

## **Strategies for Collaborative Work Delivery: The Case of Local Regeneration Partnerships in Nigeria**

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### **Abstract:**

Strategies for collaborative work have been paramount in the context of public-private partnerships delivery as they determine long-term feasibility of relevant programmes. This paper discusses and provides explanation about the challenges and contexts faced in partnership working for the survival of Nigerian local regeneration partnerships. To this extent, three performance criteria are used: goals that were met; ability by partners to implement agreed actions and the perceived effectiveness of the partnership working as argued by participants.

Methodology-wise the paper is primarily depended on a qualitative approach that offers ability for conduct of semi-structured interviews as well as accumulation of secondary data. A rich context of findings was collected via based upon collaborative elements i.e. mutual interdependence, trust, transparency and accountability that was identified at the delivery stage of two Nigerian local regeneration partnerships. The impact of these findings are comprehensively analysed and discussed and advantages and challenges are recognised.

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## **Introduction**

It has been pertinent in collaborative work to identify and form bases in which individual participants/organisations likewise funding institutions increasingly require tangible evidence based on certain performance criteria that their investments are generating intended outcomes and are achieved within a specific timeframe (Bovens, 2010). In some national contexts, the selection of partners for collaborative schemes such as local regeneration partnerships undergoes a public tendering process, as is the case in the empirical context of the research; where government organisations are suggested to dominate the tendering process by setting out the bidding guidelines for potential partners (Camen, Gottfridson and Rundh, 2011; Mouzas and Ford, 2007). In this context, the factors determining whether or not collaboration with any organisation would developed is clearly specified in advance, this gives all potential partners the same opportunity to compete to be awarded the contract (Blomqvist, Hurmelinna and Seppanen, 2005). In this type of partners' selection process, prior interaction or work history may not exist among all or some of the selected partners. Laing and Lian (2005) describe this setting as a form of elementary collaboration, where there is little or no existing collaboration. Therefore, allowing the partnership to develop from previous interactions with the selected partners may not occur (English and Baxter, 2010).

With partnership arrangements the primary essence for organisations coming together is to gain some form of collaborative advantage (Huxham, 1996). However, this creates a contradictory situation whereby on the one hand, the partnership arrangements which is as a result of the public tendering setting, is characterized by bureaucratic procedures and a formal setting, and whereby the collaborative elements; mutual interdependence, trust, transparency and accountability between the partners cannot be expected in advance due to the public tendering setting (Camen, Gottfridsson and Rundh, 2011; English and Baxter, 2010; Laing and Lian, 2005). On the other hand, partnerships are long-term collaborative arrangements in which the above collaborative elements between partners play a key role in driving the progress of the partnership (Mouzas and Ford, 2007; Luo, 2002).

This paper identifies particular strategically defined elements that help collaborative schemes in particular local regeneration partnerships in Nigeria to deliver their arranged plan of actions. In doing so, these elements are tested via real-life experience of two specific partnerships that operate in the transport section and useful insights are collected for discussion and analysis.

## **Theoretical Considerations -1: Collaborative Work Delivery**

### *Partnership Implementation Stage*

In the commencement of the partnership, the determinants of a successful performance of the collaboration is associated with the process of partnership which include; the degree to which all partners are given an opportunity to participate in the process; the level of transparency and accountability that partners exhibit for actively engaging in partnership process, and the degree to which levels of trust exist between the partners from the different sectors (Kelly, 2012). Specifically, each individual collaborative element plays a key role in contributing to the overall effectiveness of the collaboration process and to the performance of the partnership. There can be elements of overlap between these collaborative elements as benefits which emerge from the process, such as increased levels of trust and understanding between the partners, may be viewed as the partnership outcomes: a) Resource sharing: An important view in collaborative advantage theory is that shared resources glue both partners in a long-term collaboration (Luo, 2002). Yan and Gray (1994) observed an increasing role of trust in

weakening the risky effect of self-interests bargaining on partnership operations where one partner is more reliant on the other partners' distinctive resources. This means that resource sharing can enhance the initiation of trust within the collaboration process. Min *et al.* (2005) argue that the collaborative advantage of partnerships may not be instantly visible, but that the potential long-term rewards can be appealing and strategic. Sometimes these non-tangible forms may be concerned with the relationship between partners, organisations, and other groups that give the partnerships its endorsement and legitimacy (Huxham and Vangen, 2004). B) Collaborative commitment: Partners need to be committed to creating something new or adding new value to the partnership arrangement. According to Coote *et al.* (2003), commitment exists when partners believe the collaboration is worth working on, but warrants maximum efforts to maintain or enhance it. Furthermore, commitment counters opportunism and determines trustworthiness (Doz, 1996), as well as the willingness to collaborate, the propensity to enhance effectiveness because the partners can put their efforts towards desired outcomes (Coote *et al.*, 2003; Goodman and Dion, 2001). C) Local community participation: It is vital that in partnership working, partners pay due attention to, and develop appropriate mechanisms for, downward accountability; they need to allocate responsibilities to the least centralized level with the potential capacity to satisfactorily meet them, as well as represent all groups with an interest at this level (Lockwood 2010). This ensures that the partnership is close to those people who are most affected by decisions. Community participation in partnership decision-making and implementation is an ideal that partners ought to factor into partnership arrangement (Charlier, Glover and Robertson, 2009). By combining the knowledge, skills and resources of a broad array of interest groups, organisations can understand the underlying nature of these problems and develop effective and locally feasible solutions to address them.

#### *Partnership delivery stage*

Successful delivery of desired outcomes are suggested to result from the partners been able to start out with a shared vision and common concerns; to maintain their focus based on established priorities; and being able to provide a clear link between the partnership objectives and desired outcomes (Shortell *et al.*, 2002; Gamm, Rogers and Work, 1998). Successful delivery of desired outcomes also results from the ability of partnerships to make the most progress in any environment- turbulent or otherwise and to reposition its assets, competencies and resources to address changing needs and priorities (Hudson and Hardy, 2002; Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999).

### **Theoretical Considerations - 2: Strategies for Partnership Work Delivery**

#### *Mutual interdependence of the partners in the partnership arrangement*

From the discussion in the previous section, the researcher conceptualizes mutual interdependence in arrangements as involving the collaborative processes that contributes to and strengthens the partnership working, for instance, commitment and ownership, resource and information sharing, collaborative decision making, community involvement, collaborative communication and governing of partner organisations (Huxham and Vangen, 2005; Apostolakis, 2004; Hudson and Hardy, 2002). Mutual interdependence thus acts as an incentive to enter into partnership arrangements and motivates partners to pursue collective goals.

According to Lasker, Weiss and Miller (2001), the collaborative advantage that partnerships achieve is reflected in the way partners think about the partnership's goals, strategies, the type of activities the partnership carries out, the partnership delivery and the relationship the partnership develops with the local community. The innovative interventions and holistic

functioning of partnerships are likely to be revealed in the development of strategic plans and partnership delivery which have a considerable potential for success; and the achievement of the partnership outcomes are likely to be reflected in the scope of partnership efficiency and management effectiveness as part of their collaborative advantage.

#### *Trust between partners in the partnership working*

Partnerships are characterised by mutually beneficial interactions of partners and the expectation that these partners would act in favour of the partnership arrangement (Forrer *et al.*, 2010). In other words, positive actions of the partners to decrease opportunistic activities will increase their trust in the partnership. According to Hudson and Hardy (2002, p.57) “development and maintenance of trust is the basis for the closest, most enduring and most successful partnerships”. To establish and sustain trust, throughout a partnership is not an easy process; this has been attributed to the complexity that is attached to the formation of the partnership arrangements and to uncertainty within its environment (Lachapelle and McCool, 2007). According to Krishnan, Martin and Noorderhaven (2006), trust is suggested to bring about good faith in the intent, reliability, and fairness of partner behaviour. It plays a key role in the development and sustainability of long-term collaborations which allows for practical interpretation of partner intentions, facilitates more open communication, it reduces the potential for conflict, resource sharing, strategic flexibility and predictability (Seppanen *et al.*, 2007).

Trust is also suggested to have different effects on partnership arrangements depending on the environmental and internal factors within which partners it interacts (Lachapelle and McCool, 2007). Therefore it is useful to conceptualize trust as close as possible to the geographical contexts the partnerships operate in (Faehnle and Tyrvaenen, 2013; Slater *et al.*, 2007). As argued by Zaheer and Zaheer (2006), Ng *et al.* (2007) and Dyer and Chu, (2000), how trust is perceived, the institutional and cultural support for trust can vary considerably across national contexts and may also have an effect on the partners opinions and awareness of trust. Moreover, as trust is a context specific concept, partnerships are likely to experience local context factors that make it more difficult for them to achieve collaborative advantage (Appuhami, Perera and Perera, 2011).

#### *Transparency in the decision making processes*

Transparency refers to the visibility of decision-making processes and it is a requirement, which is grounded in governance ethics, of each partner organisation’s right to know about matters and decisions that affect the partnership process (Lockwood, 2010). Decision support systems such as detailed information indicating the reason behind each decision reached and the clarity and justification of every particular course of action is vital (Willems and Van Doreen, 2012). Akkermans, Bogerd and Doremalen (2003) argue that transparency in partnerships is as a result of reinforcing dynamic interactions between partners. They also state that the more partners work closely together, the more they will trust each other and the more mutual their collaborative working.

This in addition will improve their performance level when working together, while further improving trust in the collaborative process. Performance reporting is also an important element of transparency, as it is essential that these partnerships regularly disclose their progress through various mechanisms such as annual reports, reports of achievements as against intended goals and management effectiveness evaluations; this kind of information supports the accountability of partnership’s (Forrer *et al.*, 2010, Lockwood, 2010).

### *Accountability of the partners in the partnership working*

Transparency is argued to be a vital condition of accountability, but that it does not capture the whole process (Forrer *et al.*, 2010). According to Willems and Van Doreen (2012), accountability is linked to the internal responsibility of partners where it is an important part of the institutional checks and balances system. They argue that accountability can play a greater role than expressed by the idea of answerability, such that accountability is more than the actual fact of being held accountable. Hence, it is a continuous process of anticipation, identification, definition and responses to pressures, which eventually leads to certain actions. They further argue that partnership accountability involves the means by which partners manage the diverse expectations generated within and outside the organization.

Accountability in partnerships, therefore, is linked to the specific public reform efforts that emphasize high standards of collaborative arrangements. It requires the creation of appropriate procedures and decision rules which are embedded in the agreement safeguards to ensure that public services are not compromised for the sake of private profits. Forrer *et al.*, (2010), state that as partnerships are linked to the specific collaborative arrangements created and the obligations and requirements that are designed to tie both the government and the private sector, it becomes imperative that the partnerships is designed properly. They further argue that if partnerships are poorly designed, there is no reason to expect that the goals of the partnership will materialise, and these may leave the public no better or probably worse than if the public sector had relied on its own resources to carry out the local regeneration initiative.

Accountability also requires that partners exercise their authority with integrity, in that they declare any conflicts of interest and behave honestly. These integrity conditions provide a platform for the partnership's legitimacy that is consistent with key elements of trusting capabilities. Individual partners also have a responsibility to demonstrate commitment, through their decisions and actions, to the purpose and objectives of the partnership (Bovens, 2010). This depicts that failure by partners to actively pursue the partnership's objectives is a disregard of the partnership's agreement that undermines accountability.

Furthermore, the partnership should be answerable to the community in which they operate. This is sometimes referred to as downward accountability (Skelcher, 2005); answerability in partnerships implies that the public has a right to question, challenge and express their approval or disapproval of the processes, plans, decisions and actions of the partnership arrangement. This places emphasis on the need for partnerships to pay due attention to and be close as possible to those people who are most affected by their decisions. Lockwood (2010) states that partnerships are also subject to 'upward' accountability; this can be required by law or by contract, though direct reporting mechanisms to a higher-level authority, or indirectly through publicly available reports that specifically address the partnership performance.

### **Methodology**

To understand the notion of collaborative advantage between public and private sector partners, a qualitative case study approach is used. A case study research is extensively used to explore the opinions and behavior of individuals and groups within organizations (Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki, 2008). Case study research is a beneficial approach where there is little previous empirical research and also in situations where there are complex and multiple processes, thus necessitating the use of a qualitative, explorative approach (Yin, 2009). The developing of African country context provides an opportunity to study PPPs outside of the developed world and to test whether the theories developed in the developed world makes sense in this context.

Forty five interviews were carried out with participants from government organizations, regulatory and advisory bodies, funding organizations, financial and investment organizations, consulting and infrastructure development firms. The selected participants were either currently or recently involved in the decision making process of the contract negotiation and in the operations and coordination of the activities of the partnership arrangement. The interviews followed a flexible thematic guide. This was to allow the participants the opportunity to freely express their views and bring up new issues which they felt were important (Yin, 2009). The interviews were conducted on the premises of each organization and they varied between 42 and 125 minutes. The reason for undertaking interviews was that an analysis in depth would be necessary in order to identify a series of issues that can determine growth of partnership work in the specific policy area.

<b>Sector</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>No. Interviews</b>	<b>Position of Participants</b>
<b>Public Sector</b>	Government Institution	n = 12	Team leaders for core and social infrastructure, contract administration and contract management and an infrastructure engineer
<b>Public Sector</b>	Economic Reform Agency	n = 4	Director
<b>Public Sector</b>	Regulatory Agency	n = 3	Director
<b>Private Sector</b>	Infrastructure Development Institution	n = 3	Director
<b>Private Sector</b>	External Consultant	n = 3	PPP expert and consultant
<b>Private Sector</b>	Financial and Investment Adviser	n = 3	Director
<b>Private Sector</b>	International Funding Body	n = 17	Private sector and transport specialists, economist, disbursement and procurement officers

**Table 1:** Overview of the demographics of the participating organizations and participants as it came up from the research findings

The participants were asked to discuss their reasons for participating in the local regeneration partnership, their experiences with regards to the partnership collaborative processes and partnership working. Additional data was collected from some of the participants by way of documents such as policy frameworks and reports on the partnership activities. This was to enable triangulation of findings in order to elicit a better understanding of the phenomenon been investigated and to improve the validity of the findings (Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki, 2008). Data analysis was carried out in line with the process of engaging inductive theory with the use of case studies. A thematic analysis approach was used to analyse the primary data collected with the assistance of the NVivo software.

## **Research Findings – Discussion**

### *Public Private Partnerships in the Nigerian Local Regeneration: Contexts and Challenges*

Successful delivery of desired outcomes results from the ability of partnerships to deliver their goals, the most progress in any environment; turbulent or otherwise and to reposition its assets, competencies and resources to address changing needs and priorities (Hudson and Hardy, 2002; Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999). Slater *et al.* (2007) suggested, that the reflective processes of monitoring and the commencement of evaluating the collaborative process are important in assessing the partnership's performance, but possibly are more important in understanding and developing the partnership working.

As stated quite critically by a participant:

*“[Monitoring]... it is actually an area that could be neglected, because many people are so euphoric about signing the contract they may forget, on the long term that is almost as important, if not more important than what you do at the beginning, because it is through monitoring that as no contract runs perfectly, you have to continually tweak it here and most concession contracts are renegotiable”.*

Successful delivery of desired outcomes are suggested to result from the partners been able to start out with a shared vision and common concerns; to maintain their focus based on established priorities; and being able to provide a clear link between the partnership objectives and desired outcomes (Shortell *et al.*, 2002; Gamm, Rogers and Work, 1998). In the partnerships investigated, participants stated that meeting the set milestones as agreed in the partnerships for timely delivery of the local regeneration projects was a constant challenge, consequently, in a bid to ensure meeting up with the set goals, various strategies were used in the five partnerships investigated.

### *The BRT Local Regeneration Partnership*

The Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) partnership was initiated by a dedicated transport agency affiliated with Lagos State government. The partnership was proposed with the support of the World Bank (WB) as an initial pilot scheme to regulate transportation in Lagos State, to alleviate the problems with high demand for transport services by increasing accessibility and to ensure the reduction in social exclusion. Before the implementation of this partnership, the Lagos State bus transport system was to a great extent unstructured with a large fleet of privately owned buses that are locally known as ‘*danfos* or *molues*’. With a demand for these bus transport services by over a daily ridership of 200,000 passengers, it was a common sight to see buses being crammed into with more passengers than their passenger carrying capacity (IRJ, 2013). This situation led to high cases of injured passengers and concerns of unsafe travel conditions. The partnership operates buses which carries an average of 180,000 passengers per day and about 800 passengers per bus is aimed at reducing traffic congestion by providing fast and reliable transport services, reduce travel time from 78 to 50 minutes on certain routes and to improve air quality for the commuters around specific routes has exceeded the planned estimates by 200% (LAMATA, 2015). The operation of the bus service is guided by a set of regulations and this restricts them to the dedicated service lanes to reduce travel time and make them faster than conventional buses, especially during traffic congestion.

The BRT partnership agreement was finalised in March 2008 and was established with the transport agency and two private sector operators who already provided bus transport services in the state. The partnership was for an initial 5 years and it entailed the State Government to provide the enabling regulatory framework, the Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (LAMATA) Law, 2007 for Rail, Buses and Taxis and the Lagos State Roads Law, 2004 for

Roads, Bridges and Highways (PPP Office, 2011). In terms of the current operation of the bus transportation services, passengers get a reduction of 30% in average fares, 40% in journey time and 35% in average waiting time (LAMATA, 2015). There has also been a reduction in bus transport accidents and crime such as pick pockets. According to the transport agency, following the success of this BRT partnerships along the dedicated route, eight different routes are being considered for similar partnerships, with construction works about being completed on one of them (ibid).

<b>Partnership Information</b>	<b>Project Context</b>
City	Lagos
Partnership objective	Aimed at alleviating the problems of high demand for transport services and the reduction in traffic congestion within the state
Partners	Government transport agency and two private sector bus operators, supported by World Bank
Capacity	Daily operation of 220 buses to convey 180,000 passengers per day
Type of contract agreement between partners	Contractual Agreement
PPP model implemented	Operate and Maintain
Term of concession	An initial 5 years (renewable thereafter)
Construction phase	2 <sup>nd</sup> Phase
Construction cost	4.5 billion naira for the construction of dedicated bus lanes and 1 billion naira for the acquisition of buses
Financial Structure	Private investor financing from a local bank
Government contribution to the partnership	The construction of 22km of road and 3.3m wide BRT lane; segregated bus ways, 28 bus shelters and lay byes at 26 stops at 500-1000m from each other; the construction of 3 bus terminals and bus depots (garages); the provision and maintenance of infrastructure, traffic signs and road markings as well as other traffic management measures.
Recoup of project costs	From regulated bus fares, any fare changes is subject to approval by the transport agency

**Table 2:** Features of the Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) Partnership

**Source:** Compiled by the authors

The State Government also provided an investment of 4.5 billion naira in the provision of necessary infrastructure. The infrastructure included the overlay of 22km of road and 3.3m wide BRT lane; 65% segregated bus ways, 28 bus shelters and lay-bys at 26 stops at 500 to 1000 metres from each other; the construction of 3 bus terminals and bus depots (garages); the provision and maintenance of infrastructure, traffic signs and road markings as well as other traffic management measures. The acquisition of buses, the operations and maintenance is by the private bus co-operative (LAMATA, 2015; PPP Office, 2011). The 1 billion naira funding required for acquiring the initial 100 buses was provided by a local banking institute to the bus operators (LAMATA, 2015).

In the BRT Partnership, performance indicators had been agreed upon at the formation stage to assist in determining if the goals for the BRT project had been reached. These performance indicators were based on the number of bus availability per route, the number of passengers carried per trip, the number of trips that are made per day and the returns made per day. A joint



weekly performance report was sent to the Transport Agency by the private partners and the partnership monitoring team. A participant partnership stated that although the bus services were operating and it is the opinion that the partnership is moving in the right direction, however, in trying to achieve the partnership objectives, the milestones moved from time to time. The participant acknowledged that it had been a challenge in trying to formalise the informal sector such that they would understand the benefits to be derived from the partnership. Also there had been instances, whereby certain agreements had been reached, it took the efforts of the steering committee to enforce the agreements, which usually could be a time consuming and frustrating effort.

In implementing the agreed actions of the BRT Partnership, a detailed explanation about the monitoring procedure was offered by participant who explained that the project monitoring team headed by the project director had to monitor the activities of the partnership on behalf of the Transport Agency. According to the participant, for instance, they looked at the milestones set for 'Year One' to determine if the operation was well under way and on time, in terms of meeting set mile stones. In addition, they also considered the quality of service and then made their report at the meetings which are held periodically. The meetings do take place monthly or bi-monthly with all stakeholders involved, to discuss any issues or challenges which need addressing at every stage. The participant also stated that:

*"We equally have consultants working with us, now the meetings are between the consultants, the Transport Agency and the investors. In-house we have, the monitoring departments, they would submit reports, this is what has been done this month, this is the plan, this is what has been achieved, this is the gap, so the monitoring department will now pick it up, and determine why they have not been able to meet up? What are the things lined up for them to do?"*

The World Bank being a co-sponsor, working alongside the Lagos State Government on the BRT project also embarked on monitoring procedures called 'Missions'. According to participants, they come on missions at two stages; the pre-review stage and the post review stage. At the post review stage, a team from World Bank consisting of financial, engineering, procurement and environmental experts work with the Transport Agency to determine what had been achieved at that stage. They review the reports; embark on physical inspection, after which meetings are held to then discuss the challenges faced and how to mitigate against those challenges. According to a participant, these Missions are viewed as supportive of the partnership working:

*"...we discuss the problems with them and also they ask what are we doing to mitigate against that? What are the next steps? We don't call it supervision we call it support. For every project when we complete that project we have to send it to them. Periodically, we can be asked to give status report".*

A report by CEPA (2015) on 'Mobilising Finance for Infrastructure in Nigeria' acknowledged that funding institutions could play a significant role in bringing more assurance that best practices are being adhered to. This would bring more confidence to investors that about the potential of the partnership to deliver on the contractual agreement.

In addition, the State PPP office also has its own monitoring team and the monitor is reflective on the performance indicators agreed to in the contractual agreement. This is illustrated in the comment below:

*“We have a lot in place in terms of monitoring the Transport Union and the BRT and we have a lot of monitoring officers on ground from the public transport department. Such that at every point if you get into the depot [bus garage], the Agency’s staff work there to oversee the activities over there”.*

A contradictory view was offered by a participant about how effective the information received from the monitoring the partnership working was been employed. The view was made by participant:

*“We are not using it [information from the monitoring procedures] as expected, when we get the information, we are supposed to look at what was contained in the contract agreement, and use them either as a means to reward or to penalise. But as it is now we are trying to reform the transport sector, we are not getting into doing them yet.”*

A participant stated that:

*“It helps us [the Transport Agency] to get quality service and also help us to be able to get infrastructure development done quickly you don’t need to wait for government budget”.*

It was emphasised that the challenges faced had nothing to do with the PPP model but with the way the partnership working had been implemented and managed. This was further explained by the partner below:

*“The partner that they chose at the time has not delivered the objectives, the scheme continues to be profitable, they have surpluses, they have been able to pay back their loans. However, these were done at the expense of quality of service and following agreed regulatory guidelines. We are in a stage now where we are reviewing the partnership terms”.*

The success of this BRT partnership has brought confidence to the Lagos State Government and to the Transport Agency project such that plans to scale-up the BRT to other routes within the State in a new local regeneration project. This new project of BRT is being set up by the World Bank, the Transport Agency and ‘Agence Française de Développement’ (AFD). The justification for the selection of these new routes is based on comprehensive network analysis and traffic flows (World Bank, 2015).

#### *The Alpha Rail Local Regeneration Partnership*

The Rail Mass Transit partnership was established by the same transport agency as the BRT partnership and based on the objectives of the Strategic Transport Master Plan (STMP) of Lagos State which was developed to guide the development of public transport infrastructures in the state and to offer an alternative safe, reliable and environmental friendly mode of transport to bus services (LAMATA, 2015). The limited commuter service operated by the existing state rail infrastructure and managed by the Nigeria Railways Corporation (NRC) has its inadequacy in meeting up with the present transport needs in the state. The rail network is to consist of seven railway lines proposed to be constructed over the next 20 years along highly populated areas and activity centres with high demand for transport services. This is to be integrated with existing and planned water transport and BRT routes (LAMATA, 2015). Two of these seven rail lines are to be built with priority; these are the Alpha rail line and the Beta rail line (pseudo names are used). For the Alpha rail line partnership, the State Government made provision for the construction of the track and station infrastructure through traditional contracting infrastructure using a design and build contract. The USD400 million railway

systems which includes trains, control systems, electric power signalling and fare collection equipment are being provided by a private sector consortium and the consortium would be responsible for the operation and maintenance over those years (PPP Office, 2011).

<b>Partnership Information</b>	<b>Project Context</b>
City	Lagos
Partnership objective	To offer an alternative safe, reliable and environmental friendly mode of transport
Partners	Government transport agency and a private sector consortium
Capacity	400,000 passengers daily (expected)
Type of contract agreement between partners	A Concession
PPP model implemented	Operated and Maintain
Term of concession	25 years
Construction Phase	Near completion to be officially opened in 2016
Construction cost	USD 400 million for purchase of rolling stock
Financial Structure	Private investor financing from international funding institutions
Government contribution to the partnership	The track and station infrastructure which was traditionally contracted to a private contractor under a design and build contract
Recoup of project costs	From regulated rail fares, any fare changes is subject to approval by the transport agency

**Table 3:** Features of the State Rail Mass Transit Partnership

**Source:** Compiled by the authors

The construction of the Alpha rail line began in August 2009 and stretches over 27km; the first phase of 8km under construction is sub-contracted to a private construction company and financed by the State Government and is to be officially opened in 2016. The second phase is projected to be opened about two years afterwards (Nigerian National, 2014; IRJ, 2013). 13 stations are being constructed to carry an average of 10,000 passengers per hour and 300,000 passengers per day. 900 staff members have been recruited to run the daily operations of the rail line. Under the 25-year concession agreement, the concessionaire role is to provide the rolling stock, depot equipment, communication systems, control systems as well as operate and manage the rail line (LAMATA, 2015). The Beta rail line which shares the same rail corridor with 37km of existing national rail lines operated by the Nigerian Railways Corporation (NRC) is a 25-year concession and it is to be constructed using the Design, Build, Operate and Maintain and Transfer model.

In the Alpha Rail Partnership, a participant expressed concern about the delay in the construction of the rail infrastructure. Although the construction is taking place in phases, the delays in implementing agreed actions were attributed to budgetary constraints faced by the government in making payments for the rail infrastructure. Other challenges were attributed to the delays experienced in releasing the right of way of some parts of the rail route by the Federal Government as well as frequent monitoring of the construction works to ensure that they met construction standards in Nigeria. A visit by the State Governor to the on-going construction rail route was met with disappointment at the progress of the construction work; despite the evidence of slow progress, the Governor expressed optimism of its eventual completion (Akinsanmi, 2014).

A steering committee was set up that met with the State Government periodically; usually to discuss report progress and the challenges faced. In addition a participant stated that management accounts are published every month and that it was very important to keep both sides involved, to promote confidence and engagement such that disputes did not arise. A participant offered further clarification and stated that, to secure payments from the State Government they sent reports with photographs to show progress. They also have an external monitoring team from Lands, Planning and Budgeting office and also from the debt management office that check on the progress made every month alongside agreed milestones. A strategy was therefore employed to achieve close community relations to help influence the community to accept the project. As illustrated by the comment below:

*“...there is the need to talk to them regularly, also via TV and radio advertisement, communicating with them, and particularly during construction a lot of discomfort takes place, where parts of the roads are closed down, you need to let them know in advance, so stakeholder involvement and it all to do with branding and advertising.*”

It is the goal and expectation that in entering into a partnership that with the citizens of Lagos would benefit from the Alpha Rail in terms of improved transport facilities and reduced travel time and in essence attract more than 300,000 passengers per day. This is also indicated in the statement below:

*“... in the transport sector and here at the Transport Agency, PPP in our case plays a major role in achieving what we want. It is a way of creating employment, of creating a dynamic environment everybody participating one way or another”.*

Despite the challenges, the consortium on the other hand are highly optimistic that they can deliver on the terms of concession agreement and are keen to implement innovative technical solution that would allow effective integration the rail and local bus service routes (Metro Report International, 2012).

#### *Mutual Interdependence, Trust, Transparency and Accountability Concerns in the Delivery Stage of Nigeria Local Regeneration Partnerships*

Participants recognised that the partners needed to meet their obligations as at when due, for PPPs to work in the country such that all the partners needed to understand that is could only be achieved when all the partners met their obligations. Participants also stated that carrying the citizens along is very important throughout the various stages of the partnership; however there is no legislative procedure in the ICRC Act that gives an indication as to what needs to be done. A participant stated that:

*“The ICRC Act says nothing about it, most states government laws say nothing about it. If it is driven by legislation it would help, otherwise people just have to get more sense into it.”*

In being accountable to the local community, in the BRT Partnership, the Transport Agency saw to it that the public was given the necessary information they wanted to know about such that feedback provided by the members of the public were acted on and also communicated to private partners with the aim of improving bus transport services. According to participants in the partnership, it is a way of ensuring that the Transport Authority is accountable for what it has set out to achieve and to build trust between partners. It was the opinion of a participant that the government had a responsibility to ensure that the private sector actually delivered on the project.

A participant from the Rail Partnership was of the opinion that the efforts been put into engaging, communicating and informing the populace is mainly because it is a World Bank partly sponsored project. There is an amount of the WB project usually allocated to funding this exercise because of the importance placed on information, education and communication (IEC). The participant further stated that it is important that the community has a proper understanding of what the Transport Authority is trying to do, hence educating people.

Likewise in the BRT Partnership, various evaluation techniques were employed in the partnership working to promote accountability and trust. The effects of the operations of the local regeneration project is taking into consideration in order to protect the citizenry, such as environmental degradation, the health and safety of the citizens such that they do not suffer the consequence of the infrastructure development. To help mitigate the occurrence of protests, some corporate social responsibility projects to benefit the citizens resident along the bus route corridor were developed. A participant was of the opinion that:

*“...the government policy must be encompassing to deliver those things, the government must think about this when drafting the policies, it must be in the concession package”.*

In being accountable, to the populace, a participant stated that:

*“As far as members of the community are concerned, I won't say that we have engaged them as much as we would have liked to.”*

<b>PPP policy implementation in the context of Nigerian local regeneration</b>	<b>The influence of the collaboration elements on the collaborative processes</b>
<i>Antecedents to partnership arrangements</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ budgetary restraints experienced by the government</li> <li>➤ seeking alternative sources of capital investment along with the need for rapid infrastructure expansion</li> <li>➤ advocated as a well-established global model to improve delivery of services</li> <li>➤ the need to revisit and redefine the institutional structures for PPP projects</li> <li>➤ the willingness of interest groups to participate in the implementation of PPP initiatives</li> <li>➤ a greater potential for economic growth through increased infrastructure development in Nigeria</li> </ul>
<i>Mutual interdependence of the partners in the collaboration process</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ respect for the commitment made at the formation stage</li> <li>➤ understanding the skill gaps needed for the partnership working</li> <li>➤ the need for clearer and transparent competitive tendering procedures and guidelines</li> <li>➤ monitoring of the operations of the partnership</li> </ul>
<i>Building trust among stakeholders in partnership working</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ the inclusion of guarantees into the contracts as a risk sharing mechanism</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ the negotiation of a robust contractual agreement and clearly defined framework</li> <li>➤ to focus on the priorities and intended outcomes</li> </ul>
<i>Ensuring transparency in decision making processes</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ the clarity in terms of negotiation at the formation stage</li> <li>➤ the visibility of the decision making processes</li> <li>➤ ensuring greater credibility among partners going forward into the partnership arrangement</li> <li>➤ the effective management of the various interest groups is deemed equally important throughout the life cycle of the partnership</li> </ul>
<i>Evaluating partnership performance</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ the allocation and acceptance of the responsibility for decisions and actions of the partnership members</li> <li>➤ introduction of delivery units which anticipate and manage threats, opportunities and associated risks of a project</li> <li>➤ the ability of the partners to fulfil the terms of the contract negotiated</li> </ul>

**Table 4:** Strategies for Collaborative Work in the Nigerian Local Regeneration Partnerships

**Source:** Compiled by the authors

Another participant stated that:

*“These are social projects, whether you like it or not, if the concessionaire fails or does not perform; we [the Transport Agency] take all the blame for it. The operator can pull out at any time and if the operator pulls out we don’t exactly have an alternative option”.*

### **Concluding remarks**

The paper explored and explained the challenges and contexts faced in the partnership working that have implications for the survival of the Nigerian local regeneration partnerships investigated. Empirical findings indicated that despite the various strategies employed to ensure appropriate monitoring of the partnership activities and the local regeneration construction projects; these did not prevent the challenges faced that had been passed on from the formation and the implementation stages.

The challenges faced by the BRT Partnership in delivering the partnership goals came from the drive to restructure the highly informal bus services sector. Though performance indicators had been agreed upon at the formation stage of the partnership, it took the efforts of the steering committee and the external relations department to ensure that agreed actions were implemented. In addition, it can be inferred from the empirical findings that the affiliation with World Bank and the hands-on support received may have led to achieving the goals set out in the partnership. The success recorded in the achievement of the partnership goals did exceed the projections made in the feasibility studies and this success has instilled confidence in the State Government and funding institutions to scale-up BRT to other routes within Lagos State.

In the Alpha Rail Partnership, while this partnership is still young and on-going concerns have been expressed about the slow progress made with the construction of the rail infrastructure by

the private partners and milestones have had to be moved at various times to accommodate the delays. More worrying is that even if the construction phase had met the milestones set and was completed on time, the operational phase would still have stalled. This is because the 25-year concession agreement has not been awarded to the preferred bidder for the operational phase due to opposing views on how to mitigate against the revenue risks. Participants did however express optimism that issues would be resolved in time to meet up with the set time for the commencement of the operational phase.

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