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## Recent and rapid transmission of HIV among people who inject drugs in Scotland revealed through phylogenetic analysis

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*Published in:*  
Journal of Infectious Diseases

*DOI:*  
[10.1093/infdis/jiy130](https://doi.org/10.1093/infdis/jiy130)

*Publication date:*  
2018

*Document Version*  
Peer reviewed version

[Link to publication in ResearchOnline](#)

### *Citation for published version (Harvard):*

Ragonnet-Cronin, M, Jackson, C, Bradley-Stewart, A, Aitken, C, McAuley, A, Palmateer, N, Gunson, R, Goldberg, D, Milosevic, C & Leigh-Brown, AJ 2018, 'Recent and rapid transmission of HIV among people who inject drugs in Scotland revealed through phylogenetic analysis', *Journal of Infectious Diseases*, vol. 217, no. 12, pp. 1875-1882. <https://doi.org/10.1093/infdis/jiy130>

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1 Recent and rapid transmission of HIV among  
2 people who inject drugs in Scotland revealed  
3 through phylogenetic analysis

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13 Word count: 3497

14 Abstract word count: 200

15 Running title: HIV outbreak among PWID in Scotland

16 Keywords: HIV, phylodynamic, network, transmission, people who inject drugs, injection  
17 drug users, PWID, IDU

18 Short summary: An outbreak of HIV among people who inject drugs in Scotland follows  
19 similar recent outbreaks in Greece, Romania, Ireland and the USA. Phylodynamic analysis  
20 demonstrates the infections are tightly linked genetically and the effective reproductive  
21 number remains above 1.

22

23

# 24 1 ABSTRACT

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25 Harm reduction has dramatically reduced HIV incidence among people who inject drugs  
26 (PWID). In Glasgow, Scotland, <10 infections/year have been diagnosed among PWID since  
27 the mid-90s. However, in 2015 a sharp rise in diagnoses was noted among PWID: many were  
28 subtype C with two identical drug resistant mutations and some displayed low avidity,  
29 suggesting the infections were linked and recent.

30 We collected Scottish *pol* sequences and identified closely related sequences from public  
31 databases. Genetic linkage was ascertained among 228 Scottish, 1820 UK and 524 global  
32 sequences. The outbreak cluster was extracted to estimate epidemic parameters.

33 All 104 outbreak sequences originated from Scotland and contained E138A and V179E.

34 Mean genetic distance was <1% and mean time between transmissions was 6.7 months. The  
35 average number of onward transmissions consistently exceeded 1, indicating that spread  
36 was ongoing.

37 In contrast to other recent HIV outbreaks among PWID, harm reduction services were not  
38 clearly reduced in Scotland. Nonetheless, the high proportion of individuals with a history of  
39 homelessness (45%) suggests that services were inadequate for those in precarious living  
40 situations. The high prevalence of Hepatitis C (>90%) is indicative of sharing of injecting  
41 equipment.

42 Monitoring the epidemic phylogenetically in real-time may accelerate public health action.

## 43 **2 INTRODUCTION**

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44 People who inject drugs (PWID) are at risk of acquiring HIV from sharing injecting equipment  
45 and from high risk sexual activity while under the influence of drugs or in exchange for  
46 drugs[1]. There are 9-22 million PWID worldwide of whom 1-5 million have HIV [2].

47 Major outbreaks of HIV were identified among PWID in Scotland in the 1980s [3-5], along  
48 with other parts of northern [3, 6], and southern Europe[5]. A major outbreak in Edinburgh  
49 in 1983 associated with extensive needle-sharing [5] led to 50% of PWID becoming infected  
50 [3]. This epidemic was closely linked to similar ones in Dundee and Dublin [3], but few HIV  
51 cases were seen among PWID in Glasgow at the time[7]. Rapid introduction in the UK of  
52 needle exchange in 1986 followed by other harm reduction measures [8], dramatically  
53 decreased spread of HIV within this population. Since the mid-1990s HIV diagnoses among  
54 PWID in Glasgow have averaged 10 per year [9]. Similarly in the rest of Western Europe,  
55 incidence had declined in accordance with public health responses [10].

56 However, in 2011 there were reports of outbreaks of HIV among PWID in Greece [11],  
57 Romania [12], and Ireland [13]. Prior to this, HIV incidence among PWID in Greece and  
58 Ireland had been similar to the UK, around 0.1% [2, 14, 15]. In Greece, fewer than 20  
59 infections per year were reported among PWID between 2001 and 2010, but in 2011 this  
60 surged to 256 cases accounting for ¼ of all new HIV diagnoses that year [16]. The epidemics  
61 in Greece [11] and Ireland [13] followed an economic crisis which led to increases in  
62 homelessness. The recession of 2008 resulted in funding cuts to opiate substitution therapy  
63 and needle exchange programs in Greece and Romania [17]. In parallel, the surge in  
64 injection of stimulant-based new psychoactive substances, which are typically injected more  
65 frequently than heroin thus increasing the risk of needle-sharing, contributed to the  
66 outbreaks in Romania [12] and Ireland [13].

67 In 2015 a significant rise in HIV diagnoses among PWID was noted in Glasgow. Data from  
68 Scotland's Needle Exchange Surveillance Initiative showed that HIV prevalence among PWID  
69 increased from 0.3% in 2011-12 to 1.9% in 2015-16 [18]. Routine sequencing to test for drug  
70 resistance revealed many were HIV subtype C, a subtype rarely observed among PWID in the  
71 UK [19, 20], suggesting a common source for the outbreak.

72 Reconstruction of the transmission network through contact tracing is difficult for HIV  
73 because of the time delay between infection and diagnosis, the low transmission rate, and  
74 the challenge of collecting information pertaining to sexual and drug-taking behaviours.

75 Phylogenetic analysis of viral sequences provides an alternative and independent route to  
76 reconstructing transmission networks [21]. As viral sequences are generated as a  
77 component of routine clinical care in the UK, we conducted a phylogenetic analysis to  
78 investigate whether PWID cases were related, when infections had been acquired, and  
79 whether the strain was spreading into the wider community and elsewhere in the UK.  
80 Results informed the shape and intensity of the public health response.

## 81 **3 METHODS**

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### 82 **3.1 STUDY POPULATION**

83 Since 2005, the West of Scotland specialist virology centre has routinely carried out baseline  
84 sequencing of all new HIV diagnoses. The HIV-1 protease and reverse transcriptase regions  
85 (HXB2 positions 2253 to 3549) were amplified using primers described previously [22] with  
86 Expand reverse transcriptase and the Expand High Fidelity polymerase chain reaction (PCR)  
87 System (Roche) and the following programme: RT-PCR 42°C for 45 min; first round PCR (2  
88 min at 94°C; 10 cycles of 15 sec at 94°C; 30 sec at 55 °C; 1 min 30 sec at 72°C; 25 cycles of 15  
89 sec at 94°C; 30 sec at 55°C; 1 min 30 sec at 72°C + 5 sec/cycle; 10 min at 72°C ) and nested

90 PCR (2 min at 94°C; 10 cycles of 15 sec at 94°C; 30 sec at 55 °C;1 min 30 sec at 72°C; 25 cycles  
91 of 15 sec at 94°C; 30 sec at 55°C; 1 min 30 sec at 72°C + 5 sec/cycle; 10 min at 72°C). Sanger  
92 sequencing was performed on the ABI3130xl using BigDye Terminator v3.1 Cycle Sequencing  
93 Kit (Applied Biosystems). Alignment and base-calling was performed using the online  
94 sequence analysis software RECall [23]. REGAv3 was used to subtype sequences and detect  
95 drug resistance mutations [24]. All subtype C sequences were extracted from the laboratory  
96 database for further analysis. At each stage (extraction through to PCR) and for each patient,  
97 negative controls were included in each assay to detect contamination. If evidence for  
98 contamination was observed, all patient samples in that run were re-extracted. For each  
99 weekly run a simple phylogenetic tree was constructed to detect contamination occurring at  
100 the sequencing stage. Any cases of sequence identity in the same batch were repeated from  
101 the extraction stage.

102 Avidity testing was used to classify infections as recent or older than four months. The assay  
103 is a modification of the Genscreen HIV1/2 Version 2 (Bio-Rad) [25] and testing has been  
104 performed on HIV diagnoses since 2012. Clinical and epidemiological information was  
105 obtained through the National Health Service clinical portal, a virtual electronic patient  
106 record that contains clinical notes on interactions with tertiary services and test results. Data  
107 retrieved included hepatitis C status, viral load, date of last HIV negative test, sex, risk group,  
108 age, nationality, and history of drug use, incarceration and homelessness.

## 109 **3.2 BACKGROUND SEQUENCES**

110 The UK HIV Drug Resistance Database (UKRDB) receives *pol* sequences obtained for routine  
111 clinical surveillance and submitted by participating laboratories. Resistance data are linked  
112 to demographic and clinical patient data held in the UK Collaborative HIV Cohort study (UK  
113 CHIC) database [26] and the national HIV/AIDS Reporting System (HARS) database held at  
114 Public Health England[27]. After linking sequences to epidemiological data, the data were

115 anonymised. In the 2014 release of the database (sequences up to mid-2013), sequences  
116 were available for around 60% of the infected population and >80% of patients diagnosed  
117 since 2005. Of 63,163 sequences in the UKRDB, 15,864 sequences (25.1%) were classified as  
118 subtype C by REGAv3 [24]. Epidemiological data contributed by Public Health England and  
119 Health Protection Scotland included year of birth, gender and self-reported most likely route  
120 of infection (PWID, heterosexual sex, men who have sex with men (MSM), mother to child,  
121 blood product, or unknown).

122 The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) HIV database compiles all published HIV  
123 sequences, including 11,658 non-UK subtype C *pol* sequences (accessed 8<sup>th</sup> August 2014). We  
124 used Geneious to BLAST Scottish sequences against UKRDB and LANL sequences, selecting  
125 the ten closest matches for each individual Scottish sequence for analysis [28]. As the same  
126 sequence is hit multiple times, this procedure limits the size of the final alignments. Final  
127 alignments comprised 228 sequences from Scotland, 1820 from the UKRDB and 524 from  
128 LANL (2572 in total).

### 129 **3.3 GENETIC LINKAGE AND PHYLODYNAMIC ANALYSIS**

130 Sequences were stripped of 44 sites associated with drug resistance based on the 2013  
131 International AIDS Society list [29]. We reconstructed genetic clusters by calculating genetic  
132 distances between pairs of sequences under a TN93 substitution model. Each sequence was  
133 represented in the network by a node and nodes were linked if their pairwise distance was  
134 below a certain genetic distance threshold. At thresholds 1-2.5%, the same PWID outbreak  
135 cluster stood out (n=104, see Results), with all sequences from Scotland. We selected the  
136 tightest threshold because 1% is consistent with recent and rapid transmission [30]. 10% of  
137 outbreak sequences were submitted to Genbank (Accession numbers  
138 MG76186:MG761826). Sequences from the outbreak were further analysed using the  
139 Bayesian birth-death skyline model in BEAST2 [31, 32]. The birth-death skyline is well suited

140 to analysing outbreaks, because unlike coalescent models, it does not assume low sample  
141 fraction within an infinite population size; instead, sample fraction is explicitly  
142 parameterized. Furthermore, the birth-death skyline estimates the effective reproductive  
143 number  $R_e$ , the average number of infections originating from each individual, directly  
144 yielding epidemiologically-relevant results. Substitution models (TN93, GTR+G+I) and clock  
145 models (strict, uncorrelated lognormal) were compared and a GTR+G+I model with an  
146 uncorrelated lognormal clock was selected based on its Bayes factor. Chain samples were  
147 run for 500,000,000 generations in triplicate. Prior distributions for  $R_e$  and the rate of  
148 becoming non-infectious were extracted from a previous analysis of the UK epidemic[31],  
149 and priors for the origin of the tree and the sampling proportion were based on our  
150 knowledge of the UK epidemic. The origin of the tree was set with a maximum value of 30  
151 years and the sampling proportion was set as 0 until 2005 (the date of the first outbreak  
152 sequence) then with a normal distribution with mean=0.65 and sd=0.05. Because sampling  
153 fraction,  $R_e$  and time to becoming non-infectious are correlated in the birth-death skyline  
154 model, at least one must be set with a narrow prior [31].

## 155 **4 RESULTS**

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### 156 **4.1 THE DRUG-RESISTANT SUBTYPE C OUTBREAK HAS NOT BEEN OBSERVED** 157 **OUTSIDE SCOTLAND**

158 All Scottish subtype C sequences were included in the phylogenetic analysis ( $n=228$ ),  
159 alongside 1820 sequences from the UKRDB and 524 from LANL (2572 in total). Of 2572  
160 sequences, 501 (19.5%) linked to at least one other in the network using a genetic distance  
161 cut-off of 1%.



162 Within the network, a tight cluster of 104 sequences stood out (Figure 1). All sequences  
163 within the cluster were less than 1% genetic distance from at least one other sequence in  
164 the cluster. Mean genetic distance was <1% with 7 patients with *pol* sequences exactly  
165 identical to another, 2 pairs and 1 triad. All sequences originated from Scotland and  
166 contained E138A and V179E. Thus we have not yet observed evidence of spread of this  
167 strain outside Scotland. E138A is a common polymorphic accessory mutation weakly  
168 selected in patients receiving etravirine and rilpivirine that reduces susceptibility to these  
169 two antiretrovirals by around two fold. V179E is a non-polymorphic mutation weakly  
170 selected by nevirapine and efavirenz and associated with resistance to nevirapine, efavirenz  
171 and etravirine. In the UKRDB, which includes sequences sampled in Scotland until mid-2013,  
172 E138A is found in 1648/15,864 of subtype C sequences (10.39%) and V179E is found in 50  
173 (0.32%). Only 41 sequences in the UKRDB contained both mutations (0.25%), of which 26  
174 were from the present outbreak. Among the remaining fifteen, twelve sequences comprising  
175 both mutations were not closely related to the outbreak and were not included in the  
176 phylogenetic analysis; and three were included in the analysis but did not link to the  
177 outbreak. Between 2014 and mid-2016, 5 non-outbreak HIV diagnoses were made among  
178 PWID in Scotland.

## 179 **4.2 SPREAD OF HIV AMONG SCOTTISH PWID HAS BEEN RECENT AND RAPID**

180 Sequences from the outbreak cluster (n=104) were selected for analysis using the birth-  
181 death skyline models in BEAST2 to estimate growth through time and to better infer the  
182 origin of the cluster. Runs converged within 5,000,000 generations with ESS values above  
183 200.

184 The common ancestor to the cluster was dated as mid-2003 (2003.4; 95%HPD: 2001.8-  
185 2005.0), while the oldest outbreak sequence was from a female PWID diagnosed in 2005.  
186 Five patients were diagnosed in 2008-2009 (4.8%), 27 were diagnosed between 2010 and

187 2013 (26.0%) and 71 patients were diagnosed after 2014 (68.3%). All were diagnosed in  
188 Scotland and all those with a risk group reported were PWID.

189 The birth death skyline infers the effective reproductive number  $R_e$  (the average number of  
190 transmissions for each individual). Importantly,  $R_e$  has remained above 1 throughout the  
191 course of the outbreak (Figure 2), implying that the number of cases would be expected to  
192 continue to rise. Mean  $R_e$  was estimated as 1.5 (95%HPD 0.1-3.9) over the course of the  
193 outbreak, rising to 1.8 (HPD 1.1-2.6) during the last 2 years. At its highest point, in 2009,  $R_e$   
194 exceeded 2. Sample fraction was estimated as 0.66 (HPD 0.46 -0.81).

195 The distance between internal nodes in the tree approximates the upper bound on time  
196 between transmission events [33]. Based on the time-resolved trees, the average  
197 transmission interval was estimated as 6.7 months for the outbreak as a whole  
198 (Supplementary Information). Looking at the phylogeny in more detail, it divided into three  
199 subclusters: 1a, 1b, and 2, originating in peak2 and 2010, respectively (Figure 3). Subclusters  
200 1a and 1b had a higher density of recent transmission events, but there was no difference in  
201 transmission intervals between subclusters based on an analysis of 1,000 trees from the  
202 posterior distribution (Supplementary Information), indicating that while subclusters 1a and  
203 1b are most active at present, the transmission dynamics within all three subclusters have  
204 been similar. The origin of subclusters 1a and 1b correlated with an increase in  $R_e$  (Figure 2).

### 205 **4.3 DEMOGRAPHIC AND CLINICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OUTBREAK MEMBERS**

206 Among the 104 individuals in the outbreak diagnosed by mid-2016, 102 (98.1%) reported  
207 injecting drugs. Mean age was 38.4 (SD=6.5), 63/103 (61.2%) were men and 40 (38.8%) were  
208 women, 99/100 were white British (1 mixed race), 38/96 (39.6%) had a recorded history of  
209 incarceration and 41/92 (44.6%) reported having ever been homeless. 96/98 (98.0%) were  
210 confirmed to be HCV antibody positive, with 6 not tested, suggesting wide-spread sharing of

211 injecting equipment. 68/96 (70.8%) had ongoing HCV infection with a positive HCV antigen  
212 or PCR result.

213 HIV avidity was tested on 87/104 (83.7%) patients and 49/104 has a previous negative test  
214 result. 24/87 (27.6%) had low avidity results indicating that infection had occurred within  
215 the last four months. Five additional patients had a date of last negative HIV test less than a  
216 year previous to their diagnosis. Three patients had antibody levels too low for avidity  
217 testing indicating acute seroconversion, confirmed with negative Western Blot and BiSpot  
218 results. Therefore, in total at least 32/87 (36.8%) had HIV for less than a year at diagnosis,  
219 consistent with the short terminal branch lengths in the phylogenetic tree (Figure 3).

## 220 **5 DISCUSSION**

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221 This recent outbreak in Scotland is the latest in a series of rapid transmissions of HIV among  
222 PWID; in Greece [11], Romania [12], Ireland [13] and Indiana, USA [34]. Prior to these  
223 outbreaks, HIV incidence among PWID in these regions had been fairly static since the  
224 epidemics of the 1980s. From 2001 to 2014 there were 10-20 new cases per year in Scotland  
225 with 5-10 new cases around Glasgow [35]. The Scottish outbreak now comprises over one  
226 hundred linked cases.

227 Phylodynamic analysis demonstrated how rapidly the virus was transmitted, with average  
228 transmission intervals around 6 months, similar to MSM [33] and shorter than heterosexuals  
229 [36] in the UK. In contrast to the more commonly presented  $R_0$ , which represents the  
230 number of onward transmissions in a fully susceptible population,  $R_e$  is the number of  
231 secondary infections for the current frequency of susceptibles [37]. The number of  
232 secondary infections has averaged 1.5 since the outbreak originated around 2003, reaching  
233 2 at its peak in 2009. In contrast, HIV diagnoses among PWID did not reach a peak until 2015  
234 in Scotland remained around 20 per year between 2008 and 2010, not reaching a peak until

235 2015[38]. UK estimates of  $R_e$  for heterosexuals and MSM are below 1, and just above 1,  
236 respectively [39]. Previous estimates of  $R_e$  among PWID have ranged as high as 21.7 in  
237 Lithuania [40]. For the UK, estimates of  $R_e$  do not exist for PWID, but  $R_e$  was consistently  
238 above 1 for this outbreak, indicating that spread was ongoing in 2016. This number is  
239 specific to this outbreak and should not be extrapolated to reflect HIV transmission among  
240 PWID in the UK in general. The outbreak subdivided into subclusters, indicating independent  
241 concurrent transmission chains. All three transmission chains showed evidence of recent  
242 transmission events, and had equally short transmission intervals.

243 Genetic distance within the outbreak was extremely low, with multiple sets of identical  
244 partial *pol* sequences, a phenomenon observed in cases of rapid transmission [41]. While in  
245 part due to the short region of the virus sequenced, such low divergence demonstrates how  
246 rapidly the virus spread in this group. The potential for multiple partners during acute  
247 infection leads to low genetic diversity within PWID transmission networks. The recent  
248 outbreak among Greek PWID similarly displayed low diversity and high clustering[11],  
249 reminiscent of the spread of near identical subtype A variants throughout Eastern European  
250 and Russian PWID in the 1990s [42]. Full genome sequencing, currently being undertaken,  
251 may disentangle the sequence of transmissions within the outbreak.

252 The outbreak was in part detected because of two resistance mutations, E138A and V179E,  
253 repeatedly identified in subtype C viruses, which had not previously associated with PWID  
254 infection in the UK. This prompted a search through the UKRDB for the mutations and for  
255 related sequences. At present, despite the UKRDB collecting sequences from all HIV  
256 resistance tests, sequences are used for research purposes and not as a systematic  
257 surveillance tool. Genetic analysis confirmed the strain was unique to Scotland and is not  
258 transmitting elsewhere in the UK. In the UK it is rare to find large clusters from a single  
259 region [43], and this is now the largest cluster of HIV among PWID seen in the UK since the

260 1980s. However, we did not have samples from the rest of the UK as recent as those from  
261 Scotland. The most recent Scottish sequence was sampled in 2016, whereas the most recent  
262 UKRDB sequence was sampled in 2013. It is possible that the outbreak has spread outside  
263 Scotland but that we have not captured it.

264 No published PWID outbreaks have reported transmission of resistance mutations, although  
265 preliminary results from Saskatchewan, Canada, demonstrated the G190 mutation  
266 disproportionately affected Aboriginal PWID[44]. Earlier studies found a higher prevalence  
267 of resistance mutations among PWID than among those infected sexually[45]. Suboptimal  
268 treatment adherence among this group may provide an explanation for this  
269 phenomenon[46]. Another possibility is that blood to blood transmission could enable  
270 transmission of lower fitness viruses unable to establish infection through sexual  
271 transmission[47].

272 Despite access to injecting equipment, HIV still poses a significant risk to PWID. The  
273 identification of a unique strain facilitated its detection in Scotland during this outbreak, but  
274 real-time monitoring may help accelerate public health action. British Columbia recently  
275 deployed a real-time phylogeny response, where monthly reports were generated detailing  
276 cluster growth[48]. This analysis revealed a highly active cluster that expanded by eleven  
277 cases in three months. Members of the cluster were contacted to ensure linkage to care and  
278 partner notification and subsequently no further cases linked to those members were  
279 diagnosed. In the case of the Scottish outbreak, real-time phylogenetic monitoring could  
280 have brought the cluster to attention sooner. At present all UKRDB analyses are conducted  
281 with anonymised data, while Poon *et al* identified subjects to reach out to them. Use of non-  
282 anonymised HIV data for phylogenetic analyses is avoided in some jurisdictions because of  
283 the criminalisation of HIV transmission. An anonymised version of Poon's system can also be  
284 imagined, in which the background of sequences for comparison is anonymous but data are


285 available for the patient being seen at that moment [49]. If the patient's sequence were to  
286 cluster with two or more recent sequences, that patient could be selected for early initiation  
287 of treatment and pre-exposure prophylaxis could be offered to their partners. The  
288 advantage of Poon's method is that all members of the cluster can be retrospectively  
289 contacted whereas under the anonymised system, only patients diagnosed after the first  
290 few in a cluster would be identified. Overall, advances such as avidity testing and real-time  
291 phylogenetic analysis can be used to improve our understanding of outbreaks to better  
292 target public health responses.

293 Many PWID involved in the outbreak had experienced homelessness. Scotland's Needle  
294 Exchange Surveillance Initiative emphasised this point: almost 90% (20/23) of PWID from  
295 Glasgow who tested positive for HIV in 2015-16 had a history of homelessness, three-  
296 quarters of whom had been homeless within the last 6-months [18]. The situation in  
297 Scotland differs from that in other PWID outbreaks, however, because harm reduction  
298 services (Injecting Equipment Provision, Opiate Substitution Therapy) were available in  
299 Scotland post-recession. Indeed, Glasgow operates one of the most active Injecting  
300 Equipment Provision service in Europe, distributing over one million syringes per year[18]. In  
301 contrast, in Indiana, neither needle exchange nor HIV testing were available at the time of  
302 the outbreak[34]. Nonetheless, the association observed with homelessness suggests that  
303 harm reduction services available in Glasgow may have been difficult to access for those in  
304 precarious living situations, often with chaotic lifestyles.

305 This outbreak may have been due to a change in circumstances, but it may result from the  
306 unfortunate introduction of HIV into a group of connected but previously uninfected PWID,  
307 such as was the case in Sweden in 2006 [50] and in Indiana in 2015 [34]. The high prevalence  
308 of hepatitis C among PWID in this outbreak (>90%) is indicative of widespread injecting  
309 equipment sharing. In contrast, in Romania and Greece, multiple strains and networks were

310 uncovered [11, 12]; these outbreaks resulted from the reduced availability of harm  
311 reduction services. The Scottish outbreak is being managed through education of the  
312 population at risk and service providers, improved addiction services, increasing provision of  
313 needle exchange (e.g. greater evening availability), improving accessibility of HIV testing, and  
314 outreach services to support early treatment and retention. Further research is needed to  
315 demonstrate whether homelessness, or other behavioural factors, played a role in the  
316 outbreak.


## 317 6 FIGURES



318

319 Figure 1: Genetic distance network of relatedness at 1%. Of 2572 sequences analysed, only  
320 those linked to at least one other sequence at 1% are shown (501 in total). Sequences are  
321 coloured by origin: Scotland, the UK HIV Drug Resistance Database (UKRDB) or Los Alamos  
322 National Database (LANL). Node shapes are determined by drug susceptibility of viruses.


323 One large cluster, highlighted and circled, stood out due to its size (104 sequences), its  
324 concentration of drug-resistant sequences and its Scottish origin.



326 Figure 2. Reproductive number  $R_e$  inferred from the birth death skyline plot. The line across  
327 the plot marks  $R_e=1$ , the threshold above which an infection will continue to spread.

328





329

330 Figure 3: Time-resolved phylogeny for the outbreak cluster comprising 104 sequences from  
 331 Scotland with drug resistant mutations E138A and V179E. The outbreak subdivided into  
 332 three subclusters.

## 333 7 FOOTNOTES

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### 334 7.1 CONFLICT OF INTEREST

335 MRC is currently supported by a grant from Gilead to the University of California, San Diego  
 336 for work on Hepatitis C. This funding was received after the present work was completed  
 337 and did not have any influence on this work. All other authors report no conflicts of interest.

### 338 7.2 MEETINGS WHERE THE WORKS HAS BEEN PRESENTED

339 Conference on Retroviruses and Opportunistic Infections, Seattle, USA, 2017

340 HIV Dynamics and Evolution, Isle of Skye, Scotland, 2017

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## 354 **8 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

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355 The authors would like to acknowledge Denise Kuhnert for proving advice on the skyline  
356 model, and would like to thank the clinical teams for their input. This work was supported  
357 through the Pangea-HIV Consortium with support provided by the Bill & Melinda Gates  
358 Foundation and by NIH GM110749.

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