Governing the policy network on urban agriculture in Bangkok:

The role of social capital in handling cooperation and conflicts

Piyapong Boossabong

Thesis submitted to the University College London for the

Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Development Planning Unit,

The Bartlett

University College London

2014

Declaration of authorship

I, Piyapong Boossabong, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Abstract

Since 2010 a policy network on urban agriculture (UA) has emerged in Bangkok, incorporating policy actors from both governmental and non-governmental bodies. This study argues that multiple forms of social capital – including shared rules, reputation, trust, reciprocity, moral obligation, shared norms and shared knowledge among various actors – have shaped the functioning of this policy network since its emergence. In addition, the study argues that these forms of social capital support the capacity of the policy network to enhance cooperation and handle conflicts.

The role of social capital in governing the UA policy network is examined in relation to the floods experienced in Bangkok between late 2011 and early 2012. The analytical framework adopted is based on two contrasting theories: Ostrom's institutional rational choice (IRC) and Habermas' communicative action theory (CAT). Both are applied to link social capital and policy network studies. Following these two perspectives, this study conceptualises social capital by considering both rational and normative commitments. By focusing on IRC and CAT perspectives on power, this study analyses how instrumental, communicative and structural power relates to social capital. Findings reveal that the aforementioned forms of social capital influenced the emergence of the policy network by determining the status of the network's constituent organisations and groups and their power relations. Members of organisations and groups that shared forms of knowledge agreed that the reason for cooperation was epistemic, while reciprocity and moral obligation supported their decision to cooperate. The study also found that the reputable and trusted organisational leader within the network, who shared rules, norms and knowledge with others, played a key role in facilitating a deliberative process while handling conflicts. The analysis aims to bridge social capital and policy network studies, and reveals the benefits of articulating IRC and CAT to understand policy network governance.

I realise that doing a PhD is a learning process. Before conducting the fieldwork, I received valuable feedback from scholars and friends concerning my theoretical framework and methodology. The comments I gained from my upgrading seminar were also useful and influenced several changes in the project. After coming back from the field, my papers were presented and discussed at several conferences, including as part of the panel entitled the 'Governance of Urban Environmental Risk in the Global South', the 2012 RGS-IGB International Conference in Edinburgh between the 3rd and the 5th of July 2012. I benefitted considerably from the feedback provided by many of the participants, particularly from Professor Mark Pelling; chair of the panel, Dr Gina Ziervogel, Dr Emily Boyd, and Dr Vanesa Castan Broto. My post-fieldwork presentation at the Development Planning Unit allowed me to receive further suggestions on how to take my research a step further.

I also had the chance to present a paper at the Political Studies Association International Conference in Cardiff, which was immensely useful, and allowed me to refine my analytical framework. At this conference, I had a chance to speak with one of the most influential scholar for my work, Professor Rod Rhodes, who has influenced the development of the policy network approach. This was followed by a paper for the International Conference on Interpretive Policy Analysis in Vienna in 2013 and I give a special thanks to Hal Colebatch for the insightful comments and suggestions I received there. I also extend my gratitude to Dvora Yanow for her clarification of the difference between interpretive and deliberative policy analysis approaches and for her reflection on my methodology during our discussion. In addition, I am very grateful to Professor Frank Fischer; a Habermasian who has an outstanding capacity to bridge between communicative action theory and the study of policy and planning, for his kindness. It was a wonderful moment of my life being invited by him as a lecturer to share my research with his class on policy analysis, and to participate in his seminar on local knowledge and development policy. I also had the opportunity to share a panel with him in the International Conference on Interpretive Policy Analysis in Wageningen and to be his guide in exploring the Transition Town movements in London in 2014. These events are deeply engraved in my memory. I should also mention the great learning environment I enjoyed during my stay at the University of Kassel, Germany, as a research fellow funded by the International Centre for Development and Decent Work in 2013. Moreover, I

Table of contents

List of figures

List of tables

16

List of photos

List of acronyms and abbreviations

ACF   Advocacy Coalition Framework

BMA   Bangkok Metropolitan Administration

CAT   Communicative Action Theory

CBOs   Community-Based Organisations

CSA   Community Supported Agriculture

DAOs   District Administration Offices

EM   Effective Microorganism

FLEP   Foundation for Labour and Employment Promotion

GMN   Green Market Network

HPF   Health Promotion Foundation

HSF   Human Settlement Foundation

IRC   Institutional Rational Choice

MCD   Media Centre for Development

NGOs   Non-Governmental Organisations

NIMBY   Not In My Backyard

PGS   Participatory Guarantee System

SAF   Sustainable Agriculture Foundation

UA   Urban Agriculture

WGFFC   Working Group on Food for Change

Introduction

Between mid-November 2011 and early January 2012, Bangkok, the capital city of Thailand, faced the most dramatic flood in approximately 70 years. As a consequence of this disaster, the city and its inhabitants faced a series of complications, including the disruption of food supply. The food shortages experienced during the flooding period translated into short-term food insecurity. The chains of production and transportation monopolised by food corporations that were centralised in Bangkok, were severely affected by the floods. Their factories and the main roads that they usually used for the transportation of their products were under water, disrupting access to markets by city habitants. Due to the changed balance between supply and demand of food products, prices increased 3 to 4 times on average both in modern trade and traditional local markets (Working Group on Food for Change, 2012). During that period, vegetables were rarely available, owing to the fact that the largest distributive vegetable market was affected by the flooding. When vegetables were available, their price was roughly ten times more expensive than under normal circumstances (ibid). Roughly 41,500 households of the total 2,459,700 households (1.69%) in Bangkok Metropolis could not access sufficient supplies of food, while almost all inhabitants living in 36 out of 50 districts had limited access to fresh products (Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, 2011). Meanwhile, the mainstream food aid system managed by the central government in cooperation with private and international organisations provided mainly dry foodstuff, such as instant noodles and canned fish.

The poor and marginalised in Bangkok, such as slum communities settled along the river, were affected the most during the flooding. Even under ordinary circumstances, more than half of their monthly income was spent on food (Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, 2012). The dramatic increase of food prices made food unaffordable for the majority of them, while government distributed food aid with a one-size-fits-all approach. However, during this period, a network around urban agriculture (UA) promoting multi-actor 'umbrellas' in Bangkok, worked intensively and collectively to address the aforementioned problems, particularly targeting their efforts towards the most vulnerable groups in the city. This network, formed in 2010 and led by the Health Promotion Foundation, the Sustainable Agriculture

Foundation, the Media Centre for Development, the Working Group on Food for Change, and the city farm association within the City Farm programme, in order to promote an alternative urban food system in the city.

The City Farm programme was funded under the food and nutrition plan created by the Health Promotion Foundation, the Prime Minister's Office, for 7 million Baht (USD0.2 million) per year since 2010. The programme was co-managed by many non-governmental bodies, as previously mentioned. The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration and District Administration Offices, regional and local governments, also took part by promoting communities within their administrative boundary to participate by developing their community garden. They also supported training in farming practices by developing the city farm learning centre located in their office area. Other public organisations included research units of public universities that supported knowledge and information on food-growing. Their focus for urban food policy was rather more orientated towards linking food with health, local economy, environment, social welfare and education. The programme managed to engage communities of urban poor and marginalised citizens such as the network of slum dwellers and the informal labour network. More details will be provided in Chapters 1, 4 and 5.

This programme therefore brought together a variety of related autonomous but interdependent policy actors, including central, regional and local government agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community based organisations (CBOs), social and green enterprises, and farming groups. Since 2010, the network developed within the City Farm programme has supported more than 120 community gardens scattered within the inner city. They also organised seventeen green markets and community-supported agricultural systems. As the network mobilised collective actions to instigate change in urban food problems, this study refers to it as the 'policy network on urban agriculture' in Bangkok. The notion of 'policy network' is used to capture a variety of related autonomous but interdependent policy actors and actions active with the same agenda (Bevir and Richards, 2009, p.3; Compston, 2009, p.5; Marsh, 1998, p.8; Rhodes, 2007, p.1243).

During the floods, this policy network attempted to fill the gap of the mainstream one-size-fits-all food aid system, which originated from a fragmented urban governance and dependence on food corporations with a monopoly in the market. The policy network did this by focusing on the most vulnerable and aiming towards enhancing the capacity of local food systems. Constituent organisations and groups within the policy network organised several meetings and focus group discussions to share experiences, mobilise resources and promote the development of UA innovations under flood conditions. In addition, members of this policy network organised numerous field visits to provide food during the floods and distributed materials and know-how on food production to the flood victims. Furthermore, they supported mutual aid under the community-supported agricultural system by sharing seeds after the flooding. Last but not least, they enhanced awareness of food security, the right to food, and climate change adaptation by promoting these notions through a variety of information channels. Further details will be provided in Chapter 1.

The UA policy network in Bangkok was developed by a rich web of linkages among networking actors and their vertical and horizontal actions, and across and within central (national), regional (metropolitan Bangkok) and local community levels (within Bangkok). The initial review of relevant documents and observations conducted during the preliminary fieldwork revealed that many members worked on UA and with each other prior to the endorsement of the City Farm Programme. Close preceding relations based on different commitments (such as, shared rules, trust, shared norms etc.), captured here under the term of 'social capital', may therefore play a significant role in facilitating the emergence of the UA policy network. This claim is well supported by Lowndes and Pratchett (2010, p.677-707), who argue that social capital is central to the policy network literature as it could explain how a policy network emerges and functions subsequently. Lin (2010, p.58) adds that social capital is a resource embedded in networks. He mentions that it is the glue that holds actors together as a network. However, the role of social capital still needs to be clearly identified by questioning how the social capital of plural organisations and groups can facilitate the emergence and characterisation of the policy network.

This study also investigates the role of social capital in facilitating cooperation and conflict resolution during and after an extreme climate event to understand relations between social capital and key challenges of policy network governance (handling cooperation and conflicts). The literature review conducted at the beginning of this study indicated that two contesting theories on collaborative network governance – Ostromian institutional rational choice (IRC) and Habermasian communicative action theory (CAT)[1] can guide an understanding of this issue. In short, IRC focuses on rational commitments (based on predictable and concrete strings attached relationships such as shared rules and reputation for trustworthiness) and indicates that incentives and agreed rules are required for cooperation enhancement and conflict resolution, while CAT is more sensitive to normative commitments (based on unpredictable and abstract strings attached relationships such as shared norms, trust and moral obligation) and indicates that consensus and mutual understanding as a result of communication become key to enhancing cooperation and resolving conflicts. While the main assumptions underpinning each of these theories will be discussed in Chapter 2, it should be noted that each theory is often applied in isolation from the other. Therefore, there is value in contrasting these two perspectives and bringing them in dialogue with each other in order to gain a deeper understanding of social capital and policy network governance, in light of real situations during primary research conducted in Bangkok. It is also interesting to examine these debates in the context of disaster governance, where there is still a significant gap of knowledge. This thesis provides an original contribution to the current understanding of how social capital facilitates the emergence and characterisations of a policy network, and supports a policy network to deal with collective action problems – both insufficient cooperation and conflicts. In the context of Bangkok, the thesis will explore the role of social capital in handling cooperation and conflicts emerging through efforts to enhance food security, the right to food, and climate change adaptive capacity during and shortly after a disaster.

---

[1]'Communicative action theory' is called by Habermas himself, while many Habermasians call the theory in different ways such as 'communicative planning theory' (Healey, 2006) and 'deliberative (democracy/ governance) theory' (Dryzek, 2012; Wagenaar, 2011).

In summary, while previous studies pay attention to the success of social capital in gluing networks and overcoming collective actions problems by analysing cases through either IRC or CAT, this thesis aims to reveal 'the secret of its success' through different lenses – articulating IRC and CAT - and to do so by examining the role of social capital in facilitating the emergence and characterisation of a policy network as well as to examine its role in dealing with collective action problems in the context of disasters.

I Objectives of the research

Following the previous discussion, the research informing this thesis was guided by the following objectives:

I.I. To explore the role of social capital in facilitating the emergence and characterisation of the UA policy network

I.II. To examine how social capital affects the way in which the policy network enhances cooperation and solves conflicts in relation to enhancing food security, right to food and climate change adaptive capacity during and shortly after the disaster.

A clarification of the first objective should start with a clear definition of the term 'social capital', particularly because it is conceptualised differently by different schools of thought. The existence of close relations is commonly used as a minimal standard (Field, 2003; Harriss, 2001). Close relations can be based on many possible commitments, which explain why there are many forms of social capital. Aside from examining social capital by degrees of closeness, this study also explores the role of different forms of social capital including shared rules, a reputation for trustworthiness, trust, reciprocity, moral obligations, shared norms, and shared forms of knowledge.

Firstly, shared rules refer to very formal commitments. For example, public organisations share rules to create, implement and evaluate their strategic plan. They also need to be strict on fiscal management rules such as rules on fiscal expenditure

and auditing. In the case of rules shared between public and non-public organisations, they are usually in the form of conditions stated in their contract. As for non-public organisations, they share some unwritten rules such as 'first come, first serve', which means they would cooperate, support and help who demand from them before others as they have limited resources (money and staffs). Such rules are a basic reference for living and working together.

Secondly, a reputation for trustworthiness refers to the way organisations are perceived by others, which related to the degree of creditability they receive. Trustworthiness is usually understood in comparative reference to trust. According to Hardin (2002), trusting is what we do ourselves; trustworthiness is what others do. For example, training centres that have provided services for a long period of time may have harnessed the trust of others over their ability to train. University research centres can develop their reputation for being trustworthy from their expertise through their publicised research projects, the profiles of their researchers and recognition received from the media.

Thirdly, trust is more internal than trustworthiness. It refers to a belief that the trustee will be truth-telling, promise-keeping and fair. Generally, a reputation for trustworthiness supports trust, otherwise called predictive trust. In this form, it is a probabilistic expectation. Internal trust can, however, also arise even if two parties do not know one another by reputation. This is called altruistic trust, which is morally praiseworthy and derives from deserving approval, or admiration. Therefore, trust takes different forms, both rational and moral (Warren, 1999, pp.85, 290-309).

Fourthly, the notion of shared norms refers to sharing the same beliefs, values and even cultures which affect the way we interpret the world, judge what is good and bad, and even determine lifestyles. For example, almost all constituent organisations and groups of the policy network shared an environmental concern and were devoted to healthy self-produced food in the hope of increasing self-reliance. In short, these norms affect their negative point of view on modernisation, chemical use, mono-cropping, agri-business, and even their broader understanding of capitalism. Such norms also shape the lifestyles of many who are influenced by the so-called 'green

culture', which supports green restaurants and markets, and calls for sensitivity to reducing carbon footprints, reuse and recycle.

Fifthly, shared forms of knowledge refer to a shared understanding of a subject. For example, public organisations exchange some technical knowledge such as the designing of plans to develop indicators and to use specific terms. Many farming groups also share local knowledge about agricultural practices such as how to make and use an effective microorganism by using local materials and household waste.

Lastly, reciprocity and moral obligation refer to specific norms in which the related organisations and groups would like to support each other or help one another. Reciprocity is based on an expectation of mutual benefit, while moral obligation is based mainly on an altruistic mindset in which a decision is not made by trade-off between gains and losses. Chapter 3 presents how these forms of social capital are operationalised in my research.

We depart from defining the facets of social capital, to identifying the UA policy network and the policy actors and actions engaged in the City Farm programme. As mentioned earlier, the programme developed a clear UA policy network by formally structuring the existing loose network of organisations and groups working on UA. It encouraged them to work closer together through a great number of meetings and collective actions. There were four co-ordinators of the City Farm programme. The first one took care of farming groups that had been granted from the programme, while the second one linked training centres which were mostly social enterprises. The third worked on media and public relations, while the last one was responsible for financial matters. Not every organisation and group engaged with the City Farm programme received funding. Some of them, particularly public organisations, did not get financial support from the programme but instead they were supported by resource provision (e.g. free lunch boxes for trainers and trainees in the training day organised by public organisations) or incentivised by having a wider connection and a chance to exchange knowledge and information.

The policy network's constituent organisations and groups can be divided into four different types: (1) public organisations that are a part of central, regional or local

governments, and public universities, (2) NGOs and CBOs, (3) social and green enterprises including green restaurants, markets and training centres (which also played a role as think tanks), and (4) farming groups including neighbourhood-based groups, workplace-based groups, and non-area based groups (including an online group). Each actor was assumed to have different degrees of closeness and links to others through many forms of social capital, which will be examined as our point to understand how network was emerged and shaped its characters.

Moving on, the second objective of the thesis is to seek to unravel how social capital works in dealing with collective action problems, including cooperation problems and conflicts in a disaster context. Issues in methods for cooperation are understood here as obstacles to the mobilising of plural actors for constructive action within the policy network. Conflicts on the other hand can derive from both unsatisfied distributive interests (conflicts related to someone's gains and losses) and perception clashes (conflicts related to different ways of thinking and ideas on how to work together). The thesis aims to explain whether and how social capital played a role in handling such problems of collective action during and shortly after the Bangkok flooding.

The second objective highlights collective actions in relation to enhancing food security, the right to food and climate change adaptive capacity. To enhance food security means to improve its availability, accessibility, stability and utility (Ziervogel and Ericksen, 2010). Enhancing the right to food implies a broader objective often connected to campaigns for food sovereignty or, in other words, people's right to control their own food systems (Wittman, Desmarais and Wiebe, 2010; Pimbert, 2009). As argued by Yap (2013) the right to food understands food as an aspect of a set of human rights, and therefore usually advocates for the rights of vulnerable and marginalised groups in society. He points out that to fight for the right to food is a key strategy for food sovereignty in addition to the pursuit of structural changes such as land reform and democratic control. This study does not engage with the concept of food sovereignty because Thai laypeople were not familiar to this concept, while the concept of right to food was translated to Thai word called *'Sitti-Tang-Aharn'* and means right of people to 'get' enough food to eat - not in the radical sense of the demand for the right to control the food system. The

aspects of land reform and democratic control are therefore not examined in this case study. Enhancing climate change adaptive capacity can be achieved at different scales, from the household level to the level of the entire city. Increasing the capacity of city dwellers to grow their own food is a way to enhance their capacity to adapt to harsh circumstances. Many cases illustrate that UA can be a buffer or safety net for the city to feed its people during periods of disasters (UA Magazine, Vol. 25, 2011, Vol. 27, 2014; Zeeuw, Van Veenhuizen and Dubbeling, 2011).

II Focus and scope

Focus and scope of this study relate to my personal motivation. To reveal my motivation, I should link to my background. I studied Political Science and Public Administration from mainstream approach including Ostromians' institutional rational choice. In the same time, I was interested in the alternative policy analysis and planning especially in interpretive/ deliberative/ argumentative turn in policy analysis and planning inspiredby Fischer and Forester (1993) and Hajer and Wagennaar (2003). These two approaches talk about many same things but in different ways including about collaborative and network governance. As they rarely talk to each other, this project starts from putting them aside to talk to one another. The project thus begins with the idea of articulating these different approaches by recognising their ontological and epistemological differences. (This will be discussed later in this section and the Chapter 2).

In doing so, to articulate by recognising their different views on social capital and policy network governance are focused. By engaging with the notion of social capital, I starts with my personal confidence that social capital is really alive and functions in my country in particular the case study of the UA policy network in Bangkok. The study of social capital in Thailand had been focused in the last decade after this notion (*Tun-Tang-Sungkom*) was emerged in the Thai Constitution 1997. Key social capital scholars like Putnam and Ostrom have also developed their networks in Thai political studies. Many Thai scholars including me assume that they might seek to extend the implication of their idea in the Global South or, in contrast, we assume that they might realise that social capital does not really exist in the North and might exist somewhere else. During such period, there was a massive

research funding to explore social capital in the country. I have personally started engaging with the concept since 2006 by conducting a research funded by Thai National Research Council (TNRC) entitle 'Social Capital in the North-East Thailand: Comparative Studies of the Rural and Urban Areas'. I have linked it to study policy, planning and governance and developed my academic life from this area. For more than 5 years engaging in this concept, I have begun being skeptical to the analysis of social capital as compounded concepts measured by scoring each index and counting them together. This skepticism affects this project to frame each form of social capital as powerful resource in itself which does not always support and integrate with others. This project is also developed from the question on limitations of causal relations and the rational commitment framing social capital by mainstream scholars including Ostromians. So, the notion of social capital in critical views proposed by Habermasians are reviewed to seek for alternative way to capture this concept. The review then helps to conceptualise social capital from normative commitments such as altruist trust, moral obligation and shared norms (details will be provided in Chapter 2).

As a consequence, this study conceptualises social capital by focusing on both rational and normative commitments. As previously mentioned, rational commitments are based on predictable and concrete strings attached relationships, while normative commitments are opposite. Shared rules and a reputation for trustworthiness are considered as forms of social capital in this study in order to highlight the role of rational commitments in governing policy network. This study assumes that to work together policy network's constituent organisations and groups might be obliged by both formal rules and informal ones, while reputation for trustworthiness of organisations and groups might affect the likelihood that of others will to work with them. On the other hand, altruistic trust and shared norms are also the focus of this study, because these normative commitments are assumed to facilitate the way in which the network was shaped and worked. For example, the inclusion of groups of low-income inhabitants in the network might be a result of altruistic trust by other members, though they might not receive predictive trust from reflecting on their past actions. Additionally, shared norms may guide methods for cooperation, in particular when there are no rules. Apart from that, shared local knowledge is conceptualised as a form of social capital for this study. This study

aims to demonstrate that shared local knowledge as cultural rationality might also influence collective decisions and actions. Lastly moral obligation embedded in Buddhist principle is an additional form of social capital beyond reciprocate relations. Buddhist culture is still a major cultural and influence on the inhabitants of Bangkok. Buddhist moral expectations are mirrored onto principles for social conduct (details will be discussed in Chapter 4).

Furthermore, democratisation and the growth of civil society in developing countries such as Thailand are still under the shadow of the monarchy and traditional centralised government structures and culture (Cook, 1993; McCargo, 2005; Riggs, 1966). Therefore, any network structures tend to be centralised in Thailand. To examine this assumption, this study focuses on whether the UA policy network was centralised or decentralised, which requires an analysis of power. In order to understand the role of social capital in facilitating the emergence and characterisation of policy networks, the role of social capital in shaping power relations must be examined, for it affects the structure of networks, the extent to which there is devolution of power.

Two theories on collaborative network governance are employed to scope and frame this study as aforementioned. When referring to IRC scholars, this study makes reference to the work of Ostrom and her followers, particularly those who engage in the Bloomington School of Policy Analysis. On the other hand, CAT scholars refer to Habermas and his followers particularly those who engage in the Interpretative and Deliberative (Argumentative) Policy Analysis school of thought, which began organising annual conferences in Europe from 2006. This study acknowledges that to identify CAT scholars is debatable as many of them mix Habermas approach with many other post-positivist epistemological approaches, which focus discourse, deliberation, social constructivism, and interpretative methods (Fischer and Gottweis, 2012, p.1). Some of them depart from Habermas but later move so far from him. They share something in the common that is to focus language and to interpret its meaning (ibid). As argued by Wagenaar (2011), there are three broad families of scholars adopting interpretive policy analysis classified by different approaches to understand meaning in studying policy and planning (he calls three faces of meaning) including hermeneutic, discursive and dialogical meanings. This

study refers to CAT scholars by identifying their works which highlight dialogical meaning. In particular, main CAT scholars for this study, apart from Habermas himself, are the contributors of three classic works in the field including 'Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning' edited by Fischer and Forester (1993), 'Deliberative Policy Analysis' edited by Hajer and Wagenaar (2003), and 'Argumentative Turn Revisited' edited by Fischer and Gottweis (2012). These three works become the starting point to map CAT scholars, who at least take Habermas idea as one of their fundamental ideas, and then this study follows their works elsewhere apart from one that is put in these three books.

Although apart from IRC and CAT many other theories can also explain how networks could be governed collaboratively, Chapter 2 will discuss that these two theories shed light on the case study. In brief, the reason for choosing these two theories is, firstly, to understand that cooperation and conflict resolution are a central concern of both IRC and CAT. Secondly, by adopting these two theories both utility maximisers and moral agents are not be ignored. To recognise these two types of agency support an analysis of the complex urban societies (including Bangkok), where people have different expectations for life (both interest-account and beyond). Someone might aim to do something mostly for themselves, while some others aim to do the same thing for other people in different situations. Lastly, these two theories mention the importance of communication, which this study aims to look at, although their focuses are different as will be mentioned in Chapter 2. By adopting the two theories, different rationalities including instrumental and cultural rationalities are taken into account to analyse communicative forums. In relation to that the aforementioned, this study assumes that different modes of rationality are brought by each organisation and group to contest in claiming (rational and normative) validity of their arguments for convincing the others through communication.

By adopting these two theories, this study can scope the study of social capital and policy network governance. To begin with, different forms of social capital can be positioned on a sliding scale between rational and normative commitments; from concrete to abstract sense. According to Warren (1999), IRC and CAT each raise an important feature of various forms of social capital but highlight each one

differently. While IRC focuses more on rational commitment such as shared rules, reputation for trustworthiness and reciprocity, CAT emphasises more on normative commitment such as moral obligation and shared norms. Figure Intro-1 shows Warren's classification of different forms of social capital framed by differentiating rational commitment from normative one.

Figure Intro-1: Institutional rational choice, communicative action theory and social capital

Source: Interpretation from Warren's argument (1999)

Through the use of IRC and CAT, this study is guided by dual tracks of understanding collaborative policy network governance. IRC suggests that policy networks are governed by instrumental power, such as the power of rules and incentives, while CAT emphasises the power of communication, such as persuasion and negotiation. At the same time, CAT recognises that power embedded in social and political structures shapes distorted communication, whereby some dominate conversations and debate in relation to others can interrupt the communication. The two theories help to scope this study by exploring instrumental, communicative and

structural powers in governing the policy network, including shaping the network structure and driving the policy network by dealing with collective action problems.

From the discussion above, it can be noticed that the engagement with the analysis of power, communication, cooperation and conflicts make this project relate to social capital studies and beyond that. It is a consequence of the boundaries of the concept of social capital set by this study and the intention to link social capital studies to policy network studies. On the one hand, the analysis of social capital through both rational and normative commitments mentioned previously makes this study engage with plural forms of social capital. These forms are either complementary or contrast to each other. They also require a deeper analysis than quantitative measurement. So, social capital for this study is not analysed by scoring degree of each form and counting them together to identify the score of social capital as single entity. Instead, this study treats the concept by realising that each form has its own spirit. In other words, various forms of social capital could function in various ways and in different entry points either to support the function of each other or to constrain (more details will be discussed in Chapter 3 and Conclusion). As a consequence, the analysis of social capital is not coherent (as its nature is in that way). Different forms are discussed in different sections throughout the report. They also relate differently to power, communication, cooperation and conflicts, which make the boundaries of the analysis of social capital for this study involve with other boundaries of the analysis of other concepts. Although the boundaries of social capital analysis could not be separated clearly from other boundaries beyond them, this study can specify that the social network analysis both computing-based and narrative-based analysis is mainly used to analyse social capital particular in analysing the 'existence' of different forms (discussed in Chapter 3 and 4).

On the other hand, the analysis of social capital crosses over other boundaries because this study links social capital studies to policy network studies by focusing the 'function' of social capital in handling 'cooperation' and 'conflicts' of policy networks. In doing so, this study requires the analysis of the role of social capital in 'interactions' among policy network's constituent organisations and groups. So, the study focuses analysing the role of social capital in 'communicative process', which in turn this study needed to engage with other analyses (apart from social capital

analysis itself) including power analysis, rhetorical analysis and the analysis of the logic of policy deliberation (details will be discussed in section 2.4). By focusing this area, the analysis of social capital extends to examine how social capital activates power exercised by core actors to bond different actors as a policy network. The analysis also extends to explore how social capital supports effective communication through the support of the role of cooperative facilitators and conflicting mediators. As mentioned earlier, these linkages of social capital analysis and policy network governance analysis are scoped (set boundaries) by adopting the two meta-theories: IRC and CAT.

Regarding the focus on urban agriculture, it relates to my personal background. Before doing a PhD, my works were related to 'agricultural policy' and 'local food system'. I know some policy actors engaging in the City Farm programme well, especially when joining the previous programme namely 'Food Security' programme since 2008. Urban agriculture arrived at my attention after the end of this programme. The programme concludes that food insecurity in Thai society is a risk of urban area where urban dwellers depend highly on food transportation from remote rural area without their own local food system. This programme's recommendation led to the endorsement of the City Farm programme in mid-2010, which was a few months prior to my PhD journey. Like other PhD students, I seek for researching the topic that was relevant to my previous experiences and situated in the stage that I could collect and analyse information which was capable to contribute to knowledge. The promotion of urban agriculture in Bangkok by plural actors can be also characterised well with the concepts of policy networks and collaborative governance that I am focusing. Besides, I could notice the existence and active functions of social capital among UA policy network's constituent organisations and groups. So, I decided to walk with the programme by exchanging knowledge and information with them during I was based in London particular from DPU Urban Agriculture module and experiences of the London Capital Growth (details of our exchanges will be provided in 3.3.1 where I will reveal my own positionality in doing this project). As a consequence, the journey of my PhD was nearly at the same time of the journey of this programme which makes this project lively.

Moreover, by studying the period of flooding, this study aims to understand social capital and policy network governance in a context of disasters. It should be noted here that the flooding is a surprise of this project. The impact of the disaster on this project is, firstly, that certain interactions were intensified. Collective actions were organised every day in the time of crisis, while collective actions were organised 4-5 times a month during preliminary fieldwork conducted in the time of pre-disaster (considering the frequency). Apart from that, the number of participants in the time of disaster was 80-120 which were roughly 1.5-2 times higher than in the pre-disaster period.

Secondly, some actors became more prominent. Powerful organisations (the analysis will be made in Chapter 4) did not lead every collective event. Some others organisations and groups could initiate and play a leading role (supported or backed up by the powerful organisations) in such turbulent period such as the more prominent role of the online group called 'City Farm City Friends' in organising volunteers and the role of the Media Centre for Development in mediating the conflict related to organic matters in the time of crisis (this issue will be discussed in Chapter 7).

Thirdly, traditional power structures were altered during such period. The formal governmental mechanism (structural power embedded in political and bureaucratic systems) faced with a legitimacy crisis (distrust) as a consequence of the failures in prediction of risk, flood control and food aids (details will be provided in Chapter 1). In relation to that, the civil society could challenge that traditional power structure, and their outstanding role in food aiding promoted their power in leading the flood management in many aspects (this issue will be discussed in Chapter 6). However, the power structure embedded in the culture made more influence in the time of crisis such as the power of the King speech on self-sufficiency and the Buddhist idea on self-reliance (this analysis will be addressed in Chapter 6 and 7).

Lastly, there was a more intensive communication among policy actors during the disaster than during the pre-disaster (observed during the preliminary fieldwork) as a consequence of the distrust in the central governmental information sources. This distrust in turn open the door for bringing alternative information sources to discuss

in communicative forums. These sources were developed by people themselves including that based on local knowledge (see the analysis in Chapter 6).

The initial review indicates that IRC and CAT scholars do not pay sufficient attention to risk and uncertain governance. Debates do not address times when crisis is experienced. So, this study will explore an area that is not yet fully understood in existing studies and brings together existing debates between IRC and CAT to discuss disaster governance, which has become a global concern and there are still gaps in current knowledge (Pelling, 2011; Renn, 2008). The suggestion from many commentators of this project gaining from various forums is that I should conduct comparative studies between the situations with and without crisis. In doing so, I will make a strong theoretical reflection. I would respond that the comparison could not be conducted because after disaster crisis Bangkok faced another crisis known as a political crisis. As a consequence, it is hard to make a comparative study in a changing context from one crisis to another crisis. So, the study in the time of crisis becomes both the scope and limitation of this study.

III Main arguments and an overview of methods

In order to understand relations between social capital and the emergence and characterisation of the policy network in relation to the first objective requires network and power analysis. This study argues that different forms of social capital (that could not identify specifically at this stage) influence the emergence of a policy network by determining the status of the network's constituent actors and power relations between them. In the context of highly centralised regime such as Thailand, there could be an imbalance in power relations between the network's constituent actors, which could bring about a centralised network in which a handful of powerful organisations play a hegemonic role, and maintain a hold strong social capital with many other actors as well. Furthermore, this study argues that social capital activates power relations in characterising the policy network by determining who is included and excluded. Considering that shared rules and norms are forms of social capital, this study argues that exclusion from the policy network can be a result of biased rules and norms shared by those that are included in policy network's constituent organisations and groups.

Regarding the second objective, this study argues that insufficient cooperation and conflicts could be developed from both self-interest accounts of network's constituent actors and beyond. Besides, cooperation enhancement and conflict resolution may stem from an agreement and mutual understanding. Reciprocity and moral obligation as forms of social capital can link an agreement and mutual understanding to a decision to cooperate and handle conflicts. An ability of core organisations and groups (as cooperative facilitators) to propose a practical reason and making a better argument could support their success in building agreement and mutual understanding. When communication takes place, each actor attribute (including power), its logic and emotional expression affects their ability to persuade and convince to reach an agreement and a mutual understanding. This study therefore argues that reasoning based on instrumental and cultural rationalities affect the different stages of the claim-making process. Shared norms and shared forms of knowledge, which can be both technical and local knowledge, as forms of social capital, affect the ways in which actors justify their reasoning. They refer to norms and knowledge in order to differentiate between right and wrong. More specifically in the case of conflict resolution, this study argues that the role of mediators, who have outstanding social capital with many others, might be important in enabling agreement and mutual understanding.

In short, the main argument is that social capital activates power exercised by core actors which in turn shapes the policy network (this will be discussed in Chapter 4) and affects its characterisation (this will be discussed in Chapter 5). Besides, social capital supports the role of core actors (as facilitators) in making agreement on the reason to cooperate through communicative process (this will be discussed in Chapter 6). It also supports the role of mediator(s) in making agreement and developing mutual understanding for handling conflicts (this will be discussed in Chapter 7).

The methods used to examine these arguments are mostly qualitative. Only the degree of closeness, understood as a basic tool to capture social capital used a quantitative survey and computing-based network analysis. This analysis is useful as a starting point before digging deeper into understanding each form of social capital through qualitative methods, including interviews and observation. The qualitative

data is also used for analysing narrative-based networks as an alternative analysis to the aforementioned computing-based network. The background information of the interviewees was examined through structured interviews, but they were coded using quantitative analysis software. Apart from the above, basic qualitative data collection and analysis were applied. To begin with, the research mainly gained information through observations of collective action, conducting interviews, focus group discussions and in-depth sub-case studies. Some information was gained from the review of relevant grey literature, including the analysis of legal frameworks, policy documents, project proposals, organisational and group profiles, meeting reports, progress reports, data bases, websites, and Facebook pages. Regarding methods to analyse the data, the research mainly used content analysis by deciphering documents and wordings from interviewees and participants of the focus groups and observed collective actions under the relevant theoretical perspectives, which are developed in the analytical framework presented in Chapter 2. This study attempts to establish the middle-ground by avoiding the extremely contrasting approaches proposed by the two theories: both the IRC's methodological individualism (such as game analysis) and CAT's interpretive approach (such as abductive cognition). A more detailed account of the methodology adopted for this study will be presented in the methodological chapter (Chapter 3).

IV Structure of the thesis

The thesis contains seven chapters. The first chapter provides relevant background information about the Thai food regime, the Bangkok food system, Bangkok's flooding, the UA policy network and collective actions of the policy network. This chapter provides an overview of what happened in Bangkok before, during and shortly after the flooding starting in mid-November 2011 and ending in early-January 2012. The chapter begins by explaining the food regime in Thailand and how it shapes the Bangkok food systems and food culture in the capital city. Following this, problems of food shortages during Bangkok's flooding are described as the chapter examines the problems of mainstream food aid during the disaster, which is particularly significant due to the centralisation of food distribution by food corporations that hold monopoly in the market and the one-size-fits-all approach of the government. The discussion focuses on the lack of access to food by the most

vulnerable groups affected by the flood, such as slum communities settled along the river and peri-urban farmers. The discussion then looks at an alternative system for responding to gaps in the mainstream food system: the consolidation of the policy network on UA. In looking at the latter, the analysis then explores how actions to promote the alternative urban food system by multiple actors were governed between late 2010 (when the City Farm programme was endorsed and began to create a network of organisations and groups working related to UA by creating collective actions among them) and early 2012 (shortly after the flooding). The chapter ends by raising a number of concerns related to the emergence and characterisation of the policy network before the disaster took place and lessons that should be learned from achievements to mobilise collective actions of the policy network in dealing with the food agenda during and shortly after the flooding.

Chapter 2 presents the theoretical background that informs the analytical framework. The discussion starts with a review of the policy network approach by drawing attention to criticism by scholars who claim that this approach is a metaphor rather than a theory as it has limited explanatory power. Then the chapter points the contributions of IRC and CAT to enhance the power of explanation of policy network governance. Next, section 2.2 explores the notion of social capital within a policy network by recognising that the discussion around social capital in the existing literature is extensive and has generated contrasting conceptualisations. In relation to this, the chapter expands on the benefits of using IRC and CAT to capture social capital. It then reviews how IRC and CAT help to understand the role of social capital in facilitating the emergence, characterisation and functioning of the network in overcoming collective action problems. The chapter ends with the analytical framework, which is developed from applying existing frameworks that recognise IRC and CAT perspectives on social capital, power, rationality and collective action problems in network governance.

Chapter 3 presents the methodology. This chapter brings in the analytical framework to frame the methods adopted for this study. The chapter begins by describing the research approach in which qualitative methods were used and supported by some quantitative methods. Following the operational definition of each key notion, the chapter presents the methods for examining the arguments mentioned in the

Introduction for both collecting and analysing data. This chapter pays attention to some specific methods, including those for collecting relational data, developing policy network diagrams, analysing network structures by adopting power relations analysis, and understanding the communicative process through rhetorical analysis and by analysing the logic of deliberation. The chapter, then, presents a description of profiles of selected organisations and groups.

The following four chapters are devoted to the discussion of the findings. Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the role played by social capital in facilitating the emergence of the UA policy network in Bangkok. It provides a story of policy network's emergence, maps closeness among the policy network's constituent actors, and examines different forms of social capital of these actors' rational and normative commitments. Shared forms of knowledge are also analysed as a facet of social capital. The last section of the chapter analyses power relations to draw a relationship between each form of social capital and the policy network's emergence. The chapter claims that each form of social capital can activate power, which in turn glues plural organisations and groups together as the policy network's constituent actors. This chapter highlights the role of powerful organisations, who held social capital with other members of the policy network and could exercise their power to influence others' decision making the most. The discussion is also touches upon the way powerful organisations played a hegemonic role over other organisations and groups, and how they exercised their power, including instrumental power (based on rules, incentives and punishments), communicative power (based on persuasion and negotiation) and structural power (embedded in socio-cultural and political-bureaucratic structures).

Departing from the previous analysis, Chapter 5 examines how other organisations and groups exercised their power in the face of powerful organisations mentioned in the previous chapter. The focus is on relations between the social capital holding within each policy community operating within the policy network and the way they exercise power. This chapter discusses how non-powerful organisations could also play a role in characterising the policy network. The chapter also discusses how an imbalance in power relations between powerful organisations and other members was related to unequal social capital. Then, the discussion goes on to unravelling

power struggles between certain organisations and groups that safeguard a degree of centralisation by keeping powerful organisations that influence the policy network in check. Furthermore, the chapter analyses how the power of relationships can lead to the exclusion of some organisations and groups. In doing so, shared rules and norms as forms of social capital are emphasised as they can determine who is included and excluded, depending on their acceptability on rules of engagement and norms shared by the majority.

Moving on, chapter 6 discusses how social capital played a role in enhancing cooperation in the crisis. The chapter begins by giving details about cooperation between the policy actors during and shortly after flooding in Bangkok. A case of mobilising support in making and using effective microorganism balls is used to analyse remarkably successful cooperation enhancement among the policy network's constituent organisations and groups. Then the chapter analyses how cooperation enhancement is a consequence of an agreement derived from finding a more convincing argument and reaching a practical reason that are a result of communicative processes in which different forms of social capital are at play.

After paying attention to the potential of social capital in cooperation enhancement, chapter 7 examines how social capital played a role in dealing with conflicts in the crisis. The chapter begins by presenting conflicts among the policy network's constituent organisations and groups that were found during and shortly after the flooding. The highlighted conflicts include conflicts developed from different expectations; conflicts related to contrasts between scientific and local knowledge; conflicts developed from scaling down the national political conflict; and conflicts based on different degrees of acceptable practices defined as organic. The last one is brought to analyse how the conflicts were handled by emphasising the communicative process in which an agreement and mutual understanding were made. The chapter argues that the reputable and trusted organisational leader, who shared rules, norms and knowledge with the conflicting stakeholders, could play an important role in mediating conflicts through communicative process.

Finally, the concluding chapter wraps up multi-arena of the role of social capital, moving from how it facilitates the policy network's emergence, shaping the network

characteristics, to helping to enhance cooperation and support conflict resolution. Then, this last chapter points to the advantages and disadvantages of the articulation of IRC and CAT by recognising their contrasting assumptions in three domains. The first one is to combine both rational and normative commitments in conceptualising both concrete and abstract forms of social capital. The second one is to understand cooperation and conflicts within policy networks by considering both self-interest account and beyond. The discussion then moves onto the last one that is to analyse the role of social capital in governing policy networks through an analysis of power relations. In the end, the thesis presents the limitations of this research and orientations for future research based on the aforementioned limitations.

Chapter 1

The Thai food regime, the Bangkok food system, flooding in Bangkok, and urban agriculture's policy network

Introduction

This chapter provides necessary background information about the case study. The discussion begins with the problems faced by Bangkok's food system in relation to the Thai food regime. To highlight these issues the analysis focuses on the food shortages experienced during Bangkok's flooding between mid-November 2011 and early-January 2012. In this chapter, it is argued that such problems originated from the existing food system in Bangkok, which was shaped by monopolistic food corporations and centralised food distribution. These problems were aggravated when the existing governance system led by the central government adopted a one-size-fit-all approach. This affected food accessibility during the floods for the most vulnerable groups who required special support. The chapter then shifts to examine the policy network on urban agriculture (UA) and its roles during and shortly after the floods. It includes an explanation of the fact that although the policy network could not function as an alternative food system because of its small scale, it was able to fill the gap in the mainstream system in many ways. Finally, the chapter discusses a number of concerns about the emergence and characterisation of the policy network, and its collective action in dealing with the food agenda in a disaster context. These concerns in turn provide further reasons why the project is important and suggest the types of theories that are needed to frame the study which will be discussed in the next chapter.

1.1. The food regime in Thailand and how it shapes the food system and culture in Bangkok

The Green Revolution has affected the Thai food regime since 1961 when the first Thai development plan included it as a strategy for development. The government changed the way people grow food to increase productivity by supporting research on agricultural science and technology and promoting chemical fertilisers sold by food industries. However, the report of CropWatch Research Institute (2009, p.149)

43

shows that productivity had increased by a mere 30% over 40 years while Thai farmers spent 30% more on farm investment. They used chemical products imported from abroad, roughly 3.867 million tonnes per year, with a value of roughly 45,000 million Baht per year (US$15,000 million). In 2009, the EU found that Thai fruits and vegetables were the most contaminated by chemicals in comparison to other sources exported to EU and it also was found that 72% of farmers in the region owed debt of 40,000 Baht (US$1,330) per household. Moreover, since 2007 the energy crisis resulting from peak oil has clearly affected the Thai economy. Indeed, Thailand is the most heavily dependent country on oil in Asia (about 40% of GDP), particularly in the agricultural sector, partly as a result of development promoted for the Green Revolution (CropWatch, 2009, pp.149-150; Office of Agricultural Economics, 2011). Consequently, there was an emphasis on growing energy plants rather than food, which in turn has become a challenge for the future of food security of the country.

The effect of the Green Revolution on the Thai food regime also contributed to an unjust food system, monopolised by a few food corporations. The main corporations that have influenced Thai agricultural sectors since 1961 until now, are CP, Betagro and Saha Farm. These are owned by Thai investors. The largest one is CP, a company that has been in business in Thailand since 1921. The market value of CP is no less than 125,000 million Baht (US$4,170 million). Since 1997, the company has entered the top 5 of world chicken producers and exporters. There are roughly 200,000 staff (half of them are Thai)[1] and 200 sub-companies in 30 countries. CPF is the main food company under the CP group. There are 7,000 Thai farmers working under their farming contact and many of their food products are found in the modern trade market.

Large food corporations are part of the same network which they collaborate rather than compete with one another, and they have close links with the government by supporting political parties. They therefore benefitted from public policy throughout modern Thai history (they have had a visible role since the 1960s). These food corporations shape the modern trade system. They own discount and convenience

---

[1] In mid-2014, worldwide media reported that the CP has also involved with slavery and human trafficking (e.g. the Guardian and New York Times published in June 13, 2014).

stores, which can be found everywhere, particularly in the modernised city, and also attempt to develop their own brands. These food stores control food production, food distribution and also shape consumer food culture and partly affect the reduction of local food variety. They have forced farmers to sell their products to them under the contract farming system (until now) by which 90% of the total farming costs is spent buying their products such as seeds, fertilizers and agricultural equipment - a system that government policy has always supported (Leaunjumroon et al., 2011).

These corporations control a large portion of household spending on foods – which on average is 32% of the total income (BioThai, 2013) – and for the urban poor the figure is even higher. Farmers too depend on the corporations' food business. 70% of farmers still need to buy food from food markets, which are mostly controlled by monopolistic corporations (Food Security Programme, 2010). Merely 30% of them can depend on food from their own farm and natural food sources without the need to buy food. These farmers live in the rural area, where accessibility to markets is limited and natural food is still available, such as food from the community forest and natural lake (ibid). Moreover, the corporations with a monopoly in the market also control hybrid seeds globally valued at 1,659 million Baht per year (roughly 55 million US dollars) (97%); the rest was only 3% and valued merely 57 million Baht (roughly 2 million US dollars) (Thai Seed Trading Association, 2011). CP (Thailand), Monsanto (US), Syngenta (Switzerland), Pacific Seed (Thailand), East-West Seeds, and Pioneer Hybrid (Thailand) are the corporations that invest in and earn from seed control. For the largest proportion of market values on vegetable seeds, the joint-venture between Monsanto Cargill (US) and CP Cargill Seed is dominant.

A research project focused on the largest food corporation in Thailand namely CP, conducted by CorpWatch, confirms the above trends (CorpWatch-Thailand, 2009). CorpWatch mentioned that the impacts of large food corporations on the Thai food regime are more significant than what they found when focusing on one corporation. However, the outcome of their research on the largest case shows how the largest food corporation has an impact on the design and control of the food regime. After the spread of H5B1 disease (avian influenza viruses in chickens), open chicken farms owned by small-scale farmers and low-cost food corporations were banned

and no longer received support from the Thai central government. As a result, CP, which invests highly in environmental control systems (close systems), now monopolises the chicken market. Between 2005 and 2009, their products in the market consisted of roughly 2,000 tonnes each year surveyed and its value was 390-520 million Baht per year (US$13-17 million) (ibid, p.16). The well-known convenience stores that are part of the '7-11' franchise system, found at every street corner and open 24 hours, are also owned by CP. Besides, the company has had close links with the government and bureaucracy, particularly since 1988, when the corporation offered Prem Tinnasoolanon, the ex-prime minister, to be the president of the advisory board (ibid, p.34). Many ex-ministers of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and former army chiefs were also offered to be the member of the advisory board by the company, such as General Sujinda Crapayun (since 1992) and General Sonthi Bunyaratkarin (since 2006) (ibid). Apart from that, the company usually offers high level retired civil servants consultancy jobs to secure links to the government bureaucracy. CP also pushes its people to high political positions, including the ministerial level in many government departments. For example, Arch Toulanon, the president of the one of the CP-affiliated corporations, was proposed to be the vice-minister of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives in 1992 and the vice-minister of the Ministry of Industry in 1998 (ibid, p.35). The daughter and niece of the CP president were also married to powerful national politicians (Veerachai Veerameteegoon and Wattana Maungsook respectively) (ibid, p.33).

How does the Thai food regime shape the food system and food culture in Bangkok? Food mapping in Bangkok undertaken by the Working Group on Food for Change (2012) and the study of Leaunjumroon and his team (2011) indicate that large food corporations control inputs to grow food, and convenience stores to sell and buy food products. Within Bangkok alone there were 232 discount and convenience stores as surveyed in 2012 by the Thai Climate Justice. The top 25 largest stores were built on total land area of 2,926 rai (1,157 acres), which is more than the total land used to build the 25 largest public parks in Bangkok of roughly 400 rai (158 acres) (Thai Climate Justice, 2012). Their package and marketing also shape the way people consume food, while their innovations also shape changes in food culture, such as promoting fast food, microwaveable and frozen food. Large monopoly food corporations influence and have a key role in controlling the country's food system,

and influence the food culture in large, modernised cities such as Bangkok. At the same time, the growth and expansion of the system that is monopolised and controlled by large food corporations, partly facilitated by the support of political and bureaucratic systems, have gradually destroyed small and medium enterprises as well as the local food system within the city. Such trends ultimately affect people's food choices. As a consequence, ordinary citizens have gradually been forced to buy products from hegemonic food corporations in the modern trade market, such as discount and convenience stores, which can be accessed easily from everywhere throughout the city.

Does Bangkok have its own local food system apart from the mainstream modern trade system monopolised by food corporations? There are still many full-time peri-urban farmers in Bangkok as a result of the 'City Planning Act 1975', which controls land use in order to maintain peri-urban farming areas as a green belt. Under the 'Land Development Act 1982' the government attempted to preserve the peri-urban farm area as an agriculturally valuable area by developing agricultural infrastructure, particularly irrigation systems. Recently, the government announced that some of these areas will be used for water storage and will also be a floodway to protect from flooding in the inner city. The area is therefore not appropriate for the development of the industrial and commercial sectors over farming. In 2011, a survey of the Office of Policy and Planning Division found that the number of full-time farming households working in Bangkok's peri-urban fringe was 13,774 from a total Bangkok population of 5,702,883 (Policy and Planning Division, 2012, p.6). They cultivate in the peri-urban areas of 180,305 rai (71,287 acres) (ibid, p.4). Though the survey by the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives in 2007 shows that 59.73% of Thai farmers worked on lease land and that the number of working on lease land was as high as 70% in the middle region of Thailand, the land in peri-urban Bangkok is mostly owned by farmers (87.4%, 74.5%, 77.3%, and 51.6% for a survey of four main farming districts located in the North West, North East, South West and South East (peri-urban fringe) as shown in figure 1.1). While these numbers may indicate that the food system in Bangkok is self-reliant, peri-urban agriculture in Bangkok cannot sustain a self-reliant local food system for three reasons. Firstly, the Green Revolution shaped farming in peri-urban Bangkok into an intensive mono-cropping and market-oriented food production system, which is not dissimilar from farming

practices in the majority of Thai rural areas. Peri-urban agriculture in Bangkok is therefore merged with the national agriculture system rather than representing a local one. Bangkok peri-urban farmers still depend on external inputs that are monopolised by a few food corporations, such as fertilisers, pesticides and even seeds. In other words, peri-urban agriculture in Bangkok does not have an identity and does not challenge but is part of the mainstream food system.

Figure 1.1. Bangkok land-use plan by which farming lands in peri-urban fringe are conserved

Source: Department of City Planning, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (2552)

Secondly, peri-urban farming cannot build a sustainable local food system as peri-urban farm land areas are decreasing gradually by 0.5-3% each year as many farmers decided not to invest in farming and left their land vacant or sold it to neighbours for construction (Bangkok Agricultural Extension Office, 2011). Many became employees in local shops and restaurants, street vendors, day-by-day paid labourers in industrial and commercial sectors (e.g. construction, care for the elderly, babies and disable persons, etc.) (Fieldwork interview with Sudhep Kulsri, a peri-urban farmer, 4/02/2012). The reason for these changes is that the average income from the

agricultural sector is roughly six times lower than in other sectors, and many Bangkok farmers cannot cope with seasonal flooding (Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 2007). The process of leaving land vacant and building houses on what was previously farm land, has intensified since the extension of overground and underground transportation systems starting in 1999, although the Department of City Planning still attempts to protect the peri-urban green belt by does not allow the use of farm land for other purposes. However, in practice, officers often lightly in implement the regulation and turn a blind eye to the building of individual houses on farm land.

The third reason why food produced in peri-urban land around Bangkok cannot contribute to a local food system is that the products would not necessarily be consumed by Bangkok habitants. For example, though rice production within Bangkok and on peri-urban land might be adequate to feed Bangkok dwellers, they do not always consume rice produced locally when they resort to buying from a nearby market. This can be explained by the implementation of a centralised and monopolised system of rice trading shaped by the national rice policy. This policy called 'rice subsidy scheme' is widely criticised for being a populist policy aiming to gain the political support from rice farmers, who constitute the majority of Thai citizens. Under rice policy and politics, the government offers to buy rice from the farmers by paying a higher price than the market value to subsidise them. As a consequence, the government holds large rice stocks from all over the country, including from Bangkok's peri-urban areas, as the rice farmers can make greater gain by selling rice to the government than selling on the market. The government has therefore become a monopoly rice trader which holds almost all rice and has centralised rice trading in the country. Hence, rice from everywhere in the country is mixed in government storage (both belonging to the government and rented from the private sector). Subsequently, the government organises the procurement process by providing quotas to other governments and private rice traders after reserving some in the rice bank to secure domestic demands in times of crisis or humanitarian aid for other countries. In the case of private rice traders, large, monopolised food corporations always win in the procurement process as they can offer the highest price. After getting a quota, each corporation packs the rice and sells some in the modern trade market while what remains is exported under the government

agreement, which attempts to guarantee rice supply within the domestic market at a capped price.

Based on this process, it can be noticed that rice stocks are mixed by the government before allocating them to the population and traders, which causes problems with defining rice origins. Rice produced in peri-urban lands around Bangkok might be eaten by people elsewhere or even exported, while rice consumed by Bangkok dwellers might come from rural Thailand. Under the centralised and monopolised system no one knows where the rice comes from, not even the traders. As a result, this process does not support local food systems as it is an obstacle to defining local food and identifying food miles. The population of Bangkok buys rice from the supermarket without knowing where the rice comes from, despite there being rice fields nearby.[2]

As for vegetables, although many kinds of them are produced within the city, inhabitants consume vegetables transported from all around the country and many parts of the world. A survey in 2011 exploring the impacts of food miles on Bangkok's ecological footprints by Suteethorn (2012) found that city dwellers consume 240 grams of vegetables on average per day. Merely 30% of all vegetables consumed in Bangkok are produced within the parameter of 100 kilometres. In the largest central market, Talat Thai, 50% of vegetables are produced more than 200 kilometres away. Roughly 721,438 Baht (US$24,048) is spent on vegetable transportation by trucks from rural Thailand to the central city markets in Bangkok every day. Suteethorn (ibid) argues that if Bangkok dwellers consume vegetables from within 50 kilometres, which includes the peri-urban farming areas, 263,324,870 Baht (US$8,777,495) would be saved per year.

While inhabitants of the city consume vegetables from many different origins, some vegetables produced in Bangkok are consumed elsewhere. This is a consequence of the supply chains of vegetables in Thailand that transport vegetables to the central

---

[2] Some Provincial Administration Offices attempt to branding local rice produced in the specific origin, such as Roi Ed and Supanburee jasmine rice. However, the information provided by Roi Ed Provincial Administration Office (2014) shows that during 2010 to 2013 this province could make a package for branding their provincial rice only 5-10% of the total product. The rest (and majority) was sold under the aforementioned system.

markets, particularly Talat Thai and See Mum Moung located on the fringes of Bangkok. The vegetables produced within Bangkok are also mixed with vegetables from elsewhere when sold on central markets. Retailers from all around the country buy the products from markets and sell them in supermarkets and local stores around the country. Vegetables produced in Bangkok can be transported by retailers to sell in the North or even the South of the country. Retailers in Bangkok transport vegetables from the central markets to sell at the super and local markets in the inner city and some sell vegetables directly at the customers' houses by carrying food on trucks, which creates a mobile market. Some food corporations also buy vegetables from the central markets as retailers before packing and selling the products under their brand to the modern trade markets, which are owned and controlled by food corporations, without information about the origin of the vegetables. Similar to the supply of rice, vegetable supply in Bangkok does not support the local food system but rather, is merged with the national mainstream food system.

Aside from the unclear role of peri-urban agriculture in feeding city dwellers, the majority of vegetables produced on the fringes of Bangkok are an output of the Green Revolution method of production and exhibit high chemical use, so they are not different from vegetables produced elsewhere in the country. Although it was found that some farmers produced organic vegetables in and near Bangkok, and send their products directly to corporations under strict farming contract to sell in super markets in Bangkok, such products were recently tested to find chemical contamination in food sold in many supermarkets around Bangkok (Thailand Foundation for Consumers, 2012). The reason for this is that the contract stipulates that farmers need to send their organic products to the corporation in specific amounts and on a regular basis. If they cannot supply sufficient amounts and fail to send their products on time in agreed quantities, they are penalised by paying three times the product value lost by the supermarket to the corporation. During an informal interview with a vegetable farmer under contract farming it was found that when he cannot produce organic products on time and in the required quantity, he avoided the penalty by sending some non-organic products mixed with organic ones to the supermarkets (Fieldwork interview with a farmer, 4/02/2012). The tests that found chemical contamination in vegetables, claimed to be organic, received attention by the media as it was presented in newspapers and discussed in television

51

programmes. Bangkok dwellers have lost trust in organic food products sold in modern supermarkets within Bangkok, even for famous brands. Besides, the organic shops that can be trusted are few and not located in the inner city (such as Lemon Farm, Golden Place, Rangsit Farm, and Rai Ploog Rak). Therefore customers require information, time and dedicated efforts to access organic vegetables in Bangkok, and it seems that just a few customers can afford them.

However, as farming is part of a cultural identity of Thailand, many Thai people who are not full-time farmers, including many inhabitants of inner-city Bangkok, attempt to grow their own food in their backyard and in collective gardens. In other words, apart from large-scale peri-urban farming, small-scale inner city farming by part-time farmers takes place mainly for subsistence purposes. Even though inner city farming is small-scale and only contributes to a minor extent to an alternative food system, in many respects it is able to play an important role specifically for the urban poor, such as slum dwellers and informal labourers who need to reduce food spending to exercise their right to food and to live in the city. It is also significant for vulnerable groups, such as hospital patients and school children, who require a secure intake of food. Inner-city farming has also become a choice for other city dwellers who want to escape from the injustice and irresponsible mainstream food system, particularly members of middle and upper classes. They distrust food from the markets and realise that healthy food must be either home-grown or grown by producers they know. Mainly, they produce for their own consumption, while some grow food to sell to niche green markets or green restaurants.

Food growing in inner-city Bangkok has been supported by many organisations and citizen groups, particularly since the City Farm programme was endorsed by the government in 2010. The actions by various organisations and groups converge and are integrated way under the umbrella of the City Farm programme, defined here as the policy network on UA. The details of this policy network will be provided in section 1.3 as a central unit of the analysis for this research. The next section will discuss the context in which the food issue became a serious issue in Bangkok, which happened as a result of the food shortages during the floods.

1.2. Food shortages during the flooding in Bangkok

Between mid-November 2011 and early-January 2012, many areas within the city faced the most disastrous flooding reported in roughly 70 years (Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, 2012). Even though flooding is expected in some areas of the city, during that period more than half of the city was flooded, affecting 36 districts out of a total of 50 as shown in figure 1.2. In some of these districts, water levels were higher than two meters (ibid). This caused many disruptions, including in relation to the food supply, even though Thailand is known as a farming country and the world's kitchen for its export of various agricultural products. However, the magnitude of the issue of food shortage can be explained by the fact that Bangkok dwellers, particularly those who live in the inner city, mainly depend on food transportation from peri-urban areas and outside the city controlled by a few monopoly food corporations. These food corporations have centralised food distribution by transporting foods to supermarkets and convenience stores around the country from a few or even one distributive units (Phoorisumboon, 2012). This in turn meant that risk was centralised, particularly when the centralised distributive unit was damaged and all food chains had collapsed. This was not only a risk for the corporations but also for customers who were dependent on food distributed by the corporations. When the floods became so severe that the main road was effectively a river, transportation was seriously interrupted. Many food industries with market monopoly were also flooded, so they could not produce or transport their products to supermarkets and convenience stores within the city, where food consisted of 67% of their products (ibid). The quantity of food provided by this distribution system was not enough to meet the demands of the consumers. As mentioned in the Introduction, some shops were closed, while food prices in the available shops were roughly 3-4 times higher than usual. In the case of fresh vegetables, shortage was not due only to the government allowing commercial farmers' gardens to flood; the central vegetable markets were also affected. See Mum Moung market was flooded in late October while the availability of fresh vegetables in Talat Thai market was reduced by approximately 50% (Wongaree and Sirichai, 2012). Vegetable prices from available food markets and stores were found to be ten times higher (Working Group on Food for Change, 2012).

As a consequence of the floods, food shortages occurred in the capital of a country that always considered itself as a land where food is abundant. The food shortages became apparent after the third week of the crisis as a survey by the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration in 15 October 2011 found that roughly 41,500 households (1.69% of the total 2,459,700 households) could not access enough food, while almost all people living in 36 districts of 50 had limited access to fresh products.

Figure 1.2. Flooding in Bangkok in late-2011

Source: The Nation [Available at: http://www.travelfish.org/blogs/thailand/2011/ 11/04/ bangkok-flood-update-november-4-2011/] [Accessed 15/01/2015].

The diet of many households was poor, due to the fact that inhabitants consumed the same dry food for many days, lacking fresh products particularly vegetables and that many resolved to eating rotten food. There were nevertheless other sources from which Bangkok citizens could expect to buy food, including the local markets, small local shops, mobile markets (selling food from trucks) and street vendors. Not having access to food in the modern supermarkets and convenience stores led to a food shock, because people were already used to buying food in the modern trade sector while other sources of food were uncertain and unpredictable. For example, mobile food markets changed their targets quite often, while traders in local markets would be present anytime they wanted, which was hard to predict. Phoorisumboon's study (2012) points out that the number of traders in local markets decreased every year and some local shops and markets were closed after supermarkets were built nearby as they could not compete with the marketing undertaken by the supermarkets as well as their convenience and promotion of modern lifestyles. Therefore, city dwellers became more dependent on monopolistic food corporations and their food chains, which made them insecure when food corporations were affected by the floods (See the example from photo 1.1). It can therefore be argued

that the reduction in the variety of food distribution and the higher dependency on monopolised modern trade were the main cause of food shortages during the floods.

Photo 1.1. Flooding the supermarket and convenience store

Source: AP [http://www.oknation.net/blog/print.php?id=760606] and Rishukung Multiply [http://rishukung.multiply.com] [Last accessed: 20/08/2014].

Not only did food shortages exacerbated food insecurity, but the city dwellers' right to food was also constrained, particularly the rights of marginalised groups, including slum dwellers living in informal settlements along the river and peri-urban farmers. Slum dwellers were not protected from the flooding and were blamed because their houses obstructed the flow of the water in the river, which allegedly caused delays in the flood waters draining to the sea through the main rivers. While the increase of food prices affected their efforts to buy food from the markets, the negative attitude of the public sector to them made their struggle for subsistence harder to bare. They did not receive special attention from the mainstream food aid programmes provided by the central government, even though these areas included some of the most vulnerable groups. Their relations with government agencies further deteriorated when members of these communities attempted to destroy the government water block systems that affected them.

As for the peri-urban farmers, the government decided to abandon food areas and turn them into a floodway to protect the industrial and commercial sectors within the inner city. Approximately 120 thousands rai (47,455 acres) of rice fields and about 3 thousands rai (1,186 acres) of horticultural lands were flooded. Aquaculture also suffered a loss, roughly 20 thousands rai (7,907 acres) of snakefish farms were affected and shrimp farms lost roughly 15 thousands rai (5,930 acres) (Policy and

Planning Division, 2012). The total losses are estimated at 51 billion Baht (US$1.7 billions): that of rice production was 43 billion Baht (US$1.4 billions) while horticultural products lost about 10 billion Baht (US$0.3 billion) (Office of Agricultural Economics, 2011). This increased the vulnerability not only of the farmers, but of consumers also, who depended on their production to feed themselves. Nevertheless, farmers became particularly vulnerable as they lost their properties, their houses and their farming equipment. Most importantly, because they could not earn from their products, they were forced to buy food from the market, like all other urban citizens. In other words, they lost their food which was their main source of income while at the same time, they needed more money to buy food. Although later on the government compensated them for the losses with 2,222 Baht (US$74) per rai, this compensation was a generalised estimate and it was too little, too late. Different products had different values of loss. Wonganannon (2012), a think tank working for the Research and Information Devision, critiques that the government paid the market price by adjusting a number that looked 'beautiful' and to be seen as a 'lucky number', which was generally low, by which some household planned to sell their product later when the price would be higher. Apart from that, the victims needed to wait for 3-4 months to receive compensation.

Regarding food aid as a response to food shortages, the mainstream aid system provided by the existing urban formal governance system of Bangkok received support from many corporations and international organisations. The existing urban governance system shaped the mainstream food aid governance into multiple and fragmented layers. The first layer was the role of the central government. Even though Bangkok is a semi-autonomous entity, its administration appears to be under another body in which the central government wants to have a role because the city is the largest political strategic area in the country. There are roughly 2,000 communities within 50 districts of 1,500 square kilometres (Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, 2011). As Bangkok is the primate city, the central government's stability also depends on its response to demands from its citizens. They are usually able to mobilise to challenge the corrupt government. Maintaining a level of contentment among its inhabitants is key to maintaining political stability.

Moving to the regional government, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration is a one-tier system. The governor is elected by inhabitants and is usually backed by a national political party. The political party that can win the election and forms the central government usually sends their representative to compete in the elections for the Bangkok governor. If they fail to win the elections, they are usually co-opted by the governor to take their side. In case the governor is the representative of the opposition party in parliament, the government will attempt to compete with the Bangkok governor in projects for the development of the city. During the floods, the Bangkok governor was a representative of the opposition party in the central government. Considering the system of formal and mainstream governance in dealing with the flooding, the central government competed rather than cooperated with the Bangkok governor (Orathai, 2012).

Within this urban governance structure, food aid consisted mainly of dry food such as instant noodles and canned fish. Some agencies also provided freshly cooked food packaged in plastic boxes. The government agencies set up a unit and contacted each community leader to go to the central unit and return the food packages to their neighbourhoods to be allocated to the community. However, the main problem was that of accessibility due to the centralised food aid system, which was designed for equal food allocation to city dwellers. There was a lack of improved food aid for the most vulnerable people, particularly slum dwellers and peri-urban farmers. In this sense, the UA policy network was not supported by peri-urban farmers, but instead needed to support them.

A further issue associated with the mainstream food aid system was its one-size-fits-all approach, by which the victims received the same kind of food (mostly dry food) while many households already had adequate stocks and what they wanted were vegetables, which the public sector could not provide. Informal chats with the victims reflect that there were many households eating the same kind of food for more than two weeks (Fieldwork interviews with members of Clonghog and Saladin communities, 25, 27/02/2012). Even though boxes of freshly-cooked food were also provided by some agencies, the organisation of the centralised food allocation unit meant that the leaders of communities located far from the unit took many hours to collect the food and return it before it rot.

Apart from government food aid, city dwellers also relied on mutual aid aimed at enhancing food security, people's right to food and climate change adaptive capacity in this period. There were many collective actions set up by organisations and groups to support this mutual aid system and to fill the gaps created by government food aid. The next section provides an overview of these many actions by multi-actors defined here as the policy network on UA.

1.3. The policy network on UA: actions by multi-actors to promote an alternative urban food system

As mentioned in section 1.1, many people grow small-scale vegetables in the inner city of Bangkok, both individually and collectively. Most of them do so for their own consumption but some also grow vegetables for restaurant customers. Others sell surplus products in local markets or to their neighbours, or even join a vegetable box delivery scheme (under the community supported agricultural system) supported by the Green Market Network since 2008. As for farming capacity, lack of water is not a general problem as people can at least use water from the 1,165 rivers that gave Bangkok the name 'River City' (Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, 2010). Inner city farming practices are different from the mainstream food system as such practices are mostly not based on mono-cropping and chemical use. Therefore inner city farming can promote an alternative food system for the city.

The recognition of UA in Bangkok has been recorded in terms of policy and planning since 1949. Inner city farms were promoted a few years after the end of the Second World War, when Thailand faced an economic crisis. The Prime Minister at that time, Plag Piboonsongkram, established a campaign to encourage urban dwellers to grow vegetables in their houses in response to the crisis. Over the years, the campaign faded away and terminated after the country recovered from the crisis in 1954, when the economic system became highly dependent on international investment in the commercial and industrial sectors. The government, instead, began to encourage city inhabitants to consume (to spend their money including for food-consumption) in an attempt to boost economic growth. Therefore, city dwellers had not been encouraged to grow their own food for over four decades, which was broken by the remarkable promotion of inner city farming at a local level in 1994. At that time, bio-organic consumption had become a trend. This was in high demand

amongst middle and upper class inhabitants of Bangkok. Many bio-organic restaurants appeared around this time as well as alternative food production around the country, including Bangkok, to supply good-quality produce for niche restaurants. The Thai government began supporting the organic movement by certifying organic products and shops. The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration also helped to promote organic consumption through their 1995 campaign called 'Let's be organic consumers' (Fieldwork interview with Narong Litkumron, head of farmer support and development unit, Bangkok Agricultural Extension Office, 14/03/2012). While the role of the public sector was largely passive, as mentioned, some private organisations were active; for example, private organisations such as Golden Place dedicated a large section of land in Praram Kaou in central Bangkok for rent to undertake organic farming. They opened organic shops such as Lemon Farm in 1995 to sell organic products and twelve Lemon Farm shops can now be found in Bangkok. These shops are the main choice for organic producers and customers in Bangkok apart from green markets.

Government policy makers again encouraged inner city farming in 1997 when Thailand faced a dramatic economic crisis known as the 'Tom Yum Kung' crisis. On 4 December 1997, the King, who the people respect as the father of the country, gave a speech about growing food in limited areas using low-input methods and for self-reliance. This became known as the King's 'New Approach of Farming'. The rationale for his idea was that the economic crisis was a result of being highly dependent on outsiders (international sectors, particularly external investments). To respond to the crisis, Thai people should increase their self-reliance while sharing with each other. This nationalistic ideology offers the scenario that the Thai people should associate their cultural roots with agriculture. They should recall that their ancestors survived by farming. The second message behind the King's discourse was that Thai people should be resilient by trying to adapt to changes, including by attempting to feed themselves by growing food in limited areas and using their own resources. In a nutshell, the King's suggestion encouraged Thai people to grow food everywhere, beyond limitations of scale and space. Learning centres were developed through the King's own projects; the most famous of which was Jitrutda Garden, located in central Bangkok. The government adopted his speech in order to respond to the economic crisis by proposing campaigns called 'following the King's

footpath' and allocated public spending to food growing everywhere in the country including Bangkok. Even though the economic crisis period (roughly from 1997 to 1999) was not the beginning of the story of support for inner city farming, this period is a clear starting point for the current food policy agenda. Building upon the King's ideas, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration launched a variety of programmes to support UA in the city implemented by 50 District Administration Offices, such as the establishment of UA learning centres. Some District Administration Offices also created their own initiatives, such as to develop a rooftop garden and to organise UA training courses (Laksi District Administration Office, 2012, pp.1-3). Some non-governmental and international organisations also played a role in supporting the issue. Most significant is the cooperation between the Thai Environment Institution (an NGO), the International Centre for Sustainable Cities (Canada) and the Canadian International Development Agency in promoting community vegetable gardens in inner-city Bangkok during 2000-2001 (Fraser, 2002).

However, the most up-to-date forms of support for UA in Bangkok and the most collaborative ones, which have created the largest network so far in the history of the city, are the multi-actions by multi-actors under the umbrella of the City Farm programme, which began in 2010. The programme was funded under the food and nutrition programme of the National Health Promotion Foundation, the Prime Minister's Office, and managed by many non-governmental bodies led by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, the Media Centre for Development, the Working Group on Food for Change, and the city farm association. The programme later combined many projects under its umbrella and is supported by many other organisations and groups framed here by the term 'policy network', which is used to capture a variety of related autonomous but interdependent policy actors and actions active with the same agenda as stated earlier. Between 2010 and 2012, this UA policy network was driven by collective gardens which were almost all located within the inner city of Bangkok (as shown in figure 1.3), green markets and the community-supported agricultural system. The survey by the City Farm programme's coordinator of 27 community garden projects (50%) in the first nine months of the programme found that these projects can create edible green spaces in

an average space of 2,202 square metres and reuse city waste by composting roughly 4,179.5 kilogrammes (City Farm Programme Progress Report, 2011).

The UA policy network was driven by the collective action of both governmental and non-governmental players. Such policy network governance can be understood by adopting a collaborative governance approach. When the notion of policy network is used, it is usually linked to a governance approach (deLeon and Varda, 2009; Rhodes, 2006, 1997). Most scholars refer to an approach that emphasises the collaboration of cross-sectoral multi-actors or multi-stakeholders, both governmental and non-governmental bodies (see Ansell and Gash, 2007; Armitage, 2008; Chhotray and Stoker, 2010; deLeon and Varda, 2009; Donahue, 2004; Huxham, 2000; Pierre, 2000; Rhodes, 1997). As Ansell and Gash (2007) argue, the approach is usually adopted for sector-specific governance issues and regularly at a small scale, such as watershed councils, community health partnerships, and natural resource co-management. This study takes this collaborative governance approach to understanding the specific issues associated with the functioning of the UA policy network. The common conditions of collaborative governance through the policy network synthesised from the existing literature are highlighted here based on the two different approaches of IRC and CAT, which will be explained in the next chapter. This research argues that the potential of the UA policy network in responding to urban food problems was to enhance an alternative governance system to fill the gap in the formal governance system. The collaborative governance of the policy network was formulated by merging the potential cooperation of each actor regarding the food agenda, which was a common agenda for all, even if some actors advocated for different targets and supported different political camps (details will be provided in Chapter 7). The next section explores the remarkable collaborative collective actions of the policy network during the disaster, while Chapters 4 to 7 discuss how different policy actors could take action collaboratively.

Figure 1.3. Mapping collective vegetable gardens within Bangkok supported by the City Farm programme in 2010-2012

Source: Providing addresses by the City Farm programme's coordinator and mapping by Noppanit Charassinvichai

1.4. Collective actions of the policy network in dealing with the food agenda during and after the floods

This study found that many collective actions were organised by constituent organisations and groups of the UA policy network to fill the gaps within the main food aid system provided by the existing formal urban governance structure. The following section presents how the City Farm programme's UA policy network responded to the food shortages during the crisis by developing alternative food aid, which focused on vulnerable people by mobilising actor networks and utilising the capacity of the local food system. The section focuses on understanding the actions of the policy network and its contributions during and shortly after the flooding.

1.4.1. To provide food for the most vulnerable people during the disaster

While the most vulnerable inhabitants did not receive special attention by the main governmental food aid system, the UA policy network focused on helping precisely these group, including slum dwellers living along the river and the peri-urban farmers. Food aid distributed by the policy network was primarily directed towards these most vulnerable urban dwellers mobilised from roughly 90 collective gardens of the City Farm programme's members from around the city, mainly the inner city as shown in figure 1.3.[3] While vegetables were rare and very expensive in the market, the food which had been allocated by the policy network mainly consisted of vegetables. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, Working Group on Food for Change, the Media Centre for Development and the Green Market Network mobilised and distributed food in cooperation with farmer groups who donated their vegetables collected from their collective gardens. They built four food-aid centres in different zones and allocated responsibility to different actors to collect and distribute food by area. Other organisations and groups also supported them by volunteering to quicken the food-collection and allocation process. Organisations such as 'Health-me Organic Delivery' helped by transforming the collected vegetables to freshly cooked foods to provide for the victims who could not cook for themselves as illustrated in photo 1.2. In total, vegetables and freshly cooked foods were allocated to roughly 100 vulnerable groups, including slum dwellers and peri-

---

[3] Profiles of the collective gardens will be presented in Chapter 3.

urban famers who were affected by the floods (Fieldwork interview with Nardsiri Komonpan, coordinator of the City Farm programme, 21/03/2012).

Photo 1.2. Fresh cooked food provision for flood victims

Source: Photo use authorised by Health-me Organic Delivery

1.4.2. Providing materials and know-how for the production of emergency food

The proverb 'to enhance the ability to fish is better than to give fish' became the development approach of the UA policy network during the floods (Fieldwork interview with Nardsiri Komonpan, coordinator of the City Farm programme, 21/03/2012). The main idea is that teaching people to grow food is more sustainable than to give them food. Apart from food allocation, the policy network therefore provided a set of materials called 'Green Life Bag' and know-how on easy and short-term food production, such as sprouts and mushrooms, to flood victims. Mobile training was organised to enhance the capacity for self-reliance of the flood victims. The programme emphasised sharing knowledge on vegetables that are easy to grow (see photo 1.3), menus, and cooking methods. The City Farm programme's training centres played a significant role in this mission, particularly the Media Centre for Development. It provided basic growing materials to help people survive for one to three months. These included a sprout growing bucket, which could produce three kilogrammes of sprouts every three days. The mushroom growing set included 20 chunks of mushrooms and each chunk could produce one kilo of mushrooms. Each household could therefore produce twenty kilogrammes of mushrooms from the twenty chunks handed over to them (Hutapate, 2011, pp.5-7).

Photo 1.3. Mobile training for flood victims on growing easy and short-term food

Sources: Photo use authorised by the City Farm programme's coordinator and the staff of the Media Centre for Development

The training centres worked in cooperation with the Health Promotion Foundation and the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation both to promote vertical farming and hanging gardens as methods for growing, and to recommend on the product that could be easily home-grown, such as growing morning glory, cabbage, watercress, chilli, holy basil and mint. In order to make sure that water was clean enough for growing food, they used a strainer. It could not guarantee drinking water quality but it was good enough for growing sprouts, mushrooms and general vegetables (Ibid, 2011, pp.5-7). Some training was organised for flood victims by the Media Centre for Development, one of the core training centres, where teaching provided knowledge and materials about energy self-reliance. The energy sets, for example, included a sun-powered rice cooking box in which flood victims could cook rice without electricity (Fieldwork interview with Kornrachanok Hutapate, coordinator of the Media Centre for Development, 14/01/2012).

1.4.3. Developing food innovations for living with water

After it was forecasted that the floods would take longer than it was original thought, the main actors of the policy network attended a meeting to share experiences and develop food innovations for how to live submerged in water. They attempted to learn and share food innovations adapted to the circumstances, as illustrated in photo

1.4. The key actors leading the movement were from the training centres, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, the Working Group on Food for Change, the Green Market Network, many farming groups who anticipated the City Farm programme, and volunteers. During the flooding, I found that websites and Facebook pages were exchanging knowledge and innovations about food-growing.

Innovative practices were sprouting everywhere: a rooftop garden, vertical garden and food growing in containers are just some of the practices that were promoted. These new methods were developed by the City Farm programme since 2010, though some key actors practised them before. During the flooding, the practices developed by these groups were shown and shared. Some training centres engaged in the City Farm programme, particularly the 'Veggie Price' training centre, attempted to develop a model of floating gardens that was compatible with Bangkok's urban environments by learning from experiments elsewhere, such as learning from floating gardens developed in the countryside of Thailand (namely Rathchathanee Asoke, located in Warinchumrab, Ubonrathathanee). Some international experiences also inspired city farming training centres, such as the floating gardens in Inle lake, Burma and Gaibandha, Bangladesh.

Photo 1.4. Promoting food innovations for living with water

Source: Photos owned by the researcher

It is clear that the online social networks were used to transfer these experiences. Roughly 5,000 people became friends of the City Farm programme's Facebook

page[4], and each organisation and group within the UA policy network also has its own Facebook and fan-pages. In order to inspire city dwellers to develop floating gardens, the city farm trainers cooperated with farming groups engaged with the City Farm programme and volunteers built pilot floating gardens for the slum community settled along the river, which demonstrated how floating gardens worked (see photo 1.5 in the left hand). Even after the flooding disaster, floating gardens are still being promoted in anticipation of future risks, and are becoming more popular. The designs for floating gardens were diverse as each locality attempted to use local materials which were available to them. Plastic cans were used instead of weeds, because they were easier to find in the city, such as banana trees and mango leaves. Some communities were funded by the City Farm programme when they were able to show their capacity to build a floating garden. For example, the Saladin community received financial support after the community leaders proposed the development of floating gardens along the river (see photo 1.5 in the right hand). The community succeeded in growing and providing basil, Thai aubergine, cucumber and hot chilli to its members. The City Farm programme also provided funding to a training centre to experiment with the development of floating rice fields. The experiment has not yet come to fruition at the time of this study.

Photo 1.5. Pilot floating gardens

Source: Photos owned by the researcher

One particular innovation that inspired many was the application of traditional farming techniques, namely an effective microorganism (EM) ball, to improve soil

---

[4]This number was checked in February 2012. The recheck in October found that the number had increased to roughly 26,100.

quality for producing short-term vegetables and to reduce polluted water. The campaign was strengthened by the city farming training centres, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, the Working Group on Food for Change, and farming groups. There were five main nodes and many sub-nodes that mobilised human labour, including volunteers who made EM balls. Roughly 75,000 EM balls were built and distributed to city dwellers by every node every day, and roughly 1,000 people joined every day (Fieldwork interview with Potip Pechporee, an event organiser of Green Market Network, former of Organic Way and owner of Health-me Organic Delivery, 17/02/2012). The media was also interested in EM ball promotion by broadcasting and reporting relevant events. Many celebrities, such as singers, television drama actors and actresses, and teenage idols joined EM ball related events. These phenomena illustrates the influence of the UA policy network on society in terms of their ability to raise attention, mobilise social support and train people on how to deal with short-term food shortages and environmental problems. (More details will be given in Chapter 6.)

However, the conviction that the EM balls can improve soil quality and polluted water was challenged by university environmental scientists and certain actors of the UA policy network, including the funder, the Health Promotion Foundation. They argued that in theory, the time-span over which land was flooded was not long enough to truly enhance soil quality. They claimed that it did not necessarily reduce the amount of polluted water, and could actually increase pollution. Actors of the policy network advocating in favour of EM balls responded by using evidence from their practices. Nevertheless, debate between practical local knowledge and scientific knowledge on the functions and conditions of using EM balls endured. It will be expanded on in Chapter 6 and 7 as it relates to both the discussions on cooperation enhancement and conflict resolution.

1.4.4. Supporting the mutual aids during flooding

More than a hundred collective gardens were developed by city farming groups engaged with the City Farm programme. During the flooding, the policy network not only enhanced food self-reliance of such groups (including communities) and provided food to vulnerable people but also supported mutual aid among self-reliant groups, other members of the City Farm programme and their neighbours, who had

also been affected by flooding. For example, the policy network supported mutual aid between city farm producers and customers who joined the community-supported agriculture (CSA) system initiated under the umbrella structure of the City Farm programme, and facilitated by the Green Market Network and the Working Group on Food for Change.

Peri-urban farmers who were members of the CSA had been affected by flooding and became more vulnerable. Their customers, who were members of the CSA led by the green restaurant 'Health-me Organic Delivery' in cooperation with the Green Market Network and the Working Group on Food for Change, decided to help the CSA peri-urban farmers by providing them with daily food. They established free cafeterias near the flooded areas. They played a key role in providing cooking materials, including vegetables reserved for their restaurants and produced by their own labour, while the flood victims organised themselves to cook and provide food. The cafeteria became a daily space to cook and eat for local farming households who faced the effects of flooding. Health-me Organic Delivery provided information that these cafeterias could feed roughly 2,100 victims from five different areas located in peri-urban Bangkok (Fieldwork interview with Potip Pechporee, owner of 'Health Me' restaurant, 17/02/2012). This case shows a reciprocal relationship: while customers including green restaurants depended on food transported from peri-urban farmers by being members of the CSA system in a normal situation, during the flooding they did the opposite by providing food to the farmers.

1.4.5. Recovering city farms shortly after the flooding

Shortly after the flooding, the UA policy network's constituent organisations and groups continued to play a role in responding to the urban food agenda. Collective actions to recover city farms were an outstanding example. For example, the community garden of Poonshup community, Saymai, which was granted by the City Farm programme, had recovered after facing large-scale flooding (see photo 1.6 in the left hand). The key actors of the policy network, including the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, the Media Centre for Development and the Working Group on Food for Change, were present when the slum dwellers' network played an outstanding role in organising an event by preparing food for participants and mobilising donations. An interview with the community leader found that there were

roughly 80 volunteers and roughly 15,000 Baht (US$500) were donated to recover the community garden after spending just 2,000 Bath (about US$70). The leader said that the community kept 1,500 Baht (US$30) to maintain the garden and donated the remaining funds to four other slum communities towards recovering and developing their garden (Fieldwork interview with Vimon Thavilpong, leader of Poonshup community, 22/03/2012).

In nursing homes for children and women facing physical or mental violence, city farms also played a vital role. Four apartments had been built since 1980 by the government to provide for children and women who faced difficulties integrating society, such as rape victims, HIV patients, pregnant teenagers and those facing domestic violence. Roughly 150-200 children and women lived there and required mental therapy. They created a vegetable garden in the communal space covering 1.5 rai (around 0.6 acres) in 2008 and used it to cook for members until it was flooded in 2011. Every weekend from 12th March to 30th April 2012, the common farm in the area of the departments had been recovered collectively by many organisations and groups engaged in the policy network (see photo 1.6 in the right hand). The main actors were the training centres of the City Farm programme, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, the Working Group on Food for Change, and some groups of people engaged with the City Farm programme. Such collective actions were also supported by volunteers and donors, who were called upon through the online group 'City Farms, City Friends' funded by the City Farm programme.

Photo 1.6. Recovering city farms after the flooding

Source: Photo use authorised by the City Farm programme's coordinator

1.4.6. Sharing seeds shortly after the flooding

Seed sharing, or *Pa-pa Maletpun*, is a traditional agricultural culture in Thailand. However, it had never been part of the culture of UA. The UA policy network first introduced it for city farming. Seed sharing had begun by collecting seeds which were distributed to those who needed them. The tradition is based on the kindness of the givers and the belief that 'seed is life': to give a seed is to give a life. After the flooding, many city farmers, including peri-urban farmers, needed to begin their life again, for which a seed was the basic, fundamental requirement, especially for farmers. Seed sharing was not only a way to provide help to reduce the costs of farming but also encouraged farmers following their drastic loss, to begin anew. By the same token, by avoiding the purchase of seeds, this tradition was also a way to boycott the mainstream food system in which everything, even a seed, is monopolised by large food corporations.

Photo 1.7. Seed sharing after flooding

Source: Photos owned by the researcher

There were many seed-sharing events organised by the key actors of the policy network (see the example of seed sharing at Keha Tung Songhong from photo 1.7); the main actors were the Working Group on Food for Change, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, the Green Market Network, and training centres. The events involved exchanges from farmers who did not suffer the impact of flooding to those who did and from rural farmers to urban growers. The actors who did not have seeds could also join the events by donating money to the organisers to buy local seeds

from alternative sources. Seeds bought from the monopolised corporations were not accepted. The events for seed-provision were organised in appointment places where an exhibition and seminars took place to share and learn from each other about experiences with food problems during the flooding.

1.4.7. Raising awareness on urban food security, right to food, and adaptation to climate change

After the flooding, the policy network played a role in enhancing awareness of urban food security, the right to food, and adaptation to climate change through campaigns such as the campaign for food growing in the city, protecting city farming area and improving farmers' quality of life, developing a greener city, and building more flexible food systems to increase adaptive capacity to respond to future extreme climate events. The website and Facebook page of the City Farm programme have become important channels to create and organise campaigns, while other websites and Facebook pages were used to support by tagging and sharing.

Campaigns by the policy network also adapted to the situation at hand. For example, there were tonnes of household waste to dispose of after the flooding. Many actors of the policy network collaborated to campaign for the fermentation of the waste to make manure, which would then be used to fertilise soils for gardening. While the central government formulated the Water Management Plan, many actors of the policy network joined the meeting and announced their opinion and they did not agree with the plan and its process. They criticised that the plan had poor participation and merely emphasised the protection of commercial and industrial sectors. Many local governments that engaged in the policy network also played a role as critics. They demanded more concern for the protection of city farming areas to guarantee the right of city dwellers to food, and to protect vulnerable groups. Moreover, the plan was also critiqued because it did not recognise the city's environmental dimensions. The policy network's constituent organisations and groups campaigned for an opposite approach to dealing with future floods, which is to strengthen the development of UA, including edible city forestry, to cope with massive floods.

Conclusions

During Bangkok's flooding, the government sought to protect industrial and commercial sectors first. The peri-UA around the city green belt was affected by flooding as such areas became a space for water storage and floodways to drain masses of water into the sea. The response to the urban food agenda during the flooding by the existing main governance system mainly depended on the food industries that provided on a large scale and employed a one-size-fits-all approach. The formal system therefore functioned ineffectively during the crisis for it provided limited choices of dry food and responded to the food shortages too slowly, to the point that food was perishing before reaching the consumers. Slum dwellers living along the river and peri-urban farmers were marginalised by this formal urban governance and they did not receive any special treatment.

In this context, an alternative governance system emerged that responded to food shortages and other relevant food problems driven by the UA policy network in Bangkok. The discussion in this chapter demonstrates how far the policy network could fill the gap of the mainstream system in relation to the food agenda. At the same time, this chapter illustrates the possibility of UA to enhance the adaptive capacity of the city to respond to the urban food agenda during an extreme climate event through a case-study of the country that has always considered itself abundant in food. However, UA had never been taken seriously by the governments and the formal urban governance.

It must be recognised that the UA policy network in Bangkok can only contribute at a small scale, mainly as a result of the contradictory roles of the national and regional governments in supporting the policy network. For example, while they agreed with the development of food innovations, such as floating gardens, they do not allow anything that obstructs the water flow in the river. The policy network was also challenged by obstacles such as access to land for farming in the city and securing land rights for many city farms, because UA in the eyes of governmental agencies was considered to be limited to household and community gardening in available areas. The public sector, which has power in land reform policy, still did not respond to the demands of the NGOs and CBOs to provide and secure land for city farming. These challenges mean that there is a challenge to ensuring sufficient

land to produce food within the city in quantities that would allow to feed city dwellers. It becomes even harder when peri-urban farm land areas were used to protect industrial and commercial areas by acting as floodways to drain the water. The policy network was not able to respond to such challenges alone as this would require a transformation of the land ownership structure and the biased priorities of the government. A positive contribution of the policy network, however, is that city dwellers in a largely agricultural country have become more aware of the issue of food insecurity, the right to food and climate change adaptation. The number of demands for city farming training is increasing and the UA policy network is also expanding, as many new organisations and groups become engaged.

Although UA promotion in Bangkok might be not as remarkable as in many other cities around the world, the case-study has value for other cities to learn from the experience of Bangkok's UA policy network governance during a disaster. Other cities also risk facing an extreme climatic event and should begin to prepare by learning from other cities that faced disasters such as Bangkok. This study examines the governance of the UA policy network in Bangkok during the disaster by focusing on how the policy network enhanced cooperation and resolved conflicts. The central concern is the role of multiple forms of social capital in determining the quality of the policy network. This study argues that they acted as the glue to connect the plural and diverse constituent organisations and groups of the policy network. Before this, the study looks back at the way the policy network emerged and was characterised, including who were included and excluded, and who had an influence over others.

Working through a network, to understand the policy network governance requires a review of literature to provide analytical perspectives on the governance system which moves beyond governance controlled by either the state or the market, particularly the literature on collaborative, network, and polycentric governance. To focus on the power of relationships, the literature on social capital studies and power relations analysis are also explored. Chapter 2 will provide the boundary and connectedness of the existing literature in relation to this study. The next chapter will also show how this literature helps to frame the analysis in this thesis.

Chapter 2

Institutional rational choice, communicative action theory, policy network approach and social capital

Introduction

This chapter reviews the theoretical background of the key concepts that inform this study. In particular, the chapter examines debates between institutional rational choice (IRC) and communicative action theory (CAT) concerning the role of social capital in governing policy networks. The chapter is structured into four sections. The first section reviews the policy network approach by analysing the contributions of IRC and CAT to increasing the power of explanation of this approach. The discussion then moves on to examine how the two theories can help to capture the concept of social capital. The next section of the chapter changes the focus to examine how the two theories might help to create a better understanding of the role of social capital in facilitating policy network emergence and characterisation, and in overcoming the collective action problems of a policy network. This chapter concludes by presenting the analytical framework adopted in this study.

2.1. Understanding the policy network approach through institutional rational choice and communicative action theory

2.1.1. The policy network approach and the limits of explanation

What does the concept of 'policy network' refer to? What follows is an overview of the different viewpoints of scholars who have focused on this concept.

> Policy networks are modes of cooperation through collective action characterised and constituted through the mutual recognition of common or complementary strategic agendas. Policy networks are strategic alliances forged around a common agenda (however contested, however dynamic) of mutual advantage through collective action (Hay and Richards, 2000, p.12; Hay, 1998, p.38).

Policy networks are formed by a set of actors who engage in resource exchange over policy as a consequence of their resource interdependencies (Compston, 2009, p.5).

Policy networks involve a loose structural coupling; interaction within networks between autonomous actors produces a negotiated consensus which provides the basis for cooperation (Marsh, 1998, p.8).

Issue (policy) networks can be viewed as co-ordinated policy actions through networks of separate, but interdependent, organisations in which the collective abilities of a number of participants are essential for problem-solving (Heclo, 1978, p.87).

Policy networks are seen as clusters of relatively autonomous but interdependent actors that are incorporated into the process of public policy making (Schneider, 1992, p.109).

Policy networks consist of governmental and societal actors whose interactions with one another give rise to policies. They are actors linked through informal practices as well as (or even instead of) formal institutions (Bevir and Richards, 2009, p.3).

Policy networks are sets of formal and informal institutional linkages between governmental and other actors structured around shared interests in public policy making and implementation. These institutions are interdependent. Policies emerge from the bargaining between the networks' members (Rhodes, 2007, p.1243).

From this list of interpretations of what a policy network is, we can conclude that the concept refers to the policy approach in which there are a variety of related policy actors and policy actions active in the same policy agenda. The interaction within networks should be highlighted as many of the authors, particularly Marsh, point out. In Compston's view, interaction among policy network actors takes place mainly in the form of resource exchange, while Schneider focuses on interaction by examining

communication between actors that are autonomous but interdependent. Before discussing what IRC and CAT offer to the analysis of policy networks, the general background of the policy network approach is reviewed, followed by a consideration of why it is useful for this study.

The policy network approach has been developed mainly in the European context, particularly by the Anglo-Governance School led by Rhodes and Marsh. In the US, a similar approach has been developed, known as the 'Advocacy Coalition Framework' (ACF) proposed by Sabatier (2007, 1988). Fischer (2003, p.95) argues that the framework has its roots in the work on the policy network approach, while John (2012, p.155) and Colebatch (2009) mention that this framework has much in common with the policy network school.[1] The development of the policy network approach has a long history. The first scholar who proposed this approach was Heclo in his work on issue networks published in 1978 (Fischer, 2003, p.31). However, it seems clear that a strong starting point is the classic study of Rhodes and Marsh in 1992. Interest in this approach widened after Rhodes published 'Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability' in 1997, which has been cited in no fewer than 520 articles in key international journals (Kjaer, 2011, p.101).

The policy network approach is useful for this study for the following reasons. First of all, as explained in Chapter 1, this study seeks to understand the various collective actions developed by plural actors, both state and non-state organisations and groups, which go beyond 'policy hierarchies' and 'policy markets'. The concept of the policy network can capture these policy characters. As suggested by Schneider (1992, p.109), the policy network approach is an alternative to traditional rationalist policy approaches which are state- and market-centred. The word 'beyond' seems ambiguous because we cannot specify where the policy network approach is located.

---

[1] This study does not engage much with ACF because (1) while this study focuses on understanding cooperation, this framework highlights competition; (2) social capital between different sub-sectoral networks (coalitions) is not emphasised by ACF as it focuses an analysis of core beliefs of each coalition (to analyse its uniqueness rather than links with others); and (3) the policy network selected as the case study for this study emerged just for few years while the ACF was developed for the study of long-term change (lasting a decade or more).

Powell (1990; cited in Schneider, ibid) contends that networks are configurations located between markets and hierarchies. However, Rhodes (2006, 1997) argues that the policy network approach merges state-centred and market-centred approaches while at the same time challenging the conventional state-market dichotomy. Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti (1997, pp.911-45) add that the policy network approach has advantages over both hierarchy and market solutions in terms of adapting, coordinating and exchanging. This study endorses the views of Rhodes, Jones and his colleagues because it seems clear that the policy network on urban agriculture (UA) in Bangkok is driven by both the existing state structure and the market mechanism as discussed in Chapter 1. While the state structure affected financial control and bureaucratic procedures, the market mechanism affected decision-making of social enterprises, including training centres, green restaurants and green markets.

In addition, this analysis draws on the classic differentiation between types of policy networks in the literature established between issue networks and policy communities, as developed by Rhodes and Marsh (1992, p.251). According to Rhodes and Marsh, policy networks can be categorised by establishing a continuum running from issue networks at one end to policy communities at the other. The former represents the loosest relations among a largely fluctuating group of policy actors, the most open but limited interaction, the highest conflicting policy preferences, and extremely unequal power relations, while the latter has polar opposite characteristics. The different types of policy networks are placed along the continuum depending on the degree of indicators ranging from large, diverse, unequal and fluctuating issue networks to smaller, cohesive, equilibrated and stable policy communities. Marsh and his colleagues (2009) also argued that there might be policy communities within any issue network and that within any policy community there could be policy networks. This idea helps to frame the point that whole actor-constellations and their collective actions on UA can be understood as an issue network, while sub-sectoral networks within the entire UA policy network can be understood as policy communities.

The policy network approach helps to frame this study by proposing the idea of intermediary and subordinate organisations (Schneider, 1992, pp.109-29). Within

any policy networks, there usually are intermediary organisations that play an important role in the network above subordinate organisations and groups. Intermediary organisations usually hold more resources than others including political, economic and social capital. They play the role of coordinator to facilitate cooperation and of mediator to handle conflicts. Such idea can also help an understanding of actor-constellations related to UA policy in Bangkok and their patterns of interaction. There were intermediary and subordinated organisations and groups in a system of imbalanced power relations within the UA policy network, which this study calls the intermediary organisations as powerful organisations.

However, to further understand how a policy network is governed requires more explanation, which this approach alone could not provide effectively as it still needs to be framed its various focuses proposed by different scholars as mentioned in the beginning of this section. As argued by Dowding (1995, pp.145–46), the approach itself seems to be a metaphor rather than an explanatory theory. He argues that the policy network approach does not provide details on 'how' and 'why' questions. His main point is that the analysis of interactions within a policy network is undeveloped and even confused as it pays most attention to describing typologies of policy networks, their characteristics, and their effects on policy outcomes or policy changes. Although this approach mentions resource interdependence as a reason for interaction, details of why and how resources are exchanged are not clear. This argument is supported by Walker (2004, p.8) who suggests that if policy network analysis is to move beyond descriptive boundaries, there is a need to 'marry' it with theory. This study therefore requires theories that can both frame various approaches and provide more powerful explanations of policy network governance.

2.1.2. The contribution of institutional rational choice to the policy network approach

The review found that the contributions of IRC to the policy network approach can be a useful way to understand how policy networks are governed. Dowding (1995, pp.150-8) does not only critique the approach but also proposes that the policy network approach should adopt rational choice theory to analyse interactions. He refers to a 'rational actor model' which calls for rules of resource exchanges and

incentives. Unfortunately, as mentioned later by Marsh and Smith (2000), Dowding pays much more attention to criticism without providing clear suggestions on how to address such limitations. To review the literature in the relevant fields, Ostromian IRC can provide a clearer explanation in relation to Dowding's suggestion. IRC developed from micro-level analysis of rational individual choice to scale up to analyse rule-governed interactions in collective actions (Ostrom, 2010, 1999b; Scharpf, 1998, 1994). Although IRC has as its first aim the understanding of institutional arrangements of polycentric governance (Ostrom, 2010), it also applies collaborative network governance because both polycentric and network governance aim to challenge either state or market governance (Bogason, 2006). Sabatier (1988), who developed the policy network approach in the American context, called advocacy coalition framework, mentions that IRC is a well-developed theory, which proposes a clear chain of causal relations to signal clear factors influencing interactions among networks of organisations and groups in multi-layers.

The first basic assumption of IRC is to realise that individuals are rational beings in the pursuit of self-interest by means of a logic of consequentiality; to capture potential benefits and avoid or minimise costs, self-interested individuals always attempt to maximise short-term self-benefits or achieve net benefits for themselves (Marsh and Olsen, 1989;Toye, 1999). Their behaviour is also guided by external forces that shape how this theory judges the nature of being (ontological stance of the theory) (Guba, 1990). This position contributes to an understanding of policy network governance in the way suggested by Hansen (1997): that policy networks are the result of conscious choices made by fairly rational actors interested in benefiting from cooperation. On the other hand, cooperation problems such as free-riding are explained as the result of ineffective incentives and rules (including sanctions).This study agrees with this IRC logic and uses it to examine the case study. However, this study realises that there are other factors over and beyond self-interest that affect decision-making and the shape and form of policy networks. The IRC assumption along is not sufficient to frame an understanding of collective action problems of policy networks.

For the second basic assumption, IRC recognises that a reason for taking decisions is based on instrumental rationality, particularly economic and scientific. For instance,

individuals make a decision by trading off the different choices by rationally calculating their interests to maximise their utility (Hill, 2009; John, 2012), whilst also being influenced by (empirically-based) objective fact that can be demonstrated by anyone (Griggs, 2007, pp. 173-85). They also believe in the causal relations of the phenomenon. Thus, if effective incentives are provided, individuals will cooperate in collective action. This assumption guides how this theory legitimises the validity of knowledge claims (epistemological stand) (Guba, ibid). It contributes to an analysis of policy network governance in which collaboration of plural actors is possible when each self-interested network constituent organisation and group can expect benefits from investing time and effort in cooperating with the collective actions of a policy network. The policy networks are driven by a rational process, which requires technical expertise based on economic and scientific knowledge, specialisation in policy issues and policy tools for finding out the most effective way to achieve policy goals. Apart from that, driving policy networks also needs to develop incentive structures and effective rules to enhance cooperation and handle conflicts. This study also agrees with the second assumption and realises the importance of examining this assumption by the case study. However, it also further enquires about the influence of other modes of rationality, particularly cultural rationality (e.g. traditional knowledge, sacred or secular knowledge that rest on normative foundations and faith).

The above assumptions of IRC are shared with rational choice theory. However, IRC adds another dimension to rational choice theory. Bogason (2006), Lawndes and Roberts (2013) and Peters (1999) argues that IRC is one stream of new institutionalism, which is one of the fundamental theories informing the policy network approach. According to Bogason (2006, pp.97-114), IRC contributes to the policy network approach by understanding that policy actors are not necessary identified by formal institutions, nor are they simply part of a government body, which means that there is a need to recognise alternative forms of institutions, such as networks, shared norm groups and self-governing collective action. Non-governmental actors including non-governmental organisations, citizen groups, corporations, and social networks are also recognised as policy actors. In addition, Ostrom (1990, pp.51-2) defines institutions as sets of working rules applied to collective action, which may or may not resemble formal laws. The rules are about

forbidding, permitting, or requiring some action or outcome, and they are used, monitored and enforced on a regular basis by members of the institution. IRC has therefore made room for understanding the flexible institutional arrangements based on informal rules, where the policy network approach could also enter. As mentioned by Hansen (1997, p.690), it is possible to treat policy networks as sets of rules governing interactions. He claims that rules operating within them are typically informal in nature. Similar to Hansen, Scharpf (1998, p.195; 1994, p.27) argues that policy networks are systems of rules that structure the opportunities for actors, organisations and groups to realise their preferences. Policy arises from the interactions of rational actors whose beliefs and desires are shaped by rules that govern their interactions. This focus of IRC in addition to focuses of traditional rational choice theory becomes a reason why this study engages with IRC.

Furthermore, Ostrom's IRC goes beyond rational choice theory in seeking to explain choices under the constraints of each organisation and group, socioeconomic structures and the preferences of other organisations and groups (John, 2012). Ostrom (2010) argues that 'one-size-fits-all' policies are not effective because an effective policy needs to fit to a specific social-ecological setting. Another contribution of IRC to the policy network approach is therefore to recognise the limits of resources of each network's constituent organisation and group, including a limit to using reason, or 'bounded rationality' (one reason for cooperation). They do not aim for universal pretensions as traditional rational choice does, but seek the most effective way to be able to determine what drives collective actions in specific contexts. This IRC tenant reminds this study to have concern for and acknowledge specific contexts of the case study.

Apart from these contributions of IRC to the policy network approach, IRC mentions the role of communication in driving collective actions. For example, Ostrom (2010, pp.14-5; 1991) and Ostrom and Walker (2003, 1991) mention that there is a large number of studies on the impact of face-to-face communication on the capacity of plural actors to solve a variety of collective action problems. However, in their view, plural actors communicate with each actor just to gain information before returning to make their own private decisions based on their net returns. Ostrom (1995) also mentions that face-to-face repeated communication is a bargaining process, by

ignoring the philosophical background of communication, which goes further than bargaining to achieve individual self-interest. As mentioned by Forester (1999, p.111), negotiations are not just to find ways to move from zero-sum to mutual gain outcomes, but to more politically and morally sophisticated public and democratic deliberation. The discussion on this issue will be continued in the next section.

2.1.3. The contribution of communicative action theory to the policy network approach

Rhodes (2011), who is the main proponent of the policy network approach, accepts that there are irreconcilable differences of epistemology, theory and method in studying policy networks. Thatcher (1998 cited in Albrechts and Mandelbaum, 2005, p.293) also critiques that policy network approach faces the problem of theoretical and methodological inconsistency. Contributions of CAT to the approach function in different ways from IRC and reflect that claim. While IRC assumes that individuals are self-interested, the first basic assumption of CAT is that people's moral consciousness is influenced by a socially constructed impersonal collective will rather than driven by their self-interest (Habermas, 1990). Forester (1999, pp.223-4), a Habermasian, supports this assumption by arguing that there are moral and aesthetic concerns in our daily practice such as fairness and the distributive character of outcomes. He also mentions that such concerns are meta-interests, which mean that they require ethical judgement instead of benefit calculations. This assumption contributes to an understanding of policy network governance because network constituent organisations and groups do not engage with policy networks only to maximise their self-interests, but also to achieve their collective will. This study sees a debate between this point of view and the aforementioned IRC assumption, which needs to be taken to discuss through the case study.

For the second assumption, CAT mentions that it is hard to claim objectivity in the real world. Instead, a decision is made from inter-subjectivity through the communicative process such as an agreement of all. In relation to that, CAT refers to the concept of communicative rationality, by which each actor could refer to different logics or modes of rationality. This kind of rationality is concerned with collective and democratic decision-making, defined as public reasoning as a result of

collective deliberation (Habermas, 1987; Dryzek, 1990). The strength of communicative rationality is that it does not deny the importance of scientific and economic knowledge, but claims that other kinds of knowledge, particularly local knowledge, also need to be considered. Because local knowledge reflects the perceptions of local people in a specific setting, it is a validity claim based on cultural rationality (Fischer, 2000). This assumption contributes to a better understanding of policy networks, for they can be driven by communicative interactions among interdependent policy actors through a deliberative process. Rhodes (2007, pp.1243-1264) recognises this point by arguing that policy networks are less reliant on a command operating code and more reliant on diplomacy and management by negotiation. He notes that communication lies at the heart of steering networks. His work since 2007 seems to give more recognition to the interpretive approach, which is at the root of CAT.[2] He also cites many works by Habermasians such as Fischer, Forester, Hajer, Wagenaar, Yanow and Dryzek. It should be noted that by referring to communication, CAT scholars go beyond interest-based bargaining to create public spaces and transform awareness and recognition (Forester, 1999). The network's constituent organisations and groups make collective decisions by bringing various modes of rationality in contestation of one another, and seek for better arguments and practical reasons rather than the most effective solution (Fischer, 2003; Habermas, 1987; Healey, 2006; Rydin, 2003, pp.107-10). This study also sees another debate between CAT and IRC, which must be discussed through the case study as well.

2.2. Understanding social capital within policy networks through institutional rational choice and communicative action theory

2.2.1. Social capital and the problem of conceptualisation

Differently from the concept of policy network which could lead to a united definition, the discussion about the concept of social capital in the existing literature

---

[2] He became a prominent representative of the interpretive approach of the UK Political Studies Association (PSA). He gave many public talks on this approach such as at the conference on Policy and Politics 2012 (organised in Bristol). He also chaired many panels in relation to the interpretive analysis such as at the PSA conference 2013 (organised in Cardiff) and praising Wagenaar's 'Meaning in Action: Interpretation and Dialogue in Policy Analysis' (2011).

is extensive and has generated contrasting conceptualisations, as illustrated by the various understandings of the scholars quoted below.

Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition (Bourdieu, 1997, p.46).

Social capital is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities which consist of some aspect of social structure and facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure.... Social capital represents close and direct interpersonal ties (Coleman, 1990, p. 302).

Social capital can be defined simply as the existence of a certain set of informal values or norms shared among members of a group that permit cooperation among them (Fukuyama, 1995, p.11).

Social capital is not social network, but resources embedded in social networks which can be accessed or mobilised through ties in the networks (Lin, 2010, p.50).

Social capital is an attribute of individuals and of their relationships that enhances their ability to solve collective action problems (Ostrom and Ahn, 2003, p.4).

Social capital is a feature of social organisation such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit (Putnam, 2000, p. 67).

Social capital is the density of connections between members of a group and also the way that these relationships are imbued with norms of trust, reciprocity and mutuality (Rydin, 2013, p.184).

Social capital is the strength of ties between individuals, and the networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness built upon these ties (Woolcock, 1998, p.151).

Social capital is relationships among actors (individuals, groups and/or organisations) that create a capacity to act for mutual benefit or a common purpose (Spellerberg, 2001, p.9 cited in Gallent and Robinson, 2013, p.71).

Based on these different conceptualisations of social capital, we should start by finding common understandings about this concept. By using the word 'capital', social capital is assumed to be a resource, which can be invested in and can be expected to lead to a return in similar ways as financial and physical capital. Two core scholars, Bourdieu (1997) and Lin (2010), explicitly agree with this argument as they clearly recognise social capital as a resource. If this is so, what does this kind of resource look like? In response to this question, Lin (ibid) and Woolcock (1998) explain that a strong tie that brings together plural actors is an embedded resource. Coleman (1990) also argues that social capital is constituted by close and direct interpersonal ties. In a similar way, Putnam (1993, 2000, 2002) argues that such ties might be constituted by 'bond' and 'bridge' relations. While bonding refers to ties among homogeneous members, bridging represents ties among heterogeneous members, for instance across communities, across cultural or ethnical groups and across social class. This study realises the importance of his idea by using the concept of bonding social capital to capture tie relations among organisations and groups in the same policy community (sub-sectoral network/actors constellation) within the policy network. Using bridging social capital allows the identification of bridge relationships across policy communities between the centralities of policy communities (stars of each actor's constellation). Bourdieu (1986, p.243) and Rydin (2013, pp.184) also refer to ties by using the word 'connection'. A tie relation is therefore a minimal standard referring to the existence of social capital agreed by many authors contributing to this concept.

The next enquiry regards what can be captured as forms of social capital which glue plural actors together. The existing literature demonstrates that there are many possible forms that should be taken into account. Common forms of social capital mentioned by scholars are shared rules, trust, reputation for trustworthiness, shared norms, moral obligation and reciprocity. Pennington and Rydin (1999, p.234) count shared forms of knowledge as a form of social capital. This form is significant in the context of developing countries, where people hold different forms of knowledge.

They become closer by knowledge sharing and use their shared indigenous knowledge as a resource for development. All these forms of social capital were examined for their existence in the case study.

The challenges are not only that there are many forms but also that each form is understood differently by different scholars. This study agrees with Gallent and Robinson (2012) and Rydin (2013) that scoping theories and fields of study is necessary for a study of social capital. This study captures different forms of social capital by adopting IRC and CAT because the two theories can map different forms by distinguishing between rational and normative commitments. Besides, to adopt the two theories also helps to connect an understanding of social capital to an understanding of the policy networks mentioned earlier as they are framed by the same theories. To capture different forms of social capital through IRC and CAT lenses, Warren (1999, pp.85) proposes that while IRC emphasises rational commitment such as shared rules, reputation for trustworthiness and predictive trust, CAT focuses more on normative commitment such as shared norms and altruistic trust.

2.2.2. Capturing social capital by institutional rational choice

To start with Ostrom's works, social capital is defined in her 1994 work as connectedness created by individuals in the past, referring to social capital as a form of shared rules (Ostrom, 1994, pp.211, 530-31). She emphasises both formal and informal rules in self-organising collective action, making clear that such rules are made and shared by internal agents. She also attempts to understand how shared rules can be an engine driving behavioural change to support collective actions. Later, in 2002 and 2003, Ostrom worked with Ahn to conceptualise social capital in a more comprehensive way. Reputation for trustworthiness and existing networks are raised as three basic forms of social capital as well as working rules or crafting institutions (Ahn and Ostrom, 2010, 2002; Ostrom and Ahn, 2003, p.26). It can be noted that Ostromians try to conceptualise social capital in a concrete sense to identify and measure existing rules, reputation and networks.

Ostromians also mention forms of social capital in a more abstract sense. Ostrom herself mentions trust, shared norms, reciprocity and moral obligation, but avoids framing them as social capital and includes them in her causal model that provides a more concrete concept through which to understand them. For example, Ostrom and Ahn (2002, p.7) claim that trust is affected by the three basic forms of social capital mentioned above. Trust can be understood by considering crafting institutions, reputation for trustworthiness and networks as primary reasons affecting trust. Ostrom's clearly developed causal model framing relations of certain forms of social capital appeared in her 2003 study, as shown in figure 2.1. She explains that a reputation for trustworthiness is a basic cause affecting trust. Trust then affects reciprocity, which is also affected by shared norms. Reciprocity in her view is a causal link to enhance cooperation. As Ostromians' IRC develops causal relations of different forms of social capital, this study agrees with Warren (1999, p.291) that IRC scholars conceptualise social capital as a rational commitment while intrinsic motivations to develop relationships are not clearly mentioned.

Figure 2.1. Causal relations of some forms of social capital developed byOstrom

Source: Adapted from Ostrom, 1998, p.15

Concerning IRC's arguments about trust, in particular, Ostrom argues that trust is the confidence of the truster in the trustee. She adds that it is an expectation of certain future behaviour made by the truster in relation to the trustee's past actions (Ostrom

and Walker, 2003, p.23; Walker and Ostrom, 2007) so it is not an altruistic trust or trust built by trusters themselves. It is rather a probabilistic expectation, referred to as predictive trust by Jane Mansbridge (Warren, 1999, p.290), which can be predicted from analysing the causal model. For example, if information about past actions of an organisation is positive and that organisation has a good reputation, it can be expected that the organisation can be trusted. Apart from that, it can be noticed that while Ostrom mentions trust, she pays more attention to incentive provision, monitoring and sanctions based on distrust. Warren (1999, p.54) explains that trust from the IRC perspective can be an irrational decision because to trust someone is to take a risk of non-monitoring the trustee's behaviour. As developed from rational choice theory, IRC assumes that individuals tend to be free riders or opportunists as they are self-interested. It is hard to trust that they will cooperate unless there are effective incentives, monitoring and sanctions. Beyond recognising predictive trust, this study is therefore informed by the IRC perspective that encourages an awareness of risks and the vulnerability of trust.

Mentioning shared norms makes Ostromians' IRC go further than rational choice theory for considering norms is to consider specific contexts. However, even Ostrom herself does not clarify her position on studying norms. Shared norms are themselves beyond an aggregation of individual interests, which is an important basic assumption of the theory that IRC departs from. Ostrom (2009) defines shared norms as shared common sets of values, and mentions the benefit of shared norms in developing a common understanding. According to figure 2.1., shared norms facilitate reciprocity in the same way as trust, and they derive from face-to-face communication. On the other hand, Ostrom develops causal links from symmetrical interests and resources to establish the cost of arriving at an agreement about the development of shared norms (Ostrom and Walker, 2003; Ostrom, 1998, p.15). Her perspective implies that she highlights shared trade-off norms, which can help judge to what extent stakeholders can be agreeable to loss and gain.

Moral obligation and reciprocity function similarly by pushing plural actors to work together. Moral obligation is a moral force to cooperate and self-fulfilling normative incentives and expectation, while reciprocity is a rational exchange or an exchange for mutual benefits or reciprocal interests (Warren, 1999, pp.219, 349). IRC

mentions both of them but pays more attention to reciprocity, which requires an account of expected gain and loss among rational actors. As mentioned by Coleman (1990, p.99), plural actors will work together if they can expect reciprocal interests, which would be expected depending on the outcome of a ratio calculating the likelihood of gaining against the likelihood of losing. Ostrom includes reciprocity in her causal model mentioned in figure 2.1., including reciprocity at the heart of enhancing cooperation by linking it with predictive trust built on past actions and shared trade-off norms.

Lastly, to focus on shared forms of knowledge as a form of social capital from the IRC perspective requires an analysis of IRC epistemology. Modes of rationality, which are recognised by IRC, are mainly an economic way of thinking. To pay attention to the development of causal models shows that IRC is also grounded in scientific rationality so it can be claimed that IRC recognised forms of knowledge that are scientific and economic. This does not mean that IRC scholars are blind to the existence of local knowledge based on cultural rationality. As mentioned by John (2012), Ostromians recognise local and limited forms of knowledge based on context. This study argues instead that while IRC scholars mention local knowledge, they still measure its validity though economic and scientific knowledge. In other words, economic and scientific knowledge appears to be dominant in IRC's way of thinking even when they are assessing local knowledge. The next section on capturing social capital through CAT will develop analysis on the debates related to this topic.

To sum up, this study agrees with IRC's claim that rational aspects of social capital should not be overlooked. It therefore considers shared rules, reputation for trustworthiness, predictive trust and reciprocity, which are highlighted by IRC, in conceptualising social capital. However, it also realises that IRC provides an insufficient analysis of normative commitment, including altruistic trust, shared norms other than trade-off norms, moral obligation and even local knowledge.

2.2.3. Capturing social capital by communicative action theory

Although Habermas does not mention the concept of social capital as explicitly as Ostrom does, this study agrees with Bolton (2005) that Habermas's readers can see possible connections with the concept of social capital when reading between the lines of analysis on various related topics. In fact, Habermas (1987, p.286) mentions briefly that CAT was necessarily identified with the accumulation of social capital. Innes and Booher (2010, pp.97-9) mention that social capital is rooted in Habermas's ideal speech conditions, which include accuracy, comprehensibility, sincerity and legitimacy. For example, they explain that social capital makes it more difficult for stakeholders to behave insincerely because social capital can be a key to transparent negotiations. When social capital exists, informal interaction is built and people are more likely to acknowledge their real concerns.

In contrast to IRC scholars, CAT scholars emphasise normative commitments, particularly altruistic trust, shared norms, and moral obligations. To begin with trust, many Habermasians discuss its importance, for it is developed and used in deliberative processes. Habermas (1987) himself expressed that a speaker must be trusted to say what he/she consider to be true, sincere, or normatively right; it is a condition of communication. He also mentions that trust is necessary in order to reach an agreement. Trust is therefore referred to as a basis for bringing different actors to talk to each other and allowing them to express themselves without wariness and concerns derived from a sense of a lack of safety (Dryzek, 2012; Healey, 2006; Innes and Booher, 2003). Healey (2006, pp.141-2) refers to trust as a root in what she calls 'relational richness', and suggests that it is essential to build collaborative relationships. Warren (1999, p.114, 290), a Habermasian, mentions that trust is inter-subjectively created, and that it can be produced, even if trusters and trustees have never met and do not know one another by reputation. Warren (ibid, p.290) also mentions that it is a moral resource, pointing out that it is ethical in nature. The ethics of trust are truth-telling, promise-keeping, fairness and solidarity. Trust is therefore based on moral rather than rational choices, which is called altruistic trust (ibid, p.25).

Regarding shared norms, Habermasians pay particular attention to them, as they inspired critical theory, which challenges empiricism such as rational choice theory, that tends to neglect norms. Habermas (1990, 1998a) mentions shared norms by referring to the concept of shared 'lifeworlds', which can be understood as shared norms. Thomassen (2010, p.69) interprets that shared norms are taken as given in the lifeworld. Habermas (1998a, p.241) explains that a shared lifeworld is a shared conviction or strong belief, which functions as a background consensus. He also emphasises the influence of lifeworlds in deliberative processes by pointing out that common norms by participants are presuppositions of communicative action because mutual lifeworlds are moral principles, which are a cognitive claim to validity, which is moral reasoning and judgement (Habermas, 1998a, pp.ixx-xxv). The concept of shared norms can also be captured by another Habermasian's term of 'discourse coalition' (Hajer, 1995). This term is used to explain a tie relation between actors who have a similar view on a given topic. Hajer (ibid) explains that a discourse coalition commonly hold the same set of beliefs. Some narrative story lines are held together and they affect the interpretation of events or course of action in a specific context. Both shared lifeworlds and discourse coalitions are mentioned in the way in which they are important conditions supporting collaboration among plural actors, particularly through communication. To link shared norms and trust, Warren (1999, p.336) argues that trust is primarily cultural in nature and is inherited from pre-existing collective norms so, in this sense, shared (moral) norms could build (altruistic) trust. This claim is not made by Ostromians as shown in figure 2-1 so (predictive) trust instead derives from reputation and past actions.

The notion of moral obligation is promoted by CAT scholars as a means to nourish an ethics of multicultural citizenship, commanding both solidarity and equal respect (Mendieta and Vanantwerpen, 2011, p.19). Moral obligation establishes what each individual is obliged to do and what they can expect from one another. As mentioned in section 2.2.2, this concept is similar to reciprocity, as highlighted by IRC, but it is guided by moral consciousness. As influenced by Kant's moral philosophy, Habermas mentions the importance of ethics of duty or obligation (he calls 'deontology') in guiding what we are obliged to do (Thomassen, 2010, p.86). Habermas (1998a, p.xxix) also agrees with Communitarian principles, including that people have moral commitments as a result of the socialisation process and devote

collective good for long-term collective benefits rather than short-term self-interests. In this sense, apart from self-interested individuals, there are moral beings who are obliged to others by committing themselves to a course of action (incurring an obligation).[3] Habermas (ibid, pp.21-24) also explains that moral obligation is a collectively regulated interaction which has left behind the egocentric perspective of rational choice because it is a moral recognition which cannot be justified by an appeal to each individual's interests. In other words, moral obligation is a force of principle based on normative expectations (Warren, 1999, p.349). To link this to the previous discussion concerning shared norms, Habermas (1998a, p.4-7) mentions that obligation presupposes the intersubjective recognition of moral norms. We can therefore identify some indications that moral obligation can contribute to shared norms, which in turn develops trust.

However, this does not mean that CAT scholars do not pay any attention to shared rules. They do refer to this concept, but in a different way from Ostromians. Habermas focuses on the process of establishing rules as well as the process of making a judgement based on them. He mentions that rules (or law) and morality exist in a complementary relation. Punishment by externally imposed sanctions (by rule) is not more effective than punishment by internalised sanctions, such as our own feelings of guilt or shame. Such moral judgement is a normative order of internalised feelings of disapprobation and moral feelings of sympathy and rejection (Habermas, 1998a, pp.15-6). In his work entitled 'Between Facts and Norms', he argues that rules (or laws) are a category of social mediation between facts and norms (Habermas, 1996, p.430). He also raises a crisis of the constitutional state, which neglects social moral norms and instead suggests a self-organising legal community. This idea is similar to the idea of shared rules for self-organising collective actions mentioned by Ostrom, but rules are shaped by moral norms in Habermas's sense. All in all, this study interprets Habermas's point, as highlighting norms of rules (legal norms) rather than rules per se, prioritises morality over rules.

---

[3] In 2011, Habermas gave a special lecture at Georgetown University on the topic 'Myth and Ritual' by raising his hope on the role of religion to recall moral obligation of people in the globalizing world, where there will be an increase of a morality crisis.

CAT scholars also explore shared forms of knowledge, which this study interprets as a form of social capital. At first, CAT scholars recognise the importance of ideas over facts as different ideas can derive from different forms of knowledge claims. They also depart from the epistemological assumption that knowledge is socially constructed, multiple and constituted in the form of claims, open to contestation and recognition (Rydin, 2007, pp.52-68). In contrast to IRC, which emphasises mainly economic and scientific (technical and empirical) knowledge, CAT opens the door to different forms of knowledge. To highlight local knowledge, for example, while IRC touches superficially on local knowledge, CAT pays more attention to this form of knowledge. The reason is that while IRC pays attention to the rational justification for the exclusion of some forms of local knowledge (they cannot be proven as rational), CAT recognises different forms of knowledge used in the communicative process that are both rational and normative justifications. As argued by Habermas (1991, p.25), CAT is based on the principles of honesty, sincerity and openness to people's views and to available knowledge. He provides more details in his work entitled 'Knowledge and Human Interests' by arguing that apart from professional and reliable knowledge (including natural-scientific or empirical knowledge), we can also distinguish hermeneutic knowledge, practically effective, pragmatic and everyday knowledge (Habermas, 2007), which can be referred to as 'local knowledge' in more general terms. Later, Habermas and the others (2010, pp.15-23) expands on this by discussing the role of sacred knowledge or secular knowledge, which rest on normative foundations and faith seeking understanding, in deliberative process. He mentions that 'mythos' and 'logos' should not be ignored in seeking for a practical reason. A naïve faith in science on its monopolised production of knowledge is many times misleading, while recognition of secular reason makes us sensitive to cultural differences and prevents us from over-generalising context-dependent judgments (Habermas et. al., 2010, pp.17, 23).

The concept of 'policy epistemic' is used to capture a group (a network or even a community) in which its members share knowledge of specialisation (expertise) and become knowledge partnerships (Fischer, 2003, pp.230-2). While IRC focuses on knowledge for individual decision-making, CAT emphasises the role of knowledge in the communicative process. Different claims of different policy epistemics can contribute to a flow and transformation of ideas. According to Fischer (2009, p.164),

communication implies the exchange of knowledge, which can deliver transformative learning and develops an emancipatory knowledge. Fischer claims that knowledge exchange can also deliver practical knowledge, which is required for collective decision-making and action.

To sum up, although IRC and CAT each mention key forms of social capital, the former highlights rational commitment while the latter focuses on normative commitment. By adopting the two theories, this study benefits from balancing the conceptualisation of social capital between rational and normative commitments. This study proposes that to adopt only one theory would leave out other aspects that are emphasised by the other theory. As a result, the study of social capital will be not balanced – it would focus more on either rational or normative commitments. Considering both IRC and CAT perspectives on social capital is also useful in researching the context of developing countries. There is a mix of liberal and communitarian assumptions in such contexts from which IRC and CAT depart. On the one hand, people in developing countries, particularly in urban areas, experience individualisation through liberalism, which goes along well with the IRC perspective. On the other hand, in many parts of the developing world, people are still rooted in communitarian assumptions, which align with CAT. However, this study will not try to merge the two conceptualisations of social capital but rather bring together their main debates to discuss: (1) predictive and altruistic trust; (2) shared trade-offs and moral norms; (3) reciprocity based on the exchange of interests and moral obligation based on achieving collective goods; and (4) different forms of knowledge based on rational versus normative justification (contesting within the communicative process to achieve practical knowledge).

2.3. Framing the role of social capital in governing policy networks by institutional rational choice and communicative action theory

The discussion now turns to debates on the role of social capital in governing policy networks. The debates include how social capital facilitates the emergence of policy networks and how it affects policy network characterisation. This section also introduces the discussion on the role of social capital in supporting the quality of policy networks in enhancing cooperation and dealing with conflicts, which are at

the heart of understanding collaborative network governance. Among many approaches, IRC and CAT also address this topic with IRC focusing on governance through rule-driven self-governing collective actions, while CAT highlights governance through communication-driven actions.

2.3.1. Social capital, power relations, and policy network emergence and characterisation

Many scholars such as Lin (2010) and Rhodes (2007, p.1246) agree that social capital acts as a glue that holds complex sets of relationships together as a network. To understand how this glue works requires an understanding of power of the relationships to shape power relations which in turn form a network. To begin with, social capital and the power of its relationships can be framed by concepts of instrumental and communicative powers. This study argues that different forms of social capital influence the emergence of a policy network by exercising both instrumental and communicative powers that determine the status of the network's constituent actors and power relations among them. This argument is supported by IRC and CAT. On the one hand, IRC helps to understand instrumental power, such as the power of rules (including incentives), reputation and technical knowledge. IRC scholars do not make this claim explicitly, but we can imply from their basic assumption that individuals are rational beings and seek to maximise their interests. Their behaviour can be guided by an effective rule (particularly the rule that is made and agreed by them or self-regulation); the suggestion of well-known and trustworthy persons or organisations; and an analysis based on specific knowledge, which is a form of social capital.

On the other hand, CAT scholars mention communicative power such as the power of persuasion, of building agreement and negotiation. Fischer, Dryzek, Forester, and Healey, for example, recognise that power plays a role in interactions. Dryzek (1990, 2000) agrees with Foucault that power is not static but fluid and transformable. A public sphere in which communication is taken place is the arena for each actor to exercise power. He refers to the power of the better argument in which everyone claims reason as a way to claim power. Buchstein and Jorke (2012, p.271) add that there can never be a give-and-take of arguments free from power relations. Fischer

(2003, p.35) claims that Habermas recognises power in terms of the positive and productive ability of communication to organise and coordinate action. These ideas benefit this study by helping to frame an argument that trust, norms and knowledge as forms of social capital can motivate communicative power as they affect a claim for persuasion, agreement, or negotiation to realise the benefits of working together by engaging in a policy network.

Apart from instrumental power and communicative power, we cannot deny that formal and informal structural power also affects the emergence of a policy network at the macro-level, such as political regimes, formal governmental arrangements, legal systems, political and policy cultures, and hegemonic ideologies (as dominant discourses). Although IRC scholars do not clearly mention this kind of power, CAT scholars recognise power embedded in the structure, beyond communicative power. Many Habermasians, especially from the school of interpretive and deliberative policy analysis, challenge the criticism that their perspective is power neutrality in analysing political and policy structures. Healey (2003, p.113), for example, mentions that the critique of neutralised power begins with a criticism of Habermas's works. But this is an old claim, since both in her own work and in that of many other Habermasians, there is a concern that power structures are a pervasive influence. Dryzek (1997) also recognises that it is possible that forums are shaped by powerful actors who can force others to agree through their special status constructed by power structures. Some Habermasians realise that power structures affect interactions among the policy network's constituent actors and that the ideal speech conditions proposed by Habermas are hardly met. Besides, over the last decade Habermas himself also focuses more on power structures. For example, he mentions power of religion or mythical power, which is a structural power, in communicative processes (Habermas et al., 2010, pp.15-23; Mendieta and Vanantwerpen, 2011, pp.15-33). This review helps to frame the argument that apart from analysing instrumental and communicative powers, an analysis of how power structures affect the emergence of the policy network is also required.

After explaining the possible role of power of social capital (the power of relationships) in determining the status of the network's constituent actors and their power relations, this study seeks to understand how power relations in turn

characterise a policy network. It will focus on debates around 'power and centralisation' and 'power and exclusion'. As mentioned in the introduction, these aspects need highlighting in order to study the context of a developing country such as Thailand. Understanding power relations and network centralisation is important for the characterisation of the policy network. Centralised networks can be interpreted by considering the centralisation of instrumental power in the hands of few actors as emphasised by IRC, such as power in making and legitimising rules; power in making a final decision; and power to organise and allocate policy resources. The literature on social network analysis also focuses on this aspect. Scott (2000) and Freeman (2008), for example, mention that a network is centralised when few actors can control the use of resources and policy decisions. However, the centralisation of networks can also be considered by identifying outstanding actors who have strong communicative power over others, as highlighted by CAT. In this sense, power is centralised by a monopoly made up of a small number of actors who make stronger arguments and raise practical reasons. Power embedded in social, economic and political structures can also affect the centralisation of networks (recognised by some CAT scholars such as Forester, Fischer and Dryzek). These power structures can shape the privilege of the social, economic and political status of some actors. Actors with a high status can in turn influence others in the networks, which can also lead to a centralised network. Based on these claims, this study argues that imbalanced power relations bring about centralised networks in which powerful actors play a hegemonic role. It is hard to distinguish the sources of power which can centralise networks, so this study considers them as a complement of others. For instance, power structures can support communicative power and they can together create an opportunity for some actors to control others through instrumental power.

Furthermore, the review found that IRC and CAT both argue that power relations bring about inclusion and exclusion, but each provides different explanations. IRC on the one hand proposes that the exclusion of some organisations and groups is a result of the bias of rules that regulate a policy network. This argument is made from IRC assumption that instrumental power such as rules (including incentives) can guide the behaviour of each actor. Within imbalanced power relations, however, some actors have more power in making rules. Biased rules (including biased

incentives) are possible and can exclude someone who either does not fit within the rules or expects benefits from engaging with the policy network.

On the other hand, CAT argues that the exclusion of some organisations and groups is caused by prejudice norms, which lead to distorted communication, as issues that do not conform to the norms cannot be raised. For example, in a context in which people share a norm of self-reliance or even do-it-yourself, the issue of how to do good business or to invest for maximised returns might be not raised. Hence, some organisations and groups who have different norms cannot get their voices heard and are often excluded from engaging in a policy network. This argument is developed from the assumption that policy actors are engaged with a policy network if they have something in common with each other. Habermas calls a sharing of the same common norms a shared lifeworld (Habermas, 1990, 1998a) as discussed in 2.2.3. This assumption moves beyond the assumption that plural actors engage in any policy networks to seek resource exchanges based on their self-interest. Instead, it assumes that a reason for engaging in a policy network is to share and learn within the same lifeworlds or common norms that become a basic condition for developing a mutual understanding and even a consensus (Dryzek, 2012, pp.126-30). Therefore, organisations and groups that do not recognise those norms will either be excluded by core members of the policy network or exclude themselves from engaging in the policy network. When they raise their voice it is to a deaf audience. Instead of recognising one explanation and ignoring another, this study brings the two sets of explanations together to examine the evidence collected from the case study.

2.3.2. The role of social capital in overcoming collective action problems of policy networks

Social capital is recognised as being able to help overcome collective action problems, particularly a lack of cooperation and conflicts. Putnam (1993) argues that social capital is a decisive element in effective participation, which can lead to enhancing cooperation. He also points out that social capital ensures that the voices of marginalised groups are heard, which can reduce the conditions for conflicts. Similarly, Rhodes (2007, p.1246), an important scholar of the policy network approach, argues that social capital (focusing on trust and shared norms) is essential for cooperative behaviour and therefore the existence of policy networks. However,

social capital and policy network scholars cannot provide a clear analytical lens to understand how social capital can do so. Instead, this study found that the IRC and CAT perspectives are particularly useful in framing this topic.

To begin with, IRC scholars emphasise the role of social capital in dealing with collective action problems. Ostrom and Ahn (2003) found that social capital (focused on shared informal rules and a reputation for trustworthiness) can play this role as it helps reduce transaction costs such as travel costs and the costs of organising a formal meeting, which constrain cooperation, as the actors cannot expect a satisfactory return from their investment. Pretty (2003) also found that social capital can protect from free riding and rent seeking behaviours, which bring about a lack of cooperation and of conflicts. Ostrom (1994, 1995) explains that social capital can help develop effective incentive structures to encourage self-interested actors to cooperate, and to develop effective regulation to handle conflicts.

As IRC scholars had already conducted a lot of research to verify claims in relation to the role of social capital in overcoming collective action problems (e.g. Ostrom, 1994, 1995; Ostrom and Ahn, 2003; Pennington and Rydin, 1999), one of their challenges is to consider the role of social capital through the communicative process. According to Renn (2008, p.201), communication is at heart a way to cope with risks, including disaster (the setting of this study), for existing systems cannot run properly as long as everyone seeks information and ideas about changes and solutions. While Ostromian IRC highlights incentives in enhancing cooperation and regulation to deal with conflicts, this perspective does not deny the importance of communication. Instead of repeating the study of the causal relations of social capital, incentives, regulation and overcoming collective action problems in general, this study examines these relations in the communicative process where incentives and regulations are analysed as a claim among many other possible claims raised during communication.

IRC scholars mention communication as a strategy to bargain for maximising individuals' self-interests, also referred to as interest-based and zero-sum bargaining (Innes and Booher, 2010, p.89; Forester, 1999, p.177). The critique from CAT scholars is that IRC pays less attention to negotiation for mutual gain. Habermas

believes that public sphere can generate public opinion and a sense of collectiveness, and it does so both through the aggregation of interests and through the discovery of a common identity (Thomassen, 2010, p.119). Forester (1999, pp.179-81) adds that our public world is a community of mutual concern, where everyone is a citizen in a political community. Communication can go beyond interest-based bargaining to lead to persuading, convincing, negotiating and learning to transform awareness and recognition. He adds that communication can be a way to achieve meta-interests, which are moral and aesthetic concerns. By adopting the two perspectives, this study bears in mind that communication can be both a strategy to achieve self-interests and a way to reach mutual gains. Although IRC and CAT analyse communication in different ways, both of them can offer the possibility to argue that communication is a way to enhance cooperation and to resolve conflicts by carrying out strategies to either meet a self-interest or to reach a mutual gain.

Cooperation enhancement and conflict resolution can be a consequence of agreement and mutual understanding. Agreement can be a consensus or the successful building of a position based on divergent perspectives (Rydin, 2003, pp.67, 69). IRC focuses agreement in term of agreed rules created by stakeholders (Ostrom, 1995, 1994), while CAT seeks for agreement in the form of consensus built by deal making and promise giving (Dryzek, 2012, 2000). Mutual understanding, mostly mentioned by CAT scholars, refers to a greater willingness among actors to accept and live with expressed different points of view (Warren, 2002, p.182). Wagenaar (2011, p.301) adds that mutual understanding is above all of act of appreciation, of recognising and acknowledging the other, even, or especially, when the other holds beliefs or has interests that widely differ from us or that we consider threatening to our worldview or lifestyle. CAT scholars propose that agreement and mutual understanding derive from either finding better arguments or reaching a practical reason (rather than the single best way and the best reason), which is a result of communicative processes (Fischer, 1995, 2003; Forester, 1999, p.39; Healey, 2006; Dryzek, 2012, p.121). They demand high-quality communication called deliberation, which moves beyond talking in order to create a dialogue or argumentation.

Various forms of social capital play a role at different entry points. At this stage, reciprocity and moral obligation as forms of social capital can link mutual

understanding and agreement to decisions to cooperate and handle conflicts. IRC scholars address the role of reciprocity based on exchanging individual interests, while CAT scholars provide room for considering moral obligation based on awareness and willingness to collaborate in achieving common interests. Both reciprocity and moral obligation are a decision-making and action-taking force. Without these factors policy actors might not cooperate and deal with conflicts even if they already understand and agree. To cooperate and handle conflicts from the IRC perspective is to keep a balance between the interdependence of interests to satisfy self-interests. CAT explains that there are moral reasons and judgements which aim to return to the public interest encouraged by public spiritedness (Fischer, 2009, p.77-80). In relation to these different points of view, this study aims to examine the existence of both interest and altruistic decisions and action.

When communication takes place, each actor attribute (*ethos*, including power as discussed previously), emotional expression (*pathos*) and its logic (*logos*) affect his/her ability to persuade and convince in order to reach mutual understanding and agreement. These three aspects of communication form the rhetorical approach (Gottweis, 2006, 2007; Fischer, 2003, 2009, p.275; Martin, 2014; Rydin, 2003, p.7). This approach is mentioned by Aristotle in his work namely *'On Rhetoric'* (Aristotle, 2007) and also recognised and adopted by many Habermasians as mentioned by Dryzek (2012, pp.66-84; 2010, pp.319-39) and Young (2000) so that rhetorical communication now belongs to the deliberative approach (here called CAT). To start, attributes of actors including their power (which is partly shaped by social capital as discussed in 2.3.1) determine how loud their voice is. Actors with a higher status and power to control rules, reputation, to be trusted and to share various forms of knowledge with different actors, can raise their voice to be heard compared to actors with a lower status and power. Fischer (2009, p.254) provides a telling example of this: when we trust in experts, we give them credit to communicate in such a way that we can agree. They can thereafter play an outstanding role by using their 'louder voice' in developing mutual understanding and agreement. Martin (2014, p.63) supports Fischer by pointing out that trust in speaker supports confidence of the audiences that whatever is said is worth hearing. So, the audiences might not try to prove the validity of every sentence. This study will closely examine

this argument by going beyond solely analysing the role of trust to analysing other forms of social capital as well.

Emotional expressions and passion are based on empathy, sympathy, and sensibilities (Gottweis, 2006, pp.461-80). Martin (2014, pp.64-5) mentions that emotional expression plays a role in shaping the feelings rather than the thoughts of the audience. An example of the role of emotions is to express the suffering of the marginalised, concern, fear, anger, disgust, excitement, and jealousy. Fischer (2009, pp.272-94) mentions that emotional expression is a part of storytelling commonly found in the communicative process. It is a performative aspect of communication, which is often neglected in the context of modernity. The emotional aspect of communication includes feeling comfortable to talk, e.g. to feel relieved when raising concerns, using informal patterns of communication, and to act freely by using body language. Habermas (1998a, xxix) called expression an emotionally charged language. Fischer (2009, pp.282-3) explains that emotional expression is the basic to interpersonal relations, and social and cultural dimensions are grounded in deeper emotional commitments. He further explains that social and cultural dimensions affect emotional intelligence, which is an ability to monitor our own, and others' feelings and emotions. Good interpersonal relationships can support us in managing feelings and stress as we know when and how to express emotion. We can see a link to social capital which also plays a role here. Bogason (2000) argues that social capital (highlighting trust and shared norms) can develop feelings of being comfortable to talk. He points out that holding social capital with others helps us to feel safe, not to fear strangers and to feel that we will receive support. This study agrees with Bogason but assumes that other forms of social capital possibly develop comfortable feelings as well. This study introduces all forms of social capital mentioned earlier in the analysis.

To communicate is to give and take a reason (Blaug, 1996, p.72). Logic behind reasons can be created from different modes of rationality. IRC claims that a good reason is created on the basis of instrumental rationality. According to Fischer (1995, p.197), instrumental rationality is a mind-set that puts faith in empirical evidence (a clear fact) and scientific method (empirical proof), appeals to experts justify decisions, logical consistency and universality of findings. CAT proposes

communicative rationality, which seeks practical reason derived from the communicative process. CAT scholars critique instrumental rationality for being inadequate and limited in its understanding of the better argument, which influences decision-making in the real world, which is itself also affected by cultural rationality. Fischer (2003, p.136) explains that cultural rationality tends to emphasise (or at least give equal weight to) the opinions of traditional and peer groups over those of experts. This approach focuses on personal and familiar experiences rather than depersonalised calculations, holding unanticipated consequences to be fully relevant to near-term decision-making, and trusts process rather than evidence.

Shared forms of knowledge as a form of social capital play a role in the reasoning process because they propose different modes of rationality. Shared technical knowledge, such as scientific and economic explanations, is developed from technical control over objectified processes and generated within the framework of instrumental rationality which takes on an external existence as a productive force (Habermas, 2007, p.36). Shared local knowledge is usually based on cultural rationality as it is embedded in a cultural system which becomes common sense for people who share a communal sensibility (Geertz, 1983, pp.12-14). Yanow (2003, pp.234-245) explains that local knowledge is context-specific, and a knowledge in sense making. It is a spirit of passionate humility which combines the logics of description and prescription. This knowledge was commonly described in the past as traditional or indigenous knowledge in particular contexts. It remains inherently associated with, and interpreted within, the specific culture in which it is produced (Fischer, 2000, p.195). This study agrees that decision-making happens by using practical reason. This study adopts IRC and CAT to examine the possibility of both technical and local knowledge, which are contested in the communicative process, being practically effective knowledge. This study also recognises that different forms of knowledge can be merged as a result of transformative learning derived from dialogue as mentioned by Fischer (1995, 2003), Fischer and Mandell (2012) and Forester (1999).

Apart from shared forms of knowledge, shared norms as another form of social capital also affect reasoning. Norms can frame the way we think and shared norm can be a collective reason. Fischer (2003, p.32) argues that a shared norm is a moral

reason, and explains that it can motivate the movement that attempted to achieve it. He gives an example of environmental protection in which participants aim to respond to their shared norms about a better world and a more liveable place, which become a reason for their decisions and action. Local knowledge is therefore sensitive to shared norms as they are developed from intersubjective concerns and normative understandings. This study therefore puts them aside when making an analysis.

This discussion illustrates how different forms of social capital play a role in different entry points in cooperation enhancement and conflict resolution through the communicative process. Specifically, cooperation enhancement is a consequence of an agreement derived from reaching practical reason or finding a better argument influenced by various forms of social capital. This study also argues that the role of mediators, who hold outstanding social capital, is important specifically to conflict resolution. This argument is supported by Wagenaar (2011, p.233) who mentions that social (and institutional) capital informs the work on policy mediation, which is required in the situation that dialogue does not happen spontaneously. Forester (1999, p.175) also supports this, arguing that mediators can create spaces in which conflicting parties speak and listen, recollect their experiences and express their needs, articulate their interests, and invoke their commitments. In addition, Fischer (1995, 2003) mentions that mediators can facilitate deliberative processes and function as diplomatic recognition, while Gallent and Robinson (2013, p.121) add that they can be intermediaries who bring together different actors by acting as go-betweens or gate keepers, also controlling flows of information.

All in all, this study brings together arguments from both IRC and CAT to examine how social capital based on both rational and normative commitments are required. This study also acknowledges rule-driven and communication-driven collective actions emphasised by the different perspectives.

2.4. Analytical framework

This project develops an analytical framework by articulating IRC and CAT perspectives on social capital, power, and policy network governance. The analytical

framework also aims to reflect contested assumptions of the two theories and to facilitate a debate between the two approaches. The analytical framework is developed in two stages. The first one is devoted to analysing the emergence and characterisation of the UA policy network influenced by social capital (the first objective), while the second stage is dedicated to analyse how social capital affects the way in which the policy network enhances cooperation and solves conflicts (the second objective).

2.4.1. Analysing the emergence and characterisation of urban agriculture's policy network influenced by social capital

This study argues that social capital activates power exercised by core actors which in turn shapes the policy network (discussed in Chapter 4) and affects its characterisation (discussed in Chapter 5). So, power relations analysis is required to analyse how social capital plays a role in facilitating the emergence and characterisation of policy networks (the first objective) because power is a central concern for understanding the link between social capital among policy actors and policy network emergence and characterisation, as discussed in section 2.3.1. Three types of power, including instrumental, communicative and structural power, are put in the analytical framework as they link to IRC and CAT perspectives discussed earlier. To consider power relations allows an analysis of links between social capital and power in a way that differentiates how forms of social capital influence the emergence and characterisation of policy networks by determining the status of the network's constituent actors and their power relations.

This analytical framework will help not only to understand the exercise of power in three different ways, but also to examine the debate between IRC and CAT on different focuses on power. Instrumental power highlighted by IRC is observable by focusing on the behaviour in the decision- making process on specific issues, focusing on potential and actual power. The exercise of power is based on the objectivity of interests. On the other hand, communicative power highlighted by CAT is a power that creates or reinforce values and practices by persuading, convincing, enhancing learning and creating agreement instead of commanding and

controlling. As for structural power recognised by CAT (as discussed in 2.3.1), power cannot be simply conceptualised in terms of individual decisions or behaviour. In other words, power is socially constructed and becomes the culturally patterned behaviour of a group and practices of institutions so that power is a function of collective forces and social arrangements. It controls thoughts and desires, and shapes preferences both consciously and unconsciously.

Structural power seems to be the most significant, which does not imply that the others should be ignored. This study agrees with Steven Lukes (2005) that different types of power should be observed as different dimensional views (different 'faces'), which does not ranks forms of power in order of significance. As Dowding (2006) supports Lukes, the other two dimensions show that people can have autonomy to exercise power – not only to dominate or be dominated. Hence, considering the other two types is useful and helps to avoid the trap of merely analysing power as domination. Thus, this study realises that power has different faces, and each face of power has different influences. This analytical framework will not assess which type of power is more powerful than others. Instead, the analysis aims to understand in what way each face of power is exercised by recognising that they can also support each other.

This study will analyse three types of power to understand the status of the policy network's constituent actors and their power relations, which in turn shape policy networks. The focus is on power exercised by powerful actors (who influence many others in the way that they need to depend on) and how social capital facilitates the way in which they can exercise the different types of power over other actors (discussed in section 4.4). Before analysing such power, this study will visualise 'computing-based' policy network diagram (shown in section 4.2) and develop 'narrative-based' diagrams (discussed in sections 4.1/4.3 and shown in section 5.1) to define core actors (powerful actors and centralities of each policy community). Chapter 3 will describe how to do these (data analysis methods). Besides, various forms of social capital held by network constituent policy actors will be explored at this stage (discussed in section 4.3) before analysing the links between social capital and power.

This study will also analyse instrumental, communicative and structural powers exercised by other core actors (centralities) and how social capital activates the exercise of their powers in struggling for decentralising power (discussed in section 5.2) and being included (discussed in sections 5.3-4). To analyse inclusion and exclusion, the debates within IRC and CAT will be brought to examine the reason behind this process. While IRC clearly indicates that exclusion is a result of biased rules controlled by powerful actors (discussed in section 5.3), CAT is more sensitive to the effect of prejudicial norms leading to the exclusion of some (discussed in section 5.4). Key elements of the above analysis and where the analysis will be made in empirical chapters can be found in figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2. Social capital, IRC, CAT and power relations among the policy network's constituent actors: Analytical framework for Objective 1

2.4.2. How social capital affects the way in which the policy network enhances cooperation and resolves conflicts

As mentioned earlier, this study aims to understand collaborative policy network governance through the role of the policy network in enhancing cooperation and solving conflicts. In relation to that aim, this study considers the role of social capital

in affecting the quality of the policy network through the communicative process. In other words, this study develops the arguments from theoretical assumption that social capital functions through interactions. So, to examine the role of social capital in communicative process should be focused. The main argument that is relevant to this point is that social capital supports the role of core actors (as cooperative facilitators) in making agreement on the reason to cooperate through communicative process (discussed in Chapter 6). In the similar way, social capital supports the role of conflicting mediators in making agreement and developing mutual understanding for handling conflicts (discussed in Chapter 7).

Section 2.3 argues that both IRC and CAT emphasise communication in governing networks such as communication to exchange material resources, information and ideas. However, as a consequence of different ontological assumptions, IRC and CAT recognise the importance of communication in different ways; as interest-based bargaining versus the transformation of awareness and recognition (Forester, 1999, p.177-81). As a result of different epistemological assumptions, IRC and CAT recognise different modes of rationality when claiming a good reason; instrumental versus communicative rationalities. To respond to these concerns, this study adopts Frank Fischer's model, the 'logic of policy deliberation'. According to Fischer (1995, p.231), the model tests the reasons given for technical efficiency, its relevance to the circumstances of a situation, its instrumental implications for the social system as a whole, and its relationship to the ideological principles that justify the societal system. In the first place, Fischer (1995) proposes this model to comprehensively evaluate policy.[4] However, he later also refers to this model in other ways, e.g. as a way to consider a good reason, the force of a better argument and the legitimacy of a decision (Fischer, 2003, pp.189-98, 202).[5] He also argues that the model helps to analyse practical reasons, which are the result of the integration of empirical and normative arguments (Fischer, 2007, pp.223-36). As Fischer's model recognises different modes of rationality in claiming practical reasons, this model is helpful to analyse reasoning in communicative processes and

---

[4] He does this by considering programme verification, situational validation, societal vindication, and social choice.

[5] This model is adopted by other scholars in various ways as well merging it with other models, such as in Fairclough's (2013) recent work.

to examine the contributions of IRC and CAT perspectives on rationality (instrumental VS communicative modes). Fischer's model also supports the analysis of different forms of knowledge developed from different modes of rationality as well as the role of norms shared by a constellation of policy actors, as forms of social capital, in the process of claiming reason (discussed in section 6.4).

However, Fischer's model is a good starting point as reasoning is not the only force to enhance cooperation and solve conflicts through communicative processes. The power of core actors (who propose reasons and play a role as cooperative facilitators or conflicting mediators) and how they express their emotions also contributes to this study's analysis. By using Aristotle's term and his idea about rhetorical analysis, Fischer's model creates a comprehensive understanding of 'logos', but we still need to understand 'ethos' and 'pathos', through which the rhetorical approach can provide an analytical framework to explore such areas (discussed in sections 6.3 and 7.2-3). As a consequence, this study merges Fischer's logic of policy deliberation in rhetorical analysis, which is further developed by Gottweis (2006, 2007) and Martin (2014). The appeal to ethos and pathos is not an alternative to the appeal to reason but typically accompanies it (Martin, 2014, p.63). As discussed in section 2.3.2, ethos refers to the quality of speakers, which this study uses to connect ethos to the status of the policy network's constituent actors and their power. On the other hand, pathos refers to passion, which for the purposes of this study includes feeling comfortable to talk. Gottweis (2007, p.245) argues that rhetorical communicative strategies, which he calls argumentative strategies, might be logo-centric, etho-centric, or patho-centric. They might also be mixed between these three dimensions, such as etho-logical, etho-pathetic, or logo-pathetic strategies. Gottweis (2012, pp.211-35) adds that scenographies are also important for the analysis of rhetoric. Scenographies refer to a place, moment, a given use of language, a speaker and an address. To consider scenographies is to consider the proliferation of sites which affect the way in which logos and pathos are expressed, and ethos is presented. However, the concept of scenographies is close to the second level of Fischer's logic of policy deliberation, which concerns the particular context. Therefore, this thesis introduces the analysis of scenographies as part of analysing logos as proposed by Fischer.

This framework supports the analysis of better arguments and practical reasons as a result of the communicative process, which delivers agreement and mutual understanding. The question remains whether moral obligation and reciprocity as forms of social capital can connect to mutual understanding and agreement, and in turn to decisions to cooperate (discussed in section 6.2). There is a need to analyse the role of different forms of knowledge and shared norms in the communicative process, particularly when core actors claim practical reasons. Specifically, special attention needs to be paid to the role of cooperative facilitators and conflicting mediators and the social capital that they hold with others. All above elements of the analysis and where the analysis will be made in empirical chapters are put in figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3.Rhetorical analysis and an analysis of the logic of policy deliberation: Analytical framework for Objective 2

From figures 2.2 and 2.3, chains of analytical perspectives will move from policy network emergence and characterisation to an analysis of cooperation enhancement and conflict resolution among the policy network's constituent organisations and groups. By considering the connection between these two figures, rhetorical analysis

becomes the core framework in which three communicative strategies are considered, including ethos, pathos and logos. Ethos represents the attributes of the policy network's constituent organisation and groups as well as their power relations. Thus network and power analysis is required to analyse ethos. To analyse instrumental, communicative and structural power provides a place for both IRC and CAT perspectives on power as discussed in 2.4.1. Ethos helps to understand how plural actors are glued together in a network, and how that network is characterised by the relationships among those actors. Supplementing the analysis of ethos by analysing logos and pathos can develop an understanding of how policy actors approach the communicative process. Fischer's logic of policy deliberation is adopted to support the analysis of logos by assuming that different actors are engaged in the communicative process and attempt to propose a better argument, while the entire policy network seeks practical reasons. The analytical framework is based on the assumption that the role of ethos, pathos and logos in a communicative process can deliver cooperation enhancement and conflict resolution through the building of agreement and mutual understanding. The framework also indicates that multiple forms of social capital can play a role in different entry points, and debates between IRC and CAT are embedded throughout these chains of analytical perspectives. So, the analytical framework will not only support the analysis of phenomena, but also propose an analytical insight that derives from the articulation of two different theories by recognising their differences as summarised in table 2.1.

Table 2.1 Institutional Rational Choice VS Communicative Action Theory: Articulating by recognising their differences

	Social capital → Supported by	Network analysis → Supported by	Power analysis → Supported by	Rhetorical analysis → Supported by	Fischer's logic of policy deliberation
More sensitive by Institutional Rational Choice	Rational commitment	Computing network analysis	Instrumental power	Logos	Empirical evidences + Relevance to context
More sensitive by Communicative Action Theory	Normative commitment	Narrative network analysis	Communicative and structural powers	+ Ethos and Pathos	+ Fit in social norms + Leading to 'good' society

From table 2.1, the articulation of IRC and CAT could be productive in the way that both rational and normative commitments are brought to consider in capturing the notion of social capital. They could either compliment or challenge each other, but that makes this project different from other social capital studies. To articulate computing-based and narrative-based network analysis could also benefit for understanding policy network emergence and characterisation, although these two analyses might not be necessary come along well with one another. Instrumental power highlighted by IRC might not be sufficient to understand power exercised in the real world, unless communicative and structural powers highlighted by CAT are counted. These three types of power, however, do not always support each other and whether they are exercised is worth examining. Furthermore, the rhetorical analysis that analyses not only logos but also pathos and ethos as being sensitive by CAT might help us to make a better understanding of the debate of IRC and CAT on the influence of reasons, personalities and emotions in decision making process. Finally, by considering a reason given, articulating IRC and CAT might help us to analyse carefully how instrumental rationality (emphasised empirical evidences and contextual relevance) could work and in which way communicative rationality (been sensitive to social norms and a sense of good society) could take place. It is worth

learning the debate on these different modes of rationality made by IRC and CAT. The further analysis will be addressed in the end of this study (in Conclusion). The theories and relevant concepts discussed in this chapter will be taken on an adventurous journey to Bangkok in the turbulent context of a disaster. The next chapter will address the methodology to take off on this journey.

Chapter 3
Research Methodology

Introduction

This chapter uses the analytical framework presented in the previous chapter to frame the methodological approach and methods of this study, adopting a case study approach and mixed methods. The research is designed to begin with a deductive approach (from theory to field-study) and ends inductively (from field-study back to theory). This chapter begins by providing the research approach which is mainly based on qualitative methods supported by some quantitative data. The chapter then operationalises relevant theoretical concepts before presenting the methods used to examine the arguments both in terms of data collection and analysis. The research instruments are designed to collect both primary and secondary data such as reviews of the grey literature, semi-structured interviews and observation check-lists for three periods of fieldwork. [1] Specific methods are applied to analyse data, including methods for collecting relational data, developing policy network diagrams and analysing the network structure through a power relations analysis. This chapter ends by presenting profiles of selected organisations and groups.

3.1. The research approach

The fact that two theories are used in this study raise the problem of multiple ontologies. They have their own methodological approach, as institutional rational choice (IRC) is based on 'methodological individualism', which analyses individual decision-making based on the assumption that everyone will choose the best option for him/herself. Game theory, cost-benefit analysis and conducting 'laboratory' studies are used with a methodological individualism approach (adopted widely by Ostrom and her followers, e.g. Dalsak and Ostrom, 2003; Ostrom, 2009; Poteete and Ostrom, 2004; Vollan and Ostrom, 2010).Although methodological individualism approach recognises both quantitative and qualitative research methods, it mainly

---

[1] These fieldworks are not included an informal visit followed the follow-up visit while writing the first draft of the report which added some valuable information.

accepts scientific methods to develop a causal framework to guide the analysis. The validity and reliability of the data are measured before testing the hypotheses.

While IRC is sensitive to the positivist tradition as mentioned above, communicative action theory (CAT) challenges this by arguing that interest-based accounts of individual choice are limited for a full understanding of some phenomena. CAT scholars use the interpretative approach, which seeks to understand 'meaning' rather than 'fact' and does not require objectivity (Fischer and Gottweis, 2012; Wagenaar, 2011). The role of the subject and its values is recognised in this approach (Schawartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012) so CAT scholars refer to the concept of intersubjectivity, which means that conclusions are drawn from interactions. Instead of finding existing facts using a valid method, the CAT method is to understand meaning by entering into a dialogue and interpreting it.

As Schawartz-Shea and Yanow (ibid) argue, merging different methods is possible. However, some caution must be taken in doing this, as it would be inappropriate to do this for certain methodologies, especially those derived from different ontologies. This study therefore does not merge the different theories nor does it merge their methodological approaches. By balancing the methodological approaches adopted by each theory, it is possible to understand their explanatory power in the given setting of each theory rather than to judge which one is right or wrong. This balance is found using a moderate approach based on a compromise between IRC and CAT. Focusing on the middle ground, one can avoid the extremes of the two methodological approaches. On the one hand, although Ostromian arguments are interesting, it is difficult to accept their view that a wholly objective world exists. This research project rejects a 'scientific and economic objectivity'-oriented approach, including game theory and laboratory studies used by many Ostromians. It also, however, rejects a fully interpretive approach adopted by many Habermasians.This study still prefers to begin with a deductive approach, which raises hypotheses in the form of arguments developed from existing theories – not an abductive approach, as proposed by interpretive scholars that uses surprise as the entry point (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006). To set up the dialogue between theory and data is what this study aims to do. Although this study does not attempt to discover grounded theories as suggested by Wagenaar (2011, pp.260-1), this study

agrees with him that interpretation without any initial idea about the subject of the research is not conceivable. Meaning can be recognised in the data only in the context of an existent theoretical framework. He also mentions that preliminary or priori theories tell us what is relevant in the data. We should not be afraid too much that theories could impose our preconceptions on our data, because theories we bring to our study are always inadequate to the data. The rich and trick descriptions of the data that we obtain are more varied and differentiated than any theory we hold about them. Data, therefore, always suggest new conceptual insights that we had not considered before, and provide a deeper understanding of the theories we adopt (Wagenaar, 2011, pp.265-6). To sum up, this research design takes the key arguments of IRC and CAT to develop a compromise which does not take sides between methodological individualism (to test causal relations based on individual choices) and the extreme interpretive approach (to learn from surprise without priori theories). Rather, it adopts shared methods among them (and other qualitative research approaches) such as interviews, observations, and focus groups. However, these methods must deliver both objective and subjective evidence where needed. In Goertz and Manoney's (2012) words, this study establishes a middle range of a tale of two cultures by keeping in mind epistemological pluralism.

As discussed in Section 2.4, the analytical framework of this study focuses on both rational and normative commitments to understand social capital, and emphasises the communicative process in dealing with collective action problems, where instrumental and communicative powers and modes of rationality are both present. Although some quantitative analysis is used, such as network analysis, the framework requires qualitative rather than quantitative methods as they are more sensitive to an understanding of interactions when reviewing grey literature, observing conversations, interviewing, and organising focus groups. These methods are commonly used in qualitative research and recognised by both Ostromians and Habermasians. They also support the moderate methodological approach mentioned earlier because they are not applied only on the basis of either the methodological individualism or the interpretive approach.

This study adopts a 'case study' approach, which according to Yin (2009) can be applied to all types of research. The main purposes, which are all relevant to this research, are: (1) to answer the questions how or/and why; (2) to study a

phenomenon that does not require the control of behavioural events; and (3) to focus on contemporary events occurring in a given context. Yin argues that case-study research does not mean that the findings cannot be shared with other cases, referring to the benefits of 'cross-case' analysis. This approach can challenge and contribute to existing knowledge if the selected case is not too specific or unique. This study contributes to debates developed in the North on the role of social capital in governing networks by using a case study from the South to consider how this knowledge works in different settings. Selecting a disaster setting allows us to address the explanatory power of different arguments in the context of risk and uncertainty. Studies in this area are still rare, so a case study approach contributes to filling this gap.

3.2. Operationalising the key concepts

This section operationalises the key concepts of the analytical framework to link the theories to the case study, including forms of social capital, collective action problems, and the key concepts of IRC and CAT. By focusing on the social capital of the policy network's constituent organisations and groups, these collective entities are the units of analysis of this study – not individuals. The following concepts are therefore applied to organisations and groups. The information provided by each organisation and group's leader serves as collective information for that organisation or group. To cope with the limitation of representing collective entity with its leaders, two and more representatives were interviewed for each organisation and group to recheck each collective profile. Some personal information about the leaders was also collected as they act in the name of their organisation or group, and their image also represents the organisation or group.

3.2.1. Social capital

Social capital for the purposes of this study is an umbrella concept combining many related concepts. This study starts from its minimum definition, which is a close relationship. To indicate whether a relationship is close or not, the degree of closeness will be quantified with four rating scales, from knowing each other (e.g. ever met, or spoken) and to contacting each other (e.g. develop and keep connection by calling, emailing/ sending letter or sharing after met). Closer relations involve

working with each other sometimes (e.g. ever joined or joining the same project, but seldom coordinated with each other or less than once a month), and the closest is to work closely with each other (e.g. ever joined or joining the same project, and coordinated with each other on a regular basis, once a month or more). Bonding social capital refers to close or tie relations among members of the same policy community within the policy network. In contrast, bridging social capital refers to close or tie relations across policy communities. In particular, bridging social capital is a close or tie relation among the centralities of policy communities and powerful organisations within the entire policy network. This study departs from this basic operationalization of social capital by recognising that there are many forms of social capital, including ones which can be captured from stories about relations told by interviewees and noticed during the study. The following section will operationalise each form of social capital, which is also conceptualised in the Introduction (section I pages 24-6).

1) Shared rules

Shared rules include both written and unwritten ones while written rules are formal and strict with specific enforcement, usually appearing as the law or conditions of a contract. They are usually upheld by public organisations and between public and non-public organisations. In contrast, unwritten rules are often flexible and upheld by non-public organisations. These rules are usually enforced by social mechanisms such as social privilege and sanctions, rather than specific promotions and sanctions by law and order. This study captures these forms of rules by assessing pre-existing agreements about rules of engagement, which arrange relations between colleagues, particularly those who live and work together.

2) Reputation for trustworthiness and trust

As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a close link between having a reputation for trustworthiness and being trusted. This study identifies the reputation of the policy network's constituent organisations and groups by identifying recognition by the other members. In other words, the interviews capture the reputation of well-known organisations and groups in their specific areas of expertise as they are given credit

by others. This is close to the concept of predictive trust, which develops from past actions but predictive trust is more internal than reputation. For example, reputation for trustworthiness in relation to food-growing skills could be developed from the media but predictive trust is developed from performance in the past with which the truster has a direct experience. Another form is altruistic trust, which may not be related to past actions. As mentioned in the introduction, this form of trust is morally praiseworthy and derives from approval and admiration. This study identifies this kind of trust by capturing stories in which someone is trusted who did not have a trustable performance in the past. For example, some slum communities are trusted even if they had previously failed to mobilise collective action to deliver public programmes.

3) Shared norms

This study considers norms in comparison with rules so shared norms are shared beliefs, values and cultures, which not just determine shared identity, but also affect the way we interpret the world and judge what is good and bad. In this study, shared norms are identified through the perspectives of leaders of the policy network's constituent organisations and groups and their interpretations and judgements of what is good and bad in relation to urban agriculture (UA) promotion. For example, the interviews show how organisational and group leaders interpret the role of UA in contributing to the promotion of green cities and how they understand sustainable agriculture. Their perspectives reflect both their lifestyle and their opinions about what they can and cannot agree with. These perspectives reflect their norms, which can also affect their sensibility to issues such as self-reliance, reuse and recycling, or to chemical use, mono-cropping and the agri-business.

4) Reciprocity and moral obligation

This study defines reciprocity as being similar to moral obligation. They are specific norms, which make the policy network's constituent organisations and groups intend to support one another. As argued in the introduction, the difference is that while reciprocity is developed from mutual gains between reciprocated organisations and groups and can be expected from their relationships, moral obligation is developed

from the will to act for others without expecting specific returns. These two concepts are compared to analyse reasons for taking action, whether based on expected returns for mutual gain or not. For example, social enterprises can have reciprocal relations if they share benefits from resource exchange and by helping each other to promote events. Many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) supported flood victims without any clear benefits mainly because they felt morally obliged to do so.

5) Shared forms of knowledge

Different forms of knowledge shared by different organisations and groups become knowledge partnerships (or 'policy epistemics'), which are identified through an exploration of shared reasons for the support of specific knowledge, such as shared technical knowledge about managerial tools to analyse policy and planning, and shared local knowledge on traditional farming practices. By linking these epistemological debates, this study does not limit the definition of knowledge to the outcome of a scientific process of understanding. Knowledge is not necessarily derived from instrumental rationality. Local knowledge, for example, is recognised here even though it might not be based on scientific inquiry such as objective observation and valid experiments or testing. In contrast, local knowledge might involve superficial beliefs, unprovable legends, traditional practices, ceremony and myth. It might also have developed from common sense without causal empiricism. In addition, this form of knowledge is often not written down as it is preserved in oral traditions rather than texts.

3.2.2. Characteristics of the policy network

The framework of this study uses six key concepts to analyse the policy network, including powerful organisations, centralities, decentralisation, exclusion, policy communities within the policy network, and policy epistemics. To begin with, powerful organisations are identified by considering their influence on the other policy network's constituent organisations and groups. Their power is determined not only by their instrumental power to control or guide the direction of the whole network, but also their advantageous status within the network's structures and their communicative power to convince and persuade others.

122

Power within the policy network is not always monopolised by hegemonic powerful organisations but there are organisations and groups that have more power than others within the network. These are referred to as 'centralities' as they are at the centre (or star) of the sub-sectoral network called 'policy community'. They may not need a formal position as the coordinator of their policy community but they coordinate other members by becoming nodes for information flows and resource exchange. By calling the policy community is a result of the close relationships among its members compared to relationships across policy communities within the policy network. The concept of 'core policy actors' refers to powerful organisations (plus their colleagues or partners) and the centralities.

This study also analyses the 'decentralisation' of the policy network. The power relations between powerful organisations and centralities are emphasised to examine the degree of decentralisation. Although powerful organisations have the power to govern the network, they decentralise this power to the centralities so each centrality can exercise their power in their policy community. A focus on the exercise of and struggle for power between the policy network's constituent organisations and groups as well as outsiders allows an understanding of inclusion and exclusion within the development of the policy network.

Lastly, similar to the concept of policy community, this study identifies knowledge partnerships as 'policy epistemics'. Each policy epistemic includes members of many policy communities, and these members also belong to many policy epistemics. For example, members of the District Administration Offices' policy community belong to the policy epistemic that recognises scientific, technical and managerial knowledge, while the social enterprises' policy community and the slum dwellers network's policy community belong to the policy epistemic that respects local knowledge.

3.2.3. Cooperation enhancement and conflict resolution

The concept of 'cooperation enhancement' explains the ability of core policy actors to mobilise plural actors into cooperative action by providing resources, joining an event and making the actions of some actors benefit the whole network. The number

of participants and resources that can be mobilised is the basic indicator of the success of cooperation enhancement. These numbers are supported by the number of deliberative forums and intensive discussion among participants. The active role of some organisations and groups is also observed and compared with their roles in the past (before the flooding) to identify their higher quality of cooperation.

Regarding conflict resolution, this study emphasises the ambition to handle unsatisfied distributive interests and perception clashes. Dealing with conflicts does not always mean to solve them, but rather, to avoid violence. To study conflicts, different interests and perceptions between the policy network's constituent organisations and groups are explored on the basis of the interviews. Their perspectives on others are also examined to see who they define as the opposition or common enemies and why. For some of the more explicit conflicts, this study defines coalitions, which are on different sides, such as 'PRO'- effective microorganism balls and 'CON'- effective microorganism balls, and support different national political camps as will be discussed in Chapter 7.

3.2.4. Instrumental and communicative modes of rationality

Instrumental rationality is classified in two different ways: scientific and economic reasoning. The classification will be determined using specific managerial and technical tools, such as policy and planning tools adopted in bureaucratic systems. The concept also links to specific areas of expertise and training provided by the formal education system such as experiments and by citing academic articles published in international journals. Communicative rationality refers to claims made through discussion. Instead of concerns about validity and reliability, this mode of rationality emphasises the conclusions of the communicative process, such as agreement, consensus, mutual understanding and recognition of differences. Communicative rationality recognises the reasons derived from inter-subjectivity rather than objectivity. By referring to communicative rationality, this study includes the role of attributes of speakers and emotional expression in making a claim apart from the logic used. While instrumental rationality claims the best reason, communicative rationality proposes practical reasons and better arguments.

The purpose of this study is to interpret the role of different modes of rationality in claim-making during the communicative process. For example, in the process of claim making about the risks of food shortages, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA), led by its instrumental rationality pointed to food prices and food availability surveyed during the flooding. The BMA generalised that food prices were still under control and there was enough food for the people. That claim was challenged by many non-public organisations that discussed that claim widely on online social media or at public hearings. Some of them mentioned that the analysis of the BMA was based on food prices and availability on a market, which they claimed had not been severely affected by the flooding. However, this was far from the reality for people buying food from the market near their home. Hence, the issue of food shortages was raised by critics who saw this as an issue for marginalised communities by listening to people's stories, rather than illustrating it in general numbers. This qualitative way of understanding the situation led to the conclusion that there was a risk of severe food shortages in many areas of the city, while such concerns were not raised by the BMA. What derives from the communicative process is an example of communicative rationality. The discussion on the role of different modes of rationality in the communicative process in more complicate cases will be addressed in Chapter 6.

3.2.5. Instrumental, communicative and structural power

Instrumental power refers to the power of rules and regulation, which this study explores as rule-making and rule-driving processes by researching organisations or groups that influence these processes. As with communicative power, this study refers to the capacity of organisations or groups in convincing, persuading and creating mutual understanding about specific issues through communication. It captures communicative power by observing discussion among the policy network's constituent organisations and groups in communicative forums. This power is also examined in the story of the policy network's emergence and characterisation, and the story of overcoming collective action problems. Structural power is understood as power embedded in both political-bureaucratic and socio-cultural structures. The political-bureaucratic structural power refers to the hegemonic power of the state, such as the constitution, democracy (as a discourse to enhance legitimacy) and the

bureaucratic system. Socio-cultural structural power is the power of social traditions and cultural beliefs such as religious principles and the speeches of social, spiritual or charismatic leaders who are respected by many in society. To capture this interpretation of structural power, this study focuses on direct and indirect influences from outside the policy network. For example, the Buddhist principle of self-reliance had a direct influence on shaping the policy network's promotion of subsistence-oriented UA, while the King's speech had an indirect influence on the policy network when it was referred to by network members, as Thai people in general tend to agree with his speeches as a result of state propaganda to promote him and his ideas throughout more than a half century (see Handley, 2006; McCargo, 2005).

3.3. Data collection and analysis

3.3.1. Data collection methods

The study uses multiple methods to triangulate and support each other. First of all, (A) this study developed a secondary review of relevant grey literature, including the legal framework, policy documents, project proposals, organisational and group profiles, meeting reports, progress reports, databases, websites, and Facebook pages. The review was also based on YouTube clips, such as panel debates on effective microorganism ball. Secondly, (B) this study included observations of collective actions (the details of what activities were observed are shown in Appendix A). During the observations, the researcher took field notes and undertook informal interviews with organisation and group leaders who had organised the collective events. Thirdly, (C) semi-structured interviews were conducted and recorded with all actors who had ever worked in relation to the City Farm programme, including thirteen public organisations, five NGOs, and six social enterprises (a list of questions and names are provided in Appendix B and D). Fourthly, (D) this study organised focus groups with core actors, including NGOs and social enterprises (a list of names and set of questions are provided in Appendix C). Fifthly, (E) it included observations of farming practices (farm visits) and interviews with farming groups. Out of the total number of groups, 50% were selected (41 out of 80 groups). The selection process began by categorising them into three different types and found that they were composed of 43 neighbourhood-based groups, 30 workplace-based groups and 7 non-area based groups. This study set a quota of 6:4:1 for each

type for the sample in proportion to the total population. To choose half of the groups, 22 neighbourhood-based groups, 15 workplace-based groups, and 4 non-area based groups were selected through a simple random sampling method. Ten particularly remarkable groups were intentionally selected based on their past actions and the recommendation of the coordinators of the City Farm programme (the questions and a list of organisations and groups are provided in Appendix B and D). A sixth method (F) consisted of observations of activities of four selected groups (from E) and re-interviewing their representatives to achieve a more in-depth, inside and intensive discussion. The observed activities are different from B in the way that they were organised by and within policy communities (sub-sectoral networks) and details of the activities that were observed are shown in Appendix A. The interviews were informal (unstructured and open) and in-depth. The main selection criterion was the agreement of other groups in the same policy community that these groups were centralities of the policy communities. In other words, they had a good connection with many other groups as hubs for information flows and resource exchange. As a seventh method, (G) the study included interviews with two selected farming groups who did not engage with the City Farm programme (the outsiders). The selection criteria were that they had tried to engage with the policy network but were excluded (the questions and a list of names are provided in Appendix B and D).

The project also used a specific tool (H) to collect relational data about tie relations among the policy network's constituent organisations and groups as a minimum requirement for social capital as discussed in 2.2. This is a quantitative method which requires the key informants to rank their relations with other actors by scoring the degree of closeness from (1) knowing each other; (2) contacting each other; (3) working with each other sometime; and (4) working closely with each other. If a couple rates a different score, the lower one is counted. For example, in case 'A' rates its closeness to 'B' as 3 and 'B' rates 2, the score 2 is counted. A special requirement for key informants was to question the roots of their relations with the top five strongest actors in order to capture forms of social capital, including shared rules, reputation, trust, shared norms, reciprocity, moral obligation and shared knowledge as operationalised in Section 3.2.

Table 3.1. Methods for data collection in relation to research sub-objectives

Sub-objectives	Collecting data methods
1. To explore the role of social capital of key different actors in facilitating the emergence and characterisation of the policy network	
1.1. To define closeness of one actor to another (a minimum requirement for social capital)	(H)
1.2. To define roots of relations (to capture different forms of social capital)	(A), (B), (C), (E), (H)
1.3. To find a clear link between social capital and policy network emergence	(A), (C), (D), (H)
1.4. To find a clear link between social capital and policy network characterisation	(A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), (H)
2. To examine how social capital supports cooperation enhancement and conflict resolution	
2.1. To examine the role of social capital in enhancing cooperation	(A), (B), (C), (D), (E)
2.2. To examine the role of social capital in handling conflicts	(A), (B), (C), (D), (E)

To give an overview of the fieldwork, I would like to start by reflecting on my own positionality. My PhD journey started in late September 2010, a few months after the beginning of the journey of the City Farm programme, which was endorsed in July 2010. Like many PhD students, I attempted to work on a topic that is relevant to past experiences. Before the City Farm programme was endorsed, my colleagues and I

had the chance to assess the possibilities of the programme during October 2009 to March 2010, as well as being recognised as a university scholar who had worked on relevant topics of UA before, researching the promotion of sustainable and fair local food systems. When the programme began to focus on UA, I also began to learn about this area. Although both the programme and I was familiar with local food systems at that time, this was the first step towards UA promotion. As we wanted to know more about UA and learn from each other, we developed a reciprocal relationship. While I asked for updates and inside information about the programme from the programme coordinators, the coordinators needed my international experiences with UA. Therefore, we did not walk separately but together. I became a columnist for the City Farm programme's website on international experiences with UA in December 2010.

After the programme had emerged and developed for a year, preliminary fieldwork was conducted between 1July and 30 August 2011. The fieldwork aimed to establish an overview of what the programme had achieved so far, who engaged with the programme, how, why and in what way. The two months of fieldwork also assessed the general progress of the programme and its direction after a year. The main benefit was to identify the boundaries of the programme and to sketch the UA policy network as well as identifying active organisations and groups. Many assumptions could be established after my return, including the way the mapping of relations tended to look, the forms of social capital that were present, who the powerful organisations were, the number of policy communities that existed within the policy network, and who the centralities of those policy communities were.

In late 2011, the disaster was a shock and a challenge for both the City Farm programme and for myself. Working with disaster was new to us as it did not appear in the City Farm programme's plan and not even in my proposal for a PhD upgrading. As a result, I began to review the literature on UA promotion during extreme climate events to share with the City Farm programme, who clearly wanted to know about this topic at that time. In order to share and learn from the programme, I reframed the research design in the context of the disaster. As the disaster came without warning, I went to the field for the main fieldwork period between 19 December 2011 to 8 April 2012 with both planned and unplanned

questions, which led to many surprises and challenges. By learning from the policy network's constituent organisations and groups while also being expected to help, the fieldwork became participatory action research forced by the situation.

From 25 May to 25 June 2012, I went back to the field for a follow-up visit,[2] during which at least three key events had been planned. Firstly, there was an academic seminar on UA organised by the City Farm programme on 8-9 June 2012 in which I was invited as one of the key speakers. At the event, I published the first UA book in Thai written published by the City Farm programme (Boossabong, 2012). This book collects articles I wrote while being a columnist. Secondly, I reciprocated by meeting many relevant actors working under the umbrella of the City Farm programme and shared the results of data analysis with them and received their feedback on the 15th of June. In doing so, this study demonstrated the importance of social capital in supporting collective actions and raised concerns about the deliberative process to enhance cooperation and deal with conflicts. Their comments referred to their limitations in organising events and to the communicative forums. Some also mentioned cultural constraints. For example, older participants usually had a louder voice than younger ones, and civil servants usually thought they knew more than laypeople. These comments affected the way in which this study handled the cultural aspect, particularly as an effect of Buddhism and Thai traditions. This study then included cultural constraints in Habermas' concept of 'distorted communication', which makes his 'ideal speech conditions' difficult to reach. Thirdly, on the 23rd of June, a workshop was held to share experiences and opinions among the organisations and groups working under the umbrella of the City Farm programme dedicated to the future of the programme, in which I was invited to join and give an opinion. Apart from participating in these events, the follow-up period also became a chance for me to fill some gaps from the previous fieldwork, to update and re-check some information.

In relation to the above, it is hard to say that I was an outsider in the case study. It might be better to say that I was a subject of the study, for I adopted an active

---

[2] I realises that to do research is a learning process. The main fieldwork plan showed a high degree of confidence that every aspect would be explored. But in the end follow-up fieldwork was needed when some essential information was missing while a lot of information could not be analysed after research focus had changed.

observation approach not just as an outsider but instead by providing opinions. Many inside and outside the policy network recognised me as an insider of the programme. A more active role had been played after the beginning of 2013, when it exceeded the time frame of this study more than a year after the flooding. I was offered a role as a consultant of the programme after 19 April 2013. I also played many roles, such as giving a public lecture on UA, organised by the City Farm programme for a general audience, to give a special lecture to City Farm programme staff on international experiences with UA promotion, and to partake in a media interview on UA promotion between the 19th of April and the 28th of June 2013. Moreover, I formed the team to monitor and evaluate the programme. Although I could not dedicate the time to undertake an intensive role and let other team members lead the monitoring and evaluation process, I gained a lot of beneficial additional information from this project by learning from the monitoring and evaluation report while commenting on and proofreading ahead of the team.[3]

During this period, my positionality led to many organisational and group leaders to informally discuss their thoughts and to share their experiences. Although this visit was outside the initial plan, informal chats brought about unexpected data and many surprises, particularly concerning the perspective of the middle class compared to the poor, and stories behind conflicts and exclusion. Such positionality also facilitated access to inside information by being offered a chance to join exclusive meetings among core policy actors. On the other hand, it also had a negative impact as the ideas, perspectives and ways to interpret the position of the subjects of this study and my own were difficult to separate. In other words, we were assimilated through our sharing and shaped each other's viewpoints. For example, the definition of UA given by Mougeot (2000, p.3)[4] was proposed by me and it became the point of reference for the core policy actors. In contrast, the negative mindset of many organisations and groups about the concept of 'sovereignty' affected the way I framed the analysis

---

[3] Actually, my role in practice was close to the role of an advisor rather than the head of the team which is a formal position.

[4] "Urban agriculture is an industry located within (intra-urban) or on the fringe (peri-urban) of a town, an urban centre, a city or metropolis, which grows or raises, processes and distributes a diversity of food and non-food products, reusing mainly human and material resources, products and services found in and around that urban area, and in turn supplying human and material resources, products and services largely to that urban area".

by trying to avoid the concept of food sovereignty. On the field in Thailand, the term sovereignty was linked to the army, violence and even war. Their mindset shaped the way that I compromised with the theoretical concept by capturing their actions instead using the concept of the right to food (as only one aspect of the concept of food sovereignty).

With regards to ethical considerations, all people who provided information to me during the main fieldwork period from 19 December 2011 to 8 April 2012 were asked for their consent before beginning the interview. They were asked to allow the use of their data, references to them, sound recordings, photos, and notes. All participants allowed note-taking and photos, while some public servants did not allow sound recording. The information gained from the main fieldwork serves as additional information from the same people who had given their consent before. The researcher also gave key informants information concerning their rights and safety, and any mention of them breaking the law would not be reported. The researcher also gave the key informants general information about the research project and its aims, followed by a confirmation that all data collected from them would only be used for academic purposes. The recommendation report to improve the relevant policy will be developed separately from the research report in the Thai language. Because of the use information derived from informal chats, this study is careful with this source of information and does not provide names.

In addition, I had two assistants supporting data collection who both had previous research experience. The first worked as a photographer while the other helped with taking notes and they both transcribed the sound recordings. In cases when the interviewees did not allow sound recording, both of them also assisted in remembering what the interviewees had said. The research team had dinner together after finishing the day's task to discuss, identify results, and plan ahead. However, I was responsible for designing research methods and procedures for data collection, analysis, and interpreting any information and observed events.

3.3.2. Data analysis methods

As mentioned in 2.4, the analytical framework of this study is developed from many analytical tools adopted for different research objectives. The first objective is to

examine the role of social capital in facilitating the emergence and characterisation of the policy network. To analyse this role, the study began by visualising the policy network diagram to view basic relationships among the policy network's constituent organisations and groups based on their degree of closeness, which is the minimum requirement of social capital. To design the policy network diagram, it adopted the drawing technique of computing-based social network analysis which begins by building an adjacency matrix using the data collected by (H) mentioned in section 3.3.1. These data sets provided a clear image of policy actors (points) and their connection (lines) depending on the degree of closeness. The adjacency matrix was subsequently coded and the policy network diagram can be visualised by applying open source graph visualisation software 'Gephi', which supports the analysis and visualisation of relational data (see Brandes et. al., 2008; Scott, 2000; Freeman, 2008).

The diagram, which will be shown in Chapter 4 (figure 4.2), also distinguishes actor constellations, which helps to identify policy communities within the policy network. Furthermore, it helps to identify whether initially, the policy network was centralised or not and the 'stars' within the entire policy network and each policy community, or in other words powerful organisations and centralities, as operationalised in section 3.2. However, Walker (2004) argues, although mapping through computing-based network analysis can show the structure of connections to identify social capital, qualitative analysis is also needed to expand on the story of these relations. Therefore, this project developed this 'objective policy network diagram' to be the starting point for further analysis.

The first form of additional analysis was to capture different forms of social capital from interview transcriptions, including shared rules, reputation, trust, shared norms, reciprocity, moral obligation and shared forms of knowledge. These forms are operationalised in section 3.2 and they are classified by two different perspectives guided by IRC and CAT, which are rational and normative commitments. In doing so, the study contextualises the degree of closeness to understand social capital more comprehensively by exploring the reason for closeness and analysing the different contributions of IRC and CAT to social capital studies. The alternative policy network diagrams are also developed by adopting narrative network analysis

(Lejano, Ingram and Ingram, 2013). While the previous objective policy network diagram (presented in Chapter 4)represents the official viewpoint and was developed by quantitative social network analysis mentioned above, other four diagrams (presented in Chapter 5) are 'subjective policy network diagrams' that represent other viewpoints derived from storytelling of each centrality of policy communities. These alternative diagrams were made by hand drawing of relations instead of computing visualisation.

Furthermore, by examining the role of social capital identified previously in policy network emergence and characterisation, one cannot overlook power relations between the policy network's constituent organisations and groups. This study considers IRC and CAT perspectives on power to include instrumental, communicative and structural power, as discussed in 2.4. The analysis focuses on the ways in which different forms of social capital activate different types of power in shaping the policy network, particularly by determining the powerful organisations and centralities of policy communities within the policy network. It also focuses on how instrumental, communicative and structural powers shape network decentralisation and exclusion by bringing key aspects of each type of power into the analysis, as operationalised in section 3.2.

The second objective is to analyse how social capital affects the way in which the policy network enhances cooperation and resolves conflicts. The data was analysed by adopting rhetorical analysis, including the analysis of the effects of ethos, logos and pathos in the communicative process, with the aim to enhance cooperation and solve conflicts. The analysis of ethos is linked to the analysis of power of the policy network's constituent organisations and groups, as discussed previously, because power determines the identities of the speakers, such as social status, creditability and self-confidence. The analysis of logos is framed by Fischer's logic of policy deliberation, which identifies four ways of giving reasons, moving from the empirical to the normative, as discussed in section 2.4. The analysis emphasises the role of different forms of social capital with various entry points embedded in this framework by allowing the stories to reveal themselves. At the same time, the thesis also examines the impact of IRC's instrumental and CAT's communicative and structural powers and modes of rationality in the claim making process by

introducing their key aspects as operationalised in section 3.2. Finally, to understand the role of pathos, this study interprets and compares the impact of different emotional expressions of core actors in observed communicative fora. The data required for this analysis was collected from observations of communicative forums both by taking part in them directly, by watching video clips recorded by the coordinators of the City Farm programme and even clips uploaded on YouTube.

The focus of the analysis of cooperation enhancement is on the ability of powerful organisations and centralities of policy communities to make an agreement about the reason to cooperate by convincing and persuading other organisations and groups to agree with their arguments and their claims about practical reasons. Another focus is on the interrelations of their social capital, power (including social status), emotional expression, and reason (either technical information or normative claims). However, the analysis of conflict resolution highlights the role of mediators and recognises them as deliberative facilitators or interpreters of different understandings. The analysis is based on stories about the role of reputation and trust given by conflicting stakeholders in supporting the mediator's ethos, and the role of shared rules, norms and knowledge in supporting the mediator's logos and pathos. It also considers the role of the mediator in stimulating and allowing stakeholders to talk, and seeking for the compromise solution.

All in all, as mentioned briefly in the introduction of this chapter, the research starts from deductive approach where theories guide analytical framework. But, the theories still have a gap to provide specific explanation such as which form of social capital helps to handle cooperation and conflicts and how. The framework, thus, left some details to be explored. Then, empirical evidences from the study could give such details and reflect to the existing theories. So, the analysis started from deduction and moved to induction. This approach is also called 'retroductive' approach.

3.4. Profiles of organisations and groups chosen for this study

As collective entities are the unit of analysis, information is needed about each organisation and group, obtained through their leaders. The research involved interviews with 23 organisation leaders from all the public organisations engaged in

the UA policy network during the period of study. The organisations included central, regional and local governmental agencies. The central government bodies were the Health Promotion Foundation and the Bangkok Agricultural Extension Office. The former funds, guides, and monitors the City Farm programme as discussed in Chapter 1, while the latter supports knowledge on farming practices and information such as databases about total farmland, number of farmers, types of food growing, productivity and market prices, particularly for Bangkok's peri-urban agriculture. As for organisations under the regional government (the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration), the Department of City Planning collects data about land use and available vacant land to develop community gardens. The Department of the Environment helps to promote edible green space and supports the protection of peri-urban farmland to become a greenbelt, while the Food Sanitation Division of the Department of Health promotes good nutrition, including organic and fresh foods connected to support for organic food growing, the reduction of food miles and local food systems. The Food Sanitation Division also provides services such as chemical contamination tests to identify whether food is safe or not. Key local government bodies at the time of this study are the Laksi, Klongteuy and Prawaet District Administration Offices. All of these developed rooftop gardens in their office building and opened up to be an UA learning centre. They cooperated by being the UA training centres of the City Farm programme. They also agreed to support the City Farm programme by promoting farming groups to develop their community gardens and proposing to join the programme. Furthermore, they recommended outstanding groups (in their view) to be considered by the coordinator of the City Farm programme.

Apart from the public organisations, interviews were also conducted with scholars who work for public universities and engaged with the City Farm programme. Scholars from the Faculty of Architecture, Kasetsart University, supported the edible green building by designing and creating a model on a campus building. A team of scholars registered a patent to claim their ownership of the lighting soil container, which was suitable for developing vertical and rooftop gardens. A team of scholars from the Faculty of Environment and Resource Studies, Mahidon University, also provided academic services to measure the heat emitted by the building by comparing buildings with and without rooftop gardens, and the situation before and

after designing a green building. A research team from the Nutrition Institute, Mahidon University, joined the Food Security programme with the Health Promotion Foundation, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and the Working Group on Food for Change. This team influenced the promotion of food safety as part of promoting food security in Thailand and played a remarkable role for more than a decade towards promoting food safety as well as promoting food security in an urban context, particularly by contributing information and knowledge from their research results. The landscape architect team from the Faculty of Architecture and Urban Planning, Thammasart University, has an active role in UA promotion through their participatory action research and academic position to facilitate the community planning process of many communities in peri-urban areas that are still engaged in farming. The team attempted to push the communities to keep their farmland as a way to conserve farming areas in the city and to protect farming culture which is a significant community identity. Lastly, the consultant team of the Policy and Planning Programme, Mahasarakham University, assessed the possibilities of the programme. The team had a good profile in researching sustainable local food systems and worked closely with the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and its network more than a decade before the endorsement of the City Farm programme. The team also became the external programme monitoring and evaluation team in 2013. I was also an active part of this team between 2007 and 2010, assessing the possibilities of the City Farm programme. In the process of monitoring and evaluating the programme, I supported the team by giving advice and comments.

Leaders of public organisations were not the only ones to be interviewed. 21 leaders of NGOs, community-based organisations (CBOs) and social enterprises active in the Bangkok's UA policy network were also questioned. The director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and coordinators of the City Farm programme from the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation were interviewed. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation plays a major role in governing the City Farm programme as the programme manager (part of the profile of these organisations is presented in the Introduction and Chapter 1). The organisation has 24 members of staff and has developed the network of organisations and groups working on sustainable development around the country. The number of organisations and groups engaged

in the sustainable development network is roughly 50-70 (not stable). Sustainable Agriculture Foundation works closely with the Media Centre for Development and the Working Group on Food for Change as they usually organise events and manage development projects together. Leaders of these two organisations were also interviewed, including the director of the Media Centre for Development and the head of the Working Group on Food for Change. The Media Centre for Development plays an important role in collecting and publishing sustainable farming knowledge and practices through the Natural Agriculture Magazine. The Media Centre for Development also has developed a self-reliant house including backyard farming. This house was opened as a learning centre for the public and has become a place to organise the UA training programme. The organisation formed the city farm association, which is engaged by many social enterprises organising UA training programmes. The Working Group on Food for Change promotes sustainable food consumption particularly through a slow food campaign while also promoting organic food production by formulating an organic consumer network to identify demands for organic food, which benefits organic food producers looking for organic customers.

The researcher also interviewed leaders of the Green Market Network, including the coordinator of the network, the director of the 'Soun Ngeaun Mema' and leader of 'Health-me Organic Delivery' as the organisers of the network. The network promotes local organic food systems by linking organic customers to organic producers and organising seventeen weekly green markets around Bangkok and 'Green Fairs' annually. It also adopts the community-supported agriculture system by facilitating the direct sale of organic products with a pre-paid system and farm-to-table delivery. To screen green producers, the network adopts the participatory guarantee system through which the production process is monitored by customer representatives. Besides, the network organises monthly farm visits to develop better relationships among producers and customers.

Moreover, the leaders of the Human Settlement Foundation and the Foundation for Labour and Employment Promotion were included in this study. While the Human Settlement Foundation supports the slum dwellers' movement network, the Foundation for Labour and Employment Promotion supports events for the informal

labour network. They appear to be the formal coordinators of the two networks but this study concludes that in practice they did not work in this way, as discussed in section 5.1.3. As with social enterprises, I interviewed leaders of all active enterprises engaged in the city farm association (led by the Media Centre for Development), including the Veggie Prince City Farm training centre, the Suwannabhumi City Farm training centre, the 'Slow Life' hotel's training centre, and the 'Sai Jai' training centre. They developed a city vegetable garden and earned money from their main and related business, such as selling food, opening a green restaurant to use their self-grown food as the main source for cooking, and providing home stay and room service for customers who want to live closer to nature. At the same time, they are concerned with returning benefits to society by opening their vegetable garden for the public and organise a food production training programme by collecting a small training fee (not-for-profit).

As for the farming groups as mentioned in 3.3, this study selected half of them (41 out of 80) with attention to the proportion of three different types, which are neighbourhood-based groups followed by workplace-based groups and non-area based groups respectively. Hence, neighbourhood-based groups represented the highest number (22 groups) while 15 workplace-based groups and 4 non-area based groups were chosen. The selection is based on simple random sampling from the quota of each type after some groups were picked based on their significant role. Overall, 117 leaders of 41 farming groups were interviewed and the number of key informants was higher than expected. This study aimed to interview two leaders per group (a total of 82), but in practice more than two leaders of some groups wanted to join the interview (a list of names of the groups and key informants are provided in Appendix D). Table 3.2 shows the number and percentage of farming groups and key informants in comparison to the number and percentage of other sectors. The table shows that although only half of the farming groups were selected, they are still the majority. These numbers, however, could not determine the level of their influence on policy network governance in each sector (an analysis of their influence will be provided in Chapters 4 and 5).

Table 3.2. Selected organisations and groups classified by their sector

	Number of organisations / groups	Percentage of organisations/ groups	Number of key informants	Percentage of key informants
Public organisation	13	20.3	23	14.3
NGOs and CBOs	6	9.4	13	8.1
Social enterprises	4	6.3	8	5.0
Neighbour based group	22	34.4	64	39.8
Workplace based group	15	23.4	42	26.1
Non area based group	4	6.3	11	6.8
Total	64	100.0	161	100.0

Considering the profiles of the selected groups in the overview[5], almost all their collective gardens are located in the inner city as shown in figure 3.1. This sample therefore represents the whole population as almost all farming groups also developed their gardens in the inner city. This was also the reason why the City Farm programme could mobilise fresh vegetables during the flooding when water blocked access to the inner city. One third (7 of 22) of neighbourhood-based groups chosen in the sample are based in slum communities and they all engaged in the slum dwellers network. Roughly 50% of the total sample of workplace-based groups (7 of 15) developed their garden in and around their office in flats and condominiums, which represent the working conditions of modern city work life commonly found in Bangkok where workplaces tend to have a limited area. Only 13

---

[5] The story of how these groups became engaged in the City Farm programme will be explored in section 5.2.

of a total of 41 developed their collective garden on a large piece of land (larger than 2 rai or 0.8 acres)

Figure 3.1. Farming groups chosen as the sample for this study

Source: Mapping by Noppanit Charassinvichai

Moreover, it was found that 90.2% of the sample developed their collective garden on one piece of land or the common rooftop. Such spaces are owned either publicly or privately. In case of private ownership, it usually belonged to the group's leader (either the head of the community or the boss of the company), who sacrificed his/her vacant space for collective purposes. The rest (9.8%) grew food in each member's household backyard because they could not find a common place. Members therefore garden in their own space and often allow other members to access it to share responsibility and the benefits of their garden. A private backyard then becomes redefined as a collective space.

Conclusions

By moving from theories to methods, this study faces the challenge of different methodological approaches proposed by the different theories adopted for this study. To respond to these challenges, it avoids any extreme methods derived from IRC's methodological individualism or CAT's interpretive approach, such as game theory analysis and the abductive method (seeking for a surprise). This study finds the middle ground and a compromise approach by beginning with a deductive proposition as many IRC scholars do and end by revisiting theories as advocated by CAT scholars. When conducting fieldwork, my positionality is revealed as I took on the role of an active observer. This positionality provided many chances to access in-depth information and to join exclusive meetings. However, this positionality affected the interpretation of the data as my perspectives and the key informants were often assimilated, which is one of the limitations of this study (more details will be discussed in the concluding chapter).

The remaining questions concern how the chosen organisations and groups were positioned in the UA policy network; why they were included in the City Farm programme and why not others; how they related to each other; and how they cooperated in collective action in response to the disaster. These questions will be discussed in Chapters 4 to 7.

Chapter 4

Social capital, power and the emergence of
the policy network

Introduction

This chapter addresses research findings about the role of social capital in facilitating the emergence of the policy network on urban agriculture (UA) in Bangkok. Figure 4.1 shows main argument and how the analysis of this chapter is framed. To put it briefly, this chapter argues that social capital activates power exercised by core actors which in turn shapes the policy network. In relation to that, computing-based and narrative-based network analysis are employed to analyse social capital and define core actors. Then, three faces of power are analysed to understand how social capital activates power that is exercised by policy actors as discussed in 2.4. The chapter begins by exploring the story of the emergence of the UA policy network followed by mapping relationships of the policy network's constituent organisations and groups through their different degrees of closeness as a starting point to analyse their social capital. Moving on, this chapter analyses each form of social capital with reference to both rational and normative commitments, including shared rules and norms, reputation for trustworthiness, trust, reciprocity, moral obligation and shared forms of knowledge. To draw a relation between each form of social capital and the policy network's emergence, power relations are analysed. Instrumental, communicative and structural powers are analysed by focusing on how the powerful actors exercised their power. The chapter also illustrates how each form of social capital can activate power, which stimulated the emergence of the policy network.

Figure 4.1 Main argument and analytical framework of Chapter 4

Main argument: Social capital activates power exercised by powerful actors which in turn shapes the policy network

Analytical Framework:
-Visualising 'computing-based' policy network diagram + developing 'narrative-based' diagrams & exploring 'forms' of social capital held by network constituent policy actors
-Analysing 'three faces of power' exercised by powerful actors & how their social capital activates those powers in shaping the policy network

Power exercised by powerful actors

Social capital (held by powerful actors with other actors)

activate...

-Power to enforce rules/ incentives and order (**instrumental power** highlighted by IRC)

-Power to convince, build mutual understanding and make agreements (**communicative power** highlighted by CAT)

-Power embedded in political, bureaucratic, social and cultural structures (**Structural power** recognised by CAT)

affect...

Policy network **emergence**

Computing network analysis *Ch.4.2*
+
Narrative network analysis *Ch.4.1, 3*

Power analysis *Ch.4.4*

4.1. How does the urban agriculture's policy network emerge?

The story of the emergence of the UA policy network in Bangkok starts with the intention of both public and non-public sectors to support Bangkok dwellers to grow their own food. While some District Administration Offices have promoted household vegetable gardening since the economic crisis in 1997, many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) led by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, the Media Centre for Development and the Working Group on Food for Change[1] have promoted local food systems and organic food production in and around Bangkok since 1998. In 1997, the District Administration Offices promoted UA in Bangkok as a way to implement government and Bangkok Metropolitan Administration policies on self-reliance to respond to the crisis. A year later, the Media Centre for Development, in cooperation with the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and the Working Group on Food for Change published the first volume

---

[1] At the time, the Working Group on Food for Change was working under the NGO called the Thai Network on Community Rights and Biodiversity.

of the Natural Agriculture Magazine. It was the first place to include stories about UA. During 1997-2001, the sustainable agriculture discourse was also addressed in the 8th Thai National Development Plan, which relevant public organisations, including the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration and District Administration Offices were made to deliver. Subsequently, many NGOs agreed to push this agenda. The principle of UA, which fits in with the sustainable agriculture discourse, was therefore promoted in parallel by both public and non-public organisations.

Since 2004, the benefits of UA have been more seriously considered. Many inhabitants of Bangkok became concerned about food insecurity due to the curfew experiences that derived from political crisis. At the time, there was a food panic among Bangkok dwellers, regardless of the political camps that they supported. The demand for training on food growing increased and many enterprises opened training centres to respond to such demands. The leading enterprise was formed by the Media Centre for Development, namely the 'Grandfather Veggie Garden' training centre (Fieldwork interview with Korch-Chanok Hutapate, coordinator of the Media Centre for Development, 14/01/2012). Later on, the Veggie Prince and Suwannabhumi training centres also became famous and gained media attention. Still today, these enterprises not only organise training programmes, but they also sell their products, such as vegetables, handbooks, and farming instruments. These enterprises also formed a network called the City Farm Association with the aim of exchanging knowledge and resources (Fieldwork interview with Nardsiri Komonpan, coordinator of the City Farm programme, 21/03/2012).

Beyond the role of the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, District Administration Offices, NGOs and the enterprises, UA has also been practised by laypeople and recognised by community-based organisations (CBOs). Many slum communities have practised UA ever since their communities were established, including the On-nut Sibsee Rai, On-nut Hoksibhok, and Poonshup communities. They were engaged in the slum dwellers network, which was formed in 1998. The network is coordinated by the Human Settlement Foundation (a CBO) that organises a monthly meeting, a saving group, a foundation, and welfare for the members. Similarly, many groups of informal workers also practised UA as a form of welfare for their members, such as the working at home labour groups in the Keha-Tung

Songhong and Clonghog communities, the Solidarity group the Bangbon district, and the Buffalo Horn Carving group in Bangcare district. They joined the informal labour network, coordinated by the Foundation for Labour and Employment Promotion (a CBO), which works on many issues including that of food, such as developing worker skills, and promoting legal rights for informal workers.

The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation has worked with and for slum communities and groups of informal workers for a decade and the director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation has clarified that her organisation aims to work for these target groups (Fieldwork interview with Supa Yaimaung, director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, 21/03/2012). A network between the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and these poor and marginalised groups has developed since 1998 on the side of an existing network between the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and other NGOs and CBOs. The network of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and several public organisations was created roughly between 2007-2009, when the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation joined the Food Security programme engaging many public organisations, including public universities. During that period, the relationship between the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and the Health Promotion Foundation (a public organisation under the Prime Minister's Office) was also enhanced as they worked with each other. Before the end of the Food Security programme in 2009, the directors of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and the Health Promotion Foundation had the chance to discuss and agreed that to enhance food security in the context of Thailand they could pay more attention to UA. The coordinator of the Health Promotion Foundation during an interview defended that the Health Promotion Foundation kept this agreement in mind, but had still not given a word to formulate the City Farm programme using tax-funded money. As a public organisation, the Health Promotion Foundation prefer not to allow NGOs to manage public programmes (Fieldwork interview with Veerapong Kreungsinyod, coordinator of City Farm programme from the Health Promotion Foundation, 5/07/2011).

In 2009, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation produced a report on the situation of food security in Thailand after 1997 (Yaimaung, 2012; Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, 2009). The report mentioned food insecurity in the city and

recommended the importance of supporting UA, particularly in a large city such as Bangkok. During late 2009, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, in cooperation with the Working Group on Food for Change and the Media Centre for Development, aimed to know the possibilities to promote UA, by exploring the interest of city dwellers in growing food in the city and by announcing the first UA competition in Bangkok, namely 'City Vegetable Garden Award'. This event shows that many Bangkok dwellers in different places and backgrounds practised UA. At the same time, the Green Market Network was formed by green enterprises, working on the customer side. The Green Market Network was motivated by the same realisation as the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and Health Promotion Foundation: there is demand from city dwellers food from the city.

Later, the Health Promotion Foundation asked university scholars to study the possibility of supporting the City Farm programme before deciding mid-2010 to fund the programme. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation was chosen as the main manager of the programme in cooperation with the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, District Administration Offices, public universities, other NGOs, CBOs, and enterprises. The City Farm programme not only aims to support citizen groups, including communities, to develop their collective gardens; but also aims to collaborate with these groups to develop UA together with the core organisations, groups and networks from the public and non-public sectors. This programme, then, linked various actors to work together as policy alliances after they fragmented in terms of activities, goals and scales. The programme also created various policy initiatives and collective actions. From above, it can be seen that after many networks, organisations and groups of city dwellers engaged in the City Farm programme, the UA policy network in Bangkok clearly emerged. What is still missing from the story provided here is a mapping of the policy network as a whole, an analysis of the closeness among policy network's constituent organisations and groups, forms of social capital held by them, the definition of powerful actors (who held power over others) and an understanding of their power relations, as discussed in the next three sections.

Photo 4.1. Logo of the City Farm programme

4.2. The policy network's constituent organisations and groups and their closeness

In order to identify the policy network's constituent actors, this study began by developing a list of organisations and groups engaged in the City Farm programme, which derived from the observation of their engagement in collective actions during the preliminary fieldwork complemented by a review of their participation in activities organised by the City Farm programme as shown in policy documents (Progress Report of City Farm Programme, 2011; Monitoring and Evaluation Report of City Farm Programme, 2011; Annual Report of City Farm Programme, 2011). Some were included because they were referred to by others (snowball technique). Apart from creating a list of names, this study draws out the relations between the organisations and groups by asking them to rate the degree of closeness with other entities. This method allowed me to identify the policy network's constituent actors and visualise their relationships, which is a basic component of social capital. Figure 4.2 shows the policy network diagram developed from the degree of closeness among the policy network's constituent actors followed by a list of names, as shown in Table 4.1. The names of some organisations and groups do not appear here as they are grouped with the names of actor constellations but all full names are presented in Appendix D.

According to figure 4.2 together with Table 4.1, the thickness of links represents the degree of closeness and the size of points reflects how well they are connected. The

alphabets represent the different policy network's constituent organisations and groups under analysis. It should be noted that their close relations are frozen at the time of the survey (during 19 December 2011 to 8 April 2012). The purpose was to understand their relations in the specific period in the same way with taking a photo to capture the moment. However, the relations are by no means static or rigid. Dynamics of their relations will be also analysed in Chapter 6 and 7 to understand cooperation and conflicts.

Figure 4.2 illustrates that the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and Health Promotion Foundation have close links with many other organisations and groups. While the former worked as the programme manager of the City Farm programme, the latter provided funding support and monitors the programme. These two organisations also influenced other organisations and groups the most. Close relations with many others and influences over others are related, and this will be discussed in 4.4. The figure also shows that the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation works closely with two other non-governmental organisations, the Working Group on Food for Change and the Media Centre for Development. These all work directly on the food agenda.

Moreover, figure 4.2 points that the policy network also has many sub-sectoral networks. Each of them is an actor constellation, which can organise its own collective actions. For example, the Green Market Network organised food aid by joining a group of organic food restaurants with the community supported agriculture (CSA) system so that fresh food was cooked for peri-urban farmers (CSA producers) who were affected by the flooding. This study captures sub-sectoral networks by the concept of policy communities, as discussed in Chapter 2. Figure 4.2 shows that such policy communities within the policy network include the following: local governments (the network of District Administration Offices), the slum dwellers network, the informal labour network, the Green Market Network and social enterprises' policy community. A group of enterprises forming the Green Markets Network (F) is a bit different from a group of social enterprises (the 'H' set). The primer is led by the 'Soun-Ngeaun-Meema' corporation, investing in green-themed book publishing and organising green markets. The Green Markets Network works by using a business approach, though they respect and promote the local food

systems. The group of social enterprises sells self-grown food, maintains green restaurants, and organises a training programme on food growing. Their activities aim to achieve both social and commercial purposes. They also formed an association known as the City Farm Association.

The figure also shows that some groups did not engage in any specific policy communities at the time of the survey. Rather, they had a direct link to either the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation or the Health Promotion Foundation. These groups applied to join the City Farm programme independently after seeing an open call for joining proposal publicised by the programme's coordinator (without any leaders pushing for any specific policy communities). Some other groups are not the recipients of the City Farm programme. They engage in many of its collective actions, depending on their interests. Some of them avoid funding as they want to work interdependently (to only join activities that they are interested in). Others do not match the funding conditions of the programme. For instance, some grow food to sell it afterwards rather than for self-consumption, but still want to engage in the collective actions of the programme in order to build connections for sharing and learning.

The next section will move from mapping the UA policy network through an analysis of close relations among constituent organisations and groups to delving deeper into the roots of their relations, which refers here to different forms of social capital.

Figure 4.2. Bangkok's UA policy network diagram developed from degrees of closeness

Table 4-1: policy actors of the policy network

A is part of the central government	A1 = National Health Promotion Foundation, the Prime Minister' s Office
	A2 = Bangkok Agricultural Extension Office
B is part of the regional government (Bangkok Metropolitan Administration)	B1 = Department of Environment
	B2 = Department of City Planning
	B3 = Food Sanitation Division

C represents a local government entity	C1 = Laksi District Administration Office
	C2 = Clongteuy District Administration Office
	C3 = Praweat District Administration Office
	C4 = Jatujak District Administration Office
D is a public university	D1 = Nutrition Institute, Mahidon University
	D2 = Faculty of Environment and Resource Studies, Mahidon University
	D3 = Faculty of Architecture, Kasetsart University
	D4 = Faculty of Architecture and Urban Planning, Thammasat University
	D5 = Policy and Planning Programme, Mahasarakham University
E is an non-governmental organisation	E1 = Sustainable Agriculture Foundation
	E2 = Working Group on Food for Change
	E3 = Media Centre for Development
F is a group of enterprises	F1 = Green Markets Network
G is a community-based organisation	G1 = Slum Dwellers Network (coordinated by Human Settlement Foundation)
	G2 = Informal Labour Network (coordinated by Foundation for Labour and Employment Promotion)
H is a social enterprise	H1 = Organic way learning centre
	H2 = Slow life hotel training centre
	H3 = Suwannabhumi training centre
	H4 = Prince city farm training centre
I is a people's group that receives funding	I1-1 = Neighbourhood-based + proposed to join the CFP by Slum Dwellers Network
	I1-2 = Neighbourhood-based + proposed to join the CFP by local government
	I1-3 = Neighbourhood-based + proposed to join the CFP by Green Market Network
	I1-4 = Neighbourhood-based + applied to join the CFP by themselves

	I2-1 = Workplace-based + proposed to join the CFP by Informal Labour Network
	I2-2 = Workplace-based + proposed to join the CFP by Green Market Network
	I2-3 = Workplace-based + applied to join the CFP by themselves
	I3 = A non-area based group (including an online group)
J is a non-funded group	J1 = Sunti Asoke community
	J2 = Group of soldiers from the Din Daeng Army Camp

4.3. Forms of social capital: rational and normative commitments

After each organisation and group was asked to rate their degree of closeness, they were given the opportunity to tell stories about their relations with other entities. Information gathered through the interviews helped to identify six different but related forms of social capital held between the nodes of the UA policy network depicted in the previous section, including shared rules, reputation for trustworthiness, trust, shared norms, reciprocity and moral obligation, and shared forms of knowledge.

4.3.1. Shared rules

The analysis reveals that many organisations and groups became close to others by sharing certain rules, particularly among members of each policy community. To begin with, the policy community of local governments share more formalised rules than other policy communities. The basic requirement is that they need to join a monthly meeting. They also share working procedural rules, which include five main areas.

They first need to join missions together as they are integrated in implementing the same policies and strategies (formulated by national and regional levels). Many members of staff of the District Administration Offices during interviews reflected on the fact that each District Administration Office is forced by the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration to work to achieve strategic goals and indicators set by them. They are also forced to contribute to central government policies.

Secondly, they need to develop their own plan in the same way by addressing their goals, visions, missions, strategies, projects, and indicators. In doing so, they need to adopt the same analytical tools, such as SWOT (strength-weakness-opportunity-threat) analysis and using the same strict formal language. By analysing policy documents from four District Administration Offices within Bangkok, this study found that the strategic plans of these District Administration Offices have similar formats and contents. For example, three of them, including Laksi, Clongteuy and Sapansoong District Administration Offices, put city farming training as a project under the same green city development strategy, and put an increase of city vegetable gardens as one of the indicators of the success of green city development.

Thirdly, they need to produce the same pattern of paperwork so that the same rules are applied to general public organisations. For example, they are regulated to create a strict format of project proposal, progress and evaluation reports. They also need to be concerned about bill collection to claim the transparency of their expenditure.

Fourthly, they need to conform to the same regulations on personnel management. For example, they are regulated by the same rules of managing salary and other personnel benefits (including welfare). There are also rules about personnel training, rotation, assessment for career progress, and knowledge management.

Finally, each District Administration Office needs to refer to the same regulations on fiscal management. They are forced to do possibility assessments, cost-benefit analysis, and risk assessment before spending money on running public programmes. They are constrained by standard prices for procurement and the reference to cost per unit. They are also required to do accounting and allow external auditing.

Although shared rules among local governments are a tool for command and control under the bureaucratic system, this study includes this type of rules as social capital held by public organisations because it is a form of social capital created by the bureaucratic structure. More specifically, these shared formal rules can create a form of relationships that starts from formality to a transformation of relations into more informal ones through a process of informalisation. These formal rules can develop basic mutual understanding among District Administration Offices about demands

and limitations, as pointed out by a staff member of the Laksi District Administration Office:

> Without saying anything, sometimes I can understand how other District Administration Offices feel and want as we work under the same regulations and limitations. In many cases, it is not about what we want to do, but it is about what we need to do and what we can do (Fieldwork interview with Jintana Tongpud, UA trainer, Laksi District Administration Office, 23/03/2012).

The shared rules among non-state actors include joining a monthly meeting, which is commonly shared among members of every policy community. To be required to join a meeting is a starting point to develop personal relations among representatives of each organisation and group, which can represent relationships among their organisations and groups as well. Apart from the meeting, some policy communities such as the slum dwellers network and the informal labour network also have a rule that each member needs to join the monthly savings group to develop the foundation to support the network's activities. They also create shared rules on the basic principles and conditions to get benefits from their foundation, such as welfare for newborn babies, illness, and funerals. Among members of the informal labour network, there are rules to work together to produce some products, such as a t-shirt, dress, umbrella etc. The rules are set by the Foundation for Labour and Employment Promotion for controlling product quality and making a sense of fairness (related to benefits distribution), such as the rule to assess product standards monthly by the committee (its members are selected from members of each group), the rule to allocate a certain number of jobs to each member (providing quota/ amount of products/ pieces of works) by considering intention expressed by members and their readiness assessed by the aforementioned committee, and the rule determining agreed deadline (setting time-frame) (Fieldwork interview with Khun Maem, staff of the Foundation for Labour and Employment Promotion, 11/02/12). These rules are not written down but recognised by each organisation and group engaged in the network.

Regarding shared rules between members of the Green Market Network's policy community specifically, there are two types of rules: market and community

155

supported agriculture system's rules. The market regulations are set by representatives of the members for quality standard control of both the products of green enterprises and hygiene. In the case of community supported agriculture system's rules, members who are producers are required by the committee, formed by the 'Soun-Ngeaun-Meema' corporation (that organises the Green Market Network), to pass the participatory guarantee system, while customers are required to participate in the participatory guarantee system process as either a committee member or an observer. All members are also expected to join an event called 'customers meet producers' to discuss problems and give feedback. The Green Market Network regulates delivery methods and appropriate meeting points. Last but not least, a rule stipulates that each producer must welcome other members on a farm visit.

Although the above rules shared among non-state actors are not equally strict as the rules shared by local governments, they can influence relations between organisations and groups who share them. They create common spheres of interaction for various organisations and groups to meet, share, and learn from each other. This study found that the requirement to join meetings is a basic rule that is found in both rules among state and non-state actors, and this rule effectively contributes to develop closer relationships, particularly among members of the same policy community, as raised by a leader of an informal labour group:

"I do not only have a chance to raise a problem and concerns of my group during the monthly meeting, but I also have a chance to learn from others and realise that not only me (and my colleagues) are struggling. It's good to have a connection with other informal workers to support each other and to fight together for our better life. I believe that to be together is better. It's a reason that I've never missed any meetings. Every time that I join a meeting, I know someone better. That makes me feel good. I'm not alone" (Fieldwork interview with Koraporn Krugtongkum, a leader of Clong Hog community, 19/02/2012).

Furthermore, after launching the City Farm programme, rules of engagement in the programme obliged each organisation and group across policy communities to share. These rules of engagement will be the focus of this study, as they affected the governance of the policy network as a whole. These rules appeared clearly in the

application form for joining the programme and include, firstly, that the members need to join activities organised by the programme to share with and learn from each other. Secondly, fund recipients (almost all organisations and groups) need to make progress and project conclusion reports that show their transparency and efficiency in using public fund. Thirdly, members of the programme must promote non-chemical food production and local food system. For example, training centres must train how to do small scale organic farming, and farming groups must practice organic food growing. As for green markets and restaurants, they must support fresh food products produced within the city. Fourthly, farming groups must aim to enhance their self-reliant capacity by producing food for self-consumption and sharing with their neighbourhood. The surplus products can be sold, but not in modern trade markets (City Farm programme, 2010). A last rule is that demands by members for any support will be responded on a first come, first serve basis.

Specific to training centres, rules stipulate that they need to provide free training courses for the poor at least once a month without exceeding 50 trainees per course. Trainers must also share the gardening handbook (developed together by trainers). They can design training courses by themselves, but the basic standards must be agreed by all trainers before the course starts. Beyond this, mobile training for the poor communities is promoted and is allocated special funding support (Fieldwork interview with Nardsiri Komonpan, coordinator of the City Farm programme, 21/03/2012). The effects of those shared rules in governing the policy network will be discussed in Chapter 6 and 7 by highlighting how they influenced decision making of each actor to cooperate and became the point of references to negotiate conflicts.

4.3.2. Reputation for trustworthiness

Interviews with many representatives of the organisations and groups analysed reflect that recognition by the public is also a reason why some organisations and groups are linked with others. This study concludes that there are three interrelated sources of reputation for trustworthiness. Firstly, positive reputation can derive from having outstanding past performances. For example, there were 50 District Administration Offices (local government) in Bangkok, but 4 District Administration Offices were engaged with the City Farm programme as they had an outstanding past

performances in promoting UA. Laksi District Administration Office, for instance, had developed its rooftop vegetable garden to be an UA learning centre since 1998 (Laksi District Administration Office, 2012). The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation was also put forward by many others to lead the City Farm programme, as it played an outstanding role in promoting food security, local food systems and organic food production in the past decade, which were considered by others as the founding principles for promoting UA. Before managing the City Farm programme, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation involved related programmes such as the Food Security programme and the Local Food Mapping programme. The organisation also published many books to UA related themes, such as 'Self-Reliance in Practice' (Rotjanapriwong, 2008) and 'Recovering Our Land: A Revolution of Community, Agriculture and Self-sufficiency Economy' (Working Group on Recovering Our Land, 2007).

Secondly, in relation to past actions, reputation can derive from gaining media attention. This is the case, for example, for social enterprises such as the Suwannabhumi and Prince city farm training centres, that developed a close relation with other organisations and groups (as seen from H3 and H4 in Figure 4.1.) as a result gaining visibility in the media. The interviews found that between January 2009 and July 2011, the Prince city farm training centre had appeared in the media roughly 25 times, including in a television programme, newspapers, magazines, and online media (Fieldwork interview with Nakorn Limpacuptathavon, farming trainer, 15/07/2011). Together with the third source of reputation, these social enterprises are also well-known for their good connections. They are recognised by many farming group members who received training by them. They often also play the role of think tanks and advise on farming problems for city dwellers. The chance to connect with other people, organisations and groups allowed them to prove their skills in farming acknowledged by the public. Apart from these social enterprises, the Green Market Network is also well-known, mainly through this source of reputation. The Green Market Network has worked with many organisations and groups as either producers or customers, and its wide connections support its positive reputation. The number of green enterprises joining the 17 green markets organised by the Green Market Network in July 2011 was 786, while the estimated number of customers coming to each green market was roughly 5,000. The numbers of producers and customers who

joined community supported agriculture led by Green Market Network in March 2012 were 637 and 3,755 respectively (Fieldwork interview with Woranut Shooreaungsuk, coordinator of Green Market Network, 12/03/2012). This number would be many times higher if the numbers on the Facebook fan page are counted.

4.3.3. Trust

The research found that trust exists between the policy network's constituent organisations and groups. Predictive trust is more externalised than altruistic trust, as it was given by others in relation to past actions that can guide future behaviour. This study found that a reputation for trustworthiness relates to predictive trust as raised by Ostrom and discussed in Section 2.2.2 (Chapter 2). For example, Suwannabhumi and Prince city farm training centres, which are famous as a result of their skill in farming in the city, were trusted by many organisations and groups because they would help if these organisations and groups faced any problems with city farming. An interview with a Prince city farm trainer reflects that he receives 5-10 messages on average every day about farming issues (Fieldwork interview with Nakorn Limpacuptathavon, farming trainer, 15/07/2011). Representatives of other organisations working at training centres for the City Farm programme also mentioned that they had invited trainers from Suwannabhumi and Prince city farm training centres to help their centres. They also consulted with these two centres about the training programme and specific farming techniques and practices as they believed in their skill, and trusted that the suggestions from these two organisations would benefit them as well as their previous suggestions.

Altruistic trust can be illustrated by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, the Health Promotion Foundation, the Media Centre for Development, and the Working Group on Food for Change's trust in slum communities. These organisations consider grant proposals from farming groups that they will cooperate with although some of them did not have a positive reputation (little credibility). For example, it is well-known that there were many drug dealers and gangsters living in the On-nut Hoksibhok slum community, but the proposal of the leaders of this community was approved by the City Farm programme. Soun-oy slum community also received a grant from the City Farm programme, although the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation has on record that this community had failed to deliver evidence of

spending the money effectively when joining the previous Food Security programme. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation still trusted that the community would be concerned with food self-reliance to reduce the cost of living. The director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation said that this community was given a second chance and that she believed the community would not make the same mistake again (Fieldwork interview with Supa Yaimaung, director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, 3/07/2011).

It was noticed that, while predictive trust depends on past actions of the trustees, this altruistic trust depended on trusters rather than trustees. In the same case, while the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation trusted many slum communities, some other organisations and groups such as the Health Promotion Foundation and Media Centre for Development distrusted these communities. The staff at the Health Promotion Foundation mentioned that at the start of the City Farm programme (the consideration process of fund provision), the organisation was worried about the responsibility to manage public fund of some farming groups, particularly slum communities because it was thought that they would not be able to organise collective actions themselves or to develop and take care of their community gardens by using public fund. She also pointed out that each member of the slum communities needed to struggle for their own life and that they had a weak sense of belonging to their community. She therefore thought that it was difficult to expect them to cooperate to achieve common interests of the community (Fieldwork interview with Khun Ple, staff of the Health Promotion Foundation, 5/07/2011).

4.3.4. Shared norms

This study also found that there were shared norms between the policy network's constituent organisations and groups, which were both norms shared by almost all actors and among different social and economic backgrounds. To begin with, an outstanding norm shared by the majority of constituent organisations and groups was to judge that UA can contribute to a better life without requiring empirical evidences. It can be extracted from the interviews that almost all organisations and groups mentioned the importance of UA in enhancing livelihoods by reducing the cost of living, improving nutrition and increasing the capacity for food self-reliance. Farming groups engaging with the slum dwellers network and the informal labour

network were more sensitive to norms that judge that small-scale and low-input farming could enhance their self-reliance on food. For example, the leader of the Poonshup slum community mentioned that the community vegetable garden was an essential factor for her community, together with housing, clothes and medicine. She said that members of her community did not need to pay to buy vegetables. They were just asked to donate some funds to sustain the garden. To increase the quantity of food products, her community attempted to use every unit of vacant land. She encouraged every household to grow vegetables on the land they had available. To reduce costs, she said that community resources were reused, particularly household waste. She expected that joining the City Farm programme would allow her community to develop aquaculture, which would increase community food self-reliance (Fieldwork interview with Vimon Thavilpong, leader of Poonshup community, 22/03/2012).

Groups from wealthier social and economic backgrounds, such as the Green Market Network, social enterprises and some farming groups, were more sensitive to norms that judge that UA could provide healthy food and reduce environmental footprints by reducing food miles and energy use. For example, a staff member of the Green Market Network mentioned that UA provides hope for producing organic food in Thailand. She commented that it is hard to change rural mono-cropping to organic farming, while green producers within the city can make a difference as they can control food production in their small-scale spaces and find their niche market- green consumers who live in a large city. She also mentioned that from her experience with green markets, she found that green producers and consumers in the city would create a beautiful and sustainable city, creating real organic food, fair food chains and a greener city (Fieldwork interview with Woranut Shooreaungsuk, a staff member of the Green Market Network, 12/03/2012).

NGOs and CBOs engaging with the City Farm programme shared a specific norm, which can be called the pro-poor norm. NGOs and CBOs judged that poor and marginalised groups should be supported first and they advocated for these target groups since they were established. Today, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, holds a strong belief that a better city can be built by providing opportunities to slum communities and groups of informal workers to strengthen their right to the city. The

director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation also reflected on the fact that the poor and marginalised groups have the ability to organise developmental projects by themselves. She believed that if the opportunity is given to a poor and marginalised group, it will be able to organise in order to 'capitalise' on the opportunity and enhance the quality of life. Therefore, low-income communities should be provided with a chance to self-organise rather than to be the 'receiver' of development from an external agency (Fieldwork interview with Supa Yaimaung, director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, 3/07/2011). This norm is agreed on between other NGOs and CBOs. For example, the leader of the Working Group on Food for Change mentioned that she believed that the poor (and marginalised groups) can learn to change themselves, requiring support rather than an intervention (Fieldwork interview with Kingkorn Narintarakul Na Ayuthaya, leader of Working Group on Food for Change, 18/03/2012).

Lastly, it can also be deducted from interviews that the norm that stipulates that 'to promote UA is to promote social cohesion' is shared among public organisations, such as the Health Promotion Foundation, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration and the District Administration Offices. Many representatives of public organisations paid less attention to the role of UA in enhancing urban food security and creating sustainable agriculture than to its role as a tool to create joint activities for community members to enhance their cohesion. The review of District Administration Offices' policy documents in relation to the support for UA found that they aimed to support community gardens to enhance community self-reliance (on food) followed by improving relationships between community members. They also mentioned the impact of relaxation for elderly people and child learning, but they ignored the potential contribution of UA to creating local food systems and alternative food chains. To sum up, norms about the extent to which UA could contribute to a better city were shared differently by groups from different social and economic backgrounds and between non-state and state actors.

Aside from these norms, other norms shared among the policy network's constituent organisations and groups will be discussed in other parts of this thesis. These norms are not included here because although they affected policy network governance, they do not have a direct link with UA, e.g. the norm of avoidance to talk about

political conflicts (for allowing policy actors engaging in different political camps to work together) will be discussed in Chapter 7.

4.3.5. Reciprocity and moral obligation

Before the City Farm programme was endorsed, there were reciprocal exchanges among many organisations and groups. These exchanges can be characterised as interest-based sharing in which givers could expect a return from takers. For example, this study found reciprocal exchanges among social enterprises. They helped others to publicise each other's events, such as city farming training days, kids' learning in the garden and eco-therapy. They also helped each other to sell products, such as gardening and cook books, quality soil, instant manure, and gardening instruments, including containers, watering cans, spades, etc. It was also found that they tried to divide market shares rather than compete with one another, in order to achieve a mutual benefit. For instance, they shared markets by organising their events either in different areas or for different targets. To organise a training programme, they tried to set different dates or times. Some social enterprises also shared members of staff when they organised training to be able to take care of more trainees.

Sharing also happened between organisations and groups beyond interest-based exchanges. With this type of exchanges, the giver did not expect an equal return from the taker, or, in some cases, the giver did not want any return from the taker. They believed that there was a moral reason to give. These cases are therefore better referred to as moral obligation. For example, during the past decade, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation has worked for slum communities and informal workers but did not expect to receive any return from them. The director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation thought that the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation had always prioritised the poor and marginalised groups in order to enhance their quality of life, which is the organisation's task. It can be argued that to advocate for the poor and marginalised groups becomes a moral obligation for some organisations, particularly NGOs and CBOs.

Moral obligation can also be expected from other organisations and groups engaged in the City Farm programme in general; in other words, it is a Thai social

expectation. To delve deeper into moral obligation in Thai society requires a consideration of Buddhist culture shared by all the actors. One of the Buddhist principles is the ethic of giving. Buddhism mentions that the constraints of morality are greed *(Lobha)*, hatred (Dosa) and ignorance *(Moha)*. The essence of the Buddhist tradition is to overcome selfishness and transform greed into generosity, hatred into loving kindness, and ignorance into wisdom (Sivaraksa, 2011, p.92). To give with an altruistic mind is one way to do so. Although this principle is not a shared rule or even a shared norm in modern city life in Bangkok, it has become an expectation without any punishment or social sanctions. To adhere to morality by giving is considered a generous gesture, but if one does not give, this is not reflect negatively on the person.

4.3.6. Shared forms of knowledge

Knowledge is often defined as human capital in the literature, but shared forms of knowledge within a group of people is hardly considered as such. However, by highlighting the benefits of this form of social capital, this study hope to contribute to the a deeper understanding of a general theory of social capital, for the role of shared knowledge in facilitating collective actions was remarkable in this case study. To begin with, this study found that there were policy epistemics or knowledge partnerships overlapping and crossing policy communities, as discussed in Chapter 2. Two policy epistemics can be distinguished here. The first comes from university scholars, particularly scientists, who propose knowledge developed from scientific and economic modes of rationality. They usually refer to academic research results, experiments and international experiences to claim the validity of their knowledge. In other words, they hold shared technical knowledge, particularly scientific and economic knowledge. This policy epistemic mainly includes agricultural economists and agricultural scientists. They are supported by traditional city planners and policy analysts working for the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration and District Administration Offices, who are strict on scientific and economic (and mechanical) tools in the name of the managerialism of bureaucratic governance.

This technical knowledge comes along with a technical language, such as formal, academic, and expert language (specialist language), including strategic language, policy and planning language, etc. They are translated from English and are not

familiar to ordinary people. Words such as input, process, output, outcome, performance, indicators, efficiency, effectiveness, etc are outside their everyday vocabulary. An NGO member, who calls these languages 'bureaucrat languages', gave an anecdotal story to illustrate his frustration. He talked to a member of staff of a District Administration Office about his problem and asked for help. The staff member was typing while chatting with him. She looked like she understood him well and then she showed him a formal letter. She asked him to read it to consider whether the statements in the letter covered his requirements or not. He laughed and said that her written statements did not contain any words said by him. She confirmed that the statements mentioned what he said, but in a different language, and his words could not be put in this letter (Fieldwork interview with Komsun Hutapate, the director of the Media Centre for Development, 14/01/2012). The privilege of bureaucrat language reflects an effect of political-bureaucratic power in governing public programme, including the City Farm programme. Such privilege also excludes some farming groups who do not want to do paper works that requires heavy bureaucratic language. More details will be discussed in Chapter 5.

The second policy epistemic consists of city farming trainers working for social enterprises. They are practitioners who have learned from experience and by doing. Not only are they open to learn from scientific and economic knowledge but they also propose local knowledge based on cultural rationality, such as Thai traditional farming techniques and ceremony, which are not always recognised by agricultural scientists. For example, they have knowledge about how to do a ceremony to pay respect to the soil before growing food as a sign of good luck. They can predict changing climate and productivity by noticing signs of nature. This policy epistemic also captures knowledge developed from the practice of everyday life of laypeople. For example, they proposed knowledge on reusing household resources, including the making and using of locally-made effective microorganism products for household waste water treatment and soil quality improvement, which will be discussed in Chapter 6.

This knowledge of ordinary culture comes along with the use of ordinary language (everyday language) and as embedded in Thai culture, this form of knowledge also derived from Buddhist ideas. This study found that many representatives of

organisations and groups mentioned both implicitly and explicitly that they believed that Buddhism is the wisdom of sustainability. From participating in training programmes organised by 4 social enterprises, this study concludes that three main Buddhist ideas affected the way in which this policy epistemic thinks. First of all, they did not only propose technical farming knowledge, but they also emphasised the importance of respecting nature. Buddhism encourages a life in harmony with the Earth (Sivaraksa, 2011, p.92). A trainer of a social enterprise who organised a training programme said that we should take care of the plant as if it was a woman who requires a tender touch and special concern when she is pregnant. Secondly, they emphasised the importance of learning by doing by giving the example of the Buddha, who found truth from practising. A trainer mentioned similarly that the most important knowledge is knowledge about ourselves. We need to know our desires and constraints, and awaken our willingness to learn to explore ourselves. We also need to be patient to practise until we succeed. Lastly, trainers also mentioned knowledge based on a sense of the sacred, such as paying respect to water, soil, place and plants through ceremonies. A trainer said that there may be a reason why our ancestors did these ceremonies, which are good feelings rather than expected results. In other words, it is knowledge to feel good, secure and even happy.

4.4. Who has power over others and how does social capital activate power relations?

This study analyses powerful organisations and groups that influence others through the history of the UA policy network, starting from June 2010 until June 2012. The analysis focuses on defining actors which had played significant roles during the period of this study in shaping and controlling rules, making orders, organising collective action, enhancing cooperation, and mediating conflicts. The study found that the Health Promotion Foundation and the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation were not only close to other policy network's constitute organisations and groups as analysed in Section 4.2, these two organisations were also the most powerful actors. They held different types/faces of power over many others, including instrumental, communicative and structural power.

4.4.1. Instrumental power of powerful actors and their social capital

The Health Promotion Foundation and the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation exercised the power to control rule and order through grant management. Although the Health Promotion Foundation was the funder legitimised by law to manage its own money, the Health Promotion Foundation could not monopolise this power. The reason is that, although it was trusted by public organisations, it was not trusted by many non-public organisations and groups. In other words, if the Health Promotion Foundation had controlled everything itself, it would not have been able to gain wide cooperation from the non-state sector. As the programme aimed to engage various non-state organisations and farming groups, the Health Promotion Foundation realised that to pick an NGO as programme manager to share power over rules and order could allow them to meet that aim. The following is the opinion of the coordinator of the City Farm programme from the Health Promotion Foundation about this issue:

> "Originally, we (the Health Promotion Foundation's committees) thought about proposing the Ministry of Health to manage the (City Farm) programme. But, the problem is that the Ministry of Health had not engaged with city farm much, and the ministry might not be able to ask for a wide range of participation. So we thought about NGOs as they have worked on this issue, and have already developed city farm networks which could make this programme work better" (Fieldwork interview with Veerapong Kreungsinyod, coordinator of City Farm programme from the Health Promotion Foundation, 5/07/2011).

Among many possible NGOs, this study concludes that the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation was chosen for three reasons. Firstly, considering past actions, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation was the most significant actor in supporting UA from the perspective of the Health Promotion Foundation (and many other organisations and groups). The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation had developed a reputation for trustworthiness regarding UA promotion. The director of the Media Centre for Development mentioned that there was no doubt that the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation would lead the City Farm programme as it had worked on this issue for a decade, and the Media Centre for Development was pleased to

cooperate (Fieldwork interview with Komsun Hutapate, the director of Media Centre for Development, 14/01/2012). The second reason is that the reputation of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation could develop into predictive trust given by the Health Promotion Foundation. The interview with the Health Promotion Foundation's coordinator of the City Farm programme reflects at least that the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation was trusted the most as it had much experience and could be asked for a wide range of participation among non-public organisations and groups. Finally, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation was expected to connect many NGOs, CBOs and farming groups working and practising UA as they shared norms, particularly the pro-poor norm, which guided them towards advocating for the poor and marginalised groups. The Health Promotion Foundation realised that it could not connect to the poor and marginalised groups as well as the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation could, so to allow the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation to manage the programme would extend the possibility to include various organisations and groups in the programme. In conclusion, reputation, predictive trust, and shared norms as forms of social capital held by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation supported its legitimacy to possess and exercise instrumental power.

There were some limitations of using power of rules and order by the Health Promotion Foundation and the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation to shape the policy network developed by the City Farm programme in the way that these two organisations wanted to. First of all, the two powerful organisations could not force public organisations through their rules and order because public organisations, such as Bangkok Metropolitan Administration and the District Administration Offices did not receive funding from the programme. Each public organisation had their own budget to spend on food and green promotion derived from their specific hierarchy so they engaged with the City Farm programme as it was relevant to their mission and depending on how much cooperation was asked of them. The use of this power was also limited for some organisations and groups, that had joined the City Farm programme because they agreed with its objectives and were interested in activities rather than incentivised by grants from the programme. Thus, apart from instrumental power, other types/faces of power also functioned.

4.4.2. Communicative power of powerful actors and their social capital

Communicative power is the power to convince, stimulate learning for mutual understanding and to make an agreement. This study found that the UA policy network was also shaped by this face of power exercised by the Health Promotion Foundation and the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation. The Health Promotion Foundation exercised its communicative power through the coordinator, who spoke in the name of the Health Promotion Foundation. To analyse his characteristics, he was an old polite person who was respected by others. Throughout the period of this study, he communicated by using a bureaucratic style, which has a specific language. He also usually referred to constraints of the bureaucratic system to claim what was and was not possible. He attempted to ask others to be strict about rules rather than finding a flexible compromise. His main communicative strategy was to claim the necessity to achieve measurable indicators and quantitative performance.

How did social capital activate the communicative power of the Health Promotion Foundation? This study found first of all that although the Health Promotion Foundation depended on different hierarchies from the other public organisations and could not create an order, the shared bureaucratic rules between them made it possible for the Health Promotion Foundation to persuade other public organisations to join the programme through its communicative power. The Health Promotion Foundation coordinator mentioned that he asked for cooperation from the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration and District Administration Offices by pointing out that the City Farm programme could contribute to their strategic goals as he understood well that public organisations always look for ways to achieve their strategic goals. He communicated through meetings with the Bangkok governor and wrote formal bureaucratic letters to the directors of District Administration Offices. These communications reflect that, firstly, shared procedural rules on bureaucratic administration support effective communication because these rules function as a basic mutual understanding, which makes further agreement possible. Secondly, the rules concerning cross-hierarchical communication make it easier to organise meetings between civil servants at an equal level, and formal letters from other public organisations become important and need attention. Although such shared rules cannot guarantee the success of communication, such as to make an agreement,

these rules can make a difference by making it easier than non-public sectors to organise meetings with the Bangkok governor while their letters were also less likely to receive attention.

In case of communication with the NGOs, this study found that the experiences of the Health Promotion Foundation in working with NGOs and creating some forms of social capital with them made a difference when they were communicated. First of all, while it is rare to see public organisations work closely with NGOs in Thailand, as public organisations in general blame NGOs for obstructing public investment in mega-projects, the Health Promotion Foundation has developed a reputation for its sincerity and respect to NGOs. An overview of a random 100 different public programmes endorsed by the Health Promotion Foundation between 2001 and 2010 found that roughly 70 NGOs had been engaged in at least one programme. The Health Promotion Foundation maintained a reputation as a public organisation that NGOs can talk with. For example, the head of the Working Group on Food for Change mentioned that the Health Promotion Foundation was the only public organisation that she had experience contacting without frustration (Fieldwork interview with Kingkorn Narintarakul Na Ayuthaya, leader of the Working Group on Food for Change, 18/03/2012).

The predictive trust on the Health Promotion Foundation was another reason for some NGOs to consider what the Health Promotion Foundation's reason for. The director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation mentioned that she thought the Health Promotion Foundation would be different from other public organisations because it worked seriously on the issue. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation director reflected her thoughts that general government agencies could not make a real change and have a hidden agenda. They also just want to claim that they do things, so government-led programmes in her view would not lead to any real changes and would be not sustainable. By working together in the Food Security programme between 2005 and 2009, she trusted that the Health Promotion Foundation would not act the same way as in the past as the organisation had shown its strong intention to make real changes (Fieldwork interview with Supa Yaimaung, Director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, 3/07/2011). In promoting UA, the Health Promotion Foundation also developed a rooftop vegetable garden on its

building to be a learning centre and to show that the organisation takes UA promotion seriously by doing it itself before promoting it to others as shown in photo 4.2.

Photo 4.2. Rooftop vegetable garden on the Health Promotion Foundation's building

Source: Photo owned by the researcher

The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation's communicative power was exercised by four people. The first was the director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, who is an older, tough woman who formed the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation in 1998 and has worked as its director until now. She was born in Bangkok and graduated with a bachelor's degree in political science from the second university in rankings in Thailand, but decided to work for the poor in rural areas through an NGO to promote sustainable agriculture. She had much experience abroad by joining exchange programmes and conferences, particularly in South America and South-East Asia. The other three people were coordinators of the City Farm programme, who had worked as members of staff of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation as well. A middle-aged woman had the responsibility for public campaigns through the media as well as public relations. Another was a young woman who facilitated social enterprises working at training centres. They had graduated with bachelor's degrees in environmental and agricultural science respectively. The last one was a middle-

aged woman who was responsible for coordinating and monitoring farming groups that received grants from the programme. She graduated with a master's degree in sociology and all three had graduated from universities located in Bangkok. Two of them were born and lived in Bangkok. They co-organised collective events in the name of the City Farm programme. To communicate, the four of them spoke in the name of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation to adopt different approaches for different people whom they interacted with. They could both use formal language in communicating with public organisations, including written formal bureaucratic letters, and ordinary language when speaking with laypeople, including representatives of other NGOs, CBOs and farming groups.

Various forms of social capital activated the communicative power of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation. First of all, although working on UA was new for the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, the organisation was still recognised as one of the first to introduce UA in Thailand. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation highlights UA as a way to enhance food security at the community and household scales, particularly enhancing self-reliant capacity. UA is also expected to play a role in securing the right to food of the urban poor. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation thought that growing food in the city could challenge the mainstream food system controlled by a few large corporations and could produce organic food by using traditional knowledge, local materials and waste merged with the creativity of city dwellers in designing their gardens to fit in a limited space. By pushing UA, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation started by encouraging city dwellers to grow their own food within their own spaces. The first relevant book published by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation is about gardening, called the 'Handbook of Household Gardening for City Dwellers' (Limpacuptathavon, Goman and Yaibumrung, 2010) followed by 'City Dwellers' Household Gardening: Growing Happiness in Your House' (Limpacuptathavon and Sinprom, 2011). The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation then attempted to inspire city dwellers to grow food by organising competitions and rewarding the best household gardening. Stories about the winners were then included in a book entitled 'My Vegetable Garden' (Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, 2011). Since late 2011, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation has pushed this agenda, focusing more on policy and planning aspects. The organisation demanded more public land allocation, pushing

this agenda to the top ranks of governmental development priorities and recognising it in the city plan. [2] The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation has also advocated the UA as a climate change adaptive strategy. In sum, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation developed a reputation for trustworthiness in leading the promotion of UA, which in turn made its voice louder than others.

The interviews with leaders of slum communities and groups of informal workers shared the opinion that while poor and marginalised groups distrusted external organisations in general, they trusted the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation as it had worked for them since 1998. The general distrust by the slum communities of external organisations had developed from the fact that these external organisations had attempted to force them out of the area. They realised that it was rendered 'illegal' to live on public land, leading to many conflicts with public organisations. For example, before establishing the 'On-nut' Sibsee Rai slum community, members lived under bridges in the inner city of Bangkok and survived by collecting garbage and selling it to recycling industries. They were forced by the police to move out and fought for their housing rights since the 1980s. The government then provided land for them to establish their community but demanded rent, which increased every year. As a consequence, they could not pay and therefore avoided doing so. Finally, the government attempted to force them to leave. Since 2004, the situation has improved after the government in cooperation with a quasi-governmental body called the Community Organisations Development Institute endorsed the public policy 'Security house' (Ban Mun Kong). However, only 361 communities in 50 districts within Bangkok were engaged with the programme (Community Organisations Development Institute, 2008; Rapeepat, 2009), while there are still many slum communities left behind, including the communities engaged in the City Farm programme.

---

[2]The director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation consulted with me many times about international experiences on integrating UA in the policy and planning framework. I was also invited to give a public lecture in which many Bangkok Metropolitan Administration and District Administration Offices' members of staff participated. The book entitled 'Growing City for Growing Life: Theories and Practices to UA' published by the City Farm programme and written by me emphasises policy and planning to support UA, which the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation has also communicated to many relevant policy and planning units to push the issue.

Groups of informal workers have a long history of fighting both corporations and the government, demanding labour rights and welfare. For example, the 'Solidarity' group leader told the story of how his group members were laid off from the same factory that closed down in 1992 without any pension scheme. They started by learning about labour laws and demanded their right to get a pension from the factory owner, but the owner refused to pay. They subsequently demanded the Minister of Labour to help them but were ignored. As a result, roughly 900 laid-off labours protested in front of the Ministry of Labour. The government, however, did not take any action and the owner of the factory went back to Texas. Subsequently, the workers formed their own small factory to sew and screen T-shirts without receiving any loans from public banks but were instead through support provided by NGOs. As they could not provide welfare to their members, they developed a collective vegetable garden around the factory in 2001 to produce food as welfare for workers with support from the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation (Fieldwork interview with Manob Gaewpaga, leader of Solidarity group, 2/02/ 2012). The group's history provides an explanation for why it distrusted public organisations while it did trust the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation.

Predictive trust was therefore derived from past actions that made it easier for the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation to persuade slum communities and groups of informal workers to join the City Farm programme through the slum dwellers and informal labour network. Public organisations, including the Health Promotion Foundation, realised that it was hard for them to ask for cooperation from the slum communities and groups of informal workers, while it trusted that the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation could do this for them. The trust that the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation earned from slum communities and groups of informal workers is reflected in the way the Foundation is spoken of by some leaders. They trusted that the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation would not propose a fake development with little progress towards sustainable changes.

The link between the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and social enterprises and groups with wealthier social and economic backgrounds is rather different. The director accepted that she was initially a bit worried about working with these groups (she called them the middle and higher classes) in a large city, as the Sustainable

Agriculture Foundation usually works with grassroots from rural, peri-urban areas and small cities. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation never had a chance to develop trust among these groups. In this context, it could be hypothesised that shared norms became a form of social capital that supported the communicative power of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation in persuading these targets. As mentioned in Section 4.3.4, to agree that UA could contribute to making a healthier city is a norm shared by many organisations and groups and also facilitated their communication by shaping shared concerns and guiding the topics that should be raised. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation could take advantage from this shared norm by raising key concerns shared by enterprises and middle and higher class groups while speaking to them about a topic that could be of interest to them as an entry point before persuading them to join. For example, a social entrepreneur and farming trainer explained that his enterprise and training centre had joined the City Farm programme because he believed that those who have similar norms, such as having a 'green heart', would be interested in similar projects and aims. He said green heart linked people from different corners to meet and influenced their desire to know more about each other (Fieldwork interview with Nakorn Limpacuptathavon, social entrepreneur and farming trainer, 15/07/2011). His opinion reflected that shared norms could open the door for people to share (communicate) with others, which in turn opened a window of opportunities for them to work together to reproduce the importance of their norms.

4.4.3. Structural power of powerful actors and their social capital

The power of domination derived from political-bureaucratic and socio-cultural structures supported the status and role of powerful actors in shaping the UA policy network. To begin with, the Health Promotion Foundation took advantage from its dominant structural power constructed by the political regime and the bureaucratic system, which can be called the power of the Thai bureaucratic polity. Non-public sectors would try to avoid having a problem with the Health Promotion Foundation and other public organisations as they are protected by special laws. To sue public organisations is hard as it would be considered by a special judiciary procedure. Bureaucratic traditions are also powerful, as every Thai person experiences in their daily life. When non-state actors need to work with the public sector, they need to

commit themselves to the strong traditions of the bureaucratic polity, such as contacting them by sending formal letters, and implementing strict practices regarding the collection of receipts to confirm transparency and efficiency in using the public budget. Bureaucratic discourses in the name of principles are also hard to challenge.

During this study, Thai bureaucratic governance was driven by many modern managerial tools from the West. For example, the discourse of 'Good Governance' legitimised the practices of the Health Promotion Foundation by claiming that being strict about rules and complicated procedures meant following the principle of good governance, which emphasises transparency and accountability when governing public programmes. The managerial procedure known as Strategic Planning and Management, which had become a requirement for any organisations and groups receiving public funds, also supporting the power of the Health Promotion Foundation. Strategic planning and management had been adopted to govern public programmes in Thailand since 2001, when the government changed its budgeting system from Line-Item to the Strategic Planning Budgeting System (SPBS). Its power dominates the ways in which public programmes, including the City Farm programme, must be designed under rational, system and stages approaches. These approaches are based on the causal relations of each stage, starting by analysing the situation through SWOT analysis (analysing strength, weakness, opportunity and threat). Then, each public programme clarifies strategies, goals and forecast, expected results, including reasonable outputs, outcomes and impacts. After this, indicators for measuring these results must be developed, before identifying required resources, called inputs, and a clear process for implementing the programme to achieve the expected results (Boossabong and Sreesutum, 2010; Sirisumpan, 2006). The strategic planning and management approach has allowed the Health Promotion Foundation to control grant recipients through planning and management processes, particularly regarding technical advice, monitoring and evaluation.

In light of the previous analysis, it could be argued that social capital in the form of knowledge shared between public organisations has played an important role in exercising the power of the political-bureaucratic structure. As strategic planning and management required specific knowledge, there have been large training

176

programmes among civil servants until they shared such technical knowledge and developed a policy epistemic, as mentioned in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.3). In the case of the City Farm programme, public organisations, particularly the Health Promotion Foundation, intervened in non-public organisations and groups through their expertise in strategic planning and management, by giving advice and judging whether each project was able to deliver strategic goals. The power of control was also part of their use of language. A review of policy documents found that the Health Promotion Foundation exercised control by using technical terms in project proposals, progress reports and project summaries proposed by organisations and groups that received funding support. This study therefore expands on the classical statement that knowledge is power[3] by finding that knowledge legitimates the power of existing structures. In other words, this study views knowledge as backstage power which is overshadowed by dominant structures that exercise power through rationalisation.

Regarding power structures and the social capital of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, this organisation did not take benefit from the help of political-bureaucratic structures. In fact, it was constrained by the power exercised through the Health Promotion Foundation and other public organisations, including the power of bureaucratic traditions, administrative proverbs, and technocratic procedures. However, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation did benefit from snuggling up with socio-cultural structures. Although the Thai constitution guarantees equal rights of citizens, Thai people are not equal in terms of their social status, which is constructed by Thai socio-cultural structures. In general, Thai people strongly respect the elderly, for it is assumed that they have more knowledge and experiences. There is a Thai proverb that states that 'if we walk follow the older, dog will not bite' (it means that if we follow elder's suggestion, we would be safe). The director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation is the oldest engaged in the City Farm programme among leaders of public organisations, NGOs and CBOs. She therefore takes advantage of the power of socio-cultural structures as it supports her

---

[3]As mentioned by Francis Bacon and by many Foucauldians.

status which others' respect; even when they do not agree, they still listen to her and approach her politely.[4]

The power embedded in Thai socio-cultural structures, which the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation snuggled up to, are the powerful hegemonic discourses called the 'self-sufficiency economy' (*Set-takit-popeaung*) and the 'new farming approach' (*Kaset-thessadee-mai,* which is close to low-input farming) as proposed by the King, who influenced the way in which Thai people think and practise UA, as mentioned in Chapter 1. His hegemonic ideas are not new, but his privileged status has developed for over more than half a century and supports his voice in the debate. At least for the previous two decades, his ideas have become sacred words, which Thai people in general, including the government, NGOs and CBOs, tend to agree with as they appear in many development policies, plans, programmes, projects and even activities pushed by both state and non-state actors. These ideas have gradually become embedded in the Thai socio-cultural structure and become powerful discourses. Fortunately, the King's ideas go well with UA development and the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation was clever in using the power of the King's discourses to mobilise support. By doing so, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation could engage many organisations and groups in the City Farm programme which agreed with the King. The study found that 74 of 100 project proposals submitted by farming groups refer to the King's idea of the self-sufficiency economy as a reason why they would like to develop their collective vegetable garden.[5] This way of exercising power by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation also reflects a link of power embedded in the structure above the policy network with the communicative power within the policy network.

---

[4] The higher status of man over woman is not clear in modern Thai culture and in modern cities such as Bangkok and particularly in this case study. The country has a female prime minister, many female councillors, and leaders in many sectors and at many scales. The observation for this case tends to conclude the opposite that women play a significant role in the UA policy network. All coordinators of the City Farm programme from the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation are women and roughly 70% of group leaders are woman.

[5] The rest are almost all projects proposed by temples, which might agree with the King's ideas but preferred to refer to the Buddha. Some projects were proposed by groups of blue-collar workers, which highlighted UA as welfare and an activity to enhance relationships among workers.

How does social capital play a role in activating this structural power? The analysis reveals that the norm of self-reliance or 'do-it-your-self' is shared between the policy network's constituent organisation and group members and fits in well with the King's ideas of the self-sufficient economy and low-input farming. For example, the proverb proposed by the King 'to grow what you eat and to eat what you grow' is a basic idea about self-reliant practice. It is hard to say which one comes first between the norm of self-reliance and the King's ideas similar to the chicken and egg question. Nevertheless, the power of the King's discourses would certainly not be effective if such norms did not exist. On the other hand, these norms might not have been developed and shared if the King had not proposed his ideas. However, it is the case that this shared norm as a form of social capital played a part in activating the power embedded in the socio-cultural structure as exercised by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation.

Conclusions

This chapter addresses the interrelations of social capital, power relations and the policy network's emergence. The chapter analyses how the power of certain actors was activated by their social capital. The analysis focuses on the two most powerful organisations, the Health Promotion Foundation and the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and consider the role of instrumental, communicative and structural powers. However, to exercise power depends strongly on the setting, including situations, issues, channels, constraints and who they interacted with. Chapters 6 and 7 will discuss this by examining the exercise of power in the context of disasters. Although the Health Promotion Foundation and the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation played a significant role in shaping the UA policy network at the time of its emergence, other actors also played an important role in characterising the policy network. They struggled and attempted to exercise their power as well. The next chapter will discuss their power and social capital by linking them to the above discussion to draw a picture of the entire set of power relations and the role of social capital in the characterisation of the UA policy network.

Chapter 5

Unequal social capital, imbalanced power and policy network characterisation

Introduction

After paying attention to the potential of social capital in activating the power of powerful policy actors in formulating the policy network on urban agriculture (UA), this chapter analyses the power exercised by other policy actors. The relationship between the power of powerful actors and the power of the others reflects the relation between unequal social capital and imbalanced power. The relation in turn affects the way in which a policy network is characterised. Figure 5.1 shows main argument and how the analysis of this chapter is framed. In short, this chapter argues that social capital activates power exercised by centralities of each policy community which in turn affects policy network's characterisation. In a similar way as the previous chapter, this study also analyse three faces of power, but the focus is on power that is exercised by centralities of each policy community. In the same time, the chapter analyses how social capital activates the exercise of their powers in struggling for decentralising power and being included as discussed in 2.4. The chapter begins with a discussion on how power exercised by the centralities could promote a certain degree of decentralisation of the UA policy network when there are imbalanced power relations. The first section analyses the ways in which unequal social capital affected the imbalances of power. The following section discusses how the policy network was characterised by the exclusion of some organisations and groups, by considering exclusion as a consequence of the exercise of instrumental power in shaping shared biased rules. Finally, the analysis focuses on how shared norms activate structural and communicative powers that were exercised by core policy actors (powerful organisations and centralities of policy communities) to exclude some organisations and groups.

Figure 5.1 Main argument and analytical framework of Chapter 5

Main argument: Social capital activates power exercised by centralities of each policy community which in turn affects policy network's characterisation.

Analytical Framework:
-Analysing three faces of power exercised by centralities of each policy community & how social capital activates the exercise of their powers in struggling for decentralising power and being included.

Social capital
(held by centralities of each policy community)

activate...

Power exercised by centralities of each policy community

-Power to enforce rules/ incentives and order (**instrumental power** highlighted by IRC)

-Power to convince, build mutual understanding and make agreements (**communicative power** highlighted by CAT)

-Power embedded in political, bureaucratic, social and cultural structures (**Structural power** recognised by CAT)

affect...

Policy network **characterisation**
- Network decentralisation - *Ch.5.2*
- Inclusion and exclusion of the network - *Ch.5.3-4*

Narrative network analysis
Ch.5.1

Power analysis   *Ch.5.1*

5.1. Centralities of policy communities, multi-scales of social capital and the hierarchy of power

Other organisations and groups beyond the two most powerful actors also exercised their power to shape the UA policy network. They were by no means passive in processes of decision-making. However, their power was limited by constraints created by the two more powerful actors in some aspects. For example, the power to propose and negotiate the rules in use was limited by the scope of pre-existing agreed rules (rules of engagement) mentioned in 4.3.2. Overall, this study found that, aside from the Health Promotion Foundation and the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, there were five organisations and groups that play an important role in shaping the UA policy network. These five organisations and groups enjoy a position of centrality within their respective policy communities. They are: the District Administration Offices, UA social enterprises (the City Farm Association), the Green Market Network, the slum dwellers network, and the informal labour network. The centralities are the Laksi District Administration Office, the Media Centre for

Development, theOrganic Way, the 'Keha-Tung Songhong' working at home community and the 'On-Nut Sibsee Rai' slum community.

5.1.1. The centrality of local governments engaged in the policy network

The Laksi District Administration Office had a good connection with other District Administration Offices (DAOs) (the local governments). The office was the first public organisation to support UA by developing the rooftop of its building as a city farm learning centre since 1998 (Laksi DAO, 2012) as shown in photo 5.1. Its reputation supported the office's public recognition. This DAO had also become a learning centre for other DAOs, particularly after they were required to implement the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration policy 'Edible Fence' that aimed to promote household vegetable gardening throughout the city by launching a campaign 'to grow what you eat, and to each what you grow'. This policy was included in the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration strategic plan to develop a healthy and greener city (highlighting food and the environment) between 2004 and 2008. Every DAO needed to support household gardening with knowledge transfers and providing some inputs (e.g. seeds and plant tonic). These missions brought them together across different hierarchies to share resources, including knowledge and skills. The Laksi DAO became a leader in this area as a result of its past actions. Many DAOs came to visit and observed what the Laksi DAO was carrying out and learned from its best practices. The office thus took the role of coordinator, sharing information and knowledge related to vegetable gardening among DAOs. The following is what a key member of the Laksi DAO said about the emergence of an informal network of DAOs of which the Laksi DAO became a coordinator:

> "We know each other well from joining the events about sharing knowledge, skills and experiences of farming. Even though we work for different people in different areas, the sharing is needed to enhance our services by learning from others to achieve the common aim. … I try to build and keep a network (of UA development among DAOs) by updating new techniques to learn and events in which we could join together"(Fieldwork interview with Jintana Tongpud, Manager of Laksi's rooftop garden and UA trainer, 23/03/2012).

Photo 5.1. Laksi DAO's rooftop vegetable garden as learning centre

Sources: Photos publicised by Laksi District Administration Office (left) and owned by the researcher (right)

To develop a reputation for working on sustainable agriculture, the Laksi DAO developed a connection with the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation. They also developed trust and shared knowledge, particularly on technical skills for sustainable farming practices. The director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation communicated that without the Laksi DAO, it might not have been possible to link to other DAOs (Fieldwork interview with Supa Yaimaung, director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, 3/07/2011). The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation therefore used the Laksi DAO as a bridge to link to other DAOs. From the story above it can be concluded that there were two scales of social capital held by different policy actors. On the one hand, there was social capital held amongst DAOs, particularly in the form of sharing the same rules, reputation and predictive trust. On the other hand, there was social capital held between the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and the Laksi DAO at the upper scale, particularly in the form of reputation, predictive trust and shared knowledge. By holding social capital with the Laksi DAO, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation benefited from connections to other DAOs through the Laksi DAO.

To become the central entity of the DAOs' policy community, the Laksi DAO had exercised its power in many ways. First of all, the study found that it had exercised its instrumental power through technical control. Other DAOs depended on the Laksi DAO as it was the first DAO that had succeeded in developing a rooftop garden on

its building. Many other DAOs needed to come to learn how to do that. Civil servants working in DAOs generally lacked technical knowledge and skills in farming, which the Laksi DAO did have. The Laksi DAO focused on the technical aspect of UA, using both scientific and traditional roots from the beginning. The director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation had criticised the Laksi DAO's perspective, which she claimed was too much focused on gardening in the city. The office was not familiar with the right to food, and believed that food security could be built in each household garden. It did not see a link between UA and politics, so support was depoliticised and only the technical aspect was emphasised. The office became a training centre and provided technical support rather than driving policy. It encouraged city dwellers to grow their own food as much as they could, rather than being concerned with reducing the structural constraints of policy and planning tools. The director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation argued that it was hard for the City Farm programme to push public organisations to promote UA in terms of policy and planning, because even the most significant ones still ignored this. She also mentioned that almost all public organisations spent their time and effort seeking farming techniques and knowledge transfer through training programmes (Fieldwork interview with Supa Yaimaung, director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, 3/07/2011). The criticism of the director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation reflects why the Laksi DAO became important for other DAOs sought after technical support, which it provided.

Apart from exercising instrumental power through technical control, the Laksi DAO exercised its communicative power to convince and persuade other constituent organisations and groups of the policy network, though the Laksi DAO could not command and order them in top-down manner as each organisation and group work independently from one another (no one works under its hierarchy). Rather, the leader's communicative strategy was key to convincing and persuading others. She was a highly confident, middle-aged tough woman who usually expressed strong emotions. She spoke loudly with a serious face and expressed frank criticisms. But her audience knew that she was sincere and communicated through her actions rather than words. She was therefore respected by the others and she also attracted interest from the media. One coordinator of the City Farm programme said about her: "Khun Meam (her nickname) talks through her knowledge, skills and experiences. We

(referring to all coordinators) respect her and usually invite her to give us her opinions. She might not be sweet, but her opinions and the way she expresses them (e.g. loud voice) is always worth hearing and plausible" (Fieldwork interview with Pui Varangkanang, coordinator of the City Farm programme, 21/03/2012). Thus, this study analyses the exercise of communicative power of the strategy of Laksi DAO's representative as similar to the 'logo-pathetic' strategy framed by Gottweis (2007, p.245), as discussed in 2.4.2. This type of communicative strategy focuses on the provision of reason (knowledge and experiences) and expression of emotions rather than characteristics of the speaker. Such strategy is different to strategies used by the directors of the Health Promotion Foundation and the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, who benefit from their personal qualities, as discussed in the previous chapter. But, the communicative strategy of the Laksi DAO's representative was also effective, at least in convincing the coordinators of the City Farm programme.

As for structural power, the Laksi DAO benefited from the political-bureaucratic structure to achieve government and the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA)'s policies in which the role of DAOs as implementers is essential. A significant DAO will be supported by both national and regional governments, who usually claim their policy success through evidence from the performance of the implementers. As mentioned by a BMA member of staff, the BMA could not succeed in achieving development aims without the inclusion of the green agenda by the DAOs in their plans. As a policy unit, the BMA needed to enhance the participation of the DAOs so they were engaged in strategic planning formulation, and committed to implementing the strategies. The success of the BMA therefore derives from the success of the DAOs (Fieldwork interview with Unchalee Pattamasawan, director of the department of city planning, BMA, 27/03/2012). The case of the Laksi DAO's support for UA allowed it to be the 'pride' of the government and the BMA. It could benefit a lot from this status, for example receiving special grants from the BMA for garden maintenance. This status had also become a magnet attracting many organisations, groups, networks, media and even the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and Health Promotion Foundation to come to it.

5.1.2. The centralities of social enterprises and the Green Market Network

The Media Centre for Development (MCD) occupied a position of centrality among the social enterprises that engaged in the city farm association. It started with developing a magazine on alternative agriculture entitled 'Natural Agriculture Magazine' from 1998 onwards (see photo 5.2 on the left). The magazine collected a variety of knowledge on agricultural science from both scholars and practitioners. It was recognised as the agricultural science think tank. The MCD developed a network that included green enterprises, providing stories for the magazine and avenues for sponsorship. The MCD had a good connection with many social green enterprises in Bangkok, particularly vegetable producers and trainers before playing a key role in creating the aforementioned association. The members of the association shared norms that a good business should also be good for the world, and a better world could be created through green producers and a mode of production that is friendly to the earth. They also shared knowledge on growing organic food, including the local knowledge, such as farming forecasting and producing locally-made effective microorganism products.

Photo 5.2.   Natural agriculture magazine and the Media Centre for Development's vegetable garden

Sources: Photo use authorised by the Media Centre for Development (left) and photos owned by the researcher (middle and right)

The MCD developed reciprocal relations among UA social enterprises. For example, it needed stories about UA social enterprises for its magazine, while the social

enterprises also wanted to promote themselves. As many social enterprises did their business by opening farming training courses, the MCD attempted to make an agreement with them to organise their training programme with a different focus. For example, one enterprise focused on inspiring the new generation, while another focused on setting up activities for childhood development. The MCD also facilitated a reciprocal exchange between members of the City Farm Association to seek mutual benefits. For instance, some members borrowed gardening handbooks and trainers from each other. Some helped each other to publicise events designed for different target groups. Other enterprises also sold gardening products that had been developed by others, such as ready-to-use soil bags.

Moreover, the MCD worked closely with the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation as they shared the same focus and shared knowledge on sustainable agriculture. Many stories of experiences of projects run by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation were documented in the MCD magazine, which contributed to predictive trust, as both of them had a good record of promoting sustainable agriculture. They also shared the norms that UA could contribute to the city's food security, although the MCD did not focus on the role of UA towards enhancing the right to food for the poor and marginalised groups as the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation did. Even though some enterprises already knew the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation well, the MCD played an important role in bridging between the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and other social enterprises. It also provided suggestions to the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation about which social enterprises could be chosen to be training centres for the City Farm programme. The director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation mentioned this role as follows:

"Selecting training centres was very difficult because we would never know who really has a 'green heart' and strong skills. It was difficult as well to anticipate who could engage with us until the end of the programme. We would also never know who could bear with our interventions, such as delivering the training programme and setting the priority of trainees. Every centre has its own style and we might not be able to push it in the way that fits into the programme. So, we started from the ones we know well and trust the most [which] the MCD helped a lot in screening the proper ones"(Fieldwork

interview with Supa Yaimaung, Director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, 3/07/2011).

By analysing storytelling of the MCD and other members of this policy community, the narrative-based diagram can be drawn as shown in Figure 5.2. According to this figure, the MCD (located at the centre) is close to other training centres (the members of the City Farm Association) and the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation as mentioned above. It is also close to the Green Market Network as they usually meet each other in the events related to food and green agenda organised within Bangkok. The figure shows that the Health Promotion Foundation is not at the middle zone in the perspective of the MCD and other social enterprises, although this organisation is at the centre in the computing-based visualisation shown in Figure 4.2. It means that how the network looks like depends on whose perspectives. In this case, the MCD connected with the Health Promotion Foundation by passing through the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation rather than worked directly with. Apart from that, the MCD have a connection with some DAOs as a result of their information exchanges. Some farming groups are connected with the MCD as well regarding the role of the MCD in organising mobile trainings.

Figure 5.2 Narrative-based policy network diagram analysed from the perspective of social enterprises

This study did not observe clear structural and instrumental powers exercised by the MCD. Firstly, it did not take much benefit from existing structures as social enterprises in the context of Thailand did not have a specifically privilege status. In contrast, they usually did not earn enough profit from their business to have economic power, and their strong intention to support social development was doubted by many NGOs, which affected their credibility. Even when they referred to powerful discourses such as the King's notion of self-sufficiency, they still tried to make money. Secondly, specific rules could not be enforced among the enterprises nor was technical control possible because each social enterprise that the MCD engaged with had its own knowledge and skills in farming. They therefore shared knowledge with others rather than controlling others through knowledge.

However, this study can still capture the exercise of communicative power to convince and persuade others through communicative strategy of this enterprise's leaders. The director of the MCD, who was also an editor of the magazine, was a well-educated middle-aged man who had a lot of knowledge about and experience with organic farming techniques. His role in mediating conflicts will be highlighted in Chapter 7. His daughter played a role as the coordinator of the MCD. She was a young woman who was a new generation farming practitioner. She was also a columnist with a magazine column entitled 'City Veggie Garden'. When she addressed her points, she supported some scientific arguments and ignored others while she agreed with some local knowledge that did not derive from scientific methods. For example, she referred to the Buddhist principle about paying respect to nature as being similar to paying respect to parents, and she is one of many core actors who thought that the disaster was a form of punishment from a supernatural power. The media was drawn to her because she was attractive so she gave interviews on many television programmes and magazines. One of social entrepreneurs, who has contacted the MCD coordinator, said that she amazed him for she was part of the new generation but nevertheless decided to work on farm, while other young attractive people would seek other occupancies (informal chatting with Chookeit Goman, a social entrepreneur and farming trainer, Suwannabhumi training centre, 26/03/2012). She regularly expressed her emotions softly and with a smile. She could therefore exercise her communicative power and attire in the name

of the MCD to ask for the cooperation of many organisations and groups, including other social enterprises who were members of the association.

Regarding the centrality of the Green Market Network (GMN), this study found that the centrality called Organic Way was recognised by other members to play an active role in organising green markets and supporting events in the name of the GMN, such as the 'Green Fair', which had been organised annually since 2008. The group opened a green restaurant, 'Health Me Organic Delivery', which took a part in the community-supported agriculture system by establishing a contract to get vegetables directly from farmers and pre-paid them. The group developed a reputation and trust among GMN members based on their past actions. One example is that other green restaurants and producers shared information with the group about markets and innovations without thinking that the group would be unfaithful to them. It is a surprise that although the Soun Ngeaun Mema, who formed the GMN, had a better opportunity to lead the network, the Organic Way played more significant role in coordinating it in practice and became the network coordinator in the perception of the network members. The reason according to a member of the GMN was that while the Soun Ngeaun Mema did many things (businesses) and involved the creation of many networks, the Organic Way paid more attention to developing the GMN until it became its informal coordinator (Fieldwork interview with Sudhep Kulsri, a city farmer and a member of the GMN, 4/02/2012).

Photo 5.3. Vegetable garden of the Organic Way

Source: Photo use authorised by the Organic Way

In 2010, the group also developed a vegetable garden in an area of roughly 100m^2 located behind the restaurant to provide supplies (see photo 5.3), in addition to the

majority of the community-supported agriculture system. The group opened the garden as a learning centre and created activities to enhance family relations and facilitate an environment where city children could learn about nature, food growing and insects. The group contacted the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation's members of staff for knowledge and skills support during the development of the garden before the endorsement of the City Farm programme. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation agreed to support it as they shared the norm about the benefits of creating a local food system. They developed some forms of social capital from that period, including shared norms, trust and shared knowledge. After the City Farm programme was endorsed by the Health Promotion Foundation, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation contacted the GNM and engaged their members in the City Farm programme through the Organic Way.

The analysis of storytelling of the Organic Way and other members of GMN's policy community can draw the narrative-based diagram (see Figure 5.3). The Organic Way is located at the centre. It has a close relationship with the Soun Ngeaun Mema; the former of the GMN. They organised many GMN's events together including weekly green markets, which made both of them have a well-connection with the members of green markets. The Organic Way, however, connected in direct with community-supported agriculture system's members (including the online group), while Soun Ngeaun Mema often contacted them indirectly by passing through the Organic Way. The figure also shows the close relations between the Organic Way and the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation as mentioned their story above. Besides, the Organic Way worked in relation to MCD and other training centres engaged in the City Farm Association, because it also organised training programme on farming. Apart from that, the Working Group on Food for Change was found that it had a close relation with the Organic Way as well as a consequence of their information exchanges regarding the promotion of the healthy food consumption. It can be noticed that the Organic Way and other members of the GMN avoided engaging closely with public organisations such as the Health Promotion Foundation and the DAOs. The leader of the Organic Way gives a reason that her group did a green business by linking green producers and green customers. As spending most of the time managing her own restaurant and keeping the producer-customer networks, she had not a time left for approaching anyone else. Her group can work with many non-

governmental organisations and community-based organisations as they approached her group actively, while the public sector was mostly passive by waiting for the citizens to contact them in the office (Fieldwork interview with Potip Pechporee, a leader of the Organic Way and the owner of the 'Health Me' restaurant, 17/02/2012).

Figure 5.3 Narrative-based policy network diagram analysed from the perspective of the members of the Green Market Network

This study found that under horizontal relationships without hierarchical power of control, many forms of social capital supported the Organic Way to exercise its power over others. Firstly, trust given by other members allowed it to exercise instrumental power by playing a key role in creating rules for green markets and the community-supported agriculture system and no one questioned that it could do so. Secondly, the Organic Way could exercise its communicative power to persuade other members of the GMN to cooperate in events organised in the name of the network. The leader of the group was an old polite and kind-hearted middle-class woman. In relation to power in the socio-cultural structure, she benefited from her background as a retired school teacher, which is a powerful and respected status in the Thai context. Her background supported her voice to be heard especially when she talked about children.

5.1.3. The centralities of informal labour and slum dwellers networks

Although the Foundation for Labour and Employment Promotion (FLEP) worked as a formal coordinator of the informal labour network, the data derived from interviews with the network members shows that Keha-Tung Songhong home workers' group was ranked in the top two list of the first five organisations and groups that they were closest to while the FLEP came later. To explain this surprising outcome, the FLEP promoted informal labour rights for the whole country, while Keha-Tung Songhong facilitated activities organised within Bangkok. It therefore had more opportunities to interact with other members of the informal labour network in the city. In addition, there are many types of informal workers and they each have their specific problems and demands so the FLEP was not able to deal with such differences and each type usually has its own informal coordinator.

Groups of informal workers, which later engaged with the City Farm programme, had in common that they had all worked in the agricultural sector at some point. Some had migrated from rural areas to Bangkok permanently, while the rest worked as seasonal labour and moved into town after the end of the crop year. The group of Keha-Tung Songhong home workers, including 104 members, became the natural leaders without having any clear structure. Almost all members of this group were women (only seven were men) who worked as subcontractors for the garment industry. The key question is why the group became the centrality of the network, and not others. The leader of the group informed me that she and her group had an active role in the informal labour network's activities since 1992, which at the time was called the network of homeworkers. She said with pride that she was the one who came up with the nickname of the network, 'Homenet'. She reported that her group engaged with the network more than the FLEP, which only formed in 2003 (Fieldwork interview with Neeramon Suttiponnapong, group's leader of 'Keha-Tung Songhong' home workers, 12/02/12).

Their past actions supported the group's reputation and trust given by other groups of informal workers until it managed to act as an informal coordinator that collected and shared problems, solutions, knowledge, events and updated news to other members. One of group leaders of other informal labour networks was of the opinion that the group of Keha-Tung Songhong home workers usually initiated activities and

invited her group to join. She said that it was good to see someone try to begin to do something and encourage other members to support it. If the group of Keha-Tung Songhong home workers was not active, the informal labour network might have existed just in its name (Fieldwork interview with Watcharaporn Uppapun, Informal labours living in national house at Chalong krung national housing community, Nhongjog district, 14/02/12). In a similar way, another group leader of informal labour network members mentioned that the informal labour network was fortunate to have an active leader (referring to the group of Keha-Tung Songhong home workers). She also spoke about the Keha-Tung Songhong's leader blaming the Minister from the Ministry of Labour about his ignorance of informal labour rights in front of him during their social movement in 2008. She told the story of the braveness of the Keha-Tung Songhong leader who headed the mob of people during mobilisations (Fieldwork interview with Kunkaew Klaewkla, Informal labours working at home (buffalo horn carving), Bangcare district, 15/02/12). These opinions reflect a recognition of the network members and the reputation of the group of Keha-Tung Songhong for trustworthiness in leading network activities built from past actions.

Photo 5.4. Collective garden of workers at Keha-Tung Songhong

Source: Photos owned by the researcher

The director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation had known the leader of the group since they had joined the 'Health Promotion for Informal Workers in the Agricultural Sector' programme led by university scholars since 2004. They developed shared norms, particularly that the right to food is a basic human right.

The group's leader spoke about the respect she had for the director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and that the director stood for the marginalised groups. She said that she shared many thoughts with her, particularly concerning the right of informal workers to access food as a minimum level of welfare (Fieldwork interview with Neeramon Suttiponnapong, group's leader of Keha-Tung Songhong home workers, 12/02/12). To link to the informal labour network, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation connected through the Keha-Tung Songhong group together with other groups that the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation was also close with. The main aim of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation was to promote these target groups to grow their own food as a form of welfare for their group members in vacant areas, including each member's backyard, as illustrated in photo 5.4. The group's leader also said that her group gained more benefits than that because gardening could help develop relationships among members and, most importantly for her, to engage in collective action, such as making agreements and even appointments for protests.

From the stories told by the Keha-Tung Songhong group and other members of informal labour network, the narrative-based diagram can be drawn as shown in Figure 5.4. The Keha-Tung Songhong group is located at the centre, and it has a close relationship with other informal labours groups. This group also has a well well-connection with the FLEP, who facilitates the activities organised in the name of the informal labour network. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation connected with the group in relation to a promotion of food self-production for enhancing the right to food (and right to the city), while the MCD related to the group as a consequence of its role in organizing the mobile farming training for this group. Besides, the group saw the Laksi DAO as the street level bureaucracy that it needs to connect with to ask for basic support. This study found that their support in the same political camp made them think positively about each other. The members of the group became the active political activists that stood for the legitimacy of the political elites that backed up the Laksi DAO. According to the figure, it can be noticed that the connection of the Keha-Tung Songhong group included some organisations that did not recognised as an active actor engaging in the UA policy network. The National Housing Authority, for example, did not involve with the City Farm programme, but it was recognised by the group as the supportive actor that

helped in developing the community garden. Because, this organisation, who has an authority in managing the land use of the community, allowed and facilitated the group to use a piece of land to develop the community garden.

Figure 5.4 Narrative-based policy network diagram analysed from the perspective of the members of the informal labour network

Regarding the exercise of power, the case of this group did not illustrate clearly how it benefited from structural power and how it exercised its instrumental power. On the one hand, informal workers in the Thai context were victimised by the existing structures rather than taking advantage of them. For example, the Thai economic structure benefits from cheap labour and the dark or illegal economic sectors where informal workers are. The existing political and policy structures tend to reproduce this situation rather than transform it. Informal economic sectors and workers also reflect the resilient livelihood of Thai socio-cultural structures. For example, the economic crisis in 1997 led to the surprising conclusion that the unemployment rate in Thailand was not high as laid-off workers turned to the informal economic sector, such as street vendors and second-hand trading on trucks. These economic activities are illegal but at that time the police pretended not to see this and allowed people to do it as a way to deal with the crisis. Everyone knows of the existence of the

informal sector and its workers but like a ghost, no one sees them. On the other hand, the group could not exercise its instrumental power as it was not able to command, control or even monitor other groups. The informal labour network had a rule about monthly saving and the right to gain benefits from collective welfare but the Keha-Tung Songhong group did not create the rule or have decision-making power because it was just an informal coordinator with good connections with many other groups.

However, the group exercised its communicative power through its leader, who was a middle-aged woman who organised many informal labour movements demanding labour rights and who engaged with the national political camp 'the Red Shirts'.[1] She had a high level of confidence and was bravely critical through her radical thinking, she had a strong political position and a 'loud' voice. She was also often introduced as a key speaker in public forums, such as during protests and campaigns. On the one hand, exercising communicative power in this way could persuade many groups to join or support the group, particularly groups of informal workers. On the other hand, this study found that many groups, particularly those that engaged with the Green Market Network, tried to avoid interacting with this group. The leader was seen to be rude in the eyes of the middle and upper classes (interpreted from chatting with members of the Green Market Network). Another reason is that even if they did not show it explicitly, many organisations and groups that engaged in the City Farm programme supported the opposite side of the political spectrum, which this group supported explicitly. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, as it is related to conflicts within the policy network.

Regarding the centrality of the slum dwellers network, the On-nut Sibsee Rai community is analysed as having the best connections with other members of the network. Similar to the Keha-Tung Songhong group, outsiders generally view this community as a poor and marginalised group. As mentioned briefly in Section 4.4.2, members of this slum community, which consisted of 73 households, once lived under bridges located in various places in Bangkok. Almost all of them worked as

---

[1] There were politicised organisations and groups who engaged strongly with the national political conflict and clearly supported the movements of specific political camps. Chapter 7 details this debate.

garbage collectors of household waste and then sell it to recycling industries. The leader of the community was also one of the leaders of the slum movement fighting for their housing rights since the 1980s. He was well-known by other slum communities. After the establishment of this community by the government, it also became the first successful homeless movement. The success of this community in pressing its demands on the government made it a natural leader of other relevant movements of the poor. Apart from its reputation derived from past actions, this community developed trust from leading livelihood development both by showing a good example and helping other communities to develop. For example, this community had developed its community gardens since 2002 (see photo 5.5) and helped other slum communities to develop community gardens. The leader said that after they had their own house they then needed to have their own food.

Besides, the community leader also helped to organise monthly meetings and was talkative during the meetings. Although the Human Settlement Foundation facilitated the meetings and other collective events, the On-nut Sibsee Rai community still played a more inclusive role as reflected in an interview with another slum community leader. He mentioned that he saw the Human Settlement Foundation as a good friend, while the On-nut Sibsee Rai community was seen as his cousin. The reason was that they had struggled together for more than thirty years. The developments of the On-nut Sibsee Rai community also inspired him and made him believe that people who were born poor could create a better life using their hands (Fieldwork interview with Jaroon Grunsook, community leader of On-nut Padsibhok community, 21/03/2012).

The community garden became a bridge linking this community to the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation. In 2003, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation promoted community gardens outside Bangkok by examining how they could contribute to food security of the poor communities. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation found that the practices of the On-nut Sibsee Rai community could be a good example for other poor communities. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation had therefore organised a community garden tour, including the garden of this community in the programme of the tour. Roughly 150 poor community leaders from all around the country came to visit this garden. During that event the director

of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and the community leader had a chance to get to know each other and develop trust. Then, in mid-2005, the Health Promotion Foundation endorsed the Food Security programme joined by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and many other organisations. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation showed its trust in the On-nut Sibsee Rai community by proposing this community as the role model for the promotion of community food security. Even higher levels of trust were given to this community in 2010. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation had consulted with its leader to screen groups of people living in slum communities within Bangkok to engage in the City Farm programme. The director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation addressed her concerns about choosing farming groups and the importance of screening them by trusted networks:

"By engaging a variety of farming groups with us, we hope that they will do what they proposed to us. We don't want to play the role of policemen or judges. We really do not want to say: "Why don't you do what you promised to us?" We don't want to be taking decision to get our support back. We seek those that have a strong motivation to work with us and want to walk in the same and long path together ... A set of choices, which make us the most confident, is the groups engaging in the networks that we've ever worked with (Fieldwork interview with Supa Yaimaung, director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, 3/07/2011).

Photo 5.5. Community garden of On-nut Sibsee Rai slum community

Source: Photos owned by the researcher

By analysing storytelling of the the On-nut Sibsee Rai community and other members of the slum dwellers network, this study can draw the narrative-based diagram as shown in Figure 5.5. In the diagram that the On-nut Sibsee Rai community is located at the centre, this community is close to other slum dwellers communities. The community has also a well-connection with the Human Settlement Foundation, who is a formal coordinator of the slum dwellers network. The figure shows that this community is closer to the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation (an NGO) rather than the Health Promotion Foundation (a public organisation). It avoided connecting to public organisations including the DAOs. Some organisations that did not engage with the UA policy network (not included in the Figure 4.2) played supportive role for this community. For example, the Thailand Institute of Packaging and Recycling Management for Sustainable Environment supported waste management of this community including composting organic waste for farming purpose. The staff of the Community Organisations Development Institute supported the community by facilitating the development of the strategic community planning by which the community garden was merged in the plan.

Figure 5.5 Narrative-based policy network diagram analysed from the perspective of the members of the slum dwellers network

Similar to the Keha-Tung Songhong group, this case did not illustrate clearly how it benefited from structural power nor did it exercise instrumental powers between the

members of the slum dwellers network. Communicative power is the only power that this organisation had and could exercise. The reputation and trust by others supported its communicative power. The community leader, who was a middle-aged man, talked simply from his direct experiences by showcasing what the community had done. The power of his communication derived from his sincerity and his solid evidence. One coordinator of the City Farm programme mentioned that, in her opinion, when he participated in any deliberative forums he addressed the voice of the poor (Fieldwork interview with Pui Varangkanang, coordinator of the City Farm programme, 21/03/2012). He reflected on how hard he had tried to improve the quality of life for himself and other community members, which reflects existing injustices and inequalities. Chapter 6 will illustrate the communicative power exercised by this community during the disaster. Motivated by moral obligation, many citizen groups, particularly the middle class groups, sacrifice their vegetables to flood victims as poor people had sacrificed their own food for others. One coordinator of the City Farm programme called this phenomenon the 'kindness of the poor given to the rich' (Fieldwork interview with Pui Varangkanang, coordinator of the City Farm programme, 21/03/2012).

5.2. Plural centralities and policy network decentralisation

The collected stories in the previous section lead to the conclusion that the UA policy network was shaped by combining various existing actor constellations, or policy communities, which had strong and close relations, and shared some form of social capital between their members. Each policy community had their centrality, which had good connections and held strong social capital with other members. These centralities played a role as coordinators of their policy community and exercised their power particularly over other members of the same policy community. It also held some forms of social capital with the powerful actors, particularly the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, which allowed bridging across policy communities to develop the policy network. There were multi-scales of social capital, the first is called 'bonding' social capital, which functioned within the policy communities. The second and wider scale is called 'bridging' social capital and was based on the linkages with the powerful actors that played their role at the heart of the network.

These two scales of social capital activated the exercise of power in the hierarchy of power. The first level of the hierarchy consists of bonding power exercised between members of the policy community. Although the centralities did not have a higher status determined by a formal hierarchy or legal system, they had power derived from developing social capital with other members of the same policy community, as mentioned in the previous section. They also did not have a formal position legitimising their work as coordinators of the policy community, but they were allowed informally to work as coordinators, which facilitated their exercise of power, especially communicative power. On the other hand, the second level or upper layer of the power hierarchy consists of bridging power exercised between the centralities and the powerful actors. Power between them was not equal, for powerful actors benefitted from their status in existing structures and had instrumental power to control. For example, gatekeepers validated who could engage in the policy network and make final decisions about organising events in the name of the City Farm programme.

From these characteristics of the policy network, we can conclude that power was not monopolised by the two powerful actors, as discussed in the previous chapter. There was a struggle for power between plural centralities, reflecting some degree of decentralisation of the UA policy network in which power was held both by the powerful actors in the first place and the centralities of the policy communities in the second place. Some degree of decentralisation of the policy network also reflects the procedure of engaging organisations and groups in the City Farm programme after the programme was endorsed by the committee of the Health Promotion Foundation, of which the Prime Minister was the president. The director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation explained how the procedure had started:

> "After we (the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation) agreed to play a central role to organise the (City Farm) programme, we began by organising a meeting with our 'friends' working with city farms. We decided to open to the public to submit their proposal to join the programme. Our friends stood by us, and recommended capable organisations or groups that could be asked to join us and empower their colleagues to submit the proposal" (Fieldwork interview

with Supa Yaimaung, director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, 3/07/2011).

The policy communities were chosen in the first place and their centralities had a role in screening members that 'qualified' to be considered by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and the Health Promotion Foundation during the second phase. This procedure reflected the fact that the centralities were gaining decision-making power of the powerful organisations through decentralisation. To legitimise and render the screening process of grant-recipients transparent, organisations and individuals who had a good reputation were invited as members of the committee. Their reputation was judged by their engagement with topics such as food, nutrition, and sustainable agriculture. Three of nine were university scholars who researched on relevant topics. The leader of the Working Group on Food for Change was also invited as she had worked as part of a think tank on local food systems for many years. Her group then played a role in managing the programme closely with the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation. Another three members of the committee for the screening process were famous trainers, including the director of Media Centre for Development, Prince (from Veggie Prince training centre), and Chookeit (from Suwannabhumi training centre), whose training centres later became part of the programme. Members of the social enterprises' policy community were not the only ones to be asked to open training programmes for the City Farm programme; some also took part in the screening process of the recipient farming groups, as they were recognised by the public based on their good knowledge and farming skills in the city, particularly in the media or by their trainees. The two final members and leaders of the committee were the director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and a representative of the Health Promotion Foundation. The study found that all nine members worked with the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation before the screening process, which means that apart from their reputation, they had developed the trust of the powerful actor of the policy network. Although the centralities of the policy communities were not members of the committee, apart from the Media Centre for Development, they had an influence on the screening process through a deliberative process behind the scenes, as can be confirmed by their capacity to put forward members of their policy community to be grant recipients.

After the City Farm programme launched an open call for joining proposals, there were 84 project submissions from 84 groups during the first year of which only 50 were selected. However, four-fifths of the selected proposals came from communities recommended by the District Administration Offices, members of the Green Market Network, members of the slum dwellers network, and members of the informal labour network as shown in the table 5.1. Moreover, the UA social enterprises had been selected by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation at the suggestion of the Media Centre for Development to become training centres without the need to apply or pass through any formal and transparent selection processes.

Table 5.1.   Citizen groups whose proposal was selected and then engaged with the City Farm programme in 2010/2011

Policy communities	Number of groups
District Administration Offices (to recommend)	13
Informal labour network	10
Green Market Network	9
Slum dwellers network	7
Others/do not direct relate to any policy communities	11
Total	**50**

There were two ways of organising the collective actions of the UA policy network. The first was through powerful actors, namely the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and the Health Promotion Foundation. They initiated collective action and demanded the cooperation from policy communities through their centralities as well as opened up for other organisations and groups to join. The cooperation of the policy communities guaranteed that each collective action became possible, while the cooperation of the others was meaningful for it widened participation. Secondly, the policy communities initiated collective action and the powerful actors of the

policy network played a role as promoters who supported other organisations and groups across policy communities to join. These strategies were both top-down and bottom-up initiatives within the hierarchy of the decentralised policy network.

Although the vertical relations within the policy network shaped its decentralisation, the horizontal relations among members of each policy community and across them makes this policy network different from decentralised bureaucratic hierarchical relations. As mentioned in the previous section, the centralities of each policy community coordinated other members rather than control them. Unlike the power of control of the upper levels to the lower levels of the same organisational hierarchy, these organisations and groups did not have formal power within the flat relationships between its members. Instead, the power that the centralities mainly exercised was communicative power, as addressed in Section 5.1. While the cooperation across decentralised bureaucratic hierarchies generally depended on deals between top managers of different governmental agencies, cooperation across policy communities within the policy network did not depend on deals between their centralities in every case. This study found that there were many complex informal links among members of different policy communities depending on how their social capital had developed and shaped their relations. They connected with each other by developing their own informal communicative forums, not just by being coordinated through their centralities or the powerful actors. For example, the study found complex relationships, which are hard to draw, between members of the social enterprise policy community and members of the Green Market Network's policy community. They were middle and upper class people who had many things in common. They had informal chats across policy communities through opportunities occurring in daily life. It was commonly found that many members of the two policy communities were in direct contact with members of another policy community with specific requests without reporting or informing their centrality. This study also found that later, some of them seemed to engage with both policy communities, while others seemed to move from one to the other. These changes were mainly a consequence of the extension of the community-supported agricultural system through which many social enterprises transformed themselves to be green producers and connected amongst themselves to meet green customers and restaurants engaged in the Green Market Network. Unlike the decentralised bureaucratic structure, some

degree of decentralisation of the policy network was a mix of vertical and horizontal relations.

Moreover, some degree of decentralisation of the policy network does not facilitate static relations between organisations and groups within it. Even the powerful hegemonic actors were still often challenged. For example, this study found that some social enterprises often had more influence on the policy network than the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and Health Promotion Foundation. During the flooding, which will be highlighted in the next two chapters, the Organic Way, Veggie Prince and Suwannabhumi training centres, who led the policy epistemic (knowledge partnership), played a dominant role in guiding the policy network in promoting food innovations, while the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation could merely support and the Health Promotion Foundation could not do anything even if it disagreed with some of their ideas. The dynamics of relations within the policy network also reflected the emergence of new powerful organisations and groups that developed stronger social capital and subsequently had more influence on the governance of the policy network. For example, after the policy network had operated for two years, the online group, which was not a member of any policy community and submitted its grant proposal without any back up, developed from a network of friends to be a network of strangers and became a large group. It created and led collective actions, such as the monthly meeting 'sharing food in the park', during which each member cooked food they had grown themselves to share with others. During the meeting, they also shared problems, challenges, and new ideas. This event started with a meeting of group members who connected and shared stories with one another online. Then other organisations and groups engaged in the policy network became interested in joining until the event became one of the main forms of collective action in the name of the whole policy network. This event also helped the policy network to initiate events, consult its members, update on progress, publicise forthcoming activities, and transfer information and knowledge to its members. Although in the end the powerful actors of the policy network took over the initiative from the online group, the role of this group still illustrates that power relations between organisations and groups engaging in the policy network was not highly static as some became more important in the struggle for power.

5.3. Shared rules, instrumental power, and exclusion

Understanding the characterisation of the policy network does not just involve identifying who was included and who could exercise power, but also understanding who was excluded and why. This study found that although this UA policy network was not a closed network, some organisations and groups were welcome and others were excluded. By using an Ostromian lens, this study found that pre-existing shared rules affected the exclusion of some organisations and groups who were found, or even found themselves, not to fit with the rules. There were four major rules of the policy network, which excluded some organisations and groups: 'must not seek profit', 'must not use chemicals', 'must not engage in mono-cropping', and 'must seek innovations'.

Firstly, the 'must not seek profit' principle was shared between the powerful organisations of the policy network and the centralities of the policy communities that could exercise instrumental power over others under the decentralised governance of the policy network. This rule prohibited the use of grants to earn money apart from selling surplus products to sustain their collective garden. Similarly, UA enterprises had to contribute to society while at the same time doing business by using financial support from the programme to organise free training for more and wider target groups. This rule was recognised by everyone, because it was set as an important condition before any of them decided to join the programme. It was set by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and the Health Promotion Foundation, who were legitimised to exercise this instrumental power, as the former was the funder and the latter was the programme manager. They enforced their role both during the screening process and when monitoring members' performances.

This rule enforcement led to the exclusion of many organisations and groups working on UA to generate income. The main case was the exclusion of the enterprise 'Green Made', which was an outsider that had attempted to engage with the City Farm programme and had not succeeded in doing so during the period of this study. An interview with the leader of the enterprise found that her group of young people developed a vegetable garden in the inner city of Bangkok to sell organic products directly to the customers. She said that her group wanted to prove that commercial farming in the inner city could make a good profit. The interview

found that this enterprise had the capacity to do so. The enterprise developed their own brand and initiated a variety of packaging, promotions and types of food processing. Green Made also developed a niche market and adopted various market innovations, such as veggie-box delivery and advertised products online. The leader said that although her enterprise did not contact the City Farm programme coordinators to join the programme, her enterprise often brought its products to sell at the events organised in the name of City Farm programme until someone she refused to name told her that her group was not allowed to sell any products there (Fieldwork interview with Khun Oue, member of staff of Green Made, 13/03/2012).

One of the coordinators of the City Farm programme was interviewed about this but did not mention clearly the Green Made enterprise. Although the City Farm programme had engaged with some enterprises, the programme expected their support to be for social purposes. In her view, the members of the city farm association had social aims while doing business as they were widely referred to as social enterprises. They organised training for free, which poor and marginalised groups could access. They also spent time participating in collective events focused on talking and sharing knowledge, experiences and even inputs, which did not make money. The coordinator asked for her opinion on the social benefits derived from the members of the Green Market Network. She mentioned that Green Market Network activities supported sustainable local food systems through their weekly local green markets and the community-supported agricultural system (Fieldwork interview with Pui Varangkanang, coordinator of the City Farm programme, 21/03/2012). In addition, another coordinator of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation also mentioned that the Green Market Network contributed to society by developing more trustable organic food sources compared to organic food labels sold in modern trade supermarkets. She explained that in an era in which we cannot trust supermarkets as they were randomly tested to find chemical contamination in food packages labelled as organic food, the Green Market Network could provide an alternative system, which customers participated in, guaranteeing organic food (Fieldwork interview with Nardsiri Komonpan, coordinator of the City Farm programme, 21/03/2012).

In the view of the two coordinators, although members of the city farm association and the Green Market Network did business, they could be included because they also took part in developing a better society. In contrast, Green Made was excluded as it could not prove that it did not just seek profits but also had social concerns. An interview with the leader of the enterprise found that, being engaged in full-time farming, this enterprise was not available for collective events, which did not contribute much to its business. It also did not aim to organise training, unlike many members of the city farm association, as that was not one of its strengths. Besides, this enterprise was not engaged closely with the Green Market Network as it had developed its own markets and thought that the existing markets were located too far from its vegetable garden (Fieldwork interview with Khun Oue, member of staff of Green Made, 13/03/2012).

Secondly, the rule prohibiting the use of chemicals led to the exclusion of some groups. The anti-chemical rule was developed from the common objective of the City Farm programme to develop an alternative, more sustainable food system. The reason for the Health Promotion Foundation and the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation to endorse this programme was to fill a gap within the mainstream food system, which depended highly on chemical input. Data provided by the Thailand Foundation for Consumers surveyed during March to July 2012 show that Q standard vegetable (passing food safety standards) sold in modern trade supermarkets around Bangkok were contaminated by chemicals 16.8 times higher than the European Union (EU) standard (Thailand Foundation for Consumers, 2012). The EU has also rejected many kinds of exported vegetables after they were tested for chemical contamination since 2007 (Thailand Information Centre for Civil Rights and Investigative Journalism, 2012). As part of the sustainable agriculture movement, the City Farm programme aimed to support local organic food production. At least, the director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and the leader of the Working Group on Food for Change expressed that they could not hope to make a change in rural agriculture as it was been shaped by the mainstream food system which is intensive in its chemical use, while they see hope for the urban sector. The word 'sustainability' seems ambiguous but it was a minimal requirement to be an organic farmer to achieve sustainable results in the eyes of rule-makers such as the Health Promotion Foundation, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, and

the Working Group on Food for Change. It became a clearly stated rule in the rationale of the programme, while every member had already asked whether it could share the rule before agreeing to engage with the programme in the first place (a rule of engagement).

This rule, however, became a cause of exclusion of some groups practising UA. Because many of them emphasised productivity rather than process as they needed quantity rather than quality, some organisations and farming groups thought that they were not so picky about organic production. They thought that to use a few chemicals for some processes such as the first stage was fine. Their opinion was that chemical contamination happened everywhere. We needed to avoid it as much as possible but not so much as to aim to live without it at all. They also thought that to clean the products before eating reduced chemical contamination in vegetables. They were also not so picky about buying vegetables from markets. This category of people can be called 'flexible organic'. To ban non-organic products meant excluding many producers who could not devote such efforts and time to food growing. It also excluded customers who accepted to take the risk when they thought these products were more sustainably produced than in the mainstream markets.

This study found that the exclusion happened both during the screening process by the powerful organisations and centralities and through the decisions of organisations and groups themselves. For the latter, they either did not engage from the beginning or faded away from the policy network later, when they were irritated by such strict rules. This rule also became a barrier for lower class groups, such as some slum communities and informal workers, compared to middle and upper class groups, such as some members of the Green Market Network. The latter could afford to buy food but decided to grow their own to avoid chemicals and began to distrust organic food labels from supermarkets. In contrast, the urban poor aimed to produce adequate food to reduce the cost of food rather than being serious about organic production. Although the rule of organic production had become more flexible during and shortly after the flooding, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, many farming groups had already missed the opportunity to gain support and other benefits from the City Farm programme.

Thirdly, 'must not engage in mono-cropping' was a rule shared by members of the City Farm programme as a requirement to join the City Farm programme was to grow a variety of foods. This rule emerged from the idea of increasing biodiversity in the city. It also relied on a belief that eating a variety of food could guarantee better nutrition. To demand a non-mono-cropping strategy was therefore part of the challenge to mainstream agricultural production shaped by the Green Revolution. As raised earlier, the emergence of the UA policy network departed from the existing food regime. The image of mono-cropping is as an intensive form of chemical and commercial farming, which is unfriendly to humans, social relations and ecology. This rule caused the exclusion of full-time farmers on the urban fringes, particularly those who not only produce food for profit but also engaged in chemical mono-cropping. They could not position themselves in the UA policy network as they still took part in the mainstream food regime, which in turn meant that they did not have a chance to get funding and other support from the City Farm programme.

Lastly, 'must seek innovations' is another shared rule of the UA policy network. As urban geography is quite different from rural geography, the powerful organisations and centralities of policy communities believed that food innovations were required to deal with space limits. The policy network organised several events to create and share food innovations, such as vertical gardens, container gardens, rooftop gardens, energy and water saving gardens, etc. Each innovation was categorised in many ways, such as innovations for household gardening, community gardening, growing food in buildings, etc. Proposed innovations also included making fertilisers, enzyme ionic plasma, gardening, harvesting, and marketing. Many social enterprises working as training centres and city farm think tanks played a leading role in offering further innovations. The practices adopted by each farming group also became sources of innovation. The coordinator of the City Farm programme from the Health Promotion Foundation repeatedly expressed that one of the successes of the programme was its capacity to develop various innovations to inspire city dwellers to start growing their own food (Fieldwork interview with Veerapong Kreungsinyod, coordinator of City Farm programme from the Health Promotion Foundation, 5/07/2011). However, this rule caused the exclusion of many city farmers and gardeners who preferred and had developed their farms or gardens in traditional ways. Many of them proved that it is not always true that traditional farming cannot be applied in an urban setting. In

other words, it is not necessary to separate rural and urban agriculture, as knowledge and technologies can be transferred across them. For example, Jitrutda farm located in the central city practised 'rural' farming. It became a learning centre for rural methods, located in the city. The pilot projects of the King and the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives usually operated here before extending to rural areas. Jitrutda farm had been developed for rural farming development for 53 years (since 1961) but did not raise any concerns that farming in the city was different from farming in rural areas, requiring specific attention. In contrast, the farm was developed under the belief that knowledge and technologies for farming could transfer whatever the location. This perspective derives from the centralisation of Thai bureaucracy. Institutions are centralised in Bangkok, the primate city, including the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and its units for research and development. When one coordinator of the City Farm programme was asked about her opinion on Jitrutda farm, she said it is 'rural farming in the city', reflecting that she did not count this garden as a city farm.

5.4. Shared norms, structural and communicative powers, and exclusion

Shared norms excluded some groups through the structural power and the ability of powerful organisations to benefit from them through the exercise of communicative power. In the case of exclusion derived from shared norms and their power embedded in the socio-cultural structure, this study found that norms developed some conditions facilitating and welcoming certain organisations and groups that shared such norms, to engage with each other. In contrast, they constructed constraints excluding other organisations and groups that did not share them. A major example is the shared norm about promoting the 'green' agenda, which is based on the idea that a good environment is fundamental for better livelihoods. This norm is shared more strongly among middle and upper class groups, while poor and marginalised groups engaging with the policy network were more concerned with the importance of improving community ecology and reusing household waste to make fertilisers. This study noticed that many policy network's constituent organisations and groups, particularly members of the Green Market Network and social enterprises, thought that they were particularly concerned with a healthy earth and their own health compared to laypeople. The interviews also reflect that even the

212

slum communities engaging in the City Farm programme were proud that their communities were better than slum communities in general as they improved and maintained a good ecology. In other words, this norm activated the power of the socio-cultural structure by giving a sense that sharing made one better, while the people who adopted the norm usually blamed others for not being similarly concerned. It created a sense of us and them, in which 'us' were privileged over 'them'.

The norm that privileges green culture also excluded some farming groups from the policy network. For example, the slum community 'Bang Bour' was excluded from the City Farm programme as it was overlooked by powerful organisations of the policy network and not recommended by the slum dwellers network. This slum community is located along the river and is breaking the law as they were not permitted to build their houses less than 100 m^2 from the river. One reason that they were not recommended to engage with the City Farm programme was that the community had not proved that it would share clear green concerns, such as reusing local resources and household waste. The community contributed to what was considered a 'bad' urban ecology, by polluting river water, being surrounded by dense housing and rotting waste that spread a bad odour. While other slum communities that were engaged in the City Farm programme were concerned about improving the quality of their environment, this community ignored it altogether. An interview with a Human Settlement Foundation member of staff showed that one of the characteristics of the community was that people living there did not aim to live there permanently, while other slum communities aimed to protect their living space as it had been a struggle to gain the permission to live there. The 'Bang Bour' community on the other hand, had struggled for a better life and would then move away, so they were not concerned with improving their community ecology, but rather spent time and effort on working hard for an opportunity to move away. The member of staff from the Human Settlement Foundation therefore argued that they did not have a sense of home there (Fieldwork interview with Khun Nhooy, member of staff of Human Settlement Foundation, 11/01/2012).

This community showed that it was concerned with a 'brown' rather than 'green' agenda, which included an awareness of food security by practising UA, including

floating vegetable gardens located in the river (see photo 5.6). Each household also tried to grow food in their limited space, including by developing hanging gardens, container gardens, and small rooftop gardens where possible. This study concludes that this community practised UA as a resilient livelihood enhancement strategy for each household because they did not have any specific patterns and did not organise collective action to develop collective gardens. Each household just tried to garden as much as it could to reduce food costs. The members of the community also practised UA as a strategy to adapt to a changing climate as the community often experienced floods from an increasing level of water in the river. Thus they realised the significant role of UA for food security during shocks. This case became a critical one when the powerful organisations within the policy network, who were concerned with a green agenda, gave the opinion that food grown by this community could be contaminated, particularly the floating garden along the river, for the water was polluted. The Health Promotion Foundation, in particular, promoted UA as a strategy for health promotion. UA was recognised by the Health Promotion Foundation as an alternative source of food which can be safer than food grown from general mono-cropping rural agriculture. Promoting UA was therefore not just about encouraging people to grow any food, but specifically about creating good practices in communities that can be learning centres on healthy food production within the city. That is why the Health Promotion Foundation overlooked the 'Bang Bour' slum community. It created poorly nutritious food, which was not a good practice that other communities could learn from. The exclusion of 'Bang Bour' reflects the norm that green culture became the standard criterion to evaluate appropriate and inappropriate choices, although it was not a rule. This norm had the power embedded in the socio-cultural structure to legitimise the powerful organisations to exclude this community, as agreed by many other members of the policy network, including other slum communities.

Photo 5.6.   Floating gardens along the river near Bang Bour slum community

Source: Photos owned by the researcher

Beyond the fact that shared norms have power within the socio-cultural structure, they also support the exercise of communicative power, which can lead to the exclusion of others. This study could not find a clear link with the case of the exclusion of the 'Bang Bour' community. However, the case of the exclusion of agricultural input traders does reflect this. The exclusion of the input traders was not a rule but it was promoted to members of the City Farm programme by the coordinators of the programme, both by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and the Health Promotion Foundation. The promotion through communication was made by referring to the self-reliance norm. This norm challenges dependency on others rather than on ourselves. The promotion of UA in Bangkok started from the worst situation of the economic crisis at the time and it was introduced as a self-sufficiency strategy promoted by the King, as discussed in Chapter 1. The idea of UA happened alongside the idea of self-sufficiency from the beginning, which was reflected in interviews with many leaders of the policy network's constituent organisations and groups, who argued that promoting UA by the policy network was subsistence-oriented.[2]

---

[2] It can be noticed from the interviews that many relevant people within the City Farm programme rejected the idea that a lack of food could be fixed by reshaping food distribution within the existing food chains and systems rather than trying to depend on oneself by growing one's own food. On the other hand, they believe strongly that to enhance food self-reliance through UA is possible and significant.

The 'Do It Yourself' proverb became a campaign of the powerful organisations, that had the power to convince others through its roots in the aforementioned norm. This norm therefore supported the exercise of communicative power. Other members of the policy network agreed with low input methods, reusing local waste and materials. They also sought to produce their own inputs, such as soil and fertiliser. To produce their own inputs meant to reduce reliance on buying them from agricultural input traders. This promotion led to the exclusion of input traders who avoided challenging the norm and claimed their importance in the food chain as it related to the King speech. As a consequence, this norm created boundaries of what was acceptable, thinkable, and speakable. The exercise of communicative power referring to this norm could distort communication by making some issues unspoken, which is also a way to exclude. Thus the UA policy network did not engage with any agricultural input traders, which meant that they did not have equal opportunities to gain support from the public budget through the City Farm programme as many other groups in the food chain had.

Conclusions

This chapter examined how the policy network became shaped and characterised by exploring who was included and who, apart from the powerful organisations, held power. This chapter also examined how social capital of the aforementioned centralities related to power and how power shaped the policy network's characteristics. The chapter discussed how the policy network was decentralised in some degree and period (at least during the period of this study) through the power exercised by the centrality of each policy community. The focus was also on analysing the exclusion of some organisations and groups as a consequence of shared rules and norms, which activated various dimensions of power to include and exclude.

Through the analysis the connected arenas of the role of social capital were addressed starting from its role in facilitating the emergence of the policy network and moving to its role in characterising it and which types of power brought it together. As analysed in this chapter, the powerful organisations could not monopolise power and control the policy network at the centre due to the degree of decentralisation of the governance system propelled by the policy network. There

were various policy communities within the policy network who had their own aims and sub-norms as a result of their differences in life expectations in relation to their social and economic background. Cooperation problems and conflicts were present and embedded in the policy network characterisation in many forms and different degrees of complexity. The next two chapters will examine the main collective action problems faced by the policy network and analyse how they were overcome in the context of the floods. In this context, the policy network's constituent organisations and groups had to work together and mobilise massive cooperation by also including outsiders who they had previously excluded, to show their collaborative capacity other than in a normal situation. Thus another two pieces of the jigsaw will be introduced to achieve a full picture of the role of social capital in the emergence, characterisation and driven of the policy network in turbulent times.

Chapter 6

The role of social capital in enhancing
cooperation in times of crisis

Introduction

The policy network required cooperation to mobilise collective actions for coping with food-related issues during the flooding. The powerful actors and centralities of the policy communities within the policy network (the core actors) could not force other organisations and groups to work for them during such period (between mid-November 2011 and early-January 2012). So, cooperation by each organisation and group was made based on a voluntary basis. Generally-speaking, coordination problems, such as free-riding and opportunism are found in policy network governance (deLeon and Varda, 2009; Sorensen and Torfing, 2008). However, this study found that during and shortly after the flooding in Bangkok, the coordination problems of the policy network on urban agriculture (UA) were overcome as there was evidence of intensive collective action between the policy network's members during this period.

In order to examine the role of social capital in times of crisis, this chapter analyses how it determines the quality of the policy network in enhancing cooperation. This chapter argues that social capital supports the role of core actors (as facilitators) in making agreement on the reason to cooperate through communicative process. This chapter starts with the remarkable levels of cooperation between members of the policy network during and shortly after the flooding. The analysis then turns to examine how agreement between policy network's constituent organisations and groups on reasons for cooperation influences their decision to cooperate. This chapter discusses the contestation between different policy epistemics (knowledge partnerships) that propose their arguments through communication to convince others to agree with them and persuade others to support. The analysis examines how the decision of the policy network's constituent organisations and groups to cooperate was related to the achievement of the core actors that lead the policy epistemic (as cooperative facilitators) in addressing a better argument and

establishing practical reasons. The focus of the analysis is on how different forms of social capital play a role in the communicative process. In doing so, communicative fora are analysed by adopting rhetorical analysis (by analysing ethos, logos, and pathos) to investigate the role of core actors and social capital held by them in making agreement. To analyse logos, Fischer's logic of policy deliberation is integrated to understand how the practical reason and better argument are made as discussed in 2.4 and shown in Figure 6.1.

Figure 6.1 Main argument and analytical framework of Chapter 6

6.1. Cooperation during and shortly after the flooding

During the flooding period, there were multiple demands for cooperation between the policy actors to organise collective actions, as mentioned in Chapter 1. Firstly, there were demands for cooperation to provide food for the most vulnerable people during the disaster, particularly to provide vegetables to improve nutrition. Some members of the UA policy network were asked to collect vegetables from their gardens while others were responsible for distributing them. These collective actions engaged a large number of actors towards working together. Secondly, there were demands for cooperation to provide materials (including a sprout-growing bucket, a

mushroom-growing set, sets to grow vegetables in containers, a strainer, and a sun power rice cooking box) and know-how to produce emergency food. The social enterprises functioning as training centres played a key role in this type of collective action, while the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, the Working Group on Food for Change and the members of the Green Market Network supported them. Thirdly, cooperation was needed to develop food innovations for living with water. The food innovations included vertical and rooftop gardens, floating gardens, and food grown in containers and bags. Fourthly, mutual aid during the flooding improved the social safety net but also required the cooperation of many actors. These actors included farming groups that worked closely with the Green Market Network and were either producers or customers engaged in the community supported agriculture system, facilitated mainly by the Green Market Network, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and the Working Group on Food for Change. Lastly, many actors cooperated to challenge the priorities of the government and the centralised food distribution of the mainstream food system. These movements engaged many actors who were present in various ways, for instance, by opening spaces for discussions and by sharing criticisms on their websites and Facebook pages.

Shortly after the flooding, the same actors also cooperated to organise collective activities. There was, first of all, cooperation for collective actions to recover city farms of City Farm programme members. These collective actions were organised mainly by the slum dwellers and the informal labour network because the community gardens that were recovered were primarily cultivated by the farming groups that were part of these networks. Other actors joined the events as volunteer workers. These collective actions were organised, particularly through an online group, to build collective gardens for vulnerable groups who were not members of the policy network. For example, they helped a children's and women's nursing home to build a vegetable garden with the cooperation of many members of the policy network over a six week period. Moreover, there were demands to cooperate in collecting and sharing seeds. Such collective actions were organised by encouraging citizen groups affected by the flooding to begin their new growing season. Last but not least, there was wide cooperation through various events organised to raise awareness about urban food security, the right to food, environmental sustainability, and climate change adaptation. A public campaign was

the main approach employed by the coordinators of the City Farm programme to raise awareness about these issues through the website and Facebook page of the programme, while the websites and Facebook pages of other actors were used for support by tagging and sharing. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, the Health Promotion Foundation, the Media Centre for Development and the Working Group on Food for Change played a key role as organisers of the aforementioned events and activities and in opening spaces for discussion and social mobilisation.

At an interview conducted during the fieldwork, the coordinator of the City Farm programme reflected that during and shortly after the flooding, many actors cooperated in each event. This was remarkable in comparison to times when no such crisis called upon the network members to be mobilised. During mid-November 2011 to early-January 2012, there were roughly 80 to 120 organisations and groups cooperating with the organisers of each activity (Second fieldwork interview with Nardsiri Komonpan, coordinator of City Farm programme, 21/03/2012). This number shows that the majority of the policy network's members had participated in the collective actions undertaken during and soon after the floods. Although most of them did not join every single activity, the core actors, particularly the Health Promotion Foundation, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, the Media Centre for Development and the Working Group on Food for Change, engaged in every activity, and they also played a role in organising the majority of the collective events.

A particular case of mobilising support to produce and distribute locally-made effective microorganism (EM) balls (see photo 6.1) must be highlighted here. It illustrates the remarkable level of collective action that succeeded in enhancing cooperation. This collective action became a topic of conversation between inhabitants of the town. More than 120 of the policy network's constituent organisations and groups actively engaged in the activity and the initiative was also recognised, legitimised and supported by external organisations, groups and individuals, including the central government and the prime minister herself. The collective action aimed to adapt locally-made EM balls, which derive from traditional agricultural practices to improve soil quality, to produce short-term vegetables as emergency food and to reduce polluted water. The EM balls were

made and used widely, which was led by the UA policy network although there were some challenges from experts, including members of the policy network, particularly university environmental scientists who argued that more time was needed than the flooding period to enhance soil quality enough to grow food, and they would not reduce but rather, increase waste.

Photo 6.1. Effective microorganism balls

Sources: Photo use authorised by Sudhep Kulsri and Nakorn Limpacuptathavon

Roughly 75,000 EM balls were made and distributed to city dwellers from every node of the network each day. Approximately 2,000 volunteers joined daily in the making and allocation of the EM balls (Fieldwork interview with Potip Pechporee, an event organiser of the Green Market Network, the former of Organic Way and owner of Health-Me Organic Delivery, 17/02/2012). The media were also interested, broadcasting and reporting this action in several opportunities. Many celebrities, including famous singers, actresses and actors of well-known television dramas, publicly endorsed this initiative. When the Prime Minister visited flood victims by boat on 3rd November 2011, she threw EM balls along the river to legitimise and validate the use of this method. The regional and local governments also widely supported this idea. They organised centres for EM ball making and provided staff, trucks and boats to allocate EM balls to city dwellers and to throw them into the waste water. Although the joining of these EM ball movements by laypeople outside the policy network may be seen as a product of remarkable advertising campaign, cooperation between policy network's constituent organisations and groups that

organised these collective activities was based on many forms of social capital, which will be discussed throughout this chapter.

6.2. Reciprocity and moral obligation as linkages between agreement and decision-making to cooperate

The analysis of this section focuses the role of social capital including moral obligation and reciprocity in bridging an agreement on a reason for cooperating and the decision making to cooperate (from agree to take action) as highlighted in figure 6.2. The analysis is also related to the debate between Institutional Rational Choice (IRC) and Communicative Action Theory (CAT) on the different assumptions about the nature of each policy actor: self-interest individual VS altruist. IRC assumes that each actor decides to cooperate as a consequence of expectable mutual interests gaining from cooperation (reciprocity), while CAT is more sensitive to a decision to cooperate as a result of moral obligation of each altruist actor. The following discussion in this section will be based on this focus.

Figure 6.2 Focus of the analysis of section 6.2

By illustrating with the case of locally-made EM balls, many of the policy network's members agreed with the benefits of these balls, which influenced their decision to cooperate. Although some agreed based on their own experiences, others agreed only after learning through communication with others. This was, in particular, the case for middle and upper class groups who were not initially familiar with EM products. Before analysing how so many people agreed to make and use locally-made EM

balls (as illustrated in photo 6.2), this section explains the first critical entry point in which some forms of social capital, including reciprocity and moral obligation, played a role in enhancing cooperation by linking agreement to the decision to cooperate among policy network's constituent organisations and groups (before they achieved this by creating a high profile orchestrated campaign that welcomed outsiders of the network).

Photo 6.2. Collective actions to make and use effective microorganism balls

Sources: Photos taken by Sudhep Kulsri and captured from Thai free television programme channel 3

6.2.1. Reciprocity, agreement and the decision to cooperate

When an organisation or group disagrees with something they tend not to cooperate. In contrast, when the policy network's constituent organisations and groups agree, they tend to cooperate, as mentioned by the coordinator of the City Farm programme: "We pay attention while talking. When we reach an agreement with our colleagues, they would join us as partners" (Second fieldwork interview with Nardsiri Komonpan, coordinator of City Farm programme, 21/03/2012). However, this does not mean that when people agree they will always decide to cooperate. Agreement and cooperation relate to one another but they also need linkages. This study found that a reciprocal relationship between the policy network's constituent organisations and groups was one of possible linkages between agreement and the decision to cooperate as some organisations and groups had shared the benefits of making and using EM balls. For example, the agreement and active cooperation with

EM ball promotion among social enterprises illustrated their consolidation in society, which made their arguments more valid and increased their credibility as local practitioners or local think tanks that were be able to guide society in their area of expertise based on local knowledge. This image could benefit them in maintaining their connections, enhancing their reputation, and extending their future customers (including trainees). They realised that if they did not agree or take action they may not be able to gain mutual benefits.

Many farming groups that were members of the policy network could also expect to benefit from cooperating with EM ball production as they agreed that this farming method would work in coping with the flooding. They could benefit mutually from sharing local inputs (materials) which they needed to make EM balls and then took some of these back to share the benefits of the product. These farming groups expected that if each group agreed to make and use EM balls by deciding to make them themselves instead of cooperating, each group may not have had adequate inputs, such as materials and knowledge, or sufficient products. Moreover, collective activities to make and use EM balls organised in and around Bangkok became interactive spaces for many organisations and groups where a sense of friendship developed. They could expect to gain reciprocated benefits from sharing their experiences and concerns, expressing their feelings and learning while joining such collective activities.

6.2.2. Moral obligation, agreement and the decision to cooperate

Moral obligation could also be seen as a link between agreeing and the decision to cooperate. Many members of organisations and groups across different social classes could not bear to stay at home knowing that many people were affected by the floods. They were compelled to do something that they believed could improve the situation. After many of the constituent organisations and groups of the policy network agreed on the benefits of EM balls, they decided to join collective activities to co-organise the making and allocation of EM balls, joined by outsiders of the network. The organiser of an EM ball making node informed that participants did not aim to make EM balls just in the quantity that they planned to take them back for themselves. They also helped to provide EM balls to severe flood victims in various places, particularly in slum communities and threw them into rivers where the water

seemed to be terribly polluted (Fieldwork interview with Potip Pechporee, owner of Health-Me Organic Delivery, 17/02/2012).

Although moral obligation is embedded in Thai culture in general and becomes a social expectation when the country faces crises, moral obligation between members of some policy communities operating within the policy network was also embedded in their mutual sympathy developed from their long history of fighting for a better life together, particularly among members of the informal labour and slum dwellers networks, as mentioned in Chapter 4 and 5. The leader of Clong Hog informal workers mentioned that the hospitality between members of the informal labour network was developed from learning about the struggles in each other's lives. They agreed to allocate jobs in relation to the 'needs' of the members. Those in need may have had trouble to meet a forthcoming deadline for paying off informal debts or needed a job to support their children in their new semester at school. This was considered before the 'readiness' of members, such as labours, skill, and time (Fieldwork interview with Koraporn Krugtongkum, leader of Clong Hog informal workers, 19/02/2012).

The role of the coordinators of the City Farm programme encouraged moral obligation among policy network's members to act as altruists, basing this belief on Buddhist principles. According to these, we are obliged to eliminate desire, including greed for material possessions and social prestige, focusing instead on kindness, giving and mutual aid. This study found, from many interviews, that Buddhism affected the way of thinking of many leaders of organisations and farming groups. Some thought that the flood was seen as a 'collective sin' that everyone faced together and for which a collective response was needed. The sin was caused by human greed, which led to the destruction of nature and in turn caused disasters. The discourse of collective sin was also appropriated by the media to stimulate the moral environmental and collaborative consciousness of the people. A city farmer who joined community supported agriculture system and ran EM ball making activities, thought that creating collective kindness by giving to others ('Bun') was a solution that would wipe out collective sin (Fieldwork interview with Sudhep Kulsri, a city farmer and a member of the Green Market Network, 4/02/2012). In that sense, making EM balls together was to create collective kindness among organisations,

groups, and individuals, who believed that these local farming techniques could help solve problems.

Moral obligation became a convincing argument for cooperation amongst City Farm programme's members during the floods because there were poor incentives for instrumental cooperation in this period as this study found from the interviews and focus groups. The Health Promotion Foundation, which provided financial support, decided not to allocate special funding for the operation of the City Farm programme during the crisis even though there were no other forms of financial support provided by other public organisations. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation was the main organiser of the programme but could not provide or promise to provide special benefits in terms of money to drive cooperation within the City Farm programme in a crisis. As a consequence, the engagement of the actors during this period was voluntary, including the making and allocation of EM balls. The opinions of a leader of a farming group and a member of a social enterprise reflect on this issue.

> "It was not money that motivated us to join them (other actors engaging in the policy network). We realise that grant support was a single subsidy. We had already received it so this was not a reason to get more" (Fieldwork interview with Peeraton Seneewong, leader of On-nut Sibsee Rai slum community, 20/02/2012).

> "My learning centre received financial support from the programme counted as the cost per head of the trainees. During the floods, I could not organise any training programmes. I helped to support the people in other ways such as creating EM balls and allocating floating gardens. I played a role as a guest trainer sometimes, invited by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and the Working Group on Food for Change. We tried to share know-how on producing emergency food to enhance self-reliance among the communities. However, organising such events needed volunteering. I spent my own money to support the events, roughly 20,000 Baht" (Fieldwork interview with Chookeit Goman, a social entrepreneur and farming trainer, Suwannabhumi training centre, 17/03/2012).

Apart from the lack of effective financial incentives, there were also no special rewards and promotions. The public organisations could not expect to gain material benefits from cooperating with the City Farm programme and their relevant actions. They were expected to work during this period as they had a moral obligation to do so. As for social enterprises, although their actions during the flooding could increase their chance to extend customers, the majority of collective events organised by the City Farm programme during this period, including the making of EM balls, advocated for the poor and marginalised people who were not their target and potential customers. Social enterprises did not need to cooperate by expecting to have the opportunity for continued City Farm programme support for the following year as training centres for the programme, because no one could predict whether there would be an extension of the programme for one more year. If the extension was possible, the chance of each social enterprise being included as a partner was high whether they cooperated during the floods or not. The reason is that there were so few training centres at that moment, which meant that the programme avoided reducing the number of existing centres. Some enterprises therefore also had a moral obligation to engage for collective purposes.

From 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, it can be concluded from the findings that both reciprocity and moral obligation played their role here as linkages between an agreement to cooperate and a decision making to take action by cooperating. So, articulating IRC and CAT perspectives on social capital help to understand the phenomena in more comprehensive way as the complex real world has enough rooms for different assumptions including the contrasting ones like the assumptions behind the causes of cooperation: reciprocity VS moral obligation. More discussion will be made in Conclusion.

6.3. Social capital, attributes of the policy network's constituent actors, emotional expression, and better arguments

The analysis of this section focuses the role of an outstanding form of social capital in supporting attributes of the policy network's constituent actors and their power by highlighting core actors *(ethos)*. The previous two chapters already discussed on this aspect by addressing how many forms of social capital participated in shaping the

status and power of core actors. This section advances that argument and continues from the previous section by deepening the discussion through the specific case (EM ball promotion). The analysis also emphasises how a clear form of social capital supports emotional expression of those actors *(pathos)* including a facilitation of a comfortable feeling to talk. As shown in figure 6.3, a chain of the analysis of this section moves from the role of social capital in supporting *ethos* and *pathos* of core policy actors to the influence of their *ethos* and *pathos* in making a better argument than other actors' arguments (to archive in convincing other members) to enhance cooperation through the communicative process, which in turn leads to an agreement on a reason to cooperate discussed in the previous section.

Figure 6.3 Focus of the analysis of section 6.3

6.3.1. Trust, attributes of the policy network's constituent actors and better arguments

EM balls were proposed by city farming trainers engaged in the city farm association. They were also supported by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, the Working Group on Food for Change, the Green Market Network, the slum dwellers and informal labour networks and they were recognised as local practitioners. These actors can be called cooperative facilitators as they played a key role in enhancing cooperation for mobilising collective actions regarding the EM ball

promotion. They were the members of the same policy epistemic (knowledge partnership) that operated within the policy network. This policy epistemic was challenged by scientists from public universities, with support from the Health Promotion Foundation and some District Administration Offices. They can be defined as another policy epistemic. The Health Promotion Foundation and the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, which were the most powerful organisations of the policy network, maintained different opinions concerning the promotion of locally-made EM balls. On the one hand, the Health Promotion Foundation, which was made up of scientists with a background in nutrition, medical science and public health promotion, supported scientific arguments that challenged the benefits of EM balls. On the other hand, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation put itself forward as a local practitioner supporting EM balls. This organisation had worked on promoting sustainable agriculture by emphasising rural areas since 1998. The considered using locally-made EM products to improve soil quality and water treatment are one of many possible sustainable farming methods. Although the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation just backed up city farming trainers to promote EM balls during the flooding, it promoted this technique for more than a decade. This traditional technique was included in at least four books published by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation to promote local agricultural knowledge, including 'Recovering Local Wisdom to Combat the World Crisis' (Prapun, 2001), '26 Lesson Learned from Sustainable Agriculture' (Hutanuwat, 2004), 'Exploring Values of Local Vegetables' (Odompanich, 2007), and 'Traditional Ways of Rice Growing: Experiences from the Northeast and the South' (Pattanapanchai, 2009). The interviews with Sustainable Agriculture Foundation staff showed that the organisation believed that sustainable agriculture is rooted in traditional ways of farming that existed before mass, intensive and modernised mono-crop farming, which took over as a consequence of the Green Revolution. The logic of 'returning to the old days' by preserving traditional knowledge was part of the mind-set of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation.

The speakers' attributes affected their ability to convince and persuade others, which in turn supported cooperation enhancement. For example, representatives of public organisations believed in other representatives of public organisations rather than in representatives of non-governmental organisations, and this was the same when the

actors were swapped. Moreover, the actors believed and conformed to the opinions of older rather than younger speakers. Many men conformed to the opinions of women while many women conformed to those of men. Though it might sound peculiar, attractive singers, drama actors/actresses, and other teenage idols were invited to persuade people to join. Overall, this technique was successful and it contributed to enhancing cooperation.

More specifically in the case of promoting EM balls, the debates on the benefits of EM balls between different policy epistemics show that the attributes of the speakers affected whether their logic was convincing. In the context of Thailand, the image of the scientist that of an intellectual scholar who works either in the lab or in the library and produces knowledge that is irrelevant to the practical world, while the practitioner is a person who has experience and understands the real world better. These images were constructed throughout a long history based on the Buddhist principle that advocates respect for practitioners. Most Thai people would support the opinions of monks rather than university scholars, as their opinion is expected to come from what they practised rather than what they read. The story of Buddha himself affects the way Thai people think as he was a practitioner who realised the truth by practising self-actualisation (Sivaraksa, 2011, pp.11-3). Thai people are generally familiar with his story and his character has been socially constructed as the stereotype of the 'real' expert. Linked to this case, the interviews with the leaders of farming groups found that they 'distrusted' scientists and their knowledge during the crisis, while they 'trusted' local practitioners and their knowledge more, particularly the director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, the leader of the Working Group on Food for Change and city farming trainers.

'Trust' in these local practitioners also derived from their significant role in organising the main events dealing with urban food shortages during the flooding, as mentioned in Chapter 1. Their role was apparent on the frontline, while many organisations and groups that challenged EM balls played a role in backing up local practitioners active in allocating food and promoting self-grown emergency food. The characteristic qualities of the promoters of EM ball also affected the use of this farming technique as agreed by many organisations, groups, and individuals, both included in and excluded from the policy network.

The claims about the benefits of EM balls might not be correct, but many members of the City Farm programme decided to cooperate with making and using EM balls as a consequence of their belief in the qualities of local practitioners rather than the academic opinion of scientists, as raised in short interviews with some members:

> "They (local practitioners advocating EM balls) have worked on this (an EM ball) for a long time. I think they know about it and most importantly, they tried to do something to make the situation better. I joined them because I also wanted to make things better and I trust their way of improving the situation in the city" (Short interview with a coordinator of 'City Farms, City Friends' online group, 11/12/2011).

> "What did scientists try to do? I don't know their aim. People did it (making and using EM balls) and were happy with it. They blamed people in the way that we increased waste and had done a stupid thing" (Short interview with a committee of Rungchareun community, 11/12/2011).

Furthermore, the clear position of the director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and the leader of the Working Group on Food for Change in supporting the making and use of EM balls also affected the decision of other organisations and groups to support this method. The reason is that these two people were respected by leaders of other organisations and groups, particularly those in the non-public sectors. Normally, these organisation and group leaders tended to agree with the two leaders, regardless of what they proposed. According to a city farm trainer, the two leaders (and the director of the Media Centre for Development) were recognised as 'elders of the field' and became 'idols' for many other people (Chatting with Nakorn Limpacuptathavon, city farm trainer and a social entrepreneur, 13/03/2012).

6.3.2. Shared norms, emotional expression and better arguments

The importance of emotional expressions contributed to raising an idea to be heard and to create shared feelings. Emotional expression can have more influence than reasons in many cases in the context of Thai society. The emotionally sensitive image of Thai people has partly developed from media culture. It was found that Thai dramas and social news selection by the media made society more dramatic,

where people express their strong, shared feelings easily, as part of a sensitive story. The local practitioners were outstanding in expressing their emotions to persuade lay people to agree and join them. They also built strong shared feelings among many people who wanted to go out and do something for others by joining the collective making of EM balls. In building such feelings to mobilise cooperation, the policy epistemic led by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and city farming trainers constructed and communicated on a worst-case scenario from which they deducted the necessity of consolidation. The discourses of food insecurity, the right to food and climate change mitigation activated the communicative power to build these shared feelings.

Although the promotion of EM balls for soil quality improvement to produce short-term vegetables and waste water treatment could not contribute to food security, the right to food and climate change mitigation, this policy epistemic tried to link them to make people feel that EM balls were really important. This study analyses that 'to judge that the enhancement of food security, the right to food and climate change mitigation is essential for Thai society' become a 'norm' shared among policy network's constituent organisations and groups. To link to this norm through communicative strategies can emotionally stimulate the awareness of many organisations and groups on how bad the situation was. The link between EM ball promotion and food security firstly addressed the worst-case scenario of food insecurity (*Khad-Kham-Mon-Kung-Tang-Aharn*) to scale up the way in which food shortages were understood as a risk for the entire society, and all members were responsible to deal with it together. Food shortages during the disaster were often raised as a problem for the whole of society not just the victims.

The Thai proverb which was often referred to is that "the values of money and gold are constructed, while food is real". The problem of food shortages was described as the tragedy of the commons. The following statement on the City Farm programme Facebook page on 27 November 2011 and again on 13 January 2012 supports this claim: "Come out of your home and office! We all are threatened by food insecurity". The picture of the flood destroying a large paddy field was used to supplement the statement. It became known later that this statement and the picture were posted by the coordinator of the City Farm programme. She aimed to mobilise

massive support for multi-actions about the food agenda during the crisis. The statement tried to scale up the food problems so that they were not merely viewed as the problem of the flood victims by referring to the notion of food (in)security. There were a total 1,247 'likes' and 14 shares of the post observed on 14 January 2012. The logic behind this notion is that although their houses and offices did not flood, they could not just stay at home and watch TV. They had to decide to go out and help others who were faced with the terrible floods because if they ignored it food insecurity would also threaten them in the end. To help others could also be a way for them to protect themselves and to provide EM balls would be the obvious choice.

The right to food (*Sitthi-Tang-Aharn*) was used to stimulate the emotional sensitiveness of the people by building a feeling that they should not bear to see hungry people who should have the right to access food. The sense of this notion might not exactly be the same as in the Western context. As this notion is closely related to the notion of food sovereignty, which Thai people were not very familiar with and few city dwellers fought for land reform or democratic control of food. Using this notion during the Bangkok flooding referred to the right of the vulnerable to access food. It was also used to build the sense that some people had been excluded and suffered from the unjust government priorities and food aid systems, including children, the elderly, the disabled, patients, slum dwellers and peri-urban farmers. As EM balls were promoted to be provided for the vulnerable groups, this promotion came along with the right to food campaign, which aimed to handle the unjust regimes and systems by awakening people's concerns through the reconstruction of the terrible stories of sufferers. As the director of the Working Group on Food for Change put it in an interview with a newspaper:

> Many vulnerable groups were neglected by the mainstream aid system. They should have the right to food. We should do something to take care of them especially rather than put our hope in the existing generalised food allocation. ... There are many things we could do to fill the gap. To raise their voices to be heard by the government is one choice and to support them by ourselves as much as we can is another one. Of course, we'll do both and hope any of you'll do the same (Kingkorn Narintarakul Na

Ayuthaya, leader of the Working Group on Food for Change, Interview in *Matichon* newspaper, 'Where is food?', 16/12/2011, p.6).

Apart from food security and the right to food, the policy epistemic led by the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and city farming trainers also linked EM ball promotion to climate change mitigation for emotional purposes. The notion of climate change (*Kan-Pleaun-Plang-Tang-Phumi-Akard*) was usually referred to strategically. The notion of climate change was mentioned by 158 out of 161 interviewees although this does not mean that the three people were not concerned about it.[1] Climate change mitigation and adaptation became a shared concern of many actors engaging in the UA policy network. Many actions were supported if they could be linked to this notion. Most of the actors recognised the importance of climate change but few had the clear aim to push UA development to achieve climate change adaptation in practice as they realised that it would be hard. As a result, this notion is a discourse which sounded good but was avoided in practice. Connected to the case of EM ball promotion, the notion of climate change mitigation was used to make people understand how significant the problems were and how important EM balls could be. Nevertheless, it can in fact be challenged that flood victims needed food provided from the outside rather than waiting for food that they could grow themselves.

Many organisations, groups and individuals, whether they were included in the policy network or not, agreed with the contribution of EM balls because of its connection to other significant aims as argued by the policy epistemic led by city farming trainers. The making and provision of EM balls became collective events organised in the name of the City Farm programme. Then these events were scaled up from local policy interventions to the national policy level as national policy makers supported the EM balls. Although national policy makers were not sure that EM balls would deliver an effective outcome they realised that this method could deliver a beautiful process as it could create feelings of unity and solidarity. So, such

---

[1] Regarding 'resilience', Thai people were not familiar with this notion specifically. It could be noticed that they understood 'climate change mitigation and adaptation' and use its Thai term (*Prub-Teuw-To-Kan-Pleaun-Plang-Tang-Phumi-Akard*) in covering many other notions, including 'resilience'. By using Thai term, people mean to try to live as a part of the nature. When the nature changes, therefore, they also need to change to still be a part of it.

emotional feelings could also support an argument for promoting EM balls to be the better argument that could bring about the preferable course of action.

On the other hand, the language of science and the scientific styles of the anti-EM ball groups did not contribute to the agreement of the organisations, groups and individuals involved in the collective events. By ignoring the importance of emotional expression in convincing people, the scientists working for public universities, supported by the Health Promotion Foundation and some District Administration Offices, presented their arguments in an academic way and used a lot of technical terms. For example, the professor of environmental engineering from the most famous university of Thailand explained how 'Lactic Acid' made by 'Aerobic' and 'Anaerobic' bacteria in EM product work. He referred to 'Cellulase', 'Trichoderma', 'Penicillium spp.', 'BOD', 'pH', 'Eutropidication' etc. Aside from that, they did not try to mobilise social support. While local practitioners, particularly the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation staffs and city farm trainers gained significant social support as they organised a participatory process by mobilising a variety of collective actions, these scientists were mainly concerned about presenting solid results derived from valid methods or reliable sources. Overlooking the significance of emotion, scientists said a lot of sensitive things which created negative feelings. For example, a scientist said that "you (EM balls supporters) are not only not solving the problem, you also damage this city", and "we need to drive our society by knowledge not by belief" (An opinion given by the environmental engineering, professor of Chulalongkorn University, panel discussion at Malinon Building, 7/11/11). These sentences made EM ball supporters angry as they thought they were blamed for doing a stupid thing. A local practitioner responded that: "they not only do not help to row the boat, but they also lay their feet to the lake to make the rowing more difficult" (An opinion given by C. G., the city farm trainer, panel discussion at the Nation, 8/11/11). There was a war of words among the different policy epistemics operating within the policy network before spreading out during the first three weeks of the flooding.

To convince and persuade others to cooperate also resulted from expressing strong aims through intensive and serious discussion by some city farming trainers. They tried hard to argue why people should agree with them. The interviews show that

some organisations and groups agreed with promoting EM balls although they did not totally believe that this farming technique could work. They decided to cooperate with the collective activities organised for EM balls as they understood the strong intentions of the city farming trainers, whom they respected and they did not want to break their hearts.

6.4. Shared knowledge and norms, rationalities, and practical reasons

Moving from ethos and pathos, this section discusses the logos: logic, reason or rationality in wider sense. As shown in figure 6.4, the analysis focuses the role of outstanding forms of social capital in affecting rationalities of core actors that are addressed through communicative process for proposing practical reasons to back up why other actors should cooperate. The practical reasons discussed in this section and better arguments mentioned in the previous section are analysed that they support one another in building agreements. Frank Fischer's logic of policy deliberation explained in section 2.4 is employed to frame an analysis here. Different focuses of IRC and CAT on rationality are also articulated and recognised in this section.

Figure 6.4 Focus of the analysis of section 6.4

To illustrate through the case of EM balls, this case brings about a surprising conclusion because in the promotion of EM balls local knowledge was legitimised over the expert knowledge which challenged the EM balls. The different reasons

provided by the policy epistemics which combined powerful actors of the policy network, the centralities of policy communities and general members were considered in light of their logic of deliberation at four different levels as proposed by Fischer shown in figure 6.4.

6.4.1. Knowledge, rationalities and claim making through empirical evidence and relevance to the context

The policy epistemic led by university scholars and supported by the Health Promotion Foundation succeeded in verifying their argument by providing strong generalised scientific evidence with reference to international experiences and research (the first level of Fischer's logic of policy deliberation). For example, Japan's experience during the flooding following the tsunami disaster in March 2011 was referred to. Whereas the Japanese used EM balls in a normal situation, the Japanese government did not use EM balls to deal with wastewater and the food crisis (An opinion given by the environmental engineering, professor of Chulalongkorn University, panel discussion at Malinon Building, 7/11/11). Experimental results published in many credible international journals were also cited. The scientists presented relevant findings of laboratory studies to argue that it takes time for EM balls to improve soil and these farming techniques can instead increase waste. Another policy epistemic led by local practitioners (particularly the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and city farming trainers) proposed EM balls because they believed that the balls should work as they had experienced their success before. They normally use EM products to grow food on their farm and for water treatment in their house. Therefore, they just assumed without empirical evidence that they should work in a flood context.

However, the policy epistemic led by the scientists failed to place their argument in the relevant context (the second level of Fischer's logic of policy deliberation) while the local policy epistemic could do so. The local practitioners could show that many laypeople themselves had experience with locally-made EM balls. They critiqued the scientific evidence by arguing that this evidence derived from other contexts which might not be relevant in this context: "this is Thailand, not Japan". The evidence provided mainly referred to the feelings of the users, which were subjective. The historical analysis helps us understand that Thai people in general tended to feel that

the EM product was always good. The discourse about the usefulness of locally-made EM balls in the context of Thai society has been produced and reproduced throughout the country's agricultural history until it became embedded in the belief system as valuable local knowledge. Many people, particularly in rural areas, usually practise it at a household scale without asking questions. Proposing that the EM ball was useful convinced others because it was based on their previous direct experiences or even their common sense, which does not have to be proven scientifically. As a flood victim mentioned:

> We know it works. We can see many clear changes. We could grow basil. The water is cleaner. Scholars (scientists) should come and see what we do rather than to say something they've really never done (Fieldwork interview with Neeramon Suttiponnapong, community leader, Keha-Tung Songhong working at home community, 12/02/12).

Apart from the failure to situate the argument in the context, scientific knowledge was categorised as Western knowledge, which faced a legitimacy crisis during the disaster because this knowledge was blamed as a cause or for its failure to deal with the crisis. For example, people blamed experts for failing to predict and control the flood. In the case of agriculture, many people blamed Western knowledge for shaping the priority regime which meant that commercial and industrial areas were protected first while farming areas turned into floodways, which contributed to severe food shortages. The distrust of Western knowledge partly brought about a distrust of scientific arguments such as the challenges against the EM balls. Consequently, the crisis of experts and their technical rationality opened a window of opportunity for local knowledge and its cultural rationality.

A legitimacy crisis of Western knowledge often takes place during a context of wider crisis. Common to many previous crises is the loss of the credibility of modern knowledge. The reason is that Bangkok has been modernised through a dependency on Western knowledge. The city has also been shaped and controlled by a highly educated governor together with hegemonic technocrats, so external and modern knowledge was blamed when the city mechanisms failed to function. At the same time, history could show that the local knowledge preference discourse had become a shared life-world of the people when they faced a crisis. The discourse involves

memories of the old days and the recovery of traditional wisdom embedded in Thai agricultural culture, which also sheds light on the debate about EM balls.

6.4.2. Shared norms and their entry points in deliberative process of claim making

Shared forms of knowledge as forms of social capital played a crucial role in providing reasons during the deliberative process. The knowledge shared among members of each policy epistemic shaped their logic and helped to design their arguments, particularly at the first two levels of Fischer's logic of deliberation. An explanation for this is that these two levels of logic are based on an empirical and contextual analysis of claim making, which are legitimised by knowledge claims. Moving on to the third level, shared norms were also important in justifying practical reasons. The policy epistemic led by university scholars supported by the Health Promotion Foundation failed when they claimed the instrumental implications of their argument for the social system as a whole (the third level of Fischer's logic of policy deliberation) while the local practitioners' policy epistemic succeeded in doing so. The promotion of locally-made EM balls among local people to enhance their climate change adaptive capacity works well with the shared norm of self-reliance among many of the policy network's constituent actors. This norm turned the reason to promote EM balls into a practical reason, which fitted with the King's idea about sustainable development as included in the existing Thai political and social systems. The norm of self-reliance has been promoted strongly since the previous economic crisis of 1997 and has been included in many development policies and plans. To enhance people's self-reliance has become a policy and planning norm, including in the City Farm programme. Besides, the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation as a powerful organisation within the policy network which supported EM balls had focused on promoting self-reliance for many years. The Sustainable Agriculture Foundation published two relevant books about this topic, namely 'Self-reliance in Practice' (Rotjanapriwong, 2008) and 'Recovering Our Land: a Revolution of Community, Agriculture and the Self-sufficiency Economy' (Working Group on Recovering Our Land, 2007).

Other than a failure to link the argument to an existing functional system, the scientists' policy epistemic had two main flaws. Firstly, one of them said that to use

chemical fertiliser allows people to grow emergency food by themselves. This point was reasonable in the sense that organic methods could be ignored when large quantities of food were needed as a trade-off between the quantity and quality of food. However, to promote chemical use was what the Thai public sector usually implicitly did but never explicitly. To propose chemical use explicitly was also unacceptable and created negative feelings among the members of the City Farm programme. The second mistake was to argue that a lack of food could be fixed by reshaping the food distribution system and the existing food chains rather than to attempting to depend on growing one's own food. Although this might be true, many of the policy network's actors disagreed with what they thought the scientists argued, which was that food self-reliance was insufficient and that practice of self-reliance strategies were insignificant. A survey conducted by the Division of Public Cleansing and Public Park, Laksi District Administration Office (2012) shows that 70% of households in the housing areas within Laksi district had a backyard vegetable garden. Although the volume of food production in the inner city and the number of city dwellers involved and benefiting from it was not clear, the practice had spread quickly for over a decade. Farming group members of the City Farm programme had themselves experienced the capacity of food grown in the city to enhance city dwellers' livelihoods. All interviewees pointed out that they found that city farming had improved their life in many ways. When asked about the volume of production, many of them said that the products determined their consumption behaviour. Someone said that when thinking what to eat that day, she walked into the garden. When basil was growing, she cooked fried chicken with basil. Sometimes if she had a lot of products, she ate and shared more. When there was little, her family ate and shared less. When there was nothing, she waited to share with the neighbours (she ended her talk by laughing). This can explain why many organisations and groups both inside and outside the UA policy network disagreed with the comment that food self-reliance is impossible.

According to the fourth level of Fischer's logic of policy deliberation, the analysis focuses on the relevance of the argument to the ideological principles that justify the societal system. This study found that the policy epistemic led by scientists also failed to link their argument to the ideological principles that justify the societal system. To promote local knowledge is also to promote a sense of Thai-ness (the

Thai way of life). The discourse of Thai-ness is an interactive discourse, which frames the way people propose 'sounds good' statements when they make a claim. Such discourses did not really exist but shaped the socio-cultural structure at the time (it might even have taken place in the past). It is hard for anyone to disagree with this discourse even if they might think it does not make sense. For example, to use locally-made EM balls to solve problems during a period of crisis was to confirm that ancestor knowledge as part of the Thai heritage could still work and be the pride of the country, which helped Thai people escape from the crisis. To mobilise massive numbers of people to make and allocate EM balls collaboratively could contribute to the image of the beautiful mind of the Thai people who were pleased to help other people as they could not bear to see them facing difficult times.

Photo 6.3. EM balls and their contribution to the 'good society'?

Source: Photo use authorised by Sudhep Kulsri

To join the making and allocation of EM balls also reflects a strong sense of unity, kindness, power of the people, and solidarity within Thai society. There are many Thai traditional proverbs that recall these meanings. For example, "Thai people should have a helping mind *('Jit A-Sa')*"; "Happiness derives from giving"; "If we don't help each other, no one will help us"; and "Thai people are kindness and sacrifice". These proverbs were used to imply that you must be that way if you want to be Thai. These senses represent a 'good society' which Thai people in general dream of (see photo 6.3). Such dreams are influenced by spiritual considerations of the Buddhist scenario of the good society in which people develop moral obligation by reducing selfish desires and helping one another. They are also supported by

reciprocal relations and the norm of promoting social cohesion shared among many of the policy network's constituent organisations and groups.

Conclusions

This study found that enhancement of cooperation is a consequence of an agreement based on a better argument and more practical basis proposed by the core actors that lead the policy epistemic (as cooperative facilitators). Although the members of the UA policy network agreed with the reasons for cooperation, this did not mean that everyone decided to cooperate. Moral obligation and reciprocity as forms of social capital became linkages between the agreement and the decision to cooperate. For example, after the policy network's members agreed with the prospect of using EM balls to improve soil quality to grow short-term vegetables and to reduce water pollution, those who decided to cooperate were the ones who felt morally obliged and had a reciprocal relationship with others.

This chapter illustrates the 'unforced force' of the better argument argued by Habermas (1996, p.305) that comes about as the result of a communicative process. When communication took place, the status and power of the cooperative facilitators, their achievement in proposing practical reasons and emotional expression, affected their ability to persuade and convince others to reach agreement. Social capital including trust and shared norms were found supporting the aforementioned status, power and emotional expression of those cooperative facilitators. To understand the logic, each actor's reasons were challenged by empirical evidence, its relevance to the context, its relationship to social norms, and its contribution to a sense of the 'good' society. IRC's instrumental rationality could help to explain the first two levels but was limited in its explanation of the other two levels because instrumental rationality is not sensitive enough to understand existing social norms and socio-ideological expectations of the good society. CAT's communicative rationality opens the door to other types of rationality which are more sensitive to explanations of how reasons fit into norms and contribute to a sense of the good society.

Shared forms of knowledge as a form of social capital also affect the logic of deliberation. Shared expert knowledge, particularly the scientific explanations, affect

the way reasons are provided at various stages of claiming evidence and contextual relevance. Shared local knowledge fitted well with social norms and ideologies as it was more sensitive to the socio-cultural context. Shared norms of the majority of the policy network acted as another form of social capital and also affected reasons as they departed from the norms of society as a whole, and could promote a sense of the 'good society'.

Moving on from cooperation enhancement, the next chapter turns to an analysis of conflict resolution by arguing that conflicts might also emerge under cooperation, and the role of social capital at the different entry points of the deliberative process is also significant in handling conflicts, particularly in supporting the role of mediators. The stories provided in the next chapter will be another arena to understand the role of social capital in governing the UA policy network.

Chapter 7

The role of social capital in dealing with
conflicts in times of crisis

Introduction

Whilst good cooperation among the policy network's constituent organisations and groups was clearly present during flooding, many conflicts were also visible during the period. As mentioned in 2.4, to adopt institutional rational choice (IRC) and communicative action theory (CAT) perspectives on conflicts help to frame an analysis of this study. On the one hand, IRC focuses interest-based conflicts. On the other hand, CAT seeks to understand conflicts beyond self-interest accounts, which may arise from having different ideas (perceptional conflicts). Apart from that, these two theories also help to frame different approaches in handling conflicts. IRC focuses more on making agreements by creating shared rule(s) (seeking for 'instrument' to regulate conflicts), while CAT recognises agreement in the form of the deal based consensus. CAT also analyses the development of mutual understanding as the way to cope with conflicts. So, IRC and CAT focus on different points in understanding conflicts, and to articulate them helps to frame conflicts and the way to handle them in a wider sense – to understand conflicts by analysing both self-interest accounts and beyond, and to analyse conflict resolution by understanding both the making of agreements and the development of mutual understanding.

The shared view of both theories is that they mention the importance of communication in handling conflicts, and this shared view becomes the starting point for this study to highlight communicative process in coping with conflicts. In relation to the facilitation of effective communication, the two theories also mention the role of mediators, who take part in 'bridging' social capital with many conflicting stakeholders. In more specific terms, they are representatives of reputable and trusted organisations or groups that can make many others feel comfortable to express their views, and they might share rules, norms or knowledge with those conflicting stakeholders.

Departing from the above IRC and CAT perspectives on conflicts, this chapter examines how conflicts during the flooding were handled through the building of agreements and mutual understanding, and the role of different forms of social capital in supporting the effective role of mediators in handling conflicts by facilitating communicative process, where agreement and mutual understanding could be made. As shown in figure 7.1, the main argument of this chapter is that social capital supports the role of core actors (as mediators) in making agreement and developing mutual understanding for handling conflicts through communicative process. Regarding analytical framework, this chapter also analyses communicative fora by adopting rhetorical analysis (by analysing ethos, logos, and pathos) as the same as the previous chapter to investigate the communicative quality of mediator(s) and the effect of social capital held by her/them in supporting such quality.

Figure 7.1 Main argument and analytical framework of Chapter 7

In addressing all of the above, this chapter begins by discussing conflicts during and shortly after the flooding. This first section starts by addressing persisting conflicts with surround of the policy network on urban agriculture (UA). Such conflicts become part of the nature of the policy network and remain prevalent in the network

structure. Moving on, the section addresses the conflicts that could be handled during and shortly after flooding, which were about different concerns in relation to organic food production including the promotion of chemical use in the first stage of food growing before avoiding it in the further stages, and a support of hydroponics. The analysis considers that each conflict was possibly based upon distribution of benefits and clashes between different opinions.

The rest of the chapter discusses the different forms of social capital of the mediator and their roles in facilitating the resolution of conflicts through building agreements and mutual understanding. Section 7.2 analyses how the mediator becomes acceptable to conflicting stakeholders by considering the role of reputation and trust given by the stakeholders in supporting the mediator's credibility (ethos). Section 7.3 discusses how the mediator can raise 'loud' voices (to be paid attention by conflicting stakeholders) by considering the role of shared rules, norms and knowledge with those stakeholders in supporting the mediator's reason and emotional expression (logos and pathos). The last section, then, analyses the complementary function of the mediator and core conflicting stakeholders in building agreement and mutual understanding through communication. The organic farming practices during and shortly after the flood will be analysed as the case study.

7.1. Conflicts during and shortly after the flooding

Many conflicts among the policy network's constituent organisations and groups were apparent during and shortly after flooding in Bangkok. Some conflicts persist with the existence of the policy network. As mentioned in the introduction, these conflicts are embedded in the network structure and can be seen as part of the nature of the policy network. Conflicts initially arose from different expectations. For example, state and non-state actors had different expectations because the former demanded quantitative performance while the latter focused on qualitative indicators. The former, including the Health Promotion Foundation (HPF) and District Administration Offices (DAOs), also focused on urban dwellers in general without any scope for specific target groups. The HPF and DAOs were strict about paperwork and provided subsidies annually following the beginning and the end of

the fiscal year. If not all of the money was spent before the end of the fiscal year, they claimed the rest back. The latter groups, including the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation (SAF), the Working Group on Food for Change, the Media Centre for Development, the City Farm Association, the Green Market Network, slum dwellers and informal labour networks, preferred to push quality aspects of development - such as strengthening the support to the urban poor and the marginalised rather than to create solutions with quantitative outputs which determined programme success. They also demanded a reduction of paperwork, longer-term support and to reserve some money for more sustainable support after the end of the fiscal year, such as the implementation of a rotating savings fund to develop low interest loans specifically for inner city farming.

Other conflicts were based on different expectations between the HPF as the funder and several non-state actors as grant recipients. For example, the HPF provided funding to social enterprises to organise training programmes by counting the cost per head in comparison to other existing training programmes. The HPF expected free training based on the funding and standardisation of the programmes. The training centres expected to receive funding at a proper rate to develop a sustainable social enterprise. The social enterprises preferred to collect a training fee and demanded the freedom to set and run their training programme themselves. Such conflicts based on expectations are summarised in figure 7.2.

Figure 7.2. Different expectations about the role of others

Conflicts on different expectations can be called 'fruitful conflicts' as mentioned by Wagenaar (2014, pp.232-6), because they can be made productive by raising awareness of interdependencies among different actors. Although different coalitions expected differently from each other and were not satisfied with the responses of their expectations, they still kept relationships as they reminded themselves during being frustrated that they needed to work together to achieve their goals. This study also analyses that conflicts on different expectations are based on both policy actors defending their self-interest and beyond. On the one hand, expectation of conflicting stakeholders derived from expected benefits each one could gain. For example, the HPF aimed to show quantitative (concrete) performance to the central government to be recognised as the successful public organisation, which would impact whether or not they receive fiscal allocation by the central government in the future. Social enterprises expected a benefit from public grants provided to support their training courses and a chance to extend their customers. In the similar way, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and farming groups expected to gain a long-term funding support from the government through the HPF. On the other hand,

these conflicts were also based upon different perceptions and developmental approaches that are beyond interest-based accounts. For example, the SAF and other NGOs expected to strengthen support to the poor and marginalised to respond to their ideology. In contrast, the HPF concerned of the equal chance of every group living in the city to get the support.

Secondly, another conflict was about contrasting knowledge, i.e. the conflict between scientific and local knowledge. Debates on the benefits of effective microorganism (EM) balls adapted from local farming knowledge to improve soil quality lead to debates on growing short-term vegetables and reducing wastewater. These debates did not only enhance cooperation; at times they brought about conflicts between some policy actors, particularly between farming trainers supported by the SAF and scientists backed up by the HPF. Scientists challenged the use of EM balls to improve soil quality, claiming that they did not necessarily reduce waste but may increase it, as discussed in the previous chapter. This conflict was based on interest accounts and beyond. On the one hand, EM ball supporters, particularly the training centres, benefited from promoting this local knowledge as they included the making and using of EM products in their training courses. Promoting EM balls can therefore be seen as a strategy to seek for future customers and keep a reputation as the trainers in many training centres. On the other hand, the conflict can be interpreted as a result of different beliefs developed from various experiences between scientists and local practitioners (as discussed in the previous chapter). Although the conflict on EM ball promotion took place in the specific time and faded away later (after flooding), this conflict based on contrasting knowledge illustrates that conflicting knowledge between the policy network's constituent organisations and groups is in the nature of the policy network as there is not a hegemonic knowledge that can always drive the network.

The last conflict embedded in network structure (as a part of its nature) is the engagement with the national political conflict of the policy network's constituent organisations and groups. Since the UA policy network was launched until the time of writing, Thailand still experienced extreme political polarisation. The conflict developed from the fact that many of the policy network's constituent organisations and groups took part in different national political camps; 'yellow' versus 'red'

shirts.[1] This conflict spread from national politics to every unit in Thai society, departing from regions to local communities, from organisations to groups of friends, and from schools to families. The widening of the conflict also affected the UA policy network in Bangkok. Many actors engaged in political movements organised by representatives of the shirt colour that they stood for. According to voting patterns for different parties in Bangkok's political geography in recent years, the number of people who were opposed to the central government (yellow camp) was higher than the number of supporters (red camp). More specifically, 44.37% of Bangkok dwellers supported the opposition to the central government election in 2011 while 40.72% supported the current government. In addition, 45.41% and 46.26% supported the current Bangkok governor who was in opposition to the government, elected in 2009 and 2013 respectively, while 29.72% and 39.68% supported the candidate of the government party (Election Commission of Thailand, 2013). Similarly, the interviews and observations of political viewpoints of the actors engaged in the policy network showed that the majority did not support the national government. More specifically, most middle and upper class inhabitants of Bangkok, who later became engaged in the UA policy network as the majority, supported the yellow shirt movement. The slum dwellers network, the informal labour network, many poor communities and some critical middle class groups formed the minority supporting the red shirt movements (see photo 7.1 as an example from Chalong Krung (left) and Nuggeela (right) national housing communities).

---

[1] To provide a simple and synthetic account, the fight between the two camps was generally radical and has a long bitter history of loss and death. The conflict is about all the main political institutions, including the legitimacy of the government (executive power), parliament and the judiciary. There was also a conflict between the formal and informal power structures in the form of social movements. The clash between the old and new power elites emerged at the heart of this political conflict. The new elites represent a modernised power held by the elected neo-liberal government which is led by a rich businessman since 2001. The elected government won the election by selling populist policies and shaping financial politics. They claim their legitimacy in the name of modern democracy. After the coup d'état in 2006, they also claimed to support justice and fairness, as a result of which this neo-liberal camp later became merged with many socialist ideas. This camp is known as the red shirts. On the other hand, the old power elites claim their legitimacy by promoting morality-led politics, while they blame financial politics and a corrupt government. The old elites are led by the monarchy, the military, and the Democrat party (conservative party). This camp is known as the yellow shirts. For the details see McCargo, 2005, pp. 499–519; Montesano, 2014.

Photo 7.1. The spread of the national political conflict to the garden

Source: Photos owned by the researcher

This study argues that the possible causes of the conflict are based on both interest account and beyond. On the one hand, the slum dweller network, informal labour network and poor communities supported the red shirt government because they benefited from governmental populist policies, such as security housing for the urban poor (Baan Mun Kong), the community fund (Gong Tun Moo Baan), the local product support and the minimum wage guarantee policies (for details see Phongpaichit and Baker, 2004). The middle and higher classes in Bangkok supported the yellow politicians because they expected to gain benefits they had gained previously when this conservative camp was in power, such as the improvement of urban life. For Bangkok development, for example, the preference to support the yellow politicians was clear as the majority elected the representatives of this political camp to be the Bangkok governors since 2004 (continue for 10 years up until the time of writing this research report). The support for different political camps therefore relates to different benefits gained from them. On the other hand, the conflict also developed from different perceptions based on weighing between democracy, social justice and corruptions. The yellow shirt supporters believed that they were fighting with corruption, while the red shirt supporters believed that they were fighting with democracy and social justice (Pongsawat, 2007). The clash of these different perceptions is beyond self-interest.

This conflict between the viewpoints of different actors on politics was ongoing during and shortly after the flooding. If any policy network's constituent organisations and groups knew that other policy network's members stood for a different camp, they discarded them. The conflict within the policy network about the national political conflict was present in the way that the actors supporting the yellow shirts attempted to critique the government that was backed up by the red shirts about flooding control and food aid, while actors supporting the red shirt camp attempted to protect their government. For example, this study noticed that most policy network's constituent organisations and groups that were the yellow shirt supporters joined the panel to criticise the draft of the National Flood Management Plan organised by the Working Group on Food for Change at 'Shai-noi' in 28 February 2012.

This study found that national politics also directly affected city farm projects. At Nuggeela national housing community, the community garden had been developed led by community committees with the support of the City Farm programme since 2010 in the firebreak block (see photo 7.1 on the right). The vegetable garden was then replaced with cement by Sapan Soong DAO in June 2012. The interview of the leaders found that the reason behind the replacement is that the 'yellow shirt supporting leaders' usually organised meeting at the garden and mobilise political movements in that space, which the 'red shirt supporting DAO' decided to replace with cement. The DAO argued that this was motivated by a complaint from a neighbour who found a snake in his/her house, which it was assumed came from the garden (Fieldwork interview with Benjawan Komkid and Tanut Pumprech, leaders of Nuggeela national housing community, 24/06/12). However, the informal workers' leader at Keha-Tung Songhong as the red shirt supporters (as mentioned in 5.1.3) gained support from the red shirt supporting DAO, despite also developing a vegetable garden in the firebreak block. The DAO brought the backhoe loader to the land and helped to clear and proud the land for preparing soil to develop a garden (Fieldwork interview with Neeramon Suttiponnapong, community leader, 'Keha-Tung Songhong' working at home community, 12/02/12).

The effects of this political conflict to the policy network have never solved and become a part of the nature of the policy network (and could be said that such

conflict is embedded in the Thai society as a whole). This study analyses that the different political camps constructed an operational toleration zone in the everyday practices. They tried to live with the conflict that they could not solve. The policy network therefore was governed by not just recognising differences, but rather recognising the existence of conflicts. Wagenaar (2014, p.247) calls such kind of relations by the term 'agonistic networked governance'. What each organisation and group tried to do in order to work together was to depoliticise the issues of food, greening the city and climate change, to avoid colour politics. The director of the Media Centre for Development, for instance, gave the opinion that no matter the colour each member supported, everyone needs to eat, breathe fresh air and respond to extreme climate events. He said that when he met and worked on the food agenda, he attempted to turn it into an exemption boundary, where he could talk about it as an irrelevant issue to current political debates (Fieldwork interview with Komsun Hutapate, the director of media centre for development, 14/01/12). Although developmental approaches and criticisms of each organisation and group could still represent what side they advocated, many of them attempted to depoliticise the debate through the assumption that such 'common' concerns are politically neutral, to avoid political conflicts and facilitate a comfortable feeling about working with each other.

Apart from aforementioned conflicts embedded in network structure, which became a part of the network's nature, there was also another conflict that could be handled during and shortly after flooding, which will be highlighted in this chapter. Such conflict based on different degrees of acceptable practices, defined as organic, between organisations and groups that supported 'Growing out of Disaster' (GOD) led by the Chookeit city farming training centre (also known as 'Suwannabhumi' centre) and the Laksi DAO and that agreed with the another side called 'Hard-Core Organic' (HCO) led by the Prince city farming training centre (also known as 'Veggie Prince'), the Green Market Network, and the Working Group on Food for Change. Both sides agreed that promoting organic food growing is their mission, but the GOD proposed that during and shortly after the disaster, food productivity is more important for enhancing self-reliance. So, the GOD promoted 'soft-core' organic by being flexible with its principles, including the promotion of hydroponics and the use of chemical fertilisers for particular purposes such as in the first stage of

producing food to increase the possibility of the plants to grow and stimulate them to grow faster. The HCO could not accept such practices as organic, and this side was backed up by the HPF and the SAF, who were the City Farm programme managers. The conflict was present in the way that each side critiqued and discredited the other side. They also blamed each other in public and thus did not work together. There particularly was conflict between the Chookiet and Prince city farming centres that led the GOD and HCO coalitions. In the specific case of hydroponic farming, after the SAF director announced that she disagreed with the promotion and practices of hydroponic farming, the 'pro' hydroponics were upset and frustrated. They ignored her opinion and still keep practiced and promoted hydroponics, which made the SAF director disappointed.

In order to understand causes of the conflict, this study argues that, on the one hand, the conflict related to organic practices was based on interest account of training centres to propose their customers (trainees) the effective ways to succeed in producing food by themselves in the times of crisis. Part-time farmers and flood victims also found that they benefited from producing enough food in the short period of time during flooding (details will be provided in 7.4). On the other hand, this conflict was developed from the different understanding and acceptability on degree of food safety, which are beyond interest account.

This conflict was present during and shortly after flooding between late-2011 and early-2012, when various kinds of food innovations were promoted for city dwellers, including not-so-organic methods such as hydroponics. The conflict occurred during the debates on whether such methods should be promoted or not. The rest of the chapter will discuss how this conflict was handled. The next section focuses the role of reputation and trust as forms of social capital in supporting the mediator to be accepted by conflicting stakeholders.

7.2. To be the acceptable mediator: the role of reputation and trust given by conflicting stakeholders in supporting the mediator's ethos

The analysis of this section focuses the role of some outstanding forms of social capital in supporting ethos of the mediator as highlighted in figure 7.3. By illustrating with the case of the conflict based on different degrees of acceptable

practices defined as organic, the mediator was not the most powerful organisations: the SAF and the HPF, as they had taken side in the conflict. They gave their opinions, which supported the arguments of the HCO. The annual report of the City Farm programme (2010-2011) reports that the director of the HPF gave a speech during the orientation of the programme for its members in 2010 stating that: "one of our objectives, which should be the most important objective of city farm promotion, is to promote a better health of city dwellers. The promotion of organic food production (*Pug Plod Sarn*) should, therefore, be our first priority." This statement is not a surprise as health promotion (the organisation's name) is the main mission of the HPF. For the SAF, the director said during a field visit aimed towards providing food, materials and know-how for producing emergency food at Tung Song Hong (20 December 2011) that: "…we will not only have food to eat, but our food will be also organic (*Plod-Sarn*)." On that day, she also made a clear statement that she disagreed with using chemical fertilizers at the first stage of food growing and promoting hydroponics. These two programme managers could not be trusted by the organisations and groups that supported the GOD to mediate in seeking for the compromise of this conflict. A lack of trust of those organisations and groups can be reflected from their refusal to open their mind to talk about this conflict with these two programme managers. They ignored these two organisations' statements and kept promoting and practicing what they believed was not wrong.

Figure 7.3 Focus of the analysis of section 7.2

Instead, this study found that the Media Centre for Development (MCD) had tried to cope with this conflict and this organisation had been accepted to play a role in negotiating the conflicts between conflicting stakeholders. From my observation throughout the period of my fieldwork, the director of MCD had raised the conflicting issue to talk and had facilitated four clear panels. Firstly, the MCD director raised the need to discuss the shared rule on organic food production and promotion, which lacked details and led to different interpretations during the meeting for sharing experiences and developing food innovations for living with water at the SAF office on 24th December 2011. Secondly, during the seed exchanges and public showcases and seminar organised at Tung Song Hong on 29th January 2012, the MCD director played a role in questioning whether being 'organic' mattered for enhancing food security during disasters. The third one took place during the Working Group on Food For Change in cooperation with the 'City Farm, City Friends' online group organised monthly meeting called 'Eating and Sharing in the Garden' (*Gin-Khaw-Nai-Soun*). It allowed the collecting of lessons learned from the floods on 5 February 2012 at the Bangkok 'Bhudha' garden. The director of the MCD again raised the issue on organic and safety foods and facilitated the discussion. Finally, the most specific panel for discussing the issue of organic food practices and promotion in the crisis was organised by the MCD itself on the 16th of March 2012 and was assisted by the training centres working under the City Farm programme, including the ones that led the GOD and the HCO. Details of the panel discussions and the role of the MCD representative as a mediator will be analysed in 7.4.

As discussed about the MCD in 5.1.2, this organisation was a centrality of training centres (social enterprises). Some of its members became leaders of conflicting stakeholders (for both sides). The reputation of the MCD among conflicting stakeholders and the amount of trust given to it in relation to organic food practices and promotion were developed from the organisational experiences. This organisation published a magazine entitled 'Natural Agriculture', which was known as the important source to learn organic and safety food practices and promotion. This magazine also won the prize of the best media on the field of natural and sustainable agriculture in Thailand, also called the Green Grove Award, in 2008. For the director of the MCD was respected by the main conflicting stakeholders,

including the Chookiet and Prince city farming centres, the Laksi DAO, the members of the Green Market Network, the Working Group on Food For Change, as he was the editor of a this magazine and the elder of the field. During the informal chat, the Prince city farming trainer called the director of the MCD the 'farming philosopher'.

Unlike the SAF and the HPF, the MCD did not have any official mandate or direct power to control the resources and rules of the City Farm programme. Its reputation among farming groups that took part in the conflict and trust given by them were developed from the past actions of the MCD in organising mobile training courses for members of farming groups engaging in the City Farm programme at their place (see photo 7.2). The mobile training supported the MCD to be well-known by farming groups as it provided a chance for the MCD and farming groups to exchange and reflect on problems, limitations and demands for a further support. As the mobile training course paid attention on organic practices, the MCD could develop its reputation and trust in relation to its expertise in organic farming among farming groups. Although the SAF employed a similar method by organising a farm visit to every farming group, the SAF could not develop reputation and trust specific to its expertise in organic methods in the same as the MCD, for the SAF was open to visits but did not offer any training.

Photo 7.2. Mobile training provided by the Media Centre for Development

Source: Photo use authorised by the City Farm programme's coordinator

Furthermore, the MCD usually joined the monthly meeting called 'Eating and Sharing in the Garden', which is a main public sphere created by the Working Group on Food for Change in cooperation with the online group for discussing any current issues between members of the City farm programme. This event supported a development of relationships between participants, including the MCD. From my observation by joining the event twice, the MCD played an active role for it raised an issue during the meeting and acted as the facilitator. Later, some discussions were reported in the Natural Agriculture Magazine. The MCD staff also often shared knowledge and information to other participants, particularly in relation to sustainable agricultural methods and innovations. The leader of the Working Group on Food for Change gave her opinion to the researcher that the MCD was recognised as the 'think tank' of the City Farm programme.

The MCD also developed trust from conflicting stakeholders and other policy network's constituent organisations and groups by acting politically neutral. In order to take a depoliticised role, the MCD avoided making political criticisms to either the red or yellow shirt camps. The MCD did not even critique governmental agricultural policies that supported unsustainable agriculture, such as Green Revolution policy mentioned in Chapter 1. From the interview with the director, the organisation paid attention to promote laypeople to transform themselves regardless of whether the social, economic and political structures were. The MCD director believed that everyone can make life better without any help from the outside (included policy and politics). He also said that to depend on others would never be sustainable. Life in other people's hands is hopeless (Fieldwork interview with Komsun Hutapate, the director of the MCD, 14/01/12). In the time of the smouldered political conflict, this study argues that to act as being politically neutral as the MCD did also supported trust in this organisation to mediate the conflict between organisations and groups that also took part in the national political conflict as discussed in 7.1.

From the above analysis, reputation and trust given by conflicting stakeholders supported creditability (ethos) of this organisation. In other words, those stakeholders paid respect to the reputable and trustable organisation, and accepted it

to act as the mediator to cope with the conflict. The next section will analyse why this organisation can be paid attention while acting as the mediator.

7.3. To be paid attention: the role of shared rules, norms and knowledge in supporting the mediator's logos and pathos

Moving from an analysis of the reason that the MCD was accepted to be mediator, this section analyses the reason that it was paid attention through the analysis of its logos and pathos as highlighted in figure 7.4. In more specific, this section analyses why voices of the MCD were loud when led the discussion on organic practices and promotion aiming to handle the conflict. From at least four panels mentioned in 7.2, the conflicting stakeholders listened to the director of the MCD and wanted to respond to. The MCD later succeeded in leading the deliberation and facilitated the building of agreement and mutual understanding, which will discuss in 7.4. At the stage of gaining attention, this study analyses that reason and emotional expression of the MCD supported its role as mediator in raising a voice that was worth hearing for the conflicting stakeholders as the audiences and discussants. This study argues that by sharing rules, norms and knowledge with the conflicting stakeholders supported an address of reason and emotional expression of the MCD.

Figure 7.4 Focus of the analysis of section 7.3

To begin with, the MCD shared the rule of engagement with other members of the City Farm programme that they must promote and grow organic food. This rule was

known and agreed on by all members from the first time they decided to engage with the programme. Despite the fact that it was not clear how 'organic' was defined, which was at the source of disagreements, the rule was a basis for developing mutual understanding on where the conflict departed from and how to frame the discussion without crossing the boundary of legitimising the support for chemical farming. This rule therefore became a base of reference that was realised between the mediator and conflicting stakeholders. From my own interpretation as the observer, the director of the MCD benefited from sharing the rule by giving the sense that 'he understands what happens here' and 'he knows what each other feels and is frustrated with'.

The issue raised by the MCD director about the need to discuss this shared rule during the meeting at the SAF office on 24 December 2011 can show his understanding of the background and cause of this conflict, and that there were different degrees of acceptable practices defined as organic by which everyone claimed that they were not wrong and blamed the other side. The SAF also knew this problem, but responded to it (at Tung Song Hong on 20 December 2011) by mentioning that the rule was to produce organic food (*Aharn Plod Sarn*), and by using chemical fertilizers at the first stage of food growing and hydroponics they would be rendered not 'organic' (*Plod Sarn*). By saying so, the SAF interpreted the rule in the same way as the HCO coalition and became a part of this conflict. In contrast, the MCD director approached this problem by pointing out that the problem was that the rule was not clear and without details of how organic should be defined. The gap of the rule for discussion is what might be accepted as 'organic' in the context of Bangkok food production during and shortly after flooding.

Regarding norms that the MCD shared with the conflicting stakeholders, the first one is the norm that to propose chemical use explicitly was unacceptable and created negative feelings (as discussed in 6.4.2). Even though to talk about chemical farming was not prohibited by any rules, the City Farm programme's members could realise by themselves that even bringing it to the table would render the audiences unsatisfied. The leader of the Working Group on Food for Change mentioned that to practice chemical farming is what many people do, but they will never hear from them to say that it is good (Fieldwork interview with Kingkorn Narintarakul Na Ayuthaya, leader of the working group on food for change, 18/03/2012). Like the above shared rule, this norm framed the scope of the discussion to not cross the

boundary of what can be understood as 'non-chemical farming'. This norm gave the MCD director the confidence to propose solutions based on his knowledge and experiences of organic farming. Besides, this norm also helped to regulate each stakeholder to self-censor in proposing a clear non-organic method.

Another supportive norm can be called the 'green' norm which involves caring about the earth, a concern about food security and protection of the right to food, all culminating in the dream of creating a sustainable local food system and an aim to enhance climate change adaptive capacity. Any members of the City Farm programme can assume that the other members have decided to engage with the programme as they share these same visions (in some degrees), and that serves to build a sense of family and community. The MCD benefited from sharing green norms with the conflicting stakeholders by calling the City Farm programme's members the 'green family' (*Krob Kreau Kheauw*). The word 'family' is a powerful word in Thai culture. A sense of being the family member is that there are mutual interdependencies. This word built the feeling that as members of the house they should try to maintain reciprocal relationships with one another. So, by proposing that conflicting stakeholders were members of the green family the MCD director could demand them to try to compromise. According to the opinion of the Prince City Farming trainer, if members of the City Farm programme were the family members, the MCD director would be the elder of the house.

Moving on, sources of knowledge from the MCD supported the credibility of its voices to be worth hearing by the conflicting stakeholders. This organisation published a magazine on farming techniques collected from both innovations developed by agricultural scientists from university research units and local knowledge proposed by practitioners. As such, the MCD director was familiar with various forms of knowledge and could speak both the language of the practitioners and was informed in relation to technical terms. He also opened his mind to learn from various claims and tried to fulfil the role of knowledge linker. This study found that the MCD director could understand the point of view of each conflicting stakeholder which claimed their knowledge in paradox to one another, because the MCD shared knowledge across the different sides of the conflict. In relation to that, this study can capture four sets of bridging knowledge of the MCD which influenced

its role in the conflict resolution process through a building of agreement and mutual understanding.

Firstly, organic food and safety food are not the same. The MCD director understood that HCO supporters also understood about this, but it is also important to consider the way in which the word 'organic' is used in Thai society that the HCO supporters might not consider. In Thai, '*Plod Sarn*' can also refer to safety food. This puzzle became a cause of different interpretations of the rule as discussed in 7.2. In the view point of the director of the MCD, the majority of organisations and farming groups engaging in the City Farm programme understood that the main aim of promoting city farm initiatives in Bangkok was to promote safety food (rather than organic in its universal principles and requirements). The use of the word 'organic' by the directors of the HPF and the SAF was not clear at the beginning. This study also found that the City Farm programme's coordinator had also misused the concept in its specific context by using this term as she was talking about safety food. For example, she announced when providing know-how knowledge for producing emergency food at Tung Song Hong (on 20 December 2011) that the flood victims could produce organic short-lived vegetables to consume by themselves, even she knew that in fact the quality of water could produce merely the safety food and nothing more. Both knowledge on the principles of organic food and knowledge of the contextual implications of the word 'organic' helped the MCD director to bridge the gap that led to the conflict, which will be discussed in 7.4.

Secondly, the MCD has the knowledge about relations between chemical fertilizers and productivity, which shares with the knowledge claimed by the GOD supporters. The using of chemical fertilizers at the first stage of food growing can motivate the plants to grow up faster and in higher numbers. The contamination would be minimal, if chemical products are not used in the next stages especially for two weeks before harvesting. Such contamination can be also reduced by cleaning with clean water or vegetable cleaning products. So, by doing this, we can also have '*Pug Plod Sarn*' in the meaning of the safety food. This knowledge, in face, also shared by some HCO supporters including the SAF and the Working Group on Food for Change, but they ignored it. For example, they knew that the Pinchareaun community garden, which was the main food source providing vegetables for

community members during flooding (success in term of productivity) used chemical fertilizers at the first stage (see photo 7.3). However, this knowledge can also support the role of the MCD in linking the two sides together, which will be analysed in 7.4.

Photo 7.3. Using chemical fertilizers at the first stage and productivity at Pinchareaun community garden

Source: Photos owned by the researcher

Thirdly, the MCD shared with the HCO supporters the knowledge that hydroponics depend on Urea and distract people from the earth (soil). However, the MCD can see the possibility that hydroponics could be developed to be a viable organic farming method by replacing Urea with effective microorganism (EM), and this solution can be brought to create the agreement about the allowance to support hydroponics but under the condition that the use of EM is needed to replace the use of Urea, which will be explained more in 7.4. To support this claim, the director of the MCD illustrated the experiment of Tangclay School, which succeeded to use EM instead of Urea (see photo 7.4).

Photo 7.4. The experiment of Tangclay School in using effective microorganism instead of Urea in growing hydroponic vegetables

Source: Photos owned by the researcher

Lastly, the MCD shared knowledge with the conflicting stakeholders that 100% organic food production is impossible in non-organic environments as food will be contaminated by toxins in water, air and soils. This concern was raised by the MCD director during his discussion on 5 February 2012 in the monthly meeting known as 'Eating and Sharing in the Garden' at the Bangkok 'Bhudha' garden. By raising this knowledge, he could ask for the understanding of the HCO supporters in considering that any core actors should not be too hard on farming groups. In relation to his discussion, this study analyses that he could convince many key supporters of both sides including representatives of the SAF, the Chookeit city farming training centre, the Laksi DAO, the Prince city farming training centre, the Green Market Network and the Working Group on Food for Change. The reason for this argument is that those organisations and groups knew that a lot of farming groups grew their food without using chemical fertilizers but in non-organic environments, such as the On-nut Hoksibhok community garden located at the old landfill site, the community garden along railway lanes at Bangkok Noi (bad water quality and facing burning oil smoke), and the TPI workers garden in the cement company site (see photo 7.5)[2].

---

[2] These cases are different from the case of Bang Bour mentioned in Chapter 5 in the way that people here tried to produce organic food.

Photo 7.5. Organic food productions in non-organic environments

On-nut Hoksibhok community garden located at the old landfill site

Community garden along railway lanes at Bangkok Noi

TPI workers garden in the cement company site

Source: Photos owned by the researcher

All in all, this section analyses forms of social capital holding by the MCD and their role in facilitating the success of organising panels by bringing stakeholders to the table for deliberation and in supporting the role of the MCD director as the mediator

particularly by promoting his voices to be worth hearing. The next section will push further to understand how agreement and mutual understanding could be built through communicative process by which the reputable and trustworthy organisational leader who shared rules, norms and knowledge with conflicting stakeholders (the MCD director) played a role in mediating the deliberation process.

7.4. The mediator, communication and conflict resolution through building agreement and mutual understanding

Figure 7.5 shows the focus of this section in which the analysis comes to the end by explaining the process of conflict resolution through a building of agreements and a development of mutual understanding led by the mediator. How the MCD director mediated the forums anticipated by the conflicting stakeholders is the central of the analysis. In overview, this study found that the MCD director played two key mediator's roles in facilitating communicative forums (apart from to bring stakeholders in the table) including to stimulate and allow stakeholders to talk without interventions and to seek for the compromise solution by bridging ideas proposed by different sides and developing the recognition of the differences.

Figure 7.5 Focus of the analysis of section 7.4

267

7.4.1. The role of the mediator in stimulating and allowing stakeholders to talk

The observations of four communicative forums (see examples from photo 7.6) found that the MCD director played a role in stimulating and allowing stakeholders to talk without interventions. For example, during the lessons learned discussion on 16 March 2012, leaders of the GOD and the HCO had a chance to express what they thought and to contest their knowledge and experiences. This forum was the most intensive compared to the other three forums that I had observed. The key debates were among the Chookiet city farming trainer, the Laksi DAO's trainer, the Prince city farming trainer and the director of the SAF. To begin with, Chookiet discussed that he prioritised food self-reliance in the first instance during the disaster, but it did not mean that he ignored 'organic' food promotion (what he really means is 'safety' food). As it was the lessons learned, he claimed that the success of integrating food self-production in livelihood strategies of many poor communities during flooding is based on the mixing use of organic and chemical methods. He called that mixing as farming according to one's means (*Kaset Bab Tam Mee Tam Geud*). He said what the HCO coalition had advocated during the period is to promote flood victims to try to grow their own food by using any possible materials they had and under any limitations they faced. He gave an example that Chalong Krung community proved that they could have lived with the flood-water for more than two months depending on their self-produced food and fishing. He stated that the fact is that this community had used a combination of EM, compost, compressed chemical fertilizer tablets and polluted water. The key point is that he disclosed his interpretation of organic practices by saying that organic food production should mean to produce food by being harmonious with the nature. It should mean that when nature changes, we would adapt to it as one. Like Chalong Krung community's members, they grew food with materials they had in their hands from the natural conditions (e.g. insanitary water and soil, toxic contaminated containers).

Photo 7.6. Communicative forums that included the discussion on organic practices and promotion

Source: Photos owned by the researcher

The argument of Chookiet was supported by the Laksi DAO trainer's opinion. She mentioned, many times in many places including at this meeting, that using some chemical fertilisers was necessary when vegetables were not strong enough to grow, to encourage new growers. After vegetables were strong enough, changing to use organic fertilizers could also deliver 'organic' food at the end particularly when avoiding chemicals for few last weeks before harvesting (actually, she referred to safety food). Furthermore, she argued that using organic methods by refusing to use any chemicals might fail, especially at the first stage when plants are weak. This in turn, she argued, affected many new growers, who would stop growing food under the feeling that they could not achieve this so they might go back to buying food as usual. She thought that, shortly after flooding, to encourage people to start growing their own food was the most important goal. Then to adjust their practices to non-use of chemicals was the next step.

In response to Chookiet and the Laksi DAO trainer's talks, Prince said that organic food growing should not have any exception, but it would be an acceptable course of action to try to grow organic food in non-organic environments as at least the growers could show their organic heart (*Houjai Intree*). The unacceptable cases were to use chemical fertilizers whatever the stage of food growing. They should be proud to be organic producers and to consume self-organic products. It is hard, but they need to be strong. He continued to give his opinion that, for the trainers, everyone

should be reminded that they grow new seeds (to train new generation of food growers), which will be the new hope. Trainers should encourage new food growers to transform themselves. Nobody says it is easy to produce organic food, but they will realise its value. Before addressing his opinion in this forum, the Prince city farming trainer had mentioned the similar idea during the seed exchanges, public showcases and seminar organised at Tung Song Hong on 29 January 2012. At that time, he also illustrated the success case called Go Green project at Tarareanake Condomenium, where high income dwellers could produce organic vegetables (in every process of the production) in the rooftop of their condominium and gained enough products to consume during flooding period. Another case is the Slow Life hotel, where self-organic food growing can fulfil the supply chain that was interrupted during the flood. The hotel still opened and provided food to its customers and staff (see photo 7.7). He concluded his talk that the flood revealed the failure of the mainstream chemical based food production and consumption in Thailand as this system collapsed in the time of the crisis. In contrast, small scale organic farming could reveal its power to save groups of people, which were scattered in many corners of the city. These small groups of active city dwellers and enterprises formed themselves like a rhizome that could pop up anywhere.

Photo 7.7. Rooftop organic gardens at Tarareanake Go Green Condomenium and the Slow Life hotel that feed dwellers during flooding

Sources: Photo owned by the researcher (left) and photo use authorised by the Slow Life hotel (right)

As for the discussion on hydroponic farming, the SAF director was very active in giving her opinion during the lessons learned discussion on 16 March 2012, because she thought it was a serious problem that shortly after flooding, the number of the hydroponic supporters was higher than that of the 'contra' hydroponic coalition, and there was a wider practice of the hydroponic method. So, some training centres and farming groups did not really care about what she had said. She repeated many times that in many other cases like Genetically Modified Food (GMO), hydroponic food is not natural as the product does not grow from the soil. This point is hard to challenge, but it depends on an openness of each person to accept food innovations that create new experiences and new ways to define and understand nature. Another point raised by her many times was that the hydroponic farming involved chemical contamination (Urea).

Before discussing in this forum, the SAF director was not as aware as others of the 'pro' hydroponics arguments. Chookiet gave his opinion as to why her opposition avoided discussing this issue with her that because she was too clear about her opinions on this issue so that no one wanted to argue with her (Chookeit Goman, a social entrepreneur and farming trainer, Suwannabhumi training centre, 17/03/12). So, the MCD director took part in the struggle for this issue to be discussed face-to-face. The clear challenge was made by Chonlada Shourwong, one of trainers of hydroponic methods from Islam Wittayalai. She gave her opinion against the SAF director that if the programme aims to support city dwellers to grow their food, hydroponic farming can be one of the best choices. The hydroponic method is easy and fits with an urban lifestyle. It is a choice for some people who do not have soil and even do not want to touch it to avoid dirt. The products, of course, are safer than buying vegetables from markets. Chonlada also mentioned that, actually, it is the peoples' choice to accept its quality or not. If the programme still tries to build constraints rather than support it, how could they extend a number of city dwellers engaged in city farms?

Apart from the reason provided by Chonlada, Chookiet added that many new city dwellers wanted to learn about farming in that period. Hydroponics could avoid the effects of the flood as it was not set on the ground. This method also fits with the nature of the city, as it is hard to find good quality soil and vacant spaces, when there

are a lot of buildings. The hydroponic method might be the easiest way to grow food in the city for new growers as many enterprises sell ready-for-use hydroponic equipment that is easy for anyone to set up to produce food by themselves.

The director of the MCD did not agree with everyone and with every argument but he attempted to let them explain and express their opinion by not allowing interruptions. The director attempted to share emotions about all concerns. He challenged sometimes but as a critical friend who wanted more explanation rather than as the opposition who wanted to discredit its enemy. For example, after Chookiet gave his opinion about his interpretation of what should be defined as organic, the director of the MCD said that Chookiet raised an important point about the need to distinguish among 'organic', 'safety' (*Plod Pai*) and 'natural' (*Tum Ma shad*) food production. In saying so, he both challenged Chookiet's understanding and pushed forward a further discussion. After Prince addressed that city dwellers should be proud to be organic producers and to consume self-organic products even it is hard, the MCD director raised a short statement. He said that to be proud to be organic is essential, but how to produce enough food (food productivity) is also a critical point. Such a statement motivates us to think about a bridging of different priorities between the GOD and HCO coalitions.

7.4.2. The role of the mediator in seeking for the compromise solution

Not only stimulating and allowing conflicting stakeholders to talk without interventions, the MCD director also took part in seeking out a compromise solution by bridging ideas proposed by different sides and developing the recognition of the differences. The first clear aim observed by this study was during the monthly meeting called 'Eating and Sharing in the Garden' on 5 February 2012. The MCD director asked participants to draw or write anything down on one big piece of paper about what they expected from eating a meal (see photo 7.8). Participants could express what they thought at the same time of learning from what others thought. This tool proved to be an engine to bridge the different types thinking of different stakeholders. Someone wrote down that he/she wanted to feel safe from toxins, growth accelerators, preservatives, carcinogens and large food corporations. Another one wanted good health, to be free from chemicals and to be environmentally friendly. Some others pointed to food from the fair food chain (e.g. fair price and

without monopoly), quality food, fresh food, sustainability and even self-cooking with care. In relation to this activity, the MCD director pointed out that although it was merely an exercise (not a survey) and could not bring about any specific conclusions, these opinions reflect that there were different thoughts, expectations and interpretations of good food, and that all of these should be respected and recognised. In the same way, different practices and promotion on non-chemical farming should also be respected and recognised, whatever it really is in boundary of the organic discourse.

Photo 7.8. To draw or write anything down about expectations from eating a meal

Source: Photos owned by the researcher

The MCD director also mediated the conflict by bringing to light the shared norm of living and working together as members of the same 'green' family. He mentioned that everyone present aimed for the development of a green and sustainable city. Everyone also shared a vision to improve the food system. A sense of family was also fostered through calling each other nicknames beginning with 'sister', 'brother', 'uncle' or 'aunt' (called before name). In relation to that, the MCD director was called 'uncle' which represents his status as the elder of the family. My observation of their interactions found that this norm affected their 'pathos', making them more soft and compromising. All coordinators of the City Farm programme have also played an important role in creating this sense of the same family since the launching of the programme in 2010, nicknaming based on age profiles. This kind of calling

was not typical of the usual address in Thai society, which dictates that an address should start with 'khun', which means Mr./ Mrs./ Ms.

Having shared knowledge across conflicting stakeholders and contextual knowledge about farming groups in Bangkok supported the MCD director in his task of bridging knowledge of those stakeholders and proposing compromise solutions. He mentioned that organic food and safety food are not the same, and actually many stakeholders referred to safety rather than organic. The MCD director commented that many farming groups understood that safety food is the same as organic food. They interpreted (from the rule of engagement) that to produce safety food as much as they can is acceptable by the rule. So, members of the City farm programme should discuss and create a clearer agreed rule that could be started with the discussion among core organisations and groups participating that day.

The MCD director proposed that if chemicals would be permitted in any processes, any trainers and farming groups should make clear that they are promoting or trying to grow safety food. They must provide information or realise by themselves that chemicals are prohibited at least two weeks before harvesting and that it should not be called organic food. He gave an opinion that many poor communities focused on food self-reliance rather than healthy food. So, to expect them to grow real organic food might be too hard on them. To push them to produce a safety food should be more proper. To promote organic farming should be a choice that depends on capacity, environment and willingness. Farming groups that are willing to do so should be supported and promoted, while some groups that are not ready for it should be encouraged but not forced.

This study noticed that this idea of the MCD director as mediator could be agreeable among the conflicting stakeholders. The SAF director partly agreed, and discussed that to produce safety food rather than real organic food was satisfactory, but chemical fertilizers should not be promoted at all. She could understand and will not blame anyone that would promote and practise it, but she stated that her organisation would not do so. She said, it made sense to think that way but the SAF would continue to warn the public about the effects of chemicals. Prince agreed with the SAF director by mentioning that his training centre would not promote any

chemicals, but would understand that it is a choice for others. Chookiet tried to compromise by proposing that they could make a deal that would allow use of chemical fertilizers (mostly referred to using compressed fertilizer tablets for mixing with soil) if they were for motivating new coming part-time gardeners to grow food only at this time (shortly after the flood) to respond to massive demand on training as an effect of the flood, but trainers should stop promoting any chemical uses after this period. He said that in this period city dwellers still needed encouragement. They wanted to realise that they could produce their own food. So, at this time trainers might be expected to help them avoiding a failure at the first time. He trusted that every trainer would try to recommend using chemical products only when absolutely necessary.

This study analyses that although the SAF and the Prince city farming centre did not agree with Chookeit, they knew that his statement was right. In particular, they would know that some community gardens failed at the beginning in trying to grow real organic food, and then they gave up such as 'Kaset OK', 'Suntiwana' and 'Four Season Hotel' (see photo 7.9). These three organic vegetable gardens were initiated by new growers. They all learned how to grow food from the Prince city farming training centre and they adopted organic farming methods but did not use any chemicals. These three projects were funded by the City Farm programme. All of them later discontinued the project and gave money back to the programme. So, both the SAF and the Prince city farming training centre learned that to encourage city dwellers to grow their food, they might need to be flexible. In relation to that, it may just be the case that organic farming needs time before it will succeed, and be able to provide in any future times of crisis.

In the end, the discussion about whether using some chemical fertilisers (particularly when vegetables are not strong), should be allowed to encourage new growers was resolved by making a deal which promised that mixing use of chemicals with organics would be allowed just shortly after flooding. Trainers would also promote cleaning before eating. Besides, in the long term they would aim to enhance people understanding on the difference between 'safety' and 'organic' foods.

Photo 7.9. Discontinued organic food growing projects

Source: Photos owned by the researcher

Moving on, the MCD director also took part in handling the conflict on hydroponic farming. After letting the discussion come to the point that every side had revealed their reason that backed up their opinions, the MCD director proposed that hydroponic farming can be organic, if EM is used instead of Urea. The MCD also explained that this was possible based on the positive results of the experiment by Tangclay School. Although the SAF director did not argue that, she raised the issue that hydroponic farming distracts humans from nature. One aim of promoting food growing in the city was to link city dwellers to nature. She gave an example that the new generation living in the big city did not have many chances to touch soil and to learn how new life could be born from it.

The MCD director responded by saying that the City Farm programme should promote a variety of food production methods. Each method has some dimensions to learn. Children could not learn about soil from hydroponics, but they could learn from traditional farming. In contrast, they could learn about food innovation for the future by which traditional farming could not provide. So, instead of prohibition, the programme should give various chances for various kinds of learning. Chookeit added that it was not fair to prohibit hydroponic farming by saying that it is not natural as its instruments are made from polyvinyl chloride (PVC) and it produces food from synthetic substance instead of soil. He raised a question why floating gardens made by foam were promoted? He said, they were not so different from one another. By saying that, Chookeit referred to many floating garden projects that the

276

SAF and the City Farm programme had supported throughout the last two months (before the discussion on 16 March 2012). The Saladin floating garden (see photo 7.10), for example, was made from foam, because the community did not have any weeds. Finally, the discussion on hydroponic farming came to the conclusion that core conflicting stakeholders agreed to deal with the conflict by creating new agreed rules that if the hydroponic method was promoted by anyone, the supporters would have to promote the use of EM instead of Urea.

Photo 7.10. The Saladin floating garden made with foam

Source: Photos owned by the researcher

From above, this section illustrates how the conflict surrounding different types of acceptable organic practices can be handled by making a deal in which each stakeholder promises to compromise and follow agreed solutions (a mixing use of organics and chemicals at the minimum) and by developing a new rule agreed by conflicting stakeholders (to replace Urea with EM in growing hydroponic food). For the conflicting issue without consensus, this section analyses that the conflict can also be handled through a development of mutual understanding (to accept versus to reject a use of compressed fertilizer tablets). In relation to that, agreement and mutual understanding were built through communicative process where the MCD director mediated the discussions. Although to reach a mutual understanding is a long and complicated process that is hard to indicate, this study illustrates how the MCD could contribute to it by facilitating friendly and sound argumentation. This study can reflect from observation that the core conflicting stakeholders can accept

and live with expressed differences of opinion. They seemed to acknowledge, recognise and respect each argument.

Conclusions

This chapter brings IRC and CAT perspectives on conflicts to discuss through the case of conflicts within the Bangkok's UA policy network in times of crisis. The chapter analyses that conflicts were developed from both interest-based account and beyond (e.g. different ideas). Some conflicts persisted with the existence of the policy network by being embedded in the network structure. Some of them were fruitful conflicts that raised awareness of interdependencies among different actors by reminding conflicting stakeholders that they needed to work together to achieve their goals. Different coalitions also needed to construct an operational toleration zone in the everyday practices for living with conflicts. The agonistic policy network therefore was governed by recognising the existence of conflicts.

Regarding conflicts that can be handled, building either agreement or mutual understanding was a solution by which conflict mediation through communicative process required the mediator who held social capital with conflicting stakeholders. This chapter analyses that agreement can be presented both in the form of a new rule agreed by conflicting stakeholders and in the form of a deal and a promise. So, this chapter shows that to articulate IRC and CAT perspective on conflicts helps to frame conflicts and analyse the way to handle them. From the first chapter until this conclusion, multi-arenas of the role of social capital were addressed, moving from how it facilitates the policy network's emergence, shaping the network characteristics, to helping to enhance cooperation and support conflict resolution.

Conclusions

This study linked the study of social capital in policy networks by examining the role of different forms of social capital (including reputation, reciprocity, trust, moral obligation as well as shared rules, norms, and knowledge) in facilitating the emergence and characterisation of policy networks. It also examined how these forms of social capital affect the way in which policy networks enhance cooperation and solves conflicts. The policy network on urban agriculture (UA) in Bangkok was chosen as the case-study, because of an awareness of the existence forms of social capital. By conducting the fieldwork during and shortly after the flooding, this study shone light on the role of social capital in governing the policy network in the time of crisis.

In order to frame the analysis of the case study, Institutional Rational Choice (IRC) and Communicative Action Theory (CAT) were adopted as they have a capacity to explain the role of social capital in governing policy networks. Both theories focus on understanding cooperation and conflicts and recognise various forms of social capital, including their role in supporting the quality of the policy network in handling issues linked to processes of collective action. As discussed in Chapter 2, these two theories are developed from different assumptions on social capital (based on rational versus normative commitments) and assumptions about cooperation and conflicts within policy networks (based on self-interest account and beyond). The articulation by recognising the differences of these two theories relied on integrated instrumental, communicative and structural power analysis (Lukes, 2005), rhetorical analysis (Gottweis, 2007; Martin, 2014) and Fischer's logic of deliberation (Fischer, 2003, 1995). The next section will discuss the way in which articulating and contrasting these two theories supports analytical insights for this study (through theoretical contributions). By adopting two theories that have different assumptions, the challenge was to aim for a methodological approach that compromises between IRC's methodological individualism and CAT's interpretive methodology. This research therefore collected data by adopting shared methods used by IRC and CAT scholars, including a review of the grey literature, semi-structured interviews and observations, but it also required specific methods such as the collecting of relational

data to develop policy network diagrams as the starting point to make a further analysis to investigate each form of social capital embedded in the policy network.

This study started with analysing how the operation of the UA policy network in Bangkok could enhance the adaptive capacity of the city to respond to food shortage during an extreme climate event, as explained in Chapter 1. The finding indicated that this operation can only contribute on a small scale by supporting less than 5% of total victims. The study analysed the limitation of the scheme promoting UA in Bangkok, by highlighting the tendency of government priorities to support the industrial food system, and the bias of the central government in allowing areas of food-production to be flooded while industrial and commercial areas were protected. Then, the focus moved on to analyse the policy network that promoted UA and particularly the way in which it emerged, characterised, enhanced cooperation and handled with conflicts. The role of different forms of social capital were highlighted and discussed in Chapters 4-7. Although the contribution of the UA promotion in food aid during the flooding in Bangkok was not remarkable, this study pointed the importance of learning from the governance model, which can be conceptualised as the collaborative policy network governance.

The study found the interrelation of social capital, power relations and policy network emergence as analysed in Chapter 4. The social capital of powerful organisations can activate their power; for example, by supporting the acceptance of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation to play the important role in the programme and legitimising the exercise of instrumental power; such as setting rules of engagement. Many forms of social capital; such as reputation and trust, can also support the exercise of communicative power by supporting certain organisations to have a loud voice and make others feel comfortable to talk with.

Another finding of this study is that although powerful organisations played a significant role in shaping the UA policy network, other organisations and groups also affected the network characterisation, as discussed in Chapter 5. They had a strong social capital, particularly bonding social capital, within their policy communities, which supported their exercise of power and their centrality in each policy community. The powerful organisations (the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation and the Health Promotion Foundation) could not monopolise power and

control the policy network from the centre; rather the policy network had some degree of decentralisation by which the policy communities' centralities could also exercise power. Each policy community within the policy network had different backgrounds, foci, resources and expectations under this form of decentralised governance, which characterised the diversity of the network by which there were hidden cooperation problems and conflicts. Within this characterisation of the policy network, some organisations and groups were excluded, as a consequence of their alienation from existing shared rules and norms.

Moving on from the role of social capital in facilitating the emergence and characterisation of the policy network, this study examined the role of social capital in enhancing cooperation in the context of risks and uncertainty during a disaster (Chapter 6). In this context constituent organisations and groups within the policy network had to work together and mobilised for cooperation. The study found that cooperation can be enhanced by developing an agreement derived from finding a better argument and practical reasons to make a decision to cooperate. After each organisation and group agreed to cooperate, reciprocity and moral obligation determined whether each of them decided to cooperate or not, because to cooperate is to invest time and effort. While some organisations and groups, such as social enterprises (city farming training centres) could expect to gain reciprocate benefits (e.g. to promote their reputation for future customers), the others who decided to cooperate were obliged by morality (helping mind) even if they expected no returns. The process of reaching a better argument and a practical reason was communicative. Each one learned and shared knowledge, experiences, information and opinions regarding advantages and disadvantages of what they planned to do (e.g. to promote effective microorganism balls). Different policy epistemics (knowledge partners) contested by attempting to convince other organisations and groups, which in turn affected their decision whether to cooperate or not. Attributes of organisations and groups, their logic and emotional expressions were key components affecting their ability to persuade others and to reach an agreement in a communicative forum. The study found that trust supported attributes of the actors who succeeded in making a better argument and worked as cooperative facilitators, while shared norms supported their success in emotionally stimulating an awareness of other actors in the significance of cooperation.

Regarding reasons provided by those cooperative facilitators were justified using empirical evidence, its relevance to the context, its fit with social norms, and its contribution to what was considered a 'good' society. Scientific knowledge and instrumental rationality were less sensitive than local knowledge and cultural rationality to social norms and ideological expectations of the good society (e.g. expectations on being a self-reliant society and fostering mutual aid between Thai people). For example, knowledge on making and using locally-made effective microorganism balls supported a recall of the Thai traditional wisdoms to enhance self-reliance. The study found that knowledge and norms shared among many organisations and groups as forms of social capital supported this process of reason claiming to find a better argument and reach a practical agreement.

Last but not least, the aforementioned forms of social capital also supported mediators to facilitate communicative processes to handle conflicts. As discussed in Chapter 7, the reputable and trusted organisational leader (the director of the Media Centre for Development), who shared rules, norms and knowledge with the conflicting stakeholders, was accepted to mediate the conflict developed from different degrees of acceptable practices defined as organic (by which the programme managers also took part in that conflict) and could raise voices worth hearing (e.g. to propose a plausible compromising solution). This study found that the role of reputation and trust given by conflicting stakeholders to the mediator supported his or her ethos (e.g. to have a creditability to be accepted to play the role). On the other hand, the role of rules, norms and knowledge shared by the mediator with the conflicting stakeholders supported the mediator's logos and pathos (e.g. to be paid attention when gave a reason and expressed an emotion).

To sum up, this study found that many forms of social capital functioned in various entry points in supporting policy network emergence, characterisation and quality in handling cooperation and conflicts. The findings confirm some arguments made at the beginning including (1) the role of shared knowledge and norms in supporting logos of core actors particular for convincing others to agree to cooperate, (2) the role of shared rules and norms in affecting policy network inclusion and exclusion, and (3) the role of moral obligation and reciprocity in linking agreement to the reason to cooperate and the decision to cooperate. Regarding additional findings, this

study found that trust, reputation, shared rules, norms and knowledge supported ethos of the powerful organisations in exercising their power in formulating the policy network. It was also found that aforementioned forms of social capital supported ethos and the exercise of power of the centralities of policy communities in struggling for power decentralising and being included. Besides, trust was found supporting the ethos of the cooperative facilitators who succeeded in making a better argument. Shared norms, on the other hand, were found supporting the success of those cooperative facilitators in expressing their emotion (pathos) to stimulate others to realise that they should cooperate. Apart from that, in handling conflicts reputation and trust given by conflicting stakeholders were found supporting ethos of the conflicting mediator by making it be accepted to mediate the conflict, while shared rules, norms and knowledge supported its logos and pathos by facilitating that mediator to be paid attention and to propose a plausible compromising solution. So, at this stage, this study can identify specifically which forms of social capital functioned in which entry points and in what way. The figure Concl-1 summarises key findings of this study. It can be noticed that this version is more complete than the ones that are developed from literature review proposed in the beginning stage (see figure 2.2 and 2.3 shown in section 2.4).

FigureConcl-1 The role of various forms of social capital in different entry points summarised from findings of this study

This study addresses multi-arenas of the role of social capital, how it facilitated the emergence of the policy network, shaped the character of the network, helped enhance cooperation and supported conflict resolution in turbulent times. Adopting IRC and CAT as a theoretical framework allowed this study to analyse through comprehensive perspectives especially in three domains. Firstly, this study analysed social capital though both rational and normative dimensions of the commitment highlighted differently by the two theories. Secondly, this study analysed cooperation and conflicts on the basis of both self-interest account (e.g. cooperation by expecting benefits and conflicts of interests) and ideas (e.g. cooperation after agreeing with the reason to cooperate and conflicts developed from perceptional clashes). Lastly, this study analysed the role of social capital in governing the policy network through an analysis of power relations including instrumental, communicative and structural power. These domains link to contributions of this research that will be discussed next.

I Articulating institutional rational choice and communicative action theory by recognising their contrasting assumptions: Theoretical contributions

Although both IRC and CAT seek to understand collaborative governance, IRC and CAT scholars communicate insufficiently with one another. IRC is well-framed by Ostrom and her followers in the Bloomington School of Policy Analysis. They analyse the extent of self-interest of individual behaviour in cooperating for collective actions. CAT works are rarely cited by IRC scholars. One work that can be found cited is Ostrom's Understanding Institutional Diversity published in 2005, which CAT scholars were mentioned in just a few words at the footnote of the book. Another work that might be counted is developed by Heath (2003). He refers to Habermas in attempting to simplify his arguments by rational choice theory without recognising their different epistemological assumptions. For example, Heath argues that Habermas' communicative action is actually another aspect of making rational choice. On the other hand, CAT is developed from Habermas's arguments with a mixing to other post-positivist epistemological approaches as mentioned in Introduction and Chapter 2. CAT scholars not only ignore IRC works, but also critique IRC scholars for their account of behavioural analysis being motivated by self-interest and because causal models are unable to frame to understand collective

actions in the complex world. A few works, by Innes and Booher (2010, 2003) and one by Healey (2006) refer shortly to Ostrom, but in a note indicating that her work is a sound attempt to understand social capital and collective action. Healey also mentioned about New Institutionalism which IRC departs from, but she makes clear that she means social constructivist institutionalism, not IRC. During a personal discussion with a key CAT scholar during a conference, it was mentioned that the reason why IRC scholars are often ignored was because their causal models and tendency to reinforce an argument simply by using more case-studies was not engaging enough. Nevertheless, I did not intend to say that their work should be overlooked completely. Hence, this study played a vital role in bringing IRC and CAT scholars together to communicate about the same issues.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the two theories developed from different ontological, epistemological and methodological propositions so they are based on different assumptions (see 2.1). Thus the main theoretical contributions of this study are to illustrate the benefits of adopting contrasting theories in the same project but without merging these contrasting perspectives but rather by focusing on how these different arguments support the study in different ways. This study shows that by using IRC and CAT for their own merits rather than merging them can support the development of a comprehensive analytical framework. Doing this also contributes to an understanding of the debates between them, particularly the analysis of collaborative governance based on mainstream rational models on the one hand and based on dialogue and interpretation on the other.

Articulating these two perspectives while still contrasting their assumptions is possible by starting with an identification of some elements that they share. This study recognises that these two theories underline key aspects of many forms of social capital, focusing on how networks work through organising collective action, and recognise the importance of communication and the role of facilitators/ mediators in enhancing cooperation and solving conflicts. It found that the integration of social capital analysis, network analysis, power analysis, rhetorical analysis and Fischer's logic of deliberation make the possible articulation of these two theories by recognising their different perspectives that can both complement and challenge each other (see Table 2.1 shown in Chapter 2). This synthesised

analytical framework maintains the (ontological and epistemological) debates of the two theories, including their conceptualisation of social capital that relates to their sensitivity to rational and normative commitments, their claims on causes of cooperation problems and conflicts that relate to their perspectives about nature of the policy actors, and their analysis on the role of social capital in governing policy networks that relates to their perspectives on rationality and power. The sub-sections will discuss analytical insights and constraints of this articulation in each specific point.

I.I Understanding social capital by differentiating rational and normative commitments

This study found the value of differentiating between forms of social capital by putting them in the line where a rational account of the relationships and a normative one are at different ends of the line (as shown in Figure Intro-1). This idea derives from Warren (1999) to distinguish the different focuses of IRC and CAT. So, this study articulates IRC and CAT perspectives on social capital by still being able to analyse their contrasting ideas. In short, IRC is more sensitive to rational commitment of relationships (concrete string attached relationships) such as the relationships based on shared rules, a reputation for trustworthiness, predictive trust and reciprocity to secure benefits from relationships. In contrast, CAT scholars argue that commitment is sometime beyond self-interest account such as altruistic feelings and the intention to share ideas, so CAT opens the room for analysing normative commitment (more abstract string attached relationships) to seek mutual understanding and agreement, such as altruistic trust, moral obligation and shared norms (as discussed in details in Chapter 2).

In situating them along a long line with two different ends, this study found the advantages of using different focuses on social capital, for it allowed this study to analyse the case-study more comprehensively rather than relying on one camp (either rational commitment or normative one). At the same time, it was recognised that contesting the ideas between the two theories raised interesting questions and was therefore an integral part of the discussion. For example, by analysing both reciprocity and moral obligation, this study opens the room for understanding different motivations that glue relationships. On the one hand, this study does not

romanticise reality or claim that close relationships among some policy network's organisations and groups (e.g. city farming training centres) necessarily created reciprocal relationships developed from mutual benefits. Relationships were shaped by a degree of expectations from individuals from keeping a good relationship with others. On the other hand, this study recognised that morality obliged some of them to work together for solving the public problems such as food shortage and polluted water in the time of the crisis. As raised by an interviewee during the flooding, she forgot how much she spent that day, but what she could remember until this day is how much she is happy to share. This opinion shows that there were some people who thought about "all of us" before "me". They could share sadness with other people who faced effects that they did not face. They were also pleased to provide their own resources without any expected returns. This altruistic action based on giving without receiving can be explained better through the power of moral obligation rather than reciprocate exchange. So, to bring these two contrasting forms of social capital together is to compare two contesting assumptions, which provide alternative ways of understanding different objects at a specific time and to supplement each other.

Another advantage of relying on the different conceptualisations of social capital of the two theories is that the concept of social capital is not simplified as being composed of coherent components, as many previous social capital studies do (e.g. Deth, 2010, pp.150-76; Office for National Statistics, 2002; Statistics New Zealand, 2002). This study did not engage with the concept by assuming that it can be classified by many measurable indicators and each score from those measurements can be compounded to measure the holistic degree of strong or weak social capital. In contrast, this study benefitted from analysing social capital as a contested concept that can be conceptualised differently. This allowed the study to avoid analysing social capital as a composite variable, but instead, to analyse each form as it could make an effect by itself and play a role in either supporting or obstructing other forms. For example, this study analysed that shared norms and knowledge supported each other to facilitate the core organisations of the policy network to create a stronger argument and propose practical reasons, which in turn succeeded in persuading other organisations and groups to agree with the reason for cooperation, as discussed in Chapter 6. Reputation and trust in the organisation also supported

each other, in order to make that organisation accepted by the conflicting stakeholders in mediating the conflict, as discussed in Chapter 7. In contrast, shared rules can obstruct some organisations and groups that shared knowledge in making changes, such as the rule of organic practices and promotion constrained the using of knowledge on hydroponic farming.

However, the disadvantage of attempting to classify each form of social capital in either rational or normative commitments is that some forms are difficult to define and therefore hard to 'place' on the line. For instance, the situation of shared forms of knowledge on the line depends on the kind of knowledge. The analysis of shared knowledge as a form of social capital for this study was influenced by the study of Pennington and Rydin (1999), who worked together even though they were engaged in different approaches (Pennington's works engaged more with IRC, while Rydin's works are adopted many CAT ideas). Their study contests shared scientific and economic knowledge (which are fit into a classification as rational commitment) and local knowledge (which is rather fit into normative commitment). This study agrees with them that shared forms of knowledge should be placed in the middle of the line (see Figure Intro-1), but noted that types of knowledge were defined by their rational or normative orientation.

Although including knowledge in studying social capital makes the classification of different forms of social capital through rational and normative commitments puzzling, this study benefited from analysing shared knowledge as the capital of the policy epistemic (knowledge partnership). Situating shared forms of knowledge in the social capital literature can advance social capital studies by introducing this notion in epistemological debates. For example, understanding the clash of local and expert knowledge as the capitals of different knowledge partnerships is to understand multiple epistemologies. In modern society, it appears that Western knowledge has become shared knowledge of all societies in the world. This study challenges this by arguing that it is also possible that local knowledge as a form of social capital in a specific society shows its power as a resource to cope with problems in that society. To capture shared knowledge of each society as part of its social capital, it should not be assumed that Western knowledge is only one form of knowledge shared among many, particularly when studying social capital in the global South. The

capacity of local knowledge to take over expert knowledge in developing countries such as Thailand tends to increase in the era of post-modernisation. The recovery of local traditional knowledge is a strategy for localisation to fight against the hegemony of Western knowledge and its role in modernisation. Apart from effective microorganism ball promotion, this study also illustrates the demand for re-using traditional wisdom of collecting and sharing seeds to avoid buying hybrid seeds developed and controlled by monopoly food corporations (Chapter 1). The coexistence of the modern, post-modern and pre-modern in developing countries is a central challenge of the era in which we live.

I.II Understanding cooperation and conflicts within policy networks by considering both self-interest account and beyond

This study shows that articulating IRC and CAT perspectives on cooperation and conflicts helps to frame and analyse the way to handle them. As discussed in Chapter 2, IRC analyses cooperation problems as a result of self-interest behaviour and understands conflicts by focussing interest-based conflicts. On the other hand, CAT seeks to understand cooperation and conflicts beyond self-interest account, for example by analysing that insufficient cooperation is a consequence of disagreement on the reason for cooperation, and conflicts are developed from having different ideas and arguing in favour or against each other (perceptional conflicts). Forester (2009) calls such kind of conflicts as 'value-based disputes' which explains conflicts derived from value differences. In conceptualising cooperation and conflicts in this way, the analytical framework was analytically productive in the way that contrasting assumptions was considered. In other words, this study attempted to understand both the 'consumer in the market' and a 'citizen in politics' mentioned by Steiner (2012, pp.88-103). In the case of cooperation in the making and using of effective microorganism balls, this study analysed why policy network's organisations and groups decided to cooperate for mutual benefits expected in return of taking part and for altruism (helping mind). In the case of analysing conflicts, it seems that every conflict that was examined (see 7.1) had developed from both self-interest account and beyond. For example, conflicts developed from different expectations between policy actors were formed based both on expectations of specific benefits that could be gained and expectations on developmental goals that

affected the shape and form of society that each one dreamed to. In doing so, this study was neither too optimistic (e.g. no one was selfish/ everyone was moral conscious) or pessimistic (everyone was selfish/ no one is morally conscious).

By engaging in specific arguments, this study provides an analytical insight by considering different ways of framing cooperation enhancement. The analysis focused both on the role of regulations and incentives that affected decision-making to cooperate argued by IRC scholars and the role of persuasion to enhance cooperation by making others agree with the reason for cooperation argued by CAT scholars. The analysis in Chapter 5 illustrates this articulation by showing that regulations, incentives and persuasion affected decision making to cooperate for different organisations and groups at the time of the analysis. This study also took benefit from seeking for the co-function of two arguments by scoping their roles in communicative process where referring to regulations and incentives became another way to making a claim for persuasion.

Another specific argument engaged by this study is the different claims about how to deal with conflict, including by coming to an agreement and by developing mutual understanding. Agreement building is important in handling conflicts for both IRC and CAT. IRC focuses agreement in the form of a new rule agreed by conflicting stakeholders, while CAT seeks for consensus in the form of a deal and a promise. IRC does extensively deal with mutual understanding, while CAT recognises conflict-resolution through a building of mutual understanding as discussed in Chapter 2 (2.3). To engage with their arguments, the study took advantage of considering more than one possible option for handling conflicts. In particular, the analysis can be framed to understand conflict-resolution through the consideration of agreed rules development, a making of the deal and promise, and the building of mutual understanding.

I.III Understanding the role of social capital in governing policy networks through an analysis of power relations

This study proposes a productive way to link social capital to policy network governance through an analysis of power relations. While some previous studies attempt to treat social capital as if it were politically neutral (Fine, 2001, p.199), this

study put power in the centre of analysis. The advantage of doing so is that the analysis goes further than to claim that social capital glues plural actors together as a network (Lin, 2010, 2001) by providing an understanding how social capital could do so through the lens of power analysis. By analysing power relations, this study can bridge relations between social capital, network emergence, network characterisation, cooperation enhancement and conflict-resolution within policy networks. IRC and CAT help to frame not only social capital, cooperation and conflicts, but also the analysis of power relations. IRC focuses more on instrumental power (e.g. incentives and regulations), while CAT highlights communicative power (e.g. convincing and persuasion) and recognises structural power (e.g. power embedded in political-bureaucratic and socio-cultural structures). So, the analytical insight that can be provided by adopting these theories is that structural, communicative and instrumental power were used as angles from which to analyse how the policy network emerged and how it took shape as well as to understand how cooperation could be enhanced and conflicts could be solved by which social capital played a role in activating power (e.g. unequal social capital affected the imbalance of power).

In other words, an analysis of power is a bridge that links an analysis of social capital to an analysis of policy network governance. For example, this study found that shared rules as a form of social capital supported instrumental power of the powerful organisations. This is because shared rules allowed for the mobilisation of collective actions of the policy network, including rules of engagement shared and agreed by all members. In contrast, shared norms and knowledge supported structural and communicative power of organisations by convincing and persuading others to cooperate. For example, a norm for respect to the elderly and shared knowledge on effective use of some techniques supported the argument made by the elder who shared that knowledge to be the most agreeable. This case study (presented in Chapter 6) reflects the power that Habermas (1996, p.305) calls the unforced force of the better argument (power to convince others by good arguments). This study also found that trust and reputation supported the structural power of the mediator (power of social status) in facilitating conflict-resolution by relying on acceptability and legitimacy. Besides, shared rules, norms and knowledge supported communicative power of the effective mediator in proposing a compromise solution.

All in all, this study found that to engage in power analysis is the productive way to understand the role of social capital in governing policy networks by exploring the 'secret of its success'. In other words, although most scholars support the role of social capital in supporting network governance, there were few clear explanations or examples of how social capital could do this. The advantage of this analysis is to build a better understanding of how each specific form of social capital can activate power to govern policy networks.

However, there is a criticism of this analytical approach that treats each type of power as being relative. By considering different types of power, the analysis did not judge type of power was most impacting. Instead, the analysis captured the role of different types of power at different entry points and in relation to different forms of social capital. While presenting this argument in a conference at Wageningen (in July 2014), one of comments I received was that Thailand is very centralised and faces social and economic inequality, so structural conditions could be powerful and to analyse other faces of power might be meaningless. The research argued that even if it was hard at points to challenge the power embedded in Thai ruling structures, UA policy network members found room to exert instrumental and communicative power at different scales, settings and times, in particular when city food and green issues in Bangkok were depoliticised and members of the policy network became an important channel to open a public sphere t o engage lay people in ongoing discussions.

II Limitations of the research

This study acknowledges that to analyse the social capital of organisations and groups through data and opinions provided by their leaders might not reflect all aspects of their social capital. The study also assumed that their leader's social capital could represent that of the whole organisation and group. Chapter 7, for example, analysed the role of the director of one organisation by mixing both his own social capital and the social capital of his organisation. This study acknowledges that in doing so, it might not be always possible to attribute such claims to the so-called 'institutional capital' (Innes and Booher, 2003; Wagenaar, 2011), but instead this should be differentiated as institutional leaders' capital. This limitation has emerged from the actual conditions framing this research that there

were many policy network's constituent organisations and groups, which make it hard to collect data from every members of each organisation and group to analyse their collective social capital in particular by conducting the fieldwork during the flooding. However, to reduce this weakness, two and more representatives were interviewed for each organisation and group to recheck each collective profile.

This study also acknowledges that trust was analysed as an asset that leads to closer relations and supports cooperation, which might not necessary be this way. As argued by Field (2003), trust among strangers is possible, and many relationships can operate perfectly well with a minimum of trust, including those which rest on habit or institutional sanctions rather than on reflexive choices. Wagenaar (2014, pp.232-6) also analyses that mutual distrust can enhance cooperation (and support uninvited participation) as distrustful organisations, groups, individuals would not like to allow others that they distrust solely taking actions without monitoring by them and giving their hands. To think about the case of cooperation in the event called 'seed exchange' reminds me that some slum communities did not join the event, arguing that they trusted other slum communities to bring some for them. In contrast, members of the online group came to join and argued that they could not ask anyone to bring seeds for them (no one could be trusted) and they wanted to get closer to others (loose relationships could also promote cooperation). Apart from that, as pointed by Forester (2013, 2009) distrust between conflicting stakeholders makes the role of the mediator become important as it acts 'in-between' those distrusting stakeholders. It can be implied that if conflicting stakeholders trust each other which is assumed by this study that it should be positive, mediation led by the mediator discussed in this report (particular in Chapter 7) might be not required and the whole story might be changed. It should therefore be noted as a limitation that these aspects were perhaps not given enough attention as a result on employing many forms of social capital.

Moreover, another limitation of this study includes somehow the scope adopted for the analysis of collective action problems. This study acknowledges that apart from cooperation and conflicts, there might be other problems faced by the policy network, such as corruptions and continuity. This limitation has emerged from the actual conditions that this study noticed that these two problems were clearly present

and there were many cases that they were handled, which could be learned from. Furthermore, this study understands cooperation less as a personal motivation apart from linking it to social capital, rules, incentives and persuasion. As noted by Rydin and Pennington (2000), sometimes the decision to cooperate is the result of enjoyment. Some people cooperate because of their interest in the content of undertaking an activity. Others may aim to achieve their self-actualisation or to realise a value in themselves, which is another inner motivation apart from a sense of collectivity. In the case of understanding conflicts, this study pays less attention to tensions, which can be defined as another soft-conflict. This study also presumes that conflicts would be handled through a building of an agreement. However, as argued by Forrester (2013, p.299), mediators do not make agreements any more than midwives make babies. He analyses that they are not parents. They are the catalysts and the coaches and the enablers who help to develop a practical choice that satisfies stakeholders, which does not mean an agreement. Apart from that, this study ignores structural conflicts such as class and gender conflicts. These limitations are a result of the aim to frame the study by adopted meso-level theories, which focus on analysing interactions in collective action rather than personal motivation and structural constraints.

Furthermore, to touch lightly issues directly related to food and disaster is another limitation of this study. This study acknowledges that there was much more that could have been explored in relation to the role of urban agriculture in responding to food shortage during the disaster that requires the analytical insights (e.g. urban agriculture and food security, food sovereignty, resilience to climate change and urban environmental justice etc.). This limitation has emerged from the actual conditions that the researcher analyses the case study that it could reflect much more in its governance aspect. I was amazed by the strong cooperation of the policy network's members and their capacity in handling with conflicts rather than their contributions to food shortage as the research found that they could provide food, materials and know-how for less than 5% of the total amount of the victims (as mentioned in Chapter 1). This limitation is also related to my background as a lecturer in policy, planning and governance, who graduated from the department of public administration.

In addition, this study acknowledges that it cannot claim that the analysis is fit well in solely understanding disaster governance. Although the setting of this study is the context of emergency and shock, it did not compare between the situations before and during the disaster. For example, to find that not only instrumental power and rationality (state mechanisms like inflexible rational bureaucratic systems under the influence of managerialism and the idea of new public management) should be taken into account as communicative power and rationality are also required for understanding governance in the context of crisis. Without comparison between regular conditions and crisis scenarios, this study could not claim that this finding would solely apply for understanding risk and resilient governance as normal mechanisms might be equally dysfunctional under non-crisis scenarios. As a consequence, what this study can say concerns what happened under scenarios of high uncertainty, where it was more difficult to enforce formal procedures and this in turn opened the room to challenge and reshape such procedures by recognising the role of communication in governing collective action. This study can also say that a distrust of information analysed and provided by the state and a failure of the state to predict the events became reasons for challenging existing mechanisms of instrumental power and rationality in risky and uncertain situations. People deliberate with one another more intensively than in a normal situation to reduce panic and to seek trustable information and agreeable solutions. Everyone wants to hear and share to achieve what they think might be the most reasonable or even practical. In this way, they deliver communicative rationality as a result of finding a better argument and a practical reason. A clear example of the power of communication and an effect of communicative rationality is the case of effective microorganism (EM) balls promotion presented in Chapter 6. This case demonstrates that although using local-made EM balls for soil improvement and waste treatment during flooding are nonsensical from the perspective of a scientific mindset, communication among different people legitimised the use of EM balls. The EM balls could be a practical effect of applying reason by people who aim to do something valuable to improve the existing situation. They thought that applying this local knowledge was practical at a household scale as it depends on local materials and simple technology, which everyone could do. This example also demonstrates how communicative action works in concrete ways, particularly illustrating the power of persuasion or convincing to affect a decision. At this stage, the study can

claim that communicative power and rationality affects decision making in governing risk and resilient livelihoods no less than scientific and economic rationality, although this study could not say that it would not happen during the pre-crisis.

Last but not least, this study accepts that one important limitation of this study is the position of me as the researcher, which affected the interpretation of the data as the perspectives of the researcher and the key informants were often assimilated as discussed in Chapter 3 (such as the way to define urban agriculture and to understand right to food). This limitation is a result of my decision making to do a research that was relevant to previous experiences, which brought me to study this topic and field. This limitation may be relatively serious given that some research paradigms require that the researcher be an outsider, who has not engaged and took part with the case study. However, I decided to reveal myself instead of keeping it as a secret as many researchers usually do. I believes that many participatory action researches and interpretive studies would face with the same problem as the researchers could make a subjective judgement about the research finding, but nowadays these approaches are more recognised and respected.

III Orientations for future research

Beyond resolving and crossing over the limitations of this study as discussed above, future research can also consider other issues. To begin with, using social capital might help solve not only collective action problems but also other problems such as economic recession, social welfare and political contradictions. Social capital is not a static asset but has its own dynamics similar to other kinds of capital but opposite to the way proposed by Coleman (cited in Warren, 1999, pp.208-48): the more social capital is used the more it grows. Although this study reflects on some dynamics of social capital such as the stronger social capital of an online group, the period from the emergence of the policy network to the end of the disaster is too short to address clear changes in social capital. Future research could design a study to examine the dynamics of social capital by researching over a longer period.

Moreover, this study sees the potential for future research to focus specifically in studying the role of local knowledge. This study put some intention to do so, but

from conceptualising knowledge as one form of social capital among many other forms, this study did not discuss much more in this specific aspect, such as the advantages and disadvantages of adopting local traditional knowledge for solving modern problems. For example, this study discussed the role of shared knowledge on making and using locally-made EM balls in supporting an agreement to cooperate for making and using them, but did not assess their effectiveness to enhance soil quality and reduce polluted water as claimed by local practitioners. The future study should frame to understand both how local knowledge could be recognised in making policy and whether local knowledge is effective or not.

Furthermore, this study reflects on the fact that norms can activate power embedded in socio-cultural structures in a context where shared norms are strong. This study illustrates the importance of this relationship through the case of norm judging: to promote subsistence-oriented UA has notable benefits while promoting market-oriented UA does not. This norm works well with the King's speech on self-sufficiency, which is powerful in Thai socio-cultural structures. There is no public space for discussion the negative side of his speech. His ideas have become hegemonic and no one can re-examine them through a deliberative process. When someone links the norm of subsistence-oriented UA to the King's speech, that norm can activate structural power to legitimate the exercise of their instrumental power and to support their communicative power by persuading and negotiating. This analysis is a good starting point for the future research to dig deeper into the analysis of the effect of shared norms in distorting the communication particularly by studying the developing countries where norms are embedded in socio-cultural structures and legitimise power in the structures.

In addition, by framing moral obligation as a form of social capital, this study also reflects the influence of religion in analysing collaborative policy network governance. As Thailand is a strong Buddhist society, religion affects moral obligations of the people examined during crises. Buddhism emphasises that all sentient beings share humanity and are interdependent. Once they have understood their own feelings and are reliant on themselves, they should try to understand the feelings of others, support and help each other. In contrast, people should realise that by taking advantage of others is sin (*'Bab'*). A finding presented in Chapter 6, for

example, is that moral obligation links an agreement to cooperate to the decision to do so. The Buddhist notion heard a lot during the crisis is the notion of 'helping mind' (*Metra-Garuna*). Powerful organisations often attempt to stimulate the moral consciousness of the people through Buddhist principles; for example, to give is to do goodness (*Bun*) by destroying greed (*Lopa*). These principles become axioms and influence the way many Thai people think in their everyday life. In dealing with conflicts, Buddhism also support non-violent actions (*Ahingsa*), and emphasises the importance of deliberation. In referring to Buddhism, however, this study analyses the impacts of its principles as people's perceptions about good society rather than shared social norms. Buddhism guides Thai people to seek a better life rather than succeeding in shaping people to become a 'good' person as the Buddha aims to be. In doing so, this analysis may benefit as an example for further studies that plan to understand a context in which religion is very strong. However, this analysis should be just a starting point. Future research should seek for a potential of religion in not only awakening moral obligation, but also in shaping public spheres where communication takes place. Habermas's works in the last decade also pays attention to the role of religion in this area (Calhoun, Mendieta and VanAntwerpen, 2013; Mendieta and VanAntwerpen, 2011). He discusses the role of secular knowledge embedded in religion in communicative process (Habermas et. al., 2010), which could be a potential research topic. The future research may explore advantages of recognising secular knowledge in deliberation by also examining Dryzek's argument that religious fundamentalism is one of unfavourable conditions for deliberation (Dryzek, 2009, pp.1394-9).

Besides, future research needs to investigate the influence of bureaucratic systems in policy network governance. As argued by Davies (2011, p.70) and Scharpf (cited in Sorensen and Torfing, 2008, p.170), policy networks are a medium of social control that are formed in the shadow of hierarchy. This study provides some reflections on this by mentioning an effect of structural power bases on political-bureaucratic traditions in the policy network governance, such as the role of bureaucratic regulations on public funding management or the bureaucratic language used in shaping the way in which the policy network operated. However, this issue requires a more critical analytical framework, which the framework adopted by this study could not provide. For example, by adopting Gramscian approach, Davies (ibid)

analyses networks as the tactics of conducting the process of collective rule-setting, which operate under the hegemonic role of the state. They are shaped and reshaped by strategic interventions of government officials at different levels. This study realises that such arguments have the potential to contribute a critical reflection, but by adopting IRC and CAT this study focuses on interactions between plural actors by highlighting their collective actions rather than analysing under which circumstances they operated. This issue is a challenge for future research, particularly in framing to study the same case, but different timeframe such as after the coup on May 2014 (under military government).

Last but not least, to assess the extent to which the promotion of UA may be an effective strategy for climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction is another avenue that this study also touches upon, but requires more analytical insights. This area was also highlighted by the Resource Centres on Urban Agriculture and Food Security (RUAF), as argued in many articles, including my input into the *Urban Agriculture Magazine* (volume 27) entitled 'Promoting UA as a climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction strategy'. This focus is also promoted by the Transition Town movement around the world, which puts UA as an essential component for adapting to peak oil and climate change (Hopkins, 2013, 2008). What this study can do is to illustrate that under certain disaster conditions more horizontal or less hierarchical relations within the policy network might be activated, while many previous studies capture the promotion of UA through a vertical approach, either through top-down or bottom-up structural arrangements. So, this study illustrates the promotion of UA through the collaboration of a constellation of actors (similar to what Mougeot (2005) and Prain (2006) called 'stakeholders' participation'). Unfortunately, this study paid more attention on how they organised their collective actions and handled their own problems including cooperation and conflicts, rather than examine how their collective actions enhance climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction. This study provided some notices that promoting UA can be a way to respond to food shortages and the right to food of the most vulnerable groups through pro-poor collective action governed by UA stakeholders during an extreme climate event, but could not say more about the actual potential without comparison between different settings where intervention

took place and did not. So, future research should design a comparative research in this area to make an argument clearer than this study could do.

With modesty, I am confident that the case of the policy network on UA in Bangkok proved to be an interesting one to open some fruitful routes to understand social capital and network governance. To my knowledge no works have examined the role of social capital in governing policy networks on UA in times of crisis let alone how this operates for Bangkok. This thesis hopefully provided some challenging thoughts on how to define social capital, cooperation, conflicts and power by articulating IRC and CAT while still contrasting their assumptions. To marry IRC and CAT (as macro-level theories) to the policy network approach (as a meso-level theory) helps to enhance explanatory power of policy networks. This study illustrates that in doing so we can understand how the actors in a policy network actually interact, collaborate and resolve conflicts, while most policy network literature does not across the boundaries of the explanation on the qualities of the actors, the conditions that bound them, typologies of policy networks, and their links to policy outcomes. This study provides that social capital is an answer how the actors in the network who share it are able to do all these things. In relation to that, the study proves that to marry with IRC and CAT makes it possible to bridge social capital to policy networks as they help to analyse the way social capital affects the emergence and characterisation of a policy network. They also help to analyse the way it enhances cooperation and contributes to resolving conflict in policy networks. By articulating IRC and CAT for organising the vast material on social capital, both rational and normative commitments are brought to capture forms of social capital. They help to analyse deeper how social capital is the "glue" that binds the network and affects its durability and persistence. The study offers an analytical insight that the actors are committed to be part of a policy network as a consequence of their shared rules, norms and knowledge. Reciprocal relationships, moral obligation, reputation and trust each other also affect their decision to commit to the network. Besides, their cooperation and conflicts can be based on both personal utility maximisation guided by rules and incentives and shared communal norms, perspectives, habits and communication patterns that are wider than individual interests.

References

Ahn, T.K., and E. Ostrom, 2010, Social capital and collective action, *The handbook of social capital*, eds, Castiglione, D., Deth, J.W.V., and Wolleb, G., pp. 70-100, Oxford University Press, New York.

---------, 2002, Social capital and the second-generation theories of collective action: An analytical approach to the forms of social capital, *Annual Meeting of the American PSA*, August 29th-September 1st, Massachusetts, Boston.

Albrexhts, L., and Mandelbaum, 2005, *The network society: a new context for planning?,* Routledge, London and New York.

Ausell, C., and A. Gash, 2007, Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice, *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory,* Vol.18, No.4, pp.543-71.

Aristotle, 2007, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, transl. G. Kennedy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York.

Armitage, D., 2008, Governance and the commons in a multi-level world. *International Journal of the Commons,* Vol.2, No.1, pp. 7-32.

Ballet, J., N. Sirven, and M. Requiers-Desjardins, 2007, Social Capital and Natural Resource Management: A Critical Perspective, *The Journal of Environment and Development*, Vol.16, No.4, pp. 355-74.

Bevir, M., and D. Richards, 2009, Decentring Policy Networks: A Theoretical Agenda, *Public Administration,* Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 3–14.

---------, 2003, A Decentred Theory of Governance, *Governance as Social and Political Communication*, H. Bang, ed., Manchester University Press, Manchester.

Blaug, R., 1996, New Developments in Deliberative Democracy, *Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp.71-77.

Bogason, P., 2006, Networks and Bargaining in Policy Analysis, *Handbook of Public Policy*, eds., G. Peters and J. Pierre, SAGE, London, pp. 97-114.

--------, P., 2000, *Public Policy and Local Governance: Institutions in postmodern society*, Edward Elder, Cheltenham.

Bolton, R., 2005, *Habermas Theory of Communicative Action and the theory of Social Capital,* Association of American Geographers, Denver, Colorado.

Boossabong, P., 2014, Coping with Flooding in Bangkok, UA as a climate change and disaster risk reduction strategy, *Urban Agriculture Magazine*, No.27, RUAF, pp.27-29.

Bourdieu, P., 1997, Economic Capital, Cultural Capital, and Social Capital, *The Hidden Mechanisms of Power*, VSA-Verlag, Hamburg, pp. 49-79.

-----------, 1986, The forms of capital, *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education,*pp.241-58, J. Richardson, ed., Greenwood, New York.

Brandes, U. et.al., 2008, Explorations into the Visualisation of Policy Networks, *Social Network Analysis:* Vol. 1, pp. 359-387, Freeman, L., ed., Sage, London.

Buchstein, H., and D. Jorke, 2012, The Argumentative Turn toward Deliberative Democracy: Habermas Contribution and the Foucauldian Critique, *Argumentative Turn Revisited: Public Policy as Communicative Practice*, pp. 271-304, F. Fischer and H. Gottweis, eds., Duke University Press, London and Durham.

Calhoun, C., Mendieta, E., and J. Vanantwerpen, 2013, *Habermas and Religion*, Columbia University Press, New York.

Carlsson, L., 2000, Policy Networks as Collective Action, *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 502-20.

Chhotray, V. and G. Stoker, 2010, *Governance Theory and Practice: A Cross-Disciplinary Approach*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Colebatch, H. K., 2009, *Policy*, 3rd Ed., Open University Press, Berkshire.

Coleman, J, 1990, *Foundations of Social Theory*, Harvard University Press Cambridge MA.

Compston, H., 2009, *Policy Networks and Policy Change: Putting Policy Network Theory to the Test*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Cook, N. M., 1993, Democratisation in Thailand, *Asian Studies Review*, Vol.17, No.1, pp.126-134.

Dalsak, N. and E. Ostrom (eds.), 2003, *The Commons in the New Millennium: Challenges and Adaptation*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London.

Davies, J.,2011, *Challenging governance theory: From networks to hegemony*, Policy Press, Bristol.

Deth, J.W.V., 2010, Measuring social capital, *The handbook of social capital*, eds., Castiglione, D., J.W. Van Deth, and G. Wolleb, pp. 150-176, Oxford University Press, New York.

Donahue, J., 2004, *On Collaborative Governance*, working paper No.2, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Boston.

Dowding, K., 2006, Three-Dimentional Power: A Discussion of Steven Lukes' Power: A Radical View, *Political Studies Review*, No.4, pp.136-45.

----------, 1995, Model or Metaphor?: A Critical Review of the Policy Network Approach, *Political Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 136-158.

Dryzek, J., 2012, *Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

--------, 2010, Rhetoric in Democracy: A Systematic Appreciation, *Political Theory*, Vol.38, No.3, pp.319-39.

--------, 2009, Democratisation as Deliberative Capacity Building, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol.42, pp.1394-9.

--------, 2000, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

--------, 1997, *The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

--------, 1990, *Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

deLeon, P., and D.M. Varda, 2009, Toward a Theory of Collaborative Policy Networks: Identifying Structural Tendencies, *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 59-72.

Fairclough, I., and N. Fairclough, 2012, *Political discourse analysis: A method for advance students,* Routledge, London and New York.

Fine, B., 2001, *Social Capital versus Social Theory: Political Economy and Social Science at the Turn of the Millennium*, Routledge, London.

Field, J., 2003, *Social Capital*, Routledge, London and New York.

Fischer, F. and H. Gottweis, eds., 2012, *Argumentative Turn Revisited: Public Policy as Communicative Practice*, Duke University Press, London and Durham.

--------, and A. Mandell, 2012, Transformative Learning in Planning and Policy Deliberation: Probing Social Meaning and Tacit Assumptions, *Argumentative Turn Revisited: Public Policy as Communicative Practice*, pp. 343-70, eds. F. Fischer, and H. Gottweis, Duke University Press, London and Durham.

--------, 2009, *Democracy and Expertise: Reorienting Policy Inquiry*, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York.

---------, 2007, Deliberative policy analysis as practical reason: Integrating empirical and normative arguments, *Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods,* pp.223-36,eds. F. Fischer, G. J. Miller and M.S. Sidney. Boca Raton, London and New York: CRC Press.

--------, 2003, *Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices*, Oxford University Press, New York.

--------, 2000, *Citizens, Experts, and the Environment: the Politics of Local Knowledge*. Duke University Press, Durham and London.

--------, 1995. *Evaluating Public Policy*. Nelson-Hall, Chicago.

--------, and J. Forrester, eds., 1993, *The argumentative turn in policy analysis and planning*, UCL Press, London.

Flyvbjerg, B., 1998, *Rationality and power: Democracy in practice*, Translated by Steven Sampson, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London.

Forester, J., 2013, *Planning in the face of conflict: The surprising possibilities of facilitative leadership*, the American Planning Association, Washington, DC.

--------, 2009, *Dealing with Difference: Dramas of Mediating Public Disputes*, Oxford University Press, New York.

--------, 1999, *The Deliberative Practitioner: Encouraging Participatory Planning Processes*, the MIT Press, Massachusetts.

--------, 1989, *Planning in the Face of Power*, University of California Press, California.

Fraser, E., 2002, Urban Ecology in Bangkok, Thailand: Community Participation, Urban Agriculture and Forestry, *Environments*, Vol.30, No.1, pp.37-49.

Freeman, L., ed., 2008, *Social Network Analysis,* Vol. 1-3, SAGE, London.

Fukuyama, F., 1995, *Trust: the social virtues and the creation of prosperit*y, Hamish Hamilton, London.

Gallent, N. and A. Robinson, 2013, *Neighborhood planning: Communities, networks and governance*, Policy Press, London.

Geertz, C., 1983, *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology*, Basic Books, Princeton.

Gottweis, H., 2012, Political Rhetoric and Stem Cell Policy in the United States: Embodiment, Scenographies, and Emotions, *Argumentative Turn Revisited:*

Public Policy as Communicative Practice, pp. 211-235, F. Fischer and H. Gottweis, eds., Duke University Press, London and Durham.

--------, 2007, Rhetoric in Policy Making: Between Logos, Ethos and Pathos, *Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods*, eds., F. Fischer, G. Miller, M. Sidney, pp. 237-50, CRC Press, Boca Raton, London and New York.

--------, 2006, Argumentative policy analysis, *Handbook of Public Policy*, P. Guy, and J. Pierre, eds., SAGE, London.

Ghate, R., S. Ghate, and E. Ostrom, 2013, Cultural norms, cooperation, and communication: taking experiments to the field in indigenous communities, *International Journal of the Commons,* Vol.7, No.2, pp.498-520.

Goertz, G. and J. Manoney, 2012, *A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Griggs, S., Norval, A., and Wagenaar, H., eds., 2014, *Practices of Freedom: Decentred Governance, Conflict and Democratic Participation*, Cambridge University Press, New York.

-------, 2007, Rational Choice in Public Policy: The Theory in Critical Perspective, *Handbook of Public Policy Analysis. Theory, Politics and Methods*, pp.173-86, F. Fischer, G.J. Miller and M. Sidney, eds.,CRC Press, Taylor and Francis, Boca Raton, London, New York.

Guba, E.G., ed., 1990, *The Paradigm Dialog*, SAGE, London.

Habermas, J., et. al., 2010, *An Awareness of What is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-secular Age*, pp.15-23, Polity Press, Malden.

--------, 2007, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, transl. T.McCarty, Polity, Cambridge.

--------, 1998a, *On the Pragmatics of Communication*, ed., M. Cooke, the MIT press, Massachusetts.

--------, 1998b, *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*, eds., C. Cronin and P. D. Greiff, MIT Press, Massachusetts.

--------, 1996, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy*, transl. T.McCarty, Polity, Cambridge.

--------, 1991, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, transl. T. Burger and F. Lawrence, the MIT press, Massachusetts.

--------, 1990, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, transl. C. Lenhardt and S.W. Nicholsen, the MIT press, Massachusetts.

--------, 1987, *The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalisation of Society*, transl. T.McCarty, Polity, Cambridge.

Hajer, M., and H. Wagenaar, eds., 2003, *Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

--------, 1995, Acid rain in Great Britain: Environmental discourse and the hidden politics of institutional practice, *Greening Environmental Policy: The Politics of a Sustainable Future*, eds., F. Fischer and M. Black, PCP, London.

Handley, P., 2006, *The King Never Smiles: A Biography of Thailand's Bhumibol Adulyadej*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London.

Hansen, J., 1997, A 'New Institutional' Perspective on Policy Networks, *Public Administration*, Vol.75, pp. 669-93.

Hardin, R, 2002, *Trust and Trustworthiness*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Harriss, J., 2001, *Depoliticizing development: The World Bank and social capital*, Anthem Press, London.

Hay, C., and D. Richards, 2000, The Tangled Webs of Westminster and Whitehall: The practice of networking within the British core executive, *Public Administration*, Vol. 78, No. 1, pp. 1-28.

--------, 1998, The Tangled Webs We Weave: the Discourse Strategy and Practice of Networking, *Comparing Policy Networks*, pp. 33-51, D. Marsh, ed., Open University Press, Buckingham.

Healey, P., 2006, *Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies*, 2nd ed., Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

--------, 2003, Collaborative Planning in Perspective, *Planning Theory*, Vol.2, No.2, pp.101-23.

Heath, J., 2003, *Communicative action and rational choice*, The MIT press, Massachusetts.

Heclo, H., 1978, Issue networks and the executive establishment, *The new American political system*, pp. 87-124, A. King, ed., Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

Hill, M., 2009, *The public policy process*, 5th ed., Longman, London.

Hopkins, R., 2013, *The Power of Just Doing Stuff*, Green books, Cambridge.

--------, 2008, *The Transition Handbook: From Oil Dependency to Local Resilience*, Green books, Cambridge.

Huxham, C., 2000, The Challenge of Collaborative Governance, *Public Management: an international journal of research and theory*, Vol.2, No.3, pp.337-57.

Innes, J., and D. Booher, 2010, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy,* Routledge, London and New York.

--------, 2003, Collaborative policymaking: governance through dialogue, *Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society*, eds., M. Hajer and H. Wagenaar, pp. 33-59, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

John, P., *Analysing Public Policy*, 2012, Routledge, London.

Jones, C., W. Hesterly, and S. Borgatti, 1997, A General Theory of Network Governance: Exchange Conditions and Social Mechanisms, *The Academy of Management Review*, Vol.22, No.4, pp.911-45.

Kjaer, A.M., 2011, Rhodes contribution to governance theory: Praise, criticism and the future governance debate, *Public Administration*, Vol. 89, No. 1, pp. 101–113.

Lin, N., 2010, A network theory of social capital, *The handbook of social capital*, eds, Castiglione, D., J.W. Van Deth, and G. Wolleb, pp. 50-69, Oxford University Press, New York.

--------, 2001, *Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Lejano, R., M. Ingram and H. Ingram, 2013, *The Power of Narrative in Environmental Networks*, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

Lowndes, V., and M. Roberts, 2013, *Why Institutions Matter: The New Institutionalism in Political Science*, Palgrave Macmillan, London.

--------, and L. Pratchett, 2010, public policy and social capital, *The handbook of social capital*, eds, Castiglione, D., J.W. Van Deth, and G. Wolleb, pp. 677-707, Oxford University Press, New York.

Lukes S, 2005, *Power: A Radical View*, 2nd ed., Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Martin, J., 2014, *Politics and Rhetoric: A Critical Introduction*, Routledge, London.

Marsh, D., and M. Olsen, 1989, *Rediscovering Institutions*, Free Press, New York.

--------, and M. Smith, 2000, Understanding Policy Networks: towards a Dialectical Approach, *Political Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 4-21.

--------, ed., 1998, *Comparing Policy Networks*, Open University Press, Buckingham and Philadelphia.

--------, D. Toke, C. Belfrage, D. Tepe and S. McGough, 2009, Policy Networks and the Distribution between Insider and Outsider Groups: the Case of the Countryside Alliance, *Public Administration*, Vol. 87, No. 3, pp. 621-38.

--------, and R.A.W. Rhodes, eds., 1992, Policy networks in British government, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York.

McCargo, D., 2005, Network monarchy and legitimacy crises in Thailand, *The Pacific Review*, Vol.18, No.4, pp.499–519.

Mendieta, E. and J. Vanantwerpen, 2011, *The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere*, Columbia University Press, New York.

Montesano, M., 2014, What is to Come in Thailand?, *ISEAS Perspective*, No.7, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

Monge, P. and N. Contractor, 2003, *Theories of communication networks*, Oxford University Press, New York.

Mougeot, L., ed., 2005, *Agropolis: The Social, Political, and Environmental Dimensions of Urban Agriculture*, Earthscan/ IDRC.

---------, 2000, Urban Agriculture: definition, presence, potentials and risks, *Growing City, Growing Food: Urban Agriculture on the Policy Agenda*, eds., Dubbeling, M. et.al., pp.1-42., German Foundation for International Development.

Office for National Statistics, 2002, *The Measurement of Social Capital in the United Kingdom*, International Conference on Social Capital Measurement, 25-27 September, London.

Ostrom, E, 2010, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems, *American Economic Review*, Vol. 100, June, pp.1-33.

--------, 2009, A General Framework for Analysing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems, *Science*, Vol. 325, pp. 419-22.

--------, 2005, *Understanding Institutional Diversity*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

--------, and T. Ahn, 2003, *Foundations of Social Capital*, Edward Elgar, London.

--------, and J. Walker, eds., 2003, *Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons for Experimental Research*, Volume VI in the Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust, New York.

--------, 1999a, Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, *Theories of the Policy Process*, 2nd edition, ed., P.A. Sabatier, pp. 35-71, Boulder, Westview Press.

--------, 1999b, Social capital: A fad or a fundamental concept?, *Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective*, eds. P. Dasgupta and I. Serageldin, pp. 172-214, The World Bank, Washington D.C.

--------, 1998, A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 92, No. 1 (Mar., 1998), pp. 1-22.

--------, 1995, Self-organization and Social Capital, *Industrial and Corporate Change*, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 131-59.

--------, 1994, Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action, *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 527-62.

--------, 1991, Communication in a Commons: Cooperation without external enforcement, *Laboratory Research in Political Economy*, eds. T. Palfrey and A. Arbor, University of Michigan Press, Michigan.

--------, 1990, *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*, Cambridge University Press, New York.

Pelling, M., 2011, Urban governance and disaster risk reduction in the Caribbean: the experiences of Oxfam GB, *Environment and Urbanization*, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp.383-400.

Pennington, M., and Y. Rydin, 1999, Researching social capital in local environmental policy contexts, *Policy and Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 233-249.

Peters, G., 1999, *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The 'New Institutionalism'*, Pinter, London and New York.

Pierre, J., ed., 2000, *Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy*, Oxford University Press, New York.

Pimbert, M., 2009, *Towards Food Sovereignty: Reclaiming autonomous food system*, IIED, London.

Poteete, A.R. and E. Ostrom, 2004, Heterogeneity, Group Size and Collective Action: The Role of Institutions in Forrest Management, *Development and Change*, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 435-61.

Prain, G., 2006, Participatory Technology Development for urban Agriculture, *Cities Farming for Future: Urban Agriculture for Green and Productive Cities*, ed., R. Veenhuizen, IIRR/ RUAF/ IDRC.

Pretty, J., 2003, Social Capital and the Collective Management of Resources, *Science*, No. 302, pp. 1912-15.

--------, and H. Ward, 2001, Social capital and the Environment, *World Development*, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 209-27.

Putnam, R., 1993, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

--------, 2000, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, Simon and Schuster, New York.

--------, ed., 2002, *Democracies in Flux: The evolution of social capital in contemporary society*, Oxford University Press, New York.

Resources Centre for Urban Agriculture and Food Security, 2011, *Urban Agriculture Magazine*, Vol.25.

Redwood, M., ed., 2008, *Agriculture in Urban Planning: Generating Livelihoods and Food Security*, Earthscan/ IDRC, Canada.

Renn, O., 2008, *Risk Governance: Coping with Uncertainty in a Complex World*, Earthscan, London and Washington, DC.

Riggs, F. W., 1966, *Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity*, East-West Center Press, Honolulu.

Rhodes, R.A.W., 2011,Thinking on: A career in public administration,*Public Administration*, Vol. 89, No. 1, pp. 196–212.

--------, 2007, Understanding Governance: Ten Years On, *Organization Studies*, Vol. 28, pp. 1243-1264.

--------, 2006, Policy Network Analysis, *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy*, eds, M. Moran, M. Rein and R. Goodin, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 423-45.

--------, 1997, *Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability*, Open University Press, Maidenhead.

--------, and D. Marsh, 1992, New Directions in the Study of Policy Networks, *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 21, pp. 181-205.

Rydin, Y., 2013, *The Future of Planning: Beyond Growth Dependence*. London: Policy Press.

--------, 2007, Re-Examining the Role of Knowledge Within Planning Theory, Planning Theory, Vol.6, No.1, pp.52-68.

--------, and N. Holman, 2004, Re-evaluating the Contribution of Social Capital in Achieving Sustainable Development*, Local Environment*, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 117-133.

--------, 2003, *Conflict, Consensus, and Rationality in Environmental Planning: An Institutional Discourse Approach*, Oxford University Press, New York.

--------, and M. Pennington, 2000, Public Participation and Local Environmental Planning: the Collective action problem and the potential of social capital, *Local Environment*, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 153-169.

Sabatier, P., 2007, *Theories of the Policy Process*, 2nd ed., Westview Press, Boulder.

---------, 1988, An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning therein, *Policy Sciences*, Vol.21, No.2-3, pp.129-68.

Scharpf, F. W., 1994, Games real actors could play: Positive and negative coordination in embedded negotiations, *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 6, pp. 27-53.

Schawartz-Shea and D. Yanow, 2012, *Interpretive Research Design: Concepts and Processes*, Routledge, London and New York.

Schneider, V., 1992, The structure of policy networks: An comparison of the chemical control and telecommunications policy domains in Germany, *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 21, pp. 109-29.

Scott, J., 2000, *Social Network Analysis: A Handbook*, 2nd ed., SAGE, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi.

Sen, A., 1997, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 317-44.

Sivaraksa, S., 2011, *The Wisdom of Sustainability: Buddhist Economics for the 21st Century,* Souvenir Press, London.

Sorensen, E., and J. Torfing, eds., 2008, *Theories of Democratic Network Governance*, Palgrave MacMillan, London.

Statistics New Zealand, 2002, *Framework for the measurement of social capital in New Zealand*, Social Capital Programme, International Conference on Social Capital Measurement, 25-27 September, London.

Steiner, J., 2012, *The Foundations of Deliberative Democracy: Empirical Research and Normative Implications*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Taylor, M., 2003, *Public Policy in the Community*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Tewdwr-Jones, M., and P. Allmendinger, 1998, Deconstructing communicative rationality: a critique of Habermasian collaborative planning, *Environment and Planning A,* Vol. 30, pp. 1975-89.

Thomassen, L., 2010, Habermas: A Guide for the Perflexed, Continuumbooks, London.

van Ark, R. and Edelenbos, J., 2005, Collaborative Planning, Commitment and Trust: Dealing with Uncertainty in Networks, *The Network Society: A New Context for Planning*, eds., L. Albrechts and S. Mandelbaum, pp.271-83, Routledge, London.

Vollan, B. and E. Ostrom, 2010, Cooperation and the Commons, *Science*, Vol. 330, pp. 923-24.

Wagenaar, H., 2014, The agonistic experience: informality, hegemony, and the prospects for democratic governance, *Practices of Freedom: Decentred Governance, Conflict and Democratic Participation*, eds., S. Griggs, A. Norval, and H. Wagenaar, pp. 217-48, Cambridge University Press, New York.

--------, 2011, *Meaning in Action: Interpretation and Dialogue in Policy Analysis*, M.E. Sharpe, New York and London.

Walker, A., 2004, Understanding Social Capital within Community/ Government Policy Networks, Social Policy Journal of New Zealand, Vol. 22, pp.1-18.

Walker, J., and E. Ostrom, 2007, *Trust and Reciprocity as Foundations for Cooperation: individuals, institutions and context*, Paper to be presented at the Capstone Meeting of the RSF Trust Initiative, Russell Sage Foundation.

Warren, M., 2002, Deliberative Democracy, Democratic Theory Today, pp.173-202, eds.,G. Stokes and A. Carter, Polity Press, Cambridge.

---------, ed., 1999, *Democracy and Trust*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Wittman, H., A. Desmarais, and N. Wiebe, eds., 2010, *Food Sovereignty: Reconnecting Food, Nature and Community*, Pambazuka, Oxford.

Woolcock, M., 1998, Social capital and economic development: Towards a theoretical synthesis and policy framework, *Theory and Society*, Vol.27, pp.151-208.

Yap, C., 2013, Urban Food Sovereignty: Food, Land and Democracy in Kampala, DPU Working Paper No.157, Development Planning Unit.

Yanow, D., and Schwartz-Shea, eds., 2006, *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*, M.E. Sharpe, New York.

-------, 2003, Accessing Local Knowledge, *Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society*, eds., M. Hajer, and H. Wagenaar, pp.228-46, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Yin, R., 2009, *Case study research: design and methods*, 4th ed., SAGE, Thousand Oaks, London.

Young, M., 2000, *Inclusion and Democracy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Ziervogel, G. and P. Erickson, 2010, Adapting to climate change to sustain food security, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change.

Zeeuw, H., R. de Van Veenhuizen, and M. Dubbeling, 2011, The Role of Urban Agriculture in Building Resilient Cities in Developing Countries, *Journal of Agricultural Science*, Vol. 149, pp. 153–163.

Literatures published in Thai

Bangkok Agricultural Extension Office, 2012, *Annual Report 2011*, Bangkok Agricultural Extension Office, Bangkok.

BioThai, 2013, *Food Corporations and Thai Food System*, A report, BioThai, Nontaburee.

Boossabong, P., 2012, *Growing Cities for Growing Life: Theories and Practices of Urban Agriculture*, National Health Promotion Foundation and Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, Bangkok.

---------, and J. Sreesutum, 2010, Regional Development Planning in Thailand in Transitional Period: Changes and Obstacles, *The Journal of Politics and Governance*, Vol.2, No.1, pp.129-51.

------- and P. Mukdarassami, 2010, Social Capital in the North-Eastearn Thailand under Changes: A Comparative study of Urban and Rural Communities, *Journal of Humanity and Social Science*, Vol.29, No.4, pp.62-78.

Community Organisations Development Institute, 2008, *Security House Programme Evaluation 2003-2008*, Community Organisations Development Institute, Bangkok.

CorpWatch-Thailand, 2009, *CP and Thai Agriculture*. Bangkok: Bio-Thai.

Division of Public Cleansing and Public Park, 2012, *A Survey of Household Backyard Vegetable Garden in Laksi District*, Division of Public Cleansing and Public Park, Laksi District Administration Office, Bangkok.

Economics and Logistics Division, 2011, *Looking Forward to Thai Economics after Flooding*, Seminar organised by the Federation of Thai Industries, Sirikrit National Conference Centre, 23rd November, Bangkok.

Farmers research team, 2004, *Local Wisdom for Sustainable Agriculture: Brainstorming Local Practitioners*, Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, Nonthaburee.

Hutanuwat, N., 2004, *26 Lesson Learns of Sustainable Agriculture: Approaches, Process and Indicators*, Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, Nonthaburee.

Hutapate, K., S. Yaibumroon, C. Shupmanee, N. Sudgaew, and N. Anusasananun, 2010, *Urban Vegetable Garden*, Natural Agriculture Publishing, Bangkok, Thailand.

Hutapate, K., 2011, City Farm: Green Life Bag, *Natural Agriculture Magazine*, Vol.14, No.10, pp.5-7.

Laksi District Administration Office, 2012, Food from the Sky: Rooftop Garden and Learning Centre of Laksi District Administration Office, *Laksi News*, Vol.27, No.1, pp.1-3.

Limpacuptathavon, N. and S. Sinprom, 2011, *City Dwellers' Household Gardening: Growing Happiness in Your House*, National Health Promotion Foundation and Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, Bangkok.

-------, C. Goman and S.Yaibumrung, 2010, *Handbook of Household Gardening for City Dwellers*, CFP, National Health Promotion Foundation, Bangkok.

Leaunjumroon, L., 2011, *Agricultural reform for food security: an analysis and policy responses*, BioThai, Bangkok.

National Health Promotion Foundation, 2011, An increase of household vegetable garden in Bangkok, *Sang-Sug Magazine*, Vol.8, No.127, pp.3-6.

-------, 2011, Reducing your cost of living by gardening: an experiences from the CFP, *Sang-Sug Magazine*, Vol.8, No.134, pp.5-8.

Narintarakul Na Ayuthaya, K., Where is food?, *Matichon Newspaper*, 16/12/2011, p.6.

Odompanich, V., ed., 2007, *Exploring Values of Local Vegetables*, Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, Nonthaburee.

Office of Agricultural Economics, 2011, *Impacts of Flooding 2011 to Agricultural Sector*, Data presented in 14th October, Department of Agriculture and Cooperative.

Orathai, K, 2012, 'Politics and Management for Megacity Development in the Future', Conference on '*New Bangkok: Earth Change, We Adapt*', Centre of Excellence for Climate Change Knowledge Management, Southeast Asia System for Analysis Research and Training Regional Center, and Faculty of Architecture and Planning, Thammasat University, 8th February 2012.

Pattanapanchai, N., 2009, *Traditional Ways of Rice Growing: Experiences from the Northeast and the South*, Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, Nonthaburee.

Phoorisumboon, R., 2012, *Thecentralisation of food distribution and its impacts on food security during Thai floods*. The conference on seed freedom, food sovereignty and food security, Kasetsart University, 16-17th May 2012.

Plodprasop, S., 2012, 'Bangkok Vision and Development to Cope with Flood', Conference on '*New Bangkok: Earth Change, We Adapt*', Centre of Excellence for Climate Change Knowledge Management, Southeast Asia

System for Analysis Research and Training Regional Center, and Faculty of Architecture and Planning, Thammasat University, 8th February 2012.

Policy and Planning Division, 2012, *Agriculture in Bangkok*, Research Report, Department of City Planning, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, Bangkok.

Prapun, N., 2001, Recovering Local Wisdom for Combating the World Crisis, Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, Nonthaburee.

Rapeepat, A., 2009, *Rural Population, City Dwellers, and Social Justice in Thailand*, Wanida Publishing, Chai Mai.

Rotjanapriwong, S., 2008, *Self-reliance in Practice*, Alternative Agriculture Network, Bangkok.

--------, 2004, *Local DNA and Sustainable Agriculture*, Alternative Agriculture Network, Bangkok.

Sirisumpan, T., 2006, *New Public Management in Thailand*, Office of Public Sector Development Commission, Bangkok.

Suteethorn, K. *Urban Agriculture: Ecological Functions for Urban Landscape*. A paper for IFLA APR, Korea, 2009.

--------, 2012, *Impacts of food miles in Bangkok ecological footprints*, A paper for the Seminar on Urban Agriculture, organised by the CFP, Bangkok, 8-9th June.

Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, 2009, *The Risk of Endorsement of Free Trade Agreement*, Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, Nonthaburee.

--------, 2011, *My Vegetable Garden*, CFP, National Health Promotion Foundation, Bangkok.

Thailand Foundation for Consumers, 2012, *The Survey of Chemical Contamination in Vegetables Sold in Supermarkets around Bangkok*, A report, Bangkok.

Thailand Information Centre for Civil Rights and Investigative Journalism, 2012, *Economic Lost as a result of Thai Vegetables rejected by the EU*, A report, Bangkok.

Wongaree, C., and G. Sirichai, 2012, *Impacts of Flooding 2011 on the Logistic of Agricultural Products and Recommendations*, Post harvest Technology Innovation Centre, Bangkok.

Wonganannon, S., 2012, *Thailand's Flood Crisis 2011 and The Economic Impact*, Research and Information Division, Secretariat of the Senate.

Working Group on Food for Change, 2012, Bangkok Food Mapping Survey, A report.

Working Group on Recovering Our Land, 2007, *Recovering Our Land: An Revolution of Community, Agriculture and Self-sufficiency Economy*, Thailand National Health Promotion Foundation, Bangkok.

Yaimaung, S., 2012, *Food Security in Household and Community Levels*, Food Security Programme, National Health Promotion Foundation, Bangkok.

--------, ed., 2011, *Seed Freedom: Farmer Right*, Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, Nonthaburee.

Yoowa, U., ed., 2011, Food: Life or Good? Culture for Sale under Control of Corporation, Sustainable Agriculture Foundation, Nonthaburee.

Policy Documents and Plans

Government policy document reported to the Parliament, 2008

The First National Development Plan 1961-1966

The 8th National Development Plan 1997-2001

Environmental Quality Management Plan 2007-2011

Action Plan for Sustainable Urban Green Space Management 2007

Agricultural Development Plan under the 10th National Development Plan, 2007-2011

Administrative Plan, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 2008-2011

Comprehensive Urban Plan of Bangkok 2006

Draft Comprehensive Urban Plan of Bangkok 2011

Bangkok 2020

Bangkok Green Space Action Plan

Bangkok Global Warming Reduction Action Plan 2007-2012

Thailand Water Management Plan, 2012

Annual Report of Food Security Programme, 2010

City Farm Programme Proposal 2010

Progress Report of City Farm Programme, 2011

Monitoring and Evaluation Report of City Farm Programme, 2011 and 2012

Annual Report of City Farm Programme, 2011 and 2012

Project Proposals proposed by citizen groups and social enterprises engaged in the City Farm Programme, 2010 and 2011

Progress Reports proposed by citizen groups and social enterprises engaged in the City Farm Programme, 2010 and 2011

Laws

Thai Constitution 1997, 2007

National Environmental Quality Support and Protection Act 1992

City Planning Act 1975

Land Development Act 1982

Websites

Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, http://www.bangkok.go.th/th/index.php

Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, 2012, Summary of Bangkok Flooding 2011, http://www.bangkok.go.th/th/index.php

Department of City Planning, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration,

http://cpd.bangkok.go.th/default.asp

Development of Drainage and Sewerage, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, http://dds.bangkok.go.th/dds_now/

Department of Environment, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, http://203.155.220.239/subsite/index.php?strOrgID=001054

Election Commission of Thailand, 2013, National and Local Election Results in Bangkok, http://www.ect.go.th/newweb/th/home/index.php

Food Security Programme, http://www.food-resources.org/

Green World Foundation, http://www.greenworld.or.th

Laksi District Administration Office, http://203.155.220.239/subsite/index.php?strOrgID=001010

Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives,http://www.moac.go.th

National Health Promotion Foundation, http://www.thaihealth.or.th/

Office of Bangkok Agricultural Extension, http://www.bangkok.doae.go.th/home-eng.html

Office of Community Development, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration,

http://portal.bangkok.go.th/subsite/index.php?strOrgID=001024

Office of Economic Agriculture, http://www.oae.go.th/main.php?filename=index

Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, http://www.nesdb.go.th

Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning, http://www.onep.go.th

Roi Ed Provincial Administration Office, www.roiet.go.th

Sustainable Agriculture Thailand Foundation, http://sathai.org

Thai City Farm Programme, http://www.thaicityfarm.com/

Thai Green Market Network, http://www.thaigreenmarket.com/greenshoppage.php?id=191

Thai Seed Trading Association, http://www.thasta.com/

Urban Sustainable Green Area, http://www.onep.go.th/greenarea/object.html

Working Group on Food for Change, http://www.food4change.in.th/

Appendices

Appendix A: List of key events to be observed

- A field visit organised by the City Farm Programme to provide food, materials and knowledge (know-how) for producing emergency food to the flood victims at 'Tung Song Hong'

- A meeting for sharing experiences and developing food innovations for living with water at the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation (SAF)'s office

- A collective activity to adopt farming method to create an effective microorganism ball for enhancing soil quality and reducing waste water at 'Health-me Organic Delivery, Rathaburana'

- A mutual aid by helping to recover a farm of the members at 'Saymai'slum

- An exhibition of city farm under the project organised by the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration called 'Recovering Bangkok'at Laksi

- A building of floating garden at 'Saladin'community, 'Mahasawat river'

- A seed exchange and public showcases and seminar organised at 'Tung Song Hong'

- A seed exchange organised at 'Shai-noi'

- A seed exchange organised at 'Salaya'

- A city farm tour at 'Onnut'slum

- Exhibitions of city farm in 'Green Fair'week at Chulalongkorn University (2012) and Sirikrit Centre (2013)

- A meeting of training centres working under the City Farm programme at the SAF office

- Public meetings for sharing experiences and food organised at the Bangkok 'Bhudha'garden ('Eating and sharing in the garden/ *Kin-Khaw-Nai-Soun*') (twice)
- City farm public campaign, showcases and seminar at the Bangkok 'Bhudha'garden (2012 and 2013)
- A making of the rooftop garden at the office building of the Health Promotion Foundation (HPF)

The following events organized by policy communities within the policy network were also observed.

- A meeting and a mutual aid among the members of the slum dwellers network during floods at Onnut Sibsee Rai community
- Mutual aids among the members of the informal labour network during the flood at Tungsonghong Samsoonkog and Samsongsoon national housing communities
- A mutual aid of consumers to producers, who were affected by the floods and joined community supported agricultural system (CSA) organised by the Green Market Network (GMN)
- A special green markets selling not-so-good products affected by flooding organised by the GMN
- Sharing online (via Facebook page) and during monthly event called 'Eating and sharing in the park', where the online friends (members of 'City farms, City friends') come to share food and experiences

Appendix B: Sets of questions for the interview[1]

Set A: For the interviews of key staffs of the HPF, regional and local governments who supported the City Farm programme, and NGOs and CBOs who collaboratively manage the programme (led by the SAF)

Part 1: Information of the interview

1.1. Date:

1.2. Started at:

1.3. Finished at:

1.4. Observations:

Part 2: Information of the interviewee

2.1. Name of the interviewee:

2.2. Organisation:

2.3. Address:

2.4. Telephone/ fax:

2.5. Gender:

2.6. Age:

2.7. Position:

2.8. Professional background:

2.9. Since when do you work here?

---

[1] Before the sets of questions for formal interview was designed, the informal interviews with coordinators of City Farm programme had been conducted many times to scope a boundary of key actors which must be included and framing/ mapping the actors constellations (for understanding sub-sectoral networks/ policy communities).

Part 3: Profile of the organisation/organisational unit for whom the interviewee works

3.1. What does your organisation (department/ office/ unit/ foundation/ centre/ association) mainly do? (Missions/ work tasks)

3.2. What is the specific remit/focus of your organisation? Why?

3.3. How many members? Who are they?

Part4: An emergence and characterisation of the urban agriculture's policy network in Bangkok[2]

4.1. How has your organisation engaged with the City Farm programme?

4.2. How would you define the position and main role of your organisation in the City Farm programme especially during and shortly after the flood?

4.3. How can your organisation intervene the decision making of other actors who take part in the City Farm programme (e.g. to control them to follow the rules, to guide their practices in the way you want, and to push an idea)?

4.4. Who could intervene the decision making of your organisation? And how?

Part 5: Social capital

5.1. Please rating degree of closeness between your organisation and the following organisations/ groups (giving the interviewee a sheet of name list)

      1) Knowing each other (e.g. ever met, ever chatted)

      2) Contacting each other (e.g. develop and keep connection by calling, emailing/ sending letter or sharing after met)

      3) Working with each other sometime (e.g. ever joined or joining the same project, but seldom coordinate with each other by less than one a month)

---

[2]The UA policy network in Bangkok are scoped here as actions active both under the umbrella of the City Farm programme and supporting on that programme since 2010 until early 2012 (when fieldwork was ended).

4) Working closely with each other (e.g. ever joined or joining the same project, and need to coordinate with each other in regular basis by one a month or more)

5.2. Do you think are there any other organisations/ groups missing from the list. If so, who should be added? (Snow ball)

5.3. With what organisations and/or groups whom take actions both under the umbrella of the City Farm programme and supporting on that programme have you been working closely with especially during and shortly after the floods? (Ranking the top five) Why? (Tell me a story of the relation)[3]

5.4. Do you recall any specific events in which members of your organisation work collectively with those organisations and/or groups?

5.5. After work together, do you think your relations with others whom you worked with are changed? If so, are the relations closer or looser? When and why?

Part 6: Experiences on urban agriculture and opinion about urban agriculture contribution

6.1. How is urban agriculture important?

6.2. What should be concerned in practicing urban agriculture? (Including principles and constrains)

6.3. Please talk about the role of the City Farm programme during and shortly after the floods.

Part 7: Cooperation enhancement and conflict resolution during and after the floods

7.1. What did you work with other organisations and groups in running or supporting the City Farm programme during and shortly after the floods? How?

7.2. What were the problems of working with other organisations and groups your organisation faced during and after the floods?

---

[3] To capture forms of social capital

7.3. How about cooperation problems? And how about conflicts?

7.4. How did your organisation enhance cooperation? Did it work?

7.5. When your organisation communicated with other organisations and groups, in regularly who was sent to communicate?

7.6. In relation to previous question, what were status and character of that person? What logic-evidence was used to support? How to sale an idea/ information/ knowledge?

7.7. Did the rule enforcement and incentives could help to enhance cooperation? If so, how?

7.8. Did the agreement could help to enhance cooperation? If so, how?

7.9. Concerning conflicts, how did your organisation deal with them? Did it work?

7.10. Did regulations help to solve them? If so, how?

7.11. How about talking/ negotiation? Did it help? If so, how?

7.12. Were there any mediators? If yes, did the mediator (s) support conflict resolution? And how?

Part 8: Others/ open questions in relation to collective actions during and after the floods

8.1. Could you please talk a bit about other organisations and groups especially the role of your closely related colleagues and your expectations on them on what they should better do?

8.3. In specific, what do you think the central government should better do?

8.4. Is there anything else you want to raise?

Set B: For the interviews of the leaders of 41 farming groups who lunched their project under the umbrella of the City Farm programme[4]

Part 1: Information of the interview

1.1. Date:

1.2. Started at:

1.3. Finished at:

1.4. Observations (included community settlement, location of the garden, a variety of food etc.):

Part 2: Information of the interviewee

2.1. Name of the interviewee:

2.2. Group's name:

2.3. Address:

2.4. Telephone/ fax:

2.5. Gender:

2.6. Age:

2.7. Position:

2.8. Professional background:

2.9. Career:

2.10. Income (average) per month:

2.11. Since when do you become a member of the group?

---

[4] The interviews conducting for farming groups were mainly group interviews by which some parts related to individual information were asked personally.

Part 3: Profile of the group for whom the interviewee works

3.1. What does your group do?

3.2. When does it start?

3.3. What is the specific remit/focus of your group? Why?

3.4. How had your group been formed?

3.5. How does your group work?

3.6. How many members? Who are they?

Part4: An emergence and characterisation of urban agriculture's policy networks in Bangkok

4.1. How has your group engaged with the City Farm programme?

4.2. How would you define the position and main role of your group in the City Farm programme especially during and shortly after the floods?

4.3. Could you name the organisation (s) or group (s) working related to the City Farm programme in which most of organisations and groups are involved with? What are their roles?

4.4. How do they influence the decision making of your group?

4.5. If your group need to depend on them in any reasons, why?

Part 5: Social capital

5.1. Please rating degree of closeness between your group and the following organisations/ groups (giving the interviewee a sheet of name list)

      1) Knowing each other (e.g. ever met, ever chatted)

      2) Contacting each other (e.g. to develop and keep connection by calling, emailing/ sending letter or sharing after met)

      3) Working with each other sometime (e.g. ever joined or joining the same project, but seldom coordinate with each other by less than one a month)

4) Working closely with each other (e.g. ever joined or joining the same project, and need to coordinate with each other in regular basis by one a month or more)

5.2. Do you think are there any other organisations/ groups missing from the list. If so, who should be added?

5.3. With what organisations and/or groups whom take actions both under the umbrella of and supporting on the City Farm programme have you been working closely with especially during and shortly after the floods? (Ranking the top five) Why? (Tell me a story of the relation)

5.4. Do you recall any specific events in which members of your group work collectively with those organisations and/or groups?

5.5. After work together, do you think your relations with others whom you worked with are changed? If so, are the relations closer or looser? When and why?

5.6. Do you always work with the same organisations and groups? If yes, why? If no (there are other new organisations or groups working with you), will you continue working with the new one, or plan to extend to work with the other new organisations and groups?

Part 6: Experiences on urban agriculture and opinion about urban agriculture contribution

6.1. How is urban agriculture important?

6.2. What should be concerned in practicing urban agriculture? (Including principles and constrains)

6.3. Please talk about the role of the City Farm programme during and shortly after the floods.

6.4. Who did take benefits from what your group took action in relation to food agenda during and after the floods?

Part 7: Cooperation enhancement and conflict resolution during and after the floods

7.1. What did you work with other organisations and groups in running or supporting the CFP during and shortly after the floods? How?

7.2. What were the problems of working with other organisations and groups your organisation faced during and after the floods?

7.3. How about cooperation problems? And how about conflicts?

7.4. Did your group take part in enhancing cooperation? If so, how? And did it work?

7.5. When your group communicated with other organisations and groups, in regularly who was sent to communicate?

7.6. In relation to previous question, what were status and character of that person? What logic-evidence was used to support? How to sale an idea/ information/ knowledge?

7.7. To enhance cooperation by the core organisations, what were status and characters of speakers? What kind of reason/evidence/support was given? How did they try to convince? In your view, did it work or not?

7.8. Did the rule enforcement and incentives affect your decision to take part with events organised by the City Farm programme? If so, how?

7.9. Did the agreement affect your decision to take part with events organised by the City Farm programme? If so, how?

7.10. Did your group take part in handling conflicts? If so, how? And did it work?

7.11. Did regulations help to solve them? If so, how?

7.12. How about talking/ negotiation? Did it help? If so, how?

7.13. Were there any mediators? If yes, did the mediator (s) support conflict resolution? And how?

Part 8: Others/ open questions in relation to collective actions during and after the floods

8.1. Could you please talk a bit about other organisations and groups especially the role of your closely related colleagues and your expectations on them on what they should better do?

8.3. In specific, what do you think the central government should better do?

8.4. Is there anything else you want to raise?

Set C: For the interviews of the leaders of farming groups who did not engage with the City Farm programme

Part 1: Information of the interview

1.1. Date:

1.2. Started at:

1.3. Finished at:

1.4. Observations:

Part 2: Information of the interviewee

2.1. Name of the interviewee:

2.2. Group's name:

2.3. Address:

2.4. Telephone/ fax:

2.5. Gender:

2.6. Age:

2.7. Position:

2.8. Professional background:

2.9. Career:

2.10. Income (average) per month:

2.11. Since when do you become a member of the group?

Part 3: Profile of the group for whom the interviewee works

3.1. What does your group do?

3.2. When does it start?

3.3. What is the specific remit/focus of your group? Why? (Except for slum community)

3.4. How had your group been formed?

3.5. How does your group work?

3.6. How many members? Who are they?

Part 4: Social capital and the reasons to do not engage with the City Farm programme

4.1. Are there any organisations and/or groups who take actions either under the umbrella of the City Farm programme or supporting on the programme that your group familiar with? If yes, how close? (Please provide the story of the relationship)

4.2. Why don't you engage with the City Farm programme?

Appendix C: Issues prepared for organising focus groups

I The first focus group

1. Perspectives on the overview of the supports on UA in Bangkok

2. What we did and what we did not

3. Who we worked with and who we still did not

8. Our strengths

9. Our weaknesses

10. Our opportunities

11. Our threats

II The second focus group

1. Thai food regime

2. Food system in Bangkok (production, distribution and consumption)

3. Food security and its problems in Bangkok

4. Right to food and its problems in Bangkok

5. Climate change adaptive capacity on food of Bangkok habitants

6. Our roles in responding to food security, right to food and climate change
adaptation

III The third focus group (the special one organised in 2013)[5]

1. What were the main problems of cooperation during and shortly after flooding?

2. How could we enhance cooperation?

3. What were the main conflicts during and shortly after flooding?

4. How could we handle such conflicts?

5. Why someone has been excluded?

6. Open for relevant issues raised by participants

---

[5] These issues had ever raised during one by one interview. At the first place, I tried to avoid asking them during previous focus groups. I considered that they might be sensitive issues and many people might feel uncomfortable to discuss about them, if they were raised in the face of others (including someone they avoid cooperate with or even have a conflict with). But, after I have become close with many core actors (roughly a year after the floods), I decided to organise this special focus group to ask these key issues in front of stakeholders.

IV List of NGOs and social enterprises joined the first focus group

-Mrs. S.Y., the director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation
-Miss. N. K., the coordinator of the City Farm programme
-Miss. P.V. N., the coordinator of the City Farm programme
-Miss. K. W., the coordinator of the City Farm programme (coordinating training centres)
-Mrs. K. F., the coordinator of the City Farm programme (account auditing)
-Mr. N. L., the member of the City farm Association and urban agriculture practitioners
-Ms. V. K., the member of the City Farm programme monitoring and evaluation team
-Miss.T. K., the member of the City Farm programme monitoring and evaluation team

V List of NGOs and social enterprises joined the second focus group

-Mrs. S.Y., the director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation
-Miss. N. K., the coordinator of the City Farm programme
-Miss. P. V. N., the coordinator of the City Farm programme
-Miss. K. W., the coordinator of the City Farm programme (training centres)
-Miss. K. S., the staff of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation
-Mr. N. L., the member of the City farm Association and trainer
-Mr. C. G., the member of the City farm Association and trainer
-Ms. K. M., the staff of the Organic Way, Green Market Network
-Mr. K. H., the director of the Media Centre for Development and trainer
-Miss. K. G. H., the staff of the Media Centre for Development and trainer
-Miss. K.'s friend, the staff of the Media Centre for Development and trainer
-Mr. K. K., the trainer from the 'Slow Life'hotel's training centre
-Ms. K. O., the owner of the Sai Jai Healthy Food restaurant's training centre

<u>VI List of NGOs and social enterprises joined the third focus group</u>

-Mrs. S. Y., the director of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation

-Miss. N. K., the coordinator of the City Farm programme

-Miss. P. V. N., the coordinator of the City Farm programme

-Miss. K. P., the staff of the Sustainable Agriculture Foundation

-Mr. N. L., the member of the City farm Association and trainer

-Mr. C. G., the member of the City farm Association and trainer

-Ms. K. M., the staff of the Organic Way, Green Market Network

-Miss. K. G. H., the staff of the Media Centre for Development and trainer

-Ms. P. P., the group's leader of the Organic Way

-Mr. S. T., the group's leader of the 'City farms, City friends' online group

-Ms. K. C., the member of the 'City farms, City friends'

-Ms. S. S., the member of the 'City farms, City friends'

-Ms. K. T., the staff of the Working Group on Food for Change

-Ms. W. S., the staff of the Soun Ngeaun Mema, Green Market Network

-Mr. S. Y., the staff of the Media Centre for Development

-Ms. P. T., the doctor (a specialist in eco-therapy)

Appendix D: Name lists of informants and their organisation/ group

<u>I List of public agencies, NGOs, and social enterprises working related to the City Farm programme which were interviewed</u>

Organisational unit/ organisation	Informants
National Health Promotion Foundation	-Mr. V. K., senior officer -Miss K. P., coordinator of City Farm programme
Bangkok Agricultural Extension Office, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives	-Mr. N. L., head of farmer support and development unit -Ms. J. J., senior officer
Department of City Planning, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration	-Ms. U. P., director -Mr. K. P., urban planner
Department of Environment,Bangkok Metropolitan Administration	-Ms. K. P., officer
Food Sanitation Division, Department of Health, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration	-Ms. B., senior officer -Ms. S. T., senior officer
Laksi District Administration	-Ms. A. K., director -Ms. J. T., head of the unit -Miss K. M., urban agriculture practitioner and trainer
Klongteuy District Administration	-Ms. V. C. -Ms. C. K.
Prawaet District Administration	-Mr. S. C., director -Mr. P. K., developer
Faculty of Architecture, Kasetsart University	-Associate Professor P. S.
Faculty of Environment and Resource Studies, Mahidon University	Associate Professor Dr. R. C. Associate Professor Dr. S. S. Dr. W. W.
Nutrition Institute, Mahidon University	Ms. S. C. Ms. P. T.

Organisational unit/ organisation	Informants
Faculty of Architecture and Urban Planning, Thammasart University	Dr. A. S.
Policy and Planning Programme, Mahasarakham University	Ms. W. K. Miss. T. K.
Sustainable Agriculture Foundation	-Ms. S. Y., director -Ms. U. Y., senior staff -Ms. N. K., coordinator of City Farm programme (public campaign) -Ms. P.(V.) N., coordinator of City Farm programme (citizen groups facilitator and monitor) -Ms. K. W., coordinator of City Farm programme (training centres) -Ms. K. F., coordinator of City Farm programme (accounting)
Working Group on Food for Change	-Ms. K. N. A., director -Ms. K. T., staff -Ms. K. K., staff
Green Market Network	-Ms. W. S., staff -Mr. S. K., member and city farmer
Media Centre for Development	-Mr. K. H., director and urban agriculture trainer -Ms. K. G. H., coordinator and urban agriculture trainer -Mr. S.Y., staff
City farm association (Association of social enterprises)	-Mr. N. L., urban agriculture practitioner and trainer -Mr. C. G., urban agriculture practitioner and trainer
Human Settlement Foundation	Ms. K. N.
Foundation for Labour and Employment Promotion	Ms. K. M.

Organisational unit/ organisation	Informants
'Slow Life'hotel's training centre	-Ms. W. L. -Mr. K. K.
Sai Jai Healthy Food restaurant's training centre	Ms. K. O., owner and trainer
Islam Wittayalai	Ms. C. S.

II List of selected farming groups

group	Informants
1.Homelesses living in public house for homeless (SuwidWatnhoocentre), district	-Mr. V. N., group's leader -Mr. V. T. -Ms. K. G.
2.Slum dwellers at Onnut Hoksibhok community, Prawaet district	Mr. J. G., community leader Mr. P. W., community committee
3.Slum dwellers at Poonshup community, Saymai district	Ms. V. T., cooperative leader Mr. L. B., committee
4.Slum dwellers at Onnut Sibsee Rai community, Prawaet district	-Mr. P. S., community leader -Ms. B. S., community committee -Ms. P. J., community committee -Mr. K. S., community committee
5. Informal labours at Keha Tung Songhong 306 national housing community, Laksi district	-Ms. N. S., group's leader -Ms U. N., member
6. Community committee and community members at Keha Tung Songhong Samsongsoon national housing community, Laksi district	-Mr. C. R., community group's leader -Ms. K. T., community committee
7. Informal labour namely 'Solidarity group' at Bangbon district	-Mr. M. G., group's leader -Ms. B. M., key staff
8.Community committee and community members at Pradittorakarn, Jatujak district	-Mr. S. D., community leader -Mr. L. W., community committee

group	Informants
9.Staffs of All seasons hotel, Payathai district	-Ms. P. C., human resource manager -Mr. P. K., key staff -Mr. K. S., key staff
10.Staffs of the library at RatchaputChankasem university, Ladpraw district	-Dr. K.Y. -Ms. U. T. -Ms. R. S.
11.Soo Development office of Dusitsoo, Dusit district	-Mr. K. S. -Mr. C. S.
12.Munks, teachers, hospital staffs and community members at Ratchabopit temple, Pranakorn district	-Monk P. W. -Ms. S. H.
13.Munks and school members at WatThammamongkon school, Prakanong district	-Monk P. W. -Ms. K. K.
14.Community committee and community members at Saymai national housing for low income people, Saymai district	-Mr. R. D. leader -Ms. R., community committee
15. Restaurant staffs and blue collar workers namely 'Down to earth/ Organic way', Rathaburana district	-Ms. P. P., group's leader -Mr. N. P., key staff -Ms. K. M.
16.Community committee and community members at Soun-oiy community, Klongteuy district	-Mr. S. N. leader -Ms. P. P., committee -Ms. N. N., committee -Ms. S. T., committee
17. Community committee and community members at Bankleuy community, Klongteuy district	-Ms. S. T. -Ms. M. A. -Ms. J. S.
18. A group of friends namely 'self-sufficiency group' at Seunloeung district	-Ms. D. B. -Mr. S. W.
19. Informal labours living in national house at Chalongkrung national housing community, Nhongjog district	-Ms. W. U., group leader -Ms. A. K. -Ms. U. W.

group	Informants
20. Community committee and community members at Pawana community, Jatujak district	-Ms. S. K., community leader -Ms. B. S.
21. Community committee and community members at Rungchareun community, Jatujak district	-Mr. C. U., leader -Ms. C.'s wife, committee -Ms. K. P P -MS. K. S.
22. Community members at Cho-rungreung 6 community, Bangbeautong district	-Mr. N. L. -Ms. P. R.
23. School committee and teachers at Mabon muslim community, Praweat district	-Mr. F. M. -Mr. N. U. -Mr. S. N. -Mr. M. M.
24.Community committee and community members at Saladin community, Bhudhamongkol district	-Mr. U. S. -Ms. A. S. -Ms. P. P. -Mr. N. S.
25. Director and staffs of Immigrant Youth Foundation, Bangbon district	-Mr. C. P. -Ms. S. I. -Mr. P. P.
26. Staffs of Pakkred Home for Boys, Pakkred district	-Ms. P. K. -Mr. P. T. -Mr. S. N.
27. Teachers and members of Invention club at Watshongthom school, Prapradang district	-Ms. C. S. -Ms. J. K. -Ms. S. J.
28. Teachers and students at Tangklaymuslim school, Praweat district	-Mr. S. U. -Ms. S. S. -Ms. R. K. -Ms. B. L. -Mr. P. T.
29. Condominium development committee of Tarareaun-age condominium, Wangtonglhang district	-Mrs. R. C. -Miss. W. B. -Mr. P. B. -Miss B. I. -Mr. C. S.

group	Informants
30. Company staffs of Double I studio, Bangkhuntheaun district	-Mrs. A. L. -Ms. M. S.
31. Youth volunteers (young social activists) working for Youth Asian Network, Houykhang district	-Mrs. N. S. -Miss. J. S. -Miss. T. T.
32. Community committee and community members at Jorakhe-khobmuslim community, Praweat district	-Mr. H. M. -Miss. R. M. -Mr. K. S.
33. Community committee and community members at 'Nuggeela' national housing community, Sapansoong district	-Mrs. B. K. -Mr. T. P. -Mrs. S. S. -Mrs. S. P.
34. Community committee and community members at Pinjareaun, Donmaung district	-Mr. S. P. -Mr. S. K. -Mr. N. K. -Mr. S. S. -Miss. S. P.
35. Community committee, local fireman and local policeman at Jareaunnakorn 66 community, Thonburee district	-Mr. G. S. -Mr. P. M.
36. Staffs of plastic factory namely 'Joyfull', Bangbon district	-Mr. P. E. -Ms. C. N. -Ms. S. S.
37. Informal labours working at home (buffalo horn carving), Bangcare district	-Ms. K. K. -Ms. W. S.
38. A woman group at Clonghog community, Clongloung district	-Ms. M. Y. -Ms. P. S.
39. Members of online social networks namely 'Growing Food for Urban Dwellers'/ 'City farms, City friends'	-Mr. S. T. -Ms. K. C. -Ms. S. S. -Ms. K. C.
40. Green architect and friends at Pluspar community, Maung district –Patumtanee	-Ms. P. J. -Ms. P. F.
41. 'Fang Sawan'collective group, Bangbon district	-Mr. P. K., urban agriculture practitioner and trainer -Mr. S. P.

III List of organisation and groups found as the centralities of policy communities, who were re-interviewed (deeper)

group	Informants
1. Media Centre for Development	-Mr. K. H., director and urban agriculture trainer -Ms. K. G. H., coordinator and urban agriculture trainer -Mr. S. Y., staff -Ms. M. A., Columnist of the Natural Agriculture Magazine
2. Organic way, Rathaburana district	-Ms. P. P. -Ms. K. M. -Mr. K. D.
3. Slum dwellers at OnnutSibsee Rai community, Prawaet district	-Mr. P. S. -Ms. B. S. -Ms. P. J.
4. Informal labours at Keha Tung Songhong 306 national housing community, Laksi district	-Ms. N. S. -Mr. S. N. -Mr. C. R. -Ms. K. T.

IV Two selected farming groups as other sub-case studies which did not engage with the City Farm programme (the outsiders)

group	Informants
1. Bangbuew slum dwellers community, Bangkhaen district	-Mr. K. D. -Mrs. K. S.
2. Green Made, Say Mai district	-Ms. K. O.

Note: The total number of people which I interacted with is more than 180, but the persons who had been interviewed formally by me are 161 in which some of them were interviewed twice and more. In case of coordinators of the City Farm programme, they were met with me more than 30 times.