

Ideology and Pragmatism: Discourse Factors in Infrastructure Development in Indonesia's Jokowi-JK Era

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ABSTRAK

Diskursus pembangunan pada sebuah negara secara umum membicarakan tentang bagaimana ide/gagasan mempengaruhi kebijakan-kebijakan perekonomian. Di Indonesia diskursus pembangunan terus mengalami perubahan tergantung pada rezim yang memerintah. Pasca reformasi, diskursus yang dominan adalah diskursus neoliberal yang meminimalisir peran negara dalam pembangunan. Tetapi pada masa pemerintahan Jokowi-JK, peran negara kembali menguat. Pemerintah merencanakan pembangunan infrastruktur ekonomi fisik secara masif. Pemerintah melegitimasi pilihan tindakannya sebagai implementasi ideologi Pancasila dan Trisakti. Namun, dengan menggunakan teori diskursus Ernesto Laclau dan Chantal Mouffe, artikel ini berargumen bahwa negara melegitimasi kebijakannya sebagai implementasi ideologi dengan membangun diskursus pembangunan infrastruktur, tetapi sesungguhnya menutupi praktik pragmatis yang terjadi. Praktik pragmatis yang dimaksud adalah pengabaian pemerintah terhadap nasib dan hak warga yang terdampak akibat pembangunan infrastruktur.

Kata kunci: diskursus, pembangunan, infrastruktur, Jokowi-JK

ABSTRACT

The discussion about development discourse in a country talking about how an idea affect economic policies. In Indonesia, the development discourse continues to change depending on the ruling regime. After the reformation, the dominant discourse is a neoliberal one that minimizes the role of the state in development. During the reign of Jokowi-JK, however, the role of the state strengthened. The government plans to build a massive infrastructure of the physical economy. The government legitimized its choice of action as the implementation of the Pancasila and Trisakti ideologies. Using the theories of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, this article argues that the state legitimizes its policies as implementing ideology by building infrastructure development discourse, but covers only pragmatic practices that occur. The practices themselves are pragmatic because the government ignored the fate and rights of citizens affected by infrastructure development.

Keywords: discourse, development, infrastructure, Jokowi-JK

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INTRODUCTION

In general, development discourse in a country examines how ideas can influence economic policies (Sikkink 1991; Park 2005; Pesaran 2008; Barabantseva 2012; Gebresenbet 2014). These ideas can be sourced from ideology, government officials who have the power to implement it in the form of policies (Sikkink 1991; Barabantseva 2012; Gebresenbet 2014), or the epistemists in civil society who can influence government decisions (Park 2005; Pesaran 2008). Besides talking about ideas, development discourse also reveals the background of the main economic problems of a country and attempts to outline the steps the country has taken to solve the problems (Rahardjo 2012).

In the Indonesian context, the development discourse is always changing. During the first twenty years after independence, there was a consensus that socialism was the best way to plan development in Indonesia. Socialism is the antithesis of capitalism, which was considered the main factor behind the colonial system of oppression and power (Thuy 2014, 131). When the New Order began to rule, with policy makers prioritizing the need for capitalist-style stabilization, rehabilitation and economic development, the policies of reducing government spending, bank lending, and subsidy spending were a shock to the system (Mas'ood 1989). The development model was criticized because it was considered contrary to the 1945 Constitution. This caused the domestic industry to suffer and more importantly, did not solve structural problems in the Indonesian economy. To counter this, the think tank Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) encouraged the state to take a greater role as a leader who coordinates and oversees national economic activities. This is known as state corporatism (Mallarangeng 2002). Unfortunately, the development model that was executed caused structural decay, ignoring as it did social aspects. These conditions in turn led Indonesia into a very severe crisis starting in 1997 and culminated in the resignation of Suharto as president (Chaniago 2012).

Reforms in 1998 drove Indonesia to the era of openness and gave the country an opportunity to apply a different development model. The economic crisis also, however, opened opportunities for neoliberal

discourses to exert their influence in the country (Wirasenjaya 2012). International institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) encouraged a change in the nature and role of the state, from the centralization of the Old Order and the New Order. Economists like Mubyarto and Sri Edi Swasono believed that the Indonesian government was forced to follow the paradigm of neoliberalism, rendering it powerless against globalization and the expansion of capitalism (Rahardjo 2012). Neoliberalism requires governments to minimize the role of the state in the economy and development to implement good governance, social risk management, and social safety nets (Carroll 2010).

The role of the state in development has, however, strengthened again in the era of Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla, known as Jokowi-JK (2014-2019). In this era, the government has made the development of infrastructure its main political project (Lane 2015). In the 2015-2019 National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN), the government targets infrastructure development consisting of 2,000 km of roads, 1,000 km of toll roads, 3,258 railway lines, 24 ports, 49 dams, 10 airports, 1 million hectares of irrigation, and a power plant with a capacity of 35 thousand megawatts (Bappenas 2014). This ambitious and massive project aims to realize the goals set forth in Nawacita (Jokowi-JK's campaign documents), primarily economic independence. Warburton (2016) concluded that Jokowi-JK's leadership style embraces a government-oriented statist-nationalist ideology.

The above shows that the Jokowi-JK regime dares to challenge neoliberal thinking and showed significant difference from the previous governments in the post-reform era. This article therefore answers the question: "Why strengthen the state's role in infrastructure development in the Jokowi-JK era?" In political science literature, political factors or the people occupying authority can change policy and institutions. As a result of these changes, the paradigm and preferences change too (Bahri 2017, 238-240). Paradigms, preferences, and ideas can be analyzed by examining how policy discourse is constructed as a tool to legitimize government choice. This article, thus, uses the theories of the discourse

by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe to answer the question posed. In short, this theory explains that discourses become hegemonic by intervening the empty signifier as referred to both theorists. This intervention occurs through the practice of articulation. Other than that, the hegemony ushers in antagonism, which tries to expose things behind the discourses.

This article argues that the state legitimized the policy as a way to implement the ideology that comprises the development infrastructure discourse. Nevertheless, in reality it only covers pragmatic practices that already occurred because the government ignored the fate and rights of citizens affected by infrastructure development. So, ideological aspects of the policy do not really exist in practical level. The analysis in this article is divided into four sections. The first section explains the meaning of “development” as an empty signifier in the development history of Indonesia, and the second defines the articulation of infrastructure development discourses in the Jokowi-JK era. The third section examines the formation of hegemony and antagonism in this discourse, and the fourth section clarifies the pragmatical practice of the implementation of infrastructure development.

DISCOURSE THEORY

Based on Laclau and Mouffe (2008, 152), discourse is a structured totality resulting from the practice of articulation. The assumption is that all objects and actions are meaningful, and that their meaning is conferred by historically specific systems of rules. The practice of articulation is any practice establishing a relationship among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The articulation depends greatly on the context in which there is a power relation working to construct the discourse. Townshend (2003, 131) therefore asserts that “meaning is discourse-dependent”. The discourse is always contingent, partial, relational, and never fully formed itself because it is always contested. Discourses exist in a dynamic arena without boundaries, and they will compete to become dominant and hegemonic.

To be dominant and hegemonic, discourse works by intervening in an empty signifier (Howarth et al 2000, 9). An empty signifier is a discursive element that has been emptied of its content to become a uniting discourse (Savirani 2017, 114). Laclau (2007) exemplifies the application of the concept of empty signifier to explain how the formation of a public order occurs. Initially, before there was a state, there was no such thing as order, referring to Thomas Hobbes' theory of the state of nature. Order becomes an empty signifier that is contested by various political forces. In the end, it is the ruler or state that defines and dominates what the meaning or "order" is.

The ruling regime can always build a hegemonic discourse, because it controls a variety of resources. According to Antonio Gramsci, hegemony works top down, that is, when the ruling class succeed in getting rid of opposition forces and wins both active and passive approval from its allies. On the other hand, hegemony can also work bottom up, when resistance arises from the community over oppression and regime pressure (Hutagalung 2008). According to Laclau and Mouffe, the battle between the two directions of hegemony is called the contestation for discourse, and the form that it takes has come to be known as antagonism.

The hegemony and antagonism above enables the formation of a political frontier. In this situation, a chain of equivalence is built between the political forces that resist the oppressive regime. An oppressive regime, however, will try to absorb the demands of the opposition. Destabilizing the boundary separating oppressive regimes from opposing groups. If an oppressive regime accommodates some of the demands, it can break the chain of equivalence and return it to the situation of particularity. This condition is then referred to as a logic of difference (Hutagalung 2008).

This theory proposes the proposition that to understand antagonism, a distinction must be made between politics and the political (Mouffe 2005, 8-9). The first term refers to things that are more detailed and formalistic/administrative, such as decision-making and policy implementation, while the second term refers to things that are more substantial,

such as ideological battles and conflicts of power. Thus, politics exists because previously there has been the political. Things like decision-making and policy implementation are the result of the ideological battles or conflicts of power. So, to dismantle a hegemony that covers something, the political basis must be examined. Laclau further explains that it is politics that determines how humans act, think, and shape economic structures (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 34). This opinion is contrary to that of Karl Marx, who postulated that the economic infrastructure determines the political suprastructure.

This article uses a theoretical framework for the theory of discourse developed by Laclau and Mouffe above. The concepts of the empty signifier and articulation explain the changes and continuity of development discourse that occurred in Indonesian history to build a concept of infrastructure development in the style of the Jokowi-JK administration. The concepts of hegemony and antagonism explain the substantial political process behind the discourse of infrastructure development while at the same time explaining what is covered or marginalized as a result of the discourse.

METHODOLOGY

This article uses a qualitative approach to discourse analysis techniques. Discourse analysis refers to the practice of analyzing empirical raw materials and information as discursive forms. This means that discourse analysts treat a wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic data—speeches, reports, manifestos, historical events, interviews, policies, ideas, even organizations and institutions—as “texts” or “writing”. These data are “text”, which represents what is not only written but also held against all the reality that is the object of observation (Howarth et al 2000, 4).

Laclau suggested that reading politics must be by deconstruction. Two stages of “reading the text” are conducted by the researcher. First, reality is read in simple terms (which are presented in plain view) and then classified. After that, the various sources of relevant data are vali-

dated. Second, the data are further read to uncover what is not delivered, marginalized, ignored, and invisible in the observed reality. Things that do not appear in the “text” will be a reference to analyze power relations between the ruling regime as a dominant with the peoples as the victim of oppression. “Reading” in the context of discourse analysis is to generate the meaning process (Raffiudin 2014, 75-77). In addition, this study uses in-depth interviews to validate the data.

DEVELOPMENT AS AN EMPTY SIGNIFIER

Indonesia’s independence on August 17, 1945, was only limited to political independence. Economically, the colonial government still controlled the Indonesian people. To achieve economic independence, a discourse on colonial direction developed into a national economy (Thuy 2014, 131). Economic decolonization or Indonesianization includes three processes: form state enterprises, promote Indonesian citizens to occupy important positions in foreign companies operating in Indonesia, and nationalize Dutch companies (Lindblad 2009, 220).

According to the state officials at the beginning of Indonesia’s independence, shaping the national economy is also implemented through development. Proclaimer Mohammad Hatta called this development a political problem. Politics can open the way for people and provide them the opportunity to improve their lot. As the colonial government inherited a pattern of export-oriented economy, Hatta argued the state should build up the domestic market by raising the people’s purchasing power through the production of goods. This was seen as a basic requirement to grow the national economy (Rahardjo 2017). Sumitro Djohadikusumo believes that development requires continuous efforts to address and correct structural gaps and imbalances, and therefore, public policy must be directed to change the conditions imposed by the structural gap. One approach to this is by industrialization (Wie 2005). In contrast to Sumitro, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara argues that people must first get an education in management and technology before entering industrialization. Economic development must be adjusted to the needs of the community, namely agriculture and natural resources, and

in turn, industrialization should also be directed at these two things (Wie 2005).

Leaders and government officials agreed that the state must play a role in economic development at the beginning of Indonesia's independence. Then, the state launched several programs aimed at growing the national economy, such as the Economic Urgency Plan, the Fortress Program (Program Benteng), and the Eight Year of Development Plan. The Eight Year Plan is a manifestation of the principle of guided economy, "standing on one's own feet" (*berdiri di atas kaki sendiri*) and self-sufficient, which was introduced by President Sukarno during the state speech address on August 17, 1964 (Thuy 20114, 250-255). All economic activity was concentrated on the state. Private companies were forbidden to carry out activities such as export-import, unless permitted by the government (Castles 1965).

In the New Order era, the development orientation changed. On the advice of technocrats who became economic adviser and then decision-makers, the government implemented efficiency and rationalization. To overcome the economic crisis and the attendant severe inflation, the government administered a sort of shock treatment with drastic stabilization, limiting state spending so that the subsidies that have been relied on by state companies were no longer available. The state also opened up and became dependent on foreign capital (Mas'oe'd 1989). This development discourse is referred to as Widjojonomics, referring to the "chairman" technocrat, namely Widjojo Nititsastro.

When BJ Habibie became the Minister of Research and Technology, the orientation of development was based in technology, with the aim of transforming Indonesia's agrarian society into an industrial society. The strategy was to produce highly educated scientist and engineers. Habibie believed that human resources (HR) are important factors that determine the progress of the economy, a concept demonstrated by East Asian countries that achieved high economic growth, despite not having a rich of natural resources (Gie 1995, 17; Amir 2008, 318). Once again, the role of the state was strengthened in leading national

economic development. This development discourse is referred to as Habibinomics.

Entering the era of reform, the government's development direction was forced to conform to the demands of international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. These institutions encouraged states not to overly interfere with economic activities, and instead required them to make structural adjustments by implementing good governance, social risk management, and social safety nets (Carroll 2010). One form of this development model is the design of the 2011-2015 Master Plan for the Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesian Economic Development (MP3EI). In MP3EI, infrastructure development, such as drinking water, transportation, roads, electricity, oil and gas, waste management, irrigation, and telecommunications are transformed into business and industry (Rachman dan Yanuardy 2014, 23). The state's only role in this scheme is as the regulator and facilitator.

It can be concluded that the discourse of development in Indonesia's history is always changing. Referring to the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe, the meaning of development here is contingent, relational, and never forms itself, furthermore the development discourse has always opposed, dismantled and transformed itself. It is relational because it is very dependent on the ruling government regime. The meaning and the character of development will thus also be transformed along with the change of regime. In this case, the meaning of development has become an empty signifier.

ARTICULATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE

The idea of development in the style of the Jokowi-JK administration can be tracked from the 2014 Nawacita document, which contains the vision and promise of his campaign. The document stated that the weakening of the joints of the national economy was one of the main problems of the nation and offered the solution of returning to the ideological path, Pancasila and Trisakti. Pancasila is the basis that provides direction in nation building and Trisakti is the basis for the develop-

ment of national character and the foundation of future national policies. Their concrete form is through economic independence, which is understood as the ability of the state to meet the needs of society, both basic needs such as clothing, food and shelter, and basic services such as education and health. The state is considered to have the responsibility to design and guarantee that all economic policies are directed to meet these two issues. The Jokowi-JK government's strategy to meet basic needs and provide basic services is to build good infrastructure. Good infrastructure will improve people's productivity and competitiveness in the international market (Nawacita 2014).

After Jokowi-JK was elected became the president and the vice president of Indonesia for the 2014-2019 period, the Transition Team was formed on August 4, 2014. The team determined that the implementation of development must be based on justice and equity, not electoral based. In this case, the government is designed to align the direction of national development toward Pancasila and Trisakti (Interview with Arif Budimanta, May 9, 2019). The team, together with the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), then folded the campaign document Nawacita into the 2015-2019 RPJMN document, stating that the vision is the realization of a sovereign, independent, and personality (*kepribadian*) based on *gotong royong*. To realize this vision, the government estimates investment needs of up to Rp 5,519 trillion to build infrastructure (Bappenas 2014; Negara 2016, 146). One of the implications of the policy was an increase in the infrastructure budget in 2015, which reached 14,46% of the state budget. In the previous year, the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Boediono administration only budgeted 9,48% of the state budget to build infrastructure (Adam 2018).

On November 17, 2014, Jokowi reduced the budget subsidy of fuel oil in the 2015 state budget from Rp 276 trillion to Rp 64.67 trillion. The government diverted those funds instead to provide a capital injection to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), an increase in village funds, and infrastructure development (Negara 2015). Jokowi understated that the move was an unpopular policy, as it implied that the government is not pro-people. According to him, however, the policy was an attempt to

stop the wrong practice, namely fuel subsidies that have only been enjoyed by millions of private cars or the haves, rather than being spent for those who live in more deprived areas as well as those who live below the poverty line (Cabinet Secretariat of The Republic of Indonesia 2015).

For many years the state budget has included the fuel subsidy, beginning in 2012 when the trade balance of oil and gas was in deficit due to declining production while consumption is increased (Tempo 2014). Jokowi reduced the subsidies to carry out the transformation of national economic fundamental and to change the development paradigm from consumptive to productive. Productive development begins by carrying out development from the periphery, regions and villages, to increase the productivity of HR, and science and technology driven by creative, innovative, and persistent mental attitudes (Cabinet Secretariat of The Republic of Indonesia 2015). This is in contrast to the approach of the SBY government (2004-2014), in which development was directed to a densely populated area so that people immediately feel its impact (Tempo 2015a).

After implementing the transformation of economic fundamentals in its first year, the Jokowi government implemented an acceleration of national development the following year. Acceleration was needed because since independence, Indonesia was considered unable to break the chains of poverty, unemployment, and economic and social inequality. Accelerated infrastructure development as a foundation for national development was intended to strengthen inter-regional connectivity and reduce inequality and social disparities (Cabinet Secretariat of The Republic of Indonesia 2016).

After the transformation of economic fundamentals and an acceleration in development, the next step goal for the Jokowi administration was economic equality with justice. The hope was to foster centers of economic growth, by stimulating infrastructure development throughout the country rather than focusing solely on Java, as former regimes had done. With the growth of new economic growth centers, Jokowi hoped to stimulate national pride and developed the feeling of “the presence of the state” among the citizens (Cabinet Secretariat of

The Republic of Indonesia 2017). In a broader context, this shows the government's commitment to maintaining the well-being of national integration.

Jokowi called for infrastructure development to be economically sustainable in the long term, not only to make Indonesian economy more efficient and competitive, but also to unite the people of Indonesia. Jokowi does not interpret infrastructure development simply as physical development, but also as a form of developing civilization and culture to face the challenges of the present and future (Cabinet Secretariat of The Republic of Indonesia 2018). The concrete results of this discourse give social factors more priority than economic or business factors. This is why the government assign SOEs to work on infrastructure development projects which are less attractive for private companies because of their long-term profit period, such as the Trans Sumatera highway.

Through 2018, the Jokowi-JK government succeeded in building 3,432 km of national roads, 947 km of toll roads, 39,8 km of bridges, 134 suspension bridges, 754,59 km of railway lines, 10 airports, 19 ports, and 17 dams (The President of the Republic of Indonesia 2018). This achievement is still far from the target stated in the RPJMN because many of these infrastructure developments are too huge and difficult to handle (Salim and Negara 2019, 255).

Most constructions completed by the Jokowi-JK administration were called projects that had not been completed by previous governments. Completing these stalled projects can be understood as an attempt by Jokowi-JK government to build a political frontier. This article argues that the construction of massive infrastructure into a political frontier is emerging as the result of discourse articulation of infrastructure development in the Jokowi-JK era. The government believes that infrastructure is the basic capital for a country to move forward and infrastructure development should take place soon by the state because the cost will be more expensive when delayed. The neglect of infrastructure by previous governments failed to bring Indonesia on par with developed countries. In a 2014 interview with *Foreign Affairs*, Jokowi stated that the former government had an infrastructure budget, but no system to

distribute it to benefit the people. The Jokowi-JK government created a new political frontier to address the antagonism between change and the status quo, between the working and doing nothing, and between the pro-people government and the not pro-people.

The articulation of the infrastructure development discourse is thus an effort of the Jokowi-JK government to interpret development, which has become an empty signifier. This gave rise to the term “Jokowinomics” as a signifier of identity patterns and thoughts that underlie infrastructure development policies. The term refers to the designation of the ‘leaders’ approach in managing their economic policies (Sasangka et al 2017), and became popular when Arif Budimanta wrote an article in *The Jakarta Post* titled “The Concept of Jokowinomics” in October 2014. Jokowinomics is characterized by various concept such as building from the periphery, bring the state to the people, mental revolution, economic productivity, and so on (Interview with Arif Budimanta, May 9, 2019).

HEGEMONY AND ANTAGONISM IN INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE

When referring to Mouffe’s concept of politics and the political, the articulation practice of the infrastructure development discourse can be said as a politics as it pertains to the empirical case, namely an economic policy. Meanwhile, to understand the political aspects of this discourse, it is necessary to analyze the government’s efforts to get rid of opposition forces and win the approval of its allies to make the development of infrastructure as a hegemonic discourse. But at the same time, the opposition, as well as elements representing the power of civil society, would appear to criticize the government’s efforts as hegemonic discourse, revealing a discursive battle or antagonism.

In the 2015-2019 RPJMN (Bappenas 2014), it is written that politics is a necessary condition in the national development strategy. The politics in question is the support of various existing forces to create political stability that will assist the government in launching its infrastructure development agenda. In making this happen, the government

politically accommodates its supporting parties and absorbs opposition forces that have the potential to delegitimize its power.

The politics of accommodation are reflected in the composition of 34 ministers in the Kabinet Kerja, where the percentage of representation from political parties is quite large. Political influence is especially apparent in the appointment of the National Democratic Party politician, Prasetyo, as Attorney General (Tempo 2015b). Six of the nine members of the Presidential Advisory Council appointed by Jokowi also came from political parties (Tempo 2015c), and volunteers and other supporters of Jokowi awarded commissioner position in SOEs (Sudrajat 2017).

The Jokowi-JK government required strong political support at the beginning of the administration because their supporting parties only have 37% number of seats in the parliament. This reality forced Jokowi to consolidate his power (Warburton 2016). The first year of Jokowi-JK was a transactional and transformational time (Agustino 2015) primarily because the government must conduct the politics of accommodation to carry out its development agenda. At the same time, transformational steps were also taken, such as cutting fuel subsidies, building from periphery, encouraging a mental revolution, and dare to involve the Eradication Corruption of Commission (KPK) and the Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (PPATK) before appointing ministers and other officials.

The politics of accommodation for political stability and smooth development are evident in some of Jokowi's reshuffling of the cabinet. Jokowi called for the first reshuffle in August 2015 to improve cabinet consolidation and strengthen the economic team, because at the beginning of his tenure, the economy was sluggish and not performing. Research by the Institute of Development of Economics and Finance (INDEF) found that there were no breakthroughs, only failed efforts to transform economic structures. Further, the government did not well-prepared and ended up with low budget absorption. Economic growth in the first quarter of 2015 was only 4,7% which was well below the government's target of 7% (Rusli et al 2015).

The second reshuffle in July 2016 caused by several ministers were publicly making “noise” in objecting to the government’s plans. For example, a disagreement arose between Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Sudirman Said and Coordinating Minister of Maritime Rizal Ramli related to the management of the Masela Block, or noise-related to Minister of Transportation Ignasius Jonan about the management of the fast train project from Jakarta to Bandung. Jokowi declared that the government’s performance should be compact and in line with the vision and mission of the president (Tempo 2016). His cabinet reshuffle became more political when government ministers had to relinquish seats to the two political parties that began to support the government, the Golkar Party and the National Mandate Party.

The most important negative issue facing the Jokowi-JK government was the government’s impartiality toward Islamic groups. This issue is disruptive to political stability, especially when there were several series of Islamic demonstrations that required the Governor of Jakarta at the time, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, sued for imprisonment for blasphemy. Jokowi is on Basuki’s side and several of Jokowi’s policies received strong criticism from Islamic groups. The first was the legalization of the Law on Mass Organizations that allowed the government to dissolve the mass organization Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia. This group very vocally wishes to replace democracy with the Caliphate system. Secondly was the government’s attitude which was considered less appreciative to the ulamas because it allowed legal case to proceed against them to occur, as it happened to the Chairman of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Rizieq Shihab.

Responding to anti-Islamic sentiment, Jokowi undertook several steps to try to embrace and gain the sympathy of the Islamic group, including regular visits to Islamic boarding schools in the regions, establishing National Santri Day which is commemorated every October 22, issuing a day’s discourse wearing *sarung*, and appointed the Chair of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) Ma’ruf Amin as candidate for vice president in the 2019 Presidential Election. According to Greg Fealy (Handayani 2018), Jokowi’s use of political Islam in Indonesia

was a mere symbol for political purposes. Because of this lip service and because Islamic groups themselves do not have a clear political program based on Islamic principles, the influence of Islamic leaders in government decision-making has been minimal.

Two aforementioned steps, namely, political accommodations and gaining the sympathy of Islamic groups, are attempts by the government to absorb rather than eradicate opposition forces. With these forces in line, the government has won the approval of its allies to legitimize infrastructure development agendas.

After achieving successful political stability, the next political challenge the government faces is that of building the infrastructure itself. Over the years, the structural obstacles that must be faced by the government in infrastructure development are a matter of exemption or land acquisition and financing issues. Furthermore, a decentralized political system has resulted in the central government also having to deal with the complicated flow of the bureaucracy that also involves local governments (Davidson 2015; Utomo 2017).

Via Presidential Regulation Number 26 of 2015, Jokowi formed the Presidential Staff Office (KSP), a non-structural institution to improve the smooth control of national priority programs, the administration of presidential political communication, and the management of strategic issues. The president carries out his political efforts through the function of the KSP, which ensures that his vision, mission, and promises can be achieved. On a daily basis, then, the KSP oversees all Nawacita programs and reports its supervision periodically to Jokowi. The KSP further works to unravel the bottleneck that hinders the implementation of infrastructure development (Interview Gibran Sesunan, April 4, 2019). One of the KSP's duties is to help the government deal with four problems in infrastructure development, namely land acquisition, financing, cross-sectoral coordination between ministries and institutions, and local government support related to handling social imp

One consequence of the Jokowi-JK government's prioritizing infrastructure development is the attendant neglect of the other sectors and issues. This gives rise to resistance and led to antagonism between

various political forces because their interests may collide with and confront each other. Antagonisms arise usually from two existing political forces, namely political opposition and civil society organizations and intellectuals.

Political opposition builds the narrative that the government only gives the appearance of effectiveness, does not answer economic problems, and only acts in electoral interests. For the opposition, infrastructure development is the government's obligation, not an achievement, and the discourse of infrastructure development is considered to be performed for appearances only. Infrastructure development also does not answer economic problems with an example of logistical costs, which are in fact still expensive. Further, infrastructure development should support the distribution of domestic products to support domestic industries. The government also builds infrastructure with a pragmatic approach, electoral interests, for example, quickly finishing a structure to host the inauguration ceremony, there, even though the construction is not necessarily in accordance with societal or economic needs (Jppn.com 2019; Prabowo 2018; Thomas 2019).

Antagonisms arising from civil society and intellectual groups are issues largely ignored by the government due to the hegemony of the infrastructure development discourse. Such antagonisms include the resolution of human right issues, the eradication of corruption, environmental problems, and agrarian conflicts. Disregard for these issues, for example, is reflected in Jokowi's State Address which barely touches on them. Regarding human rights issues, for example, according to a 2018 report by Amnesty International, there were 39 homicides in Papua involving state officials, but none of the cases were processed.

The Jokowi-JK government has had to address corruption. The Anti-Corruption Study Center of the University of Gadjah Mada (UGM Pukat) assessed the direction and strategies to eradicate and prevent corruption stated in the RPJMN. First, UGM Pukat found that the harmonization sought through the draft Law of Corruption (Corruption Bill) stagnated and did not even appear in the national legislation program priorities. Second, criminalization present at the outset of the Jokowi-

JK government weakened KPK (Corruption Eradication Committee). Third, from 2015 to 2017, the KPK enforcement statistics still noted the trend of increasing corruption of priority sectors, namely the prevention of procurement of goods and services by employees of both SOEs and private enterprises. Fourth, the strategic agenda on community awareness of preventive measures has not been implemented through means such as anti-corruption courses in universities (Syambudi 2018).

According to Wahana Lingkungan Hidup (Walhi), the massive development of infrastructure under the pretext of improving people's welfare can result in governmental neglect of the environmental impact. The evidence supporting this statement is the number of cases of human rights violations against environmental fighters, as many as 93 cases from 2014 to 2018. Three of them are the cases of Salim Kancil in East Java, Indra Pelani in Jambi and Poro Duka in East Nusa Tenggara (Putri 2018). This problem is also related to agrarian conflicts.

INDEF is a civil society organization that specifically criticizes infrastructure development policies in the Jokowi-JK era, and according to their research, there are some weakness in the government's infrastructure development. First, the development is funded by debt, the uses of which can lead to a weakening of Rupiah. Second, raw materials and capital goods for infrastructure development, such as iron, steel, and electrical machinery, rely primarily on imports. This places a burden on the state budget because it increases the deficit in the trade balance. Third, infrastructure development that involves more SOEs and their subsidiary will edge other contractors out, especially small business from the middle and lower classes. Data from the Construction Contractors Association of Indonesia (Gapeksi) reveal that thousands of contractors in Indonesia have bankrupt during Jokowi-JK's reign (Saputri 2018).

Measures of the Jokowi-JK government that give priority to infrastructure development and ignore other issues indicate an attempt to construct hegemonic discourse. The emergence of resistance from various civil society and intellectual forces that oppose the various excesses of the policy, such as Amnesty International, UGM Pukat, Walhi, and

INDEF is a form of debate or discursive practice between the government and non-government in the public sphere. It is when each power -government, opposition and civil society- articulates or builds relationships between elements, that antagonism or contestation of meaning occurs. The various strengths of civil society can become chains of equivalence to counter government dominance in infrastructure development.

PRAGMATIC PRACTICES IN INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

The character of hegemony tends to cover something and a deconstruction is needed to uncover the things behind it. When referring to the articulation of the discourse of infrastructure development, the impact of the infrastructure projects to the affected people affected not submitted into and did not appear in any official reports. This shows that infrastructure development is legitimized by ideology but is implemented in a pragmatic way, in practice by the government.

Society is of course affected by infrastructure development, usually in the social, economic, and ecological arenas. This impact is related to threats to the survival of the community and the natural landscape and environment at the location of the development. Restitution for land used for the benefit of infrastructure development is one mechanism to reduce the burden of the people affected, but sometimes the compensation received is not worth the loss suffered (Setyawati 2015). The process of infrastructure development always begins with land acquisition. In developing countries such as Indonesia, residents feel a strong bond to the acquired land and this bond becomes the basis of identity (Davidson 2015, 69-70). Land is the source of people's livelihood, and access to land determines their class position and status. The problem of land acquisition on a large scale thereby becomes a structural problem that continues to hamper the progress of infrastructure development that is deemed "land hungry" (Salim and Negara 2019).

This article examines the example of the process of land acquisition development for the International Airport West Java (BIJB), which was

started and completed in the reign of Jokowi-JK. Planned since 2005 and one of the listed projects in MP3EI, BIJB is located in District Kertajati, Majalengka, West Java, and has been operating since May 24, 2018. Due to constraints posed by land acquisition, construction had been delayed. Only in the Jokowi era did development continue after the central government injected Rp 2.3 trillion from the state budget. The airport, with a targeted capacity of up to 5.6 million passengers per year is expected to trigger a new economic growth center in West Java that is not based in Bandung, Bekasi, Bogor or Cirebon (Gumiwang 2018).

This land acquisition process for the airport did not run smoothly and encountered numerous problems. The Intensive Agrarian Reform Consortium (KPA), which oversaw the project argued that the acquisition process was not transparent. The airport development planning document states that the land needed is 1,800 hectares, but the area of the acquired land was 5,000 hectares. The extra land was needed for the construction of supporting infrastructure such as toll roads, aero-city, hotels, restaurants, shopping centers, and the industrial area. This indicates that the true development of the BIJB is full of private interests. One problem with the project was the socialization related to this plan did not involve all affected residents: the government and project developers just liaised with the village chief. Moreover, the government did not give the option of cash compensation, land replacement, relocation, or equity participation of citizens as mandated by law. Unilaterally, compensation was given to affected residents (Interview with Dewi Kartika, April 1, 2019).

The company at the helm of the project development BIJB acquired land from 11 villages in Kertajati with 1,305 households. The first acquisition took place in 2009 in two villages, Kertajati and Kertasari, and the affected residents were not allowed to have a previous deliberation. The next acquisition took place in nine other villages and residents of one of them, Sukamulya village, with a total land area of 33 hectares, refused to sell their land because they were not willing to leave their fields and abandon their profession as farmers. The land in Sukamulya

was included in the plan to become a runway for BIJB. Bambang Nurdiansyah (Fahriza 2017) opines that the story of Sukamulya residents illustrates how the socialization process of the BIJB development plan did not involve all the affected residents as mandated in the president's law and regulations. He states:

“Residents were never consulted by the village head, suddenly we had to face the fact that they had declared to agree (surrendering) their land (to) be used as airport land. Even though the residents never knew about the agreements. These agreements are a public deception. Residents were never consulted, suddenly a ministerial decree was issued that Sukamulya had to be displaced for the development of BIJB” (Fahriza 2017).

According to the West Java Regional Secretary, Iwa Karniwa, all citizens of the land to be acquired were to be remunerated at a decent price. He further appealed for residents who received compensation to use their money for productive matters. Iwa further stated:

“Yes, we, as the government, pay a fair price. We understand what people need. This is precisely to improve the lives of the people in Majalengka and surrounding areas, including West Java and national level. So, that the society can release sincerely with a reasonable price. Now, people in Majalengka after receiving compensation money, they should be more productive. They can buy more land or find the cheaper one quickly. Other than that, they can also buy a new house and if there still any remaining use for capital in other business. The development of BIJB will continue, because the airport is bigger than Soetta Airport. It is also in the interest and progress in general, which will boost the economy in the Majalengka region, for the provincial and state in general” (Masnuradiansyah 2016).

Other Sukamulya citizens named Otong, explains that the compensation provided by government is very small. The government only

appreciates the acquired land with a value of Rp 50 thousands per meter or Rp 700 thousands per brick (14 meters) plus a house building worth Rp 67 million. Meanwhile to buy a replacement land in another place the price has reached Rp 1-4 million per brick. Many residents displaced by the BIJB development project were unable to rebuild their lives. Otong confirmed that residents were asked to sign a memorandum of understanding at a price unilaterally determined by the government and not given the opportunity to negotiate when the funds were disbursed. The government also promised to relocate residents, but the realization did not materialize (Renaldi 2017).

The West Java Provincial Government through the National Land Agency (BPN) responsible for making the land available, took measurements unilaterally on November 17, 2016, by deploying officers from the Indonesian National Army (TNI), the Republic of Indonesia Police (Polri), and the Civil Service Police Unit (Satpol PP). Several residents were beaten and arrested for blocking the measurement process (Kresna 2016). Then, it can be said that infrastructure development has acquired the productive agricultural land owned by Sukamulya residents. In this regard, the environmental impact assessment (Amdal) issued in 2006 called Sukamulya unproductive land due to its low production level of only about six quintals of rice per hectare. According to Bambang (Fahriza 2017), land in Sukamulya produces up to seven tons of dry rice. If this is indeed true, the development of infrastructure specifically the BIJB project, clearly contradicted the other Jokowi mission, namely, to achieve food sovereignty.

The authorities carried out the land acquisition execution because there were regulations that allowed it. Jokowi signed Presidential Regulation Number 148 of 2015 about the Implementation of Land Procurement for Development in the Public Interest, which accelerated the convoluted stage of land acquisition, in which 'residents' complaints on their land are handled within three working days. If the dispute has not been resolved within the time period, the determination of the location is deemed to be agreed upon by all parties. It can therefore be concluded that because the land owned by Sukamulya residents was

included in the BIJB development plan, there was no other choice for the residents but to surrender.

During the land acquisition on November 17, 2016, the government deployed 2,000 members of the Police Mobile Brigade (Brimob) armed with rifles. Residents protested the acquisition process, prompting Brimob to take repressive action and fire tear gas the protesters. In fact, according to Bambang’s story (Fahriza 2017), members of the police were treating citizens arbitrarily. The police burned *pos warga*, a public shelter that residents used for accommodating guests, and arrested citizens who rebelled. Concerned Sukamulya residents gathered in the village hall after this tense situation went on for three days.

Following this, the KSP invited citizen representatives to advocate in Jakarta on January 6, 2017, and as a result recommend the provincial government to form a conflict resolution team in Sukamulya, consisting of the involved residents. Unfortunately, however, the team was not formed until the acquisition was completed and the BIJB began operating. As mentioned in the previous section, in this case, the KSP did its job to ensure the infrastructure development stayed on track to further President Jokowi’s agenda.

The Sukamulya case is one of 100 agrarian conflicts that occurred during 2016 as a result of massive infrastructure development. The table below details the number of cases of agrarian conflicts and amount of land associated with infrastructure development.

Table 1
 Number of Cases and Land Infrastructure Development
 Due to Agrarian Conflicts, 2014-2018.

Year	Number of Cases	Land Size (Ha)
2014	215	74.405,16
2015	70	10.603
2016	100	35.824
2017	94	52.607,9
2018	16	4.859,32

Source: Processed from the KPA Annual Reports from 2014 to 2018.

The decrease in agrarian conflicts in the infrastructure was not caused by the completion of the conflict or the improved approach taken by the government toward affected citizens. The decrease was because most National Strategic Programs (PSN) have entered the construction phase. This means that for most projects, land acquisition is almost complete (Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria 2019).

Resistance from civil society groups and organizations to the development of the BIJB was formed through an alliance of the National Committee for Agrarian Reform (KNPA) which is included 25 organizations, including the KPA, KontraS, Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara, Walhi, and the Sajogyo Institute. This alliance was a form of antagonism against the government's hegemony in building the BIJB. The alliance filed a petition through *change.org* channel to demand that President Jokowi stop the acquisition of Sukamulya village land. The petition stated:

“This project (BIJB) is loaded with cronies of the authorities, the practice of manipulation and corruption in land acquisition. It is the people who bear all the suffering from the ways of implementing such a project. The status of 10 displaced villagers in Kertajati became unclear. They not only lost their homeland, but also could not afford to buy shelter and paddy fields that were as fertile as before. For the sake of launching and guarding the measurement process by force, the Governor (West Java) has deployed a combined apparatus of more than two thousand fully armed [police] personnel. The act caused terror for Sukamulya residents. What is the difference between the development of the New Order era and what you [Jokowi] are doing now? We request: Cancel the immediate construction of BIJB on Sukamulya Village land. Don't destroy Sukamulya Village from this republic map. We also ask to stop repressive actions, intimidation, and criminalization of residents of Sukamulya Village. We also ask to investigate thoroughly the indications of corruption in land acquisition and land acquisition in the previous villages which have obviously impoverished the people. We also request that Presi-

dent Jokowi ensure that land acquisition anywhere in the country must not be carried out in barbaric ways in the form of evictions accompanied by the deployment of officials” (Change.org 2017).

The KNPA Alliance demonstrates that civil society organizations can unite to form a chain of equivalence to deal with state hegemony in carrying out its infrastructure development. Ultimately, the Alliance’s goal was not achieved, BIJB development continues and the airport is currently operating. The Alliance succeeded, however, in antagonism and waging a discourse battle against the state in the face of its hegemony. Alliances such as the KNPA are needed to prevent state hegemony from becoming totalitarianism.

The Sukamulya case shows how the government acquired land for BIJB development by manipulative means, also referred to as land grabbing. In a land grab, villagers are not involved in the project’s socialization and deliberation, even though government rules ostensibly include them. The government was simply not concerned with how they handled the affected citizens in this case. It seems that Jokowi’s instruction for minimal negative impact and preserving the community’s social and cultural life is being ignored. In fact, the massive infrastructure development schemes of the Jokowi-JK administration that aimed to strengthen the state’s role in development have made room for greater investments in the agrarian field. The penetration of capital and markets eventually removes people from the land that is their source of livelihood. Even though the government legitimizes its policy choices in building massive infrastructure as an implementation of ideology, in practice a pragmatic approach must still occur. The discourse of infrastructure development legitimized by ideology but covers only pragmatic practices that occur. The practices are pragmatic because the government ignored the fate and rights of citizens affected by infrastructure development.

CONCLUSION

This article shows that the state legitimizes its policies as implementing ideology by advancing its infrastructure development discourse, but it covers pragmatic practices that occur. The magnitude of the constraints, however, forced the government to act, which then harmed the affected people owing to the infrastructure development. This article shows that ideological discourse is not always applied as a tool of legitimacy and becomes the true reason behind a policy, but it can also be an attempt to cover up the reality.

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