

# Reviewing the Emergence of Radicalism in Globalization: Social Education Perspectives

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The spreading phenomenon of radicalism has become an international issue, and it serves as the background to this paper. Many countries are prioritising efforts to combat radicalism within their borders as it has become a problem for the global society. Radicalism is threatening human life and hindering the administration of global law. This paper aims to define the factors that are contributing to the emergence of radical movements and the influence of globalisation in the dynamics of radicalism. It also seeks to offer comprehensive solutions. This paper is significantly useful as a complementary reading material when trying to understand radicalism and attempting to anticipate and eradicate it.

**Key words:** *Conflict theory, globalisation, identity, radicalism, western hegemony.*

## Introduction

This paper reviews the impact of globalisation on the growth of radicalism. Relying upon a critical analysis of research results, this paper claims that the recent global phenomenon has been marred by a developing radical movement that employs religious slogans like “return to the Quran and Sunnah” to force Muslims to return to a strict, literal, and scriptural lifestyle (Wahyudi, 2010). The emerging public discourse over radicalism is often linked with violence. Indeed, radicalism and cases of violence are often based on religion, even though violence is never condoned by any theological system. A big problem in society is that the acts of terror and violence are committed by certain people against society, the state, or public facilities (Jackson et al., 2010).

One form of radicalism is to create a movement involving Muslim individuals using violent means. Radical Islamic groups are not a new thing, with radical movements occurring in various forms throughout the religion's history. Radical thinking and movements are deeply rooted because their followers use Islamic doctrine as a reference for their actions, such as the obligation to defend oneself, conduct renewal, and improve life in society (Saikal, 2007).

Radicalism has become a big issue in the recent era of globalisation. Initially, radicalism was merely a domestic concern in countries, but in this contemporary era, it has become a global concern. Since the attack on the World Trade Centre (WTC) on September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks have spread through many countries in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and even parts of Africa. Osama bin Laden then became globally known as a transnational Islamic movement actor. After Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi proclaimed on June 29, 2014 that ISIS was transforming into an international caliphate, terrorist movements became rampant in all corners of the globe (Buchta, 2015). Due to the increasing spread of radicalism, transnational religious movement actors were further pushed into global renown, as these people are the controllers of the activities of terrorist movements (Haynes, 2001). Attacks took place at such an intensity that broadcasters were constantly reporting acts of terrorism around the world. Radicalism actually has deep historical roots, however, and prior to 2001, radicalism had already manifested in several places, such as with the post *tahkim khawarij* movement.

This paper discusses radicalism as a violent movement led by radical Islamic groups. Acts committed by these radical Islamic groups represent a historical-sociological phenomenon that bring many problems to political discourse and global civilisation. These problems are exacerbated as modern media can shape public opinion. Those controlling the media can also bring about their wishes because of the media's strong potential to maintain power and hegemony (Ahmed, 1993). This is an interesting area to research because globalised Islamic radicalism was also influenced by the fast growth of media.

Radicalism is often linked to certain religious communities. Radicalism and violence often come from the splinter (not mainstream) groups of religious sects. Radical movements often obtain their "justification" from a religious understanding, but mainstream theologians often consider it narrow, shallow, and exclusive. Terrorists often interpret scripture through the lens of black-and-white conspiracy theories. They often selectively collect certain verses and interpret them in a way that opposes universal humanitarian values. Once such understandings manifest, violence is then committed through the justifying lens of religion.

Research into radicalism is plentiful. Some studies on the topic include those by Wahid Taylor, Arif, Lukito, Dipomanggolo, Gaus (a consultant and literature researcher) and Mulkhan, Rinakit, Qodir, Nuryatna, and Panggabean. These studies tend to conclude that radical Islamic movements are caused by a superficial understanding of Islamic teachings

(Wahid, 2009). Other research conducted by Hogg et al. (2010) concluded that radicalism relies more on group identity politics, and could be understood from a social psychological perspective rather than a religious one. The causes of radicalism clearly cannot be viewed from just one perspective, so this research aims to explain the factors behind the emergence of radicalism and globalisation's role in the dynamics of it, so solutions can be offered.

Radicalism is a form of conflict, so it must be understood through conflict theory. Conflict in society happens when there are different qualities of authority. A certain position in society delegates power and authority to another position, and this difference in social distribution triggers conflict. One group holds power, while the subordinate group opposes it, leading to conflict (Ritzer & Goodman, 2008). In the following section, this paper reviews radicalism issues as a social issue from three perspectives: violence in the name of God, the role of globalisation in radicalism, and a critical reflection.

## Discussion

### *Violence in the Name of God*

Radical Islamic groups use theological tools to move their socio-political positions from the periphery to the centre (Wahyudi, 2010). Acts of terror that were committed by radical Islamic groups, against centrist groups, began at the end of Ali bin Abi Thalib's reign. The *Khawarij* did not take the elite's central position, instead forming a clandestine movement and committing acts of terror against the mainstream Islamic community. The *Khawarij* made claims of *takfir* were based on pre-set conclusions.

These acts of terror were reoccurring until finally violence was committed in the name of holy doctrines. Although radicalism can manifest in any religious community, it rarely has the intensity and effect of that of Islamic splinter groups. Studying radicalism is difficult without seeing Islamic doctrines as being used as the theological justification for radical movements.

Islam as an instrument of radicalism is not a natural fit, because like most religions, Islam promotes peace. Islamic doctrine is used by just a small portion of the Muslim community to justify their violent movements. The verses used often relate to jihad, war, and attitudes towards infidels (Mudofir & Bakri, 2005). These verses are used in attempts to prove that the violence committed is a part of a jihad with religious approval. The killing of Ali by the *Khawarij* was a dark moment in the early history of Islam, and it shows how religious interpretation can lead to violent movements.

Ali's murder and the *Khawarij*'s acts of terror towards Muslim rulers in his time marked a new milestone for violence in Islamic history. After the *Khawarij* was crushed by Muawiyah,



more radical groups emerged, such as the Azariqah sect, who fought anyone outside their own group. Other radical sects included the An-Najdah and As-Sufriyah, who committed acts of terror during the Umayyad dynasty. In the Abbasid era, the Qaramithah sect also often conducted terrorist movements against the authorities (Abegebriel et al., 2004).

In the 1700s, the Wahhabi religious movement was spearheaded by Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1702-1792), who formed a coalition with the Al-Saud family and carried out a series of catastrophic massacres in the course of a paramilitary conquest. People who had deviated from Islam were killed or robbed as part of their religious fervor.

In 1802, the Wahhabi–Al-Saud coalition attacked, killed, and seized Shia Muslims in Karbala who were deemed to be criminals to the faith. The domes in their own country were destroyed because they were deemed as symbols of their faith (Dreyfuss, 2007). A campaign of violence and murder in the name of religion was later carried out by the Ikhwanul Muslimin movement, which was founded in Egypt in 1928. Dreyfuss considers that the Ikhwanul Muslimin sponsored a radical movement in addition to opposing the forces of communism and supplying the mujahedeen during the Arab-Israeli war. Members of the Ikhwanul Muslimin often bombed European cafes, recreation places, and villages in the Arab world. This terrorist movement continued until the murder of Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi Nuqrashi in December 1948 and the assassination of Anwar Sadat on October 6, 1981 (Dreyfuss, 2007).

The pattern of the Ikhwanul Muslimin movement inspired other radical Muslim activists, as seen in the establishment of the Islamic Jama'at-I in Pakistan (1941), Hezbollah in Lebanon (1960s), Hamas and Hizb ut-Tahrir in Palestine (1952). Furthermore, Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded because their founders were disappointed with Ikhwanul Muslimin's willingness to cooperate with the West (Baran, 2004).

In Nusantara, the Paderi movement attacked the palace of Pagaruyung (1809 and 1815), and in the process killed families and royal employees who were deemed to not be following Islamic sharia (Wahid, 2009).

Since the globalisation era, religious radicalism has increasingly spread to various parts of the world through groups such as Al-Qaeda, Anshorul Islam, Jemaah Islamiyah, and ISIS. The link between globalisation and religious radicalism is very close, because modern radicalism developed as a response to globalisation. The radical community believes that religious teachings must be the basis of social, economic, and political life. To ground this doctrine in the social, political and economic realm, violent methods are often used (Giddens, 2001). This was exemplified by the hundreds of thousands of cross-country mujahedeen volunteers, who trained in Pakistan, and who were willing to fight the Soviet forces in Afghanistan

between 1982 and 1992. Following the cold war, radical movements were strengthened by the declaration of The International Islamic Front for The Struggle Against The Jews and Crusaders (al-Jahbah al-Islamiyah al-Alamiyah li Jihad al-Yahud wa al-Salibiyyin), which was signed on February 23, 1998 by Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and other leaders of radical movements from various Muslim countries. The declaration was followed by a fatwa on jihad obligations against the forces of the Jews and the United States (Dreyfuss, 2007). This declaration strengthened radical Islamic movements, because Osama bin Laden had previously issued a fatwa on jihad against America and its' allies around the world on August 23, 1996 (Husaini, 2001). Radical fatwas affect the formation of radical Islamic networks, who often commit acts of terror or violence in various parts of the world (Amal & Panggabean, 2004; Isik et al, 2018). Whatever the motivation or goal, these movements often use a violent and uncompromising approach.

A radical movement does not just appear, it has a background that leads to its emergence. Some of these background factors are listed below.

Firstly, there are theological-political factors. In the concept of global religious revival, theology and politics are illustrated as two worlds that mix and move together. This means that it is difficult to separate religious revival without linking it to the political world (Amal & Panggabean, 2004). Tibi (1998) describes how religious radicalism (including Islam) is an aggressive form of the politicisation of religion that is carried out in order to achieve religious goals. From this point of view, religious violence can be more precisely seen as a theological-political symptom rather than a purely religious one.

The birth of the Khawarij and the radical movements they engaged in were motivated by political problems (the battle of Siffin and *tahkim*), although they were undeniably influenced by the theology they adopted. Likewise, the religious movement of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (Wahhabism), which promoted puritan theology through violent means, also turned out to have a strong political element, as evidenced by its collaboration with the Al-Saud family.

It is acknowledged that martyrdom and Islamic groups' jihadi movements were part of how individuals committed to Islam, thus serving as justification for their radical movements (Beck, 2003), even though the dominant Islamic thinking rejects such justification. The radicalism network was at first a subset community (e.g. the Khawarij), a group outside the hegemonic social structure. The term *subaltern* was used by Gramsci (an Italian Marxist) to denote non-ideological and neutral margins (Morton, 2007; Jayakumar, 2016). However, the non-ideological sub-alternation society became an ideological one and engaged in a revolutionary movement. Feelings held by those on the periphery of society support militants in occupying a central position through clandestine movements.

According to Ayubi (1991), although the emergence of Islamic radicalism throughout history is related to theological issues, it is more of a socio-political issue. Radicalism must therefore also be understood as a way for certain Muslim communities to support belief values in response to the pressure of westernisation. Gelner (1981) believes Islamic movements in their various forms can be interpreted as loyalty to tradition, serving as a shield to resist outside pressures. This transformation and reposition from the periphery to the centre has produced radical thoughts and movements.

In this case, the radicals hold the belief that Muslims do not benefit from globalisation, so they are a marginalised people. This fosters resistance to dominant forces. Globalisation is then characterised by a culture of liberalisation, marketisation, and privatisation (Gelner, 1981).

This contradicts Islam's values and mission. Using religious symbolism, radicals try to form anti-globalisation movements by touching on religious emotions to fight globalisation, which is characterised by capitalism and "westernisation" (Gelner, 1981).

Radical movements also use the Quran and Sunnah as authoritative sources for political, economic, social, and cultural norms. Likewise, the Islamic romanticism of the past also supplies ideological support for Islamic radicals (Wahyudi, 2010). Of course, blame cannot always be placed on religion, because some behaviours are rooted in the interpretation of religious and historical phenomena. When people perceive that social irregularities and inequalities are detrimental to the Muslim community, radicalism arises.

Secondly, there is emotional factors and religious solidarity. Radicalism uses the approach of creating a collective Islamic identity by emphasising the movement's commitment and recruitment (Beck, 2003). The Arab-Israeli War, the Israeli occupation of Palestine, the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan, and western and American hegemony in the Middle East are socio-political issues that touch people's religious sentiments. Religious sentiment, including solidarity for oppressed peoples, then becomes effective in developing radical Islamic movements.

The establishment of the Ikhwanul Muslimin in Egypt (1928), followed by the Islamic Jama'at-I in Pakistan (1941) and Hezbollah in Lebanon (1960s), as well as other radical groups, were based on Islamic solidarity and identity and what was seen as a destructive global influence on aspects of religious life (Harris, 1964). These movements have spread to various regions in the world in response to perceived western hegemony.

Thirdly, cultural factors make a considerable contribution to the emergence of radicalism. Radical Muslims developed as a symbol of resistance to the dominant culture of ruthless

leaders and western values (Lymch, 2005). This is because in the theory of culture, there is always an effort to escape from the entanglement of certain cultural networks that are considered inappropriate (Asy'arie, 1992).

The cultural factor here is an antithesis counter culture to secularism, which radical Muslims believe must be eliminated. History also shows a western domination in various aspects of Muslim countries, and western civilisation has become a dominant and universal expression in human civilisation.

The radical movements associated with the Muslim community are understood as a way for certain religious communities to develop faith values in the face of colonialism and westernisation. Gelner (1981) states that Islamic movements in their various forms can be interpreted as a loyalty to tradition, serving as a shield to resist outside pressures. Radical Islam therefore adopts a collective identity that places doctrine in an important position. The strength of the religious ideals of radical militants lies in their belief in the “millenaristic” dimension of future heavenly rewards. The radical movements of militants are an expression of Islamic reliance, politics, and culture. The West is deemed to have marginalised all aspects of Muslim life, such that Muslims have become backward and oppressed. The West, with its secularism, has been regarded as something polluting eastern cultures and Islam, and it is considered the greatest danger to continued Islamic morality. Radical Islamic movements always portray Israel, the West, and the United States as destroyers of world culture and civilisation, so they often become the target of the jihad.

Fourthly, there is the ideological factor of “anti-westernisation”. Everyone in the world is related in some way to modernisation processes. Modernisation involves transforming a society from its traditional way of life, in the sense of technology and social organisation, towards economic and political patterns more like those of stable western countries. Modernisation is characterised by machine technology, rational thinking, and secular and differentiated social structures (Sztompka, 2008). Modernism is western-centric, so it is often called “westernisation” and is considered by some Muslims as a danger to Muslims in applying Islamic sharia. The political behaviours and policies of western countries towards Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel, as well as the perceived arrogance of the United States, paint a picture of corrupt values for some Muslims (Kombluh, 2003). When carrying out revolutionary activities to oppose modern western hegemony, various terrorist groups also use modern organisational management patterns (Beck, 2003). Modern western symbols are the main targets of this resistance, and the path of violence pursued by radicals demonstrates their inability to position themselves as competitors in culture and civilisation.

Western universalism seeks to maintain the cultural hegemony that has forced the world community to view the interests of America and Western Europe as the interests of the world community. This has caused a clash of civilisations between the West and other regions, resulting in anti-westernisation attitudes and conflict. However, it is only logical that a society wants to withdraw from a dominating foreign culture.

Fifthly, governments in Muslim countries are frequently incapable of improving the living conditions for people, resulting in some Muslims' frustration with the ideological, military, and economic domination of western countries. This was echoed by Mahathir Muhammad at the meeting of OIC countries in Kuala Lumpur on April 1–3, 2002 when he said the emergence of radical Islamic movements were caused by government policy being unable to address the root causes in the form of local social problems (SOLOPOS, 200). Modern radicalism usually arises due to political pressure by the authorities, failed government policies, and as a response to the West (Mudofir & Bakri, 2005).

At the same time, it is often western leaders, especially in the United States of America, who support the government elites and religious leaders in Muslim countries in developing moderate religious attitudes and fighting terrorism as a common enemy (Noor, 2008). The West, in this way, seeks to stem the spread of radicalism and show that it is not Islamophobic by promoting religious tolerance (Woodward, 1998). Unfortunately, such leaders in Muslim countries are often regarded as western lackeys and condemned politically, economically, and socially (Abdullah & Himawan, 2005), so they are also often targeted by militants. Indications of this can be seen in the killing of officials in Egypt by the Muslim Brotherhood and expulsions and threats to liberal Muslim thinkers in various Muslim countries.

Sixthly, there is a superficial interpretation of verses (Wahid, 2009), such as with the following verse: “Do not follow the infidels, and strive against them with the Qur'an with great jihad” (Qur'an 25:52). The great jihad in this verse is interpreted by radicals as a violent war as a way to fight infidels and those who follow unbelievers. Take another verse: “It is obligatory for you to fight even though you do not like it. It may be that what you do not like is actually good for you...” (Qur'an 1:216). The verse actually relates to a command of the Prophet Mohammed's in dealing with the threat of the Quraysh at the time, but it is interpreted by radicals as instructing a war against the West and its allies. Even more astonishing, westerners who are ignorant of religious and political matters also become targets for murder. Many other verses are also interpreted through a radical lens. All radical Muslims, from the Khawarij to the contemporary movements, always justify their actions through radically charged verses and interpretations of loose and nuanced social harmony.

Seventhly, the existence of western media and its' portrayal of Muslims is a factor in the emergence of violence by Muslim groups. If radicalism and extremism are associated with



certain religions, such as Islam, those religions becomes stereotyped. Religion often becomes a set of symbolic forms and actions that connects people to the highest level of existence, so a sense of injustice may encourage acts of violent resistance in the name of religion (Bellah, 2000). This also indicates a failure of religious leaders to guide people towards a just global civilisation (Abegebriel, 2004). Propaganda spread through western media has tremendous power and is very difficult to counteract, so radical terrorist movements increasingly react to what they see being inflicted on the Muslim community.

Thus, an objective assessment of Islamic radicalism finds that the majority of mainstream Muslims and Islamic teachings do not support it. This is one of the most objective ways an assessment can be made, and is preferable to making statements based on hasty generalisations.

The eighth factor is economic deprivation (Smelser, 2007). Poor economic conditions in Islamic countries have caused desperation, thus giving rise to extreme responses in the form of radicalism. This view was also expressed by Azra (1996) in that the deteriorating economic situation of Muslim countries in the North–South conflict was supporting the emergence of modern radicalism. Economic problems, poverty, and social inequality, aggravated by socio-political problems, led to what Rahman (1981) calls neo-fundamentalism, where a radical movement stresses loyalty and emotional ties between fellow Muslims and seeks to strengthen Muslims against the West.

### ***Globalisation's Impact on Radicalism***

Today's global reality features much inter-dependence on a variety of common goals. This growing interconnection and interdependence is often called globalisation (Nassar, 2010). This world system increasingly manifested itself after the fall of the Soviet Union in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century (Azra, 1996), but it actually existed in Western European societies during the modernisation of the early 19<sup>th</sup> century (Rahman, 1981). Globalisation is characterised by the integration of markets, politics, values, and environments around the globe (Nassar, 2010). Globalisation has also seen the world become more connected through information networks and faster transportation technology that increasingly blurs territorial boundaries.

Globalisation is essentially a process of mutually agreeing on common guidelines for multiple nations around the world. The spread of modern Western European society to other regions marks the beginning of the globalisation process.

From this process, there appeared what Waters (1994) calls the global village, a social process in which geographical constants and social and cultural arrangements recede, with people becoming increasingly aware of this. Western ideas and notions then became those of

the world (i.e., western universalisation), thus forming a global village. The former countries of the Soviet Union and developing countries particularised western ideas.

Because of globalisation (particularised universalisation and universalised particularisation), some groups feel politically and religiously disadvantaged, contributing to radicalism. Radicalism, which was initially particular, then enters the realm of universal action, so radicalism is not just a reaction to globalisation but also a globalised action in itself. The spread of terrorist attacks around the world with systematic organisation and coordination is not just terrible, it indicates that radicalism has penetrated the global network. Radicalism can even be regarded as an indicator of globalisation.

Dreyfuss (2007) recorded several episodes in the history of the Cold War (1945-1991) until the era of globalisation and found that behind the long history of radicalism, there was support from the United States. Radicalism is now a global phenomenon that has seized the attention of western countries. Dreyfuss (2007) notes that it originated out of western and American hegemony in the Middle East, some of which sought to side with radical Islamic fundamentalist forces. America's strategy was to stem the flow of communist ideology and dominate the oil resources in the Middle East by putting Islam and communism at odds with each other.

The attack on September 11, 2001 resulted from a miscalculation of US strategy in a demonic game. It followed a long history of American involvement in the Middle East, including manipulating and betraying fundamentalist movements. Islamic radicalism has become a global, trans-national problem that threatens human life. There is no clearly agreed definition for radicalism, so it is derived from discourse in America. The word radicalism itself was actually used in 1794 during the French Revolution, where the state committed acts of terror on its people. Radicalism now occupies an extraordinary status on the same level as communism as an enemy of the United States (Nassar, 2010). Experts have set basic limitations on when a movement can be classed as radicalism, namely if it engages in behaviours like hostage taking, assassination, mass bombings, and other violent acts, both in opposition to a legitimate state and symbols of certain world civilisations (Blakely, 2010). To understand further, it is necessary to understand the elements of radicalism, namely (i) the use of violence, (ii) politics, (iii) the use of terror, (iv) threats, (v) incompatibility between targets and victims, (vi) deliberate planning and systematic organisation, (vii) battle strategies, and (viii) a psychological impact on the community (Katona, 2006).

Identifying the above elements has not answered unresolved issues in relation to radicalism, such as the difference between radicalism and political violence, separatist movements, and organised criminal movements (Katona, 2006). In the *Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia*,

radicalism is defined as an ideology or sect that wants social or political change or renewal in a violent or drastic way.

Radical Islamic movements are often interpreted as religious–political movements with a conservative character, often using violence to enforce their beliefs (Nasution, 1995). Islam teaches people to create and maintain peace, and it has never promoted violence to spread religious beliefs and political ideals. This shows that the body of belief sometimes does not manifest in the spirit of friendliness in some of Islam’s adherents, with religious communities often being out of sync with Islamic doctrine. While Islam is a religion of peace, it sometimes manifests in the form of violence and radicalism.

Radicalism is more closely related to *a community of believers* than *a body of belief* (Thomas, 2005). Denying that there is a relationship between Islam and radicalism is also inappropriate, because in history, certain Islamic groups committed violent acts and acts of terror to achieve their political goals in the name of their religion or impose their religious beliefs rigidly. However, it is difficult to conclude that radicalism arises from the teachings of mainstream Islam.

The term radicalism is more appropriate for hardliners than fundamentalists, because fundamentalism itself has many meanings. From the western perspective, fundamentalism refers to extremely rigid people who do not hesitate to promote their ideology, while from the Islamic perspective, fundamentalism is based on the moral message of the Quran and Sunnah (Imarah, 1999). In the tradition of religious theological consideration, fundamentalism is a movement to restore the order of life for Muslims so that it accords with the Quran and Al-Hadith (Watt, 1988). Fundamentalism therefore implies anti-westernisation (Rahman, 1982). Fundamentalist designations sometimes apply to Islamic revivalists (Gibb, 1990), but sometimes the term is used to refer to Islamic radicalism. In the western media, fundamentalism implies intolerance and violence motivated by religious fanaticism (Ahmed, 1993). The term was also often used to refer to the Salafi movement in Egypt and Morocco (Wahyudi, 2010), so radicalism is an appropriate term for militant Islamic groups who use violence to achieve political targets on the basis of religious sentiments or emotions (Bakri, 2004).

There are various other names for labelling radical Islamic movements, such as extremists and militants. Shaban (1994) refers to radical hardliners as the *neo-Khawarij*. This can be applied to groups that take *takfir* as their main ideology. This authoritative pride can be traced to radicals who practice unilateral absolutism and monopolise the truth, much like the *Khawarij* did (Wahyudi, 2009). The *Khawarij* arose in a *post-tahkim* socio-political atmosphere (Katsir, 1995) and were known to be textual and intolerant (Khaldun, 2000). Nasution (1995), meanwhile, called it the *Khawarij* of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (and presumably now



the 21<sup>st</sup> century), because it indeed follows the path taken by the *Khawarij* in the *post-tahkim* period to achieve their goals through violence. However, there is no institutional genealogy relationship or doctrine that shows that this modern transnational radical Islamic movement is a continuation of the *Khawarij*.

The term Islamic radicalism comes from the western media's portrayal of hard-line Islamic movements (i.e., extreme and militant). The term radicalism sometimes subtly, sometimes explicitly, refers to Islam, but the problem is actually not Islam itself but the violent practices of certain Muslim groups in the process of group identity formation (Ahmed, 1993). The term radicalism, from a western perspective, is often associated with extreme, old-fashioned, conservative, anti-western attitudes that are hard to maintain even through physical violence and terror.

The violence practiced by a group of Muslims, historically and sociologically speaking, is more appropriately regarded as a socio-political symptom of the periphery wanting to occupy a central position rather than a religious phenomenon, even though they may employ religious banners. Cultural factors also become very important in understanding radicalism despite its apparent religious motivation (Beck, 2008). Radical movements are motivated by a political interest to carry out social movements in the name of religion. The radicalism of some Muslims is also often exaggerated by the western media, so western public opinion comes to believe that Islam is a violent religion. With many negative images being attached to Islam, Muslims are portrayed as a people who need to be suspected.

This happens because western society is able to master the media, which is a powerful instrument in projecting the dominant culture of global civilisation. What is perceived by the global community is whatever the western media defines. The fundamentalist label for Islamic movements is a lot more pleasing to the western media than other militant groups, such as the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka, the Hindu militants of India, the IRA of Northern Ireland, Jewish militants, the cults of Japan, or even the old enemy, the communists.

Western historians even deliberately cover up the black history of Catholic radicalism that occurred in Spain. In 1487, Pope Innocent VIII appointed Spanish Dominican monk Tomas de Torquemada to lead the Spanish Inquisition. Under his leadership, thousands of Protestant Christians, Jews, Muslims, and alleged witches were killed and tortured in Andalusia. Torquemada was known as a "holy man" who was very cruel, fanatical, intolerant, and hateful (Said, 1983). The Inquisition ended with the establishment of two options, namely consenting to be baptised and convert to Christianity or be expelled from the Iberian Peninsula, leaving behind any property (Perry, 2008). The Spanish Inquisition featured a brutal fanaticism and radicalism by Catholic clergymen. Of all such phenomena in

history, the Spanish Inquisition was the most active and sadistic form of radicalism in eliminating religious freedom.

Western historians also hide the barbaric political behaviours of their societies in the past. This is evident in the fact that when western nations entered the American continent, imbued with white fanaticism, they caused many native tribes to perish or at least become marginalised. On entering the African continent, the indigenous people were used as slaves, while in Australia, the aboriginal people were appeased with alcoholic drinks. On colonising Asia, Europeans deprived the local people of indigenous natural resources (Suryanegara, 2010). The insatiable western hunger for natural resources continued with a more horrific action, namely using military power to support colonialism, thus triggering violent resistance movements. This is perhaps why western imperialism is considered harmful to Muslims (Ahmed, 1992).

The historical reality is that the West uses double standards and acts unjustly towards Islamic and other non-western nations. When mosques and mullahs are seen as symbols of radicalism or when everyday Muslim culture is projected as a form of fanaticism and extremism, Islamic civilisation is restrained and incarcerated. The West has claimed that Islamic civilisation is still in the process of forming its' identity. This does not justify radicalism, however, because whatever the reason for it, violence goes against religious and humanitarian norms.

Although theoretically speaking, radicalism's definition is still rather dynamic, understanding radicalism as a global problem is an urgent necessity because of its potential for global destruction. Modern radicalism moves itself through the global system by using sophisticated science and technology to carry its' message through the currents of globalisation, which is presumed to not benefit its' religion and beliefs. In other words, modern radicalism goes in a pragmatic direction (Dekmejian, 1995) by increasing religious awareness through technology while still trying to implement Islamic sharia in the world, even if this is done through violence.

Radicalism is more due to dissatisfaction from the periphery towards rulers who are not deemed to be in accordance with the sacred doctrine. Classical radicalism is more dominated by pure theological factors, while modern radicalism is more a protest against a western-centric globalisation that does not seem to benefit Islamic society. Modern radicals engage in a revolutionary movement using the global information network.

Radicalism presents a serious threat to the world community. While it was originally localised in nature, it has since developed into a global problem. This globalisation of the network of radicalism is strongly suspected to be linked to Islamic boarding schools, even from a western perspective (Noor & Sikand). This is due to the effect of generalising *maktab*

translations in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Wahyudi, 2010). The role of Islamic schools in the context of the violence associated with radicalism has been mentioned in many studies. Some Islamic boarding schools have alumni associated with international terrorist networks (Turmudi, E., & Sihbudi, 2005). Of course, such schools are managed by the mainstream Islamic community.

The puritan-literalist slogan of “back to the Qur'an and Sunnah”, which has been adopted by radical groups, shows the existence of the Khawarij radical ideology of puritanism. Although it does not have the genealogy and sustainability of that institution, the methods used indicate the existence of ideological similarities. Radicalism is also a form of metamorphosed Wahhabism, in that it at least looks for new forms of covert action against the West. Unlike the fifth Wahhabism movement of the 1970s, which focused on ideological development through *pesantren* and *maktab*, this 21<sup>st</sup> century Wahhabism has taken the path of jihad with the rules of modern military formulation (radicalism) (Wahyudi, 2010). Radical movements can therefore be referred to as the sixth wave of Wahhabism.

Radicalism at first departs from the issue of theological–political identity. The demand for the application of Islamic law represents a strong desire for radical Islam, which often impoverishes Islamic thought and imposes literal and intolerant interpretations (Wahyudi, 2007). This emphasises a distinctive Islamic identity in the midst of globalisation (Hasan, 2005). Radical Islamic groups feel that Muslims are being marginalised by their rulers, who they feel deviate from Islamic teachings and subscribe to the pagan hegemony of western civilisation. This encourages them to struggle for identity, by showing what Fazlurrahman and Wahyudi call Islamic positivist transcendentalism (Wahyudi, 2010), by conducting a physical jihad in the form of terror and violence as a means of becoming more “central”.

From a different perspective, such a radical movement, although it has no genealogical relationship, shows the same pattern for interpreting scripture as the Kharijites, who always put forward *al-hakimiyyah* verses, such as verses 44, 45, and 46 of the letter Al-Maidah. These verses translate as follows: “*And whosoever does not judge with what Allah has sent down then they are unbelievers*”, “*And whosoever does not punish with what Allah has sent down then they are wicked people*”, and “*And whoever does not judge what has been revealed by Allah then they are the people of fasiq*” (al-Jauzi, 1992). Ever since the Khawarij launched their war, terror and murder were committed against those believed to be *kafir*, *dzalim* or *fasiq*. Sociologically, this jargon arose out of the marginalisation and dissatisfaction of the Khawarij over the results of the *tahkim*. The Khawarij became a radical opposition that were hostile to groups that did not agree with them.

The development of radical movements can also be understood from Huntington's framework, which states that the years following the Cold War brought about dramatic

changes in identities and symbols, global politics began to reconfigure along cross-cultural boundaries. At first, people question the most basic things about being human, such as who we are and what our identity is. This shows how meaningful culture and cultural identity are for most people. Whoever denies them are also denying their ancestors, heritage, and even their birth. People seek identity and to rediscover entities, so the most dangerous hostility is the clash that occurs between the world's great civilisations (Huntington, 2001).

The idea of Huntington's clash of civilisations can be used as an analytical tool for how radicalism emerges as a crisis and search for identity. The emergence of political issues in the radicalism of Islamic militant groups is a separate phenomenon that is challenging for scholars to address. Many important questions about the theory of international relations have emerged since the events of September 11, specifically those related to the root causes of the terrorist acts of radical Islamic groups. This arises because the activities of radical Muslims seem to be inspired by the spirit and symbol of religion (Thomas, 2005).

In some western countries, following the collapse of communist ideology after the Cold War, Islam was seen as a movement from a frightening civilisation. An image of Islam as a barbaric culture has developed among some western orientalist (Said, 1978). It could be that this image relates to how the United States was born from a mostly protestant revolution in 1775. The protestant movement was started in 1529 by Marten Luther, who taught anti-Catholicism, anti-Islam, and even insulted the Prophet Muhammad.<sup>1</sup> There was no political turmoil more feared than the rise of the Islamic movement. Western accusations and propaganda describing Islam as a religion that supports radical movements have become typical international rhetoric.

The violent practices of some Muslim groups using religious symbolism have been used by the western mass media as the main tool in maintaining their concept of civilisation, so Islam continues to be misunderstood by the public. Western society has perhaps been deceived by the media it created, because the rush to generalisations has led to them being unable to objectively see the religious-historical nature of Muslims. However, this by no means justifies radicalism in the name of religion, and there are indeed Muslim groups who practice radicalism and violence under various pretexts, such as warring against unbelievers and fighting the oppression of some Muslims.

The rapid development of radicalism through globalisation is an urgent concern for the world community. Radicalism has entered the globalised network very easily, carefully using all its facilities to emerge as a sinister force. That is how radicalism manifests in multiple places at almost the same time. Radicalism even provides a new definition for the enemy of the state.

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<sup>1</sup> Ahmad Mansur Suryanegara, *Api Sejarah*, pg. 169.

Globalisation benefits people around the world, such as through, science and technology, but it also brings threats, such as facilitating the spread of radicalism to various parts of the world.

### **Critical Reflection**

Neither globalisation nor radicalism is new, and both have roots in history. Both have many meanings, causes, and consequences (Nassar, 2010). Understanding the problem of radicalism is not simple because it develops through a long and complex global process. The process of social change in the background of globalisation involves various aspects of society, such as politics, economics, culture, and education (Black, 1976). Likewise, with radicalism, there is also a combination of complex elements, such as politics, the flow of globalisation, an understanding of religion, economics, and even minor domestic problems.

It is therefore necessary to view it with an outsider's perspective that does not assume a religious commitment or make claims based on sentiment. A neutral state must be prioritised for this complex problem to become clearly understood. Neutrality is usually interpreted as looking at a relationship between two conflicting groups, with different interests, without letting the differences affect the assessment and understanding of them (McCutcheon, 1999). Such an approach is used to understand the reality of a religion historically and empirically. This outsider perspective is needed to understand the historical-sociological phenomena related to religious issues, which is important to gain a more objective picture of a community's religious life.

The radical movements of some Muslim groups must be comprehended both internally and externally. The roots of these two aspects must therefore be identified as follows.

Firstly, internal factors come in the form of religious emotions based on interpretations of religious texts, as seen in the Khawarij, Wahhabism and modern radicalism. In such cases, action needs to be taken to minimise radicalism by enlightening religious thinking and leading it towards an ethical, substantial and universal understanding. Religious leaders need to anticipate incorrect religious understandings so that the modern equivalents of the Khawarij do not appear.

Secondly, there are external factors, such as the political rights of Muslims who have been "incarcerated" by the West. Next, the media's war against Islam and its propaganda against Muslims needs to end. Territory belonging to the Muslim community that was "colonised" by the West needs to be returned, and the West's economic, cultural and military domination over Muslim countries that are considered militant should end. Resecting Muslim rights is the main requirement in minimising radicalism, because radicalism is partly a reaction to



violence perpetrated by the western military in Muslim countries, although this retaliation was also carried out with the same violence (Nassar, 2010).

Using large-scale military power to eradicate radicalism is not the right approach. For example, the search for leading Al-Qaeda and Taliban figures in Afghanistan led to many civilian casualties (Smelser, 2007). Advanced intelligence is needed so that any eradication of terrorists through military force is more focussed and effective and not detrimental to civilians.

Government policy in Muslim countries also plays an important role in minimising radicalism, because some Muslim groups distrust the strength and will of their governments, and they may focus on their vulnerability in international diplomacy due to being disparaged, marginalised, or colonised. A government's rigid handling of radicalism also does not solve the problem, because not only will it fail to eradicate radicalism, it can create new problems that trigger even more radicalism. This is what happens when authorities do not understand the phenomenon in their society and try to use suspicion and violence as tools to eradicate radicalism.

Radicalism cannot be fought with violence, because it is usually based on ideology while being supported by emotion and a very strong religious solidarity. It therefore needs persuasive efforts, pride, and a sense of brotherhood from Muslim rulers so more radical movements can be averted. Improving economic conditions is also important for minimising radical Islamic movements that are motivated by poverty. Likewise, creating a just society for everyone must be an objective for governments.

## **Conclusions**

Firstly, Islamic identity, or a general awareness as Muslims, is considered to be the correct identity and the effective reference for radical movements. Islamic doctrine has become an effective tool in mobilising human resources in the grand design of a radical movement by using slogans to uphold the law of God and Islamic positivist transcendentalism. Nevertheless, the western domination in Muslim countries is a more dominant factor in triggering Muslim radicalism. It is clear that radicalism arises from injured pride (i.e. Islamic identity being damaged by the West), complaints (i.e. oppressed Muslims being ignored), and despair due to political and economic vulnerability.

Secondly, the radical movements of Islamist groups aim to move their political position from the periphery to the centre. Political issues dominate the background for the development of radicalism, going from the Khawarij uprising to modern-day radicalism. It cannot be denied that radicalism is supported by theological factors, but the acts of violence carried out by



radical Muslim groups cannot be blamed on Islam's body of belief, even though propaganda in the western media generalises it to mainstream Muslims. Islam does not teach radicalism. The violent behaviour of radical Muslim groups towards western symbols is indeed a historical-sociological reality due to globalisation, which some Muslims consider detrimental to Islam. This resulted in the emergence of radical movements to fight the West and its' allies, but this phenomenon has been used by the western media to portray certain Muslim communities as being rife with anger and brutality. Globalised communication has led to a media war and stigmatisation between the West and radical Muslims and terrorists.

Thirdly, solutions that arise naturally must be able to cover all the complex problems. What is more, western leaders and the leaders of Muslim countries must understand the phenomena of the times that reflect the aspirations of Muslims. Global and local issues that are closely related to radicalism must be comprehensively understood. Poor socio-political and economic conditions have increasingly marginalised Muslims and made them a subaltern society that can easily become trapped in a network of radicalism. Radical movements often act in the name of anti-colonialism while at the same time fighting westernisation, which is assumed to threaten Islam. This should be used as an initial foundation for addressing the problem of radicalism.



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