



Failure of Bottom-Up Implementation: A Case Study the Improving Welfare Program in West Java

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Abstract

Policy implementation is one of the stages in public policy process. This process often faces diverse issues and challenges. This paper aims to analyse models of policy implementation in a governance system in Indonesia. The Indonesian government introduced top-down policy implementation system for more than three decades. The fundamental policy implementation changes in Indonesia following the fall of the new order regime, Indonesia introduced a bottom-up policy implementation system. The bottom-up approach often faces diverse issues and challenges. The failure of implementation in the improving welfare program in West Java Provincial triggers researcher's intention to investigate it. Thus, this paper examines the bottom-up model in two different levels of autonomy such as province (provinsi), regencies and municipalities (Kabupaten and Kota) in West Java. This research utilizes applies the intensive interviews technique to gather perspectives from many informants purposively including civil servant, former government officio, NGOs, target groups, and individuals. The qualitative analysis applies the integrated analysis to display the informants' opinions by integrating their voices in the arguments and discussions. The significant contribution of this paper composes of two emphases such as first, the paper explicates the bottom-up model integration is unfit to be applied in the improving welfare program in West Java. Second an efficient implementation must have remained governed by policy makers, because it will lead to abuse of authority.

Keywords: Policy Implementation, Bottom-up Model

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1. Introduction

It has been observed that policy implementation is one of the major problems confronting developing nations. Within the last decade, many countries across the nation have struggled to enhance their performance measurements for the programs and services they provide to citizens. However, these programs many failed. Some public policy experts write the cause of the failure of a policy for implementation of the policy is the most difficult to implement than the process of planning and evaluation. The above statement is aligned with the opinion Lewis L. Gunn (1978: 76) who said that the implementation of the policy is the easiest thing to say, but very difficult to implement. Constraints that applicable usually occur as the separate connection between policy planners, policy makers and

policy implementers.¹ Though a public policy without implementation is 'writing no significance' as argued Birkland, (2001:177); Edward III (1984:1); Ripley dan Franklin (1986); that the absence of effective implementation of a policy decision not achieved. Basically almost all countries in the world have a good policies design but was not successful in the implementation process and creates dilemma in making of public policy.

Various studies have been successful policy implementation is done by scholars such as Harold D. Lasswell (1951) who initiated argument about a concept of fundamental science and use of a 'policies process.' Douglas R. Bunker (1972) agreed with Lasswell about the implementation process. Martha Derthick (1972) wrote about the implementation of policies based on the case of failure of the policies in the face of urbanization in the

¹ Andrew Dunsire (1978) defines that policy failure as a result of the "implementing gap", i.e. the dispute or difference scheme with what is being implemented.

United States. Dethrick argument at agreed by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) who pointed out the implementation of the policy on *the Economic Development Administration* (EDA) program in Oakland, California, United State. After that, many scholars wrote about the implementation of policies and they agreed that the implementation of the policy is the spirit to achieve the objective of a policy.

The study be classified into two approach that is top down and bottom up. Both of these approaches have different argument and context of its own. Top-downers pointed out the policies formulation formed from top to bottom by the decision makers and implemented by administrators at the central, state, district, village, etc (Bardach, 1977; Derthick, 1972; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1981, 1983, 1989; [44] and Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975;). While bottom-uppers to see that the local bureaucrats are the main actors in implementing policies that comprehend the negotiation process within the goal operators and the bureaucrats can exert strong influence to supporting successful policies [15, 16, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 37].

Although different perspective, scholars have argued that the successful a policies influenced by efficient execution. Despite of policies created completely and systematic, it will not necessarily guarantee the achievement of the objectives. If the implementation is,² it would lead to a policies failure.³ This suggests that the

² The Indonesia planning policies an ongoing basis have been transformed direction an excellent. After the reform of the 'authoritarian regime' enforce new rules about local government number 22 of 1999, which was then amended no. 32 of 2004 about local government is a milestone change in public policy mechanisms. Central government control shifted for the role of local government. Local governments play an important role in the public policy process. Changes in planning from top down planning and uniformity into bottom-up planning and diversity to make Indonesia have better planning. Policy planning in Indonesia at the present starting from MUSRENBANG at neighborhood level up to the country level. The development plan involves all elements of the civil society whether ordinary public, NGO (non governmental organization), journalism, government bureaucracy and the others. MUSRENBANG produce an input regarding the needs of development in each region involved. MUSRENBANG would otherwise result from the development priorities (*standard priority*) a major implemented by the government. This determination of development priorities associated with the limitations development budget, a period of implementation, and resources development. Results of MUSRENBANG then making government public policy in RPJP (*rencana pembangunan jangka panjang/long-range development plan*), RPJM (*rencana pembangunan jangka menengah/development plan of intermediate term*), Renstra (*rencana strategis/strategic plan*) and the other public policy development. MUSRENBANG mechanism involving civil society would open up broad new hope in public policy development in Indonesia. Changes in policy planning from the top down to bottom up to make the provincial and district or city became enough effective intellectual actors. Policy planning with bottom-up planning mechanism through the MUSRENBANG familiar with *participatory planning*. Investment planning has been reviewed by Dudi Sudradjat Abdurachim in his doctoral dissertation titled *Perencanaan Pendidikan Partisipatif Berbasis Kewilayahan Dalam Konteks Otonomi Daerah* (2009).

³ It was argued Edwards III (1984: 9-10) that policy implementation is needed to obtain a successful policy to see the causes of the ineffectiveness of policy implementation. This is reinforced by the statement Grindle (1980: 10) and Quade (1984: 310) are expecting Discovery of configuration and the synergy the various variables which

implementation of the policy has an important role against the success of the policies.⁴

This paper attempts to delineate the theories of policy implementations that focus on local government and the bureaucrats in West Java-Indonesia. The research analysis clarifies assumptions that have been made by other scholars by presenting alternative solutions to problems encountered by these agencies. Consideration of these variations is essential for the future improvement of not only the organizations that deliver welfare services but for the legislative process that undergirds them. This paper illustrates the results of bureaucrats using discretionary action to facilitate their work and to deliver services to needy clients. Rigid work environments influence workers' behaviour and significantly impact the clients' access to agency services. Thus, this paper introduces several feasible ways to overcome rigid work environments in people processing organizations.

2. Theory and Methods

a. Theory of Policy Implementation

Implementation means literally to carry out, accomplish, fulfill, produce or complete. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) define implementation in terms of a relationship to policy as laid down in official documents (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984, xxi, xxiii). Policy implementation encompasses those actions by public and private individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions [44].

According to Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983:20-21), "implementation is the carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually incorporated in a statute but which can also take the form of important executive orders or court decisions...". The starting point is the authoritative decision. It implies centrally located actors are seen as most relevant to producing desired effects. More concisely, O'Toole and his colleagues remark that policy implementation refers to the connection between the expression of governmental intention and actual result (O'Toole and et.al, 1995:43).

Policy implementation relate to how governments put policies into effects [17]. In this sense, it is process

determine success or failure of a policy. Then Nakamura and the Smallwood (1980: 2) support arguments that the implementation Edward above the basis of a basic value. Another argument advanced by Eugene Bardach (1991: 3), he describes the difficulties in the implementation of policies and the programs that the setting up the public policy appears to good on paper is something weird in the policy process. It is convenient to formulate in words and the slogans exquisite the ear hears leaders and the voters than implement policies that satisfy everyone, including those a considered customer.

⁴ Rian Nugroho (2008a: 6-436) describes the theory of Pareto's Principle of 80/20 with an example the case implementation the public policy in which there are 20 per cent are factors that can influence a policy. While a basic process the the process of planning can be had only 20% whereas the implementation of policies by 60 per cent and the 20 per cent is controlled from implementation ground.

whereby programs or policies are carried out, the translation of plans into practice. While some decisions have been made on the general shape of a policy, still others are required for it to be set into motion. Funding must be allocated, personnel assigned, and rules of procedure developed, among other matters (ibid, 185).

From above discussion, implementation can be conceptualized as a process, an output and an outcome. It is process of or series of decisions and actions directed towards putting a prior authoritative decision into effect. The essential characteristic of implementation process, then, is the timely and satisfactory performance of certain necessary tasks related to carrying out the intent of the law. Implementation can also define in terms of outputs or extent to which programmatic goals have been satisfied. Finally, at the highest level of abstraction, implementation outcome implies that there has been some measurable change in the larger problem that was addressed by the program, public law or judicial decisions (Lester and et. al., 1995: 87).

b. Top-Down and Bottom-Up Perspectives of Policy Implementation

In this essay, top-down and bottom up perspectives of policy implementation are used to analyze the status and determinants of health policy implementation in Nepal. The top-down perspective assumes that policy goals can be specified by policy makers, and that the implementation can be carried out successfully by setting up certain mechanisms (Palumbo & Calista, 1990:13). This perspective is 'policy centered' and represents the policy maker's views. A vital point is the policy maker capability to exercise control over the environment and the implementers (Younis & Davidson, 1990: 5-8.). Similarly, the bottom-up perspective does not see policy goals and factors influencing policy goal attainment as the main concern of implementation. The bottom-up perspective directs attention to the formal and informal relationships constituting the policy sub-systems involved in making and implementing policies (Howllet and Ramesh, 2003:190). This perspective has as its starting point a problem in society. The focus is on individuals and their behaviour, and the street-level bureaucrats are central.

Table 1. Differences between top-down and bottom-up implementation perspective

Variables	Top-down perspective	Bottom-perspective
Policy decisions	Policy makers	The street level bureaucrats
Starting points	Statutory language	Problem in a society
Structure	Formal	Both formal and informal
Process	Purely administrative	Networking including administrative
Authority	Centralization	Decentralization
Output/Outcomes	Prescriptive	Descriptive
Discretion	Top level's bureaucrats	Bottom-levels' bureaucrats

Top-town perspective puts the emphasis on formal steering problems and factors which are easy to manipulate and lead

to centralization and control. Interest will be directed towards such things as funding formulas, formal organization structures, and authority relationships among administrative units, regulations, and administrative controls like budget, planning, and evaluation requirements [8].

A bottom-up perspective tends to stress the importance of decentralization of control contrary to the top-down perspective. The street-level bureaucrats are considered to have a better understanding of what clients need as it is they who have direct contact with the public. Michael Lipsky [26] developed a theory on 'street-level bureaucracy'. It focuses on the discretionary decisions that each field worker- or 'street-level bureaucrat'. This discretionary role in delivering services or enforcing regulations makes street-level bureaucrats essential actors in implementing public policies. Indeed, Lipsky claims that street level bureaucrats are the real policy makers (Winter, 2003, 214).

The main features in the top-down perspectives are the emphasis on policies and that directions and control originate from "top". One looks at formal steering with clearly specified goals and management plans. Organizational structure, planning and objective evaluation are important, and implementation failure might be due to lack of planning, specification and control.

The bottom-up perspective has as its starting-point a problem in society. The focus is on individuals and their behavior, and the street-level bureaucrats are central. Routine and discretion might cause implementation failure together with ineffective behavior, poor interpersonal skills and lack of motivation.

The term "street level bureaucrats" used by Lipsky [23, 24, 25, 26], supported by other mainstream scholars such as Prottas [35], Weatherley (1980), Elmore [8, 9], and Hjern [15] has made a profound contribution to the study of frontline workers. Their fundamental idea is that the frontline workers in government offices may modify or redefine agency policy to overcome day-to-day problems encountered with clients. Smith and Lipsky [42] extended their prediction on the frontline workers' behaviour to non-profit organizations, particularly those agencies processing clients' information. They predicted that the frontline workers are the new street level bureaucrats that are likely to apply their personal discretion in determining benefits and opportunities for their clients. The application of discretion by the frontline workers triggers the way policy is implemented at the bottom in the non-profit community organizations. This situation is referred to by Lipsky [23, 24, 25, 26] and Smith and Lipsky [42]) as inevitable. It raises an essential question for the researcher of whether or not the frontline workers in the non-profit community organizations behave as predicted by [42] Smith and Lipsky in providing welfare services to the needy communities.

A few scholars like Goodsell [14], Meadow and Menkel-Meadow [34], Finlay [11], Keiser and Soss [21], Kaler [22] have analysed critically the Lipsky's model of behaviour of the street level bureaucrats. They applied

Lipsky's street level bureaucracy principles to study various programs in the public agencies that provide child support program, food stamps, Medicaid, and AFDC, medical residencies, and community based family planning in Kenya. Based on these scholars' research, workers' behaviours have been examined without distinguishing the entity of the organizations as either public or non-profit. The gap displayed in these scholars' research allows this article to further analyse the workers' behaviours, specifically in the non-profit organizations. This study is important to the bottom-up policy implementation approach, as workers are viewed as mediators of policy to people. As their roles and actions augment the policy process, assessing the implications of their discretion is vital to understand the framework of top-down and bottom-up approaches.

The involvements of the non-profit community organizations in providing welfare services are supported legally by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. This act legitimized the War on Poverty program declared by President Lyndon Johnson in 1964 and it was a crucial step in combating poverty nationally [4, 13, 30, 31]. The philosophy behind the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 addressed the need to redistribute the existing wealth to the poor and to provide opportunities for the needy to earn a decent living and to maintain their families at a comfortable living standard.⁵ The War on Poverty program was administered by the federal Office of Economic Opportunity to set standards, procedures and eligibility guidelines. This policy also adopted a coordinated approach to alleviate the causes of poverty by concentrating on several major provisions as outlined in Title I through Title V.⁶

As the strategy is centered on providing opportunities and developing skills through education and training, this legislation emphasizes a strong collaboration among the federal, state and local governments. A combination of intergovernmental resources is fundamental, as the War on Poverty is viewed as a national issue. Besides this cooperation, the War on Poverty legislation has encouraged the community organizations to participate in helping the government to combat poverty as stipulated in Title II of the Urban and Rural Community Action Programs of the Economic Opportunity Act [3, 18, 32]. Title II of the bill also authorizes the federal financial assistance to community action programs as well as giving technical advice. Programs must be developed and conducted at a community level to combat poverty. This is based on the belief that local citizens understand their communities best and they will initiate ideas, resources, and sustain good leadership. Furthermore, Title II of the bill recognizes the need for community programs to be varied and flexible in their approaches in order to meet the local needs and interests. Therefore, programs may be developed in urban and rural areas or wherever poverty is found.

Financial assistance under the Title II is made available to organizations that show concrete progress toward combating poverty and causes of poverty. Organizations that are competent to implement such programs could be the public or private agencies or a combination of both that has the resources or capacity to develop, coordinate and operate an effective community action program. This title directly encourages maximum community participation in order to reach individuals who are in need. Community organizations are selected strictly to ensure that the chosen community agencies possess the ability and capacity to implement poverty programs successfully.

3. Bottom-up Implementation: A Case of West Java Provincial Government

Policy design and implementation are tasks of policy and political problem solving that are subject to a variety of pressures. As a process policy design identifies feasible options and analyzes the cost and impacts of such options. Thus it can be said public policy gives the course of action and structure implementation.

After reformation, the trends in Indonesia improving welfare program design has mostly been guided by block grand budget policies/strategies. In a case study implementation improving basic welfare program in West Java, Lipsky analysis raises some concerns mainly administrative accountability system. Regulation and the accountability in program activities in Indonesia must take accountability based on Acta No. 15 Year 2004 *Pemeriksaan Pengelolaan dan Pertanggungjawaban Keuangan Negara* (Financial Management and Accountability of State), *Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri* (PERMENDAGRI/Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation) No. 13 tahun 2006⁷ on *Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah* (Regional Financial Management) and the amendments clarify that the provisions of implementation activities should follow the order of the administrative order, order implementation and the order accountability. Furthermore, bottom-up approach has resulted in other problems such as corruption cases such as described [45] explained that the decentralization in Indonesia have an impact in the form of decentralized corruption, the rules implemented by the central committee the committee local eager to get 'illegal budget' and the spreading money politics for the consolidation of gangsters (predators). Hadiz [45] added that the case in Indonesia is are not unique enough, it can be found in many cases in various countries that offer programs with predator's democracy and decentralization as key players (eg is the best example is a post-Soviet regime, besides the Philippines and the Thailand).

The implementation in Indonesia, Lipsky research could result in the effect of outside force causing case such as national administration, even corruption. Lipsky study also raises the question of mainly associated with the

⁵ Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, 1965-1968 (Washington D.C., 1969) Vol. 11, pp. 650.

⁶ Economic Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 78 Stat. 508 (pp. 2900-2911).

⁷ <http://www.kemendagri.go.id/produk-hukum>

quality of the implementing policy actors. Whereas the case an investigated by Lipsky is differently the developed of the actor implementing the policy with developed countries such as Indonesia. The actors implementing quality policies that have some low abilities to concurrent reading of situation, would lead to prevent the operation of the base, thereby policy goals are unreachable.

Hadiz [45] opinion supports arguments from Sadu Wasitiono [40] which said that the policy of decentralization in Indonesia besides autonomy increase 'kings' smaller in the region, as well as increasing corruption. Another argument in was presented by Indonesia Governance Index (IGJ) that 80% of new autonomous regions in Indonesia have failed to implement policies and are not able to provide prosperity to its citizens. To make matters worse, since 2009 at least Rp. 50 trillion, Indonesia budget has been spent as the budget for the creation new provinces.⁸

This reality is different from the study conducted Lipsky [23, 24, 25, 26] that "street level bureaucrats" determine the success of a program. The author conducted of research in West Java with the following programs:

- a. Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri (PNPM Mandiri)

Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri (PNPM Mandiri/ National Community Empowerment Program) is the national level program purpose to reduction of poverty communities, particularly empowering community-based. The program design of the basic policy framework and a referral for the performance of poverty eradication programs based on community empowerment. PNPM Mandiri implemented through the harmonization and the development of the systems, mechanisms and the procedures which are authorized by the government program. The government gives guidance and the financing incentives to encourage initiative and the innovation communities in sustainable poverty reduction. The program design of the basic policy framework and a referral for the performance of poverty eradication programs based on community empowerment. PNPM Mandiri implemented through the harmonization and the development of the systems, mechanisms and the procedures which are authorized by the government program. The government gives guidance and the financing incentives to encourage initiative and the innovation communities in sustainable poverty reduction.

Special programs are designed and implemented by the central government is unable to improve the welfare of society in general. Variety of constraints, particularly geographical, cultural and intervention in society interest groups (NGOs, journalists, bureaucrats, executives and the political interest groups or members of political parties) to be one of the problems encountered. It is associated with

the process of program planning and the implementation of programs are very top-down, too bureaucratic and the subordinate administrator only as the technical tasks based on the guidelines that have been set. Based on data from the High Court of West Java (2013) there were 72 cases of corruption of the Village Head in custody because of a change in the basic mechanisms of implementation the program.

This is different with the opinions Smith and Lipsky [42] that argue there are several important variables related to the study of frontline workers and the prediction on the new street-level bureaucrats in the non-profit organizations. Smith and Lipsky [42] developed their theory on the new street level bureaucrats in the non-profit organizations and their prediction emphasized rigid work environments that encouraged workers to exercise discretion. Factors such as insufficient funds, shortages of staff, mounting paperwork, ambiguous and voluminous rules, and conflicting agency goals are reasons for the new street level bureaucrats in the non-profit organizations to exercise personal discretion. A worker's personal discretion was manifested through rationing and routinizing that led to bias, inequality and discrimination in delivering services to clients. Additionally, reasons for such outcomes were due to workers in non-profits organizations receiving low wages, few benefits, and facing job insecurity. Consequently, these conditions discouraged the workers from being loyal to the organizations and undermined their commitment toward delivering good services to clients [42]. Therefore, Smith and Lipsky [42] assumed that discouraging work conditions affect workers' commitments that will in turn lead to bias, inequality, and discrimination in their services to the clients.

- b. Program DAKABALAREA (Dahareun loba, kabeuli ku balarea, barudak tetep sakola, lanjutkeun reformasi, anu iman nambahan)

DAKABALAREA program means the program is to get people need to eat, can buy basic needs, the children can go to school regularly and the continue the reform process to enhance the piety of faith to Allah/God. Literally, this program a purpose to interest along with the decision to give micro-entrepreneurs credit and the small businesses with a pattern of results. The program was established and the commenced with the trisukses principle : the successful distribution with the purpose of conveying to the right target, the right level of needs and the meet the determined requirements, should provide the benefits biggest most hearty and can attempt to develop the recipient and successfully return of the funds is a trust that must be returned loans instead of grants, the return should be timely and the accurate number because applicants have to wait for another credit (rolling system). Trisukses are designed in the program until the end of 2010 does not run properly. Only one success of the successful distribution that nearly all channelled to the community budget. But the reality in the field level, many of the planned budget so a revolving

⁸ <http://wartakota.tribunnews.com/2014/10/14/80-persen-daerah-otonomi-baru-dob-gagal-sejahterakan-rakyat>.

between citizens apparently be used for business capital the kindred management organizations program.

This is different from Smith and Lipsky [42] which predicted that ambiguous and voluminous rules lead workers to exercise personal discretion by modifying rules through ration and routine that result in depriving clients' access to benefits and services. Although workers admitted that unrealistic guidelines and rules exist, the elements of lobbying, advocating, and attempting to work around the issues showed different results from [42].

Smith and Lipsky [42] criticized rules and guidelines limit workers from delivering services to needy people on several essential issues with regards to income guidelines, job manuals, definitions for homelessness, and food stamp requirements. Despite these limitations that impede worker's abilities to deliver their services to needy people, they attempt to work around the issues with the intention of making sure that needy people get what they deserve. Workers' efforts, such as becoming a representative for their clients to the DTA office and advocating for their clients' rights to services, are important to be recognized. Their efforts also show their seriousness in helping clients, and their roles as community service workers who professionally dedicate themselves to helping the needy people.

While the programs that are bottom up rather than the central government and the provincial government is PNPM Mandiri and the DAKABALAREA Program. The program almost successful in the implementation stage, but there are barriers such as limited resources executive bureaucrats to understand the message of the policy makers. Number of overlapping regulations in the administrative system of reporting thereby the bureaucrats are afraid to make a basic implementation, the intervention of other parties, such as interest groups and the political groups that exploit them for interest his party. This is parallel with Edward III (1980) the argument that the failure of policy implementation is often the case, one only due to insufficient staff or employees, or incompetent in this field thereby not to understand the meaning of the public policy purpose. Although the results are expected to be good enough freedom to implement policies at the level below to make base used by the various interests involved, as was argued by (Turner and the Humle, 1997).

4. Bottom-up Implementation Issues in West Java

The use bottom-up implementation synonymous with actor or "bureaucrat" has been applied in many contexts. Interestingly one may argue that when Lipsky [23-26] first labelled frontline workers as "street-level bureaucrats," he was referring to the public officials that exercised personal discretion in dealing with clients directly in daily work. Lipsky viewed workers at the bottom as bureaucrats because they were public officials too, like their top-level bureaucratic colleagues. Furthermore, this does not conclude that "bureaucrat" necessarily carries any negative connotation such as delay or rigidity.

In fact, the Weberian model of bureaucracy is rational, centralized and objectively determinant. Thus this Weberian model promotes the essence of rationality in approaching human decisions, goals, accomplishments, tasks applications, environmental selection based on scarce resources and the ability to resolve issues embedded in organizations. Parsons [38] observed that Weber has formulated his organizational theory in the systematic approach that is concentrated overwhelmingly on normative patterns of rationality. In this way an organization's efficiency can be achieved through discipline and reliability in exercising control over human beings [38]. This hierarchical model enhances an organization's efficiency through a systematic division of labour, discipline and control, organized rules and regulations, competent administrative conditions, qualified candidates, and a standard system of rewards. Therefore, this bureaucratic administration in an organization results in the essential qualities of efficiency, formality, rationality, calculability, knowledge ability and technical competency.

Daft and Steers [6] argued that while this bureaucratic model might be needed in large-sized organizations where a central system is able to bring together a large number of people and tasks to achieve organizational goals, for smaller organizations, adversarial bureaucratic procedures are unnecessary because tasks can be supervised or accomplished by a single or a few individuals. In fact, bureaucratic procedures such as standardizing, regulating, monitoring, and controlling may reduce flexibility and slow productivity and efficiency for small size organizations. Therefore, the question of whether or not bureaucracy promotes high performance is a matter of size and fit [6]. Having bureaucratic procedures may be vital for organizations as they expand in size, employees, tasks, and networks, but too much of bureaucracy may disrupt simple functions in a small-scaled organization.

Furthermore, Hummel [20] argued that Weber's intention to create a bureaucratic system through division of labour, specialization, training and hierarchy of duties is to maintain control and to produce stability and productivity. However, Weber's bureaucracy has unintentional effects: hierarchical authority leads to a powerful centralized system that distorts training, specialization, division of labour and rewards. One extreme result may be to reduce stability and productivity. Therefore, bureaucracy is open to many interpretations and it is up to individuals to balance fit with function.

The use of scientific management in a rational top-down bureaucratic model has been criticized by bottom-up scholars like Lipsky [23-26], Lipsky and Weatherly [27], Elmore [8, 9], Weatherly [46], Hjern [15], Hjern and Porter [16]. Lipsky's [23-26] street level bureaucracy theory was revolutionary in late 1960s because it introduced the idea of looking at the implementation processes from the bottom-up in contrast to the rational top-down approach. Lipsky was concerned with the low level public employees who utilized the discretionary nature of their jobs to wield substantial power and in effect create policy for their agency. This term has been defined by Smith and Lipsky

[42] to designate contractual regimes, where non-profit organizations that receive grants from the government will have workers that behave similarly to public officials. A simple reason is that the non-profit organizations have to comply with government's rules and standards that shape work ethics among workers. Thus work ethic is assumed to be similar for both the public officials and the street level bureaucrats, who may also ration and routine work that can result in bias, inequality and discrimination.

The case of the implementation program in West Java, the authorities granted to "street-level bureaucrats," is not optimal. This may result in abuse of power, corruption affects failure to achieve objectives of the program. The failure of PNPM Mandiri and DAKABALAREA program is just another instance besides are still many other fails programs. The low quality mental is the resource of bureaucrats become one of a major obstacle in the decentralization of the government authority from above to the bottom.

5. Conclusion

The rules and guidelines designed for the welfare programs are avenues to ensure that limited resources are utilized to achieve goals and to alleviate poverty by distributing resources and services to help needy people. Further recognition is that rules and guidelines are ways to assess standard eligibility, to allow consistency in decision making, and to provide solutions for anticipated outcomes. As these formal rules and guidelines are codes of action that are determined by the top level decision makers, they are presumed to be followed. These rules remain as a standard procedure that applies to all, but rules and guidelines can be modified at the bottom based on agency expertise and personal discretionary power.

The actual policy rules and guidelines are modified at the bottom when immediate needs and emergency cases require expertise to decide what is doable and what is the best that fits in such circumstances. In fact, the case of the implementation program in West Java, the authorities granted to "street-level bureaucrats," is not optimal. This may result in abuse of power, corruption affects failure to achieve objectives of the program. The failure of PNPM Mandiri and DAKABALAREA program is just another instance besides are still many other fails programs. The low quality mental is the resource of bureaucrats become one of a major obstacle in the decentralization of the government authority from above to the bottom.

This proves the importance of policy design that provided explicit policy directives, clear statements of administrative responsibilities, and more direct actions with fewer veto points. A top-down model of six variables linking policy to performance included standards/objectives, resources, inter-organizational communications, characteristics of implementing agencies, economic/social/political conditions, and implementer "dispositions" [44].

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