing relationships beyond a few generations and with each successive generation, branches of distant kin tend to drift beyond the horizon of mutual recognition into separate *biraderis*. The genealogical depth of *biraderis* tends to be relatively shallow.

The concept of *biraderi* can be used in a number of contexts. For example, Blunt uses it to denote a group, which does not mean a specifically located ecological or geographical group.<sup>8</sup> Korson states that it includes not only the blood relatives but other people as well.<sup>9</sup> Anwar suggests that, in actual fact, where it ends depends on the person defining those he thinks belong to the *biraderi*. In practice it depends on the contact maintained with each other, the degree to which endogamy is practised, the frequency with which members meet and take decisions which affect the *biraderi* as a whole.<sup>10</sup> As Mr Y, a councillor in Roli village, indicated:

My *biraderi* can be [anyone] whose help I need or whoever needs my help. That person is not always known to me and my family, but someone somewhere will know of them. Well it's not a big place is it?

Anwar's point about *biraderi* being a function of the frequency with which members meet was further mentioned by Mr K who commented:

People make a big deal about the *biraderi*, between you and me, I'm always told. All the time that this man is a member of the *biraderi* and then I shake his hand and never see him again. I haven't got a clue who is in the *biraderi* and who isn't. It just seems to be anyone and well I suppose the more often you meet someone the more he's a part of the *biraderi*.

The *biraderi* functions as an institution of mutual aid. Interviews with members of the Kashmiri community who were visiting Azad Kashmir during the May-June 1996 field trip commented on its importance during the migration process. Recollecting his experiences of preparing for migration to Luton Mr L commented:

What would I have done without my brothers in my village? They told me about what it would be like in Britain and even helped me out with the cash. I hadn't seen that much money before. I was only a boy.

Mr T said:

I had no money and well there wasn't much hope here and they gave me money to travel and even bought me the clothes to wear.

The *biraderi* also functions as an emotional support as Mr H commented:

I was the eldest son, my father was dead and, well, I had to leave all my sisters behind and, well, it was the *biraderi* members who looked after them. I knew that they were safe and that helped me very much in the early years over there.

Mr H's eldest sister added the importance of the emotional and security factor when she pointed out:

To leave us young women behind was a big thing. I wanted him to go because we needed the money but it was bad because we were on our own here. Family helped but lots of men had gone as well from their families and, well, we had to rely on the good nature of our other brothers (*biraderi* members).

Biraderis do not always function as positive institutions. Interviews suggested that the *biraderi* bound individuals to the prevailing social mores and in some cases left them vulnerable. Those most affected were often women. The effect of these institutions and the migration process on women is under-documented in literature. Migration not only deprived villages of some of their potential labour but had huge implications for village women. The men who migrated were often the breadwinners of the family. Migration therefore deprived women of their economic source. There were further implications connected to the nature of society. Kashmiri society is patriarchal, where a woman's legitimacy within that order is governed by her role as a daughter who is protected by her father and brothers, as a wife protected by her husband and as a mother protected by her sons. Women are seen as the bearers of *izzat* and men are defenders of *izzat*.

Migration from Azad Kashmir led to the breakdown of these systems. Women's economic positions were altered and they became more vulnerable. Often changed circumstances led to the questioning of a woman's role within the extended family, and the questioning of her honour by *biraderi* members. This was particularly the case with the daughter-in-law of the family and where men

had not yet started sending money home. This point was summarised by Mrs T when she said:

Your *izzat* is with a man at your side, no one takes you seriously otherwise and they all look at you with a bad *nazar* (look). It doesn't matter who they are, they all think like each other.

Many women talked of the adverse effects of migration. Everyone had experiences or knew of someone in the village who had problems during this time. As Mrs D discussed:

When my husband died and I had lots of little children and they (members of the *biraderi*) sorted out my life and said that I should marry the cousin and I said that I didn't want to, they said that it was everyone's decision. I didn't want it but I couldn't say anything to them. I was told that they were doing the best for me.

Mrs G talked extensively of her experiences after her husband migrated to Britain in 1969:

He promised, of course that he would send for me once he was settled over there you know when he had some money. The money came but it went straight to his brothers. They didn't give me anything of it. My children had to work to get food and always letters came to tell me that he will call for me. I knew he was sending money but nothing was happening and then one day I told one of the men in the village to help me, he was an older man. They (husband's brothers) just went mad saying that who was I to complain and that he was doing the best for his family and supporting his family.

Financial limitations and time constraints in the early years of migration meant that many men could not return to their homes. Long separations from wives meant that in many instances men took second wives in Britain, which caused tensions when news reached home. Mrs B told me:

She was such a pretty little girl when he went away. She was from another village and they (her in-laws) didn't treat her very well

and then when he went away they wouldn't even give her milk. He came only once and she got to have a baby and then they found out that he was married again and they said it was her fault.

In other cases men would return home for several weeks and during these stays women would become pregnant. Despite having members of the extended family and *biraderi* there for support it was clear from conversations that nothing could compensate for having the husband and father present. When husbands returned to Britain to work the women were left to bring up their children. Mrs Y commented on these problems:

I feel so bad saying this but look you know how things are with our people. It wasn't that bad at first but then I would spend all day doing the family member thing. It was in my mind but I felt part of the family again. Then I was going to have a baby and I was part of the family again but then he went back and I was on my own again. It was hard those years.

Overall then the *biraderi* functions as an institution of mutual aid in times of need. This may include financial aid, particularly significant during the early migration years; emotional support at difficult times such as those associated with the migration process mentioned above; reprimanding members of the family; at the deaths of loved ones and at weddings and births. In its unadulterated form it can be seen as legitimising solidarity for families and normative obligation to members within those families.

One way of cementing relationships with *biraderi* members is through the exchange of gifts. Unless financial, gift exchange is usually administered by the older women of the *biraderi*. Gifts are offered and exchanged at births, deaths,

marriages, visiting family and biraderi members, and at religious occasions such as *Eid-ul-Fitar* and *Eid-ul-Haj*. Both Alavi and Anwar refer to this as *vatan bhanji* but in everyday Kashmiri vernacular it is simply referred to as *lena-dena* which literally means to get and to give.<sup>11</sup>

It is important to point out however that an essential obligation of *vatan bhanji* is the obligation to reciprocate. It is not usual for this exchange to take place at the same occasion. Gifts may be reciprocated at another occasion. It may be for the same amount or significantly more than what was received. Mrs G pointed out that:

“*Lena-dena* can be anything really. I can give some milk or some money to a family but they don't have to give me milk or money back. They can just do something for me like get me wood or help me do something in my house that I cannot do myself.”

At weddings and when children are born we give clothes or these days just some money because people don't always like the gifts. Money is better. At weddings there is always someone to write down the money we give so that that family will know in the future which family has given what so that when someone from that family gets married they will be given something back.

Interviews suggested that *lena-dena* from *biraderi* members was particularly important during the migration years, since *biraderi* members often gave financial support to each other which was not necessarily reciprocated in monetary terms. For families that remained behind it was a further source of support. For all those involved it also functioned as an institution of belonging. As Alavi points out, it functions as the *biraderi* of participation.<sup>12</sup>

Villages in Mirpur and Kotli districts are small and residents are members of one or two extended families. They also considered themselves to be part of the *biraderi* that extends outside of the family and goes beyond the village area. Biraderi also functioned further afield, encompassing individuals, families and whole villages in neighbouring areas. Large-scale migration from these regions has meant the formation of transnational *biraderis* where although members live thousands of miles away they remain in close contact attending important functions back in their villages.

Alavi points out that numbers as well as physical distance impose limits on *biraderi* organisations and the social interaction which keeps mutual recognition alive.<sup>13</sup> However, in the case of the Azad Kashmiris who have migrated to Luton, the continuation of *biraderi* systems, despite the problems of distance, appears to have secured their primordial loyalties back to the *biraderi*-based social organisation within their villages and towns of origin. It has ensured that assimilation does not take place in the new British context in which they are now settled.

Biraderis can be identified through names. All *biraderi* members belong to a *Zat*, which is generally accepted as an endogamous group: a “kindred of recognition”.<sup>14</sup> All biraderis have *zat* names and such names are used as surnames to identify biraderis. It is, however, important to point out that surnames and *zat* cognomens are not always mutually exclusive and intimate

details of biraderi organisation within specific locations are often necessary before making associations. However, through links with the Kashmiri community in Azad Kashmir and Luton it is possible to identify the main *biraderis* from which migration to Luton has taken place<sup>15</sup>.

Many of the migrants from Azad Kashmir are *Rajput*. The *Rajputs* claim to be from the princely lineages in Kashmir, namely Hari Singh, and converted to Islam when Mohammad Bin Kasim brought Islam to the region. They were the large land ruling classes in Kashmir and amongst Kashmiris their names are usually prefixed with Raja, which literally means prince, for identification. The *Maliks* in the region were the *Jagirdars* (landlords) for the *Rajas*, working primarily as ministers and accountants managing the lands. The *Raja* and *Malik zats* and biraderis are heavily represented in Luton. The *Jats* are also represented and *Gujar zats* are less represented but nevertheless significant. The *Jats* are primarily large landowners and farmers and the *Gujars* are small landowners, primarily shepherds and nomads. In Luton many of the *Chowdry biraderi* are from the *Jat* and *Goojar zats*. The other main *biraderi* represented are the Butts who are also from the *Jat zat*. They generally worked for the *Maliks* on the land but were also clerks and small business owners. The *zat* system is often likened to the Hindu caste system. Khan for instance points out that:

“Although the caste system is rejected in Islam there are clear vestiges of the pre-partition social structure. Notions of purity and pollution, restricted commonality and certain other features of the caste system are less evident in Mirpur but there is a general hierarchy of castes”.<sup>16</sup>

Alavi disagrees with the notions of caste as he points out that:

Not simply because the religion of Islam does not sanction it, that is an ideological view [shared by many Pakistanis] because it is based not upon the observation of society but upon the interpretations of ideas and ideals without reference to social realities. The central criteria of caste-orientated behaviour, namely that of ritual pollution and associated purificatory rites, do not exist. No dietary restrictions differentiate people with different *zat* names nor are there any restrictions on commensality. There is no hierarchy of castes. High status is accorded to the *Sayyids* who claim descent from the sons of Fatima the Daughter of the Prophet Mohammed. But such status is accorded to them in Arab society also: but that society is not organised on the basis of caste.<sup>17</sup>

Indeed interviews also reaffirmed Alavi's observations. Mr I commented that "there is no caste in Islam, it is prohibited and one's *zat* group does not mean one's *biraderi*". Mr H presented an Islamic reasoning for marrying into one's own *zat* when he said:

Look the Quran doesn't say anything about *zats* but the Hadith says that we should marry within our kind to avoid discrimination and things like that. Marrying into your own *zat* is suggested as being good for daughters because then they will be with their own kind and know all the systems and things like that.

*Zat* does however become important for marriage arrangements as it defines the boundaries of looking for marriage partners. As Mrs D highlighted:

When my daughter gets married she will get married within our family to a cousin or if she doesn't want that then within our *zat*. I don't care where he's from. He could be a Malik from Britain for all I care but it's better that he's from our *zat* because then we know the customs and things like that and she will know how to behave and then have respect because she is the same.

Marriages within Kashmiri Muslim society tend to be consanguineous and take place within the extended family or *Biraderi*. The first "port of call" for choosing

a marriage partner is to turn to the prospective partners' brothers or sisters to make a match. Often "brothers and sisters expect to be given the right of first refusal in offers of marriage for each other's children, so much so that rejection causes great offence. It is often regarded as a repudiation of the obligation of siblingship itself".<sup>18</sup> Only if suitable partners are not available will parents look elsewhere. Mrs T explained the reasoning behind exogamous marriages:

It is best to marry into your own family. Look put it this way if my daughter marries my brothers' son then everything will be in the family. She will know her parents-in-law as she has been brought up with them and they will know her. She will know their ways because they are the same as our ways. It will be so easy for her to be accepted and be happy.

Ballard points out that "one common suggestion is that it is a tactical response to Islamic law of inheritance, which makes daughters heirs as well as sons so by marrying patrilateral cousins, men can ensure that property does not slip beyond the control of the descent group."<sup>19</sup>

Interviews did not suggest this to be the case directly but certainly the cost of the marriage was often mentioned as less when family members were involved because there was less of a need to impress. Although this was not seen as an incentive it was considered an advantage. This was not always the case however as Mrs D commented:

Look you have to look after your own better than others otherwise it causes big problems later. Brothers and sisters can be the worst. Mostly it is good because your sisters and brothers will treat your children well; after all they are their nephews and nieces as well. When something goes wrong in the marriage they will help because it is their *izzat* as well as ours: we are the same family.

Also there is more love because when children are born they belong to all of us and they increase the bonds between the family.

Where family members are not available suitable matches will be sought within the *biraderi*. Suitable matches may be made between two families who have high respect for each other. Marriages are overwhelmingly arranged within the same *zat* in Azad Kashmir. Overall, marriages are seen as consolidating relationships within the family or between two families. Whatever the marriage mores, families, *biraderis* and *zats* remain important in Azad Kashmiri society. Socio-cultural, economic and political affiliations and solidarity are functions of the organisation of the *biraderi*.

As with the extended family, roles and relationships within the *biraderi* are clearly delineated. *Bazoorg* (elders) within the *biraderi* are treated with respect. Matters affecting the family and *biraderi* are discussed with the *bazoorg* whose advice is highly valued. "Respect for old age and traditional authority are enjoined by religious beliefs and are part of the local traditions"<sup>20</sup> The *bazoorg* within family and *biraderi* can be both men and women. Although much of the literature on the South Asian family identifies the patrilineal social organisation, very often the role of women is ignored or undermined. General perceptions of the role of women in Muslim society centre around issues of submission to patriarchy, limited freedom of speech and subordination. The status of women within Islam is discussed below in more detail but here it is important to identify the role of women within Kashmiri social organisation (in Kashmir).

Within Muslim society there are clearly delineated social spaces for men and women and indeed the “ethics” of interaction between the genders are also clearly defined. Since many of the Kashmiri women who have migrated to Britain are from this society they carry with them these mores. The importance of the male and female domains and the relationship between the two as a mutually stabilising organisation are underestimated within the literature. Misunderstandings arise from lack of access to the female domain. Limited access by male researchers, non-Muslims, as well as white female researchers, has led to these misunderstandings.<sup>21</sup>

Dahya is one writer who has underestimated if not ignored the female role in social organisation when he writes that:

The head of the family exercises control of the family members and manages the property and the distribution of resources for the domestic needs of its members. He is responsible for the handling of the family's funds, for arranging marriages for his sons and daughters and for his grandchildren, if any, and for undertaking economic ventures in the interest of the family. He represents the family in its dealings with all outside authorities and makes decisions in all matters affecting the social-economic life of the family members. He is the decision-maker for the family. It is believed that he knows what is best in the interest of the family.<sup>22</sup>

Access into the female domain revealed that in Kashmiri society as in much of Muslim society the woman's role is indispensable within the home. She is first and foremost responsible for the smooth and efficient running of the home. This includes attending to her husband's needs, her children's needs and those requirements of the extended family. Her role further extends into the female

domain of the *biraderi* where she maintains family contact with other women and through her social skills ensures the continued and enhanced respectability of her family within the *biraderi*. This is vital for one of her most important roles: that of arranging marriages. Interactions are social and can range from the very informal practice of sitting and talking with other women after the evening meal or dropping in on each other during the day, to the more formal practices of attending religious gatherings, engagements, weddings, births, funerals. All however are equally important to the reputation of the family. Indeed it is the women that carry out much of the *lena-dena* mentioned above. As Mrs G pointed out:

If you don't go to pay your respects when someone in the *biraderi* has died, then well you're just not seen to be very good and you get shunned and so does the family and then you won't be respected.

Mrs Y commented:

We must attend things like funerals because we represent our families at weddings and things like that and if we don't then we will be seen as a poor family and no one will want to marry their son or daughter into our family. We will not be seen as *khandani* people.

As Mr F pointed out:

I go and work and only see the men and we talk of money and business and politics. If it wasn't for my wife, how would I know what was going on in the community? You know - who was marrying who and that sort of thing, and that's more important than anything else sometimes.

Much of the interaction depends on interpersonal skills. These are usually taught to succeeding generations of women and are vital for good marriage prospects, as

Mrs B pointed out:

Everyone wants a daughter-in-law who knows how to talk properly and who knows the etiquette about *betna-utna* and things. So I have to teach my daughters this otherwise no one will want them. If a daughter is able to do all of this it increases the *izzat* of the family at the end of the day.

As with the male members of the family and *biraderi*, as the women get older so does the respect accorded to them by younger members. Generally speaking, the older the woman the more power and control she has within the female domain and the *biraderi* as a whole. Older women are able to transcend the boundaries of the male and female domains and often act as mediators between the two. Social limitations on women are reduced as they get older, since they are seen as less sexual. Mr H commented that:

I don't run this house really. I'm here to make the final decisions and all of that really. My mother and wife have already made all of the decisions before they even get to me.

Mr Y said:

What would we do without our Grandmother? Whenever there needs to be a marriage arranged she does it. Whenever there is a problem she sorts it out. She is in charge really.

Although the level of control that Mr H and Mr Y talked about is not necessarily the norm in most families, it was clear through interactions with families in Kashmir that women were far from being the subordinate partners in Kashmiri household organisation. However Mrs D made an important point:

Look they are the kings of their kingdoms. We cannot say anything to them concerning their business. We can say but they know best about those things because they have been taught about them and we about ours so it's best that people stay with what they know.

It is clear from Mrs C's comments that it is essential that etiquette and decorum is maintained for a harmonious system. To the untrained observer the spatial manifestation of the separate male-female domains has been seen as seclusion. In many homes in Azad Kashmir there are separate quarters for social interaction with non-family members, usually called the *baiithak* (front sitting room). The *baiithak* is usually at the front or side of the house with a separate entrance to maintain the privacy of other family members. Here non-family male members of the community can be entertained without unnecessary interaction with female members of the family.

In Azad Kashmiri society then it has tended to be the men who were the economic earners and women who played central roles in the running of homes and looking after children and livestock. The woman's role was central and essential for the functioning of the Kashmiri *biraderi*. Interaction between men and women does take place, but according to the cultural and religious etiquette.

For Azad Kashmiris much of their identity is located with the significant others, namely immediate family, extended family, and kinsmen making up the *biraderi*. As noted by Dahya, "in the villages I visited a person's identity stemmed primarily from his family, his group of kinsmen and his allies, both in his own

village and in neighbouring ones.”<sup>23</sup> As well as the political situation in Kashmir and *biraderi* systems religion is also a pivotal identifier for community organisation in Azad Kashmir.

### **III. RELIGIOUS NETWORKS OF HOME**

Religious ideology has played a major role in the creation of the South Asian subcontinent as it is observed today. At a more localised level religion has been a focus for the specificities of the form and functioning of community. That is, the Kashmiri family and *biraderi* are bound together by religion.

Formation of religious leadership and associated cultural formations, which have their origins in Azad Kashmir, have directly contributed to settlement and the associated community formation in Britain. The religious beliefs carried and transferred through the migration process have had a direct impact on the specificities of Kashmiri British identity formation.

It is not my intention to present the basic tenets of the Islamic faith since this space has been more than adequately filled by other writers.<sup>24</sup> What is intended is presentation and analysis of the origins of the character of Islam and the significant spiritual and psychological aspects of the form of Islam specific to the Azad Kashmiris now settled in Britain and Luton. Implicit within this therefore is the idea that there are significant differences in the forms of Islam practised by Muslims. Before embarking on the differences it is necessary to present those aspects of Islam that are universal. The overwhelming majority of Kashmiris are

Muslims. Islam is a monotheistic faith and lies within the Abrahamic tradition.

Fundamental to all Muslims is the concept of Allah.

The God of Islam is transcendent, the all-powerful and all knowing Creator and Lawgiver, though at the same time infinitely merciful, generous and forgiving. Man, His creature His servant into whom He has breathed something of His spirit, stands before him without intermediary or intercessor, meeting Him through prayer during this brief life on earth and meeting Him face-to-face when his life is over. In Islam God does not embody himself in a human being to make Himself accessible through idols and images. He is what he is, absolute and eternal.<sup>25</sup>

The words of Allah are written in the Quran, as revealed to the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). The Quran, the Hadith (teachings of the prophet Mohammad (PBUH) and the Sunna (actions of the Prophet, PBUH) lay out the particulars of Islamic life. The Quran refers to Islam as *din* (a way of life). Islam affects moral as well as family life and social order. The foundations of the family and social organisation with the importance of the extended family unit; the importance of and respect for relationships within the family with its explicit reference to the nurture of others within that family unit; *izzat*; the continuation of religious heritage; adhering to gender, eating and dress codes - all have a religious as well as a socio-cultural base.

Islam is united in the belief and practice of its five pillars. The Prophet's last address at Arafat on his final pilgrimage before his death in 632, sums up the essence of Islam where he identifies the five pillars of Islam:<sup>26</sup>

O people, indeed your lives, your properties and your honour are sacred and inviolable to you till you appear before your lord. O people! Be conscious of God. And even if a mangled Abyssinian

slave becomes your leader harken to him and obey him as long as he establishes and institutes that Book of God. Worship your Lord and Sustainer. Perform your five daily salat (prayer). Fast your month [of Ramadan]. Make pilgrimage to your House [the Kabbah at Makkah]. Pay the Zakat on your property willingly and obey whatever I command you. Then will you enter the Paradise of your Lord and Sustainer.

Despite common belief in Allah and the Islamic ideals, “in practice, political and historical factors have helped to create differences within the community which are essentially of a social and cultural nature.”<sup>27</sup> There are two broad sects within Islam, namely the Sunnis and the Shias, and various schools of thought have emerged from these particular Islamic leanings.

Both Shias and Sunnis believe in the five pillars of Islam but there are many conceptual and ritual differences, which have emerged over the centuries. Akbar Ahmed succinctly summarises the conceptual differences and these are identified below.

The essence of the difference lies with the Shia concept of the Imamate as distinct from the Sunni concept of the Caliphate. The Caliph is the elected successor to the Prophet with regard to political and military leadership but not to the religious authority of the Prophet, whereas the Imam is both political leader and religious guide and is the interpreter of God's will as formulated in Islamic Law. It is this Shia concept of religious authority that is unacceptable to the Sunnis who believe such authority lies with the consensus (*ijma*), that is the consensus of the *ulema*, the traditional religious scholars. Further differences arise because Sunnis believe that the God's laws in the Quran and Sunnah ended with him whilst the Shias believe that God would not leave them without guidance. Thus Imams are seen as the guides who are sinless because God is guiding them. Shias believe that Ali was the favoured successor and that he was rightfully the first Caliph. The martyrdom of Ali and his son Hussain are seen by Shias as personifying their history, which is seen as a history of the

struggle of an oppressed and disinherited community trying to restore God's way against evil. Sunnis on the other hand take the opposing view and see early Islamic power as signs of God's guidance and rewards to the faithful community as well as the validation of Muslim beliefs and claims<sup>28</sup>

There are many other differences between the Sunnis and the Shias, which centre on ritual differences. These are complex and beyond the scope of this study.

Shia Islam has its largest following in Iran. Although it has a significant presence on the South Asian Sub-Continent its followers are outnumbered by the Sunni majority. Within Sunni and Shia branches of Islam there are several schools of religious thought and distinct traditions. In Azad Kashmir the majority of Sunnis belong to the Barelwi tradition. This particular strand of Islam and its dominance within the subcontinent is widely attributed to the influence of Sufism and Ahmad Raza Khan (1856-1921) with his ardent defence of Sufistic practices against the increasing attacks by the reform groups at the time. Indeed it was Ahmad Raza Khan who cultivated the Barelwi tradition and established a common identity.

The Sufis have played a significant role in the Islam practised in Azad Kashmir. Popular images of the spread of Islam centre on military conquest. However some commentators question the validity of this consensus. For instance Khan points out that the Sufis often served in the armies and helped them in their campaigns and had the task of bringing Islam to the hearts and souls of the

people.<sup>29</sup> They were particularly significant in bringing Islam to remote rural areas where many of the Muslim armies did advance.

Gellner has identified differences in the types of Islam practised in rural and urban areas. Geaves discusses Gellner's analysis and sets out his two sets of characteristics, which he claims distinguishes urban and rural forms of Islam.<sup>30</sup> This analysis is particularly significant in the case of the Azad Kashmiris who as we have seen above migrated to Britain from the rural areas, and it helps in understanding their particular form of Islam.

Urban Islam in Gellner's analysis is characterised by: strict monotheism; puritanism; stress on scriptural revelation and therefore on literacy; egalitarianism amongst the believers and consequently an absence of human mediation and its accompanying hierarchy; a minimisation of ritual or mysticism and focus on sobriety and moderation; and finally the stress on rules rather than emotional states. Rural Islam is characterised by: a tendency towards this-world and other-world hierarchies; a reliance on human intermediaries in this world and a hierarchy of spirits in the other; the development of perceptual symbols and images rather than the abstract word, which leads to a multiplicity of ritual and mystical practices; and finally towards personalities rather than a set of rules. This analysis is based on the argument that rural Muslims require spiritual mediators because illiteracy renders the abstract reasoning of trained *ulema*

beyond them. Further they require the mediators to define the norms of tribal life.<sup>31</sup>

In Azad Kashmiri society these mediators are known as *Pirs*. These are usually men who have received the veneration of villagers. They are individuals who are deemed to have a special connection with God. They are blessed individuals who have *karamat* (supernatural powers) to help alleviate their followers' problems through *barakat* (the power to bless). *Pirs* usually travel from village to village often stopping in a particular village for a while. Villagers then come to a *Pir's khanaqah* or *dargah* (shrine) to ask advice and seek solace. Often this is presented in the form of *ta'widhs* (amulets) which contain some specific Quranic verse thought to be appropriate for the particular ailment.

“Spiritual powers are not lost after the death of the *Pir* but claimed by his successor known as the *pirzade*. This is usually by stressing blood ties to the saint himself or to his immediate successor. The main duties of the successor are to cherish the memory of the dead saint”<sup>32</sup>. Over the centuries there have been many prominent *Pirs* in the Azad Kashmir area, who have gathered large followings. The *Nakhsbandi*, *Chisti* and *Quadiri tariquas* are three that have the largest *silsilah* of followers from the areas from which migration to Britain has taken place.

Geaves points out that the Barelwi tradition is the only major nineteenth century Islamic movement in the subcontinent whose teachings were not derived from the ideas of Shah Wali-allah.<sup>33</sup>

Rather than emerging out of a desire to change standards of religious practice, they adhered to the custom-laden style of Sufism and closely allied themselves to the teachings of the medieval *Pirs*. The Barewalis can be seen as a conscious reaction to the Deobandi reformers.<sup>34</sup>

The Barelwi tradition is strongly represented, although not exclusively, in the migrant communities of Azad Kashmir and consequently in Britain and Luton. *Pirs* sometimes travel to British cities with their disciples to speak to their followers. Notification of visits usually passes from one family to another and meetings are usually held in local community halls or in people's homes. To welcome a *Pir* to one's home is highly revered in Kashmiri society. From interviews with Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir and migrants now settled in Luton it was apparent that this particular form of Islam was used to reinforce a religious identity. This was perceived as different from other Muslims in Britain, particularly the Punjabis, and as such it reinforced identification with migrants' villages in Azad Kashmir. Mr K commented:

We can't be confused with all the rest of them. I mean we are Muslims we know that but we are different and well it's got a lot to do with where we come from. If my family didn't have a *Pir* then we would be different we would think different.

Mrs J said:

In Britain other Muslims look down on us because we follow our *Pirs*. We follow the Naksbundis. They think that we are worshipping idols and look down on us and I've even heard them

call us *Kafirs* (non believers). They shouldn't do that because we are all Muslims.

Mrs D commented on the 'changes' in her daughter:

My daughter thinks that all this visiting *Pirs* and things is a waste of time and that they are just out to get money from us. Our youngsters think that they don't need help from these people because they can get it from God. All this going to these Muslim women's things is making them look down on us. They say we are *unpar* and *jahil*. It's tough coming from your kids.

Mr K and Mrs J's comments indicate some of the potential sectarian problems that are impacting on the British scene and which have been particularly significant in the formation of community. Mrs D's comments are particularly significant to the understanding of changes in religious identification amongst migrants and the Kashmiri British youth.

As well as understanding the rural and urban particularities of Islam it is also important to make distinctions between the private and the public Islam. Identification with *Pirs* forms a part of the public Islam easily identifiable to outside observers. As well as following particular *Pirs* and organising around this particular identity, another focal point of public religious activity in Azad Kashmir is the local village Mosque. Here the Imams lead the congregation to prayer five times a day and particularly on Fridays at the *Jumma* prayer. As well as leading prayers, the Imam is responsible for sermons on special days, the day to day functioning of the Mosque and the religious instruction of the village children. In many cases he also acts as the mediator between different village groups. The role of the Mosque is primarily religious, but another important role

is as an arena where discussion of various important issues, such as for example debates and discussion of politics, can take place between and within biraderis. Many of the Mosques built in villages in the Kotli and Mirpur district were initiated by local *Pirs* and funded by the local communities or devotees of the particular *Pir*. Often one or two *biraderi* groups would share the same Mosque in the village.

Islamic expression was widely visible throughout Azad Kashmir with large numbers of Mosques and shrines dotted all over the landscape. Various villagers pointed out that Kotli district is often described as the city of Mosques. Each has a separate character reflecting the Imam's or founder's particular style. Public manifestation of religious identity helps maintain a common religious identity and at the private level Islam gives a sense of belonging, values and morality to the individuals.

Although as mentioned above women tend to have a separate, usually private domain, in rural Azad Kashmir women also partake in public religious activity. Although it is not the custom for women to attend Mosques at prayer time, they usually pray at home on their own or in groups. Women also attend *Pirst* shrines and thus play an important role in consolidating identity. One interesting point was highlighted by Mr D of Roli village:

When I was young we used to have just a very small shelter-like Mosque here where we would pray. It was very small and it was for all of us and then people from here started to go away and send

money back to their *Pir* you know it's *sawab* to do that. We Muslims have to do that you know like paying *zakat*. The people here are very religious so they all do that. Some women even sell their jewellery and give it to the *Pirs* for their Mosques and shrines. Then it started getting bigger and better - the Mosque. We are very proud when your grandson sends money for the Mosque.

Mr D's experiences of witnessing the changes in his Mosque suggest another direct impact of remittances from Britain and Luton. Mrs H indicated that:

These *Pirs* or their disciples come to the UK to collect money to build their Mosques and shrines back home. Didn't you know this? You must know this? They are everywhere. Sometimes you don't know who is real and who just wants money to make his own name big back home. I don't know what to do sometimes but my mother-in-law always says that we have to help God's men.

The motives of *Pirs* was often commented upon by Kashmiri youth in Luton as one of the reasons for moving away from what one young respondent Shahid called "ego Islam". His sentiments and those of other young British Kashmiris are discussed in more detail in relation to Islam in Luton.

For now at least we can note the importance of remittances, visits and associated collections. They have the effect of maintaining religious identity and more particularly ensure that the specific Barelwi traditions are maintained. What is apparent is that "it is a strand of Islam that is inextricably interwoven with the customs pertaining to ethnic origin".<sup>35</sup> The following chapter presents an analysis of how this particular form of Islam is expressing itself within the Luton context. It considers its salience within the Kashmiri community; and its future role in identity maintenance in the face of the demise of cultural forms of Islam. These

have declined in favour of identifications with a more orthodox global Islam. Before moving onto this, however I want to turn to the political identity at home.

#### **IV. POLITICAL IDENTITY AT HOME**

Preceding sections have outlined some of the significant details pertaining to economic conditions, socio-cultural factors and religious belief which appear to be significant during the migration process and that have contributed to the transfer, construction and redefinition of identity within the new British context. Whilst acknowledging differences between the South Asian communities settled in Britain it would be correct to say that Kashmiris share the above experiences with other South Asian communities settled in Britain. Research suggests that it appears to be the unique political identity of Kashmiris that differentiates them from other South Asian groups settled in Britain and particularly from the Pakistani group with whom as discussed above they have been categorised for academic as well as policy reasons. The political dimensions to migration and identity have often been under-emphasised within literature.

In much of the literature on Pakistani migration to Britain the economic factors have taken precedence. Invariably they have been the focus of research, and political factors in migration have been under emphasised. This is not surprising since as mentioned above there have been long traditions of economic migration from these regions. However for Kashmiris there has been a significant political dimension that has affected and is affecting identity formation and reformation.

In the 1950s and early 1960s an important political dimension to migration from Azad Kashmir was the construction of the Mangla Dam. Some Kashmiris displaced by the construction of the Dam see themselves as political refugees rather than economic migrants.

Construction of the Mangla Dam had the effect of displacing large numbers of Azad Kashmiris. Discussion and research with former members of the Anti Mangla Dam League, based in Mirpur, suggests that the history of the construction of the Dam goes back to pre-partition days. At that time the scheme was being proposed by the Punjab Government. Hari Singh opposed the proposal because the wall of the proposed dam fell within the Jammu and Kashmir State and at that time the Kashmir Government was not willing to give up part of Kashmir to the Punjab Government. After partition Pakistan faced serious irrigation problems as the headwaters of the region's largest rivers lay on the other side of the control line. In 1950 India refused access to its water supply. The need for a dam became an issue of urgency.

The project was started in the 1950s by a consortium of countries which included the United Kingdom, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Germany. The intention was to confine the water of the Jhelum and Poonch, increase the volume of irrigation water for the Punjab and to generate electricity for this area. Construction of the Dam took place in several stages and initial stages involved the relocation of approximately 200 villages and the old town of Mirpur, which

comprised approximately 13,000 inhabitants. In the 1960s the population close to the dam was evacuated and from 1963 the whole population of the area was relocated so that when construction was in its final stages approximately 100,000 inhabitants had been moved.

The Mangla Dam achieved many of its original aims. It is a major source of hydro-electric power and serves as the principal water storage reservoir for the entire canal system of West Punjab. Mangla is thus critical to the success of the Pakistani economy as a whole providing cheap electricity, year round irrigation, and security from flooding.<sup>36</sup>

However, large-scale dam construction has serious environmental consequences and the construction of the Mangla Dam was no exception. Construction meant some of the most fertile land in Mirpur district, and the district's two major market towns, Mirpur and Chaomukh, were flooded. Transport routes were also disrupted and efforts to build alternatives were undermined by lack of finance. As Ballard puts it, the government of Pakistan and the World Bank - who provided most of the finance for the Mangla Scheme - chose to skimp and save.<sup>37</sup> This was only too obvious to the Mirpuris. The Dam constructors built a first class road around the southern (and originally virtually unpopulated) shore of the newly formed lake. However, the long and winding road around the densely populated northern shore, which now provided the remainder of the district with its only access to the plains, was built to a much lower standard. This was not

completed until some years after the water had risen. It was more than a decade before a bridge was finally constructed across the river Poonch to Dudyal, which the rising waters of the dam had turned into an isolated peninsula inaccessible to vehicular traffic. Ballard's observations were reiterated by Abdul Khaliq Ansari, a Mirpuri advocate:

They promised us lots of things. They made promises that we would get free water, free electricity. They promised because they wanted to construct it and were getting opposition. We now pay more than the Punjab are paying for electricity and well, the roads you can see for yourself

Mr Q of the Kashmir Record and Research Cell added:

Before the Mangla Dam, from Mirpur to Dudyal was half an hour but afterwards it is about a two hour drive. They promised us the fish will be free to eat now they are in the possession of WAPDA. Now they only give fishing contracts to their own people and we are deprived of fish. We do not have the right to tender for fishing. They have in effect occupied this area. Why haven't they developed this area? It's clear it's a colony of that country (Pakistan) and who takes care of the colony and it's colonial people? No one. We have no rights, we can't demand anything from them and it's our land.

From conversations with individuals at all levels, a political dimension to migration was emerging which is vital when understanding the interrelationship between migration and identity. It is important to recognise that Kashmiris in this area had already been uprooted as a result of the above mentioned political upheaval leading up to 1947. Construction further displaced families. Estimates as to the number vary from approximately 100,000 to 200,000 people. At every stage there was opposition to the construction of the Dam. Mass opposition centred on one fundamental issue: ownership of the land on which the dam was

to be constructed. These feelings were emphasised by many of the individuals interviewed in Mirpur who had memories of the “Mangla Dam Years”. Abdul Shakoor Khokhar head of the then active Anti Mangla Front pointed out that:

We knew nothing about the Mangla Dam about a year or so before they planned on starting the building. Of course no one was going to consult the people who would be affected, the Kashmiri people. Look, the thing is that the land belonged to the Kashmiri people not the government of Pakistan. Put it this way - Kashmir is a disputed territory. That is, it is disputed by Pakistan and Kashmir. We the people of the state do not dispute it, we know that it is ours. Pakistan knew if they admitted this then there would be no Dam and Pakistan would become a desert. We just didn't get a say.

Abdul Khaliq Ansari added:

Politically Pakistan did not have the right to build in another country that was Jammu and Kashmir. The whole thing took place by force, it was forced all the way. There were demonstrations from everywhere. People living here came out of their houses, even the women and children were demonstrating. We didn't want to leave our land but had no choice because unless we agreed to move we were arrested. Lots of people were arrested because they were demonstrating against the Pakistani Government. We were asking why no one asked us what we wanted. When we refused to go they brought in the Army and the police. They had no right to construct the Dam in our country. We didn't understand how they could call it a development scheme when the only people it benefited were the Pakistanis.

MrdH added:

It wasn't a peaceful construction. Those who opposed it were thrown into cells. There were hundreds of people in cells. It was the force of the Army and police that got that Dam built. If no one was going to listen to the people then no one was listening to the Azad Kashmiri government either.

Abdul Shakoor Khokhar continued to point out that:

It was because there was so much opposition to the Dam that we formed the Anti Mangla Dam Front, so that someone at the top

would hear what the people wanted. We wanted a say about what was happening to our land. It was the right of the Kashmiri people and only the Kashmiri people. They even bought off our people. The president of the Anti Mangla Dam Front was given an offer to become a commissioner of the state. The Secretary General was given the post of an Advocate General of the Pakistan Water and Power Foundation and the chairman was given a post of a minister in the cabinet.

The above sentiments were reiterated by many individuals in Mirpur. Discussions with members of the Kashmir Record and Research Cell in Mirpur highlighted the psychological impact of the upheavals caused by the 'capturing of our land'. Mr F recalled that: I don't remember much but I know it was very painful for my parents. Everything had to go. When people like my parents refused to go then they started to submerge the land. Some houses and other buildings in Old Mirpur were half submerged and even then people would not leave. They were taken away. Some left then with their things on *tangas*, with all their possessions.

The psychological attachment to home was recalled by Mr Q:

In my father's desperation to hold onto a piece of his home he removed the front door of our house. He keeps it on the roof of our current home believing that one day he will construct a house like that one, or maybe to remind him.

About 246 villages were submerged in total, of which an estimated 189 were in Mirpur District and approximately 57 in Pakistan (Kashmir Record and Research Cell). Mr N pointed out that:

We were 189 villages affected here and more than 80,000 people had to leave and migrate and more than 65,000 acres of land was submerged in the water.

Anwar comments that “at the end of the 1950s and 1960s, the villagers of the proposed dam area were give compensation. Some bought land and settled in other parts of Pakistan”.<sup>38</sup> Some who had relatives in Britain used the money to come to Britain and to find work. The issue of compensation resulted in some passionate and angry responses. Mr T said:

They promised compensation but it was just for their fun. They never honoured what they said. Yes people were given compensation. We got money for houses and if we had some little bit of land then they bought that also. The big *zimidars* could get land the same size somewhere else. There was no choice though. We just had to go where the government decided. The land was in the far off districts of Punjab, in Gugrewala, Surgoda, Faislabad, Multan, Deragasikhan and some families were settled in Sind province.

Mr S commented:

If you didn't have land - and many people didn't you know, we are poor people, we worked for big landowners, - in the town they would say that, for example, you bought this land for 100rs. Now it's old so we can give you less. To them it was just money. They could have given us land in our own country. There's no compensation in seeing my land going to someone else.

Mrs H, who is now resident in Luton but originally from Old Mirpur, commented on the subject of compensation:

With the money they gave us for our land and house we couldn't get anything there so I stayed and your Uncle (referring to her husband) had to come here.

Mrs H's husband added that:

With that money I couldn't build another house like the one I had there, well not until I came here. Really they made us leave that country. I would never have left my family if I could have managed. It's not compensation separating parents from their

children, brothers from sisters and fathers and mothers from their children.

Mr T, also resident in Luton, told me:

They sent us where we didn't know anyone. OK you can try to get on but those people were different. I wanted to go back home but I came here because there was nothing there and I had my *izzat*. Now I have a small bit of land in Mirpur. That is where I belong but I can only afford it because I give my brother money. At least I have somewhere I belong, but what if I hadn't been here?

Many of those affected used their compensation money to travel to Britain. Many of those forced to move had previous experience of migration. Mr H of the Kashmir Record and Research Cell suggested that they were forced to move when he explained:

More than 80.000 people went abroad. They had to leave because of the Mangla Dam but although they didn't want to move they were used to it. So many had given up their land and bought bad land, it wasn't irrigated. They had little choice, lots settled there because they didn't have land here then.

The political consequences are a relatively recent example of the political dimension to migration and identity. Experiences of political upheavals, however have a long and complicated history. In this research political experience and sentiments have been best expressed in the form of a national identification with the homeland of a united Kashmir.

It is not intended within the limits of a study of this length to present a detailed historical account of the political situation in Kashmir over the last fifty years; that is beyond the scope of this study. What is intended however is a review and presentation of the core events within Kashmiri political history which appear to

be firmly lodged within Kashmiri sentiment and have been expressed as contributory factors to the development and the maintenance of a Kashmiri identity in its current form. A review of the political history of the Kashmir situation is therefore presented as a vital prerequisite for contextual understanding of the debates currently prevalent within the Kashmiri British community, and as a way of understanding the current importance of territorial identification within their identity structures.

For centuries Kashmir's beauty has been documented in photographs and literature. It often being referred to as "Paradise on Earth" or "Heaven on Earth" and idealised in folk crafts and songs. In contrast its political history has been troubled. Its status has been disputed within international politics since Partition in 1947. It is without question the events of 1947 which have been the focus of much of the debate on Kashmir and its current position. The majority of Kashmiris question the Instrument of Accession of 1947 whereby Kashmir was handed over to India. Their suspicions have recently been supported by Lamb, who suggests that the Maharaja could not have signed the Treaty since he was travelling from Srinagar to Jammu at the time that the treaty is alleged to have been signed. Accordingly, then, he argues that when the Indian troops arrived at the airfield, that state was still independent, rendering the Treaty fraudulent.<sup>39</sup> However, to understand the complexities of the "Kashmir Issue" it is necessary to delve deeper into Kashmir political history and review the political events leading to Partition in 1947.

Through its history Kashmir has been ruled as a princely state by twenty-two dynasties. As part of their colonial expansion the British had come into possession of the territory of Kashmir due to the gradual demise of the Sikh Empire of Ranjit Singh which was suffering gradual collapse with the pressure of British imperialist power. The foundations for the present day nationalism amongst Kashmiris across the world were laid in 1846. Bose begins his account of the turbulent history of Kashmir, and sees the roots of the present day conflict as also being laid in 1846. At this date “a commercial transaction was concluded between the British, then preoccupied with bringing the entire subcontinent under their direct or indirect rule, and Gulab Singh, the Dogra King of Jammu”<sup>40</sup> He continues to point out that the reason Gulab Singh was chosen as the beneficiary was that despite formerly being a leading member of the Lahore court, he had been conniving with the British against Ranjit Singh's successors.

With the signing of the treaty of Amritsar of 16 March 1846 the Vale of Kashmir was sold to Gulab Singh by the British. As quoted in Choudhry (1996) referring to this human sale, the poet Iqbal wrote:

O Thou morning breeze: if ever thou shouldst happen to pass  
Geneva, convey from me to the League of Nations: these poor,  
innocent peasants, their fields and their crops, their beautiful  
streams and gardens, all sold for sordid cash – in fact a whole  
nation was wantonly sold into slavery and sold very cheap.<sup>41</sup>

The British imperialists acknowledged Kashmir's semi-independent status in return for military support from Gulab Singh and acknowledgement of British

supremacy in the region. Thus the State of Jammu and Kashmir was taking shape. Before 1846 Gulab Singh had already taken Ladakh and Baltistan. After the acquisition he set about expanding his territory to include Gligit, Hunza, Nagar and other areas bordering Afghanistan and China collectively known as Dardistan. These areas are now referred to as the Northern Areas. With his obtaining of the Vale of Kashmir in 1846 his expansion was complete and “he became the master of practically all distinct regions that came to comprise the historical territory of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir”.<sup>42</sup>

Lamb points out that “the State of Jammu and Kashmir thus assembled was, therefore, of considerable complexity”.<sup>43</sup> It was moreover, in the context of the broad history of India a totally new polity quite without precedent. The original heartland Jammu was predominantly Hindu and Sikh in population and dominated by the Dogras who claimed Rajput ancestry, though in the outlying districts it had by 1947 a small Muslim majority, the latter concentrated in Mirpur (now part of Azad Kashmir). The vale of Kashmir was largely Sunni Muslim with a small but influential Hindu minority who were largely Braahmin Pandits, from which group came the family of Nehru. The sparse population of Ladakh was mainly Tibetan Buddhist. Baltistan was Shia Muslim whose population was ethnically related to Tibet and the people of Dardistan were Shia or Ismalli Muslims.

“Controlling” the Muslim majority in the Vale of Kashmir proved a difficult task. “It took Gulab Singh, and then only with British military assistance, some two years to establish himself in his new possession where his possession was not welcomed by the local population - some of his opponents were flayed alive, one of his favourite punishments”.<sup>44</sup> Gulab Singh was an extremely unpopular autocratic ruler.

Bose highlights how Kaul “paints a Dickensian picture of Srinagar in the early 1920s - prostitution, thievery, beggary, disease, illiteracy and unemployment were apparently rife, while 90% of Muslim houses [were] mortgaged to Hindu money lenders”.<sup>45</sup> Bose continues to point out that the Pandit writer Bazaz wrote in 1941 that:

The poverty of the Muslim masses is appalling. Dressed in rags and barefoot, a Muslim peasant presents the appearance of a starving beggar. Most are landless labourers, working as serfs for absentee landlords - almost the whole brunt of official corruption has been borne by the Muslim masses...rural indebtedness is staggering.<sup>46</sup>

There was increasing discontent amongst the population of Jammu and Kashmir against the types of social and economic deprivations described by Bazaz. Discontent became a struggle and culminated in the formation of political movements in the 1930s. These political movements and their ideologies have been transferred with the Kashmiris through the migration process and consequently have a presence within the Kashmiri diaspora.

In protest against the Maharaja's autocratic rule and the poor social and economic conditions, there were a series of minor revolts within the area. However it was in 1932 that the first significant organised political party was formed in reaction to the prevailing conditions, in the form of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, by two of the most prominent leaders of modern Kashmiri political history, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah and Ghulam Abbas. The aim of this organisation was to co-ordinate the popular movement for democratic government and social justice.

In 1938 the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference split on ideological grounds. Abdullah was more secular in his approach and closely subscribed to the ideology of the Indian National Congress. He persuaded members to shed the communal label and adopt the new title of the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, which would include Muslims as well as non-Muslims. Abbas on the other hand was more communal with an ostensibly religious approach. Out of some seventy or eighty delegates only about four were opposed to the change of the name. Despite this majority, a minority led by Abbas continued as the Muslim Conference. "Inevitably the latter grew closer to the [Jinnah's] Muslim League and later threw in its lot with Pakistan, becoming the nucleus of the Azad Kashmir Government, whilst Abdullah's National Conference lined itself with the Indian National Congress".<sup>47</sup> Bose points out that "the National Conference had a strong following in the Valley because of Abdullah's charismatic leadership, but also more importantly because of the party's 1944 social

manifesto, *Naya* [New] Kashmir, which promised radical land reform once the monarchy had been abolished".<sup>48</sup> The Muslim Conference continued to be strong in the Jammu region with deep roots amongst the biraderis, especially in the western Jammu districts that later became part of "Azad Kashmir".

The majority of Kashmiris question the accession of Kashmir. The events leading up to the accession have been presented from a variety of perspectives and are the subject of academic as well as political dispute. The intention here is not to recount treaties in chronological order but place emphasis on the significance of these to the identity of the Kashmiri people. It is well to remember that the years leading to the withdrawal of imperial power were ones of considerable turmoil throughout the South Asian subcontinent and this was replicated, with considerable severity, nowhere more than in Kashmir. The Maharaja was challenged by the popular movements within Kashmir and in the face of increasing instability was trying to hold on to his power in the region. Bose points out that in the face of the chaos he "briefly toyed with the idea of working out an association with Pakistan once imperial paramountcy over Jammu and Kashmir lapsed on 15 August 1947, if Pakistan would agree to leave his throne intact. By August a limited standstill agreement had been signed".<sup>49</sup>

However the Maharaja faced increasing problems with revolts against his rule. Between August and October a major Muslim revolt began from the Poonch and Jammu areas. Further revolts occurred in the Valley. The Muslims and some ex-

Indian army men became the Azad (free) Kashmir force. This initial resistance led to the creation of Azad Kashmir under Pakistan's control. Interviews with Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir and those now settled in Luton who experienced the atrocities highlighted the psychological impact of these years.

Many recounted the atrocities by the Maharaja's armies against the Muslims as a way of quelling the uprisings. Dawson points out that "the worst example occurred in early November when two crowded convoys of Muslim evacuees who had been promised safe conduct to Pakistan were set on by their guards and others outside Jammu and men and women and children were slaughtered."<sup>50</sup> As a result of this about 400,000 Muslims fled into Azad Kashmir and at least another 100,000 into Pakistan. Kashmiris enlisted the help of Pakistani men, many of whom were from the North West Frontier and volunteered as part of the Islamic Jihad. "However the tribal invasion soon degenerated into an indiscriminate looting and murder of Hindu and Muslims like."<sup>51</sup> As Bose correctly observes "memories of this carnage were to imbue an entire generation of Kashmiri Muslims with deep scepticism towards subsequent rhetoric demanding Kashmiri 'self-determination', a generation who were forced to leave their homeland, suffer the humiliation of refugee status and poor economic status when settling in other areas of Kashmir".<sup>52</sup>

"Under the Act of Independence the rulers of all 560 princely states had been empowered to accede to either India or Pakistan if they wished with the proviso

that they took into account the geographic contiguity, religious composition and wishes of their people. At the time, the state of Jammu and Kashmir was thus independent as no accession document had been signed linking in to India or Pakistan”.<sup>53</sup> However as 15 August 1947 approached, the Maharaja, faced with the prospect of being overthrown by the rebels, sought the help of India. He was faced with two choices: stand against the rebels or lose power and accede to India with the prospect of remaining Head of State.<sup>54</sup>

On 26 October with the support of Abdullah who was in favour of an independent Kashmir loosely linked to India rather than Pakistan the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession. Importantly, Lord Mountbatten, the then Governor General of India, included a covering letter saying “In consistence with their policy that in the case of any State, where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my government’s wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people”<sup>55</sup>. In this sense then the treaty was provisional and conditional upon the wishes of the Kashmiri people. The UN Security Council set up a commission, which passed a number of resolutions calling upon both countries to cease military hostilities and institute a UN-supervised plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the Kashmiris. The UN plebiscite has not yet been instigated.

Further uprisings in the wake of accession led the UN to enforce a cease-fire line. Ali, Ellis and Khan indicate that “the territory of Jammu and Kashmir is now split into several parts either resulting directly from actions in 1947 or by subsequent events both military and political. In 1947 the State of Jammu and Kashmir was divided into two with Pakistan controlling what is currently known as Azad (free) Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and the Northern Areas.”<sup>56</sup> A provisional government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir was established and this was the government of Abbas' Muslim Conference. India came to control the remaining part including Ladakh. The area came under the governance of Abdullah and his National Conference. “The Northern Areas comprising Baltistan, Gilgit and Hunza are officially part of AJK but under the Karachi agreement of 1949 is administered by Pakistan on behalf of the AJK government until the AJK government is capable of doing so. This arrangement was recently reconfirmed by the Supreme Court. In 1962 in an agreement with China Pakistan handed over some territory in Hunza on a temporary basis on the explicit understanding that this would be reviewed when the overall Kashmir situation was resolved”.<sup>57</sup>

A further uprising took place in Indian occupied Kashmir with the arrest of Abdullah in 1953 and his replacement by the new Prime Minister Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. Abdullah's continued stance became increasingly unpopular with Nehru.<sup>58</sup> He spent the next fourteen years in prisons across India until his death in 1982. The politics Indian Occupied Kashmir changed beyond all recognition

and gradually a state which was more or less self governing, with its own Prime Minister, own President and national flag, by 1964 became like any other Indian state subject to the rules and regulations of the Indian Constitution. As Bose points out:

In 1954, a Constitutional Order (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) was promulgated by the President of India, which empowered the Indian government to legislate on matters on the union list, not just defence, foreign affairs and communications...this was the beginning of the end of article 370.<sup>59</sup>

In Pakistani controlled Azad Kashmir the status of the Kashmir Issue was also changing. The death of Jinnah in 1948, one year after independence, the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1958, the dismissal of his elected successor Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin in April 1953 and his eventual replacement by Ayub Khan meant that “Pakistan slipped into the hands of the *Babu* bureaucrats and political agents of the outgoing imperial regime. Publicly scorned by Nehru as unrepresentative clerks and beneath him to talk to, the *Babu* Kashmir policy was quite simple: to latch the country onto the device of Western alliance and hope and pray that these “leaders of the free world” would, in return, force India to let the UN hold a free and fair plebiscite and let the Kashmiris decide whether they wanted to join India or Pakistan”.<sup>60</sup>

This state of affairs continued until 1962. After 1962 a series of events relegated the Kashmir Issue to bilateral status. After the breakdown of talks between the respective Indian and Pakistani foreign ministers, Sardar Swaran Singh and

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the outcome was India's relegation of the cease fire line to a permanent border. In the shadow of failed negotiations Pakistan made an attempt in 1965 to liberate Jammu and Kashmir from Indian control. Pakistani commandos were meant to lead a Kashmiri uprising under the so-called Operation Gibraltar, destroying strategic communication lines, and under the sister Operation Malta to cross the cease fire line and free the Kashmiris. Both operations failed as Pakistan felt the full force of the Indian army which also crossed the cease fire line into Azad Kashmir.

For the Kashmiri people the failure of Operation Gibraltar and Operation Malta left two very significant lasting impressions. The first was the memories of the casualties of war which are deeply ingrained, and secondly the loss of faith in the Pakistan Army as their potential 'liberators'. A further blow came in 1971 with its failure in East Pakistan.

These events were particularly significant for the Kashmiris who took matters into their own hands. As Mr D from Mirpur commented:

Look, just about everyone has failed us and then the situation was so bad that they [the imperialists] no longer cared. They just spoilt the place and then left. Whilst our brothers were being killed they were counting their losses and washing their hands of the whole thing. Pakistan was helping because they wanted Kashmir for Pakistanis not a Kashmir for the Kashmiris and everything they were doing was failing anyway. They sold Kashmir and they were humiliated out of Bangladesh. We had to do things for ourselves, we aren't any less than the Bangladeshis.

Nationalistic and liberation politics were further enhanced with the 'loss of faith' with Pakistan over the Simla Treaty in 1972. At this date, under the Bhutto regime Pakistan agreed not to take up the issue of Kashmir at any international forum but only consider bilateral talks between itself and India. The Kashmiri people are not included in the equation, thus they are seen as the problem only and not part of any solution to the issue. Most Kashmiris, even those that subscribe to accession to Pakistan, believe that with the signing of the Simla Treaty Bhutto sold Kashmiri freedom to the Indians. His intentions of making Kashmir the fifth province of Pakistan were fervently rejected by the majority of Kashmiris. Pakistan's failure to support the Kashmiris, deep-seated mistrust of the Bhutto regime and increasing anti-democratisation of Kashmir by India resulted in the formation of stronger liberation organisations working for independence within Indian-occupied Kashmir and Azad Kashmir. Referring to Indian Occupied Kashmir Bose points out that: "the inevitable result was that when mass Kashmiri alienation from Indian 'democracy' eventually surfaced in an explosive form...it was simultaneously a total and violent rejection of the Indian nation".<sup>61</sup>

The Kashmiri struggle for independence continued in the form of protests but it was not until 1987 that the Azadi (freedom) organisations in Indian Occupied Kashmir organised themselves under the Muslim United Front (MUF). Their main objective was to participate in elections as a way of forcing the political settlement of the Kashmir issue. "But on this occasion too the Indian imperialism

repeated the process of fraud and rigging. The frustrated youth seeing no alternative took to guns".<sup>62</sup> They saw Farooq Abdullah of the National Conference as selling out to the Indians. Failure in the elections and discontent with the ruling National Congress led to the more organised expression of liberation movements, indeed mid-1989 is generally seen as the beginning of organised liberation movements in Kashmir. The most prominent of the liberation movements in the Valley are the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), the Hizbul Mujahideen (who are closely linked with the Jamat-I-Islami) and the Therek Ulema.

The status of Azad Kashmir is not significantly better than that of Indian Occupied Kashmir. It is certainly not as Azad (free) as the designated name suggests. Since 1947 and more ardently after 1972 the Bhutto regime began to show their support of Sardar Qayum rather than the Muslim Conference of Sardar Ibrahim. No genuine election has ever been held. The judicial system is rudimentary and its constitution stipulates that no one person or political party in Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall be permitted to propagate against or take part in activities prejudicial or detrimental to the ideology of the State's accession to Pakistan.<sup>63</sup> Mr T further pointed out that:

We are supposed to be free and we can do nothing. We are really just Pakistan's puppets and we have to go along with what they say.

Along similar lines Mr H pointed out:

Look, we have a government OK and it's meant to represent the Kashmiri people but in fact they just represent Pakistan. They don't even know what the Kashmiris want just what the Pakistani Government wants. They have a seat in the Pakistani National Assembly and then Pakistan tell them you have to keep your mouth shut or well you can speak but then don't expect us to do anything about it. Let's face it it's all just to keep us quiet'.

Although there have not been any popular uprisings in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir there are high levels of support for Kashmiri brethren across the cease fire line. As Khan points out there exists "great support and fervour for the uprisings, while there is strong feeling of solidarity towards their kith and kin across the border who have been subjected to immense suffering under Indian Occupation"<sup>64</sup>. These observations were supported by Mr H from Muzzafarabad when he said:

In many ways I was lucky and in others I wasn't - you know why? Well I had to leave my family. Some of them are still there. There aren't very many now but the thing is what can I do sitting here, sometime I would like to visit and well that's the thing that makes me keep on with fighting for them over there. One day I will see my family over there again.

Mrs K, the head of the Women's Textile College in Muzzaffarabad, commented:

That [Indian Occupied Kashmir] is my real home. I am a refugee here and there we had everything and here well we live like people who had nothing. We have an identity that is different from Pakistanis and we have been forced to be like them. So we are the blessed ones that we are here free from harm but my heart is there with my brother and his family and one day our Kashmir will be ours again.

As well as personal loss these comments and others like them highlight the sheer frustration and resentment with Britain and the international community in

general for ignoring the Kashmir issue and “turning its back” on the human rights violations in the area. Mrs K continued to comment that:

Sometimes I think that the world has forgotten us people. It was OK when the tourists had to come and then we were the Kashmiris but now that things are so bad even the British who made the problem in the first place don't care. What I would like to do is send people postcards of the refugee camps instead of the beautiful landscapes, and hope for a better reaction than what our people are getting.

Support for the Kashmiris in Indian Occupied Kashmir and for a free Kashmir are expressed in the ideologies of some of the liberation organisations in Azad Kashmir, some of which have their foundations in the Valley. In 1960 K. H. Kurshid founded the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Liberation League otherwise known as the Liberation League. Khurshid's background was also through the Muslim Conference. He did not have a natural constituency in Azad Kashmir since he had originated from the Valley in a society whose traditional networks were heavily biraderi based. In 1962 he became head of the Azad Kashmir Government. Thus for the first time there was political opposition to the Muslim Conference's pro-Pakistan ideology.

The other formidable pro-independence parties organising around this time were the Jammu and Kashmir Peoples National Party (JKPNP), The Plebiscite Front, Tehreke Kashmir, Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Front (JKNLF), Pakistan People's Party Azad Kashmir (PPPAK), Azad Jammu Kashmir People's Party (AJKPP), Azad Kashmir Muslim League (AKML) and the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).

Bose points out that “in fact it was in prison during 1987 that the five young men who formed the (JKLF) nucleus in the Valley in 1989-90 met and on their release, took a collective decision to go to Pakistan-controlled Kashmir in search of military training and weapons.”<sup>65</sup> These men were Asfaq Majid Ali Wani, Ejaz Ahmed Dar, Abdul Hamid Sheikh, Yasin Malik, and Javid Ahmed Mir.

In recent years there has been increased mobilisation along liberation lines within Azad Kashmir. Bose talking to Qasim Khokhar, a member of the JKLF in Mirpur suggests that:

There has been a resurgence in the pro-independence sentiment in Azad Kashmir in the last few years. He comments that the 'the 1980s were an especially difficult and frustrating decade for the independence activists, what with the crushing burdens of martial law and Islamisation. However by the end of the decade, the insurrection across the border had begun to have a tremendous demonstration effect on Azad Kashmir, and attendance at JKLF meetings, for example rose dramatically, despite the threat of harassment and victimisation.’<sup>66</sup>

Mr Ashraf of the Pakistani Muslim League explained the increased support for and membership of liberation organisations as the direct result of more organised strategies for recruitment:

The men at the head of the liberation organisations are calling on young men in Azad Kashmir and Pakistan to join their men on the front line. They target young men of course because they are easily persuaded. They are more organised now and they go to schools and colleges and talk about human rights and Muslims being killed in the Valley. They have training camps up in the mountains where they take these men and teach them how to use guns and explosives and then when they are ready send them to the front line. Before they were only recruiting Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir; now they are targeting Pakistani young men as well to join the cause.

Increased support of liberation movements within Azad Kashmir can be attributed to increased organised awareness of the political causes of the Kashmir issue and atrocities occurring across the cease fire line. The flow of information has been transmitted across the border via letters from relatives and the media. There have been further advances as Ms Sultana of the women's section of the JKLF pointed out, commenting on her observations:

A few years ago much of what we heard was just word of mouth. There were reports and things but it was difficult to tell what was what. Now things are more together. We have information through our own organisations like the Kashmir publicity core of the JKLF and the information is given to us regularly by our men over there. All this means that we can tell our people here with facts what is going on and people especially the young women and men like that sort of information, the real facts.

During the April 1991 and May-June 1996 field trips to Azad Kashmir, meetings were held with the publicity section of the JKLF and the Kashmir International Friendship Club whose headquarters are in Mirpur. Observation and interviews highlighted the improved organisation of publicity around the Kashmir issue. Mr Y of the publicity core of the JKLF based in Mirpur, commenting on his organisation, pointed out:

We have always had a mixed membership with older and younger men but now lots of the people are very young and that's very good because they are enthusiastic. They come from universities so they are enthusiastic and more and more educated which makes a big difference.

Dissemination of information was widespread through the distribution of books and pamphlets distributed at rallies and also through networks across Azad Kashmir and the international Kashmiri diaspora. Three particularly interesting

mediums of disseminating information were through the use of political postcards, tapes which contain songs of freedom in a lamentation style, and of extensive graffiti across Azad Kashmir. Political graffiti were very much a part of the Azad Kashmiri townscape. This represented most of the liberation organisations, and political slogans included calls for liberation from India and an end to human rights violations. Most organisations and their sub-organisations were advertising their cause. Graffiti were not restricted to the cities and towns and could be found on walls and painted on mountain-sides in the remotest and most inaccessible areas. Particularly visible was the work of the student wing of the JKSLF. Often under their initials were the words “our objective is national independence”. As well as political slogans there was a heavy pictorial presence of martyred leaders particularly Maqbool Butt the founder of the JKLF who was killed in 1983. The Kashmiri flag was also commonplace and displayed outside homes in cars and in taxis. Slogans that were common place included “Free Kashmir”, “ I love Kashmir” and “See you in Srinagar” to name a few.

The centrality of the Kashmir issue in the emotional life of the Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir was highlighted by other visible reminders of the struggle. For example the issue was also represented by the central *chouk*, (roundabout) in Kotli town. The terrain of Kashmir is represented by a mountain which is etched and painted with a man holding a gun. The words etched above are “Indians out Kashmiris In”. The centrality of the issue can be seen in the important place accorded to freedom fighters and refugees by welfare associations in Kashmir. The Kashmir

Welfare Society based in Kotli is one of these. Many receive donations from the UK-based Kashmiri community, thus maintaining links. Representations were not simply confined to the townscape. Pictures of Maqbool Butt, martyred family members, stylised pictures of Azad Kashmir, calendars published by liberation organisations, pamphlets and newspapers were visible in almost every house visited in Azad Kashmir, bringing the Kashmir issue into the home in an organised manner. As I will go on to show, these form part of the discourse of “Kashmiriyat” and impact on the formation of Kashmiri identity in Luton.

Visual material promoting notions of “Kashmyriat” were commonplace all over Azad Kashmir. In addition there is a vast intellectual literature now accumulated on the Kashmir Issue. Mr A of the Kashmir Record and Research Cell pointed out that:

We have to know what is being written about Kashmir. Kashmir is not just about that fight for freedom - it's about the place and the people out there. Our history is a struggle for freedom but we have to know about that place as well.

His feelings were supported by Mr G who said that:

The next generation has to be made up of intellectuals as well as fighters. We need all types of people. Everyone has a role to play and that's what will get us our freedom in the long run.

Muslim women have been accused of lack of agency. The existence of the women's wing of the JKLF is a testimony to their importance in the struggle for independence. Women are playing an important role in the liberation politics of Kashmir.

Women in Indian Occupied Kashmir have been actively demanding freedom from India since 1947. Action has largely taken the form of support for male members of the family joining freedom organisations and protesting against the Indian Occupation. Ms Y who came to Azad Kashmir to flee the violence in Indian Occupied Kashmir pointed out that:

Women are at the heart of the issue. Remember we cannot detach ourselves because the martyred men you talk of are our fathers, brothers, husbands or sons. How can it be that we are not involved? We suffer the most because we put up with the pain of loss. My female relatives over there have been part of the struggle all along and I know they would not hesitate to kill after what they have seen. There is no such thing as a peaceful Kashmiri. You cannot be calm after what they have seen and what we have heard.

Ms Y's desire to fight for freedom is also captured in "Women's testimonies from Kashmir", collated by The Women's Initiative who organised and visited the Kashmir Valley between 2<sup>nd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> May 1994 with the intention of being "a set of eyes and ears which would listen and bear witness to the testimonies of ordinary people, particularly women". This collection highlights the women's commitment to take up arms. Asiya is recorded as saying: "We thank the forces for their excesses. The more atrocities they commit, the more people will be prepared to take up arms for the struggle". U.B.G. is noted as saying: "After what I have been through, I have the right to revenge to pick up the gun. But what will happen to my family, my sisters? I may pick up the gun, but I don't like bloodshed and violence".<sup>67</sup>

The women in Azad Kashmir are not as directly involved in the struggle as their Indian Occupied Kashmir counterparts. However, Sabrina Sultana of the Women's wing of the JKLF based in Mirpur pointed out that: "Women here have always been active in Kashmiri politics since they are affected by it every day of their lives, but until recently the Azad Kashmir women have not been organised to be so pro active but now we have started a women's section".

Sabrina continued to point out some of the reasons of women's lack of participation:

You know young girls are not thought strong enough to get involved in this sort of thing. It's OK if your father's involved or a brother but on your own it's difficult. We try and get things organised, get the men's permission and then on the day not many women turn up. It's always the same few who do. I think our culture is a problem.

Support for the liberation movement was unanimous amongst all the women despite the fact that the majority of them were not directly involved in organised activity. They all described their anger at the continued killings in Indian Occupied Kashmir which were having an impact on their lives. Mr K in Muzaffarabad pointed out that: "The border's only over there. Some nights I lie awake and I can hear the guns and then have to relive every moment of my brother's death. This fight is destroying our families."

Many of the women interviewed have lost a member of the family or knew of someone who had lost a member of the family. Sadaf talked at length of her

young brother who was one of the martyrs killed in the 1991 attempted border crossing: “I can’t get his face out of my head. He was my brother and they killed him for nothing. I am proud of him. Proud that he did what he did. At his funeral I couldn’t cry. I didn’t cry.”

What is clear is that the emotional impact of Sadaf’s brother’s killing has not deterred her from the Kashmir issue, rather made her stronger and adamant to fight. Below she talks of how if she were able she would take up arms and fight alongside her brothers to live in a free Kashmir: “I see his face and then it’s clear to me that they deserve to die. I would have no hesitation in taking up arms. Sometimes I have so much anger in me that I think just give me a gun and I’ll give you Kashmir but then we can’t fight. Sometimes now I wish I was a man.”

Unable to participate on the front line, Azad Kashmiri women help with collections for supplies for the wounded men, provide food and sometimes shelter for refugees whose numbers are continuously increasing according to Rani Mussaffar. These women feel an emotional and moral responsibility to support their cause.

Research suggests that Kashmiri political identity forms part of the geographical, political, economic, social and emotional fabric of their lives. For men, women, young and old the resolution of the Kashmir issue focuses primarily on two aspects: the reunification of the divided territory and the self-determination of a

United Kashmir, the installation of which can only come about through a plebiscite.

## V. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have presented the “before” picture of “Kashmiriyat” In the process I have had to tell much of the history of Kashmir during the period leading up to the formation of Pakistan and India. I have relied extensively on the testimony of many respondents as a means of understanding what they consider the main elements of Kashmiri identity. It can be seen that the partition of Kashmir and the emergence of distinct “Kashmiriyat” are closely linked. The role of memory as a means of carrying memes associated with “Kashmiriness” is crucial. It is because of the way in which memes signifying “Kashmiriness” have been intrinsic to Kashmiris that the shock of partition, occupation, displacement, migration and settlement seems to have been absorbed, to the extent that a notion of “Kashmiriness” continues to operate. This of course, does not mean that Kashmiri identity has not changed as a result of these processes (and in particular the process of migration and settlement to Britain), but it does mean that we have to be specific about the ways in which Kashmiri identity has changed and ways in which it has remained the “same”. I have shown how the process of migration has been linked to particular features of Kashmiri life, for accounts of push-pull and chain migration have depended on social structure and economic practices of Kashmiri life. I have also argued implicitly for the primacy of the political. In other words, the various economic, socio-cultural, religious factors of Kashmiri

identity are seen as secondary to the politics of the Kashmiri context. This is not only because of the specific nature of Kashmiri identity, but more importantly, because the construction of a collective identity seems to be an inherently political task.

I want to go on to look at the identity transformations of Kashmiris who have settled in Britain. In other words, having presented the “before” picture, logic demands that I present the “after” picture. So having looked at the core factors that influence Kashmiri identity at “home” I want to turn to Kashmiris “away” There is, however, an intermediate stage between “before” and “after”, between “home” and “away” - the “during”, or more prosaically the process of migration itself. This then is the subject of the next chapter.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> I have already said that when I am using the term “Kashmiriyat” I am referring to Kashmiris constituting a national community. By “Kashmiriness” I mean the general quality of being Kashmiri.
- <sup>2</sup> Khan (b)1976.
- <sup>3</sup> Anwar, 1985, p.54.
- <sup>4</sup> Zekiye Eglar, 1976.
- <sup>5</sup> Anwar, 1979.
- <sup>6</sup> Alavi, 1972, p. 2.
- <sup>7</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>8</sup> Blunt, 1931.
- <sup>9</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>10</sup> Anwar, 1979, p.63.
- <sup>11</sup> See for example, Alavi, 1972 and Anwar, 1979.
- <sup>12</sup> Alavi, 1972.
- <sup>13</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>15</sup> The impact of *biraderi* based settlement in Luton is discussed later in the thesis.
- <sup>16</sup> Khan, 1977(a), p. 60.
- <sup>17</sup> Alavi, 1972, p. 26.
- <sup>18</sup> Ballard, 1990, p. 231.
- <sup>19</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>20</sup> Dayha, 1972.
- <sup>21</sup> This point was discussed in the Chapter on Researching Kashmiris.
- <sup>22</sup> Dhaya, 1972, p. 252.
- <sup>23</sup> Dhaya, 1974, pp.252-253.
- <sup>24</sup> See Ahmed, 1993.
- <sup>25</sup> Hasan abdu'l-Hakim, 1997, p. 7.
- <sup>26</sup> Ahmed, 1993, p. 28
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 49.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid., pp. 50-51.
- <sup>29</sup> Khan, 1980
- <sup>30</sup> Geaves, 1996, p.43.
- <sup>31</sup> Gellner, 1981, 1992. Also see Sayyid’s 1997 critique of Gellner’s formulation.
- <sup>32</sup> Geaves, 1996, p.94.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid., p.95.
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 97.
- <sup>36</sup> Ballard, 1990.
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>38</sup> Anwar, 1979, p.24.
- <sup>39</sup> See Lamb, 1994 for a detailed discussion of the issues surrounding the “Kashmir Issue”
- <sup>40</sup> Bose, 1997
- <sup>41</sup> Choudhry, 1996
- <sup>42</sup> Bose, 1997
- <sup>43</sup> Lamb 1991
- <sup>44</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>45</sup> Bose, 1997
- <sup>46</sup> Bazaz as quoted in Bose, 1997 pp.252-53
- <sup>47</sup> Dawson, 1994,
- <sup>48</sup> Bose, 1997
- <sup>49</sup> Ibid.

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- <sup>50</sup> Dawson, 1994  
<sup>51</sup> Ibid.,  
<sup>52</sup> Bose, 1997  
<sup>53</sup> Ali, Ellis and Khan, 1996  
<sup>54</sup> Khan, 1993  
<sup>55</sup> Ibid., This is the JKLF opinion.  
<sup>56</sup> Ali, Ellis and Khan, 1996, p.242  
<sup>57</sup> Ibid.  
<sup>58</sup> At this time Abdullah had been Chief Minister for seven years.  
<sup>59</sup> Bose, 1997, p. 33  
<sup>60</sup> Irfan as quoted in Bose, 1997, p. 8  
<sup>61</sup> Bose, 1997, p.40  
<sup>62</sup> World Peace Organisation Kashmir Report, 1993, p.3  
<sup>63</sup> Bose, 1997,p. 67.  
<sup>64</sup> Khan, 1989, p.1  
<sup>65</sup> Bose, 1997, p. 47  
<sup>66</sup> Ibid.,  
<sup>67</sup> Women's Initiative, 1994, p. 13

## **CHAPTER SIX: KASHMIRIS ON THE MOVE**

### **I. INTRODUCTION**

This chapter is concerned with the relationship between migration and identity. Migration leads to the construction, consolidation, transfer and redefinition of identities resulting in distinct configurations of identity through time. We cannot understand these configurations without discussion and an understanding of the historical, political, economic and socio-cultural forces in the emigrants' country of origin, as well as the forces prevalent in the countries of settlement which have influenced migration and settlement and the maintenance of identity. It is the former that are the concern of this chapter.

The aim of this chapter is to use current literature on migration, interview data gathered during two field trips to Azad Kashmir and interview data collected amongst the Luton Kashmiris, to identify the collective features of the Kashmiri migration which have influenced Kashmiri identity in Britain. Migrants' stories were used to ascertain their experiences. These have been central to understanding the role of the migratory process in the construction of identity. After all it is difficult to imagine how one can analyse what humans are doing without some notion of why they think they are doing it. Humans act for purposes and according to the meaning these actions have for them. Hence, any social analysis must attempt to understand the ensemble of meaning in which the action of human agents takes place.

## **II. THE ROLE OF MIGRATION IN IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT**

The earliest systematic approaches to the study of migration derive from the nineteenth century geographer Ravenstein, who advocated the formulation of statistical “laws of migration” in his paper to the Royal Statistical Society on 17 March 1885 and subsequently in 1889. Ravenstein’s basic framework is still used by many economists, geographers and demographers.<sup>1</sup>

### **A. Push-Pull Theories**

Ravenstein’s hypothesis suggests that migration can be attributed to socio-economic imbalances between regions. There are certain factors “pushing” people away from the area of origin and others “pulling” them to the area of destination. “Push factors” include demographic growth, low living standards, lack of economic opportunities and political repression, while “pull factors” are demand for labour, availability of land, good economic opportunities and political freedom.

Often South Asian migrations are explained in terms of this push-pull thesis and the present research draws heavily on these ideas. It is important to note the problems with these accounts; They tend to be individualistic and a-historical. Rarely is a decision to move based on an individual decision or a decision that is based on rational comparison of the relative costs and benefits of remaining in the area of origin or moving to various alternative destinations. As Brown and Foot, commenting on Bank's work, point out: researchers tend to deal with movements

or events which have happened, and therefore can err with hindsight in assuming that such trends or happenings were inevitable. Further they tend to think of migrants as crude sociological groups and therefore miss the intricate patterns of decision making which precede migration. It is not individuals, but families, the key unit of decision-making and selection of a migration strategy.<sup>2</sup>


Further, these models ignore restrictions or constraints such as government restrictions on immigration or emigration. These are ignored or regarded as distortions which should be removed from the rational choice market. Certainly immigration controls have influenced Kashmiri patterns of migration. These are discussed below. Everett Lee does consider restrictions or constraints on emigration or immigration and refers to them as “intervening obstacles”. He summarises the factors which lead to the decision to migrate in four categories as follows:

1. Factors associated with the area of origin
2. Factors associated with the area of destination
3. Intervening obstacles
4. Personal factors

The first three of these can be represented below in Figure 6.1. In every area there are a number of factors which come together to hold or indeed attract people to that area. These are shown as plus and minus signs. The set of pluses and minuses

at both the origin and the destination is differentially defined for each migrant or future migrants depending on personal factors. However it is important to note that there are fundamental differences between factors associated with the area of origin and the area of destination. Knowledge of the latter area is often not exact and in many cases advantages and disadvantages can only be weighed up by living there. Intervening obstacles may affect the prospective migrants' motivations and even prevent migration. These intervening obstacles include problems of migration restrictions, mentioned above, and may include problems of financing migration.<sup>3</sup> Such obstacles are often faced by Azad Kashmiri migrants and are referred to later.

Figure 6.1: Origin and Destination Factors and Intervening Obstacles in Migration.



Source Jackson, 1986.

These models have much in common with neo-classical theories of the labour market, indeed this approach is mainly found in the work of neo-classical economists.<sup>4</sup> Borjas puts forward the model of an immigration market. According to him, neo-classical theory assumes that individuals maximise utility: individuals search for the country of residence that maximises their well being. The search is constrained by the individuals' financial resources, by the immigration regulations

source country. In the immigration market the various pieces of information are exchanged and the various options are compared. In a sense, competing host countries make “migration offers” from which individuals compare and choose. The information gathered in this market place leads many individuals to conclude that it is “profitable” to remain in their birthplace. Conversely, other individuals conclude that they are better off in some other country. The immigration market randomly sorts these individuals across host countries<sup>5</sup>. Borjas claims that “this approach leads to very clear - and empirically testable - categorisation of the types of immigrant flows that arise in the world where individuals search for the “best” type of country”.<sup>6</sup>

If this were the case, then it would follow that all disadvantaged people would be moving from poorer areas to more wealthy ones and the disparities between different areas would be sufficient to generate migration flows. In the long run these migration flows would equalise wages and conditions in underdeveloped and developed regions, leading towards economic equilibrium. Actual migratory movements however appear more complex than over simplistic theories. It is rarely the poorest people from the least-developed countries that move to the richest countries. More often the migrants are of intermediate social status and from areas that are undergoing economic and social changes. Similarly the push-pull model would predict movements from densely populated to under populated areas, yet in fact countries of immigration are amongst the world’s most densely populated. A further problem arises with the push-pull model since it treats

intervention of the state as being merely disruptive of the “normal” functioning of the market. The state invariably plays a major role in shaping and controlling the movements. Therefore the notion that migrants make free choices in order to “maximise their well-being” but also to lead to “an equilibrium in the market place” is far from historically correct. Perhaps more importantly the push-pull model does not explain the localised nature of migration. Why do a certain group of migrants from a particular town in one country move to a particular town in the new country of origin?<sup>7</sup>

### **B. Chain Migration Accounts**

One important factor is previous history of migration among various locals. Traditions of international migratory movements usually arise from the existence of prior links between the sending and receiving countries. These links may be based on colonisation, political influence, trade, investment or cultural ties. Thus migration from Azad Kashmir or Pakistan has been linked to the British colonial experience in the South Asian sub-continent. It is suggested that migrations can be best understood by using the conceptual framework of “migration systems.”<sup>8</sup> A migration system refers to a set of places linked together by flows and counter flows of people, information, goods and services and ideas. These links can be categorised as state-to-state relations and comparisons, mass culture connection and family and social networks. Migration systems consist of macro and micro structures. Macro structures refer to large scale institutional factors such as the political economy of the world market, inter-state relationships, and the laws,

structures and practices established by the states of the sending and receiving countries. The micro structures refer to the beliefs and informal networks and practices developed by the migrants themselves to cope with migration and settlement. These informal networks include psychological adaptations, personal relationships, family and household patterns, friendship and community ties and mutual help in economic and social matters. These micro structures have previously been referred to in literature using the concept of “chain migration.”

“Chain migration” can be defined as the movement in which prospective migrants learn of opportunities, have transportation provided for them and have initial accommodation and employment arranged through primary social relationships with previous immigrants. For example different forms of sponsorship and patronage have the effect of clustering Kashmiris. In addition, kinship-friendship networks are involved whereby the role of chain migration becomes important.

John and Leatrice MacDonald have used “chain migration” to describe the fundamental processes influencing ethnic neighbourhood formation.<sup>9</sup> They have used the concept of chain migration to account for the presence of Italian neighbourhoods in American cities, coming from highly localised places of origin. The process of chain migration may begin with the arrival of a single immigrant who subsequently becomes successful. News of this reaches home and encourages friends and relatives to join him. This is the first stage of chain migration. The second stage starts when early migrants became well established, sufficiently so

that they are able to call their wives, children and in many cases brides-to-be to join them. This process leads to the reuniting and establishment of families, which eventually leads to the recreation of home culture. Traditional ceremonies and social occasions become more numerous and the customs and values of their place of origin become more strongly rooted with greater emphasis being placed on education and religion. Community life becomes well established and once news of this reaches the area of origin it has the effect of enticing the older, younger and the less enterprising. This completes the chain and the results are a full community life.

Research in Luton suggests that another stage of migration is now taking place. Once new communities are established they preserve identity through links with relatives in Azad Kashmir. This form of identity preservation is made easier in today's global era where geographical distance is not a limitation on interaction with family and events in Azad Kashmir and where, consequently, perceived distance is no barrier to memory renewal. This transnational transfer of information has the effect of renewing and reconstructing memory and maintaining identity-creating transnational communities.<sup>10</sup>

The following sections look at the historical, economic, socio-cultural, religious and political contexts to migration, which have influenced memory and through migration have contributed to the formation of British Kashmiri identity. The contexts in which memory has been formed and subsequently transferred to the

new environment are essential to the understanding of the current identity manifestations of the Kashmiri British community in Luton.

### **III. BACKGROUND TO KASHMIRI MIGRATION**


#### **A. Who are the Kashmiris?**

There is a tendency among researchers to refer to their samples as coming from Pakistan although on the basis of the migration patterns, their sample will have been from Azad Kashmir (see Map 1, 2 and 3). Alternatively a regional designation may be given.<sup>11</sup> For example Anwar refers to his sample as Mirpuri without acknowledgement that this is a district of Azad Kashmir.<sup>12</sup> Contrast this with Dahya, who states that his sample is from Azad Kashmir but does not elaborate any further, and thus implicitly continues to treat the sample as Pakistani.<sup>13</sup> Other writers who know that their samples are from Azad Kashmir assert that this is not relevant and that the sample can be treated as Pakistani, giving little tangible evidence that this represents the views of their samples.<sup>14</sup> Khan and Ballard are among the many writers who have designated migrants from Azad Kashmir as explicitly Punjabis or Pakistanis. For example, Khan writes:


Mirpuris from Mirpuri district of Azad Kashmir are Punjabi in culture and can be conceptualised as subcategories deriving from a degree of marginality. Mirpuris are proportionally over represented in the Pakistani population and in addition to all other Punjabis form the great majority of the population.<sup>15</sup>

Ballard argues that Mirpuris are Punjabis:

Not only are at least two-thirds and possibly as many as all British South Asians of Punjabi origin, but the great majority of British Punjabis can trace their roots (in approximately equal numbers) either to Jullundur Doab in India or to Mirpur district in Azad



Map 2- The State of Jammu and Kashmir showing areas of migration from Azad Kashmir



Map 3- The main towns of migration from Azad Kashmir

Kashmir: Indeed as many as three quarters of British Punjabis may well be either Jullundurites or Mirpuris.<sup>16</sup>

Samad, however, does acknowledge the complexities of identity when he points out that:

Working class Mirpuris from Bradford can see themselves as British, Pakistani, Muslim and Punjabi depending on the political and social circumstances which depress or elevate various strands of identity.<sup>17</sup>

Generally these accounts seem to exclude the idea of a distinct Kashmiri identity option., something that, as my research in Luton demonstrates, is a subject position clearly articulated by those whom people like Ballard will call “Mirpurites or Punjabis.”<sup>18</sup>

Ascription of a Pakistani, Mirpuri or Punjabi identity can be understood since many of those individuals who see themselves as Kashmiri actually hold Pakistani passports, so for official purposes are seen as Pakistani. Further the geographical proximity of the Mirpur district to the Punjab and similarities with the Punjabi language made it difficult for early researchers to differentiate. However the blanket approach does not reflect the specificities of migration from Azad Kashmir to the United Kingdom and underplays the unique role that the migration process plays in transfer of the cultural, religious and national identities.<sup>19</sup>

Migration from Azad Kashmir has been a long and complicated process and has occurred in several historical stages. As suggested previously, some factors can be explained in terms of the above-mentioned “push-pull” thesis as well as chain

migration. This point is supported by Anwar who sees migration as broadly resulting from colonial links, political freedom of movement and an economic “push” and “pull” which slowly developed into a chain migration.<sup>20</sup> As mentioned above migration has occurred from selected areas of Azad Kashmir. The overwhelming majority of emigrants have come from Mirpur or the southern district of Kotli.

Kashmir had for a long time been a depressed region within the subcontinent. Among the majority of Kashmiris education was unavailable as the governmental policy was to keep it for those groups that were linked to the political elite. Many revolts left large numbers of people being displaced and forced to migrate to the Punjab during the British Raj in the 19th Century and to Southern areas, namely Mirpur and Jammu. Many migrated to East Africa, the Indian Ocean Islands and the Caribbean in the nineteenth century. Further, a largely agrarian economy and small land led to a surplus male labour force in the area.<sup>21</sup> During the First and Second World Wars many people from Azad Kashmir joined Allied armies and navies. Mirpur district is well known for the high percentages of men in the British army. Army service provided the opportunity for men to go overseas and provided knowledge of the advantages in foreign lands.

There are three main phases in the mass-migration of Kashmiris. Firstly, the partition of India in 1947 when Pakistan was created. Partition had the effect of displacing large numbers of people on a scale never seen before in the South

Asian sub-continent. The large-scale movements of population which took place following the creation of Pakistan in 1947 created Muslim refugees (*Muhajirs*). This migration at the time of the Indo-Pakistan partition fits quite neatly into Peterson's category of "impelled flight" discussed earlier. The related problem of the Kashmir issue may also fall within this category. The constant threat of war between India and Pakistan in this region has resulted in further displacement of large numbers of Mirpuris since 1947, some of whom have now established residence in this country.

Secondly, migration at the closing decades of the last century, particularly from Mirpur, was caused by the need to look for work. The "push" factors were mainly the poor quality of land and high unemployment because of a predominantly agrarian economy and little industrialisation. Consequently high numbers of Mirpuris joined British steamships operating from Bombay as stokers. Once the original connections were made, the rest was easy. The railway station at Gujjar Khan was little more than a day's walk away from most parts of Mirpur district, and having reached Bombay, finding work presented few difficulties. By the end of the last century a high proportion of engine-room and stoke-hold *sirhangs* were themselves from Mirpur.<sup>22</sup>

Thirdly, as the British coal-powered merchant fleet expanded so more and more men were recruited. After the Second World War Mirpuri men who had been in the army began to settle in Britain. They had access to knowledge of job

opportunities on shore. As a result of the industrial labour shortages during the Second World War many of the men were recruited to fill the gaps. After 1941 former seamen began to leave ports and settle inland. These were the “pioneer migrants” and they became a source of voluntary chain migration.<sup>23</sup> Similarly Ballard suggests that these wartime pioneers formed the bridgehead to further settlement. He goes on to point out that when opportunities began to widen still further in Britain's subsequent post-war boom, Mirpuri seamen began to leave their ships in ever-increasing numbers and having established themselves ashore began to call their kinsmen over to join them, unleashing the process of chain migration.<sup>24</sup> Aurora suggests that once a tradition of migration is established it acts as a “social force” and many people who may not have an economic reason to migrate are drawn into it.<sup>25</sup> There have, therefore, been close historical links between these areas and Britain, which influenced migration patterns in the 1950's and 1960's.

The main migration of Azad Kashmiris from Mirpur Town and Mirpur District began in the late 1950's and early 1960's as migrants followed the routes of pioneer migrants. Impetus for the large-scale movement of people was provided by the construction of the Mangla Dam, which had huge implications for the people of Mirpur district, and Mirpur Town itself. Some individuals no doubt saw the economic possibilities in Britain. As mentioned above the tradition of surplus male labour in the region meant that a tradition of economic migration was long established. Lee indicates that “a person who has once migrated and who has

broken the bonds which tie him to the place in which he has spent his childhood is more likely to migrate again than is the person who has never previously migrated.”<sup>26</sup> Similarly Banton suggests that if there is already a tradition of migration, that makes the process much easier since it provides not only the psychological element in the motivation but often the material possibility as well.<sup>27</sup> The immigrants left Pakistan with the intention of returning home with money which would benefit their immediate kin at home, by being used for extending land holdings, building better houses, giving larger dowries and starting up in business; in short, factors which would increase their social standing within the local community. The scale of migration from these areas has been truly massive. In many of the villages over half of the population now lives overseas.<sup>28</sup>

The flow of knowledge back from the migrants has been important for Azad Kashmiris in Luton. Sponsorship and patronage by the pioneer migrants has helped to overcome the obstacles mentioned above. Push-pull factors with chain migration on the kinship-friendship basis, has continued even after the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962.

These events were taking place at around the same time as the immigration laws were being put in place to limit future immigration. News of this in Azad Kashmir resulted in an increased effort and a larger influx of migrants than might have been otherwise experienced. However whilst it might be said that the 1962 Commonwealth Act might have created a sudden imbalance to the pattern as more

rushed to beat that deadline set by the act, the pattern would have continued albeit at a slower rate. The most important influence as Anwar suggests is the presence of the pioneers who acted as a catalyst for further migration.<sup>29</sup>

During the early migration years Azad Kashmiris had to travel over seven hundred miles to Karachi to obtain passports. By the end of the 1960s, however, passports could be obtained from Rawalpindi, only a few hours journey from Azad Kashmir and Mirpur itself. The high level of immigration from these regions can also be attributed to the number of travel agents who began to make money out of the process. Pakistani agents established their agencies within the towns of Azad Kashmir and their contacts deep within the countryside. Many of my respondents claimed that these agents helped intending migrants to evade the restrictions that the government of Pakistan had imposed on the migrants to Britain.

Due to increasingly restrictive immigration laws since 1962 it has become more difficult for adult males from the sub-continent to enter Britain. But in the Mirpuri case the pressure to migrate has remained intense. Above all, because there are so few local opportunities to make money largely because of unmechanised agricultural methods, a farmer's life is still one of back-breaking toil so even those with substantial land holdings see work abroad as offering better prospects than staying back home.<sup>30</sup>

Immigrants had no intention of becoming assimilated into British society and classed themselves as transients, not settlers. Their main motive for coming to Britain was economic. As Shaw points out this is not surprising since wages for labouring jobs in Britain in the early 1960's were over thirty times those offered for similar jobs back in Pakistan. In Mirpur, for example, the average weekly wage was equivalent to about 37 pence whilst in Birmingham, a Pakistani's average weekly wage was £13.<sup>31</sup> Peach has also suggested that employment was a major factor in attracting people to Britain. He has shown that there is a strong correlation between the level of Commonwealth immigration and job vacancies in this country, i.e. when job vacancies went up immigration rose and when job vacancies went down, immigration fell.<sup>32</sup> One further characteristic of Azad Kashmiri migration is that migrants were given financial assistance to pay for fares through sponsorship and free accommodation and hospitality once here. Pioneer migrants also provided help to seek suitable employment.

The type of migrations mentioned above have been reduced to a trickle. Expectations that migrants will return back home have subsided as family unification and subsequent settlement and community infrastructure has ensued. It is clear that they now regard themselves as settlers and not transients. Azad Kashmiris settled in Luton make frequent visits back to their homeland and as a result it is well known that unemployment in Britain is widespread and jobs are difficult to obtain. Migration that does occur has now taken on new characteristics.

Migration of partners for marriage to Azad Kashmiris settled in Britain does continue but migration for economic purposes has been geographically redirected and increasingly takes place to the Middle East. The restrictions on migration imposed in 1962 and 1968 limited entry almost entirely to family reunion: wives and children joined the male head of the family already resident in Britain.<sup>33</sup>

### **B. The Effect of Migration on Mirpur and Kotli**

Despite long-term settlement the Luton Kashmiris have maintained strong links with their homeland. Ballard suggests that this may be the result of two factors. Firstly: they have tended to delay uniting their families overseas, and secondly: their kin who have remained at home have become increasingly dependent on remittances to maintain their standard of living.<sup>34</sup> Certainly the dependency factor was recurrently emphasised by residents of New Mirpur as they described the changes to their town- and village scapes. Mrs B pointed out that “It is the men who have gone to Britain who have built New Mirpur. It wouldn’t look like this if it wasn’t for them.” Similarly Mr F commented:

I just could not live like this if it wasn’t for my brother who just happened to be the one that moved to the UK...you see he wasn’t married and the rest of us were then and well it was just natural that he should be the one. He worked really hard and that’s why we have all of this.

The Mirpur and Kotli areas have rapidly developed as a consequence. As Ballard points out, thanks to the remittances they have sent back, there has been an immense inflow of wealth into these otherwise remote and isolated settlements.<sup>35</sup> Before mass migration to Britain and the flow of remittances back to Mirpur and

Kotli districts, houses in the area were characteristic of those across much of the rural area of Pakistan. They were *kacha* buildings with flat roofs, three or four rooms which doubled as living quarters during the day and sleeping areas during the night. Houses were surrounded by temporary walls, which would be extended as the family grew. Washing facilities and animal enclosures were located within the courtyards. Streets outside the houses tended to be dirt tracks or at best locally built cobbled alleys. The transformation from *kacha* to *pukka* housing is best illustrated in the words of those who experienced the transformation:

You cannot have recognised this place twenty years or so ago. Then there were no big houses like this. Not much was brick like it is now. There appears to be so much money here in these buildings and well now it is a place to be proud of - better than your place.

Mr G showing us around his fifty-bedroom home located in the Kotli district said, “when I was building this house it was not usual but now everywhere you go things are like this - things are improving.” He continued to point out that:

The first type of housing like this really happened in Mirpur but now those people who have gone to UK from Kotli and villages are sending back money. We caught up with Mirpur.

Mr T commented:

It is a reflection of the foreign exchange, those who have gone abroad because of the Mangla Dam. They have constructed Mirpur - we have done everything ourselves. Look they (Pakistan Government) bought our land for 150rs for a kanal and sold it back to us for 27.00rs for a kanal. We could not afford to buy anything back because at that time we didn't have the money. They flooded our land and took our livelihoods. We had to rely on our brothers abroad.

Mr Q said:

We thank our people that are living there and earning. Do you think there are factories and industries where children can get jobs? There is no source of income here.

New houses are usually built from a combination of brick, metal and cement and tend to follow a Western style with climatic modifications such as flat roofs and balconies. Characteristically all new homes have Western style facilities, particularly bathrooms with a move away from communal spaces to more and more private spaces such as bedrooms. All homes are now well equipped with labour-saving devices such as washing machines. Interestingly, many of the household appliances, televisions and videos and increasingly satellite dishes, are visible, consumer durables often brought over from Britain on various trips back home by family members settled in Luton. Living standards in these areas have certainly risen. As Mrs B, now settled in Luton, recalls:

*Beti* (daughter), it's not the Kotli I grew up in. Then it was a big thing when we had to leap the walls of our house with cattle dung, now they use paint and a brush. Then we used to go down to the local well to collect water. Now it's piped to the house. I had to wash all the family clothes by hand. I had three little children then and there was all the rest of the family and only one of me and now they have machines...it was just very different.

Associated developments in the *bazaars* have also taken place particularly in Kotli and Mirpur towns. Mirpur in particular has experienced rapid expansion with busy *bazaars*. One feature absent until Kashmiris abroad started investing in the town were the modern style shopping plazas like the Valayat Centre (English Centre) which was developed by a Bradfordian Kashmiri and run by his family who are resident in Mirpur Town.

Ballard has noted the existence of a thriving remittance economy in Azad Kashmir. He points out that the inflow of resources has not stimulated real economic growth, since Mirpuris have not found secure and profitable ways to deploy them, other than by leaving them on deposit in the bank. This has proved exceedingly problematical, given Mirpur's location in the wider political economy of Pakistan.<sup>36</sup> He also points out that farming is no longer considered a priority by migrants or their families.<sup>37</sup>

Interviews carried out during the May-June field trip to Azad Kashmir indicated that there appear to be changes since Ballard's observations.<sup>38</sup> Although investment in housing based on remittances from Luton Kashmiris is continuing there was also increasing investment into the local economy. Investment initiated by Luton-based Kashmiris included monetary input for local irrigation schemes, roads, small businesses such as the running of local bus services, car workshops, and furniture import and export businesses, to name a few. At interviews carried out during the May-June field trip, when asked about the economic input of the British Kashmiris into the local Mirpur economy, Amanullah Khan, Chairman of the JKLF, pointed out: "They are investing in industrialisation now. The schools are run by British Kashmiris on a commercial basis and they are helping their families back here very much."

Abdul Rashid Turabi, the President of the Jamaat-I-Islami in Azad Kashmir pointed out that:

Economically our brothers abroad are very important because they are sending us pounds and keeping this economy floating. They have established industries in Mirpur and therefore provided employment and other services to our community over here. Others need to be persuaded to come and invest over here.

The then Prime Minister of Azad Kashmir, Sardar Qayum, indicated that: “The British Kashmiris are extremely important. They are meeting the requirements of unemployment here - they are very helpful economically to us.”

Investment in agriculture however tends to remain a lower priority for investment as Ballard suggests.<sup>39</sup> On this point Mr Q commented:

We need men to work on the land and many of them have gone to the UK. Us older men can't do all this type of work. Also farming these days needs machinery like tractors and well we can't afford so much and the government doesn't help and well this land is a colony of Pakistan and I don't know that it is a good idea to put money in land that another country occupies. We'll probably lose it like Mangla.

In response to questions about government policy on the diaspora, Amanullah Khan and Abdul Rashid Turabi indicated that they had no specific agenda to encourage or utilise any form of investment from Kashmiri communities overseas. Any policies that did exist were ad hoc and in place generally to encourage investment through tax exemption.<sup>40</sup> Mr K's comments about the uncertainty and political marginality of Azad Kashmir being a hindrance to investment were also reiterated by political leaders, who felt that the government could do much more to encourage investment from overseas. Interviews and conversations suggested a lack of government investment into Azad Kashmiri economic infrastructure. A poor quality road network, limited subsidies for industry, especially in terms or

energy consumption and loans to industry from state banks, were often quoted as examples.

There was also some indication in conversations with Azad Kashmiris that remittances have slowed down over the last ten years. As Mr H indicated: “We can’t expect those people over there to work and work for us and have nothing for themselves. We need to do something for ourselves now. I didn’t expect money for ever from them.” Giving the example of her brother’s family based in Luton Mrs B attributed changes in remittance patterns to the fact that: “Jobs are hard to get now over there so how can he send us so much money like he used to and he has his own daughters to marry.”

The effect of families joining early migrants, the associated increasing family demands, the need to build community life in Luton and rising unemployment have resulted in changing patterns of remittances and investment back into Azad Kashmir. Less affluent families here have reduced the level of remittances to relatives but it is important to point out that research does not suggest that they have stopped. Results suggest that it appears remittances will continue as the Kashmiri youth become more economically active.

The tensions caused by strains on households due to reduced incomes here are less documented. Often families remitting money to relatives in Azad Kashmir felt they were “losing out on the luxuries of life.” Mr K highlighted this point when he

said that: "I don't mind sending money home but the thing is I really wish they would do something with it rather than just buy a tractor which sits there." Mr S commented: "I have been sending money back for years and it's a lot of money but every time there is a wedding they want more. I don't mind but I'm not a cash till."

Talking of her cousins Ms N said:

I remember when my cousins used to work all night to get money together to send to relatives back home. Whenever I go there they always expect more. I really wish they could just see how hard it is here to get money together and besides why is it that we are always the ones that have to go without things? I haven't seen my mother ever wearing expensive clothes but all my aunties over there do and she's the one who's always on the machine like I just don't get it, oh and it's always my dad's family that get the cash of course.

There is no doubt that the impact of remittances has had a huge impact on the town- and village-scapes of Kotli, Mirpur and the surrounding districts. However, the disparity between affluent and poor is clear. It is not difficult to distinguish between families who have members overseas and those who do not. Despite changing patterns of remittances, research suggests that they provide an economic and emotional link with kin in Azad Kashmir which is vital to individuals for identity maintenance.

It is perhaps worth noting that the majority of migrants had prior experience of migration albeit within the South Asian sub-continent. This point is noted by Lee who says that " A person who once migrated and who has broken the bonds which tie him to the place where he has spent his childhood is more likely to migrate than a person who has never previously migrated." <sup>41</sup> Peterson has noted

the importance of individual migrants' motives and decisions and suggests that the feedback of information and other help given by pioneer migrants was an important factor in stimulating others to join the movement.<sup>42</sup>

Migration was initially male. This can be explained by the surplus of male labour due to the economic condition and history of early migration, but another important factor was the religious-cultural background of the migrants. The Islamic way of life encouraged seclusion of women and culturally the joint family system enabled wives to be protected by the extended family while their husbands left for Britain. The sponsorship by pioneers also meant that only men could be sponsored.

#### **IV. CONCLUSION**

In this chapter, I looked at the relationship between the process of migration and identity transformation, in particular how the migratory process has impacted on Kashmiri identity development. Using data collected from fieldwork, I argued that despite popular notions of economically induced migration, Kashmiris also see their migration in political terms, and this has a profound impact on the development of nationalistic sentiments. This finding supports the point I made in the last chapter, regarding the primacy of the political in articulation of Kashmiri identity. In the next chapter, this finding will be further elaborated, as I will look at what happens to "Kashmiriyat" when Kashmiris are "away" from Kashmir.

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Castles and Miller, 1993, p. 19.

<sup>2</sup> Brown and Foot, 1994, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Modified versions of Ravenstein's model showing Everett Lees intervening obstacles can be found in Jackson, 1986, p. 15 and Anwar, 1979, p. 18.

<sup>4</sup> As suggested by Castles and Miller, 1993, p. 20.

<sup>5</sup> Borjas, 1989, p. 461.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> For a criticism of these theories see Castles and Miller, 1993, pp. 20-21.

<sup>8</sup> Fawcett and Arnold, 1987, pp.456-7.

<sup>9</sup> John and Leatrice MacDonald, 1962, in Anwar, 1979, p. 19.

<sup>10</sup> Common historical-economic, socio-political and religious memories of home have the effect of maintaining a separateness from the majority white community and sharing identity with other South Asian groups. However for Kashmiris political memory has the effect of maintaining a separate identity from both. Theories of migration acknowledge the possible political causes of migration. However they appear to underplay its importance in favour of socio-economic causes. Many writers commenting on migration refer to the political context of migration but only as part of the larger economic implications. Whilst it is true that political problems in Kashmir are inextricably linked to economic reasons for migration, what is being suggested is that in the case of Kashmiri migration to Britain political reasons must be allocated their due academic space, since they have been particularly important in current identity structures. Ansari, 1994 and Clark, 1994 acknowledge the importance of political factors in migration. With reference to Partition they talk of political factors being the cause of migration from India to Pakistan in 1947. From conversations with Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir and Luton it appears that the political upheavals in Kashmir as the colonial powers left the sub-continent were an important factor in their migrations to Azad Kashmir. There was no alternative but to face the hostility of the Indian Army. Migration from 1960s onwards can be seen as a response to discrimination by the Pakistani governments in the wake of their own policies and the marginality of Azad Kashmir. Experiences of upheavals are recollected through shared memory and reinforced through links with relatives and events in Kashmir.

The role of memory in the migration process is vital for identity within the new context. In the case of the Kashmiris, as well as memory of family, village life, culture and religion there is the additional migratory memory that is related to a contested history, recollection of oppression, persecution and lack of representation. As, 1994 suggests memory of oppression and totalitarianism is one of the driving forces behind some of these migrations and the transmission of memories between family generations, which are then reconstructed in the new abode.

In the new location this common experience and shared memory can mobilise as resistance and in the case of the Kashmiris the right to self-determination. Benmayor and Skotnes, 1994, p.9 point out that social movements of disenfranchised people are placing a wide range of identity issues on the public agenda and that through such struggles, people constitute themselves as social subjects and actors, reasserting and redefining who they are and what they want to become. This memory transferred through the migration process in the case of the Kashmiris is reconstituted to become a political tool. Thus, in response to specific situations and moments, people strategically bring to the fore different dimensions of their individual and collective memories to construct who and what they are fighting for. It is important to note that generation and gender play significant roles in the differential construction of memory and definitions of "what they are fighting for" and the migration process changes gender identities within the new context.

<sup>11</sup> See for example Robinson, 1979; Anwar, 1979; Peach 1990, pp. 414-20 and Rafiq 1991, pp. 213-21.

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<sup>12</sup> See Anwar, 1979.

<sup>13</sup> Dahya, 1974.

<sup>14</sup> See Dahya, 1972, pp.75-86; Shaw, 1988.

<sup>15</sup> Khan, 1976, p.225.

<sup>16</sup> Ballard, 1990, p.220.

<sup>17</sup> Samad, 1992, p.508.

<sup>18</sup> Joly, 1986. In her research she identifies her sample as Kashmiri families from Mirpur district, speaking a dialect of Punjabi and manifesting their particularities through community activities. Ellis, 1991, p. 378 in her Coventry study talks of people identifying themselves as Kashmiris. She also demonstrates awareness of the existence of Kashmiris elsewhere when she points out that in some towns across Britain tensions based on a Punjabi-Kashmiri split have caused tensions within Muslim community organisations.

All of the respondents interviewed who had migrated came from Azad Kashmir and importantly identified themselves as Kashmiri rather than Pakistani or Punjabi. Most were from Kotli district and do not call themselves Mirpuris now even though they migrated in the 1960s prior to the administrative split. Some respondents were from Mirpur district and variously called themselves Kashmiri and Mirpuri.

<sup>20</sup> Anwar (1979)

<sup>21</sup> In this case eventually land holdings would be so small that they would not be able to sustain families.

<sup>22</sup> See Ballard, 1990.

<sup>23</sup> See Anwar, 1979.

<sup>24</sup> Ballard, 1990.

<sup>25</sup> Aurora, 1967.

<sup>26</sup> Lee, 1969

<sup>27</sup> Banton, 1983

<sup>28</sup> Ballard, 1990.

<sup>29</sup> Anwar, 1979.

<sup>30</sup> Ballard, 1983.

<sup>31</sup> Shaw, 1988

<sup>32</sup> Peach, 1968.

<sup>33</sup> Nielsen, 1984.

<sup>34</sup> Ballard, 1983.

<sup>35</sup> Ballard, 1990.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>37</sup> Ballard, 1988.

<sup>38</sup> Ballard, 1990.

<sup>39</sup> Ballard, 1988.

<sup>40</sup> This information was gathered during a fieldwork in Kashmir during 1996. Subsequently the data from this fieldwork has appeared in a paper by Ellis and Khan.

<sup>41</sup> Lee, 1969.

<sup>42</sup> Peterson, 1958.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN: BACKGROUND TO KASHMIRI SETTLEMENT**

### **I. INTRODUCTION**

In the previous chapter I have illustrated how migration is rarely a single historical event, rather it is a continuous process, the final stage of which is permanent settlement. Once initial migration is complete, settlement of pioneer migrants, their households and the establishment of a community infrastructure within a new environment ensues. We have seen that through the process of migration individuals transfer their identity maintenance systems to the new country of residence. Settlement of community changes the context in which identities are formed and reformed and it is argued that these contextual changes, whether local, national, or global, transform identity kits. Thus, once community establishment is complete and the concerns of the early migration and settlement years have been overcome, these identity systems may be updated and redefined to give a contemporary sense to identity, particularly amongst the British offspring. This redefinition takes place through a process of enculturation. In what follows I look at the way in which contextual changes (i.e. settling down in Britain) impact on the identity of Kashmiri community and individuals.

### **II. KASHMIRI SETTLEMENT IN LUTON**

Before I turn to the issue of enculturation of Kashmiris it is necessary to place Kashmiri settlement in the broader context of post war migration and settlement to Britain and specifically the ethnic and the South Asian component.

## **A. Demographics<sup>1</sup>**

The 1991 Census did include the ethnic question, by which it is now possible to make a more accurate estimate of Britain's Pakistani population. However there continues to be a dearth of accurate information with regard to the proportion of those referred to as Pakistanis who are Azad Kashmiri. From the Census data it appears that many of the Kashmiris opted for the Pakistani category where there was no satisfactory category recognising their ethnicity. Based on the 1991 Census the Pakistanis are now the third largest ethnic minority group in the United Kingdom.


Overall the Kashmiri community is the largest of the Muslim communities. Estimation of the actual numbers of Kashmiris in Britain is obscured, as already mentioned, by Kashmiris holding Pakistani passports. Although the majority of Kashmiris are now British nationals, many have dual nationality and retain Pakistani citizenship, a process which was eased by the Pakistani Government. This further obscures estimations of the actual size of the Kashmiri community in Britain so at best only estimates can be made. Ballard has estimated that somewhere in the region of two-thirds of those who are categorised as 'Pakistani' are in actual fact from Azad Kashmir.<sup>2</sup>

In many cities in the United Kingdom but particularly Bradford, Birmingham and Luton, the Kashmiris form the largest group amongst those categorised as Pakistani, followed by Punjabis and Pathans. Pakistani/Kashmiri settlement in


the United Kingdom reflects the economically driven aspects of migration and consequently the largest settlements are found in the West Midlands, West Yorkshire, Lancashire, Central Clydeside, and selected areas of Scotland. The old industrial cities such as Bolton, Bradford, Birmingham, Manchester and Luton have been the main recipients and hence it is in these areas that “Kashmiriyat” is best expressed. Map 4 shows the geographical distribution of the Pakistani/Kashmiri community in the United Kingdom. The dynamics of migration, settlement and identity are however best understood at a local level. The following sections look at these in relation to the Kashmiri experience in Luton.

## **B. Patterns of Settlement**

Migration has not only been selective in terms of region of emigration. It has also been very localised in nature so that there exists a town by town pattern of Azad Kashmiri settlement in Britain. Significant Kashmiri settlement has taken place in Luton, the largest in the South East of England. Luton has a population of approximately 171,000 people. Black and Asians make up 20% of the population and the Pakistani/Kashmiris comprise 6.2% of that total. This percentage places Luton in the top ten boroughs/districts in England and Wales, in terms of its ethnic population.<sup>3</sup> Community estimates of the size of the Kashmiri community vary from 10,000 to 12,000 people, the majority of whom are from Mirpur and Kotli. Census data, however, put the Pakistani population numbers in Luton at



Map 4- Location of Luton with respect to other concentrations of Kashmiri settlement



Map 5- Location of "Bury Park" area of Luton (wards)

10,657. There is reason to believe that official statistics may have significantly underestimated the Kashmiri population in Luton.<sup>4</sup>

The majority of the Kashmiris have settled in the three adjacent wards of Dallow, Biscot and Luton South in the area that is referred to as “Bury Park”, which is located to the north-west of the centre. Map 5 shows the municipal wards in Luton. There is an abundance of Kashmiri households across these three wards. Although there are significant Black and Asian settlements in the Marsh Farm area in north Luton, unlike many of the larger industrial cities such as Bradford and Birmingham there is no clear segregation of different ethnic groups. Kashmiris, Punjabis, Pathans, Bengalis, Sikhs, Hindus and members of the African Caribbean community are all represented within this area. This is in contradistinction to cities like Bradford and Birmingham where intra-ethnic segregation is more visible. One reason for this may be that these towns and cities are larger than Luton. Birmingham is a good example of this. The majority of Kashmiris have settled in the Small Heath area, Alum Rock and Aston, whereas Punjabis have favoured Sparkbrook, Small Heath, Edgbaston and Handsworth and the Pathans appear to favour Sparkbrook and Alum Rock.

“Bury Park” is well known in Luton for being the ethnic segregated area. It is important to point out that segregation in this context refers to situations where members of the Azad Kashmiri community in Luton are not distributed uniformly in relation to the rest of the population. It has the effect of reducing interaction

one of the earliest Kashmiri migrants, a retired army officer based in Muzaffarabad, described the popular story of the first Kashmiri pioneer migrant to Britain:

Look it was with one poor man that it all started. He was really very poor and from here he went to Mirpur and from there to the Punjab to look for work. I am talking about the pre-partition days and still he found no work so he went to the seaport of Karachi. He got a job there on a ship. There were no cranes then and he had to load all the coal on the ship. He worked for two months. When he had enough of loading twenty kilos of coal he hid in the coal store and left the country hiding. Someone is said to have seen him and reported him to the captain who made him work in the kitchens and when they came to London he let him go. The story is that he stayed there and called all family and friends over from Mirpur where his family had gone to be with him.

Mr Y explained the migration of one of the pioneer migrants to Luton:

I suppose he was like one of our forefathers, I suppose if it wasn't for him really many of us just wouldn't be here at all. This was 1954 and I think he settled in Beech Road and then there were other houses where men started to come...I know that Westbourne Road was another place where a lot of us young men settled when we first came here.

Mr Y's comments highlight the importance of chain migration: "I came here because a friend of my father's was here in Luton so where else was I to go. I had to come here because he was here and he knew about jobs and things. Contacts are very important in a new country." Community contacts highlighted streets of pioneer settlement as Ferndale Road, Dallow Road and Salisbury Road. Subsequent settlement of Kashmiris followed pioneer migrants. This approach to some extent assumes that immigrants have a choice in the areas they wish to reside and in doing so avoids discussion of the constraints affecting newly arrived immigrants. Problems of migration are extenuated by the economic necessity to be

close to places of work and cheap housing. There are many factors such as debts to repay and the travel costs of bringing their family to the new country, as well as the desire to save as much as possible for remission to kin or to accumulate wealth and return home relatively well off. Discussion of constraints centred on finance for housing. As Mr G comments:

Oh there were always big houses then as well but two things you must remember: first we didn't need them because there was only us men and then we couldn't afford them and then well they were so far from work and the community. It would have cost so much to get to the places and we had to send back money to family. When we first came here we could just about afford to live together. We shared beds not just houses. I remember one year there was nearly twenty of us in the house. We were never there all together but there were lots of us and we didn't even think of the big houses and the posh areas. For us it was work and sleep to get by.

From the above comments it is clear that finance was a constraint on housing choice.

Economic difficulties have played an important role in the segregation of Kashmiri households in Luton. We have seen that one of the “push” factors for Kashmiri migration to Britain was shortage of work in Azad Kashmir. The “pull” factors attracting Kashmiris to Luton as with the majority of migration from the South Asia was the availability of work. As in other major industrial towns and cities in Britain the Kashmiris came to Luton as “replacement labour” and overall settlement in the inner city area is reflective of the services that the Kashmiris came to provide.

Kashmiris were initially attracted to the industries in Luton<sup>8</sup>. Luton was founded on the hat industry in the nineteenth century. Early employment taken up by Kashmiri migrants was unskilled labour in the factories in the inner wards of Luton. Principal manufacturing industries at this time were motor cars. The largest employers in car manufacture were Vauxhall Motors<sup>9</sup> followed by IBC Motors. Other manufacturing industry centred on the manufacture of domestic and bulk meters (Asea Brown Boveri), ball and spherical roller bearings (SKF), domestic electrical appliances (Electrolux), industrial pumps (Hayward Tyler), chemicals (Laporte Industries) and clothing. In the post war period there were considerable number of vacancies in these industries. For this reason Luton was also attractive for those migrants that had gone to other industrial towns of Britain. Intra-urban migration was particularly attractive during the 1970s as industries in the north began to decline.

As I have already mentioned, the migrants were from predominantly rural backgrounds and lacked qualifications.<sup>10</sup> They had very little knowledge of the English language and spoke only their local dialects. Kashmiri migrants on arrival entered into the lower echelons of this hierarchy due to lack of skills, education and wealth. The morphology of the city and financial constraints means that they were restricted to particular types of houses. For example in Glasgow Asians were confined to the pre 1880 tenements, in Birmingham to low quality inner city housing and in Bradford to the cheap back to back terraces.<sup>11</sup> The need for cheap accommodation due to the narrow occupational structure is accentuated by many

factors. These include debts to reimburse travel costs, remittance payments, etc. In all cases these migrants were a residual population filling the gaps where the whites no longer wanted to live through the “filtering process”.<sup>12</sup>

The settlement patterns of Kashmiris in Luton meant that they involuntarily entered the inner city areas which are synonymous with deprivation and cheap housing.<sup>13</sup> New housing is built for affluent residents but the filtering mechanism does not provide better housing for all, hence almost every town has its area of deprived housing. Bury Park is such an area. In Luton the filtering mechanism is further hindered by the continuing influx of Azad Kashmiri migrants. With time and as a result of improvements in their socio-economic situation, migrants are expected to move out of the segregated area. As a generalisation then, there is an upward shift of the whole socio-economic system. This upward shift does not appear to be taking place in Luton. This may be one reason why Kashmiris continue to reside in Bury Park. Some of the most often quoted reasons for patterns of settlement were to do with work. As Mr D’s comments exemplify: “I lived here because I was working near. In those days I didn’t know about buses or couldn’t afford a car or a house for that matter so it was best to live close to where I worked. All us young boys lived close in those days.”

The psychological impact of migration and changes in employment is often ignored in the literature. The ease with which these migrants adapted to their new factory work was remarkable considering their occupations in Azad Kashmir.

However this was not without its problems. Kashmiri narratives highlight the changes in working conditions that came about as a result of migration to Luton.

Mr K talks of the changes from rural life to factory life in Luton:

I couldn't stand to be in indoors all the time. I just felt as if I never saw the daylight. It was awful and I thought that I would never get used to this life. It was really strange to have been working out on our farmland one minute and come to be indoors all the time. At first I couldn't understand why they (family) all thought that this would be the best option for me.

Since the decline of industry in the inner wards of Luton, the Kashmiri population has once again had to adapt itself to change. There have been considerable casualties of industrial decline but many have moved into small scale consumer retail businesses. These individuals however have come from small business backgrounds in their villages back in Azad Kashmir. In Luton these businesses are particularly visible along Bury Park Road. In recent years there has been the emergence of ethnic businesses such as solicitors' firms, accountants' firms and international pay -phone exchanges within this area. These firms tend to be headed by professionals who have migrated from Azad Kashmir, migrants who have continued education on arriving and particularly the younger generation of Kashmiris born and brought up in Britain.

Migrants often accepted conditions which they would not have tolerated in Azad Kashmir because of the other benefits besides employment, such as free health and education which are highly regarded amongst Kashmiri migrants. Conversations suggest that these factors may be some compensation for lack of employment.

Mrs F commented:

My husband has been out of work for nearly five years. He had to leave because he got heart problems. I just thank Allah that we are in this country because we have got good medical help and well you don't have to pay. In Kashmir I would have had to sell things or borrow money to get the care that he has got at the L and D (Luton and Dunstable Hospital).

The majority of migrants are small landholders with five to six bighas (4 bighas = 1 acre) in Mirpur district. They are therefore small landholders who had very low incomes and landless labourers who also earned very small wages. However after migration to Britain, migrants, both labourers and 'gentry', work alongside each other in factories and mills because “in a strange country the status of a labourer is not the same as that associated with the labourer back home.”<sup>14</sup>

Many immigrants do succeed in climbing this hierarchical ladder and thus improve their economic and social status, but this “upward” mobility is easier to achieve during periods of economic boom. However the British economy has been relatively stagnant over the last decade leading to high scale unemployment within the Kashmiri immigrant social group.

The arrival of Kashmiri migrants and entrance into the lower echelons of the socio-economic hierarchy mean they involuntarily enter into the inner city area (Dallow Ward/Bury Park area in this study) which are synonymous with deprivation and cheap, often poor quality housing. Low socio-economic status of ethnic groups can only partially explain their high levels of segregation.<sup>15</sup> Discrimination is another important factor in segregation.

Discriminatory factors come into play where ethnic groups are perceived as undesirable by the host population. The “blocking” strategy is usually administered by the existing occupants of city neighbourhoods, in an attempt to resist the “invasion” of ethnic groups. This occurs in a variety of ways ranging from social hostility to petty violence and deliberate vandalism. Where this strategy of “voicing” opposition is unsuccessful or where the area in question is occupied by socially and geographically more mobile households, the host population's strategy becomes that of “exit”.<sup>16</sup> This process eventually leaves the ethnic group spatially isolated.

The spatial concentration of ethnic minorities further comes about through discrimination in the housing market. This has been termed the “discrimination thesis”.<sup>17</sup> The most powerful discrimination devices in the private sector are the inability to obtain and maintain a mortgage. As already mentioned, Kashmiris are economic migrants and a “replacement labour force” and therefore were irregularly employed in low-paid unskilled jobs which were rejected by the host population.<sup>18</sup> Under these circumstances mortgages were difficult to obtain. Further discrimination occurs through estate agents. The presence of Asians in a neighbourhood is thought to lower property values and neighbourhood status. Thus estate agents not willing to antagonise future white clients did not direct Asians to all-white residential areas.

Parallel discrimination is thought to exist in terms of entry into the public housing sector. A system exists “in which some ethnic groups deemed to be inferior become a de facto ghetto”.<sup>19</sup> There has been considerable support for the discrimination thesis in the literature. For example, Carter and Jones state that there is “an accumulated wealth of evidence that Asians in common with other British Blacks, have been subject to continuing housing discrimination, overt and covert, individual and organised, deliberate and unintended”.<sup>20</sup> Baboolal points to the undervaluing of the importance of skin colour in place of easily measurable characteristics such as religion and social class. Skin colour is an explicit factor in segregation within the city.<sup>21</sup> Even if the actual threat of discrimination disappears the psychological threat remains an important factor in segregation.

The localised nature of cheaper accommodation mentioned above has an impact on the residential segregation of Azad Kashmiris in Luton. It has the effect of further channelling ethnic minority groups into particular niches. As Ms P comments: “You’re talking about the experience of us lot when we first came here. I can’t get a Council house now.”

There have been many studies which have shown that disadvantaged groups have long suffered discrimination in allocation of local authority housing.<sup>22</sup> Carter highlights the discrimination by building societies, estate agents and builders.<sup>23</sup> Recent research on housing patterns of South Asians emphasises the decisive role played by racism in curtailing the accommodation options available to South Asian settlers.<sup>24</sup> This approach contrasts sharply with work done by academics

like Dahya and Werbner whose research suggests that South Asian housing patterns were a matter of choice based on cultural preferences.<sup>25</sup> According to these writers Pakistanis prefer owner occupation. The question which Dahya and Werbner fail to address is exactly what is involved in the idea of cultural preference. Is it not possible that “cultural preference” for owner occupation may be a cultural adaptation to an environment in which South Asians faced serious discrimination in accessing other forms of accommodation? What is it about “Pakistani culture” that would favour owner occupation? How specific is it to “Pakistanis”? Too often culturalist explanations betray a determinism “which portray Britain's black population as pawns, unable to resist the forces which control their lives, and which fail to consider culture, in the sense of world view, rather than attributed exoticism.”<sup>26</sup> Mr K commented on the discrimination he experienced whilst trying to buy a house:

Racism has always been around. I remember when things got bad on the job front people blamed us. You know the stuff - get out you Pakis and all that rubbish, but I didn't really come across it in a really big way until I wanted a house. I went to the council and they said that they couldn't give me a house in 'Bury Park' and there were some available in Marsh Farm area. Well my wife and children would know no one there but they wouldn't listen. Then someone told me that I could get a mortgage. I didn't have a clue in those days but I know now that they didn't even want me to have that. In the end I had to borrow most of it from people I knew from here and there. Most men I knew did that.

Similarly Mr H pointed out:

When I came to this country I had money and well even though I wanted to buy a house off New Bedford Road I had problems. I remember going and talking to these people (white estate agents) and them just not wanting to show me the place and it was only when I insisted that they showed it to me. In the end I gave up and

went to one of our own men. I didn't want to do that because you can't trust them either.

There is however, another set of arguments which explain the spatial concentration of ethnic minorities, not in terms of discrimination, but as result of voluntary non-participation by immigrants. The "Return Migration Orientation Thesis" developed by Dahya, maintains that ghettoization of ethnic minorities is a product of their desire not to fully participate within the host society.<sup>27</sup> As Patiya describes: "this theory is based on the concept that the immigrants come with the firm intention of returning home where they hope to enjoy the fruits of their labour in retirement. That is, the immigrants consider themselves to be transients and not settlers."<sup>28</sup> According to this approach Pakistani migrants are in Britain to accumulate money which they use to pay off their debts incurred in the process of migration, to invest in larger land holdings in their villages of origin and to construct *pukka* permanent houses in Pakistan. The main aim of the *vilayati* (a Pakistani who has migrated to Britain) is to save as much as possible to enable him to return home quickly. In order to be readily accepted back into the village at home the *vilayati* must maintain his culture, which means non-participation in the 'morally lax, status conscious British society'.<sup>29</sup> Similarly Banton suggests that the "reference groups" by which the migrant measures himself are located in the sending society, as are indeed many of the informal social controls upon his behaviour when in the presence of fellow migrants.<sup>30</sup> To resist conforming to values and social behaviour of the receiving country over generations requires a tremendous commitment to the group and powerfully distinctive institutions.

This non-participation manifests itself in variety of ways including: “their living and eating requirements were broadly the same as before migration and secondly, savings are maximised to allow them not merely to express but also to defend and perpetuate their traditional social forms, values, beliefs and ethnic identity.”<sup>31</sup> In British society this is expressed in housing purchased by Azad Kashmiris in Luton. Aspirations of Pakistani immigrants are determined by the *kacha* (non-permanent) houses found in the villages of origin, so the industrial terrace became the norm. Ownership allows Azad Kashmiris to save greater percentages of their income whilst at the same time allowing easy access to places of employment and providing money for remittances to Azad Kashmir. Dahya also notes that the immigrants do not think of localities in which they live as decaying areas or slums since no matter how old and dilapidated the immigrant houses in Britain may be, they are regarded as infinitely superior to those left behind in the villages.<sup>32</sup>

There is some suggestion that non-participation in majority societal norms continues to be an important factor for Kashmiris in Luton. For example one respondent claimed: “I think it is better to live amongst people of your own kind because that way you will be influenced by their ways and you won’t get children going to clubs or going out like English people do.” It is not clear whether non-participation (i.e. refusing to accept without distinction) the cultural norms of a host society is the same as not participating in other ways within the host society. Not accepting prevailing norms turns a *de facto* settler into a transient. Dahya seems to have an essentialist notion of migrant social forms, values, and beliefs.

There is clearly an assumption that because something is traditional it is somehow static and immutable. The whole point about enculturation is to examine the ways in which traditional beliefs and values are adapted to new environments. A closer analysis of traditions of ethnic identity demonstrates clearly that what is considered to be traditional is also open to re-definition and re-contextualization.<sup>33</sup>

Other explanations for the apparent segregation of Azad Kashmiris in Luton can also be summarised by the ideas put forward by Boal.<sup>34</sup> He suggests such clusters are basically defensive in function and in response to external pressures. Different immigrant groups have different levels of assimilation. Segregation is more likely to occur if the immigrant group is easily identifiable by colour and clan. The differences in the way in which segregation manifests itself in distinct spatial outcomes. It is important to note here that full assimilation adopts the notion that total dispersal of an immigrant population amongst the host population should take place. This will only take place if migrants mix with the host population quickly before any differences between the immigrant population and the host population become extenuated. Where this occurs ethnic or residential clusters are only temporary in the assimilation of the migrant group into the host population. Boal terms such clusters as “colonies”.<sup>35</sup>

These “colonies” serve as a port of entry for members of the ethnic group concerned. They provide a foothold in new societies for groups who are likely to have little difficulty in achieving either behavioural or structural assimilation and

most importantly are motivated towards those ends. Ethnic clusters which exist over a longer time are usually the result of the interaction between discrimination and internal cohesion. Where internal cohesion is a prominent feature residential clusters are termed “enclaves”. This ethnic area is likely to persist over time because it is primarily based on choice and in particular the preservation function.

The term “enclave” adequately describes the situation occurring amongst Azad Kashmiri migrants in Luton. Where external factors such as the constraints and the discriminatory action of the host population exist, the residential clusters are termed “ghettos”. These are ethnic areas which persist and here no assimilation takes place.


Figure 7.11 shows a number of ways in which the three spatial forms of the colony, enclave and ghetto may emerge and are based on Boal's (1978) examples.

Thus it can be argued that the concentration of Azad Kashmiris within the poorer inner city areas emphasises the social and economic disadvantage experienced by these groups when they arrived in Britain. This concentration also has the effect of increasing the visibility of an already distinctive minority, (making them easier targets for hostility and aggression).

It is argued that with time the coloured immigrants will disperse from their ethnic clusters into the white majority community and the socio-economic structure of

the host society.<sup>36</sup> It is likely that at a later stage, the immigrants may begin to re-evaluate their position vis-à-vis Britain and Pakistan. Accordingly, they may adopt new values and aspirations and seek recognition in British society. Alternatively they may modify their present perspective and yet, given the external constraints suggested by Rex and Moore, find their residential mobility blocked. Reticence of aspirations has certainly taken place amongst the Kashmiris. The most significant factor was that many felt it was unrealistic to hope that they would return to Azad Kashmir to settle.

Figure 7.1 Types of Ethnic Area



Source: Herbert, D.T and Thomas, C.T. 1982

permanently. As Mr. J said: "I thought once that I might go home, I think most people my age thought that we would but it's not possible now because all my children are here. I can't see them going back unless it's for holidays. This is their Kashmir."

My research also suggests that Kashmiris will remain segregated within "Bury Park". Kashmiri residential segregation in Luton remains high despite the fact that migrants have been settled for nearly thirty years and have structurally assimilated.<sup>37</sup>

Reasons for remaining within the segregated community were given as:

There is no need to move out of this area. My family are here, my friends are here and we have all our day to day necessities here. I know people who live in other areas of Luton, Farley Hill or Lewesly Farm, and I can tell you they're not happy at all. You know it's one thing being with your own family and own kind and another being with strangers.

I can't live with those people. They are not like me, you know, they don't speak the language and they don't do anything like we do. Here at least I know that if I need it I will get all the help that I need. I can ask a fellow Muslim for anything and I know that he will do his best to get it for me and even I feel that my family is more protected here because everyone knows whose *izzat* that is.

Interestingly, whilst recognising the negative aspects of living within segregated community many younger members of the Kashmiri community expressed the desire to continue living within the "Bury Park" area, which is perhaps an indication of the depth of their identification with that particular locality.

I can't go out of this area. Here I know everyone and I feel protected. All my mates are here, I went to school here and well everything is here...when I get married my family will be near for

things that I will need. It's no good going away when I will need their help and all that sort of thing.

Relatives are important but you know something else when I came all the jobs were here and that was just great. I could walk to work. I lived here to be close to my sister but also to be close to my work, now there's no work anymore and I feel at least there is some family here and there is a Mosque and other things just for us and our needs.

Kashmiri segregation has thus been influenced by 'institutional completeness' and Azad Kashmiri use of exclusive institutions which increases their identification with traditional culture, language, national origin and religion. These factors increase Kashmiri 'encapsulation' and reduce the opportunity for assimilation leading to segregation. Kashmiri settlement within "Bury Park" is geographically distinct. Settlement has also reached the stage where the community is now structurally, socially and culturally distinctive. The segregated area may therefore be seen as a separate territory, which serves to heighten and proclaim a distinctive identity of the minority and provide support and protection for the migrants as Boal suggests. Perhaps most importantly the segregated space acts as an important self-ascriptive force, which is central to identity formation.

From the above sections it is clear that Kashmiri patterns of settlement are distinct and that for many of the Kashmiris in Luton the segregated area is very important. Research suggests that by living in close proximity, as well as being psychologically comforting Kashmiris in Luton are able to reproduce the social systems of home which are held together by ethnic institutions. The following sections highlight the important cultural, religious and political institutions that are influencing the identity of Kashmiris in Luton.

### III CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have drawn a demographic outline and settlement profile of the Kashmiri community in Britain and more specifically in Luton. I spent some time discussing the way in which the Kashmiri population is concentrated in the “Bury Park” area of Luton. This concentration can be understood in the terms of the four main models: choice/constraint model, the discrimination thesis, voluntary non-participation thesis, and the idea of defensive settlement. Regardless of which model one accepts, what is clear is that settlement models are linked to ideas on the identity of ethnic minorities. This is fairly clear in the latter three models, which all explain the behaviour of ethnic migrants as being affected by who they are, whether this be in the form of discrimination and exclusion or self-induced non-participation. Even the choice/constraint model has an implicit notion of identity. In other words, who the migrants are conditions the way they have settled in Luton. The urban landscape of Luton is marked by the identity of the Kashmiri community, not only in the provision of particular types of buildings and amenities (mosques, halal butchers etc.) but also in the spatial form the settlement takes. Thus, identity is central not only in terms of providing the norms and values of Kashmiri settlers, but also in terms of the manifold ways in which Kashmiri settlement is given shape. Therefore, an investigation into the identity of Kashmiris, is an investigation that deals with the everyday life of Kashmiris. The question of who the Kashmiris are is not simply an ethnographic one, because who the Kashmiris are determines their economic and social, as well as their cultural well being. In this chapter I took issue with the way Dahya’s model

assumes a static notion of tradition and identity. In the subsequent chapters, I will show how the process of enculturation produces syncretic forms of identity, that is identity states that are re-defined and re-contextualised in response to new situations and environments. In the next chapter, I will investigate the collective and individual dimensions of Kashmiri identity, examining the way in which they have been translated in response to migration to Britain. This chapter, then, by providing a profile of the Kashmiri community in Luton, has set the stage for the investigation into what aspects of Kashmiriness have changed, and what facets have remained the same, in the context of Kashmiri settlement in Luton.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> This demographic profile of Pakistani is based on Ballard and Kalra's analysis of the 1991 census.
- <sup>2</sup> Ballard, 1991, pp.513-17
- <sup>3</sup> Gwilliam, 1994, p.4.
- <sup>4</sup> This belief is based on discussions with community leaders and reference to internal community records.
- <sup>5</sup> Various studies have used residential segregation as a measure for assimilation of ethnic populations for example Kearsley and Srivastava, 1973 and Peach, 1975.
- <sup>6</sup> See Dahya, 1972 and Rex and Moore, 1967.
- <sup>7</sup> Anwar, 1985, p. 6 for settlement patterns.
- <sup>8</sup> The name Luton was derived from the River Lea and historical records show that earliest settlement was on the banks of the River Lea.
- <sup>9</sup> Vauxhall Motors remains the largest single employer in Luton.
- <sup>10</sup> It is important to note that this does not mean that these individuals lacked basic education as is reported in much of the migration literature but that they did not have experience of education according to the Western model.
- <sup>11</sup> For Glasgow see Kearsley and Srivastava, 1973. For Dundee see Jones and Davenport, 1972.
- <sup>12</sup> The "filtering process" has been described by Hoyt, 1939. According to this model old housing is occupied by lower status groups, better housing is occupied by lower middle class households and the best housing is synonymous with the upper middle class. New housing is built for the upper middle class. The lower classes move up the housing scale according to changing family requirements and migrants move into the vacated, worst housing. For more details on the "filtering process" and residential mobility generally, see Short, 1978.
- For further details see Short, 1978 and Carter and Jones, 1979.
- <sup>13</sup> This seems to comply with Carter and Jones, 1979 observations.
- <sup>14</sup> Dahya, 1973.
- <sup>15</sup> See Lee, 1977 and Taeuber, 1965.
- <sup>16</sup> Knox, 1972.
- <sup>17</sup> See Rex and Moore, 1967, for elaboration of this thesis.
- <sup>18</sup> Peach, 1965, 1968, and 1979.
- <sup>19</sup> Rex, 1973.
- <sup>20</sup> Cater and Jones, 1979, p.
- <sup>21</sup> Baboolal also argues that although the self segregationists do not deny the existence of and importance of skin colour discrimination, their isolation of a separate "voluntary" segregation factor largely ignores this essential characteristic of their study groups. "Skin colour is the omnipresent badge of identity"
- <sup>22</sup> I refer to studies undertaken by Henderson and Karn, 1987 as well as those of Bowes, Mc Cluskey and Sim, 1989.
- <sup>23</sup> See Cater, 1981.
- <sup>24</sup> See Bowes, et al. 1996.
- <sup>25</sup> See Dahya, 1974 and Werbner, 1987.
- <sup>26</sup> Bowes, et al. 1996, p.2. See also Ballard, 1992 for a critique of cultural determinist approaches.
- <sup>27</sup> Dahya, 1972, 1974.
- <sup>28</sup> Patiya as quoted by Dahya, 1974
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>30</sup> Banton, 1983.
- <sup>31</sup> Dahya, 1974.
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>33</sup> For example, among many Kashmiri women who have been brought up in Britain there is an increasing turn towards Islam. This return to Islam is not a return to the Islam of their parents or grandparents- but rather to a Islam, which is increasingly shorn of cultural accretions and particularism.
- <sup>34</sup> See Boal in Herbert and Thomas 1982.
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>36</sup> See for example, Johnston, 1963 or Patterson, 1965.
- <sup>37</sup> Structural assimilation refers to assimilation within the economic, political and educational structures of the majority white community.

## **CHAPTER EIGHT: KASHMIRIS AWAY**

### **I. INTRODUCTION**

In the previous chapter I pointed out how the spatial concentration of Kashmiris within Luton is only explicable in terms of who the Kashmiris are. In other words, their concentration in particular areas was part and parcel of the way in which they manifested their identity, how this identity interacted with the identity of the host community, and what accommodation options were available to them, given that the way their identity states interacted with the new environment. As I have already discussed, identity is not a constant, nor is it something that is constantly changing. If the latter were the case, there would be no continuity, as an identity would transform to such an extent that it would be unrecognisable from its previous states. If, however, identity were constant, it would be impossible to account for any changes: Kashmiris would always be Kashmiris. This would deny the historically contingent nature of identity. What needs to be examined are the complex ways in which some elements of identity are maintained whilst others are changed. In this chapter, I begin the task of showing how the process of enculturation has produced syncretic forms of Kashmiri identity which reflect not only the way Kashmir and its history has marked the Kashmiris but also how their settlement in Luton has affected “Kashmiriness”. In other words, how Kashmiriness continues to be produced in very different contexts and situations. The next few chapters will be primarily dealing with this issue. In this chapter I investigate the collective and individual dimensions of Kashmiri identity.

Specifically it looks at the way in which these dimensions have been transferred and translated within the new context of Britain and especially Luton.

## II. CULTURAL NETWORKS IN LUTON

In the early years of settlement cultural networks manifest themselves most obviously in their role of sponsorship and patronage. A number of previous studies have shown the importance of sponsorship and patronage by pioneer migrants.<sup>1</sup> We have already seen that the cultural networks such as the *biraderi* system function as an aid to the chain migration process, an important function being the alleviating of Lee's intervening obstacles to migration. Cultural networks have also played an important role in the settlement and subsequent segregation of Azad Kashmiris in "Bury Park". Once pioneer migrants have settled they have developed the infrastructure by which later growth and settlement was possible.<sup>2</sup>

Research in Luton supports these earlier studies and suggests that the pioneer migrants aided the settlement of new households by obtaining employment through mutual support. Eventually the process brings households together, thereby encapsulating them. Once new immigrants become established, they in turn take up the role as inn-keepers, sponsors and informants for newly arriving immigrants. These new arrivals have increased dependence on kin and friends' and systems such as the *biraderi* function to protect and educate them and to find them jobs. The *biraderi* has been especially important in the process of Kashmiri

migration and has resulted in a chain migration on a kinship-friendship basis, which is linked to very specific spatial patterns within Luton. Interviews revealed the direct impact of the *biraderi*. The following are typical of conversations with members of the Luton Kashmiri community.

Mr H was one of the *biraderi* brothers so we had to help him. You know Islam says that we must help our brothers.

Mr T pointed out that:

I am here because my cousin was here before me and not long after he was here my father back in Kashmir said that I should try and go and so he wrote to my cousin and asked him to help me settle down here. I was very excited. I knew that he would look after me...you see I was very young then. He came to the airport to pick me up, he showed me the ropes and after about a month I got a job. It was really all his doing.

Similarly Mr G said:

Mr A was sponsored by one of his relatives who had come to Luton several years earlier and had managed to establish himself. I knew Mr A back home, we live in Kotli town and our fathers were friends. Anyway he came back to see his ill father soon after he went to Luton and told me that I should come back with him. He gave me the air money and I came over here with him.

Thus, in the early days the pioneer migrants and their *biraderi* functioned to influence relatives and friends back home through letters, visits and remittances, thus displaying to them the economic opportunities available in Britain. Migration continued steadily through the 1960s and early 70s. Jorgen Nielsen points out that this was particularly significant for the future, as it was in this period that the infrastructure for prospective settlement was made possible. He suggests that as the first immigrants arrived, they established themselves and were then ready to facilitate the settling of family and friends.<sup>3</sup> This availability of a ready

infrastructure also meant that many migrants chose to settle within the community area. In the early days of settlement segregation also helped people with similar values maintain their group norms and preserve a sense of cultural and religious identity. The foundations for the development of institutions to enhance the maintenance of identity were therefore developed prior to family reunification and during the phase of mass migration. The process of chain migration led to *biraderi* based migration and bound subsequent settlement. The continued segregation of Azad Kashmiris in the “Bury Park” area of Luton demonstrates the importance of kinship-friendship networks and the *biraderi* even after the initial stages of migrations were complete.

Today the impact of the *biraderi* within the Kashmiri community in Luton continues to be of vital importance to the social organisation of the community. It is important however not to overemphasise the importance of these cultural networks and therefore present deterministic accounts of community organisation. Settlement of Kashmiris in Luton reflects their *biraderis* and *zats*. So the same five *biraderis* found in Azad Kashmir are represented in Luton. Each *biraderi* may have a slightly different approach to the same issue. Further, if we are to essentialise these cultural systems, then there is no space for redefinition of identities in the new context or different expression of identities by different generations of Kashmiris. It is not necessarily the case that individual actions are bound by the *biraderi* and that individuals are not allowed to belong to various cultural organisations or to develop other alliances. Essentialist accounts of these

systems have too often been used as catch-all explanations of settler community infrastructure. There is no essential *biraderi* system as so much of the literature suggests.<sup>4</sup> At a policy level this has been commonly used as an excuse for poor allocation of resources.

The infrastructure that Nielsen refers to is a complex one comprising organisations dealing with social organisation, community welfare, religion and local politics. Once permanent settlement has taken place communities quickly established infrastructures whose organisational structures are complex. It is very difficult to distinguish between the social, cultural, religious and political organisations of the Muslim community since there is a high degree of polyvalence. In addition, the demarcation between different domains is not necessarily the same as those demarcations that circulate in Eurocentric discourses.<sup>5</sup> For example, in Luton the Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association may be primarily involved in welfare but has also represented Kashmiris in Luton at significant religious and political events in the town. Thus this one organisation has played various roles depending on the circumstances. What is clear from interviews with Kashmiris in Luton is that these cultural networks provide the basis of community fabric and are important for rallying initial support for various schemes regardless of whether they are welfare, religious or political issues. The following narratives point out the importance of the *biraderi* for social organisation:

In many ways the *biraderi* is our life. It's like a group of relatives and friends that you invite to weddings and funerals and go out

with in happy times. They are your friends and help you out ...they are people that you can rely on for all sorts of support.

Most people here have loads of family but I don't have many here in Luton so when there is a small problem I know that I can call upon someone who knows who I am. They know that because I am from the same village back home. It helps a lot.

It is so important to have community like this because you need it for your children. How will they know who they are if they don't have people the same as them to sit with, to eat with and to socialise with?

You know the thing is that it's fun getting things on *Eid* from people you know and then giving things out and things like that. My Mom does all of that but it makes us who we are... weddings is another time my parents always help out as much as they can.

This narrative is referring to the function of *lena-dena* (literally “taking and giving”) which has been discussed by Alison Shaw amongst others. She points out that these transactions are in general the offering of gifts at special occasions to celebrate family rituals of all kinds, including birth, circumcision, children's birthdays, a child's first completed reading of the Quran and of course marriage.<sup>6</sup> The new contexts mean that these transactions may go beyond the biraderi and include non-relatives and go beyond Kashmiris settled in Britain.

Other reasons for the importance of cultural networks were highlighted as financial support and often mentioned was the usefulness of these systems on social occasions especially marriages. Overall they provide the mechanism by which Kashmiris in Luton can recreate the social systems of home. Commenting on the “public face” of Kashmiri social organisation Mr Y commented that:

You know, these people you know are vital when you are trying to get support for something you want to set up.

Mr M pointed out that:

All these organisations are is a formalisation of these systems in many ways. Someone identifies a need, gets support from community members and tries to get Council support.

In terms of community welfare active members of the Kashmiri community have established various welfare organisations for Kashmiris in Luton. Welfare organisations in Luton include the Pakistani/Kashmiri Youth Forum.<sup>7</sup> This organisation deals with youth programmes catering for the needs of Pakistani and Kashmiri youth from the ages of seven to twenty five. It is also active in identifying new areas of need and dealing with issues concerning all youth in Luton regardless of ethnicity, such as crime and drugs. The other significant organisation is the Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Organisation.<sup>8</sup> This organisation deals with enquires about income support, housing welfare rights, interpretation, and health issues. Mr M pointed out that many of these organisations are at risk of dwindling because they lack volunteers. He also highlighted that they need to be tackling more issues:

A lot of it has to do with lack of organisation and volunteers. I think that they should be at the forefront. When you talk about the Pakistan/Kashmir Youth Forum, it's a youth organisation and they should be setting up training programmes for young people. Unemployment within the Kashmiris is the highest in these two wards, Dallow and Biscot, so they should be doing things to improve their opportunity towards jobs.

MstE said,

They should take charge yeah and they don't. There seems to be a bit of ownership flying around and that's not good.

The role of Luton Borough Council is significant to these welfare organisations.

In most instances they work in partnership with these organisations. Limited

resources also mean that they look for joint funding with other organisations. In line with increasing need, Luton Borough Council has recently established an Anti Poverty Scheme to identify pockets of poverty and the means of alleviating poverty. The Kashmiri community has been included in this. There are also various other welfare organisations in Luton such as the Federation of Pakistani Youth and the Luton Muslim Youth Organisation. With reference to the effectiveness of these Mr M commented that: “They are nothing but paper organisations. In reality they do very little and are not effective at all.”

The importance of cultural networks is perhaps overemphasised in discussions about religion and politics (which often seems to insist that religion and political activity is heavily conditioned by cultural networks such as the *biraderi*). It is worth noting that this research sees the relationship between these as complementary in the sense that an overwhelming majority of Kashmiris settled in Britain are Muslim and religion affects every aspect of living. The relationship between cultural networks such as the *biraderi* in politics is more complex than generally assumed and is most often referenced as important for rallying support for local Councillors. Local political activity among Kashmiris in Luton cannot be reduced to being an epiphenomenon of *biraderi* and factionalism.

At best cultural networks such as kinship-friendship networks and the *biraderi* should be seen as an aid to cultural reconstruction in the new environment, providing a framework for everyday interactions amongst Kashmiris and a sense

of solidarity over issues affecting them. Ballard sees them as “ ‘networks of reciprocity’ which lie at the heart of any sense of community”.<sup>9</sup>

Even our councillors use it and at the end of the day they represent the community. They really keep their support within their own direct community like Raja, Jat, Malik plus when they get in the only people that benefit are from their own *biraderi*.

The biggest problem in Luton is that the organisations are wary of each other, and that they don't like to work in partnership... there's that brilliant British thing about divide and rule. That's it in Britain because no one's working together except in pockets and they are doing the same thing if they all came together and then we wouldn't be this far behind. Compare Luton to Birmingham or Bradford. We're ten to fifteen years behind them.

### III. RELIGION AMONG KASHMIRIS

The cultural networks of kinship-friendship and *biraderi* as well as all other aspects of Kashmiri social organisation are bound together by religion. Religiosity is a central feature of Kashmiris living in Luton and its influence is felt in all aspects of Kashmiri life. This dynamic has directly contributed to settlement in Britain and has had a direct impact on Kashmiri British identity formation. As Rex points out, “the presence of major Islamic communities in the British Isles in the 1980s is to a large extent the result of a late imperial process, common to all of Western Europe - the migration of people into Britain seeking work from former British colonies”.<sup>10</sup> Proposition two argues that religion is an essential component of ethnic identity. As migrants have settled in an environment in which their ethnicity is seen as inferior, mobilisation around religious values and religious symbols ensues. Where there is a continued threat from majority identity these

symbols will become even more powerful. This inferiority was manifested most fervently in assimilation policy, which understood that migrants would eventually give up religious identities or reconstruct them in line with the majority religion, which is secular (i.e. that religion should be part of the private conscience rather than the public discourse).

These accounts derived from paradigms, which had for more than a century accepted that assimilation of religious identities into the national society was a necessary precondition for socio-economic and political development. In fact, diverse and competing ethnic and religious communal identities were seen as a primary factor in dividing post-colonial societies and hindering development. In this context religious identities were seen as inimical to rational social planning and economic development, and thus highlighted the classical European model where, it was assumed, modernity had eroded communal identities in favour of loyalty to the state<sup>11</sup>.

Contrary to assimilationist policies, rather than fade away Muslims in Britain have organised around religion. Despite the fact that Islam in Britain has a long history many commentators have suggested that religion was not significant to early migrants to Britain<sup>12</sup>. It is important to note that discussion with Kashmiris suggest that the contrary was true. As narratives highlight, mobilisation around Islam became increasingly important with family reunification and settlement. As MrtD noted;

I think that looking back people think that it wasn't very important to us. I don't blame them really because we were working all the time and anyway there were no big posh Mosques so nobody saw us praying. How did they know which room in a friend's house was for prayer, they probably thought we were having parties.

Mr F's comments below highlight however the increasing importance of religious organisation in family reunification:

When we were on our own here we really had nothing to worry about. On Jumma we just got together in someone's front room and prayed. When my wife came over I started to pray more and then when we had children we both prayed more because we wanted them to be Muslims also.

In a country which is not Muslim I can't expect my children to be Muslims if I don't pray and I don't do anything about their religious teaching.

For most Kashmiris interviewed in Luton the development of religious spaces within areas of Muslim settlement was seen as a necessary step to living in Britain. Thus it can be argued that the "reunion of the family was the route as well as the cause and the locus for the immigration of Islam to Britain".<sup>13</sup> Neilsen notes that the increasing number of Mosques may indicate rising commitment to Islam in Britain. "From 1966 the number started increasing at a steady rate to 81 in 1974 and then at an even faster rate to 314 in 1985 and 452 in 1990. Informed observers suggest that the actual figure is probably more than double".<sup>14</sup>

Despite the diversity of Muslims in Britain the selectivity of migration means that the form of Islam that developed most strongly in Britain was South Asian Islam with its particular form and experience of European colonialism. This has been transported via the migration process to Britain, and influenced the development

of Islam in this country. As Rex points out “religions survive their original historical context as ethnic and religious groups migrate to wholly different contexts”.<sup>15</sup>

Within the South Asian group there are differences based on region of migration in South Asia, income, occupation, education, and sectarian allegiances. As discussed, the Barelwi tradition is strongly represented, although not exclusively, in the migrant communities from Azad Kashmir since historically these regions have been closely linked with the Sufi tradition. It follows then that it is this particular form of Islam, practised in towns such as Kotli and Mirpur, that initially established itself and continues to be strongly represented amongst the Luton Azad Kashmiris. This form of Islam “involves a wide range of local customs established by oral tradition or kept to a particular locale through being focused around a Sufi shrine”.<sup>16</sup>

The Barelwi tradition has significantly impacted on the political organisation of Islam in Luton. Geaves argues that “within the major Sufi *tariqas* the prime loyalty is not to the *tariqa* itself but to the individual *pir* and that although those amongst the Barelwis who follow a *pir* acknowledge his *tariqa*, they do not organise themselves around their identity as *Naqshbandis*, *Chishtis*, or *Qadaris*”<sup>17</sup>. In Luton religious organisation does appear to be influenced to some extent by the *tariqas*. Mr G observes that:

When I first came to Luton many years ago you know no one really cared about who was this and what that person was. If you

were Muslims you were Muslim. It could have been because we were all from similar places in Kashmir. Then everyone started to come here and now when you go anywhere people don't just want to know if you are Muslim they want to know what type of Muslim and what person you follow.

The change in context has had several effects on Barelwi identity. Firstly, since much of Barelwi religious worship exists around *pirs* and their shrines, in migration to Britain this locus of religious identity was displaced. In many cases this has been overcome by *pirs* visiting from "back home" and in some cases residing in Britain for months at a time.

There are *pirs* here as well. Well they call themselves *pirs* and people here know about them and go to visit them a lot. They might be in other towns so they go there or they might come and visit here and they go to the people. Usually it's to do with illnesses or if they have some *muradas*.

Secondly, changes in context have meant that Barelwis have come into contact with other Islamic traditions, particularly the reform groups such as the Deobandis, Jamat-I Islami and Tabligh-I Jamat. This is not to say that these individuals were unaware of such groups before migration but that changes in context have resulted in increased contact with individuals from these groups. Geaves quoting from a discussion with Maulana Shaid Raza points out that he insists that the Barelwis are particularly afraid because the reform groups, especially the Jamat-I-Islami and the Tabligh-I-Jamat are exceedingly well-organised, having good leadership, and working in a dynamic way in this country.<sup>18</sup>

These reformist movements have had a significant impact on Azad Kashmiris.

Changes brought about by increased contact are highlighted in narratives:

I suppose in a way we were all Barelwis at one time. I didn't understand Islam. I do now and I feel more in tune with who I am. Islam is about politics as well as peace and that is why I feel more in tune with the Jammats' (referring to the Jammats-I Islami).

You know once I came here to this country I realised that I had to learn more about Islam and then that's when I thought that this was going to be an important time in my life. Being here made me realise that I had to join the Tabligh-I Jammats.

For these Kashmiris in Luton (in line with all Muslims in Britain) then, Islam was not only becoming a key signifier in marking religious identity with respect to the majority community but also internally among Muslim settlers. Differences in internal religious expression are illustrated by the establishment of denominationally orientated Mosques.

As with other major cities of Muslim settlement, organisation of Islam in Luton initially centred on Mosques. Mosque development in Luton has closely followed ethno-religious lines and has been used to enforce and reinforce group identity in the town.

During early settlement religious activity generally took place in front rooms donated by various members of the Azad Kashmiri community<sup>19</sup>. As Mr K points out:

Our identity is the Mosque. When we came here we knew that this is what we needed because they had churches and we needed Mosques to be ourselves but no one had any money or knew how

to do anything so we really just gathered in friends' houses whenever we could.

We had to have a place to pray because otherwise we would forget that we are Muslims. I suppose you could call this front room a Mosque if there were a few people. That's the way it was then.

As permanent settlement continued as a result of family reunification, community members pooled resources and purchased properties specifically for worship and religious education. A more recent phenomenon has been purpose-built Mosques. Many of these Mosques are denominationally oriented. Mr G said:

We had to get bigger places because there are so many of us now. On *Eid* and other religious days there was no way you could get everyone into those small houses.

With reference to an article on Bradford Pakistanis published in the 1970s, Lewis reports that there were two stages to community development:

Whereby an initial tendency towards fusion - in which pioneer settlers associated together regardless of their regional, caste or sectarian origins, gradually gave way as numbers grew, to fission and segmentation; in this second stage of fragmentation ties of village-kinship and sectarian affiliation grew steadily more significant as the basis of communal aggregation.<sup>20</sup>

Kashmiri narratives suggest that this was also the case in Luton. Mr Y comments:

Most of the time we used to go to the same Mosques and now things are different. We can go into any Mosque here but you know you stick to the one where the things you agree with are said. I can't go to the big Mosque (referring to the Jammia Masjid).

There are three Mosques in Luton all located within the Bury Park area reflecting different Islamic denominations<sup>21</sup>. The largest Mosque is situated on Westbourne Road. This is purpose-built. Construction was started in 1974 and it serves the majority of Barelwi Azad Kashmiris in Luton.<sup>22</sup> The Madina Mosque is located

on Oak Road and serves the Tablig-I-Jamat. The Masjid Noor largely serves the Bangladeshi community and is located on Bury Park Road.

Much of the recent literature on Muslims in Britain has focused extensively on Mosques as the centre of community organisation and religious identity.<sup>23</sup> Over attention to Mosques may be due to the fact that they are perhaps one of the most “visible” manifestations of Islam in Britain and because they are of relatively easy access. Mosques also architecturally mark out a space that is very “other”. Thus like the *hijab* they become highly visible representations of Muslim identity. Discussion has also centred on the nature of sectarian influences and hostilities amongst various Islamic schools of thought, which manifest themselves as internal Mosque disputes. In most cases this has the effect of sensationalising community differences, destabilising the Muslim community and implying that it is dysfunctional. Despite a variety of factors behind the disputes they are often described as *biraderi* or sectarian disputes. This is partly due to the fact that conflicts within ethnic minorities are denied a political dimension. In reality they involve a mixture of motives and interests (personal, ethical, manipulative, ideological and political etc.).

#### **A. The Jammia-Masjid Dispute**

The Jammia Masjid dispute has been the source of internal and external attention during the research period. Most descriptions of the Mosque dispute in Luton (Jammia Masjid) emphasise the a-political nature of the conflict by pointing to

factors such as faction in-fighting, *biraderi* based dispute, sectarian clashes or ego-driven conflicts.

What is relevant to the research is not the actual events of the Mosque dispute but the question of how the participants and observers actually represent the dispute and to what extent these are rhetorical devices in the dispute itself. In this sense then the narratives outlined above are also rhetorical. In describing disputes within communities such as the one above academics such as Lewis tend to make a distinction between politics and internal disputes within settler communities. By doing this they reduce such issues to ones of factionalism. As Carl Schmitt argues, the political is inscribed in the friend-foe distinction.<sup>24</sup> So wherever this distinction exists a political conflict arises. Thus there is no reason why a Mosque dispute such as the one in Luton cannot be seen as political (rather than sectarian or religious) and there is no reason to see it as exceptional since like any political conflict it will be waged by whatever means are acceptable to those involved in the dispute.

### **B. Islam: The Next Generation**

As the Kashmiri community has settled and early intentions of returning home have subsided, the second and third generations are incorporated into wider society, however precarious this relationship may be. One of the most pressing issues facing Muslims in Luton and generally in Britain has been the issue of transfer of religious identity to offspring born and brought up in Britain. As the

preceding paragraphs have suggested this was an important part of the creation of religious spaces within areas of large Muslim settlement like Luton.

Conversations with older Kashmiris suggest that what they did not foresee was a move away from traditional Islam towards a more universal Islam grounded in notions of the *Ummah*, for the younger generation. In considering this increasing Islamic identity in Britain many external commentators have placed little emphasis on the discourses internal to the communities within which the individual is physically and emotionally located, apart from highlighting what they see as the “caught between two cultures” syndrome. It is vital that identity is seen as an on-going psychological process where individuals make conscious choices as to the elements of religious identity they choose to maintain for a contemporary contextual sense of their identity.<sup>25</sup> Mrs H comments that:

I thought that my kids would become less Muslim not more Muslim. Now they tell me that I should do this and not be doing that. It's strange but I'm proud of them... You know what's so new to me is that they are telling me that my religion isn't Islam and that it's really just our culture.

Geaves argues that for the younger generations, gathering around Islamic symbols has been utilised as an attack on the ethnic customs of their parents and un-Islamic. He suggests that they often seek a different form of Islam, one which is free from South Asian cultural accretion.<sup>26</sup> “Regardless of British citizenship there is no doubt that membership of a universal community - the Muslim *Ummah* - is an important aspect of self awareness and understanding. To belong to the *Ummah* young people are going through a process of identity development”.<sup>27</sup>

This process of “Islamisation” has been described by Sayyid and Clark amongst others. For Sayyid Islamism is about placing Muslim identity at the centre of political practice. In this sense he sees Islamism as a political discourse that attempts to centre Islam within the political order and can range from the assertion of a Muslim subjectivity to a full-blooded attempt to reconstruct society on Islamic principles.<sup>28</sup>

The encounter for the first time with different cultural and religious forms, even with different Muslim traditions, as well as British society and the emergence of the second generation of British born and British educated Muslims, has made the creation of an Islamic community that is not seen to be too closely linked to any particular cultural tradition a top priority.<sup>29</sup>

Younger Kashmiris’ drive towards increased Islamic identity can be summarised as being in response to racism and anti Islamic feeling within Britain and against Muslims internationally, and a general disillusionment with the cultural Islam of their parents’ generations. In this sense changing contexts may have the effect of redefining forms of Islam or creating new forms of religious expression. As we have seen above, for the older generation who were born in Azad Kashmir there appears to have been little reason to question their religious ideals and understandings because their context did not require this as an aspect of living. What was prominent in their minds was the creation of religious space within areas of settlement and the recreation as far as possible of the religious systems of home in their new environment. This is not to suggest that there was no debate but rather that this debate was located within traditional Islamic jurisprudence, for example the debates around Sunni versus Shia.

The younger generation however are living in a context where they are ethnically and religiously marked as different and therefore the nature of the debate is shaped by this context. In this case then these religious identities are constructed and reconstructed in response to the prevalent political discourses. As Yasmin Ali suggests, the idea of engaging with the interpretation of Islam as an intellectual exercise was unfamiliar to most of the older generation, who mainly came from poorly educated rural backgrounds.<sup>30</sup> As well as this it is worth noting that they were from a Muslim background so that Islam was part of their common sense. However the younger generation are able to engage in this as an intellectual debate because they have been educated in the traditions of Western critical discourse which has led to the questioning of revealed truths. Kashmiri narratives suggest reactions to racism and disillusionment with the cultural Islam of their parents' generations. As Ms F points out:

I can't stand the fact that every time I leave my house someone calls me a Paki. Now that I wear the *hijab* they call me a smelly Muslim or stuff like that. It's better to be that than a Paki. If there's a few of us together they're scared. I think a lot of people are reverting back. You know there's that phase about ten years ago when people were going away from religion and going to clubs and pubs and things. We have to thank the press for bringing them back because all of a sudden the people who didn't see themselves as Muslim now call themselves Muslims. The Rushdie thing and the press have done it really by slating Muslims and saying they are fundamentalists.

There's more of an Islamic identity in Luton that's being created significantly from external pressure that we get from national and local press. This tends to fire up young Muslims. That's what young people are clinging on to in these organisations.

Disillusionment with parents' cultural Islam was expressed by Ms D with reference to reactions to the wearing of the *hijab*:

It's funny but when I got round to putting this on my parents were mad for days with me telling me that I wouldn't get a husband and stuff like that and that Islam doesn't say that you need to do this at all. For them it's all about how beautiful their daughter is and that will mean a good marriage. I told them that this is who I am. They think it's just because all my friends are doing it and that I am part of some group. They don't understand that there is too much culture in their Islam and can't get to grips with the fact that what I practise is Islam.

Another problem highlighted is a response to the big drive in recent years to get involved in Islamic activity in Luton beyond that located around the Mosque.

Although the Mosque remains central to Islamic identity many younger Kashmiris explained that they were disillusioned by disputes like the one presented above and by older members of the community excluding them from the running of Islamic organisations. As Mr G said: "It's all very well them expecting us to be there all the time but they just won't let us get involved in any of the organisation or anything - they really want to keep it for themselves."

Younger Kashmiris are particularly influenced by Islamic political parties. These are largely revivalist organisations which have their origin in the Middle East and which are generally becoming more significant in Britain. The attraction of these appears to be their denunciation of any form of sectarianism in the face of universal Islam and their commitment to political Islam. Ms R said:

These oldies believe that the Mosque is everything but there is more to knowing about your religion and that's what we're all about.

Some well-known examples that are significant in Luton are the Hizb-ut-Thariar and Al- Mahjaroon.<sup>31</sup> Both these organisations promote the ideas mentioned.

Both operate from members' homes and about three years ago went "underground" in Luton.

We believe that all Muslims belong to the *Ummah* and that there are no important divisions amongst Muslims like the *biraderis* and stuff that our parents always come up with.

Other less overtly political Islamic organisations catering for changing needs of the Luton Muslim community are an example of this. The British Muslim Welfare in Luton has a significant young membership as well as about thirty reverts to Islam. Mohammad Khalid established this organisation in 1995. The organisation is largely involved in teaching and interpretation of the Quran and Hadith within the framework of the Tablig-I-Jammat. The organisation is located on Kenilworth Road in the Bury Park area above Nasons supermarket. The Young Muslims also have a significant presence in Luton. The organisation is based in Madina Masjid and the activities centre on youth clubs, Islamic camps and activities. Dr Fiaz Hussain heads the organisation. Another recent organisation headed by Mobeen Qureshi is *Khidmatt* (service) whose premises are located on Leagrave Road. The Young Muslim Women's organisation and the Luton Islamic Society also carry out similar activities. In Luton these organisations appear to have been more successful than the welfare organisations which may suggest the importance of Islam for a sense of self.

In addition the prevalence of posters advertising forthcoming religious rallies or lectures and the appearance of groups of stalls in the streets around Bury Park and Luton town centre to encourage passers by to engage in discussion on the merits

of Islam all indicate increased activity around religious identity.<sup>32</sup> All this contributes to the increasing visibility of Muslims in Luton. Visibility has also come about from overt political mobilisation around Islam whether on international issues, such as the Gulf War or the Rushdie affair, or on more local issues such as the provision of *halal* meat in schools, appropriate dress for women students (particularly issues around the *hijab*) or the recognition of Islamic schools by central and local government. All highlight the political nature of Islam and the demand for a “Muslim Voice”. The above issues and the organisations associated with them tend to transcend ethnic and linguistic differences. However, Kashmiri nationalism largely articulates itself through its Muslimness. Thus, unlike most nationalism in the Muslim world, Kashmiri nationalism is closely identified with Muslimness. Even the main “secularist” organisation the JKLF has to make many concessions to the intimate relationship between Kashmiri and Muslim identity. The effect of the way in which Kashmiriyat and Muslimness is articulated is that the increasing salience of Muslim subject position tends to go hand-in-hand with the assertion of Kashmiri identity. It is possible that the split between black and white which defined race relations in Britain up until about the 1980s may be giving way to a tripartite division of the black subject position, so that Britain’s ethnicised minorities are increasingly categorised as black (people of the African diaspora), Asian (mainly people associated with India) and Muslim (including not only Pakistanis, Kashmiris, Bangladeshis but also Kurds and Arabs). All these categories are heavily contested. However, it is the case that such a development undermines the efficacy of the Pakistani identity option as a

way of continuing to define people who migrated to Luton from the districts of Mirpur and Kotli in Azad Kashmir. Some of the difficulties these transformations pose can be seen by looking at Lewis's recent work. Lewis acknowledges the diversity of Muslims in Britain but then continues to do much the same as previous research and to talk of Pakistanis, implying that they represent the Muslim community in Britain. The writings on Pakistani Muslims, have given little recognition of Kashmiri Muslims who as discussed previously comprise the majority of those referred to as Pakistani.

#### **IV. THE POLITICAL VOICE OF "BURY PARK"**

The size and demography of the Kashmiri Muslim community in Luton and in Britain make their voice important in influencing votes. An acknowledgement of this can be seen during the General Election campaign in 1997 where political parties had an active policy of wooing the Muslim vote which was particularly significant in marginal constituencies. The various organisations described above are important in creating an authoritative political voice for the Kashmiri community in Luton. This is particularly significant in lobbying political parties and presenting community demands. As a consequence of the strength of the Kashmiri community in Luton, an otherwise hostile media covered "race" issues in the pre-Election season in a generally positive fashion.<sup>33</sup>

Within Luton, as in other areas of large Muslim settlement in Britain, a Muslim identity has emerged in response to majority-minority relations, i.e. between

secular and non-secular communities through bipolar ethnic competition. It is partly in the face of assimilationist and multiculturalist policies to eradicate difference and to contrive a “Britishness” based on majority identity, but also in an attempt to maintain distinctiveness from other South Asian communities in Britain.<sup>34</sup> At a policy level it becomes clear that the majority community and minority communities do not share the same idea of national identity.

Lord Tebbit recently expressed these fears at a Conservative Party conference. The desire to hold on to a British identity were highlighted by his comments when he said:

Multiculturalism is a divisive force. One cannot uphold two sets of ethics or be loyal to two nations, any more than a man can serve two masters. It perpetuates ethnic divisions because nationality is in the long term is more about culture than ethnics. Youngsters of all races born here should be taught that British history is their history, or they will be forever foreigners holding British passports and this kingdom will be Yugoslavia.

In Britain’s culture and hegemonic identity Muslims are seen as very alien and a direct threat to national identity. This is evidenced at all levels, most prominently in salient anti Islamic elements increasingly summarised as Islamaphobia<sup>35</sup>. The next chapter shows how Kashmiris in Luton are expressing a national identity.

## **V. CONCLUSION**

The above sections have shown that far from losing their distinctiveness through migration and settlement Kashmiris have transferred their social and religious belief systems to the new environment, which has required gradual adjustments.

Islamist organisations appear at least for now to be fulfilling the needs of the Muslims born in Britain in their proclamation of a universal Islam. Overall cultural networks and Islam have become pivotal identifiers for community organisation. Culture and religion provide an ascriptive measure of social differentiation and offer a symbolic resource for belongingness.<sup>36</sup>

Attempts by the majority communities to eradicate difference have failed. Contrary to Weberian analysis, recent years have witnessed the emergence and renewed assertion of ethnic identities. These have been a reaction to local, national as well as global developments which have in turn had an impact on the local, national and global scenes.<sup>37</sup> With reference to increasing recognition of the rise of nationalism globally and with the resultant impact on international politics, there has been a growing interest and intensive debates on definitions and the relationships between nations, ethnic groups, their nationalism and the state.<sup>38</sup> For Kashmiris national sentiments continue as focal points for movements for self-definition. Rather than disappear in the face of assimilationist policies “Kashmiriyat” has emerged as currently one of the primary sources of community mobilisation in Britain. The next chapter looks at definitions of the nation and the emergence of “Kashmiriyat” and the particular form it is taking in Luton.<sup>39</sup>

## ENDNOTES

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1 See for example Carter and Jones, 1979, for Bradford, see Davenport 1972 for Dundee, Kearsley and Srivastava 1974 for Glasgow, Duncan 1977 for Huddersfield and Robinson 1979 for Blackburn.

2 Neilsen, 1984.

3 Ibid.

4 See Werbner, 1989.

5 Asad, 1993.

6 Shaw, 1994, pp. 46-48.

<sup>7</sup> This was initially set up about twelve years ago by Zulfar Ahmed and Zafar Khan, two key members of the Azad Kashmiri community in Luton

<sup>8</sup> Since doing this research The Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Organisation is believed to have been dismantled. At the time of the research it was being run primarily by Mr Iqbal.

<sup>9</sup> Ballard, 1994, pp. 1-34.

<sup>10</sup> Rex, 1990, p.60.

<sup>11</sup> This discussion is presented in the "Country Report" for the Muslim Voices in the European Union: The Stranger Within: Community, Identity and Employment completed in October 1997 by the author.

<sup>12</sup> The first Mosques built in Britain are over a one hundred years old. For example the mosques built in Cardiff by the Yemeni Muslims and in Woking by Indian Muslims. Many writers like Anwar and Shaw would argue that mosques only became important after family reunification as a way of consolidating and enhancing religious identity. Based on my research it is clear that the lack of mosques etc. did not necessarily mean a lack of religious sentiment amongst the immigrants rather the inability at the time to mobilise sufficient resources at the time to build mosques.

<sup>13</sup> Neilson, 1996, p.8

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p.5.

<sup>15</sup> Rex, 1993, p.19.

<sup>16</sup> Geaves, 1996, p.101.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ahmed Raza Khan founded the Barelwi orientation within Islam and is regarded as a prominent Barelwi alim. Maulana Shaid Raza is currently Executive Secretary of the Shari'ah Council.

<sup>19</sup> This point has been noted by Dahya, 1973, Anwar, 1973 and Shaw, 1988, amongst others.

<sup>20</sup> Lewis, 1994, p.56.

<sup>21</sup> At the time of this research there was an Ahmedi Mosque planned in Luton and since the research another Mosque has been opened on Beech Road serving the Luton Shia community. These are converted premises.

<sup>22</sup> The Jammia Masjid comprised of three terraced houses, numbers 2, 4 and 6 on Westbourne Road prior to the granting of permission to build a purpose built Mosque.

<sup>23</sup> See Lewis, 1994.

<sup>24</sup> Schmitt, 1996, pp. 26-27.

<sup>25</sup> This point is taken from the work of Peter Weinreich on identity redefinitions.

<sup>26</sup> See Geaves, 1996, pp 57-59.

<sup>27</sup> This point first appeared as part of the discussion on "Islamic Identity Development and the Politics of Gender in The Higher Education Environment" by Ali, Ellis and Shah, 1997.

<sup>28</sup> For elaboration see Sayyid, 1997, pp 17-18.

<sup>29</sup> Clark as discussed Geaves, 1996, p. 54.

30 Ali, 1992.

31 The Al-Mahjaroon split from the Hizb-ut-Thariar due to an internal dispute. The Hizbul leader Omar Bakri left the organisation after being criticised by members for publicly inviting people to Islam in Trafalgar Square in 1995. He formed the Al-Mahjaroon soon after this event.

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<sup>32</sup> This point is discussed by Ali, Ellis and Shah, 1997.

<sup>33</sup> Law, 1997.

<sup>34</sup> For more detail on bipolar ethnic competition see Vertovec, 1995.

<sup>35</sup> Discussion of this point also appears in the Country Report for the “Muslim Voices” in the European Union: The Stranger Within” project by the author.

<sup>36</sup> See Wilpert, 1989, p.7.

<sup>37</sup> Weber, 1922. Weber basically argues that the forces of Capitalism through their reliance on rationalism would bring an end to nationalism.

<sup>38</sup> See Smith, 1986; Gellner, 1983 and Hobsbawn, 1990.

<sup>39</sup> The literature in this area is expansive and due to constraints of time and space in a study of this size and depth it is not possible to present a detailed account of theories of nationalism. What is presented however is a broad overview of those aspects of the debate that are particularly relevant to the Kashmiris.

## CHAPTER NINE: DEFINING “KASHMIRIYAT”

### I. INTRODUCTION

In the nineteenth century ethnic identity was generally regarded as an objective fact although it was becoming difficult to define, it continued to be measured through the categories I have discussed previously in relation to Kashmiris, specifically culture and religion. The idea was that these were central to distinguishing one group from another. The 1970s saw the emergence of two lines of thinking on identity. The first is usually attributed to Frederick Barth. For Barth ethnic identity is “an evanescent situational construct, not a solid enduring fact”<sup>1</sup> He saw individuals as choosing identity to improve their situation, which was usually based on changed circumstances. His ideas led to the instrumentalist approach to ethnic identity. “According to this view, identities are not inborn and unchanging, but manipulable and chosen: the product of personal choice. In some contexts, they can also take the form of ideologies deliberately fostered by elites who want to create senses of solidarity in subject people bound to them”.<sup>2</sup> The second is the primordialist approach in which ethnic identity is seen as a given which can be passed on from generation to generation. The emphasis is on blood ties, common ancestry, language and culture, characteristics which are seen to define the group. Most importantly these cannot be manipulated. “Research has shown that many of the group’s defining characteristics are picked up unconsciously in the earliest years of life. They can thus shape individual behaviour on a very profound level”.<sup>3</sup> These two approaches to ethnic identity

contradict and conflict with each other. The emergence of Kashmiri nationalism however appears to fit both scenarios. In this chapter I show how both instrumentalist and primordialist notions of ethnicity can be found at work in Kashmiri discourse and how enculturation allows for the inclusion of both within notions of “Kashmiriyat”. In this chapter, I will examine the various means by which Kashmiri identity is articulated. Specifically looking at the way in which the notions of “Kashmiriyat” have been disseminated throughout the Kashmiri population. I begin with a discussion of the idea of nationhood and how it applies to the Kashmiri case.

## **II. DEFINING THE NATION**

Kellas defines nation as “a group of people who feel themselves to be a community bound together by ties of history, culture and common ancestry.”<sup>4</sup> A nation then, is social group which shares a sense of common history and a common way of life. Peterson defines the nation as:

A people, a folk held together by some or all of such more or less immutable characteristics as common descent, territory, history, language, religion, way of life, or other attributes that members of the group have from birth onward.<sup>5</sup>

Oommen, presents another definition of the nation:

A community of sentiment, which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own.<sup>6</sup>

The abstract appears in all the definitions of nation presented above. Connor’s definition talks of a “sense of belonging”. Peterson talks of “a way of life” and

Oommen of "a community of sentiment". In all these definitions there is the assumption of a primordial psychological bond.<sup>7</sup> The nation then is seen as ambiguous and essentially psychological. "What ultimately matters is not what it is but what people believe it is and a belief in the group's separate origin and evolution is an important ingredient of national psychology".<sup>8</sup>

Modernist approaches such as those of Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner argue that notions of nation are constructed.<sup>9</sup> In this instance:

It is a political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in their minds lives the image of their communion.<sup>10</sup>

Gellner traces the development of nationalism to the need of modern societies for cultural homogeneity in order to function. This need, when satisfied, is sponsored by the modern nation state.<sup>11</sup> The state usually takes the form of a defined territory. For the Kashmiris the association between nation and territory is particularly important. Territoriality appears to be the central feature on which the defence of national-cultural identity is currently based. Oommen also references contemporary western sociology as seeing the state as:

An entity endowed with political sovereignty over a clearly defined territorial area having a monopoly on the use of legitimate force and constraining of citizens with terminal loyalty. A series of empirical situations is assumed to be in existence for such a definition to be operative. For example if a people do not have their own territory in which to lead settled lives, they are defined as being "stateless".<sup>12</sup>

These definitions are based on the associations between nation and territory that emerged after the French revolution (1789) on the one hand and the emergence of the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 on the other. “The Westphalian order encouraged the idea that it was possible to make tidy correspondences between state, territory and people.”<sup>13</sup> However this is not applicable to the Kashmiris whose nationalism is not confined to territory and in its current formation has emerged outside of the territory. Manifestations of “Kashmiriyat” transcend time and space.<sup>14</sup>

Kashmiri nationalism has been constructed around nodal points of “peoplehood”: ethnicity, religion and citizenship of specific states, thus incorporating both instrumentalist and primordialist notions of identity. Collectively these have come to be known as “Kashmiriyat”. Definitions of nation, state and nationalism have a tendency to simplify ideological movements. Kashmiri nationalism is complex. Nira Yuval-Davis's three categorisations of Volknation, Kulturation and Staatnation are particularly appropriate for describing and understanding Kashmiri nationalism. The first is constructed around the origin of people, the second around specific cultures or religion and the third around citizenship of specific states. These categorisations are more useful for understanding the complexities of nationalistic movements and ideologies than definitions of the nation based on the Westphalian model. Kashmiri nationalism can be categorised as deriving from one of two stances, the Kulturation or the Staatnation.<sup>15</sup>

Yuval-Davis goes on to argue that three key features are important in defining a nation - common sense of history, common destiny and an element of common solidarity. This is illustrated using a quote from Renan:

A nation is a grand solidarity constituted by the sentiment of sacrifices which one has made and those that one is disposed to make again. It supposes a past, it renews itself especially in the present by tangible deed: the approval, the desire, clearly expressed, to continue the communal life.<sup>16</sup>

Kashmiri narratives presented below highlight these factors.

### **III. NARRATING “KASHMIRIYAT”**

Kashmiri narratives in Luton and Azad Kashmir highlighted the differing perceptions on notions of national identity. For Mr K and Mr M this is primordial. Mr K pointed out that “Kashmiris are a civilisation, a people who have a history that goes back generations. We are Kashmiris because it's in our blood”. Similarly, Mr M suggested that, Kashmiris are a nation (*Qaum*) and Kashmir is our homeland.

The narratives of Kashmiris interviewed in Luton and Azad Kashmir present strong evidence for people's belief in separate origin and evolution and their importance in the formation of “Kashmiriyat”. Mr T said: “Kashmiris are a nation of people. We have a culture that is different from anyone else. Our history has been taken away from us [but] we still are Kashmiris”.

The naturalness of a nation having its own state to protect and maintain cultural identity as suggested by Oommen above was supported by Mr G when he said that:

It's not a question of do we feel different. You see we are different. We have a different history and different culture and we had a place that was ours. How else can we belong to a place? Look Pakistanis belong to Pakistan, the Indians have a state and just look at Israel. They needed a territory to have an identity and they didn't even really have one. We have a territory and we want it back.

Certainly the Kashmiris see others as seeing them as "stateless". The importance of this for Mr G is highlighted when he asks:

So where are we Kashmiris meant to belong? When someone asks us where are you from what can we say, our home is occupied by others. So they think that we are Pakistanis or Indians. How is it that we can have "Kashmiriyat" without a Kashmir?

The majority of Kashmiri narratives in Luton suggest that Kashmiris fit into the definition of nation and categorisation of nationalism as defined by Yuval-Davis - Volknation, Kulturation and Staatnation. As has been seen with the comments from Mr G and others, there is a strong sense of solidarity, with individuals self-identifying as Kashmiris and having a clear concept of the Kashmiri nation. The exact nature of geographical boundaries, however, is a cause of confusion. Ms F, a British born Kashmiri, comments:

I still have to go to Kashmir but you know I sometimes have to make myself understand where it is and you know trying to tell someone else is always a nightmare.

I know it's near Pakistan and that India's desperate to get their hands on it. Hey I know what the flag's like. It's ace that we have a flag.

There is a common sense of history and a common idea of destiny, which underpins not only a set of attitudes but also a set of “tangible deeds”:

One day the killing is going to stop and our people are going to be together again. We will do anything to save our brethren - we will fight till the end to get a piece of our heaven back and all you people in Britain can bring attention to what's going on here.

In Luton there is a commitment to a shared Kashmiri culture. Although important this does not appear to be central to the nationalist struggle. Many Kashmiris feel an alliance with Pakistan is the natural way forward, based on shared religion, but for the majority it does not appear to be the basis of national identity. The focus is on the idea of belonging to a nation. The foundation of this thinking is that before the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 it was an independent multi-ethnic state. Thus the emphasis is on Staatnation and not Kulturnation.

This emphasis on belonging to a multi-ethnic state prior to the 1947 partition refutes many of the arguments which describe the Kashmiri situation as ethno-nationalism.<sup>17</sup> The basis of these arguments has been that since Kashmiris do not share a common language, religion or physical appearance their nationalism is based on the polarisation of these differences between different groups within Kashmir (e.g difference between Hindu and Muslim Kashmiris). The Kashmiris believe that the “selling” of the Kashmir situation as a dispute based on religion is a distortion caused by the rivalry over the area by Pakistan and India. This definition also fits in with the Indo-Pakistan dimension of the Kashmir issue, i.e. the two-nation theory. This is that as most Kashmiris are Muslims so Kashmir

should become part of Pakistan, hence an ethno-religious Kashmir, or that Kashmir should become part of India because it is secular.

There are four important features to consider in looking at Kashmiri ethnic groups: regional location, religion, culture and language. Religion has been highlighted by politicians for analysing the disputes in the territory and linking this to the basis for the 1947 partition. Given the apparent lack of ethnic conflict within Kashmir itself, the implication of labelling the Kashmir issue as an ethnic conflict is that there is conflict between one ethnic group, the Kashmiris or a subset of the Kashmiris, and another the Indians. The concept of Indians who represent the state as an ethnic group would potentially accord with those writers who have seen the events of 1947 as creating “ethnic” states, Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India. This categorisation accords religion the overriding characteristic of ethnicity in the subcontinent and lines it up with those conflicts where religion is the motivating factor. <sup>18</sup>

The focus in fact appears to be territorial identification with the united land of Kashmir. Mr I commented that “most of us are Muslims but in our history we have always lived peacefully with our neighbours and we like all people”. Similarly another Luton Kashmiri said that “Too many people have turned this into a fight between Muslims and Hindus [but] even the Hindus in Kashmir want to be free and separate from India”.

Throughout its history Kashmir has had a reputation for overall religious tolerance and ethnic harmony. This has to some extent continued through into the present civil uprisings which have been focused on the Indian State as represented by the police and the military forces. Most of the conflicts have taken place between Indian troops and Muslims in the Valley which has added to the confusion and discussion of the dispute as an ethnic and not political conflict.

In much of the writing the focus has been on the Indian controlled territory of Jammu and the Valley with the implication that these areas together with Ladakh constitute Kashmir. The Pakistani controlled territories of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and the Northern Areas are virtually ignored. This then removes from the analysis any discussion of the “Kashmiri nation” or acknowledgement of the existence of a former legitimate state with, arguably, a current situation of colonisation by the Indian State.

It can be argued that the presentation of the Kashmir situation as ethnic conflict, or religious nationalism, has a basis in a Western discourse whose own nationalisms are seen as secular. This then widens the categorisation of the “other” as religious fundamentalism.

It appears that for the majority of Kashmiris in Luton religion is currently an “irrelevant variable.”<sup>19</sup> This does not mean that religion is not central to Kashmiri ethnic identity or that there are not articulations of religious

nationalism amongst Kashmiris. Political organisations such as the Muslim Conference and the Jammat-I-Islami all articulate religious nationalism as one solution to the problem. Kashmiris also belong to pan-Islamist organisations such as the Hizb-ul-Tahrir which advocate an Islamic resolution to the Kashmir problem. However this does not form the majority consensus amongst the Luton Kashmiris.<sup>20</sup> Oommen argues that although religious ties are clearly central to cultural and ethnic identity, their objective relevance to national struggles is more questionable. This has been the case for the Kashmiri struggle. In this sense many organisations “created” a “new religious symbolism”.<sup>21</sup>

If notions of nation are psychological and imagined then the question is therefore how do these imaginings take hold and become ideological frameworks. As Ratcliffe argues:

Awareness of a distinct national identity clearly in itself does not lead to the development of nationalist movements. One needs to ask another set of comparative questions about the ways in which community identity is mobilised and the necessary and sufficient conditions for this mobilisation to take place (at the same time avoiding the pitfalls of a crude historicism).<sup>22</sup>

Narratives of older generation Kashmiris now settled in Luton have highlighted the importance of memory. This appears to be particularly important for “Kashmiriyat”. The crystallisation of demands for a separate state is particularly fervent due to the memory of discrimination, exploitation and oppression.

In Mercer's words “identity only becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when something assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable is displaced by the

experience of doubt and uncertainty”<sup>23</sup> and for the Kashmiris this identity has been displaced since 1947. Specifically since the 1930s the “bone of contention” has been social, economic and political marginalisation. This continues to be the focus of Kashmiri nationalism globally. For many of those settled in Britain who originate from Azad Kashmir there is a feeling of resentment towards Pakistan which is seen as controlling its “fifth province”.<sup>24</sup> Yunas Samad has argued that for Pakistan, Kashmir is significant for the body politic and it has been a crucial component of Pakistan's Muslim nationalism. “In the core areas of nationalism, particularly Punjab, Kashmir was a sensitive issue and politicians were quick to recognise the influence it has; from Liaquat down to Nawaz Sharif all Pakistani leaders have been hawkish on Kashmir”. As one Kashmiri commented:

We might as well be Pakistanis so Azad is supposed to mean free?  
That's a laugh, they are making fun of us. We're not free, no way,  
Pakistan controls us all the way [and] we are like occupied  
Kashmir. India controls them and Pakistan controls us.<sup>25</sup>

Administratively and legislatively the functioning of Azad Kashmir is controlled by Pakistan in all aspects of decision making. Pakistan is significant in controlling Azad Kashmir's economy, defence and foreign policy and financial budget, all of which make the Azad Kashmiri administration and legislation less significant. This is a cause of much resentment amongst Kashmiris resident in the United Kingdom and Azad Kashmir alike.

There are many ways in which Azad Kashmir is tied to the development of Pakistan. The educational policy promotes the idea of Kashmir being the “fifth

province” at the expense of Kashmiri identity. “Schools and Universities are not only the means by which society educates and trains its workforce but they also operate as a vehicle for developing national identity. The school curriculum in Azad Kashmir is that of Pakistan and is controlled from Pakistan”.<sup>26</sup> There was a general feeling that the curriculum did not reflect Kashmiri geography, history and culture, and as results undermines the idea of a distinct Kashmiri identity. It was felt that the Pakistani objective was to subsume Kashmiri identity into a Pakistani nationalism. Ms R based in Muzaffarabad commented that:

Sometimes it gets a bit much really but we know what goes on because the family is involved but what about those people who don't know as much as us. We have a duty to inform everyone.

The remittance sub-economy has been important for building a poorly Pakistani-supported Azad Kashmiri infrastructure. Ballard notes that as a result of migration, “Mirpur experienced a considerable economic boom during the 60s and 70s. Almost every family rebuilt their house in steel and concrete, and with the sudden inflow of funds, as well as a heavy demand for construction materials, the bazaars expanded rapidly”.<sup>27</sup> Narratives of Kashmiris settled in Luton suggest some reasons for this. Mr K commented:

I've been here for the last fifty years and all those years I've been sending this money back - most of them still don't work over there. I have married off my brothers' daughters and now their children as well, my grandchildren. I want to set up some business for them to do because there is nothing for them to do over there. [Mr K talked at length of the lack of an employment structure] I'm not going to be here for always but over there it's not like here so I end up doing everything over here. I've bought some property here.

Mr K's comments highlight an increasing problem for the Azad Kashmiri economy. Ballard noted the lack of investment in agriculture and the lack of government support in this sector of the economy. Whilst land and property by remittance money has helped the local infrastructure it has largely been for family prestige and thus superficial in terms of the general economic improvement of the area.

The lack of development of the Azad Kashmiri economy has meant that the full potential of the remittances has not been felt. In fact in places like Mirpur they have increased local differentials leading to a distorted view of development. Most of the investment has taken place in housing or the buying of land plots primarily for family. Any investment that has taken place has been within the service sectors. Research suggests that overseas Azad Kashmiris are reluctant to invest in Azad Kashmir for three interrelated reasons: economic control by Pakistan, lack of investment infrastructure and the volatile political situation.

Economic control by the Pakistani Government is felt in the controlling of the banking sector. Research suggests that because Pakistan controls the banking system this means that Pakistan gains the foreign exchange benefit from the remittances and the use within Pakistan of the investment opportunities from the now considerable savings accounts.

In addition to this there appears to be little evidence of a secure economic structure within Azad Kashmir for overseas investors. Interviews with Government officials and the political activists highlighted the lack of an effective investment infrastructure in Azad Kashmir.<sup>28</sup> Sardar Qayum, the then Prime Minister highlighted the usefulness of overseas finance and argued that there were policies designed to attract investment into Azad Kashmir. These included the exemption from various types of taxes, and the provision of services at “reasonable rates”. “Whilst there were examples of major foreign investment such as a European hydroelectricity project in the Neelam Valley and some World Bank money, there had been no investment from the British or the Japanese and this was attributed to the Kashmir situation”.<sup>29</sup>

The political activists interviewed highlighted the potential of overseas remittances but felt that Pakistan's stranglehold and the Kashmir situation were a deterrent to investment. Abdul Rashid Turabi, the president of the Jamaat-I-Islami in Azad Kashmir pointed out that:

There is great potential. Community planners here have not exploited that potential in a sensible way [because] of the limited infrastructure and the political structure is corrupt.

Similar sentiments were expressed by potential investors in Luton. Mr K summarises some general sentiments:

There's no point in doing anything than build a place to reside really. I know Mirpur and Kotli are the same. Look people don't care what's outside their door. Nobody wants a nice road outside their beautiful house because they know that there is no one to

maintain it. No Pakistani Government wants responsibility and everyone will be using it, at least people will be living in a house.

Other examples of poor economic conditions facing the Azad Kashmiris were presented as poor employment opportunities and poor upkeep of public property and roads. "It was also pointed out that ironically the residents of Azad Kashmir find themselves suffering "load shedding" because of the growing energy consumption of Punjabi industry. However whilst poor economic conditions and impoverishment have added to the Kashmir crisis the roots of the problem lie in political marginalisation. It is documented that under an agreement between the Pakistani Government and the Azad Kashmir Government (Muslim Conference), defence and foreign affairs were the responsibility of the Pakistani Government.

Although Azad Kashmir is recognised as a disputed territory, Pakistan controls it by exercising political control in a number of ways. The legislative Assembly was set up in 1970 and a constitution drawn up. However the legislative assembly can only concern itself with domestic policy matters. As it is not recognised internationally as an independent country, it is subject to the Pakistan government in terms of defence and foreign policy. This is particularly the case in matters concerning the northern areas (Gilgit and Baltistan). Further, it is dependent on the Pakistani government for a proportion of its revenue, which is received in the form of a grant. The ministry of Kashmir Affairs in Pakistan provides the Chief Secretary to the Government of Azad Kashmir. In addition the upper house of the Assembly is chaired by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, who

also appoints some of its members. It has been suggested that the roots of the crisis may lie primarily in the Kashmiris' fears for their own distinct identity in the face Hindu nationalism. For Azad Kashmiris the crisis also lies in the notion of Pakistani nationalism.

Kashmiri narratives, some of which have been highlighted above, suggest that psychologically primordial sentiments predominate amongst Azad Kashmiris because of the contested nature of their identity. As well as “emotional location” and feelings of marginalisation in Azad Kashmir, for the majority of Kashmiris another impetus appears to be the fact that “they are a community displaced from their homeland and stranded in an “archipelago of cities” in the “developed world”, that they have been provided with specific opportunities to construct their identities as a response to globalisation through an engagement with civil society”.<sup>30</sup> In the next section, I will focus on the development of Kashmiriyat specifically in Luton.

#### **A. “Kashmiriyat” in Luton**

There are four contextual changes arising out of the consequences of settlement in Britain that have contributed to the growth of “Kashmiriyat” in Luton. These are changes in the social structure of the community in Luton, the value placed on living in a “democratic” society, political upheavals in Europe, the crisis of British identity and events in the sub-continent since the 1970s.

## **1. Changes in the Structure of the Community**

Firstly, the Kashmiri community in Luton is now well established. It is socially, culturally and spatially distinct. Costs incurred during migration have been repaid and migration has been reduced to a trickle. After initial migration a sense of permanence has prevailed as owner occupation has become the trend. Businesses and institutions catering for the migrants' needs have become well established. There is a thriving sub-economy and community infrastructure. Concentrated settlement has reinforced the migrants' early desires for maintenance of the traditional culture, language, and religion. This institutional completeness has led to the migrants' desires for non-participation in the "morally lax, status conscious British society".<sup>31</sup> Therefore the concerns of the early years of migration have become less important. That is not to say that issues such as housing problems and racism are no longer important but that the community is established enough to articulate itself in such matters and this has left space for them to express their collective identity.

## **2. Living in a "Democratic" Society**

Whilst "emotional location" for the older generation is significant in maintaining links and identity through close contact with their homeland and continuing a biraderi based lifestyle despite geographical space, for the younger generation *Kashmiriyat* takes on importance particularly due to human rights violation in Occupied Kashmir.<sup>32</sup> Ms D pointed out:

Our parents were born over there but all I know is that Pakistan treats Azad Kashmir really badly and that's why we stay backward and that women are being raped and children killed in Occupied Kashmir. We fight for a dog's life here and well those are my people and their lives are worth loads more than animals.

I didn't even realise what was happening to all these people until I went to a talk this year. I just can't believe in 1996 this stuff can go on. We are a free people and people need to know.

I'm a lawyer right and I can tell you that there's no way that this can go on.

It is clear that for these young Kashmiris being born and brought up in Britain has led to the greater questioning of the nature and principles of the situation in Kashmir.

### **3. The Crisis of British Identity**

Kashmiris also feel that they need to maintain a sense of self within the changing definition of what it constitutes to be "British". In other words, as Britain sheds its perceived distinctiveness in the face of increasing cultural diversity, so internationally the term 'British' now gives off very different messages than it did a hundred years ago. For the Kashmiris as with many other ethnicised communities this increases the importance of working to maintain a sense of self identity. As Yinger comments:

In the midst of collapsing states and empires, old dreams of their own nation-state become vivid for many long-suffering ethnic minorities. In less conflictual settings the continuing need for a more personal identity in a culturally complex and rapidly changing world persists.<sup>33</sup>

Further it is interesting that the “presence of the migrant ‘other’ is used not only in the nationalist discourse of the established; this discourse, which marginalises and demonises the migrant, also breeds nationalism among those who are marginalised”.<sup>34</sup> This has no doubt influenced the Kashmiri nationalism in Britain who not only feel marginalised because they are not seen as Kashmiris but also because they suffer marginalisation and exclusion along with other Muslim “settler communities”.<sup>35</sup>

At the “Kashmir Conference” held in Luton on 2 July 1995 the speakers (Zahid-ar-Rashidi, Jamal Harwood, Rashid Karim and Omar Bakari Mohammad) all drew analogies between the Kashmiris’ right for self determination and their human rights violations with those of the Muslims in Bosnia. A conversation with Ms R after the conference was significant in getting what she considered to be the general opinion across. She said:

Kashmir is a real big issue for us Kashmiris. There's no way that people can't take notice of what's going on over there. I just feel that. OK so there's all this stuff going on in Bosnia and they're our brothers as well but the difference is that people seem to know what's going on there. No one knows about Kashmir but if we can fight for Bosnians we can fight for Kashmiris.

#### **4. Events in the Subcontinent since the 1970s**

It is within this wider framework of changing social structures, emphasis on democratic values, upheavals in Europe and crisis of “British Identity” that events in the subcontinent should be viewed. Since the 1970s a series of events in the sub-continent have led to a change of Kashmiri identity expressions among

Luton Kashmiris of both generations. This is not to say that subjective political identities did not necessarily exist before the 1970s but these sentiments however were dormant until that time. These feelings have been invoked by the various organisations that were established around this time as a reaction to events in the subcontinent adding an objective dimension to British Kashmiri identity.

Interviews suggest that the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war fought over Kashmir was one such event. This war left the Kashmir issue unresolved. However interviews suggest that this event did help to politicise some Kashmiris in Britain. The emergence of Bangladesh in 1972 was also significant as it would appear that the Azad Kashmiris became increasingly disillusioned with Pakistan's role as a possible ally against India. It was increasingly felt that Pakistan was not strong enough to bring about their independence. This added fuel to the whole independence struggle. Since Bangladesh had successfully achieved independence Kashmiri independence for the Kashmiris became a possible reality. These sentiments were transmitted into the diaspora through links with Kashmiris already settled in the United Kingdom and also by the continuing migration. These factors appear to have contributed to the current expression of political identity.

The offspring of the Kashmiris who have been born in Britain have also become heavily involved in liberation politics. The impetus for this appears to be the human rights violations in Occupied Kashmir. Reports of abuses against

Kashmiris are increasingly available in easily accessible media. An increasingly important source is the Muslim media. During the research period many have to varying degrees carried reports on the situation in Kashmir.

Highlighting the primordial and socially constructed elements of identity in relation to contextual changes adds continuity to the concept of enculturation and allows an understanding of communities through the process that challenges common theoretical categorisations. The either/or options provided by primordialist approaches to national identity do not allow for the fluidity of identity, which is necessary for understanding redefinitions of identity. For the Kashmiris it appears that due to changes in historical, political, social and economic context the producers and reproducers of “Kashmiriyat” are tapping primordial sentiments. This is not to say that there is some absolute “Kashmiriness” They are only “real” in the Barthian sense in so far as nationalistic movements use these accounts of history to lend legitimacy to their actions. Linked to the discussion of the conditions for mobilisation therefore is the role played by the producers and reproducers of “Kashmiriyat”.

### **B. The (Re) Producers of “Kashmiriyat”**

There is an on-going debate within the social constructionist framework about how national identity is fabricated. As such it requires agents who have the role of (re) producing national identity. Some writers see these producers and reproducers to be part of the state-apparatus. Others emphasise the role of “free-

floating” intellectuals. Organisations and the community also have a role in the perpetuation of a particular discourse. In what follows I will look at how “Kashmiriyat” is articulated and who are the responsible agents.

### **1. The State Apparatus**

The institutions of the state have historically played a major role in articulating national identity. Nationalism tended to be state-led among the early nation-states (e.g. England, France, Sweden etc.). In others words there were states that became nations.<sup>36</sup> In contrast, in wake of the dissolution of the major empires, nations or proto-nations have tended to become states. The case of Azad Kashmir seems to hark to the earlier pattern of state-led nationalism, in that Azad Kashmir has been one of the main forces behind the articulation of a Kashmiri national identity. This, however, is not the complete story, since Azad Kashmir is not a totally autonomous state. As such its relationship to “Kashmiriyat” is as ambiguous as its own status. There are three main ways in which the Azad Kashmiri state contributes to development of the discourse of “Kashmiriyat”, despite its paradoxical relationship to Kashmiri nationalism.

Firstly, the existence of the Azad Kashmiri Government adds legitimacy to “Kashmiriyat” in the sense that the Government validates the idea of Kashmir as a nation state. There is a Kashmiri flag, which is an identifier of this. “Kashmiriyat” is further justified with the establishment of Azad Kashmir

branches of political parties such as the People's Party in 1969 and the Jamaat-Islami.

At the same time, however, the Azad Kashmiri government's links to the Pakistani state deny "Kashmiriyat" (for example, according to the 1974 constitution, Azad Kashmir's political parties have to swear to accession to Pakistan in order to be recognised). As one disgruntled politician pointed out:

There is a Kashmiri Flag that the government has as a backdrop to all meetings but the question we need to ask is what do they actually do to advance the idea of a Kashmiri state? There is no point in having a flag to show the world we are a country when half of our country is being held by others (referring to Indian Occupied Kashmir) and the other half (referring to Azad Kashmir) has a government only by name. The Azad Kashmir Government [Muslim Conference] is the "puppet of Pakistan":

The Muslim Conference has had its hands tied by the Pakistanis. What's a government who has no charge over its defence? We can all herd sheep. They are puppets of Pakistan. We call them *chamcha*.

Ellis and Khan point out that:

The reality is that the Pakistanis are extremely influential and unofficially exercise a "chief whip" role on the Azad Kashmir government members and this is particularly the case where the party in power is the same as the party in power in Pakistan. A constitutional crisis occurred in May 1996, which underlined how closely Azad Kashmir governance is tied to that of Pakistan politics. The maximum term of office was about to finish for the Muslim Conference government of Sardar Qayum at the same time as the term of office for the President was also coming up for re-election. The Prime Minister of Pakistan indicated timing for the presidential election, which would potentially favour her party. In order to highlight the issue the president, who was of Muslim Conference affiliation, resigned ahead of time so that it would be the Muslim Conference government in power during the presidential election. He immediately offered himself for re-

election and was successful. Three weeks later however the Legislative Assembly elections returned a People's Party government who immediately deposed the President through a no confidence vote on the legitimacy of the recent presidential election. It could be perceived that the Assembly is now exercising its democratic right to challenge situations through this vote of no confidence.<sup>37</sup>

There is a third relationship between the Azad Kashmiri Government and “Kashmiriyat” That is the simultaneous extension and denial of Kashmiri nationalism makes possible “Kashmiriyat” in that this allows a particular discourse around notions of “Kashmiriyat” to exist. During the 1970s it is was this discourse around “Kashmiriyat”, the discontentment with the Azad Kashmiri Government, and increasing resentment at Pakistan's involvement in Azad Kashmiri governance and political parties, which led to the emergence of liberation organisations.

## **2. Intellectuals**

Smith and Gellner stress the importance of intellectuals in the creation and reproduction of nationalist ideologies, especially those of oppressed collectives.<sup>38</sup> It is important to note that by intellectuals I do not simply mean academics, writers, artists and the like. Rather, following Gramsci, the category of intellectuals include individuals who carry out the task of organising civil society, thus intellectuals can include civil servants, political leaders, journalists or trade union activists.<sup>39</sup> These have the role of articulating pre-existing notions around Kashmir identity, and at the same time altering and suggesting new notions of Kashmir identity. In other words intellectuals both voice and at the

same time echo “Kashmiriyat”. As we have already seen most Kashmiris already have an implicit primordial notion of what it is to be Kashmiri. What key intellectuals have done is to take the implicit, almost folksy collection of beliefs and assumptions about what it is to be Kashmiri and make it explicit, often harnessing it to Kashmiri nationalism.

Some of the earliest intellectuals that can be identified with “Kashmiriyat” appeared during the oppressions of the 1930s in response to the autocratic rule of the Maharaja and poor social, economic and political rights.<sup>40</sup> Their interventions led to uprisings in the Poonch area (the area that came to be known as Azad Kashmir). Amongst these, the best known was Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. Abdullah later went on to head political parties, the National Conference in the Valley and the Muslim Conference in the Azad Kashmir Region. It is these political parties that are prominent in Azad Kashmir that also have branches in Britain and have been significant in the production and re-production of “Kashmiriyat”.

Key individuals such as Maqbool Butt, Amanullah Khan, Major Ananullah, Mir Abdul Qayyum and G.M Lone are seen as the forefathers of liberation politics in Kashmir. They began to organise themselves in the 50s. Their activities culminated in the formation of the Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Front (JKNLF) (which subsequently became the Plebiscite Front and which was

reorganised and renamed the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front-JKLF) in 1965.

Research suggests that the marginality of political parties within Azad Kashmiri politics and the contextual factors outlined above have provided the space for the formation of branches of these political parties and liberation organisations to flourish in Britain. It is important to point out, however, that these parties would not have been established or survived without the social, economic and political links with Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir.

Individuals who had been involved with liberation politics in Azad Kashmir in the late 60s and early 70s moved to Britain. Since moving to Britain they carried out various initiatives to organise Kashmiri settlers in response to events in Kashmir. In the 1970s in Britain key Kashmiris such as Lala Abdul Rehaman, Sofi Azim, Habib Khan and others were trying to organise Kashmiri settlers. These initiatives were taking place in direct response to events in Azad and Occupied Kashmir. As Mr M pointed out: “we felt that being here we could still do something for our brethren over there but just didn’t know how to go about it at all”.

In 1971 Abdul Rehman was central in the development of the Kashmir Independent Movement. This organisation was established in response to members of the Plebiscite Front and the Liberation Front being interrogated in

Pakistan in relation to the hijacking of the Ganga aeroplane belonging to India. Also at this time Choudry Abdul Majid and colleagues were forming the United Kashmir Liberation Front, the headquarters of which was in Birmingham. The key activities of these organisations was to raise the profile of the Kashmiri issue by meeting with various dignitaries including the Pakistani Ambassador and to demonstrate against the torture of the National Liberation Front and Plebiscite Front members in Pakistan.

After the Ganga aeroplane incident two members of the United Liberation Front, Mirza Siddique and Arif Ansari formed the Plebiscite Front. This was reorganised in 1971 by Abdul Rehman. The Plebiscite Front in Britain was independent from the Plebiscite Front of Kashmir but through its constitution and activities was seen as a branch of the Plebiscite Front in Kashmir.<sup>41</sup> It was not however, until 1975 with the arrival of Abdul Khaliq Ansari, Amanullah Khan and Mr G.M Mir, all members of the Plebiscite Front in Kashmir that Kashmiri Liberation politics in Britain began to take a more distinguishable shape.

Amanullah Khan is generally assumed to have been the leading intellectual in bringing about some cohesion to Kashmiri liberation politics in Britain. At a convention held in Birmingham on 29 May 1977 he suggested that the name of the Plebiscite Front should be changed to the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). The grounds for change were that the aims and objectives of the Plebiscite Front no longer catered for changed circumstances in Kashmir and

since Kashmir belongs to Kashmiris then why would Kashmiris want a plebiscite? Its attraction to many of the members of the Plebiscite Front, the National Liberation Front and members of branches of the Muslim Conference in Britain was that it was systematic and organised.

Whereas Amanullah Khan is seen as the leading intellectual in the Kashmiri struggle the most revered figure is Maqbool Ahmad Butt. Butt is generally recognised as the central figure of the armed side of the Kashmiri independence struggle and the epitome of what constitutes “Kashmiriyat”. Not only is he a household name amongst Kashmiris world wide but also in many homes photographs of Maqbool Butt adorn walls, mantels and dressers. Kashmiri narratives suggest that this is a privilege accorded to only a few respected figures in Muslim households. The following comments are typical:

Maqbool Butt is our hero. He fought for everything that we stand for. I keep a picture of him here to remind myself of who I am. A Kashmiri.

He is like a reminder of what it is all about. He started this and we have to carry on with his dream of an independent Kashmir.

The main message of these individuals is that Kashmir is a nation. The basis of this is common history, ancestry, and culture. There is also a strong idea of a shared territory, which covers the geographical areas of Jammu, the Valley of Kashmir, Ladakh, Baltistan, Gilgit and Aksai Chin. These intellectuals were also products of a wider vision, which many of them argue was put in place at the time of British colonial rule in the mid-nineteenth century when Kashmir, a

Princely State at the time, was sold to Gulab Singh. Many of these intellectuals believe that on the day of Independence Kashmir was legally and constitutionally independent as no accession document had been signed. The events surrounding the signing of the accession by the Maharaja are considered dubious, leading to questioning of the legitimacy of the accession treaty. Based on these events many individuals believe in Kashmiri governmental sovereignty and self-determination for a unified Kashmir. These ideas constitute the essence of “Kashmiriyat”.

Intellectuals spread their messages through their writings in books and pamphlets, through rallies and tours, but to more effect within the context of particular institutional ensembles. The Azad Kashmiri government provides one of the main institutional arenas for the dissemination of “Kashmiriyat.”

### **3. Organisations**

Intellectuals need to consolidate and institutionalise their opinions and the best way of doing this is through organisations, which take on the role of advocates, promoting a self-conscious collective identity. They fulfil this aim through referring to shared beliefs to promote a sense in the individual of belonging to the collective and they mobilise this through demonstrations, lobbying MPs and fundraising.

The discourse of “Kashmiriyat” has dispersed this because it is articulated by various organisations which means that “Kashmiriyat” does not have a sole

representative and thus its power centres are also scattered. This is not surprising since different people have produced it in different places and at different times, and all have been influenced by their context. In other words there is no single representative, a type of Qaid-I-Azam figure. The President and Prime Minister of Azad Kashmir, Political Parties in Azad Kashmir and Occupied Kashmir and Liberation organisations in Azad Kashmir, Occupied Kashmir and Britain all talk of “Kashmyriyat”. The polycentric nature of “Kashmiriyat” therefore makes it very diffuse and difficult to co-ordinate.<sup>42</sup>

There are significant differences amongst the nationalism expressed by these different organisations but interestingly none of them deny the existence of the Kashmir Problem and all are united in wanting a Kashmir free of Indian occupation. Their approaches vary with regard to the solution to the problem.

There are a number of political parties that operate in Kashmir but only a few operate outside.<sup>43</sup> The pro-Pakistan Muslim Conference is one of these and has a considerable following in Britain and Luton.<sup>44</sup> It was during the 1930s that religion became significant for different political parties as a way of gaining popular support against loss of Kashmiri sovereignty. The Muslim Conference continues to argue for a Kashmir that is a part of Pakistan on the basis of shared religion. Identification based on the *Ummah* is also expressed by Islamic revivalist organisations such as the Hizb-ul-Tahrir. These organisations reject concepts of the nation state articulated by organisations like the JKLF in favour

of a transnational community based on Muslim identity. For them the solution has to be an Islamic one. The “creation” of this “new religious symbolism” has taken place in the context of wider political debates.<sup>45</sup>

Research in Luton suggests that despite the existence of political parties such as the Muslim Conference and revivalist organisations like the Hizb-ul-Tharir it is the liberation organisations that have a stronghold. Mr E explained that this was because, “ I suppose if we push the religion side of it then we become religious fanatics and the idea of Kashmiris being a nation goes out of the window. Islam doesn’t allow for nations”.

The idea of Kashmir as a Nation-State is the sustenance of liberation organisations like the JKLF.<sup>46</sup> The JKLF is the only liberation organisation that functions in all three parts of Kashmir-Indian Occupied Kashmir, Azad Kashmir and Gilgt-Baltistan and abroad under the same name, constitution, leadership, organisational structure, flag and policy.<sup>47</sup> In the JKLF is regarded as “the face of liberation” and Luton is generally accepted as the place that the “movement was born”. Discussions with Kashmiris suggested that there are three main reasons for this. Firstly because Luton was home to Kashmiris that were active in liberation politics, which made them sympathetic to the JKLF. Secondly because Amanullah Khan already had relatives and supporters in Luton and so used Luton as his base when he arrived in Britain in 1975 and thirdly because the JKLF Zonal Office, Kashmir House, was established in Luton. Thus Luton and its

Kashmiri settlers were placed firmly on the “liberation map”. The establishment of the JKLF signifies the emergence of political identity as a priority for Kashmiris. As Mr E commented: “There was no where else for us to go, no one was listening and our young brothers were being killed so the JKLF came at the right time for me”.

One of the problems of organisations like the JKLF that function globally is the contesting of authority within the organisation, which leads to factionalism.<sup>48</sup> This has been one of the problems for the JKLF. There have been several defections, the reasons behind which vary depending on who one is interviewing. The three most often recounted defections have been: firstly in 1995 when Yasin Malik, the President of the JKLF in Indian Occupied Kashmir, was removed from office for ignoring Amanullah Khan’s authority. He then organised a splinter group. The second defection was by the JKLF “top brass” Raja Muzaffar, the ex Senior Vice Chairman and Dr Farooq Haider who allegedly wanted to move away from the armed side of the struggle and focus on a diplomatic agenda. Arguably the most serious split in the organisation occurred in 1992. Leading upto the 1992 elections there were increasing questions around the JKLF leadership and questions of organisation funding (at this time the JKLF was linked to the Pakistani ISI - Inter Services Intelligence - so there were particular questions about where weapons for the armed struggle were coming from). The elections provided an opportunity for change within the organisation. However there were accusations of unfair practices when 30% of the quota was allotted to

450 people while the full membership of the JKLF runs in excess of approximately 12,500. The majority of individuals elected were seen to be pro-Amanullah Khan. This event was used to further question Mr Khan's authority at which time he dissolved the JKLF. Some individuals accepted this whilst others regarded it as unconstitutional. The current situation is that there are two organisations calling themselves the JKLF, one under the leadership of Amanullah Khan based in Azad Kashmir and the other under the leadership of Yunus Choudhry based in Accrington. To differentiate between the two one is commonly referred to as the Amanullah group and the other as the Yunus group. As well as liberation organisations there are also some NGOs operating in Britain. The UK based World Kashmir Freedom Movement headed by Ayub Thukar, The Jammu Kashmir Council for Human Rights headed by Syed Nazir Gilani, the Kashmir Welfare Association (Kashmir Relief Fund) which is patronised by Lord Avebury, who is the head of the Human Rights Group in the British Parliament, the Tehreek-e-Kashmir, the Kashmir Council for Human Rights and Kashmir Watch are all sympathetic to the violation of human rights in Kashmir.<sup>49</sup>

Kashmiri welfare organisations have also played important roles. These have spread in Britain in response to the settlement of communities. Their function has been primarily welfare. They have, however spread "Kashmyriat" without being overtly political (in the sense that they are not directly linked to the idea of an Independent Kashmiri State) through assembling social identities. In Luton one

of the more “visible” organisations is the Pakistani/Kashmir Welfare Association.

<sup>50</sup> Recently, local residents have established organisations like *Kidmat*. Mr I pointed out that, “when we were first here everything was about how to find work, get somewhere to live, look after our children’s problems at schools. Now we can turn to freeing our country”. This suggests a priority in emerging political identity as organisations established in the early years of migration predominantly to serve a welfare type role become more politicised.<sup>51</sup>

There has also been a proliferation of publicity organisations within Kashmir, which take on the role of making the Kashmir Issue visible through overtly political Eid cards and other material such as pamphlets. These organisations are not necessarily affiliated to liberation organisations, which have their own publicity corps but do at times work in association with them. The Kashmir International Friendship is one of these organisations. It is based in Mirpur and is responsible for the publication of the Eid cards shown overleaf in Plate 9.ii.

Plate 9.2 shows the cover of a photo album purchased in Mirpur during a visit to a photography shop. These albums were also circulating in Kotli. The owner of the photograph booth in Kotli was the brother of a restaurant owner in Luton who mentioned that “this sort of thing was of contribution to the struggle”


In frequent visits back and forth from Azad Kashmir and Britain this sort of national publicity also circulates. Eid cards are sent celebrating the end of

Ramadan but with political messages such as “Freedom Now” and “The day of Independence will be the day of Eid for Kashmiris”. Other organisations such as the Kashmir Record and Research Cell in Mirpur take on a more research orientated role. Many of the co-ordinators of the organisation are members of the JKLF. In this sense it is difficult to separate Kashmiris from the freedom struggle.


Plate 9.1- The Urdu writing says: “On this side of Kashmir is sadness and on the other side of Kashmir is barbarianism”.



A picture of Maqbool Butt, similar to the one found in many Kashmiri homes. The Urdu writing says: "I swear to Allah you are free in Allah's court" On the left of the picture the Urdu writing says: "My work in Kashmir against evil forces, poverty and imperialism is seen by the world powers as treason".



The Urdu writing says: "With the blessing of Allah freedom is near".



The Urdu writing says: "When we stood out with the flag, we knew we would be martyrs. From that time to now the enemy is living in fear of execution".






Plate 2- The Cover of a photograph Album. The Urdu writing says: "My motherland one day I will be in your heaven".





Plate 3- Kashmiri women at a political rally in Bedford calling for attention to the injustices in Indian Occupied Kashmir.



The central roundabout in Kotli town, is also an everyday reminder of Indian occupation. It is built to symbolise a mountain and on it is pictured an armed soldier above whom the writing reads “ Indians out”. Another reminder is the extensive graffiti calling for liberation, the drawings of Maqbool Butt and the liberation organisation initials as well as slogans.

Since the 1970s these political parties, liberation organisations and to a lesser extent welfare organisations have been tapping into people’s emerging political awareness. Members of the community have been recruited through the tools of nation building. This can be best seen at the community level with a closer look at the discourses and symbols of nation building.

#### **4. Community**

“Kashmiriyat” has been constructed by intellectuals, the state apparatus and organisations through political action, which relies heavily on representation of what it is to be Kashmiri. Hall points out that, “We only know what it is to be English because of the way that Englishness has come to be represented as a set of meanings -a system of cultural representation”.<sup>52</sup> In the same way Kashmiris only know what it is to be Kashmiri because of the way in which Kashmiriness has come to be represented by a set of meanings.

For Kashmiris these meanings defend the discourse of Kashmiris as a national community and the symbolic power of the sense of identity and allegiance that

this generates is strong.<sup>53</sup> “Through this discourse they “rediscover” collective memories, transform popular oral traditions and languages into written ones, and portray a ‘national golden age’ in the far mythical or historical past whose reconstruction becomes the basis for nationalist aspirations”.<sup>54</sup>

Community mobilisation around “Kashmiriyat” in Britain is closely linked to events in the subcontinent. Kashmiri community involvement takes several forms. The first activity is to maintain strong links with “home” through which “Kashmiriyat” is maintained. As discussed above the *biraderi* plays a significant role in this. “Political activity is particularly concentrated on the influencing of political processes in Kashmir primarily for the benefit of the *biraderi* in village of origin. There is evidence that this activity in the United Kingdom has a direct impact on the membership and conduct of Azad Kashmir Legislative assembly. Increasingly leading political figures from Azad Kashmir visit the United Kingdom to maintain their influence within the British based Kashmiri community.”<sup>55</sup>

The first activity of maintaining their link to Kashmir is through the circulation of liberation material such as the Eid cards discussed above as well as phone calls and letters. All have the effect of keeping Kashmiri settlers informed.

Secondly, the utilisation of community/welfare organisations maintains the social side of “Kashmiriyat”, for example, the organisation of Eid festivals, or

celebrations of Muslim holy days such as the Birthday of the Prophet Mohammed (SAW). All have the effect of bringing Kashmiris together. Although not national occasions they provide the forum for the expression of “Kashmiriyat” through articulation of a distinct collective identity which is made visible to members of the Kashmiri community and non-Kashmiris. These events bring Kashmiris together, which provides the opportunity for them to engage in discussion around issues of “Kashmiriness”.

The social side of “Kashmiriyat” is particularly important for women who generally do not attend political meetings. Women are central to the production and reproduction of nationalism, as they are the biological reproducers of the next generation. Also our early experiences of childhood influence our subjectivity and it is mothers who influence this stage of life, therefore women are vital teachers of social and political ideological structures and in this sense they are reproducing state ideology. In Luton women may gather for birthdays or weddings but they are promoters of Kashmiriness through various mediums. The following narrative points to the importance of cooking and clothes. Ms T said, “well I suppose you can tell we are Kashmiri from the way we conduct ourselves. I will make sure I cook things that are Kashmiri - cook with yoghurt and stuff like that, so that at least I can keep telling my kids this is Kashmiri. Sometimes the clothes I wear feel more Kashmiri than other times but you can tell the older ladies are definitely Kashmiri from the way they wear their *dupatas*”.

This is not of course to say that women are not involved in “Kashmiriyat” outside of the home. Plate 9.3 shows a photograph from a political rally in April 1996 in Bedford where women were participants in voicing demands for peace in Kashmir. The political objectification of women and symbolism as daughters, mothers, wives has come to represent the honour of the Kashmiri nation but in Azad Kashmir and Britain they remain marginal in the struggle. Sabrina Sultana, the leader of the women’s wing of the JKLF based in Mirpur, Azad Kashmir pointed out that the problem was that many families would not allow their daughters to take a public role in the struggle. She suggested that in many cases culture and Islam were used as an excuse for non-participation. Stories of violations by Indian armed forces against women’s honour in Occupied Kashmir are currently one of the prominent nation-building tools and legitimisers of the Kashmiri freedom struggle amongst Kashmiris.

Thirdly, through the support and membership of political parties and liberation organisations which arrange meetings and raise general community awareness around the liberation of Kashmir. Through these organisations, and particularly the JKLF in Luton, Kashmiri settlers have been involved in a number of activities, which have promoted “Kashmiriyat”. Some these are discussed below.

As mentioned above, the JKLF emerged in reaction to the interrogation of members of the National Liberation Front and the Plebiscite Front in relation to the Ganga Plane hijacking. It emerged most strongly, however, during the events

leading up to the execution of Maqbool Butt. For Kashmiris his execution is regarded unlawful and as one Kashmiri now living in Oldham pointed out “ignited a sense of who I should be”.

For Kashmiris in Britain Butt’s execution was significant not only because of his position in the struggle but because of the reaction from Kashmiri settlers. In 1966 Butt had been arrested and sentenced to death for killing an officer of the Indian Intelligence (who was actually killed by his colleague Aurangzeb who was himself killed later at the hands of the Indian Army). In December 1968 Butt escaped from prison to Azad Kashmir but on his return to Occupied Kashmir was arrested and taken to a top security prison in Tihar, New Delhi where his death sentence was renewed. Butt remained in prison until 1984. The injustice of his sentence enthralled some JKLF Kashmiri youth in Britain (some of whom were from Luton) whose response was to form the Kashmir Liberation Army (KLA). They kidnapped the Indian Deputy High Commissioner in Birmingham, the ransom being the release of Butt who was rumoured to have been executed.<sup>56</sup> When Butt was not released the Indian Deputy High Commissioner was killed. In retaliation the Indians hanged Butt.<sup>57</sup> Events surrounding his death led to demonstrations in areas of high Kashmiri settlement such as Bradford, Birmingham and Luton and raised the Kashmir issue onto the political agenda. One of the largest protests took place outside India House in London on 10 February 1984. It was in this highly charged atmosphere that Kashmiri

intellectuals through their organisations were able to advance the idea of “Kashmiriyat”.

Liberation organisations like the JKLF were also instrumental in organising demonstrations at the time of the Hazratbal Siege and the burning of the Charare Sharif Shrine. The Hazratbal shrine was taken on 24 March 1996 by Indian troops as a combined meeting of the high command of the political and military wings of the JKLF was about to be held in the premises. The Indian troops opened fire and killed some of the JKLF commanders when the Shrine administration had been given assurances of safety. These events provoked public demonstrations at the Indian High Commission in London as well as marches and rallies in Hyde Park and Trafalgar Square.

The JKLF have also organised events involving Kashmiris from Britain travelling to Azad Kashmir to take part in the 1992 border crossing. The JKLF leadership felt that the Kashmir issue was not getting enough attention. There was also a misconception by Kashmiris in Indian Occupied Kashmir that Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir were not doing enough to support their struggles. At a conference held in Islamabad in 1991 Amanullah Khan announced that JKLF members would cross the cease-fire line on 11 February 1992, the 8<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Maqbool Butt’s martyrdom.<sup>58</sup> As the 30,000 Kashmiris, some of whom were from Britain, crossed the cease-fire line at Chakothe the Pakistani security forces opened fire and approximately fifty people were injured. In total seven lives were

lost. The significance of this event is not just that some of the protestors were from Britain but also that it was the Pakistani troops who opened fire killing Kashmiris. The attempted crossing had several important outcomes: it fulfilled its aim of making people in Occupied Kashmir aware that people in Azad Kashmir and indeed the Kashmiri community abroad were interested in their plight. It heightened the feeling that “the Pakistanis are just as bad as the Indians” throughout the Kashmiri community. The matter was taken up to the UN Security Council. It also helped to raise world wide publicity for liberation as a possible solution to the Kashmir problem. “It was after this event that Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan, in answer to a question from BBC correspondent Liz Ducet in an interview in Tehran on 18 February, 1992 conceded to Kashmiris the right to self-determination.<sup>59</sup> Two subsequent attempts to cross the cease-fire line were made on 30 March 1992 and on 2 and 4 October 1992.<sup>60</sup>

Organised Kashmiri activity also involves the lobbying of the British Parliament. On International Human Rights day on December 10 1991 they organised a mass lobby in London. Kashmiris in Britain have also reacted to the actions of British politicians. Ellis and Khan point out that:

In 1994 Douglas Hurd, the then Foreign Secretary, said in a press conference in Islamabad that the UN resolutions were no longer useful in resolving the Kashmir problem. There was uproar in Pakistan but in particular in the United Kingdom amongst the Pakistani/Kashmiri community. The Gulf war was invoked in questioning why UN resolutions should be the basis of actions over Kuwait but not over Kashmir. It raised the whole issue of

‘equality’ of different UN resolutions. In August 1995, Robin Cook, found himself at the centre of a serious controversy over his speech to Brent Indian Councillors in which he stated ‘the position of the Labour Party is that Kashmir is part of the Indian State’. This provoked very strong reactions to the media in the United Kingdom by Pakistanis and Kashmiris as well as by the Pakistani media.

One of the outcomes of the lobbying is that members of the British Parliament have an all party Kashmiri Parliamentary Group, which tries to influence British Foreign and European Parliament policy over the Kashmir issue.<sup>61</sup>

Kashmiri nationalism has emerged within the United Kingdom in the 1970s. Contextual changes have enabled the Kashmiris to construct a Kashmiri identity as “settler communities” away from their homeland. For the older generation Kashmiris, Britain has been an “emotional location” which is also an emotional dislocation given the situation of a divided Kashmir<sup>62</sup>. Mrs K pointed out that, “My heart is still over there. I have been here for many years now but some of my family is over there and I worry. I am afraid for them”<sup>63</sup> Mr F also commented that, “it's bad enough that we are seen as Pakistani but then no one understanding (sic) and taking notice of what goes on over there”. For Kashmiris born and brought up in Britain the motivation appears to be the human rights violations.

These activities have the effect of consolidating a Kashmiri identity and help alleviate some of the problems of negotiating Kashmiriness with other multiple identities such as a Muslim identity, Pakistani identity, Asian identity and a

British identity. This means that “Kashmyriat” no longer exists just at an abstract level in the minds of the intellectuals and is validated (despite the fact that the Kashmiri nation-state and a political entity does not exist) at the everyday level where Kashmiri is included in the fabric of the society. The visibility of “Kashmiriyat” through its inclusion in shop names, calls for renaming of streets and inclusion of Kashmiri as an ethnic group on Equal Opportunity forms has the effect of creating a virtual nation state.<sup>64</sup>

#### **IV. CONCLUSION**

The spread of “Kashmiriyat” has been highly significant in developing among Kashmiri people their sense of “Kashmiriness”. This notions of “Kashmiriyat” has relied on a number of factors to emerge and it has spread along a number of circuits which have been part of the Kashmiri migrations system. On the one hand it is the process by which the Kashmiri settlers have been given a strong sense of identity but at the same time “Kashmiriyat” has been dependant on the various ensemble of institutions and practices by which Kashmiris have lived there lives.

This chapter has shown that traditional theories of nationalism with their focus on either primordialism or instrumentalist approaches fall short of explaining the complexities of Kashmiri nationalism in Britain. Individuals may display emotional dependence on their ethnic identity whilst simultaneously manipulating certain contexts in which they find themselves.

This manipulation may often take the form of primordialist claims or instrumentalist calculation. The fact that both primordialist and instrumentalist options are available suggests the constructed nature of nationhood including that of the Kashmiris. Any claims that are made by individuals will of course depend on specific life experiences and the willingness of groups to recognise these claims. It is this recognition of the Kashmiri claim that it is a national community that is particularly significant. As discussed above, some local councils in Britain have recognised the Kashmiris as an ethnic group. The project of “Kashmiriyat”, will no doubt continue until all groups at the local, national and international level recognise its existence and salience. During this process the components of “Kashmiriyat” highlighted above will change in response to community and individual experiences and the willingness of others to accept its existence. The concept of enculturation provides a useful anchor for “Kashmiriyat” allowing for both the primordialist and instrumentalist nature of “Kashmiriyat” to be understood.

In the last three chapters I have looked at the “before” and “after” picture of Kashmiriness. In the next chapter I will corroborate these impressionistic accounts with statistical evidence gathered in Luton. The aim as outlined at the beginning of this study, to provide an inter-disciplinary approach, which matched qualitative and quantitative methodologies, will be realised in the following chapters.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> See Heather, 1996, p. 5
  - <sup>2</sup> Heather, 1996, p. 4
  - <sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 5.
  - <sup>4</sup> Kellas, 1991, p. 3.
  - <sup>5</sup> Peterson, 1975, p. 181.
  - <sup>6</sup> Weber in Gerth and Mills, 1948, p. 176.
  - <sup>7</sup> Discussion of the nation as a primordial given has been discussed by Geertz, 1963 and Van den Berghe, 1994 amongst others.
  - <sup>8</sup> Connor, 1994, p.37.
  - <sup>9</sup> Anderson, 1990 and Gellner, 1983
  - <sup>10</sup> Anderson, 1990, p. 6.
  - <sup>11</sup> Yuval-Davis, 1994, p. 119.
  - <sup>12</sup> Oommen, 1994, p. 26.
  - <sup>13</sup> Sayyid, 1997, p. 81.
  - <sup>14</sup> The home of Kashmiri nationalism was Kashmir itself but current constructions are also taking place outside of Kashmir, and it is this point that is being explored.
  - <sup>15</sup> Yuval-Davis, 1994, p 120. This analysis also appears in "The 1990's: A time to Separate British Punjabi and British Kashmiri Identity" by Ali, Ellis and Khan.
  - <sup>16</sup> Renan, 1882 as quoted by Yuval-Davis, 1994 p.120.
  - <sup>17</sup> Malik, 1996; Kaul, 1994.
  - <sup>18</sup> Ali, Ellis and Khan, 1996.
  - <sup>19</sup> Oommen, 1994, talks of irrelevant variables.
  - <sup>20</sup> It is important to note that although this phenomenon is particularly strong in Luton it is not being suggested that this is necessarily representative of all Kashmiris.
  - <sup>21</sup> Kaul, 1994.
  - <sup>22</sup> Ratcliffe, 1994 p. 7.
  - <sup>23</sup> Mercer as discussed by McCrone, 1997, p. 581.
  - <sup>24</sup> Zafar Khan and the JKLF take this position.
  - <sup>25</sup> Samad, 1995, p.74
  - <sup>26</sup> Ellis and Khan, 1998 have a paper published based on this research. The project 'British Kashmiris: Expectations in the Sub-Continent was carried out by Dr Patrica Ellis, Zafar Khan and Nasreen Ali and was funded by the Nuffield Foundation. This Research project took place after the main data collection phase of this research. Since there was continuity in many of the themes of this project the results have been used to qualify my research propositions.
  - <sup>27</sup> Ballard, 1985, p.6.
  - <sup>28</sup> I was the research assistant on the May-June 1996 research field trip to Azad Kashmir and in many cases was present at the interviews with officials.
  - <sup>29</sup> Ellis and Khan, 1998, p.8.
  - <sup>30</sup> Ali and Sayyid, 1997.
  - <sup>31</sup> Robinson, 1979.
  - <sup>32</sup> Ali, Ellis and Khan, 1996.
  - <sup>33</sup> Yinger, 1994, p. 343.
  - <sup>34</sup> Van der Veer, 1995, p. 7.
  - <sup>35</sup> For a comprehensive look at marginalisation and exclusion of Muslims in Britain see "Muslim Voices in the European Union: The Stranger Within". Country Report for Britain by Ali, 1997.
  - <sup>36</sup> Tilly and Blockmans, 1994, pp. 25-26.
  - <sup>37</sup> Ellis and Khan, 1998, p. 5.
  - <sup>38</sup> See Anthais and Yuval Davis, 1993, p. 27.
  - <sup>39</sup> See Simon, for a brief discussion of Gramsci's theorisation of the role of intellectuals in political processes. Simon, 1991, pp. 91-99.

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<sup>40</sup> I am not suggesting that the idea of “Kashmiriyat” was not being promoted before the 1930s or that there were no intellectuals promoting this idea before the 1930s. The 1930s is seen as a cut-off point because it sees the emergence of political parties.

<sup>41</sup> I would like to thank Riffat Ejaz for allowing me to use this information which appeared in her undergraduate dissertation in which she discussed the development and present position of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), in the diaspora. I would also like to thank her for allowing me to use some of her tape-recorded interviews. Her dissertation was completed in May 1996, University of Luton.

<sup>42</sup> A consequence of this is that “Kashmyriat” becomes very cultural. For example there are many Kashmiri flags hanging out of cars during the Manchester Eid parade. However this does not mean that all those that have a flag necessarily support to the idea that Kashmir is a nation state.

<sup>43</sup> In Indian Occupied Kashmir the main pro-Indian political parties are the National Conference, Panthers Party Kashmiri Organisations, Congress, BJP, Janta Dal, SWP, Communist Party Branches of Indian Parties. The Hurriet Conference (APHC) is an alliance of Kashmiri Organisations Jamaat-e-Islami, Peoples Conference, Awami Action Committee, Muslim Conference, Ittehdal Muslimeen and a break of group of the JKLF led by Yasin Malik, that demand the implementation of UN resolutions on Kashmir. They are considered to be pro-Pakistan. The main pro-Pakistan organisations in Azad Kashmir are the Muslim Conference, Peoples Party of Pakistan AK,, Jamaat-e-Islami AK,. The pro-Independence organisations are the JKLF, JK Plebiscite Front, JK NLF, JK Freedom Movement, Peoples National Party, Tehreek-e-Islami Jamhooria Kashmir, Quami Tehreek-I-Azadi Kashmir, National Awami Party JKSLF And NSF. The JK Liberation League demands recognition by the Azad Kashmir Government as the revolutionary government of the whole State. The JK Liberation Alliance JKLA, stands for the unfettered right of self-determination but is not very active. Its predecessor the Kashmir Liberation Alliance KLA, no longer functions.

<sup>44</sup> The founder of the National Conference later the Muslim Conference. The reason I talk of the Hizb-ul-Tahrir is that they are active in Luton. The Kashmir Conference of 1995 held in Luton was looking specifically at an Islamic resolution to the Kashmir Problem.

<sup>45</sup> Kaul, 1991.

<sup>46</sup> The JKLF basically argues for the recognition of Kashmir as a State. It sees Independence as the only viable solution to the Kashmir problem. It demands that Pakistan and India take notice of the right of Kashmiris to opt for an independent state. The Third Option, in addition to the option of accession to Pakistan or India.

<sup>47</sup> This information is from “Twenty Years of the JKLF” published by the JKLF, 1998.

<sup>48</sup> There are thirty two branches of the JKLF in Britain.

<sup>49</sup> Other global NGOs include the Washington based Kashmir American Council headed by Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai, the New York based Council for Human Rights in Kashmir headed by Farook Kathwari who has also recently founded the Kashmir Study Group KSG, the Kashmir Canadian Council, The Pakistan based Kashmir Action Committee headed by Dr Mazufar Shah and Col. Ali Mohammad Mir, the Karachi based Jammu Kashmir Welfare Association headed by Dr. Nazir Khalid and Khwaja Ahsan. There are also some organisations amongst non-Muslims but most are against the Kashmiri armed struggle. This information has been obtained from “Twenty Years of the JKLF, Published by the JKLF.

<sup>50</sup> Since this research was carried out this organisation has folded.

<sup>51</sup> The Kashmir Workers Association in Birmingham is a particularly good example of this.

<sup>52</sup> Hall as discussed in McCrone, 1997, p.581.

<sup>53</sup> Bhabha as discussed in McCrone, 1997, p. 581.

<sup>54</sup> Anthais and Yuval Davis, 1992, p. 27.

<sup>55</sup> Ali Ellis and Khan, 1996, p 249.

<sup>56</sup> The Deputy High Commissioner was Mr Ravindra Mhatre. He was kidnapped in 1984 and later killed. There were a number of arrests and imprisonments at this time including the chairman of the JKLF Amanullah Khan who was later released, as there was no evidence of his involvement in the kidnapping.

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<sup>57</sup> This information is from "Twenty Years of the JKLF" published by the JKLF. Butt together with other leading intellectuals Amanullah Khan, Major Amanullah, Aurangzeb, Kala Khan and Habibullah Butt were the co-founders of the JKLF Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Front, in 1965 based in Occupied Kashmir.

<sup>58</sup> The JKLF asked other Kashmiri Liberation organisations to unite with them for this occasion but they did not give them their support.

<sup>59</sup> This information is from "Twenty Years of the JKLF" published by the JKLF.

<sup>60</sup> This attempted crossing was organised by opposition parties of Azad Kashmir-The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation League, the Azad Kashmir Peoples Party and the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim League with the support of the JKLF.

<sup>61</sup> See Ali, Ellis and Khan, 1996 and Ellis and Khan, 1998. There is already a all party Pakistani Group.

<sup>62</sup> Ali, Ellis and Khan, 1996.

<sup>63</sup> Many Kashmiris living in Britain have homes in Mirpur or Kotli and in this respect these feelings may be more to do with having property in Azad Kashmir and Indian Occupied Kashmir and family rather than with nationalistic feelings for the country.

<sup>64</sup> In 1992 there were calls from the Kashmiri community in Luton that Westbourne Road should be renamed as Kashmir Road. This proposal was rejected by the Council on the grounds that it would be racist to the white community. It also came under fire from leaders of the African-Caribbean and Bangladeshi community. A bid to include Kashmiri as an ethnic group on Equal Opportunity forms was however, accepted in 1998 by Luton Council on the grounds that large numbers of Kashmiris were identifying themselves as Kashmiri in the "Other" category on the form.

## **CHAPTER TEN: BIOGRAPHICAL PROFILES OF KASHMIRIS IN LUTON**

### **I. INTRODUCTION**

This chapter presents biographical data for the selected sample and analysis. Information was collected using the biographical questionnaire. The intention here is to give some indication of the sample characteristics to help develop an overall picture of the individuals selected for the study. This chapter focuses on four main features of the Kashmiri sample: its migration characteristics, its educational and employment profile, its household size and structure, and residential patterns, to highlight the degree to which the respondents were integrated into the Kashmiri community. I illustrate my discussion of these features by presenting the findings of the biographical questionnaire. The purpose of this chapter is to present an overall profile of the Kashmiris I interviewed in an attempt to bring them into the discussions outlined in the preceding chapters and as a background to the ISA results and discussion in chapters eleven and twelve.

### **II. FREQUENCY ANALYSIS**

Analysis of the biographical data was undertaken by looking at the basic features of single variables of the sample. The variables had been coded from the outset to reduce time spent at the data analysis stage. Data was entered using a number of SPSS data entry guides.<sup>1</sup> The intention was to identify the frequency distributions over a range of different values, which would allow the investigation of the

composition of the sample and to identify how many cases have any value for the variable in question. The SPSS frequency procedure displayed a series of tables, some of which have been regrouped here for consistency in presentation. The responses are presented descriptively below and the corresponding tables of results can be found in the appendices.

### **A. Basic Sample Characteristics**

Seventy Kashmiri respondents completed the questionnaire, twenty-nine males, and forty-one females. The age of respondents ranged from sixteen to seventy with the highest number falling in the twenty-one to twenty-five and thirty-six to forty brackets. Twenty-three respondents were single, forty-six were married and one respondent was divorced. The majority (83%) of respondents currently have British citizenship and only 7% have dual nationality. The remaining individuals have elected to maintain a Pakistani nationality.

### **B. Migration Characteristics**

43% of respondents arrived between 1961 and 1980. Migration between 1961-1970 may have been influenced by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962. Responses to open questions suggest that Kashmiris arriving in Luton during these periods were also influenced by the Kashmiris settled in Luton as they arranged work permits for relatives and friends and sponsoring them to come to the United Kingdom - the kin relationship explained previously. This point is further supported by responses given to questions twenty-eight and twenty nine.

The majority of individuals (53%) who migrated were sponsored. For the majority of migrants their sponsor was a relative or someone from the same village/town, which supports the earlier discussion of chain migration. Further support for the chain migration process can be ascertained from question twenty-seven which asked about motivations and influences for migration to the United Kingdom. Male individuals referenced grandfathers, fathers and uncles as primary motivators whilst women mentioned parents and husbands. However only 15% of individuals stated that employment had been arranged for them on arrival. In accordance with the migration literature discussed earlier 44% of individuals were unmarried on arrival to the United Kingdom.

From the data it appears that the second Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1968 may have contributed to Kashmiri immigration to Luton. Levels of migration between 1971-1981 were higher than the previous decade. Discussion suggested that this might have been due to a rush to beat the restrictions imposed by the Immigration Acts. Although the Act necessitated the need for a certificate before one could arrive here and often led to long periods of waiting, this factor does not appear to have reduced migration to Luton. One community leader commented: "I remember many of our men turning up on my door step with forms to fill because they thought this was the last time they would have to call over their wives." A romantic impression of the influx of women into Luton after the second Commonwealth Immigrants Act was given by Mr F who commented: "To me it felt like all of a sudden there was lots of colour." Question twenty-two

showed that 63% of individuals interviewed for the research identified themselves as being born in Azad Kashmir, 29% in the United Kingdom and 8% identified their country of birth as Pakistan.

Questions twenty-four and twenty-five were further attempts to identify patterns of chain migration. Results illustrated in indicate that emigration to Luton occurred from specific areas. 67% of migrants were born in Azad Kashmir. Emigration was highest from Kotli (47%) and from villages around Kotli such as Roli (10%) and Narr (7%). The interesting point here is that results again highlight the significance of chain migration and illustrate its significance for the consequent town by town settlement patterns.

The reasons for moving to the United Kingdom were not always mutually exclusive, although joining the family figured highest among the reasons for moving. This reflects the high percentage of females in the sample. Migration for economic reasons was also emphasised. More particularly, subsequent discussion and comments highlighted the importance of economic factors. One individual stated, "I was coming here to Luton to be with my family. You see at the time I was too young to make decisions for myself, but you see I understood that I was coming to work so that my sisters back home could get decent husbands and good dowries."

For those individuals migrating to join family there also appears to have been an economic incentive. As Mrs K told me:

When I came here I thought I was going to live a good life. Everyone told me that England would be very good and that I was lucky to have a husband who was here. When I came there was a sewing machine ready for me. I couldn't sew but I had to learn fast because I was expected to help improve my husband's family position back home. I've been doing it for the last twenty years.

Therefore we can assume that for most migrants there was an economic incentive to migration. What does not appear in the are conversations with community elders who stated the partition of India and Pakistan was a cause of early migration and subsequently the unsettled conditions in Kashmir were an incentive to migrate. These individuals, however, were in the minority. Along these lines one community elder said:

Look who would want to stay somewhere that had so many bad memories. First there was all the killing during the partition and then there was all the mess in Kashmir. I had so many members of my family dead that I just wanted to get out of that place. I know it's my home but at that time I had to come.

As I have mentioned previously, early writings on the South Asian diaspora comment on the non-return of migrants to countries of origin once settlement has occurred, contrary to their early intentions.<sup>2</sup> However there is little available literature on more recent patterns, perceptions and the structure of return migration. Questions thirty-two, thirty-three and thirty-four were asked in order to obtain some indication about these phenomena for Kashmiris in Luton. 71% of the total sample have no intention of making a permanent move back to Azad Kashmir. This number was higher than initially anticipated and appears to be

consistent with the literature discussed. Based on open interviews, however, one can speculate that the percentage of the older generation wishing to return to Azad Kashmir would be higher than for their offspring. As Mr M commented: "I would go back today if I could but it's not the right time yet. I have to have more money to live a good life there." Mrs D said: "I will go back I dream every day of being with all my family again and in the open but you know I have to marry children first and then I will think it over. It will probably be too late by then."

23% of individuals stated there were intentions of making a permanent move back to Azad Kashmir. Mr S summed up much of the sentiment when he pointed out that: "How can I go back when all my children are here? There are relatives over there and I have lots over there but my children are here and a man needs his children to be looked after in old age. No matter how close the relatives they never will do this." A younger respondent Ms G said: "I could never live there. I mean I love the place and all of that but you know it's so different and this is my home."

From responses to questions thirty-three and thirty-four it was clear that there were two types of individuals moving back to Azad Kashmir. The first were older members of the family who were nearing retirement age. The second were young men and women who had married partners based in Azad Kashmir and who subsequent to marriage were unable to obtain a visa. The only option remaining

for the British based female was to join the husband in Azad Kashmir. Indications of both these situations are summarised below:

Mr H stated that: "I just want an easy life now. I'm finished with working and I want to feel the sun on my face and smell home. I'm an old man now and I need to be with my brothers and sisters now that I have done all that I can for my children." Mrs M said: "You can never understand what that place means to me. I have never belonged here and now I'm going back. I have a daughter married there to my nephew and it's her turn to have a bit of me." Mr K commented: "I want to be buried on Muslim ground and in my home soil, this is my last prayer to Allah." Recently married, Mrs N told me: "I've been trying to get a visa for my husband for the last God knows how long and now I'm having a baby so I have no choice. I have to go back I suppose 'cause what else can I do. It's a mess cause I don't know if I can take that place."

### **C. Education and Employment Patterns**

Questions on education and employment were asked to identify the socio-economic status of the sample. Question seven asked the respondents to identify their qualifications. The qualifications of the sample ranged from the Pakistani matric through to the Pakistani degree. The English equivalent of O Levels and BTECs were mentioned. There were some respondents with HNDs. 39% of individuals received basic FE education in Kashmir whilst 47% received this in

the United Kingdom. 11% of individuals interviewed had not received any further education.

It is important to note that comments in recorded interviews indicated differences in perceptions of education. Those individuals who indicated that they had no basic education pointed out that education in their village during their childhood was not as structured as is currently the case. They pointed out that they received religious, moral and basic matricial (GCSE) education from grandparents and parents. This type of instruction was irregular and took place in the home. They further pointed out that this was not because structured education did not exist, indeed it did, centring particularly around the village Imam and Mosque, but rather that they were needed at home. Individuals reporting this were characteristically the older female members of the family, who were required to look after younger siblings. Mrs S summarised this when she said:

What education could my mother and father give me? I had to take care of my brothers and sisters and also my grandparents. When it was the time that my brothers and sisters were OK to help themselves a little my father went away and my grandmother got ill. I can tell you my life itself has been education, what could they have taught me at school?

13% of individuals received higher education in Kashmir and 27% in the United Kingdom. The majority (60%) had not received any higher education

Question ten requested respondents to identify their employment status in their country of origin before coming to the United Kingdom. 20% of individuals

were employed, 12% were unemployed, 44% were not seeking employment, 8% were students and 4 declined a response. Question eleven asked individuals what their occupation was in their country of origin. Of the 20% employed 40% were self employed and worked on their own subsistence plots of land, 20% were local bus drivers, 10% were teachers, 10% religious instructors in the local village Mosque, 10% factory workers and 10% mechanics respectively. The percentage of respondents employed increased on first arriving in the United Kingdom. 30% of individuals were employed on first arriving. Consequently unemployment dropped to 6%. Individuals not seeking employment remained around the same level, 44% versus 46%. 16% of the sample were students and 8% declined a response. For those individuals who found work on arriving to the United Kingdom employment centred predominantly on factory work of different types. At the time of the interview 30% of respondents were employed, 17% unemployed, 31% not seeking employment and 21% students. This data is consistent with regional averages for economically active individuals - those employed or actively seeking employment.<sup>3</sup> The regional average for Pakistani males is 73%, for females 21% and the total is 52%. The issue of unemployment proved a little sensitive. Respondents looked upon the questions with suspicion and in many cases responses had to be coaxed. Often the aims of the project were re-emphasised to regain confidence. Where information was forthcoming the high rates of unemployment were mentioned. Discussion often centred on issues of discrimination, particularly for the younger generation. It is not being suggested that discrimination does not have a bearing on the statistics, certainly this is not

being excluded. However it is possible that discrimination itself may not be the underlying factor. The level of education of Kashmiris is one other reason, especially since the last ten to twenty years has seen a dramatic increase in the need for some sort of qualification or skill to be able to hold employment. This is particularly significant in the current economic climate, which has seen a wholesale decline in manual jobs. Mr F, a respected community leader, commented: "Look there's no need just saying that it's because we are the wrong colour for this country, we had jobs when there were jobs that we were good for. The thing is that our people just haven't got the skills that are needed now and don't want to get them." The opposite view was put forward by Ms H: "I'm a solicitor and I work with these people, and I can tell you with certainty that they don't want us to succeed. You see, I expect you know, that they see us as a real threat, after all if we get the jobs where will their young folk go?"

The occupations of respondents who were employed varied considerably. To the nearest rounded figure, 40% were factory workers, 10% solicitors, 20% teachers and 10% dentists. It is important to note that it was the younger generation respondents who fell within the professional skilled category.

#### **D. Household Size and Structure**

As I discussed in chapter seven, there is a tendency for immigrant populations to settle in the central area and subsequently progress outwards to the suburbs. The intention of this group of questions was to assess the level of residential stability

of the Kashmiri community in the Bury Park area and to ascertain the extent to which the Kashmiri community settlement patterns are an indication of assimilation or lack of assimilation. Early literature on migration and settlement has addressed some of the issues of concern to the older generation. However, the literature does not sufficiently address the perceptions and choices of the younger generation who have been born and brought up in the United Kingdom. Earlier discussion and the results presented above suggest that the younger generation Kashmiris are the most upwardly mobile within their community. Investigation of settlement patterns and settlement choices can be used as an empirical measure and indication of levels of community involvement, maintenance of identity and assimilation into majority society.

Question thirty-six asked respondents if their current home was their first in this country. For 46% of individuals their current home is their first in this country but 54% have moved at least once. This shows that residential mobility is taking place within the Kashmiri community in Luton. Research show that owner occupation is prevalent amongst the Kashmiri households (question thirty-five). Only 6% were tenants, indicating a sense of permanence. Housing tenure has also changed over time. Home ownership reflects a spectrum of housing tenure suggesting that some change in housing tenure has taken place within the Kashmiri sample interviewed. We can see that 23% of individuals are now sole owners of their property, compared with only 17% previously. Joint ownership (husband and wife) is also on the increase which is perhaps an indication of

greater “Westernisation” of ownership attitudes amongst the sample. What is interesting is the high percentage of individuals living with parents and in-laws, 26% now compared with 16%. The latter figure was lower than initially expected which suggests that perhaps patterns of extended family are changing. This point was supported by interview data when Mr S pointed out that:

I would love to have my son and his family live with me but the problem is that there just isn't any space in this house. If I was in Kashmir I would have bought a plot next to my house and built him a house or just extended my house so that we could live together. In this country it is impossible to go on living together.

Mr M said: “There is no longer any space for all of us here so I thought the best thing was to look for a house close to us.” Mrs L commented: “Daughters-in-law don't want to live with us anymore. They argue and just living together in small spaces causes problems and fights so they just take off with our sons. At least they like to live close and that's something I suppose. In our time we just didn't have any choice.”

Question thirty-eight asked about the location of individuals' previous houses. Their responses showed that the majority of individuals who moved did so within the “Bury Park” area. Often individuals named roads only a few minutes away from their current residence. Question thirty-nine asked respondents for the primary reasons for moving house. The results show that individuals moved because of insufficient space to cater for their needs in their previous homes. These results are consistent with the behavioural models developed by Abu-Lughod and Foley.<sup>4</sup> They suggested a series of moves within the same area would

result during the early stages of the life-cycle to satisfy additional space requirements following the extension of family. This pattern of residential mobility is supported by the work of Rees and Ram and is supported by comments from interview data mentioned above.<sup>5</sup> Abu-Lugard and Foley have also pointed out that moves to suburban areas would take place once children had grown and income levels had been restored following both partners returning to work.<sup>6</sup> Other motives for moving were redevelopment and in one case, eviction and bad neighbours. The priority however was insufficient space. Those few individuals who had moved from other towns had done so from towns characteristically settled by minority communities and from within community areas similar to that of “Bury Park”.

Question forty asked respondents who had moved from outside of Luton why they decided to move to Luton. It is worth noting here that due to questionnaire design there was an element of duplication with question twenty-six and many of the respondents were first time residents in Luton. Thus some of the responses given were similar to those given for question twenty-six. Respondents moved to Luton for work, to join family and to marry. Those individuals who moved to Luton from other towns and cities within the United Kingdom did so primarily for economic reasons and to be closer to family already settled in Luton.

Respondents moved into their present area (question forty-one) overwhelmingly to be close to relatives and family, and bought houses using estate agents instead

of internal community links. It is interesting to note that approximately a quarter of individuals bought and sold houses between relatives, friends and someone known to the family. Individuals often commented that they bought their house from *apna bunda* (one of our own men). Contrary to extensive literature highlighting racism and prejudice within the housing market this was not evident in the experiences of the selected sample. 91% of individuals did not experience any difficulties when purchasing a house. Any problems that were experienced (question forty-four) centred on not being able to afford deposits on housing. Financial problems were overcome by borrowing money from members of the *biraderi* without interest.

Question forty-six asked respondents about future housing plans. 73% of individuals had no plans to move house. The remaining 27% planned to move house but remain within the Bury Park area (question forty-seven). They choose to remain close to local amenities, and all mentioned closeness to relatives and friends to be very important in their decisions (question forty-eight). Question forty-nine asked who individuals were planning to buy their houses from. The responses were similar to those found for question forty-two described above. Individuals were planning to buy houses from local estate agents and from friends or relatives. Often a family within the *biraderi* might outgrow their home and a smaller family known to them might want the house, as one community leader explained: “We all know who is selling and who is in need so we can tell each other. It works out a lot cheaper and is safer like this.” Ms K said: “OK so there

are big risks because not everything is signed for and things but someone will know the person and if they made any bad deals then other people would never leave them alone in this place so it is safe I suppose.”

Only 10% of individuals had any plans to move out of Luton, to London, Bradford, Birmingham (question fifty-one). The reasons given for moving out of Luton (question fifty-two) centred on better job prospects, being close to relatives and in one case for marriage. Of those planning to move whether in Luton or out of Luton 90% said that their new area would be near the city centre and only 10% said that they would live in a suburb (question fifty-three). All individuals planning to move were new and younger families. Households were splitting due to lack of space where older members of the family were staying in their house whilst the younger members were planning to move to a new house. It is interesting to note that although younger families were moving they were on the whole choosing to remain within the community area. This is further analysed below. Indeed results to question five and question fifty-five show that the average Kashmiri household comprised of 6.0 members with an average of 2.9 children. 30% of families lived as extended families.

As previously mentioned housing in the Bury Park area typically comprises terraced houses with on average three bedrooms. Household size and limited space bring into focus traditional family organisation. In the subcontinent the extended family system is prevalent with two or more family units co-existing

within the one family enclosure. Question fifty-eight asked if individuals live as an extended family. Results showed that only 30% of individuals live as an extended family in Luton. This figure is unexpectedly low since so much emphasis is placed on the system of extended family within South Asian diasporic literature. However the interview data suggests that the form of the extended family is changing and thus a new definition of “extended family” needs to be ascertained. Since 94% of respondents had relatives living within the next few streets and regarded them as being part of their “extended family”.

Comments such as those made by Mr G were common. He pointed out that:

Yes we live in an extended family but we're not all in the same house because it's not big enough...but my daughter lives next door and my son has just bought a house in the next street.

Mrs B said:

I see my daughter every day, she lives here all day, we all eat together and do things she only goes home to sleep. We wanted to buy the house next door but we didn't have the money then but we've got a house in the next street so she's close by.

The extended family continues to remain strong but appears to be taking a different form. Some individuals commented that their extended family lived in other parts of Luton and stretched as far afield as other towns in England. 89% of respondents had relatives in other parts of Luton. 29% had relatives in the South East and 44% had relatives living in other parts of the United Kingdom. These figures are supported by comments made by one community leader who said: “Are you talking about the Biraderi or the extended family? Well I suppose they

are the same. Our extended family does not have to be living in our shoes it is still there to help however far it is.”

Individuals living as an extended family suggested the benefits of this as financial, emotional, and economic support (question fifty-nine). From the results, expanding families, shortage of space and being close to relatives and facilities therefore appear to be significant factors for housing choices for the Luton Kashmiris for both generations. The Chi-square test was applied to questions forty-five and fifty-five to ascertain the statistical significance of the above factors and generational significance in Kashmiri housing choices. Results are presented below.

The existing models of mobility indicate that movement of households would be expected to occur outwards from the central segregated area as greater inter-group mixing takes place over time. The results of this study are not consistent with the established models and suggest that despite expanding generations, large proportions of intra-area movement has taken place. This pattern in Luton is similar to that found by Kearsley and Srivastava in their studies on the Asian community in Glasgow.<sup>7</sup> They found that many shorter moves, most of which involve a short distance of no more than a few streets, seem to represent an adjustment within an area of adequate utility in order to optimise accommodation rather than location. It can therefore be concluded that there is some mobility of

households within Luton involving invasion, succession and filtering, produced by a combination of factors, but movement out of the area is not occurring.

Research suggests that on the whole there appears to be a high level of satisfaction amongst households in terms of their house and neighbourhood as is evidenced by individuals' movement within the area rather than outwards, or in a few cases to other similar areas. This high level of satisfaction with the individual's existing environment was also found by Boales, McCluskey and Sim in their study of Glasgow's ethnic minority.<sup>8</sup>

High levels of satisfaction were also indicated by younger members of the Kashmiri community. This was evidenced in interviews when they expressed a desire to continue living within the community/biraderi although they will in the future no doubt have the financial ability to move out. These sentiments are expressed by Mr F who commented: "I'm training to be a solicitor...but there's no point moving out of the area because Islam says you should use your education to help your own people and my people all live here not on New Bedford Road." Ms L said: "I could never move away from my parents and my parents would never move from here because they know everyone here. They have a better social life than me so I guess I'll have to stay here and anyway I like all the shops 'cause I don't have to go far to get anything."

Not only were most people relatively satisfied but interview data interestingly highlights a high proportion of individuals who were living on the periphery of this area and in areas such as High Town who actually expressed a desire to move back into the “Bury Park” area. This desire for centripetal movement is unexpected and contrary to the established models of mobility discussed in chapter seven. These individuals referred to problems of moving out of the community area and highlighted feelings of non-acceptance from the people in the areas in which they are living and feeling cut off from relatives and the rest of the *biraderi*. Park talks of the “marginal man”, that is, those immigrants who assimilate in the majority population, often losing contact with their “home” group without being fully accepted as members of the majority population.<sup>9</sup> It was to avoid this fate that many of the respondents were reluctant to leave “Bury Park” and its environs.

#### **E. Maintenance of links with Community in Kashmir**

Patterns of settlement and the consequent formation of community and political organisation have contributed to the maintenance of social, cultural, political and economic ties within the locality but also with Azad Kashmir. The effect of this on the migrants here is that there is emotional pressure for the maintenance of culture and religion and non-conformation to the white majority culture. Community and political organisations provide the facility for maintaining and strengthening community and political identity. Identity is also maintained and reinforced through the maintenance of links with Azad Kashmir.

This set of questions was asked to ascertain the extent of involvement of individuals within community and political organisations in Luton with individuals in Azad Kashmir. Research suggests that identity is maintained through membership of community and political organisations, extended visits for education or marriage, permanent visits, short visits, contact with extended family and investment in Azad Kashmir.

36% of respondents said that they were members of a political group. A similar number said that they were members of community organisations. These results do not suggest high involvement in political or community organisations. However, during interviews there was considerable reluctance to answer this question. Reasons for not disclosing information are exemplified in comments made during and after the interview. One young man said: "You really don't think that I can tell you if I'm part of any political organisation do you? It's bad enough trying to get a job in this place. If people find out that I am part of this or that then that's it. You should know what it's like." Female respondents in particular mentioned that these were sensitive areas in the family. Ms B said:

Well I can tell you that I am part of a community organisation but please don't write it down because there is no need for anyone to find out at all. I'm not really scared but it's just that my family think that other people will talk. You know they think like well Auntie will say this and that - that she's always out and about and that sort of thing.

Ms B's sister said: "Look, it's not that they think we shouldn't be joining things or anything but it's just that it means that we are out and people will talk. It's OK if

they are women's things, that's always OK and if they know it's round someone's house or something like that.”

Questions seventeen and twenty asked respondents to name these organisations. In most cases respondents were reluctant to name them, particularly the political organisations. Organisations that were referenced were the JKLF, Hizb-ul-Tahrir, Tablig-I-Jamat and Young British Muslims. Community organisations referenced were the Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association. There were also several local women's organisations.

Question eighteen and twenty-one asked respondents the purpose of these organisations. Responses varied according to the particular organisation. Local political and community organisations and their functions have already been discussed. Responses to question eighteen and twenty-one reflected these functions. Also that records of community and political organisations show high levels of membership and involvement. Further, despite low levels of involvement indicated by results from the biographical questionnaire, all respondents were passionate and enthusiastic about political/territorial questions as reflected by responses to the ISA instrument.

Question sixty asked respondents if they or anyone in their family had made extended visits to Azad Kashmir for education. Results show that only 4% of individuals have made extended visits back to Azad Kashmir for educational

purposes. This figure was unexpectedly low considering that in interviews many individuals referred to members of family or people that they knew were going back for extended educational visits. Mr K, a community leader, succinctly alluded to this process when he said: “Lots of people especially parents who have young daughters send them back to Azad Kashmir because there are better influences for their growing up there. If and when they come back they tend to have learnt how to respect their elders and tend to be better behaved. I think it is very good for the system.”

Individuals said that they sent children back to achieve a better standard of education. Here 'standard' was being seen as education in the values and morality of their culture which it was felt was lacking in this country. Mrs H pointed out that:

You just have to compare the children here to the children there to understand which ones have better respect and care about the *izzat* of their families. Children here these days just don't care and well I will send all my daughters back so that they grow up having good influences in their lives and so that they don't start acting like these white girls going out with boys and doing sex and all that.

The percentage of individuals returning for marriage was higher. 30% of individuals said that they or a member of the household had made extended visits back to Azad Kashmir for marriage. It is perhaps important to indicate that the question asked about extended visits for marriage rather than simply visits back for marriage. This may be one reason for the small percentage. Time constraints mean that on the whole individuals are unable to spend long periods of time back

in Azad Kashmir. Interviews suggested that shorter visits, often two or three over a number of years for marriage, were more common than extended visits. Reasons for returning to Azad Kashmir for a marriage partner were extensive and varied. Ms D said: "My parents want me to have a husband from back home 'cause they think that he will be more respectful and look after me better but they only see those bad boys on the streets. I don't mind 'cause my husband is OK." One concerned parent pointed out that: "It's really important for their future children to have at least one parent who knows about our culture. The children here have a bit of everything in them and they don't know who they are so how will they tell their children about who they should be." Mrs G: said that: I prefer a daughter in law from my home because she will look after me better because she will be blood and not a *gar* (foreign)."

89% of respondents had relatives back in Azad Kashmir and 94% own land in Azad Kashmir. Only 27% owned this land before moving to the United Kingdom which indicates that most of them have bought the land since moving to the United Kingdom. 83% of individuals hold investments in the United Kingdom.

Discussions during interviews show that 77% of respondents make a trip back to Azad Kashmir once every five years usually to monitor investments, to keep in close touch with relatives or attend weddings and funerals. These results do not support the view that international commuting has been reduced as a consequence of changing economic climate in the United Kingdom. Interviews suggest that

individuals do not intend to make a permanent move back to their country of origin but continue to own land and property there.

The results suggest that cash remittances continue to be important. 90% of respondents indicated that they continue to send money back to relatives in Azad Kashmir and only 11% of respondents expected returns on their “investment” It is interesting to note that these returns were not seen as material returns as Mr Y pointed out, “I’ve always sent money back home since I’ve been in this place. My mother is there you see. I don’t want anything from her or any of the family but know that they respect me for looking after them and one day they will look after me inshahallah.” Mr T said: “I must send something back to them. It is my *farz* (duty) to do this. The only thing they can give me back is good *duwa* (prayers).”

### **III. INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF DATA**

The results above have alluded to Kashmiri housing choices. It has been stated that limited outward movement is taking place for both the older and younger generation. It appears that for the majority of respondents the segregated community remains fundamentally important. Since respondents placed a high level of importance on being close to relatives, community, Mosques and community centres, they choose to remain concentrated within the central area. Therefore the research suggests that the desire to live in “Bury Park” area of Luton is related to the high value attached to community life and identity for older and younger individuals.

What is not clear from the results, however, is whether the similarity between choices amongst the older and younger generation is statistically significant. To identify if this association is statistically significant the inferential statistic of Chi-Square was employed. This method of statistical analysis was used to look at the significance of the relationships between a number of variables for older and younger generation Kashmiri respondents in Luton. The tables below summarise the data showing associations and significance for questions forty-five and fifty-five.<sup>10</sup>

**Table 10.1 Chi-square values for question forty-five**

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Calculated Chi-Square value</u>
Importance of closeness to own society	0.07
Importance of closeness to schools with Kashmiri/Muslim children	3.58
Closeness to relatives	1.96
Closeness to Asian shops	0.39
Closeness to services such as mosques and community centres	0.77

**Table 10. 2 Chi-Square values for question fifty-five**

<b><u>Variable</u></b>	<b><u>Calculated chi-square value</u></b>
Importance of closeness to own society	0.18
Importance of closeness to schools with Kashmiri/Muslim children	1.31
Closeness to relatives	1.54
Closeness to Asian shops	0.30
Closeness to services such as mosques and community centres	2.24

The null hypothesis tested was that the above factors are important to older and younger generation. Table 10.1 shows that that the chi-square value (question forty-five) is lower than the critical value for Chi-Square at a significance level of 0.05 which is 3.84 (see Appendix 10.1). Therefore we cannot reject the null hypothesis that being close to own society, importance of schools with Kashmiri/Muslim children being close to relatives, being close to Asian shops and being close to services such as Mosques and community centres are important to the Kashmiri respondents of both generations.

The importance of amenities is the focal point of all discussions of models of residential mobility with increasing mobility away from the centre of the city linked to a proportional decline in the number of services available. As discussed earlier Luton Kashmiris are self-sufficient in terms of amenities. This factor

restricts movement away from the community centre into areas which do not offer such services and further forms a fundamental attracting force into the area i.e. institutional completeness which is an important factor in restricting assimilation.<sup>11</sup>

Question fifty-four asked the same questions as question fifty-five but to those individuals who were thinking of moving house. The intention was to ascertain if they placed a different emphasis on the above factors to those individuals settled and not planning to move. The null hypothesis tested was that there is no difference between individuals planning to move house and those settled with respect to the above mentioned factors.

Table 10.2 above gives the Chi-Square values. These were lower than the critical values for Chi-Square, (which at a significance level of 0.05 is 3.84. See Appendix 10.2) for all the variables. Therefore we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is any difference between respondents wishing to move house and those settled in Bury Park area in terms of importance of being close to own society.

Results appear to be consistent with the findings of Kearsely and Srivastava their study of the spatial evolution of Glasgow's Asian community.<sup>12</sup> They found that the most often quoted factor was the desirability of being in close physical proximity to member's of one's own society. In fact 30% quoted this as their main

reason for choosing their particular location, while a further 10% indicated closeness to relatives as being important to them. Although their study involved the Asian community as a whole this trend of strong preference for a self-segregated way of life appears to apply to the Kashmiris in Luton.

#### **IV. CONCLUSION**

Results suggest that migration of Kashmiris to Luton reflects the general patterns of South Asian patterns of migration to Britain. It also appears that chain migration and sponsorship played an important part in the migratory process and the role of the biraderi was an important aspect of this. In the early days of migration this acted as a support network for the Kashmiris in Luton. The pattern of settlement has contributed to the maintenance of social, cultural, political and economic ties within the locality. Research suggests that in general Kashmiris choose to remain segregated within the “Bury Park” area because of the importance they place on being close to own society, appropriate facilities and closeness to relatives. Significantly this appears to be the case for the younger generation even though some have the potential to move out of the community area. Any mobility of households that is taking place occurs within the community area. The extended family no longer means living in the same house. Since houses are too small to accommodate the expanding generations, families are buying houses next door or a few streets away. This has the effect of not only continuing the extended family as a form of community organisation but also further strengthens the community networks over an increasingly larger and

integral geographical area. This is furthered through membership of and affiliation with Kashmiri community and political organisations, which provide the space for the maintenance of identity. Social, cultural and political ties with the subcontinent have also preserved a strong sense of identity.

Identity is also maintained and reinforced by frequent visits back to Azad Kashmir and the choosing of marriage partners from Azad Kashmir. These collectively provide the emotional pressure and incentive for the maintenance of culture and religion and non-conformation to the white majority culture. The next chapter presents a global comparison between Kashmiri and Anglo-Saxon identity structures.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> See for example, Frude 1987, Dometrius, 1992.
- <sup>2</sup> See for example the work by Anwar, 1979; Shaw, 1988; Dahya, 1974 and Khan, 1974.
- <sup>3</sup> Gwilliam, 1994.
- <sup>4</sup> Abu-Lughod and Foley, 1960.
- <sup>5</sup> See Rees and Ram, 1987.
- <sup>6</sup> Abu-Lughod and Foley, 1960.
- <sup>7</sup> Kearsley and Srivastava, 1973.
- <sup>8</sup> Boales, McCluskey and Sim, 1990.
- <sup>9</sup> Park, 1950.
- <sup>10</sup> Question forty five focussed on current housing choices and question fifty four on future housing choices. Each variable of the question was treated separately for analysis. The SPSS statistical package can be used to show the degree of correlation between two or more variables. The degree of correlation is expressed as the chi-square value. A significant result indicates that there is a relationship between the row variable and the column variable. An underlying assumption for the chi-square test is that 80% of the expected frequencies should be greater than five and that none of the frequencies should be less than one.
- <sup>11</sup> Anwar, 1979
- <sup>12</sup> Kearsely and Srivastava, 1973.

## **CHAPTER ELEVEN: KASHMIRI AND ANGLO-SAXON IDENTITY**

### **COMPARED**

#### **I. INTRODUCTION**

In the preceding chapters I have shown the way in which Kashmiri identity has emerged. I have relied on information gathered from interviews to give what can be called an impressionist account of how identification with Kashmir and Kashmiris manifests itself. I listened to the tales that Kashmiri respondents told about how they construct their own identity and how these have influenced the emergence of “Kashmiriyat”. I have already mentioned the importance of the context in which identities have been formed and reformed, whether this has been the immigration policies of the British State, political developments within South Asia or social and economic structures within Luton itself.

Therefore, here I begin by examining the extent to which the context of the Kashmiris is specific to them. This requires two main lines of enquiry: a comparative analysis which I carried out with a sample from the Anglo-Saxon group and an examination of the core values and beliefs of the samples. The comparative analysis will of course be affected by which group is used to compare Kashmiris with. For example, the results would be different if I had chosen, for example, the Chinese or Indians as the control group. I am aware of the problems of using the Anglo-Saxon

group as a category. In doing this however I am keeping within the ISA tradition of using Anglo-Saxon as a descriptive category which refers to the white majority population. I would point out that the Anglo-Saxon like any other form of collective identity is internally divided along lines of religion, class gender etc.

The reason why I decided on the Anglo-Saxon group is two fold. Firstly they are not subject to racism, so that comparing ethnicised minorities with ethnically unmarked communities like the Anglo-Saxons allows one to isolate the effects of racism on identity.

Secondly as Anglo-Saxons constitute the majority of the population which is politically, economically, socially and culturally dominant many theories assume that it will be their values that will in the long term prevail over the members of the ethnicised minorities. In other words they will have a slower rate of identity transformation than ethnicised minorities because they are so embedded in the political, economic, social, and cultural context. Underlying these ideas is the view that Anglo-Saxons constitute the mathematical norm and Archimedian point by which we can compare other ethnically marked groups. For this reason then in the following section I will test my main propositions by using Anglo-Saxons as a control group.

By comparing structural pressures on constructs (for the Kashmiri instruments see Appendix 4.2 and for the Anglo-Saxon instrument see Appendix 4.3) for Kashmiri and Anglo-Saxon individuals this section addresses two questions. Firstly, to what extent do these evaluative dimensions of Kashmiri identity compare with ideologies as represented in Anglo-Saxon evaluative dimensions of identity? Secondly, how do different value systems meet in the minds of young Kashmiri people. In other words I am asking to what extent pioneer settlers transmit cultural values to their descendants. The format I will follow is that I will first present my findings, and then discuss some of the main points that arise from the findings.

In this chapter I want to investigate whether the “impressionistic” accounts correspond with notions of identity produced by ISA. My aim is to use ISA to give depth to the open interviews I conducted and at the same time to use the interviews as ways of enriching the ISA findings. Specifically the objective of this chapter is twofold, firstly to present an overall picture for the different value and belief systems of the Kashmiri and Anglo-Saxon sample and secondly to present differences in the value and belief systems between younger and older Kashmiri men and women. To this end I use the ISA global indices of identity diffusion and self-esteem and the particular indices of empathetic identification, contra-identification and identification conflicts with specific people to obtain a comparative perspective on Kashmiri and Anglo-Saxon identity.

## **II. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN KASHMIRIS AND ANGLO-SAXONS**

In this section I use the ISA global indices of current and past identity diffusion and current and past self-evaluation to highlight overall comparisons between the Kashmiri and Anglo-Saxon samples. Selected target entities are used in conjunction with the ISA indices of empathetic identification and contra-identification to ascertain patterns of intra- and inter-ethnic identification conflicts. By investigating conflicts in identification, different identity states can be conceptualised.

Weinreich has used the term identity diffusion to describe the identity state where the individual has conflicted identifications dispersed across several significant others.<sup>1</sup> In conjunction with the ISA indices of self-evaluation it is possible to evaluate the gross variations in identity states.

Figure 11.1 below illustrates that the scale for identity diffusion can range from individuals having high tolerance to low tolerance. Thus any identification conflicts will fall within the high range for individuals with high tolerance and within the low range for individuals with low tolerance. In other words this means that subjects with high levels of identity diffusion will have higher rates of identification conflicts. Weinreich has found that in ordinary cross-sections of most individuals the most usual identity variants are intermediate or confident.<sup>2</sup>

With self-evaluation we can see that individuals have high to negative self-evaluation. On this scale if they have low levels of self-evaluation they perceive themselves as lacking the skills to act in accordance with their values and aspirations. In this case they are unlikely to be able to resolve all their identification conflicts and they also have difficulties in forming clear-cut commitments. People with a foreclosed identity state or low levels of tolerance are likely to be more dogmatic and make undifferentiated appraisals of their social worlds. They are also likely to experience difficulties in responding to complex relationships and changed circumstances.<sup>3</sup>

#### **A. Divided Selves**

As I have mentioned, there has been a tendency in the literature on ethnic studies to pathologise the experiences of ethnically marked people. For example they are seen as suffering from cultural schizophrenia and as “stuck between two cultures”, the assumption being that members of these communities have a great deal of difficulty in narrating stories about themselves. In other words they would have high levels of conflicts over issues of identification. If this was the case then the Kashmiri sample would fall at the diffused identity state of the identity diffusion scale and this would be higher than that of the Anglo-Saxon sample. Identity diffusion falls within the moderate range for all groups. Analysis of variance found no significant difference according to ethnicity, generation or gender. There is no evidence therefore that

Kashmiris were more prone to identification conflicts than the control sample. Rather, my findings confirm Weinreich's point that individuals usually fall within the moderate range and therefore have some conflicts and are resolving others. They contradict the very popular notion that members of the ethnicised minorities are likely to experience more identification conflicts than the ethnically unmarked community. <sup>4</sup>

**Figure 11.1 ISA Classification of Identity Variants**

IDENTITY DIFFUSION			
	Diffusion variants indicating a tolerance of high levels of identification conflicts		Foreclosed variants indicating a
	High (0.40 to 1.00)	Moderate (0.20 to 0.39)	Low (0.20 to 0.39)
<b>SELF-EVALUATION</b>			
<b>Positive Variant</b>			
High	Diffuse high self-regard	Confident	Defensive high self-regard
Moderate	Diffusion	Intermediate	Defensive
Low	Crisis	Negative	Defensive negative

Negative variant  
Source: Weinreich (1992)

## **B. Ethnic Pride**

Identity diffusion is insufficient on its own for assessing individuals' adjustments. Using the ISA indices of self-evaluation can assist in a more holistic analytical impression. For instance when high self-evaluation is combined with high levels of identity diffusion the person concerned is said to be in a state of diffuse high self-regard. High self-evaluation combined with low levels of identity diffusion is said to lead to a state of defensive high self-regard. Neither state is regarded as "well adjusted". Consequently, when assessing adjustment it is necessary to consider self-evaluation along with identity diffusion.

Current self-evaluation fell within the high range for all groups. Analysis of variance revealed no significant difference by ethnicity, generation or gender. By looking at past evaluation we are able to identify changes over time. Past self-evaluation is higher for the Kashmiri sample than the older Anglo-Saxon men and women, falling within the high range for the older men and older women and within the moderate range for the younger men and women. Past self-evaluation fell within the moderate range for all Anglo-Saxon groups. Analysis of variance found an interaction effect for ethnicity by generation at a significance level of  $F=25.4728$ ;  $df=1,101$ ;  $p<0.0001$  and by ethnicity at a significance level of  $F=3.658$ ;  $df=1,101$ ;  $p<0.05$ . There were no interaction effect. A decrease in self-evaluation from the past to the present suggests that perhaps the older generation Kashmiris have experienced new and unfamiliar

encounters through migration. It further suggests that perhaps they are not gaining as much as they expected from migration. So far we have seen that in some areas there is a specific Kashmiri effect while in others the comparison between Kashmiris and Anglo-Saxons reveals no significant difference.

### **C. Betwixt and Between Two Cultures**

Writers like Lewis, Anwar and Werbner tend to imply that identification conflicts among Britain's ethnicised minorities tend to be along inter-ethnic lines. In the case of Kashmiris, for example, it would mean that any conflicts that transpire would arise out of the Kashmiris trying to adjust to living in Britain, populated by a different ethnicity. Further there is a tendency to assume that offspring born and brought up in Britain will suffer greater degrees of identification conflicts. This is because their family circumstances and their social circumstances outside the family (for example, friends and school) may be based on significantly different values and customs.

To investigate these claims it is necessary to turn to the ISA indices for empathetic identification, contra-identification and identification conflicts and carry out analysis with the selected entities (see below). It is the relationship between these indices which indicates the extent of identification conflicts. Identification conflicts occur when respondents perceive similarities with the other (empathetically identifying),

whilst simultaneously wishing to dissociate from the other (contra-identifying). It follows then that if respondents do not empathetically identify with another, there can be no conflicts in identification. Similarly, if there is no contra-identification with another there can be no conflicts in identification. Three-way analysis of variance was carried out to elucidate the patterns of “other” and “own” group identification conflicts and to identify interaction effects. As suggested earlier the highest levels of identification conflicts are likely to be inter-ethnic. Further it was assumed that the younger generation of both samples would have lower levels of identification conflicts with the “other” ethnic group. This is because this cohort would be the most immersed in the multicultural background of Luton and as such this will be the space where most forms of cross ethnic identifications are likely to occur.

Ideas of political separatism were represented by support for the JKLF and Scottish devolution. Consciousness of the political situation in Kashmir was investigated through identifications with Kashmiris in Kashmir for the Kashmiri sample and for the Anglo-Saxon group by awareness of the Kashmir situation. Identification with Islam was seen through mosques, identification with social networks through the comparable entities of *biraderi* and family networks for the Kashmiris and the Anglo-Saxon sample respectively. Finally representations of Asianess and

Englishness were seen through Asian men and women and English men and women. Results of these groupings are presented below.

#### **D. Political Separatism**

ISA results for mean empathetic identification show that empathetic identification with idea of political separatism (political entities of JKLF and Scottish devolution for the Anglo-Saxon sample) is highest for the Kashmiri respondents. Contra-identification was lowest for the older generation Kashmiri men but higher for the Kashmiri older generation women and younger generation respondents suggesting that although they identify with the idea of separatism there are certain characteristics they wish to dissociate from. Anglo-Saxon respondents had low empathetic identification with ideas of separatism suggesting that in general they do not identify with ideas of separatism. Contra-identification was also low but since it exists suggests that they wish to dissociate from ideas of separatism. Consequently, identification conflicts fall within the very high range for the Kashmiri respondents and within the low range for the Anglo-Saxon respondents. Analysis of variance revealed a significant difference with the main effect of ethnicity for empathetic identification ( $F=66.2303$ ;  $df=1,82$ ;  $p<0.0001$ ), contra-identification ( $F=11.0344$ ;  $df=1,82$ ;  $p<0.01$ ) and identification conflicts ( $F=39.6691$ ;  $df=1,82$ ;  $p<0.0001$ ). No interaction effects were revealed.

The JKLF stance for an independent Kashmiri nation state appeals to a large section of the Kashmiri community, which suggests that the JKLF's political discourse has played a large part in developing and disseminating ideas of "Kashmiriyat". It was found that older male Kashmiris were the strongest supporters of Kashmiri nationalism. Women and younger Kashmiris were less strident in their support. This may illustrate perhaps the masculinist and patriarchal nature of nationalism in general and specifically the Kashmiri nationalism articulated by the JKLF.<sup>5</sup> For Anglo-Saxons the lack of support for separatism may suggest their South Eastern English location where issues of Scottish devolution seemed at the time of the research far removed from the current scenario.

#### **E. Political Consciousness**

Mean values for the Kashmiris in occupied Kashmir and the Kashmir situation for the Anglo-Saxon sample show high levels of empathetic identification and moderate levels of contra-identification leading to very high identification conflicts for the older generation. Lower levels of empathetic identification but higher values for contra-identification suggest a desire to dissociate from the Kashmir situation for the younger generation and lead to high identification conflicts. In comparison mean values for empathetic identification show low identification with the Kashmiri situation for older generation, low contra-identification and low identification conflicts for the men and moderate identification conflicts for the women. Younger

generation Anglo-Saxon respondents have low empathetic identification, low contra-identification and low identification conflicts with the Kashmir situation. This suggests that for the older generation higher levels of empathetic identification with the Kashmiri situation are indicating a desire to dissociate from it more highly than the younger generation. Analysis of variance revealed a strong main effect of ethnicity for empathetic identification ( $F=50.1865$ ;  $df=1,99$ ;  $p<0.0001$ ), contra-identification ( $F=15.736$ ;  $df=1, 70$   $p<0.01$ ) and identification conflicts ( $F=7.9859$ ;  $df=1,70$ ;  $p<0.01$ ). Analysis of variance also revealed a main effect of generation for empathetic identification at a significance level of  $F=12.324$ ;  $df=1,99$   $p<0.01$ . No interaction effects were revealed.

Given their support for the JKLF it seems strange to report that the older cohort of Kashmiris had high levels of contra-identification with the Kashmir situation. This however becomes explicable when it is realised that they also have very strong empathetic identification. The resulting identification conflicts appear to be of distressing proportions and suggest that the helplessness and sense of disappointment over the situation in Kashmir. Thus the strong contra-identification may be the consequence of frustration rather than any wavering of allegiance to Kashmir or its people. For the younger cohort the situation is less complex. Kashmir is far away and thus their identification and plight are predictably more muted.

It was interesting to note that despite Luton being the centre of Kashmiri activism the general public remained blissfully ignorant of the Kashmiri situation. This indicates that the discourse of “Kashmiriyat” may have been successful in articulating Kashmiri nationalism among Kashmiris but it has largely failed to make the issue of Kashmiri nationhood something that transcends Luton’s ethnic enclaves. It is the case that a number of MPs (including Robin Cook in opposition) have voiced some concerns about the Kashmir situation but it is true to say, however, that Kashmiris have been unable to persuade the British Government to accept the idea in principle of a Kashmiri nation. As previous chapters have shown most political interventions on behalf of the Kashmiris tend to take the form of appeals for the ending of human rights violations rather than the ending of Kashmir’s occupation, and the satisfaction of its demand for self-determination.

#### **F. Identification with Islam**

Empathetic identification with mosques fell within the low range for all respondents. Contra-identification fell within the low range for the Kashmiris and was significantly higher for the younger generation. The picture was more complicated for the Anglo-Saxon respondents ( $F=108.1715$ ;  $df=1,177$ ;  $p<0.0001$ ) indicating a desire to dissociate from mosques. Identification conflicts with Madina Masjid was high for the Kashmiri respondents. The pattern for the Anglo-Saxon respondents was more complex. The younger generation respondents had higher identification

conflicts with mosques than the older generation men but all fell within the high range. However identification conflicts fell within the very high range for the Anglo-Saxon older generation women. Analysis of variance revealed a strong main effect of ethnicity for empathetic identification ( $F=14.1686$ ;  $df=1,77$   $p<0.0001$ ), contra-identification ( $F=108.1715$ ;  $df=1,77$ ;  $p<0.0001$  and identification conflicts ( $F=28.9839$ ;  $df=1,77$ ;  $p<0.0001$ ). The main effect of gender was also found to be significant with contra-identification ( $F=8.9295$ ;  $df=1,77$   $p<0.01$ ) and identification conflicts ( $F=6.562$ ;  $df=1, 1,77$ ;  $p<0.05$ ). No interaction effects were revealed.

One of the surprising conclusions from these findings is the way in which identification with mosques was comparatively low for both Kashmiri and Anglo-Saxon respondents. Given the recent emphasis on the assertion of Islamic identity in Britain at first sight these results would appear to contradict the impressionistic accounts of the preceding chapters. The picture however is complicated. On one hand mosques represent aspects of Muslimness (which is closely linked to Kashmiriness) and on the other Mosques represent the site of political conflicts within the community. These political conflicts (for example fundraising, choice of Imams, elections of Mosque committees) tend to undermine the status of mosques as places of religiosity. This reading is born out by the way in which the older male cohort whilst strongly identifying still do not dismiss them since many of them would be involved directly or indirectly in Mosque politics. For the younger cohort

mosques were more exclusionary because of the political conflicts and since they felt that they could not participate in these conflicts. This ambiguous attitude replays a larger tension found in most Muslim societies between Islam in its universal form and its specific institutional incarnations. So that most Muslim communities have both high veneration for Islam and Islamic motifs combined with a folk-lore tradition which is often disparaging and sarcastic about Imams and other mainly junior *Ulema*. With the contemporary reassertion of Islamic identity this tension has expanded so that with a few notable exceptions Islamists tend to be hostile to most members of the *Ulema*. Some of these tendencies can be seen in response to this entity in Luton. The politicisation of Islam often means greater critical evaluation of mosques rather than increasing subordination to mosques.

It was not surprising that Anglo-Saxons did not identify with mosques. After all they do not represent their religious institutions. Other reasons however may be at play. One explanation for this may be the popular references to Islam (see for example the recently published Islamaphobia report). Results found there was a gender effect amongst the older cohort with women strongly disassociating. This again would confirm the way in which in Luton members of the ethnically unmarked majority still continue to perceive Islam as misogynist. The younger generation also dissociates from mosques; that may be because they are more secularised.

## G. Social Networks

*Biraderi* has often been fetishized as an attribute peculiar to South Asian settlers. In these results I compare identifications with the *biraderi* for Kashmiris and with family networks for Anglo-Saxons to try and determine the role of these networks for these respondents. The results found that there was a generation divergence with identification with the *biraderi* with the older cohort falling within the high range. Empathetic identification with the *biraderi* was lower for the younger Kashmiris. Contra-identification for older Kashmiris was lower than for the younger cohort. For the Anglo-Saxon sample identification conflicts were high. Empathetic identification with family networks fell within the low range for the Anglo-Saxon respondents but was highest for older generation women. The Anglo-Saxon women perceived more similarities with the entity than the male respondents and contra-identification was low for all groups. Consequently identification conflicts fell within the moderate range. Analysis of variance revealed a significant difference with the main effect of ethnicity with empathetic identification ( $F=57.4881$ ;  $df=1,101$   $p<0.0001$ ), contra-identification ( $F=4.2144$ ;  $df=1,101$ ;  $p<0.05$ ) and identification conflicts ( $F=20.9649$ ;  $df=1,101$ ;  $p<0.0001$ ). Significant differences occurred with the main effect of generation for empathetic identification ( $F=17.4795$ ,  $df=1,101$ ;  $p<0.001$ ) and contra-identification ( $F=6.4079$ ;  $df=1,101$ ;  $p<0.05$ ) and gender for empathetic identification ( $F=0.0315$ ;  $df=1,101$ ;  $p<0.05$ ). Interaction effects were revealed for empathetic identification for ethnicity by generation ( $F=12.3496$ ;  $df=1,101$ ;  $p<0.001$ ) and

ethnicity by gender ( $F=7.0067$ ;  $df=1,101$ ;  $p<0.01$ ) and for contra-identification for ethnicity by generation ( $F=15.1703$ ;  $df=1,101$ ;  $p<0.001$ ).

These results suggest that the biraderi is more central to older Kashmiris than to the younger generation. Although the biraderi is important for younger Kashmiris they are more likely to see it as constraining than enabling. It may also point towards the fact that other networks such as neighbourhood links and the extended family are increasingly replacing biraderi relationships. Overall the results for the Anglo-Saxon group suggests that family networks do not feature very highly for Anglo-Saxon respondents and that they organise closely around the nuclear family principal.

#### **H. Asianness and Englishness**

As I have discussed previously the way in which ethnically marked communities have been categorised in Britain has changed radically in the last twenty years. Black as a catch all label gave way to Asian as a category. This bipolar scheme itself, some would argue, is in the process of breaking down with the introduction of a Muslim category. So when it comes to assessing ideas of the Kashmiri community's identification with Asian men and women the results are fairly complex. It has to be pointed out from the start that in using the category Asian I had succumbed to the charms of this bipolar division of ethnicised minorities in Britain. Therefore I assumed that the identification between Kashmiris and Asian would at some point be

isomorphic. However my respondents showed me the error of my ways since they failed to include themselves unproblematically within the category of Asian.

Analysis of variance found significant difference for identification with Asian men for the index of empathetic identification with ethnicity being at a significance level of  $F=14.1429$ ;  $df=1,101$   $p<0.001$ . Where as expected the Kashmiri men had highest identification with Asian men, Anglo-Saxon respondents contra-identification with Asian men was high and analysis of variance with the main effect of ethnicity at a significant level of  $F=13.6821$ ;  $df=1,101$ ;  $p<0.001$ . Interaction effects existed for contra-identification with ethnicity by generation at a significance level of  $F=10.0572$ ;  $df=1,101$ ;  $p<0.01$  and ethnicity by generation by gender at a small significance level of  $F=5.9321$ ;  $df=1,101$ ;  $p<0.05$ . Identification with Asian women fell within the high range for all Kashmiri respondents. They were lower for the Anglo-Saxon sample. Contra-identification was low for the younger Kashmiri men and higher for young women and the older cohort and fell within the low range. They also fell within the low range for Anglo-Saxon respondents. Analysis of variance for identifications with Asian women found significant differences with empathetic identification for the main effect of ethnicity ( $F=13.7389$ ;  $df=1,101$ ;  $p<0.001$ ) with contra-identification ( $F=15.6018$ ;  $df=1,101$ ;  $p<0.001$ ). A small interaction effect was revealed with contra-identification for ethnicity by generation ( $F=5.0270$ ;  $df=1,101$ ;  $p<0.05$ ).

Similar patterns of own group identifications were revealed for English men and women. As expected empathetic identification with English men and women were the highest for the Anglo-Saxon sample. This fell in the high range and contra-identification was low. There were some variations in identification conflicts, which fell in the moderate range for men but were higher with women. The story for the Kashmiris was more complex. Perceived similarity with English men fell within the low range for the Kashmiri respondents but was higher for the younger cohort. Identification with women was low for all respondents. Contra-identification fell within the high range for English men and was very high for women. Identification conflicts with English men and women fell within the high range for older Kashmiris but were significantly lower for younger Kashmiris. They fell within the moderate range of English women. Contra-identification and low to moderate levels of identification suggests that although young Kashmiris do not perceive high levels of similarity with English men and women they do not wish to dissociate from them to the same extent as the older cohort. Analysis of variance for identifications with English men and women respectively revealed significant difference for empathetic identification with the main effect of ethnicity ( $F=94.4701$ ;  $df=1,99$ ;  $p<0.0001$ ), ( $F=13.7389$ ;  $df= 1,99$ ;  $p<0.001$ ) and generation ( $F=13.4735$ ;  $df=1,99$ ;  $p<0.001$ ) ( $F=19.4982$ ;  $df=1,99$ ;  $p<0.0001$ ), for contra-identification with the main effect of ethnicity ( $F=58.1895$ ;  $df=1,99$ ;  $p<0.0001$ ) ( $F=56.06971$ ;  $df=1,99$ ;  $p<0.0001$ ) and

identification conflicts ( $F=12.345; df= 1,99; p<0.01$ ) ( $F=5.4931; df=1,99; p<0.05$ ). Analysis of variance revealed additional differences for generation at a significance level of  $F=22.2140; df=1,99; p<0.0001$  and for ethnicity and gender at a significance level of  $F=4.3420; df=1,99; p<0.05$ .

The results can be seen in four main ways. Firstly there is a definite age cohort effect. The results suggest that older respondents have less difficulty in identifying with Asians. Identification with Asian men and women for the older age cohort may be higher because for these individuals the reality of a unified South Asia and a unified South Asian settler presence is strongest. (For example depending on the context these individuals are more likely to use the expression of Asian being *apna*, which is not used for the white community). Secondly, despite this Kashmiri identification with Asian it is possible to see the reluctant nature of this identity by the way, in which they dissociated themselves from aspects of Asianess. This contradiction produced high levels of identification conflicts. Part of this may be explained by the perception by Kashmiris of Asian constituting the “other” group, for example Indians, Bangladeshis and Pakistani. This may also partly be because of the way in which Asianess is seen to be exclusionary of Muslims and also as a response to the way in which settler groups do not want to identify with the dominant notions of their community as being backward.

Thirdly, there was a strong ethnicity effect, which demonstrated the salience of the Asian category for both Kashmiri and the Anglo-Saxon respondents. Clearly the idea of an Asian community has some sociological weight in that Kashmiris continue to identify with Asian despite variations in identifications. Not surprisingly the Kashmiris had low levels of identification with English men and women. Even though there was among the younger cohort greater willingness to identify with Englishness it was still within very low parameters. This would suggest that the attempt to articulate Englishness in a multicultural environment has a long way to go. It would have been interesting if instead of Englishness the representation had been Britishness which might have generated more specific data to indicate the emergence of an enculturated identity under the label of Britishness. In other words would a British Kashmiri be less of an oxymoron than an English Kashmiri?

The purpose of these global comparisons between Kashmiris and the Anglo-Saxons was to examine the salience of the inter-ethnic frontier as a source of identification conflicts. What is clear from the above findings is that the division is for the purposes of understanding identification conflicts and that these do not necessarily arise from the situation in which you have ethnically marked minorities living in an enclave in a larger ethnically unmarked society. It is the case that most of these identification conflicts tend to be intra-ethnic. If this were truly the case then it would be difficult to imagine the existence of any unity that could be meaningfully

called a community. What the global comparisons thus far show is that each group had high levels of identification with the peoples and institutions that represent their “sense of community”. Identification conflicts arise from a variety of contextual causes which are intra or inter-ethnic and which reflect specific political, economic, social and cultural concerns. As I have discussed previously within ISA identification conflicts are seen as the norm and all well-adjusted people have them in moderation. What is important is how they are distributed which is what this section has shown. In the next section my focus will be on the core dimensions of the respondents’ identities. In other words I will be looking at the basic value systems around which respondents construct their identities.

### **III. FUNDAMENTAL BELIEFS AND VALUES OF KASHMIRI AND ANGLO-SAXON IDENTITY**

This section presents data in relation to the core evaluative dimensions of identity for the Kashmiri sample and the Anglo-Saxon sample. The aim is to present an overall picture of the different value and belief systems of the two. The results are also presented with emphasis on comparison between generation and gender. It has already been suggested that central features of Kashmiri identity centred on principal values and beliefs embedded in cultural, religious and nationalistic aspects of Kashmiri life. By comparing structural pressures on constructs for Kashmiri and Anglo-Saxon individuals this section addresses two questions. Firstly, to what extent

do these evaluative dimensions of identity compare with ideologies as represented in Anglo-Saxon evaluative dimensions of identity? Secondly how do different value systems meet in the minds of young people. In other words I am asking to what extent pioneer settlers transmit cultural values to their descendants.

### **A. The Place of Language**

Construct five (speaks traditional language because believes it is a valuable part of one's heritage/speaks traditional language only because of pressure from family/*biraderi*) highlighted the extent to which individuals saw language to be a valuable part of heritage or to what extent they considered it to be simply an attribute signifying local pressures and constraints. Results show the extent to which language played a role as a core evaluative dimension of identity. Most Kashmiris saw language as a valuable part of their heritage that is, (88% (Net SP=47.63) of older men, 95% (Net SP=52.01) of older women, 70% (Net SP=20.61) younger men and 74% (Net SP=50.57) of younger women. It was a secondary dimension of identity for the older Anglo-Saxon cohort and a core evaluative dimension for the younger members of the Anglo-Saxon sample. (Structural pressures showed 50% (Net SP=37.86) older Anglo-Saxon men, 73% (Net SP=48.43) older Anglo-Saxon women, all Anglo-Saxon younger men (Net SP= 59.42) 80% (Net SP=60.37) Anglo-Saxon younger women).

We can see from the results that for the Kashmiri community speaking traditional language was an important marker of collective identity. There was a generation effect with the structural pressures being lowest for younger Kashmiri men not seeing traditional language as a major dimension of ethnic identity. Again not surprisingly the Anglo-Saxon sample did not see language as a major core indicator of identity. This can be explained perhaps by the way in which English is not seen in Britain as an ethnically marked language. As such its ability to bound a specific ethnic community is muted.

Pole one of construct four (speaks English only because it is necessary for employment and living in the UK/speaks English to become integrated into English society) was used to identify whether English is seen as either a resource for economic well being or as a means of assimilation and integration into British life. In the first position English is purely instrumental and opportunistic whilst the second position suggests that English is worth learning for reasons other than economic well being. Results for this construct support the results presented above. It would follow that if so many of the Kashmiris placed a high value on speaking traditional language then they would not see English as a substitute. In accordance with this a considerable majority of the Kashmiri respondents saw English as a resource (94% (Net SP =47.10) older men, 95% (Net SP =52.01) older women, 70% (Net SP=20.61) younger men and 74% (Net SP=50.57) younger females), whilst the

Anglo-Saxon sample saw it as necessary to be part of English society. (87% (Net SP =62.84) Anglo-Saxon older men, 93% (Net SP=50.95) Anglo-Saxon older women, 86% (Net SP=52.83) Anglo Saxon younger men, 90% (Net SP= 65.40) Anglo-Saxon younger women).

### **B. Marriage**

A majority of Kashmiris believed that Kashmiris should be able to marry non-Kashmiris 61% (Net SP= 19.00) of older men, 63% (Net 60% (Net SP=39.72) of younger males and 78% (Net SP=46.32) younger women). Structural pressures indicate stress for 63% Kashmiri older women (SP=-7.04). For the remainder of individuals this option was a secondary evaluative dimension of identity (75% (Net SP=24.61) Anglo-Saxon older men, 60% (Net SP=43.68) Anglo-Saxon older women, 71% (Net SP=52.30) Anglo-Saxon younger men and 90% (Net SP=45.97) Anglo-Saxon younger women).

One has to be careful here because exogamy was defined in terms of non-Kashmiris and did not mean non-Muslim. Thus it could be justified in purely Islamic terms, which encourages marriages in relation to other Muslims. Certainly for the Kashmiri sample marriage to Muslims was a core evaluative dimension of identity. The majority of Kashmiris felt that Muslims should only marry a Muslim rather than being able to marry non-Muslims (construct fourteen). (88% (Net SP=82.01) of older

men, all older women (Net SP=78.15), 70% younger men (Net SP=55.85) and 74% (Net SP=58.95) of younger women).

For construct six (believes that traditional systems of arranged marriage are fundamental to being Asian/believes that in today's society it is better to have the freedom to choose one's own marriage partner) older generation Kashmiris saw pole one as a core evaluative dimension of identity (72% (Net SP=69.57) of the older men and 53% (Net SP=69.31) of older women), whilst younger generation Kashmiris and Anglo-Saxon individuals place emphasis on pole two. It is important to note however that structural pressures show that for Kashmiri younger generation men, identification with pole two is only as a secondary evaluative dimension of identity (80% (Net SP=32.27) and for Kashmiri younger women it is a conflicted or inconsistently evaluative dimension of identity (69% (Net SP=16.81). For the Anglo-Saxon individuals pole two forms a core evaluative dimension of identity (87% (Net SP=51.89) Anglo-Saxon older men, 73% (Net SP=63.56), Anglo-Saxon older women, all (Net SP=74.89) Anglo-Saxon younger men and 90% (Net SP=57.72), Anglo-Saxon younger women).

Results suggest that the relationship between Kashmiri identity and arranged marriage is not seen as being fundamental for younger Kashmiris. They, agreed with the Anglo-Saxon sample that “love marriages” i.e. marriages in which individuals

choose their own partners without assistance or interference from their parents or other family members were preferable. The older age cohort amongst the Kashmiris clearly saw arranged marriages as being as one of the core pillars of Kashmiri identity. Structural pressures above highlight that this is a complicated relationship, which would suggest that marriages provide one area where the possibility of inter-generational and intra-ethnic variations amongst the sample is high.

### **C. Moral Choices**

Structural pressures for construct seven (believes that parents and elders should be treated with special deference/feels that parents/elders should be treated as equals and should have to earn special respect) shows that Kashmiris felt that parents and elders should be treated with special respect by virtue of their role and age. The highest structural pressure for majority consensus for Kashmiris (94% (Net SP=82.84) of older men, 95% (Net SP=83.24) of older women, 80% (Net SP=50.00) of younger men and 61% (Net SP=75.19) of younger women).

In contrast Anglo-Saxon respondents seem to feel that parents and elders had no intrinsic role and that they should be treated as peers. Structural pressures show that this forms a core evaluative dimension of identity for Anglo-Saxon older women (Net SP=68.68), and the younger Anglo-Saxon cohort (younger women 50% (Net SP=81.38) younger men 86% Net SP=65.13). The indifference towards this construct

is further highlighted by the fact that the older Anglo-Saxon men see this only as a secondary evaluative dimension of identity. (75% (Net SP=42.55).

Structural pressures on construct nine (believes and respects *izzat* (honour)/thinks that doing the right thing according to one's own sense of morality is more important than *izzat* (honour) show differing value and belief systems. Kashmiri individuals see pole one as important (88% for older men (Net SP=87.11), all older women (Net SP=86.30), 80% of younger men (Net SP=42.49) and 74% (Net SP=68.08) of younger women) although the structural pressures were lower for the younger generation. Pole two was important for Anglo-Saxon individuals. Structural pressures show that it forms a secondary evaluative dimension of identity for 75% (Net SP=42.55) of older men but a core evaluative dimension of identity for 73% (Net SP=68.68) older women), 86% (Net SP=65.13) younger men and 50% (Net SP=81.38) younger women.

#### **D. Cultural Belonging**

Structural pressures for construct ten show that the Kashmiri older cohort felt deeply committed to the system of *biraderi* (67% (Net SP=73.33) older men and 58% (Net SP=74.49) older women). Younger Kashmiris (70% (Net SP=24.74) 65% of young Kashmiri women (Net SP=14.88) and Anglo-Saxon individuals believed in the freedom for individuals to follow their own independent life. 87%((Net SP=41d5)

Anglo-Saxon older men, 87% (Net SP=50.88) Anglo-Saxon older women, 57% (Net SP=60.29) Anglo-Saxon younger men and 50% (Net SP=64.47) Anglo-Saxon younger women). Pole two was however a conflicted or inconsistent dimension of identity for Kashmiri younger generation whilst Anglo-Saxon older generation men see it as a secondary evaluative dimension of identity and other Anglo-Saxon individuals see it as a core evaluative dimension of identity.

The findings for this construct demonstrate that there are some generational differences amongst all respondents regardless of ethnic belonging. This would seem to contradict the assumptions often made that members of Britain's South Asian communities are less individualistic and more collectivist than the members of the dominant ethnicity (I will discuss this assumption in greater detail in the last chapter of this thesis).

The younger Kashmiris clearly thought that the ability of individuals to project their destiny into the future was a crucial aspect of their identity. They believed that individuals should be able to exercise their independence in the pursuit of life and happiness. Despite the emphasis on individual freedom the younger cohort among the Kashmiri sample expressed high levels of inconsistency in expressing this preference for individualism. This suggests that they are not necessarily removing themselves from the idea of *biraderi* in favour of individual freedom but that this is

an inconsistent dimension of their identity. When net structural pressures on constructs are low or negative the construct cannot be regarded as providing dependable criteria by which the individual may evaluate self and others. In other words this is an area of stress.

Rather than projecting traditional ideas of inter-generational conflict this stress may be more to do with the relative lack of confidence that this cohort has about what is actually involved in being Kashmiri. They may see the dominant ethnically unmarked group perceiving these as their own and intrinsically linking them to their own history therefore internalising ownership. In other words the Kashmiris may see individualism as a trait specific to the dominant Anglo-Saxon society rather than something that is universal to all human beings. Therefore their support for this trait may be seen to be subversive of their community's identity.

#### **E. Notions of “Britishness”**

Older generation Kashmiris favoured pole two of construct seventeen stating that they would feel happier with Kashmiri nationality (78% older men (Net SP=48.39; 84% older women (Net SP=44.56) whilst the younger generation Kashmiris and Anglo-Saxon individuals emphasised that they would feel happy with British nationality although this was a secondary evaluative dimension of identity. Results show that for 60% (Net SP=40.67) young Kashmiri men, 56% (Net SP=30.90)

younger Kashmiri females, 50% (Net SP=41.47) Anglo-Saxon older men, 86% (Net SP=43.89) Anglo-Saxon older women, 86% (Net SP=37.04) Anglo-Saxon younger men and 60% (Net SP=58.02) Anglo-Saxon younger women this pole forms a secondary evaluative dimension of identity.

In the earlier section I discussed the possibility of Britishness providing a more inclusive label, better able to deal with the multicultural and multi-ethnic nature of contemporary society than the category of English. Support for this is provided by this construct, which clearly shows that the younger Kashmiris in common with the Anglo-Saxon sample were fairly happy to define themselves as British. It should be pointed out however that the fact that this was a secondary evaluative dimension of identity indicates that this aspect of identity is volatile and subject to changes. What is interesting is that this appears to be the case for younger Kashmiris and the Anglo-Saxon sample indicating some overall unhappiness with what actually constitutes Britishness. The older Kashmiris consider themselves to be Kashmiris rather than British.

This point is supported by looking at structural pressures for the Kashmiri samples on construct nineteen (feels more at home in Kashmir/feels more at home in Britain). 67% (Net SP= 45.14) of older Kashmiri men and 58% (Net SP= 52.12) older Kashmiri women emphasised pole one. The younger generation place emphasis on

pole two but feeling at home in Luton is only a secondary dimension of identity for 69% (Net SP=37.50) of younger Kashmiri women and 70% (Net SP=45.96) younger Kashmiri men. 62% (Net SP=52.82) of older Anglo-Saxon men and 40% (Net SP=40.86) of younger Anglo-Saxon women felt at home in Britain. For 53% (Net SP=-2.09), older Anglo-Saxon women and 86% (Net SP=-1.30) younger Anglo-Saxon men this pole was an inconsistent evaluative dimension of identity.

Pole one of construct twenty (wants the younger generation to think of Kashmir as their homeland/believes that the younger generation should think of Britain as their homeland) was a core evaluative dimension of identity for 88% (Net SP=55.34) of older men, 89% (Net SP=56.80) of older women, 50% of younger men (Net SP=40.05) and 52% (Net SP= 50.03) of younger women. Results for the Anglo-Saxon respondents show that 25 % (Net SP=51.38) older men, 40% (SP=38.38) older women, 57% (Net Sp=48.21) younger women and 20% (SP=63.28). It is interesting that although for about half of the older cohort Kashmiriness was far more salient than Britishness in furnishing the core of their identity when the younger generation project themselves into the future a Kashmiri homeland is also important.<sup>6</sup>

## **F. An Independent Homeland**

The feeling that Kashmir should be united and independent of both Pakistan and India as opposed to a Kashmir which is part of Pakistan (construct eight) was valued by 67% (Net SP=62.32) older men 47% (Net SP=62.15) of older women, 70% (Net SP=29.86) of younger men and 61% (Net SP=39.34) of younger women. Results show that as with the Kashmiri individuals the Anglo-Saxon older men also placed emphasis on pole one. However structural pressures indicate that this is an inconsistent evaluative dimension of identity and is unreliable since it is likely to change (37% (Net SP=19.30) Anglo-Saxon older men). Other Anglo-Saxon individuals favoured pole two but low structural pressures indicate further inconsistencies (33% (Net SP=16.12) Anglo-Saxon older women, 57% (Net SP=14.26) Anglo-Saxon younger men and 40% (Net SP=8.95, Anglo-Saxon younger women).

These results are consistent with those presented in the preceding chapters where I have suggested the centrality of ideas of independence for Kashmiris. It is obvious that the Anglo-Saxon group interviewed in Luton do not identify with the political situation in Kashmir. This is not surprising since it is poorly publicised in the news and media, which would be their first point of contact with events in the subcontinent.<sup>7</sup>

#### IV. CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have done two things: I have compared my Kashmiri sample with the Anglo-Saxon control group using selected entities and ISA indices, and I have tried to show structural pressures on target constructs to identify the value and belief systems of the Kashmiri and Anglo-Saxon individuals interviewed. While my emphasis has been mainly on the Kashmiri experience it should be pointed out that there were a number of interesting findings regarding the Anglo-Saxon sample, for example the relationship between British and European identity.<sup>8</sup> To what extent has ISA helped to deepen the accounts that I gathered from my open-ended interviews?

What was interesting to me is how many of the topics that came through almost informal discussions with respondents, using observer-participant techniques, are reflected in the more structured responses to the ISA instruments. What ISA helps to do in the first place is to demonstrate that my interviews were not just idiosyncratic. The opinions that my respondents expressed were somehow representative. This, however, is not the only or main contribution ISA made to my analysis. Far more important is the way in which ISA provided a theoretically rigorous and conceptually rich language for describing the “Kashmiri experience”. The field of ethnic studies (especially studies looking at South Asian experience) has been framed within epistemology which carries with it traces of Orientalism. As such it is very difficult to find a conceptual language that is adequate to the experience of immigration and

settlement and not tainted by the Orientalist paradigm. ISA provided a schema which was not (as) beholden to Orientalism and which was also capable doing comparative research.

The picture that emerges from the above ISA generated accounts of Kashmiris in Luton, are certainly far more complex than most conventional studies. This can be seen in the way which the Kashmiris are often contrasted with the host community in terms of the tradition/modern distinction. The argument is that since Kashmiris are from a traditional culture they are embedded within values and beliefs, which are in conflict with the modern world. Thus, the Kashmiris would be considered to be representatives of a world view that would emphasis collective endeavour over individualism, rural lifestyles over urban and so forth. My findings however do not support such a clear-cut division. What the ISA generated data demonstrates emphatically is that this “tradition Vs modern” framework is inadequate to the situation in Luton, and as such, it reflects the genre of writing of immigrant studies rather the complex realities found among the Kashmiris.<sup>9</sup>

My findings point more towards a process of enculturation taking place rather than de-traditionalisation of Kashmiri society. In other words many practices and rituals, values and beliefs that were considered to be primordial and uncontested, have become open to question and redefinition. This, however, does not necessarily imply

Anglicisation. My sample suggests that they want to be Kashmiris in a different context rather than abandoning “Kashmiriyat”. Even the younger cohort wants to redefine its identity in terms of being modern Kashmiris rather than modern Britons. The continued importance of “Kashmiriyat” suggests that we may need a new vocabulary to describe dislocated ethnic community in the age of globalisation. As I noted earlier the Kashmiris have not been successful in establishing their nation state but as many of my ISA findings show there is a strong case to be made that they have been successful in forging a diaspora.

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Weinreich, 1989 points out that this is the equivalent to Erickson's 1965 and 1968 clinically described identity state. He highlights that individuals who exhibit minimal levels of identification conflict do not in practice acknowledge ordinary differentiations between good and bad characteristics, nor recognise that they are often to be found in both oneself and in others. This state of defensive denial is regarded as the analytical equivalent of identity foreclosure as described by Erikson. In between these two extremes and for psychologically well adjusted people moderate and quite usual levels of identity conflicts are expected to exist. Since individuals may settle for a balance in identity conflicts rather than a total resolution of conflicts through resolving some identity conflicts with people and reassessing relationships with others.

<sup>2</sup> See Weinreich, 1989, p. 54.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Weinreich's Bristol Study demonstrated this point. See Weinreich, 1979. Weinreich points out that comparing current identity diffusion and past identity diffusion may give indications of resolutions in identification conflicts. For my sample past identity diffusion also fell within the moderate range for all groups and analysis of variance revealed no significant difference by ethnicity, generation or gender and consequently there were no interaction effects.

<sup>5</sup> See Anthais and Yuval Davis on patriarchy, 1992.

<sup>6</sup> Areas of stress did occur for a minority of Anglo-Saxon individuals and centred pole one of construct nine (believes and respects family honour above all else/thinks that doing the right thing according to one's own morality is more important than family honour) for 25% (Net SP=-13.27) of older men, 7% (Net SP=15.33) of older women and, 14% (Net SP=-3.70) of younger men. Pole two of construct thirteen (enjoys spending leisure time with women/prefers to mix with women only at work or at school/college or university) was problematic for 12% (Net SP=-33.58) of older men and pole one of construct ten for 28% (Net SP=12.32) of younger men. Pole two of construct sixteen (is/are strongly British and would be happy anywhere in Britain/is/are British but feel a strong attachment to Luton) caused stress for 12% (Net SP=17.69) of older men and 20% (Net SP=-14.99) of younger women. Also pole two of construct seventeen (feels happy with British nationality/would feel happier with European nationality) proved to be a non evaluative dimension of identity for 37% (Net SP=28.14) older men and 14% (Net SP=-21.90) of younger men. From the results above there appears to be apparent separation of values and beliefs between the older generation Kashmiris and the Anglo-Saxon individuals. In all cases inconsistent evaluative dimensions of identity occurred by values by respect of parents, respect of *izzat* (or honour), marriage to Muslims remains a core evaluative dimensions of younger generation Kashmiri identity suggesting that it is within these areas that enculturation may currently be strongest.

<sup>7</sup> Inconsistencies between evaluative connotations of cognitions and overall evaluations of self and others are represented by low or negative structural pressures on constructs. Cognitive-affective incompatibilities are seen as areas of conflict or stress. In these cases constructs cannot be used as dependable measures of an individuals evaluations. Results show that most areas of stress occurred for individuals who had a minority view. 28% (Net SP=-10.14) older men and 47% (Net SP=-18.47) older women placed emphasis on pole two of construct six. Net structural pressures show inconsistencies in evaluations and suggest that the idea that individuals should have the freedom to choose their own marriage partner is problematic for some older generation Kashmiris. Further 33% (Net SP=-13.84) older men and 42% (Net SP=-7.37) older women have conflicted evaluative dimensions of identity with pole two of construct nineteen (feel/s more at home in Britain). For 10% (Net SP= -23.72) of younger men pole two of construct nine is causing stress. It is important to note that two individuals did not respond to this construct which is an indication of possible conflict. Pole two of construct seventeen (would feel happier with Kashmiri nationality) is problematic for 38%

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(Net SP=-19.76) of younger men. Results indicate that older generation women have the highest conflicted evaluative dimensions of identity. 37% (Net SP=-41.17) of older women have conflicted evaluations with pole two of construct ten (believes in the freedom for individuals to follow their own independent life). One individual did not respond to this construct. For 39% (Net SP= -5.68) of older women pole two of construct fifteen (would socialise with all Asians) is an arena of stress. Pole two of construct twenty (believes that the younger generation should think of Britain as their homeland) is an area of stress for 10% (Net SP=-22.54) of older women.

<sup>8</sup> Pole two of construct seventeen (feels happy with British nationality/would feel happier with European nationality) was problematic for the Anglo-Saxon respondents. The idea of European identity was an area of stress for a minority of Anglo-Saxon individuals and thus a non-evaluative dimension of Anglo-Saxon identity. For older men 3% (Net SP=28.14) and 14% (Net SP=21.90) for younger men.

<sup>9</sup> See Sayyid, 1997.

## **CHAPTER TWELVE: KASHMIRIS, KASHMIR AND “KASHMYRIAT”**

### **I. INTRODUCTION**

In the previous chapter I focused on the comparison of Kashmiri and Anglo-Saxon identity structures as a means of providing a global context to the preceding chapters. In this chapter I will be focusing on the Kashmiri sample. In particular, I will be elaborating on a set of six postulates, which were developed in order to assess the degree of identity transformation undergone by the Kashmiris in Luton. The postulates refer to aspects of Kashmiri identity which are often ethnically marked in the literature on South Asian settlers. For example, the importance of kinship networks is considered to be something specific to South Asians but also something that reflects their past origins rather than their contemporary realities. In other words, all postulates tend to refer to sets of features, which are considered to mark out South Asians as a specific ethnicised minority. What these postulates then are trying to uncover is what makes Kashmiris Kashmiri, and whether being Kashmiri in Mirpur is the same as being Kashmiri in Luton.

The format of this chapter is similar to the previous one. Under each section I present a brief description, followed by the results of ISA instruments, and conclude with a commentary. Once all the postulates have been discussed, I will reflect on the

way they have helped to answer the question of the Kashmiriness of Kashmiris and how they fit into my earlier discussions on enculturation.

## **II. POSTULATE ONE: CULTURAL NETWORKS ARE A CENTRAL COLLECTIVE DIMENSION OF KASHMIRI IDENTITY IN BRITAIN**

As I showed in earlier, “impressionistic” chapters, many respondents pointed to the significance of *biraderi* links in open interviews. Identifications with parents were also seen as important, as we know that in early life one’s parents take on the role of giving primary socialisation to a child. In Kashmiri society parents exist within the *biraderi* and are in turn influenced by it. One of the major ways in which cultural influences were felt to have an effect on Kashmiri identity development was due to the way in which Kashmiris distinguished between children born in Azad Kashmir and those born in the United Kingdom.

In the following sections I will consider the degree of involvement (ego-involvement), the extent to which role models are mentioned (idealistic identification), the extent to which they contra-identify and the extent to which identification conflicts occur with these significant others, and finally how they are evaluated. Differences between older and younger Kashmiris of both genders will be discussed if and where they arise.

### **A. Identifications with the *Biraderi***

The findings suggest that the institution of *biraderi* is a significant marker of Kashmiri identity. Mean values for the older generation current empathetic identification with the institution of Kashmiri *biraderi* falls within the high range whilst those for the younger generation with the Kashmiri *biraderi* falls just above the low range suggesting lower identification.<sup>1</sup> An analysis of variance revealed a generational difference at a significance level of  $F=48.07$ ;  $df=1,66$ ;  $p<0.0001$ . There is some variation in empathetic identification when respondents are situated in the past self, which may reveal some ongoing psychological processes. When we turn to the mean values for past empathetic identification we can note that there is no change for the older generation whose past empathetic identification also falls within the high range. However for the younger generation empathetic identification with the Kashmiri *biraderi* is higher when they are situated in the past. Analysis of variance reveals a generational difference for past empathetic identification at a significance level of  $F=39.69$ ;  $1,66$ ;  $p<0.001$ . Analysis of variance revealed no significant gender differences and no interaction effects were found. What these results show is that the younger Kashmiris are involved in an ongoing process of moving away from a close identification with the *biraderi*.

What seems puzzling, given these generational differences, is the way in which results for ego-involvement, i.e. the indices of the intensity of involvement with the

*biraderi*, did not show a difference amongst generations or indeed any gender differences. Mean values for ego-involvement show very high levels of ego-involvement with the Kashmiri *biraderi* for the older generation. One way of explaining this involvement for young Kashmiris may be to argue that they feel involved in an institute which they considered to be negative despite themselves (perhaps as a result of peer pressure). One way to find out whether the generations considered *biraderi* to be a good thing is to examine their idealistic identification with it. Mean values of idealistic identification for the older generation fall within the high range. The younger generation have significantly lower idealistic identification with the Kashmiri *biraderi*  $F=42.75$ ;  $df=1,66$ ;  $p < 0.0001$ , which suggests that the respondents see it as reflecting their own value systems?

These results indicate that while the older cohort consider *biraderi* to be a positive aspect of the Kashmiri way of life, the younger cohort, while not necessarily disagreeing with this conclusion, do not rate it as highly. If a sense of empathetic identification, ego involvement and idealistic identification is associated with a wish to dissociate i.e. contra-identify from the characteristics that make up in this case the Kashmiri *biraderi*, then conflicts in identification will ensue.

Contra-identification with the Kashmiri *biraderi* falls within the low range for the older generation. Analysis of variance highlighted higher levels of contra-

identification with the Kashmiri *biraderi* for the younger generation at a significance level of  $F=25.67$ ;  $df=1,66$ ;  $p<0.001$ . Analysis of variance revealed no gender significance and no interaction effects were found.<sup>2</sup> As expected, high levels of empathetic identification and low levels of contra-identification with the Kashmiri *biraderi* for the older generation lead to only moderate levels of identification conflicts. These findings are therefore consistent with Weinreich's suggestion that for most people identification conflicts will fall within the moderate range. These results indicate that the younger Kashmiris wish to dissociate from certain features of *biraderi* to a greater extent than the older Kashmiris. Again results appear to contradict many popular accounts, which tend to see generational conflict between ethnically marked communities as endemic. The contrast between older and younger Kashmiris is one of "generational difference" rather than "generational conflict" It appears that the younger Kashmiris are showing signs of enculturation for they do not translate their distance from the *biraderi* into the rejection of the institution.

As we have seen there is substantial evidence in support of Postulate One. However, variations in identification between older and younger generation suggest that the Kashmiri *biraderi* cannot be the only influence in the lives of the Kashmiri respondents. I have mentioned above that parents also play a central role in socialisation. I will discuss identifications with parents in the next section.

## **B. Identification with Parents**

The findings for identification with parents followed similar patterns as those for identifications with the *biraderi* outlined above, but there were some small gender differences. Current empathetic identification with parents is higher for the older generation Kashmiris and lower for the younger generation. Analysis of variance reveals a significant difference by generation  $F= 52.744$ ;  $df=1,64$ ;  $p<0.001$ . All respondents are highly ego-involved with parents.

These results indicate generational differences in empathetic identification with parents. In other words, the older Kashmiris were more likely to identify with their parents and elders than the younger Kashmiris who may show greater signs of being enculturated into the general British culture. This was further confirmed by looking at idealistic identification for which the older Kashmiris saw themselves as identifying with their parents whilst Kashmiri youngsters idealistically identified to a lesser extent. Analysis of variance revealed a significant difference by generation  $F=33.823$ ;  $df=1,64$ ;  $p<0.0001$ . Analysis of variance also revealed a small gender significance. Male respondents have significantly higher idealistic identification with parents  $F=33.823$ ;  $df=1,64$ ;  $p<0.0001$ . Contra-identification with parents is low for the older generation respondents but higher for the younger generation. Analysis of variance revealed a generational significance  $F=19.952$ ;  $df=1,64$ ;  $p<0.0001$ . Identification conflicts fell within the moderate range. This once again demonstrates

Weinreich's point that there is a general tendency towards achieving an optimal solution to attempts to resolve identification conflicts. Analysis of variance revealed no significant difference by generation or gender.

### **C. Imagining a Virtual Kashmir**

These results demonstrate the extent to which the idea of the Kashmiri diaspora is manifested in everyday identifications with Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir. The results showed again a significant generational difference between older and younger Kashmiris. Even though both sets empathetically recognised their association with Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir, this empathetic identification was greater for older Kashmiris who probably have direct relatives and memories of those associations. Analysis of variance revealed a significant generational difference of  $F=49.756$   $df=1,64$ ;  $p<0.0001$  (Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir) and  $F=64.374$ ;  $df=1,64$ ;  $p<0.0001$ . This result was further corroborated by the indices of ego-involvement and idealistic identification which both showed high values. While it is the case that this identification was lower for the younger Kashmiris it was still within the high range. Analysis of variance revealed a generational difference of  $F=47.939$ ;  $df=1,64$ ;  $p<0.0001$ . No gender significance was found and no interaction effects were revealed. The younger generation Kashmiri respondents have highest levels of contra-identification with Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir while contra-identification was low for the older Kashmiris. Analysis of variance found this difference to be

very significant  $F=27.214$ ;  $df=1,64$ ;  $p<0.0001$ .<sup>3</sup> Overall evaluation of Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir fell within the high range for the older generation whilst overall evaluation by the younger generation within the low range. A generational difference occurred at a significance level of  $F=36.977$ ;  $df=1,64$ ;  $p<0.0001$ .

The importance of these results is that it seems that direct familial links and knowledge between Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir and Kashmiris in Luton is very significant in giving rise to the idea of a Kashmiri diaspora. It would be wrong to read the generational difference as vital to the existence of the diaspora, in other words that the diaspora would disappear if the older generation were to die out and with them the links with Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir. These findings confirm that the idea of a Kashmiri diaspora has now proliferated fairly firmly into Kashmiri society and is not the result of disgruntled intellectuals and politicians as found in the interviews.

These results point towards two main conclusions. Firstly, the importance of cultural networks for the maintenance of identity. Secondly, the results demonstrate that whilst there are significant generational effects these are contrary to popular and journalistic writings, and did not conform to the stereotype of inter-generational conflicts. I would argue that the generational effects point towards the process of enculturation rather than pathological inter-generational conflict.

### **III. POSTULATE TWO: RELIGION IS A CENTRAL COLLECTIVE DIMENSION OF KASHMIRI IDENTITY IN BRITAIN**

This section presents data in relation to Postulate Two. As discussed earlier “public Islam” is easier to investigate. Mosques in Luton, specifically the Jammia Masjid (which reflects the Barelwi tradition with which the majority of the Kashmiris interviewed identified in the open interviews), the Madina Masjid and Masjid Noor were included in the ISA instruments as representations of “public Islam”. Many of the younger Kashmiris mentioned the Luton Islamic Society, which was run within the University and appealed to young Muslims, so this was also included. The results for identification with these institutions are presented in terms of selected ISA indices.

#### **A. The Public Face of Islam**

Perceived similarity with the religious entities (Mosque Noor, Madina Mosque, Jammia Masjid, and the Luton Islamic Society) falls within the low range for all Kashmiri respondents. Analysis of variance found no significant difference by generation or gender. Ego-involvement with the religious entities falls within the low range for the older generation but is higher for the younger generation Kashmiri respondents. However analysis of variance did not find this difference to be significant. Women are more intensely involved with the religious entities. Analysis of variance found significant gender differences at a level of  $F=8.379$ ;  $df=1;44$ ;

$p < 0.05$  (Jammia Masjid),  $F = 9.718$ ;  $df = 1,31$ ;  $p < 0.01$  (Mosque Noor),  $F = 10.419$ ;  $df = 1,42$ ;  $p < 0.05$  (Madina Mosque). No interaction effects were revealed. Idealistic identification with religious entities for all Kashmiri respondents fell within the low range. Analysis of variance revealed no significant differences by generation or gender.

Contra-identification also fell within the low range for all Kashmiri respondents. However means show higher values for the younger generation. Analysis of variance found generational differences to be significant at a level of  $F = 10.889$   $df = 1,44$ ;  $p < 0.01$  (Jammia Masjid),  $F = 8.869$ ;  $df = 1,31$ ;  $p < 0.01$  (Mosque Noor),  $F = 7.41$ ;  $df = 1,42$ ;  $p < 0.01$  (Madina Masjid) and  $F = 7.810$ ;  $df = 1,62$ ;  $p < 0.01$  (Luton Islamic Society). Analysis of variance revealed no significant difference by gender and no interaction effects were found. Mean values for current identification conflicts fell within the low range for the older generation Kashmiri respondents but were higher for the younger generation falling within the moderate range. Analysis of variance revealed a generational difference with Mosque Noor ( $F = 16.213$ ;  $df = 1,31$ ;  $p < 0.001$ ) and Jammia Masjid ( $F = 11.776$ ;  $df = 1,44$ ;  $p < 0.001$ ). No significant difference was revealed by gender and no interaction effects were found. The older generation evaluate the religious entities very highly whilst overall evaluation of religious entities by the younger generation is lower but remains within the moderate range. Analysis of variance revealed a generational difference at

a significance level of  $F=10.291$ ;  $df=1,44$ ;  $p<0.01$  (Jammia Masjid),  $F=7.89$ ;  $df=1,31$ ;  $p<0.01$ (Mosque Noor),  $F=6.458$ ;  $df=1,42$ ;  $p<0.01$  (Madina Mosque) and  $F=7.051$ ;  $df=1,62$  $p<0.01$ (Luton Islamic Society).

The most surprising conclusions from the results of identifications with these religious entities were the absence of gender differences. Some differences were found for ego-involvement with religious entities but it would seem that these results are at variance with accounts that see Mosques and Islam as mainly masculinist spaces. The general assumption is that older women, especially, do not go to the Mosques and as a result their involvement and attachment to Mosques would tend to be lower. This is not born out by the results.

The second interesting finding was that while local opinion has it that the Jammia Masjid is the Kashmiri Mosque there was no significant difference in involvement with this Mosque when compared to the other Mosques in Luton. Again this seems to suggest a variance with many accounts which argue that Mosques are closely (almost exclusively) identified with particular national and sectarian communities.<sup>4</sup> It may be that the national and sectarian nature of identification may be the result of geography and demography rather than social exclusion.

The third point to bring out is the identification with religious entities by older and younger Kashmiris. Referring back to my comparison between Kashmiris and the Anglo-Saxon sample using the global indices I pointed to the way in which youngsters did not identify as strongly with Mosques as the older Kashmiris. I read this not to be an indicator of greater secularism but a difference in their understanding of Islam. It is interesting in this light that the results for ego-involvement while within the range were actually higher for the younger cohort suggesting they have allegiance to mosques as indicators of Islam in Britain. It is important however not to fall into another stereotype with over-emphasis on the relationship between identifying with Islam and Kashmiri identity since all respondents for all indices (despite the variations mentioned above) fell within the low range.

Overall these results suggest that the place of religion as a marker of Kashmiri identity may be far more implicit than many analysts have considered. The idea that Islam is part of one's life may mean that for a community such as the Kashmiris in Luton, Islam is unmarked and an unremarkable part of their existence. Thus the lack of its contested nature may explain why it remains as a background to Kashmiri identity rather than the main banner under which Kashmiri identity is forged. This may also be the effect of the success of Kashmiri nationalistic discourse, which would reduce Islam to a secondary role within public life.

#### **IV. POSTULATE THREE: NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION IS A CENTRAL COLLECTIVE DIMENSION OF KASHMIRI IDENTITY IN BRITAIN**

This section presents data in relation to nationalistic identification with Kashmir as a central feature of Kashmiri identity in Britain. Previous chapters have already shown that open interviews stressed the importance of “Kashmiriyat” to Kashmiris in Luton. Most often this sense of being Kashmiri was referenced with respect to the disputed nature of their homeland as well as to key players and representatives of different viewpoints within the struggle. The JKLF, Muslim Conference, Benazir Bhutto and Narasimha Rao were all referenced and therefore included in the ISA instruments. In other words each of these figures indicated a particular stance regarding nationalistic identifications of the Kashmiri sample.

##### **A. Independent Kashmir**

It is clear from the findings that the JKLF exercises a hegemonic influence over the Kashmiris in Luton with regard to Kashmiri nationalism. There were only a few gender differences but analysis of variance did not find these to be significant. More marked were the generational effects. A review of the data shows that empathetic identification with the political entity of JKLF falls within the high range for both generations of Kashmiri respondents. However the older generation perceive higher similarity with the JKLF than the younger generation. An analysis of variance

revealed this generational difference to be very significant  $F=32.182$ ;  $df=1,64$ ;  $p<0.0001$ .

Identification with the JKLF fell within the high range for respondents of both generations. All Kashmiris are intensely involved with the JKLF. Analysis of variance showed no significant difference according to generation, but a gender difference was found. Men had higher ego-involvement with the JKLF at a significance level of  $F=4.375$ ;  $df=1,64$ ;  $p<0.05$ . Idealistic identification with the JKLF is high for Kashmiri respondents of both generation but significantly higher for the older generation  $F=26.711$ ;  $df=1,64$ ;  $p<0.0001$ . An interaction effect for idealistic identification with JKLF was revealed at a significance level of  $F=4.247$ ;  $df=1,64$ ;  $p<0.05$ .

Mean values for contra-identification with the JKLF fell within the low range for the older generation but were higher for the younger generation. Analysis of variance shows a generational difference at a significance of  $F=12.697$ ;  $df=1,64$ ;  $p<0.001$  and an interaction effect with contra-identification for generation by gender was revealed at a significance level of  $F=4.358$ ;  $df=1,64$ ;  $p<0.05$ . For all individuals identification conflicts with the JKLF fell within the moderate range but are higher for the female Kashmiri respondents at a significance level of  $F=5.816$ ;  $df=1,64$ ;  $p<0.01$ . Mean values for overall evaluation of the JKLF show highest evaluation by

older generation men. Older generation women's evaluation falls within the moderate range and the younger generation have low evaluation of the JKLF. No significant gender differences were revealed but an interaction effect occurred for evaluation with JKLF for generation by gender at a small significance of  $F=5.238$ ;  $df=1,64$ ;  $p<0.05$ .

While the role of the JKLF was high for all respondents it was clear that this organisation was more favoured by the older Kashmiris. This again reflects the way in which the nationalist struggle has tended to recruit mainly from these Kashmiris who were politically conscious at the time of major struggles such as the Mangla Dam, the war in 1965 and President's rule in 1983 to name a few significant events. The extent of the JKLF's influence was expressed not only by high empathetic identification, ego-involvement, idealistic identification, low contra-identification and moderate identification conflicts but also by correspondingly low associations with the political entities of Muslim Conference, Narasimha Rao and Benazir Bhutto.

Perceived similarity with the political entities of Muslim Conference, Narasimha Rao and Benazir Bhutto fell within the low range for respondents of both generations. Ego-involvement with the Muslim Conference, Narasimha Rao and Benazir Bhutto was low and no generational significance was found. However,

analysis of variance did show a small gender significance. Women were more ego-involved with the Muslim Conference at a significance level of  $F=5.923$ ;  $df=1,40$ ;  $p < 0.05$ . Narasimha Rao, Benazir Bhutto and the Muslim Conference were not seen as role models and idealistic identification fell within low range. There were no generational or gender interactions.

Contra-identification with Narasimha Rao, and Benazir Bhutto was also low and no generational or gender significance was found. Contra-identification with the Muslim Conference was also low and a generational difference occurred at a significance level of  $F = 6.819$ ;  $df=1,40$ ;  $p < 0.05$ . Identification conflicts with The Muslim Conference, Narasimha Rao, and Benazir Bhutto fell within the high range. Analysis of variance revealed that the younger generation has higher identification conflicts with the Muslim Conference, at a significance level of  $F=7.448$ ;  $df=1,40$ ;  $p < 0.01$  (identification conflicts based in current self) and  $F=6.486$ ;  $df=1,40$ ;  $p < 0.05$  (identification conflicts based in past self).

Evaluation of Benazir Bhutto fell within the low range. Analysis of variance revealed no significant generation or gender difference and no interaction effects were found. Evaluation of the Muslim Conference and Narasimha Rao fell within the low range for women and fell within the moderate range for male respondents.

Analysis of variance revealed a small gender significance at a level of  $F=4.709$   $p<0.05$ . No generational significance was found.

What is interesting is the way in which the respondents did not distinguish between the Pakistani and Indian Prime Ministers, which confirms that the JKLF's position on the twin occupation of Kashmir seems to have made a great deal of headway amongst Kashmiris in Luton.

#### **V. POSTULATE FOUR: "CULTURE CONFLICT" BETWEEN KASHMIRI MIGRANTS AND THEIR OFFSPRING IS LEADING TO NEGATIVE SELF EVALUATION**

This section presents data in relation to "culture conflict" between Kashmiri migrants and their offspring and the extent to which this leads to negative self-evaluation. It was assumed then that a common feature of Kashmiri adolescents would be their high incidence of identification conflicts with people of their own ethnicity. In an environment where alternative ethnic groups are salient, individuals have the opportunity of identifying with representatives of the other community. It was therefore assumed to be inevitable that some cross-ethnic identification would therefore take place. Previous ISA studies (see Weinreich and Kelly) have shown that high identification conflicts with own ethnic groups and partial identification

with the dominant community would lead to overall negative self-evaluation.<sup>5</sup> This was combined with identity diffusion.

When mixes of partial identifications occur individuals may experience a degree of identity diffusion. ISA conceptualises identity diffusion as the degree of difficulty in resynthesising childhood and later identifications, that is the difficulty in incorporating new identifications and resolving conflicts in existing identifications which are dispersed over a number of significant others. In some circumstances, high identity diffusion may be accompanied by very low self-evaluation and individuals concerned may be in a state of identity crisis. However in other circumstances individuals may exhibit identity diffusion as a result of having identification conflicts and yet have moderately favourable self-evaluation.

Identification conflicts or the absence of identity conflicts with significant others on self-evaluation were investigated for older and younger generation Kashmiri respondents. Representations of own group culture, religion and political identification were chosen. Representations from the dominant community were also included. Identification conflicts were ascertained with the “own group” cultural entities of parents, Asian men and women and Kashmiri *biraderi*, with religious entity of the Jammia Masjid and with the political entity of JKLF. Also

there were identification conflicts with “other” ethnic groups by English men and women.

#### **A. “Culture Conflict”**

For all individuals conflicts in identification are high with their own group. This is to be expected and supports the idea that ethnic minority youngsters have high identification conflicts with their own group as mentioned above. A closer look at the results shows that identification conflicts with parents fell within the moderate range. Analysis of variance revealed no significant difference by generation or gender. Conflicts in identification with Kashmiri *biraderi* fall within the moderate range for older generation Kashmiris and within the high range for the younger generation Kashmiris. Identification conflicts with Asian men and women fell within the high range for the older generation and were significantly lower for the younger generation. Analysis of variance revealed a generational difference in identification conflicts with Asian men at a significance of  $F=8.029$ ;  $df=1,66$ ;  $p<0.01$  and Asian women at a significance of  $F=8.262$ ;  $df=1,66$ ;  $p<0.01$ .

Identification conflicts with the Jammia Masjid also fell within the moderate range for the younger generation Kashmiri individuals. Identification conflicts fell within the low range for the older generation and analysis of variance found a significant generational difference  $F=11.776$   $df=1,44$ ;  $p<0.001$ . Conflicts in identification with

the political entity of JKLF fell within the low range for the older generation but within the moderate range for the older generation women and the younger generation. Analysis of variance did not reveal a generational difference but a difference by gender was found. Women have higher identification conflicts with the JKLF at a significance level of  $F=5.816$ ;  $df=1,44$ ;  $p<0.01$ . Overall self-evaluation lies within the high range for all respondents and analysis of variance found no generational or gender differences. Combined with moderate levels of identity diffusion this indicates that identification conflicts are acting as a resource for redefinition of identity towards updated identifications.<sup>6</sup>

From the above some general patterns of younger generation identification conflicts with the older generation can be identified. The results suggest that the younger generation have high identification conflicts with representatives of their own culture. This difference reflects their dual socialisation, with early socialisation within their own ethnic group and increasing socialisation with white dominant society through school, university, work and the media. Moderate levels of current identity diffusion and high levels of current overall self-evaluation suggest that for the younger generation Kashmiris, identification conflicts with their own ethnic group may be the impetus for the redefinition and thereby maintenance in updated form of their ethnic identity.<sup>7</sup> Results are in contradistinction to proposition four, which proposes the commonly held perceptions of generational culture conflict

within the Kashmiri community and the associated negative self-evaluation.<sup>8</sup> Results therefore suggest that whilst there is a difference in identification conflicts between the older and younger generation this difference is not about culture conflict, which is often translated as the younger generation being “caught between two cultures,” but rather redefinition of identity. In other words the process of enculturation.<sup>9</sup>

Whilst it is true that different age cohorts are operating under different influences, and that these influences are significantly different enough to make marked generational differences, these dissimilarities do not translate into inter-generational conflict along the lines of cultural conflict. Rather that inter-generational conflict may reflect “normal” differences between young and old and not necessarily differences about whether the young wish not to identify with the Kashmiri community.

There was no sign in the interviews and the ISA results suggesting that the enculturation process of youth and the resistance to that enculturation by the older cohort caused inter-generational conflict. It is only possible to read this inter-generational conflict as a conflict arising out of cultural schizophrenia, if the analysts assume the unproblematic relationship between certain traits and practices and British society (for example a belief in the individual as being intrinsically

British), and thus argue that expressing that opinion is subject to a form of Anglicisation.

**VI. POSTULATE FIVE: CONTEMPORARY CONTEXTUAL REDEFINITION OF IDENTITY AMONGST SECOND GENERATION KASHMIRI BRITISH IS TAKING PLACE THROUGH A PROCESS OF ENCULTURATION AND RESULTS IN HIGH SELF EVALUATION**

This section presents data in relation to redefinition of second generation identity through a process of enculturation rather than acculturation and the extent to which this leads to high self-evaluation. As I mentioned previously I have used enculturation to explain a process of definition and redefinition of identity by which individuals pull together a series of overlapping networks of culture. The results outlined in this section suggest that people growing up in an environment where more than one culture is salient may identify with elements of the other cultural groups. Redefinitions of identity do not lead to either/or scenarios or well established negative notions of second generation offspring from ethnic minority backgrounds being “stuck between two cultures” as concepts of acculturation imply.<sup>10</sup> Enculturation allows for redefinitions of identity, which remove notions of victimisation and allow space for high self-evaluation.

To investigate contemporary redefinitions of identity amongst young Kashmiris this section investigates the younger cohort's identifications with their own ethnic group. It also investigates the extent to which partial identifications with the dominant white ethnic group are occurring and the extent to which these lead to positive conceptions of one's own ethnic group and the consequences these identifications have for overall self evaluation.<sup>11</sup>

It was assumed that young Kashmiris would maintain distinctiveness of their identity through high levels of empathetic identification with their own group including religious, cultural, and political representations. Redefinitions of ethnic identity are also occurring through enculturation of elements of the dominant culture, which form part of young Kashmiris' identity structures. The following central collective features of Kashmiri identity were selected for exploration, parents, Kashmiri *biraderi*, Jammia Masjid and the JKLF. Elements of dominant culture which have an impact on young Kashmiri socialisation through for example schooling, generally living in Luton were selected as English men and women, John Major, British Media, and Luton University.

In order to highlight the partial cross-identifications with the Anglo-Saxon group and partial cross-identifications with the dominant community a sample of older generation Kashmiris is also highlighted. If the younger generation is indeed going

through a process of *enculturation* then it is expected that they will have higher empathetic identification with the Anglo-Saxon entities than would the older generation whilst simultaneously identifying with their own ethnic group, which would lead to positive evaluations, given that their own ethnic group is esteemed and held in high regard.<sup>12</sup>

#### **A. Enculturation and the Maintenance of Distinctiveness**

Results suggest that the younger generation members of the Kashmiri community in Luton have partial identifications with institutions and emblems of the white dominant community. When compared with the older generation Kashmiris, results indicate low overall identification with white dominant community but this identification is nevertheless higher than that for the older generation. Younger generation Kashmiris are partially identifying with representations of the dominant culture. Partial identification is taking place with English men and women, political representations such as British political parties, British media and British educational institutions.

For the younger generation some partial identifications with the Anglo-Saxon entities is taking place. When compared with the older generation Kashmiri individuals, mean values indicate higher identification with Anglo-Saxon entities for the younger generation. A closer look at the results highlights that empathetic

identification with English men and women fell within the low range for all individuals but was significantly higher for the younger generation. A generational difference in current empathetic identification occurred at a significance level of  $F=25.732; df=1,65; p<0.0001$  with English women and  $F=20.867; df=1,65; p<0.001$  with English men. Empathetic identification with John Major fell within the low range for all individuals but the younger generation had higher levels of identification. Analysis of variance revealed a generational difference at a significance level of  $F=12.226; df=1,61; p<0.001$ .

All Kashmiri individuals have low empathetic identification with British media and Luton University. As with empathetic identifications with English men and women, younger Kashmiris have higher identifications when compared to the older generation. Analysis of variance revealed a generational difference in empathetic identification at a significance level of  $F=6.194; 1,57; p<0.01$  (British media) and  $F=7.020; df=1,32; p<0.05$  (Luton University).

Results suggest that the younger generation is identifying more with elements of the majority Anglo-Saxon culture than the older generation. As mentioned above this is to be expected since the young Kashmiris have experienced more years of their socialisation in Britain. The results therefore support the idea that individuals will

form partial identifications with dominant culture will exist where individuals are witnesses to other ethnic groups.

If the concept of acculturation, however, were to hold fast then would be very limited identifications with elements of individuals' own ethnic expected.<sup>13</sup> Research shows that the younger generation Kashmiris simultaneously empathetically identify with individuals and elements (cultural, religious and political) of their own group. Identifications with elements of own ethnic group are lower for the younger generation than the older generation. This is to be expected if, as the above section highlights, some partial cross-ethnic identifications are taking place with elements of the dominant culture.

Results show that, for the older generation, mean values for empathetic identification with the cultural entity of parents falls within the high range. Younger generation empathetic identification with parents is lower. Analysis of variance revealed a generational difference at a significance level  $F=52.744$ ;  $df=1,64$ ;  $p<0.0001$ . The institution of Kashmiri *biraderi* is very important to the older generation. Empathetic identification falls within the high range. Empathetic identification is significantly lower for the younger generation  $F=48.071$ ;  $df=1,166$ ;  $p<0.001$ .

The younger generation Kashmiris are maintaining religious activities and obligations. Identifications with the Jammia Masjid fell within the low range for older and younger generation Kashmiri individuals. However it is interesting to note that identification with the Jammia Masjid was higher for the younger generation than for the older generation. However analysis of variance did not find this difference to be significant. This generational pattern of identifications with Mosques and related activities may be due to the ongoing mosque disputes in Luton, which have involved many older members of the community and led to overall disillusionment with community establishment. The younger generation have been more removed from these local disputes which may be one explanation for higher identification with mosques. Identification with the JKLF falls within the high range for the older generation. Empathetic identification is lower for the younger generation. Analysis of variance revealed a generational difference in identification with the JKLF at a significance level of  $F=32.182$ ;  $df=1,64$ ;  $p<0.0001$ .

It was anticipated that redefinitions of identity would lead to high levels of self-esteem amongst the Kashmiri offspring.<sup>14</sup> Levels of self-esteem fell within the high range for the older generation. Although levels of self-esteem were lower for the younger generation they still fell within the moderate range. Analysis of variance (Mosque Noor, Madina Mosque, Jammia Masjid, and the Luton Islamic Society) found the difference to be significant at a level of  $F=11.836$ ;  $df=1,66$ ;  $p<0.001$ . This

is to be expected since the older generation have more well established value systems that are subject to fewer outside influences than the younger generation who have been born and brought up in the United Kingdom. Scores for self-esteem do not differ significantly by gender. Current self-evaluation fell within the high range. Analysis of variance did not show any marked differences in overall self-evaluation by generation or gender.

The results above suggest that the younger generation continue to identify with aspects of their own culture. Since identification with own culture remains high regardless of partial identifications with the dominant we can assume that a process of enculturation is indeed taking place. Strong identifications with own ethnic group's cultural values and beliefs and partial identification with the white group are also leading to high overall self-evaluation. The young Kashmiris interviewed are far from being "stuck between two cultures". They are enculturating into aspects British values such as ideas of Western democracy, notions of justice and entertainment which reflect into various British institutions. They are redefining their identity into a contemporary Kashmiri British context.

## **VII. POSTULATE SIX: THE CENTRALITY OF GENDER ROLES IN REDEFINITIONS OF ETHNIC IDENTITY**

This section presents data in relation to the role of gender within the redefinition of ethnic identity. Results presented for postulate five above have highlighted that contemporary redefinitions in identity are taking place among the Kashmiri offspring. Gender identities are central to ethnic identity redefinitions since they are closely bound to the specific cultural milieu of ethnic groups.<sup>15</sup> Certainly the form and function of Kashmiri society is bound by gender dynamics. Gender roles and the relationship between men and women are central features of Kashmiri society and are continuously reinforced by community, culture and religion. Whilst it is the case that I found very few significant gender effects for the discussions of the preceding postulates I felt that redefinitions of identity would be most strongly felt with respect to identifications with the opposite gender from own group and identifications with English and women.

### **A. Changes in Gender Roles**

Results for gender identifications did reveal some interesting patterns. Kashmiri individuals and especially the younger generation are empathetically identify with English men and to some extent women (mean values fall within the low range for all respondents. Analysis of variance found a significant generational difference for English men  $F=20.867$ ; 1,65;  $p<0.0001$  and English women  $F=25.732$ ; 1,65;

$p < 0.0001$ . Mean values for empathetic identification with Asian men and women were higher but fell within the low range for older Kashmiri female identification with Asian men.

Details of mean values for identification conflicts with English men and women and Asian men and women show that identification conflicts fell within the moderate range for all respondents except for older men with Asian men and older females with Asian men and women. Identification for these individuals fell within the high range. Analysis of variance found the generation difference to be significant with Asian men  $F = 0.034$ ;  $df = 1, 66$ ;  $p < 0.01$  and Asian women  $F = 8.262$ ;  $df = 1, 66$ ;  $p < 0.01$ .

Results for evaluation of self and others show that Kashmiri respondents have low overall evaluation of English men and women. Mean values fell within the low range for older Kashmiri men and women's evaluation of Anglo-Saxon men and women. Whilst younger Kashmiris also had low evaluations of Anglo-Saxon men and women they were higher than the evaluations of the older generation. Analysis of variance found this generational difference to be significant for English men  $F = 25.575$ ;  $df = 1, 65$ ;  $p < 0.000$ , English women  $F = 29.681$ ;  $df = 1, 65$ ;  $p < 0.0001$ , Asian men  $F = 7.669$ ;  $df = 1, 66$ ;  $p < 0.01$  and Asian women  $F = 4.752$ ;  $df = 1, 66$ ;  $p < 0.05$ .

Mean values did show some gender differences. Highest evaluation is with own gender and falls within the moderate range. Younger generation Kashmiri women have low evaluation of Asian men and also have a poor view of own gender. Kashmiri men have a higher evaluation of English women than do Kashmiri women. Overall evaluation falls within the low range suggesting that both genders do not hold English men or English women with overall high regard. Analysis of variance did not however find this difference to be significant.

We have already seen above that contrary to popular belief redefinitions in identity within young members of ethnically marked communities do not lead to low levels of self-evaluation. It is perhaps worth repeating here that levels of self-evaluation did not vary considerably between the genders. Gender dynamics appear to be playing some part in redefinitions of Kashmiri ethnic identity but these were not as extensive as I expected them to be. All Kashmiris had higher identifications with Asian men and women whilst identifications with English men and women were higher for the younger Kashmiris.

## **VIII. CONCLUSION: EXPANDING KASHMIRI IDENTITY**

In this study I have followed a dual approach to the analysis of my subject. On the one hand I have relied on interview data on what could be called an oral history

approach to uncover what Kashmiris thought and the metaphors they relied on to tell stories about themselves. The second approach was a commitment to ISA instruments, constructed using the results of the ethnographic fieldwork, as a way of giving a degree of rigour to the findings but also examining how by looking at the same subject in a slightly different light what contrasts might emerge. What the ISA chapters have shown in a theoretically and mathematically thorough language supports the more impressionistic conclusions derived from interviews.

The absence of “cultural conflict” as a generalised phenomenon either along “generational” or gender lines is clearly evident in this assessment of the six research postulates. This finding strongly points to the way in which the process of enculturation is at work. Kashmiri identity is being transformed partly due to the consequences of immigration and settlement in Britain but also due to a number of developments in the rest of the world. Thus Kashmiri identity like other subjectivities is a process rather than an end state.

It is clear from the ISA results that the younger cohort of Kashmiris is transforming the meaning of what it is to be Kashmiri. It is important to note that this is a transformation of “Kashmiriyat” rather than about abandonment or negation. For example when young Kashmiris are more willing to take on “love marriages” rather than arranged marriages they do not see moving from one to the other as

proceeding from Kashmiri to Western identity. They still define themselves as Kashmiri and would not readily admit they are Anglicised or diluting their identity. For young Kashmiris the idea of love marriages may no longer be a marker of Anglo-Saxon identity but it may be a more general form of the way marriage should be. In other words, that is the way that everyone marries in contemporary times. This can be seen by the way in which the Kashmiri idea of arranged marriage tends to differ from the Western conception of arranged marriage. That is, the way in which all respondents pointed to an absence of coercion and its pragmatic advantages, whereas in Western eyes it is usually seen as coercive and intrinsically misogynist.

Like the notion of arranged marriages the idea of the extended family is also being transformed but this transformation cannot be read as a simple move towards the nuclear family despite the fact that in Luton there are many structural pressures that would favour the nuclear family over extended families. Take for example the size of dwellings and recognition of the importance of family members such as grandparents, aunts and uncles etc. It is true that the extended family in Luton is not the same as the extended family in Kotli. What is not the case however is that somehow the family in Kotli is more Kashmiri than the extended family in Luton. What my findings show is that the development of a Kashmiri identity has occurred in very different locations but there is no primary Kashmiri identity through which

one could argue that Kashmiris in Luton are less Kashmiri than their counterparts in Kotli.

My ISA results clearly point to the way in which Kashmiri identity has expanded to include elements which conventionally would not be seen to be part of Kashmiri life. Kashmiris are no longer primarily agricultural. They have largely become part of the remittance-based economy. All of these factors suggest that we need to take more seriously the notion of understanding Kashmiri identity in its fragmented and dispersed totality. We need to know how to connect Kashmiriness as it is articulated in British towns such as Luton to the way that Kashmiriness is articulated in Azad Kashmir and indeed around the world.

A way of doing this would be to use the notion of diaspora. I will look at this in the final chapter. Results suggest that cultural networks, religion and nationalistic affiliation are currently central to the development of Kashmiri identity. Inter-generational differences amongst Kashmiris do not correspond to static notions of cultural differences but rather demonstrate the process of the redefinition of identity in the radically different context of settlement in Britain. Clearly the Kashmiri community is in a state of flux. To paraphrase Antonio Gramsci, the old is dying and the new has not yet been born. Traditional networks and structures of Kashmiri

life have had to be redefined in the context of settlement in Britain. So far this redefinition seems to be occurring without a dilution of a sense of “Kashmiriness”.

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Recall that the recognition in another of characteristics one feels one has in common with another is termed empathetic identification. Individuals may want to emulate these characteristics or indeed dissociate from them, such that that though they possess them, they wish not to.

<sup>2</sup> I did not use the indices of past identification conflicts, as I was more interested in current identity structures. The results are however available in the Appendices.

<sup>3</sup> Identification conflicts with Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir fall within the high range for the older generation and within the moderate range for the younger generation but analysis of variance did not find this difference to be significant.

<sup>4</sup> Ahmed Andrews talks of this. See Andrews, 1993, PP. 68-95.

<sup>5</sup> See Weinreich, 1983 and Kelly, 1989.

<sup>6</sup> Earlier ISA studies have also found this to be true. See Weinreich, 1983, Kelly, 1989 and Weinreich, Luk and Bond, 1996.

<sup>7</sup> See Weinreich, 1983, Northover, 1988, Kelly, 1989 and Weinreich, Kelly and Maja, 1987 and 1988.

<sup>8</sup> This is a principal ISA postulate-that large identification conflicts provide the "engine" for the identification process. In this sense it is a resource.

<sup>9</sup> See Weinreich, 1979.

<sup>10</sup> I am aware that writers such as Weinreich, Ballard and others have challenged this notion of "stuck between two cultures" twenty years ago. My use of this notion again in this research highlights how these ideas remain in academic and popular accounts of ethnicised communities. This demonstrates how difficult it is to alter these views. On this point this research supports many earlier ISA studies such as Weinreich, 1979, which suggests that there is accumulating evidence with which to challenge these false descriptions.

<sup>11</sup> Weinreich, Luk and Bond, 1996 look at the self-evaluation of Hong Kong Chinese students in relation to identifications with other cultural groups.

<sup>12</sup> If they had poor evaluation of their own group, then close empathetic identification with them would be associated with low self evaluation. The point here is that, despite another groups low evaluation of one's own group (alter-ascribed social identity) one's own evaluation of one's own group is generally high. Weinreich makes this point in his Bristol study. See Weinreich, 1979.

<sup>13</sup> Berry's notion of acculturation and particularly his strategies of integration allow for partial identifications.

<sup>14</sup> Recall that self esteem or self-evaluation is seen as the extent to which individuals see themselves as implementing or failing to implement their identity aspirations. Self esteem is defined in terms of the individuals own value and belief system.

<sup>15</sup> See Weinreich, 1983.

## **CONCLUSION: RE-THINKING ETHNIC IDENTITIES**

Over the last fifty years there has been a growing conviction among Kashmiris that they constitute a distinct people with their own way of life. The rise of Kashmiri consciousness has occurred despite the fact that the Kashmiris have been unable to form a sovereign nation state. In many ways Kashmiri identity harks back to a previous century when many people defined themselves as a nation even before they acquired statehood.<sup>1</sup> In contrast, most of the de-colonisation that has occurred in this century has tended to emphasise the role of states informing nations. The Kashmiri case differs from that of nineteenth century nationalism in the way in which it has been profoundly affected by the forces of globalisation.

Kashmiris came to Britain in the 1950s and 1960s as part of the large Commonwealth migration. Even though they constituted one of the largest segments of post-war immigration and settlement they remained invisible and unrecognised. For the British authorities they were part of the South Asian immigrant population. For South Asians they were mainly Pakistanis and for Pakistanis they were Pakistani or Mirpuris. All of these designations were ascribed to the Kashmiris.

The development of a Kashmiri consciousness was linked to four main factors. Firstly, Kashmiri settlement in Britain meant that the Kashmiris were relocated in a

society in which their ability to champion Kashmiri identity was unlikely to provoke the ire of state authorities (contrast this with the situation of Kashmiris in Pakistani and Indian occupied Kashmir) Also, skills learnt through the process of immigration could be utilised for broader aims once settlement was complete. For example lobbying local authorities for welfare provision helped develop awareness amongst Kashmiris of how to operate within the British political context. This ability could then be used to articulate a distinct Kashmiri identity.

Secondly, as with most South Asian post war immigration to Britain the Kashmiris continued to maintain core and frequent ties with friends and relatives in what was viewed as the Pakistani Occupied Kashmir. So that kinship ties, a remittance economy, the circulation of marriage partners, all of these in addition to other forms of communication such as telecommunications and letters, helped to maintain links between Luton, Mirpur and Kotli districts. These links however did not just help bind the Kashmiri settlers in Luton with those in Kashmir but also helped to articulate a notion of “Kashmiriyat” which is transnational.

Thirdly, the crisis of British identity allowed many of Britain’s ethnicised minorities to abandon their ascribed identities in favour of projects in which they articulated their own subjectivities. The breakdown or at least the weakening of overarching categories such as Black allowed Kashmiris to articulate their own identity as distinct

from other ethnic communities. The unravelling of the “Rainbow Alliance” allowed many groups to claim that they were a separate ethnic formation. Among these were also Kashmiris.

Fourthly, the above three developments provided the setting through which the consequences of events in South Asia could be played out. So that events such as the construction of the Mangla Dam, the formation of Bangladesh, the Indo-Pakistan wars and uprisings in Indian Occupied Kashmir all became episodes in the story of Kashmiri nationhood. “Kashmiriyat” then emerges as a diasporic formation. A community, now located transnationally, has dispersed from the villages of Mirpur and Kotli districts in Azad Kashmir to the streets of “Bury Park”. Despite its dispersal it manages to gather a large number of people who subscribe to it.

My research demonstrates that the failure of the Kashmiri nationalist movement to form a nation state has to be tempered by recognition of their success in forging a diaspora. Interviewee after interviewee was clearly beholden to the vocabulary, beliefs and values that emanate from the discourse on Kashmiriness. What many people may find surprising is, given its inauspicious situation, how durable the idea of Kashmir has become. So much so that even children of Kashmiris, who were born and schooled in this country, who could not recognise Kashmir on the map and who do not speak the language, still celebrate Eid by waving the Kashmiri flag. Both my

observer-participant data and my ISA results point to the continuing salience of Kashmiriness for those born and brought up in Britain.

Culture and religion in the form of Islam were also important to Kashmiris and made up what they saw as Kashmiriness. The most prominent dimension of Kashmiriness currently appears to be national affiliation. The conventions of cultural-conflict and cultural schizophrenia do not present themselves in the situation of Kashmiris in Luton. That is not to say that there were no differences between Kashmiris born and brought up here and those who were settlers to Britain, but those differences were about redefinition and the re-articulation of Kashmiriness rather than its abandonment. For example, the institutions of arranged marriage and gender roles are being transformed but they are still distinct from marriage and male-female dynamics amongst the Anglo-Saxons. These transformations are not seen as a move away from Kashmiriness but simply a (re-) interpretation of what it means to be Kashmiri in Luton.

Whether cultural, religious or political, ideas of “Kashmiriyat” were produced and disseminated by a number of agencies ranging from intellectuals such as Maqbool Butt and Amanullah Khan to local community leaders. The work of these men has not only been essential to give coherence to the idea of Kashmiri nationalism, but they have also contributed more generally to developing “Kashmiriyat”. In many

homes in Luton you can find pictures of Maqbool Butt without necessarily implying a clear understanding of his project. In this sense Maqbool Butt operates as a symbol of “Kashmiriyat” and not just as an advocate of Kashmiri nationalism.

Apart from the intellectuals, community centres and the organisation of community festivals are an important means of spreading the discourse of “Kashmiriyat”. For example, anything ranging from birthday parties to religious festivals all gave space for discussion around what it was to be Kashmiri, whether this was the issue of being an independent state or the establishment of the latest Kashmiri accountants’ firm in “Bury Park”. In other words all these became venues for the spread of ideas about “Kashmiriyat”. In particular the formation of political organisations dedicated to advancing the cause of Kashmiri sovereignty have helped to further the idea that the Kashmiri people are not only distinct in South Asia but also that Kashmiris form a particular ethnicity in a multi-racial, multi-cultural Britain. The importance of this can be seen with the recently established Kashmiri National Identity Campaign (KNIC) in Bradford on 24 January. This national umbrella organisation aims to advance the general awareness of Kashmiris as a separate ethnic group, the idea being that this will avoid their frequent labelling as Pakistanis or Indians, promote Kashmiri identity including culture, religion and national interests and lead to the provision and delivery of more equitable services. One of the interesting paradoxes of Kashmiri politics is the way in which the existence of Azad Kashmir both hinders

and contributes to the development of Kashmiriness. These producers of “Kashmiriyat” are the main sources of Kashmiri identity. The question remains why was it that they were successful in recruiting so many people as Kashmiris?

Given the above descriptions, what kind of community do the Kashmiris form? If this question was posed to members of the JKLF they would argue that the Kashmiris were a nation but on the other hand if the same question was asked of women in “Bury Park” they would reference being Kashmiri as a way of life. Both types of respondents agreed that there was something distinctly Kashmiri even though there was a huge debate about what that something was and what was included in its definition. It is the idea that there is a Kashmiri identity which circulates in Luton and other conurbations in Britain but which also circulates in South Asia and elsewhere. This circulation has material effects. For example the recent decision by Luton and Bradford Borough Councils to recognise Kashmiris as one of the main ethnic categories is not only a symbolic gesture but will help fine tune service provision for this community.

The development of Kashmiri identity has been important not only for the Kashmiri people but also an example of how a disparate group can forge a collective consciousness in the age of globalisation. The Kashmiris are best understood as a diaspora, in that they are a community which is dislocated from its (imagined)

homeland but which nevertheless continues to see itself as a unit even though its location is fragmented. The identity of a diaspora comes about through its identification with the referent of an imaginary homeland. As such, diasporic formations are constituted by the way in which the imaginary homeland becomes constant whilst their contexts change through displacement. This is why it is not possible to say that the Kashmiris in Mirpur and Kotli districts are more authentically Kashmiri than young Kashmiris in Luton. Kashmiriness is something that is being defined and redefined in the various contexts in which Kashmiri settlers find themselves. Kashmiriness is an idea that floats along the circuit of the remittance economy and global telecommunications so that it may be true to say that Kashmiris in Luton are not what Kashmiris used to be. This however will also be the case for Kashmiris in the Mirpur and Kotli districts of Azad Kashmir. In effect what it means to be Kashmiri in these areas has been affected by Kashmiri immigration and settlement in the same way as immigration has affected those Kashmiris settled in Britain.

I started this thesis by looking at the way in which ideas of assimilation and acculturation, steeped as many of them are in notions of traditionalist Western superiority, produced models which would have seen the gradual dissolution of Kashmiri identity as a consequence of its settlement in a tautologically adherent, highly urbanised society. As my research has shown this is far from being the case.

Kashmiris are not disappearing but actually appearing in more and more locations. The emergence of “Kashmiriyat”, the assertion of a Kashmiri identity, points to a process not of nativist rebellion or some atavistic “return” to their roots but the creation of a new subjectivity.

Kashmiri identity does not simply mean the uncovering of a primordial Kashmiriness shorn of its layers of repression. It means the articulation of a new subject position that takes the language of “Kashmiriness” but redefines it and makes it alive and relevant for the contemporary world. Enculturation is the name that is given to this process. Ultimately enculturation is about how we hold onto notions of our community while at the same time living with all the changes that time and circumstances throw at us. Enculturation is what stops the Kashmiris becoming another ethnographic exhibit in the museum of mankind. The Kashmiris have learnt how to be Kashmiris not just outside Kashmir but outside the historical notions of what it was to be Kashmiri.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> For an account of the process of early state formation see Tilly, 1990.

**Appendix 4.1 Biographical questionnaire**

**COMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY OF THE KASHMIRI COMMUNITY  
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM**

**BIOGRAPHICAL QUESTIONNAIRE**

**NASREEN ALI  
UNIVERSITY OF LUTON**

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**PERSONAL DATA**

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**Q1. Name**  
.....**Q2. Gender**

Male 1  
Female 2

**Q3. Which of the following age categories do you fit into?**

16-20 1  
21-25 2  
26-30 3  
31-35 4  
36-40 5  
41-45 6  
51-55 7  
56-60 8  
61-65 9  
66-70 10  
71-75 11  
76-80 12  
80+ 13

**Q4. What is your marital status?**

Single 1  
Married 2  
Widow(er) 3  
Divorced 4  
Separated 5

**Q5. How many children do you have?**

One 1  
Two 2  
Three 3  
Four 4  
Five 5  
More than five 6  
None 7

**Q6. What is your Nationality according to your passport?**

British 1  
Pakistani 2  
Indian 3  
Dual (please specify) 4  
.....  
Other (please specify) 5  
.....

**Q7. What qualifications do you have?**  
.....  
.....**Q8. Where did/have you receive(ed) the majority of your basic FE education?**

In your country of origin 1  
In the United Kingdom 2  
Other (please specify) 3  
.....

**Q9. Where did/have you receive(ed) the majority of your higher education?**

In your country of origin 1  
In the United Kingdom 2  
Other (please specify) 3  
.....

**Q10. What was your employment status in your country of origin before coming to the United Kingdom? (answer if applicable)**

Employed (go onto Q11) 1  
Unemployed 2  
Not seeking employment 3  
Student 4  
Other (please specify) 5  
.....

**Q11. If employed what was your occupation in your country of origin before moving to the United Kingdom? (answer if applicable)**

.....

**Q12. What is your employment status on first arriving in the United Kingdom?(answer if applicable)**

- Employed 1
- Unemployed 2
- Notseekingemployment 3
- Student 4
- Other (please specify) 5

.....

**Q13. If employed what was your occupation on first arriving in the United Kingdom? (answer if applicable)**

.....

**Q14. What is your current employment status in the United Kingdom?**

- Employed 1
- Unemployed 2
- Notseekingemployment 3
- Student 4
- Other (please specify) 5

.....

**Q15. If employed what is your current occupation ? (answer if applicable)**

.....

**Q16. Are you a member of any community group/s?**

- Yes 1
- No (go onto Q19) 2

**Q17. Can you name these groups?**

.....

.....

**Q18. What are the purposes of these groups?**

.....

.....

.....

**Q19. Are you a member of any political group?**

- Yes 1
- No (go onto Q22) 2

**Q20. Can you name these groups?**

.....

.....

**Q21. What are the purposes of these groups?**

.....

.....

.....

**MIGRATION DATA**

**Q22. Country of Birth?**

.....

**Q23. Date of arrival in the United Kingdom? (answer if applicable)**

.....

**Q24. Area/region of birth?**

.....

**Q25. Town/village of birth?**

.....

**Q26. What were your reasons for moving to Britain? (answer if applicable)**

- Work 1
- Education 2
- Marriage 3
- Joining family 4
- Other (please specify) 5

**Q27. Who motivated/influenced you to move to the United Kingdom?**

.....  
.....

**Q28. Were you sponsored e.g. given financial assistance ?**

Yes 1  
No 2  
(go onto Q31)

**Q29. Was your sponsor a relative or someone from the same town/village as you already in the United Kingdom?**

Yes 1  
No 2  
Other 3  
(please specify)

.....

**Q30. Was employment arranged for you on arrival to the United Kingdom?**

Yes 1  
No 2

**Q31. Were you married before arriving in the United Kingdom? (answer if applicable)**

Yes 1  
No 2

**Q32. Do you or any member of your household have any plans to make a permanent move back to your country of origin?**

Yes 1  
No 2  
(go onto Q35)

**Q33. Who is going back?**

.....  
.....

**Q34. What are your/their main reasons for wanting to move back to your/parents country of origin?**

.....  
.....

**RESIDENTIAL DETAILS**

**Q35. With respect to your house are you:**

Sole owner 1  
Spouse of sole owner 2  
Joint owner 3  
Tenant 4  
Living with parents 5  
Living with in laws 6

**Q36. Is this your first house in this country?**

Yes 1  
(go onto Q40)  
No 2

**Q37. With respect to your previous house wer you:**

Sole owner 1  
Spouse of sole owner 2  
Joint owner 3  
Tenant 4  
Living with parents 5  
Living with in laws 6

**Q38. Where was your previous house located?**

.....  
.....  
.....

**Q39. What were your primary reasons for moving house?**

.....  
.....  
.....

**Q40. Why did you decide to move to Luton?**

.....  
.....

**Q41. Why did you move into your present are.**

.....  
.....

**Q42. Who did you buy your property from?**

.....  
.....

**Q43. Did you have any problems when purchasing your house?**

Yes

No

**Q44. What problems did you have?**

.....  
.....  
.....

**Q45. Which of the following are important in your decision to live in this area?**

- Closeness to own society 1
- Closeness to schools with Kashmiri/Muslim children 2
- Closeness to relatives 3
- Closeness to Asian shops 4
- Closeness to services such as Mosques and community centres 5
- Other (please specify) 6

**Q46. Do you have any plans to move house elsewhere in Luton in the near future?**

- Yes 1
- No 2  
(go onto Q50)

**Q47. Where in Luton do you plan to move?**

.....

**Q48. Why do you plan to move into this area/street?**

.....  
.....  
.....

**Q49. Who are you buying your property from?**

.....  
.....

**Q50. Do you have any plans to move out of Luton and into another city/town in the United Kingdom?**

- Yes 1
- No 2  
(go onto Q55)

**Q51. Can you name the city/town where you plan to move?**

.....

**Q52. Why do you plan to move out of Luton?**

.....  
.....

**Q53. Will your new home be in any of the following areas?**

- Near city centre 1
- Suburb 2
- Other 3  
(please specify)

.....

**Q54. Which of the following are important in your decision to move to your new area?**

- Closeness to own society 1
- Closeness to schools with Kashmiri/Muslim children 2
- Closeness to relatives 3
- Closeness to Asian shops 4
- Closeness to services such as Mosques and community centres 5
- Other (please specify) 6

.....

**Q55. How many members of your family are there presently living in your house?**

- One 1
- Two 2
- Three 3
- Four 4
- Five 5
- Other 6  
(please specify)

.....

**Q56. Do you have any relatives (outside of your house) living in the United Kingdom?**

Yes 1  
No 2  
(go onto Q58)

**Q57. Where in the United Kingdom are they located?**

Living within the next few streets 1  
Living in other areas of Luton 2  
Living in the South East 3  
Living in the United Kingdom. 4

**Q58. Do you live as an extended family (i.e. living with immediate family and their spouses and children)?**

Yes 1  
No 2  
(go onto Q60)

**Q59. Why do you live as an extended family?**

.....  
.....  
.....

**MAINTENANCE OF LINKS DATA**

**Q60. Have you or any children/young adult(s) in your household made extended visits to your/parents country of origin for education?**

Yes 1  
No 2  
(go onto Q62)

**Q61. Why did you go/send children/young adult(s) to your/parents country of origin for education?**

.....  
.....

**Q62. Have you or any children/ young adult(s) in your household made extended visits to your/parents country of origin for marriage?**

Yes 1  
No 2  
(go onto Q64)

**Q63. Why did you go/send children/young adult(s) to your/parents country of origin for marriage?**

.....  
.....

**Q64. Do you have relatives in your/parents country of origin?**

Yes 1  
No 2

**Q65. Do you or members of your family living with you in the same house own land in your/parents country of origin?**

Yes 1  
No 2  
(go onto Q67)

**Q66. Did you /they own this land before or after moving to the United kingdom?**

Before my/ their move to the UK 1  
After my/their move to the UK 2  
Born in the UK 3

**Q67. Do you or members of your family living with you in the same house own property in your/parents country of origin? (answer if applicable)**

Yes 1  
No 2  
(go onto Q69)

**Q68. Did you own this property before or after moving to the United kingdom? (answer if applicable)**

Before my/their move to the UK 1  
After my/their move to the UK 2  
Born in the UK 3

**Q69. Do you or any member of your family living with you in the same house have any investments in the United Kingdom?**

Yes 1  
No 2  
(go onto Q71)

**Q70. Do any of the following describe these investments?**

- House currently resident in 1
- Property 2
- Business 3
- Shares 4
- Land 5
- Other (please specify)

.....

**Q71. Do you regularly send back money to your family and relatives in your/parents country of origin?**

- Yes 1
- No 2  
(go onto Q 73)

**Q72. Do you expect any returns on the money sent to your family and relatives in your/parents country of origin?**

- Yes 1
- No 2  
(go onto Q 74)

**Q73. What type of returns do you expect?**

.....

.....

**Q74. How often do you or members of your household return to your country of origin?**

- More than once a year 1
- Once a year 2
- Once every five years 3
- Other (please specify) 4

.....

**Q75. Why do you/they return this often?**

.....

.....

**Appendix 4.1 Biographical questionnaire**

**COMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY OF THE KASHMIRI COMMUNITY  
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM**

**BIOGRAPHICAL QUESTIONNAIRE**

**NASREEN ALI  
UNIVERSITY OF LUTON**

PERSONAL DATA

Q1. Name

Q2. Gender

Male 1  
Female 2

Q3. Which of the following age categories do you fit into?

16-20 1  
21-25 2  
26-30 3  
31-35 4  
36-40 5  
41-45 6  
51-55 7  
56-60 8  
61-65 9  
66-70 10  
71-75 11  
76-80 12  
80+ 13

Q4. What is your marital status?

Single 1  
Married 2  
Widow(er) 3  
Divorced 4  
Separated 5

Q5. How many children do you have?

One 1  
Two 2  
Three 3  
Four 4  
Five 5  
More than five 6  
None 7

Q6. What is your Nationality according to your passport?

British 1  
Pakistani 2  
Indian 3  
Dual (please specify) 4  
Other (please specify) 5

Q7. What qualifications do you have?

Q8. Where did/have you receive(ed) the majority of your basic FE education?

In your country of origin 1  
In the United Kingdom 2  
Other (please specify) 3

Q9. Where did/have you receive(ed) the majority of your higher education?

In your country of origin 1  
In the United Kingdom 2  
Other (please specify) 3

Q10. What was your employment status in your country of origin before coming to the United Kingdom? (answer if applicable)

Employed (go onto Q11) 1  
Unemployed 2  
Not seeking employment 3  
Student 4  
Other (please specify) 5

**Q11. If employed what was your occupation in your country of origin before moving to the United Kingdom? (answer if applicable)**

.....

**Q12. What is your employment status on first arriving in the United Kingdom?(answer if applicable)**

- Employed 1
- Unemployed 2
- Notseekingemployment 3
- Student 4
- Other (please specify) 5

.....

**Q13. If employed what was your occupation on first arriving in the United Kingdom? (answer if applicable)**

.....

**Q14. What is your current employment status in the United Kingdom?**

- Employed 1
- Unemployed 2
- Notseekingemployment 3
- Student 4
- Other (please specify) 5

.....

**Q15. If employed what is your current occupation ? (answer if applicable)**

.....

**Q16. Are you a member of any community group/s?**

- Yes 1
- No 2  
(go onto Q19)

**Q17. Can you name these groups?**

.....

.....

**Q18. What are the purposes of these groups?**

.....

.....

.....

**Q19. Are you a member of any political group?**

- Yes 1
- No 2  
(go onto Q22)

**Q20. Can you name these groups?**

.....

.....

**Q21. What are the purposes of these groups?**

.....

.....

.....

.....

**MIGRATION DATA**

**Q22. Country of Birth?**

.....

**Q23. Date of arrival in the United Kingdom? (answer if applicable)**

.....

**Q24. Area/region of birth?**

.....

**Q25. Town/village of birth?**

.....

**Q26. What were your reasons for moving to Britain? (answer if applicable)**

- Work 1
- Education 2
- Marriage 3
- Joining family 4
- Other (please specify) 5

**Q27. Who motivated/influenced you to move to the United Kingdom?**

.....  
.....

**Q28. Were you sponsored e.g. given financial assistance ?**

Yes 1  
No 2  
(go onto Q31)

**Q29. Was your sponsor a relative or someone from the same town/village as you already in the United Kingdom?**

Yes 1  
No 2  
Other 3  
(please specify)

.....

**Q30. Was employment arranged for you on arrival to the United Kingdom?**

Yes 1  
No 2

**Q31. Were you married before arriving in the United Kingdom? (answer if applicable)**

Yes 1  
No 2

**Q32. Do you or any member of your household have any plans to make a permanent move back to your country of origin?**

Yes 1  
No 2  
(go onto Q35)

**Q33. Who is going back?**

.....  
.....

**Q34. What are your/their main reasons for wanting to move back to your/parents country of origin?**

.....  
.....

-----  
**RESIDENTIAL DETAILS**  
-----

**Q35. With respect to your house are you:**

Sole owner 1  
Spouse of sole owner 2  
Joint owner 3  
Tenant 4  
Living with parents 5  
Living with in laws 6

**Q36. Is this your first house in this country?**

Yes 1  
(go onto Q40)  
No 2

**Q37. With respect to your previous house were you:**

Sole owner 1  
Spouse of sole owner 2  
Joint owner 3  
Tenant 4  
Living with parents 5  
Living with in laws 6

**Q38. Where was your previous house located?**

.....  
.....  
.....

**Q39. What were your primary reasons for moving house?**

.....  
.....  
.....

**Q40. Why did you decide to move to Luton?**

.....  
.....

**Q41. Why did you move into your present area?**

.....  
.....

**Q42. Who did you buy your property from?**

.....  
.....

**Q43. Did you have any problems when purchasing your house?**

Yes  
No

**Q44. What problems did you have?**

.....  
.....  
.....

**Q45. Which of the following are important in your decision to live in this area?**

Closeness to own society	1
Closeness to schools with Kashmiri/Muslim children	2
Closeness to relatives	3
Closeness to Asian shops	4
Closeness to services such as Mosques and community centres	5
Other (please specify)	6

.....

**Q46. Do you have any plans to move house elsewhere in Luton in the near future?**

Yes 1  
No 2  
(go onto Q50)

**Q47. Where in Luton do you plan to move?**

.....

**Q48. Why do you plan to move into this area/street?**

.....  
.....  
.....

**Q49. Who are you buying your property from?**

.....  
.....

**Q50. Do you have any plans to move out of Luton and into another city/town in the United Kingdom?**

Yes 1  
No 2  
(go onto Q55)

**Q51. Can you name the city/town where you plan to move?**

.....

**Q52. Why do you plan to move out of Luton?**

.....  
.....

**Q53. Will your new home be in any of the following areas?**

Near city centre	1
Suburb	2
Other (please specify)	3

.....

**Q54. Which of the following are important in your decision to move to your new area?**

Closeness to own society	1
Closeness to schools with Kashmiri/Muslim children	2
Closeness to relatives	3
Closeness to Asian shops	4
Closeness to services such as Mosques and community centres	5
Other (please specify)	6

.....

**Q55. How many members of your family are there presently living in your house?**

One	1
Two	2
Three	3
Four	4
Five	5
Other (please specify)	6

.....

**Q56. Do you have any relatives (outside of your house) living in the United Kingdom?**

Yes 1  
No 2  
(go onto Q58)

**Q57. Where in the United Kingdom are they located?**

Living within the next few streets 1  
Living in other areas of Luton 2  
Living in the South East 3  
Living in the United Kingdom. 4

**Q58. Do you live as an extended family (i.e living with immediate family and their spouses and children)?**

Yes 1  
No 2  
(go onto Q60)

**Q59. Why do you live as an extended family?**

.....  
.....  
.....

---

**MAINTENANCE OF LINKS DATA**

---

**Q60. Have you or any children/young adult(s) in your household made extended visits to your/parents country of origin for education?**

Yes 1  
No 2  
(go onto Q62)

**Q61. Why did you go/send children/young adult(s) to your/parents country of origin for education?**

.....  
.....

**Q62. Have you or any children/ young adult(s) in your household made extended visits to your/parents country of origin for marriage?**

Yes 1  
No 2  
(go onto Q64)

**Q63. Why did you go/send children/young adult(s) to your/parents country of origin for marriage?**

.....  
.....

**Q64. Do you have relatives in your/parents country of origin?**

Yes 1  
No 2

**Q65. Do you or members of your family living with you in the same house own land in your/parents country of origin?**

Yes 1  
No 2  
(go onto Q67)

**Q66. Did you /they own this land before or after moving to the United kingdom?**

Before my/ their move to the UK 1  
After my/their move to the UK 2  
Born in the UK 3

**Q67. Do you or members of your family living with you in the same house own property in your/parents country of origin? (answer if applicable)**

Yes 1  
No 2  
(go onto Q 69)

**Q68. Did you own this property before or after moving to the United kingdom? (answer if applicable)**

Before my/ their move to the UK 1  
After my/ their move to the UK 2  
Born in the UK 3

**Q69. Do you or any member of your family living with you in the same house have any investments in the United Kingdom?**

Yes 1  
No 2  
(go onto Q71)

**Q70. Do any of the following describe these investments?**

- House currently resident in 1
- Property 2
- Business 3
- Shares 4
- Land 5
- Other (please specify)

.....

**Q71. Do you regularly send back money to your family and relatives in your/parents country of origin?**

- Yes 1
- No (go onto Q 73) 2

**Q72. Do you expect any returns on the money sent to your family and relatives in your/parents country of origin?**

- Yes 1
- No (go onto Q 74) 2

**Q73. What type of returns do you expect?**

.....  
.....

**Q74. How often do you or members of your household return to your country of origin?**

- More than once a year 1
- Once a year 2
- Once every five years 3
- Other (please specify) 4

.....

**Q75. Why do you/they return this often?**

.....  
.....

Appendix 4.2 Kashmiri (older and younger generation) identity instruments

COMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY OF THE KASHMIRI COMMUNITY  
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

برطانیہ میں کشمیری کمیونٹی کے افراد کی ذاتی اور اجتماعی شناخت

IDENTITY STRUCTURE INSTRUMENT  
OLDER GENERATION

شناخت ظاہر کرنے کیلئے سوالنامہ

(بڑوں کیلئے)

NASREEN ALI  
UNIVERSITY OF LUTON

نسreen علی  
یونیورسٹی آف لوٹن

ان کے بارے میں میری جذبات انتہائی اچھے ہیں۔

یہ میں بالکل پسند نہیں کرتا

I have warm <1> I don't like at all  
feelings towards

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	.....t.....t.....			0			
Person in the community I admire	.....t.....			0			
JKLF	.....t.....t.....			0			
Me as I was when I was in Azad Kashmir	.....			0			
Mosque Noor	.....			0			
Kashmiri biraderi	.....			0			
Young English women in Luton	.....			0			
My children born and brought up in Azad Kashmir	.....			0			
Young English men in Luton	.....			0			
Person in the community I dislike	.....			0			
My children born and brought up in the UK	.....t.....t.....			0			
Luton Islamic Society	.....t.....t.....			0			
Madina Mosque	.....t.....t.....			0			
Jamia Masjid	.....t.....			0			
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....t.....t.....			0			
Young Asian women in Luton	.....t.....t.....			0			
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association	.....t.....			0			
Muslim Conference	.....			0			
Young Asian men in Luton	.....t.....t.....			0			
John Major	.....t.....t.....			0			
British media	.....t.....			0			
Narasimha Rao	.....t.....t.....			0			
My Parents	.....			0			
Benazir Bhutto	.....t.....			0			
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....t.....t.....			0			
Luton University	.....			0			
Kashmiri Music	.....			0			
Me as I would like to be	.....t.....			0			

جس طرح میں اب جکل ہوں۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں۔  
جوان کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ۔

جس طرح میں آزاد کشمیر میں تھا۔  
مسجد نور۔

کشمیری برادری۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں۔  
میرے بچے جو آزاد کشمیر میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔

لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا۔  
میرے بچے جو انگلینڈ میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔

لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی۔  
مدینہ مسجد۔

جامع مسجد۔  
آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں۔

پاکستان کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی۔  
مسلم کانفرنس۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد۔

جان میجر، ڈرائیو ایلاغ۔  
نرسمہا راؤ۔  
میرے والدین۔

بے نظیر بھٹو۔  
بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری۔  
لوٹن یونیورسٹی۔

کشمیری میوزک۔  
میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/چاہوں گی۔

اپنے طور طریقوں میں انتہائی انگریز/تھا۔

اپنے طور طریقوں میں انتہائی ایشیائی ہے/ہیں اور  
انگریزی رسموں سے دور رہتا ہے/ہوں۔

is/was strongly English <2> is/are very Asian in their way/s and  
in my/their ways keep/s away from English customs

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now				0			
Person in the community I admire				0			
JKLF				0			
Me as I was when I was in Azad Kashmir				0			
Mosque Noor				0			
Kashmiri biraderi				0			
Young English women in Luton				0			
My children born and brought up in Azad Kashmir				0			
Young English men in Luton				0			
Person in the community I dislike				0			
My children born and brought up in the UK				0			
Luton Islamic Society				0			
Madina Mosque				0			
Jamia Masjid				0			
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir				0			
Young Asian women in Luton				0			
Pakistan / Kashmir Welfare Association				0			
Muslim Conference				0			
Young Asian men in Luton				0			
John Major				0			
British media				0			
Narasimha Rao				0			
My Parents				0			
Benazir Bhutto				0			
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir				0			
Luton University				0			
Kashmiri Music				0			
Me as I would like to be				0			

جس طرح میں آج کل ہوں۔

کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں۔  
جموں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ۔

جس طرح میں آزاد کشمیر میں تھا۔

مسجد نور۔

کشمیری برادری۔

لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں۔

میرے بچے جو آزاد کشمیر میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔

لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد۔

کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا۔

میرے بچے جو انگلینڈ میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔

لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی۔

مدینہ مسجد۔

جامع مسجد۔

آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری۔

لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں۔

پاکستان کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی۔

مسلم کانفرنس۔

لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد۔

جان میجرس ڈرائیو ایلانغ۔

نرس مہارائو۔

میرے والدین۔

بے نظیر بھٹو۔

بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری۔

لوٹن یونیورسٹی۔

کشمیری میوزک۔

میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/چاہوں گی۔

پکا پاکستانی ہونے کے ساتھ رسم و رواج میں کشمیری کو  
پاکستانی جیسا سمجھتا ہے / ہیں / تھا -

اپنی رسم و روایات کو پاکستان مختلف سمجھنے کے علاوہ روزمرہ  
زندگی میں پکا کشمیری ہے / ہیں / تھا -

is/was/are strongly Pakistani in their attitudes and customs and see Kashmiri the same as Pakistani <3>  
is/was/are strongly Kashmiri in their everyday lives and regard Kashmiri attitudes and customs as different from Pakistanis

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I admire	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
JKLF	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Me as I was when I was in Azad Kashmir	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mosque Noor	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiri biraderi	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young English women in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
My children born and brought up in Azad Kashmir	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young English men in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I dislike	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
My children born and brought up in the UK	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Luton Islamic Society	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Madina Mosque	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Jamia Masjid	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pakistan/ Kashmir Welfare Association	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Muslim Conference	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
John Major	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
British media	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Narasimha Rao	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
My Parents	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Benazir Bhutto	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Luton University	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiri Music	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Me as I would like to be	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

جس طرح میں اب جکل ہوں -  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں -  
جموں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ -  
جس طرح میں آزاد کشمیر میں تھا -  
مسجد نور -  
کشمیری برادری -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں -  
میرے بچے جو آزاد کشمیر میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد -  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا -  
میرے بچے جو انگلینڈ میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے -  
لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی -  
مدینہ مسجد -  
جامع مسجد -  
آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں -  
پاکستان کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی -  
مسلم کانفرنس -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد -  
جان میجر رٹس ایلانغ -  
نرسمہ راؤ -  
میرے والدین -  
بے نظیر بھٹو -  
بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری -  
لوٹن یونیورسٹی -  
کشمیری میوزک -  
میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا / چاہوں گی -

انگریزی روزگار اور تعلیم میں رہنے کیلئے بولتا ہوں۔

کیونکہ میں کھل کر جاننے کے لئے انگریزی بولتا ہوں / ہے

speaks English only because it is <4> necessary for employment and living in the UK

speaks English to become fully integrated into English society

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now							
Person in the community I admire				0			
JKLF				0			
Me as I was when I was in Azad Kashmir				0			
Mosque Noor				t			
Kashmiri biraderi				0			
Young English women in Luton				0			
My children born and brought up in Azad Kashmir				t			
Young English men in Luton				t			
Person in the community I dislike				t	t		
My children born and brought up in the UK				0			
Luton Islamic Society				t			
Madina Mosque				t			
Jamia Masjid				t			
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir				0			
Young Asian women in Luton				0			
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association				t			
Muslim Conference				0			
Young Asian men in Luton				t			
John Major				t	t		
British media				t	t		
Narasimha Rao				t			
My Parents				t	t		
Benazir Bhutto				t	t		
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir				t			
Luton University				0			
Kashmiri Music				0			
Me as I would like to be				0			

جس طرح میں اب جھک ہوں۔  
کیونکہ میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں۔  
جموں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ۔

جس طرح میں آزاد کشمیر میں تھا۔  
مسجد نور۔

کشمیری برادری۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں۔  
میرے بچے جو آزاد کشمیر میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔

لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد۔  
کیونکہ میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا۔  
میرے بچے جو انگلینڈ میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔

لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی۔  
مدینہ مسجد۔

جامع مسجد۔  
آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری۔

لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں۔  
پاکستان کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی۔

مسلم کانفرنس۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد۔

جان میجر۔  
برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ۔

نرسیمہا راؤ۔  
میرے والدین۔

بے نظیر بھٹو۔  
بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری۔

لوٹن یونیورسٹی۔  
کشمیری میوزک۔

میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا / چاہوں گی۔

روایتی زبانیں اپنا قیمتی ورثہ سمجھ کر بولتا ہے/ ہوں۔

خاندان اور برادری جو باؤ کی وجہ سے روایتی زبانیں بولتا ہے/ ہوں

speaks/s traditional language because <5> speaks/s traditional languages only  
believes it is a valuable part of one's heritage because of pressure from family and birader

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	0					
Person in the community I admire	.....	0					
JKLF	.....	0					
Me as I was when I was in Azad Kashmir	.....	0					
Mosque Noor	.....	0					
Kashmiri biraderi	.....	0					
Young English women in Luton	.....	0					
My children born and brought up in Azad Kashmir	.....	0					
Young English men in Luton	.....	0					
Person in the community I dislike	.....	0					
My children born and brought up in the UK	.....	0					
Luton Islamic Society	.....	0					
Madina Mosque	.....	0					
Jamia Masjid	.....	0					
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....	0					
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	0					
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association	.....	0					
Muslim Conference	.....	0					
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	0					
John Major	.....	0					
British media	.....	0					
Narasimha Rao	.....	0					
My Parents	.....	0					
Benazir Bhutto	.....	0					
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....	0					
Luton University	.....	0					
Kashmiri Music	.....	0					
Me as I would like to be	.....	0					

جس طرح میں اب جکل ہوں۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں۔  
جس طرح میں آزاد کشمیر میں تھا۔

مسجد نور۔  
کشمیری برادری۔

لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں۔  
میرے بچے جو آزاد کشمیر میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔

لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا۔  
میرے بچے جو انگلینڈ میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔

لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی۔  
مدینہ مسجد۔

جامع مسجد۔  
آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری۔

لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں۔  
پاکستان کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی۔

مسلم کانفرنس۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد۔

جان میجر۔  
برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ۔

نرسیمہا راؤ۔  
میرے والدین۔

بے نظیر بھٹو۔  
بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری۔

لوٹن یونیورسٹی۔  
کشمیری میوزک۔

میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/ چاہوں گی۔

روایتی طے کردہ شادیوں کے طریقے کو ایشیائی ہونے کی  
بنیاد تصور کرتے ہیں۔

آج کے دور میں اپنا ساتھی خود چننے کی آزادی پر  
یقین رکھتے ہیں۔

believe/s that traditional systems of arranged  
marriage are fundamental to being Asian

believe/s that in today's society it is better to  
have the freedom to choose one's own marriage  
partner

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Measrammow	.....t.....t.....	0					
Person in the community I admire	.....t.....t.....	0					
JKLF	.....t.....t.....	0					
Me as I was when I was in Azad Kashmir	.....t.....t.....	0					
Mosque Noor	.....t.....t.....	0					
Kashmiri biraderi	.....t.....t.....	0					
Young English women in Luton	.....t.....t.....	0					
My children born and brought up in Azad Kashmir	.....t.....t.....	0					
Young English men in Luton	.....t.....t.....	0					
Person in the community I dislike	.....t.....t.....	0					
My children born and brought up in the UK	.....t.....t.....	0					
Luton Islamic Society	.....t.....t.....	0					
Madina Mosque	.....t.....t.....	0					
Jamia Masjid	.....t.....t.....	0					
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....t.....t.....	0					
Young Asian women in Luton	.....t.....t.....	0					
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association	.....t.....t.....	0					
Muslim Conference	.....t.....t.....	0					
Young Asian men in Luton	.....t.....t.....	0					
John Major	.....t.....t.....	0					
British media	.....t.....t.....	0					
Narasimha Rao	.....t.....t.....	0					
My Parents	.....t.....t.....	0					
Benazir Bhutto	.....t.....t.....	0					
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....t.....t.....	0					
Luton University	.....t.....t.....	0					
Kashmiri Music	.....t.....t.....	0					
Me as I would like to be	.....t.....t.....	0					

جس طرح میں آجکل ہوں۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں۔  
جس طرح میں آزاد کشمیر میں تھا۔  
مسجد نور۔  
کشمیری برادری۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں۔  
میرے بچے جو آزاد کشمیر میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا۔  
میرے بچے جو انگلینڈ میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔  
لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی۔  
مدینہ مسجد۔  
جامع مسجد۔  
آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں۔  
پاکستان کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی۔  
مسلم کانفرنس۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد۔  
جان میجر۔  
برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ۔  
نرسیمہ راؤ۔  
میرے والدین۔  
بے نظیر بھٹو۔  
بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری۔  
لوٹن یونیورسٹی۔  
کشمیری میوزک۔  
میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/ چاہوں گی۔

والدین اور بزرگوں کے ساتھ مختلف اور مخصوص سلوک  
کئے جانے پر یقین رکھتا ہے/ ہیں۔

سمجھتا ہے کہ والدین یا بزرگ عزت کروانا سکیں اور  
سب کے ساتھ یکساں سلوک پر یقین رکھتا ہے/ ہیں۔

believe/s that parents/elders should be <7> feel/s that parents/elders should be treated  
treated with special deference as equals and have to earn special respect

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	.....t.....	0					
Person in the community I admire	.....t.....	0					
JKLF	.....t.....	0					
Me as I was when I was in Azad Kashmir	.....t.....	0					
Mosque Noor	.....t.....	0					
Kashmiri biraderi	.....t.....	0					
Young English women in Luton	.....t.....t.....	0					
My children born and brought up in Azad Kashmir	.....t.....	0					
Young English men in Luton	.....t.....	0					
Person in the community I dislike	.....t.....	0					
My children born and brought up in the UK	.....t.....	0					
Luton Islamic Society	.....t.....	0					
Madina Mosque	.....t.....	0					
Jamia Masjid	.....t.....	0					
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....t.....	0					
Young Asian women in Luton	.....t.....t.....	0					
Pakistan/ Kashmir Welfare Association	.....t.....	0					
Muslim Conference	.....t.....	0					
Young Asian men in Luton	.....t.....	0					
John Major	.....t.....	0					
British media	.....t.....	0					
Narasimha Rao	.....t.....	0					
My Parents	.....t.....t.....	0					
Benazir Bhutto	.....t.....	0					
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....t.....	0					
Luton University	.....t.....	0					
Kashmiri Music	.....t.....	0					
Me as I would like to be	.....t.....	0					

جس طرح میں آج کل ہوں۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں۔  
جموں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ۔  
جس طرح میں آزاد کشمیر میں تھا۔  
مسجد نور۔  
کشمیری برادری۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں۔  
میرے بچے جو آزاد کشمیر میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا۔  
میرے بچے جو انگلینڈ میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔  
لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی۔  
مدینہ مسجد۔  
جامع مسجد۔  
آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں۔  
پاکستان کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی۔  
مسلم کانفرنس۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد۔  
جان میجر۔  
برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ۔  
نرسیمہ راؤ۔  
میرے والدین۔  
بے نظیر بھٹو۔  
سبھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری۔  
لوٹن یونیورسٹی۔  
کشمیری میوزک۔  
میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/ چاہوں گی۔

متحدہ کشمیر اور اس کے پاکستان و بھارت دونوں سے  
خود مختار ہونے پر یقین رکھتا ہے / ہیں -

پورے کشمیر کو پاکستان کا حصہ خیال کرتا ہے / ہیں

feel/s that Kashmir should be re united <8> think/s that all of Kashmir should  
and independent of both Pakistan and India be part of Pakistan

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I admire	.....t.....t.....t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
JKLF	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Me as I was when I was in Azad Kashmir	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mosque Noor	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiri biraderi	.....t.....t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young English women in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
My children born and brought up in Azad Kashmir	.....t.....t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young English men in Luton	.....t.....t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I dislike	.....t.....t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
My children born and brought up in the UK	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Luton Islamic Society	.....t.....t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Madina Mosque	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Jamia Masjid	.....t.....t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....t.....t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Muslim Conference	.....t.....t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian men in Luton	.....t.....t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
John Major	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
British media	.....t.....t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Narasimha Rao	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
My Parents	.....t.....t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Benazir Bhutto	.....t.....t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....t.....t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Luton University	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiri Music	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Me as I would like to be	.....t.....t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

جس طرح میں آج کل ہوں -  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں -  
جموں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ -  
جس طرح میں آزاد کشمیر میں تھا -  
مسجد نور -  
کشمیری برادری -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں -  
میرے بچے جو آزاد کشمیر میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد -  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا -  
میرے بچے جو انگلینڈ میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے -  
لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی -  
مدینہ مسجد -  
جامع مسجد -  
آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں -  
پاکستان کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی -  
مسلم کانفرنس -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد -  
جان میجر -  
برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ -  
نرسیمہا راؤ -  
میرے والدین -  
بے نظیر بھٹو -  
بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری -  
لوٹن یونیورسٹی -  
کشمیری میوزک -  
میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا / چاہوں گی -

ذاتی عزت پر اعتماد رکھتا ہے / ہیں -

انسان کے اپنے کردار کی مطابق درست کام کرنے کو عزت سے زیادہ  
مزوری خیال کرتے ہیں / ہیں -

believes and respects *izat* <9> think/s that doing the right thing according  
to one's own sense of morality is more important  
than *izat*

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now				0			
Person in the community I admire				0			
JKLF				0			
Me as I was when I was in Azad Kashmir				0			
Mosque Noor				0			
Kashmiri biraderi				0			
Young English women in Luton				0			
My children born and brought up in Azad Kashmir			t	0			
Young Englishmen in Luton			t	0			
Person in the community I dislike				0			
My children born and brought up in the UK				0			
Luton Islamic Society			t	0	t		
Madina Mosque			t	0			
Jamia Masjid				0			
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir				0			
Young Asian women in Luton				0			
Pakistan/ Kashmir Welfare Association				0			
Muslim Conference			t	0	t		
Young Asian men in Luton			t	0	t		
John Major				0			
British media				0			
Narasimha Rao			t	0			
My Parents				0			
Benazir Bhutto				0			
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir				0			
Luton University			t	0			
Kashmiri Music				0			
Me as I would like to be				0			

جس طرح میں آج کل ہوں -  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں -  
جموں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ -  
جس طرح میں آزاد کشمیر میں تھا -  
مسجد نور -  
کشمیری برادری -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں -  
میرے بچے جو آزاد کشمیر میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد -  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا -  
میرے بچے جو انگلینڈ میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے -  
لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی -  
مدینہ مسجد -  
جامع مسجد -  
آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں -  
پاکستان کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی -  
مسلم کانفرنس -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد -  
جان میجر -  
برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ -  
نرسیمہ راؤ -  
میرے والدین -  
بے نظیر بھٹو -  
سبھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری -  
لوٹن یونیورسٹی -  
کشمیری میوزک -  
میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا / چاہوں گی -

برادری سسٹم میں زیادہ لگن محسوس کرتا ہے/ہیں۔

خود مختار زندگی گزارنے کے لئے انفرادی آزادی پر یقین رکھتا ہے/ہیں۔

feel/s deeply committed to the <10> believe/s in the freedom for individuals to  
system of biraderi follow their own independent life

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now				0			
Person in the community I admire				0			
JKLF				0			
Me as I was when I was in Azad Kashmir				0			
Mosque Noor				0			
Kashmiri biraderi				0			
Young English women in Luton				0			
My children born and brought up in Azad Kashmir			t	t			
Young English men in Luton			t	t			
Person in the community I dislike				0			
My children born and brought up in the UK			t	t			
Luton Islamic Society			t	t			
Madina Mosque			t	t			
Jamia Masjid			t	t			
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir				0			
Young Asian women in Luton				0			
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association			t	t			
Muslim Conference				0			
Young Asian men in Luton			t	t			
John Major			t	t			
British media				0			
Narasimha Rao			t	t			
My Parents			t	t			
Benazir Bhutto				0			
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir			t	t			
Luton University				0			
Kashmiri Music				0			
Me as I would like to be			t	t			

جس طرح میں آج کل ہوں۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں۔  
جس طرح میں آزاد کشمیر میں تھا۔  
مسجد نور۔  
کشمیری برادری۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں۔  
میرے بچے جو آزاد کشمیر میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا۔  
میرے بچے جو انگلینڈ میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔  
لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی۔  
مدینہ مسجد۔  
جامع مسجد۔  
آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں۔  
پاکستان کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی۔  
مسلم کانفرنس۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد۔  
جان میجور۔  
برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ۔  
نرسمہ راؤ۔  
میرے والدین۔  
بے نظیر بھٹو۔  
بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری۔  
لوٹن یونیورسٹی۔  
کشمیری میوزک۔  
میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/چاہوں گی۔

گھر کے باہر روایتی لباس پہننا پسند کرتا ہے/ ہیں۔

گھر کے باہر مغربی لباس پہننا پسند کرتا ہے/ ہیں۔

outside of the home prefers to wear <11> outside of the home prefers wearing  
traditional dress western style dress

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now				0			
Person in the community I admire			t	t			
JKLF			t	t			
Me as I was when I was in Azad Kashmir			t	t			
Mosque Noor				0			
Kashmiri biraderi				0			
Young English women in Luton				0			
My children born and brought up in Azad Kashmir				0			
Young English men in Luton				0			
Person in the community I dislike			t				
My children born and brought up in the UK				0			
Luton Islamic Society				0			
Madina Mosque				0			
Jamia Masjid			t	t			
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir				0			
Young Asian women in Luton				0			
Pakistan/ Kashmir Welfare Association			t				
Muslim Conference				0			
Young Asian men in Luton				0			
John Major			t				
British media			t				
Narasimha Rao			t				
My Parents			t				
Benazir Bhutto				0			
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir			t				
Luton University			t	t			
Kashmiri Music				0			
Me as I would like to be			t	t			

جس طرح میں اب جکل ہوں۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں۔  
جنون کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ۔  
جس طرح میں آزاد کشمیر میں تھا۔  
مسجد نور۔  
کشمیری برادری۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں۔  
میرے بچے جو آزاد کشمیر میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا۔  
میرے بچے جو انگلینڈ میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔  
لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی۔  
مدینہ مسجد۔  
جامع مسجد۔  
آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں۔  
پاکستان کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی۔  
مسلم کانفرنس۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد۔  
جان میجور۔  
برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ۔  
نرسمہا راؤ۔  
میرے والدین۔  
بے نظیر بھٹو۔  
بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری۔  
لوٹن یونیورسٹی۔  
کشمیری میوزک۔  
میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/ چاہوں گی۔

صرف فالٹو وقت مَرحوں ساتھ گزارنے کو ترجیح دیتا ہے۔ تہی ہے۔

صرف کالج/کام/یونیورسٹی میں مردوں کیساتھ وقت گزارنا چاہیے گی/چاہیے گا۔

prefer/s the company of men <12> would spend time with men only at work or at school/college/university in leisure time

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	.....t.....			0			
Person in the community I admire	.....t.....			0			
JKLF	.....t.....			0			
Me as I was when I was in Azad Kashmir	.....t.....			0			
Mosque Noor	.....t.....			0			
Kashmiri biraderi	.....t.....			0			
Young English women in Luton	.....t.....			0			
My children born and brought up in Azad Kashmir	.....t.....			0			
Young English men in Luton	.....t.....			0			
Person in the community I dislike	.....t.....			0			
My children born and brought up in the UK	.....t.....			0			
Luton Islamic Society	.....t.....			0			
Madina Mosque	.....t.....			0			
Jamia Masjid	.....t.....			0			
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....t.....			0			
Young Asian women in Luton	.....t.....			0			
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association	.....t.....			0			
Muslim Conference	.....t.....			0			
Young Asian men in Luton	.....t.....			0			
John Major	.....t.....			0			
British media	.....t.....			0			
Narasimha Rao	.....t.....			0			
My Parents	.....t.....			0			
Benazir Bhutto	.....t.....			0			
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....t.....			0			
Luton University	.....t.....			0			
Kashmiri Music	.....t.....			0			
Me as I would like to be	.....t.....			0			

جس طرح میں آجکل ہوں۔  
 کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں۔  
 جموں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ۔  
 جس طرح میں آزاد کشمیر میں تھا۔  
 مسجد نور۔  
 کشمیری برادری۔  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں۔  
 میرے بچے جو آزاد کشمیر میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد۔  
 کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا۔  
 میرے بچے جو انگلینڈ میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔  
 لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی۔  
 مدینہ مسجد۔  
 جامع مسجد۔  
 آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری۔  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں۔  
 پاکستان کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی۔  
 مسلم کانفرنس۔  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد۔  
 جان میجر۔  
 برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ۔  
 نرسیمہا راؤ۔  
 میرے والدین۔  
 بے نظیر بھٹو۔  
 بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری۔  
 لوٹن یونیورسٹی۔  
 کشمیری میوزک۔  
 میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/چاہوں گی۔

صرف مالتو وقت میں عورتوں سے گھنڈا ملنا پسند  
کرتی / کرتا ہوں -

صرف کام پر / سکول / کالج / یونیورسٹی میں عورتوں کے  
ساتھ کھلنے جلنے دتر جیج دیتی ہے / دیتا ہے -

enjoy/s spending leisure time <13> prefer/s to mix with women only  
with women at work or at school/college/university

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	
Me as I am now	.....t.....t.....							جس طرح میں آجکل ہوں -
Person in the community I admire	.....0.....							کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں -
JKLF	.....0.....							جنون کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ -
Me as I was when I was in Azad Kashmir	.....t.....							جس طرح میں آزاد کشمیر میں تھا -
Mosque Noor	.....0.....							مسجد نور -
Kashmiri biraderi	.....0.....							کشمیری برادری -
Young English women in Luton	.....0.....							لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں -
My children born and brought up in Azad Kashmir	.....0.....							میرے بچے جو آزاد کشمیر میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے -
Young English men in Luton	.....t.....t.....							لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد -
Person in the community I dislike	.....t.....t.....							کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا -
My children born and brought up in the UK	.....t.....							میرے بچے جو انگلینڈ میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے -
Luton Islamic Society	.....0.....							لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی -
Madina Mosque	.....t.....							مدینہ مسجد -
Jamia Masjid	.....t.....t.....							جامع مسجد -
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....0.....							آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری -
Young Asian women in Luton	.....t.....							لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں -
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association	.....t.....t.....t.....							پاکستان کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی -
Muslim Conference	.....0.....							مسلم کانفرنس -
Young Asian men in Luton	.....0.....							لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد -
John Major	.....0.....							جان میجور -
British media	.....t.....							برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ -
Narasimha Rao	.....t.....							نرسمہا راؤ -
My Parents	.....t.....t.....							میرے والدین -
Benazir Bhutto	.....0.....							بے نظیر بھٹو -
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....t.....t.....							بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری -
Luton University	.....t.....t.....							لوٹن یونیورسٹی -
Kashmiri Music	.....0.....							کشمیری میوزک -
Me as I would like to be	.....t.....							میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا / چاہوں گی -

محسوس کرتا ہوں کہ مسلمان صرف مسلمانوں سے ہی شادی کر سکیں۔

محسوس کرتا ہوں / کرتی ہوں کہ مسلمان لوگ غیر مسلموں سے شادی کر سکیں۔

feel/s that Muslims should <14> feels that Muslims should be able  
only marry a Muslim to marry non Muslims

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now				0			
Person in the community I admire				0			
JKLF				0			
Me as I was when I was in Azad Kashmir				0			
Mosque Noor				0			
Kashmiri biraderi				0			
Young English women in Luton				0			
My children born and brought up in Azad Kashmir				0			
Young English men in Luton				0			
Person in the community I dislike				0			
My children born and brought up in the UK				0			
Luton Islamic Society				0			
Madina Mosque				0			
Jamia Masjid				0			
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir				0			
Young Asian women in Luton				0			
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association				0			
Muslim Conference				0			
Young Asian men in Luton				0			
John Major				0			
British media				0			
Narasimha Rao				0			
My Parents				0			
Benazir Bhutto				0			
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir				0			
Luton University				0			
Kashmiri Music				0			
Me as I would like to be				0			

جس طرح میں آج کل ہوں۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں۔  
جنوں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ۔  
جس طرح میں آزاد کشمیر میں تھا۔  
مسجد نور۔  
کشمیری برادری۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں۔  
میرے بچے جو آزاد کشمیر میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا۔  
میرے بچے جو انگلینڈ میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔  
لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی۔  
مدینہ مسجد۔  
جامع مسجد۔  
آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں۔  
پاکستان کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی۔  
مسلم کانفرنس۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد۔  
جان میجور۔  
برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ۔  
نرسمہا راؤ۔  
میرے والدین۔  
بے نظیر بھٹو۔  
بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری۔  
لوٹن یونیورسٹی۔  
کشمیری میوزک۔  
میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا / چاہوں گی۔

تمام ایشیائیوں کے ساتھ میں جوں رکھنا چاہوں گا/ائے گی  
 ہر مسلمانوں سے میں جوں کو ترجیح دوں گا/ائے گی۔

prefers to socialise with Muslims <15> would socialise with all Asians

	3	2	1	0	0	2	3
Me as I am now	.....t.....	0					جس طرح میں اب جکل ہوں۔
Person in the community I admire	.....t.....	0					کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں۔
JKLF	.....t.....	0					جموں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ۔
Me as I was when I was in Azad Kashmir	.....t.....	0					جس طرح میں آزاد کشمیر میں تھا۔
Mosque Noor	.....t.....	0					مسجد نور۔
Kashmiri biraderi	.....t.....	0					کشمیری برادری۔
Young English women in Luton	.....t.....	0					لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں۔
My children born and brought up in Azad Kashmir	.....t.....	0					میرے بچے جو آزاد کشمیر میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔
Young English men in Luton	.....t.....	0					لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد۔
Person in the community I dislike	.....t.....	0					کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا۔
My children born and brought up in the UK	.....t.....	0					میرے بچے جو انگلینڈ میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔
Luton Islamic Society	.....t.....	0					لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی۔
Madina Mosque	.....t.....	0					مدینہ مسجد۔
Jamia Masjid	.....t.....	0					جامع مسجد۔
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....t.....	0					آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری۔
Young Asian women in Luton	.....t.....	0					لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں۔
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association	.....t.....	0					پاکستان کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی۔
Muslim Conference	.....t.....	0					مسلم کانفرنس۔
Young Asian men in Luton	.....t.....	0					لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد۔
John Major	.....t.....	0					جان میجر۔
British media	.....t.....	0					برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ۔
Narasimha Rao	.....t.....	0					نرسمہا راؤ۔
My Parents	.....t.....	0					میرے والدین۔
Benazir Bhutto	.....t.....	0					بے نظیر بھٹو۔
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....t.....	0					بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری۔
Luton University	.....t.....	0					لوٹن یونیورسٹی۔
Kashmiri Music	.....t.....	0					کشمیری میوزک۔
Me as I would like to be	.....t.....	0					میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/چاہوں گی۔

پکا کشمیری ہے / ہیں اور کشمیر میں زیادہ خوش ہو گا / گئے۔

کشمیری ہے لیکن لوٹن کو اپنا گھر سمجھتا ہے / ہیں

is/are strongly Kashmiri and <16> is/are Kashmiri but feel/s more at home in Luton

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	
Me as I am now	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	جس طرح میں اب جھک ہوں۔
Person in the community I admire	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں۔
JKLF	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	جوان کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ۔
Me as I was when I was in Azad Kashmir	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	جس طرح میں آزاد کشمیر میں تھا۔
Mosque Noor	.....	t.....	t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	مسجد نور۔
Kashmiri biraderi	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	کشمیری برادری۔
Young English women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں۔
My children born and brought up in Azad Kashmir	.....	t.....	t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	میرے بچے جو آزاد کشمیر میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔
Young English men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد۔
Person in the community I dislike	.....	t.....	t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا۔
My children born and brought up in the UK	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	میرے بچے جو انگلینڈ میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔
Luton Islamic Society	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی۔
Madina Mosque	.....	t.....	t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	مدینہ مسجد۔
Jamia Masjid	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	جامع مسجد۔
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....	t.....	t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری۔
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں۔
Pakistan/ Kashmir Welfare Association	.....	t.....	t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	پاکستان کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی۔
Muslim Conference	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	مسلم کانفرنس۔
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	t.....	t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد۔
John Major	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	جان میجر۔
British media	.....	t.....	t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ۔
Narasimha Rao	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	نرسمہا راؤ۔
My Parents	.....	t.....	t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	میرے والدین۔
Benazir Bhutto	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	بے نظیر بھٹو۔
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری۔
Luton University	.....	t.....	t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	لوٹن یونیورسٹی۔
Kashmiri Music	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	کشمیری میوزک۔
Me as I would like to be	.....	t.....	t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا / چاہوں گی۔

کشمیری شہریت سے خوش ہو گا/ ہوں گے۔  
برطانوی شہریت سے خوش ہے/ ہیں۔

feel/s happy with British <17> would feel happier with Kashmiri  
nationality nationality

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	t						
Person in the community I admire	0						
JKLF	0						
Me as I was when I was in Azad Kashmir	t	t					
Mosque Noor	0						
Kashmiri biraderi	0						
Young English women in Luton	t	t					
My children born and brought up in Azad Kashmir	0						
Young English men in Luton	0						
Person in the community I dislike	0						
My children born and brought up in the UK	t	t					
Luton Islamic Society	0						
Madina Mosque	t	t					
Jamia Masjid	0						
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	0						
Young Asian women in Luton	t	t					
Pakistan/ Kashmir Welfare Association	0						
Muslim Conference	t	t					
Young Asian men in Luton	t	t					
John Major	t						
British media	0						
Narasimha Rao	t	t					
My Parents	0						
Benazir Bhutto	t	t					
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	t						
Luton University	0						
Kashmiri Music	0						
Me as I would like to be	0						

جس طرح میں آج کل ہوں۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں۔  
جنوں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ۔  
جس طرح میں آزاد کشمیر میں تھا۔  
مسجد نور۔  
کشمیری برادری۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں۔  
میرے بچے جو آزاد کشمیر میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا۔  
میرے بچے جو انگلینڈ میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔  
لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی۔  
مدینہ مسجد۔  
جامع مسجد۔  
آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں۔  
پاکستان کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی۔  
مسلم کانفرنس۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد۔  
جان میجور۔  
برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ۔  
نرسمہ راؤ۔  
میرے والدین۔  
بے نظیر بھٹو۔  
بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری۔  
لوٹن یونیورسٹی۔  
کشمیری میوزک۔  
میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/ چاہوں گی۔

کشمیری کی کشمیری کے ساتھ ہی شادی پر یقین رکھتا رہیں۔

کشمیریوں کے غیر کشمیریوں سے شادیاں کر پر یقین رکھتا رہیں۔

feel/s that a Kashmiri should only <18> believe/s that Kashmiris should be able to marry a Kashmiri

marry non Kashmiris

	3	2	1	0	0	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	0					
Person in the community I admire	.....	0					
JKLF	.....	0					
Me as I was when I was in Azad Kashmir	.....	0					
Mosque Noor	.....t.....	0					
Kashmiri biraderi	.....t.....	0					
Young English women in Luton	.....	0					
My children born and brought up in Azad Kashmir	.....	0					
Young English men in Luton	.....t.....	0					
Person in the community I dislike	.....	0					
My children born and brought up in the UK	.....	0					
Luton Islamic Society	.....	0					
Madina Mosque	.....t.....	0					
Jamia Masjid	.....	0					
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....	0					
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	0					
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association	.....	0					
Muslim Conference	.....	0					
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	0					
John Major	.....t.....t.....	0					
British media	.....	0					
Narasimha Rao	.....	0					
My Parents	.....	0					
Benazir Bhutto	.....	0					
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....	0					
Luton University	.....	0					
Kashmiri Music	.....	0					
Me as I would like to be	.....t.....	0					

جس طرح میں اب جھک ہوں۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں۔  
جموں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ۔

جس طرح میں آزاد کشمیر میں تھا۔  
مسجد نور۔

کشمیری برادری۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں۔  
میرے بچے جو آزاد کشمیر میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔

لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا۔  
میرے بچے جو انگلینڈ میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔

لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی۔  
مدینہ مسجد۔

جامع مسجد۔  
آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری۔

لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں۔  
پاکستان کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی۔

مسلم کانفرنس۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد۔

جان میجور۔  
برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ۔

نرسیمہ راؤ۔  
میرے والدین۔

بے نظیر بھٹو۔  
بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری۔

لوٹن یونیورسٹی۔  
کشمیری میوزک۔

میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/چاہوں گی۔

کشمیر میں رہنا گھر جیسا محسوس کرتا ہے / کرتے ہیں۔

برطانیہ میں رہنا گھر جیسے محسوس کرتا ہے / کرتے ہیں۔

feel/s more at home in Kashmir <19> feel/s more at home in Britain.

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	
Me as I am now	.....t.....			0				جس طرح میں آج کل ہوں۔
Person in the community I admire	.....t.....			0				کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں۔
JKLF	.....t.....			0				جس طرح میں آزاد کشمیر میں تھا۔
Me as I was when I was in Azad Kashmir	.....t.....			0				جس طرح میں آزاد کشمیر میں تھا۔
Mosque Noor	.....t.....			0				مسجد نور۔
Kashmiri biraderi	.....t.....			0				کشمیری برادری۔
Young English women in Luton	.....t.....			0				لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں۔
My children born and brought up in Azad Kashmir	.....t.....			0				میرے بچے جو آزاد کشمیر میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔
Young English men in Luton	.....t.....			0				لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد۔
Person in the community I dislike	.....t.....			0				کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا۔
My children born and brought up in the UK	.....t.....			0				میرے بچے جو انگلینڈ میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔
Luton Islamic Society	.....t.....			0				لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی۔
Madina Mosque	.....t.....			0				مدینہ مسجد۔
Jamia Masjid	.....t.....			0				جامع مسجد۔
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....t.....			0				آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری۔
Young Asian women in Luton	.....t.....			0				لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں۔
Pakistan/ Kashmir Welfare Association	.....t.....			0				پاکستان کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی۔
Muslim Conference	.....t.....			0				مسلم کانفرنس۔
Young Asian men in Luton	.....t.....			0				لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد۔
John Major	.....t.....			0				جان میجر۔
British media	.....t.....			0				برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ۔
Narasimha Rao	.....t.....			0				نرسمہا راؤ۔
My Parents	.....t.....			0				میرے والدین۔
Benazir Bhutto	.....t.....			0				بے نظیر بھٹو۔
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....t.....			0				بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری۔
Luton University	.....t.....			0				لوٹن یونیورسٹی۔
Kashmiri Music	.....t.....			0				کشمیری میوزک۔
Me as I would like to be	.....t.....			0				میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا / چاہوں گی۔

چاہتا ہے کہ نوجوان نسل کشمیری کو اپنا گھر سمجھے۔

سمجھتا ہے کہ جوں نسل کو برطانیہ ہی کو اپنا گھر سمجھنا چاہئے

wants the younger generation to think of  
Kashmir as their homeland

<20> believes that the younger generation should  
think of Britain as their homeland

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person in the community I admire	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
JKLF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Me as I was when I was in Azad Kashmir	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mosque Noor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kashmiri biraderi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Young English women in Luton	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
My children born and brought up in Azad Kashmir	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Young English men in Luton	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Person in the community I dislike	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
My children born and brought up in the UK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Luton Islamic Society	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Madina Mosque	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jamia Masjid	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Young Asian women in Luton	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pakistan/ Kashmir Welfare Association	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Muslim Conference	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Young Asian men in Luton	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Major	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
British media	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Narasimha Rao	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
My Parents	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Benazir Bhutto	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Luton University	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kashmiri Music	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Me as I would like to be	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

جس طرح میں آج کل ہوں۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں۔  
جس طرح میں آزاد کشمیر میں تھا۔  
مسجد نور۔  
کشمیری برادری۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں۔  
میرے بچے جو آزاد کشمیر میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا۔  
میرے بچے جو انگلینڈ میں پیدا ہوئے اور بڑے ہوئے۔  
لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی۔  
مدینہ مسجد۔  
جامع مسجد۔  
آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں۔  
پاکستان کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی۔  
مسلم کانفرنس۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد۔  
جان میجور۔  
برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ۔  
نرسمہا راؤ۔  
میرے والدین۔  
بے نظیر بھٹو۔  
بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری۔  
لوٹن یونیورسٹی۔  
کشمیری میوزک۔  
میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/ چاہوں گی۔

## Appendix 10.1 Chi - Square calculations

### Factors important for living in current area

#### (a) Extended contingency table

		Degrees of preference					Total
		Y	N	3	2	1	
Closeness to own society	Young	25	8	0	0	0	33
	Old	27	10	0	0	0	37
		<b>52</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>70</b>
Closeness to schools with Kashmiri / Muslim children	Young	25	8	0	0	0	33
	Old	20	17	0	0	0	37
		<b>45</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>70</b>
Closeness to relatives	Young	23	10	0	0	0	33
	Old	31	6	0	0	0	37
		<b>54</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>70</b>
Closeness to Asian shops	Young	22	11	0	0	0	33
	Old	22	15	0	0	0	37
		<b>44</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>70</b>
Closeness to services such as mosques and community centres	Young	27	6	0	0	0	33
	Old	33	4	0	0	0	37
		<b>60</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>70</b>

#### (b) Expected frequencies

		Degrees of preference					Total
		Y	N	3	2	1	
Closeness to own society	Young	24.5	8.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.0
	Old	27.5	9.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	37.0
		<b>52.0</b>	<b>18.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>70.0</b>
Closeness to schools with Kashmiri / Muslim children	Young	21.2	11.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.0
	Old	23.8	13.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	37.0
		<b>45.0</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>70.0</b>
Closeness to relatives	Young	25.5	7.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.0
	Old	28.5	8.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	37.0
		<b>54.0</b>	<b>16.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>70.0</b>
Closeness to Asian shops	Young	20.7	12.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.0
	Old	23.3	13.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	37.0
		<b>44.0</b>	<b>26.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>70.0</b>
Closeness to services such as mosques and community centres	Young	28.3	4.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.0
	Old	31.7	5.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	37.0
		<b>60.0</b>	<b>10.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>70.0</b>

#### (c) Chi-squared values

		Degrees of preference					Total
		Y	N	3	2	1	
Closeness to own society	Young	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04
	Old	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03
		<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.07</b>
Closeness to schools with Kashmiri / Muslim children	Young	0.68	1.22	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.90
	Old	0.60	1.08	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.68
		<b>1.28</b>	<b>2.30</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>3.58</b>
Closeness to relatives	Young	0.24	0.80	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.04
	Old	0.21	0.71	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.92
		<b>0.45</b>	<b>1.51</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>1.96</b>
Closeness to Asian shops	Young	0.08	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.21
	Old	0.07	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.18
		<b>0.15</b>	<b>0.24</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.39</b>
Closeness to services such as mosques and community centres	Young	0.06	0.35	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.41
	Old	0.05	0.31	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.36
		<b>0.11</b>	<b>0.66</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.77</b>

#### Hypothesis

Ho = variables are independent  
 Degrees of freedom = 1  
 Significance level = 0.05  
 Chi-squared value = 3.84

یہ میں بالکل پسند نہیں کرتا ان کے بارے میں میری جذبات انتہائی اچھے ہیں۔

I have warm <1> I don't like at all  
feelings towards

	3	2	1	0	d	2	3
Me as I am now							
Person in the community I admire				0			
JKLF				0			
Me as I was when I left school				0			
Mosque Noor				0			
Kashmiri biraderi				0			
Young English women in Luton				0			
My children to be born in the future				0			
Young English men in Luton				0			
Person in the community I dislike				0			
Apachi Indian				0			
Luton Islamic Society				0			
Madina Mosque				0			
Jamia Masjid				0			
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir				0			
Young Asian women in Luton				0			
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association				0			
Muslim Conference				0			
Young Asian men in Luton				0			
John Major				0			
British media				0			
Narasimha Rao				0			
My Parents				0			
Benazir Bhutto				0			
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir				0			
Luton University				0			
Bangra music				0			
Me as I would like to be				0			

جس طرح میں آج کل ہوں -  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں -  
جنوں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ -  
سکول چھوڑتے وقت میں جس طرح تھا -  
مسجد نور -  
کشمیری برادری -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں -  
میرے آئندہ پیدا ہونے والے بچے -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد -  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا -  
اپاچی انڈین -  
لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی -  
مدینہ مسجد -  
جامع مسجد -  
آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں -  
پاکستان/کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی -  
مسلم کانفرنس -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد -  
جان میجر -  
برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ -  
نرسمہا راؤ -  
میرے والدین -  
بے نظیر بھٹو -  
بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری -  
لوٹن یونیورسٹی -  
بھنگرا میوزک -  
میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/چاہوں گی -

اپنے طریقوں میں انتہائی انگریز ہے/تھا۔

اپنے طور طریقوں میں انتہائی ایشیائی ہے/ہیں اور  
انگریزی رسموں سے دور رہتا ہے/ہوں۔

is/was strongly English <2> is/are very Asian in my/their ways and  
in my/their ways keep/s away from English customs

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I admire	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
JKLF	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Me as I was when I left school	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mosque Noor	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiri biraderi	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young English women in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
My children to be born in the future	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young English men in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I dislike	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Apachi Indian	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Luton Islamic Society	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Madina Mosque	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Jamia Masjid	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pakistan/ Kashmir Welfare Association	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Muslim Conference	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
John Major	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
British media	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Narasimha Rao	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
My Parents	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Benazir Bhutto	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Luton University	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bangra music	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Me as I would like to be	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

جس طرح میں آجکل ہوں۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں۔  
جوں کشمیر لیبریشن فرنٹ۔  
سکول چھوڑتے وقت میں جس طرح تھا۔  
مسجد نور۔  
کشمیری برادری۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں۔  
میرے آئندہ پیدا ہونے والے بچے۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا۔  
اپاچی انڈین۔  
لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی۔  
مدینہ مسجد۔  
جامع مسجد۔  
آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری۔  
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پاکستان/ کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی۔  
مسلم کانفرنس۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد۔  
جان میجر۔  
برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ۔  
نرسمہا راؤ۔  
میرے والدین۔  
بے نظیر بھٹو۔  
بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری۔  
لوٹن یونیورسٹی۔  
بھنگرا میوزک۔  
میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/ چاہوں گی۔

پکا پاکستانی ہونے کیساتھ رسم و رواج میں کشمیری کو پاکستانی جیسا سمجھتا ہے/ ہیں/ تھا -

اپنی رسم و روایات کو پاکستان سے مختلف سمجھنے کے علاوہ روزمرہ زندگی میں پکا کشمیری ہے/ ہیں/ تھا -

is/was/are strongly Pakistani in their attitudes and customs and see Kashmiri as the same as Pakistani

is/was/are strongly Kashmiri in their everyday life and regard Kashmiri attitudes and customs to be different from Pakistani

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I admire	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
JKLF	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Me as I was when I left school	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Mosque Noor	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiri biraderi	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young English women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
My children to be born in the future	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young English men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I dislike	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Apachi Indian	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Luton Islamic Society	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Madina Mosque	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Jamia Masjid	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Pakistan/ Kashmir Welfare Association	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Muslim Conference	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
John Major	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
British media	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Narasimha Rao	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
My Parents	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Benazir Bhutto	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Luton University	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Bangra music	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Me as I would like to be	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....

جس طرح میں آجکل ہوں -  
 کمیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں -  
 جنوں کشمیر لیبریشن فرنٹ -  
 سکول چھوڑتے وقت میں جس طرح تھا -  
 مسجد نور -  
 کشمیری برادری -  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں -  
 میرے آئندہ پیدا ہونے والے بچے -  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد -  
 کمیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا -  
 اپاچی انڈین -  
 لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی -  
 مدینہ مسجد -  
 جامع مسجد -  
 آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری -  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں -  
 پاکستان/ کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی -  
 مسلم کانفرنس -  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد -  
 جان میجر -  
 برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ -  
 نرسمہا راؤ -  
 میرے والدین -  
 بے نظیر بھٹو -  
 بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری -  
 لوٹن یونیورسٹی -  
 بھنگرا میوزک -  
 میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/ چاہوں گی -

انگریزی روزگار اور الفیڈ میں رہنے کیلئے بولتا ہوں/ہیں۔

کیونٹی میں گھل مل جا کیلئے انگریزی بولتا ہوں/ہیں۔

speaks English only because it is <4> necessary for employment and living in the UK

speaks English to become fully integrated into English society

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now				0			
Person in the community I admire				0			
JKLF				0			
Me as I was when I left school				0			
Mosque Noor				0			
Kashmiri biraderi				0			
Young English women in Luton				0			
My children to be born in the future				0			
Young English men in Luton				0			
Person in the community I dislike				0			
Apachi Indian				0			
Luton Islamic Society				0			
Madina Mosque				0			
Jamia Masjid				0			
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir				0			
Young Asian women in Luton				0			
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association				0			
Muslim Conference				0			
Young Asian men in Luton				0			
John Major				0			
British media				0			
Narasimha Rao				0			
My Parents				0			
Benazir Bhutto				0			
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir				0			
Luton University				0			
Bangra music				0			
Me as I would like to be				0			

جس طرح میں آجکل ہوں۔  
 کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں۔  
 جموں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ۔  
 سکول چھوڑتے وقت میں جس طرح تھا۔  
 مسجد نور۔  
 کشمیری برادری۔  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں۔  
 میرے آئندہ پیدا ہونے والے بچے۔  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد۔  
 کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا۔  
 اپاچی انڈین۔  
 لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی۔  
 مدینہ مسجد۔  
 جامع مسجد۔  
 آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری۔  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں۔  
 پاکستان/کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی۔  
 مسلم کانفرنس۔  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد۔  
 جان میجر۔  
 برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ۔  
 نرسمہا راؤ۔  
 میرے والدین۔  
 بے نظیر بھٹو۔  
 بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری۔  
 لوٹن یونیورسٹی۔  
 بھنگرا میوزک۔  
 میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/چاہوں گی۔

روایتی زبانیں اپنا قیمتی ورثہ سمجھ کر بولتا ہے/ ہیں۔

خاندان اور برادری کے دباؤ کی وجہ سے روایتی زبانیں بولتا ہے/ ہیں۔

speaks traditional language because <5> speaks traditional languages only  
believes it is a valuable part of one's heritage because of pressure from family and biraderi

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I admire	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
JKLF	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Me as I was when I left school	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Mosque Noor	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiri biraderi	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young English women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
My children to be born in the future	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young English men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I dislike	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Apachi Indian	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Luton Islamic Society	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Madina Mosque	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Jamia Masjid	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Muslim Conference	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
John Major	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
British media	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Narasimha Rao	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
My Parents	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Benazir Bhutto	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Luton University	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Bangra music	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Me as I would like to be	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....

جس طرح میں آج کل ہوں۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں۔  
جسوں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ۔  
سکول چھوڑتے وقت میں جس طرح تھا۔  
سجد نور۔  
کشمیری برادری۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں۔  
میرے آئندہ پیدا ہونے والے بچے۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد۔  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا۔  
اپاچی انڈین۔  
لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی۔  
مدینہ مسجد۔  
جامع مسجد۔  
آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں۔  
پاکستان/کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی۔  
مسلم کانفرنس۔  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد۔  
جان میجر۔  
برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ۔  
نرسمہا راؤ۔  
میرے والدین۔  
بے نظیر بھٹو۔  
بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری۔  
لوٹن یونیورسٹی۔  
بھنگرا میوزک۔  
میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/چاہوں گی۔

روایتی طے کردہ شادیوں کے طریقے کو ایشیائی ہونے کی بنیاد تصور کرتا ہے/ہیں۔

آج کے دور میں اپنا ساتھی خود چننے کی آزادی پر یقین رکھتا ہے/ہیں۔

believe/s that traditional systems of arranged marriage are fundamental to being Asian

believe/s that in today's society it is better to have the freedom to choose one's own marriage partner

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	.....t.....t.....	0					
Person in the community I admire	.....t.....t.....	0					
JKLF	.....t.....t.....	0					
Me as I was when I left school	.....t.....t.....	0					
Mosque Noor	.....t.....t.....	0					
Kashmiri biraderi	.....t.....t.....	0					
Young English women in Luton	.....t.....t.....	0					
My children to be born in the future	.....t.....t.....	0					
Young English men in Luton	.....t.....t.....	0					
Person in the community I dislike	.....t.....t.....	0					
Apachi Indian	.....t.....t.....	0					
Luton Islamic Society	.....t.....t.....	0					
Madina Mosque	.....t.....t.....	0					
Jamia Masjid	.....t.....t.....	0					
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....t.....t.....	0					
Young Asian women in Luton	.....t.....t.....	0					
Pakistan/ Kashmir Welfare Association	.....t.....t.....	0					
Muslim Conference	.....t.....t.....	0					
Young Asian men in Luton	.....t.....t.....	0					
John Major	.....t.....t.....	0					
British media	.....t.....t.....	0					
Narasimha Rao	.....t.....t.....	0					
My Parents	.....t.....t.....	0					
Benazir Bhutto	.....t.....t.....	0					
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....t.....t.....	0					
Luton University	.....t.....t.....	0					
Bangra music	.....t.....t.....	0					
Me as I would like to be	.....t.....t.....	0					

جس طرح میں آجکل ہوں۔  
 کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں۔  
 جموں کشمیر لیبریشن فرنٹ۔  
 سکول چھوڑتے وقت میں جس طرح تھا۔  
 مسجد نور۔  
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 اپاچی انڈین۔  
 لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی۔  
 مدینہ مسجد۔  
 جامع مسجد۔  
 آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری۔  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں۔  
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 جان ميجر۔  
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 میرے والدین۔  
 بے نظیر بھٹو۔  
 بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری۔  
 لوٹن یونیورسٹی۔  
 بھنگرا میوزک۔  
 میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/ چاہوں گی۔

والدین اور بزرگوں کے ساتھ مختلف مخصوص سلوک  
کئے جانے پر یقین رکھتا ہے / ہیں۔

سمجھتا ہے کہ والدین یا بزرگ عزت کروانا سیکھیں اور سب کے  
ساتھ یکساں برتاؤ پر یقین رکھتا ہے / ہیں۔

believe/s that parents/elders should be <7> feel/s that parents/elders should be treated  
treated with special deference as equals and have to earn special respect

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	.....t.....	0					
Person in the community I admire	.....t.....	0					
JKLF	.....t.....	0					
Me as I was when I left school	.....t.....	0					
Mosque Noor	.....t.....t.....	0					
Kashmiri biraderi	.....t.....	0					
Young English women in Luton	.....t.....	0					
My children to be born in the future	.....t.....	0					
Young English men in Luton	.....t.....	0					
Person in the community I dislike	.....t.....	0					
Apachi Indian	.....t.....	0					
Luton Islamic Society	.....t.....	0					
Madina Mosque	.....t.....	0					
Jamia Masjid	.....t.....	0					
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....t.....	0					
Young Asian women in Luton	.....t.....	0					
Pakistan/ Kashmir Welfare Association	.....t.....	0					
Muslim Conference	.....t.....	0					
Young Asian men in Luton	.....t.....	0					
John Major	.....t.....	0					
British media	.....t.....t.....	0					
Narasimha Rao	.....t.....	0					
My Parents	.....t.....t.....	0					
Benazir Bhutto	.....t.....t.....	0					
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....t.....	0					
Luton University	.....t.....	0					
Bangra music	.....t.....	0					
Me as I would like to be	.....t.....t.....	0					

جس طرح میں آجکل ہوں۔  
 کمیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں۔  
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 لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں۔  
 میرے آئندہ پیدا ہونے والے بچے۔  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد۔  
 کمیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا۔  
 اپاچی انڈین۔  
 لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی۔  
 مدینہ مسجد۔  
 جامع مسجد۔  
 آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری۔  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں۔  
 پاکستان/ کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی۔  
 مسلم کانفرنس۔  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد۔  
 جان میجر۔  
 برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ۔  
 نرسیمہا راؤ۔  
 میرے والدین۔  
 بے نظیر بھٹو۔  
 بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری۔  
 لوٹن یونیورسٹی۔  
 بھنگرا میوزک۔  
 میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/ چاہوں گی۔

کشمیر کے اتحاد اور ہندوستان اور پاکستان سے  
علیحدہ خود مختار ہونے پر یقین رکھتا ہے/ہیں

پورے کشمیر کو پاکستان کا حصہ ہونا خیال کرتا ہے/ہیں

feel/s that Kashmir should be re united <8> think/s that all of Kashmir should  
and independent of both Pakistan and India be part of Pakistan

	3	2	1	0	4	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I admire	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
JKLF	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Me as I was when I left school	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mosque Noor	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiri biraderi	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young English women in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
My children to be born in the future	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young English men in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I dislike	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Apachi Indian	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Luton Islamic Society	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Madina Mosque	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Jamia Masjid	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Muslim Conference	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
John Major	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
British media	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Narasimha Rao	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
My Parents	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Benazir Bhutto	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Luton University	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bangra music	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Me as I would like to be	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

جس طرح میں آجکل ہوں -  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں -  
جموں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ -  
سکول چھوڑتے وقت میں جس طرح تھا -  
مسجد نور -  
کشمیری برادری -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں -  
میرے آئندہ پیدا ہونے والے بچے -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد -  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا -  
ایپاچی انڈین -  
لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی -  
مدینہ مسجد -  
جامع مسجد -  
آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں -  
پاکستان/کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی -  
مسلم کانفرنس -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد -  
جان ميجر -  
برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ -  
نرسمہا راؤ -  
میرے والدین -  
بے نظیر بھٹو -  
بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری -  
لوٹن یونیورسٹی -  
بھنگرا میوزک -  
میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/چاہوں گی -

انسان کے اپنے کردار کی مطابق درست کام کرنے کو عزت سے  
ذاتی عزت پر یقین رکھتا ہے / ہیں

believes and respects izat <9> think/s that doing the right thing according  
to one's own sense of morality is more important  
than izat

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I admire	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
JKLF	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Me as I was when I left school	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mosque Noor	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiri biraderi	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young English women in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
My children to be born in the future	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young English men in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I dislike	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Apachi Indian	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Luton Islamic Society	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Madina Mosque	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Jamia Masjid	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pakistan/ Kashmir Welfare Association	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Muslim Conference	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
John Major	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
British media	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Narasimha Rao	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
My Parents	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Benazir Bhutto	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Luton University	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bangra music	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Me as I would like to be	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

جس طرح میں آج کل ہوں -  
 کمیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں -  
 جموں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ -  
 سکول چھوڑتے وقت میں جس طرح تھا -  
 مسجد نور -  
 کشمیری برادری -  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں -  
 میرے آئندہ پیدا ہونے والے بچے -  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد -  
 کمیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا -  
 اپاچی انڈین -  
 لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی -  
 مدینہ مسجد -  
 جامع مسجد -  
 آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری -  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں -  
 پاکستان / کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی -  
 مسلم کانفرنس -  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد -  
 جان میجر -  
 برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ -  
 نرسمہا راؤ -  
 میرے والدین -  
 بے نظیر بھٹو -  
 بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری -  
 لوٹن یونیورسٹی -  
 بھنگرا میوزک -  
 میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا / چاہوں گی -

خود مختار زندگی گزارنے کیلئے انفرادی آزادی پر یقین رکھتا ہوں۔۔۔ برادری سسٹم میں کافی لگن محسوس کرتا ہوں/ہیں۔

feel/s deeply committed to the <10> believe/s in the freedom for individuals to follow their own independent life system of biraderi

	3	2	1	0	0	2	3
Me as I am now	.....t.....						
Person in the community I admire	.....0.....						
JKLF	.....0.....						
Me as I was when I left school	.....0.....						
Mosque Noor	.....t.....						
Kashmiri biraderi	.....0.....						
Young English women in Luton	.....0.....						
My children to be born in the future	.....0.....						
Young English men in Luton	.....t.....						
Person in the community I dislike	.....0.....						
Apachi Indian	.....0.....						
Luton Islamic Society	.....0.....						
Madina Mosque	.....0.....						
Jamia Masjid	.....t.....						
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....0.....						
Young Asian women in Luton	.....0.....						
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association	.....0.....						
Muslim Conference	.....0.....						
Young Asian men in Luton	.....0.....						
John Major	.....0.....						
British media	.....t.....						
Narasimha Rao	.....0.....						
My Parents	.....t.....						
Benazir Bhutto	.....0.....						
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....0.....						
Luton University	.....t.....						
Bangra music	.....0.....						
Me as I would like to be	.....t.....						

جس طرح میں آج کل ہوں۔  
 کمیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں۔  
 جموں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ۔  
 سکول چھوڑتے وقت میں جس طرح تھا۔  
 مسجد نور۔  
 کشمیری برادری۔  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں۔  
 میرے آئندہ پیدا ہونے والے بچے۔  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد۔  
 کمیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا۔  
 اپاچی انڈین۔  
 لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی۔  
 مدینہ مسجد۔  
 جامع مسجد۔  
 آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری۔  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں۔  
 پاکستان/کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی۔  
 مسلم کانفرنس۔  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد۔  
 جان میجر۔  
 برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ۔  
 نرسمہا راؤ۔  
 میرے والدین۔  
 بے نظیر بھٹو۔  
 بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری۔  
 لوٹن یونیورسٹی۔  
 بھنگرا میوزک۔  
 میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/چاہوں گی۔

گھر کے باہر روایتی لباس پہننا پسند کرتا ہے/ ہیں

گھر کے باہر مغربی لباس پہننا پسند کرتا ہے/ ہیں

outside of the home prefers to wear <11> outside of the home prefers wearing  
traditional dress western style dress

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I admire	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
JKLF	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Me as I was when I left school	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mosque Noor	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiri biraderi	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young English women in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
My children to be born in the future	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young English men in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I dislike	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Apachi Indian	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Luton Islamic Society	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Madina Mosque	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Jamia Masjid	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Muslim Conference	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
John Major	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
British media	.....	t	.....	t	.....	.....	.....
Narasimha Rao	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
My Parents	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Benazir Bhutto	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Luton University	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bangra music	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Me as I would like to be	.....	t	.....	t	.....	.....	.....

جس طرح میں آجکل ہوں -  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں -  
جموں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ -  
سکول چھوڑتے وقت میں جس طرح تھا -  
سجد نور -  
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لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں -  
میرے آئندہ پیدا ہونے والے بچے -  
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اپاچی انڈین -  
لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی -  
مدینہ مسجد -  
جامع مسجد -  
آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں -  
پاکستان/کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی -  
مسلم کانفرنس -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد -  
جان میجر -  
برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ -  
نرسمہا راؤ -  
میرے والدین -  
بے نظیر بھٹو -  
بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری -  
لوٹن یونیورسٹی -  
بھنگرا میوزک -  
میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/چاہوں گی -

صرف فالٹو وقت مردوں کے ساتھ گزارنے کو ترجیح دیتا ہے/ دیتی ہے -

صرف کام/ کالج/ یونیورسٹی میں مردوں کے ساتھ وقت گزارنا چاہے گا/ گی -

prefer/s the company of men <12> would spend time with men only at work or at school/college/university in leisure time

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	.....t.....t.....			0			
Person in the community I admire	.....t.....t.....			0			
JKLF	.....t.....t.....			0			
Me as I was when I left school	.....t.....t.....			0			
Mosque Noor	.....t.....t.....			0			
Kashmiri biraderi	.....t.....t.....			0			
Young English women in Luton	.....t.....t.....			0			
My children to be born in the future	.....t.....t.....			0			
Young English men in Luton	.....t.....t.....			0			
Person in the community I dislike	.....t.....t.....			0			
Apachi Indian	.....t.....t.....			0			
Luton Islamic Society	.....t.....t.....			0			
Madina Mosque	.....t.....t.....			0			
Jamia Masjid	.....t.....t.....			0			
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....t.....t.....			0			
Young Asian women in Luton	.....t.....t.....			0			
Pakistan/ Kashmir Welfare Association	.....t.....t.....			0			
Muslim Conference	.....t.....t.....			0			
Young Asian men in Luton	.....t.....t.....			0			
John Major	.....t.....t.....			0			
British media	.....t.....t.....			0			
Narasimha Rao	.....t.....t.....			0			
My Parents	.....t.....t.....			0			
Benazir Bhutto	.....t.....t.....			0			
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....t.....t.....			0			
Luton University	.....t.....t.....			0			
Bangra music	.....t.....t.....			0			
Me as I would like to be	.....t.....t.....			0			

جس طرح میں آجکل ہوں -  
 کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں -  
 جموں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ -  
 سکول چھوڑتے وقت میں جس طرح تھا -  
 مسجد نور -  
 کشمیری برادری -  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں -  
 میرے آئندہ پیدا ہونے والے بچے -  
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 اپاچی انڈین -  
 لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی -  
 مدینہ مسجد -  
 جامع مسجد -  
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 برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ -  
 نرسمہا راؤ -  
 میرے والدین -  
 بے نظیر بھٹو -  
 بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری -  
 لوٹن یونیورسٹی -  
 بھنگرا میوزک -  
 میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/ چاہوں گی -

صرف نالوقت میں عورتوں سے گھننا ملنا پسند  
کرتی ہوں/ کرتا ہوں -

صرف کامپیر/ سکول/ کالج/ یونیورسٹی میں عورتوں کے ساتھ گھننے  
ملنے کو ترجیح دیتی ہوں/ دیتا ہوں -

enjoy/s spending leisure time <13> prefer/s to mix with women only  
with women at work or at school/college/university

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	
Me as I am now	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	جس طرح میں آجکل ہوں -
Person in the community I admire	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں -
JKLF	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	جموں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ -
Me as I was when I left school	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	سکول چھوڑتے وقت میں جس طرح تھا -
Mosque Noor	.....	t.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	مسجد نور -
Kashmiri biraderi	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	کشمیری برادری -
Young English women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں -
My children to be born in the future	.....	t.....	t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	میرے آئندہ پیدا ہونے والے بچے -
Young English men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد -
Person in the community I dislike	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا -
Apachi Indian	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	اپاچی انڈین -
Luton Islamic Society	.....	t.....	t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی -
Madina Mosque	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	مدینہ مسجد -
Jamia Masjid	.....	t.....	t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	جامع مسجد -
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری -
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	t.....	t.....	0	.....	.....	.....	لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں -
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association	.....	t.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	پاکستان/کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی -
Muslim Conference	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	مسلم کانفرنس -
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد -
John Major	.....	t.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	جان میجر -
British media	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ -
Narasimha Rao	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	نرسمہا راؤ -
My Parents	.....	t.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	میرے والدین -
Benazir Bhutto	.....	t.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	بے نظیر بھٹو -
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری -
Luton University	.....	t.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	لوٹن یونیورسٹی -
Bangra music	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	بھنگرا میوزک -
Me as I would like to be	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/ چاہوں گی -

محسوس کرتا ہوں / کرتی ہوں کہ مسلمان صرف  
مسلمانوں سے ہی شادی کریں -

محسوس کرتا ہوں / کرتی ہوں کہ مسلمان لوگ غیر مسلموں  
سے شادی کر سکیں -

feel/s that Muslims should <14> feel/s that Muslims should be able  
only marry a Muslim to marry non Muslims

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I admire	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
JKLF	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Me as I was when I left school	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Mosque Noor	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiri biraderi	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young English women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
My children to be born in the future	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young English men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I dislike	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Apachi Indian	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Luton Islamic Society	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Madina Mosque	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Jamia Masjid	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Muslim Conference	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
John Major	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
British media	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Narasimha Rao	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
My Parents	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Benazir Bhutto	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Luton University	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Bangra music	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Me as I would like to be	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....

جس طرح میں آج کل ہوں -  
 کمیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں -  
 جموں کشمیر لیبریشن فرنٹ -  
 سکول چھوڑتے وقت میں جس طرح تھا -  
 مسجد نور -  
 کشمیری برادری -  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں -  
 میرے آئندہ پیدا ہونے والے بچے -  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد -  
 کمیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا -  
 اپاچی انڈین -  
 لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی -  
 مدینہ مسجد -  
 جامع مسجد -  
 آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری -  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں -  
 پاکستان / کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی -  
 مسلم کانفرنس -  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد -  
 جان میجر -  
 برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ -  
 نرسمہا راؤ -  
 میرے والدین -  
 بے نظیر بھٹو -  
 بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری -  
 لوٹن یونیورسٹی -  
 بھنگرا میوزک -  
 میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا / چاہوں گی -

صرف مسلمانوں میں جمل کو ترجیح دوں گا۔

تمام ایشیائیوں کے ساتھ میل جول رکھنا چاہوں گا/گی

prefers to socialise with Muslims <15> would socialise with all Asians

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I admire	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
JKLF	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Me as I was when I left school	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mosque Noor	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiri biraderi	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young English women in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
My children to be born in the future	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young English men in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I dislike	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Apachi Indian	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Luton Islamic Society	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Madina Mosque	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Jamia Masjid	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Muslim Conference	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
John Major	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
British media	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Narasimha Rao	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
My Parents	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Benazir Bhutto	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Luton University	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bangra music	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Me as I would like to be	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

جس طرح میں آجکل ہوں -  
 کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں -  
 جموں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ -  
 سکول چھوڑتے وقت میں جس طرح تھا -  
 مسجد نور -  
 کشمیری برادری -  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں -  
 میرے آئندہ پیدا ہونے والے بچے -  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد -  
 کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا -  
 اپاچی انڈین -  
 لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی -  
 مدینہ مسجد -  
 جامع مسجد -  
 آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری -  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں -  
 پاکستان/کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی -  
 مسلم کانفرنس -  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد -  
 جان میجر -  
 برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ -  
 نرسمہا راؤ -  
 میرے والدین -  
 بے نظیر بھٹو -  
 بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری -  
 لوٹن یونیورسٹی -  
 بھنگرا میوزک -  
 میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/چاہوں گی -

کشمیری ہے، لیکن لوٹن کو اپنا گھر سمجھتا ہے، یہیں

پکا کشمیری ہے، یہیں اور کشمیر میں زیادہ خوش رہے گا/ رہیں گے۔

is/are strongly Kashmiri and <16> is/are Kashmiri but feel/s more at would be happier in Kashmir home in Luton

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now				0			
Person in the community I admire				0			
JKLF				0			
Me as I was when I left school				0			
Mosque Noor				0			
Kashmiri biraderi				0			
Young English women in Luton				0			
My children to be born in the future				0			
Young English men in Luton				0			
Person in the community I dislike				0			
Apachi Indian			t	0			
Luton Islamic Society			t	0			
Madina Mosque				0			
Jamia Masjid				0			
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir				0			
Young Asian women in Luton				0			
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association				0			
Muslim Conference				0			
Young Asian men in Luton				0			
John Major				0			
British media				0			
Narasimha Rao				0			
My Parents			t	0			
Benazir Bhutto				0			
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir			t	0	t		
Luton University			t	0	t		
Bangra music				0			
Me as I would like to be				0			

جس طرح میں آج کل ہوں -  
 کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں -  
 جموں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ -  
 سکول چھوڑتے وقت میں جس طرح تھا -  
 مسجد نور -  
 کشمیری برادری -  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں -  
 میرے آئندہ پیدا ہونے والے بچے -  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد -  
 کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا -  
 اپاچی انڈین -  
 لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی -  
 مدینہ مسجد -  
 جامع مسجد -  
 آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری -  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں -  
 پاکستان/کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی -  
 مسلم کانفرنس -  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد -  
 جان میجر -  
 برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ -  
 نرسمہا راؤ -  
 میرے والدین -  
 بے نظیر بھٹو -  
 بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری -  
 لوٹن یونیورسٹی -  
 بھنگرا میوزک -  
 میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/ چاہوں گی -

کشمیری شہریت سے خوش ہو گا/ہوں گے  
برطانوی شہریت سے خوش ہے/ہیں -

feel/s happy with British <17> would feel happier with Kashmiri  
nationality nationality

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	
Me as I am now	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	جس طرح میں آج کل ہوں -
Person in the community I admire	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں -
JKLF	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	جموں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ -
Me as I was when I left school	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	سکول چھوڑتے وقت میں جس طرح تھا -
Mosque Noor	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	مسجد نور -
Kashmiri biraderi	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	کشمیری برادری -
Young English women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں -
My children to be born in the future	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	میرے آئندہ پیدا ہونے والے بچے -
Young English men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد -
Person in the community I dislike	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا -
Apachi Indian	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	اپاچی انڈین -
Luton Islamic Society	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی -
Madina Mosque	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	مدینہ مسجد -
Jamia Masjid	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	جامع مسجد -
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری -
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں -
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	پاکستان/کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی -
Muslim Conference	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	مسلم کانفرنس -
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد -
John Major	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	جان میجر -
British media	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ -
Narasimha Rao	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	نرسمہا راؤ -
My Parents	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	میرے والدین -
Benazir Bhutto	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	بے نظیر بھٹو -
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری -
Luton University	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	لوٹن یونیورسٹی -
Bangra music	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	بھنگرا میوزک -
Me as I would like to be	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/چاہوں گی -

کشمیری کی ایک کشمیری کیساتھ ہی شادی پر یقین رکھتا ہے/ہیں۔

کشمیریوں کے غیر کشمیریوں سے شادی بیاہ پر یقین رکھتا ہے/ہیں۔

feel/s that a Kashmiri should only <18> believe/s that Kashmiris should be able to marry a Kashmiri

marry non Kashmiris

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I admire	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
JKLF	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Me as I was when I left school	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Mosque Noor	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiri biraderi	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young English women in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
My children to be born in the future	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young English men in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I dislike	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Apachi Indian	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Luton Islamic Society	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Madina Mosque	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Jamia Masjid	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pakistan/ Kashmir Welfare Association	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Muslim Conference	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
John Major	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
British media	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Narasimha Rao	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
My Parents	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Benazir Bhutto	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Luton University	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Bangra music	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Me as I would like to be	.....	0	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

جس طرح میں آجکل ہوں۔  
 کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں۔  
 جموں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ۔  
 سکول چھوڑتے وقت میں جس طرح تھا۔  
 مسجد نور۔  
 کشمیری برادری۔  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں۔  
 میرے آئندہ پیدا ہونے والے بچے۔  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد۔  
 کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا۔  
 اپاچی انڈین۔  
 لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی۔  
 مدینہ مسجد۔  
 جامع مسجد۔  
 آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری۔  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں۔  
 پاکستان/ کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی۔  
 مسلم کانفرنس۔  
 لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد۔  
 جان میجر۔  
 برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ۔  
 نرسمہا راؤ۔  
 میرے والدین۔  
 بے نظیر بھٹو۔  
 بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری۔  
 لوٹن یونیورسٹی۔  
 بھنگرا میوزک۔  
 میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا/ چاہوں گی۔

برطانیہ میں رہنا گھر جیسے محسوس کرتا ہے / ہیں - کشمیر میں رہنا گھر جیسے محسوس کرتا ہے / ہیں -

feel/s more at home in Kashmir <19> feel/s more at home in Britain.

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	
Me as I am now				0				جس طرح میں آج کل ہوں -
Person in the community I admire				0				کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں -
JKLF				0				جنوں کشمیر لیبریشن فرنٹ -
Me as I was when I left school				0				سکول چھوڑتے وقت میں جس طرح تھا -
Mosque Noor				0				مسجد نور -
Kashmiri biraderi				0				کشمیری برادری -
Young English women in Luton				0				لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں -
My children to be born in the future				0				میرے آئندہ پیدا ہونے والے بچے -
Young English men in Luton				0				لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد -
Person in the community I dislike				0				کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا -
Apachi Indian				0				اپاچی انڈین -
Luton Islamic Society				0				لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی -
Madina Mosque				0				مدینہ مسجد -
Jamia Masjid				0				جامع مسجد -
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir				0				آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری -
Young Asian women in Luton				0				لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں -
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association				0				پاکستان/کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی -
Muslim Conference				0				مسلم کانفرنس -
Young Asian men in Luton				0				لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد -
John Major				0				جان میجر -
British media				0				برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ -
Narasimha Rao				0				نرسمہا راؤ -
My Parents				0				میرے والدین -
Benazir Bhutto				0				بے نظیر بھٹو -
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir				0				بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری -
Luton University				0				لوٹن یونیورسٹی -
Bangra music				0				بھنگرا میوزک -
Me as I would like to be				0				میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا / چاہوں گی -

چاہتا ہے کہ جوان نسل کشمیر کو اپنا گھر سمجھے -

سمجھتا ہے / ہیں کہ نوجوان نسل کو برطانیہ ہی کو اپنا گھر سمجھنا چاہئے

want/s the younger generation to think of <20> believe/s that the younger generation should  
Kashmir as their homeland think of Britain as their homeland

	3	2	1	0	d	2	3
Me as I am now							
Person in the community I admire				0			
JKLF				0			
Me as I was when I left school				0			
Mosque Noor				0			
Kashmiri biraderi				0			
Young English women in Luton				0			
My children to be born in the future				0			
Young English men in Luton				0			
Person in the community I dislike				0			
Apachi Indian				0			
Luton Islamic Society		o	o			t	
Madina Mosque				0			
Jamia Masjid				0			
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir				0			
Young Asian women in Luton				0			
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association				0			
Muslim Conference				0	t		
Young Asian men in Luton				0			
John Major				0	t		
British media				0			
Narasimha Rao				0			
My Parents				0			
Benazir Bhutto				0	o		o
Kashmiris in Indian occupied Kashmir				0		t	
Luton University				0	o		t
Bangra music				0			
Me as I would like to be				0			

جس طرح میں آجکل ہوں -  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کی میں قدر کرتا ہوں -  
جسوں کشمیر لبریشن فرنٹ -  
سکول چھوڑتے وقت میں جس طرح تھا -  
سجد نور -  
کشمیری برادری -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز عورتیں -  
میرے آئندہ پیدا ہونے والے بچے -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان انگریز مرد -  
کیونٹی میں جس شخص کو میں پسند نہیں کرتا -  
اپاچی انڈین -  
لوٹن اسلامک سوسائٹی -  
مدینہ مسجد -  
جامع مسجد -  
آزاد کشمیر میں کشمیری -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی عورتیں -  
پاکستان / کشمیر ویلفیئر سوسائٹی -  
مسلم کانفرنس -  
لوٹن میں نوجوان ایشیائی مرد -  
جان میجر -  
برطانوی ذرائع ابلاغ -  
نرسمہا راؤ -  
میرے والدین -  
بے نظیر بھٹو -  
بھارتی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے کشمیری -  
لوٹن یونیورسٹی -  
بھنگرا میوزک -  
میں جو کچھ بننا چاہوں گا / چاہوں گی -

**Appendix 4.3 Anglo-Saxon identity instrument**

**COMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY OF THE KASHMIRI COMMUNITY  
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM**

**IDENTITY STRUCTURE INSTRUMENT**

**NASREEN ALI  
UNIVERSITY OF LUTON**

I have warm <1> I don't like at all  
feelings towards

3 2 1 0 1 2 3

Me as I am now	..... 0 .....
Person in the community I admire	..... 0 .....
The idea of Scottish Devolution	..... 0 .....
Me as I was when I left school	..... 0 .....
Mosques	..... 0 .....
Family networks	..... 0 .....
Young English women in Luton	..... 0 .....
My children	..... 0 .....
Young Englishmen in Luton	..... 0 .....
Person in the community I dislike	..... 0 .....
Cross-cultural music	..... 0 .....
Salvation Army	..... 0 .....
Anglican Church	..... 0 .....
Roman Catholic Church	..... 0 .....
Kashmiris in Britain	..... 0 .....
Young Asian women in Luton	..... 0 .....
Asian community organisations	..... 0 .....
Conservative Party	..... 0 .....
Young Asian men in Luton	..... 0 .....
John Major	..... 0 .....
British media	..... 0 .....
Jacques Delors	..... 0 .....
My Parents	..... 0 .....
Benazir Bhutto	..... 0 .....
The Kashmir situation	..... 0 .....
Luton University	..... 0 .....
English music	..... 0 .....
Me as I would like to be	..... 0 .....

**is/was strongly English <=> is/are very European in my/their ways and  
in my/their ways keep/s away from English customs**

	3	2	1	0	d	2	3
Me as I am now	.....						
	0						
Person in the community I admire	.....						
	0						
The idea of Scottish Devolution	.....						
	0						
Me as I was when I left school	.....						
	0						
Mosques	.....						
	0						
Family networks	.....						
	0						
Young English women in Luton	.....						
	0						
My children	.....						
	0						
Young English men in Luton	.....						
	0						
Person in the community I dislike	.....						
	0						
Cross-cultural music	.....						
	0						
Salvation Army	.....						
	0						
Anglican Church	.....						
	0						
Roman Catholic Church	.....						
	0						
Kashmiris in Britain	.....						
	0						
Young Asian women in Luton	.....						
	0						
Asian community organisations	.....						
	0						
Conservative Party	.....						
	0						
Young Asian men in Luton	.....						
	0						
John Major	.....						
	0						
British media	.....						
	0						
Jacques Delors	.....						
	0						
My Parents	.....						
	0						
Benazir Bhutto	.....						
	0						
The Kashmir situation	.....						
	0						
Luton University	.....						
	0						
English music	.....						
	0						
Me as I would like to be	.....						
	0						

**is/was/are strongly British in their attitudes and customs and see British as the same a English** <3> **is/was/are strongly English in their everyday life and regard English attitudes and customs to be different from British**

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I admire	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
The idea of Scottish Devolution	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Me as I was when I left school	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Mosques	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Family networks	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young English women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
My children	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young English men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I dislike	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Cross-cultural music	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Salvation Army	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Anglican Church	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Roman Catholic Church	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Britain	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Asian community organisations	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Conservative Party	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
John Major	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
British media	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Jacques Delors	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
My Parents	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Benazir Bhutto	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
The Kashmir situation	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Luton University	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
English music	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Me as I would like to be	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....

is/was/are not at all integrated <4> is/was/are strongly integrated  
 into British society into British society

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I admire	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
The idea of Scottish Devolution	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Me as I was when I left school	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Mosques	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Family networks	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young English women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
My children	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young English men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I dislike	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Cross-cultural music	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Salvation Army	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Anglican Church	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Roman Catholic Church	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Britain	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Asian community organisations	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Conservative Party	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
John Major	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
British media	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Jacques Delors	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
My Parents	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Benazir Bhutto	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
The Kashmir situation	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Luton University	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
English music	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Me as I would like to be	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....

**considers the English language <5> believe/sat is not an important part of heritage  
valuable part of heritage**

	3	2	1	0	d	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
Person in the community I admire	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
The idea of Scottish Devolution	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
Me as I was when I left school	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
Mosques	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
Family networks	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
Young English women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
My children	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
Young English men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
Person in the community I dislike	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
Cross-cultural music	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
Salvation Army	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
Anglican Church	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
Roman Catholic Church	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
Kashmiris in Britain	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
Asian community organisations	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
Conservative Party	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
John Major	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
British media	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
Jacques Delors	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
My Parents	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
Benazir Bhutto	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
The Kashmir situation	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
Luton University	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
English music	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						
Me as I would like to be	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
	0						

**believe/s that traditional systems of arranged marriage are fundamental to being Asian**

**believe/s that in today's society it is better to have the freedom to choose one's own marriage partner**

3 2 1 0 d 2 3

Me as I am now	..... 0 .....
Person in the community I admire	..... 0 .....
The idea of Scottish Devolution	..... 0 .....
Me as I was when I left school	..... 0 .....
Mosques	..... 0 .....
Family networks	..... 0 .....
Young English women in Luton	..... 0 .....
My children	..... 0 .....
Young Englishmen in Luton	..... 0 .....
Person in the community I dislike	..... 0 .....
Cross-cultural music	..... 0 .....
Salvation Army	..... 0 .....
Anglican Church	..... 0 .....
Roman Catholic Church	..... 0 .....
Kashmiris in Britain	..... 0 .....
Young Asian women in Luton	..... 0 .....
Asian community organisations	..... 0 .....
Conservative Party	..... 0 .....
Young Asian men in Luton	..... 0 .....
John Major	..... 0 .....
British media	..... 0 .....
Jacques Delores	..... 0 .....
My Parents	..... 0 .....
Benazir Bhutto	..... 0 .....
The Kashmir situation	..... 0 .....
Luton University	..... 0 .....
English music	..... 0 .....
Me as I would like to be	..... 0 .....

believe/s that parents/elders should be <7> feel/s that parents/elders should be treated  
 treated with special deference as equals and have to earn special respect

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I admire	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
The idea of Scottish Devolution	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Me as I was when I left school	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Mosques	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Family networks	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young English women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
My children	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young Englishmen in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I dislike	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Cross-cultural music	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Salvation Army	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Anglican Church	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Roman Catholic Church	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Britain	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Asian community organisations	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Conservative Party	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
John Major	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
British media	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Jacques Delors	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
My Parents	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Benazir Bhutto	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
The Kashmir situation	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Luton University	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
English music	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Me as I would like to be	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....

**feel/s that the Kashmir issue should be resolved internally <8> think/s that external international intervention is necessary**

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	..... 0 .....						
Person in the community I admire	..... 0 .....						
The idea of Scottish Devolution	..... 0 .....						
Me as I was when I left school	..... 0 .....						
Mosques	..... 0 .....						
Family networks	..... 0 .....						
Young English women in Luton	..... 0 .....						
My children	..... 0 .....						
Young English men in Luton	..... 0 .....						
Person in the community I dislike	..... 0 .....						
Cross-cultural music	..... 0 .....						
Salvation Army	..... 0 .....						
Anglican Church	..... 0 .....						
Roman Catholic Church	..... 0 .....						
Kashmiris in Britain	..... 0 .....						
Young Asian women in Luton	..... 0 .....						
Asian community organisations	..... 0 .....						
Conservative Party	..... 0 .....						
Young Asian men in Luton	..... 0 .....						
John Major	..... 0 .....						
British media	..... 0 .....						
Jacques Delors	..... 0 .....						
My Parents	..... 0 .....						
Benazir Bhutto	..... 0 .....						
The Kashmir situation	..... 0 .....						
Luton University	..... 0 .....						
English music	..... 0 .....						
Me as I would like to be	..... 0 .....						

**believes and respects family honour above all else** <9> **think/s that doing the right thing according to one's own sense of morality is more important than family honour**

	3	2	1	0	0	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I admire	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
The idea of Scottish Devolution	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Me as I was when I left school	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Mosques	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Family networks	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young English women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
My children	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young English men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I dislike	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Cross-cultural music	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Salvation Army	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Anglican Church	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Roman Catholic Church	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Britain	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Asian community organisations	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Conservative Party	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
John Major	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
British media	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Jacques Delors	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
My Parents	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Benazir Bhutto	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
The Kashmir situation	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Luton University	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
English music	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Me as I would like to be	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....

**feel/s deeply committed to <10> believe/s in the freedom for individuals to follow  
family networks their own independent life**

	3	2	1	0	0	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Person in the community I admire	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
The idea of Scottish Devolution	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Me as I was when I left school	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Mosques	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Family networks	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Young English women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
My children	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Young English men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Person in the community I dislike	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Cross-cultural music	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Salvation Army	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Anglican Church	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Roman Catholic Church	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Britain	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Asian community organisations	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Conservative Party	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
John Major	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
British media	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Jacques Delors	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
My Parents	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Benazir Bhutto	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
The Kashmir situation	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Luton University	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
English music	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Me as I would like to be	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....

**believe/s that in Britain people <11> feel/s that people should conform to  
should be able to wear what ever they want      wearing Western style dress**

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I admire	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
The idea of Scottish Devolution	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Me as I was when I left school	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Mosques	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Family networks	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young English women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
My children	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young English men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I dislike	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Cross-cultural music	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Salvation Army	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Anglican Church	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Roman Catholic Church	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Britain	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Asian community organisations	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Conservative Party	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
John Major	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
British media	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Jacques Delors	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
My Parents	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Benazir Bhutto	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
The Kashmir situation	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Luton University	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
English music	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Me as I would like to be	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....

**prefer/s the company of men <12> would spend time with men only at work or at  
in leisure time school/college/university**

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	..... 0 .....						
Person in the community I admire	..... 0 .....						
The idea of Scottish Devolution	..... 0 .....						
Me as I was when I left school	..... 0 .....						
Mosques	..... 0 .....						
Family networks	..... 0 .....						
Young English women in Luton	..... 0 .....						
My children	..... 0 .....						
Young English men in Luton	..... 0 .....						
Person in the community I dislike	..... 0 .....						
Cross-cultural music	..... 0 .....						
Salvation Army	..... 0 .....						
Anglican Church	..... 0 .....						
Roman Catholic Church	..... 0 .....						
Kashmiris in Britain	..... 0 .....						
Young Asian women in Luton	..... 0 .....						
Asian community organisations	..... 0 .....						
Conservative Party	..... 0 .....						
Young Asian men in Luton	..... 0 .....						
John Major	..... 0 .....						
British media	..... 0 .....						
Jacques Delors	..... 0 .....						
My Parents	..... 0 .....						
Benazir Bhutto	..... 0 .....						
The Kashmir situation	..... 0 .....						
Luton University	..... 0 .....						
English music	..... 0 .....						
Me as I would like to be	..... 0 .....						

**enjoy/s spending leisure time <13> prefer/s to mix with women only  
with women at work or at school/college/university**

	3	2	1	0	0	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Person in the community I admire	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
The idea of Scottish Devolution	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Me as I was when I left school	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Mosques	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Family networks	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Young English women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
My children to be born in the future	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Young Englishmen in Luton	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Person in the community I dislike	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Cross-cultural music	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Salvation Army	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Anglican Church	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Roman Catholic Church	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Britain	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Asian community organisations	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Conservative Party	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
John Major	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
British media	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Jacques Delors	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
My Parents	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Benazir Bhutto	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
The Kashmir situation	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Luton University	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Rave music	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Me as I would like to be	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....

**feel/s that Muslims should <14> feel/s that Muslims should be able  
only marry a Muslim to marry non Muslims**

	3	2	1	0	0	2	3
Me as I am now	.....						
	0						
Person in the community I admire	.....						
	0						
The idea of Scottish Devolution	.....						
	0						
Me as I was when I left school	.....						
	0						
Mosques	.....						
	0						
Family networks	.....						
	0						
Young English women in Luton	.....						
	0						
My children	.....						
	0						
Young English men in Luton	.....						
	0						
Person in the community I dislike	.....						
	0						
Cross-cultural music	.....						
	0						
Salvation Army	.....						
	0						
Anglican Church	.....						
	0						
Roman Catholic Church	.....						
	0						
Kashmiris in Britain	.....						
	0						
Young Asian women in Luton	.....						
	0						
Asian community organisations	.....						
	0						
Conservative Party	.....						
	0						
Young Asian men in Luton	.....						
	0						
John Major	.....						
	0						
British media	.....						
	0						
Jack Delores	.....						
	0						
My Parents	.....						
	0						
Benazir Bhutto	.....						
	0						
The Kashmir situation	.....						
	0						
Luton University	.....						
	0						
English music	.....						
	0						
Me as I would like to be	.....						
	0						

**prefers to socialise with own <15> would socialise with any religious group  
religious group**

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I admire	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
The idea of Scottish Devolution	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Me as I was when I left school	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Mosques	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Family networks	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young English women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
My children	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young English men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I dislike	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Cross-cultural music	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Salvation Army	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Anglican Church	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Roman Catholic Church	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Britain	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Asian community organisations	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Conservative Party	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
John Major	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
British media	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Jacques Delors	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
My Parents	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Benazir Bhutto	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
The Kashmir situation	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Luton University	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
English music	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Me as I would like to be	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....

**is/are strongly British and <16> is/are British but feel/s  
would be happy being anywhere in Britain a strong attachment to Luton**

	3	2	1	0	d	2	3
Me as I am now	.....						
	0						
Person in the community I admire	.....						
	0						
The idea of Scottish Devolution	.....						
	0						
Me as I was when I left school	.....						
	0						
Mosques	.....						
	0						
Family networks	.....						
	0						
Young English women in Luton	.....						
	0						
My children	.....						
	0						
Young English men in Luton	.....						
	0						
Person in the community I dislike	.....						
	0						
Cross-cultural music	.....						
	0						
Salvation Army	.....						
	0						
Anglican Church	.....						
	0						
Roman Catholic Church	.....						
	0						
Kashmiris in Britain	.....						
	0						
Young Asian women in Luton	.....						
	0						
Asian community organisations	.....						
	0						
Conservative Party	.....						
	0						
Young Asian men in Luton	.....						
	0						
John Major	.....						
	0						
British media	.....						
	0						
Jacques Delors	.....						
	0						
My Parents	.....						
	0						
Benazir Bhutto	.....						
	0						
The Kashmir situation	.....						
	0						
Luton University	.....						
	0						
English music	.....						
	0						
Me as I would like to be	.....						
	0						

**feel/s happy with British <17> would feel happier with European  
nationality nationality**

	3	2	1	0	0	2	3
Me as I am now	.....						
	0						
Person in the community I admire	.....						
	0						
The idea of Scottish Devolution	.....						
	0						
Me as I was when I left school	.....						
	0						
Mosques	.....						
	0						
Family networks	.....						
	0						
Young English women in Luton	.....						
	0						
My children	.....						
	0						
Young English men in Luton	.....						
	0						
Person in the community I dislike	.....						
	0						
Cross-cultural music	.....						
	0						
Salvation Army	.....						
	0						
Anglican Church	.....						
	0						
Roman Catholic Church	.....						
	0						
Kashmiris in Britain	.....						
	0						
Young Asian women in Luton	.....						
	0						
Asian community organisations	.....						
	0						
Conservative Party	.....						
	0						
Young Asian men in Luton	.....						
	0						
John Major	.....						
	0						
British media	.....						
	0						
Jacques Delors	.....						
	0						
My Parents	.....						
	0						
Benazir Bhutto	.....						
	0						
The Kashmir situation	.....						
	0						
Luton University	.....						
	0						
English music	.....						
	0						
Me as I would like to be	.....						
	0						



**feel/s more at home living in Britain <19> feel/s at home living anywhere**

	3	2	1	0	1	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I admire	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
The idea of Scottish Devolution	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Me as I was when I left school	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Mosques	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Family networks	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young English women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
My children	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young English men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Person in the community I dislike	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Cross-cultural music	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Salvation Army	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Anglican Church	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Roman Catholic Church	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Britain	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Asian community organisations	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Conservative Party	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
John Major	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
British media	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Jacques Delors	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
My Parents	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Benazir Bhutto	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
The Kashmir situation	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Luton University	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
English music	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....
Me as I would like to be	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....	.....

**believe/s that the Kashmiri community  
wants the younger generation to think  
of Kashmir as their homeland**

**<20>feel/s that the Kashmiri community should want  
the younger generation to think of Britain  
as their homeland**

	3	2	1	0	0	2	3
Me as I am now	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Person in the community I admire	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
The idea of Scottish Devolution	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Me as I was when I left school	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Mosques	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Family networks	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Young English women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
My children	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Young English men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Person in the community I dislike	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Cross-cultural music	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Salvation Army	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Anglican Church	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Roman Catholic Church	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Kashmiris in Britain	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Young Asian women in Luton	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Asian community organisations	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Conservative Party	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Young Asian men in Luton	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
John Major	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
British media	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Jacques Delors	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
My Parents	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Benazir Bhutto	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
The Kashmir situation	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Luton University	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
English music	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....
Me as I would like to be	.....	.....	.....	.....	0	.....	.....

**ANY OTHER COMMENTS**

## Appendix 10.1 Chi Square calculations Factors important for living in current area

### (a) Extended contingency table

		Degrees of preference					Total
		<u>Y</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	
Closeness to own society	Young	25	8	0	0	0	33
	Old	27	10	0	0	0	37
		<b>52</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>70</b>
Closeness to schools with Kashmiri / Muslim children	Young	25	8	0	0	0	33
	Old	20	17	0	0	0	37
		<b>45</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>70</b>
Closeness to relatives	Young	23	10	0	0	0	33
	Old	31	6	0	0	0	37
		<b>54</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>70</b>
Closeness to Asian shops	Young	22	11	0	0	0	33
	Old	22	15	0	0	0	37
		<b>44</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>70</b>
Closeness to services such as mosques and community centres	Young	27	6	0	0	0	33
	Old	33	4	0	0	0	37
		<b>60</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>70</b>

### (b) Expected frequencies

		Degrees of preference					Total
		<u>Y</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	
Closeness to own society	Young	24.5	8.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.0
	Old	27.5	9.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	37.0
		<b>52.0</b>	<b>18.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>70.0</b>
Closeness to schools with Kashmiri / Muslim children	Young	21.2	11.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.0
	Old	23.8	13.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	37.0
		<b>45.0</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>70.0</b>
Closeness to relatives	Young	25.5	7.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.0
	Old	28.5	8.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	37.0
		<b>54.0</b>	<b>16.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>70.0</b>
Closeness to Asian shops	Young	20.7	12.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.0
	Old	23.3	13.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	37.0
		<b>44.0</b>	<b>26.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>70.0</b>
Closeness to services such as mosques and community centres	Young	28.3	4.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.0
	Old	31.7	5.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	37.0
		<b>60.0</b>	<b>10.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>70.0</b>

### (c) Chi-squared values

		Degrees of preference					Total
		<u>Y</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	
Closeness to own society	Young	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04
	Old	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03
		<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.07</b>
Closeness to schools with Kashmiri / Muslim children	Young	0.68	1.22	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.90
	Old	0.60	1.08	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.68
		<b>1.28</b>	<b>2.30</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>3.58</b>
Closeness to relatives	Young	0.24	0.80	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.04
	Old	0.21	0.71	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.92
		<b>0.45</b>	<b>1.51</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>1.96</b>
Closeness to Asian shops	Young	0.08	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.21
	Old	0.07	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.18
		<b>0.15</b>	<b>0.24</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.39</b>
Closeness to services such as mosques and community centres	Young	0.06	0.35	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.41
	Old	0.05	0.31	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.36
		<b>0.11</b>	<b>0.66</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.77</b>

### Hypothesis

Ho = variables are independent  
 Degrees of freedom = 1  
 Significance level = 0.05  
 Chi-squared value = 3.84

## Appendix 10.2 Chi - Square calculations Factors important for living in future area

### (a) Extended contingency table

		Degrees of preference					Total
		Y	N	3	2	1	
Closeness to own society	Young	40	11	0	0	0	51
	Old	14	5	0	0	0	19
		<b>54</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>70</b>
Closeness to schools with Kashmiri / Muslim children	Young	30	21	0	0	0	51
	Old	14	5	0	0	0	19
		<b>44</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>70</b>
Closeness to relatives	Young	35	16	0	0	0	51
	Old	10	9	0	0	0	19
		<b>45</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>70</b>
Closeness to Asian shops	Young	37	14	0	0	0	51
	Old	15	4	0	0	0	19
		<b>52</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>70</b>
Closeness to services such as mosques and community centres	Young	41	10	0	0	0	51
	Old	12	7	0	0	0	19
		<b>53</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>70</b>

### (b) Expected frequencies

		Degrees of preference					Total
		Y	N	3	2	1	
Closeness to own society	Young	39.3	11.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	51.0
	Old	14.7	4.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	19.0
		<b>54.0</b>	<b>16.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>70.0</b>
Closeness to schools with Kashmiri / Muslim children	Young	32.1	18.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	51.0
	Old	11.9	7.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	19.0
		<b>44.0</b>	<b>26.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>70.0</b>
Closeness to relatives	Young	32.8	18.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	51.0
	Old	12.2	6.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	19.0
		<b>45.0</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>70.0</b>
Closeness to Asian shops	Young	37.9	13.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	51.0
	Old	14.1	4.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	19.0
		<b>52.0</b>	<b>18.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>70.0</b>
Closeness to services such as mosques and community centres	Young	38.6	12.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	51.0
	Old	14.4	4.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	19.0
		<b>53.0</b>	<b>17.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>70.0</b>

### (c) Chi-squared values

		Degrees of preference					Total
		Y	N	3	2	1	
Closeness to own society	Young	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05
	Old	0.03	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.13
		<b>0.04</b>	<b>0.14</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.18</b>
Closeness to schools with Kashmiri / Muslim children	Young	0.13	0.22	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.35
	Old	0.35	0.60	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.95
		<b>0.48</b>	<b>0.82</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>1.30</b>
Closeness to relatives	Young	0.15	0.27	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.42
	Old	0.40	0.72	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.12
		<b>0.55</b>	<b>0.99</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>1.54</b>
Closeness to Asian shops	Young	0.02	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.08
	Old	0.06	0.16	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.22
		<b>0.08</b>	<b>0.22</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.30</b>
Closeness to services such as mosques and community centres	Young	0.15	0.46	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.61
	Old	0.40	1.23	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.63
		<b>0.55</b>	<b>1.69</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>2.24</b>

### Hypothesis

Ho = variables are independent  
 Degrees of freedom = 1  
 Significance level = 0.05  
 Chi-squared value = 3.84

## Appendix 12.1 Scale ranges for ISA indices

SCALE RANGES FOR ISA INDICES		SUGGESTED CUT-OFF POINTS FOR DESIGNATING THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA		
INDEX	RANGE	CRITERION	CUT-OFF POINT: APPROX. MAGNITUDE	
1. EGO-INVOLVEMENT	0.00 to 5.00	Very high:	Above	4.00
		Low:	Below	2.00
2. EVALUATION ("normalised") & SELF ESTEEM	-1.00 to +1.00	Very high:	Above	0.70
		Moderate:	0.30 to	0.70
		Low:	-0.10 to	0.30
		Very low:	Below	-0.10
3. IDENTIFICATION & IDENTIFICATION CONFLICT INDICES				
IDENTITY DIFFUSION	0.00 to 1.00	High:	Above	0.40
		Moderate:	0.20 to	0.40
		Low:	Below	0.20
IDENTIFICATION CONFLICT	0.00 to 1.00	Very high:	Above	0.50
		High:	0.35 to	0.50
		Moderate:	0.20 to	0.35
		Low:	Below	0.20
IDEALISTIC- IDENTIFICATION	0.00 to 1.00	High(+ve role):	Above	0.70
		Low:	Below	0.50
CONTRA- IDENTIFICATION	0.00 to 1.00	High(-ve role):	Above	0.45
		Low:	Below	0.25
EMPATHETIC IDENTIFICATION	0.00 to 1.00	High:	Above	0.70
		Low:	Below	0.50
4. STRUCTURAL PRESSURE	-100 to +100	"Core" evaluative)****	Above	80
		dimensions of )***	70 to	79
		identity )**	60 to	69
		)*	50 to	59
		"Secondary" eval-)+++	40 to	49
		uative dimensions)++	30 to	39
		of identity )+	20 to	29

"Conflicted", inconsistently, or non-, evaluative  
dimensions of identity: -20 to +20

Consistently incompatible evaluative dimensions: Large negative

**IMPORTANT NOTE:** It is stressed that cut-off points are by their nature somewhat arbitrary. The indices themselves should be regarded as estimates of the underlying parameters, which may be subject to bias as a result of over-inclusion, or omission, of certain kinds of constructs or entities, and to error as a result of rating-scale response failures. Caution should be exercised in their interpretation.

ISA CLASSIFICATION OF IDENTITY VARIANTS

IDENTITY DIFFUSION

Diffusion Variants (indicating a tolerance of high levels of identification conflicts)	Moderate (0.20 to 0.39)	Low (0.00 to 0.19)
		Foreclosure variants (indicating a defensiveness against identification conflicts)

SELF-EVALUATION

Positive variants	High (0.70 to 1.00)	Diffuse high self-regard	Confident	Defensive high self-regard
	Moderate (0.30 to 0.69)	Diffusion	Indeterminate	Defensive
Negative variants	Low (-1.00 to 0.29)	Crisis	Negative	Defensive negative

NOTES (SEE IDEXPC USERGUIDE FOR ALTERNATIVE CUT-OFF POINTS) \*

1. This classification of identity variants is based solely upon the underlying parameters of identity diffusion and self-evaluation, and is therefore a global one that ignores individual characteristics indicated in detail by the full range of identity indices for the person. A person's identity variant classification will evidently vary over time in accordance with biographical evolution.
2. Because cut-off points are used with respect to underlying parameters there is, of course, no hard and fast distinction between immediately adjacent "identity variants" in the classification.
3. Cut-off points are inevitably somewhat arbitrary, and the estimates of the underlying parameters are subject to error and bias, hence caution should be exercised in the interpretation of these identity variants. The cut-off points designated above should not be regarded as definitive, but only indicative of gross qualitative differences between identity variants of polar contrasting kinds on the two parameters in question.
4. If two categories "confident" and "indeterminate" are considered to represent well-adjusted identities, then the remaining categories may be designated vulnerable identities of various kinds. With the cut-off points indicated above, the degrees of identity vulnerabilities so designated will range from the relatively mild (likely to be experienced by everyone from time to time) to the more troublesome in accordance with the extremity of the underlying parameters.

\* Revised cut-off points, based on statistical criteria for a sample of 546 respondents, for self-evaluation are 0.19 and 0.81, and for identity diffusion 0.25 and 0.41. These may be substituted for the default cut-off points indicated in the above Table (for self-evaluation 0.30 and 0.70, and identity diffusion 0.20 and 0.40).

## GLOSSARY

*Alim*, (pl. *ulama*) a learned scholar particularly in religious/Islamic thought.

*apna*, ours

*baithak*, front sitting room

*beti*, daughter

*betna-utna*, the etiquette of socialising

*biraderi*, literally brotherhood and/or kinship network

*chunda*, alms collected from local community

*dupata*, scarf *fiqh*, Islamic jurisprudence

*Eid*, religious festivals.

*Gar*, foreign

Hadith, the sayings of the Prophet.

*ijtihad* individual interpretation of Islamic fiqh

*izzat*, honour

*jahil*, ignorant (also the period before Islam)

*jihad*, struggle in the name of God.

*jumma*, Friday congregational prayers

*kafir*, an unbeliever

*kacha*, temporary (literally uncooked)

*khandani*, lineage of extended family

*madrassa*, schools for teaching religious education

*Pahari*, Meaning literally mountain. The dialect of Punjabi spoken by many Kashmiris from Azad Kashmir

*pir*, a leader of a Sufi order

*pukka*, permanent (literally cooked)

*sawab*, grace from God

*shalwar kameez*, traditional South Asian trouser and top combination.

*Shia*, the party of Ali, the second largest tradition within Islam.

*silsilah*, the chain of spiritual descent reaching back to the Prophet

*Sunna*, the customs and norms of the Prophet that Muslims should emulate.

*tangas*, horse and cart

*tariqa*, Sufi order

*Ummah*, the global community of all Muslims.

*unpar*, illiterate

*zakat*, alms giving

*zimidars*, landowner

## **GLOSSERY OF ISA TERMS**

### **I. DEFINITIONS OF IDENTITY**

One's identity is defined as the totality of one's self-construal, in which how one construes oneself in the present expresses the continuity between how one construes oneself as one was in the past and how one construes oneself as one aspires to be in the future.

#### **A. Ideal Self-image (or ego-ideal)**

One's ideal self-image is defined as one's construal of "me as I would like to be"

#### **B. Positive values**

One's positive values are defined as those personal characteristics and guidelines for behaviour which one aspires to implement for oneself in accordance with one's ideal self-image.

#### **C. Negative values (or contra-value)**

One's negative values are defined as the contrasts of one's positive values, that is, those characteristics and patterns of behaviour from which one would wish to dissociate

#### **D. Current Self-image**

One's current self-image is defined as one's construal of "me as I am now"

#### **E. Past self-image**

One's past self-image is defined as one's construal of "me as I used to be"

### **II. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ROLE MODELS, AND POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE REFERENCE GROUPS**

#### **A. Positive role model (and reference group)**

One's positive role model (reference group) is defined as some other person (group) constructed as having many of the attributes and values to which one aspires, that is, ones associated with one's ideal self-image

#### **B. Negative role model (and reference group)**

One's negative role model (reference group) is defined as some other person (group) is defined as some other person (group) constructed as possessing many of the attributes and contra-values from which one wishes to dissociate, that is, one's aligned with one's contra-value system.

### **III. IDENTIFICATION WITH ANOTHER OR WITH A GROUP**

#### **A. Empathetic identification**

##### **1. Current Identification (perceived similarity)**

The extent of one's current identification with another is defined as the degree of similarity between the qualities one attributes to the other, whether "good" or "bad", and those of one's current self-image.

##### **2. Past identification (perceived similarity)**

The extent of one's past identification with another is defined as the degree of similarity between the qualities one attributes to the other and those of one's past self-image.

#### **B. Role Model Identification**

##### **1. Idealistic-identification (positive role model and reference group)**

The extent of one's idealistic identification with another is defined as the degree of similarity between the qualities one attributes to the other and those one would like to possess as part of one's ideal self-image.

##### **2. Contra-identification (negative role model and reference group)**

The extent of one's contra-identification with another is defined as the degree of similarity between the qualities one attributes to the other and those from which one would wish to dissociate.

#### **C. Identification conflicts and overall identity diffusion**

##### **1. Identification conflicts with others**

In terms of one's current self-image the extent of one's identification conflict with another is defined as a multiplicative function of one's current and contra-identification with the other.

A similar definition holds for identification conflicts in terms of one's past self-image. As one's current (past) and contra-identification with another simultaneously increase, so will one's conflict in identification with that other become greater.

##### **2. Overall identity diffusion**

The degree of one's identity diffusion is defined as the overall dispersion of, and magnitude of, one's identification conflicts with significant others. This may be assessed in relation both to one's current to one's past self-images.

#### **IV. EVALUATION OF SELF AND OTHERS AND SELF ESTEEM**

##### **A. Evaluation of another**

One's evaluation of another is defined as one's overall assessment of the other in terms of the positive and negative evaluative connotations of other in terms of the positive and negative evaluative connotations of the attributes one construes in that other, in accordance with one's value system.

##### **B. Evaluation of current (past) self**

One's evaluation of one's current (past) self is defined as one's overall self-assessment in terms of the positive and negative evaluative connotations of the attributes one construes as making up one's current (past) self-image, in accordance with one's value system.

##### **C. self-esteem**

One's self-esteem is defined as one's overall self-assessment in evaluative terms of the continuing relationship between one's past and current self-images, in accordance with one's value system.

#### **V. EGO-INVOLVEMENT WITH ENTITIES**

##### **A. Ego-involvement with another**

One's ego-involvement with another is defined as one's overall responsiveness to the other in terms of the extensiveness both in quantity and in strength of the attributes one construes the other as possessing.

##### **B. Self-involvement**

One's ego-involvement in oneself as one aspires to be (or as one is now, or as one was in the past) is defined as one's overall self-responsiveness in terms of the extensiveness both in quantity and in strength of the attributes of one's ideal self-image (or current self-image, or past self image).

#### **VI. STRUCTURAL PRESSURE ON CONSTRUCTS (CONSISTENCY OR STABILITY OF THEIR EVALUATIVE CONNOTATIONS)**

The structural pressure on one's construct is defined as the overall strength of the excess of compatibilities over incompatibilities between the evaluative connotations of attributes one makes to each entity by way of the one construct and one's overall evaluation of each entity.

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