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# A NEW MODERNITY

## Living and Believing in an Unstable World

### ABSTRACT

Dalam situasi tak stabil saat ini konsep postmodernitas dan multikulturalisme tak lagi banyak berguna. Pluralitas dan fragmentasi hanya menarik saat kondisi sosial stabil dan aman, saat keragaman kultural tampil sebagai aneka pilihan. Yang dibutuhkan kini adalah rasa keutuhan baru. Namun berbagai jalur pencarian keutuhan saat ini macam fundamentalisme, romantisisme, universalisme dan "*splitting*" ternyata juga tak cukup realistis menghadapi kompleksitas tuntutan jaman. Artikel ini mengusulkan konsep "modernitas baru", yang mengandung prinsip reflektivitas, kesadaran atas kaburnya batas-batas, kemampuan menerima hibriditas, dan orientasi kosmopolitan. Berdasarkan itu diusulkanlah konsep kekatolikan baru, yakni kekatolikan yang kosmopolitan dan tidak etnosentris; mengandung keutuhan iman yang menampilkan kepenuhan kemanusiaan dan mempromosikan rekonsiliasi; serta mampu menciptakan masyarakat komunikasi yang mengelola kompleksitas dunia manusia secara lebih konstruktif.

### Key Words:

*Postmodernity • multiculturalism • fundamentalism • romanticism • universalism • splitting • globalization • migration • resurgence of religion • global terrorism • new modernity • hybridity • new catholicity • cosmopolitan; reflexivity • communication.*

## Is Postmodernity Over? Living in an Unstable World

When people in the future look back on the decades that surrounded the turn of the twenty-first century and of the third millennium, what are they likely to notice most? Surely one thing will be the contrast between the beginning of the 1990s and the beginning of the subsequent decade. In the early 1990s, the world was still celebrating the astonishing collapse of Communism in Europe and the dramatic end of the Cold War period. No one could really imagine what would take the place of the bipolar relations that had marked the second half of the twentieth century, after the cataclysm of two world wars in the first half. Some, like Francis Fukuyama, opined that this meant the ultimate triumph of democratic capitalism, and perhaps the ushering in of what Immanuel Kant had dreamt of at the end of a century two hundred years earlier a "perpetual peace." Others along the same line hoped that worldwide disorder might finally be coming to an end.

It did not take long, however, for a very different picture to emerge. The Cold War standoff had kept many local conflicts under control; only those that served as proxies for the Big Power struggles were permitted to come to the surface. Within a few years, Samuel Huntington was predicting a "clash of civilizations," with a key fault line between the Christian West and the world of Islam.<sup>1</sup>

Today, those voices that heralded the world as being a place of such harmony and peace for the foreseeable future are silent. Hardly anyone sees the beginnings now of a perpetual peace. Rather, observers point to factors that portend badly for a peaceable future. To mention but one: the high birth rates in many countries in the world are providing a supply of unemployed young males for at least the next thirty years. This is the group most likely to cause unrest and civil disorder.

But rather than engaging in a generalized apocalyptic doom, it is important to try to look closely and carefully at what is happening today. The intent of these lectures is to do that: to look at where we are in the world today, to find adequate ways of interpreting what is happening, and to see what resources in Christian faith and heritage might contribute to making this world a better place to be, for ourselves and for those generations that we hope will follow us.

In order to do this, I would like to devote this first lecture to the task of describing where are some of the neuralgic points in our world today those points that cause us concern or even outright distress. Responding to this distress will then set the scene for the second and third lectures, which will

take up themes of new ways of looking at these challenges, and the resources of Christian faith to respond to them.

In order to fulfill that first aspiration, of looking at the world today, I want to point to four major movements that have largely (but not exclusively) begun in the last decade and a half that together are making the world a turbulent and unstable place. I would like to treat them in more or less in the order that they have come to our attention. They are: globalization, increased migration, the resurgence of religion, and threats of global terrorism. Having done that, I will turn to two of the principal frameworks available for accounting for the phenomena, and at times the consequences, of these movements. These frameworks are postmodernity and multiculturalism, respectively. I will argue that both of these have become increasingly unhelpful as analytic tools for reading the signs of our times.

## **Globalization**

The first is *globalization*. This movement was already under way in 1990, but it took the end of state socialism in 1989 and 1991 to see how far it had already progressed. New movements of globalization are initiated by changes in communication and transportation. The information technology developments that began in the 1980s became widely accessible in the 1990s as first personal computers, and then the development of the World Wide Web changed the way people were connected and communicated. The consistent drop in air transportation costs did for space what information technologies were doing for time. Hence, both space and time have shrunk. When these were wedded to the economic forces of capitalism, a single, worldwide set of interconnected markets came into existence. For those who were inside this network, there was an opportunity to make significant financial gain. But those on its fringes or outside the network, however, often fell even further behind, losing the little gain that had been made in the 1960s and 1970s. This has been affecting not only the historically poor countries, but also the working poor in the societies most directly benefiting from globalization. To be sure, at a macro-level, globalization was lifting the giant populations in India and especially China statistically to new levels of prosperity, but it is often those losing out within those societies who have felt the keenest pinch.<sup>2</sup>

Globalization creates a great deal of turbulence and instability. It is a rough ride for many, struggling to hold on as market forces and competition

force us all to continue to lurch ahead. In the early 1990s, globalization's virtues were being sung in many quarters. Today, there is a great deal more caution. The language of its inevitability is fading, and parallels to other periods of globalization and especially among the Great Powers in Europe leading up to the 1914 War are beginning to emerge.<sup>3</sup> A crisis could arise that would make trading partners pull back within their borders, and send the dizzying juggernaut into a tailspin.

A second voice being raised in recent years about globalization is that of the World Social Forum, with its slogan "Another world is possible." First seen as an anarchic alternative to the Davos Forum and the World Trade Organization, it is gradually taking on more contours of trying to imagine alternative and more humane approaches to the worse depredations of globalization.

For those who are caught up in its thrall, however, the breakneck pace that staying up with globalization demands has been taking a greater human toll on personal relationships, societies, and the institutions within those societies. In a recent study done in the United States, arguably the epicentre of the globalization frenzy, Dr. Peter Whybrow of the University of California at Los Angeles describes what he calls the "American mania," of people caught up in the globalization whirlwind, constantly striving for more possessions and higher status even as it ruins their personal relationships and their happiness.<sup>4</sup>

## Migration

The second movement is *migration*. Migration is, of course, as old as human history. But the migration of the last two decades or so has brought some distinctive features into the mix. The nineteenth-century migrations to North America, Australia and New Zealand were largely out of Europe. The relative inexpensive possibilities of air transportation have now created migration from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as well as inner migration from Eastern Europe to countries in the West. Migration is no longer solely to the Western world; internal migration in all of the continents is currently underway. The combination of "push" factors such as poverty and war, and the "pull" factors of opportunities for a better life have created a pluralization of our societies such as we have never before seen. The United Nations Development Programme's 2004 report on migration estimates that at this point in history one out of every thirty-five persons on the planet is a migrant. The number goes up to one out of twelve in Europe.<sup>5</sup> London claims to be the most multicultural city in the world now at least in terms of

sheer numbers of immigrants and asylum seekers. Arguably, however, Toronto and Vancouver have the highest percentages and variety of ethnic backgrounds. Australia is the most multicultural country in the world (again, based on percentage and its relatively low population level), followed by Canada and the United States.

Because of the relatively inexpensive means of communication and transportation now available, migrants do not break their ties with their homeland as they once had to do. Telephone cards, the Internet, and cheap air tickets make it possible to send cash remittances home and to stay in touch with loved ones. This has had an effect on how people are viewing citizenship, something studied especially by Canadian sociologist Will Kymlicka,<sup>6</sup> and how they choose to align their allegiances between their country of birth and chosen country of employment.

These highly pluralized societies today are experiencing some destabilizing tensions. For countries that have not seen themselves as end points for migration (such as most of the countries of Europe), xenophobic reactions have been taking place. Politicians in Denmark, The Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, and Austria are beginning to claim that their countries are "full," that is, cannot accept any more new faces. Great Britain traditionally more friendly to immigration has seen a turn in recent months against asylum seekers and other foreigners. Countries once known for their tolerance (such as the Netherlands) are drafting draconian legislation to deal with what they see as a growing "problem." At the same time, economists and demographers are pointing out in many of those countries that they will have to continue to import even more foreigners if they wish to maintain the national standard of living. The settled population's birthrate is so low that the working population is not being replaced. Consequently, future welfare (if kept to its current level) cannot be paid for.

Recent political assassinations of public figures critical of immigration in the Netherlands, and the increasingly shrill rhetoric of politicians and advocates for greater immigration control have reached a harsh level in some places. Two issues seem to underlie the debates. On the one hand, is there a limit to how much social diversity a country can manage? There are differing opinions about if there is such a threshold and where it might lie.<sup>7</sup> In the views of many, democracy is the best form of social ordering found thus far to accommodate high levels of diversity and plurality. But does even democracy have limits? Second, a model of tolerance in which each ethnic group keeps to itself is not providing any cohesion for the total society. The disengaged tolerance of the Netherlands and Belgium is now

coming apart.<sup>8</sup> If tensions arise elsewhere, especially in societies with less of a history of tolerance, what will happen to those societies? These are serious questions to be pondered, and as of yet no one has found convincing answers to them.

### **The Resurgence of Religion**

The third movement that is creating turbulence in the world is the *resurgence of religion*. Up into the 1990s, western sociologists followed the secularization hypothesis with which Max Weber had begun the twentieth century. In this view, the Western Enlightenment was leading to a desacralization of worldviews and of the world itself. First religion would become a private matter, and then it would gradually disappear altogether.

That may still true for some societies (especially in the North Atlantic region, and for Australia and New Zealand), but some of those same sociologists who had predicted the forward march of secularization are now noting that there has been a resurgence of interest in religion across the world today.<sup>9</sup> It manifests itself in a variety of different ways.

Among the poor and the lower middle classes of Latin America and Africa, Pentecostalism is sweeping through the landscape like wildfire. A third of Guatemala is now Pentecostal. The single largest Christian congregation in the world is in Seoul: Yoido Full Square Gospel Church has more than six hundred thousand members, who fill its twenty-five thousand seat sanctuary six times on Sundays. Some estimate that there will be more Pentecostals and Charismatics in the world by 2025 than all the Orthodox and mainline Protestants combined. Already there are an estimated 350-500 million of them.

What is fuelling this rapid growth cannot be reduced to a single cause. The move from the countryside into urban megalopolises, the empowerment of women, the search for personal power in the midst of being tossed to and fro by globalization, the quest for quick money all of these contribute to this phenomenon.<sup>10</sup> It has been especially since 1970 that this rapid expansion has been seen. Whether it will continue at this rapid pace through the next decades is anyone's guess, but at the moment it shows no sign of abating. It is rapidly changing the face of Christianity around the world today.

In Islam, the second largest religious body in the world after Christianity, there has been a resurgence of faith as well. It, too, is fuelled by diverse factors. Some point to the growing resentment of being humiliated by the Christian West. The invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and

Iraq have been the most recent causes for resentment, of Christian forces humiliating Muslims in their own heartland. The support of Israel by the United States to the neglect of the Palestinian people only confirms such resentment in the minds of many. But there are other factors as well. Many young, educated males in Muslim lands cannot find jobs. Since Western technology has failed them, they turn to their faith. The sheer pace of globalization, and the migration of Muslims out of majority-Muslim countries into a Muslim diaspora have created an alienation that makes people cling more to their faith. Movements of revival have been moving through the Muslim world since the 1930s, but the recent developments of globalization and migration have brought them to the attention of the rest of the world. As recently as the early 1990s, French scholar Olivier Roy saw worldwide Islam as too decentralized and too disorganized to make much social difference. Today, he speaks more carefully about what he sees happening.<sup>11</sup>

It has not been uncommon for Westerners to label all these revival movements as Fundamentalism. There are, to be sure, fundamentalist movements in Islam, but to paint all the movements with the same brush is surely a misperception, since many Muslims view these movements as a revival of faith in unstable times. There is the radicalization of some young Muslims, particularly those who find themselves marginalized in their own societies and in those countries of immigration where they are viewed with suspicion. The case of the young Muslim who murdered Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in November, 2004 is a case in point. Born in the Netherlands of Moroccan parents, he did well in school. But he took a yet unexplained radical turn in the last two years before the event, aligning himself with an extremist understanding of Islam.

There are two things about this religious resurgence that intersect especially with the first two movements, namely, globalization and migration. Religion and religious belief however construed now is a major player on the stage of international relations. It can no longer be discounted as merely the intrusion of private faith into the public forum. It is one of the factors that must be calculated into relations between and within states. The problem facing political figures is that all the currently available models for understanding international relations are secular. The only place for religion has been in humanitarian intervention by religious aid agencies or the pleas of figures like Pope John Paul II. Political theorists are scrambling to move beyond their secular bias to include what has been called "the missing dimension of statecraft".<sup>12</sup>

That religion is now implicated so often in political violence has likewise given religion a prominent, if unwelcomed, place at the table. For

secular agnostics, religion's role in violence simply confirms the oppressive quality of religion in public life outlined by Feuerbach and Marx in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. How to account for the attraction of religious legitimation for political violence as well as how to account for religion's role in peace-building and reconciliation is still a matter of lively debate, something to which we shall return in the final lecture. The point is that religion's prominent role in public and international life is now so salient that it cannot be ignored and to this point, has not been adequately accounted for by either its supporters or its opponents. Because of its great intellectual and emotive power, religion can add to both the stability of the world in the decades ahead, and well as to its instability.<sup>13</sup>

The other feature is the relation of this resurgence of religion to migration. Migrants are frequently more explicitly religious in their practice in their new countries than they were in their homelands. When their new country is a largely secularized one, their practice of religion may add another level of tension and conflict between the newcomers and the settled population.

This is being seen especially in Europe. African immigrants are bringing with them their African Instituted Churches (AICs), marked by enthusiastic worship, lively singing, focus on healing and the powers of the Spirit. There are now six such congregations in Copenhagen whose Sunday attendance is higher than the rest of the attendance combined in the entire country. Such African-led congregations are also the largest such congregations in Amsterdam, London, and Birmingham. They are attracting non-immigrants as well. What this will mean for the face of Christianity in a dechristianized Europe in a decade or two remains to be seen. The migration of clergy from India, Nigeria, and the Philippines to the United States is creating a situation where soon a third of all the Roman Catholic clergy in that country will be foreign born. That appears already to be the case among diocesan seminarians.

The other intersection between religion and migration is seen also in Europe, where many of the newcomers are Muslims. Even as churches are being closed, torn down, or converted to other uses, mosques and madrasas are being built in the cities and towns of that continent. The opening of a large mosque just north of Vatican City in Rome a few years ago has become emblematic of that change in European society. In parts of secular Europe, where there is even hostility toward religion, this is likely to make things even more volatile, as the sharp contrast between the agnosticism of the larger population and the religiosity of the newcomers portends potential conflict.



## Global Terrorism

The fourth and final movement causing instability in the world is *global terrorism*. The attacks in New York, on Bali, and in Madrid, as well as the ongoing acts of terrorist violence in the Middle East, have introduced new actors into international politics. Terrorists are not like the nation-states who have been the principal actors on the world stage in war up to this time. That is why a "war on terrorism" seems a bit of a misnomer. It is hard to make war on a concept, and it is harder still to see if one is winning or losing, and especially to see when such a war might be over. We are all aware, however, of how it has been changing our lives. It adds costs and time to air travel. It has had an impact on the flow of foreigners into our countries and universities. It creates periodic patterns of social anxiety as terrorist alerts are raised. It is most noticeable in societies that heretofore have felt themselves to be internally secure. Now they share the chronic anxiety of societies beset by violence and civil conflict.

Terrorist actions have multiple causes, stemming from resentment, humiliation, hatred, and desperation. It is an unwelcome fact of the twenty-first century, but unlikely to go away any time soon. Globalization, migration, and religious resurgence all contribute to the environment that spawns and sustains terrorism and we hope that these three movements, too, will contribute to its resolution. Global terrorism, in a word, is emblematic of the instability with which we live in our world today.

Other factors could be named that are adding or will be adding soon to this instability. A range of looming environmental crises is at the top of the list. As disputes about whether there will be an impending environmental disaster dwindle in the face of mounting evidence, this challenge will be coming more and more to the fore. Its dynamics are somewhat different from the four already mentioned, and it is for that reason I will not be going into its implications in these lectures. It certainly deserves attention, but best attention in its own right, not as part of a longer list. So I will be concentrating on these four, since they are quite visible and at least in the case of three of them religious faith has something to say about them. This very long introduction to these lectures has been intended to set the stage for looking at how we are responding to these challenges and how we may have to change our frame of mind in order to do so more effectively. So it is not simply a matter of economics (globalization) or demographics (migration) or motivations for violence. Faith, I believe, has to account for

itself in the midst of what is happening in the world, as well as begin to offer some contributions to resolving the dilemmas that lie ahead. In this second part of this first lecture, I want to look at two of the principal frameworks that have been put forward to interpret this world of globalization, migration, religious resurgence and global terrorism all of which are contributing to shaping a different world and at least for the time being creating a good deal of instability.

The two frameworks I want to examine here are that of postmodernity and of multiculturalism. They have both developed as ways to help us deal with the dynamics of diversity and difference we encounter in our environments. And I would like to say at the outset that I think neither of them is serving us very well in these matters any more.

### **Postmodernity**

Postmodernity is a slippery concept. As the word itself connotes, it is somehow after the "modern." It was first used in the art world as early as the 1920s. It came to be used in philosophy, the social sciences, literature and finally theology in the last third of the twentieth century.

Within the wider domain of knowledge, Jean-François Lyotard's report on knowledge to the government of Quebec in 1979 has served as a kind of benchmark for the postmodern as an intellectual framework.<sup>14</sup> Lyotard paints a picture of the increasing complexification and differentiation of high modernity, an outgrowth of the European Enlightenment. In that process of complexification, one discovers an increasing plurality of phenomena and types of knowledge, with a concomitant sense of the radically historical and the local. The universalist pretensions of the French and German Enlightenments seem to be slipping further and further away. One is struck in this complexity by the fact that difference seems to press itself as a priority over similarity and sameness. One is faced with unavoidable and irreducible difference. Metaphysics on uncertain legs since the time of Immanuel Kant becomes an untenable assertion. Indeed, as Lyotard pointed out most famously, the "grand narratives" (*grands récits*), those shared narrative that are the basis of social cohesion and identity, slip further and further away. What we are left with is fragments, disruptions, and discontinuities. Even the sense of the self turns out to be illusory.

The work of French deconstruction in literature, led by figures such as Paul De Man and Jacques Derrida, used these same insights to show

instabilities in what has been otherwise perceived as coherent texts.

Paul Lakeland has been one of the most thoughtful figures in seeing how postmodernity has worked itself out in theology.<sup>15</sup> He has suggested that "postmodern" can refer to an intellectual theory, a set of social values, or even a subculture where these values are lived out. In theology itself, the postmodern turn has manifested itself in three principal ways. First of all, it is an anti- or countermodern turn, questioning modernity as a sound basis for doing theology at all. This is most evident in the Radical Orthodoxy group around John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, a largely Anglo-American movement.<sup>16</sup> Second, there is a belief that the postmodern is something radically new and thus separate and distinct from high modern theology. The "Death of God" theologians in the United States in the 1960s and the work of figures such as Mark C. Taylor would fit into this category.<sup>17</sup> A third group would say that modernity is only failing us because it has not been thoroughly implemented enough. Theologians following the German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas would be in this movement.<sup>18</sup> Postmodernity for them (although some of this third category would not use the term) would entail a more radical delving into modernity.

One can see how the postmodern framework might be compatible with the four movements contributing instability to our world today. Globalization has been a fragmenting, destabilizing force for many. Among the majority poor of the world it often wrests away from them any control they may have over their lives and livelihood. Among the wealthy, people are inundated with choices, so that it is hard to think in any other terms than small discrete elements sound bytes and to prefer the short-term gain over the long-term haul and development. Migration heightens our sense of difference. Difference in language and custom, especially in urban areas where more than a hundred different ethnicities may be rubbing up against each other, seems to be the very height of the postmodern. The resurgence of religion has also meant the proliferation of new types of religiosity either independent forms of Pentecostal and Charismatic faith, or New Age syncretisms between Asian traditions and the West, homemade forms of witchcraft in the West, and Neo-Hindu and Neo-Buddhist forms of religion at home in Asian countries but in the West as well.<sup>19</sup> Even within established traditions of Christianity such as Roman Catholicism and Anglicanism we see the fragmentation caused by different ideologies or changing social conceptions of things such as the ordination of gay persons and the legitimating of gay marriage.<sup>20</sup> Contending parties within churches

can seem as heterogeneous as those without. And finally, terrorism itself is about the strange, the other, the different, and the dangerous.

When seen even cursorily in this light, an inclination might be to say that the postmodern framework is the most suitable one for understanding these changing, often turbulent movements in our kinds of societies. Many people self-consciously describe themselves as "postmodern," as living in this fragmented, heterogeneous world where difference is prized in its very difference. It is most common among elites who are able to survey the difference around them. But it is also common among young adults who have grown up in this blooming, buzzing reality and see it as the way to survive and to thrive in an open-ending, ever-accelerating, always-changing society. But it is not a useful term for the poor of the world, who do not have the luxury of choice that postmodernity seems to provide, and for whom further fragmentation may threaten their very survival.

Put succinctly, postmodernity is a useful way of describing the difference, discontinuity, and fragmentation we are experiencing provided that this difference, discontinuity, and fragmentation does not undermine a basic sense of security and safety. It may be experienced as swirling around us, but we still have our feet planted firmly on the ground. If that ground beneath our feet is sensed as itself unstable, we are likely no longer to want to exult in difference and discontinuity. This is what happens when one finds oneself living amidst a war, in a failed state, and under direct threat of global terrorism. Then difference and discontinuity is not seen as providing more possibilities for choice, but rather as a threat to our survival. My contention is that many people in wealthier parts of the world who once saw postmodernity as enhancing their choices are now beginning to experience postmodernity's consequences as threatening their existence.

### **Multiculturalism**

"Multiculturalism" like its counterpart, postmodernity carries multiple meanings. In the study of populations, it refers to people of many different cultural backgrounds occupying the same space. Within that space, they contend for recognition and respect, for goods and services, for power, and for access to the meaning-making resources of society. This has been up to the last few years a common meaning of the term. It is an acknowledgement of the fact that globalization and migration have changed our neighbourhoods and our cities.

It has another meaning, especially from the mid-1990s, a meaning used

in a pejorative manner. It refers to the attempts to broaden the general education curriculum in universities to include non-Western texts. At times it has been used to decenter the educational syllabus altogether. To be reading "dead white European males" was to be "Eurocentric" and hence not "multicultural." Because of those "culture wars" fought in the 1990s, multicultural has become a dirty word for those who wish to preserve the European heritage. The Nobel laureate in Literature Saul Bellow summed it up in these words: "When the Zulu produce a Tolstoy, I will read him." These discussions and debates have subsided somewhat in academe, but the miasma around the term "multicultural" lingers on.

Most recently, another pejorative use of the term has appeared. "Multicultural" refers to failed government policies regarding the integration of newcomers into (predominantly Western) societies. Societies that welcomed newcomers with great tolerance, provided support for maintaining cultural heritage (as does the Canadian government), and generally encouraged cultural distinctiveness are now blamed for these same newcomers not being integrated into the larger society. What "integrated" means varies from place to place. In some instances, it means that newcomers still do not speak the national language. In other instances, it refers to their rejection of dominant culture values regarding equality of women, freedom of choice, freedom of religion, and autonomy of individuals within families. In yet other instances, it means the failure of newcomers to take on citizenship in their adopted lands. In all of these instances, those pointing to what they see as failure are now announcing "multiculturalism is dead!" By that they mean that such cultural tolerance is a failed policy that threatens the cohesion of the nation.<sup>21</sup>

Thus, when multiculturalism operates in stable circumstances, it can be seen as enhancing the variety in our experience of life. In unstable situations, on the other hand, the plurality of cultures bumping up against one another becomes a sign for the unknown, even the dangerous unknown. Toleration of difference becomes strained. If a genuine crisis emerges, then the channels of communication between the different groups may not be sufficient to bear the weight of information and feeling needed, because those channels are not familiar and trusted pathways.

### **The End of Postmodernity and Multiculturalism?**

As can be seen from even this brief overview of uses of the terms postmodernity and multiculturalism, they both have captured important aspects of the world we are now living in. The diversity, the fragmentation,

and the acceleration of life all are given some meaning by appeal to postmodernity. They are all factors that square uneasily with the optimism of the high modern period. Multiculturalism was an attempt to name the increasing plurality of our societies, without perhaps giving much further description of the complex interplay. Some have tried to overcome the limitations of multiculturalism by speaking of polyculturalism. I do not know if switching from a Latin-based to a Greek-based prefix really moves the debate along much.

In these lectures I am trying to suggest that, while postmodern and multicultural may be useful descriptive terms for our experience when things are stable and can go relatively unquestioned, they do very little to interpret those experiences or to engage them constructively when we are perceived to be moving into a crisis. The convergence of globalization, migration, the resurgence of religion, and now the threat of global terrorism have, together, given us a potent brew that makes the world seem at great deal more unstable than has been the case in the recent past. The Cold War certainly carried with it risk and uncertainty. But the lines of demarcation between East and West, between communist and capitalist, were more sharply drawn. The postmodern, by definition, lacks such clarity. The sheer multiplication of cultures in a given place complicates the matter further.

I think that terms such as the postmodern and multicultural served us reasonably well in a time of relative stability or at least perceived stability. That stability could be heard in the euphoric rhetoric after the fall of the Berlin Wall and announcements of the "end of history." We are now in a much more unstable time, especially in view of the threat of global terrorism and ecological collapse. Ulrich Beck, the German sociologist who first wrote about technological and ecological risk in the mid-1980s, has returned again to that theme.<sup>22</sup> The sense of indeterminate but real and uncontrollable risk now pervades social consciousness. One of the consequences of this is much less tolerance of ambiguity. The language of multiculturalism collapsed in the weeks about September 11, 2001. Instead of celebrating diversity, the clarion cry was: "United we stand." People of ethnic groups that looked to be Middle Eastern had to go out of their way to prove their loyalty to the American ideals. In some instances, Muslim institutions were attacked just because they were Muslim. Similarly, the language of tolerance so long prized in Dutch society has disappeared in the Netherlands since the political murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh. In times of risk, an openness to the different and the unknown becomes simply too dangerous.<sup>23</sup>

In the face of such threats to our security, the temptation is to move toward a kind of default position (to use the language of information technology) of self-defense. That is, an unexamined way of interpreting things takes over, reshaping our thinking and reorienting our action. This frame may represent our genuine feelings and fears, heretofore papered over with the rhetoric of postmodernity and multiculturalism. Such unexamined thinking does not serve us well. It attempts to shield us from uncertain and unwanted intrusions into our world, but it does not engage them in any significant way.

That is what is happening, I believe, in Western societies today, in the anxiety over the long-term effects of globalization, continuing migration, resurgent religion, and global terrorism. We know that, historically, societies who perceive themselves to be under such threat are willing to sacrifice their liberty to more authoritarian rule. If the perception of threat becomes interwoven with a sense of being wronged or humiliated, it can lead to forms of fascism and willingness to sacrifice those "others" in our midst at any cost. The question then becomes: can we find a more adequate framework for interpreting this unstable world that will lead to a better way of living together on our planet, that will guide us in overcoming the challenges facing us (rather than ignoring, denying or repressing them)? These are the questions that animate this presentation and these lectures.

In the second of these lectures, I want to take up the question of such frameworks. Can we find our way forward into a different kind of modernity that will account for what we are experiencing in terms of plurality, difference, contingency, and instability without engaging in violence toward one another or creating fortress-like havens of safety where people may survive for a time, but will not flourish? It is with this question that we turn to the second lecture.

### **Seeking the Whole: From Fundamentalism to a Cosmopolitan Worldview**

The previous lecture looked at four factors that have made the world an increasingly unstable place in the last decade and a half. Globalization, migration, the resurgence of religion, and global terrorism have all contributed to creating a very different kind of environment for human life today. It was noted that two of the frameworks that were most frequently used to interpret much of this were invocations of postmodernity and multiculturalism. While these both had descriptive value, authenticating in some way the sense of diversity, difference, fragmentation, and instability,

they did not of themselves have much explanatory power to help us interpret the world we live in, especially when that world became fundamentally unstable. Nor did they suggest much by way of action to address that instability, other than affirmation of those same experiences they were intended to describe. And given the fact that the instability they herald provokes anxiety, the response we do give may grow out of our worst instincts rather than our best lights. We may well find ourselves falling back into a "default" position that will not permit us to deal with these realities in a creative fashion.

In this lecture, I would like to propose an interpretive framework that will attempt to move us beyond relying on postmodernity and multiculturalism as modes of response. This is, needless to say, a first and tentative effort. The reality we are addressing here is complex. Nor can it be worked out in sufficient detail within the short compass of these lectures. My hope, however, is to give a first glimpse of a direction that might be taken to move along the discussion of how we are to live in the world that is taking shape around us.

My basic hypothesis is this: although Lyotard and others aligned with some form of postmodernism have declared the "death of the grand narrative" and even the "death of the subject," I think their claim is overdrawn. To be sure, their consigning to the dustbin of history socially shared narratives of whole societies that make overstretched claims is probably well taken. The claims of the utter universality and triumph of Western values over those of other societies does look like imperial overreach. The confidence that reason can lead to socially engineered utopias probably deserves the same fate. If the twentieth century was the acme of high modernity, its far-reaching claims have much to answer for: two world wars, genocides on new and terrifying scales, nuclear destruction, and perhaps irreversible environmental degradation cannot be claimed as triumphs for humankind. Certainly such grand narratives need to be exposed for what they are.

But to move from there and say that no grand narrative is any more possible goes a bit too far. If anything, global communications has made commonly shared narrative more possible now than in the past. Think of the rolling celebration of the millennium in the year 2000 from Kiribati around the world to the mid-Pacific on our televisions. The mobilization of sentiment through those same media, be it at the death of Diana, Princess of Wales; the views on the Middle East from Al-Jazeera; or the devastating effects of the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean have created shared narratives that were not possible before the information era. To be



sure, viewers of these spectacles and reportage are not passive agents; they can construct meaning at local levels that elude the control of the meaning makers. One should more properly speak here of narrative flows, that is, chains of locally constructed and transmitted narratives that are at once mutually intelligible, yet reflect concrete circumstances in local communities. Such flows have been in evidence in the social forces of globalization since the mid-1990s, and are becoming more prevalent today.<sup>24</sup> These flows may well represent as close as we may come to an explicitly "universal" be it socially or in our theology in our complex and interconnected times.

Similarly, how well people are able to adjust to constant and thoroughgoing difference especially when it threatens identity and safety cannot stand as an assumed and unexamined premise. Especially when the transition is very rapid, most of us are likely to need help through this period. Unlimited difference may work when other aspects of society are secure, but when society itself appears under threat, our actions need to be more deliberate, and we need a place to stand from which we can see the bigger picture..

I would suggest, then, that in an unstable world, the response to the heterogeneity, the difference, and the fragmentation of the postmodern and to the relativist juxtaposition of the multicultural is not more of the same becoming more postmodern and more relativist. To advocate this strategy is not to take into account how people act under threat. To write people off as being overly anxious or pathologically afraid is not a recipe for an ordered society. That is precisely not a celebration of difference: it is, rather, excluding people from the conversation. I think a more fruitful approach is to posit that, we as human beings, are involved in a constant searching for the whole, that is, an ongoing quest to take these disparate experiences, sensations and idea, and craft them into patterns of intelligibility. That intelligibility may be cognitive, moral, social, or aesthetic or all of the above. The point is that we do not live in an utterly unordered world. To do so would condemn us all to solipsism and silence. Unless we can discern and delineate some of the patterning that is going on in this bewildering variety of data, we give ourselves over to a Hobbesian world where the strongest and those with most access to power will prevail.

The first reaction to such a proposal may be one of extreme caution. Because we know what kind of unities or wholes were crafted out of the chaos of the immediate past century. Varieties of totalitarian rule be it fascist, communist, revanchist or what have you have been imposed by strongmen upon a helpless population. To suggest such stirs resistance

even in those who are the most critical of the Enlightenment. This is a set of dangers for which we must remain vigilant. But fear, uncertainty and the lack of security will drive even the most rational into postures they would not have accepted of themselves in calmer times. Recent legislation regarding immigrants and potential terrorists in different countries in Europe, the United States, and Australia are evidence of this. To simply turn our heads away, saying that we must do this because the world has become too dangerous, will not eliminate the danger. As human beings, we are symbol-makers, and we do not make them in isolation from one another. It seems to me better to pay close attention as to how we try to construct a sense of the whole rather than see it as a slippery slope that leads to totalitarianism. If we are able to learn from history and from previous reflection on great human failures, we have a better chance of constructing something that will indeed serve the well-being of the human community.

In this lecture, then, I would like to begin by examining four such attempts at seeking the whole that go astray. They are all modes that have been engaged in by societies in recent times. To simply dismiss them as pathologies fails to understand their attraction. To overcome them requires comprehending the needs they address and the questions they answer. As will be clear, I am not recommending any of them. But I recognize the kind of lure they have had for some people.

Having done that, I will turn to an emerging model that is being discussed principally in Great Britain and Germany today, that goes by different names: reflexive modernity, new modernity, second modernity. Here is where I think we have the best chance to overcome the misfires that turn quests for the whole into new oppressive forms of totalitarianism.

In order to begin, however, there must be a few words about modernity itself. Like postmodernity it is a slippery concept, one that cannot be resolved here. What is offered is no more than a benchmark against which to measure what will come after.

### **One View of Modernity**

A good way to get some perspective on the elusive concept of modernity is to step outside the North Atlantic, Western ambit, where modernity was born and where its flame is kept most brightly burning. As with secularization, there was once the view that the rest of the world would follow in the path blazed by Europe, especially with the French and the Scottish Enlightenments. Today, it is more common to speak of

modernities in the plural. They bear family resemblances and can communicate with one another, but are not carbon copies or (perhaps now the more apposite metaphor) clones of one another.<sup>25</sup>

For such a view, I turn here to the Mexican critic Néstor García Canclini, in his study of hybridity, modernity, and mixing.<sup>26</sup> In looking at modernization from a Latin American perspective, he describes modernity as the result of four interlocking projects.

*The first* he calls an *emancipating* project, wherein all aspects of life are secularized, i.e., emancipated from ecclesiastical or political control. Social life is rationalized and individualism becomes the norm, especially in urban areas.

*The second* is an *expansive* project, whereby society tries to gain power over nature as well as over the production and circulation of goods and knowledge. Extending scientific knowledge and enhancement of profit give this expansion an open horizon.

*The third* is a *renovating* project, that insists on constant innovation to elude sacred prescriptions and control, as well as constant renewal of the sign value of things in society as their value and meaning is eroded by a consumer mentality.

*And finally*, there is a *democratizing* project that constantly tries to extend all these other projects across all sectors of society for greater participation and reinforcement of the modernizing enterprise as a whole.<sup>27</sup>

This combination of emancipation, expansion, renovation, and democratization can provide a general framework for how modernity has operated heretofore, in a variety of cultural contexts, as well as give us a point of departure for how to think about a different kind of modernity in the second half of this lecture. Before leaving this brief consideration, however, it is important to note that, for most of the world, modernity does not occupy a uniform space. Particularly in urban conglomerations outside the Western world, people may be passing daily from premodern to modern into postmodern settings. In the squatter settlements around Lagos, the *favelas* of Rio or São Paulo, the *barrios* of Mexico City, those arriving from the countryside try to reproduce their premodern villages in their new locale, but go off to work (especially the women) in the modern or postmodern sites of the city as domestic help or cleaning personnel, or doing the delicate work of computer board construction. More could be said about this different faces of modernity, but that is not our principal purpose here. Let us turn to some of the attempts to find the whole that are currently practiced, but fall short of the idea.

## Search for the Whole: Detours and Dead Ends

I would now like to sketch very briefly four such quests for the whole that end short of the goal, and often very badly. They are: fundamentalism, romanticism, universalism, and what I shall call "splitting." These last attempts are presented as bulwarks against anomie. Each will be described and, to the extent, possible, their allure identified and their point of weakness examined.

### Fundamentalism

Certainly the most talked about of these quests for the whole today is fundamentalism. The term originates from struggles within conservative Protestantism in Britain and the United States at the turn of the twentieth century. At that time, a series of pamphlets circulated in the United States, describing the "fundamentals" of Christian belief; hence the name. Today, the term is used somewhat indiscriminately, especially by non-conservatives, for any kind of conservative faith with which they disagree. It is extended also beyond Christianity to include a wide range of Muslim revival and reform movements, some forms of Judaism, and Hindu communalism.

Despite numerous extended efforts to define and to map out the forms of fundamentalism (notably the University of Chicago Project conducted jointly with the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in the early 1990s), there is still not any agreed upon definition of fundamentalism.<sup>28</sup> The definition I have found most useful was developed by Bruce Lawrence.<sup>29</sup> He sees fundamentalism first of all as a modern phenomenon. It arises in modernity as a reaction against modernity. It establishes its sense of the whole by lifting up elements from a religious tradition that are specifically anti-modern in character, and then making them a boundary of identity that separates off the true believer from the apostate and the infidel. Thus, in early twentieth century Christianity, the five "fundamentals" were the literal interpretation of Scripture, the virginal conception, the substitutionary atonement of Christ's death, his bodily resurrection, and his physical return at the end of time—all beliefs hard to reconcile with modernity. Other Christian dogmas like the Trinity, for instance, are not included here.

Similarly, in contemporary Islam, the prescription for literal application of the *sharia* and the sequestering of women from the public sphere have nothing to do with what have long been considered the five pillars of Islam:

the oneness of God, the duty to pray five times a day, giving alms, maintaining the fast during the month of *Ramadan*, and making the pilgrimage to Mecca. Again, in asserting *sharia* and the sequestration of women, one sees a reaching for distinctively anti-modern elements to bolster an anti-modern outlook, thereby striving to create a community that will stand over against the corrosive acids of modernity.

The fundamentalist quest for the whole sees modernity as incapable of ever fulfilling that dream, either because of the *hybris* of its claims for science and technology, the immorality of its rank individualism, or its lack of normative behaviour because of its being driven by consumption. Only by creating a sectarian group, clearly bounded by anti-modern markers, can one hope to live in integrity and wholeness within a tradition. Fundamentalism comes in degrees, of course. But it is its adherence to the explicitly anti-modern, and privileging those anti-modern elements of a tradition over what might be considered the principal elements in other settings, that gives it its attraction. In the confusion of a pluralist world, it provides clarity, if not truth.

### **Romanticism**

It was the late Sir Isaiah Berlin's studies in the early German and French Romantics who proposed a Counter-Enlightenment view of the world, that first alerted us to the power and destructive potential of this worldview.<sup>30</sup> Starting with Johann Georg Hamann in Germany, a powerful reaction grew against the universalizing tendencies of the Enlightenment. Rather than stressing the general, the universal and the rational, Romanticism emphasized the genius of the solitary individual who had special insight into the nature of reality. Only by following uncompromisingly the true genius could one arrive at beauty and the true which was not generalizable but particular. The power of the unconscious to reveal this reality ultimately supersedes what conscious rationality can attain. It is the Dionysian, not the Apollonian path that leads to true reality.

Recently Richard Wolin has traced how this late eighteenth century and nineteenth century strand of quest for the whole leads through Nietzsche to right-wing movements in the twentieth century: the cult around the analytic psychologist Carl Gustav Jung, and the German and French New Right including some of the scions of postmodernism.<sup>31</sup> Other strands flowing out of this cult of the personal and the irrational, and drawing in different ways upon Nietzsche, are to be found in the philosophy of Martin

Heidegger and in National Socialism. To be sure, these are not direct genealogies; but the family resemblances are there. The irrational and the poetic, the singular and the particular, the solitary genius are seen to triumph over the pedestrian ministrations of the bureaucratic, the universal, and the rational.

It goes without saying that this Romanticist strain in Western thought has tried to create its senses of the whole, either in esoteric readings not open to less discerning minds, or even in outright fascism, where violence is seen as purgative of the banal and the impure. It creates its own kinds of purity over against the hybridities of modernity. In emphasizing the ineluctable, the pure, the particular, it develops an especially aesthetic reading of the truth, which at times is counterintuitive to what otherwise would be held as moral truth.

### **Universalism**

If Romanticism, in its search for the whole, counters the central tenets of the Enlightenment, and with it, modernity, then universalism is an attempt to find the whole precisely in the very tenets of the Enlightenment. The Western Enlightenment arose, as Stephen Toulmin has reminded us, out of an effort to overcome the sectarian feuding of the churches in the seventeenth century. The murderous outcome of holding in uncompromising fashion of each to one's own dogma, thereby not allowing any common ground where all parties could stand, but by insisting rather on the irreducibility of one's own position to any other, can only lead to the most powerful winning the day.<sup>32</sup> Only when all accede to the rules of reason, common to all human beings, can such tribalism be overcome. These powerful ideas did much to shape a new sense of the whole in their French forms of rationality, and in their Scottish forms of polity and economy. They appeared to free Europe from the rivalries of the churches and the unchallenged authority of their hierarchs. Science, not religion, would hold the day.

The confidence (some would say the *hybris*) of such a confidence in rationality helped free the powers of scientific and technological innovation that religious authorities had to some extent held in check. It made the technological and political progress of Western society possible. It also helped move it into colonizing much of the rest of the world, where the "benefits" of this Enlightenment civilization would then raise the benighted peoples of the rest of the world from their darkness. Inasmuch as any rational person could participate in this process, made this

universalism in principle open to all, not merely to those who by birth or rank would control the levers of power.

Much can be said for this quest for the whole. It dwells especially on cognitive, scientific understandings of the truth that are, in principle, accessible to all reasonable people. But it, too, has had its overreach, notably in three areas.

*First of all*, it posits a single and sole rationality, without retrieving the nuances of cultural difference. In its cruder nineteenth century forms (echoed in Kant's and Hegel's comments about the irrationality of Africans), it fails to understand that there are fundamentally different ways of organizing the whole. This fact continues to plague Christian theology today at a time when the majority of Christians live outside the Western sphere, yet their own theology and efforts at inculturation are largely ignored by the West.

*Second*, and in the most tragic instance, "sciences of society" were devised in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that have utterly crushed individuals and cultural lifeways. The depredation of Marxism in its various forms be it Stalinism, Maoism, or Maoism's offshoots in Peru, Cambodia, and Nepal can hardly be seen by most as a new whole in which human life flourishes.

*Third*, and perhaps less obviously (at least to some), the negative dimensions of globalization its relentless innovation, its brutal competition, its utter restlessness go hand in hand with this universalism and continue, in Habermas' words, to colonize the lifeworld. Habermas himself has not always been clear about the universalism of his ideal communicative situation, in which all will be resolved by rational argument, might have cultural and class biases.<sup>33</sup> In recent years, he has accorded a greater role for religion itself even in these idea societies. Given that, one cannot foreclose a judgment on just where all of that will end up. But it is noteworthy that even the most rational of quests for the whole does not automatically yield the desired human flourishing.

While such universalism might seem to be the single best candidate for seeking the whole because of its democratic access, its universalized rules, its shared criteria for evaluation of outcomes it too potentially falls short in a complex, pluralistic world. Nonetheless, its distinctive advantages should not be underestimated.

## **Splitting**

A fourth way of seeking the whole I would call splitting. This entails

splitting off the problematic parts of the perceived reality, and trying to construct the whole out of what is left. The construction is then regarded as a bulwark against the anomie that threatens a society because of its complexity, pluralism, and conflicted situation.

Muslim scholar Bassam Tibi gives a useful example of how this is done by some Muslims who face Western modernity, but find parts of that modernity incompatible with their sense of Islam. He distinguishes between *institutional modernity* and *cultural modernity*. Institutional modernity is the modernity evident in the achievements of science and of technology. It is based on a mathematicization of nature. This kind of modernity Muslims can accept, as is evident by the number of Muslim immigrants to North America who are engineers, physicians, chemists, and workers in the natural sciences. This is the modernity created by the scientific worldview.

Cultural modernity, on the other hand, is problematic; for this grows of the results of accepting values such as individual free will, the freedom to change one's social or cultural environment, the acceptance of relativism as a principle for dealing with pluralism. Such cultural modernity is rejected by some Muslims. In other words, they live in the modern West as workers in institutional modernity, but try to continue their lifeworld as opposed to cultural modernity.<sup>34</sup>

This is not something that besets only Muslims. One finds it among other religionists as well, including among Christians. The point here is the attempt to wall off part of modernity and to live in a way that accepts only parts of it. This is different from taking a critical stance toward aspects of modernity; here we see an attempt to simply ignore or suppress a dimension of it altogether.

Splitting happens in many other ways. One sees it in politics where one is willing to ignore unpleasant aspects of a political programme in order to embrace other, cherished values. This has been pointed out in a recent study in the United States, where it was shown that some of the poorest sectors of the United States consistently voted for the Republican Party because of that party's commitment to "family values," even though that same party's economic policies toward poor families actually harms them.<sup>35</sup>

Yet another way is found in nativist reassertions. Samuel Huntington did this in 2004 with his controversial book, *Who Are We? The Challenge to America's National Identity*. In that book, Huntington asserted that the United States' identity is based in White Anglo-Saxon Protestant values, and the influx of Latinos from the various countries of Central and South



America (especially Mexico), constituted a threat to the nation. Similar voices can be heard today in Germany, with the assertion of a national *Leitkultur* or guiding culture that is under threat because of immigration. "Germany is not a land of immigration (*Zuwanderungsland*)" is frequently heard there. In these instances, reasserting a reified version of the national culture is seen as a hedge against the complexity emerging because of the entry of people whose cultures are fundamentally different.

Perhaps given the complexity of the world we live in, some such splitting is difficult to avoid. Difficult choices have to be made. But to simply cordon off attitudes or policies, rather than critically engage them, seems to be short-circuiting, in the long run, the search for the whole.

### **A New Modernity**

Given the fact that people are likely to continue to seek the whole that this is something inherent to the meaning-making, symbolizing process that makes us human beings. Are there strategies for creating a way of living in the complex, plural realities we live in that can take into account the shifting factors in our existence, that can deal with the instabilities that are created without giving in to ways of seeking the whole that may be deeply flawed, either morally or socially?

What I would like to sketch out here are some attempts that are being made in that direction, that going beyond simply revelling in plurality (what Canadian sociologist Reginald Bibby designated a number of years ago as "mosaic madness"<sup>37</sup>) or a kind of Balkanized multiculturalism that collapses at the first sign of stress. It goes by a number of names, and is being constructed especially by thinkers in Great Britain and in Germany. It was initially called "reflexive modernity." Somewhat later, Scott Lash called it a "second modernity." Most recently, Ulrich Beck has been calling it a "new cosmopolitanism".<sup>38</sup> Let us look at each of these names to explore how they are reading what needs to change in our perception of modernity."

Reflexive modernity" refers to an attitude in our reading of modernity. It is intended to convey that our experience of modernity is no longer simply a phenomenological one, accepting the principles and promises of modernity at face value. Rather, we take a reflective, even critical posture toward it. For example, that progress and innovation are taken for granted as defining features of modernity is no longer assumed. We have been experiencing the limits of progress and innovation as values that can be

accepted uncritically. This is most evident in debates about the environment. Is drilling for oil in wildlife reserves to be accepted because of the West's insatiable hunger for petroleum, even if it is a potential danger to the environment? The threat of global terrorism likewise compels us not take our security for granted any longer. Our sense of risk in general has been heightened, be it for reasons of ecology, the volatility of financial markets, the spread of communicable diseases such as SARS or avian flue. Reflexive modernity, then, means that we experience reality increasingly at one remove. We now question what we once took for granted.

"Second modernity" is an attempt to seek the whole, using the framework of reflexive modernity. It reflects the fact that we have moved beyond the first modernity, but are not mired in a fragmented postmodernity. One of the features of a second modernity is a sense that many of the boundaries that defined the first modernity have been shifted. These shifts are sometimes experienced as a deterritorialization, that is, boundaries which once defined and even protected us are no longer fulfilling these functions. This is most evident in the experience of the pluralization of our societies through migration. Not only are dominant culture people confronted with a multiplicity of ethnic identities, the situation has become such in some places that there is no ethnic majority any more. That, for instance, is the case in Los Angeles, and becoming increasingly so in other urban centres of immigration. Ecological threats in the atmosphere be they the hole in the ozone layer or the cloud of smog hanging over South Asia from the cooking fires know no national boundaries. Thus boundaries that define identities are found to be shifting as are those we thought once protected us. The United States thought it was largely safe from global terrorism because of the expanse of two oceans on its eastern and western frontiers. September 11 changed all of that.

Deterritorialization is experienced also in the fact that boundaries that once defined purity are being replaced by concepts of mixing and hybridity. As people migrate, mix, and marry racial identities become blurred. Jacques Audinet has called this "the human face of globalization".<sup>39</sup> To be of mixed race was through much of the nineteenth and twentieth century a sign of being impure, even of weaker stock. But things are changing rapidly in this regard. The golfer Tiger Woods has become an icon of this new hybridity: not only drawing his identity from African and Asian resources, but also by being the very opposite of a scion of a debilitated stock. He is the number

one golfer in the world. *Mestizaje*, *métissage*, creolization whatever it is called represents now a new and positive way of being in the world.

The second modernity not only forces us to rethink boundaries; it calls forth new decisions. The debate about genetically modified crops, and the divide between North America and Europe on this matter, represents one set of such decisions to be made. The capacities of biotechnology to prolong life have created another. The line between medicinal supplements and doping in professional sports raises yet another. This second modernity raises, therefore, a whole set of questions that must be addressed now in a way that was not the case even in the immediate past.<sup>40</sup>

Finally, the most recent term introduced for this new modernity is cosmopolitanism. This is of course an older term, usually intended to convey the sense of being (as its etymology implies) a world citizen. It was typically used of elite populations, who had the means to travel frequently, and who as a result of this felt at home in many places in the world. In this newer usage that older meaning is not denied, but has been supplemented in two key ways. First of all, the new cosmopolitans are not so much an elite as they are the mass of migrants moving around the world today. Some are professionals and middle class, but the great majority of them are working class people. They are cosmopolitan in their capacity to negotiate multiple cultures, both in their current place of residence, their workplace, and their country of origin, and in their use of communications media to hold all of this together. Cultural critic Paul Gilroy sees them creating a new sense of *convivência*, or capacity to live together and interact with the great deal of difference that surrounds them. They do not experience cosmopolitan life as tourists or sometime visitors, but as those who must encounter and interact with difference every day of their lives. They do not have the luxury of experiencing the different as exotic or romantic; it is part of their ongoing struggle for survival.<sup>41</sup>

The other dimension of this new cosmopolitanism is that its thinking and decision-making is increasingly characterized by a "both-and" rather than an "either-or" approach. Modernity was marked by its capacity to differentiate and make distinctions. That is, after all, a key aspect of critical thinking. Confronted as it is with increasing plurality and complexity, the new cosmopolitanism is more keenly aware of the need to capture that sense of complexity in its decision-making. A simple differentiation is less useful to explain phenomena in the world today. For example, the early stages of globalization were often characterized as a homogenization of the

world: global flows from the media would gradually erase differences and we would all come to be more and more alike. Experience has shown, however, that such is not entirely the case. While some things have become more the same, the reaction against this homogenization has been new emphases on the local. English may be becoming the universal language of commerce and education in Europe, but this has also led to a revival of many local languages such as Breton, Frisian, and Ladino that once were considered doomed to extinction. Globalization has become, in the words of Roland Robertson, "glocalization," a mixture of the global and the local.<sup>42</sup>

It is this "both-and" attitude that is most characteristic of the new cosmopolitanism. Ways need to be found to incorporate the plurality we experience into our decision-making, our policies, and our ways of life, and taking an inclusive, rather than an exclusive, attitude is a major way of doing this.

### **Conclusion: A Second Modernity**

What I have tried to outline in this lecture is how terms like postmodernity and multiculturalism have become less useful, especially for any analysis of the world we live in today. They both pointed to important dimensions of contemporary experience: a sense of pluralization, of fragmentation, of irreducible difference. Both terms did describe for a time these aspects of our existence. But we can now see they were best suited to a relatively stable set of social conditions. One can revel in plurality and fragmentation when one feels secure that the larger world will hold together without any great effort on our part. One can celebrate cultural diversity when encounter with those cultures is a choice or an exotic excursion to an ethnic restaurant. But the instability of the last years has shown that these concepts are not resilient when put to the test. People quickly seek a new whole when they cannot presume that the erstwhile arrangements are going to stay in place. The rhetoric of multiculturalism has collapsed under social stress in a number of countries today. People need some sense of the whole in order to know how to navigate a crowded and confused world. In the words of Reginald Bibby, they need frameworks for moral and social judgements.

I examined briefly four such quests for the whole that mark the current landscape of our world. Fundamentalism, Romanticism, Universalism, and splitting present a series of options for such quests for the whole. Each has certain advantages, but often also glaring disadvantages that do not address the complexities of our time.

Because of those shortcomings, I suggested a look at a new viewing of modernity, that is increasingly being called a second or new modernity. It is marked first of all by a reflexivity that has tried to learn from the shortcomings of high modernity, with its sometimes overweening self-confidence, its unexamined belief in innovation and progress, its tendency to believe in the efficacy of its utopian social engineering. Secondly, it is aware that boundaries that had provided relatively stable identities and becoming more porous and are being redrawn. Some boundaries that we thought would protect us are disappearing altogether and creating new senses of risk. Thirdly, as a result of these shifting, porous and disappearing boundaries, older concepts of purity are being replaced by sense of mixing and hybridity. Where once multiracial identity was seen as debilitating (especially by Europeans), such hybridity today means resilience and capacity to survive and even flourish in pluralistic and difficult circumstances. The capacity to see the positive dimensions in such mixing creates also the possibility of a new *convivência*, a capacity for an engaged living together amidst, and indeed with, people and identities that are quite different. Fourth, these aspects of reflexivity, shifting boundaries, and hybridity call forth a new cosmopolitan view of the world that tries to encompass and interconnect the various dimensions of this complex world. This view recognizes that, if left to itself, a pluralized, complex world will seek the whole in ways that might become pathological and detrimental to the well-being of society. It realizes that decisions will have to be made, that moral and social judgements cannot be suspended or postponed indefinitely.

Let me conclude by returning to the four major features that have been creating instability in the world, and look at them briefly through the lens of a second modernity.

### **Globalization.**

The interconnectedness of communication and the global flows that such communication creates will continue to be with us, barring a political cataclysm that pulls countries back, fortress-like, behind high walls. But a second modernity realizes that there is no "invisible hand" guiding globalization and making it socially responsive. More and more in the coming years, multilateral ways will have to be found to see that globalization does not collapse under its own excesses.<sup>43</sup> Recent concern about Africa among some of the developed countries is a heartening

example of this.

### **Migration.**

Migration is likely to continue as long as there is economic inequity and political instability in the world. It is creating multicultural societies that will have to find more explicit ways of negotiating difference, of promoting cultural interaction, and of continuing to seek what will bind all of this together in some kind of a whole. The crisis now surfacing in a number of European countries (and also in Australia) is indicative of this need. A second modernity realizes that the question is not *whether* we will be multicultural; it is, rather, *how* we will be multicultural. Here new patterns of engagement, and a logic of "both-and" will likely be part of the response.

### **Resurgence of Religion.**

The resurgence of religion has called into question secularization as the sole paradigm for dealing with diversity, or at least is prompting a critical review. That religion is resurgent at a time of instability is itself evidence of one of the quests of searching for the whole either as fundamentalism or in revival movements. Simply to try to re-privatize religion is not an option. The question is rather how to encourage the positive dimensions of religion for the sake of a second modernity, and how to curb those totalizing tendencies that threaten the well-being of others. I will be returning to this in the third lecture.

### **Global Terrorism.**

Global terrorism is not likely to go away any time soon. Large groups of unemployed, disaffected males will provide a steady demographic stream into its ranks for at least the next thirty years. Reducing the conditions that feed and sustain the turn to terrorism—poverty, humiliation, a sense of powerlessness—will reduce its attractiveness. The "both-and" thinking of a second modernity is likely to provide better intermediate resolutions than ever greater disjunctive policies and discriminating practices against certain populations.

The prospect of a second modernity is only now being sketched out. But it seems likely to provide some direction in dealing with the complexity and the instability of the world as we are experiencing it. The question now comes: how do we as Christian believers direct the resources of our faith to

this kind of world? That will be the subject of the final lecture.

### **The Second Modernity and a New Catholicity**

The first two lectures have dealt with what it means to live in the unstable world we are now experiencing. It has tried to locate some of the principal sources of that instability, and to look at the possible critical and analytical frameworks that might be used to address them. In this final lecture, I want to turn to the resources of faith, especially Christian faith, to engage and address these challenges that lie ahead.

I have suggested that the framework that might best describe our situation and direct our response is what is being called a "second modernity." This second modernity has a reflexive or critical relationship with the first modernity, and recognizes how things have become more complex, how boundaries and identities are changing, how we have to consider plurality in make-up of identities, and how a more cosmopolitan worldview will serve us better in the years ahead.

How might our faith provide an adequate and engaged response to the new modernity? If the Second Vatican Council, whose fortieth anniversary we are celebrating this year, helped give contour to living in the first modernity, how might we seek out our responses for living in a second modernity?

### **The Role of Religion in International Politics**

The Second Vatican Council, especially in its Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, *Gaudium et spes*, charted out a trajectory into modernity that has served us quite well. Its commitment to the fundamental goodness of the world, its recognition of the centrality of the concept of culture in shaping human and social life, and its valuing of human agency or activity for the sake of that world are ideas that will continue to guide us. At the same time, no doubt inevitably, the world has continued to change. Globalization was still an unknown concept for most people in the 1960s. No one would have imagined the urbanization and the extent of migration that we now experience nearly a half-century later, nor the profound pluralism of our societies as a consequence of this. The international religious issues at the time of the Council were atheism and

secularization. Today, as we have seen, there is a resurgence of religious feeling in the world.

We have already talked about some of these features thus far in these lectures. I would like to take as a point of departure for this final lecture the role religion can play in the world as it is developing, and some of the potential things that religion can contribute on the international scene today. It was already noted that religion now intrudes into international politics and studies of international relations in a way unimagined only a short time ago, because of a renewed interest in religion, and its own resilience. Scholars working in these areas are struggling to come up with models that give an appropriate place to religion in these settings.

Richard Falk has been one of the leading figures in this regard. In a work on the role of religion in creating a more humane model of governance on the international scene, he has made some brief suggestions about a number of potential contributions religion can make to this important area.<sup>44</sup> Let me enumerate them here as a way of beginning this reflection:

1. An appreciation of suffering, and a commitment to lift up people in society who are suffering.
2. The mobilizing potential of religion and its resonance with the deep roots of a society.
3. An ethos of solidarity, especially when religion shows its inclusivist face.
4. Normative horizons that affirm humanity even in the midst of fragmentation and diversity.
5. The transformative nature of faith and ideals, particularly as they are related to struggle and self-sacrifice.
6. A sense of limits, growing out of an awareness of finitude and the capacity of human beings for evil.
7. A sense of identity that is not achieved by subjection to the state, but rather in reference to a spiritual journey, making of the "citizen" a "citizen pilgrim."
8. A sense of reconciliation that recognizes human limits, and the need for forgiveness and the beginning of life again after conflict and catastrophe.

These eight points stake out a considerable agenda for faith as it faces a second modernity. I would like to combine them somewhat and focus on four areas where Christian faith might make a contribution to living in the



second modernity, of believing in an unstable world.

## Suffering

Suffering is theological category that does not get much attention in the developed world. It is a reminder of the finitude and shortcomings of human existence, and of the oppression and injustice that the developed world either imposes on the poor two-thirds world or acquiesces to in order not to be disturbed.

Yet suffering is the lot of much of the world's population today, either suffering caused by poverty, malnutrition, and disease, or the suffering caused by civil conflict, political oppression, and a variety of forms of racism and xenophobia. The theologian Edward Schillebeeckx speaks of the "ecumene of suffering," the widespread, pervasive character of suffering that marks the world today. Suffering can be reduced, but not entirely eradicated. Its causes are at times too complex to admit of simple solution. The fact that it cannot be completely eradicated reminds us of the *hybris* that haunts some of our enterprises. It recalls to our minds that margin that we cannot control.

But more importantly, suffering calls to respond to the things we can indeed change, the suffering that is propped up and sustained by human sinfulness, by greed and injustice, by pride and by power. The call to justice has again echoed loudly in Catholic Social Teaching, especially since the Bishops' Synod on Justice in 1970. The quest for justice will continue to be central to the Christian agenda. Within the context of the second modernity, we are called upon to refocus our sense of justice, in order to create workable goals for eradication of certain kinds of suffering. There are forms of suffering, such as malnutrition and disease, that can be directly and effectively addressed by more effective food production and medical distribution systems. There are other forms, such as racism and xenophobia, that will require education especially to combat. Advocacy, using international forums and the means of modern communication, are already finding new avenues of effectiveness.

Reflecting on the meaning of suffering in no way legitimates it. But we need to come to understand better how it is that so many people who suffer manage not to lose their humanity in the process. What resources of the human spirit are called forth in the best of human beings that can take even the destructive trajectories of suffering and turn them into a source of an expanding and even transcending human spirit? What happened to someone like Nelson Mandela in all those years of imprisonment on

Robben Island that produced not a man bent on revenge and retaliation, but one of the great statesmen of the close of the twentieth century? What lessons can be learned from his life to help oppressed people elsewhere? What did Mother Teresa learn from living among those dying people who had been abandoned by society, what did she learn about faithfulness, abiding presence, and care that has gone on to inspire so many people around the world? Spiritual guides have often spoken of the "school of suffering," a trying discipline that strips us of our illusions, makes us adhere to what is central and fundamental, and steadies our hand in unstable, unsteady times. To learn from suffering is not to condone it; it is, rather, an attempt to harness its awesome power to a nobler calling and broader spiritual horizon. Christian faith in the second modernity must face the reality of suffering more squarely. It must not avert its eyes from suffering's searching gaze. It must bring to it the wisdom of the cross, that central symbol in Christian faith that makes us rethink power and recipes for success.

Indeed, all the great religious traditions of the world have reflections on suffering. How can these be brought to bear on the suffering people experience today, not as a palliative, but as a means of strengthening the human spirit in its struggle to overcome suffering, and for the sake of recognizing the nobility that sometimes emerges in suffering rather than seeking ways for ourselves to insulate our lives from it?

### **Mobilization and Solidarity**

One of the features that mark the resurgence of religion in the world is its capacity to mobilize energies and to create bonds of solidarity. Pope John Paul II, in his many trips to different parts of the world, has exhibited again and again this mobilizing power of faith. Because faith makes an appeal not only to transcendent realities but also has what Richard Falk calls "civilizational resonance," it can draw the different strands of narrative in a society together into a greater sense of the whole. In the recent debates about whether to make inclusion of references to God and to Christianity in the European Union Constitution, EU leaders worked studiously to avoid recourse to religious references. At the same time, as the sense of multiculturalism was collapsing in those same countries, the possibility of a religious "grand narrative" was unavoidable: the religious face of Islam and of many of the African immigrants to those countries reminded an older Europe of its religious heritage.

Reference to religion can be divisive, but it can also mobilize solidarity. When Bosnia and Herzegovina were invaded by the Serbs in the early 1990s,

the leaders of the three major religious traditions (Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim) all spoke out against the invasion and the war. Yet none of the voices was strong enough to be heard outside its own community, and sometimes was feeble even within them. After the war, those leaders committed themselves to forming an interreligious council. In the last years of the 1990s, they met publicly, sometimes as often as biweekly, in order to impress upon the public consciousness that they were acting together. In this way, they hope to be prepared should another war come to their country.

The centennial celebration of the 1893 Parliament of the World's Religions, held again in Chicago in 1993, has created an ongoing organization the Council for a Parliament of the World's Religions that has sponsored parliaments in Capetown in 1998 and in Barcelona in 2004. Besides bringing religionists of all kinds together, each of these parliaments has provided a forum for religious leaders to address together some of the world's most pressing problems. These landmark events of religious cooperation show the potential of religion for making the world a better place. Much is being written about religion's collusion wittingly or unwittingly with violence, and for the sake of a better world those collusions need to be uncovered and eradicated. But perhaps the best long-term antidote to such conspiracy is linking the religions together for the sake of good. In so doing, the potential for creating new bonds of solidarity for the sake of the betterment of humankind can help point the rest of the world toward ways of redefining the boundaries that separate rich and poor, the powerful from the powerless, and the races of humankind. The term "solidarity" first arose in the trade union movements of the nineteenth century. Pope John Paul II has made it very much part of the vocabulary of Catholic Social Teaching. In a second modernity, as boundaries shift and are redefined, we must find new ways to bring people together as well. The affective bonds of faith are certainly among the strongest that may be able to do that.

### **Forming Identities in a Second Modernity**

The complexity created by globalization and migration has put identities under greater stress. One of the things that a second modernity stresses about identities is similar to its understanding of the concept of culture. In modernity, culture was often seen as a reified, definable entity that was relative stable and enduring through time. It had its roots in Johann Gottfried Herder's definition of culture from the eighteenth century: that culture was a union of three things: language, custom, and territory.

Migration and globalization has deterritorialized culture. The media have undermined any defining custom, and have creolised language. Culture is much more a negotiated reality now, having a certain historical core, but constantly in conversation with forces all around it. What happens to a migrant's culture over the span of the first two to three generations in a new setting has been the object of much study. Culture is now seen more as a kind of force field in which identities are negotiated.

To say this does not make culture or any constructed identity utterly pliable or arbitrary. It is, however, to recognize that culture and identity are never utterly stable. They are living entities that react to and change in the midst of all kinds of stimuli.

For that reason, it may not be useful to think of identity as an entity or reified lump of stuff. It might better be seen as the intersection point of multiple relationships. Rather than thinking of identity as an isolate or independent entity, it might better be viewed as an interdependent reality that is greater than the sum of all its parts. An identity is not dependent upon a single relationship; rather, it gets its resilience from its capacity to identify with a whole range of relationships. One of the basic principles of *convivência* is to have people in many different sets of relationships, so as to avoid identifying solely with one single such set. Identities today have to be capable of functioning amid many cultural realities.

Religion plays a significant role in this. It has already been noted that religion is one of the most salient strands of identity in a migrant's life: migrants often become more religiously attuned in their new country than they were in their homeland. This seems to be so because religion provides a connecting and familiar bond in an otherwise strange world. The great religious traditions such as Islam, Christianity, Buddhism and others have the additional quality of creating solidarity among peoples who are otherwise so different. The experience of a papal audience in St. Peter's Square in Rome, or of the *hajj* in Mecca can give one of the sensation of being one with a greater humanity. Those transethnic, transnational identities are important building blocks for creating a different kind of human community for the future. The calling on those principles to create genuine *communio* (as Roman Catholics would call it) or a worldwide *ummah* (as Muslims would call it) would be a powerful antidote to the xenophobia, the racism, and the forms of prejudice that still mark the human family.

To see identity as a series of relationships, to see religion as providing both face-to-face community, as well as a transcendental allegiance, is an example of the cosmopolitan "both-and" that is a hallmark of the second

modernity. As Falk pointed out, in that transcendental allegiance, life and human community can also be seen as a pilgrimage or spiritual journey. This helps create a critical distance from kinds of nationalist loyalties that harden boundaries between people and create obstacles in communication. "We have here no lasting city," as the Letter to the Hebrews reminds us (13:14). While this can be viewed as playing down citizenship and the commitments that flow from it, it should be read rather as not engaging in idolatrous behaviour ascribing divine meaning to a human institution. Religion, it seems to me, can help balance the quest for identity between a static, immobile sense of self and an arbitrary, unstable anomie. It can help maintain flexibility but within the context of direction, moral grounding, and normative horizons.

### **Reconciliation and Forgiveness**

Since the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, there has been a dramatic growth in interest in reconciliation and the possibilities of forgiveness. Some of this has come from a heightened awareness of the amount of destructive conflict that has happened in the last decade and a half. But it has also arisen from an admission of the profound damage that colonialism has done to indigenous peoples around the world, and how their cultures and personal lives were often wrecked by the advance of European settlers. The upheavals and social conflicts that have uprooted more than a hundred million people worldwide to create ongoing camps of displaced persons and flows of refugees into other countries has made people yearn for peace and repair from such disastrous occurrences.

The idea of reconciliation has been at the forefront especially of Christianity and increasingly Islam during this period. Caritas Internationalis, the umbrella organization for 164 relief and development agencies in the Roman Catholic Church, has been working since 1995 to build and implement training programmes in reconciliation in its member organizations. To date thousands of people have been trained on all six continents to engage in this work. In its current phase, it is working especially with its counterparts in the Muslim world to collaborate in this work of reconstruction and peace.<sup>45</sup>

It has been noted that these religions dare to believe in reconciliation *and* forgiveness, in justice *and* living together. My own involvement in this work has convinced me that it helps to have a religious, even eschatological vision of reconciliation. Reconciliation is not an extrapolation from cessation of conflict to some point of living together. To create the conditions for reconciliation, one has to have what John Paul Lederach, a

leading practitioner in the transformation of conflict, calls a "moral imagination".<sup>46</sup>

Reconciliation is more than finding the right strategies or techniques to end conflict. It is built on a sense of humanity as a peaceable existence, a sensitivity to securing and sustaining justice, and a capacity to imagine those rituals and other practices that will ground such peace and celebrate it regularly.

As Desmond Tutu put it so eloquently in his memoir of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, there is "no future without forgiveness".<sup>47</sup> Without embarking on forgiveness, we remember too much and forget too little. As the narratives of a society are reconstructed in the forgiveness process, there has to be a capacity to see wrongdoers in a new light not just as malevolent beings bent on our destruction, but as vulnerable, finite, even broken human beings acting out of a jumble of emotions and motivations. Forgiveness is the creation of a space for a different kind of future. The religious capacity to envision both reconciliation and forgiveness creates the conditions for the development of a genuinely new and renewed society. This possibility is crucial for a second modernity, as it tries to negotiate its way between destructive pasts and complex present situations.

### **The Two Pillars for a Theological Vision**

In order to bring especially Christian faith into engagement with the second modernity, two areas of theology will need closer attention. One is the area of theological anthropology. The other is our sense of Christian faith itself what I have called a "new Catholicity."

It could be argued that Christology was the key area for systematic theology in the last quarter of the twentieth century. This period coincided with what has been called the "third quest of the historical Jesus." During that period the social study of the New Testament, with its use of contemporary sociological and anthropological methods, helped bring to life the Gospel stories about the life and ministry of Jesus in a new way. It was also the period when an emerging question the relation of Christian claims about Jesus to the other great world religions reached a new height of attention.

It has been my contention that the major area for theological reflection for the first quarter of the twenty-first century will be theological anthropology, our theological understanding of what it means to be human.<sup>48</sup> In doing so, theological anthropology will need to move beyond

the "anthropocentric turn" that marked theology at the turn of the twentieth century, as cosmocentric views of creation made way for anthropocentric ones. Certainly the looming ecological crisis has made a solely anthropocentric view of the world obsolete and even dangerous. But there are a number of other reasons that have made a return to a theological anthropology more urgent.

*One of these* is the presence of biomedical technologies that have complicated the boundary between human and non-human life. The prospects of cloning, of continuance of life by technological means, and advances in cognitive science have all raised questions about the human that were not even thinkable a few decades ago. Here in the second modernity, boundaries are being redefined with great rapidity. We must constantly be thinking about how these affect our sense of the human.

*Second*, the development of concerns about human rights, the forms of racism that globalization have created<sup>49</sup> alongside the intractable historical forms we have inherited from colonialism, the slave trade, and the racist ideologies of the nineteenth century<sup>50</sup> all call us to expand what is included in the topic of theological anthropology. How identities are formed and how we will live together with all our difference yet find means of social cohesion constitute challenges to theological anthropology.

*Third*, our capacity to move beyond the anthropocentrism that shaped much of twentieth century theological anthropology is crucial. To be sure, this anthropocentrism was experienced at the time as liberating from ecclesiastical and social strictures, but our continued survival is based on learning our proper place within the world and all its systems. As ecological theologies move into greater maturity beyond lists of desiderata into carefully constructed new anthropologies theological anthropology as a whole will benefit from this.<sup>51</sup>

*Fourth*, the ways that new social cohesion, through solidarity and *convivência*, is theologically grounded will be an important part of how we talk about human community. As has been noted, the second modernity will have to find ways for greater engagement and cohesion between groups that are different. To invoke simply the beauty of difference when societies are under stress will not be effective. An intercultural hermeneutics is an important dimension of interpreting these communities to one another.<sup>52</sup>

The other theological concept that will be important to the Christian theological interpretation of this vision is what I have called elsewhere a "new Catholicity".<sup>53</sup> Let me remind us here of the three dimensions that I saw as central to this new Catholicity.

*The first* two have long been seen as constitutive of catholicity as a descriptor of the Church. The first was the universal extension of the Church throughout the world (catholicity in its etymological sense). While such worldwide extension is even more true today, in the twenty-first century, than it was through much of the Church's history, that "seeking of the whole" of the Church today will have to include aspects that have been discussed here as part of the second modernity: a cosmopolitan, rather than an ethnocentric view of humanity and human cultures; ways of including a sense of the "both-and" view of reality rather than the more familiar "either-or" attitude that has shaped much of our history; and ways to extend our sense of *communio* to include a *convivência* of peoples, where difference is not only recognized, but engaged.

*The second* was the fullness of faith. Not only must the faith handed down to us from the apostles be maintained in all its integrity, we may wish to emphasize within that faith elements that will keep us attuned to the fullness of humanity that must receive this fullness of faith. I would suggest two themes here.

*The first* is to bring together more closely the long Catholic tradition of natural law with the newer worldwide emphasis on human rights. In many ways this is what efforts at the global ethic are trying to do across religious lines. How these might be brought together should be high on the theological agenda.<sup>54</sup>

*The second* is to continue to explore the theme of reconciliation, both for its Christian theological resources, and also for how it can link with those theological resources from other religious traditions. Here is one of the places where religious traditions can collaborate most fruitfully.

The third dimension of the new Catholicity is communication. It should be clear from what has been said in these lectures that communication efficacious speech, constructive listening, and creating the speech environment where all of this can happen is going to be essential for the well being of the human family in all of its complexity. For the constructive engagement of cultural communities, patterns of communication and interpretation will have to be strengthened. Ways to keep all the groups in the conversation will need to be found in order to do this. An effective pedagogy of listening within the Church itself will be one of the important ways of modelling this for the larger society. The Roman Catholic Church is the largest transnational, multicultural organization in the world. If it can translate its theology of catholicity into ways of creating this engagement, it will be doing incomparable service to humanity.



The possibility of embarking on a new, or second modernity is the challenge before us. We must find more effective ways of analyzing our world if we are to be able to live together in the shrunken space and time of globalization, in the convergence of peoples in migration, amid new ways of living and believing in an unstable world. I would like to conclude here with a passage from the Letter to the Ephesians, since it embodies to my mind the vision that can animate this quest for a new way of seeking the whole:

So you are no longer aliens or foreign visitors; you are fellow-citizens with the holy people of God and part of God's household. You are built upon the foundations of the apostles and prophets, and Jesus Christ himself is the cornerstone. Every structure knit together in him grows into a holy temple in the Lord; and you too, in him, are being built up into a dwelling place of God in the Spirit.  
(Eph 2:19-22; *New Jerusalem Bible*)

No longer aliens and strangers; citizens in a common household of God; built upon firm foundations; anchored by Christ as the cornerstone; knit together as a holy temple, a dwelling place of God in the Spirit: that strikes me as the visionary agenda for the Church in a second, a new modernity.

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#### **End Notes:**

1. Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Making of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).
2. For an assessment of the positive dimensions of globalization, see Martin Wolf, *Why Globalization Works* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). For the negative dimensions, see Richard Falk, *Predatory Globalization: A Critique*

- (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999).
3. See for example Niall Ferguson, "Sinking Globalization," *Foreign Affairs* 84 (March/April, 2005), 64-77.
  4. Peter Whybrow, *American Mania: When More is not Enough* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005).
  5. The report may be found at: [www.un.org/esa/policy/wess](http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess).
  6. Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Society and Minority Rights* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
  7. On this matter, see Peter Berger (ed.), *Die Grenzen der Gemeinschaft: Konflikt und Vermittlung in pluralistischen Gesellschaften* (Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 1997).
  8. A study that portended some of the problems now emerging is Jan Lucassen and Arie de Ruijter (eds.), *Nederland multicultureel en pluriform? Een aantal conceptuele studies* (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2002).
  9. Notably Peter Berger, *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999).
  10. Recent analyses of this phenomenon can be found in David Martin, *Pentecostalism: The World Their Parish* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002); and Allan Anderson, *An Introduction to Pentecostalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
  11. See his *The Failure of Political Islam* (London: I.B. Tauris 1994) French original in 1992; *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).
  12. The title of an early work devoted to this by Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (eds.), *Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). See among others Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (eds.), *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
  13. Among the quickly growing literature on this topic, see R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001); Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002 revised edition).
  14. Jean-Francois Lyotard, *La Condition postmoderne: Rapport sur le savoir* (Paris: Editions du minuit, 1979); ET *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
  15. Paul Lakeland, *Postmodernity: Christian Identity in a Fragmented Age* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997). I follow something of this same scheme in "La teologia postmoderna e oltre nella chiesa mondiale," in Rosino Gibellini (ed.), *Prospettive teologiche per il XXI secolo* (Brescia: Queriniana, 2003, 373-388).
  16. John Milbank *Theology and Social Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); Catherine Pickstock, *After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998).

17. Mark C. Taylor, *Erring: A Postmodern A/Theology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
18. Some of this work has been collected recently in Eduardo Mendieta (ed.), *The Frankfurt School on Religion* (New York and London: Routledge, 2005). The theologians presented here are Johannes Baptist Metz, Edmund Arens, and Helmut Peukert.
19. I have explored this in "Syncretism in North America and Europe: The re-enchantment of the West," *Chakana* 2(2004)4, 7-24.
20. On these issues in Canada, see Michael Higgins and Douglas Letson, *Power and Peril: The Catholic Church at the Crossroads* (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2002).
21. One of the most outspoken on this has been Samuel Huntington in his *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).
22. See his *The Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* (London: Sage, 1992). The German original appeared in 1986.
23. I have explored this in more detail in "Pluralism after 9/11: Living with Difference and Instability," *The Ecumenist* 41 (Spring, 2004), 12-16.
24. I described these in *The New Catholicity: Theology between the Global and the Local* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1997), 15-21.
25. I have explored this more in "Is the Modernization Process Uniform in its Effect?" in Fritz Frei (ed.), *Inkulturation zwischen Tradition und Modernität* (Fribourg: Presses Universitaires de Fribourg, 2000), 297-308.
26. *Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).
27. *Ibid.*, 12-13.
28. The five volumes that came out of the project were edited by R. Scott Appleby and Martin E. Marty, and published by the University of Chicago Press, 1991-1995. Of special note for the general reader are the opening and final volumes, which try to map out and synthesize the results of the research.
29. Bruce Lawrence, *Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1989).
30. See His *Magus of the North: J.G. Hammann and the Origins of Modern Irrationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); *The Roots of Romanticism* (Henry Hardy, ed.), London: John Murray, 1999.
31. Richard Wolin, *The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
32. Stephen Toulmin, *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity* (New York: The Free Press, 1990).
33. I have made this point, also drawing upon other authors, in "Theorie und Praxis interkultureller Kommunikationskompetenz in der Theologie," in Edmund Arens (ed.) *Anerkennung der Anderen* (Freiburg: Herder, 1995), 9-30.

34. Bassam Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 24.
35. Thomas Frank, *What's the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of America* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004).
36. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).
37. Reginald Bibby, *Mosaic Madness* (Toronto: Stoddard, 1990).
38. Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization* (Stanford: Standord University Press, 1994); Scott Lash, *Another Modernity* (London: Sage, 1999); Ulrich Beck, *Der kosmopolitische Blick* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2004).
39. Jacques Audinet, *The Human Face of Globalization: From Multicultural to Mestizaje* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005).
40. These questions of deterritorialization and new decisions in second modernity are explored in a variety of fields in Ulrich Beck and Christoph Lau (eds.), *Entgrenzung und Entscheidung* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2005). This book and Beck's *Der kosmopolitische Blick* both appear in a series with Suhrkamp edited by Beck, entitled *Edition Zweite Moderne*.
41. Paul Gilroy, *Postcolonial Melancholia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). *Convivência* is a Portuguese term referring to the capacity of people from different backgrounds to live together. Theo Sundermeier is credited with introducing the term into theology. See the entry "Konvivenz," RGG IV, 1654.
42. I explore Robertson's idea in *The New Catholicity: Theology between the Global and the Local* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1997).
43. An example of looking at some of the major problems facing the world and of what can be done about them economically has been developed by a group of economists known as the Copenhagen Consensus. See Bjorn Lomborg (ed.), *Global Crises, Global Solutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). This work is not an example of the second modernity I am speaking about here, but does exemplify how people are not waiting for problems in globalization to be solved by some invisible hand of neo-liberal capitalism.
44. Richard Falk, *Religion and Humane Global Governance* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 30-32.
45. Caritas Internationalis has created a handbook and a training manual for this purpose: *Working for Reconciliation: A Caritas Handbook* (Vatican City: Caritas Internationalis, 1999); and *Peacebuilding: A Caritas Training Manual* (Vatican City: Caritas Internationalis, 2003). Both have already been translated into many languages.
46. John Paul Lederach, *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Peacemaking* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

47. (New York: Doubleday, 1999).
48. Robert Schreiter, *Theologie en kultuur in een nieuw millennium* (Nijmegen: Nijmegen University Press, 2001).
49. See Stephen Castles, "The Racisms of Globalization," in his *Ethnicity and Globalization* (London: Sage Publications, 2000), 163-186.
50. Robert J.C. Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race* (London: Routledge, 1995).
51. These more sophisticated theological anthropology are appearing. Two that might be cited are Sigurd Bergmann, *Geist, der Natur befreit: Die trinitarische Kosmologie Gregors von Naziana im Horizont einer ökologische Theologie der Befreiung* (Mainz: Matthias Grünewald, 1995); Larry Rasmussen, *Earth Community, Earth Ethics* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1997).
52. See Theo Sundermeier, *Konvivenz und Differenz* (Erlangen: Verlag der Evangelischen-Lutheranischen Mission, 1995).
53. Robert Schreiter, *The New Catholicity: Theology between the Global and the Local*, op. Cit.
54. See for example Roger Ruston, *Human Rights and the Image of God* (London: SCM Press, 2004); Jean Porter, "The Search for a Global Ethic," *Theological Studies* 61(2000), 700-730.