

INTRODUCTION



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Parties are indispensable political organizations through which people channel commonly shared values, beliefs, and ideas of governing and ordering priorities. Once political parties gain power; preferably, in free and fair elections, they can control the state and the resources and personnel of the government individually or in coalition with other political parties. As instruments of collective action, argues Weiner, political parties are the creation of the political elite in a bid to control the resources and personnel of government to implement an ideology or a political program.¹ From this perspective, Islamic political parties that entered competitive politics are no different from other political parties in that all parties struggle to gain power and to control the government and its resources. Moreover, much like other political parties, they have various types of organizational structures, ability to mobilize financial resources, provide support and goodwill, recruit cadres, select or elect officers, and, in some cases, develop procedures for internal control and management.²

However, Islamic political parties are different from other political parties, including, for example, confessional Christian political parties, which recognize Roman law as a source of law. Islamic political parties espouse creating a society that adheres to, or is at least influenced by, Islamic teachings and values derived from the sources of Islamic legislation or law (Sharia). In Islam, there is neither distinction between ethics and law nor distinction among the social, economic, political, and religious functions of Islamic political parties beyond the political activities in which they engage. A common denominator among political parties that call themselves Islamic, whether radical or moderate, is that their adherence professes an Islamic identity with a conscious and deliberate objective of advancing an Islamic way of life as well as serving the interests of the Muslim Umma (community of believers). Nevertheless, moderate and militant Islamic political parties differ in their responses to whether Muslim societies should be governed

by secular laws and jurisdictions or adhere literally and strictly (applying fundamentalist principles or calling for a return to the fundamentals of Islam) to the Koran and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad.³ This is a major difference between the two with far-reaching implications for the nature of the state, whether it is strictly Islamic and ruled by an Islamic constitution with all its social economic and political ramifications or secular. It also has similar far-reaching implications for the position of women in society and in respect to human rights issues (polygamy, stoning to death for adultery, inheriting an equivalent to half of what a brother inherits from the parents' inheritance, and an evidence brought to court by two women witnesses is equivalent to that of one man). Another major difference between moderate and militant Islamic political parties is their position vis-à-vis *hudud* (or amputation of limbs for theft beyond certain value), which is not condoned by moderate Islamic political parties.

Therefore, the point of departure of this volume is that Islamic political parties constitute the most tangible institutional manifestation of diverse schools of political Islam, ranging from the most militant to the moderate. The contributors to the volume illustrate that Islamic political parties advocate diverse and at times contradictory ideological orientations and responses to major concerns in the contemporary Islamic world with regard to social justice, human rights, and the position of women and minorities. They explore Islamic political parties' responses to as well as confrontation or cooperation with secular political parties and how these relations are shaped by differences in ideology and the socioeconomic and political contexts within which they operate. For realizing this ambition, the volume includes country and cross-country comparative studies covering large parts of the Islamic world (Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritius, Maldives, South Africa, Somalia, Sudan, and Turkey). The cases of Jordan, India-Pakistan, Tunisia, and Yemen are treated at length in this introduction to capture the diversity of historical, social, and political issues that militated Islamic political parties' emergence into competitive electoral politics and their political behavior both in government and opposition.

The entry of Islamic political parties into democratic competitive politics raised more questions than answers. The most intriguing question is, Can Islamic political parties be trusted? Moreover, can they be both Islamic and democratic or are they vying to access power and control government, resources, and personnel of government only to create an Islamic state? Are Islamic political parties different or just like secular political parties? How and why? With these questions in mind, this volume intends to elucidate the evolution, current development, and role of Islamic political parties in contemporary polity and society in the Islamic world. It attempts to explain the increasing presence of Islamic political

parties as actors in democratic competitive politics and their responses to major contemporary social, political, and economic issues.

EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL PARTIES

This section offers a background on the emergence of Islamic political parties. It is divided into at least three broad historical periods: colonial, independence, and the end of the Cold War (includes post-1990s development, including the current democratization process).

Islamic Political Parties during the Colonial Period

The emergence of modern institutional Islamic political parties is recent and can be traced to the colonial past of the Islamic world and most commonly the Muslim struggle for independence. In most Muslim countries, debates and negotiations took place among Muslim political elite and scholars on what type of state should succeed the colonial state. Moreover, how much should the modernization or westernization process be allowed to challenge the traditional social forces? The debate on the nature of the state and Western-versus-Islamic values culminated in two types of struggle. The first was the struggle for the soul of the Muslim Umma and prevalence of Islam as a way of life, foremost and for some more militant ideologues, the only permissible source of legislation (Sharia, literally Islamic law). The second struggle was for independence and self-rule. The two struggles are inseparable, and in both struggles, Islam was used as a source of piety and an ideology of national liberation.⁴

However, not all Muslim societies were hostile to modernization and some cooperated with colonial rule. As will be illustrated in this chapter, some Islamic political parties and organizations were allowed limited space for conducting social welfare activities that were considered apolitical in nature. For example, in Indonesia (see Chapter 3 by Diederich), the Sarekat Islam Party was formed in 1912. Considered one of the first mass Islamic political parties in Southeast Asia where Islam played a pivotal role, Islam served as a link cementing the sentiments of national unity against Dutch colonialism. Accordingly, Islam was the most obvious means of both establishing national unity and disassociating the Indonesians from the Dutch ruling elite. Founded by H. Samanhoedi in Solo in 1911, Sarekat was "the first politically based Indonesian nationalist organization to evolve." Under the leadership of H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto, Agus Salim, and Abdoel Moeis, it was a pioneering organization, which "embarked upon a political program calling for self-government" and "complete independence." Unfortunately, Sarekat Islam met a quick demise because of its interest in Marxist ideas, which resulted in conflicts

and division among the party leadership. The party disintegrated in the 1920s, its founders, Soekarno and Tjokroaminoto, created the Indonesian National Party (PNI) in 1927. The chapters on Indonesia elaborate on the political struggles of moderate Islam in Indonesia and in Chapter 2 by van Dijk, compare Indonesia with Malaysia from the colonial period through their current political development.

In India, the Muslim League, probably the first modern Muslim political party in the Indian subcontinent, was founded during the British Colonial rule at the auspices of the annual All India Muhammadan Educational Conference held in Shahbagh, Dhaka, in 1906. Initially, the Muslim League was not hostile to British rule and supported its 1905 decision to partition Muslim Bengal from India. In fact, the first article of the Muslim League's inaugural charter advocated promoting a feeling of loyalty to the British government among Indian Muslims.⁵ This illustrates that the frictions and suspicion that marred the relationship between the Muslim and Hindu political elite had already existed during the struggle for independence. For the Hindus, independence was meant for a united India. For the Muslims, independence meant independence from British colonial rule as a prelude to creating an independent Muslim state. However, the Muslim League changed its attitude from friendly to hostile against British rule when British colonial rule reversed its 1905 decision to partition Muslim Bengal from India and joined the independence movements without relinquishing its stance on the creation of an independent state.

After several failures to reconcile Muslim and Hindu political elite, Muhammad Iqbal put forward the demand for a separate Muslim state in India under the Two Nation Theory, according to which he pronounced that Hindus and Muslims are different nations, with different religions. The 1940 Lahore Resolution formed the principles under which the partition and the emergence of independent Pakistan as a Muslim state were founded. Not all Muslims championed the Muslim League's agitation for independence; for example, the Indian Union Muslim League was pro-Indian unity. The All India Muslim League was disbanded in 1947 and was succeeded by two separate Muslim political parties, the Pakistan Muslim League and the Indian Union Muslim League.

Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru accepted the partition in fear of civil war. Much ink and paper have been consumed in narrating the upheavals of the partition, including the war between India and Pakistan and the ongoing saga in Kashmir. What is relevant to this book is the evolution of the All Indian Muslim League and its role in the independence of Pakistan and the use of Islam as an ideology of national liberation.

In Egypt, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as a nationalist Islamic movement vying to oust the colonial state and build an Islamic state or at least a state conscious of the role of Islam in society and

by doing so invoking the authenticity of the religious text.⁶ The brotherhood emerged as a reaction to or inspired by a subtle wave of modernization and creeping Western values in Egyptian polity and society. Hassan al-Banna established the Muslim Brotherhood (between 1927 and 1928) as a movement against British colonial rule and together with other Egyptian intellectuals such as Sayyid Qutb perceived Western modernity as a threat to Egypt's Islamic identity.⁷

While the majority of the political parties espoused a secular liberal ideological orientation, the Muslim Brotherhood based its political creed and struggle on the promise of creating an Islamic state ruled by the teachings of Islam. Three factors contributed to the radicalization of the Muslim Brotherhood: (1) the rejection of the Muslim Brotherhood's application to register as a political party in conformity with Egypt's 1923 Constitution, which prohibited the registration of religious political parties; (2) its mobilization capacity increased as it became known for its ability to hold large demonstrations, which were seen as a threat to the secular establishment. As a result, (3) it was able to attract a considerable following and influence among the educated elite and university students, thus preparing the next generation of radical Islamists,⁸ including a sizable number of the politically vocal urban population. More important, the Muslim Brotherhood benefited from the fragmentation of other political parties and their degeneration into several splinter groups, including the Wafd and Young Egypt (Misr al-Fatah). This situation continued until the late 1940s when the Muslim Brotherhood grew in popularity but remained banned from electoral politics. By the late 1950s, Sayyid Qutb abandoned liberal nationalism in favor of a militant struggle calling for the need for the violent overthrow of the Egyptian State to create a state-based on Islamic values, *shura* (consultation) and *Sharia*.⁹

Externally, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood recruited fighters to join the 1948 Palestinian-Israeli war in support of the Palestinian cause. One such external influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is the creation of the Muslim Brotherhoods of Sudan, Yemen, Kuwait, Jordan, Palestine, and many others, which emerged during the same period.¹⁰ Internally, the Muslim Brotherhood began clandestine operations to undermine government authority, including attacks on government buildings and installations. The climax of the brotherhood's clandestine operations inside Egypt was the assassination of Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi Nokrashi in December 1948. The Egyptian government could no longer ignore the Muslim Brotherhood's strength and the dangers of radicalizing it even further. As part of the appeasement policy, the Muslim Brotherhood was tolerated and even legalized as a political organization but not a political party. This delimitation of the Muslim Brotherhood's activities relegated it to a political organization not eligible to contest elections.¹¹

If the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood prides itself on being the inspiration for the most Muslim movements in the world, including a large number of surrogate organizations in the Middle East, Sudan's Muslim Brotherhood should pride itself on being the most successful organization in terms of electoral politics and state capture both through legitimate and illegitimate means. Born in the embryo of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, it was able to recruit a following among Sudanese students studying in Egypt. While the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood was established by El-Rashid al-Tahir, Babiker Karar, and other members of the Muslim Front in 1947, two years later (1949), Sudanese students established the Islamic Liberation Movement (*harakat al-tahrir al-Islami*), which although influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, preferred to keep its independence, also in fear of the colonial power's crackdown.¹² Upon returning to the Sudan, the Muslim Brotherhood of the Sudan was founded at Khartoum University in 1954/1955 by some lecturers and students as an intellectual movement not interested in diluting its intellectual content by opening itself to the general public. The Islamic Charter Front (ICF) was formed as a political wing to contest elections after the October revolution of 1964 that ended the first military rule in independent Sudan (1958–1964).¹³ As a mass organization, ICF was backed by a number of intellectuals, including its mentor, Dr. Hassan al-Turabi (then the dean of the Faculty of Law at Khartoum University), armed with the teachings of Sayyid Qotb and Hassan al-Banna, the founding fathers of the Muslim Brotherhood movement and its expansion throughout the world.¹⁴

Like Sudan's Muslim Brotherhood, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood was an offshoot of the Egyptian Brotherhood but differed markedly in its pronounced rejection of violence, loyalty to the Jordanian monarchy, and working within the established political order. According to Quintan, its relationship with the Jordanian regime was established when the movement was first founded in Jordan on November 19, 1945. The Jordanian regime granted the movement legal status in January 1946 as a charitable society. The king was a personal associate of the Jordanian Brotherhood's founder, Abdul Latif Abu Qura, and included the movement's secretary, Abdul Hakim Adin, in the government's cabinet, proclaiming that Jordan is in need of the brotherhood's efforts.¹⁵

However, the Muslim Brotherhood's loyalty to the Jordanian monarchy was tested following the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War, the occupation of the West Bank, and the presence of a large number of Palestinian refugees in Jordan. The Palestinian liberation movements (known as *fedayeen*) began to behave and act like states within the Jordanian state, using it as a military base from which they hijacked airplanes and attacked Israeli settlers. Jordan became a victim of Israeli reprisals against Jordanian cities and large urban centers, which developed into an

open war, involving Syria and Iraq against Jordan and in support of the Palestinians.¹⁶

The role of Islamic movements in Algerian polity dates back to the precolonial period and continued well into the anti-imperial struggle and agitations for independence and self-rule. French colonialists feared the possible reemergence of Islamic rebellion and the rise of Islam as rallying points for anticolonial rule (Ottaway et al). The colonial government prohibited by law large gatherings of Muslims as well as banned Muslims from carrying firearms. Muslims were required to denounce Islamic law before they could become full French citizens. Islamic charitable trust lands were confiscated and made government property and Koranic schools were considered breeding grounds for anticolonial rule and therefore treated with suspicion at best or closure at worst.¹⁷

However, French anti-Islamic policies backfired and encouraged the emergence of new orthodox Islamic teachers, such as Abdel Hamid Ben Badis, who preached against the Marabouts and cultic saints for their apparent political neutrality vis-à-vis the major upheavals confronting Algerian society.¹⁸ In contrast with Egypt, where British colonial rule was more tolerant to Islamic revivalism, which was crucial for the ensuing debate on major social and political issues, the French colonial experience in Algeria was quite the opposite. It is little wonder then that Islam had become an ideology for national liberation during Algeria's agitation for independence. Although the leaders of Algeria's war of independence were socialists advocating a secular political program, they could not resist the mobilizing power of Islam calling the fighters *mujahideen* (fighters of a holy war) and those who killed for the cherished goal of independence *shuhada* (singular *shaheed*, or martyr).¹⁹

Internal political rivalry among Algerian independence leaders was based on ethnic cleavages and divergent convictions in respect to the compatibility of Islam and socialism. David and Marina Ottaway lament, "Boumediene's opposition to Ben Bella's policies was veiled behind a pseudo-religious argument over the compatibility of Islam and Marxist Socialism. This issue had been raised by the conservative religious leaders, who contended that socialism was contrary to the teachings of Islam."²⁰

After gaining self-rule, the Algerian leaders (Ben Bella and Houari Boumediene) imposed Arab Socialism as the ideology of the official ideology and yet declared Islam the religion of the state, established a Ministry of Religious Affairs with the authority to establish mosques, religious schools, train Imams (prayer leaders), and even control the content of Friday Prayer sermons. Chadli Bendjedid introduced Islamic family law²¹ and established an Islamic university (Universite Emir Abdelkader des Sciences Islamiques) as a concession to the Islamists who became very vocal in their critique of the government. Government leniency toward

some radical Egyptian scholars who were allowed to migrate to Algeria and militant Imams was a major factor in strengthening the position of Islamists in society.²²

In subsequent years, the Algerian Islamist movement was emboldened (see Boubekur's chapter in this volume), leading to the emergence of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which radicalized the role of Islam in Algerian polity. This matter will be dealt with in the section on post-1990s Islamic political parties in this introduction.

The emergence of Islamic political parties during the colonial period was epitomized by their struggle for independence, which signaled an early contestation between different schools of political Islam within these parties, debating questions about the nature state after the attainment of independence and self-rule. Islam in general and Islamic political parties in particular played an important role in shaping political destinies of many countries, but mostly espoused pragmatism to the extent that some cooperated with colonial rule.²³ On the majority however, most political organizations, parties, and movements opposed colonialism and championed the struggle of self-rule. As will be explored further, some of these political parties and organizations continue to influence politics and society in the Muslim world well into the postindependence epoch, while others have declined and even ceased to exist.

Islamic Political Parties from Independence to the Cold War

Most Islamic countries became independent under democratic rule. A few years after independence, they were ruled by the military, military socialist regimes, one-party states (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Syria, Sudan, Egypt, Iraq, Tunisia, Libya), guided democracies (Indonesia), or non-democratic monarchs, sheikhs or sultans (the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, and Libya at the eve of independence). The Muslim states of Central Asia were under Soviet influence in which the formation of political parties was banned in accordance with the dominant communist ideology.

The Islamic world seemed to have moved from what Tachau (1994) called the "liberal era" during the closing period (1950s and 1960s) of colonial rule to totalitarianism. By the mid-1960s through the 1980s, most Muslim populations worldwide lived under totalitarian regimes.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhoods, political organizations, social movements, and philanthropic organizations emerged in response to at least two prominent crises in the least-developed Muslim countries (Sudan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Somalia, Mauritania, Yemen, and Jordan).²⁴ These crises are (1) economic, as exemplified by low to negative economic growth and (2) livelihood, including poverty, unemployment,

and lack of adequate public amenities. Apart from a few less authoritarian states with majority Muslim populations, the majority of the states, including the oil rich and those considered part of the Asian Tigers (Indonesia and Malaysia) suffered governance crises or severe governance deficits. The governance deficits included economic mismanagement, corruption, abuse of power, and human and civic rights violations.

This period was also characterized by the strong influence of the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 on world affairs and the rise of Islamic insurgency. According to Abdelnasser, the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran had far-reaching impact, direct as well as indirect, throughout the region. of the influence of the Iranian Revolution was obvious in the manner in which various Islamic groups and organizations throughout the Muslim world began to uphold the banner of Islam as a political ideology and program in their quest for controlling the state power.²⁵ In contrast, some radical Islamic, opposing the Iranian Revolution, such as the Society of Muslims (Jama't al-Muslimin), thought it contradicted the organization's philosophy of isolation and emigration from society and its belief that it was the only true Islamic movement. In addition, the organization was opposed to bridging gaps between Sunnis and Shiites and had its own reservations toward the Shiite doctrine. However, argues Abdelnasser, the Holy Struggle (al-Jihad) organization firmly supported the Iranian Revolution and considered it an Islamic experience that should be seriously studied.²⁶

In the same vein, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) was formed in 1951 because of an internal split within the dominant United Malays National Organization (UMNO) Party. PAS rose to new heights under the leadership of the radical nationalist and Islamist intellectual, Dr. Burhanuddin al-Helmy, who led the party between 1959 and 1969. It gained an unprecedented victory by winning control of the states of Kelantan and Trengganu for the first time and became the first Islamic party in Asia to win power through democratic and constitutional means. Not even the Jama'at-e Islami of Pakistan or the Ikhwan'ul Muslimin of Egypt managed such a feat.²⁷

Inspired by the Iranian Revolution, PAS was radicalized in its opposition to the established order by calling for the revival of the Ulama institution. In 1984, PAS stepped up its critique against ethnonationalism and blamed it for the decline of the Muslim Umma on the whole and the Malay-Muslims in particular. Nationalism, for this new generation of PAS leaders and intellectuals, was thoroughly secular and modern. It belonged to the world of the here and now, and the profane sphere of realpolitik, which was responsible for sowing the seeds of discord and chaos (*fitnah* and *mihna*) in the world. PAS radically restructured and reoriented so that it could play this role.²⁸

In 1984, a number of PAS leaders were arrested and detained under the Internal Security Act because their speeches and religious sermons posed a threat to national security and racial harmony. Those arrested included Ustaz Abu Bakar Chik, Ustaz Bunyamin Yaacob, Ustaz Latif Muhammad, Ustaz Ghazalli Hasbullah, Mahfuz Omar, and Muhammad Sabu. The Kelantanese PAS leader Muhammad Sabu was detained because of his inflammatory speeches against Christian missionary groups that were active in the country and which he claimed had been trying to convert Malay-Muslims. Another PAS leader who was meant to be detained but managed to escape was the outspoken Ustaz Ibrahim Mahmood (also known as Ibrahim Libya).²⁹

In a sense, the future radicalization of some Malaysian Islamic political parties and groups in the post-9/11 era cannot be treated in isolation from these early agitations, which inflamed the passion of Jihadist and other groups, not only in Malaysia but also in other parts of the Muslim World.³⁰ In a way, they also produced the dialectics of radicalism and jihad among the moderate sectors of Muslim populations in the post-1990s developments toward democratization.

It is fair to argue that, during this period, Islamic political parties usurped characteristics similar to those of Islamic resurgence outlined by Esposito (1998, 165), whereby (1) Islam is a total and comprehensive way of life and integral to politics, law, and society; (2) the failure of Muslim societies is due to their departure from the straight path by following Western secular ideologies and values; (3) the renewal of society requires a return to Islam; (4) to restore God's rule and inaugurate a true Islamic social order acceptable blueprint for Muslim society; and (5) although the westernization of society is condemned, modernization as such, is not.

From independence to the end of the Cold War can be referred to as an experimental period during which various schools of political Islam from the militant to the moderate began to create the political and social institutional basis for political engagement with the secular state. Some even experimented with responsible opposition while others joined secular political parties in coalition governments.³¹ The experiences gained from this period have proven indispensable in the post-1990s democratic resurgence in the Muslim world.

Post-1990s Islamic Political Party Developments

An upsurge of Islamic political parties' activities occurred with the end of the Cold War and the commencement of the so-called third wave of democratization, which opened the political space for citizen participation. Vali Nasr recognized that, since the early 1990s, political openings in a number of Muslim-majority countries—all admittedly outside the

Arab world—have seen Islamic-oriented (but non-Islamist) parties vying successfully for votes in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan (before its 1999 military coup), and Turkey.³² The notion of Muslim democrats introduced by Nasr is useful in distinguishing between Islamists political parties with their insistence on (1) rule by Sharia and the view that (2) democracy is not deeply legitimate, but at best a tool or tactic that may be useful in gaining power to build an Islamic state. In contrast according to Nasr, Muslim democrats acknowledge the need for (1) enshrining Islam in politics, though they do wish to harness its potential to help them win votes; and (2) the integration of Muslim religious values—drawn from Islam's teachings on ethics, morality, the family, rights, social relations, and commerce.³³

Late into the 1990s, the Arab world joined Muslim democracy, combined in some cases with Islamist tendencies such as the cases of Hamas in Palestine, Hizbollah in Lebanon, the National Islamic Front (NIF) in the Sudan, and FIS in Algeria. Islamic political parties seem to have begun to reconcile old-held resistance of democratic politics and are entering into the realm of competitive electoral politics. They based their struggle on the essentialist claim that they represent Muslims and not political organizations divided by ideology, class, race, or creed. However, in reality, they rarely adhere to this normative credo and are often divided along the very lines they portend to negate. Even the claim that they represent Muslims is challenged by their division and adherence to various schools of political Islam, ranging from the moderate to the most radical.

Islamic political parties have commonly emerged during what Islamists refer to as times of great upheavals, which require challenging the prevailing secular regimes and ideologies to transform the established political, economic, and social order. Their overarching objective is to invoke Islamic morality and ethics and steer the Muslim Umma back into the fundamentals of Islam or to protect broader Muslim interests against real or perceived injustices. In this respect, Islamic political parties represent the institutional face of political Islam and share its overall goals, with Islam offering the ideological overture and moral and ethical creed that justifies their entry into competitive democratic politics.

For example, unlike Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, which was radicalized after the 1967 Arab defeat in the Six-Day War, the Jordanian Brotherhood was resentful of the presence of active Palestinian liberation fronts such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization and others inside Jordan, which threatened the independence of Jordan. This granted the Muslim Brotherhood the opportunity to champion the Palestinian cause without directly confronting the royal family.

Another real-world event, which contributed to the radicalization of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood was the introduction of Structural

Adjustment Programs, better known as SAPs. Although the poor sectors of the Jordanian population experienced hardships as a result of the introduction of the economic reform policies of the 1990s and the government's withdrawal of subsidies (food, medicine, health, water, and education), the Muslim Brotherhood did not incite violent acts such as the case in Egypt.³⁴ Wiktorowicz (1999) reports that in the 1989 and 1996 riots, which erupted over subsidy reductions, the Muslim Brotherhood was careful not to criticize King Hussein, focusing its attacks on the cabinet and not the system of power or legitimacy. The brotherhood actively worked to ease tensions and looked to the king as an unbiased arbiter during the crisis, publicly praising his wisdom and political acumen.

In 1992, the Muslim Brotherhood was transformed into an Islamic party by establishing the Islamic Action Front (IAF), which acted as a political wing in preparation for contesting the 1993 elections. While the Muslim Brotherhood won twenty-two seats in the 1989 elections, the IAF won only sixteen seats in the 1993 elections. Amwai (1994) explains the democratization process and Sahliyah (2005) explains the decline of the Muslim Brotherhood-IAF votes because of the introduction of "one person, one vote," which curtailed its electability.

The IAF built alliances with Christian and leftist political parties, and candidates are testimonies to the IAF pragmatic nature. The June 2003 elections confirmed the decline of the IAF where tribal candidates and candidates of conservative social forces achieved a decisive victory by capturing eighty-four parliamentary seats. The IAF won only twenty seats, described as the lowest achievement in its political history.

A major cause of the rift between IAF and the government was the charge that without the monarchy's intervention in the 2003 parliamentary elections and the replacement of the 1993 Election Law with Election Law No. (34), 2001, which favored the secularists and royalist supporters, it would have won the majority of votes. Two of the provisions undercut the IAF electoral support: Article (8a) stipulates that candidates should not have any other nationality. This means that the Palestinians can no longer vote. Article (8k) stipulates that candidates should not be members of any non-Jordanian political entity, party, or movement, which also undercut the Palestinians, particularly Hamas supporters, who traditionally supported the Muslim Brotherhood and by extension IAF.

Three observations explain why Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood-IAF had not resorted to violence: (1) Notably, it was initially developed as a philanthropic rather than a political association. (2) It was tolerated by the monarchy to which they paid homage. (3) And, when it decided to enter electoral politics, it maintained a duality whereby the IAF became the institutional face, with the brotherhood acting in a typically moderate political Islamic fashion. As the contradictions between politics and

religion intensifies, for example, the current debate on reforming Election Law No. (34), 2001, yet again, so will its oppositional posture.

In the 2007 general election, 885 candidates (out of whom 199 were women) contested the elections. According to the Jordanian election law, a minimum of six seats are guaranteed for women, nine for Christians, and three for the Circassian and Chechen minorities. Twenty-two Islamic candidates contested the elections under the IAF ticket, winning only six seats (compared with seventeen seats in the 2003 elections), which shows the decline of IAF popularity.

The outcome of the electoral system reforms and the 2007 elections would determine whether the Muslim Brotherhood-IAF's hunger for power would transform them into the familiar patterns reminiscent of the more confrontational Islamic political parties elsewhere in the Middle East.

In contrast to the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and IAF, its offshoot, the FIS of Algeria emerged with a clear oppositional posture against the one-party rule. As Takeyh (2003, 2) laments, "The conventional breakdown of the authoritarian state took an innovative departure in the case of Algeria. The opposition came eventually to be dominated by the forces of tradition, as the Islamists not only proved adept at mass mobilisation, but offered a vision that seemed compatible with pluralism and political representation." This could be explained because of popular resistance to President Colonel Chadli Benjedid's introduction of political and harsh economic reforms. A new constitution was promulgated in 1989, and Algeria became a multiparty state. The Islamists, led by FIS, became a political force to reckon with under the new democratic dispensation. It is not unique to FIS that Islamic political parties often present themselves as the main alternative to the authoritarian and corrupt secular political establishment, a claim that resonates with some Muslims.

FIS called for national elections. In the 1992 elections, the FIS received more than 2 million votes; 1 million fewer votes than in 1990 (3.26 million votes) but the non-Islamist vote was so badly fragmented that FIS was well on its way to a stunning electoral victory after the first round. The hard-liners in the military panicked, suspecting that the president had made a deal with the Islamists. In early January 1992, the military forced Benjedid to resign, cancelled the second round of elections, declared martial law, banned the FIS, and set up a transitional government.³⁵

The FIS reaction to the cancellation of the elections was swift, declaring war on the government.³⁶ The 2002 elections illustrated Algerian society as divided into at least three main ideological blocs: (1) a nationalist group backed by between 25 and 30 percent of the population—officials, state workers, and rural voters—that reliably votes for the National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale-FLN), or other

government-endorsed parties; (2) an Islamist bloc that commands the loyalties of some 15 to 20 percent; and (3) a Berber-nationalist bloc that has the support of another 10 to 15 percent. Political allegiances within the remainder of Algerian society were scattered among small groups of democrats, regionalists, and independents. No single bloc had a majority, and none could easily govern without some support from at least one of the other blocs (Quandt 2002, 18–19).³⁷

However, in reality, FIS boycotted the elections and the emergent moderate Islamic-oriented Movement of National Reform (*el-Islah* in Arabic) founded in 1999 took first place over the Movement of Society for Peace, with the FLN maintaining the dominant majority. Obviously, the Islamists must have realized that the civil war had turned the public against them, and what they could do is to stay the course against the contention that peace is subservient to justice.³⁸

In 1999, although the government of Algeria signed a peace agreement with the Armee Islamique du Salut (AIS) or Islamic Salvation Army the military wing of FIS, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSCP) rejected the amnesty; both have continued their violent struggle.³⁹ In common with Egypt, once the largest Islamic political organization or party moderated its position and decided to renounce political violence, new and more violent Islamic groups emerged (i.e., GIA and GSCP in Algeria and *Tanzim al-Jihad*, the Jihad Organization and *Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya*, the Islamic Group, in Egypt). In both cases, a large number of the Muslim Brotherhood and FIS followers joined these radical organizations.

Algerian radical Islamic political parties and organizations believed that peace is subservient to justice and therefore rejected amnesty and continued on the path of jihad, an issue that will be explained in the concluding sections of introduction. Apart from the NIF (Sudan), which came to power through a military coup, the other three political parties have either ruled in coalition with secular governments (Jordan) or were banned by the secular state (Egypt and Algeria). Although their promise to reorder the secular establishment has so far failed, they succeeded in forcing their opponents to respond with their own version of a tolerant Islamic political group or more moderate state-sponsored Islam.

Although it is difficult to generalize from these few cases, it is fair to conclude that the colonial government's attitude toward the emergence of Islamic political parties and the counterresponse of Islamic political parties (such as the Muslim League's position on the British promise of the partition of Muslim Bengal from India in 1905) was not hostile. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, and Palestine and Sarekat Islam in Indonesia were tolerated. However, and for constitutional reasons, the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Yemeni Muslim Brotherhoods were

refused registration as political parties. While the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood continues to contest elections by filing independent candidates, the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood established the Yemen Congregation for Reform (Islah) Party and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood established as political (party) fronts to circumvent the constitutional prohibitions.

During this period, the Islamic political parties and political organizations were fostered by the fact that "real-world events have made religion central in current affairs" (Bellin 2008, 315). As such, two main competing interpretations of the rise of Islamic political parties whereby (1) the rise of Islamic political parties is part of the conservative Islamization process, critical of and vied for to replace the secular state. Conservative Islamization is an ally to equally conservative forces, such as ethnicity and religion, that are, for example, dominant in several Muslim societies where Islamic political parties emerged.⁴⁰ (2) Corruption, political expediency, and hegemony of the dominant secular political parties resulted in anger among some sectors of the Muslim population who flocked to Islamic political parties as an alternative to the established political order. In this view, the twin crises of hegemony and legitimacy heralded the emergence of an alternative political discourse espoused by the Islamists. These factors coincided with rising aspirations of middle-class professionals once acquiescent under authoritarian rule but who now clamor for democratic rights. As the economic crisis among the poor intensified pressures for a new democratic bargain, reformists hope that steps toward political pluralism and competitive elections will help buy popular acceptance of painful economic reforms.⁴¹

STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

The underlying theme of this volume is our knowledge of Islamic political parties' practices once they join competitive politics and form government, opposition, or become part of a coalition with other political parties is meager. Our precepts are based on a few cases (Iran, Lebanon, Indonesia, Palestine, Sudan, Afghanistan, Jordan, and Yemen). Even here, reality in some instances defies perception.

Islamic political parties portray complex and diverse ideological and institutional manifestations of political Islam, and as such, they range from the radical to the moderate and from the moderate to the quasi-secular. Because Islamic political parties are not monolithic, neither should be our treatment of and attempts to understand their diverse roles and positions through major issues such as women, conflict, and democracy. There is therefore a pressing need for internal dialogue among the Muslims and Islamists and not simply between them and the non-Muslim world. The Islamic world is divided between radical Islamists, moderate Muslims, and

secularists, and this means that debating among each other will go a long way toward informing the Western world about diversity there, too.

Comparative Islamic Political Party Politics

Sinno and Khanani (Chapter 1) argue that the term *Islamist* is problematic, as it does not explain much and should be discarded. If we are to heed their suggestion, we will end up with nothing to discuss and will be forced to find a different banner under which to house our Islamic parties and movements. Indeed, Islamic parties are sometimes so diverse that the only commonality among them is that their members happen to be Muslims. Sinno and Khanani also emphasize that by their very religiosity, some Islamic political parties' cost-benefit analysis often points them to the importance of avoiding rather than acquiring power. It is only in circumstances of majoritarian Islam—when they are assured of wider popular support—that they agitate for power (Lebanon, Malaysia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Sudan, and to some extent Algeria before the civil war).

Brown argues (Chapter 5) that Kuwait's Islamic Constitutional Movement (known as HADAS according to the Arabic acronym for *al-haraka al-dusturiyya al-islamiyya*) is integrated into Kuwaiti polity as a political party more than any other Islamist group in the Arab world. In 2008, it descended from a local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood—prepared hopefully for its second parliamentary election campaign in two years. HADAS sent ministers to the government, negotiated with other parliamentary blocs, and ran the most sophisticated election campaigns that Kuwait has witnessed. Indeed, HADAS's strong party machinery is unusual not only in Arab terms but also is a marked contrast to its rivals in the Kuwaiti political spectrum, all of which are still composed of a collection of prominent personalities with at best a rudimentary organization to back them. The challenge to HADAS, according to Brown, is not from its Islamic stance (as it is committed to a full-party system, a cabinet composed of elected deputies, and a prime minister who comes from outside the ruling family), but from Kuwait's attempt to combine democratic and monarchical elements that threaten the party's strategy of long-term political reform.

Belucci and Zaccaria (Chapter 4) push this point much further. In their reading, 9/11 created a world that is not conducive to understanding Islam. In a stunning but equally sad revelation, they arrive at the conclusion that in Italy, Islam is simplistically seen as evil and irrational. The authors proceed to challenge this perception by asking, Why is Islam on the rise if it is that bad? They further concluded that to define Islam as evil analytically is practically incorrect because such a characterization will

not allow for dialogue and peaceful coexistence. Somalia offers us another example where chaos, poverty, and exclusion have bred violence that contributed to the collapse of the Somali state and the latest move toward Islamist jihadist under Islamic court militants. In Somalia, state collapse has been responsible for loss of security, justice, and public services. The collapse of the Somali state has led to the emergence of the Islamic courts, providing security and social services for the Somali people. Similarly, such instances have been argued by Zaccaria and Belucci in Chapter 4 (the Horn of Africa), Knio in Chapter 13 (Hizbollah in Lebanon), and Zemni and Bogaert in Chapter 7 (the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt).

Islamic Parties' Response to Political Reforms

Inasmuch as we celebrate democratic potentials of Islamic parties and movements, we should not overlook situations in which the opposite predominates. Examples abound whereby Islamic parties acted to stifle national democratic processes. In this regard, one does not need to subscribe to Wahabi Islam, which displays notoriety in its opposition to democracy. In Chapter 6, Ahmed exposes the disturbing profile of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, and how it discarded democracy to control the government of Sudan. The Muslim Brotherhood, later renamed NIF, took advantage of democracy to build a formidable organization. Once democracy exhausted its potentials for the brotherhood, it was summarily abandoned.

What followed was a sad saga in which the NIF wreaked havoc with Sudan's infant democracy and took the entire country on a rough ride. In his contribution to this volume, Ahmed, who is much harsher on the NIF, shows that the Sudanese Brotherhood approached democracy with utter contempt. Its drive to gain and control power is evident throughout its history. The brotherhood used every card and every tactic, legal or otherwise and ethical or otherwise. Thus, strategies employed by the NIF included (1) control over key institutions by dubious means, (2) intimidation, (3) suspect alliances, (4) deception, and (5) delay tactics.

However, unlike Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, its Sudan counterpart benefited tremendously from the fact that Sudan's two major political parties at the time of independence: Umma and the National Unionist Party⁴² were religious based, sectarian, and could not restrict the operations or ban the activities of the brotherhood. In other words, it would have seemed odd, if not anti-Islamic for political parties that based their following on Islamic credentials to ban an Islamic political party. The Umma Party had even shared with the Muslim Brotherhood the idea of creating an Islamic Constitution.⁴³

The march of Islamic parties and movements toward democracy has not been easy. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood also had to quiver on its opposition to a woman as president and settle for the principle of accepting the majority verdict in accordance with democratic principles. (Zemni and Bogaert, Chapter 7). The contextual problem is now confounded by the rise of a totally integrated world in which external forces can be as formidable as internal national dynamics. This is what the Egyptian Brotherhood learned. The brotherhood saw their space shrink because of new government legislation. Taking advantage of the War against Terror, the Egyptian government replaced its antidemocratic emergency law with antiterrorist law that meant little but a change of name. In its campaign for democracy, the brotherhood found itself with the same limited space as it had before (Zemni and Bogaert). Ironically, the NIF of the Sudan sponsored the military coup, which brought it to power in 1989, took place at a time when its political fortunes improved considerably during the 1986 elections.⁴⁴

The NIF of the Sudan presents a sharp contrast to the Yemen Congregation for Reform (or *Islah* in Arabic) Party in Yemen, which joined the democratization process in earnest, holding a general conference under the name of Wahda and Salam (Unity and Peace) to prepare itself for engaging in democratic politics. It joined two other parties: General People's Congress Party and Socialist Party in contesting the 1993 parliamentary elections in April 1993. When the war between South and North Yemen broke out in 1994,⁴⁵ the Yemen Congregation for Reform Party was part of the coalition government along with the General People's Congress Party and the Socialist Party. With the defeat of the separatist elements in the south, the Socialist Party withdrew from the government, which was then controlled by the Yemen Congregation for Reform Party and the General People's Congress Party. The coalition government ended when the General People's Congress Party won the majority in the 1997 general elections. Yemen Congregation for Reform's electoral fortunes dwindled in the 2003 and 2006 general elections, but maintained its position as the second largest political party in Yemen.⁴⁶ This could be seen in contrast to Lebanon. Karim Knio's attempts to conceptualize Hizbollah's multiple roles, identity, and evolutionary nature within Lebanese local politics has always presented a controversial debate. He argues that a closer examination of the events that have ravaged Lebanon since the eruption of the Cedar Revolution does not fully corroborate the argument espoused by many structuralists or holistic interpretations. The relative retreat of the Syrian regime from Lebanon in 2005 has further radicalized Hizbollah's agenda and encouraged it to paralyze all formal institutions in Lebanon until its demands were completely met. This suggests that any analysis that deals with Hizbollah's transformation process

must take into consideration the party's alliance patterns and the conditions under which they were formed. This is ironically reminiscent of the instrumentalist line of analysis previously deemed simplistic and obsolete by many structuralist lines of argumentation.

Women, Minorities, and Islamic Political Parties

In Western public imagination, Islam is seen as a prime adversary to women's rights and is often taken as somewhat responsible for gender inequalities in the Muslim world. A careful examination of current Islamic parties and movements lends only a limited support to this thesis. Conservative brand of Islam certainly displays elements that are crippling to women rights. However, adherence to conservative Islam seems to be the exception rather than the rule, as there is nothing inherently antiwomen in Islam. Indeed, Islamic countries so far have seen three women rise to the highest position of prime minister / president in their countries (Pakistan, Indonesia, and Turkey). The Arab world and sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of Liberia, are yet to witness women presidents. In some ways, the debate on low status of women in these countries can be shifted away from Islam as such to broader cultural parameters. After all, we are talking about Arab cultures in addition to numerous African cultures and the latter are not necessarily Islamic.

In her contribution to the workshop from which this book emanated, Chaouachi persuades us to hail Tunisia as a shining path in the area of women representation in governance. As she states, women constitute 15 percent of the cabinet membership, 22.75 percent of the national parliament, 27 percent of the judicial organ, and 31 percent of local councils (Chaouachi).⁴⁷ These statistics certainly put many European countries to shame, particularly those at the lower level, such as Malta with 9.2 percent female Members of Parliament in its national parliament.⁴⁸ Tunisia probably reached this level of political accommodation of women's issues despite rather than with the assistance of Islamic parties. Nonetheless, Tunisia is a Muslim country that has outshined other Muslim countries in respect to women's rights. One important revelation from Tunisia is that there is a tendency for historic gains to metamorphose into rights that are difficult to reverse. Over the years, Tunisian Islamic parties tried to roll back women's gains in the country. So far, they have not succeeded.⁴⁹

For the past three decades, and in line with international conventions, it has been common among most Muslim leaders to talk about advancement of women in their respective countries. Nonetheless, achievements so far have been embarrassingly modest. Given the relative success of Tunisia, it is opportune to look at it for guidance to see how it succeeded in moving ahead of every other Muslim country in the world. Positive

discrimination or, in its more recent term, affirmative action, is a universal principle used as a corrective measure to counteract excessive majority hegemony in democratic systems. As such, affirmative action can make it up for minorities, including women, and can give reprieve where contenders to power do not rest on leveled competitive plains. Affirmative action may also be combined with a quota system.

The significance of political will in the pursuit of women's advancement is demonstrated well in Indonesia (Diederich, Chapter 3). Legislation for affirmative action regarding women's political representation in party politics generated little positive results. It is best to avoid the temptation to blame Indonesian culture for making it difficult for Indonesian political parties to meet the demand of finding enough female candidates as stipulated by legislation. While the role of culture in this regard is acknowledged, culture is not static and can be modified through wise leadership, but only if it is backed by political will. Lack of political will in advancing women's causes in Indonesia is chillingly demonstrated by the introduction of counterdemands on women that stifled their progress. These demands, which are often backed by national and regional laws, aim primarily at curtailing women's presence in the public sphere and are clearly at odds with advancing women's rights. Diederich (Chapter 3) argues that, in some provinces, regional parliaments decided to change laws according to conservative interpretation of Islamic principles. Because of these decisions, women were no longer allowed to go out at night. However, many of the (female) factory workers needed to do so for purely economic reasons.

In some countries, Islamic parties and movements employed state power to obstruct women's advancement. This is evident in circumstances in which governments themselves come under control of parties claiming Islamic credentials. Saudi Arabia, Iran, Sudan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, which has reached notoriety in the field, have all experienced at least a regression in women's rights.

Modest achievements in women's rights have been recorded in many countries. Tunisia, Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, Turkey, and a few others can boast some positive trends regarding gender equality. Yet, statistics do not always translate into power. Women may sit in parliaments and may even hold ministerial posts, but they remain mere tokens of gender politics. Moreover, women's portfolios are often relegated to areas with limited influence in the public sphere. We must therefore go behind statistics to understand the reality of power achieved in the process.

Islamic Political Parties and Secularism

In Western popular imagination, Islam and Islamic parties and movements are seen as the archrival of democracy. Thus, even when these parties and movements declare their commitment to democracy, they are seen as having a nondemocratic hidden agenda and the questioning of their stated philosophy still prevails. This means that any serious attempt toward a comparative approach must guard against two paradoxes. The first is taking Islam/Islamism as the commonality among entities, while the second pertains to the dilemma of sidelining the socioeconomic context. For example, when confidence and reason prevail, some Islamic political parties do not shy from showing direct borrowing from the West, often denounced as crusaders and enemies of Islam. Boubekeur (in the opening of Chapter 8) quotes Aboujerra Soltani, leader of the Milli Selamet Partisi, as saying, "OK, we are heirs of the Islamic tendency. But today we are inspired by the European Christian democrat experience.... I understand myself as a Muslim democrat."

On the issue of commonalities among Islamic parties, Sinno and Khanani (Chapter 1) come close to throwing our entire project into disarray in their argument over the term *Islamist*, as described earlier in this chapter. According to Salih's contribution on South Africa, the Africa Muslim Party has a very secular outlook and a program that is no different from any other political party. If secularism is the antithesis of Islam, as indeed of any other religion, then on what ground has the Africa Muslim Party managed to retain its name and continue its activities as a confessional political party?

Underplaying of socioeconomic context is inherent in all methodological comparative approaches. The context very often gets lost in an avalanche of entities that it produces, but it is the context that is more important as alluded to by Salih (Chapter 9), who calls for looking into the factors that lead to the emergence of Islamic political parties and movements. Thus, instead of focusing on structures, dynamics, and objectives of Islamic parties and movements, it may be more fruitful to turn our attention to socioeconomic contexts that underlie these organizations, their diversity and modes of cooperation or resistance to the established secular order. Poverty, dictatorship, lack of development, alienation, absence of democracy, lack of freedom, and countless other deficiencies provide a better common denominator that binds all Islamic parties and movements.

Philanthropy and Islamic Political Parties

Recent research on Islamic social movement theory and its application to Islamic social movements provide useful insights into how Islamic political

organizations and parties use these institutional arrangements as part of their socioeconomic activities and political networks. The entrepreneurial spirit, business-like tendencies, and ability to manage local political processes in Muslim societies has meant that Islamic political parties adopt broad-based sources of support and resources.⁵⁰ For example, Clarke's (2004) work could be used to trace the interfaces between Islamic political parties, social institutions, and movements in secular settings. At best, these institutions (whether political parties or philanthropic organizations) portray what Clarke (2004) succinctly diagnosed as "patron-client" relations. At worst, they become fringe or front organizations supporting deeply entrenched religious causes and directly or indirectly contribute to an emergent Islamic polity.

Islamic political parties cooperate with various political and economic actors, such as leaders of Islamic religious sects, trade unions, professional organizations, Islamic banks, Muslim immigrants, and traders, as well as influential sympathetic secular institutions of the state used to serve the party and with it a disenfranchised Muslim public, which lends support at the ballot box. Obviously, the leadership and a large number of the members of Islamic political parties are educated, giving them access to state institutions.

With merits of democracy in mind, and in an environment often steeped in oppression, it is not surprising that Islamic parties take to democracy even if that means a sacrifice of a few ideals. After all, democracy confers legitimacy, brings resources, attracts cadres, and opens the corridors of power for these organizations (Salih in Chapter 9 and Sinno and Khanani in Chapter 1). When in power, resources can be amassed, legitimately or otherwise, for the advancement of the cause, as in Sudan, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey (Ahmed in Chapter 6 and Akdogan in Chapter 10). Indeed, the use of public resources for partisan causes is common among Islamic parties but not necessarily confined to them. As guardians of the moral order in society, Islamic parties and movements often use and occasionally abuse public religious venues for spreading the message. Mosques, madrasas (Islamic religious schools), and religious festivals, including the Hajj, are often used as extensions to party venues replete with a captive audience. In countries with limited resources, this may constitute a tremendous edge against rival secular parties. No wonder Islamic parties and movements often manage to fight way above their weight class making a mockery of the relationship between number of supporters and power in democratic systems. In his study of the South African situation, Salih's contribution brings this point in succinct reference to the inverse relationship between numerical and political weight. South African Muslims constitute only 1.5 percent of total population, and yet they manage to set and influence local agendas and send large numbers of Muslims to

the national assembly who are not members of any South African Islamic political parties, but are members of secular political parties such as the ANC (Salih, Chapter 9).

With multiple and complex transnational networks, Islamic parties and movements have in recent times benefited from globalization and the opportunities it avails them (Internet, sophisticated websites where the Koran is freely accessible, satellite TV, digital radios, virtual libraries for on-demand Islamic teachings, party programs, policy documents, Islamic dating and marriage websites, etc.). Taking advantage of Islam as a universal religion, Islamic political parties and movements often, as part of the global networking society, attract highly needed resources that cannot be mobilized locally. Globalization is a catalyst for democracy by spreading its universal ideals. At the same time, globalization can also manifest itself into a force that retards local evolution of democratic institutions. External resources available to Islamic parties skew agendas in favor of outside forces and internationalize national dynamics. Moreover, these resources help create an unlevelled ground leading to suffocation of rival political institutions. Many Islamic parties owe their survival to their global reach much more than to their internal endeavors. Invariably, that comes at a high price of partial or full alienation from localities, a development, in our view, that contributes to their continuing secularization or at least accepting the democratic rules of competitive politics.

Islamic parties and movements present us with both opportunities and challenges for democratic transformation. Indeed Islamic parties and, much more so, movements and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have been in the forefront in providing services for the poor, as well as championing social justice and political inclusion in society. Still, there is no place for complacency. A formidable challenge to Islamic parties and movements is their vulnerability to demagoguery and extremist elements (9/11 is an example), a tendency against which Islamic parties, except a few, are increasingly guarding against the bid to become a positive force in the democratic transformation of their respective societies.

CONCLUSION

Islamic political parties and political organizations were created in response to similar material problems (poverty, marginalization, corruption, foreign occupation, puritanical purposes, etc.) and not material problems of religious zeal, the creation of a Muslim Umma and the observance of an Islamic way of life. The two cannot be separated. Islamic political parties differ markedly in their political organization, political mobilization, and modes of resistance. Radical Islamic political parties and organizations represent a true manifestation of radical schools of political Islam, which

is inherently violent and could be rightly criticized for using democracy as a means to an end. That end is the creation of an Islamic state. Although the more moderate and reformist Islamic political parties seek to unseat what they call the corrupt Western-style secular states, they continue to operate within the established political order (defy nondemocratic practices, stage strikes and demonstrations, boycott elections, etc.) and largely adhere to the norms of the democratic rule. Islamic political parties and political organizations are diverse as are their responses to liberal democratic norms and their dealings with the secular political order.

This collective effort and chapters in this volume illustrate that most Islamic political parties originated in Islamic social movements engaged in contentious politics.⁵¹ They aim to establish a new social order through collective action to bring fundamental social, economic, and political transformation; represent a broad range of social forces; and cooperate with the institutionalized secular political regimes. The social movement origin of Islamic political parties and political and philanthropic organizations inform the forms of resistance, mobilization, election campaigns, and sources of finance. Generally, these are characteristics common to contentious politics.⁵²

Although established within the sovereign boundaries of the nation-state, Islamic political parties assume a transnational character owing to what they perceive as the universal nature of the Islamic Umma. Muslim Umma (or community of believers) is perceived as borderless, a belief that makes Islamic political parties espouse a global mission transcending national polity and opting for global orientations and actions (i.e., wherever there are Muslims).

Islamic political parties represent various institutional manifestations of political Islam inspired by a religious drive to capture power and to control the resources and personnel of the state. Their political activities are premised on the need to create a Muslim state or to propagate a Muslim society guided by Islamic morality, informed by an abrasive engagement in contentious politics vis-à-vis the established secular political order.

However, Islamic political party development is not linear (i.e., some evolved from social and liberation movements to institutionalized political parties, while others developed from institutional political parties to violent movements) and often oscillates between peaceful and violent resistance. While some Islamic political parties, as the case studies illustrated, operate within secular institutional politics, others do so with the long-term objectives to subvert the political order that brought them to power (Sudan). On the one hand, they offer the organizational structure or political institution (the party) through which they compete among themselves and against secular political parties to obtain power and control government, resources, and personnel of government or form a legal

opposition to challenge the secular political parties in competitive politics. On the other hand, they become the medium through which political Islam can transform ideology into practice or into concrete political programs that can be implemented in the real world. Differences in the orientations of political Islam whether quasi-secular, moderate, or militant are reflected in Islamic political parties' orientations via major contemporary social justice issues pertaining to human rights, the position of women and minorities in Muslim societies, indeed the very essence of liberal political thought. It is hoped that this volume will stimulate further research on the internal structures of Islamic political parties, their sources of finance, and relationships with other civil society and NGOs in the Muslim world and beyond.

NOTES

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21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*
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28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*
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32. *Ibid.*, 13.
33. *Ibid.*, 14.
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45. Excerpts from a paper entitled, "Yemen Reform Party Rise, Philosophy and Development," presented by Dr. M. S. As-Saeedi, Assistant Secretary General of Islah Political Party at the Conference on Islamic Political Parties, Movements, Conflict, and Democracy, The Hague, the Netherlands, January 22–24, 2008.
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47. Excerpts from a paper entitled, "Women and Islamic Political Parties in Tunisia" presented by Honorable Senator Ms. Samira Chaouachi, member of Party of Peoples Unity at the Conference on Islamic Political Parties, Movements, Conflict, and Democracy, The Hague, the Netherlands, January 22–24, 2008.
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